Category: European Union

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Aid reopening border crossings between Spain and France – P-001909/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is aware of the closure of road RN134 in France. The French authorities reported to the Commission that the Inter-Department Directorate for Atlantic Roads (DIRA) carried out a technical assessment on the ground, based on which it presented a proposal to repair the damage. Accordingly, the DIRA estimates that the works should be concluded in 2025[1].

    The EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF)[2] can only be activated at the request of an eligible state, which has a deadline of 12 weeks as from when the first damage occurred, demonstrating that the total direct damage exceeds the thresholds specified in Article 2 Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002.

    The EUSF may cover a part of the costs for emergency and recovery operations incurred by public authorities[3]. Private damage is not eligible. France has not requested EUSF assistance for this disaster yet.

    The Commission supports Member States in improving their transport networks through different instruments, including Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for transport and Cohesion Policy’s European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).

    CEF supports the development of an interconnected trans-European transport network. Interreg supports cross border cooperation to promote the development of joint strategies and projects in relevant sectors for border regions.

    The Spain-France-Andorra cooperation programme 2021-2027 invests EUR 18.7 million from the ERDF to promote climate change adaptation and disaster risk prevention, resilience taking into account eco-system based approaches.

    An additional EUR 12.4 million from the ERDF will be invested to increase the institutional capacity of regional authorities to deliver common services and to solve existing legal and administrative obstacles for better cooperation.

    • [1] Although the traffic could already be restored in January 2025.
    • [2] Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3) as amended by Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 143) and by Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 March 2020 (OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002R2012
    • [3] Eligible operations include the restoring of essential infrastructure, the provision of temporary accommodation to the population, cleaning-up operations and protection of cultural heritage.
    Last updated: 30 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Budgetary impact of new economic governance rules and the need for methodological transparency – E-002213/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    22.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002213/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    João Oliveira (The Left)

    The consequences of budgetary constraints caused by years of following EU rules are plain to see in Portugal, in the erosion of public investment, public services and the social functions of the state.

    A recent study shows that the application in Portugal and Finland of the new EU economic governance rules would lead to even deeper budget cuts than those introduced under the rules of the already burdensome Stability Pact. Hungary would also suffer more, if it were to adopt a seven-year plan.

    Even the IMF has acknowledged that ‘on average, fiscal consolidations do not reduce debt-to-GDP ratios’.

    What is more, the methodology used in the debt sustainability analysis is opaque.

    Given all that, it is essential that we find out how the effects of the new rules are being assessed and how the rules will be reflected in the state budget, particularly with regard to stipulations concerning public investment and the financing of the social functions of the state.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.What is the Commission’s assessment of the negative effects of the new fiscal rules on these countries, especially Portugal, and what has it said to the Portuguese Government about this matter?
    • 2.What steps will it take to make the debt sustainability analysis methodology transparent?

    Submitted: 22.10.2024

    Last updated: 30 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards the electronic value added tax exemption certificate – A10-0012/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards the electronic value added tax exemption certificate

    (COM(2024)0278 – C10‑0083/2024 – 2024/0152(CNS))

    (Special legislative procedure – consultation)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2024)0278),

     having regard to Article 113 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C10‑0083/2024),

     having regard to Rule 84 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0012/2024),

    1. Approves the Commission proposal;

    2. Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

    3. Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

    4. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    The proposal addresses the amendment of the Directive 2006/112/EC as regards the electronic value added tax exemption certificate. It aims to replace the paper version of the VAT and/or Excise Duty exemption certificate by the introduction of an electronic exemption certificate confirming that a transaction qualifies for a specific exemption under the first subparagraph of Article 151(1) of that Directive.

    The transactions covered by the first subparagraph of Article 151(1) are

    i. the supply of goods or services under diplomatic and consular arrangements;

    ii. the supply of goods or services to international bodies recognised as such by the public authorities of the host Member State, and to members of such bodies, within the limits and under the conditions laid down by the international conventions establishing the bodies or by headquarters agreements;

    iii. the supply of goods or services within a Member State which is a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, intended either for the armed forces of other States party to that Treaty for the use of those forces, or of the civilian staff accompanying them, or for supplying their messes or canteens when such forces take part in the common defence effort;

    iv. the supply of goods or services to another Member State, intended for the armed forces of any State which is a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, other than the Member State of destination itself, for the use of those forces, or of the civilian staff accompanying them, or for supplying their messes or canteens when such forces take part in the common defence effort;

    v. the supply of goods or services to the armed forces of the United Kingdom stationed in the island of Cyprus pursuant to the Treaty of Establishment concerning the Republic of Cyprus, dated 16 August 1960, which are for the use of those forces, or of the civilian staff accompanying them, or for supplying their messes or canteens.

    According to the Commission, the highly technical nature of this initiative and its alignment with efforts at EU level to promote digital government interactions justify no stakeholder consultation and no impact assessment. The proposed electronic conversion of the VAT exemption procedure supports the adaptation to the digital age and strengthens the rights of citizens with regard to the processing of their personal data.

    The proposal will remove the administrative burden and costs associated with processing the paper version of the VAT exemption certificate. The implementation costs will be covered by the FISCALIS programme within its foreseen financial envelope in the current Multiannual Financial Framework. The costs for Member States, mainly related to providing access to the central application, are estimated to be low.

    The new electronic certificate will not affect the scope of VAT exemptions applied. There will therefore be no impact on the EU budget as the own resources based on gross national income (GNI) will not be affected.

    The proposal strengthens anti-abuse measures by stipulating that if the exemption conditions outlined in paragraph 1 are not met or cease to apply, the eligible body or individual who issued and signed the certificate will be responsible for paying the VAT to the relevant Member State. In such exceptional cases, Member States are encouraged to allow the payment of VAT without requiring full VAT registration.

    The rapporteur acknowledges the highly technical nature of this initiative, its non-controversial content, and the need to enhance digital government interactions, and therefore fully supports the objectives of the directive.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards the electronic value added tax exemption certificate

    References

    COM(2024)0278 – C10-0083/2024 – 2024/0152(CNS)

    Date Parliament was consulted

    15.7.2024

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    ECON

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Aurore Lalucq

    12.9.2024

     

     

     

    Simplified procedure – date of decision

    14.10.2024

    Discussed in committee

    14.10.2024

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    14.10.2024

     

     

     

    Date tabled

    22.10.2024

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: The Marshall Star for October 30, 2024

    Source: NASA

    Editor’s Note: Starting Nov. 4, the Office of Communications at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center will no longer publish the Marshall Star on nasa.gov. The last public issue will be Oct. 30. To continue reading Marshall news, visit nasa.gov/marshall.

    Blake Stewart, lead of the Thrust Vector Control Test Laboratory inside Building 4205 at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center, explains how his team tests the mechanisms that steer engine and booster nozzles of NASA’s SLS (Space Launch System) rocket to a group of Marshall team members Oct. 24. The employees were some of the more than 500 team members who viewed progress toward future Artemis flights on bus tours offered by the SLS Program. Building 4205 is also home to the Propulsion Research and Development Laboratory that includes 26 world-class labs and support areas that help the agency’s ambitious goals for space exploration. The Software Integration Lab and the Software Integration Test Facility are among the labs inside supporting SLS that employees visited on the tour. (NASA/Sam Lott)

    A group of Marshall team members gather below the development test article for the universal stage adapter that will be used on the second variant of SLS, called Block 1B. The universal stage adapter is located inside one of the high bays in building 4619. The universal stage adapter will connect the Orion spacecraft to the SLS exploration upper stage. With the exploration upper stage, which will be powered by four RL10-C3 engines, SLS will be capable of lifting more than 105 metric tons (231,000 pounds) from Earth’s surface. This extra mass capability enables SLS to send multiple large payloads to the Moon on the same launch. (NASA/Sam Lott)

    Marshall team members view the Orion Stage Adapters for the Artemis II and Artemis III test flights inside Building 4708. The Orion Stage Adapter, built at Marshall, connects the rocket’s interim cryogenic propulsion stage to the Orion spacecraft. The Orion Stage Adapter for Artemis II is complete and ready to be shipped to Kennedy Space Center. The Oct. 24 tours featured four stops that also included opportunities to see the Artemis III launch vehicle stage adapter, and the development test article for the SLS Block 1B universal stage adapter that will begin flying on Artemis IV. Additionally, programs and offices such as the Human Landing Systems Development Office and the Science and Technology Office hosted exhibits in the lobby of Building 4220, where employees gathered for the tours. (NASA/Jonathan Deal)
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    By Serena Whitfield
    In conjunction with National Disability Employment Awareness Month, NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center held anagencywide virtual event hosted by the Office of Diversity and Equal Opportunity on Oct. 24.
    Marshall team members watched the Webex event in Building 4221.

    In alignment with the month’s national theme, “Access to Good Jobs for All,” the program highlighted the perspectives of people with disabilities in the workplace as they navigate the work lifecycle – from applying, to onboarding, career growth and advancement, and day-to-day engagements.
    The event began with Marshall Associate Director Roger Baird welcoming NASA team members.
    “NASA is dedicated to inclusive hiring practices and providing pathways for good jobs and career success for all employees, including workers with disabilities,” Baird said. “Some ways we do this is through targeted recruitment of qualified individuals with disabilities through accessible vacancy announcements, outreach to students with disabilities, and community partnerships.”
    NASA also utilizes Schedule A Authority, a non-competitive Direct Hiring Authority to hire people with disabilities without competition.
    Baird introduced event moderator Joyce Meier, logistics manager at Marshall, who welcomed panelists Casey Denham, Kathy Clark, Paul Spann, and Paul Sullivan, all NASA team members. The panelists from the disability community discussed their work lifecycles, lessons learned in the workplace, and shared a demonstration on colorblindness and its impact.
    Denham discussed some of the best practices for onboarding employees with neurodiversity, a term used to describe people whose brains develop or work differently than the typical brain.

    Clark talked about what can be done to continue raising awareness and advocating for disability rights. She said NASA empowers its workforce with knowledge so they can be informed allies to team members with disabilities and foster a safe and inclusive working environment. 
    Spann gave insight into practical steps employers can take to accommodate candidates with deafness, and Sullivan spoke about some key considerations NASA managers should keep in mind to make the job application process more accessible to candidates with low vision.
    Guest speaker Chip Dobbs, supply management specialist at Marshall, talked about his personal experiences with being deaf. Dobbs has worked at NASA for 29 years and said he has never let his disability hold him back, but instead uses it as a gateway to inspire and connect with others.
    The event ended with closing remarks from Tora Henry, director of the Office of Diversity and Equal Opportunity at Marshall. The virtual event placed importance on planning for NASA’s future by promoting equality and addressing the barriers people with disabilities face in the workplace. 
    “As we celebrate National Disability Employment Awareness Month, keep in mind that NASA’s mission of exploring the unknown and pushing the boundaries of human potential requires the contributions of every mind, skill set, and perspective,” Baird said. “Our commitment to inclusivity ensures that no talent goes untapped, and no idea goes unheard because together, we’re not just reaching for the stars, we’re showing the world what’s possible when everyone has a seat at the table.”
    A recording of the event is available here. Learn more about NASA’s agencywide resources for individuals with disabilities as well as the agency’s Disability Employment Program.
    Whitfield is an intern supporting the Marshall Office of Communications.
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    By Wayne Smith
    Farley Davis, manager of the Environmental Engineering and Occupational Health Office at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center, has received a 2024 Blue Marble Award from the agency.
    NASA’s Office of Strategic Infrastructure, Environmental Management Division presented the 2024 Blue Marble Awards on Oct. 8 at the agency’s Johnson Space Center. The Blue Marble Awards Program recognizes teams and individuals demonstrating exceptional environmental leadership in support of NASA’s missions and goals. In 2024, the awards included five categories: the Director’s Award, Environmental Quality, Excellence in Energy and Water Management, Excellence in Resilience or Climate Change Adaptation, and new this year: Excellence in Site Remediation. 

    Davis was recognized for “exceptional leadership and outstanding commitment above and beyond individual job responsibilities, to assist Marshall and the agency in enabling environmentally sound mission success.”
    “The award was unexpected, and I am very thankful to receive the Environmental Management Director’s Blue Marble Award,” said Davis, who has been at Marshall for 33 years. “Collectively, Marshall’s environmental engineering team has made this award possible with their diligent support for many years keeping the center’s environmental compliance at the forefront. I will cherish the award for the rest of my life.”
    June Malone, director of the Office of Center Operations at Marshall, credited Davis for his environmental leadership and mentoring team members.
    “Farley’s attitude of professionalism and personal responsibility for the development and implementation of well-grounded environmental programs has increased Marshall’s sustainability and prevented pollution,” Malone said. “His tireless leadership has resulted in compliance with federal, state, and local environmental laws and regulations, and his creative solution-oriented approaches to environmental stewardship have restored contaminated areas.”
    Charlotte Bertrand, director of the Environmental Management Division at NASA Headquarters, said it was an honor to select Davis for the 2024 Blue Marble Director’s Award.
    “Farley’s incredibly distinguished career with NASA reflects the award’s intention to recognize exceptional leadership by an individual in assisting the agency in enabling environmentally sound mission success,” Bertrand said.
    Please see the awards program for additional information.
    Smith, a Media Fusion employee and the Marshall Star editor, supports the Marshall Office of Communications.
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    By Wayne Smith
    When human exploration of Mars becomes a reality and more than just the stuff of science fiction, Brooke Rhodes will be eager to investigate what astronauts discover on the Red Planet.
    From listening to her talk about her work as an engineer at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center, it’s easy to grasp her excitement about the future of human space exploration and NASA’s Moon to Mars architecture.

    “I can’t wait for the Mars rovers to have some human company,” said Rhodes, who recently began a detail as the chief of Marshall’s Avionics and Software Ground Systems Test Branch. “I need to know if we can grow Mark Watney (of The Martian movie fame) quantities of potatoes up there. Everything we do to prepare to return humans to the Moon and establish a presence in deep space is building toward putting boots on Mars. It’s an honor and a privilege to be even a small part of it.”
    Rhodes also appreciates the responsibility she takes on in any form in NASA’s exploration missions to benefit humanity. After all, she has worked on hardware for the International Space Station and has had supporting roles for the Mars Ascent Vehicle and Artemis missions.
    “We at Marshall hold an incredible amount of responsibility: responsibility for the welfare of the crew on the space station, responsibility for the welfare of the crew on the Artemis missions, and even the welfare of humanity through the responsibility we have for science on the station and elsewhere,” said Rhodes, who is from Petal, Mississippi, and has worked at Marshall for seven years. “When your missions are as critical as ours, it’s nearly impossible to not be motivated.”
    Now, on to Mars.
    Question: What is your position and what are your primary responsibilities?
    Rhodes: I recently began the detail as the branch chief of the Avionics and Software Ground Systems Test Branch, ES53. Our branch is primarily responsible for the development of hardware-in-the-loop and software development facilities for the Artemis and MAV (Mars Ascent Vehicle) missions. My home organization is ES61, the Instrument Development, Integration and Test Branch, where I’ve been responsible for the integration and testing of International Space Station payloads for the past several years.

    Question: What has been the proudest moment of your career and why?
    Rhodes: One really cool moment that sticks out was the first time I saw hardware I had been responsible for being used in space. I spent several years as the integration and test lead of the Materials Science Research Rack (MSRR) Sample Cartridge Assemblies (SCAs) and we shipped our first batch of SCAs to the space station in 2018. That shipment was the culmination of years of intense effort and teamwork, so to see them onboard and about to enable materials science was an incredible feeling. There was a moment in particular that felt a bit surreal: prior to our SCA shipment the crew discovered they were missing a couple of fasteners from the onboard furnace, so we had those shipped to us from Europe and I packed them into the SCA flight foam before they shipped to the launch site. The next time I saw those fasteners they were being held up to a camera by one of the crew members, asking if those were the ones they needed for the furnace. Putting fasteners into foam didn’t take much effort, but what it represented was much bigger: being a small part of an international effort to enable science off the Earth, for the Earth, was an incredible moment I’ll carry with me for the rest of my career.
    Question: Who or what inspired you to pursue an education/career that led you to NASA and Marshall?
    Rhodes: I had a couple of lightbulb moments my junior year of high school that eventually set me on my current career path. I very specifically recall sitting in my physics I class and learning how to calculate the planetary motion of Jupiter and thinking I had never learned about anything cooler. Even then, though, NASA didn’t really enter my thoughts. Growing up, working for NASA didn’t even occur to me as something people could actually do – being a “rocket scientist” was just an abstract concept people threw around to indicate something was difficult.
    That changed later when the same teacher who had been teaching us planetary motion took us on a field trip to Kennedy Space Center. The tour guide showing us around the Vehicle Assembly Building was a young employee who said he had majored in aerospace engineering at the University of Tennessee. That was the second lightbulb moment: here was a young person from the Southeast, just like me, who had done something tangible in order to work for NASA. That seemed easy enough, so I decided to major in aerospace engineering at Mississippi State and one day work for NASA. That turned out to not be easy, but definitely doable.
    While at Mississippi State, I was able to complete three NASA internships, one at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and two at Marshall. Eventually, I was hired on full-time at NASA’s Johnson Space Center, but wound up making my way back to Marshall, where I’ve been ever since. There’s no place on the planet better for enthusiasts of both aerospace engineering and football.

    Interestingly, my physics I teacher’s name was Mrs. Rhodes, and I used to joke with my classmates that I wanted to be Mrs. Rhodes when I grew up. I didn’t actually mean that literally, but then I married Matthew Rhodes and did, indeed, become Mrs. Rhodes.
    Question: What advice do you have for employees early in their NASA career or those in new leadership roles?
    Rhodes: Scary is good. If you aren’t stepping out of your comfort zone you probably aren’t growing, and if you’re experiencing imposter syndrome, you’re probably the right person for the job.
    Question: What do you enjoy doing with your time while away from work?
    Rhodes: While away from work I tend to invest too much of my mental wellbeing into football. To recover from the stresses of work and my football teams being terrible, I like to explore National Parks. The U.S. has some of the most diverse scenery anywhere in the world, and I love getting outside and exploring it.
    Smith, a Media Fusion employee and the Marshall Star editor, supports the Marshall Office of Communications.
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    Most stars form in collections, called clusters or associations, that include very massive stars. These giant stars send out large amounts of high-energy radiation, which can disrupt relatively fragile disks of dust and gas that are in the process of coalescing to form new planets.
    A team of astronomers used NASA’s Chandra X-ray Observatory, in combination with ultraviolet, optical, and infrared data, to show where some of the most treacherous places in a star cluster may be, where planets’ chances to form are diminished.

    The target of the observations was Cygnus OB2, which is the nearest large cluster of stars to our Sun – at a distance of about 4,600 light-years. The cluster contains hundreds of massive stars as well as thousands of lower-mass stars. The team used long Chandra observations pointing at different regions of Cygnus OB2, and the resulting set of images were then stitched together into one large image.
    The deep Chandra observations mapped out the diffuse X-ray glow in between the stars, and they also provided an inventory of the young stars in the cluster. This inventory was combined with others using optical and infrared data to create the best census of young stars in the cluster.
    In a new composite image, the Chandra data (purple) shows the diffuse X-ray emission and young stars in Cygnus OB2, and infrared data from NASA’s now-retired Spitzer Space Telescope (red, green, blue, and cyan) reveals young stars and the cooler dust and gas throughout the region.
    In these crowded stellar environments, copious amounts of high-energy radiation produced by stars and planets are present. Together, X-rays and intense ultraviolet light can have a devastating impact on planetary disks and systems in the process of forming.
    Planet-forming disks around stars naturally fade away over time. Some of the disk falls onto the star and some is heated up by X-ray and ultraviolet radiation from the star and evaporates in a wind. The latter process, known as “photoevaporation,” usually takes between five and 10 million years with average-sized stars before the disk disappears. If massive stars, which produce the most X-ray and ultraviolet radiation, are nearby, this process can be accelerated.
    The researchers using this data found clear evidence that planet-forming disks around stars indeed disappear much faster when they are close to massive stars producing a lot of high-energy radiation. The disks also disappear more quickly in regions where the stars are more closely packed together.
    For regions of Cygnus OB2 with less high-energy radiation and lower numbers of stars, the fraction of young stars with disks is about 40%. For regions with more high-energy radiation and higher numbers of stars, the fraction is about 18%. The strongest effect – meaning the worst place to be for a would-be planetary system – is within about 1.6 light-years of the most massive stars in the cluster.
    A separate study by the same team examined the properties of the diffuse X-ray emission in the cluster. They found that the higher-energy diffuse emission comes from areas where winds of gas blowing away from massive stars have collided with each other. This causes the gas to become hotter and produce X-rays. The less energetic emission probably comes from gas in the cluster colliding with gas surrounding the cluster.
    Two separate papers describing the Chandra data of Cygnus OB2 are available. The paper about the planetary danger zones, led by Mario Giuseppe Guarcello (National Institute for Astrophysics in Palermo, Italy), appeared in the November 2023 issue of the Astrophysical Journal Supplement Series, and is available here. The paper about the diffuse emission, led by Juan Facundo Albacete-Colombo (University of Rio Negro in Argentina) was published in the same issue of Astrophysical Journal Supplement, and is available here.
    NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center manages the Chandra program. The Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory’s Chandra X-ray Center controls science operations from Cambridge, Massachusetts, and flight operations from Burlington, Massachusetts.
    NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) managed the Spitzer Space Telescope mission for the agency’s Science Mission Directorate until the mission was retired in January 2020. Science operations were conducted at the Spitzer Science Center at Caltech. Spacecraft operations were based at Lockheed Martin Space in Littleton, Colorado. Data are archived at the Infrared Science Archive operated by IPAC at Caltech. Caltech manages JPL for NASA.
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    NASA recently evaluated initial flight data and imagery from Pathfinder Technology Demonstrator-4 (PTD-4), confirming proper checkout of the spacecraft’s systems including its on-board electronics as well as the payload’s support systems such as the small onboard camera. Shown is a test image of Earth taken by the payload camera, shortly after PTD-4 reached orbit. This camera will continue photographing the technology demonstration during the mission. 

    Payload operations are now underway for the primary objective of the PTD-4 mission – the demonstration of a new power and communications technology for future spacecraft. The payload, a deployable solar array with an integrated antenna called the Lightweight Integrated Solar Array and anTenna, or LISA-T, has initiated deployment of its central boom structure. The boom supports four solar power and communication arrays, also called petals. Releasing the central boom pushes the still-stowed petals nearly three feet away from the spacecraft bus. The mission team currently is working through an initial challenge to get LISA-T’s central boom to fully extend before unfolding the petals and beginning its power generation and communication operations.
    Small spacecraft on deep space missions require more electrical power than what is currently offered by existing technology. The four-petal solar array of LISA-T is a thin-film solar array that offers lower mass, lower stowed volume, and three times more power per mass and volume allocation than current solar arrays. The in-orbit technology demonstration includes deployment, operation, and environmental survivability of the thin-film solar array.  
    “The LISA-T experiment is an opportunity for NASA and the small spacecraft community to advance the packaging, deployment, and operation of thin-film, fully flexible solar and antenna arrays in space. The thin-film arrays will vastly improve power generation and communication capabilities throughout many different mission applications,” said John Carr, deputy center chief technologist at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center. “These capabilities are critical for achieving higher value science alongside the exploration of deep space with small spacecraft.”

    [embedded content]
    NASA teams are testing a key technology demonstration known as LISA-T, short for the Lightweight Integrated Solar Array and anTenna. It’s a super compact, stowable, thin-film solar array that when fully deployed in space, offers both a power generation and communication capability for small spacecraft. LISA-T’s orbital flight test is part of the Pathfinder Technology Demonstrator series of missions. (NASA)

    The Pathfinder Technology Demonstration series of missions leverages a commercial platform which serves to test innovative technologies to increase the capability of small spacecraft. Deploying LISA-T’s thin solar array in the harsh environment of space presents inherent challenges such as deploying large highly flexible non-metallic structures with high area to mass ratios. Performing experiments such as LISA-T on a smaller, lower-cost spacecraft allows NASA the opportunity to take manageable risk with high probability of great return. The LISA-T experiment aims to enable future deep space missions with the ability to acquire and communicate data through improved power generation and communication capabilities on the same integrated array.
    The PTD-4 small spacecraft is hosting the in-orbit technology demonstration called LISA-T. The PTD-4 spacecraft deployed into low Earth orbit from SpaceX’s Transporter-11 rocket, which launched from Space Launch Complex 4E at Vandenberg Space Force Base in California on Aug. 16. Marshall designed and built the LISA-T technology as well as LISA-T’s supporting avionics system. NASA’s Small Spacecraft Technology program, based at NASA’s Ames Research Center and led by the agency’s Space Technology Mission Directorate, funds and manages the PTD-4 mission as well as the overall Pathfinder Technology Demonstration mission series. Terran Orbital Corporation of Irvine, California, developed and built the PTD-4 spacecraft bus, named Triumph.
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    By Paola Pinto
    For more than two decades, the NASA Short-term Prediction Research and Transition Center (SPoRT) within the NASA Earth Science Office at Marshall Space Flight Center has been at the forefront of developing and maintaining decision-making tools for meteorological predictions.

    Jonathan Brazzell, a service hydrologist at the National Weather Service (NWS) office in Lake Charles, Louisiana, highlighted a recent example of SPoRT’s impact while he was doing forecasting for Texas streams.
    Brazzell, who manages the South Texas and South Louisiana regions, emphasized the practical applications and significant impacts of the Machine Learning model developed by NASA SPoRT to predict future stream heights, known as the SPoRT Streamflow A.I. During a heavy rainfall event this past spring, he noted the challenge of forecasting flooding beyond 48 hours. SPoRT has worked closely with the NWS offices to develop a machine learning tool capable of predicting river flooding beyond two days and powered by the SPoRT Land Information System.
    “Previously, we relied on actual gauge information and risk assessments based on predicted precipitation,” Brazzell said. “Now, with this machine learning, we have a modeling tool that provides a much-needed predictive capability.”
    During forecasted periods of heavy precipitation from early to mid-May, Brazzell monitored potential flooding events and their magnitude using NASA SPoRT’s Streamflow-AI, which provided essential support to the Pine Island Bayou and Big Cow Creek communities in south Texas.
    Streamflow A.I. enabled local authorities to provide advance notice, allowing residents to prepare adequately for the event. Due to the benefit of three to seven-day flood stage predictions, the accurate forecasts helped county officials decide on road closures and evacuation advisories; community officials advised residents to gather a seven-day supply of necessities and relocate their vehicles, minimizing disruption and potential damage.
    Brazzell highlighted specific instances where the machine learning outputs were critical. For example, during the event that peaked around May 6, Streamflow A.I. accurately predicted the rise in stream height, allowing for timely road closures and advisories. These predictions were shared with county officials and were pivotal in their decision-making process.

    Brazzell shared that integrating SPoRT’s machine learning capabilities with their existing tools, such as flood risk mapping, proved invaluable. Although the machine learning outputs had been operational for almost two years after Hurricane Harvey, this season has provided their first significant applications in real-time scenarios due to persistent conditions of below-normal precipitation and ongoing drought.
    He also mentioned the broader applications of Streamflow A.I., including its potential use in other sites beyond those currently being monitored. He expressed interest in expanding the use of machine learning stream height outputs to additional locations, citing the successful application in current sites as a compelling reason for broader implementation.
    NASA SPoRT users’ experiences emphasize how crucial advanced prediction technologies are in hydrometeorology and emergency management operations. Based on Brazzell’s example, it is reasonable to say that the product’s ability to provide accurate, timely data greatly improves decision-making processes and ensures public safety. The partnership between NASA SPoRT and operational agencies like NOAA/NWS and county response teams demonstrates how research and operations can be seamlessly integrated into everyday practices, making a tangible difference in communities vulnerable to high-impact events.
    As the Streamflow A.I. product continues to evolve and expand its applications, it holds significant promise for improving disaster preparedness and response efforts across various regions that experience different types of flooding events.
    The Streamflow-AI product provides a 7-day river height or stage forecasts at select gauges across the south/eastern U.S. You can find the SPoRT training item on Streamflow-AI here.
    Pinto is a research associate at the University of Alabama in Huntsville, specializing in communications and user engagement for NASA SPoRT.
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    NASA has selected All Native Synergies Company of Winnebego, Nebraska, to provide custodial and refuse collection services at the agency’s Marshall Space Flight Center.

    The Custodial and Refuse Collection Services III contract is a firm-fixed-price contract with an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity provision. Its maximum potential value is approximately $33.5 million. The performance period began Oct. 23 and will extend four and a half years, with a one-year base period, four one-year options, and a six-month extension.
    This critical service contract provides custodial and refuse collection services for all Marshall facilities. Work under the contract includes floor maintenance, including elevators; trash removal; cleaning drinking fountains and restrooms; sweeping, mopping, and cleaning building entrances and stairways.
    › Back to Top

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Participants in the Netherlands Trainee Programme make study visit to The Hague

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Participants in the Netherlands Trainee Programme make study visit to The Hague

    The participants were accompanied on the study trip by Willie Chatsika, Head of the English-speaking Africa Regional Desk in the WTO’s Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation (ITTC).
    The NTP is a joint initiative of the WTO and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands aimed at improving participants’ capacity through “learning by doing”. Officials taking part in this year’s edition are from Africa, Asia and the Pacific region.
    The study trip was coordinated by the Clingendael Institute, an independent academic and research institute engaged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands under the framework of the NTP. The main objectives of the study trip were to enhance the participants’ trade policy-making skills, enable them to gain insight into how the needs of different national stakeholders are translated into trade policy, and to learn more about the nexus between international trade and development.
    During the study trip, participants were given first-hand exposure to the formulation of trade policy during various presentations by officials from the International Trade Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Clingendael Institute also organized sessions on negotiations and presentation skills, considered critical for trade negotiators.
    The study trip also included visits to selected institutions in The Hague which have an input in trade policy formulation. These were the Social and Economic Council (SER), the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW) and the Horti Centre which brings together multiple enterprises in the horticultural sector to form a collective bargaining position for their products. A guided tour of the Port of Rotterdam, a major gateway for international trade, was another aspect of the study visit.  
    The group also had a visit to the Peace Palace, which houses the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). The PCA provided a detailed presentation of its structure and functions and allowed the group to access the chamber of the ICJ.
    The NTP is a ten-month internship programme funded by the Government of the Netherlands and undertaken in the WTO Secretariat, with the aim of assisting in the economic and social development of least developed countries (LDCs), other low-income countries and comparable small and vulnerable economies in areas related to trade policy, with a particular focus on Africa.
    The 2024 NTP cohort comprises 14 government officials, whose diversity reflects the different targets of the programme — a focus on LDCs and Africa, geographical diversity and gender balance. Eight of the participants are from Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Lesotho, Namibia, Tunisia and Uganda), five are from Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Myanmar and Pakistan) and one from the Pacific (Solomon Islands). Eight of the NTPs are from LDCs, and six out of the 14 are women.
    The NTP was launched in 2005 and has been regularly renewed. The current phase was launched in 2023 and will continue until 2028.

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  • MIL-OSI Economics: WTO members review safeguard actions during latest committee meeting

    Source: WTO

    Headline: WTO members review safeguard actions during latest committee meeting

    Japan and Australia took the floor to stress that safeguards are emergency measures, and members taking safeguard actions must ensure that they comply with the relevant rules.
    Review of legislative notifications
    The legislative notifications from Cabo Verde and the Solomon Islands were tabled at the meeting. Both members notified that they did not currently have regulations or administrative procedures relating to safeguard measures. The Committee also continued the review of legislative notifications from Liberia and from Ghana.
    Specific notifications of safeguard actions
    Notifications of various safeguard actions from the following members were reviewed by the Committee: the European Union (1 investigation); Ghana (1 investigation); India (1 investigation); Indonesia (8 investigations); Madagascar (3 investigations); the Philippines (1 investigation); South Africa (1 investigation); Türkiye (4 investigations); Ukraine (1 investigation), the United Kingdom (1 investigation); and the United States (2 investigations).
    Six members took the floor in respect to the European Union’s update of the status of its safeguard measure on certain steel products. One member referred to its proposal to suspend substantially equivalent concessions against European Union imports in reaction to the European Union’s measure.
    Five members took the floor to comment on the latest status of the United Kingdom’s safeguard measure on certain steel products, with several members recalling that the UK applies this measure having “transitioned” it from the EU following its departure from the European Union.
    Japan expressed concerns about two specific safeguards: Viet Nam’s safeguard measure on “certain semi-finished and finished products of alloy and non-alloy steel” and Indonesia’s safeguard measure on “articles of apparel and clothing accessories”.
    Indonesia’s request regarding Türkiye’s proposed suspension of concessions against its exports
    On 11 July 2024, Indonesia submitted, pursuant to Article 13.1 (e) of the Safeguards Agreement, a request in relation to Türkiye’s proposal to suspend substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations against imports from Indonesia. Türkiye had proposed the suspension of concessions in response to Indonesia’s safeguard measure on carpets and other textile floor coverings.
    Article 13.1 (e) of the Safeguards Agreement stipulates, as one of the functions of the Committee, to “review … whether proposals to suspend concessions or other obligations are ‘substantially equivalent’, and report as appropriate to the Council for Trade in Goods”. The Chair explained how he intends to move forward on this matter. Several members took the floor to describe their views, including with respect to the relevant period to use for the purpose of determining the value of the substantially equivalent concessions.
    Discussion Group regarding safeguard proceedings
    A member, on behalf of 13 other members, explained that a meeting of an informal discussion group regarding safeguard proceedings would take place after the Committee meeting. While it was not part of the Committee meeting, the discussion was open to all members. The idea behind this discussion group was to provide a broader perspective than in formal Committee meetings where members review particular notifications, and to focus more on each other’s experiences and to learn from each other.
    Creation of online portal for submission of safeguard notifications
    Under “Other Business”, the Chair provided an update regarding the creation by the WTO Secretariat of an online portal for the submission of safeguard notifications. The Chair reported that a prototype was now ready for delegations to test.
    Next meeting
    The next meeting of the Committee on Safeguards is scheduled for the week of 28 April 2025.
    Background
    Under the WTO rules, a member may apply measures to imports of a product temporarily (take “safeguard” actions) through higher tariffs or other measures if it determines through an investigation that increased imports of a product are causing or threatening to cause serious injury to its domestic industry. Unlike anti-dumping duties, safeguard measures cover imports from all sources, although imports from developing country members with a small share of imports are exempted through special and differential treatment provisions.
    More background on safeguards is available here.

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  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Hurricane Unpreparedness in the Caribbean, Disaster by Imperial Design

    Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs –

    St. Lucia during and post Hurricane Beryl

    by Tamanisha J. John

    Toronto, Ontario

    Whenever a hurricane hits in the Caribbean, people rush to point out that it is an indicator of “disaster capitalism” and/or that “disaster capitalism” will surely come. While I agree that non-governmental organizations (NGO) and other organizations profit from disasters in the Caribbean region, and have a long history of doing so, I am less inclined to believe that “disaster capitalism” exists there unless one takes an ahistorical view. Disaster capitalism in the Caribbean can only exist in those states whose revolutions have been defeated and/or undermined, but overall, there has been no massive structural changes in these states. The region is already, and historically has been, ultra-accommodating to capitalism. Disaster capitalism refers to “the use of the shock of disastrous situations to dismantle state participation in the economy and to implant structural changes in the form of laissez-faire capitalism” (Schwartz, 2015, p. 311). To claim that disaster capitalism will come to the Caribbean region would thus indicate a marked period of state participation in the Caribbean that provided for the peoples living there.

    Instead, all states’ independence was marked by US interventions given the ideological and economic struggle of the Cold War and the neoliberal turn, which attacked state input and intervention in the market. Caribbean states’ independence was marked by debt and lack of access to capital. It occurred alongside financial institutions’ proliferation of structural adjustment policies whose implementation was necessitated for states in the region to acquire access to loaned capital (John, 2023). Though struggles for nationalizations did occur – in industries like mining, banking, insurance, and others – harsh retaliations from the US and Canada made them unsustainable (John, 2023, p. 134) – with no real reductions in foreign ownership “despite the changes in legal forms of ownership” (Thomas, 1984, p. 168-9). Thus, large foreign ownership of resource extractive industries and financial institutions remained a feature of Caribbean societies when they became independent – just as it also marked the colonial landscape in these spaces. The foreign players that controlled corporations, land, and industries in these countries did change somewhat, but this was also typical with imperial rivalries (Caribbean states themselves having been subject to multiple phases of European colonization throughout their histories).

    It was Walter Rodney, who in his 1972 text How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, put forward a critique of the thesis that capitalism had to develop prior to ushering in socialism – which was Marx’s estimation – given that this thesis went against the trajectory of capitalist development in both the Caribbean and in Africa, where the capitalist logics of extraction with disregard for these societies left them in almost permanent states of underdevelopment, that only physical and ideological anti-imperialism could rectify. One of the consequences of this underdevelopment, I argue, is the lack of hurricane preparedness. The logic of “getting people back to work” and “security” in these colonized spaces have always trumped wellbeing for the people and environment – precisely because the people in them have always been categorized as disposable, while the natural resources have been reduced to instruments for the generation of profit. This ideology was true under European empires, and now true under US hegemony in the region – where foreign imposing actors continue to have more say on preparedness, wealth distribution, land ownership, security, economic development, and entrepreneurship (innovation).

    In a Region Prone to Hurricanes, Unpreparedness is an Ideological Policy Choice

    “Hurricanes are not random phenomena. Atmospheric conditions and physics limit their movement” (Schwartz, 2015, p. xvi). In the Caribbean, the Yucatán Peninsula, the Gulf of Mexico, and the South-Eastern United States, we have come to expect a lack of preparedness whenever hurricanes strike. Though Hurricane Beryl’s strength and early formation in June was unprecedented for the Caribbean’s hurricane season, what is precedent is the lack of regional preparedness for hurricanes in a region prone to have them – no matter when these hurricanes form. Forming around June 25th it was clear that Beryl would break the record for earliest formed Category 5 hurricane by the time that it made way into the Caribbean. This was due to the unusually warm temperatures registered in both the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea as early as March, various heatwave advisories and warnings were placed on the region acknowledging that the summer 2024 would be “hotter than usual” (Loop News 2024). When news of Beryl’s formation first spread, people expected the worst given unusually hot increases in temperatures (+4°c) for the region so early in the year.

    Making landfall as a Category 4 hurricane in one of the smaller islands of Grenada, Carriacou, on July 1st Beryl would destroy 95% of the infrastructure there before strengthening to a Category 5 hurricane. It would bring even worse devastation to a smaller island of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Mayreu, where reports proclaim that island to have nearly been “erased from the map” (AP News 2024). In its Caribbean path, Beryl brought devastation as a Category 5 and 4 storm to Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, Tobago and northern Venezuela, Barbados, and the southern portion of Jamaica. In its North American path, Beryl brought devastation as a Category 2 and 1 storm to Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula, before making landfall in Texas and Louisiana. Thereafter the storm was experienced elsewhere in the form of a tropical cyclone and massive downpours of rain. Beryl eventually tapered off in Canada on July 11th where it left heavy rain that caused massive flooding (due to Canada’s neglected flood systems). Beryl’s death toll currently stands at 33, with the storm causing 6 deaths “in Venezuela, 1 in Grenada, 2 in Carriacou, 6 in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 4 in Jamaica […] at least 11 in the Greater Houston area, 1 in Louisiana, and 2 in Vermont.” (TT Weather Center 2024)”

    Now that the storm has passed, people in impacted areas must contend with the loss of life, destruction of physical infrastructure – including homes and businesses, the lack of food and other basic products, as well as the lack of power and electricity. While contending with loss, victims of this severe weather will start to question the inability of their governments – rich or poor – to adequately address the post hurricane scenarios that they find themselves in repeatedly. This discontent with unpreparedness is now prevalent even before the hurricane season itself has ended.

    A Note on Cuba’s Hurricane Preparedness, The Importance of Ideology

    One of the most infuriating elements of hurricanes in this region is the “disaster” narratives that come after them, which falsely assert the “naturalness” of unpreparedness given the chaos of the disaster itself – when unpreparedness is, in fact, an ideological policy choice. Poorer states in this region are shackled by an unwillingness of the state to drastically deviate from “larger institutional constraints from which the logic of colonial administration derived its central purpose” and are inherited (Pérez Jr., 2001, p. 133-4).  On the other hand, richer states are shackled by their individualist ideologies which offer “vigorous critiques of government expenditure” which leave preparedness up to “market-driven, neoliberal economic policies,” that turn state and local responsibilities over “to charitable institutions, to churches, or to the victims themselves and their communities” (Schwartz, 2015, p. 300).

    When looking at states in the Western Hemisphere which frequently experience hurricanes, Cuba stands out as a state which tends to fare better in the post hurricane environment given that state’s policies of shared responsibility towards its people. This even as Cuba has been subjected to a draining embargo and sanctions which places a burden on economic growth there. Yet still, Washington maintains that Cuba’s successful hurricane response and disaster mitigation strategies amount to “the exchange of liberty for effectiveness” (Schwartz, 2015, p. 293-4). Though couched in this language of ‘liberty,’ mitigating the loss of life ensures one’s longtime enjoyment of liberty – as opposed to dying for ‘liberty’s’ sake during a hurricane (or other disasters like the COVID-19 pandemic). For example, Cuba’s hurricane preparedness in relation to the US stands out. Cuba’s disaster response compares a bit more favorably to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA “oversaw 15 times more deaths from hurricanes than Cuba from 2005 — the year that Katrina struck New Orleans — to 2015” (Wolfe, 2021).

    This is because Cuba’s disaster preparedness is proactive, prioritizing human life and well-being given the ideological foundations of its revolution that transformed political, social, economic, and environmental relations in the country. US disaster preparedness on the other hand prioritizes profit at the expense of people – it is reactionary and reactive, often blaming victims of hurricane disasters for the lack of state preparedness.

    The Caribbean Hurricane as Natural Phenomena, the Disaster as Colonial Inheritance

    Hurricanes are not experienced equally amongst states in the Western Hemisphere. People living on Caribbean islands tend to experience the worst effects of hurricanes when they do strike, and it is also people on these same islands which tend to have less resources to recover from the impacts of a hurricane. Though Cuba’s hurricane preparedness is commendable, infrastructure and livelihoods there are still devastated by hurricanes. Many of the Caribbean islands are geographically located “in the Atlantic Hurricane Alley, [and] the region is sensitive to large-scale fluctuation of ocean patterns that are disrupted by warming seas” (Zodgekar, et. al 2023, p. 321). Additionally, populations and infrastructure on these islands tend to be concentrated on the coast – a colonial holdover – given that European “settlements were established directly in the path of oncoming hurricanes (Pérez Jr., 2001, p. 8). Initially due to lack of knowledge, this trend remained unchanged amongst Europeans given the need to export what was being extracted from these islands using the ports developed on the coasts.

    Historically, environmental disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, and droughts) throughout the 1600s-1900s would consolidate land amongst the wealthiest European settlers on different islands and would foil settler attempts to diversify agriculture on islands. This was because wealthy settlers could more easily recover and rebuild what was lost in the aftermath of a hurricane, due to their ability to access credit from Europe and resort to using their own fortunes (wealth and networks). On the other hand, smaller settlers unable to rebuild and recover from hurricane losses had a harder time accessing credit – and creditors within Europe viewed loaning to smaller settlers as a financial burden. If these smaller settlers were already in debt, the passing of a hurricane meant that they would either have to work off debt by giving all that they had to a creditor in Europe, or one on the island, by entering into a credit arrangement with a wealthier plantation owner (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 86-8). These losses were quite frequent, as it is known that these phenomena made it so that some European creditors in Europe would amass plantation wealth, even if they themselves had never visited a Caribbean island or formally engaged in plantation life (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 87-8).

    These dynamics, in part, explain the predominance of the cultivation of sugar (and rice in what would become the South-Eastern United States) within the region, and even then, “plantership […] necessitated deep pockets (or strong credit) to survive its constant and rapid fluctuations” (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 66). “Without access to credit, smaller farmers were forced to sell their lands to wealthier and more secure planters, who thereby expanded their landholdings and production capabilities” (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 86). This consolidation of larger and wealthier plantations also made other concerns arise, namely the depopulation of settlers from the islands, as debtors opted to leave in the aftermath of storms, and later the transfers of estates to owners outside of the colonies (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 86-7). In essence, settlers’ decision to flee in the wake of, or after, a hurricane shaped population dynamics and demographics in colonies. They also shaped the lack of hurricane preparedness in colonies. Wealthier planters on the islands, and Europeans in Europe, who could suffer from hurricane losses (hurricanes themselves not being guaranteed every season), rebuild afterwards, and recover previous losses given the profit from plantation trade goods – had less incentives to plan ahead if they were not as risk of losing everything they had amassed in their life after a hurricane.

    In smaller island states’, where plantation systems were heavily disrupted or stunted in growth due to geography of the land (especially in the Lesser Antilles), even fewer attempts were made to develop any infrastructure which could protect against storms (Mulcahy, 2006). To be clear, this does not mean that these landscapes were spared from destruction which made the impacts of hurricanes worse: deforestation, overgrazing, and over-cultivation of Caribbean islands during centuries of European colonialism that included dispossession of indigenous groups and the enslavement of Africans, also impacted how hurricanes came to be experienced. While planter consolidation, rebuilding, and profits have so far been underscored here – the elephant in the room is that all of this occurred alongside the massive death toll of enslaved Africans who suffered the most both during and after the passage of a hurricane. Outside of the high death tolls for enslaved Africans on the islands, once a hurricane passed, the ultimate goal in the colonies became the reestablishment of ‘law-and-order’ given fears of slave revolt in the wake of destruction (Mulcahy, 2006; Schwartz, 2015). Although slave-revolts post hurricane remained a consistent fear of settlers, slave revolts did not occur after a hurricane due to its disproportionate toll on enslaved populations who were “often the most debilitated by the shortage of food and the diseases that followed the hurricane” (Schwartz, 2015, p. 49).

    Caribbean Indigenous Peoples Blamed European Imperial Settlement for Increased Hurricane Devastation

    From historical accounts, we know that the Spaniards were the first Europeans to experience a hurricane within the Western Hemisphere during Columbus’s second voyage in 1494/5 (Pérez Jr., 2001; Mulcahy, 2006; Schwartz, 2015). The hurricane experience was unlike anything that Europeans had observed in Europe, and it was from this experience that they sought out intel from the indigenous peoples in the Caribbean. For Caribbean indigenous peoples, “the great storms were part of the annual cycle of life. They respected their power and often deified it, but they also sought practical ways to adjust their lives to the storms. Examples were many: The Calusas of southwest Florida planted rows of trees to serve as windbreaks to protect their villages from hurricanes. On the islands of the Greater Antilles—Cuba, Jamaica, Hispaniola, and Puerto Rico—the Taino people preferred root crops like yucca, malanga, and yautia because of their resistance to windstorm damage. The Maya of Yucatan generally avoided building their cities on the coast because they understood that such locations were vulnerable to the winds and to ocean surges that accompanied the storms” (Schwartz, 2015, p. 5). Further, Indigenous representations of hurricanes were overall accurate and are similar to modern meteorological mapping of these storms. Europeans also learned from Caribbean Indigenous groups that you could “track” when a hurricane would strike. These developments meant that Indigenous Caribbean knowledge of the hurricane was not only limited to the occurrence of storm, but also meant that Indigenous Caribbean societies factored in preparedness for hurricanes within their worldviews.

    Given Caribbean Indigenous knowledge of hurricanes, it is these same people who also recognized that the changes to the landscape by European colonialism contributed to the increased devastation caused by hurricanes between the 1600s-1900s. As such, English colonists who would also come to experience the hurricanes report that “several elderly Caribs stated that hurricanes had become more frequent in recent years, which they viewed as a punishment for their interactions with Europeans” and the main “alteration that our people attribute the more frequent happenings of Hurricanes” (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 35). What these settler accounts reveal about Indigenous Caribbean peoples is what Schwartz notes in his 2015 book, Sea of Storms: A History of Hurricanes in the Greater Caribbean from Columbus to Katrina, that although “hurricanes were a natural phenomenon; what made them disasters was the patterns of settlement, economic activity, and other human action” (p. 74). Nonetheless, colonial ecological and environmental destruction in the Caribbean – which increased the felt impact of hurricanes – remained worthwhile for Europeans given the high profits to be made from export crops, which kept people there to rebuild after hurricanes. Mulcahy in his 2006 book, Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater Caribbean, 1624 – 1783, writes “European settlers and colonists were engaged in a never-ending struggle against nature in their quest for wealth” (p. 93)

    Additionally, the European empire’s responses to hurricanes also influenced decisions to stay. Because colonial societies in the Caribbean were stratified along racial and other social hierarchies – hurricanes presented opportunities for large scale consolidation of plantation property on islands which privileged wealthy plantation owners. Additionally, smaller merchants and plantations which could not recover post hurricane were sometimes forced to transfer ownership to merchants in Europe – who never had to visit these properties while amassing wealth from them thereafter (Mulcahy 2006, p. 88). Disaster relief to the colonies thus came to be historically designed as a way for further economic integration, and “assistance to the colonies in times of disaster would bring wealth and affluence to the empire” (Mulcahy 2006, p. 162). Disaster assistance – while increasing inequalities between all peoples in the colonies – did overall benefit imperial capitalism and patriotism within the empire, amongst loyal subjects, especially amongst elite classes, who received the majority of aid based on their losses.

    Banking on Hurricanes and Absolving Empire of Responsibility: Debates in Europe

    While debates in Europe raged regarding enriching the already wealthy within the colonies with disaster relief – these debates did not change the post-hurricane reality of which those most needing of aid (Indigenous groups, enslaved Africans, indentured workers, small merchants, and small planters) were the least likely to receive it, which was true across all of the different European colonies (Pérez Jr., 2001; Mulcahy, 2006; Schwartz, 2015). “Vulnerability to the hurricane itself was a function of the material determinants” around which colonial social hierarchies were arranged (Pérez Jr., 2001, p. 111). In Europe, debates focused primarily on creditors, so it was argued that the wealthy were more primed to repay creditors when/if they received disaster relief after a hurricane. On the other hand, the proliferation of print news meant that individuals and organizations (e.g., the Church) could send aid to the colonies after disaster struck. Previously, when disaster struck it would take months for news to reach those in Europe, even as the disruptions in trade were more readily felt. Moreover, it was hard for the public in Europe to understand the scale of destruction caused by hurricanes in the Americas, given that this kind of natural disaster did not occur in Europe.

    With the establishment of print media, the destruction caused by hurricanes and the damages that they did to plantation systems – which would require a lot of assistance to recover – was made much more readily available to people who could empathize and assist in recovery efforts. Within the British empire, some newspapers even published who would send what amount and type of post disaster relief to the colonies, which undoubtedly contributed to the charitable giving of some wealthy individuals (Mulcahy 2006; Schwartz 2015). Given that the voyage from Europe to the various colonies was long, there was illegal trading between different colonies to provide relief to one another faster – including with the United States, even after the American Revolution.

    It is this colonial history which still shapes the lack of hurricane preparedness in a region prone to have them. Thus, most scholars on hurricanes in the region continue to highlight the colonial and slave legacies which have shaped regional unpreparedness to hurricanes. Though the United States is a wealthier country today with the capabilities to develop hurricane preparedness – even if only within its own borders – it is elite US security interests and ideological leanings which have prevented it from doing so. Additionally, historians like Schwartz (2015) make a compelling argument that “the United States, by its military and political expansion into the Caribbean after 1898, its foreign policy objectives in the Cold War, and through its advocacy of certain forms of capitalism joined with its ability to impose its preferences on international institutions, has also influenced the way in which the whole region has faced hurricanes and other disasters” (Schwartz, 2015, p. xviii-xix). This implies that the United States – like the European empire’s past – also has a stake, or interest, in regional hurricane unpreparedness for both political, economic, and security objectives.

    US Imperial Extensions in the Caribbean, Impact on Hurricane Preparedness

    From this overview of the history of hurricanes in the Caribbean, the Yucatán Peninsula, the Gulf of Mexico, and the South-Eastern United States a few things become clear: hurricane preparedness has never been a concern for colonial capitalist development. Hurricane disasters came to be recognized as extremely ruinous to those occupying the lowest rungs of colonial societies, aid was given to the wealthy people who were understood as being able to put aid to better usage, and disaster situations consolidated preferred modes of accumulation in otherwise “chaotic” and uncivilized landscapes. Thus, outside of patriotic tales and misremembering of the storm events, historically “hopes of communal solidarity” in the wake and aftermath of hurricanes “were either naïve or disingenuous [… with] social divisions ha[ving] always shaped the responses to hurricanes (Schwartz, 2015, p. 68-9). Given strict colonial hierarchies, the maintenance of order – to dissuade slave revolts and looting – were always preeminent concerns of empires and those with wealth and power. This is important to plainly state, given that little has changed in today’s experience with hurricanes in the region.

    Today’s granting of conditioned relief and temporary debt removals still serve to subordinate Caribbean states to the Western capitalist system and the US security apparatus. Those areas hardest hit by storms and less likely to receive aid, continue to be occupied by the poor populations that are largely non-white/Euro peoples. Settlements on islands continue to be concentrated on coasts, where the tourist industry quickly rebuilds its infrastructure post-hurricane and are the first to receive aid. This at once dispels the myths that recovery is impossible, as it happens in the large coastal areas owned and controlled by foreign hotel chains and entities which quickly beckon tourists back to their “lovely beaches” less than a day after a hurricane. Preparedness for hurricanes in the Caribbean islands are “subordinated to political, military, or what today would be called ‘security’ concerns” (Schwartz, 2015, p. 276). I would include economic and ideological concerns as well. These latter concerns are maintained by the wealthiest states in the hemisphere – the United States and Canada.

    Hurricane Flora in the 1960s claimed the lives of over 5,000 Haitians under the Duvalier dictatorship – which failed to even warn Haitians about the arrival of the hurricane so that disorder against Duvalier would not take over the country. The lack of preparedness was accepted by both the United States and Canadian governments given their fear of communism in the Caribbean region. Thus “unlike Haiti’s U.S.-backed right-wing president, François Duvalier, Castro’s Communist government ordered residents living in the hurricane’s projected path to evacuate their homes, and if they were unable, to stay and prepare appropriately for the storm.” This preparation and the establishment of Cuba’s defense system in 1966 accounted for significantly less deaths (1,157) in Cuba (Wolfe, 2021). Today, unpreparedness remains a feature in most Caribbean countries that put corporate interests and the interests of the US (and its allies) security objectives above the prioritization of human life and livelihoods in the Caribbean.

    As further illustration of this point, even though the 2004 Hurricane Jeanne hit Cuba a lot harder than Haiti – killing 3,000 Haitians – no Cuban lives were lost due to the hurricane (Wolfe, 2021). The historical and present-day case of Haiti is both informative and a cause for worry as we expect future hurricane seasons to be quite bad. Not only is Haiti a fully privatized economy (Wilentz, 2008); but it is also one that has been under the tutelage of the CORE group – a group composed primarily of foreign ambassadors from the US, France, Canada, Spain, Brazil, Germany, and a few representatives from the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the Organization of American States (OAS) – for over two decades. The CORE group’s tutelage of Haiti has been exceptionally negative, as these states and their ambassadors secure their own corporate and labor interests in the country at the expense of that state’s democracy and national sovereignty (Edmonds, 2024). Thus, disaster preparedness in Haiti has never been an agenda item – and has only gotten worse as those governing the country continue to benefit from political, economic, and environmental disasters there. Present day armed intervention and occupation in Haiti, further makes it unlikely that Haiti will be able to weather the next hurricane season.

    Hurricane Unpreparedness, A Note on Canada

    It is important to remind here that although much is said about US imperialism and security concerns trumping human rights and pro-people development in the region – Canada is not exempt from this critique. For instance, although Canada touts that its military base (OSH-LAC) in the Caribbean is a “support hub” – that also seeks to assist states experiencing disasters, of which hurricanes are included – in 2017 when Category 5 Hurricane’s Irma and Maria wreaked havoc on Dominica, OSH-LAC warships monitored the situation but provided no on the ground help to Caribbean peoples there (John, 2024, p. 12-3). The Canadian government also enacted restrictive migration policies towards those fleeing from the hurricane and its damages. This practice would be repeated by Canada again in 2019 during the aftermath of Hurricane Dorian in The Bahamas (John, 2024, p. 12-3). Given that I am currently living in Canada, it is important to point out that Canada is a state that frequently touts progressive rhetoric on climate change, resiliency, and disaster preparedness in the Caribbean region. However, Canada’s actions continue to render the Caribbean region unprepared alongside the actions of the US.

    In the 2023 Canada-CARICOM summit hosted by Canada, Caribbean prime ministers sought to place climate issues and climate infrastructure at the top of the agenda – however, Canada was mainly concerned with getting support for an armed intervention in Haiti (Thurton, 2023). Haiti remains the most unprepared country in the Caribbean when disasters hit, which made Canada’s insistence on armed intervention and occupation even more tone deaf. Haiti’s unpreparedness is directly tied to US, Canada, France, and CORE group members tutelage and rejection of Haitian democracy ever since that country’s integration into the Western capitalist system via US occupation. These examples illuminate the fact that the wealthier states in the Western Hemisphere, namely the US and Canada, actively disregard the lives of those impacted by hurricanes and other natural disasters to their south – while first and foremost safeguarding their own economic, ideological, and security priorities. In my analysis of ‘south,’ the Caribbean, the Yucatán Peninsula, the Gulf of Mexico, and the South-Eastern United States are included.

    Conclusion

    Ideologically, the promotion of capitalism, colonialism, and imperialism in the Caribbean (of which the South-Eastern United States, the Gulf of Mexico and Yucatán Peninsula is included) continues to pose an obstacle to disaster preparedness in a region prone to hurricanes.  More importantly, the promotion of these harmful ideologies often comes at the expense of human life. Nothing makes this clearer than the fact that it is the revolutionary state – which is also the most heavily economically sanctioned state in the region – Cuba, that continues to be the most prepared state in times of disaster. This stands in stark contrast to other Caribbean states and to wealthier states, like the US, which mandate regional unpreparedness. Today, while we await (but hope that it is not so) a bad hurricane season, the Caribbean region is more militarized than it has been since the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century. Militarization is directly due to US security objectives that aim to keep China’s investments (thus competition) out of the region. This policy is backed by Canada, which seeks to advance its own corporate interests in the region.

    The US and Canada continue to militarize the Caribbean region, exacerbating climate change and neglecting the urgency of developing resiliency infrastructure. In fact, militarization in the Caribbean region today (and in Africa and Asia) occurs alongside the tightening of both the US and Canadian borders given hostile narratives towards immigrants and immigration within them. This even with the region’s long history (as has been pointed out) of people fleeing the region both during and after a hurricane. All of which indicates that while these states are undoubtedly deepening the climate crisis with their global “security” endeavors, they view the people harmed and negatively impacted by their actions as disposable.

    Postscript

    Three months after the writing of this document, 5 hurricanes – Debby, Ernesto, Francine, Helene, and Milton – have impacted peoples and infrastructure in the south. The 2024 Atlantic Hurricane season thus far (October 11th, 2024) has taken almost 400 lives – with the actual figure being uncertain, given that the damage from Milton is still being assessed. Each storm is estimated to have cost between $80 – $250 billion (USD) in damages across the region. While governments talk about costs and recovery efforts to get economies “back on track” and provide people with temporary and conditional aid – which is the post disaster norm – we are presented with an uncomfortable, yet undeniable fact: states in the region, whether by colonial inheritance or commitment to capitalism, are banking on unpreparedness continuing well into the future. We must be proactive in defeating this dangerous ideology that places people’s lives, livelihoods and the physical environment at stake; while perpetuating, in its aftermath, conditions that make it so.

    References

    Clark, John I, and Léon Tabah, eds. 1995. Population and Environment Population – Environment – Development Interactions. Paris, France: Comité International de Coopération dans les Recherches Nationales en Démographie (CICRED). http://www.cicred.org/Eng/Publications/pdf/c-a1.pdf.

    Direct Relief. 2024. “Direct Relief Responds as Hurricane Beryl Impacts the Caribbean. The Region, Watchful and Ready, Will Weather the Storm Today.” Direct Relief. https://www.directrelief.org/2024/07/direct-relief-responds-as-hurricane-beryl-impacts-the-caribbean-the-region-watchful-and-ready-will-weather-the-storm-today/.

    Edmonds, Kevin. 2024. “CARICOM, Regional Arm of the Core Group, Sells Out Haiti Again.” Black Agenda Report. https://www.blackagendareport.com/caricom-regional-arm-core-group-sells-out-haiti-again.

    Forecast Centre. 2024. “Atlantic Canada Next in Line for a Soaking, Flood Risk from Beryl Remnants.” The Weather Network.https://www.theweathernetwork.com/en/news/weather/forecasts/atlantic-canada-next-in-line-for-a-soaking-flood-risk-from-beryl-remnants.

    IFRC. 2024. “Humanitarian Needs Ramp up in the Aftermath of ‘unprecedented’ Hurricane Beryl, Signaling New Reality for Caribbean.” The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). https://www.ifrc.org/press-release/humanitarian-needs-ramp-aftermath-unprecedented-hurricane-beryl-signaling-new-reality.

    Jobson, Ryan C. 2024. “Hurricane Beryl at the Gates: The Grenadines and Caribbean Autonomy.” Medium. https://medium.com/clash-voices-for-a-caribbean-federation-from-below/hurricane-beryl-at-the-gates-the-grenadines-and-caribbean-autonomy-86834fb43bcd.

    John, Tamanisha J. 2023. “Canadian Imperialism in Caribbean Structural Adjustment, 1980-2000.” In Class Power and Capitalism, Brill Publishers, 136–79.

    John, Tamanisha J. 2024. “Capitalism, Global Militarism, and Canada’s Investment in the Caribbean.” Class, Race and Corporate Power 12(1): 25.

    Loop News. 2024. “Caribbean 2024 Heat Season Could Climb to Near-Record Heat.” Caribbean Loop News. https://caribbean.loopnews.com/content/caribbean-2024-heat-season-could-climb-near-record-heat.

    McGrath, Gareth. 2024. “Hurricane Beryl Was the Earliest Category 5 Storm. What Could That Mean for NC?” Star News Online. https://www.starnewsonline.com/story/news/local/2024/07/11/what-hurricane-beryl-the-earliest-category-5-storm-could-mean-for-nc/74288495007/.

    Mulcahy, Matthew. 2006. Hurricanes and Society in the British Greater Caribbean, 1624 – 1783. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

    NACLA. 2024. “This Week: Hurricane Beryl Slams the Caribbean, a Victory for Midwives in Mexico, Venezuelan Elections, and More.” https://nacla.salsalabs.org/july_12_24?wvpId=37c1b636-52b7-44b5-af75-9a38617519d5.

    NASA. 2024. “Carriacou After Beryl.” NASA Earth Observatory. https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/153039/carriacou-after-beryl.

    Pérez Jr., Louis A. 2001. Winds of Change: Hurricanes & The Transformation of Nineteenth-Century Cuba. Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press.

    Rodney, Walter. 2018. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Verso Books.

    Schwartz, Stuart B. 2015. Sea of Storms: A History of Hurricanes in the Greater Caribbean from Columbus to Katrina. Princeton University Press.

    Thomas, Clive Y. 1984. Plantations, Peasants and State: A Study of the Mode of Sugar Production in Guyana. Los Angeles: UCLA Center for Afro-American Studies.

    Thurton, David. 2023. “Caribbean Looks to Trudeau to Put Quest for Climate Change Funding on the World’s Agenda.” CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/caricom-trudeau-caribbean-1.6999106.

    TT Weather Center. 2024. “Hurricane Beryl Death Toll Now At 33.” Trinidad and Tobago Weather Center. https://ttweathercenter.com/2024/07/11/hurricane-beryl-death-toll-now-at-33/.

    VOA News. 2024. “Remnants of Beryl Flood Northeast US.” VOA News. https://www.voanews.com/a/remnants-of-beryl-flood-northeast-us/7694063.html#.

    Wagner, Bryce, and Cristiana Mesquita. 2024. “In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Beryl Nearly Erased the Smallest Inhabited Island from the Map.” AP News. https://apnews.com/article/hurricane-beryl-mayreau-island-caribbean-bb64fc9b61da76685704b8f42f97736c?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=fffcba4b-3154-47e9-b4ce-e0349f4225db.

    Wilentz, Amy. 2008. “Hurricanes and Haiti.” Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/la-oe-wilentz13-2008sep13-story.html.

    Wolfe, Mikael. 2021. “When It Comes to Hurricanes, the U.S. Can Learn a Lot from Cuba: Cuba Devised a System That Minimizes Death and Destruction from Hurricanes.” The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/09/01/when-it-comes-hurricanes-us-can-learn-lot-cuba/.

    Zodgekar, Ketaki, Avery Raines, Fayola Jacobs, and Patrick Bigger. 2023. A Dangerous Debt-Climate Nexus. NACLA Report on the Americas. https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2023.2247773.

    Photo Credit: InOldNews, by Delia Louis
    Description: Depicts St. Lucia during and post Hurricane Beryl
    License info: Creative Commons taken from Flickr.

    About the author: Tamanisha J. John is an Assistant Professor at York University in the Department of Politics

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  • MIL-Evening Report: How do children learn good manners?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Sophia Waters, Senior Lecturer in Writing, University of New England

    Pexels/Anna Shvets

    Ensuring kids have manners is a perennial preoccupation for parents and caregivers.

    How, then, do you teach good manners to children?

    Modelling good manners around the home and in your own interaction with others is obviously crucial.

    But there’s a clear uniting theme when it comes to manners in Australia: in Australian English, good manners centre on honouring personal autonomy, egalitarianism and not appearing to tell people what to do.

    Which manners matter most in Australia?

    Some of the most important manners in Australian English are behavioural edicts that focus on particular speech acts: greeting, requesting, thanking and apologising.

    These speech acts have a set of words associated with them:

    • hello
    • hi
    • may I please…?
    • could I please…?
    • thank you
    • ta
    • sorry
    • excuse me.

    Good manners make people feel comfortable in social situations by adding predictability and reassurance.

    They can act as signposts in interactions. Anglo cultures place a lot of weight on egalitarianism, personal autonomy and ensuring we don’t tell people what to do.

    If you want to get someone to do something for you – pass you a pen, for example – you frame the request as a question to signal that you’re not telling them what to do.

    You’ll also add one of the main characters in Anglo politeness: the magic word, “please”.

    This framing recognises you don’t expect or demand compliance. You’re acknowledging the other person as an autonomous individual who can do what they want.

    If the person does the thing you’ve asked, the next step is to say “thank you” to recognise the other person’s autonomy. You’re acknowledging they didn’t have to help just because you asked.

    ‘Say ta!’
    DGLimages/Shutterstock

    The heavy hitters

    The words “please” and “thank you” are such heavy hitters in Australian English good manners, they’re two of the words that language learners and migrants learn first.

    They can help soften the impact of your words. Think, for example, of the difference between “no” and “no, thank you”.

    Of course, there are times when “no” is a full sentence. But what if someone offered you a cup of tea and you replied “no” without its concomitant “thank you” to soften your rejection and acknowledge this offer didn’t have to be made? Don’t be surprised if they think you sound a bit rude.

    The other big players in Australian English good manners are “sorry” and “excuse me”. Much like in British English, the Australian “sorry” means many things.

    These can preface an intrusion on someone’s personal space, like before squeezing past someone in the cinema, or on someone’s speaking turn.

    Interrupting or talking over someone else is often heavily frowned on in Australian English because it is often interpreted as disregarding what the other person has to say.

    But in some cultures, such as French, this conversational style is actively encouraged. And some languages and cultures have different conventions around what good manners look like around strangers versus with family.

    Good manners involve saying certain words in predictable contexts.

    But knowing what these are and when to use them demonstrates a deeper cultural awareness of what behaviours are valued.

    Talking over someone else is often heavily frowned on in Australian English.
    MDV Edwards/Shutterstock

    How do children learn manners?

    As part of my research, I’ve analysed parenting forum posts about “good manners”. Some believe good manners should be effortless; one parent said:

    Good manners shouldn’t be something that a child has to think about […] teach them correctly at home from day one, manners become an integral part of the way they view things.

    Another forum user posited good modelling was the key, saying:

    the parent has to lead by example, rather than forcing a child to say one or the other.

    One study, which involved analysis of more than 20 hours of videorecorded family dinner interactions collected in Italy, found mealtimes are also sites where parents control their children’s conduct “through the micro-politics of good manners.”

    By participating in mealtime interactions, children witness and have the chance to acquire the specific cultural principles governing bodily conduct at the table, such as ‘sitting properly’, ‘eating with cutlery’, and ‘chewing with mouth closed’.

    Yet, they are also socialised to a foundational principle of human sociality: one’s own behavior must be self-monitored according to the perspective of the generalised Other.

    In Australian English, that means regulating your behaviour to make sure you don’t do something that could be seen as “rude”. As I argued in a 2012 paper:

    While child socialisation in Anglo culture involves heavy discouragement of rudeness, French does not have a direct equivalent feature […] French children are taught ça ne se fait pas, ‘that is not done’. Where the French proscribe the behaviours outright, the Anglos […] appeal to the image one has of oneself in interpersonal interactions.

    In Anglo English, the penalties for breaches could be other people’s disapproval and hurting their feelings.

    Good manners form part of the bedrock for human sociality.
    Shutterstock

    Why are good manners important?

    Good manners affect our interactions with others and help us build positive relationships.

    Fourteenth century English bishop and educator, William of Wykeham, declared that “manners maketh the man”.

    John Hopkins University Professor Pier Forni called them a “precious life-improvement tool.”

    The “Good Manners” chart, based on a set of rules devised by the Children’s National guild of Courtesy in UK primary schools in 1889, was issued to Queensland primary schools until the 1960s.

    It tells kids to remember the golden rule to “always do to others as you would wish them to do to you if you were in their place.”

    Good manners form part of the bedrock for human sociality. Childhood is when we give kids foundational training on interacting with others and help them learn how to be a culturally competent member of a society.

    Sophia Waters does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. How do children learn good manners? – https://theconversation.com/how-do-children-learn-good-manners-237133

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  • MIL-Evening Report: Not too big, not too small: why modern humans are the ideal size for speed

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Christofer Clemente, Assistant Professor in Evolutionary Biomechanics, University of the Sunshine Coast

    The fastest animal on land is the cheetah, capable of reaching top speeds of 104 kilometres per hour. In the water, the fastest animals are yellowfin tuna and wahoo, which can reach speeds of 75 and 77 km per hour respectively. In the air, the title of the fastest level flight (excluding diving) goes to the white-throated needletail swift, at more than 112 km per hour.

    What do all of these speedy creatures have in common? None of them are particularly big, nor particularly small for the group of animals they represent. In fact, they are all intermediately sized.

    The reason for this is a bit of a mystery. As animals increase in mass, several biological features change as well. For example, in general leg length steadily increases. But clearly long legs are not the answer, since the largest land animals, like elephants, are not the fastest.

    But my colleagues and I have taken a key step towards solving this mystery. By using a scaleable, virtual model of the human body, we were able to explore the movement of the limbs and muscles, find out what limits speed, and gain important insights into the evolution of the human form over thousands of years.

    From a mouse-sized human to a giant

    Since the early 2000s scientists have been building OpenSim – a freely available, virtual model of the human body, complete with all its bones, muscles and tendons.

    This model has been used in various scientific studies to understand human movement, explore exercise science and to help model the effects of surgery on soft tissues.

    In 2019 a group of Belgium researchers took this one step further, and built a physics-based simulation using OpenSim. Rather than telling the model how to move, they asked it to move forward at a certain speed. The model then figured out which combinations of muscles to activate so it could walk, or run, at the prescribed speed.

    But what if we took this even further and scaled the model down to the size of a mouse? Or what if we scaled the model up to the size of an elephant? Then we could see which models could run – and how fast.

    Predictive muscle-driven simulations of 5kg, 50kg, and 500kg musculoskeletal models moving at 2.25 metres per second.

    This is exactly what my team did. We took the standard human model (75kg), and made smaller and smaller models down to 100 grams. We also made the models bigger, up to 2,000kg, and challenged them to run as fast as they could.

    Getting the mass just right

    Several fascinating things happened when we did this.

    First, the 2,000kg model couldn’t move. Nor could the 1,000kg model. In fact, the largest model that could move was 900kg, suggesting an upper limit to the human form. Beyond this size we need to change shape in order to move.

    We also found that the fastest model was not the biggest nor smallest. Instead, it was around 47kg, a similar weight to an average cheetah. Crucially, we could look under the hood and see why this was so.

    The curve that explains the shape of the maximum running speed with mass is the same shape as the curve, which explains the max ground force with mass. This makes sense: to move faster, you need to push off the ground harder.

    So why couldn’t larger models push harder off the ground? It appeared the larger models were limited by their muscles.

    A muscle’s ability to produce force depends on the cross sectional area of that muscle. And as animals increase in size, the mass of their muscles gets bigger faster than their cross-sectional area.

    This means the muscles of larger animals are relatively weaker. The muscles begin to “max out” above the max speed – and so the model has to slow down.

    At the other end of the spectrum, the miniature models have relatively stronger muscles, but have a problem with gravity. They are just too light. They try to push on the ground to produce a large force, but this just causes their body to leave the ground earlier.

    To try to produce more force on the ground, they crouch their limbs, just like mice or cats do. This allows them to stay on the ground longer and so produce more force, just like you might when doing a standing jump. But this takes time. And the longer you take to produce force, the slower your stride will be and you still won’t run faster.

    So a trade off between ground force and stride frequency begins, and doesn’t end until you reach the intermediate size, where your mass is just right.

    The pattern of speed and size for running animals (in blue), showing intermediately size species (like the cheetah) are typically the fastest. Computer-generated models of humans (right), which are then scaled in size from a mouse to a horse (orange dots), show the same pattern, revealing the underlying biomechanical reasons.
    Christofer Clemente et al.

    As fast as we will get

    What might all of this say about human evolution?

    We know throughout history that the size of modern humans and extinct human species – a collective group known as “hominins” – has varied significantly, from the roughly 30kg Australopithecus afarensis that existed roughly 3.5  million years ago, to the roughly 80kg Homo erectus  from nearly 2 million years ago.

    So generally body mass has tended to increase – and presumably so too has our running speed. Homo naledi, which existed around 300,000 years ago and weighed around 37kg, and Homo floresiensis, which existed around 50,000 years ago and weighed around 27kg, must have had to sacrifice some speed for their small size.

    The average body mass of modern adult humans is around 62kg – a little heavier than the 47kg peak weight that our modelling found, but still close to that ideal size.

    Interestingly, many of our fastest long distance runners such as Eliud Kipchoge weigh around 50kg.

    So based on our new research, we now know humans today are about as fast as we will get – without large changes to our muscular form.

    Christofer Clemente receives funding from an ARC Discovery grant (DP230101886)

    ref. Not too big, not too small: why modern humans are the ideal size for speed – https://theconversation.com/not-too-big-not-too-small-why-modern-humans-are-the-ideal-size-for-speed-241668

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  • MIL-OSI USA: 56th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique

    Source: United States Department of Defense

    1. The 56th United States (U.S.)-Republic of Korea (ROK) Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was held in Washington, D.C., on October 30, 2024. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and ROK Minister of National Defense Kim Yong Hyun led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. On October 17, 2024, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Charles Q. Brown Jr., and ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Kim Myung-soo, presided over the 49th ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM).

    2. The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed that the U.S.-ROK Alliance is the linchpin of peace, stability, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and beyond based on our shared values, including freedom, human rights, and the rule of law. The two leaders reviewed progress taken during 2024 to implement the “Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” including enhancing extended deterrence against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), modernizing Alliance capabilities based on science and technology cooperation, and strengthening solidarity and regional security cooperation with like-minded partners. They noted that the SCM has played a pivotal role in developing the ROK-U.S. Alliance into a Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance and would continue maintaining its role as a core consultative mechanism to discuss the future development of the Alliance and provide strategic direction.  The two leaders also provided direction and guidance for continued progress in 2025 through a newly endorsed framework of U.S.-ROK bilateral defense consultative mechanisms that effectively and efficiently support Alliance objectives.  Both concurred that the current U.S.-ROK Alliance is stronger than ever and reaffirmed the two nations’ unwavering mutual commitment to a combined defense posture to defend the ROK as stated in the U.S-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and as reflected in the Washington Declaration. The two leaders also resolved to continue to strengthen the Alliances’ deterrence and defense posture against DPRK aggression and promote stability on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the region.

    3. The Secretary and the Minister reviewed the current security environment in and around the Korean Peninsula and discussed cooperative measures between the two nations. The Secretary and Minister expressed grave concern that the DPRK continues to modernize and diversify its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities.  The two sides condemned the DPRK’s multiple missile launches, including ballistic missiles, its attempted launches of a space launch vehicle, and Russian-DPRK arms trade as clear violations of existing UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs).  They noted that these actions present profound security challenges to the international community and pose an increasingly serious threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the Indo-Pacific region, as well as in the Euro-Atlantic region.

    4. Secretary Austin reiterated the firm U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence to the ROK, utilizing the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, missile defense, and advanced non-nuclear capabilities.  He noted that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and would result in the end of the Kim regime in line with the 2022 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.  He highlighted the increased frequency and routinization of U.S. strategic asset deployments as committed to by President Biden in the Washington Declaration, and noted that these were tangible evidence of the U.S. commitment to defend the ROK.

    5. The two leaders highly appreciated the work of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) inaugurated following the Washington Declaration.  Both applauded the completion on July 11, 2024, of “United States and Republic of Korea Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula,” which represents tremendous progress of the NCG commended and endorsed by President Biden and President Yoon. The two leaders affirmed that the completion of the Guidelines established the foundation for enhancing ROK-U.S. extended deterrence in an integrated manner.  Minister Kim noted that, through such progress, the ROK-U.S. Alliance was elevated to a nuclear-based alliance. The two leaders stressed that the principles and procedures contained in the Guidelines enable Alliance policy and military authorities to maintain an effective nuclear deterrence policy and posture.  The Secretary and Minister also welcomed the successful execution of the ROK-U.S. NCG table-top simulations and table-top exercises to enhance decision-making about nuclear deterrence and operations, and planning for potential nuclear contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.  Both sides affirmed that the full capabilities of the two countries would contribute to the Alliance’s combined deterrence and defense posture, and in this regard the Secretary welcomed the recent establishment of the ROK Strategic Command.  The Secretary and Minister directed the NCG to continue swift progress on NCG workstreams, including security protocols and expansion of information sharing; nuclear consultation processes in crises and contingencies; nuclear and strategic planning; ROK conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency through conventional-nuclear integration (CNI); strategic communications; exercises, simulations, training, and investment activities; and risk reduction practices.  They noted that such efforts would be coordinated to strengthen capabilities of the ROK and United States to enhance U.S.-ROK extended deterrence cooperation in an integrated manner, and looked forward to receiving regular updates on NCG progress activities at future SCMs.

    6. The two sides pledged to continue coordinating efforts to deter DPRK’s nuclear threat with the Alliance’s overwhelming strength, while continuing to pursue efforts through sanctions and pressure to dissuade and delay DPRK’s nuclear development.  Both leaders stressed the importance of full implementation of UNSCRs by the entire international community, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, both permanent members of the UN Security Council.  The two leaders urged the international community to prevent and respond to DPRK’s sanctions evasion so that it abandons its illegal nuclear and ballistic missile development.  To this end, they decided to work closely with each other and the international community to combat the DPRK’s illegal and malicious cyber activities, cryptocurrency theft, overseas laborer dispatches, and ship-to-ship transfers.  The Secretary and Minister expressed concern that Russia-DPRK military cooperation, which has been intensified since the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the two, is deepening regional instability.  The two leaders made clear that military cooperation, including illegal arms trade and high-technology transfers between Russia and the DPRK, constitute a clear violation of UNSCRs, and called on Russia to uphold its commitments.  The two leaders also strongly condemned in the strongest terms with one voice that the military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK has expanded beyond transfers of military supplies to actual deployment of forces, and pledged to closely coordinate with the international community regarding this issue. 

    7. Both leaders reiterated the willingness of their Presidents to pursue dialogue and diplomacy, backed by a robust and credible deterrence and defense posture.  In this regard, Secretary Austin expressed support for the goals of the ROK’s Audacious Initiative and President Yoon’s vision of a free, peaceful, and prosperous unified Korean Peninsula, and welcomed President Yoon’s desire to open a path for serious and sustained diplomacy with the DPRK.  Both sides reaffirmed that they remain open to dialogue with the DPRK without preconditions and pledged to continue close coordination.

    8. The Minister and the Secretary noted concerns that the DPRK’s claims of “two hostile countries,” and activities near the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) could threaten peace and the Armistice on the Korean Peninsula.  The two leaders strongly condemned DPRK’s activities that raise tension on the Korean Peninsula, such as multiple unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) infiltrations in the past, as well as the recent unilateral detonation of sections of inter-Korean roads and ongoing launches of “filth and trash balloons,” and urged the DPRK to immediately cease such activities.  The Secretary and the Minister concurred that the Armistice Agreement remains in effect as an international norm guaranteeing the stable security order on the Korean Peninsula, and that all parties of the Korean War should abide by it while it remains in force.  Both sides noted that the Northern Limit Line (NLL) has been an effective means of separating military forces and preventing military tension over the past 70 years, and urged the DPRK to respect the NLL.

    9. Secretary Austin and Minister Kim reaffirmed the role of the United Nations Command (UNC) in implementing, managing, and enforcing the Korean Armistice Agreement, deterring DPRK aggression, and coordinating a multinational, united response in case of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.  They reaffirmed that UNC has successfully contributed to those aims for more than 70 years and continues to carry out its mission with the utmost respect for the sovereignty of ROK, the primary host nation.  Both sides welcomed the successful organization of the second ROK-UNC Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting and expressed their appreciation for UNC Member State contributions.  They welcomed the addition of Germany to UNC, and noted that peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, including the Korean Peninsula, and Euro-Atlantic regions are increasingly connected.  The two leaders are determined to continue seeking the expanded participation in UNC by like-minded countries that share the values of the 1953 Washington Declaration, anchored in the principles of the UN Charter and mandates of relevant UNSCRs. Secretary Austin thanked Minister Kim for the ROK’s efforts to support the UNC’s role to maintain and enforce the Armistice Agreement, and to support the defense of the ROK against DPRK aggression.  In this regard, the Secretary and Minister both highlighted their desire to expand combined exercises, information sharing, and interoperability between the ROK, the Combined Forces Command, and UNC Member States.

    10. The Secretary and the Minister also noted the critical role that U.S. forces in the ROK have played for more than 70 years and reaffirmed that U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) continues to play a decisive role in preventing armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and in promoting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.  Secretary Austin reiterated the U.S. commitment to maintain current USFK force levels to defend the ROK. 

    11. The Secretary and Minister also reviewed the work of the various bilateral mechanisms such as the U.S.-Korea Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD).  They welcomed efforts to enhance information sharing through the U.S. Shared Early Warning System (SEWS) for strengthening the Alliance’s detection capabilities in response to advancing DPRK missile threats.  They also commended the work of the Counter-Missile Working Group (CMWG) and reviewed “the Joint Study on Alliance Comprehensive Counter-Missile Strategy” aimed at informing recommendations for counter-missile capabilities and posture of ROK and United States.  The Secretary and Minister also discussed concrete efforts to strengthen cooperation in space and cyber to robustly deter and defend against growing threats.  They endorsed efforts by the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) to improve space situational awareness information sharing and interoperability, and acknowledged the need to expand ROK participation in exercises and training that can strengthen Alliance space capability and improve resilience against growing space threats.  In particular, the Secretary also welcomed ROK participation in the Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) cell to leverage space industry and strengthen allied space capabilities.  The Secretary and Minister also pledged to deepen cyber cooperation through the Cyber Cooperation Working Group and improve coordination through cyber defense exercises, such as Cyber Alliance and Cyber Flag.  Overall, both leaders expressed appreciation for the continuing cooperation to ensure the Alliance’s space, cyber, and counter-missile efforts to keep pace with the evolving threats posed by the DPRK.

    12. Noting the importance of science and technology (S&T) cooperation, the Secretary and Minister decided to establish the Defense Science and Technology Executive Committee (DSTEC) at the Vice-Minister-Under Secretary level within this year, to guide and prioritize Alliance defense S&T cooperation.  They noted priority areas for cooperation including autonomy, artificial intelligence, and crewed-uncrewed teaming are particularly vital to ensure the ROK is able to achieve the goals of Defense Innovation 4.0 and modernize Alliance capabilities.  Both leaders also welcomed future S&T cooperation related to quantum technologies, future-generation wireless communication technologies, and directed energy to ensure that S&T advancements enhance the combined capabilities of the Alliance.  This included efforts to identify potential areas of collaboration on AUKUS Pillar II.  The Secretary welcomed the Minister’s proposal to host a Defense Science and Technology conference in 2025, and concurred that the DSTEC should leverage this conference to baseline and prioritize Alliance defense S&T collaboration.

    13. The Secretary and Minister also reviewed efforts to improve the interoperability, interchangeability, and resilience of the U.S. and ROK defense industrial base.  They underscored the need to improve efficient and effective collaboration in the development, acquisition, fielding, logistics, sustainment, and maintenance of defense capabilities, and to ensure that S&T advancements are swiftly and seamlessly transitioned into acquisition and sustainment efforts.  Both leaders welcomed progress under the U.S. Regional Sustainment Framework (RSF) and welcomed ROK participation in a Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) pilot project on Air Force aviation maintenance.  The two leaders noted that this pilot project could lead to more bilateral co-sustainment opportunities, and also expand defense industrial collaboration with like-minded partners in the region in light of the ROK’s key role in the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) contact group.  The Secretary and Minister also noted with satisfaction the recent U.S. Navy contract with ROK shipyards to conduct MRO services for U.S. vessels, and underscored the potential to expand such work to improve the resilience of the Alliance’s posture in the Indo-Pacific Region.  The Secretary and Minister also recognized the need to improve reciprocal market access to deepen defense industrial cooperation and enhance supply chain resiliency, and are committed to accelerate cooperation with the goal of signing the Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement next year based on guidance from both Presidents.

    14. The Secretary and the Minister received and endorsed the MCM Report to the SCM presented by the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Charles Q. Brown.  They welcomed the efforts of General Brown, Admiral Kim, and the MCM to enhance military plans, posture, training, exercises, and efforts to coordinate U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) activities and enhance military strength of the Alliance.  The Secretary and Minister concurred that the Freedom Shield 24 (FS 24) and Ulchi Freedom Shield 24 (UFS 24) exercises, which included realistic threats from the DPRK advancing nuclear, missile, space, and cyber threats, enhanced the Alliance’s crisis management and strengthened deterrence and defense capabilities.  In addition, they assessed that combined field training exercises (FTX), which were more extensive than the past year and conducted in land, maritime and air domains, enhanced interoperability and combined operations execution capabilities.  Based on such outcomes, both leaders decided to continue strengthening combined exercises and training in line with the rapidly changing security environment of the Korean Peninsula, and further decided that future combined exercises should include appropriate and realistic scenarios including responses to DPRK nuclear use.  The Secretary and the Minister also emphasized that ensuring consistent training opportunities for USFK is critical to maintaining a strong combined defense posture.  Secretary Austin noted the efforts of ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) to improve the training conditions for U.S. and ROK forces and stressed the importance of maintaining close cooperation between USFK and MND for the joint use of ROK facilities and airspace for training. 

    15. Given the growth and diversification of the DPRK’s chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and delivery systems, both leaders assessed efforts and works to ensure execution of Alliance missions under a CBRN-challenged environment.  In particular, they welcomed progress by the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee (CWMDC), including the expansion of information sharing required for nuclear elimination operations consistent with the Nuclear Weapons Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the strengthening of cooperation to prevent proliferation of WMD in the Indo-Pacific region. Both leaders welcomed continued multinational counter-proliferation activities in the region amidst advancements of DPRK nuclear and missile program and intensification of arms trade between Russia and the DPRK following the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.  Secretary Austin expressed appreciation for ROK contributions to various global security efforts such as Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the Minister and the Secretary concurred on the importance of maintaining cooperative efforts to enforce relevant counter-proliferation UNSCRs.

    16. The Secretary and Minister also reviewed the progress and works to fulfill the Conditions-based Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) Transition Plan (COTP).  Both leaders reaffirmed that the conditions stated in the bilaterally approved COTP must be met before wartime OPCON is transitioned in a stable and systematic manner.  They received the results of the annual U.S.-ROK bilateral evaluation on the capabilities and systems for conditions #1 and #2 based on the bilaterally-approved assessment criteria and standards.  Both leaders affirmed that there was a significant progress of this year’s bilateral evaluation on readiness posture and capabilities, and pledged to continue close consultations between the ROK and the United States. for the establishment of the Future-CFC.  The Secretary and the Minister also reaffirmed that Future-CFC Full Operational Capability (FOC) Certification would be pursued when the results of the bilateral evaluation on the capabilities and systems of conditions #1 and #2 meet the mutually approved levels.  Regarding condition #3, the Secretary and the Minister decided to remain in close consultation for the assessment of the security environment.  Both sides pledged to support continued evaluation and progress in wartime OPCON transition implementation through annual MCMs and SCMs, and affirmed that the wartime OPCON transition would strengthen ROK and Alliance capabilities and the combined defense posture. 

    17. The Secretary and the Minister reviewed the regional security environment, and plans to expand U.S.-ROK security cooperation throughout the Indo-Pacific region to support maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific that is connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.  They also reaffirmed support for Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) centrality and the ASEAN-led regional architecture as well as regional efforts of the Pacific Islands Forum.  In particular, the two leaders noted the importance of enhancing cooperation during the implementation of both the ROK and U.S. respective strategies for the Indo-Pacific region.  To this end, the Secretary and the Minister endorsed the “Regional Cooperation Framework for U.S.-ROK Alliance Contributions to Security in the Indo-Pacific,” and discussed priorities areas and partners to better respond to the complex regional and global security situation.  After reviewing the work of the ROK-U.S. Regional Cooperation Working Group (RCWG), both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen defense cooperation with ASEAN members and work together with the Pacific Island Countries to contribute to regional security.  The Secretary and the Minister also acknowledged the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as reflected in the April 2023 “Joint Statement in Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the Alliance between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea.”  

    18. The Secretary and the Minister reflected on the remarkable progress made during 2024 to fulfill the historic understandings at the Camp David Summit.  They welcomed the Memorandum of Cooperation on the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework (TSCF), signed by the Ministers and the Secretary of the United States, ROK, and Japan in July, along with enhanced sharing of missile warning information and efforts to systematically conduct trilateral exercises, including the first execution of the multi-domain trilateral exercise FREEDOM EDGE.  The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed their commitment to continuing to promote and expand trilateral security cooperation including senior-level policy consultations, trilateral exercises, information sharing, and defense exchange cooperation.

    19. The two sides also took the opportunity to reaffirm that expediting the relocation and return of U.S. military bases in the ROK is in the interests of both countries, and decided to work closely to ensure the timely return of the bases in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and related agreements.  The two leaders noted the significance of the complete construction of Yongsan Park, and pledged to expedite the remaining return of Yongsan Garrison.  The Minister and the Secretary also reaffirmed their mutual commitment to discuss the return of other U.S. military bases through regular consultations through SOFA channels to reach mutually acceptable outcomes in the future.

    20. Secretary Austin expressed his gratitude that the ROK is contributing toward ensuring a stable environment for U.S. Forces Korea.  The Secretary and Minister also welcomed the recent conclusion of consultations related to a 12th Special Measures Agreement (SMA), and concurred that it would greatly contribute to the strengthening of the U.S.-ROK combined defense posture.

    21. Secretary Austin and Minister Kim affirmed that the discussions during the 56th SCM and the 49th MCM contributed to strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance with a vision toward the further development of a truly global alliance.  The two leaders commended the U.S. and ROK military and civilian personnel that worked to strengthen the bond of the Alliance, and expressed appreciation for their shared commitment and sacrifice.  Both sides expect to hold the 57th SCM and 50th MCM in Seoul at a mutually convenient time in 2025.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: iRhythm Technologies Announces Third Quarter 2024 Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SAN FRANCISCO, Oct. 30, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) —  iRhythm Technologies, Inc. (NASDAQ: IRTC), a leading digital health care company focused on creating trusted solutions that detect, predict, and prevent disease, today reported financial results for the three months ended September 30, 2024.

    Third Quarter 2024 Financial Highlights

    • Revenue of $147.5 million, an 18% increase compared to third quarter 2023
    • Gross margin of 68.8%, a 260-basis point increase compared to third quarter 2023
    • Unrestricted cash, cash equivalents and marketable securities of $522.0 million as of September 30, 2024

    Recent Operational Highlights

    • Strong quarterly registration volume driven by record demand from existing accounts combined with another record quarter of new account openings in the United States and record registrations in the United Kingdom
    • Received FDA 510(k) clearance for updates previously made to the Zio AT device as letter to file
    • Expanded global reach with commercial launch of Zio monitor in Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Spain, and received Japanese PMDA regulatory approval for Zio monitor, highlighting our continued commitment to bringing our innovative digital healthcare solutions to millions of people worldwide
    • Entered into technology license agreement with BioIntelliSense to incorporate medical grade, connected, multi-sensor capabilities into our future ambulatory cardiac monitoring products, positioning us to expand the capabilities of our product platform
    • Upcoming data at American Heart Association’s Scientific Sessions 2024 in Chicago from November 16–18

    “The third quarter of 2024 was an exceptional quarter of execution as our teams drove significant demand in our core business, made substantial progress in expanding our Zio services into global markets, and established an important licensing agreement with an external partner to drive future platform capabilities for long term growth,” said Quentin Blackford, president and chief executive officer of iRhythm. “Third quarter revenue growth of over 18% year-over-year was driven by record volume demand from existing accounts, and our field teams were also able to open a record number of new accounts during the quarter while continuing our expansion into primary care channels. We were also very pleased to be able to celebrate one million patients having been registered for Zio monitor – our newest generation, long-term continuous monitoring system – in October and have officially launched our first commercial account using Aura – Epic’s specialty diagnostics and devices suite.”

    “We also made tangible progress towards long-term initiatives to drive future growth. For the first time ever, we have achieved more than 10,000 billable registrations in a single quarter in the UK, and we are excited that we have begun receiving physician orders following commercial launch in four additional European countries. Furthermore, we have recently received a FDA 510(k) clearance for updates to our Zio AT device associated with our FDA remediation efforts, an ongoing and critical priority for our teams to demonstrate our commitment to quality, compliance and performance. With strong execution across multiple growth levers and with additional catalysts on the horizon, we could not be more excited about the future of iRhythm.”

    Third Quarter Financial Results
    Revenue for the third quarter of 2024 was $147.5 million, up 18% from $124.6 million during the same period in 2023. The increase was driven by growth in demand for Zio services.

    Gross profit for the third quarter of 2024 was $101.5 million, up 23% from $82.5 million during the same period in 2023, while gross margin was 68.8%, up from 66.2% during the same period in 2023. The increase in gross profit was primarily due to increased volume of Zio services provided due to higher demand. The increase in gross margin was primarily due to operational efficiencies as well as the absence of increased reserves for excess Zio XT printed circuit board assembly (PCBA) components that were incurred during the prior year.

    Operating expenses for the third quarter of 2024 were $151.8 million, compared to $110.1 million for the same period in 2023. Adjusted operating expenses for the third quarter of 2024 were $143.8 million, compared to $107.1 million during the same period in 2023. The increase in adjusted operating expenses was primarily driven by a $32.1 million charge for license consideration payable to BioIntelliSense that was recognized on iRhythm’s unaudited condensed consolidated statements of operations as acquired in-process research and development (“IPR&D”) expense during the third quarter of 2024. In alignment with SEC guidance around non-GAAP financial measures relating to acquired IPR&D expense, iRhythm does not exclude expenses related to acquired IPR&D from its non-GAAP results.

    Net loss for the third quarter of 2024 was $46.2 million, or a diluted loss of $1.48 per share, compared with net loss of $27.1 million, or a diluted loss of $0.89 per share, for the same period in 2023. Adjusted net loss for the third quarter of 2024 was $39.2 million, or a diluted loss of $1.26 per share, compared with an adjusted net loss of $24.1 million, or a diluted loss of $0.79 per share, for the same period in 2023. The increase in net loss was primarily driven by a $32.1 million charge for license consideration payable to BioIntelliSense that was recognized on iRhythm’s unaudited condensed consolidated statements of operations as acquired IPR&D expense during the third quarter of 2024.

    Unrestricted cash, cash equivalents, and marketable securities were $522.0 million as of September 30, 2024.

    2024 Annual Guidance
    iRhythm projects revenue for the full year 2024 to grow approximately 18% to 19% compared to prior year results, ranging from approximately $582.5 million to $587.5 million. Gross margin for the full year 2024 is expected to range from 68.5% to 69.0%. iRhythm now expects adjusted EBITDA margin for the full year 2024 to range from approximately negative 2% to negative 1.5% of full year revenues. Adjusted EBITDA guidance includes license consideration payable to BioIntelliSense that is recognized on iRhythm’s consolidated statements of operations as acquired IPR&D expenses, including a charge of approximately $32 million of expense incurred during the third quarter of 2024. In alignment with SEC guidance around non-GAAP financial measures relating to acquired IPR&D expense, iRhythm will not exclude expenses related to acquired IPR&D from its non-GAAP results, which include adjusted EBITDA.

    Webcast and Conference Call Information
    iRhythm’s management team will host a conference call today beginning at 1:30 p.m. PT/4:30 p.m. ET. Interested parties may access a live and archived webcast of the presentation on the “Events & Presentations” section of the company’s investor website at investors.irhythmtech.com.

    About iRhythm Technologies, Inc.
    iRhythm is a leading digital health care company that creates trusted solutions that detect, predict, and prevent disease. Combining wearable biosensors and cloud-based data analytics with powerful proprietary algorithms, iRhythm distills data from millions of heartbeats into clinically actionable information. Through a relentless focus on patient care, iRhythm’s vision is to deliver better data, better insights, and better health for all.

    Reclassifications
    Certain prior period amounts have been reclassified to conform to the current year presentation. These reclassifications have no impact on previously reported results of operations or financial position.

    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    We refer to certain financial measures that are not recognized under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in this press release, including adjusted EBITDA, adjusted net loss, adjusted net loss per share and adjusted operating expenses. We use these non-GAAP financial measures for financial and operational decision-making and as a means to evaluate period-to-period comparisons. See the schedules attached to this press release for additional information and reconciliations of such non-GAAP financial measures. We have not reconciled our adjusted operating expenses and adjusted EBITDA estimates for full year 2024 because certain items that impact these figures are uncertain or out of our control and cannot be reasonably predicted. Accordingly, a reconciliation of adjusted operating expenses and adjusted EBITDA estimates is not available without unreasonable effort.

    Adjusted EBITDA excludes non-cash operating charges for stock-based compensation expense, changes in fair value of strategic investments, impairment and restructuring charges, business transformation costs, and loss on extinguishment of debt. Business transformation costs include costs associated with professional services, employee termination and relocation, third-party merger and acquisition, integration, and other costs to augment and restructure the organization, inclusive of both outsourced and offshore resources.

    Forward-Looking Statements
    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These statements include statements regarding financial guidance, market opportunity, ability to penetrate the market, anticipated productivity improvements and expectations for growth. Such statements are based on current assumptions that involve risks and uncertainties that could cause actual outcomes and results to differ materially. These risks and uncertainties, many of which are beyond our control, include risks described in the section entitled “Risk Factors” and elsewhere in our filings made with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including those on the Form 10-Q expected to be filed on or about October 30, 2024. These forward-looking statements speak only as of the date hereof and should not be unduly relied upon. iRhythm disclaims any obligation to update these forward-looking statements.

    Investor Contact
    Stephanie Zhadkevich
    investors@irhythmtech.com

    Media Contact
    Kassandra Perry
    irhythm@highwirepr.com

    IRHYTHM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (In thousands, except par value)
    (unaudited)

     
      September 30, 2024   December 31, 2023
    Assets      
    Current assets:      
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 519,535     $ 36,173  
    Marketable securities   2,496       97,591  
    Accounts receivable, net   77,427       61,484  
    Inventory   15,032       13,973  
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets   13,419       21,591  
    Total current assets   627,909       230,812  
    Property and equipment, net   122,390       104,114  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets   45,570       49,317  
    Restricted cash, long-term   8,358        
    Goodwill   862       862  
    Long-term strategic investments   59,059       3,000  
    Other assets   45,540       45,039  
    Total assets $ 909,688     $ 433,144  
    Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity      
    Current liabilities:      
    Accounts payable $ 7,593     $ 5,543  
    Accrued liabilities   73,958       83,362  
    Deferred revenue   3,031       3,306  
    Operating lease liabilities, current portion   15,522       15,159  
    Total current liabilities   100,104       107,370  
    Long-term senior convertible notes   645,821        
    Debt, noncurrent portion         34,950  
    Other noncurrent liabilities   17,978       1,012  
    Operating lease liabilities, noncurrent portion   74,019       79,715  
    Total liabilities   837,922       223,047  
    Stockholders’ equity:      
    Preferred stock, $0.001 par value – 5,000 shares authorized; none issued and outstanding at September 30, 2024 and December 31, 2023          
    Common stock, $0.001 par value – 100,000 shares authorized; 31,516 shares issued and 31,287 shares outstanding at September 30, 2024, respectively; and 30,954 shares issued and outstanding at December 31, 2023   31       31  
    Additional paid-in capital   854,363       855,784  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss   (66 )     (112 )
    Accumulated deficit   (757,562 )     (645,606 )
    Treasury stock, at cost; 229 and 0 shares at September 30, 2024 and December 31, 2023, respectively   (25,000 )      
    Total stockholders’ equity   71,766       210,097  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 909,688     $ 433,144  
    IRHYTHM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (In thousands, except per share data)
    (unaudited)

     
        Three Months Ended September 30,   Nine Months Ended September 30,
          2024       2023       2024       2023  
    Revenue, net   $ 147,538     $ 124,604     $ 427,514     $ 360,170  
    Cost of revenue     46,062       42,130       135,051       115,790  
    Gross profit     101,476       82,474       292,463       244,380  
    Operating expenses:                
    Research and development     15,694       16,309       52,378       44,828  
    Acquired in-process research and development     32,069             32,069        
    Selling, general and administrative     103,375       93,768       318,797       285,531  
    Impairment charges     641             641        
    Total operating expenses     151,779       110,077       403,885       330,359  
    Loss from operations     (50,303 )     (27,603 )     (111,422 )     (85,979 )
    Interest and other income (expense), net:                
    Interest income     6,456       1,717       16,198       4,619  
    Interest expense     (3,329 )     (927 )     (9,501 )     (2,709 )
    Loss on extinguishment of debt                 (7,589 )      
    Other income (expense), net     1,182       (108 )     772       (143 )
    Total interest and other income (expense), net     4,309       682       (120 )     1,767  
    Loss before income taxes     (45,994 )     (26,921 )     (111,542 )     (84,212 )
    Income tax provision     188       195       414       495  
    Net loss   $ (46,182 )   $ (27,116 )   $ (111,956 )   $ (84,707 )
    Net loss per common share, basic and diluted   $ (1.48 )   $ (0.89 )   $ (3.59 )   $ (2.78 )
    Weighted-average shares, basic and diluted     31,262       30,607       31,147       30,470  
    IRHYTHM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
    Reconciliation of GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Information
    (in thousands, except per share data)
    (unaudited)

        Three Months Ended September 30,   Nine Months Ended September 30,
          2024       2023       2024       2023  
    Adjusted EBITDA reconciliation*                
    Net loss1   $ (46,182 )   $ (27,116 )   $ (111,956 )   $ (84,707 )
    Interest expense     3,329       927       9,501       2,709  
    Interest income     (6,456 )     (1,717 )     (16,198 )     (4,619 )
    Changes in fair value of strategic investments     (1,059 )           (1,059 )      
    Income tax provision     188       195       414       495  
    Depreciation and amortization     5,135       4,067       15,426       11,434  
    Stock-based compensation     17,158       21,008       59,970       53,358  
    Impairment charges     641             641        
    Business transformation costs     7,360       2,999       8,656       14,094  
    Loss on extinguishment of debt                 7,589        
    Adjusted EBITDA   $ (19,886 )   $ 363     $ (27,016 )   $ (7,236 )
                     
    Adjusted net loss reconciliation*                
    Net loss, as reported1   $ (46,182 )   $ (27,116 )   $ (111,956 )   $ (84,707 )
    Impairment charges     641             641        
    Business transformation costs     7,360       2,999       8,656       14,094  
    Changes in fair value of strategic investments     (1,059 )           (1,059 )      
    Loss on extinguishment of debt                 7,589        
    Adjusted net loss   $ (39,240 )   $ (24,117 )   $ (96,129 )   $ (70,613 )
                     
    Adjusted net loss per share reconciliation*                
    Net loss per share, as reported1   $ (1.48 )   $ (0.89 )   $ (3.59 )   $ (2.78 )
    Impairment charges per share     0.02             0.02        
    Business transformation costs per share     0.24       0.10       0.28       0.46  
    Changes in fair value of strategic investments per share     (0.03 )           (0.03 )      
    Loss on extinguishment of debt per share                 0.24        
    Adjusted net loss per share   $ (1.26 )   $ (0.79 )   $ (3.09 )   $ (2.32 )
    Weighted-average shares, basic and diluted     31,262       30,607       31,147       30,470  
                     
    Adjusted operating expense reconciliation*                
    Operating expense, as reported   $ 151,779     $ 110,077     $ 403,885     $ 330,359  
    Impairment charges     (641 )           (641 )      
    Business transformation costs     (7,360 )     (2,999 )     (8,656 )     (14,094 )
    Adjusted operating expense   $ 143,778     $ 107,078     $ 394,588     $ 316,265  

    *Certain numbers expressed may not sum due to rounding.
    1 Net loss for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2024 includes $32.1 million of acquired in-process research and development expense.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 30.10.2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Nokia Corporation
    Stock Exchange Release
    30 October 2024 at 22:30 EET

    Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 30.10.2024

    Espoo, Finland – On 30 October 2024 Nokia Corporation (LEI: 549300A0JPRWG1KI7U06) has acquired its own shares (ISIN FI0009000681) as follows:

    Trading venue (MIC Code) Number of shares Weighted average price / share, EUR*
    XHEL 1,347,700 4.45
    CEUX 200,000 4.45
    BATE
    AQEU
    TQEX
    Total 1,547,700 4.45

    * Rounded to two decimals

    On 25 January 2024, Nokia announced that its Board of Directors is initiating a share buyback program to return up to EUR 600 million of cash to shareholders in tranches over a period of two years. The first phase of the share buyback program started on 20 March 2024. On 19 July 2024, Nokia decided to accelerate the share buybacks by increasing the number of shares to be repurchased during the year 2024. The post-increase repurchases in compliance with the Market Abuse Regulation (EU) 596/2014 (MAR), the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052 and under the authorization granted by Nokia’s Annual General Meeting on 3 April 2024 started on 22 July 2024 and end by 31 December 2024 with a maximum aggregate purchase price of EUR 600 million for all purchases during 2024.

    Total cost of transactions executed on 30 October 2024 was EUR 6,883,705. After the disclosed transactions, Nokia Corporation holds 190,407,909 treasury shares.

    Details of transactions are included as an appendix to this announcement.

    On behalf of Nokia Corporation

    BofA Securities Europe SA

    About Nokia
    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs.

    Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    Inquiries:

    Nokia Communications
    Phone: +358 10 448 4900
    Email: press.services@nokia.com
    Maria Vaismaa, Global Head of External Communications

    Nokia Investor Relations
    Phone: +358 40 803 4080
    Email: investor.relations@nokia.com

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Russia should end the war now instead of sending other countries’ sons to die: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Statement by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on maintenance of peace and security of Ukraine.

    When Russia invaded Ukraine, almost 1000 days ago, the General Assembly was clear in its condemnation: it deplored Russia’s aggression in the strongest terms, demanded its full withdrawal and declared Russia’s invasion to be in violation of the UN Charter.

    Only five countries voted against, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

    Today the DPRK’s support for Russia goes even further. Pyongyang provides significant support to Russia by supplying munitions, arms, and other materiel, and now 10,000 troops have arrived in Russia, with a significant number believed to be deploying to Kursk.

    In addition to aiding Russia’s ongoing violation of the UN Charter, and a UN Member State’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, this cooperation between Russia and the DPRK is a direct violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions.

    Russia voted for these resolutions. Now it violates them. This undermines not only international peace and security, but also the Security Council itself.

    Council members have repeatedly condemned these violations, yet the transfers continue.

    This latest development, Russia’s training and deployment of DPRK troops, is a significant step further for both countries. Russia has now suffered over 600,000 casualties. Instead of sending other countries’ sons to die for the imperialistic whims of one man, they should end the war now.

    Russia is not just paying for this invasion in the lives of young men. Defence and security will consume over 40% of state spending next year. 

    We can be sure that DPRK will be extracting a high price from Russia in return for the transfer of its troops, including military assistance. This risks further raising tensions on the Korean peninsula and undermining regional security in the Indo-Pacific.

    A DPRK with improved military technology and enhanced capacity to export weapons, could fuel instability in vulnerable conflict areas around the world.  An escalation of violence and expansion of the battlefield is in no one’s interest.

    It is clear that a desperate and impoverished Russia needs external support for this war to continue. Any country providing assistance to Russia’s aggression is thereby prolonging Russia’s illegal war.

    But Russia’s desperation will not deter our resolve to support Ukraine to exercise its right to self-defence in line with the UN Charter, and to protect their people and sovereignty.

    Updates to this page

    Published 30 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: Kishida’s legacy: Scandals and compromise at home, global respect for security and diplomacy – AP

    Source: United States Institute of Peace

    TOKYO (AP) — Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will step down Tuesday, handing over leadership to his successor Shigeru Ishiba,…

    TOKYO (AP) — Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will step down Tuesday, handing over leadership to his successor Shigeru Ishiba, who is expected to formally take office later in the day. He says he plans to call a snap election for Oct. 27.

    Kishida’s popularity ratings were precarious during most of his three-year term due to damaging corruption scandals that eventually led him to bow out.

    At home, Kishida was seen as a leader without a vision who compromised with powerful conservative nationalists within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to stay in power. But he has won respect outside Japan, especially from the United States, for pushing bold changes in Japanese defense and security policies and for standing tougher against Russia and China.

    Here is a lookback at Kishida’s leadership and his legacy:

    Distress at home

    After taking office in October 2021, Kishida made a number of major decisions, such as reversing Japan’s nuclear energy phase-out and pursuing a rapid military buildup. But he avoided controversial social issues related to gender and sexual diversity. As head of a smaller faction in the ruling party, his top priority appeared to be keeping a stable grip on power by avoiding clashes with members of the Liberal Democrats’ powerful conservative group, led by the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

    Abe’s assassination in July 2022 and subsequent major corruption scandals linked to Abe’s faction members left constantly in damage control mode, as his support ratings tumbled. Kishida himself narrowly escaped an explosives attack during a speech at a fishing port in western Japan’s Wakayama in April, 2023.

    Investigations into Abe’s assassination led to revelations of the Liberal Democrats’ decades-long links to South Korea’s Unification Church. That was followed by a more damaging corruption scandal involving more than 80 LDP lawmakers, again mostly in Abe’s faction, involving illegal slush funds.

    Several lawmakers, their aides and accountants were indicted in that scandal.

    Kishida led internal probes and moved to reform and tighten political funding laws, but opposition lawmakers and voters viewed the measures as inadequate.

    Public outrage over the slush funds scandal has caused the LDP to lose a few local elections this year and lawmakers within the party called for a fresh face to shake off the scandals in order to win the next national election.

    Kishida ends his term as a kingmaker who could remain influential behind the scenes after he helped lift Ishiba to a come-from-behind victory in the party’s vote on Friday against staunch conservative Sanae Takaichi.

    Stronger defense

    Kishida, who long served as foreign minister under Abe, has won respect for his national security and foreign policies that significantly deepened ties with the United States and other partners such as Australia, the U.K., South Korea and the Philippines, while elevating the country’s international profile.

    In December 2022, Kishida’s government adopted a security and defense strategy involving a rapid buildup of Japan’s military power to acquire a “counter-strike” capability with long-range cruise missiles, a major break from Japan’s post-World War II self-defense-only principle.

    Kishida’s government set a five-year goal to double Japan’s military spending to nearly 2% of GDP, eventually to about 10 trillion yen ($70 billion), making it the world’s third biggest spender after the United States and China. But it’s unclear how Japan will fund that spending and balance it against other urgent needs such as coping with the country’s shrinking population.

    In December, Kishida substantially eased Japan’s weapons export rules, allowing licensing of Japanese-made PAC-3 missile interceptors to the United States and future foreign sales of fighter jets that Japan is developing with the U.K. and Italy.

    Kishida quickly joined other G7 countries in sanctioning Russia and supporting Ukraine. He has repeatedly said “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” comparing the Russian invasion of Ukraine to China’s growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region. He has worked on strengthening economic and security cooperation in the region.

    “Although Kishida’s successes on foreign affairs were overshadowed by domestic political scandals involving his Liberal Democratic Party, as well as lackluster economic growth, he oversaw increases in Japan’s reputation and popularity in the region and globally, as well as the institutionalization of related partnership gains,” Mirna Galic, a senior policy analyst at the U.S. Institute of Peace, wrote in a recent article.

    Better ties with South Korea

    One of Kishida’s diplomatic successes was Japan’s improved ties with South Korea, especially in regional security and in ties with their mutual ally, the United Sates, due to shared concerns about China and North Korea.

    Kishida, under pressure from Washington and with support from South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, helped mend ties between the two Asian neighbors that have suffered over Japan’s colonial-era legacy of colonialism and atrocities. Stable relations are key to the U.S.-led united front in the Pacific.

    In April, Kishida made a state visit to Washington and spoke to Congress, stressing Japan’s determination to stand by America as a global partner. In 2023, President Joe Biden invited him to a trilateral summit at Camp David with Yoon where they agreed to strengthen their trilateral security framework.

    When Kishida announced in August his plans to step down, Biden lauded Kishida’s leadership, saying he had helped take the U.S.-Japan alliance “to new heights.”

    “Guided by unflinching courage and moral clarity, Prime Minister Kishida has transformed Japan’s role in the world,” Biden said in a statement. Kishida’s “courageous leadership will be remembered on both sides of the Pacific for decades to come,” he said.

    Kishida also recently helped work out a deal with Beijing to lift a Chinese ban on imports of Japanese seafood that Beijing imposed due to Japan’s release of treated radioactive wastewater into the Pacific from its wrecked Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Tensions over China’s military activity near Japanese water and airspace persist.

    He also deepened ties with Southeast Asian countries, the Pacific Island nations as well as so-called Global South developing countries.

    G7 Hiroshima and nuclear disarmament

    Kishida represents a constituency in Hiroshima and hosting a summit of the Group of Seven wealthy nations in the city in May 2023 was a highlight of his time in office aligned with his career goal of working toward a world free of nuclear weapons.

    However, the G7 summit statement on nuclear disarmament defended the possession of nuclear weapons as a deterrence, disappointing and angering survivors of the U.S. 1945 atomic bomb attack.

    Kishida says he adheres to Japan’s principles of not developing, possessing or allowing the deployment of nuclear weapons in its territory. Ishiba, a former defense minister, has advocated deepening a discussion among regional partners about the U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy.

    “New Capitalism” never took off

    Kishida espoused a “new capitalism” economic strategy calling for more equitable distribution of national wealth, an alternative to Abe’s heavy government spending and hyper-easy monetary policy. Neither policy has managed to get flagging growth back on track.

    Kishida’s defense and childcare policies would require big spending and the wage hikes he supported failed to keep pace with price increases.

    Government moves to try to reverse Japan’s falling birth rate involved mostly childcare allowances for married couples and didn’t address the problems of the growing number of young Japanese reluctant to marry and start families due to bleak job prospects, the high cost of living and a corporate culture that is unfriendly to working mothers.

    Copyright © 2024 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, written or redistributed.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Kneat to Announce 2024 Third-Quarter Financial Results November 6, 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LIMERICK, Ireland, Oct. 30, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — kneat.com, inc. (TSX: KSI) (OTC: KSIOF) (“Kneat” or the “Company”) a leader in digitizing and automating validation and quality processes, announced today that the Company will release its financial results for the quarter ended September 30, 2024, after TSX market close on November 6, 2024.

    Eddie Ryan, Chief Executive Officer and Hugh Kavanagh, Chief Financial Officer, will host a conference call and Q&A for sell side analysts via webcast on November 7, 2024 at 09:00 ET (14:00 GMT).

    Interested parties can register for the live webcast via the following link:

    Register Here

    The third-quarter financial results will be available from the Financial Information section of the Investors page on the Kneat Solutions website, at: https://kneat.com/investors/ 

    About Kneat
    Kneat Solutions provides leading companies in highly regulated industries with unparalleled efficiency in validation and compliance through its digital validation platform Kneat Gx. We lead the industry in customer satisfaction with an unblemished record for retention and implementation, powered by our user-friendly design, expert support, and on-demand training academy. Kneat Gx is an industry-leading digital validation platform that enables highly regulated companies to manage any validation discipline from end-to-end. Kneat Gx is fully ISO 9001 and ISO 27001 certified, fully validated, and 21 CFR Part 11/Annex 11 compliant. Multiple independent customer studies show a 40% or more reduction in validation cycle times, nearly 20% faster speed to market, and 80% reduced changeover time. For more information visit www.kneat.com.

    For further information:

    Katie Keita, Investor Relations Lead, +902-706-9074, katie.keita@kneat.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Security: Minneapolis Man Sentenced to Prison for Insider Trading Scheme

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    ST. PAUL, Minn. – A Minneapolis man has been sentenced to 18 months in federal prison, followed by two years of supervised release, and 320 hours of community service for an insider trading conspiracy involving nonpublic negotiations for the acquisition of a medical device company valued at $1.6 billion, announced First Assistant U.S. Attorney Lisa D. Kirkpatrick.

    According to evidence presented at trial, beginning in January 2018 through at least August 2020, Doron “Ron” Tavlin, 69, of Minneapolis, and Afshin “Alex” Farahan, 58, of Los Angeles, engaged in an insider trading conspiracy. The conspiracy involved nonpublic information about the acquisition of Mazor Robotics, an Israeli-based company that specialized in robotics for spinal procedures, by Medtronic, Inc., an Ireland-based medical device company that primarily operated from its executive headquarters in Minneapolis. Tavlin, while working as vice president of business development at Mazor Robotics, learned material, nonpublic information about Medtronic’s impending acquisition of his company. In violation of federal law and his duty to his former employer, Mazor Robotics, Tavlin tipped this information about the acquisition to his friend, Farahan, and instructed him to buy shares in the company. Tavlin and Farahan knew that Medtronic’s imminent acquisition of Mazor would likely result in an increase in Mazor’s stock price. Farahan used the nonpublic information tipped by Tavlin to quickly buy more than $1 million of Mazor stock throughout August and September 2018. The morning after the secret acquisition was publicly announced, Farahan immediately sold all the stock he had purchased over the preceding weeks based on Tavlin’s illegal tip, which resulted in a profit of over $246,000. According to evidence presented at trial, after the acquisition occurred, Tavlin learned that the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) was investigating certain trades of Mazor securities that occurred prior to the publicly announced acquisition. As part of its inquiry, FINRA asked Tavlin, and other insiders who knew about the secret acquisition negotiations, whether he knew any of the parties who traded in Mazor securities leading up to the public announcement. In January 2019, Tavlin responded to FINRA’s inquiry by falsely denying that he recognized any names on a list of persons and entities that purchased Mazor securities, which included Farahan.

    According to evidence presented at trial, the insider trading conspiracy included an agreement between Tavlin and Farahan that Farahan would pay money to Tavlin in exchange for the material, nonpublic information.

    On February 16, 2024, Tavlin was found guilty on one count of conspiracy to commit insider trading and ten counts of securities fraud and aiding and abetting securities fraud following a nine-day trial. He was sentenced yesterday in U.S. District Court by Judge Donovan W. Frank.

    Farahan pleaded guilty on August 4, 2022, to one count of conspiracy to engage in insider trading. His sentencing hearing will be scheduled at a later time.

    This case is the result of an investigation conducted by the FBI.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Matthew S. Ebert, Robert M. Lewis, and William C. Mattessich prosecuted the case. 

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Scheme launches to support Registered lower-income workers30 October 2024 A temporary scheme to support lower-income workers who have lived in Jersey less than five years has been launched. The Registered Employee Support Payment Scheme (RESPS) has been established as part… Read more

    Source: Channel Islands – Jersey

    30 October 2024

    A temporary scheme to support lower-income workers who have lived in Jersey less than five years has been launched. 

    The Registered Employee Support Payment Scheme (RESPS) has been established as part of the range of support measures to assist employers and employees during Jersey’s transition towards a living wage. 

    Approximately 900 people who are believed to be eligible have been contacted by CLS to let them know that the support is available and that they have until 22 November to apply for a one-off lump sum payment of £250. 

    In order to be eligible for this scheme an individual must: 

    • be aged 18 or over 
    • have been be resident in Jersey for less than 5 years 
    • have Control of Housing and Work Law ‘Registered’ status 
    • not live in a household that meets the residency condition for the Income Support scheme 
    • have contribution earnings declared in every month for Quarter C of 2024 i.e. July, August and September 
    • be resident in Jersey and have a Jersey or other accepted UK bank account in their own name. 

    The scheme acknowledges that, while low-income individuals who have lived in Jersey for more than five years are eligible for Income Support and the Community Cost Bonus to help with their living costs, this support is not available to those that have been in Jersey for less than five years. 

    Minister for Social Security, Deputy Lyndsay Feltham, said: “The transition towards a living wage is an important priority of this Government. By 2026 we aim to reach a minimum wage based on two-thirds of the median wage and we are providing some temporary support measures to these employees during that time.

    “I also recognise the impact the current cost of living is having on lower-income workers not entitled to Income Support. These Islanders provide valuable services across a range of sectors and make a significant contribution to the Island. 

    ​​​​“They will benefit significantly from increases in the minimum wage over the next two years and this scheme is designed to support lower wage earners through this transitionary period, and hopefully encourage them to stay in the Island, and continue to provide important services and skills.”​

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: E3 foreign ministries call for the urgent renewal of Israeli-Palestinian correspondent banking services

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    Statement calling on Israel to urgently renew reciprocal banking arrangements to prevent economic collapse in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

    The foreign ministries of France, Germany and the United Kingdom call for the urgent renewal of Israeli-Palestinian correspondent banking services for a period of at least one year. Failure to renew would completely suspend cross-border trade, which would be catastrophic for the Palestinian economy. This will endanger regional security and harm Palestinian and Israeli businesses alike.

    We note the significant steps completed in recent months to mitigate risks related to illicit financing, including the completion of a National Risk Assessment by the Palestinian Monetary Authority and agreement for a MENAFATF on-site evaluation to take place next year.  

    We urge the Government of Israel to renew the indemnifications without delay for a period of least one year, in line with their obligations under the Paris Protocol. We are committed to working with Israel and the Palestinian Authorities to continue countering the financing of terrorism while reiterating that a failure to renew indemnifications, or another temporary renewal, would be unacceptable and cause serious economic damage to both Israel and the West Bank.

    Updates to this page

    Published 30 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Te Māori Manaaki Taonga Trust Board strengthened

    Source: New Zealand Government

    He toi whakairo, he mana tangata.

    The reappointment of one trustee and the appointment of four new trustees to the Te Māori Manaaki Taonga Trust Board will enable the legacy of Te Māori to be carried forward into the future, Māori Development Minister Tama Potaka and Arts Minister Paul Goldsmith have announced.

    Mr Arapata Hakiwai (Rongowhakaata, Ngāti Kahungunu, Ngāti Porou, Ngāi Tahu) has been reappointed. Mr Hakiwai is currently the kaihautū Māori co-leader at the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, where he provides bicultural leadership and works to develop strong relationships with iwi. 

    The four new appointments are:

    Tā Selwyn Parata (Ngāti Porou). Tā Selwyn is a champion of the utilisation and revitalisation of te reo Māori, tikanga, waiata and kapa haka. Under his leadership, Te Matatini has grown significantly in viewership and kapa haka participation across the country. 

    Ms Puamiria Parata-Goodall (Ngāi Tahu, Ngāti Māmoe, Waitaha and Ngāti Kahungunu). Ms Parata-Goodall has over 30 years’ experience in the arts, culture and heritage sectors. She is current a member of the Ngāi Tahu Fund, Te Pae Kōrako Ngāi Tahu Archives, Canterbury Museum Trust Board and the Arts Council of New Zealand. 

    Mr Ngataiharuru Taepa (Te Arawa, Te Āti Awa). Mr Taepa is one of New Zealand’s most significant and innovative contemporary Māori artists and is the present Chair of Te Atinga, Contemporary Visual Arts Committee of Toi Māori Aotearoa.

    Ms Evie O’Brien (Ngāti Awa, Ngāti Ranginui and Ngāti Pikiao). Ms O’Brien has built a career working in executive leadership in higher education. She was previously the inaugural Program Director at the Atlantic Institute based at Rhodes Trust, Oxford, in the United Kingdom.

    These appointments come as we have just marked the 40th anniversary of Te Māori, Arts Minister Paul Goldsmith says.

    “Te Māori stands as one of Aotearoa New Zealand’s most significant cultural achievements, a transformative event that brought Māori taonga to the world, showcasing the identity, mana, and the richness of Māori culture.”

    Established by founding trustees Tā Hirini Moko Mead, Wiremu Cooper and Te Aue Davis, the Trust sought to ensure that Māori were afforded the skills needed to care for their taonga, Māori Development Minister Tama Potaka says.

    The Trust was relaunched in 2015 by Piri Sciascia, Arapata Hakiwai and Garry Nicholas, with a broader focus including leading and supporting information exchange, knowledge transfer, and increasing awareness and understanding of taonga Māori.

    “I believe there is potential for a reimagined Te Māori, where our culture and taonga amplify international trade and tourism opportunities.  

    “To quote Tā Hirini Moko Mead, ‘Te Māori raised our self-esteem, it gave us more space in the world, it defined clearly our identity as Māori and as New Zealanders, it ennobled us and lifted our morale – illuminated by a new glow of internationalism’.

    “Te Māori is as relevant today as it was 40 years ago, and our collective challenge is to enable its impact to continue.

    “I want to acknowledge and thank Garry Nicholas, for his commitment to reviving and strengthening the Trust.”

    Kua whakapakarihia te Poari o Te Māori Manaaki Taonga Trust

    He toi whakairo, he mana tangata.

    I te whakatūnga i tētahi kaitiaki, me te whakatūnga anō i tētahi tokowhā kaitiaki hōu ki te Poari o Te Māori Manaaki Taonga Trust ka whai mana tonu Te Māori haere ake nei, e ai ki tā te Minita Whanaketanga Māori Tama Potaka rāua ko te Minita Toi Paul Goldsmith tauākī.

    Kua whakatūngia anō a Mr Arapata Hakiwai (Rongowhakaata, Ngāti Kahungunu, Ngāti Porou, Ngāi Tahu). Ko Mr Hakiwai te kaihautū Māori takirua i Te Papa Tongarewa, te tukuna ai e ia ngā aratakinga ā-ahurea, te whakapau kaha ai hoki e kino ai te painga o ngā hononga ki ngā iwi.

    Koia ēnei ko ngā whakatūnga hōu e whā:

    Tā Selwyn Parata (Ngāti Porou). He kaihapahapai a Tā Selwyn i te karawhiua me te whakarauoratia o te reo Māori, te tikanga, te waiata, me te haka. I te urungitanga āna, kua mātotoru te tupuranga o tō Te Matatini hunga mātakitaki, waihoki, kua pēnā hoki te nōhanga mai a te tini makiu ki ngā kapa haka puta noa i te motu.

    Ms Puamiria Parata-Goodall (Ngāi Tahu, Ngāti Māmoe, Waitaha, Ngāti Kahungunu). Kua koni atu i te 30 tau a Ms Parata-Goodall e noho nei ki te ururuatanga o ngā rāngai mō te toi, te ahurea me te tiaki taonga. He mema ia i te Tahua Ngāi Tahu, Te Pae Kōrako Ngāi Tahu Archives, Canterbury Museum Trust Board me Toi Aotearoa.

    Mr Ngataiharuru Taepa (Te Arawa, Te Āti Awa). Ko Mr Taepa tētahi o ngā tino i te ao toi hōu Māori i Aotearoa, ā, ko ia hoki te Upoko o Te Atinga, te Komiti Toi Ataata Hōu o Toi Māori Aotearoa.

    Ms Evie O’Brien (Ngāti Awa, Ngāti Ranginui, Ngāti Pikiao). Kua poipoi a Ms O’Brien i tōna anō umanga i āna mahinga i te hunga kaihautū i te ao mātauranga tiketike. I ōna wā, ko ia te Kaihautū Kaupapa tuatahi i te Atlantic Institute i te Rhodes Trust, i Oxford, i Peretānia.

    He huanga ēnei whakatūnga i tā mātou whakanui i te huringa tau 40 o Te Māori, hei tā te Minita Toi Paul Goldsmith.

    “Mātāmua ko Te Māori e tū ana hei angitutanga ā-ahurea nā Aotearoa, arā, he huinga whakaumu i kitea ai ngā taonga Māori e te ao, i whakaaturia ai te tuakiri, te mana, me te iho o te ahurea Māori.”

    He mea whakatū e ngā kaitiaki, e Tā Hirini Moko Mead rātou ko Wiremu Cooper, ko Te Aue Davis, me te aha anō, ko te kōingotanga o te Tiakitanga kia whāia e te Māori ngā pūkenga e tiakina ai ā rātou taonga, hei tā te Minita Whanaketanga Māori Tama Potaka.

    I whakarewaina anō te Tiakitanga i te 2015 e Piri Sciascia rātou ko Arapata Hakiwai, ko Garry Nicholas, me te whāinga whānui e tae rā anō ana ki te aratakinga me te tautokonga i te whakawhitia o te mōhiohio, te mātauranga, me te whakatairanga i ngā mōhiotanga me ngā māramatanga ki ngā taonga Māori.

    “Hei tāku, he pito mata e pohewatia anō ai Te Māori, e whakanuia ai te tauhokohoko ā-ao me ngā whai wāhitanga ā-tāpoi e tō tātou ahurea me ā tātou taonga.

    “Arā te kōrero a Tā Hirini Moko Mead, ‘Nā Te Māori i hiki ai te wairua, i whai wāhi ai tātou ki te ao hurihuri, nāna tō tātou tuakiri i āta whakatauria mai hei Māori, hei ngāi Aotearoa hoki, nāna tātou i rangatira ai, i mana ai – ā, i miramiratia e te kura o te ao’.

    “E pērā tonu ana te hāngai o Te Māori i ēnei rā, tērā i ngā tau e 40 ki muri, ka mutu, ko tā mātou wero he para i te huarahi e whai pānga tonu ai ia.

    “E tika ana rā hoki kia mihia a Garry Nicholas i tāna ūnga ki te whakaoranga ake me te whakapakarihia o te Tiakitanga.”

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III and South Korean Defense Minister Kim Yong Hyun Hold Joint Media Availability

    Source: United States Department of Defense

    PENTAGON PRESS SECRETARY MAJOR GENERAL PAT RYDER: Well, good afternoon and thank you for being here today. Ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to introduce Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin and Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Kim Yong Hyun. The secretary and the minister will deliver opening remarks and then we’ll have time to take a few questions.

    Please note that I will moderate and call on journalists. And with that, Secretary Austin, over to you sir. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LLOYD AUSTIN: Thanks, Pat. Good afternoon, everybody and thanks for being here. Minister Kim, let me again welcome you and your team to the Pentagon. It’s our honor to host our allies in the Republic of Korea for our 56th Security Consultative Meeting. The SCM is the annual capstone event for the US-ROK Alliance. It brings our defense leaders together to tackle shared challenges and to deepen our friendship.

    For more than 70 years, our alliance has been the foundation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Our two proud democracies share a vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific and we stand shoulder to shoulder against those who would upend the status quo. Now we’re closely tracking the unprecedented level of direct military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK. In our meetings today, we shared our deep concerns about the deployment of DPRK troops to Russia.

    We also discussed how we’re going to work together with our allies and partners to respond to this dangerous and destabilizing escalation. The evidence now suggests that North Korea has sent around 10,000 soldiers to train in eastern Russia and some of these DPRK troops have already moved closer to Ukraine.

    And we’re seeing them outfitted with Russian uniforms and provided with Russian equipment. And I am increasingly concerned that the Kremlin plans to use these North Korean soldiers to support Russia’s combat operations in Russia’s Kursk region near the border with Ukraine. And let me remind you that Russia signed on to the UN Security Council resolutions agreeing not to provide military assistance to North Korea.

    Of course, we know that Putin has gone tin cupping to get weapons from the DPRK and Iran. Turning to a pariah state like North Korea for troops just underscores how much trouble he is in. And we take this very seriously. We urge the Kremlin to change course and we fully understand the security implications for both Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

    Putin will not prevail in Ukraine even with more help from North Korea, but these deeply concerning developments only underscore the importance of our alliance with the ROK and other allies and partners committed to shared security and prosperity. Now, Minister Kim and I had an outstanding meeting today.

    Our discussions move the ball forward to modernize and deepen our alliance that will help protect the security of the Korean Peninsula and shape the future of the Indo-Pacific. It was with a sense of urgency we’ve delivered on a shared security objectives that we set forth just a year ago in a defense vision of the US-ROK Alliance.

    The US Department of Defense and the ROK Ministry of National Defense signed the Nuclear Consultative Group guidelines in July and later that month I traveled to Japan to join an historic trilateral ministerial meeting with the ROK and Japan. It was held in Tokyo for the first time as envisioned by the 2023 Camp David Summit.

    Now I assured Minister Kim today that the United States remains fully committed to the defense of the ROK and our extended deterrence commitment remains ironclad. That commitment is backed by the full range of America’s conventional missile defense, nuclear and advanced non-nuclear capabilities. We’ve also returned to large scale exercises with our ROK allies and that strengthening our combined readiness and our interoperability.

    We’re also working together to tackle shared security challenges across the Indo-Pacific. So today Minister Kim and I endorsed a framework to expand our cooperation throughout the region based on our shared values and common interests. We also discussed the important role of the United Nations Command, which reflects the international community’s long-standing commitment to peace on the peninsula.

    And earlier this year with support from the ROK, we accepted Germany as the 18th member state of the UNC. Moving forward, we’ll build on our momentum and will expand the scope and scale of our cooperation. We’ll use our strategic advantages and innovation in our defense industrial bases to bring cutting edge tech to our warfighters.

    Now our alliance has always been rooted in our shared commitment to act together in the interests that brought us together seven decades ago have continued to grow stronger. Today’s discussion again underscored our shared vision for this alliance’s future. So, Minister Kim, thanks for your leadership and your commitment to this proud alliance.

    We got a lot done today and I look forward to doing even more tomorrow in the US-ROK 2+2 with Secretary Blinken and Minister Cho and thanks very much and now let me turn it over to Minister Kim. SOUTH KOREAN DEFENSE MINISTER KIM YONG-HYUN: (Via interpreter) Good afternoon. This is the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, Kim Yong-hyun. I find it highly meaningful to conduct my first overseas defense diplomatic engagements after my inauguration here at the Pentagon, the heart of safeguarding liberal democracy. Today at the SCM, Secretary Austin and I reviewed the work of implementing the defense vision of the ROK-US alliance over the last year.

    In addition, we reaffirmed that the ROK-US alliance remains more robust than ever, even amid complex international security crisis. While asserting its theory of hostile two nations. North Korea continues to escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula through detonation of sections of inter-Korean roads. In order to deter and respond to DPRK, provocations and

    threats, Secretary Austin and I agreed to maintain an overwhelming combined defense posture and engage in close coordination and responses.

    In particular, we made it clear that DPRK’s ongoing practice of sending filth and trash balloons constitutes a violation of the armistice agreement and called for an immediate cessation of this activity with one voice. Furthermore, we condemned in the strongest terms with a unified voice, the unlawful military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, which directly violates the rules-based order through the deployment of North Korean forces to Russia and arms trade and pledged to closely work with the international community.

    This July, the defense authorities of Korea and the United States completed the NCG Joint Guidelines through the Nuclear Consultative Group, thereby elevating the ROK-US alliance to an unequivocal nuclear based alliance. Building on these guidelines, Secretary Austin and I will diligently pursue the NCG tasks in a substantive manner to enhance the execution capabilities of extended deterrence of ROK and US equal partners.

    Throughout this process, the ROK Strategic Command will be a key unit in the execution of the ROK-US conventional nuclear integration, CNI, operations. Secretary Austin reaffirmed the United States’ unwavering commitment to providing extended deterrence to the Republic of Korea by utilizing the full range of its military capabilities.

    In addition, as tangible evidence of the US commitment to the defense of the ROK, Secretary Austin reiterated that the frequency and intensity of US strategic asset deployment would be increased and made regularized in accordance with President Biden’s commitment in the Washington Declaration. The ROK and the United States will further enhance their — continue to further enhance the Alliance’s capabilities and posture in response to nuclear and missile threats through implementing combined exercises that reflect the North Korean nuclear threats.

    Secretary Austin and I agreed to strengthen security cooperation in the region based on the respective Indo-Pacific strategies of our two countries. The nuclear and missile threat from North Korea is now an existential threat, not only to the ROK, but also to the Indo-Pacific region. We had a shared understanding that the ROK-US-Japan Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework signed this July represents a historic milestone in trilateral security cooperation.

    We will continue to further enhance it. In particular, we highly appreciated the achievements of freedom to exercise the first multi-domain training and have decided to conduct a second training in the near future. In today’s meeting, Secretary Austin and I approved the regional cooperation framework for ROK-US Alliance contributions to security in the Indo-Pacific, demonstrating our commitment to cooperation both domestically and internationally.

    Based on the framework, we will expand substantive cooperation with ASEAN and Pacific Island nations, enhancing the level and broadening the scope of the ROK-US Alliance.

    Secretary Austin and I pledge to strengthen cooperation in science and technology and defense industry based on the defense vision of the alliance.

    We plan to establish a vice minister level defense Science and Technology executive committee within this year to explore the application of cutting-edge science and technology in the defense sector as well as cooperation on all cause Pillar 2. Furthermore, we acknowledge the significance of securing supply chain resilience and modernizing alliance capabilities and pledge to engage in active cooperation in the defense industry sector.

    In this regard, Secretary Austin welcomed ROK’s participation in the US MRO pilot project and underscored the efforts to expand cooperation between our two countries. For more than 70 years, the ROK-US Alliance has overcome countless challenges establishing itself as one of the world’s most premier and exemplary alliances.

    Through the 56th Security Consultative Meeting, Secretary Austin and I reaffirmed our resolve to leap forward as a stronger alliance in response to uncertain future challenges. As the minister of National Defense, I will work closely with Secretary Austin so that the ROK-US Alliance serves as a linchpin of peace and stability in the world extending beyond the Korean Peninsula.

    I deeply appreciate Secretary Austin’s active support for the successful meeting we had today. We go together, [untranslated]. Thank you. MAJ. GEN. RYDER: Thank you very much, gentlemen. Our first question will go to Phil Stewart, Reuters. Q: To Secretary Austin, how soon do you believe that North Korean soldiers may enter the fight against Ukrainian forces in Kursk? Are we talking days or weeks? And do you believe there’s anything the international community can still do to stop that deployment? And to Mr. Kim, does this deployment increase the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula?

    And does this change South Korea’s willingness to provide lethal direct aid to Ukraine? If not, why not? SEC. AUSTIN: Well, Phil, as you heard me say in my opener (pause for translation)— Phil, as you heard me say in my opener, we believe that the DPRK has sent some 10,000 troops into eastern Ukraine and there they’ve been drawing equipment and conducting some training. And some of those troops have begun to make their way towards the border of Ukraine in the Kursk region.

    Whether or not they’ll be employed in the fight, is left to be seen yet. But certainly, if they are employed, then that’s very disturbing. And so, we remain concerned that they’re going to use these troops in combat. I won’t speculate on the timing of employment. Again, this is something we’re going to continue to watch and we’re going to continue to work with allies and partners to discourage Russia from employing these troops in combat.

    Again, this is a violation of the UN security agreement. So, this is pretty serious. Again, we’re going to continue to watch it and continue to work with our allies and partners to discourage it, so (pause for translation) Phil, to be clear, violation of UN sanctions. Q: Do you mean eastern Ukraine? SEC. AUSTIN: I’m sorry? Q: I thought you said deployed to eastern Ukraine. Yeah? Q: Did you mean eastern Ukraine or Eastern Russia that they had deployed to? SEC. AUSTIN: They had deployed to Eastern Russia and then they’re making their way west towards the Ukrainian border, sorry about that. DEFENSE MINISTER KIM YONG-HYUN: (Via interpreter) I’d like to answer the question regarding the increase in the possibility of war breaking out on the Korean Peninsula following the North Korean’s troops deployment to Russia. I do not necessarily believe that the North Korean troops deployment to Russia results in the changes in the possibility of war breaking out on the Korean Peninsula.

    However, I believe this can result in the escalation of the security threats on the Korean Peninsula. This is because there is a high possibility that North Korea, in exchange for their troops deployment, would ask for cutting edge technology transfer. There is a high chance that they would, in exchange for their deployment, North Korea is very likely to ask for technology transfers in diverse areas, including the technologies relating to tactical nuclear weapons technologies related to their advancement of ICBM, also those regarding reconnaissance satellite and those regarding SSBNs as well.

    There is also a high chance that they will try to replace their equipment that have been taken a lot of time, so therefore old technologies or equipment. I believe such changes in the technological situation of North Korea can pose an increase in the escalation of security threats on the Korean Peninsula.

    However, one thing to consider is that as we have witnessed in the Russia-Ukraine war, the conventional weapon capabilities of Russia is not as formidable as we expected it to be. Therefore, even with the possibility of Russia’s cutting-edge technology flowing into North Korea and thereby resulting in the advancement of North Korea’s military technology, I believe it is possible for us to overcome such challenges based on our robust ROK-US alliance and ROK-US-Japan trilateral security cooperation.

    And through these cooperation, I believe we can secure enough and sufficient capability in order to overcome such security challenges. In short, I would rather see the results or impacts of the deployment as an increase that can result. I believe the deployment can result in the security threats on the Korean Peninsula and it could also have a destabilizing impact on the security of the Korean Peninsula, but I don’t believe it is going to be any changes in the possibility of war breaking out on the Korean Peninsula.

    MR. RYDER: Thank you both. Our next question will go to Ji Hun Kim, Yonhap News Agency. Q: (Via interpreter) This is Reporter Kim from Yonhap Agency, and first I have a question to direct it to Minister Kim. Last year’s munition deal between Korea’s corporation and the United States is an exemplary case where Korea was able to provide support toward United States in accordance with the mutual defense treaty. And do you have any additional plans to give indirect support to Ukraine by supplying munitions to the United States in an indirect way?

    And also, there’s another question about the trash and filth balloons. Korea has been showing consistently the kind of response — Korea has been showing response such as collecting the trash balloons after they were dropped on the territory of Korean Peninsula, or they have consistently asked North Korea to cease the release of trash balloons.

    Do you have any additional measures in order to respond to such release of trash or filth balloons from North Korea? And this question, the last question is directed to both Minister Kim and Secretary Austin. North Korea has consistently shown their anti-humanitarian provocations. Do you have any messages in mind that you can deliver to Kim Jong Un and North Korea? DEFENSE MINISTER KIM YONG-HYUN: (Via interpreter) So the first question about munitions supply to United States, I have to give you an answer that at the current moment, nothing is determined. And for your second question about Korea’s response to North Korea’s release of trash and filth balloons, in today’s meeting, Secretary Austin and I have confirmed that the deployment of trash and filth balloons are a violation of armistice agreement. And as the release of trash and filth balloons is a provocation that poses a safety threat to our people, we have been using the response of first identifying and then tracking and then after we found out the location of the dropping. And then we checked if there is any biological or chemical weapons in it after we have gone through all the tests, then we collected those balloons.

    These measures were taken under our assessment that this is the best and most optimal way of guaranteeing and confirming the safety of our people and that this is the way to protect our people in our best way. However, North Korea is crossing the line with various methods of provocations and we are open to all alternatives when it comes to the risk — when it comes to our response to North Korea’s provocation.

    On your third question, I recall it was if I have any message toward — that I have to Kim Jong Un. I believe the essence of North Korean troop deployment is the possibility of expansion of the war. And this results from the intervention of the third party, which is North Korea. And such possibility is resulting in grave concerns of European countries, including Ukraine.

    And the deployment is — North Korea is joining the collusion of Russia’s illegal aggression and invasion, and therefore I see that the deployment is Kim Jong Un’s attempt to maintain

    its dictatorship and Kim Jong Un didn’t hesitate to sell out its young people and troops as cannon fodder mercenaries. I believe such activities is a war crime that is not only anti-humanitarian but also anti-peaceful.

    Therefore, I would like to strongly condemn the activity of Kim Jong Un and I believe all responsibility from the results of the deployment belong to Kim Jong Un. We call for Kim Jong Un’s immediate withdrawal of his troops in our strongest terms. Thank you.

    SEC. AUSTIN: Thank you for the question. I don’t have any messages for the leadership of DPRK. I call upon them to cease their potentially destabilizing behavior in both the Indo-Pacific region and now in the European theater as well. And like my colleague here, Minister Kim, I call upon them to withdraw their troops out of Russia.

    It does have the potential of lengthening the conflict or broadening the conflict if that continues. MR. RYDER: Our next question will go to Courtney Kube, NBC. Q: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, you told Phil that you — the US will continue to watch this deployment and work with allies to discourage it. But how specifically can the US or the international community actually stop? Is there anything the US can do? And you just said that that this does have the potential for broadening the conflict.

    Does that mean that you see the possibility that if in fact Russian troops are fighting alongside North Korean troops that that means other countries could send troops perhaps even to fight alongside the Ukrainians in an advisory level or fighting or anything? And then just one more, this is my real question. Those were follow ups.

    My real question is just what happens when North Korean troops are killed by US provided weapons? And then Minister Kim, do you see any signs that North Korea plans to interfere in the US elections? We — your DIA said today that DPRK may be ready to launch an ICBM, perhaps a nuclear weapon.

    Is there any indication that that could be or other actions that they may be taking could be specifically to interfere with the US election? Thank you. You only get one. SEC. AUSTIN: So Courtney, the first of your 20 questions here was whether or not we can stop the DPRK from sending troops. We certainly can work with others to discourage this — this kind of behavior. But I didn’t mean to imply that we can stop that. But certainly, their actions have consequences as all actions have consequences.

    And we need to be mindful of that. In terms of what could happen, you mentioned my reference to potentially broadening this conflict. Yes, it could encourage others to take action, different kinds of action, but I won’t speculate on what could exactly happen. But we — there are a number of things that could happen.

    And what happens when DPRK soldiers are killed with US provided weapons? Well, if the DPRK soldiers are fighting alongside Russian soldiers in this conflict and attacking Ukrainian soldiers, Ukrainian soldiers have the right to defend themselves and they will do that with the weapons that we provided and others have provided.

    That’s to be expected. But if they are fighting alongside of — of Russian soldiers, they are co-belligerents and you have every reason to believe that those kinds of things will happen, that they will be killed and wounded as a result of battle. DEFENSE MINISTER KIM YONG-HYUN: (Via interpreter) Thank you for giving 20 questions to Secretary Austin, but only one for me. I’m so happy. So on your question about the possibility that North Korea attempts to interfere with US presidential election, my short answer is that the possibility is not high. I believe there isn’t a high chance of them attempting to interfere with the election.

    However, I believe there is a high chance that they would want to exaggerate their existence around the season of US presidential election before and after the election. The expected courses of action that North Korea could take in their attempt to provoke could be either their launch of ICBM or their seventh nuclear tests. MR. RYDER: Thank you. Our final question will go to Ji-ho Yang, Chosun. Q: (Via interpreter) This is Reporter Yang from Chosun Daily. First, I have a question to Minister Kim. The main opposition party of Republic of Korea has expressed their opposition to North Korea’s dispatch of analysis team and Korean delegation to Ukraine. So from your perspective, Minister Kim, what do you think is the role that Korean military can play in Ukraine?

    And I have another — I have a question to Secretary Austin. So it is my understanding that the current assessment of the United States DOD is that North Korea did deploy troops to Ukraine — to Russia, however, they were not involved in any combats at the moment. So however, some are claiming that North Korean troops that are — are already being deployed are being — are already being in engagement.

    So like, what would be your standard to determine whether the participation of these North Korean troops will be deployment or actual participation in combat operations? And also you have — US DOD has also made a statement that the North Korean troops who are in Russia will also be classified as enemies that can be attacked by — by US weapons that are supplied to Ukraine.

    So could you give a little more elaboration on this statement? This concludes my question. DEFENSE MINISTER KIM YONG-HYUN: So I recall the question was about our observers and monitoring teams of Korea that are — that are and could be sent to Ukraine. So throughout the history in many different wars, including the Iraq war, there have been many

    cases where we have sent monitoring teams or lesson learned analysis team to the countries that are currently — that were in war.

    The role of such observers or analysis team play in the war is mainly analysis of the trends of the modern warfare or different aspects of modern welfare. And especially as we have confirmed North Korean troops were deployed to Russia, I believe it could serve as a great opportunity for our analysis team or observer to learn the movements or trends of the North Korean troops.

    In many wars there — we have witnessed many new and diverse weapon systems continuously popping up and also we were able to witness many different modern tactics in the war. I believe if we can collect such information diligently and then utilize it for our future safety of — and stability of our country, I believe it can serve as an opportunity for us to provide better protection to our — the people of Republic of Korea.

    I believe it is an obvious task that our military should play to send observers and analysis team to the Russia-Ukraine war. And I — I would even say that if we don’t send our observers or analysis team, it would mean that we are not faithfully doing our jobs. SEC. AUSTIN: So thank you for your question. As I understand it, the first question was what was our — what is our standard for determining whether or not the DPRK troops are actually fighting or in the fight. And the second question was whether or not they can be engaged with US weapons. So I think standards are pretty easy.

    If they’re fighting, if they’re attacking Ukrainian soldiers and they are co-belligerents, they’re a part of this fight, that’s fairly easy to determine. And it’s not certain that they will be introduced into this fight. But clearly 10,000 soldiers, and some of them are moving west towards the Ukrainian border, then there’s a good likelihood that they will be employed, but we’ll see.

    We won’t speculate. We’ll collect evidence. They’re doing this because Putin has lost a lot of troops, a lot of troops. And you know, he has a choice of either getting other people to help him or he can mobilize. And he doesn’t want to mobilize because then the people in Russia will begin to understand the extent of his losses of their losses.

    So there’s a good likelihood that these troops will be introduced into combat, not certain, but I think the likelihood is pretty high. But this is not a sign of strength. It’s a sign of weakness. Putin has not achieved one strategic objective in two and a half years against a force that was far inferior to his force. That’s a sign of weakness. Again, he’s gone to other countries for weapons and munitions and now he’s going to other countries for people. And as I said earlier, if they are fighting and they’re co-belligerents, they’re attacking Ukrainian troops and the Ukrainian troops have the right to defend themselves, and we have every expectation that they will.

    They’ll use their own weapons. They’ll use the weapons that they’ve been provided, and that won’t be a surprise to anyone. But this doesn’t have to happen. Putin can end this war

    today. It was his choice to launch this war. He’s not achieved his objectives. He can end this war and he should end this war.

    Otherwise, we’ll see a lot more losses on both sides and that’s really highly unnecessary. But I think in terms of our standards for determining whether or not they’re fighting, they’re in the fight, I think it’ll be pretty easy to determine that. OK. MAJ. GEN. RYDER: Secretary Austin, Minister Kim, thank you both, gentlemen. Ladies and gentlemen, that’s all the time we have available today. This concludes our press briefing. Thank you.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Preparation, swift response define wildfire season

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Aerial view of wildfires near Fox Lake and Garden River in July.

    Through effective investments, including a historic $155-million wildfire base budget, Alberta’s government ensured the province was prepared to respond throughout the 2024 wildfire season. In anticipation of the wildfire season, Alberta’s government recruited 100 additional wildland firefighters and an additional 40 contract wildland firefighters – in addition to securing more airtankers, heavy equipment, and helicopters equipped with night vision technology. As a result of this preparation, front-line crews were able to respond quickly and fight fires around the clock, containing 85 per cent of wildfires within 24 hours of detection.

    “While the 2024 wildfire season was challenging, our coordinated efforts and the resilience of Albertans have been crucial in mitigating the impact. We will continue to adapt and strengthen our wildfire management strategies to protect our communities and natural resources.”

    Todd Loewen, Minister of Forestry and Parks

    “This wildfire season has tested our resolve, especially in areas like Fox Lake and Jasper. The coordinated efforts of our firefighters and support teams were instrumental in protecting our communities. We will build on this experience to continue to improve response strategies and initiate new strategies to ensure the safety of all Albertans.”

    Martin Long, MLA for West Yellowhead

    The 2024 wildfire season began earlier than usual, with 64 carryover wildfires stemming from a mild winter and extremely dry conditions. In response to this elevated danger, Alberta’s government activated an early start to the wildfire season on February 20, 2024, implementing a fire ban and fire permit system to prevent additional human-caused wildfires.

    Despite significant challenges, including large wildfires near Jasper that led to evacuations and the tragic loss of an Alberta wildland firefighter, as well as the loss of homes and businesses in the community, Alberta Wildfire demonstrated remarkable coordination, offering immediate aid and resources to Parks Canada, including support personnel, firefighters, aircraft and equipment.

    While supporting the Jasper response led by Parks Canada, Alberta Wildfire crews continued to tackle substantial wildfires throughout the province, deploying personnel, aircraft and equipment to combat wildfires and assist impacted communities. Throughout the season, residents of Garden River, John D’Or Prairie, Fox Lake in the Little Red River Cree Nation, and the Chipewyan Cree Nation were also evacuated. Additionally, an area near Peace River and four neighborhoods in Fort McMurray faced short-term evacuations due to wildfires.

    “In the wake of the heartbreaking loss from the Jasper wildfire, we are reminded of the strength found in collaboration – with each other and among all orders of government. We are reminded also of the compelling need to invest together in training, preparation, mitigation and adaptation, ensuring that we not only respond effectively, but that we also build a more resilient future.”

    Richard Ireland, mayor, Town of Jasper

    “The 2024 wildfire season underscored the importance of early planning and preparation. Investments in people, resources and new technology proved invaluable in our response efforts.”

    Trevor Lamabe, executive director Wildfire Management Branch

    During the 2024 wildfire season, Alberta Wildfire responded to more than 1,210 wildfires in the Forest Protection Area, exceeding last year’s record-breaking total. While the number of fires in 2024 exceeded the total number of fires in 2023, wildfires this season burned less than a third of the area compared with 2023, underscoring the effectiveness of Alberta’s preparation and investments.

    Although Oct. 31 marks the end of Alberta’s wildfire season, Alberta Wildfire remains vigilant and ready to respond to any potential wildfires across the province.

    Quick Facts

    • Alberta Wildfire responded to more than 1,210 wildfires this year with more than 705,000 hectares burned.
    • In 2023, there were 1,080 wildfires and more than 2.2 million hectares burned.
    • Alberta Wildfire had almost 1,900 firefighters, contractors and support staff working on Alberta’s provincial response.
    • Alberta Wildfire also received assistance from other agencies with more than 1,300 firefighters and support staff arriving from around the world to assist.
    • While most wildfires were caused by people, we had 410 lightning-caused wildfires in July, the highest number in 20-years.

    Related information

    • Alberta Wildfire
    • Alberta Wildfire app
    • Alberta Wildfire Status Dashboard

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI China: China publishes world’s first international standard for stem cell data

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, Oct. 30 — The world’s first international standard for stem cell data, ISO8472-1, has been officially released, the Institute of Zoology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences said Wednesday.

    This standard is expected to enhance global stem cell data management and make contributions to the advancement of stem cell research and applications, according to the institute.

    As biotechnology advances rapidly worldwide, stem cell data is proliferating. However, the lack of international standards for stem cell data has resulted in issues such as unregulated data management and low efficiency in data sharing and application.

    ISO8472-1, co-formulated by experts from China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and other countries, stipulates a framework for the interoperability of stem cell data. It is applicable to related databases, data management systems, web interfaces, and more in the field of stem cell research.

    The release of ISO8472-1 will provide standard and guidance for data management in the field of stem cells and offer a systematic framework for the development of subsequent international standards for stem cell data, said Qiao Gexia, director of the Institute of Zoology.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI: Capgemini Q3 2024 revenues

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Media relations:
    Victoire Grux
    Tel.: +33 6 04 52 16 55
    victoire.grux@capgemini.com

    Investor relations:
    Vincent Biraud
    Tel.: +33 1 47 54 50 87
    vincent.biraud@capgemini.com

    Capgemini Q3 2024 revenues

    • Q3 2024 revenues of €5,377 million, down -1.6% at constant exchange rates*
    • 9M 2024 revenues of €16,515 million, down -2.3% at constant exchange rates
    • FY 2024 constant currency revenue growth target revised to -2.0% to -2.4% and operating margin target narrowed to 13.3% to 13.4%
    • FY 2024 organic free cash-flow target confirmed at around €1.9 billion

    Paris, October 30, 2024 – The Capgemini Group reported consolidated revenues of €5,377 million in Q3 2024, down -1.9% year-on-year on a reported basis, and down -1.6% at constant exchange rates*.

    Aiman Ezzat, Chief Executive Officer of the Capgemini Group, said: “Our growth improved marginally in Q3 compared to Q2, despite stronger headwinds than anticipated in some sectors, primarily in Manufacturing. However, we continue to see recovery in Financial Services and gradually lesser headwinds from Telco and Tech.

    In a market that remains soft overall, we expect to deliver a similar growth in Q4 while demonstrating the resilience of our operating margin and organic free cash-flow. Client demand continues to be driven by operational efficiencies and cost reduction and we seize their growing appetite for AI and Gen AI services.

    Our positioning as a business and technology transformation partner, the relevance of our offerings and the quality of our talent are driving our solid book-to-bill ratio and growing pipeline of strategic deals. We are also launching a set of targeted actions to simplify our operations to make the Group more agile with a stronger emphasis on growth.

    Based on Q4 perspectives, we now expect a full-year constant currency growth rate of -2.0% to -2.4% and narrow the operating margin target to 13.3% to 13.4%, while the organic free cash-flow target of around €1.9 billion is confirmed.”

      (in millions of euros)   Change
    Revenues 2023 2024   At current
    exchange rates
    At constant
    exchange rates*
    Q3 5,480 5,377   -1.9% -1.6%
    9 months 16,906 16,515   -2.3% -2.3%

    After bottoming out in Q1 2024, Capgemini activity trends improved again in Q3, but only marginally. The Group generated revenues of €5,377 million in Q3 2024, down -1.9% year-on-year on a reported basis and -1.6% at constant exchange rates*. On an organic basis (i.e., restated for changes in Group scope and exchange rates), revenues contracted by -2.1%. For the first nine months of the year, growth stands at -2.3%, both on a reported basis and at constant exchange rates.

    Clients remained focused on driving efficiencies through large digital transformation programs, at the expense of discretionary deals. This is fueling strong demand for Capgemini’s Cloud and Data & AI/Gen AI services, as well as for digital core modernization and intelligent supply chain services that are key focus themes in the current environment.

    Bookings totaled €5,222 million in Q3 2024, down -0.8% at constant exchange rates, leading to a book-to-bill ratio of 0.97 for the period. Generative AI bookings amounted to around €600 million over the last 9 months which represent around 3.5% of Group bookings.

    OPERATIONS BY REGION

    In the Group’s largest regions, Q3 growth rates remained similar to Q2. Overall, this reflects the continued recovery in Financial Services across all regions combined with, as anticipated, a slowdown in the Manufacturing sector.

    At constant exchange rates, revenues in the North America region (28% of Group revenues in Q3 2024) decreased by -3.9% year-on-year. Financial Services further improved, yet still posting a year-on-year decline in Q3. Overall, the revenue contraction was driven by the Consumer Goods & Retail, Energy & Utilities, and Public sectors.

    Revenues in the United Kingdom and Ireland region (13% of Group revenues) returned to positive growth at +0.4%. The continued dynamism of the Energy & Utilities sector and a resilient Manufacturing sector outweighed the contraction in the Consumer Goods & Retail sector.

    Revenues in France (19% of Group revenues) decreased by -2.5%. Growth in the Public sector, along with positive momentum in TMT (Telecoms, Media & Technology), were more than offset by the slowdown of the Manufacturing sector.

    Revenues in the Rest of Europe region (31% of Group revenues) increased by +0.6%. Solid growth in Financial Services, as well as continued dynamism in Energy & Utilities and Public sector, made up for the contraction in the Manufacturing and TMT sectors.

    Lastly, revenues in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America region (9% of Group revenues) were down -2.2%. In the Asia-Pacific region, strong momentum in the Public sector and improving Financial Services were more than offset by visible weakness in the Consumer Goods & Retail and Manufacturing sectors. Growth acceleration in Latin America was mostly driven by the Consumer Goods & Retail sector.

    OPERATIONS BY BUSINESS        

    In Q3 2024, at constant exchange rates, the growth in Strategy & Transformation services (9% of the Group’s total revenues* in Q3 2024) further strengthened to +6.5% year-on-year. This reflects continued client demand for strategic consulting on their transition towards a more digital and sustainable model as well as their unwavering interest in the broad AI and Gen AI opportunities.

    In Applications & Technology services (63% of the Group’s total revenues and Capgemini’s core business), growth rates improved by 170 basis points compared to Q2, to -1.2% year-on-year in Q3.

    Lastly, Operations & Engineering total revenues (28% of the Group’s total revenues) decreased by -3.4% primarily driven by the contraction in Infrastructure Services and, to a lesser extent, Engineering services.

    HEADCOUNT

    The Group’s total headcount stands at 338,900 as at September 30, 2024, down -1.1% year-on-year and up +0.6% since the end of June. The offshore workforce stands at 194,400 employees or 57% of the total headcount.

    OUTLOOK

    The Group’s financial targets for 2024 are updated as follows:

    • Revenue growth of -2.0% to -2.4% at constant currency (was -0.5% to -1.5%);
    • Operating margin of 13.3% to 13.4% (was 13.3% to 13.6%);
    • Organic free cash-flow of around €1.9 billion (unchanged).

    The inorganic contribution to growth should be 40 basis points.

    CONFERENCE CALL

    Aiman Ezzat, Chief Executive Officer, accompanied by Nive Bhagat, Chief Financial Officer, and Olivier Sevillia, Chief Operating Officer, will present this press release during a conference call in English to be held today at 8.00 a.m. Paris time (CET). You can follow this conference call live via webcast at the following link. A replay will also be available for a period of one year.

    All documents relating to this publication will be posted on the Capgemini investor website at https://investors.capgemini.com/en/.

    PROVISIONAL CALENDAR

    February 18, 2025        FY 2024 results
    April 29, 2025        Q1 2025 revenues
    May 7, 2025        Shareholders’ Meeting
    July 30, 2025        H1 2025 results

    DISCLAIMER

    This press release may contain forward-looking statements. Such statements may include projections, estimates, assumptions, statements regarding plans, objectives, intentions and/or expectations with respect to future financial results, events, operations and services and product development, as well as statements, regarding future performance or events. Forward-looking statements are generally identified by the words “expects”, “anticipates”, “believes”, “intends”, “estimates”, “plans”, “projects”, “may”, “would”, “should” or the negatives of these terms and similar expressions. Although Capgemini’s management currently believes that the expectations reflected in such forward-looking statements are reasonable, investors are cautioned that forward-looking statements are subject to various risks and uncertainties (including, without limitation, risks identified in Capgemini’s Universal Registration Document available on Capgemini’s website), because they relate to future events and depend on future circumstances that may or may not occur and may be different from those anticipated, many of which are difficult to predict and generally beyond the control of Capgemini. Actual results and developments may differ materially from those expressed in, implied by or projected by forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are not intended to and do not give any assurances or comfort as to future events or results. Other than as required by applicable law, Capgemini does not undertake any obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statement.

    This press release does not contain or constitute an offer of securities for sale or an invitation or inducement to invest in securities in France, the United States or any other jurisdiction.

    ABOUT CAPGEMINI

    Capgemini is a global business and technology transformation partner, helping organizations to accelerate their dual transition to a digital and sustainable world, while creating tangible impact for enterprises and society. It is a responsible and diverse group of 340,000 team members in more than 50 countries. With its strong over 55-year heritage, Capgemini is trusted by its clients to unlock the value of technology to address the entire breadth of their business needs. It delivers end-to-end services and solutions leveraging strengths from strategy and design to engineering, all fueled by its market leading capabilities in AI, cloud and data, combined with its deep industry expertise and partner ecosystem. The Group reported 2023 global revenues of €22.5 billion.

    Get the Future You Want | www.capgemini.com

    * *

    *

    APPENDIX3F1

    BUSINESS CLASSIFICATION

    • Strategy & Transformation includes all strategy, innovation and transformation consulting services.
    • Applications & Technology brings together “Application Services” and related activities and notably local technology services.
    • Operations & Engineering encompasses all other Group businesses. These comprise Business Services (including Business Process Outsourcing and transaction services), all Infrastructure and Cloud services, and R&D and Engineering services.

    DEFINITIONS

    Organic growth or like-for-like growth in revenues is the growth rate calculated at constant Group scope and exchange rates. The Group scope and exchange rates used are those for the reported period. Exchange rates for the reported period are also used to calculate growth at constant exchange rates.

    Reconciliation of growth rates Q1 2024 Q2 2024 Q3 2024 9M 2024
    Organic growth -3.6% -2.3% -2.1% -2.7%
    Changes in Group scope +0.3 pts +0.4 pts +0.5 pts +0.4 pts
    Growth at constant exchange rates -3.3% -1.9% -1.6% -2.3%
    Exchange rate fluctuations -0.2 pts +0.4 pts -0.3 pts -0.0 pts
    Reported growth -3.5% -1.5% -1.9% -2.3%

    When determining activity trends by business and in accordance with internal operating performance measures, growth at constant exchange rates is calculated based on total revenues, i.e., before elimination of inter-business billing. The Group considers this to be more representative of activity levels by business. As its businesses change, an increasing number of contracts require a range of business expertise for delivery, leading to a rise in inter-business flows.

    Operating margin is one of the Group’s key performance indicators. It is defined as the difference between revenues and operating costs. It is calculated before “Other operating income and expense” which include amortization of intangible assets recognized in business combinations, expenses relative to share-based compensation (including social security contributions and employer contributions) and employee share ownership plan, and non-recurring revenues and expenses, notably impairment of goodwill, negative goodwill, capital gains or losses on disposals of consolidated companies or businesses, restructuring costs incurred under a detailed formal plan approved by the Group’s management, the cost of acquiring and integrating companies acquired by the Group, including earn-outs comprising conditions of presence, and the effects of curtailments, settlements and transfers of defined benefit pension plans.

    Normalized net profit is equal to profit for the year (Group share) adjusted for the impact of items recognized in “Other operating income and expense”, net of tax calculated using the effective tax rate. Normalized earnings per share is computed like basic earnings per share, i.e., excluding dilution.

    Organic free cash flow is equal to cash flow from operations less acquisitions of property, plant, equipment and intangible assets (net of disposals) and repayments of lease liabilities, adjusted for cash out relating to the net interest cost.

    Net debt (or net cash) comprises (i) cash and cash equivalents, as presented in the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows (consisting of short-term investments and cash at bank) less bank overdrafts, and also including (ii) cash management assets (assets presented separately in the Consolidated Statement of Financial Position due to their characteristics), less (iii) short- and long-term borrowings. Account is also taken of (iv) the impact of hedging instruments when these relate to borrowings, intercompany loans, and own shares.

    REVENUES BY REGION

      Revenues
    (in millions of euros)
      Year-on-year growth
      Q3 2023 Q3 2024   Reported At constant exchange rates
    North America 1,608 1,530   -4.9% -3.9%
    United Kingdom and Ireland 676 690   +2.1% +0.4%
    France 1,045 1,019   -2.5% -2.5%
    Rest of Europe 1,633 1,646   +0.8% +0.6%
    Asia-Pacific and Latin America 518 492   -5.0% -2.2%
    TOTAL 5,480 5,377   -1.9% -1.6%
      Revenues
    (in millions of euros)
      Year-on-year growth
      9 months
    2023
    9 months
    2024
      Reported At constant exchange rates
    North America 4,896 4,638   -5.3% -4.9%
    United Kingdom and Ireland 2,062 2,070   +0.4% -1.8%
    France 3,353 3,264   -2.6% -2.6%
    Rest of Europe 5,105 5,116   +0.2% +0.1%
    Asia-Pacific and Latin America 1,490 1,427   -4.2% -1.9%
    TOTAL 16,906 16,515   -2.3% -2.3%

    REVENUES BY BUSINESS

      Total revenues*
    (% of Group revenues)
    Year-on-year growth at constant exchange rates in total revenues of the business
      Q3 2024
    Strategy & Transformation 9% +6.5%
    Applications & Technology 63% -1.2%
    Operations & Engineering 28% -3.4%
      Total revenues*
    (% of Group revenues)
    Year-on-year growth at constant exchange rates in total revenues of the business
      9 months
    2024
    Strategy & Transformation 9% +3.9%
    Applications & Technology 62% -2.7%
    Operations & Engineering 29% -2.3%

    1 Note that in the appendix, certain totals may not equal the sum of amounts due to rounding adjustments.

    Attachments

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: SUBC – Ex. Dividend NOK 3.00 on 30 October 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Luxembourg – 30 October 2024

    • Issuer: Subsea 7 S.A.
    • Ex-date: 30 October 2024
    • Dividend amount: NOK 3.00
    • Announced currency: Norwegian Krone

    Contact for investment community enquiries:
    Katherine Tonks
    Investor Relations Director
    Tel +44 20 8210 5568
    ir@subsea7.com

    This information is published in accordance with the requirements of the Continuing Obligations.

    This stock exchange release was published by Katherine Tonks, Investor Relations, Subsea7, on 30 October 2024 at 07:00 CET.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Melexis Q3 2024 results – Third quarter sales of 247.9 million EUR

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Regulated information

    Intermediate declaration by the Board of Directors

    Ieper, Belgium – October 30th, 2024, 07.00 hrs CET

    Dear,

    Please find herewith the link to our most recent press release:

    www.melexis.com/en/news/2024/financial/melexis-q3-2024-results

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Amundi: Third quarter and nine-month 2024 results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Amundi: Third quarter and nine-month 2024 results

    Net income1,2up +16% Q3/Q3 and record assets under management at €2.2 trillion

    Strong growth in earnings and revenues   Q3 – adjusted net income1,2 at €337m, fast-growing: +16.1% Q3/Q3

    • Thanks to revenue growth (+10.5%) and positive jaws effect
    • Q3/Q3 cost/income ratio improvement at 52.9%3

    9 months – adjusted net income1,2 at €1,005m, up +10.4% 9M/9M

    Earnings per share2: €1.65 for Q3, €4.91 for 9M

         
    Record AuM
    & dynamic MLT inflows5
      Record assets under management3: €2,192bn at 30 September 2024, up +11% year-on-year

    Q3 net inflows3 of +€2.9bn, or +€14.5bn excluding the exit from a large, low-income institutional mandate4

    • +€9.1bn in MLT assets4,5,6
    • Solid commercial momentum of Asian JVs: +€5.3bn
         
    Continued strategic progress   ETFs6: +€8bn in Q3 net inflows, now more than €250bn in assets under management
    Third-party distribution: +€7bn Q3 net inflows, with contribution from all regions and asset classes

    Asia: +€7bn in Q3 net inflows, from JVs and direct distribution in Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and China

    Technology: revenues +42% Q3/Q3

    Victory Capital: approval7 of the partnership with Amundi secured at EGM, transaction expected to close in Q1 2025

    Paris, 30 October 2024

    Amundi’s Board of Directors met on 29 October 2024 under the chairmanship of Philippe Brassac, and reviewed the financial statements for the third quarter and the first 9 months of 2024.

    Valérie Baudson, Chief Executive Officer, said:
    « Amundi’s results in the third quarter of 2024 demonstrate our ongoing strategic progress and continued growth potential. Our Q3 net profit1,2of €337m, increased by +16% compared to the same period in 2023 and exceeded one billion euros over 9 months. Assets under management reached a record level of €2.2 trillion.

    We have been able to support our clients whatever their profile and needs, which has resulted in a high level of net inflows in our strategic development areas, namely Asia, Third-Party Distributors, and ETFs.

    By putting clients at the heart of our strategy and by continuing to develop the areas of expertise that primarily seek to meet their needs, we are ideally positioned to seize growth opportunities in the savings industry. »

    * * * * *

    Further progress in achieving our 2025 Ambitions plan

    Q3 2024 saw key areas of focus under the “2025 Strategic Ambitions” plan contribute to activity and earnings growth.

    • ETFs exceeded €250bn in assets under management at the end of September, up +31% year-on-year, thanks in particular to very dynamic net inflows reaching +€17bn over 9 months, including +€8bn in Q3. This places Amundi in second place in the European market in terms of net inflows this quarter8. these inflows are well diversified across equity and fixed income products, with a high share of products classified as responsible investment9 in net inflows (+€3bn, or 34% market share in flows in this market segment). Amundi has had many commercial successes this quarter: for example, the Amundi ETF Stoxx Europe 600 is the best-selling (+€0.85bn) European equity ETFs in Q3, the Amundi ETF Euro Government Tilted Green Bond, launched last year, saw its assets under management exceed €3bn after gathering +€1.1bn since the beginning of the year, and the Amundi ETF Prime ACWI exceeded €1bn in assets under management 8 months after its launch.
    • Third-Party Distribution reached €377bn in assets under management at the end of September, up +24% year-on-year, with net inflows +€19bn for 9 months 2024, and +€7bn in Q3, thanks to contributions from all regions and asset classes, from ETFs, treasury products and active management;
    • Asia assets under management increased by +17% year-on-year to €458bn; net inflows for 9 months 2024 stood at +€30bn with a significant contribution from Amundi’s Indian JV SBI MF, which now has €278bn in assets, up +19% year-on-year (+€18bn in net inflows); €103bn of total Asian assets under management come from direct distribution excluding JVs (+20% year-on-year), with net inflows for 9 months 2024 standing at +€3bn in Japan, +€2.4bn Singapore, +€1.4bn Hong Kong and also +€1.7bn in China outside the two JVs, mainly with institutional clients;
    • The Technology & Services offering is also experiencing strong growth, with technology revenues of €54m over 9 months, up +28% compared to the same period in 2023, and even +42% Q3/Q3; the Fund Channel fund distribution platform exceeded €490bn in assets at the end of September 2024; during the quarter it signed a distribution agreement with ING Germany and integrated the fintech AirFund into its ecosystem to digitise access to private markets; Fund Channel was also ranked “Best Distribution Platform” for the third consecutive year by the consulting and research firm Platforum;
    • In fixed income expertise, Amundi now manages €1,160bn in assets10 across a wide range of solutions, from treasury products to target maturity funds, offering attractive returns and capital protection; fixed income net inflows stood at +€46bn10 over 9 months and +€14bn10 in Q3 thanks to sustained activity in active bond strategies (+€11bn excluding JV) and ETFs (+€2.5bn);
    • The partnership project with Victory Capital reached an important milestone with shareholder approval of resolutions7 necessary to finalise the transactions, expected in Q1 2025. As a reminder, this partnership aims at creating a larger US investment platform, via the contribution of Amundi US to Victory Capital in return for Amundi taking a 26%-stake of the combined entity as well as 15-year distribution agreements, to serve the clients of both companies; Amundi would thus have a greater number of US and global management expertise to offer its clients. The transaction, which involves no disbursement of cash, is expected to bring a low single-digit accretion for Amundi shareholders, with an increase in the contribution of our US operations to the adjusted net income and EPS.

    Activity

    Market environment

    In the third quarter of 2024, equity markets11 increased by +1.1% in average compared to the previous quarter and by +15.6% compared to Q3 2023. The European bond markets12 also rose, reflecting the shift in monetary policy and the ECB’s decision to cut rates. Year-on-year, our benchmark index12 increased by +6.3% in Q3 2024 compared to Q3 2023 and by +2.1% compared to Q2 2024. The market effect is therefore positive on the evolution of Amundi’s revenues and net income.

    When compared to the 2021 averages used as a reference for the 2025 Ambitions plan, the market effect is only slightly positive.

    The European asset management market continues its gradual recovery. Open-ended fund volumes13, at +€213bn in the third quarter, continued to be driven by treasury products (+€93bn) and passive management (+€75bn). Nevertheless, the third quarter recorded positive flows in medium- to long-term active management for the second quarter in a row (+€45bn), driven by fixed income strategies (+€69bn).

    High level of activity over the quarter in MLT assets5, assets under management at a record level of €2.2tn

    Activity this quarter continues to be marked, like the rest of the European market, by risk aversion among retail clients. However, Amundi performed well, driven in particular by ETFs, bond solutions, third-party distributors and Asia. Excluding the exceptional exit from a low-income insurance mandate4, net inflows were positive in all major medium- to long-term areas of expertise (passive, active, structured products and real assets), in all client segments (Retail, Institutional and JV), and in all major markets (France, Italy, Germany, Asia and the United States).

    Amundi’s assets under management at 30 September 2024 increased by +11.1% year-on-year (compared to the end of September 2023) and by +1.6% quarter-on-quarter (compared to the end of June 2024), to €2,192bn, an all-time high.

    In the third quarter of 2024, the market and currency effect amounted to +€32.5bn (+€175.9bn over a year) and Amundi generated positive net inflows of +€2.9bn. As announced at the time of the second quarter results publication, this amount includes the exit of a low-income multi-asset mandate4 with a European insurer, of €11.6bn.

    Adjusted for this exit4, net inflows for the quarter were +€14.4bn of which +€9.1bn in MLT Assets5. It was positive in active management (+€4.3bn) and ETFs (+€7.8bn), partially offset by outflows from index strategies. Structured products and real and alternative assets also recorded positive net inflows (+€0.8bn), while treasury products were flat (+€0.1bn).

    Finally, the JVs14continued their solid commercial momentum, with net inflows of +€5.3bn, reflecting a positive contribution from India (SBI MF, +€6.0bn) and South Korea (NH-Amundi, +€0.4bn), partially offset this quarter by slight net outflows in China (ABC-CA) despite continued open-ended net inflows.

    By Client Segment, Retail recorded net inflows of +€6.3bn, of which +€1.3bn in MLT assets5, with contrasting developments according to the sub-segments:

    • Third-Party Distributors had another very good quarter in terms of total net inflows (+€6.8bn); all regions contributed to these inflows, which were highly diversified across asset classes, with positive contributions from ETFs, treasury products but also active management (+€1.5bn);
    • Risk aversion has a larger impact on the activity of partner network clients in France (+€1.1bn) and outside France excluding Amundi BOC WM (-€0.9bn), despite the good performance of structured and treasury products as well as bond strategies; Sabadell’s network in Spain continues its sales momentum (+€0.4bn);
    • In China, Amundi BOC WM posted net outflows this quarter (-€0.7bn), as the maturities of fixed-term funds were not offset by open-ended fund subscriptions.

    Excluding the loss of the low-income insurance mandate already mentioned4, the Institutional segment recorded very positive inflows in MLT Assets5(+€7.8bn), in all sub-segments: Institutional & Sovereigns with +€4.4bn, CA & SG insurance mandates with +€2.4bn thanks to the continued recovery of the traditional life insurance Euro contracts this quarter, Corporates and Employee Savings (+€1.0bn) thanks to net inflows in short-term bond products from corporates. Net outflows in Treasury Products (-€4.9bn) are to a large extent seasonal.

    Results

    Sustained growth in net income, +16% Q3/Q3 to €337m, and more than €1bn in the 9 months of 2024

    Adjusted data2

    In the third quarter of 2024, adjusted net income2reached €337m, up +16.1% compared to the third quarter of 2023. Since the second quarter, it includes Alpha Associates, whose acquisition was finalised in early April.

    The growth in net income was mainly due to organic revenue growth, amplified by operating efficiency, which led to a positive jaws effect, and by the very strong momentum of Asian JVs. These results were achieved against the backdrop of continued client risk aversion, and inflation.

    Adjusted net revenues2 reached €862m, up +10.5% compared to the third quarter of 2023.

    • The sustained growth in net management fees, up +9.2% compared to the third quarter of 2023, to €805m, reflects the good level of activity and the increase in average assets under management excluding JVs (+8.6% over the same period);
    • Performance fees (€20m) doubled compared to the third quarter of 2023 (€10m), a low basis of comparison; however, they were down compared to the second quarter of 2024 (€50m) due to the lower level of crystallisation15 in the third quarter than in the second and fourth quarters, as it does every year; however, the performance of Amundi’s management is at a good level, with more than 71% of assets under management ranked in the first or second quartiles according to Morningstar16 over 1, 3 or 5 years and 257 Amundi funds rated 4 or 5 stars by Morningstar as of 30 September;
    • Amundi Technology’s revenues, at €20m, continued to grow steadily (+41.8% compared to the third quarter of 2023; +13.0% compared to the second quarter of 2024), confirming the development of this business;
    • Finally, the Financial and other income2 amounted to €17m, down slightly compared to the third quarter of 2023 and previous quarters.

    The increase in operating expenses2, by +7.4% compared to the third quarter of 2023, to €456m, remains lower than the increase in revenues (+10.5%) over the same period, thus generating a positive jaws effect which reflects the Group’s operational efficiency.

    The increase is mainly due to:

    • the first consolidation of Alpha Associates;
    • the provision for individual variable remuneration in line with the increase in results;
    • and finally the acceleration of investments in development initiatives according to the axes of the 2025 Ambitions Plan, particularly in technology.

    The Cost income ratio improved to 52.9% in adjusted data2 compared to the same quarter last year, and remains in line with the 2025 target and at the best level in the industry.

    The Adjusted gross operating income2(EBIT) amounted to €406m, up +14.2% compared to the third quarter of 2023, reflecting double-digit revenue growth amplified by operational efficiency.

    Income from equity-accounted companies, which reflects Amundi’s share of the net income of minority JVs in India (SBI MF), China (ABC-CA), South Korea (NH-Amundi) and Morocco (Wafa Gestion), was up +36.5% compared to the third quarter of 2023, to €33m, representing 10% of adjusted net income, reflecting the good level of activity in India and Korea.

    Adjusted earnings per share2in the third quarter of 2024 reached €1.65, up +16.0%.

    Accounting data in the third quarter of 2024

    Accounting Net income Group share amounted to €320m and includes non-cash charges related to acquisitions, in particular the amortisation of intangible assets related to distribution and client contracts (-€24m before tax in the quarter including the corresponding new charges related to Alpha Associates, see details in p. 11), representing a total of -€17m after tax.

    Accounting earnings per share in the third quarter of 2024 reached €1.56.

    In the first 9 months of 2024, adjusted net income2amounted to €1,005m, up +10.4%, reflecting the same trends as in the third quarter:

    • Adjusted net revenues2 grew by +7.3% compared to the first 9 months of 2023, to €2,573m, reflecting as in the quarter the sustained growth in management fees (+6.6%) and the strong increase in Amundi Technology’s revenues (€54m, +28.2%) and financial and other income2 (€67m, +38.2%); performance fees, on the other hand, were down by -2.0% to €88m;
    • Adjusted operating expenses2 are well controlled with an increase of +5.9% compared to the first 9 months of 2023, at €1,356m, resulting in a positive jaws effect;
    • Adjusted cost income ratio2 stands at 52.7%.

    Adjusted gross operating income2 was €1,217m, up +8,9% compared to the first 9 months of 2023, showing a higher growth rate than revenue growth thanks to operating efficiency.

    Income from equity-accounted companies increased by +28.6% compared to the first 9 months of 2023, to €94m.

    Adjusted earnings per share2for the first 9 months of 2024 reached €4.91, up +10.1% compared to the first 9 months of 2023.

    Accounting data for the first 9 months of 2024

    Accounting Net income Group share amounted to €956m and includes non-cash charges related to acquisitions, in particular the amortisation of intangible assets related to distribution and client contracts (-€68m before tax in the 9 months including the corresponding new charges related to Alpha Associates, see details on p. 11), representing a total of -€49m after tax in the first 9 months of 2024.

    Accounting earnings per share for the first 9 months of 2024 reached €4.67.

    To be noted for the fourth quarter and full-year 2024

    Success of the capital increase reserved for employees – The capital increase reserved for employees “We Share Amundi”, announced on 23 September 2024, is expected to be completed tomorrow, 31 October 2024. This operation offered for the seventh consecutive year a subscription of shares at a discount.

    It was once again a great success this year: more than 2,000 employees in 15 countries subscribed to this capital increase, for a total amount of €36.3m. This represents nearly two out of three employees in France and more than two out of five worldwide.        
    This transaction, which is in line with the existing legal authorisations voted by the Shareholders’ Meeting on 12 May 2023, reflects Amundi’s desire to involve its employees not only in the development of the Company but also in the creation of economic value.

    The impact of this transaction on earnings per share will be very limited: the number of shares to be created will be 771,628 (i.e. ~0.4% of the share capital before the transaction).        
    This issue will bring the number of shares making up Amundi’s share capital to 205,419,262 as of 31 October 2024, i.e. a share capital increased to €513,548,155.        
    Employees will now hold around 1.7% of Amundi’s capital, compared to 1.3% before the transaction. In the fourth quarter of 2024, the Amundi Group will record in its consolidated financial statements a charge relating to the subscription discount of €12.3m before tax.

    On the basis of the Finance Bill presented by the French government, an exceptional tax contribution on the profits of large companies would apply to Amundi, whose turnover in France for tax purposes is more than €3bn.

    * * * * *

    APPENDICES

    Adjusted income statement2of the first 9 months of 2024 and 2023

    (€m)   9M 2024 9M 2023 % chg.
    9M/9M
             
    Net revenue – Adjusted   2,573 2,397 +7.3%
    Management fees   2,364 2,217 +6.6%
    Performance fees   88 89 -2.0%
    Technology   54 42 +28.2%
    Net financial & other net income   67 49 +38.2%
    Operating expenses – Adjusted   (1,356) (1,280) +5.9%
    Cost income ratio – Adjusted (%)   52.7% 53.4% -0.7pp
    Gross operating income – Adjusted   1,217, 1,117, +8.9%
    Cost of risk & other   (7) (5) +24.5%
    Equity-accounted companies   94 73 +28.6%
    Income before tax – Adjusted   1,305 1,185 +10.1%
    Corporate tax   (302) (277) +8.8%
    Non-controlling interests   2 3 -25.2%
    Net income, Group share – Adjusted   1,005 910 +10.4%
    Depreciation of intangible assets after tax   (49) (44) +11.6%
    Integration costs net of tax   0 0 NS
    Net income, Group share   956 866 +10.3%
    Earnings per share (€)   4.67 4.25 +10.0%
    Earnings per share – Adjusted (€)   4.91 4.46 +10.1%

    Adjusted income statement2of the third quarter of 2024

    (€m)   Q3 2024 Q3 2023 % chg.
    Q3/Q3
      Q2 2024 % chg.
    Q3/Q2
                   
    Net revenue – Adjusted   862 780 +10.5%   887 -2.9%
    Management fees   805 737 +9.2%   794 +1.3%
    Performance fees   20 10 +97.3%   50 -58.9%
    Technology   20 14 +41.8%   17 +13.0%
    Net financial & other net income   17 19 -10.6%   26 -34.0%
    Operating expenses – Adjusted   (456) (424) +7.4%   (461) -1.1%
    Cost income ratio – Adjusted (%)   52.9% 54.4% -1.5pp   51.9% +1.0pp
    Gross operating income – Adjusted   406 356 +14.2%   426 -4.8%
    Cost of risk & other   (2) (3) -36.0%   (5) -63.4%
    Equity-accounted companies   33 24 +36.5%   33 -0.1%
    Income before tax – Adjusted   437 377 +15.9%   454 -3.9%
    Corporate tax   (101) (88) +14.9%   (105) -3.8%
    Non-controlling interests   1 1 -23.5%   0 NS
    Net income, Group share – Adjusted   337 290 +16.1%   350 -3.7%
    Depreciation of intangible assets after tax   (17) (15) +17.9%   (17) +1.2%
    Integration costs net of tax   0 0 NS   0 NS
    Net income, Group share   320 276 +16.0%   333 -4.0%
    Earnings per share (€)   1.56 1.35 +15.9%   1.63 -4.0%
    Earnings per share – Adjusted (€)   1.65 1.42 +16.0%   1.71 -3.7%

    Evolution of assets under management from the end of 2020 to the end of September 202417

    (€bn) Assets under management Net

    inflows

    Market &

    Forex Effect

    Scope effect   Change in AuM
    vs. previous quarter
    As of 31/12/2020 1,729       / +4.0%
    Q1 2021   -12.7 +39.3   /  
    As of 31/03/2021 1,755       / +1.5%
    Q2 2021   +7.2 +31.4   /  
    As of 30/06/2021 1,794       / +2.2%
    Q3 2021   +0.2 +17.0   /  
    As of 30/09/2021 1,811       / +1.0%
    Q4 2021   +65.6 +39.1   +14818  
    As of 31/12/2021 2,064       / +14%
    Q1 2022   +3.2 -46.4   /  
    As of 31/03/2022 2,021       / -2.1%
    Q2 2022   +1.8 -97.75   /  
    As of 30/06/2022 1,925       / -4.8%
    Q3 2022   -12.9 -16.3   /  
    As of 30/09/2022 1,895       / -1.6%
    Q4 2022   +15.0 -6.2   /  
    As of 31/12/2022 1,904       / +0.5%
    Q1 2023   -11.1 +40.9   /  
    As of 31/03/2023 1,934       / +1.6%
    Q2 2023   +3.7 +23.8   /  
    As of 31/06/2023 1,961       / +1.4%
    Q3 2023   +13.7 -1.7   /  
    As of 30/09/2023 1,973       / +0.6%
    Q4 2023   +19.5 +63.8   -20  
    As of 31/12/2023 2,037       / +3.2%
    Q1 2024   +16.6 +63.0   /  
    As of 31/03/2024 2,116       / +3.9%
    Q2 2024   +15.5 +16.6   +8  
    30/06/2024 2,156         +1.9%
    Q3 2024   +2.9 +32.5   /  
    30/09/2024 2,192         +1.6%

    Total over one year between September 30, 2023 and September 30, 2024: +11.1%

    • Net inflows          +€54.5bn
    • Market & exchange rate effects        +€175.9bn
    • Scope effects        -€12.2bn
      (disposal of Lyxor Inc. in Q4 2023, first consolidation of Alpha Associates in Q2 2024)

    Details of assets under management and net inflows by client segments19

    (€bn) AuM

    30.09.2024

    AuM

    30.09.2023

    % change /30.09.2023 Net flows

    Q3 2024

    Net flows

    Q3 2023

    Net flows

    9M 2024

    Net flows

    9M 2023

    French networks 138 126 +9.1% +1.1 +0.9 +0.3 +4.6
    International networks 167 156 +7.1% -1.6 -1.0 -4.4 -3.2
    o/w Amundi BOC WM 3 4 -26.9% -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -3.3
    Third-party distributors 377 305 +23.5% +6.8 +2.1 +19.2 +4.1
    Retail 681 587 +16.1% +6.3 +2.0 +15.1 +5.6
    Institutional & Sovereigns (*) 518 489 +6.0% -9.3 +17.9 +1.4 +14.4
    Corporates 113 97 +16.0% +2.3 -3.8 -5.8 -7.4
    Employee savings plans 92 84 +9.8% -0.5 -0.9 +2.5 +2.6
    CA & SG insurers 428 406 +5.3% -1.2 -3.9 +0.5 -9.6
    Institutional 1,151 1,076 +6.9% -8.7 +9.3 -1.4 +0.0
    JVs 360 310 +16.0% +5.3 +2.4 +21.3 +0.7
    Total 2,192 1,973 +11.1% +2.9 +13.7 +35.0 +6.3

    Details of assets under management and net inflows by asset classes19

    (€bn) AuM

    30.09.2024

    AuM

    30.09.2023

    % change /30.09.2023 Net flows

    Q3 2024

    Net flows

    Q3 2023

    Net flows

    9M 2024

    Net flows

    9M 2023

    Equity 527 443 +18.9% -0.7 +7.0 +0.0 +2.0
    Multi-assets 274 274 -0.0% -15.4 -5.9 -22.3 -17.0
    Bonds 732 624 +17.3% +12.8 +7.7 +36.8 +10.1
    Real, alternative & structured assets 114 124 -8.3% +0.8 -1.1 +1.5 +2.4
    MLT ASSETS excl. JVs 1,647 1,465 +12.4% -2.5 +7.8 +16.1 -2.4
    Treasury products excl. JVs 185 198 -6.5% +0.1 +3.5 -2.4 +8.0
    Assets excl. JVs 1,832 1,663 +10.1% -2.4 +11.3 +13.6 +5.6
    JVs 360 310 +16.0% +5.3 +2.4 +21.3 +0.7
    TOTAL 2,192 1,973 +11.1% +2.9 +13.7 +35.0 +6.3
    o/w MLT assets 1,973 1,745 +13.1% +3.4 +11.3 +34.9 -0.7
    o/w Treasury products 219 229 -4.2% -0.5 +2.5 +0.1 +7.1

    Details of assets under management and net inflows by management type and asset classes19

    (€bn) AuM

    30.09.2024

    AuM

    30.09.2023

    % change /30.09.2023 Net flows

    Q3 2024

    Net flows

    Q3 2023

    Net flows

    9M 2024

    Net flows

    9M 2023

    Active management 1,136 1,022 +11.1% -7.1 -1.9 +2.2 -15.6
    Equity 208 187 +11.4% -2.3 -1.6 -5.4 -2.5
    Multi-assets 263 265 -0.9% -15.7 -6.3 -23.4 -18.2
    Bonds 665 570 +16.6% +10.8 +6.1 +31.0 +5.1
    Structured products 43 35 +22.3% +0.8 -0.2 +2.7 +2.9
    Passive management 397 319 +24.5% +3.8 +10.8 +12.4 +10.8
    ETFs & ETC 251 192 +31.1% +7.8 +3.6 +17.3 +8.0
    Index & Smart Beta 146 127 +14.5% -4.0 +7.2 -5.0 +2.8
    Real & alternative assets 71 89 -20.5% +0.0 -0.9 -1.2 -0.5
    Real assets 67 63 +4.8% +0.2 -0.3 -0.1 +0.2
    Alternative assets 4 25 -83.8% -0.2 -0.6 -1.1 -0.7
    MLT ASSETS excl. JVs 1,647 1,465 +12.4% -2.5 +7.8 +16.1 -2.4
    Treasury products excl. JVs 185 198 -6.5% +0.1 +3.5 -2.4 +8.0
    TOTAL ASSETS excl. JVs 1,832 1,663 +10.1% -2.4 +11.3 +13.6 +5.6
    JVs 360 310 +16.0% +5.3 +2.4 +21.3 +0.7
    TOTAL 2,192 1,973 +11.1% +2.9 +13.7 +35.0 +6.3

    Details of assets under management and net inflows by geographical areas19

    (€bn) AuM

    30.09.2024

    AuM

    30.09.2023

    % change /30.09.2023 Net flows

    Q3 2024

    Net flows

    Q3 2023

    Net flows

    9M 2024

    Net flows

    9M 2023

    France 987 903 +9.3% +2.8 +4.1 +12.8 -1.2
    Italy 202 197 +2.7% -10.8 -1.5 -13.8 -2.2
    Europe excl. France & Italy 421 353 +19.2% +1.9 -0.8 +6.0 +6.0
    Asia 458 392 +17.0% +7.4 +3.4 +29.6 -0.3
    Rest of the world 124 129 -4.3% +1.7 +8.4 +0.4 +4.0
    TOTAL 2,192 1,973 +11.1% +2.9 +13.7 +35.0 +6.3
    TOTAL outside France 1,204 1,070 +12.5% +0.1 +9.6 +22.2 +7.5

    Methodology Appendix

    Accounting & adjusted data

    Accounting data – These include the amortization of intangible assets, recorded as other income, and since Q2 2024, other non-cash expenses spread according to the schedule of payments of the earn-out until the end of 2029; these expenses are recognized as deductions from net income, in finance costs.

    The aggregate amounts of these items are as follows for the different periods under review:

    • Q1 2023: -€20m before tax and -€15m after tax
    • Q2 2023: -€20m before tax and -€15m after tax
    • Q3 2023: -€20m before tax and -€15m after tax
    • 9M 2023: -€61m before tax and -€44m after tax
    • 2023: -€82m before tax and -€59m after tax
    • Q1 2024: -€20m before tax and -€15m after tax
    • Q2 2024: -€24m before tax and -€17m after tax
    • Q3 2024: -€24m pre-tax and -€17m after tax
    • 9M 2024: -€68m before tax and -€49m after tax

    There were no significant integration costs recorded in the third quarter as a result of the acquisition of Alpha Associates

    Adjusted data – in order to present an income statement closer to economic reality, the following adjustments are made: restatement of the amortization of distribution contracts with Bawag, UniCredit and Banco Sabadell, intangible assets representing the client contracts of Lyxor and, since the second quarter of 2024, Alpha Associates, as well as other non-cash charges related to the acquisition of Alpha Associates; such depreciation and amortization and non-cash expenses are recorded as a deduction from net revenues.

    Acquisition of Alpha Associates

    In accordance with IFRS 3, recognition of Amundi’s balance sheet as at 01/04/2024:

    • goodwill of €290m;
    • an intangible asset of €50m representing client contracts, depreciable on a straight-line basis until the end of 2030;
    • a liability representing the conditional earn-out not yet paid, for €160m, including an actuarial discount of -€30m, which will be amortized over 6 years.

    In the Group’s income statement, the following is recorded:

    • amortization of intangible assets for a full-year expense of -€7.6m (-€6.1m after tax)
    • other non-cash expenses spread according to the schedule of payments of the earn-out until the end of 2029; These expenses are recorded as deductions from net income, as finance costs.

    In Q3 2024, the amortization of intangible assets was -€1.9m before tax (-€1.5m after tax) and non-cash expenses were -€1.4m before tax (i.e. -€1.1m after tax). Over the first 9 months of 2024, these expenses are respectively -€3.8m and -€2.9m (-€6.6m in total), since they only started in Q2.

    Alternative Performance Measures20

    In order to present an income statement that is closer to economic reality, Amundi publishes adjusted data that excludes the depreciation of intangible assets and, since the second quarter of 2024, Alpha Associates, as well as other non-cash charges related to the acquisition of Alpha Associates.
    Adjusted, normalized data are reconciled with accounting data as follows:

    = accounting data
    = adjusted data
    (m€)   9M 2024 9M 2023   Q3 2024 Q3 2023   Q2 2024
                     
    Net operating income   2,452 2,307   825 747   844
    Technology   54 42   20 14   17
    Net financial income and other income   (1) (13)   (6) (1)   3
    Adjusted net financial income and other income   67 49   17 19   26
                     
    Net revenues (a)   2,505 2,336   838 760,   864,
    – Depreciation of intangible assets before tax   (65) (61)   (22) (20)   (22)
    – other non-cash charges relating to Alpha Associates   (3) 0   (1) 0   (1)
    Net revenues – Adjusted (b)   2,573 2,397   862, 780,   887
                     
    Operating expenses (c)   (1,356) (1,280)   (456) (424)   (461)
    – Integration costs before tax   0 0   0 0   0
    Operating expenses – Adjusted (d)   (1,356) (1,280)   (456) (424)   (461)
                     
    Gross operating income (e) = (a) + (c)   1,149 1,056   382 335   403
    Gross operating income – Adjusted (f) = (b) + (d)   1,217 1,117   406 356   426
    Cost-income ratio (%) -(c)/(a)   54.1% 54.8%   54.4% 55.9%   53.4%
    Cost-income ratio – Adjusted (%) -(d)/(b)   52.7% 53.4%   52.9% 54.4%   51.9%
    Cost of risk & other (g)   (7) (5)   (2) (3)   (5)
    Equity-accounted companies (h)   94 73   33 24   33
    Income before tax (i) = (e) + (g) + (h)   1,237 1,124   413 356   431
    Income before tax – Adjusted (j) = (f) + (g) + (h)   1,305 1,185   437 377   454
    Income tax (k)   (283) (260)   (94) (82)   (98)
    Income tax – Adjusted (l)   (302) (277)   (101) (88)   (105)
    Non-controlling interests (m)   2 3   1 1   0
    Net income, Group share (o) = (i)+(k)+(m)   956 866   320 276   333
    Net income, Group share – Adjusted (p) = (j)+(l)+(m)   1,005 910   337 290   350
                     
    Earnings per share (€)   4.67 4.25   1.56 1.35   1.63
    Adjusted earnings per share (€)   4.91 4.46   1.65 1.42   1.71

    Shareholding

        30 September 2023   31 December 2023   30 September 2024
    (units)   Number

    of shares

    % of share capital   Number

    of shares

    % of share capital   Number

    of shares

    % of share capital
    Crédit Agricole Group   141,057,399 68.93%   141,057,399 68.93%   141,057,399 68.93%
    Employees   3,042,292 1.49%   2,918,391 1.43%   2,751,891 1.34%
    Treasury shares   1,297,231 0.63%   1,247,998 0.61%   958,031 0.47%
    Free float   59,250,712 28.95%   59,423,846 29.04%   59,880,313 29.26%
                       
    Number of shares at end of period   204,647,634 100.0%   204,647,634 100.0%   204,647,634 100.0%
    Average number of shares year-to-date   204,050,516   204,201,023   204,647,634
    Average number of shares quarter-to-date   204,425,079   204,647,634   204,647,634

    Average number of shares on a pro rata basis.

    • The average number of shares is unchanged between Q2 and Q3 2024, it increased by +0.1% between Q3 2023 and Q3 2024 and by +0.3% between the first 9 months of 2023 and the same period of 2024;
    • A capital increase reserved for employees will be carried out on October 31, 2024. 771,628 shares were created (approximately 0.4% of the share capital before the transaction), bringing the share of employees to about 1.7% of the capital, compared to 1.34% at September 30, 2024, before the transaction.                                        

    Financial communication calendar

    • Q4 and Full Year 2024 Results: February 4, 2025
    • Q1 2025 earnings release: April 29, 2025
    • Annual General Meeting: May 27, 2025
    • Q2 and H1 2025 earnings release: July 29, 2025
    • Q3 and 9-month 2025 results: October 28, 2025

    About Amundi

    Amundi, the leading European asset manager, ranking among the top 10 global players21, offers its 100 million clients – retail, institutional and corporate – a complete range of savings and investment solutions in active and passive management, in traditional or real assets. This offering is enhanced with IT tools and services to cover the entire savings value chain. A subsidiary of the Crédit Agricole group and listed on the stock exchange, Amundi currently manages close to €2.2 trillion of assets22.

    With its six international investment hubs23, financial and extra-financial research capabilities and long-standing commitment to responsible investment, Amundi is a key player in the asset management landscape.

    Amundi clients benefit from the expertise and advice of 5,500 employees in 35 countries.

    Amundi, a trusted partner, working every day in the interest of its clients and society.

    www.amundi.com  

    Press contacts:        
    Natacha Andermahr 
    Tel. +33 1 76 37 86 05
    natacha.andermahr@amundi.com 

    Corentin Henry
    Tel. +33 1 76 36 26 96
    corentin.henry@amundi.com

    Investor contacts:
    Cyril Meilland, CFA
    Tel. +33 1 76 32 62 67
    cyril.meilland@amundi.com 

    Thomas Lapeyre
    Tel. +33 1 76 33 70 54
    thomas.lapeyre@amundi.com 

    Annabelle Wiriath

    Tel. + 33 1 76 32 43 92

    annabelle.wiriath@amundi.com

    WARNING

    This document does not constitute an offer or invitation to sell or purchase, or any solicitation of any offer to purchase or subscribe for, any securities of Amundi in the United States of America or in France. Securities may not be offered, subscribed or sold in the United States of America absent registration under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “U.S. Securities Act”), except pursuant to an exemption from, or in a transaction not subject to, the registration requirements thereof. The securities of Amundi have not been and will not be registered under the U.S. Securities Act and Amundi does not intend to make a public offer of its securities in the United States of America or in France.

    This document may contain forward looking statements concerning Amundi’s financial position and results. The data provided do not constitute a profit “forecast” or “estimate” as defined in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/980.

    These forward looking statements include projections and financial estimates based on scenarios that employ a number of economic assumptions in a given competitive and regulatory context, assumptions regarding plans, objectives and expectations in connection with future events, transactions, products and services, and assumptions in terms of future performance and synergies. By their very nature, they are therefore subject to known and unknown risks and uncertainties, which could lead to their non-fulfilment. Consequently, no assurance can be given that these forward looking statement will come to fruition, and Amundi’s actual financial position and results may differ materially from those projected or implied in these forward looking statements. [In particular, conditions to completion of the announced transaction between Amundi and Victory Capital, may not be satisfied and such transaction may not be completed on schedule, or at all; risks relating to the expected benefits or impact of the transaction on Victory Capital’s and Amundi’s respective businesses are contained in their respective public filings.]

    Amundi undertakes no obligation to publicly revise or update any forward looking statements provided as at the date of this document. Risks that may affect Amundi’s financial position and results are further detailed in the “Risk Factors” section of our Universal Registration Document filed with the French Autorité des Marchés Financiers. The reader should take all these uncertainties and risks into consideration before forming their own opinion.

    The figures presented were prepared in accordance with applicable prudential regulations and IFRS guidelines, as adopted by the European Union and applicable at that date. The financial information set out herein do not constitute a set of financial statements for an interim period as defined by IAS 34 “Interim Financial Reporting” and has not been audited.

    Unless otherwise specified, sources for rankings and market positions are internal. The information contained in this document, to the extent that it relates to parties other than Amundi or comes from external sources, has not been verified by a supervisory authority or, more generally, subject to independent verification, and no representation or warranty has been expressed as to, nor should any reliance be placed on, the fairness, accuracy, correctness or completeness of the information or opinions contained herein. Neither Amundi nor its representatives can be held liable for any decision made, negligence or loss that may result from the use of this document or its contents, or anything related to them, or any document or information to which this document may refer.

    The sum of values set out in the tables and analyses may differ slightly from the total reported due to rounding.


    1        Net income Group share
    2        Adjusted data: excluding amortisation of intangible assets relating to distribution and client contracts as well as other non-cash charges relating to the acquisition of Alpha Associates recorded in net financial income (see note p. 11)
    3        Assets under management and flows including assets under advisory, marketed assets and funds of funds, and taking into account 100% of Asian JV’s assets and flows; for Wafa Gestion in Morocco, they are reported in proportion to Amundi’s holding in the capital of the JV
    4        As announced at the time of the publication of the Q2 results, exit in Q3 from a large low-income mandate (€11.6 billion) with a European insurer, in multi-asset; including this exit, net inflows were positive by +€2.9bn in Q3 and +€35bn over 9 months
    5        Medium-Long Term Assets
    6        Excluding JVs
    7        Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of Victory Capital, held on 11 October 2024
    8        Source: TrackInsight Q3 2024
    9        Classified as article 8 or 9 of the SFDR regulation of the European Union
    10        Including JV: €234bn in assets, +€12bn net inflows over 9 months and +€1bn in Q3
    11        50% MSCI World + 50% Eurostoxx 600 composite index for equity markets, average values over each period considered
    12        Bloomberg Euro Aggregate for bond markets, average values over each reporting period
    13        Source: Morningstar FundFile, ETFGI. European & cross-border open-ended funds (excluding mandates and dedicated funds). Data as of the end of June 2024.
    14        Assets under management and flows including assets under advisory, marketed assets and funds of funds, and taking into account 100% of Asian JV’s assets and flows; for Wafa Gestion in Morocco, they are reported in proportion to Amundi’s holding in the capital of the JV
    15        Anniversary dates of the funds triggering the recognition of these fees
    16        Source: Morningstar Direct, Broadridge FundFile – Open-ended funds and ETFs, global fund scope, September 2024; as a percentage of the assets under management of the funds in question; the number of Amundi open-ended funds rated by Morningstar was 1063 at the end of September 2024. © 2024 Morningstar, all rights reserved
    17        Assets under management and flows including assets under advisory, marketed assets and funds of funds, and taking into account 100% of Asian JV’s assets and flows; for Wafa Gestion in Morocco, they are reported in proportion to Amundi’s holding in the capital of the JV
    18        Lyxor, integrated as of 31/12/2021
    19        Assets under management and flows including assets under advisory, marketed assets and funds of funds, and taking into account 100% of Asian JV’s assets and flows; for Wafa Gestion in Morocco, they are reported in proportion to Amundi’s holding in the capital of the JV; as of 01/01/2024, reclassification of short-term bond strategies (€30 billion in outstandings) as Bonds previously classified as Treasury until that date; Outstanding amounts up to that date have not been reclassified in these tables
    20        See also the section 4.3 of the 2023 Universal Registration Document filed with the AMF on April 18, 2024
    21Source: IPE “Top 500 Asset Managers” published in June 2024, based on assets under management as at 31/12/2023
    22Amundi data at 30/09/2024
    23Boston, Dublin, London, Milan, Paris and Tokyo

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd. – Results of Special Meeting of Shareholders

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    FALCON OIL & GAS LTD.

    (“Falcon)

    Results of Special Meeting of Shareholders

    30 October 2024 – Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd. (TSXV: FO, AIM: FOG) held its special meeting of shareholders in Dublin, Ireland yesterday.

    All resolutions considered and voted upon by the shareholders were approved. The full text of each resolution was included in the Management Information Circular communicated in advance of the meeting to shareholders.

    Ends.

    CONTACT DETAILS:

    Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd.          +353 1 676 8702
    Philip O’Quigley, CEO +353 87 814 7042
    Anne Flynn, CFO +353 1 676 9162
     
    Cavendish Capital Markets Limited (NOMAD & Broker)
    Neil McDonald / Adam Rae +44 131 220 9771

    About Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd.

    Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd. is an international oil & gas company engaged in the exploration and development of unconventional oil and gas assets, with the current portfolio focused in Australia, South Africa and Hungary. Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd. is incorporated in British Columbia, Canada and headquartered in Dublin, Ireland with a technical team based in Budapest, Hungary.

    For further information on Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd. please visit www.falconoilandgas.com

    Neither the TSX Venture Exchange nor its Regulation Services Provider (as that term is defined in the policies of the TSX Venture Exchange) accepts responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of this release.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: RIBER: Solid Business Growth at End-September 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SOLID BUSINESS GROWTH AT END-SEPTEMBER 2024

    • Revenues up +14% to €18.5m
    • Order book strengthened to €38.3m (+14%)

    Bezons, October 30, 2024 – 8:00am – RIBER, the global leader for molecular beam epitaxy (MBE) equipment serving the semiconductor industry, is reporting its revenues for the year to end-September 2024.

    Change in revenues

    €m 2024 2023 Change
    First quarter 4.5 3.7 +20 %
    Second quarter 9.3 8.5 +10 %
    Third quarter 4.7 4.0 +19 %
    Total 9-month revenues 18.5 16.2 +14 %
    At end-September (€m) 2024 2023 Change
    Systems 12.3 9.6 +28 %
    Services and accessories 6.2 6.6 -6 %
    Total 9-month revenues 18.5 16.2 +14 %

    At September 30, 2024, RIBER revenues amounted to €18.5m, up +14% compared with the same period in 2023, reflecting the company’s strengthened position in the MBE market for both research and industrial production.

    Systems revenues came to €12.3 m, up +28% with the delivery of 4 machines, compared with 5 machines in the first nine months of 2023.

    Revenues for services and accessories totaled €6.2 m, down 6% compared with the previous year.

    The geographical breakdown of revenues at end-September 2024 was as follows: Asia 68%, Europe 25% and North America 6%.

    Order book developments

    At end-September (€m) 2024 2023 Change
    Systems 31,9 27,6 +16%
    Services and accessories 6,4 6,1 +6%
    Total order book 38,3 33,6 +14%

    The systems order book came to €31.9m, up +16%, with a total of 13 systems, including 8 production machines. This figure does not include the order for a production system announced on October 21, 2024.

    The services and accessories order book reached €6.4m, up +6% from the previous year.

    As a result, at September 30, 2024, the total order book came to €38.3m, up +14% compared with the same period in 2023.

    Outlook

    Based on the fourth-quarter delivery schedule, RIBER expects to exceed €40m in full-year revenues, along with further improvements in earnings.

    Against a favorable backdrop of growth in the compound semiconductor market, new orders should continue to be booked before the end of the year.

    Next date: 2024 full-year revenues will be released on Wednesday January 29, 2025 (before start of trading).

    About RIBER

    Founded in 1964, RIBER is the global market leader for MBE – molecular beam epitaxy – equipment. It designs and produces equipment for the semiconductor industry, and provides scientific and technical support for its clients (hardware and software), maintaining their equipment and optimizing their performance and output levels.
    Accelerating the performance of electronics, RIBER’s equipment performs an essential role in the development of advanced semiconductor systems that are used in numerous applications, from information technologies to photonics (lasers, sensors, etc.), 5G telecommunications networks and research, including quantum computing.

    RIBER is a BPI France-approved innovative company and is listed on the Euronext Growth Paris market (ISIN: FR0000075954).
    www.riber.com

    Contacts

    RIBER : Annie Geoffroy| tel: +33 (0)1 39 96 65 00 | invest@riber.com

    CALYPTUS : Cyril Combe | tel: +33 (0)1 53 65 68 68 | cyril.combe@calyptus.net

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    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Q&A: Innovative Finance Facility for Climate in Asia and the Pacific (IF-CAP)

    Source: Asia Development Bank

    • Workers walking by a solar power plant in Kazakhstan

    Article | 30 October 2024
    Read time: 6 mins

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    What is IF-CAP?

      The Innovative Finance Facility for Climate in Asia and the Pacific, or IF-CAP, is a multi-donor financing partnership facility with the goal of scaling-up finance for accelerated action against climate change in Asia and the Pacific. IF-CAP partners will provide guarantees for parts of ADB’s sovereign loan portfolios to enable ADB to free up capital to increase lending for climate investments. Supplementary grants will facilitate project preparation, capacity building, and knowledge solutions.

    Why is IF-CAP being formed?

    The battle against climate change will be won or lost in Asia and the Pacific. And our region is uniquely vulnerable to the impacts. More than 40% of climate-related disasters occurred in Asia and the Pacific since the start of the century, affecting nearly 3.6 billion people. ADB estimates that $1.7 trillion per year will need to be invested in infrastructure in developing Asia between 2016-2030 to meet both climate and development goals. The Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) says the year 2030 is a significant crossroad after which it will become considerably harder to meet climate targets.

    As Asia and the Pacific’s climate bank, the Asian Development Bank is spearheading significant climate change financing and expertise across the region.   IF-CAP is the first leveraged guarantee mechanism for climate finance to ever be adopted by a multilateral development bank. It is inspired by the International Finance Facility for Education (IFFEd), which aims to use innovative financing to unlock new education funding in low-and middle-income countries.

    What will IF-CAP do?

    IF-CAP will allow ADB to significantly increase climate finance for investments that are aligned with the Paris Agreement and other key ADB policies, including the forthcoming Climate Change Action Plan.

      With a model of “$1 in, $4.5 out”, IF-CAP’s current guarantee size of $2.5 billion will create over $11 billion in climate finance for much-needed climate projects across Asia and the Pacific. Alongside lending facilitated by IF-CAP, ADB will provide up to $1 billion in concessional ordinary capital resources lending (COL) from its own resources, in support of projects enabled by IF-CAP’s guarantee structure. In total, resources aligned with IF-CAP amount to over $12 billion.

    IF-CAP enabled projects will address both climate change mitigation, which focuses on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and climate change adaptation, which focuses on building resilience to the worsening effects of climate change. These investments could cover a wide range of sectors, such as transportation, energy, urban, and agriculture and natural resources, as well as social sectors such as health and education, for projects with high climate impacts.

    What will IF-CAP not do?

    IF-CAP will not support new or existing fossil fuel-based electricity generation facilities or dedicated transmission, or any new or existing natural gas-related projects. Climate finance enabled by IF-CAP will not be used towards early retirement or repurposing of fossil fuel fired power plants.

    • Developing Asia’s share of global greenhouse gas emissions nearly doubled, from 22% in 1990 to 44% in 2019 and is expected to remain at this level until mid-century under current policies.

    • Asia and the Pacific can only realize its climate goals if it pursues a transition away from coal-based energy in the near term.

    How does the leverage mechanism work?

    The program is based on the use of financial guarantees from our partners. By guaranteeing a portfolio of ADB sovereign loans on a first-loss basis, they will help shoulder some of the loss in case of a default by one of our borrowers included in our portfolio.

    This is a groundbreaking arrangement because IF-CAP’s portfolio guarantee enables ADB to optimize the usage of our balance sheet, supported by the strength of our triple-A credit ratings and preferred creditor status. This allows ADB to reduce the capital held for credit risk and release more capital for climate loans. Every dollar of guarantee into IF-CAP will result in the capacity to provide more climate finance for eligible projects. Simulations show that for every $1 that is guaranteed, $4.5 of climate finance could be generated. That is a fundamental shift from the traditional “one dollar in, one dollar out” facilities at MDBs, because of IF-CAP’s leverage effect.

    Who are the partners supporting IF-CAP?

    IF-CAP’s founding partners are Denmark, Japan, Norway, Republic of Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 2023, the Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet established a trust fund under the IF-CAP Financing Partnership Facility.

    What sovereign portfolios will their guarantees cover?

    IF-CAP will cover a dynamic and diversified reference portfolio consisting of ADB’s exposures to a board spectrum of developing member countries, which have been identified to achieve the desired leverage based on the risk appetite of the partners.

    Which countries are eligible for IF-CAP financing?

    All ADB’s developing member countries (DMCs) are eligible. Individual financing partners may exercise discretion for certain projects based on their policies and priorities.

    Will IF-CAP differ from ADB’s regular climate financing?

    Functionally, there will be no difference. IF-CAP’s role will be to enable ADB to approve climate financing more quickly and at a higher volume.

    What are the benefits of IF-CAP?

    For DMCs, IF-CAP can help them advance operations with high climate ambition that are currently not in their pipeline, increase climate finance components of existing pipeline projects, and enable greater visibility and demonstration effects for projects including those with innovative components or high climate impact.

    For IF-CAP partners, it can enable them to make a greater impact through a leveraged guarantee mechanism not offered by other financing partnership facilities, providing them with an effective and efficient way to fight climate change in support of their national commitments.

    For ADB, IF-CAP is an innovative method to optimize our balance sheet, unlock capital resources, and increase our lending capacity by over $11 billion so we can make more resources available for critical climate projects in Asia and the Pacific.

    Will IF-CAP contribute to ADB’s ambition of $100 billion climate financing for 2019-2030?

    IF-CAP will be one of the flagship instruments to enable ADB to reach its climate finance target beyond $100 billion and support our target for climate finance to reach 50% of the total committed financing volume by 2030.

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    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI: Sydbank’s Interim Report – Q1-Q3 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Company Announcement No 51/2024
    30 October 2024

    Sydbank’s Interim Report – Q1-Q3 2024

    Bigger Sydbank – new 3-year strategy plan
    On the back of the highly satisfactory results achieved during the present strategy period, which will expire at the end of 2024, Sydbank is announcing today a new 3-year strategy plan to ensure that the Bank will continue the positive momentum demonstrated since 2014. The strategy is called: “Bigger Sydbank – value for all through advice and relationships”.

    Q1-Q3 2024 – highlights

    • Profit for the period of DKK 2,396m equals a return on equity of 21.7% p.a. after tax
    • Core income of DKK 5,447m is 4% higher compared to the same period in 2023
    • Trading income of DKK 223m compared to DKK 240m in the same period in 2023
    • Costs (core earnings) of DKK 2,453m compared to DKK 2,335m in the same period in 2023
    • Core earnings before impairment of DKK 3,217m are 3% higher compared to the same period in 2023
    • Impairment charges for loans and advances etc represent an expense of DKK 87m
    • Bank loans and advances have risen by DKK 8.0bn, equal to an increase of 11% compared to year-end 2023
    • The CET1 ratio stands at 18.0%, equal to a decrease of 0.9pp compared to year-end 2023

    CEO Mark Luscombe comments on the result:

    • It is positive that we were able to lift core income and total income in the first 9 months of the year from their all-time high levels last year. Costs have risen by 3% – excl Coop Bank – compared with a year ago. Thanks to the Bank’s constant focus on becoming increasingly efficient, the increase in costs is smaller than the effects of the agreed overall pay rises and the abolition of Great Prayer Day. Profit for the first 9 months of the year is on the same level as that of the record year 2023 and equals a return on equity of 21.7%, which is highly satisfactory.

    Mark Luscombe comments on developments in business volume:

    • We are pleased that the continued effect of our strong focus on providing value-creating advice to our customers has boosted our business volume in terms of bank loans and advances, deposits and the investment area. Bank loans and advances constitute DKK 82.5bn – an increase of DKK 8.0bn during the period. Deposits make up DKK 114.8bn – – and are thus at a historically all-time high.

    Board chairman Lars Mikkelgaard-Jensen comments on Sydbank’s new 3-year strategy plan:
    As a natural next step for the current strategy “Growing our business” we will be raising the bar and we will create a Bigger Sydbank in the next strategy period. This means that we will maintain our starting point as Denmark’s Corporate Bank and increase our market share in the corporate segment. Our ambition is to have more satisfied retail clients and significantly more retail clients and Private Banking clients. Assets under management will increase as a result of our customer focus within Wealth Management.

    Mark Luscombe elaborates:
    Our strategy “Bigger Sydbank” centres on 5 themes: “Customer-focused”, “Bigger and efficient”, “Attractive and cooperating”, “Data, digitization, AI and security”, and “ESG integrated in core business”. The themes must go hand in hand with a level of profitability at the very top of the Danish banking industry. We will continue to focus on the customer and be the workplace for some of the industry’s brightest and most dedicated employees.

    Outlook for 2024

    • Moderate growth is projected for the Danish economy.
    • Profit after tax is expected to be in the range of DKK 2,800-3,100m.
    • The outlook is subject to uncertainty and depends on financial market developments and macroeconomic factors which may affect eg the level of impairment charges.

    Additional information
    Jørn Adam Møller, Deputy Group Chief Executive, Tel +45 74 37 20 30
    Lars Grubak Lohff, Press Manager Tel +45 20 31 54 65

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