Category: European Union

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Deputy Prime Minister to attend G7 and G20 Finance Ministers’ Meetings and Annual Meetings of the IMF and World Bank

    Source: Government of Canada News

    News release

    October 23, 2024 – Ottawa, Canada – Department of Finance Canada

    This week, from October 23 to 25, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, the Honourable Chrystia Freeland, will attend the Fall Meetings of G7 and G20 Finance Ministers and the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in Washington D.C.

    At these meetings, the Deputy Prime Minister will advance work with Canada’s allies to strengthen supply chains with trusted trading partners to create jobs and economic growth that is shared by all Canadians.

    While in Washington, the Deputy Prime Minister will discuss with allies further efforts to support Ukraine through to victory and into reconstruction. Canada was an early champion of G7 efforts to make full use of frozen Russian sovereign assets, and provided a CA$5 billion (US$3.7 billion) contribution to the G7’s CA$68 billion (US$50 billion) Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration Loans for Ukraine. 

    The Deputy Prime Minister will further Canada’s work to build resilient economies and reduce economic inequalities—as demonstrated by the government’s historic investments in early learning and child care, national dental care coverage, and free contraception and diabetes medication. The Deputy Prime Minister will also advance Canada’s work on international tax cooperation.

    An itinerary of events will be released in advance of the meetings.

    Quotes

    “Canada is leading the G7 in cutting interest rates four times this year and reducing inflation to target for all of this year. The wages of Canadian workers have outpaced inflation for 20 months. And, the IMF expects Canada’s economic growth to be the best in the G7 next year. Together, Canada and our allies are working to ensure recent economic gains are not unwound, but rather built upon, so we can create more good-paying jobs, help people get ahead, and build a fairer future for every generation.”

    – The Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance

    Quick facts

    • Canada is leading the G7 in:

      • Cutting interest rates; the first to cut rates twice, the first to cut rates a third time, and now the first to cut rates a fourth time;
      • Economic growth expectations, with the IMF predicting that Canada’s GDP will be the fastest growing in 2025;
      • Maintaining the lowest net debt-to-GDP ratio—by a significant margin—in the G7; and,
      • Securing AAA credit ratings from at least two of the world’s three major credit rating agencies, along with only Germany.
    • Inflation has been within the target range of 1 per cent to 3 per cent for all of 2024, with inflation in Canada falling to 1.6 per cent in September—a 43 month low. 

    • Wages in Canada have outpaced inflation for 20 months in a row, which means Canadian workers today on average have larger pay cheques, even accounting for inflation, than they did before the pandemic.

    • The Annual Meetings of the IMF and World Bank, which generally take place in October, have customarily been held in Washington for two consecutive years and in another member country in the third year.

    Contacts

    Media may contact:

    Katherine Cuplinskas
    Deputy Director of Communications
    Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
    Katherine.Cuplinskas@fin.gc.ca

    Media Relations
    Department of Finance Canada
    mediare@fin.gc.ca
    613-369-4000

    General enquiries

    Phone: 1-833-712-2292
    TTY: 613-369-3230
    E-mail: financepublic-financepublique@fin.gc.ca

    Stay Connected

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Commissioner responds to Government’s accountability announcement

    Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police

    A statement from Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley following the Government’s announcement on police accountability:

    “We welcome today’s announcement from the Government introducing important reforms to strengthen the police accountability system.

    “These measures represent positive progress toward a system that is both fairer and faster, supporting the vast majority of officers who serve with integrity every day. The importance of these changes couldn’t have been demonstrated more clearly than by the acquittal of our firearms officer Sergeant Martyn Blake. He was a brave officer who acted in line with his training and faced immense danger to protect the public.

    “Accountability of the law is critical, but the current system is protracted and unbalanced and fails to secure the confidence of the public and officers. Over many years this has created a culture where our officers are increasingly more worried about a skewed, imbalanced system than they are the dangerous criminals they face on the streets. If this continues, it risks making the public less safe.

    “These reforms are a crucial and welcome step forward and we will now work with Government to deliver them at pace.”

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Response from NPCC lead for Armed Policing

    Source: United Kingdom National Police Chiefs Council

    The NPCC will continue to work with Government to ensure police accountability.

    Chief Constable Simon Chesterman, the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for Armed Policing, said:

    “Our thoughts remain with Mr Kaba’s family and friends, and the wider community who we know have experienced the most terrible trauma after losing him. 

    “My thoughts also go to Sergeant Martyn Blake, his family, and colleagues, I do not underestimate the pressure and distress they all must have endured.

    “The court case reflects the complex and difficult situations armed officers face and the decisions they have to make in a split second, under immense pressure.  In the UK it is rare that firearms officers discharge their weapons and even rarer that someone dies as a result.  When this happens, there must be proper investigation, accountability.”

    “Police officers are not above the law, and nobody expects them to be, but the system that holds officers to account when they use force to protect the public, their colleagues and themselves, has become broken.

    “We are supportive of the Home Secretary’s announcement and welcome their commitment to getting it right for officers and the public they serve and improving overall policing standards for communities.

    “The ongoing work on the Accountability Review now has momentum to continue and is a real opportunity to get the balance right in the interests of the public we are here to protect.

    “We are proud have the most restrained and professional armed officers in the world, but increasingly they are more afraid of going to prison for doing their jobs, than facing the violent and dangerous individuals we rely on them to protect us from.

    “Good police officers need to know that if they do what they are trained to do, they will be supported by the leaders of the police service, Government and most importantly the public.

    “We remain determined to get police accountability right and we will support Government to address concerns about the current accountability system to restore the confidence of police officers and the public.”

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA Welcomes Republic of Cyprus as 46th Artemis Accords Signatory

    Source: NASA

    NASA Associate Administrator Jim Free welcomed the Republic of Cyprus as the latest nation to commit to the responsible use of space for humanity on Wednesday, marking 46 signatories to date.
    “We applaud Cyprus’ commitment to the Artemis Accords, which will enhance the country’s engagement with NASA and the international community,” said Free, who participated virtually. “By joining 45 other country signatories in this effort, Cyprus will help play a role in implementing the accords and exploration that is open, responsible, transparent, and peaceful for the benefit of all.”
    Nicodemos Damianou, Cyprus’ deputy minister of research, innovation, and digital policy, signed the Artemis Accords during a ceremony in Nicosia, Cyprus. James O’Brian, assistant secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs for the U.S. Department of State, also attended the event.
    “Today marks a significant milestone for Cyprus as we officially sign the Artemis Accords,” said Damianou. “As we embark on this exciting journey, we reaffirm our commitment to a safe and responsible space exploration, as well as our strong belief in the importance of international cooperation in ensuring space is utilized to the benefit of all humanity. Cyprus, an European Union member state, is capitalizing on its geostrategic location between three continents, and aspires to play an integral role in the international space community.”
    The signing with Cyprus comes on the heels of an Artemis Accords meeting in Milan earlier this month with dozens of signatory countries, including the United States.
    In 2020, NASA, in coordination with the U.S. Department of State and seven other initial signatory nations, established the Artemis Accords, which identified an early set of principles promoting the beneficial use of space for humanity. The Artemis Accords are grounded in the Outer Space Treaty and other agreements including the Registration Convention, the Rescue and Return Agreement, as well as best practices and norms of responsible behavior that NASA and its partners have supported, including the public release of scientific data. 
    The commitments of the Artemis Accords and efforts by the signatories to advance implementation of these principles support the safe and sustainable exploration of space. More countries are expected to sign in the coming days and weeks ahead.
    Learn more about the Artemis Accords at:
    https://www.nasa.gov/artemis-accords
    -end-
    Kathryn Hambleton / Elizabeth ShawHeadquarters, Washington202-358-1600kathryn.a.hambleton@nasa.gov / elizabeth.a.shaw@nasa.gov

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Netflix’s Territory is a Succession-like drama packed with family rivalry and betrayal, set in Australia’s outback

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Alexa Scarlata, Research Fellow, Media & Communication, RMIT University

    Netflix

    The Australian commissioning team at Netflix has had a pretty good run over the past 12 months. In January, the adaptation of Trent Dalton’s novel Boy Swallows Universe proved to be the most successful Australian-made show to that point, scoring 7.6 million views globally in its first two weeks.

    A few months later, the second season of the streamer’s Heartbreak High reboot debuted at number one in Australia, and stayed on the Global Top 10 English TV Series list for three consecutive weeks.

    Will Netflix’s latest Australian series – one without any ties to a familiar book or TV show – be as well received? Luckily for the streamer, its new six-part outback western, Territory, has already been described as “epic”, “unforgettable” and “rollicking TV”.

    Robert Taylor plays patriarch Colin Lawson.
    Netflix

    Premium bush family drama

    The series takes place in the Northern Territory, on the “world’s largest cattle station”. The fictional Marianne Station is about the size of Belgium.

    The once-great dynasty of its owners, the Lawson family, is thrown into doubt when their heir apparent dies in the first episode. The Top End’s most powerful players – billionaire miners, rival cattle barons, desert gangsters and Indigenous elders – immediately start circling.

    While this is an original concept by creators Timothy Lee and Ben Davies, you’d be forgiven for feeling a sense of déjà vu, as Territory has been described as equal parts Succession and Yellowstone. I can imagine Netflix executives running the numbers on the returns from those two hits and saying, “let’s throw some money into this”. And boy, did they.

    The show could double as a sophisticated Tourism Australia ad.
    Netflix

    No expenses spared on hats and helicopters

    Territory was directed by Wolf Creek heavyweight Greg McLean. According to him, it’s the

    biggest South Australian TV production ever. Possibly one of the biggest TV productions in Australia just in terms of the amount of crew (and) the incredible support that we had to put in place to go to the locations we went to.

    As Netflix put it, Bondi Beach this is not. While the interiors were filmed in South Australia, half of the series was filmed in stunning remote locations across the NT.

    As a result, the show looks like the most ambitious and sophisticated Tourism Australia ad you’ve ever seen. The wildlife! The panoramic drone shots! The hat budget! The rest of the world could go from thinking we ride kangaroos to work, to assuming we’ve all got our own helicopters.

    Overseas viewers watching would be forgiven for thinking the lot of us have our own helicopters.
    Netflix

    The show looks as expensive as it sounds, but is still kind of soapy. The irony in this story is that everyone’s dirty, but no one ever sweats.

    Territory was originally announced as “Desert King”. Changing the name was wise. The landscape is, for the most part, pretty lush – and not in a “look at this oasis we’ve stumbled upon” kind of way. I counted one fly.

    Desert queens

    What’s more, while the male characters are brilliant sources of humour and violence, it’s the ladies in Territory that bring the heart.

    Anna Torv leads the series as Emily Lawson. Emily is the wife to the next-in-line but perpetually drunk Graham (Michael Dorman). She’s also the girl from the property next door, belonging to the rival Hodge family – a slightly shifty bunch who’ve been known to steal the Lawson’s cattle.

    Anna Torv plays Emily Lawson with a keen sense of cunning.
    Netflix

    Torv was the perfect choice to embody Emily as the long-suffering wife, disdained daughter-in-law, loving sister and exasperated mother. Her poker face kept me guessing. She may not be a Lawson by blood, but her cunning makes her a great fit in this powerful family.

    Kylah Day plays Sharnie Kennedy, a young kid kicking (and fooling) around with a couple of Top End bandits. It was fun – if a little frustrating – to watch her figure out her loyalties and her limits.

    Finally, Sara Wiseman plays Sandra Kirby, a disgustingly wealthy and ruthless land developer who doubles as the quintessential villain. Sandra plays everyone – even her own son. Her merciless manipulation of aspiring Indigenous cattle baron Nolan Brannock (Clarence Ryan) stings, even as it feels quite heavy-handed.

    Clarence Ryan is impressive in his role as Indigenous station owner Nolan Brannock (left), who gets caught up in the drama.
    Netflix

    Whose land and whose legacy?

    Territory does a great job of establishing a simmering tension between the traditional owners of the land and the families and businesses that have taken possession of it.

    But for a show that’s so centred on the battle for power in the Top End, the plotlines that deal with the issue of dispossession move at a frustratingly slow pace.

    Perhaps this is to cater to a global audience, which will likely lack the context that local viewers have. And maybe, for Australian viewers, the enduring subordination and struggle of the original landowners is the intended takeaway.

    Ultimately, Territory is an ambitious and attractive series. It was wonderful to see so many resources poured into a new concept, filmed and set in a part of Australia that rarely sees the kind of spotlight it deserves.

    Sam Delich and Kylah Day play petty thieves Rich Petrakis and Sharnie Kennedy.
    Netflix

    Territory is streaming on Netflix from today.

    Alexa Scarlata does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Netflix’s Territory is a Succession-like drama packed with family rivalry and betrayal, set in Australia’s outback – https://theconversation.com/netflixs-territory-is-a-succession-like-drama-packed-with-family-rivalry-and-betrayal-set-in-australias-outback-241896

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI: Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 23.10.2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Nokia Corporation
    Stock Exchange Release
    23 October 2024 at 22:30 EET

    Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 23.10.2024

    Espoo, Finland – On 23 October 2024 Nokia Corporation (LEI: 549300A0JPRWG1KI7U06) has acquired its own shares (ISIN FI0009000681) as follows:

    Trading venue (MIC Code) Number of shares Weighted average price / share, EUR*
    XHEL 1,334,469 4.34
    CEUX 394,178 4.34
    BATE
    AQEU
    TQEX
    Total 1,728,647 4.34

    * Rounded to two decimals

    On 25 January 2024, Nokia announced that its Board of Directors is initiating a share buyback program to return up to EUR 600 million of cash to shareholders in tranches over a period of two years. The first phase of the share buyback program started on 20 March 2024. On 19 July 2024, Nokia decided to accelerate the share buybacks by increasing the number of shares to be repurchased during the year 2024. The post-increase repurchases in compliance with the Market Abuse Regulation (EU) 596/2014 (MAR), the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052 and under the authorization granted by Nokia’s Annual General Meeting on 3 April 2024 started on 22 July 2024 and end by 31 December 2024 with a maximum aggregate purchase price of EUR 600 million for all purchases during 2024.

    Total cost of transactions executed on 23 October 2024 was EUR 7,504,921. After the disclosed transactions, Nokia Corporation holds 181,887,229 treasury shares.

    Details of transactions are included as an appendix to this announcement.

    On behalf of Nokia Corporation

    BofA Securities Europe SA

    About Nokia
    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs.

    Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    Inquiries:

    Nokia Communications
    Phone: +358 10 448 4900
    Email: press.services@nokia.com
    Maria Vaismaa, Global Head of External Communications

    Nokia Investor Relations
    Phone: +358 40 803 4080
    Email: investor.relations@nokia.com

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Netherlands Ambassador H.E. Marisa Gerards calls on Secretary Dr. Devesh Chaturvedi at Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 23 OCT 2024 8:51PM by PIB Delhi

    Today, H.E. Marisa Gerards, Ambassador of the Netherlands to India, paid a courtesy call to Dr. Devesh Chaturvedi, Secretary of the Department of Agriculture & Farmers’ Welfare, at Krishi Bhawan, New Delhi. The meeting provided a valuable opportunity to discuss ongoing collaborations and explore potential areas of cooperation in the agriculture and allied sectors between the two countries.

    Ambassador Gerards highlighted the robust partnership between the Netherlands and India, underpinned by a Memorandum of Understanding that has been in place for over 40 years in the agriculture sector. She expressed a strong commitment to further enhancing cooperation, particularly in horticulture, and underscored the potential for both countries to learn from each other’s expertise.

    Dr. Chaturvedi emphasized the longstanding and amicable relations between India and the Netherlands, noting the significant opportunities for collaboration in sectors of mutual interest, such as horticulture, animal husbandry, capacity building and technology transfer.

    He informed that India and the Netherlands have successfully identified 24 Centers of Excellence (CoEs), with 9 of these approved for funding under the Mission for Integrated Development of Horticulture (MIDH), receiving valuable technical support from their Dutch counterparts. Of these, 7 CoEs have been completed and have commenced commercial production, supplying high-quality planting material to farmers across India. To date, over 25,000 farmers have received training at these centers. Both parties recognized the significance of further strengthening their ongoing cooperation in this vital area.

    Additional Secretary Shri Pramod Kumar Meherda proposed a collaborative effort to develop farm machinery tailored to the needs of India, reflecting the shared vision for advancing agricultural innovation.

    The meeting was also attended by representatives from the Ministry of External Affairs and senior officials of Department of Agriculture & Farmers’ Welfare.

    ***

    SS

    (Release ID: 2067502) Visitor Counter : 53

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Threats to media freedom in Poland: concerns over PiS Party plans for TVN and Hungarian involvement – E-002081/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    15.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002081/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Łukasz Kohut (PPE), Krzysztof Brejza (PPE)

    Media reports indicate that the Law and Justice (PiS) Party intends to take control of the private broadcaster TVN in Poland. According to information disseminated by the media, this action may involve Hungarian entrepreneurs associated with Orbán’s regime, and it is suggested that this plan could be carried out by former Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki.

    TVN plays a crucial role in Polish public discourse. It is essential to emphasise that the impartiality of this media outlet has led to several persistent attempts by PiS to undermine it, including the drafting of the ‘Lex TVN’ law and the deliberate withholding of its broadcasting licence.

    In the light of the fact that media freedom and pluralism are enshrined in Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, is the Commission monitoring the situation regarding media freedom? Will it respond promptly and employ all available tools to prevent violations of media freedom by Orbán’s regime?

    Submitted: 15.10.2024

    Last updated: 23 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Disparities in workers’ payments covered under EU funds – E-002143/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    17.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002143/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Lynn Boylan (The Left)

    In Ireland, there are two employment paths for personal assistants and note takers who assist third-level students with disabilities. Those employed directly by Education and Training Boards are paid through SOLAS, the designated intermediate body for Ireland’s European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) programme for employment, inclusion, skills and training. Those employed by individual third-level institutions are paid through the Higher Education Authority’s Fund for Students with Disabilities, which is also financed under the ESF+.

    Personal assistants paid through SOLAS earn EUR 21 per hour. Those paid through the Fund for Students with Disabilities are paid EUR 14.50 per hour. Both funding streams come from the ESF+.

    • 1.Are there rules around the allocation of ESF+ funding that aim to guarantee equality of pay for the same work across different funding programmes?
    • 2.Has the Commission provided guidance to Ireland or other Member States about how to ensure equal pay across ESF+ funding programmes?

    Submitted: 17.10.2024

    Last updated: 23 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – RC-B10-0133/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Rasa Juknevičienė, François‑Xavier Bellamy, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, David McAllister, Sebastião Bugalho, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Daniel Caspary, Loucas Fourlas, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Andrius Kubilius, Miriam Lexmann, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Raphaël Glucksmann, Udo Bullmann, Matthias Ecke, Francisco Assis
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Emmanouil Fragkos, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Assita Kanko, Marion Maréchal, Aurelijus Veryga, Geadis Geadi, Rihards Kols, Bert‑Jan Ruissen, Charlie Weimers
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Nathalie Loiseau, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Bernard Guetta, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Moritz Körner, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Sergey Lagodinsky
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2890(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Azerbaijan, Armenia and the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh,

     having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, ratified by Azerbaijan in 2002 and to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

     having regard to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,

     having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 22 April 1996 between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part[1],

     having regard to the statements by the European External Action Service spokesperson of 29 May 2024 on the human rights situation in Azerbaijan and of 3 September 2024 on early parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan,

     having regard to Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe resolution 2527 (2024) of 24 January 2024 entitled ‘Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of Azerbaijan’,

     having regard to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the Election Observation Mission to the Early Presidential Elections held on 7 February 2024 and to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission to the Early Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan held on 1 September 2024,

     having regard to the report of 29 March 2023 by the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Azerbaijan and to the memorandum of 21 October 2021 by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights on the humanitarian and human rights consequences following the 2020 outbreak of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh,

     having regard to the orders of the International Court of Justice of 22 February 2023, of 6 July 2023 and of 17 November 2023 on the request for the indication of provisional measures for the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v Azerbaijan),

     having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the choice of Azerbaijan’s capital Baku as the venue for the 29th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), scheduled to take place from 11 to 22 November 2024, has sparked controversy, notably owing to Azerbaijan’s worsening human rights record, as well as recent and blatant violations of international law, including aggressive behaviour towards its neighbour Armenia; whereas respect for fundamental human rights and civil society participation are enshrined in the host country agreement through which the Azerbaijani Government committed to uphold these rights; whereas in the lead-up to this major international conference, the Azerbaijani authorities have intensified their repression of civil society organisations, activists, opposition politicians and the remaining independent media through detentions and judicial harassment; whereas corruption and a lack of judicial independence further undermine governance;

    B. whereas civil society organisations list over 300 political prisoners in Azerbaijan, including Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, Tofig Yagublu, Ilhamiz Guliyev, Aziz Orujov, Bahruz Samadov, Akif Gurbanov and many others; whereas there are credible reports of violations of prisoners’ human rights, including detention in inhumane conditions, torture and refusal of adequate medical care;

    C. whereas prominent human rights defender and climate advocate, Anar Mammadli, has been in pre-trial detention since 30 April 2024 on bogus charges of conspiracy to bring illegal foreign currency into the country and his health has deteriorated significantly while in custody; whereas Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist, opposition figure and one of the finalists for the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; whereas his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life; whereas the health of Gubad Ibadoghlu’s wife, Irada Bayramova, continues to deteriorate as a result of the physical violence she suffered during her detention by the Azerbaijani authorities; whereas on 4 December 2023 human rights activist Ilhamiz Guliyev was arrested on politically motivated charges a few months after he gave an anonymous interview to Abzas Media about the alleged police practice of planting drugs on political activists;

    D. whereas for more than a decade and with increasing determination, Azerbaijani authorities have been reducing space for civil society, arbitrarily closing down non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and arresting or forcing into exile civil society representatives; whereas in recent years, the Azerbaijani authorities have imposed increasingly stringent restrictions on civil society organisations; whereas activists, journalists, political opponents and others have been imprisoned on fabricated and politically motivated charges;

    E. whereas according to human rights defenders, crackdowns on civil society have occurred around other major international events hosted by Azerbaijan, including Eurovision 2012 and the European Games 2015;

    F. whereas the Azerbaijani regime appears to extend its repressive actions beyond its borders; whereas the ongoing crackdown on freedom of expression in Azerbaijan is also reflected in reports of transnational repression and reprisals against family members of detainees; whereas, since 2020, Mahammad Mirzali, an Azerbaijani dissident blogger, has been the target of several assassination attempts in France; whereas, on 29 September 2024, Vidadi Isgandarli, a critic of the Azerbaijani regime living as a political refugee in France, was attacked in his home and succumbed to his injuries two days later; whereas the Azerbaijani authorities have also engaged in politically motivated prosecutions of EU citizens, as seen in the case of Théo Clerc, prompting at least one Member State to formally warn its citizens against travelling to Azerbaijan owing to the risk of arbitrary detention;

    G. whereas Azerbaijan has implemented a systematic policy of bribing officials and elected representatives in Europe in order to downplay Azerbaijan’s human rights record and to silence critics, as part of a widely used strategy described as ‘caviar diplomacy’; whereas some cases have been investigated and some of those involved have been prosecuted and convicted by national courts in several EU Member States;

    H. whereas a number of European Court of Human Rights decisions have found that Azerbaijan has violated human rights; whereas according to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, more than 320 court judgments against Azerbaijan have not yet been executed or have been only partially implemented, which is the highest number among all state parties to the European Convention on Human Rights;

    I. whereas on 3 July 2024, the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) publicly denounced Azerbaijan’s ‘refusal to improve the situation in the light of the Committee’s recommendations’ and the ‘persistent lack of cooperation of the Azerbaijani authorities with the CPT’;

    J. whereas the PACE decided in January 2024 not to ratify the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation, noting its ‘very serious concerns as to …[Azerbaijan’s] respect for human rights’; whereas the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted that its Monitoring Committee’s rapporteurs were not allowed to meet with people who had been detained on allegedly politically motivated charges, and that the Azerbaijani delegation refused to allow the rapporteur for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to visit the country;

    K. whereas according to the Election Observation Mission led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the early presidential election held on 7 February 2024 took place in a restrictive environment and was marked by the stifling of critical voices and the absence of political alternatives; whereas Azerbaijan held early parliamentary elections on 1 September 2024 in what the OSCE/ODIHR-led International Election Observation Mission described as a restrictive political and legal environment that did not enable genuine pluralism and resulted in a contest devoid of competition; whereas in the period leading up to the parliamentary elections, several government critics were detained;

    L. whereas media legislation in Azerbaijan has become increasingly repressive, with the February 2022 media law effectively legalising censorship; whereas several other laws affecting the media also violate the country’s international obligations with regard to freedom of expression and press freedom; whereas public criticism of the authorities is subject to severe penalties;

    M. whereas according to Reporters Without Borders, virtually the entire media sector in Azerbaijan is under official control, with no independent television or radio broadcasts from within the country, and all critical print newspapers shut down; whereas the authorities continue to suppress the last remaining independent media and repress journalists who reject self-censorship; whereas Azerbaijan has intensified its repression against the remaining independent media, such as Abzas Media, Kanal 13 and Toplum TV, through detentions and judicial harassment;

    N. whereas the Azerbaijani laws regulating the registration, operation and funding of NGOs are highly restrictive and arbitrarily implemented, thus effectively criminalising unregistered NGO activity; whereas Freedom House’s 2024 index ranks Azerbaijan among the least free countries in the world, below Russia and Belarus;

    O. whereas gas contracts between Gazprom and SOCAR for the delivery of one billion cubic metres of gas from Russia to Azerbaijan between November 2022 and March 2023 have raised significant concerns about the re-export of Russian gas to the European market, particularly in the context of the signed memorandum of understanding on the strategic partnership in the field of energy; whereas the EU aims to reduce European dependence on Russian gas, but this agreement could be seen as undermining that goal, as Russian gas would still be flowing into Azerbaijan, thus potentially freeing up Azerbaijani gas for increased re-export to the EU; whereas there are also worrying reports of Russian gas being rebranded as Azerbaijani for sale in the EU;

    P. whereas Azerbaijani leaders have engaged in anti-EU and anti-Western rhetoric; whereas Azerbaijan has intensified its disinformation campaigns targeting the EU and its Member States, with a specific focus on France; whereas Azerbaijan has actively interfered in European politics under the guise of ‘anti-colonialism’, notably in overseas countries and territories such as New Caledonia;

    Q. whereas in addition, in September 2023, after months of the illegal blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan launched a pre-planned, unjustified military attack on the territory, forcing over 100 000 ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia, which amounts to ethnic cleansing; whereas as a result, Nagorno-Karabakh has been almost entirely emptied of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries; whereas this attack represents a gross violation of human rights and international law, a clear breach of the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020 and a failure to uphold commitments made during EU-mediated negotiations;

    R. whereas the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh lost their property and belongings while fleeing the Azerbaijani military push in 2023 and have been unable to recover them since; whereas actions amounting to ethnic cleansing have continued since then; whereas the EU has provided humanitarian aid to people displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas credible reports confirm the organised destruction of Armenian cultural and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas Azerbaijani leaders and officials repeatedly use hate speech against Armenians;

    S. whereas both Azerbaijan and Armenia are bound by international humanitarian law and the Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war from all forms of torture and cruel treatment; whereas reports indicate that 23 Armenian prisoners are currently being held in Azerbaijani prisons without adequate legal representation, including eight former leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh, some of whom have received long prison sentences;

    T. whereas in February 2023, the EU deployed the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to observe developments at the international border with Azerbaijan; whereas Azerbaijan has refused to cooperate with EUMA and the mission has been the target of disinformation by Azerbaijani authorities and government-controlled media; whereas the Azerbaijani leadership continues to make irredentist statements with reference to the sovereign territory of Armenia; whereas the Azerbaijani army continues to occupy no less than 170 km2 of the sovereign territory of Armenia;

    U. whereas Armenia and Azerbaijan have engaged in negotiations on a peace treaty, the normalisation of their relations and border delimitation, both before and after the 2023 attack on Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas, despite mediation efforts by the EU and others, no peace agreement has been signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia; whereas, although both governments have stated that they are close to an agreement, recent remarks by the Azerbaijani president raise concern about Baku’s willingness to find a compromise to conclude the negotiations;

    V. whereas the EU fully supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia and actively supports efforts towards a sustainable peace agreement between the two countries, achieved by peaceful means and respecting the rights of the population concerned;

    W. whereas since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Azerbaijan has deepened its relations with Russia, including political and economic ties, as well as increased cooperation between their intelligence services; whereas Russia has openly backed Azerbaijan in its aggressive behaviour towards Armenia;

    1. Strongly condemns the domestic and extraterritorial repression by the Azerbaijani regime against activists, journalists, opposition leaders and others, including EU nationals, which has noticeably intensified ahead of COP29; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all persons arbitrarily detained or imprisoned on account of their political views, to drop all politically motivated charges and to cease all forms of repression, both within and beyond Azerbaijan; recalls in this context the names of Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, human rights defenders and journalists, including Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali and Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Ilhamiz Guliyev and Farid Ismayilov, as well as of civil society activists arrested after March 2024 such as Anar Mammadli, Farid Mehralizade, Igbal Abilov, Bahruz Samadov, Emin Ibrahimov and Famil Khalilov; expresses deep concern about the environment of fear that this has created inside the country, leaving civil society effectively silenced;

    2. Reiterates its call for the Azerbaijani authorities to drop all charges against Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and allow him to travel abroad, unhindered and to the country of his choice, to reunite with his family, to receive the medical care he urgently needs and attend the Sakharov Prize ceremony in Strasbourg in December 2024; calls on Azerbaijan to ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad; calls on all EU representatives and individual Member States to actively support the release from house arrest of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and insist on his release in every exchange with the Azerbaijani authorities;

    3. Demands that freedom of the press and expression be guaranteed and that media organisations not be restricted; calls, therefore, on the Azerbaijani Government to release journalists working for Abzas Media and Toplum TV, including Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifqizi and Alasgar Mammadli;

    4. Considers that Azerbaijan’s ongoing human rights abuses are incompatible with its hosting of COP29; urges EU leaders, in particular Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, to use COP29 as an opportunity to remind Azerbaijan of its international obligations and to meaningfully address the country’s human rights record in their interactions with the Azerbaijani authorities, including by calling for the unconditional release of all persons arbitrarily detained or imprisoned on account of their political views and by requesting to meet with political prisoners while in the country; calls for the EU and its Member States to do their utmost to ensure that United Nations Climate Change conferences are not hosted in countries with poor human rights records;

    5. Reminds the Azerbaijani authorities of their obligations to respect fundamental freedoms, and calls on them to repeal repressive legislation that drives independent NGOs and media to the margins of the law; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to repeal repressive legislation on the registration and funding of NGOs to bring them into line with Venice Commission recommendations;

    6. Recalls that the 1996 EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which is the legal basis for bilateral relations, is based on respect for democracy and the principles of international law and human rights and that these have been systematically violated in Azerbaijan;

    7. Reminds the Azerbaijani Government of its international obligations to safeguard the dignity and rights of detainees, ensuring that they receive adequate medical care, are detained in humane conditions and are protected from any mistreatment; calls on the Azerbaijani Government to swiftly comply with long-standing recommendations of the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on the subject of the widespread recourse to physical ill treatment – including, on occasion, torture – by the police in Azerbaijan; calls on the Azerbaijani Government to implement all the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights;

    8. Reiterates its call for EU sanctions to be imposed under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations; calls on the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to request meetings with political prisoners in Azerbaijan;

    9. Insists that any future partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan be made conditional on the release of all political prisoners, the implementation of legal reforms and the overall improvement of the human rights situation in the country, as well as on Azerbaijan demonstrating its genuine readiness to faithfully engage in the negotiation of a peace agreement with Armenia and to respect the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians;

    10. Calls for the EU to end its reliance on gas exports from Azerbaijan; calls on the Commission to suspend the 2022 memorandum of understanding on the strategic partnership in the field of energy and to act accordingly;

    11. Reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia and strongly supports the normalisation of their relations based on the principles of the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders, in accordance with the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration; reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of Armenia’s sovereign territory; calls on Azerbaijan to unequivocally commit to respecting Armenia’s territorial integrity; highlights that Azerbaijan’s connectivity issues with its exclave of Nakhchivan should be resolved with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia; reiterates its position that the EU should be ready to impose sanctions on any individuals and entities that threaten the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Armenia;

    12. Condemns any military aggression, use of force or hybrid threats against Armenia, as well as foreign interference and attempts to destabilise the political situation in Armenia; welcomes, furthermore, the decision to adopt the first assistance measure under the European Peace Facility in support of Armenian armed forces and calls for the cooperation between Armenia and the EU to be further reinforced in the field of security and defence; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges the Member States to consider similar initiatives; welcomes the new momentum in bilateral relations between the EU and Armenia, which is strongly supported by the authorities in Yerevan; calls on the Commission and the Council to actively support Armenia’s desire for increased cooperation with the EU;

    13. Expresses its support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; reiterates its concern regarding the repeated smear campaigns originating from Azerbaijan against EUMA; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size and extend its duration;

    14. Supports all initiatives and activities that could lead to the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the signing of a long-awaited peace agreement; calls on Azerbaijan to demonstrate genuine efforts to this end; warns Azerbaijan that any military action against Armenia would be unacceptable and would have serious consequences for the partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU; welcomes the Armenia-Azerbaijan joint statement of 7 December 2023 on confidence-building measures; welcomes the progress made in the framework of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation process, which has led to an agreement on several sections of the border; encourages both sides to take further steps on the remaining sections; calls for the EU to cease all technical and financial assistance to Azerbaijan that might contribute to strengthening its military or security capabilities; calls on the Member States to freeze exports of all military and security equipment to Azerbaijan;

    15. Calls for the full implementation of all orders issued by the International Court of Justice, including the order of 17 November 2023 indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of people who fled Nagorno-Karabakh; recalls that the decision to host COP29 in Baku was made after Azerbaijan failed to comply with the above-mentioned International Court of Justice order as well as those of 7 December 2021 and of 22 February 2023; reiterates its call for independent investigations into the abuses committed by Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh; reiterates its call on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh, to genuinely engage in a comprehensive and transparent dialogue with them, to provide robust guarantees for the protection of their rights, including their land and property rights, the protection of their distinct identity and their civic, cultural, social and religious rights, and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric that could incite discrimination against Armenians; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all 23 Armenian prisoners of war detained following Azerbaijan’s retaking of the Nagorno-Karabakh region;

    16. Reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to continue to offer assistance to Armenia to deal with the refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh; calls for the EU, in this regard, to provide a new package of assistance to Armenia to help the Armenian Government address the humanitarian needs of refugees; welcomes all efforts by the Government of Armenia to provide shelter and aid to the displaced Armenians;

    17. Expresses deep concern regarding the preservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh following the massive exodus of its Armenian population; urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destruction, neglect or alteration of the origins of cultural, religious or historical heritage in the region and calls on it instead to strive to preserve, protect and promote this rich diversity; demands the protection of the Armenian cultural, historical and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh in line with UNESCO standards and Azerbaijan’s international commitments; insists that Azerbaijan allow a UNESCO mission to Nagorno-Karabakh and grant it the necessary access;

    18. Deplores steps taken by Azerbaijan towards the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus, which are against international law and the provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984); calls on Azerbaijan to respect the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and to not invite the secessionist entity in occupied Cyprus to any meetings of the Organization of Turkic States;

    19. Condemns Azerbaijan’s repeated attempts to denigrate and destabilise Member States, including through the so-called Baku Initiative Group; condemns in particular its support for irredentist groups and disinformation operations targeting France, especially in the French departments and territories of New Caledonia, Martinique and Corsica; recalls that these methods were used against Germany in 2013; denounces the smear campaigns targeting Denmark; regrets the smear campaign aimed at damaging France’s reputation by calling into question its capacity to host the 2024 Olympic Games, launched by actors suspected of being close to the Azerbaijani regime;

    20. Condemns the arbitrary arrests of EU citizens based on spurious accusations of espionage and their disproportionate sentencing;

    21. Strongly condemns the public insults and direct threats made by Azerbaijani diplomatic or government representatives, or members of the Azerbaijani Parliament, targeting elected officials of EU Member States; demands, in this regard, that access to EU institutional buildings be denied to the Azerbaijani officials concerned until further notice;

    22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Director-General of UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations and the Council of Europe.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Croatia’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Latest state of play – 23-10-2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Croatia’s national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) is an ambitious outline of reforms and investment designed to mitigate the pandemic’s socioeconomic fallout. Following the December 2023 amendment of the Croatian NRRP, to which a REPowerEU chapter was added, the plan’s worth reached €10 040.7 million (or 18.5 % of national gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019), an increase of over 59 % compared with the original (2021) version of the plan, which was worth €6 297 million in grants only. The amended plan comes with a grant allocation of €5 779.4 million and a freshly requested loan allocation of €4 254.2 million (of which more than 62 % is for the REPowerEU chapter). The grant part includes the June 2022 downward revision of Croatia’s grant allocation of €785.1 million and the country’s REPowerEU grant allocation of €269 million. In addition, Croatia has requested a €7.2 million transfer from its share of the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to its NRRP. So far, Croatia has received €4 487.3 million of Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) resources (44.7 % of the amended NRRP) in the form of pre financing, five grant and one loan instalment. The disbursements are above the current EU average of 41 %. The measures in the amended plan are designed to help Croatia overcome the socioeconomic ramifications of both the pandemic and the energy crisis, as well as to address the consequences of the two devastating earthquakes of 2020. The plan focuses on the green transition by devoting over 39 % of the resources to it. It also fosters the digital transformation by committing 20.1 % of the funds (excluding the REPowerEU chapter) to digital projects. In the context of the European Semester, in 2024 the Commission assessed the implementation of the Croatian plan as ‘under way’. The European Parliament continues to ensure transparency and accountability through interinstitutional dialogues on RRF implementation, and scrutiny of the Commission’s work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Fourth edition. The ‘NGEU delivery’ briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan – RC-B10-0134/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Michael Gahler, Miriam Lexmann, Sebastião Bugalho, Rasa Juknevičienė, Danuše Nerudová
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Kathleen Van Brempt, Tonino Picula
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Charlie Weimers, Michał Dworczyk, Alexandr Vondra, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Rihards Kols, Maciej Wąsik, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alberico Gambino, Bert‑Jan Ruissen, Carlo Fidanza
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Engin Eroglu, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Dan Barna, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Bernard Guetta, Svenja Hahn, Ľubica Karvašová, Karin Karlsbro, Moritz Körner, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Ana Vasconcelos, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Markéta Gregorová
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    European Parliament resolution on the misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

    (2024/2891(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan,

     having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 on a new EU-China strategy[1],

     having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation[2],

     having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific[3],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan[4],

     having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations[5],

     having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022,

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 entitled ‘The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ (JOIN(2021)0024),

     having regard to the EU’s ‘One China’ policy,

     having regard to the EU-China summit of 7 December 2023,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions on China of 30 June 2023,

     having regard to the visits of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 25 to 27 July 2023 and of the Committee on International Trade of 19 to 21 December 2022 to Taiwan,

     having regard to the statement of 1 September 2024 by the Spokesperson of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the latest dangerous actions in the South China Sea,

     having regard to the statements by the Spokesperson of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on China’s military drills around Taiwan, including the most recent statement of 14 October 2024,

     having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers’ statements of 18 April 2023 and of 3 August 2022 on preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,

     having regard to the statement by the Chair of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of 23 September 2024,

     having regard to the joint declaration by the G7 Defence Ministers of 19 October 2024,

     having regard to the urgency motion on Taiwan passed by the Australian Senate on 21 August 2024,

     having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971,

     having regard to the motion on UN Resolution 2758 passed by the Dutch House of Representatives on 12 September 2024,

     having regard to the press statement by the US Department of State of 13 October 2024,

     having regard to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

     having regard to Article 7 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), concluded on 9 May 1992,

     having regard to Rule 5 of the Standing Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),

     having regard to Article 4 of the Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol),

     having regard to Article 8 and Article 18(h) of the Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO),

     having regard to Rules 136(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas UN Resolution 2758 was passed by the UN General Assembly on 25 October 1971 and shifted the official recognition from the Republic of China (Taiwan) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC); whereas today Taiwan, while not being a member of the United Nations, maintains diplomatic relations with 11 of the 193 United Nations member states, as well as with the Holy See;

    B. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law; whereas Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, with a flourishing civil society; whereas Taiwan held peaceful and well-organised elections on 13 January 2024;

    C. whereas following the adoption of UN Resolution 2758, Taiwan lost its access to participation in multilateral forums, such as the WHO;

    D. whereas Taiwan has never been part of the PRC; whereas the Republic of China was established in 1912 and the PRC in 1949;

    E. whereas UN Resolution 2758 addresses the status of the PRC, but does not determine that the PRC enjoys sovereignty over Taiwan, nor does it make any judgement on the future inclusion of Taiwan in the UN or any other international organisation; whereas, however, the PRC continues to misinterpret UN Resolution 2758 to block Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organisations and unilaterally change the status quo; whereas these actions highlight the PRC’s ambition to alter the existing multilateral international order and undermine international law, and can be seen as an expression of systemic rivalry;

    F. whereas the EU continues to maintain its own ‘One China’ policy, which is different from the PRC’s ‘One China’ principle; whereas the EU’s long-standing position has been to support the status quo and a peaceful resolution of differences across the Taiwan Strait, while encouraging dialogue and constructive engagement;

    G. whereas through their statement of 23 September 2024 the G7 members, among other things, underlined their support for ‘Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is’;

    H. whereas supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organisations does not undermine the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy, which remains the political foundation of EU-China relations;

    I. whereas over the past decade the PRC has persistently tried to increase its influence over international institutions, using this to sideline Taiwan and prevent Taiwanese passport holders, including journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and political activists, from accessing international institutions; whereas the PRC exercises transnational repression by misusing extradition treaties to target Taiwanese people abroad and therefore put them at risk of arbitrary persecution and human rights abuses;

    J. whereas the statutes of most international organisations tasked to address global issues, including the WHO, the UNFCCC, Interpol and the ICAO, provide opportunities for entities such as Taiwan to participate without infringing on the rights of member states;

    K. whereas Taiwan has consistently demonstrated a peaceful and cooperative attitude globally, has significantly enhanced global developments and thus could contribute greatly to the work of various international organisations;

    L. whereas the PRC is a one-party state that is entirely controlled and ruled by the Chinese Communist Party;

    M. whereas in a speech on Taiwan’s national day of 10 October 2024, Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te stated that the PRC has ‘no right to represent Taiwan’ and reiterated that the two sides are ‘not subordinate’ to each other; whereas the PRC has justified its recent military exercise by claiming that President Lai Ching-te is pursuing a separatist strategy;

    N. whereas on 14 October 2024 the PRC launched a large-scale military drill, named Joint Sword-2024B, that simulated a blockade of Taiwan; whereas during this exercise a record number of 153 PRC aircraft,18 warships and 17 PRC coastguard ships were detected around Taiwan;

    O. whereas during the exercises four formations of the PRC coastguard patrolled the island and briefly entered its restricted waters; whereas the very frequent deployment of the coastguard by the PRC in the Strait in what the PRC considers ‘law enforcement’ missions is putting constant pressure on the Taiwanese authorities and causing a dangerous increase in the risk of collisions, in what is one of the most concrete indications of the PRC’s intention to erode the status quo; whereas the exercises launched on 14 October 2024 were the fourth round of large-scale war games by the PRC in just over two years;

    P. whereas these activities were condemned by Taiwan as an ‘unreasonable provocation’ and are the latest in a series of war games conducted by the PRC against Taiwan; whereas these military drills came days after Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s new president, gave a speech vowing to protect Taiwan’s sovereignty in the face of challenges from the PRC;

    Q. whereas the median line, which was set up in a decades-old tacit agreement between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, was designed to reduce the risk of conflict by keeping the military aircraft from both sides of the Strait at a safe distance and thus prevent fatal miscalculations; whereas the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army violated the median line only four times between 1954 and 2020, but now routine incursions reflect Beijing’s intent to irreversibly reset long-standing benchmarks;

    R. whereas the press statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the US Department of State reaffirm that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are of strategic importance for regional and global security and prosperity; whereas the High Representative’s statement recalls the need to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, opposes any unilateral actions that change the status quo by force or coercion and calls on all parties to exercise restraint and avoid any actions that may further escalate cross-Strait tensions;

    S. whereas on 23 May 2024 the PRC launched a military drill called Joint Sword-2024A, just days after the inauguration of Lai Ching-te as the new President of Taiwan;

    T. whereas over the past few years the PRC has held similar military drills around Taiwan; whereas these military drills have increased in intensity and have been moved closer and closer to Taiwan’s mainland; whereas during a previous drill in August 2022 the PRC also fired missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone;

    U. whereas on top of military pressure the PRC has long been pursuing a sophisticated strategy of targeting Taiwan with foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including hybrid and cyberattacks with the goal of undermining Taiwan’s democratic society;

    V. whereas the PRC, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has said that it will not renounce the use of force to seek unification with Taiwan;

    W. whereas the PRC’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law includes the use of non-peaceful means, triggered by ambiguous thresholds, to achieve what the PRC calls ‘unification’ with Taiwan; whereas such military action is a grave threat to the security and stability of the entire region, with potentially dire global consequences; whereas EU and US deterrence is of strategic importance to dissuade the PRC from undertaking any unilateral action against Taiwan;

    X. whereas the PRC’s increasingly aggressive behaviour, in particular in its own neighbourhood, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security; whereas since 2019 the PRC has violated the Taiwanese air defence identification zone (ADIZ) with increasing regularity; whereas the PRC has been behaving aggressively across vast areas of the Indo-Pacific and exerting varying degrees of military or economic coercion, which has led to disputes with neighbours such as Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia;

    Y. whereas the EU has condemned the dangerous actions conducted by Chinese coastguard vessels against lawful Philippine maritime operations in the South China Sea on 31 August 2024; whereas this incident is the latest in a series of actions endangering the safety of life at sea and violating the right to freedom of navigation and overflight in compliance with international law; whereas maritime security and freedom of navigation must be ensured in accordance with international law and, in particular, UNCLOS;

    Z. whereas the PRC is supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular through the export of dual-use goods to Russia and the ongoing involvement of PRC-based companies in sanctions evasion and circumvention;

    AA. whereas as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the PRC has a responsibility to work for peace and stability in the region, and particularly in the Taiwan Strait;

    AB. whereas through its 2021 strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the EU and its Member States increased their presence in the region, including through a higher military presence of certain Member States and the continued passage of military ships through the Taiwan Strait;

    AC. whereas Taiwan is located in a strategic position in terms of trade, notably in high-tech supply chains; whereas the Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships travelling from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan towards Europe; whereas Taiwan dominates semiconductor manufacturing markets, as its producers manufacture around 50 % of the world’s semiconductor output; whereas the EU’s strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific argues for increasing trade and investment cooperation with Taiwan;

    AD. whereas the EU is Taiwan’s fourth largest trading partner after the PRC, the United States and Japan; whereas in 2022 Taiwan was the EU’s 12th largest trading partner; whereas the EU is the largest source of foreign direct investment in Taiwan; whereas Taiwanese investments in the EU remain below their potential;

    AE. whereas members of the Australian Senate and of the Dutch House of Representatives have recently adopted motions concerning the distortion of UN Resolution 2758 by the PRC and called for support for Taiwan’s greater participation in multilateral organisations;

    1. Reiterates that Taiwan is a key EU partner and a like-minded democratic friend in the Indo-Pacific region; commends Taiwan and the Taiwanese people for their strong democracy and vibrant civil society, demonstrated once more by the peaceful and well-organised elections of 13 January 2024;

    2. Opposes the PRC’s constant distortion of UN Resolution 2758 and its efforts to block Taiwan’s participation in multilateral organisations; calls for the EU and its Member States to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in relevant international organisations such as the WHO, the ICAO, Interpol and the UNFCCC; further calls on the UN Secretariat to grant Taiwanese nationals and journalists the right to access UN premises for visits, meetings and newsgathering activities;

    3. Strongly condemns the PRC’s unwarranted military exercises of 14 October 2024, its continued military provocations against Taiwan and its continued military build-up, which is changing the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, and reiterates its firm rejection of any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; lauds the restraint and disciplined reaction of the Taiwanese authorities and calls for regular exchanges between the EU and its Taiwanese counterparts on relevant security issues;

    4. Reaffirms its strong commitment to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; underlines that any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, particularly by means of force or coercion, will not be accepted and will be met with a decisive and firm reaction;

    5. Underlines that UN Resolution 2758 takes no position on Taiwan; strongly rejects and refutes the PRC’s attempts to distort history and international rules;

    6. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to its ‘One China’ policy as the political foundation of EU-China relations; recalls that the EU’s China strategy emphasises that constructive cross-strait relations are part of promoting peace and security in the whole Asia-Pacific region and that the EU supports initiatives aimed at dialogue and confidence-building;

    7. Underlines that in Taiwan it is up to the people to democratically decide how they want to live and that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait must not be unilaterally changed by the use or threat of force;

    8. Reiterates its strong condemnation of statements by Chinese President Xi Jinping that the PRC will never renounce the right to use force with respect to Taiwan; underlines that the PRC’s use of force or threats or other highly coercive measures to achieve unification is incompatible with international law; expresses grave concern over the PRC’s use of hostile disinformation to undermine trust in Taiwan’s democracy and governance; reiterates its previous calls for the EU and its Member States to cooperate with international partners in helping to sustain democracy in Taiwan, keeping it free from foreign interference and threats; underlines that only Taiwan’s democratically elected government can represent the Taiwanese people on the international stage;

    9. Condemns the PRC’s systematic grey-zone military actions, including cyber and disinformation campaigns against Taiwan, and urges the PRC to halt these activities immediately; calls, in this regard, for cooperation between the EU and Taiwan to be deepened further to enhance structural cooperation on countering disinformation and foreign interference; welcomes the posting of a liaison officer at the European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan to coordinate joint efforts to tackle disinformation and interference as a first important step towards deeper EU-Taiwan cooperation, and calls for the EU to further deepen cooperation with Taiwan in this key area; praises the courage of the Taiwanese people and the proportionate and dignified reactions of the Taiwanese authorities and institutions in the face of intensifying Chinese threats and activities;

    10. Firmly rejects the PRC’s economic coercion against Taiwan and other countries, as well as against EU Member States, and underlines that such practices are not only illegal under World Trade Organization rules, but that they also have a devastating effect on the PRC’s reputation around the world and will lead to a further loss of trust in the PRC as a responsible actor; stresses the independent right of the EU and its Member States to develop relations with Taiwan in line with their interests and shared values of democracy and human rights without foreign interference; calls on EU and Member State missions abroad to address and provide alternatives to malign PRC business practices, especially in the Global South;

    11. Is very concerned at the adoption of the so-called guidelines for punishing ‘diehard Taiwan independence separatists’ for committing crimes of secession and the incitement of secession jointly announced by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the ministries for public security and state security and the justice ministry in June 2024, which could lead to harsh punishments for the crime of secession, up to and including the death penalty; strongly condemns the sentencing of one Taiwanese activist to nine years in prison in September 2024 after his arrest in the PRC in 2022, as well as the constant harassment of Taiwanese people working and living in the PRC;

    12. Is seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas; recalls the importance of respecting international law, including UNCLOS and, in particular, its provisions on the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means and on maintaining the freedom of navigation and overflight; calls on all countries that have not done so to swiftly ratify UNCLOS; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their own maritime capacities in the region; reminds the PRC of its responsibilities, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to uphold international law and emphasises the obligation to resolve disputes peacefully;

    13. Reaffirms its grave concerns about China’s increasing military investments and capabilities; expresses grave concerns about the renewed Chinese and Russian commitment to further strengthen their military ties and condemns the Chinese supply of components and equipment to Moscow’s military industry; welcomes the Council decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies for supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine; deplores the ‘no limits’ partnership between Russia and the PRC; welcomes the increasing commitment and military presence of the United States in the Indo-Pacific; reiterates its calls for a coordinated approach to deepening EU-US cooperation on security matters, including through transatlantic parliamentary dialogue;

    14. Strongly welcomes the close cooperation and alignment of Taiwan with the EU and the United States in responding to Russia’s war against Ukraine and issuing sanctions in response to this blatant violation of international law; recalls Taiwan’s help in addressing the humanitarian crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its continuous involvement and support for the Ukrainian government and countries hosting Ukrainian refugees;

    15. Highlights that the PRC’s various actions in the field of cognitive and legal warfare are slowly undermining the status quo, as well as intensifying grey-zone activities that are intended to circumvent detection, existing laws and response thresholds; calls for the EU to establish and enforce its redlines through its toolbox of sanctions, including sectoral sanctions, against hybrid activities and cyberthreats, and to coordinate strong diplomatic and economic deterrence measures with liked-minded partners;

    16. Expresses its gratitude for Taiwan’s help and assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic;

    17. Recognises the importance of Taiwan in securing global supply chains, especially in the high-tech sector where Taiwan is the leading producer of semiconductors, and calls for the EU and its Member States to engage in closer cooperation with Taiwan;

    18. Calls on the Commission to launch, without delay, preparatory measures for negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement, or other kinds of agreement, with Taiwan; highlights the potential for cooperation on foreign direct investment screening policy and on tackling economic coercion and retaliation;

    19. Applauds the increase in freedom of navigation exercises conducted by several EU countries, including France, the Netherlands and Germany; notes that these activities are in line with international law and calls for more cooperation and coordination with regional partners in order to increase freedom of navigation operations in the region;

    20. Welcomes visits by former and current Taiwanese politicians to Europe, including the recent visit of former President Tsai Ing-wen to the European Parliament on 17 October 2024; welcomes, furthermore, continued exchanges of its Members with Taiwan and encourages further visits of official European Parliament delegations to Taiwan; additionally encourages further exchanges between the EU and Taiwan at all levels, including political meetings and people-to-people encounters;

    21. Encourages, in this light, increased economic, scientific and cultural interactions and exchanges, focusing, among other areas, on youth, academia, civil society, sports, culture and education, as well as city-to-city and region-to-region partnerships; reiterates its call on the Member States to engage in meaningful and structural technical cooperation with Taiwan’s National Fire Agency and National Police Agency and with local administrations in the field of civil protection and disaster management;

    22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments of the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1826 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP23211 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council – B10-0150/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
    Members responsible: Martin Häusling, Biljana Borzan, Anja Hazekamp

    B10‑0150/2024

    European Parliament resolution on Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1826 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP23211 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2024/2838(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1826 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP23211 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council[1],

     having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed[2], and in particular Article 7(3) and Article 19(3) thereof,

     having regard to the vote of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, on 26 April 2024, at which no opinion was delivered, and the vote of the Appeal Committee on 29 May 2024, at which again no opinion was delivered,

     having regard to Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers[3],

     having regard to the opinion adopted by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on 29 November 2023, and published on 18 January 2024[4],

     having regard to its previous resolutions objecting to the authorisation of genetically modified organisms (‘GMOs’)[5],

     having regard to Rule 115(2) and (3) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,

    A. whereas, on 11 December 2019, Pioneer Overseas Corporation, based in Belgium, submitted, on behalf of Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., based in the United States, an application to the national competent authority of the Netherlands (the ‘application’) for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP23211 (the ‘GM maize’), in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003; whereas the application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of the GM maize for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation;

    B. whereas, on 29 November 2023, EFSA adopted a favourable opinion, which was published on 18 January 2024;

    C. whereas the GM maize contains genes conferring resistance to glufosinate and produces insecticidal proteins;

    Lack of assessment of the complementary herbicide

    D. whereas Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2013[6] requires an assessment of whether the expected agricultural practices influence the outcome of the studied endpoints; whereas, according to that Implementing Regulation, this is especially relevant for herbicide-tolerant plants;

    E. whereas the vast majority of GM crops have been genetically modified so that they are tolerant to one or more ‘complementary’ herbicides which can be used throughout the cultivation of the GM crop, without the crop dying, as would be the case for a non-herbicide tolerant crop; whereas a number of studies show that herbicide-tolerant GM crops result in a higher use of complementary herbicides, in large part because of the emergence of herbicide-tolerant weeds[7];

    F. whereas herbicide-tolerant GM crops lock farmers into a weed management system that is largely or wholly dependent on herbicides, and does so by charging a premium for GM seeds that can be justified only if farmers purchasing such seed also spray the complementary herbicides; whereas heightened reliance on complementary herbicides on farms planting the GM crops accelerate the emergence and spread of weeds resistant to those herbicides, thereby triggering the need for even more herbicide use, a vicious circle known as ‘the herbicide treadmill’;

    G. whereas the adverse impacts stemming from excessive reliance on herbicides will worsen on soil health, water quality, and above and below ground biodiversity, as well as leading to increased human and animal exposure, potentially also via increased herbicide residues on food and feed;

    H. whereas glufosinate is classified as toxic to reproduction 1B and therefore meets the ‘cut-off criteria’ set out in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council[8]; whereas the approval of glufosinate for use in the Union expired on 31 July 2018;

    I. whereas assessment of herbicide residues and metabolites found on GM plants is considered outside the remit of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms and is therefore not undertaken as part of the authorisation process for GMOs;

    Member State competent authority and stakeholder comments

    J. whereas Member States submitted many critical comments to EFSA during the three-month consultation period, including that the monitoring plan concerned does not ensure that relevant information for the monitoring of the product is gathered and therefore cannot be considered adequate, as well as that the insecticidal protein produced by the plant has not been adequately assessed;

    Ensuring a global level playing field and upholding the Union’s international obligations

    K. whereas the conclusions of the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture[9] call on the Commission to reassess its approach on market access for agri-food imports and exports, given the challenge of diverging standards of the Union and its trading partners; whereas fairer trade relations, at a global level, coherent with goals for a healthy environment were one of the main demands of farmers during the demonstrations of 2023 and 2024;

    L. whereas a 2017 report by the United Nations’ (UN) Special Rapporteur on the right to food found that, particularly in developing countries, hazardous pesticides have catastrophic impacts on health[10]; whereas the UN Sustainable Development Goal (UN SDG) Target 3.9 aims by 2030 to substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination[11];

    M. whereas the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (‘Kunming-Montreal Framework’), agreed at the COP15 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UN CBD) in December 2022, includes a global target to reduce the risk of pesticides by at least 50 % by 2030[12];

    N. whereas Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 states that GM food or feed must not have adverse effects on human health, animal health or the environment, and requires the Commission to take into account any relevant provisions of Union law and other legitimate factors relevant to the matter under consideration when drafting its decision; whereas such legitimate factors should include the Union’s obligations under the UN SDGs and the UN CBD;

    Reducing dependency on imported feed

    O. whereas one of the lessons from the COVID-19 crisis and the still ongoing war in Ukraine is the need for the Union to end the dependencies on some critical materials; whereas in the mission letter to Commissioner-designate Christophe Hansen, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen asks him to look at ways to reduce imports of critical commodities[13];

    Undemocratic decision-making

    P. whereas, in its eighth term, Parliament adopted a total of 36 resolutions objecting to the placing on the market of GMOs for food and feed (33 resolutions) and to the cultivation of GMOs in the Union (three resolutions); whereas, in its ninth term, Parliament adopted 38 objections to placing GMOs on the market;

    Q. whereas despite its own acknowledgement of the democratic shortcomings, the lack of support from Member States and the objections of Parliament, the Commission continues to authorise GMOs;

    R. whereas no change of law is required for the Commission to be able not to authorise GMOs when there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour in the Appeal Committee[14];

    S. whereas the vote on 26 April 2024 of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 delivered no opinion, meaning that the authorisation was not supported by a qualified majority of Member States; whereas the vote on 29 May 2024 of the Appeal Committee again delivered no opinion;

    T. whereas on 2 July 2024, the Commission authorised the placing on the market of the GM maize;

    1. Considers that Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1826 exceeds the implementing powers provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003;

    2. Considers that Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1826 is not consistent with Union law, in that it is not compatible with the aim of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, which is, in accordance with the general principles laid down in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council[15], to provide the basis for ensuring a high level of protection of human life and health, animal health and welfare, and environmental and consumer interests, in relation to GM food and feed, while ensuring the effective functioning of the internal market;

    3. Calls on the Commission to repeal Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1826;

    4. Calls on the Commission not to authorise herbicide-tolerant GM crops, due to the associated increased use of complementary herbicides and therefore the increased risks to biodiversity, food safety and workers’ health in line with the One Health approach;

    5. Highlights, in this regard, that authorising the import for food or feed uses of any GM plant which has been made tolerant to herbicides that are banned in the Union, such as glufosinate, is incoherent with the Union’s international commitments under, inter alia, the UN SDGs and the UN CBD, including the recently adopted Kunming-Montreal Framework[16];

    6. Expects the Commission, as matter of urgency, to deliver on its commitment to come forward with a proposal to ensure that hazardous chemicals banned in the Union are not produced for export;

    7. Welcomes the fact that the Commission finally recognised, in a letter of 11 September 2020 to Members, the need to take sustainability into account when it comes to authorisation decisions on GMOs[17]; expresses its deep disappointment, however, that, since then the Commission has continued to authorise GMOs for import into the Union, despite ongoing objections by Parliament and no qualified majority of Member States in favour;

    8. Urges the Commission, again, to take into account the Union’s obligations under international agreements, such as the Paris Climate Agreement, the UN CBD and the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for draft implementing acts to be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum explaining how they uphold the principle of ‘do no harm’[18];

    9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Usurpation or unlawful involvement of EU citizens with properties in the occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus – E-002080/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    15.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002080/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Costas Mavrides (S&D)

    EU citizens are among those facing criminal charges of usurpation or unlawful business involvement with properties in the occupied territory of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), mainly for acting as intermediaries for construction companies operating in the occupied territory, promoting or selling luxury accommodation built on illegally seized property owned by Greek Cypriots. So far, citizens of Germany, Italy, Hungary, Czechia and Portugal have been arrested and/or charged in the RoC for illegal involvement and activities.

    Such incidents represent a clear violation of rulings by the Court of Justice of the EU and of the rule of law. They deserve special attention as EU citizens are at the centre of the violations.

    Moreover, these violations are part of the blatant, cynical policy of the occupying Turkish regime to gain legitimacy by establishing economic ties with the EU via lucrative though illegal property and development deals, using EU citizens as buyers, promoters or middlemen.

    • 1.Is the Commission aware that EU citizens are involved in such illegal property dealings in the occupied territory of Cyprus?
    • 2.What measures does it intend to take aimed at preventing similar cases in the future, safeguarding the rule of law in the EU and protecting EU citizens’ rights?

    Submitted: 15.10.2024

    Last updated: 23 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Union Minister Shri Jayant Chaudhary to felicitate WorldSkills 2024 winners tomorrow

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 23 OCT 2024 5:45PM by PIB Delhi

    Minister of State (I/C), Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (MSDE) and MoS, Ministry of Education Shri Jayant Chaudhary to honor the outstanding achievements of the Indian delegation at the WorldSkills 2024 competition during a  Felicitation Ceremony in New Delhi tomorrow.

    India has made a remarkable mark on the global stage at WorldSkills 2024 at Lyon in France, by winning four Bronze medals in different categories. These are: Ashwitha Police in Patisserie and confectionery; Dhrumil Kumar Dhirendra Kumar Gandhi and Sathyajith Balakrishnan in Industry 4.0; Joethir Adithya Krishnapriya Ravikumar in Hotel Reception and Amaresh Kumar Sahu in Renewable Energy category.

    In addition, the Indian delegation earned 12 Medallions of Excellence, a testament to their exceptional skills and consistent performance across various trades. India’s performance at WorldSkills 2024 was a strong showing on the global stage, with the country competing against other global giants like China, Japan, Germany, and the USA.

    The event will also be graced by Shri Atul Kumar Tiwari, Secretary, MSDE, and Shri Ved Mani Tiwari, CEO, NSDC, Sector Skill Council Experts and Industry/Academia Partners for WorldSkills 2024.

    WorldSkills Lyon 2024 saw more than 1,400 participants from over 70 countries competing in diverse skill categories, and the Indian competitors stood its ground among the best in the world, showcasing their talent and innovation in front of an international audience. India competed in 52 skills against countries like China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Germany, Brazil, Australia, Columbia, Denmark, France, UK, South Africa, Switzerland, USA, etc.

    The Indian contingent’s success at WorldSkills 2024 is a significant milestone in the country’s journey toward becoming a global skills leader. Winning the Bronze medal in Patisserie and Confectionery in France, the global epicenter of fine pastry and baking, is an extraordinary achievement. It signifies India’s rising prowess in culinary arts, proving that Indian talent can stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the best in a country renowned for its mastery in this craft.

    India’s 12 Medallions of Excellence at WorldSkills 2024 highlight the nation’s prowess across a range of traditional and emerging skills, from Mechatronics and Cyber Security to Jewellery and Beauty Therapy. These achievements underscore India’s leadership in both innovation-driven fields like Additive Manufacturing and Web Technology, as well as craftsmanship in areas like Cabinet Making and Cooking.

    The success of the Indian competitors at WorldSkills 2024 is a testament to the rigorous preparation and industry support they received throughout their journey. Each participant underwent extensive training, supported by industry experts, mentors, and the best-in-class infrastructure provided by organizations across various sectors.

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – EU budget for 2025 to focus on research, health, education, and climate action

    Source: European Parliament

    Parliament demands an EU budget for 2025 that focuses on improving people’s lives, boosting competitiveness, and addressing current challenges.

    MEPs set the overall level of commitment appropriations for the 2025 draft budget at almost €201 billion, €1.24 billion more than the Commission’s proposal from last June. Parliament wants to boost programmes vital in addressing health challenges, supporting young people, agriculture and rural areas, helping people suffering from natural disasters, boosting climate action, managing migration and security needs, and strengthening EU support for neighbouring regions experiencing geopolitical and humanitarian crises. MEPs restored €1.52  billion in funding cuts proposed by the Council, and set payment appropriations at €153.5 billion.

    Repayment costs for the European Recovery Instrument (EURI)

    The EURI repayment costs, which are twice the amount initially forecast for 2025, should not result in reduced funding for essential programmes, like Erasmus+ or R&D, according to Parliament. MEPs want to reverse cuts made by member states to appropriations dedicated to these areas and to use the new “EURI cascade mechanism” introduced by the revision of the EU’s long-term budget . This mechanism is designed to manage escalating Next Generation EU borrowing costs without affecting key initiatives, maintaining the budget’s flexibility and response capacity.

    Quotes

    Victor Negrescu (S&D, Romania), general rapporteur for the EU budget 2025 (for section III – Commission), said: “Today’s vote is a strong signal of support for a citizen-centred EU budget focused on investments in economic development and improving people’s lives. That is why we are asking for an increase of €110 million for actions in the area of health, an additional €70 million for Erasmus, €42 million to protect our citizens against the effects of natural disasters, an additional €96 million for agriculture, €120 million for humanitarian aid, and €110 million for the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood.”

    Niclas Herbst (EPP, Germany), rapporteur for the other sections, said: “Cybersecurity is vital for EU institutions and has remained a pressing concern since 2023. Another key priority is ensuring that the institutions have enough staff to fulfil new tasks, like for the implementation of the Artificial Intelligence Act. Additionally, improving the security of European External Action Service buildings, particularly in delegations situated in remote and high-risk areas, is essential. To address this, an increase of €37 million is required.”

    Next steps

    The vote initiates three weeks of “conciliation” talks with the Council, with the aim of reaching a deal for next year’s budget, which then has to be voted on by Parliament and signed by its President.

    Background

    Over 90% of the EU budget funds activities in EU countries and beyond, benefiting citizens, regions, farmers, researchers, students, NGOs, and businesses. Unlike national budgets, the EU budget is primarily aimed at investment, to generate growth and opportunities across the European Union.

    The EU serves 27 countries with a total population of 450 million. With these figures in mind, the annual EU budget is actually relatively small – on average €160-180 billion annually in 2021-27. This is comparable to the national budget of Denmark, which serves 5.6 million people, and is about 30% smaller than the budget of Poland, which serves 38 million people. (Source: Commission)

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Spread of South African citrus thrips in the Mediterranean basin – E-001639/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission invests in plant health research and innovation, with EUR 189 million allocated over the past four years through Horizon Europe[1], and keeps it as a priority in the next work programmes under Cluster 6 ‘Food, Bioeconomy, Natural Resources, Agriculture and Environment’[2] of Horizon Europe[3].

    At present, there is no project relating to the Scirtothrips aurantii. A call for proposals for projects related to regulated pests has recently closed and is currently under evaluation[4].

    Both Spain and Portugal apply eradication measures for Scirtothrips aurantii. Regulation (EU) 2021/690[5] allows them to request co-financing for eradication measures.

    When eradication is no longer possible, Member States request for containment measures, which should be adopted by an Implementing Regulation. To date, the Commission has not received such request from Spain or Portugal.

    As regards the import of citrus fruit, cold treatment has been added to the EU requirements as a measure to guarantee freedom from Thaumatotibia leucotreta in oranges.

    The EU follows a risk-based approach as regards protective measures against pests. To date there is not sufficient evidence to support an extension of that measure to other citrus fruits for other Union quarantine pests.

    Regulation (EU) 2022/2389[6] on frequency rates prescribes 100% identity and physical checks at import for citrus fruits, except for those referred to Annex I of that regulation.

    The number of non-compliances at import is a criterion for deciding the frequency rates. As regards controls at origin, the Commission has carried out audits[7] in many third countries that the EU imports citrus fruits from, including South Africa, Zimbabwe, Brazil, Argentina, Israel and Tunisia.

    • [1] https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/document/e8a5772e-9fca-4583-a81b-649729068f1e_en
    • [2] https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe/cluster-6-food-bioeconomy-natural-resources-agriculture-and-environment_en
    • [3] https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe/strategic-plan_en
    • [4] https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/horizon-cl6-2024-farm2fork-02-4-two-stage
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/690/oj
    • [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022R2389&qid=1695292904290
    • [7] https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Favourable conservation status of wolves – E-001649/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The term ‘extensive’ (German: flächendeckend) is neither mentioned in the Habitats Directive[1] nor in the Commission document on the ‘guidelines on concepts and definitions of Article 17 for the Habitats Directive’ which is publicly available[2].

    As stated in the reply to Written Question E -1611/2023, pursuant to Article 1(i) of the Habitats Directive, the conservation status is considered as ‘favourable’ when population dynamics data on the species concerned indicate that it is maintaining itself on a long-term basis as a viable component of its natural habitats, the natural range of the species is neither being reduced nor is likely to be reduced for the foreseeable future, and there is, and will probably continue to be, a sufficiently large habitat to maintain its populations on a long-term basis.

    Germany provides one of the most transparent monitoring schemes where the progress towards achieving a good conservation status can be publicly followed[3].

    The Commission document on the ‘guidelines on concepts and definitions of Article 17 for the Habitats Directive’ was established together with the Member States[4].

    The current system leaves flexibility on how to assess the conservation status in certain situations, e.g. in case of transboundary populations.

    • [1] Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7-50.
    • [2] https://cdr.eionet.europa.eu/help/habitats_art17/Reporting2025/Final Guidelines Art. 17_2019-2024.pdf/
    • [3] https://www.dbb-wolf.de/wolf-occurrence/evidence-in-germany/map-of-occupied-raster-cells
    • [4] Expert Group on Reporting under the Nature Directives and the Expert Group on the Birds and the Habitats Directives (NADEG) and the Habitats Committee.
    Last updated: 23 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1822 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP915635 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council – B10-0149/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
    Members responsible: Martin Häusling, Biljana Borzan, Anja Hazekamp

    B10‑0149/2024

    European Parliament resolution on Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1822 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP915635 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2024/2839(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1822 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP915635 pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council[1],

     having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed [2], and in particular Article 7(3) and Article 19(3) thereof,

     having regard to the vote of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, on 26 April 2024, at which no opinion was delivered, and the vote of the Appeal Committee on 29 May 2024, at which again no opinion was delivered,

     having regard to Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers[3],

     having regard to the opinion adopted by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on 30 November 2023, and published on 17 January 2024[4],

     having regard to its previous resolutions objecting to the authorisation of genetically modified organisms (‘GMOs’)[5],

     having regard to Rule 115(2) and (3) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,

    A. whereas, on 20 December 2020, Pioneer Overseas Corporation, Inc. based in Belgium, submitted, on behalf of Pioneer Hi-Bred International, based in the United States, an application to the national competent authority of the Netherlands for the placing on the market of foods, food ingredients and feed containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize DP915635 (the ‘GM maize’), in accordance with Articles 5 and 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (the ‘application’); whereas the application also covered the placing on the market of products containing or consisting of genetically modified maize DP915635 for uses other than food and feed, with the exception of cultivation;

    B. whereas, on 30 November 2023, EFSA adopted a favourable opinion, which was published on 17 January 2024;

    C. whereas the GM maize contains genes conferring resistance to glufosinate and produces the insecticidal IPD079Ea toxin derived from the Ophioglossum pendulum fern; whereas the genetic modification involved a multistep process using CRISPR/Cas to introduce a ‘landing pad’ at the target site, where the gene constructs for the production of the new traits are subsequently inserted;

    Lack of assessment of the complementary herbicide

    D. whereas Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2013[6] requires an assessment of whether the expected agricultural practices influence the outcome of the studied endpoints; whereas, according to that Implementing Regulation, this is especially relevant for herbicide-tolerant plants;

    E. whereas the vast majority of GM crops have been genetically modified so that they are tolerant to one or more ‘complementary’ herbicides which can be used throughout the cultivation of the GM crop, without the crop dying, as would be the case for a non-herbicide tolerant crop; whereas a number of studies show that herbicide-tolerant GM crops result in a higher use of complementary herbicides, in large part because of the emergence of herbicide-tolerant weeds[7];

    F. whereas herbicide-tolerant GM crops lock farmers into a weed management system that is largely or wholly dependent on herbicides, and does so by charging a premium for GM seeds that can be justified only if farmers purchasing such seed also spray the complementary herbicides; whereas heightened reliance on complementary herbicides on farms planting the GM crops accelerates the emergence and spread of weeds resistant to those herbicides, thereby triggering the need for even more herbicide use, a vicious circle known as ‘the herbicide treadmill’;

    G. whereas the adverse impacts stemming from excessive reliance on herbicides will worsen on soil health, water quality, and above and below ground biodiversity, as well as leading to increased human and animal exposure, potentially also via increased herbicide residues on food and feed;

    H. whereas glufosinate is classified as toxic to reproduction 1B and therefore meets the ‘cut-off criteria’ set out in Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council[8]; whereas the approval of glufosinate for use in the Union expired on 31 July 2018;

    I. whereas assessment of herbicide residues and metabolites found on GM plants is considered outside the remit of the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms and is therefore not undertaken as part of the authorisation process for GMOs;

    Outstanding questions concerning assessment of the toxin IPD079Ea

    J. whereas the Ophioglossum pendulum toxin (IPD079Ea) is not a part of European flora and has never previously been introduced into the food or feed chain; whereas the mode of action of IPD079Ea has only been poorly described; whereas Member States underline that the introduction of this protein into agriculture and the food chain would require a lot more data on the mode of action and specificity of the toxins;

    Member State competent authority and stakeholder comments

    K. whereas Member States submitted many critical comments to EFSA during the three-month consultation period, including that an opinion on the safety of the GM maize cannot be given in view of the data gaps in the file relating to the requirements of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 503/2013, that the monitoring plan requires further elaboration, and that the effects of glufosinate on the gut microbiome of consumers and on the soil-microflora have not been considered by EFSA, even though they are clearly affected;

    Ensuring a global level playing field and upholding the Union’s international obligations

    L. whereas the conclusions of the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture[9] call on the Commission to reassess its approach on market access for agri-food imports and exports, given the challenge of diverging standards of the Union and its trading partners; whereas fairer trade relations, at a global level, coherent with goals for a healthy environment were one of the main demands of farmers during the demonstrations of 2023 and 2024;

    M. whereas a 2017 report by the United Nations’ (UN) Special Rapporteur on the right to food found that, particularly in developing countries, hazardous pesticides have catastrophic impacts on health[10]; whereas the UN Sustainable Development Goal (UN SDG) Target 3.9 aims by 2030 to substantially reduce the number of deaths and illnesses from hazardous chemicals and air, water and soil pollution and contamination[11];

    N. whereas the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (‘Kunming-Montreal Framework’), agreed at the COP15 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UN CBD) in December 2022, includes a global target to reduce the risk of pesticides by at least 50 % by 2030[12];

    O. whereas Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 states that GM food or feed must not have adverse effects on human health, animal health or the environment, and requires the Commission to take into account any relevant provisions of Union law and other legitimate factors relevant to the matter under consideration when drafting its decision; whereas such legitimate factors should include the Union’s obligations under the UN SDGs and the UN CBD;

    Reducing dependency on imported feed

    P. whereas one of the lessons from the COVID-19 crisis and the still ongoing war in Ukraine is the need for the Union to end the dependencies on some critical materials; whereas in the mission letter to Commissioner-elect Christophe Hansen, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen asks him to look at ways to reduce imports of critical commodities[13];

    Undemocratic decision-making

    Q. whereas, in its eighth term, Parliament adopted a total of 36 resolutions objecting to the placing on the market of GMOs for food and feed (33 resolutions) and to the cultivation of GMOs in the Union (three resolutions); whereas, in its ninth term, Parliament adopted 38 objections to placing GMOs on the market;

    R. whereas despite its own acknowledgement of the democratic shortcomings, the lack of support from Member States and the objections of Parliament, the Commission continues to authorise GMOs;

    S. whereas no change of law is required for the Commission to be able not to authorise GMOs when there is no qualified majority of Member States in favour in the Appeal Committee[14];

    T. whereas the vote on 26 April 2024 of the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and Feed referred to in Article 35 of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 delivered no opinion, meaning that the authorisation was not supported by a qualified majority of Member States; whereas the vote on 29 May 2024 of the Appeal Committee again delivered no opinion;

    U. whereas on 2 July 2024, the Commission authorised the placing on the market of the GM maize;

    1. Considers that Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1822 exceeds the implementing powers provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003;

    2. Considers that Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1822 is not consistent with Union law, in that it is not compatible with the aim of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003, which is, in accordance with the general principles laid down in Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council[15], to provide the basis for ensuring a high level of protection of human life and health, animal health and welfare, and environmental and consumer interests, in relation to GM food and feed, while ensuring the effective functioning of the internal market;

    3. Calls on the Commission to repeal Implementing Decision (EU) 2024/1822;

    4. Calls on the Commission not to authorise herbicide-tolerant GM crops, due to the associated increased use of complementary herbicides and therefore the increased risks to biodiversity, food safety and workers’ health in line with the One Health approach;

    5. Highlights, in this regard, that authorising the import for food or feed uses of any GM plant which has been made tolerant to herbicides that are banned in the Union, such as glufosinate, is incoherent with the Union’s international commitments under, inter alia, the UN SDGs and the UN CBD, including the recently adopted Kunming-Montreal Framework[16];

    6. Expects the Commission, as matter of urgency, to deliver on its commitment[17] to come forward with a proposal to ensure that hazardous chemicals banned in the Union are not produced for export;

    7. Welcomes the fact that the Commission finally recognised, in a letter of 11 September 2020 to Members, the need to take sustainability into account when it comes to authorisation decisions on GMOs[18]; expresses its deep disappointment, however, that, since then the Commission has continued to authorise GMOs for import into the Union, despite ongoing objections by Parliament and a majority of Member States voting against;

    8. Urges the Commission, again, to take into account the Union’s obligations under international agreements, such as the Paris Climate Agreement, the UN CBD and the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for draft implementing acts to be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum explaining how they uphold the principle of ‘do no harm’[19];

    9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Serious concerns regarding animal cruelty during animal transport in Austria – E-002112/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    16.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002112/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anja Hazekamp (The Left)

    Two shocking incidents of animal cruelty have recently been observed during the transport of animals in Austria.

    During the export of pregnant animals from Austria, footage on the Bulgarian-Turkish border shows a calf being cut out of a pregnant, dead cow, following which the calf is thrown on to the blood-drenched ground, while shaking violently[1]. Other footage shows animals unable to stand upright due to illness or exhaustion being brutally dragged from a vehicle by their front legs.[2]

    An overloaded truck carrying 142 calves was also stopped in Austria. A veterinarian on site confirmed that this transport from the Netherlands should never have taken place because the transport documents were not in order, the duration of the transport and the planned rest breaks were not respected and the water system for the animals was inadequate[3].

    • 1.Can the Commission outline its views on the mistreatment of calves during these transports?
    • 2.What action and sanctions has the Commission already taken against the relevant authorities in the Member States concerned for a flagrant infringement of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005?
    • 3.Does the Commission consider serious cruelty to animals to be reason enough to suspend the transport of live animals from Austria?

    Submitted: 16.10.2024

    • [1] https://vgt.at/presse/news/2024/news20240905mn.php.
    • [2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JcI0XeoepN4.
    • [3] https://www.krone.at/3518368.
    Last updated: 23 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Democratic developments in Germany and Austria – E-002056/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    14.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002056/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Christine Anderson (ESN)

    In Germany and Austria, the winners of recent elections – the AfD and the FPÖ – have faced resistance from the defeated parties, who have refused to cooperate with them. These developments, as well as the current motion in the Bundestag to ban the AfD, give rise to questions as to democratic practice and respect for the Union’s fundamental values, in the context of the EU’s responsibility for upholding the democratic standards set out in the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

    • 1.What view does the Commission take, given the principle of political diversity and plurality, of the practice of systematically shutting election winners out of political cooperation?
    • 2.What view does the Commission take of the motion to ban the AfD currently being discussed in the Bundestag, with regard to the democratic principle of political diversity and freedom of expression, which the EU regards as a fundamental value?
    • 3.What criteria must be met for a ban on a party in a Member State to be compliant with the values of the Union and, in particular, the principles of democracy and the rule of law within the meaning of Article 2 TEU?

    Submitted: 14.10.2024

    Last updated: 23 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Return and readmission cooperation with Syria – E-002106/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    16.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002106/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Marieke Ehlers (PfE), Sebastiaan Stöteler (PfE)

    The Commission notes in its July 2024 report entitled ‘Assessment of third countries’ level of cooperation on readmission in 2023’ (COM(2024)0340) that Syria was excluded from the assessment, as it was ‘not possible to establish effective operational contacts due to the conditions on the ground’.

    In July 2024, eight Member States expressed an interest in thawing relations with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In June 2024, seven Member States stated that they agreed to reassess ‘more effective ways of handling’ Syrian refugees and that the situation in Syria had ‘considerably evolved’. In September 2024, President al-Assad granted another amnesty, notably for people convicted of military desertion and minor crimes.

    In 2020, Denmark became the first Member State to revoke the residency permits of Syrian refugees from the Damascus region, citing the improved security situation around the capital. In November 2023, the Nordic countries agreed to cooperate more closely on the deportation of migrants who entered those countries illegally.

    In light of these events:

    • 1.Is the Commission, together with the Member States, exploring possibilities for promoting the voluntary and involuntary return of Syrian migrants to Syria?
    • 2.If not, why has the Commission not taken any action, given the growing support and cooperation among the Member States in seeking the effective return of Syrian migrants to Syria?

    Submitted: 16.10.2024

    Last updated: 23 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Alarming spread of peste des petits ruminants (PPR) – E-002100/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    16.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002100/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Daniel Buda (PPE), Dan-Ştefan Motreanu (PPE)

    The first signs of sheep and goat plague or peste des petits ruminants (PPR) were detected in Tulcea County in Romania on 11 July 2024, on a commercial farm with a herd of 49 091 sheep, and a month later outbreaks were confirmed at 60 other sites across the country. The outbreaks were identified in the south-east and west of Romania, indicating the rapid spread of the disease despite the immediate implementation of measures to combat it.

    Losses from the 60 sites amount to 232 927 animals, which has hit the livestock sector hard. The slaughter of hundreds of thousands of goats and sheep due to this epidemic has impacted significantly not just on farmers, but also right the way along the economic chain.

    • 1.What aid mechanisms does the Commission intend to implement for the livestock sector?
    • 2.Will the Commission authorise, as a matter of urgency, the rollout across the EU of the current vaccine against PPR?
    • 3.In countries not as yet seriously affected by PPR, the protocol is to slaughter contaminated flocks but, in countries where the disease occurs frequently, an alternative to slaughter is to isolate sick animals and treat them with antibiotics to prevent secondary infections. Will the Commission endorse such an approach in order to limit the number of animals slaughtered and reduce farmers’ losses?

    Submitted: 16.10.2024

    Last updated: 23 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Implementation of an EU-wide certificate of competence in agriculture – E-002110/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    16.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002110/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Christine Schneider (PPE)

    In Germany, people who are competent and regularly take part in training courses are authorised to apply pesticides professionally. The certificate of competence is based on Directive 2009/128/EC, which aims to ensure that pesticides are used sustainably in the EU. The EU Member States have drawn up national action plans to implement the measures laid down in the directive. Accordingly, certificates of competence are implemented at national level and are valid only in the issuing Member State. Many companies are faced with the problem of a shortage of skilled workers, while at the same time long-standing employees from other Member States who can safely apply plant protection products are unable to obtain the relevant certificate of competence at their place of work due to language barriers.

    • 1.To what extent does the Commission consider an EU-wide certificate of competence for the application of plant protection products to be useful, and how could it be implemented in practice?
    • 2.How can agricultural businesses deploy employees who have obtained the certificate of competence in one Member State and now work in another Member State, whose official language they do not speak fluently, when it comes to the application of plant protection products?

    Submitted: 16.10.2024

    Last updated: 23 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Human Rights Committee Welcome France’s Efforts to Combat Homophobia, Raise Questions on Violence in New Caledonia and Rules Governing Identity Checks

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the sixth periodic report of France on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with Committee Experts welcoming France’s national plan combatting hatred against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons and plans to combat homophobia, while raising questions on violence in New Caledonia and rules governing identity checks. 

    One Committee Expert said the Committee welcomed the national plan for equality and against hatred and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons (2020-2026) and the government plan (2023-2026) to combat homophobia and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. 

    Another Expert said it appeared that the current violence in the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia was linked to reforms of the Nouméa Accord and a lack of progress in the decolonisation process.  What was the progress made on the issue of self-determination of the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia as well as that of French Polynesia, and the participation and consultation processes put in place with the indigenous peoples living in these territories to obtain their free and informed consent and access to independence? 

    Another Expert asked if the State party could indicate whether mandatory training on racial and ethnic discrimination and profiling was systematically offered to law enforcement officials, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories?  Did the State party systematically collect data to monitor the use of identity checks, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories?  Would the State party be prepared to implement a template for all individuals subject to an identity check?  Would it be willing to introduce a centralised record of all identity checks to have an overview of how they were used, with whom and where?

    The delegation said France supported the recognition of indigenous peoples.  New Caledonia was one of the most advanced examples of the French Government recognising the rights of indigenous peoples.  Since the Nouméa Accord, an institutional framework had been put into place allowing for shared governance between the communities, representing the customs of the Kanak people.  On 1 October, the Prime Minister announced the postponement of elections in 2025, which was unanimously agreed by Parliament.  Since 1998, France had been cooperating with the decolonisation committee and the work had been fruitful.

    The delegation said all French citizens were equal before the law. The code of ethics for the police and national gendarmerie prohibited discriminatory identity checks.  When the law authorised an identity check, the police should not rely on any physical trait, unless there were specific grounds. Any act of discrimination could be reported by someone who believed they were a victim of discriminatory profiling. There were several ways to do this, including through the various controlling and monitoring authorities and the judiciary.

    Introducing the report, Isabelle Rome, Ambassador for Human Rights of France and head of the delegation, said human rights were a priority for France.  In December 2023, the President of the Republic announced that a House of Human Rights would be created in Paris to support civil society organizations. France had strengthened its public policies on the judiciary, democracy and the law enforcement agencies since 2022, paying particular attention to conditions for the use of force, and compliance with the rules of ethics during all police operations.  Ms. Rome concluded by saying that France believed in its democratic model, in liberty, equality and fraternity, as illustrated this summer by the Olympic and Paralympic Games.

    In concluding remarks, Ms. Rome thanked the Committee for the dialogue.  France was deeply attached to the rule of law and the Committee’s recommendations would be scrupulously considered.  The country was committed to renewing dialogue with the territory of New Caledonia and its inhabitants. 

    Tania María Abdo Rocholl, Committee Chairperson, thanked the delegation for the dialogue, which had covered a wide range of subjects under the Covenant.   The Committee aimed to ensure the highest level of implementation of the Covenant in France. 

    The delegation of France was made up of representatives of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of the Interior and Overseas; the Ministry of Justice; the State Council; the Interministerial delegation to the fight against racism, anti-Semitism, and hatred; the French office for the protection of refugees and stateless persons; and the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-second session is being held from 14 October to 7 November 2024.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 23 October, to begin its consideration of the second periodic report of Türkiye (CCPR/C/TUR/2).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the sixth periodic report of France (CCPR/C/FRA/6).

    Presentation of Report

    ISABELLE ROME, Ambassador for Human Rights of France and head of the delegation, said human rights were a priority for France.  In December 2023, the President of the Republic announced that a House of Human Rights would be created in Paris to support civil society organizations.  Launched in 2021, the Marianne initiative for human rights defenders aimed to encourage the activities of human rights defenders, both in their country of origin, and by welcoming them in France.  The fight against the death penalty was also a priority for France.  France would host the ninth World Congress against the Death Penalty in Paris in 2026.  France was also contributing to the organization of the first World Congress on Enforced Disappearances in Geneva on 15 and 16 January 2025. 

    The State’s new feminist diplomacy strategy would be published by the end of 2024.  France was proud that the Paris 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games were the first gender-balanced games in history.  Through its diplomatic and consular network, France supported projects of democratic governance, respect for the rule of law, the fight against impunity, access to justice, and mechanisms to monitor the effective exercise of civil and political rights.  In 2019, France launched the Partnership for Information and Democracy, which was joined by 54 States from all regions, to guarantee freedom of expression.  In May 2024, the President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister of New Zealand announced the creation of a new non-governmental organization, the Christchurch Call Foundation, to coordinate the work of the Christchurch Call to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online. 

    France had strengthened its public policies on the judiciary, democracy and the law enforcement agencies since 2022, paying particular attention to conditions for the use of force, and compliance with the rules of ethics during all police operations.  The national law enforcement plan published in 2021 provided for an adaptation of the employment strategies of the republican security companies and the mobile gendarmerie squadrons during public demonstrations.  The right to demonstrate was guaranteed by the Constitution in France.  By getting in touch with the prefects and police units involved in public demonstrations, journalists could be added to communication channels, allowing them to receive live information and ask questions. 

    Between 2020 and 2024, the Ministry of Justice’s budget increased by 33 per cent, from €7.6 billion in 2020 to €10.1 billion in 2024. In five years, the French Ministry of Justice would have recruited as many magistrates as in the last 20 years. To combat prison overcrowding, the Ministry of Justice was implementing a proactive prison regulation policy, based on the development of alternatives to incarceration, the strengthening of early release mechanisms, and an ambitious prison real estate programme creating 15,000 net prison places.  An Interministerial Committee for Overseas Territories was set up in July 2023.  France had mobilised authorities to enable and guarantee the return to calm and security of people in New Caledonia. Emergency measures were deployed last June.  The mediation and work mission continued its work, with the aim of renewing political dialogue. 

    France had been implementing a new interministerial plan for gender equality 2023-2027, which contained 161 measures divided into four priority areas: the fight against violence against women; the global approach to women’s health; professional and economic equality; and the dissemination and transmission of a culture of equality.  The law of July 2023 aimed at strengthening women’s access to responsibilities in the public service.  It increased the mandatory quota of first-time female appointments to senior and management positions to 50 per cent.  On 8 March 2024, France became the first country in the world to enshrine the freedom to have access to voluntary termination of pregnancy in its Constitution. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert welcomed that France’s report was prepared in consultation with the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, whose role was to monitor France’s international commitments and the implementation of recommendations issued by international and regional bodies.  In May 2024, despite the provisions of the Nouméa Accord which provided for a process of gradual transfer of power from France to New Caledonia, the National Assembly voted in favour of expanding the electorate of New Caledonia.  Thousands of Kanak demonstrators mobilised to denounce these reforms, which were allegedly passed without adequate consultation or free, prior and informed consent.  In the absence of sufficient dialogue on the part of the authorities, a violent conflict had been raging since that date. 

    The French Government had deployed considerable military resources to restore order, but at the cost of numerous allegations of excessive use of force that led to several deaths among Kanak protesters and security forces, as well as injuries.  According to information received by the Committee, at least 11 people were shot dead and 169 others were injured; 2658 demonstrators were arrested, many of whom were arbitrarily arrested and detained, dozens of them were also transferred to metropolitan France. 

    It appeared that the current violence in the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia was linked to reforms of the Nouméa Accord and a lack of progress in the decolonisation process.  What was the progress made on the issue of self-determination of the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia as well as that of French Polynesia, and the participation and consultation processes put in place with the indigenous peoples living in these territories to obtain their free and informed consent and access to independence?

    There had been several prominent court cases regarding the removal of headscarves in France.  In the opinion of the French State, should the Committee’s Views be followed only in the case where the Committee considered a complaint to be inadmissible or agreed with the arguments presented by the French Government? Were there intentions to lift reservations to the Covenant?  Who currently appointed the magistrates of the courts?  What was the current state of the constitutional reform initiated with a view to making the Prosecutor’s Office independent of the executive?  How could the full independence of judges and prosecutors be guaranteed?

    Since 2015, France had put in place measures to combat terrorism, which had been seen over the years to be increasingly detrimental to people’s rights and freedoms.

    Was the new legislation accompanied by sufficient guarantees against the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory implementation of these measures?  What independent and impartial expertise did public authorities have to assess the impact of new technologies on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Covenant? 

    It was understood that mass surveillance technology was used during the Olympic and Paralympic Games.  How did the State party ensure that it did not lead to profiling that disproportionately affected racial, ethnic and religious minorities?  How did the State party ensure that continuous surveillance by algorithm-based systems did not violate the right to privacy and respected the requirements of proportionality and necessity?  For how long could the data collected in this way be kept? 

    What were the current conditions for the communication of information to the intelligence services, particularly in the area of sensitive data? What information could be transmitted and what traceability requirements were in place?  Under what conditions could information provided by the intelligence services be made available to the judicial authority and the Public Prosecutor’s Office?  What means of access was available to defendants and those accused of acts of terrorism?

    Another Expert said the Committee was informed that people of colour were subjected to identity checks by the police about 20 times more often than other citizens.  They also faced discriminatory treatment during police stops and searches, including direct fines, often without objective suspicion and without being informed of the reasons.  What could be done to ensure that the use of identity checks and fines was not left to the discretion of law enforcement agencies, and was based only on objective and individualised conditions, and not on racial origins?  Did the State party have explicit guidelines for law enforcement agencies that clearly prohibited racial profiling in police operations as well as discriminatory identity checks? 

    Could the State party indicate whether mandatory training on racial and ethnic discrimination and profiling was systematically offered to law enforcement officials, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories?  Did the State party systematically collect data to monitor the use of identity checks, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories?  Would the State party be prepared to implement a template for all individuals subject to an identity check?  Would it be willing to introduce a centralised record of all identity checks to have an overview of how they were used, with whom and where?

    The Committee had received extensive information that showed the persistent problem of systemic racial discrimination, as well as the use of negative stereotypes against minorities.  What measures had the State party taken to effectively combat all forms of hate speech and hate crimes against racial, ethnic and religious minorities? What training was provided to law enforcement officers, judges and prosecutors, and what awareness campaigns were organised to prevent and combat hate crime and hate speech?  Would France develop data collection and research in compliance with data protection rules, to effectively identify cases of racial or ethnic profiling and offences in metropolitan France and overseas?

    The Committee welcomed the national plan for equality and against hatred and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons (2020-2026) and the government plan (2023-2026) to combat homophobia and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  How would the State party ensure adequate resources and the active participation of civil society in the implementation of these plans?  Did these programmes sufficiently take into account minorities within minorities, such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex asylum seekers? 

    The Committee was informed that some of the measures granting extensive powers to the administrative authorities, developed in the context of the state of emergency, had been granted permanent status.  What measures had the State party taken to ensure that initial emergency measures were in conformity with the Covenant in terms of necessity and proportionality?  How did the State party promote the accessibility of judicial procedures and ensure that they were effective?

    How would France ensure that anti-terrorism legislation did not disproportionately target Muslims and that actions were based on alleged criminal behaviour rather than religious practices?  How did the State party ensure that house searches and dissolution of organizations were conducted by the courts?  What was the percentage of terrorist offences in relation to criminal offences committed in the last five years?  The Committee was informed of the law establishing a new security regime, which subjected the accused to certain obligations, with a view of ensuring their reintegration.  How did France ensure that this monitoring system, which was based on the rather vague notion of “dangerousness”, was not arbitrary and did not disproportionately infringe on the rights of persons who had served their sentences?

    One Committee Expert said the Committee particularly welcomed the State party’s commitment of significant financial resources to address the needs of vulnerable groups during the health crisis of COVID-19. What was the impact of the measures described in the State party’s report, to ensure that the COVID-19 pandemic did not exacerbate inequalities, discrimination and exclusion, including among vulnerable groups?  Specifically, regarding domestic violence against women, which was said to have increased during the pandemic, what was the assessment of the effectiveness and impact of the measures taken? 

    While noting the information provided by the State party, including on the judicial review of the restrictions imposed, could the proportionality of the measures imposed to address COVID-19 be explained, including the ban on any gathering of more than 10 people imposed for a certain period? What assessment did the State party make of this experience for a better consideration of human rights in future crises?      

    Another Expert said the State party had reported on humanitarian repatriations from Syria of women and children of French nationality.  With regard to returns, according to public reports, there was still a significant number of women and children detained or held in camps and rehabilitation centres in Syria.  What was the number, the current situation, and the measures taken by the State party to ensure the full repatriation of all French women and children still in detention camps and rehabilitation centres for minors in Syria? 

    What was the estimated number of detained men and women in Syria who participated as Islamic State fighters?  Had measures been taken to ensure that due process standards were strictly respected in the trials before the Syrian national courts? According to information, in May and June 2019, 11 French nationals had been sentenced to death in Iraq for their involvement as Islamic State fighters.  Could the delegation provide an update on that information and indicate what steps the State party had taken to prevent the continued imposition of death sentences on its nationals in that country?  What other penalties had been applied to these French nationals in lieu of the death penalty?

    The Committee had requested information related to the Arms Trade Treaty, in order to know whether the State party carried out an evaluation for the granting of export licenses aimed at determining that the recipient country used the weapons included in the respective license within the framework of respect for the right to life.  Did the evaluation of an arms export take this into account?  Had any measures been taken to ensure a total ban on arms sales to countries where there was a clear risk that such weapons could be used to violate international human rights law?  Was it possible to access information on arms exports so that civil society could carry out oversight?  What measures had been taken to prevent the negative effects on the right to life of the operations of French companies abroad, especially in the province of Cabo Delgado in Mozambique? 

    A Committee Expert said the Committee was informed that there had been a rise in police violence in recent years, with multiple incidents resulting in fatal outcomes, some of them young boys.   Could more information be provided on trainings on racism for police officers?  Had improvements been made, bearing in mind previous incidents?  The Committee was informed that investigations and legal procedures of unlawful killings by law enforcement officials were not expeditious, sometimes even leading to de facto police impunity, or that sentences were not commensurate with the gravity of the crime. 

    Had there been plans to amend legal norms and review legal conditions for the use of firearms by the police and the gendarmerie, aiming to reduce the risks of disproportionate use of lethal force, and to strike a better balance with the principles of absolute necessity and strict proportionality?  What was the status of investigations of fatalities and injuries, including those related to alleged excessive use of force, which emerged during conflicts that started in May 2024 in New Caledonia? Had trainings been undertaken for those operating in France’s overseas territories? 

    The Committee welcomed the reported introduction of the new right to appeal introduced by article 803-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as a step forward.  However, Experts had been informed that there were several challenges preventing its full use and benefits.  Since the right to a judicial remedy against undignified conditions of detention was introduced in 2021, what were the steps taken by the State party to disseminate it within the incarcerated population?  Was the information on the creation of a new legal tool easily reachable in all penitentiaries under the jurisdiction of the State party?  Had legal aid been introduced to those incarcerated persons who could not afford a lawyer or judicial taxes?  Were there plans to introduce wider use of alternatives to detention or a more restricted use of detention as a last resort?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said France supported the recognition of indigenous peoples.  New Caledonia was one of the most advanced examples of the French Government recognising the rights of indigenous peoples.  Since the Nouméa Accord, an institutional framework had been put into place allowing for shared governance between the communities, representing the customs of the Kanak people.  On 1 October, the Prime Minister announced the postponement of elections in 2025, which was unanimously agreed by Parliament.  Since 1998, France had been cooperating with the decolonisation committee and the work had been fruitful.

    Since 2015, the technical intelligence community had been working on a specific legal framework.  The law included respect for the private lives of citizens and had a strict principle of proportionality.  The law set forth the procedures to be respected when it came to implementing intelligence techniques, including prior authorisation by the Prime Minister.  There were restrictions on how long the data could be held.  The enhanced video surveillance was enacted in advance of the Olympics and Paralympics Games.  France chose to engage in a rigorous oversight mechanism regarding this surveillance.  This was a tool for detecting events without having to resort to facial recognition. 

    All French citizens were equal before the law.  The code of ethics for the police and national gendarmerie prohibited discriminatory identity checks.  When the law authorised an identity check, the police should not rely on any physical trait, unless there were specific grounds.  Any act of discrimination could be reported by someone who believed they were a victim of discriminatory profiling.  There were several ways to do this, including through the various controlling and monitoring authorities and the judiciary.

    At the end of the state of emergency, which followed the attacks carried out on France in 2015, the Government acknowledged the need to keep these tools in place due to the possibility of other attacks.  Four new measures had then been created.  These laws were only for preventing terrorism and were accompanied with significant guarantees for citizens.  The law of 30 July 2021 on preventing acts of terrorism gave these measures permanency.  The Constitutional Council believed this was a balanced approach that ensured achieving the goal of preventing terrorism while respecting private life.  House searches could not be instigated unless there was prior authorisation from a judge; 1,447 remedies were presented for the state of emergency.  The law of 2021 applied to people who had been sentenced to acts of terrorism. Sentences for terrorist activities represented around 0.04 per cent of all criminal activities. 

    A plan had been developed to prepare the plan on combatting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex hatred, involving members of civil society.  The plan contained 16 key measures, including a ten-million-euro fund by 2027 to improve the host centres for these individuals.  The goal was to have two centres per region in France.  For hate speech, the legislation provision had recently been strengthened.  In 2021, there was a vote to govern the digital space and that law had a set of provisions on combatting online hate speech to better regulate illegal behaviour. There had been significant progress made in this area, given that a bill had been introduced in the European Parliament to regulate heinous content online. 

    In France, 2020 was the year that the State had the lowest rate of femicide.  This meant that the measures set up were effective, and that the police and justice systems were able to act swiftly to combat family violence.  There were also provisions which allowed complaints to be raised. 

    Measures adopted during the pandemic were considered to be proportional.  The measures taken to address the pandemic did not overturn other measures in place. During COVID-19, the number of calls to victim support groups for violence had increased.  The accelerated measures implemented by France to support victims included electronic bracelets to ensure restraining orders were complied with.   In 2021, emergency plans were implemented to ensure people were protected.  At the end of the pandemic, the State provided hotlines 24/7 and reception centres in shopping malls.  More specialised support was also provided in courts. 

    International commitments by France to human rights did not involve a repatriation of citizens in an area where France had no control.  Authorities responded systematically to requests for repatriation made by French citizens.  Since 2019, repatriation efforts for minors had been organised.  France exported weapons to countries that wished to strengthen their armies, only with strict national oversight. 

    Force was only used when necessary in cases set forth by law and in a manner which was proportional to the threat.  A police or member of the gendarmerie would only use force if it was essential in their work, such as in cases of self-defence.  Police had additional guidelines on the use of weapons.  There should never be doubt regarding the reasons of an arrest warrant. 

    France had a law which allowed for all inmates to request guarantees for their detention conditions, ensuring they were dignified. A provision was in place which allowed individuals to benefit from jurisdictional support, in place since 2023. Template forms for this purpose were provided to all detainees upon their detention. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the problem with the New Caledonia information was the outcome of the projects which arose in France in 1984. The idea of postponing elections to 2025 was a positive sign as this would allow for mediation between the local and French authorities.  Over recent years, there had been a considerable strengthening of anti-terrorist measures.  However, the majority of terrorist threats were foiled by international cooperation efforts.  Were the measures justified by the threats the State faced?  How could this be transmitted between different intelligence branches?  How long was intelligence data stored and what measures were provided to keep the information secure? 

    Another Expert asked for disaggregated data on what law enforcement officials had been charged with?  Were inmates allowed to apply to a collective appeal so that others could benefit? 

    An Expert said there were laws which prohibited discrimination in identification checks; how was it ensured that this legislation was implemented?

    Another Committee Expert asked for the delegation to bear in mind the matter of redress granted to victims of violence. 

    One Expert asked for a more specific response to the measures adopted to comply with the rulings of the European courts against certain cases against France?  How did the State party ensure effective judicial control and parliamentary oversight in weapon exportation? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the French overseas territories met all international criteria under the law.  France had completed the decolonisation process and no longer administered non-self-governing territories.  As for French Polynesia, in 2023, France decided to speak before the General Assembly, illustrating ongoing dialogue between the State and French Polynesia. France supported the development of French Polynesia. 

    The French Government followed the individual communications procedure before the Committee.  Any communications were the subject of broad consultations among many ministries and institutions. 

    When France ended the state of emergency of 2015 to 2017, the risk of terrorism in the country was still high.  While this risk had come down, threats still persisted; 45 attacks had been foiled between 2017 and now. 

    In 2022, over 700 people brought cases to court regarding acts of violence committed by people in public authority.  Over 200 of these led to convictions. 

    The Ministry of Education and Youth was currently creating a programme to consider the new kinds of racism and anti-Semitism which had cropped up in recent years. 

    The French law enforcement force represented the population and was diverse.  Inmates could ask for specific improvements to detention conditions which impacted their dignity.  Improvements had been carried out in several penitentiaries as a result of this. Several inmates could present these complaints together.   

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said since the end of the state of health emergency on 10 July 2020, the situation of exiled people in Calais had deteriorated.  The nearly 1,200 homeless men, women and children in Calais had seen their living conditions deteriorated due to the brutal “evacuations” of several large camps, and the dramatic reduction in vital services such as food distributions, and lack of access to showers and water points.  Additionally, around 100 unaccompanied minors had settled in tents in Jules Ferry Square to highlight that they had been abandoned by the State. Could the State party comment on this?

    According to information received, journalists and media organizations were reportedly facing increasing challenges in carrying out their duties, including restrictions on reporting, potential abuses of power, and other pressures that undermined press freedom.  Reporters without Borders reported that police reportedly assaulted several “clearly identifiable” journalists.  There were several cases cited to support these allegations, including journalists in New Caledonia who stated they were constantly harassed for their coverage of the riots.  Could the delegation comment on these allegations?  What measures did the State party intend to take to better protect journalists and human rights defenders in the exercise of their work? Had the perpetrators of the mentioned cases been prosecuted and what was the outcome, including convictions and reparations?

    Another Expert noted the numerous allegations of prison overcrowding in the State party and the serious health risks during the most critical period of the COVID-19 pandemic, asking what were the reasons for providing, through decree-law 2020-303, for the full continuation of pre-trial detention, which even affected minors?  What were the conditions for the application of the measure of full maintenance of pre-trial detention to children and how many children were affected by this measure? How did law no. 2021-646 of 25 May 2021 on global security preserving freedoms effectively guarantee respect for privacy, especially in the use of portable cameras by law enforcement officers and cameras installed on unmanned aerial vehicles?  Did it include the principles of proportionality and necessity? In the case of the use of surveillance devices in public demonstrations by law enforcement officers, were there safeguards or limitations to prevent their use from affecting the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression? 

    It was alleged that four former national secretaries of the General Confederation of Labour were being investigated for defamation and public slander following a complaint filed against them by the Directorate of the National School of Prison Administration.  Could information on this be provided?  The Committee would also like information on the processes followed against various union, political and community leaders for the crime of glorifying terrorism after the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023.  It was reported that during the recent Olympic Games, there were many cases of systematic Islamophobia that mainly affected Muslim athletes and communities, a situation exacerbated by the security measures adopted. Could the delegation comment on this? What measures had the State party taken to combat hate speech against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons?

    One Expert said the Committee had unfortunately been informed that the situation of migrants in Calais and Grande-Synthe was still very worrying, with authorities continuing to apply the “zero point of fixation” policy, under which temporary shelters were systematically dismantled, sometimes with excessive use of force, every 48 hours.  How were migrants informed of the 48 hour rule and the possible dismantling of their temporary shelters?  Could the State consider the use of more humane and proportionate alternatives to dismantling these shelters, including increasing the capacity of reception centres?  What measures had been adopted to facilitate reporting on police abuses? 

    The Committee was concerned by reports that migrants had been detained at the French-Italian border without having obtained legal documents explaining their detention.  How did France ensure that such detentions were not arbitrary and that all migrants were informed of their procedural rights?  The Committee was also informed that the immigration law of 2 January 2024 expanded the criteria for expulsion to include minor offences, and allowed authorities to place a foreign person in administrative detention for reasons related to a potential threat to public order without justification, as well as allowing detention to be extended and reducing procedural rights.  How was it ensured that these measures were compatible with the provisions of the Covenant? 

    The Committee had received information that the State party continued to issue expulsion notices for the return of persons to countries where they were at risk of serious violations of their rights.  How did the State party ensure respect for the principle of non-refoulement in all cases of expulsion?  Regarding the internal borders of the Schengen area, in particular the issue of rapid refoulement at the border between France and Italy, the Committee noted with appreciation the State party’s follow-up to the conclusion of the Court of Justice of the European Union.  The Committee welcomed the annulment by the Council of State, in February, of certain parts of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum. 

    However, information had been received that foreign nationals continued to be forcibly returned to Italy without having had access to a proper asylum procedure.  How did France ensure the individualised examination of all applications and effective access to asylum procedures?  Did the State intend to end the use of bone tests in law and in practice?  What was the objective of the January 2024 law to establish files to identify unaccompanied minors suspected of a criminal offence?  Who controlled these files and who kept them?  What measures had been taken to ensure adequate temporary accommodation and emergency accommodation for unaccompanied minors?

    One Committee Expert said France had adopted the third national action plan against human trafficking (2024-2027) at the beginning of 2024.  Could the evaluation of achievements from the second action plan be provided and what goals were set for the third plan?  What were the measures developed to combat trafficking?  Could victims receive compensation within the criminal procedure, or did they have to undergo civil suits for compensation?  What safeguards were in place to protect victims themselves from criminal accountability?  What methods had been developed for victims’ identification?  Had trainings been organised for prosecutors, judges and lawyers on human trafficking? 

    The Committee was concerned by numerous reports that the ban on manifestation of religious beliefs by means of clothing, headgear or other religious symbols was a source of tension in French society and was seen by some as disrespect for multiculturism, fuelling the sense of discrimination, racism, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia.  What measures were being taken to ensure that the ban on expressing religion by means of religious clothing, headgear or symbols did not have a discriminatory effect in practice?  How was it ensured that all visible religious symbols were treated equally? What criteria was used to decide what symbol should be treated as conspicuous and thus be banned, while others were treated as discrete and allowed?  How did the State party avoid that the ban on manifestation of religious beliefs by means of clothing affected predominantly Muslim girls and women? 

    What safeguards were in place to ensure that provisions on the dissolution of association would not be broadly interpreted and end in violating the right to freedom of assembly?  There had been examples of associations, such as Uprisings of the Earth, labelled as eco-terrorists.  Could the delegation provide its views on this?  The Committee was concerned at the expansion of police powers to stop and check persons in the vicinity of protests, and the effect that this could have on the effective enjoyment of the right of peaceful assembly.  A significant number of protesters had been arrested and detained and a small percentage of the protesters arrested had been charged.  What was the position of the State party on these allegations?  How were personal dignity and respect understood by the courts?

    Another Expert said the year 2023 was marked by a succession of bans on demonstrations, particularly related to the mobilisation against the pension reform, or those carried out in support of the Palestinian people.  In October 2023, the Minister of the Interior issued a memo calling on local authorities to pre-emptively ban all demonstrations of solidarity with the Palestine people.  The ban was challenged before the Council of State, which determined that local authorities had to judge on a case-by-case basis the risks to public order and thus avoid repression by invoking public order, excessive force or arbitrary arrest.  This had had repercussions, even in the area of the right to information, which was concerning.

    Did the National Law Enforcement Scheme adopted in September 2020 mention the path of “de-escalation”, as a strategic principle for policing political manifestations in Europe, supported by the European Union?  The Committee had expressed concern about allegations of ill treatment, excessive use of force, and disproportionate use of intermediate force weapons, in particular during arrests, forced evacuations, and law enforcement operations.  A 2017 law (the Cazeneuve law) created a common framework for the use of weapons, allowing police to use armed force in five different cases.  However, the number of deaths had increased fivefold after the 2017 law, causing France to become the country in the European Union with the largest numbers of people killed or injured by shots fired by police. 

    Could the delegation explain the extent to which law enforcement agencies followed the applicable protocols in practice, with supporting statistics, and respected the principles of necessity, proportionality, precaution, non-discrimination and self-defence in the use of weapons?  What measures, in terms of training for law enforcement agencies, were envisaged?  Would the State party be willing to review the legal framework on the use of weapons and limit the use of firearms within the Security Code?  What follow-up had been given to decision 2020-131 of the Defender of Rights on general recommendations on law enforcement practices with regard to the rules of ethics? 

    According to a decision by the Ombudsman, France was the only country in Europe to use stun grenades to keep demonstrators at bay. Would grenades continue to be used despite the serious mutilations and injuries they caused?  Could the delegation provide updated information on the number of persons who had died as a result of police operations during arrests, including through the excessive use of force, and on the outcome of investigations into such deaths, sanctions imposed, and reparations provided to victims and their families?  Could statistics be provided on the number of proposals for sanctions presented by the Defender of Rights and what became of them, in particular the number of prosecutions? 

    Would the Brigades for the Repression of Motorised Violent Actions be dissolved?  The State party’s report provided information on complaints and investigations initiated concerning members of the security forces.  What measures would be taken to make the relevant statistical data more reliable, disaggregated and complete?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the evacuations of camps in Calais which took place were done through either a legal or an administrative decision. These decisions were carried out with proper supervision and were overseen by the Government and social organizations.  Unaccompanied minors were housed in emergency shelter systems when possible and the same for adults when possible. 

    France guaranteed the right to protest and freedom of collective speech and expression of ideas.  The French State allowed journalists free circulation.  France was seeking to strike a balance because there were now many journalists without press identification who ran risks, placing themselves between protesters and law enforcement officials.  Law enforcement officers were called on to show professional behaviour at all times, including in situations where protests were violent. 

    Videos in public spaces were used to call attention to pre-determined actions; they did not have any impact on the right to protest. France supported the European plan for protecting journalists against violence.  This had allowed for additional guarantees to be provided in certain cases. 

    French authorities were mobilised to support efforts against hate speech, and there were efforts to address this phenomenon within the Ministry of Justice.  When cases were thrown out, they could be appealed before the appeals court.  Investigations into allegations of hate speech were underway. 

    The administrative police were evacuating camps, which were aimed at putting an end to illegal occupation and squatting of lands.  These operations on the ground involved parameters being established.  Regarding expulsions in Calais, 36 operations had taken place.  They were based on the same legal foundations; the anti-squat laws had been utilised to proceed with the evacuation.  Minors were always supported.  The State was aware of the situation of unaccompanied minors in Calais. Systems had been put in place to address these realities and identify the unaccompanied minors.  Work was being done with associations on the ground in Calais, including Doctors without Borders.  The shelters were only 20 minutes from Calais and allowed for daily operations and support.  This distance was far enough to protect unaccompanied minors from traffickers found in these camps. 

    When foreigners were not eligible for asylum seeking procedures, they could then be placed under administrative detention in administrative detention centres.  These decisions were subjected to oversight by judges.  During the detention period, foreigners benefitted from health care support and legal counsel.  Voluntary returnees received financial support.  Some countries were not considered to be safe, and therefore returns were only on a voluntary basis.  Since October 2022, the Government was active in Mayotte, allowing active participation in the asylum-seeking process. 

    There were 2,100 victims of trafficking and exploitation in 2023, a six per cent increase compared to 2022.  Around 882 people had been sentenced for exploitation and trafficking.  France thanked civil society for helping contribute to the National Action Plan against Trafficking.  Training was an important part of the strategy to combat trafficking; there was a training course on human trafficking with a focus on modern slavery. Training was provided to 150 different professionals.  To care for the victims of human trafficking, several mechanisms were in place, including an early detection mechanism.

    France guaranteed the rights of citizens at the highest level, and any restrictions applied to all religions equally.  There was freedom for an individual to display religious signs, but this needed to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  Any restriction on a religious symbol was only imposed if they were identified as a risk to the public service. 

    Freedom of expression was guaranteed in France, but this could result in some groups promoting racist and hate speech.  The law of 2021 amended the list of cases where a dissolution could take place, broadening the list of discriminatory measures which could lead to a dissolution. 

    The Public Ministry could carry out prosecutions.  Sometimes the Prosecutor could enact educational measures instead, which was used in some cases of minors.  The judges of France were required to argue for their decisions, given that there were no automatic sentences in the State.  This was also true for those found guilty of threatening public order. 

    France was one of the first countries to call for a ceasefire in Gaza.  There had been a significant increase in anti-Semitic acts since October 2023. Freedom to demonstrate was a fundamental right protected by the Constitution and protests were not subjected to authorisation.  There should be a notification to law enforcement around 15 days before to protect the safety of those participating and those living in the area.  The prohibition of protests was only carried out if it was believed they were a threat to public order, and this was done with the oversight of a judge.  Exceptionally, some protests had been prohibited due to the risk they posed to public order. 

    The use of firearms in France was regulated by the Criminal Code. This allowed a gradual response to respect necessity and proportionality to the violence and the threat.  The goal was to reduce the risk of threatening life and the integrity of people.  The police and gendarmerie were trained on how to use these weapons.  Regarding the brigades, several changes in the practices of demonstrators, including the increase in use of social media, had meant that for three years, the strategy had changed.  On average, there were two to three protests every day in Paris.  To meet this challenge, the brigades were developed and had been used to break up certain disruptive groups.  Since October 2023, the Ministry of Justice had circulated a document on combatting offences related to terrorist activities. 

    The fight against Islamophobia was a strong State policy. The strong Muslim community in France should be able to live with their beliefs peacefully to enjoy their religion. Any law which might be seen as a restriction did not target any specific population or any specific religion. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert asked if minors in Mayotte could be afforded the same protections as in metropolitan France? 

    Another Expert said hate speech online affected artists and activists in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. What had been done to prevent this? 

    An Expert said there had been a significant increase in those killed or wounded during protests or police operations.  Were grenades and defensive bullets still used?  What happened when police used these weapons? Was there a compulsory inquiry? Was there oversight regarding each use of weapons? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    Minors were subjected to an age evaluation before they were recorded as minors.  If recorded as a minor, they should not undergo another evaluation.  The dismantling of camps was based on public legal rulings.  The individuals were informed, and efforts were made to help them find shelters or to change their immigration status.  Readmission into the Schengen space was a complex issue. 

    There was a doctrine for the use of medium weapons which allowed gradual and proportionate use.  Recent changes allowed France to address the risk of wounds with these weapons.  Law enforcement officers needed to be clearly trained on each type of weapon on a regular basis.  There was a proposal to replace grenades with non-lethal “flash-bangs”. Random visits were undertaken to police and gendarmerie stations as a form of auditing.  Efforts were made to identify the amount of time weapons were used. 

    Closing Remarks

    ISABELLE ROME, Ambassador for Human Rights of France and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the dialogue.  France was deeply attached to the rule of law and was a living democracy; the Committee’s recommendations would be scrupulously considered.  France would continue to progress with an open-minded spirit, in partnership with civil society and the national human rights institution.  The country was committed to renewing dialogue with the territory of New Caledonia and its inhabitants. 

    TANIA MARÍA ABDO ROCHOLL, Committee Chairperson, thanked the delegation for the dialogue, which had covered a wide range of subjects under the Covenant.  The Committee aimed to ensure the highest level of implementation of the Covenant in France. 

    __________

    CCPR.24.024E

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    English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI: DT Cloud Acquisition Corporation Announces Entering into a Business Combination Agreement with Maius Pharmaceutical

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    New York, New York, Oct. 23, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — DT Cloud Acquisition Corporation (Nasdaq: DYCQU, DYCQ, DYCQR) (“DT Cloud” or the “SPAC”), a publicly-traded special purpose acquisition company, and Maius Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (“Maius” or the “Company”), a biopharmaceutical R&D company, announced that they had entered into a definitive business combination agreement (the “Business Combination Agreement”) for the merger transactions (the “Business Combination,” and the transactions in connection with the Business Combination collectively, the “Transaction”). As contemplated in the Business Combination Agreement, upon closing of the Transaction, Maius will become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Maius Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd., a newly formed holding company (“Pubco”), the securities of which will be listed on The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC (“Nasdaq”).

    Maius is a biopharmaceutical R&D company focusing on innovative formulations and targeted small-molecule chemical drugs. The Company focuses on developing new drugs in three major areas: anticancer drugs, autoimmune medication and anti-infectives. Its core products include small-molecule chemical drug candidates and peptide drug candidates. It has independently established an integrated drug development platform, combining a chemical drug screening system with a drug delivery system.

    Transaction Overview

    Upon consummation of the Business Combination, the outstanding shares of DT Cloud and Maius will be converted into the ordinary shares of Pubco. The Business Combination Agreement provides for an equity value of $250 million for Maius at the time of the closing of the Business Combination.

    The Transaction has been unanimously approved by the boards of directors of both DT Cloud and Maius and is expected to be consummated in the first half of 2025, subject to regulatory approvals, the approvals by the shareholders of DT Cloud and Maius, respectively, and the satisfaction of certain other customary closing conditions, including, among others, a registration statement (the “Registration Statement”), of which the proxy statement/prospectus forms a part, being declared effective by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), and the approval by Nasdaq of the listing application of Pubco. Upon the closing of the Business Combination, Pubco, the combined company, is expected to operate under the name of “Maius Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd.” and with a new trading symbol.

    The description of the Business Combination contained herein is only a summary and is qualified in its entirety by reference to the Business Combination Agreement. A more detailed description of the transaction terms and a copy of the definitive Business Combination Agreement will be included in a Current Report on Form 8-K to be filed by DT Cloud with the SEC and will be available on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov.

    Advisors

    Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Professional Corporation, Ogier (Cayman) LLP and Han Kun Law Offices are serving as legal counsel to DT Cloud. Sichenzia Ross Ference Carmel LLP, Appleby (Cayman) Ltd. and Beijing Yingke Law Firm Shenzhen Office are serving as legal counsel to Maius.

    About Maius

    Maius is a biopharmaceutical R&D company focusing on the research and development of innovative formulations and targeted small-molecule chemical drug candidates. The Company focuses on developing new drugs in three major areas: anticancer drugs, autoimmune medication and anti-infectives. Its core products under development include small-molecule chemical drugs and peptide drugs. It has independently established an integrated drug development platform, combining a chemical drug screening system with a drug delivery system. 

    About DT Cloud Acquisition Corporation

    DT Cloud is a blank check company formed for the purpose of effecting a merger, share exchange, asset acquisition, stock purchase, reorganization or other similar business combination with one or more businesses. While DT Cloud may pursue an initial business combination target in any business or industry, it intends to focus its search on industries that complement its management team’s background. DT Cloud is led by Shaoke Li, its Chief Executive Officer, and Guojian Chen, its Chief Financial Officer.

    Forward-looking Statements

    This press release includes “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the “safe harbor” provisions of the United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. All statements other than statements of historical fact contained in this press release, including statements as to future results of operations and financial position, planned products and services, business strategy and plans, objectives of management for future operations of the Company, market size and growth opportunities, competitive position and technological and market trends, estimated implied pro forma enterprise value of the combined company following the Mergers (the “Combined Company”), the cash position of the Combined Company following the closing of the Transaction, SPAC and the Company’s ability to consummate the Transaction, and expectations related to the terms and timing of the Transaction, as applicable, are forward-looking statements. Some of these forward-looking statements can be identified by the use of forward-looking words, including “anticipate,” “expect,” “suggests,” “plan,” “believe,” “predict,” “potential,” “seek,” “future,” “propose,” “continue,” “intend,” “estimates,” “targets,” “projects,” “should,” “could,” “would,” “may,” “will,” “forecast” or the negatives of these terms or variations of them or similar terminology although not all forward-looking statements contain such terminology. All forward-looking statements are based upon current estimates and forecasts and reflect the views, assumptions, expectations, and opinions of SPAC and the Company as of the date of this press release, and are therefore subject to a number of factors, risks and uncertainties, some of which are not currently known to SPAC or the Company and could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Some of these factors include, but are not limited to: (1) the occurrence of any event, change or other circumstances that could give rise to the termination of the Business Combination Agreement; (2) the outcome of any legal proceedings that may be instituted against SPAC, the Company or others following the announcement of the Transaction, the Business Combination Agreement and other ancillary documents with respect thereto; (3) the amount of redemption requests made by SPAC public shareholders and the inability to complete the Transaction due to the failure to obtain approval of the shareholders of SPAC, to obtain financing to complete the business combination or to satisfy other conditions to closing and; (4) changes to the proposed structure of the Mergers that may be required or appropriate as a result of applicable laws or regulations or as a condition to obtaining regulatory approval of the Mergers; (5) the ability to meet stock exchange listing standards following the consummation of the Transaction; (6) the risk that the Transaction disrupts current plans and operations of the Company as a result of the announcement and consummation of the Transaction; (7) the ability to recognize the anticipated benefits of the Transaction, which may be affected by, among other things, competition, the ability of the Company to grow and manage growth profitably, maintain relationships with customers and suppliers and retain its management and key employees; (8) costs related to the business combination; (9) risks associated with changes in applicable laws or regulations and the Company’s international operations; (10) the possibility that the Company or the Combined Company may be adversely affected by other economic, business, and/or competitive factors; (11) the Company’s estimates of expenses and profitability; (12) the Company’s mission, goals and strategies; (13) the Company’s future business development, financial condition and results of operations; (14) expected growth of the global digital trading and investing services industry; (15) expected changes in the Company’s revenues, costs or expenditures; (16) the Company’s expectations regarding demand for and market acceptance of its products and service; (17) the Company’s expectations regarding its relationships with users, customers and third-party business partners; (18) competition in the Company’s industry; (19) relevant government policies and regulations relating to the Company’s industry; (20) general economic and business conditions globally and in jurisdictions where the Company operates; and (21) assumptions underlying or related to any of the foregoing. The foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive. You should carefully consider the risks and uncertainties described in the “Risk Factors” section in the annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2023 of SPAC, and the “Risk Factors” section of the Registration Statement relating to the Transaction which is expected to be filed with the SEC, and other documents filed from time to time with the SEC. These filings identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. There may be additional risks that neither SPAC nor the Company presently know or that SPAC or the Company currently believe are immaterial that could also cause actual results to differ from those contained in the forward-looking statements. In light of these factors, risks and uncertainties, the forward-looking events and circumstances discussed in this press release may not occur, and any estimates, assumptions, expectations, forecasts, views or opinions set forth in this press release should be regarded as preliminary and for illustrative purposes only and accordingly, undue reliance should not be placed upon the forward-looking statements. SPAC and the Company assume no obligation and do not intend to update or revise these forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise, except as required by law.

    Additional Information and Where to Find It

    In connection with the Transaction, SPAC and the Company intend to cause the Registration Statement to be filed with the SEC, which will include a proxy statement to be distributed to SPAC’s shareholders in connection with its solicitation for proxies for the vote by SPAC’s shareholders in connection with the Transaction. You are urged to read the proxy statement/prospectus and any other relevant documents filed with the SEC when they become available because, among other things, they will contain updates to the financial, industry and other information herein as well as important information about SPAC, the Company and the Transaction. Shareholders of SPAC will be able to obtain a free copy of the proxy statement when filed, as well as other filings containing information about SPAC, the Company and the Transaction, without charge, at the SEC’s website located at www.sec.gov. This press release does not contain all the information that should be considered concerning the proposed business combination and is not intended to form the basis of any investment decision or any other decision in respect of the business combination.

    INVESTMENT IN ANY SECURITIES DESCRIBED HEREIN HAS NOT BEEN APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED BY THE SEC OR ANY OTHER REGULATORY AUTHORITY NOR HAS ANY AUTHORITY PASSED UPON OR ENDORSED THE MERITS OF THE OFFERING OR THE ACCURACY OR ADEQUACY OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN. ANY REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE.

    Participants in the Solicitation

    SPAC, the Company and their respective directors, executive officers, other members of management, and employees, under SEC rules, may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies from SPAC’s shareholders in connection with the Transaction. You can find information about SPAC’s directors and executive officers and their interest in SPAC can be found in its Annual Report on Form10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023, which was filed with the SEC on March 28, 2024. A list of the names of the directors, executive officers, other members of management and employees of SPAC and the Company, as well as information regarding their interests in the Transaction, will be contained in the Registration Statement to be filed with the SEC by the Company. Additional information regarding the interests of such potential participants in the solicitation process may also be included in other relevant documents when they are filed with the SEC. You may obtain free copies of these documents from the sources indicated above.

    No Offer or Solicitation

    This press release is not a proxy statement or solicitation of a proxy, consent or authorization with respect to any securities or in respect of the Transaction and does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any securities of SPAC, the Company or the Combined Company, or a solicitation of any vote or approval, nor shall there be any sale of securities in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such jurisdiction. No offer of securities shall be made except by means of a prospectus meeting the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

    Contact:

    For investors:

    DT Cloud Acquisition Corporation
    Shaoke Li
    Chief Executive Officer
    30 Orange Street
    London
    United Kingdom, WC2H 7HF
    Email: jack.li@dtcloudspac.com

    Maius Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
    Mingfeng Shi
    Chief Executive Officer
    Room 913, Building 1, No. 515 Huanke Road, Pudong New District, Shanghai, China
    Email: maius@maiuspharma.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: [Galaxy Unpacked 2025] Galaxy Tech Forum ② Health AI: Integrated Wellness Solutions for Smarter Health Management

    Source: Samsung

    Samsung hosted the Galaxy Tech Forums on January 23 in San Jose, California. The panels provided an in-depth exploration of Samsung’s AI innovations and the challenges they address across four key areas — Sustainability, Health AI, Galaxy AI and Home AI. During the Health AI session, experts shared insights into how AI technologies are shaping the future of daily health management.
     
     
    Samsung Electronics is leveraging AI technology to enhance its comprehensive health solutions, delivering more meaningful and personalized health experiences.
     
    To understand how Samsung’s AI ecosystem is poised to transform the future of wellness, Samsung Newsroom observed the second Tech Forum session, titled “The Role of Technology for a Healthier Life.”
     
    ▲ (From left to right) Dr. Vanessa Hill, Dr. Hon Pak, Dr. Patrick O’Connor, Emily English and Dr. Kyu Rhee
     
     
    Healthy Living Starts With a Holistic Approach
    Moderator Dr. Vanessa Hill, an award-winning science communicator and sleep scientist, started the discussion by providing insights into the practical utility of today’s health technology.
     
    While advancements such as wearable devices, health apps and telehealth platforms have made health management more accessible, the sheer volume of information can lead to confusion — making it easy to overlook critical insights amid an overwhelming sea of data.
     
    ▲ Dr. Patrick O’Connor from the University of Georgia
     
    “The issue is not the amount of data but the fragmentation,” said Dr. Patrick O’Connor, a professor in the Department of Kinesiology at Mary Frances Early College of Education, University of Georgia. “The key is to bring the scattered data together to create a comprehensive understanding, as health requires a holistic approach due to the interconnectedness of so many factors.”
     
    “As a sleep scientist I know the importance of gathering health data around the clock. Identifying abnormalities in metrics like heart rate, temperature or even snoring during sleep is key to not only unlocking better sleep, but better overall health,” said Dr. Hill, who emphasized that sleep is the foundation of holistic health.
     
     
    Personalized Care Through Various Health Metrics and Continuous Tracking
    The discussion also explored the importance of adding new health metrics to track, and monitoring those metrics in a continuous manner.
     
    ▲ Dr. Kyu Rhee from the NACHC
     
    “Continuous health monitoring of physical activity, sleep, nutrition and stress should become new, additional vital signs for users and health professionals,” said Dr. Kyu Rhee, President and CEO of the National Association of Community Health Centers (NACHC). “Combining this essential health data with clinical data powered by AI insights has the potential to transform the health system by improving health outcomes, reducing healthcare costs, and empowering patients, their caregivers and healthcare teams.”
     
    ▲ Dr. Hon Pak from Samsung Electronics
     
    One health metric receiving a substantial amount of attention from both Samsung and the digital health industry in general is blood glucose.
     
    “Blood glucose is an area Samsung has been deeply invested in, and we’ve made significant progress in developing CGM-integrated nutrition coaching as well as enhancing non-invasive technologies for tracking blood glucose levels,” said Dr. Hon Pak, Senior Vice President and Head of Digital Health Team, Mobile eXperience Business at Samsung Electronics, sharing the company’s roadmap for blood glucose management and end-to-end (E2E) healthcare experiences. “These advancements are all part of our work to deliver more proactive and preventive disease detection solutions to everyone, helping lower healthcare burdens on people, their families and society at large.”
     
    ▲ Emily English, a BSc nutritionist
     
    “There isn’t a one-size-fits-all approach to health and nutrition, it’s a journey that requires a holistic understanding of yourself,” said Emily English, a BSc nutritionist. “Wellness technology is helping provide a full 360-view of your life. New solutions that offer easy access to health metrics like blood glucose will offer a more holistic understanding of our bodies and revolutionize the way we manage our everyday health.”
     
     
    Ushering in the Era of Personalized Health Insights
    The discussion touched on how AI can translate tracked health data into actionable and meaningful insights.
     
    ▲ The Tech Forum discussion on Health AI
     
    In an effort to consolidate disparate data onto a single platform, Samsung has collaborated with Dr. O’Connor’s research team to develop Energy Score — a feature that enhances the digital healthcare experience. “New AI-enabled features like Energy Score have become a jumping off point for broader health innovations,” explained Dr. Pak. Calculated based on health indicators such as activity levels, sleep, heart rate during sleep and heart rate variability during sleep, Energy Score exemplifies how wearable devices and AI can support a holistic and personalized approach to health and wellness management.
     
    ▲ Dr. Patrick O’Connor describes Energy Score.
     
    “Monitoring overall readiness might benefit from minimally invasive brain sensing technology,” said Dr. O’Connor. “Today, we are able to leverage non-invasive technology, the available science and AI to generate an Energy Score, helping translate complex data into an intuitive and understandable index.”
     
    Dr. Pak also teased Samsung’s upcoming plans to expand the AI capabilities of Energy Score to include nutrition, mental health and even mobile usage patterns — offering users deeper and more comprehensive insights into their overall well-being.
     
    The Health AI session underscored the importance of a holistic approach to health management, highlighting the potential of personalized health experiences powered by continuous health monitoring. As AI becomes an indispensable partner in modern wellness, Samsung’s innovative technology is set to drive a new era of tailored and comprehensive health solutions.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI China: Discovery to unravel mystery of early universe

    Source: China State Council Information Office 2

    Scientists have revealed new insights into the distant X-ray universe, with the Einstein Probe satellite offering fresh perspectives on the distant explosions in the cosmos.
    The research results of its discovery of a mysterious blast of X-rays in March — less than three months after EP was launched in January last year — was published on international academic journal Nature Astronomy on Thursday.
    The discovery could require us to change the way we explain the extraordinary explosions known as gamma-ray bursts, said Liu Yuan, co-first author of the paper and a scientist from National Astronomical Observatories, Chinese Academy of Sciences.
    The burst of low-energy X-rays EP’s Wide-field X-ray Telescope detected in March lasted for more than 17 minutes, and fluctuated in brightness before fading away again. Such an event is known as a fast X-ray transient, or FXRT, and this particular transient was designated as EP240315a.
    “EP240315a was the first time astronomers had detected soft X-rays for such a long duration from such an ancient explosion,” Liu said. “It was really good to see the WXT onboard trigger algorithm working fine for this event.”
    About one hour after the X-rays were seen, a telescope situated in South Africa as part of the Asteroid Terrestrial-Impact Last Alert System detected visible light from the same location.
    Follow-up observations from the Gemini-North telescope on Hawaii Island and the Very Large Telescope in Chile returned redshift measurements that confirmed that the burst had come from around 12.5 billion light-years away, beginning its cosmic journey to us when the universe was just 10 percent its current age.
    “The detection of EP240315a demonstrates Einstein Probe’s great potential for discovering transients from the early universe. The mission will play an important role in international observations and collaborations,” said Wu Xuefeng, one of the paper’s authors and a researcher at the Purple Mountain Observatory of the CAS in Nanjing, Jiangsu province.
    In later analyses, the X-rays were found to be coincident with a gamma-ray burst.
    These results show that a substantial fraction of FXRTs may be associated with gamma-ray burst, and that sensitive X-ray monitors such as EP can pinpoint them in the distant universe, said Roberto Ricci, a research fellow from University of Rome Tor Vergata in Italy.
    Combining the power of X-ray and radio observations hands researchers a new way to explore these ancient explosions even without detecting their gamma rays, he said.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Environment – First global gathering of Food and Plastics Networks to prevent devastating environmental impacts

    Source: WRAP

    Pact Network Connect 2025 – First global gathering of Food and Plastics Networks share actions to cut food and plastic waste and prevent devastating effects on planet.

    Representatives from 15 countries met in Mexico this week for Pact Network Connect 2025, a three-day programme focussed on addressing the issue of our broken food systems, and the spiralling environmental cost of plastic pollution and waste.

    Convened by global environmental action NGO WRAP, Pact Network Connect 2025 was the first time the two networks – 13 international Plastics Pacts run in conjunction with the Ellen MacArthur Foundation – and 11 Food Pacts met as one to share experiences and strategies to strengthen collaborative efforts on the two environmental crises.

    The Pacts represent collaborative action initiatives formed in country by private and public sector organisations, charities and NGOs. Representatives from the Pact Secretariats joined investors and philanthropic organisations to co-design solutions to key food and plastics triggers. Focus was on generating practical steps and actions to tackle plastics pollution within the 19 countries comprising the Plastics Pact Network – and share more widely, and address food waste and loss in the 10 countries encompassing the first Food Pact Network.

    Harriet Lamb, CEO WRAP, “The numerous Pacts are the engine rooms driving forward a new circular economy for plastics and food. They give me hope that we can correct the failures of our food and plastic systems. They show that ahead of securing global inter-governmental agreements at scale, companies, ngos and governments can get behind voluntary action as an agile and effective front runner along the road to transformation. We’re delighted to be in Mexico, bringing together leaders from the food and plastics Pacts for the first ever joint global meeting to share solutions and accelerate change.”

    Pact Network Connect 2025 built on the learnings and progress achieved in the first Plastic Pact Network meeting, held in South Africa in 2024 inspiring the move to bring together both Food and Plastics Pacts to amplify impact. The Plastics Pact Network meeting had an added sense of urgency this year, given the lack of agreement on key elements for a global treaty to end plastic pollution at INC5 negotiations in Busan 2024. To achieve this, we need ambitious regulation to complement and accelerate voluntary efforts and create a level playing field for all businesses. The Plastics Pacts are uniquely placed to inform and enable policymaking and treaty implementation through the Network’s large repository of tools, insights, guidance, and standardised definitions.

    Marta Longhurst, Pacts and Field-building Lead Ellen MacArthur Foundation, “The Plastics Pacts have proved that such a network can deliver real impact towards eliminating plastic waste and pollution. Thanks to Plastics Pacts, tens of billions of problematic or unnecessary plastic items have been eliminated; design for reusability, recyclability, and composability in practice and at scale has increased by 23%; and incorporation of recycled content back into packaging has increased by 44%. We are pleased to see the tangible impact of the Plastics Pacts, and to see this knowledge shared and applied to other sectors to accelerate the transition to a circular economy worldwide.”

    The Plastics Pact Network is a global coordinated response to the hazards plastics pose to people and the planet. Managed through a partnership between WRAP and the Ellen MacArthur Foundation, in just six years the Plastic Pacts have led work tackling pollution and delivering impact on national and global scales. The Network includes over 900 local and global organisations across a 19-country membership. Its members have eliminated more than 360,000 tonnes of problematic and unnecessary plastics and increased recycled content in their packaging by 44% – reducing virgin plastic by 2.2 million tonnes by 2022. All Plastics Pacts align in a common vision to create a circular economy for plastics and eliminate waste and pollution.

    Alejandra Kopaitic, Directora Consumo y Producción Sustentable y Pacto Chileno de los Plásticos, “Pact Network Connect is a key event when many countries can share experiences, foster regional collaboration, and strengthen our global partnerships. It will enrich the Chilean Plastics Pact as part of this international network committed to systemic change. We are here to listen, learn, and collaborate, while showcasing the work we are doing in Chile and aligning our goals with international experience and best practices.”

    Ninel Escobar, Director of Climate Change WWF Mexico, “In México, between 38% and 58% of plastic waste is mismanaged. Resolving this problem requires us to work along the whole life cycle of plastic, using a systemic approach. We are pleased to join our Pact partners at Pact Network Connect to share our experiences of resolving these complex problems.”

    The Food Pact Network connects collaborative action initiatives within individual countries to a global community dedicated to reducing food loss and waste. This is the first time the group has joined forces in person as the Food Pact Network, and through the universal adoption of the principles of Target-Measure-Act the Pacts are changing how food is produced and consumed to support the UN Sustainable Development Goal 12.3 to halve global food waste by 2030.

    Notes

    The Plastics Pact Network includes: ANZPAC Plastics Pact, The Canada Plastics Pact, Polski Pakt Plastikowy – The Polish Plastics Pact, The U.S. Plastics Pact, Pacto Português para os Plásticos- The Portuguese Plastics Pact, The South African Plastics Pact, UK Plastics Pact, Pacte National sur les emballages plastiques – French Plastics Pact, Circula El Plástico – The Chilean Plastics Pact, The Kenya Plastics Pact (KPP), Colombia Plastics Pact, India Plastics Pact and Mexico Plastics Pact.

    The Food Pact Network includes: Courtauld Commitment 2030 (UK), South Africa Food Loss and Waste Initiative, Pacific Coast Food Waste Commitment, Pacto Por La Comida (Mexico), GRASP 2030 (Indonesia), Brasil Sem Desperdisio  (Brazil, launching in 2025), U.S. Food Waste Pact, Samen Tegen Voedselverspilling (Netherlands) , Kai Commitment (New Zealand) and the International Food Waste Coalition.

    WRAP is a global environmental action NGO catalysing policy makers, businesses and individuals to transform the systems that create our food, textiles and manufactured products. Together these account for nearly 50% of global greenhouse emissions. Our goal is to enable the world to transition from the old take-make-dispose model of production to more sustainable approaches that will radically reduce waste and carbon emissions from everyday products. To do so we examine sustainability challenges through the lens of people’s day-to-day lives and create solutions that can transform entire systems to benefit the planet, nature and people.

    Our work includes: UK Plastics Pact, Courtauld Commitment 2030, Textiles 2030 and the campaigns Love Food Hate Waste and Recycle Now. We run Food Waste Action Week and Recycle Week.

    MIL OSI – Submitted News

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Innovation – A robot cleaning up the Hofvijver in The Hague

    Source: The Hague

    And a new electric boat cleans up the bigger pieces of waste in the canals

    The Hague, the Netherlands, 24 January 2025 — The Municipality of The Hague has launched a pilot project to keep the historic Hofvijver plastic-free. Using the remote-controlled Jellyfishbot, plastic and other litter are being efficiently removed from this iconic body of water in the heart of the city.

    The initiative was introduced following an increase in complaints about litter in the Hofvijver, the famous lake located in front of the Dutch parliament buildings. The pilot project, which began at the end of 2024 and will run for one year, aims to determine the effectiveness of the Jellyfishbot in improving water quality. If successful, the technology may be deployed to other locations in the city, such as canals, where it could assist in cleaning water surfaces and even mapping underwater areas and quay walls. This project is led by the Urban Management team of the Municipality of The Hague, which is dedicated to enhancing the local living environment throughout the city.

    Alderman Robert Barker (Animal Welfare, Outdoor Space, and Environment) stated: “Unfortunately, too much waste still ends up in the Hofvijver. This is bad for the water quality and all plants and animals in and around the water. That is why we do our best to keep this historic piece of water in the middle of the city clean. This innovative robot can make a great contribution to that.”

    Stella Polaris

    Alongside the Jellyfishbot project in the Hofvijver, another new boat is now being used to clean up larger debris in the city’s waters. The service vessel is deployed for monitoring and maintenance purposes, retrieving large objects such as reels and planks from the water, and installing signs or mirrors when necessary. The previous service vessel, named Die Haghe, was built in 1986 and featured a Hatz diesel engine. The use was no longer viable due to CO2 emissions and height restrictions preventing it from passing under movable bridges. As a result, a new electrically powered service vessel, Stella Polaris, has been introduced. This eco-friendly boat can navigate all inner waters of The Hague and is stationed at its dedicated berth in the Poolsterhaven.

    Alderman Arjen Kapteijns (Energy Transition, Mobility and Raw Materials): “It is important that we keep our beautiful city clean, not only for nature, but also for our residents. This innovative technology offers us the opportunity to dispose of waste effectively and sustainably.”

    Read the full story about cleaning up the waters in The Hague on Stories of Purpose from The Hague:  https://storiesofpurpose.thehague.com/impact/robot-mission-jellyfishbot-cleaning-hofvijver

    About The Hague & Partners  

    The Hague & Partners is the official marketing & acquisition organisation for the promotion of The Hague, focused on residents, visitors, conferences, businesses, and institutions. www.thehague.com  

    MIL OSI – Submitted News