Category: Federal Bureau of Investigation

  • MIL-OSI Security: USERT: Tools of the Trade

    Source: US FBI

    Light and Camera System

    Lights and recording functions are controlled from the surface, and high-definition images are displayed on surface monitors. However, divers rarely use lights below the surface because particulate matter churned up from walking on the bottom diffuses any light.

    Metal Detectors

    Different sizes of underwater metal detectors allow divers to locate large and small objects.

    Lift Bags

    Divers are prohibited from lifting anything above 15 pounds by themselves. Lift bags inflate to lift objects as large and heavy as 2,000-pound vehicles. Bags are inflated either by divers or, for larger items, by surface-supplied air.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: FBI Launches Stolen Art App

    Source: US FBI

    Claude Monet paintings. Stradivarius violins. Tiffany lamps.

    Law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and around the world have submitted these to the FBI’s National Stolen Art File (NSAF), a database of stolen pieces of art and culturally significant property. The NSAF assists in law enforcement’s efforts to close cases and return pieces of art and property to their rightful owners.

    Now, you can access that database in the palm of your hand using our new National Stolen Art File app.

    “One of the biggest evolutions for NSAF was making it publicly available,” said Colleen Childers of the FBI’s Art Crime Program. “Now, with the new mobile upgrade that we’ve undergone, we want to continue to push to make it a more user-friendly platform.”

    While the app was primarily created with law enforcement and art-industry partners in mind, anyone can use it to verify that art or antiquities they own or are looking to buy aren’t actually stolen property.

    In the app, you can:

    • Search and filter stolen art by location, description, type of art, and more.
    • Display the information most relevant to you.
    • Save pieces of art to a favorites page and easily access them later.
    • Share stolen art entries via text, email, or social media.
    • Submit tips to the FBI directly from the app.

    Download the app for free on the Apple App Store or on Google Play.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Boston Marathon Bombing Anniversary

    Source: US FBI

    Large images of the victims were arrayed in a conference room last month at the Boston Field Office, along with a whiteboard agents used to sketch out their plans and the wanted posters that helped identify the suspects, brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev. A moment of silence preceded the remembrance ceremony.

    “It was important, first and foremost, to honor the victims,” said Joseph Bonavolonta, special agent in charge of the Boston Division.

    But he also wanted to enlighten the office’s large cadre of young agents, analysts, and professionals—many not around 10 years ago—who may not fully appreciate the all-hands-on-deck response required in major cases like this.

    “Internally, I wanted to give my personnel a real good idea, with some granularity, about what it means when a critical incident occurs,” he said, “what is expected of all of us to step up, and how we work toward a common goal.”

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Wilver Villegas-Palomino Added to FBI’s Ten Most Wanted Fugitives List

    Source: US FBI

    The ELN uses proceeds from Villegas-Palomino’s drug trafficking enterprise to fund terrorist attacks, launch sabotage operations, buy political influence, and engage in other malign activities designed to destabilize government institutions and subvert U.S. national security and law enforcement interests in the region. 

    A federal arrest warrant was issued for Villegas-Palomino in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, on February 13, 2020, after he was charged with narcoterrorism, international cocaine distribution conspiracy, and international cocaine distribution. 

    “Villegas-Palomino continues to present a grave threat to the community through his cocaine and narcoterrorist empire,” said FBI Supervisory Special Agent Nick Zarro, who is overseeing the investigation out of the FBI Houston Field Office. “Cocaine produced in Villegas-Palomino’s laboratories ultimately ends up on U.S. streets, plaguing local communities and driving spikes in violent crime.” 

    The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, a federal drug enforcement program overseen by the U.S. Attorney General and the Department of Justice, has named Villegas-Palomino a consolidated priority organization target (CPOT), which is reserved for those involved in the most significant international drug trafficking operations affecting the United States. 

    Zarro hopes the poster and publicity will move hesitant associates to come forward with tips. “Continued publicity of Villegas-Palomino’s status on this list will disrupt his ability to travel abroad, restrict his ability to meet with international drug trafficking associates, and hamper his ability to recruit new members—and will generate leads and intelligence for law enforcement,” he said.

    Villegas-Palomino is 41 years old and has black hair and brown eyes. He is between 5’7” and 5’9” tall and weighs about 190 pounds. He is a Colombian national and speaks Spanish. Aliases include Carlos El Puerco (“Carlos the Hog”), El Puerco, Wilver Villegas, and Wilver Palomino. 

    If you have any information concerning Villegas-Palomino, please contact the FBI via WhatsApp (neither a government-operated nor government-controlled platform) at (281) 630-0330. You can also contact your local FBI office or the nearest American Embassy or Consulate, or you can submit a tip online at tips.fbi.gov.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Victim Specialists Support American Indian and Alaska Native Communities

    Source: US FBI

    How long have you worked with AI/AN populations?

    I’ve lived in the Aberdeen community since 2009, and I love it here. I’ve had the privilege of working with the AI/AN populations since I started victim services in 2011.

    In my work with the FBI, I cover the Lake Traverse and Standing Rock South Dakota side reservations. Our office puts in a lot of miles. The communities we cover are, on average, two to three hours away.

    What challenges do you face in working with AI/AN victims that you may not face elsewhere?

    The lack of resources is, by far, my biggest challenge. The reservations are very rural, so they don’t have the resources that you see in bigger towns. My car is stocked with toiletries, clothing, diapers, blankets, gloves, etc., that I can access when needed.

    On the reservations, there’s a lack of trauma-informed counseling options. With many of the cases I work, people have to travel anywhere from 30 minutes to two hours one way to see a counselor that specializes in trauma. This is not sustainable due to costs, limited transportation, and weather.

    Another big challenge is the lack of foster homes and shelters, as well as the ability to keep these placements confidential. This can create a barrier for victims who want to leave their situations but fear the perpetrators will be able to find them.

    What do you wish people knew about working as a VS in the FBI?

    Being a victim specialist can be the most challenging but, more importantly, the most rewarding job. I think some people have the notion that the AI/AN populations do not want our help, but that could not be farther from the truth, in my experience. Everyone I have met is so excited to see there is help, support, resources, and justice for the things that have been done to them. I’m reminded every day of how I am so blessed, and it helps me want to give more to provide hope that they can get through this.

    What’s the best part of being a VS?

    The best moment in my job is seeing a victim realize they are strong, courageous, and a survivor. This happens in many ways. For example, I worked with a young victim who initially said she couldn’t testify at trial with the defendant there. Not only did she do an amazing job at testifying, which helped the jury convict the defendant, but she stood and read her victim impact statement at the sentencing hearing. The hug I received after that hearing is something I will never forget.

    I also worked with a mom who had endured years of domestic violence and then found out her husband was abusing their daughter. Those were truly their darkest days, but the transformation I have seen in them is truly amazing. The daughter received a kindness award at school and has improved her grades and attendance. The mother has kept stable employment and secured a home for their family to continue to heal and grow.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Operation SpecTor Targets Darknet Markets

    Source: US FBI

    To get the word out about the prevailing dangers, the JCODE team embarked on an effort this spring called Operation ProtecTor. This effort involved reaching out to individuals whose identities were discovered during search warrant and arrest operations of prolific vendors. The FBI sent leads to each of its field offices to work with partner agencies. Agents then drove to subjects’ homes, knocked on their doors, and let them know that law enforcement was aware of what they had been doing—and that the safest thing to do was to stop.

    “No matter what somebody is telling you, you really don’t know what’s in it,” said Andrew Innocenti, a supervisory special agent who leads a JCODE squad in the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office. He said the drugs—or the precursor ingredients they’re made of—can change hands frequently as they travel from the darknet to the doorstep.

    “When these pills are created and shipped around the country, they are being resold in some instances to people in high school, people at universities, people on social media,” he said. “And by that point, you’re diluting the message of what this actually is or is purporting to be. When the messaging gets changed over time, from drug trafficker to darknet vendor, to reseller, to the local high school kid who’s handing them out, who knows what you might be taking? And so that’s where the danger lies.”

    Operation SpecTor is the fifth coordinated law enforcement action since the JCODE team was established in 2018. In remarks at a May 2 press conference in Washington, D.C., Attorney General Merrick Garland said the recent operation represents the most funds seized and the highest number of arrests in any coordinated international action led by the Justice Department against drug traffickers on the darknet.

    “Our message to criminals on the dark web is this: You can try to hide in the furthest reaches of the internet, but the Justice Department will find you and hold you accountable for your crimes,” Garland said.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Attorney’s Office Hosts Meeting of the Western District Health Care Fraud Working Group

    Source: US FBI

    Multi-Agency Partnership Continues Efforts to Combat Health Care Fraud and Protect Taxpayer Dollars

    CHARLOTTE, N.C. – U.S. Attorney Dena J. King announced today the annual meeting of the Western District’s Health Care Fraud Working Group, a partnership of federal and state agencies focused on combating health care fraud and protecting taxpayer dollars in the Western District of North Carolina.

    The working group comprises investigators, analysts, auditors, and attorneys from state and federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG), the Food and Drug Administration’s Office of Criminal Investigations (FDA-OCI), the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI), the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General (VA-OIG), the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), the North Carolina Attorney General’s Medicaid Investigations Division, the North Carolina Department of Insurance, the South Carolina Medicaid Investigations Division, and the Office of Personnel Management.

    At today’s meeting, U.S. Attorney King reaffirmed the importance of collaboration among the partner agencies and recognized their contributions.

    “Health care fraud undermines public trust, exploits vulnerable patients, and siphons billions from taxpayer-funded programs,” said U.S. Attorney King. “By combining our expertise and resources we can detect, dismantle, and prosecute health care fraud schemes and protect vital government programs that so many North Carolinians rely upon for their health care needs. I am grateful to our partner agencies for their dedication to protect our health care system and hold perpetrators accountable.”

    The Health Care Fraud Working Group’s mission is to detect health care fraud through coordinated investigations, information sharing, identification of existing and emerging schemes, and case development. This includes uncovering schemes of fraudulent billing, COVID-19-related fraud, kickback schemes, and fraud targeting government health care programs like Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE. The working group also focuses on fraud committed by both corporate entities and individuals, including hospitals, telemedicine companies and providers, nursing home chains, pharmacies and pharmaceutical manufacturers, durable medical equipment suppliers, physicians, therapists, and affiliated health care professionals.

    If you suspect Medicare or Medicaid fraud, please report it by phone at 1-800-HHS-TIPS (1-800-447-8477), or via email at HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov.

    To report Medicaid fraud in North Carolina, call the North Carolina Medicaid Investigations Division at 919-881-2320 or fill out an online complaint form.

    TRICARE fraud can be reported here.

    Fraud against the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs healthcare system can be reported at www.vaoig.gov/hotline.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: FBI Honors Fallen During 2023 Police Week Events

    Source: US FBI

    Police Week regularly draws 25,000 to 40,000 visitors to the nation’s capital. The observance comprises several events—including some, like the FBI service, that occur before Police Week officially starts.

    These collective events include the Blue Mass at St. Patrick’s Catholic Church; a Police K-9 Memorial Service at the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial; a 5K fundraising run; the arrival of the Police Unity Tour, where more than 2,000 bicycle riders simultaneously arrive in Washington, D.C., after traveling for days from cities around the country; the aforementioned 35th annual candlelight vigil; and the 42nd annual National Peace Officers Memorial Service at the U.S. Capitol, which was followed by a wreath-laying ceremony at the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: North Carolina Man Sentenced to Prison for Assaulting Law Enforcement and Other Offenses During January 6 Capitol Breach

    Source: US FBI

                WASHINGTON – A North Carolina man was sentenced to prison today after he was previously convicted of assaulting law enforcement other offenses during the Jan. 6, 2021, breach of the U.S. Capitol. His actions and the actions of others disrupted a joint session of the U.S. Congress convened to ascertain and count the electoral votes related to the 2020 presidential election.

                Brett Alan Rotella, also known as Brett Ostrander, 35, of Kannapolis, North Carolina, was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Randolph D. Moss to 38 months in prison, 36 months of supervised release, and ordered to pay $2,000 in restitution.

                A federal jury previously found Rotella guilty of three felony offenses, including obstruction of law enforcement during a civil disorder, two counts of assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers, and several misdemeanors.

                According to court documents and evidence presented during the trial, on Jan. 6, 2021, at approximately 2:24 p.m., Rotella was identified among a crowd of rioters amassed on the West Plaza of the U.S. Capitol building in Washington, D.C., wearing distinctive clothing that included a red skull cap, a black sleeveless puffy vest over a red sleeveless shirt, and white or gray long shorts. He carried a long pole with at least two flags affixed to it at various points during the day.

                According to police body-worn camera footage, just minutes after his arrival at the West Font, Rotella approached a police barricade and forcibly pushed it toward a Metropolitan Police Department officer, while shouting inflammatory remarks.

                At approximately 2:33 p.m., as the police line on the West Plaza became overwhelmed and was forced to retreat, Rotella was observed taking charge of a group of rioters, directing their movements by periodically signaling with his hand to “hold” and leading them up the southwest stairs toward the Capitol.

                Video footage from the Lower West Terrace showed that at approximately 2:40 p.m., Rotella followed retreating officers into the Lower West Terrace Tunnel, the site of some of the most violent attacks against law enforcement that day. Inside the Tunnel, as officers attempted to hold back the rioters, Rotella continued his advance, even after pepper balls containing chemical irritant were fired at him.

                Evidence during the trial showed that the mob, including Rotella, breached the Capitol entrance at the Tunnel by smashing the glass pane of one of the locked doors and forcing the doors open. CCTV and body-worn camera footage depicted Rotella entering the Tunnel and joining others in a concerted effort to physically assault police officers inside. Inside the Tunnel, Rotella pushed against police shields and attempted to leverage his body to push through the police line and into the building.

                Rotella left the Tunnel at approximately 2:55 p.m., but remained in the vicinity for approximately ninety more minutes, joining a large crowd that repeatedly surged against the police line. Further video evidence depicted Rotella counting down and leading a coordinated push by the mob against the officers.

                Rotella was later observed grabbing a large orange ladder and handing it toward the front of the crowd in an apparent attempt to use it against the officers. Video footage showed Rotella pushing the ladder into the Tunnel and pushing against other rioters near him in an effort to collectively breach the police line.

                The FBI arrested Rotella on Aug. 29, 2023, in Mooresville, North Carolina.

                This case was prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and the Department of Justice National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section. Valuable assistance was provided by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of North Carolina and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of North Carolina.

                This case was investigated by the FBI’s Charlotte and Washington Field Offices, which identified Rotella as BOLO (Be on the Lookout) #82 on its seeking information photos. Valuable assistance was provided by the U.S. Capitol Police and the Metropolitan Police Department.

                In the 47 months since Jan. 6, 2021, more than 1,572 individuals have been charged in nearly all 50 states for crimes related to the breach of the U.S. Capitol, including more than 590 individuals charged with assaulting or impeding law enforcement, a felony. The investigation remains ongoing.

                Anyone with tips can call 1-800-CALL-FBI (800-225-5324) or visit tips.fbi.gov.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Raleigh Man Who Fled From Police with ‘Ghost Gun’ Sentenced to Eight Years

    Source: US FBI

    RALEIGH, N.C. – A Raleigh man was sentenced to 96 months in prison after fleeing from the police and discarding a “ghost gun”.  On May 22, 2024, Treyvion Maleke Sutton pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.

    According to court documents and other information presented in court, on December 8, 2023, Sutton, 20, fled from Raleigh police officers on foot after officers attempted a traffic stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. While running from officers, Sutton discarded a loaded, unserialized “ghost gun” with an extended magazine. Sutton, who has prior felony convictions for common law robbery, assault by strangulation, discharge of a weapon into occupied property, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and battery of an unborn child, was prohibited from possessing firearms or ammunition.

    A privately made firearm is often called a “ghost gun” because it is not marked with a serial number and therefore is far more difficult for law enforcement to trace if they are used to commit crimes. These firearms can be made from scratch, or they can be assembled from weapon parts kits, including “buy-build-shoot” kits, which are weapon part kits with pre-manufactured, dissembled, complete firearms (a firearm in a box).

    The conviction is a result of the ongoing Violent Crime Action Plan (VCAP) initiative which is a collaborative effort with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, working with the community, to identify and address the most significant drivers of violent crime. VCAP involves focused and strategic enforcement, and interagency coordination and intelligence-led policing.

    Michael F. Easley, Jr., U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina made the announcement after sentencing by U.S. District Judge James C. Dever III. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Raleigh Police Department investigated the case and Assistant U.S. Attorney Sarah E. Nokes  prosecuted the case.

    Related court documents and information can be found on the website of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina or on PACER by searching for Case No. 5:24-CR-24-D-RN.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Zoe Mafia Family, Other Gang Members Convicted on Firearms and Narcotics Charges in South Florida Federal Court

    Source: US FBI

    MIAMI – The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida, ATF Miami, and Broward Sheriff’s Office (BSO), in collaboration with other federal and local law enforcement agencies, secured federal convictions and prison sentences against 18 members of violent South Florida street gangs – including Zoe Mafia Family (ZMF), the 3rd World gang, and several sects of the Bloods gang.

    The joint operation involved charges of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine trafficking; carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and felon in possession of a firearm. It led to the recovery of 23 firearms, three kilograms of fentanyl, and seven kilograms of cocaine, as well as methamphetamine, crack cocaine, and marijuana.

    The defendants, former residents of South Florida (Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties) were convicted and sentenced to prison terms as follows: 

    Andre Allen, 37, was sentenced to 120 months for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl (22-cr-20190);

    David Brown,41, was sentenced to 151 months for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl (22-cr-60177);

    Tirell Caldwell,26, was sentenced to 57 months for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon (22-cr-60220);

    Johnnie Gibson,51, was sentenced to 175 months for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and cocaine (23-cr-60205); 

    Brionne Griffin,35was sentenced to 60 months for possessing with the intent to distribute fentanyl, crack cocaine, cocaine, and methamphetamine (22-cr-60082);

    Joseph Johnson, Jr.,46, was sentenced to 120 months for possessing with the intent to distribute fentanyl (23-cr-60131);

    Timothy Neil Lewis, Jr.,26, was sentenced to 60 months for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (22-cr-60083);

    Makinson Moise,35, was sentenced to 248 months for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and possessing with intent to distribute fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine base (23-cr-60004);

    Arnicious Odom,48, was sentenced to 30 months for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and cocaine (23-cr-60205);

    Wendy Previl,33, was sentenced to 120 months for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and possessing with intent to distribute fentanyl (23-cr-60089); 

    Joshua Robinson,38, was sentenced to 51 months imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine (24-cr-60132);

    Robert Roseme,28, was sentenced to 42 months for possessing with intent to distribute fentanyl (23-cr-60089); 

    Nolan Setoute,43, was sentenced to 12 months for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon (22-cr-60124);

    Terrance Stanley,40, was sentenced to 60 months for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (22-cr-60120);

    Dorshawn Tate,20, was sentenced to 8 months for possession with intent to distribute alprazolam (23-cr-60051);

    British Wilkerson,42was sentenced to 60 months for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (22-cr-60125);

    Byron Felecio Williams, Jr.,40was sentenced to 60 months for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (22-cr-80136); and

    Kevin Williams,31was sentenced to 18 months for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine (24-cr-60132).

    U.S. Attorney Hayden P. O’Byrne for the Southern District of Florida; acting Special Agent in Charge Gordon Mallory of the ATF Miami Field Division, and Sheriff Gregory Tony of the Broward Sheriff’s Office announced the results of the operation.

    This case was investigated by ATF Miami and Broward Sheriff’s Office, with assistance from DEA Miami, HSI Miami, and FBI Miami.

    Southern District of Florida Managing Assistant U.S. Attorney Bruce Brown and Assistant U.S. Attorney Jason McCormack prosecuted these cases.

    Several of the defendants, are associated with Zoe Mafia Family (ZMF), a South Florida Haitian street gang.

    Earlier this month, the U.S. State Department designated two Haitian gangs (Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

    This effort is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/ocdetf.

    You may find a copy of this press release (and any updates) on the website of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida at https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdfl.

    Related court documents and information may be found on the website of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida at www.flsd.uscourts.gov or at http://pacer.flsd.uscourts.gov.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Indiana Woman Pleads Guilty to Wire Fraud for Embezzling Nearly $1.2 Million From Employer

    Source: US FBI

    CHARLOTTE, N.C. – Christina Robinson, 52, of Fort Wayne, Indiana, appeared before U.S. Magistrate Judge David C. Keesler today, and pleaded guilty to wire fraud for embezzling nearly $1.2 million from her employer, announced Dena J. King, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of North Carolina.

    Robert M. DeWitt, Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Charlotte Division, joins U.S. Attorney King in making today’s announcement.

    According to filed plea documents and the hearing, from September 2013 to April 2023, Robinson engaged in a scheme to defraud a Charlotte-based company by abusing her position as the company’s controller to embezzle nearly $1.2 million in company funds. During the scheme, Robinson misused her position and access to the company’s bank accounts to carry out the scheme by moving the embezzled funds and withdrawing them in cash. To conceal the theft and to remain undetected, Robison made materially false and misleading accounting entries in the company’s books and records. As Robinson admitted in court today, she used some of the embezzled funds to pay for personal expenses, including more than $330,000 in purchases, over $324,000 in credit card payments, more than $80,000 in loan payments, over $40,000 in mortgage payments, and more than $35,000 in car payments.

    Robinson was released on bond following the plea hearing. At sentencing, she faces up to 20 years in prison and a $250,000 fine for the wire fraud charge. A sentencing date has not been set.

    The FBI investigated the case.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney William Bozin of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Charlotte is prosecuting the case.

     

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Assaulting Law Enforcement During January 6 Capitol Breach

    Source: US FBI

                WASHINGTON – A North Carolina man pleaded guilty today to assaulting law enforcement during the Jan. 6, 2021, breach of the U.S. Capitol. His actions and the actions of others disrupted a joint session of the U.S. Congress convened to ascertain and count the electoral votes related to the 2020 presidential election.

                David Paul Daniel, 37, of Mint Hill, North Carolina, pleaded guilty to a felony offense of assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers before U.S. District Judge Trevor N. McFadden. Judge McFadden will sentence Daniel on May 5, 2025.

                According to court documents, Daniel traveled to Washington, D.C., to attend the Jan. 6, 2021, “Stop the Steal” rally on the National Mall.

                At approximately 2:12 p.m., the initial breach of the U.S. Capitol building occurred at a doorway known as the Senate Wing Door. Eventually, U.S. Capitol Police officers were able to stop the influx of rioters from that doorway. To secure the area, the officers, among other efforts, placed heavy wooden structures in front of the Senate Wing Door and nearby windows.

                At approximately 2:42 p.m., a rioter succeeded in once again breaking open the Senate Wing Door, but further entry was blocked by one of the heavy wooden structures, which was placed in front of the door like a barricade. At approximately 2:46 p.m., Daniel moved to the front of the crowd directly in front of that barricade.

                About one minute later, Daniel and another rioter to his right thrust their arms into and forcefully pushed the barricade into the officers standing on the other side. Officers attempted to keep the heavy wooden barricade in place as the crowd swarmed behind Daniel to support the push. Approximately one minute later, rioters succeeded in overwhelming the officers and swarmed into the Senate Wing Door hallway.

                At about 2:49 p.m., Daniel climbed over a pile of wooden structures to exit the Senate Wing Door area through a broken window. Daniel then re-entered the Capitol through another broken window beside the Senate Wing Door. He spent several moments walking around the perimeter of the area just inside the Senate Wing Door, then then walked south down a corridor, through the Small House Rotunda, and entered the Capitol Crypt. After a few moments, Daniel walked back north to the Senate Wing Door, where, at approximately 3:04 p.m., he eventually exited the building through a broken window.

                This case is being prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and the Department of Justice National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section. Valuable assistance was provided by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of North Carolina.

                This case is being investigated by the FBI’s Charlotte and Washington Field Offices. Valuable assistance was provided by the U.S. Capitol Police and the Metropolitan Police Department.

                In the 48 months since Jan. 6, 2021, more than 1,583 individuals have been charged in nearly all 50 states for crimes related to the breach of the U.S. Capitol, including more than 600 individuals charged with assaulting or impeding law enforcement, a felony. The investigation remains ongoing.

                Anyone with tips can call 1-800-CALL-FBI (800-225-5324) or visit tips.fbi.gov.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Justice Department Announces North Georgia Results of Operation Restore Justice

    Source: US FBI

    ATLANTA – Between April 28, 2025 through May 1, 2025, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducted Operation Restore Justice, a coordinated enforcement effort, by all 55 FBI field offices, United States Attorneys’ Offices across the country, and the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division (CEOS), to identify, track, and arrest child sex offenders.  The operation resulted in the rescue of 115 children and the arrests of 205 subjects, including six individuals charged in the Northern District of Georgia: Austin Hunter Bedingfield, 27, of Douglasville; Ian Dudar, 26, of Roswell; Kenneth Frazier, 30, of Powder Springs; Eduardo Gardea, 26, of Norcross; Connie Lynn Thompson, 52, of Grantville; and Christopher Welcher, 44, of Grantville.

    “The Department of Justice will never stop fighting to protect victims – especially child victims – and we will not rest until we hunt down, arrest, and prosecute every child predator who preys on the most vulnerable among us,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “I am grateful to the FBI and their state and local partners for their incredible work in Operation Restore Justice and have directed my prosecutors not to negotiate.”

    “Sex crimes against minors are especially heinous,” said U.S. Attorney Theodore S. Hertzberg. “We commend our federal and local law enforcement partners for their tireless efforts to hold accountable those who prey on children and achieve a measure of justice for the victims and their families.”

    “Every child deserves to grow up free from fear and exploitation, and the FBI will continue to be relentless in our pursuit of those who exploit the most vulnerable among us,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “Operation Restore Justice proves that no predator is out of reach and no child will be forgotten. By leveraging the strength of all our field offices and our federal, state, and local partners, we’re sending a clear message: there is no place to hide for those who prey on children.”

    “Our commitment is resolute. FBI Atlanta remains steadfast in its mission to safeguard children from those who seek to harm society’s most vulnerable,” said Paul Brown, Special Agent in Charge of FBI Atlanta. “However, let there be no confusion – this week’s operation is just one chapter in a relentless, year-round effort that our dedicated agents are fully invested in. We will continue to leverage every tool and resource at our disposal to track down child predators and ensure they face justice.”

    According to U.S. Attorney Hertzberg, the charges, and other information presented in court, the following defendants were arrested in connection with the operation, indicted by federal grand juries seated in the Northern District of Georgia, and have now been arraigned before a United States Magistrate Judge:

    • Austin Hunter Bedingfield was charged with distribution of child sexual abuse material and possession of child sexual abuse material. Bedingfield allegedly distributed graphic videos depicting the abuse of minors to an undercover officer via Kik. FBI agents conducted a search of Bedingfield’s electronic devices and recovered additional images of sexual abuse of minor children. He was arrested on April 30, 2025.
    • Ian Dudar was charged with possession of child sexual abuse material. Dudar allegedly purchased child sexual abuse material using Bitcoin from a commercial child exploitation ring on at least four occasions in 2022.  Later, in January 2024, when FBI agents executed search warrants on his person and home, they found child sexual abuse material on two of his electronic devices. He was arrested on April 29, 2025.
    • Kenneth Frazier was charged with enticement of a minor, receipt of child sexual abuse material, and possession of child sexual abuse material. On November 7, 2024, acting on tips to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, the Cobb County, Georgia, Police Department executed a search warrant at Frazier’s residence in Powder Springs. Officers seized Frazier’s cell phones, which contained hundreds of images and videos of children as young as infants and toddlers forced to engage in sex acts. One of Frazier’s phones also contained chat transcripts in which Frazier allegedly described himself as a “pedophile,” enticed a minor to engage in sexual activity, and received a visual depiction of that minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. He was arrested on May 2, 2025.
    • Eduardo Gardea was charged with distribution of child sexual abuse material and possession of child sexual abuse material. Gardea allegedly distributed child sexual abuse material on two internet platforms and possessed thousands of images depicting the sexual abuse of children. He was arrested on April 24, 2025.
    • Connie Lynn Thompson was charged with obstruction of justice for allegedly destroying electronic devices to conceal the alleged child exploitation crimes of Christopher Welcher, who was also arrested during the operation, as is more fully described below. Approximately a week after Welcher’s arrest, he allegedly called Thompson from jail and discussed a plan to destroy electronic devices that contained evidence against him. Although Thompson allegedly executed the concealment plan, the FBI recovered the damaged devices from Thompson’s household trash. She was arrested on May 16, 2025.
    • Christopher Welcher was charged with enticement of a minor, interstate travel to engage in an illicit sex act with a minor, possession of child sexual abuse material, and commission of a felony by a registered sex offender. On March 4, 2025, Welcher, a registered sex offender who previously served more than six years in federal prison for distributing child sex abuse materials, allegedly exchanged sexually explicit text messages with an undercover investigator he believed to be a 14-year-old girl. Welcher then drove from Alabama to the vicinity of a northwest Georgia high school to allegedly meet and molest the girl. Police arrested Welcher upon his arrival at the meeting location and seized his phone, which contained hundreds of images of child sex abuse. He was arrested on May 16, 2025.

    Members of the public are reminded that the indictments only contain charges.  The defendants are presumed innocent of the charges and it will be the government’s burden to prove the defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.

    United States Attorney Theodore S. Hertzberg and Assistant United States Attorneys James Hwang, Matthew LaGrone, Leanne Marek, and Amy Palumbo are prosecuting these cases.

    These cases are being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with valuable assistance from the Cobb County Police Department, Georgia Bureau of Investigation, and Rome/Floyd Metro Drug Task Force.

    This effort follows the Department of Justice’s observance of National Child Abuse Prevention Month in April 2025, and underscores the Department’s unwavering commitment to protecting children and raising awareness about the dangers they face. While the Department, including the FBI and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, investigate and prosecute these crimes every day, April served as a powerful reminder of the importance of preventing these crimes, seeking justice for victims, and raising awareness through community education.

    The Department is committed to combating child sexual exploitation. These cases were brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative to combat the epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse launched in May 2006 by the Department. Led by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and CEOS, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to better locate, apprehend, and prosecute individuals who exploit children via the internet, as well as to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, visit www.justice.gov/psc.

    The Department partners with and oversees funding grants for the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which receives and shares tips about possible child sexual exploitation received through its 24/7 hotline at 1-800-THE-LOST and on missingkids.org. The Department urges the public to remain vigilant and report suspected exploitation of a child through the FBI’s tipline at 1-800-CALL-FBI (225-5324), tips.fbi.gov, or by calling your local FBI field office.

    For further information please contact the U.S. Attorney’s Public Affairs Office at USAGAN.PressEmails@usdoj.gov or (404) 581-6280.  The Internet address for the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia is http://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Columbus Man Sentenced to 27 Years in Prison for Crimes Related to Sexually Exploiting and Sextorting More Than 25 Identified Victims

    Source: US FBI

    COLUMBUS, Ohio – A Columbus man was sentenced in U.S. District Court today to 324 months in prison for crimes related to sexually exploiting and sextorting more than 25 known victims in at least four states.

    Lorenzo A. Winfield, 23, persistently and aggressively sought out and collected nude files of high school classmates and minor females he met online.

    “Acts of sextortion are serious and have no place in our society. As we heard in court today from more than a dozen victims, this conduct creates significant harm,” said U.S. Attorney Kenneth L. Parker. “Today’s sentencing reflects that we will hold such perpetrators accountable for their damaging actions.”

    According to court documents, from at least 2016 until 2021, Winfield used extortion tactics to solicit and collect explicit photos of underage girls at his Columbus high school, the Arts and College Preparatory Academy (ACPA), where he was known as the “ACPA Hacker”.

    Winfield would contact students at ACPA and demand nude images and videos of them.  He would also hack into victims’ social media accounts and use the photos he obtained in their private accounts against them as leverage for more content.  Winfield would threaten the victims, letting them know he had nude content depicting them or other students and that he would distribute those images and videos unless the victims complied with his demands. On numerous occasions, Winfield followed through on these threats, distributing sexually explicit photos of his victims to others to prove he was serious with his threats in a bid to contain more content. In addition, Winfield told the victims to send him sexually explicit images or videos in order to regain control of their own social media accounts.

    Winfield used several social media accounts of his own to engage in the exploitation and extortion of the victims. His accounts were active across platforms such as Discord, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, Skype and Google Hangouts.

    Winfield was separately investigated by the FBI Washington Field Office for extorting and exploiting at least four victims in Fairfax and Prince William counties in Virginia.

    For example, one identified victim was approximately 11 years old at the time Winfield first contacted her online. During their communications, Winfield obtained nude images of her and videos of her masturbating. Winfield used this content as leverage and eventually sent nude photos of the victim to students at a Virginia middle school to prove he was serious about his sextortion of her. Eventually, as the victim got older, Winfield also sent the images to students at her high school, promising the victim that if she got her friends to help her out by sending him nude images, that he would stop. Winfield threatened to harm the family of the Virginia minor if she did not comply with his requests for sexually explicit photos and videos and continued to exploit and extort her until his arrest.

    Similarly, Winfield exploited at least one victim in College Station, Texas. The investigation revealed that the Texas victim sent approximately 50 pictures and videos to Winfield. Winfield demanded explicit images and videos of her daily. On one occasion, when the victim did not comply with Winfield’s demands, Winfield sent images of the victim’s nude breasts and vagina to the victim’s brother and friend. 

    The defendant pleaded guilty in December 2023 to sexually exploiting minors, possessing child pornography, and communicating interstate with the intent to extort.

    Kenneth L. Parker, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio, and Elena Iatarola, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cincinnati Division, announced the sentence imposed today by U.S. District Judge Michael H. Watson. U.S. Attorney Parker and Special Agent in Charge Iatarola commended the cooperative investigation in this case with FBI divisions and state and local law enforcement agencies in Ohio, Virginia and Texas. Assistant United States Attorney Emily Czerniejewski is representing the United States in this case.

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    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Ohio Man Arrested on Felony and Misdemeanor Charges for Actions During January 6 Capitol Breach

    Source: US FBI

                 WASHINGTON — An Ohio man was arrested on felony and misdemeanor charges related to his alleged conduct during the Jan. 6, 2021, breach of the U.S. Capitol. His alleged actions and the actions of others disrupted a joint session of the U.S. Congress convened to ascertain and count the electoral votes related to the 2020 presidential election.

                 David Valentine, 46, of Wilmington, Ohio, is charged in a criminal complaint filed in the District of Columbia with a felony charge of civil disorder. In addition to the felony, Valentine is charged with misdemeanor offenses of knowingly entering or remaining in any restricted building or grounds without lawful, knowingly, and with intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of government business or official functions and disorderly conduct in a Capitol building or grounds.

                 Valentine was arrested on Aug. 22, 2024, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and he made his initial appearance in the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

                 According to court documents, Valentine was identified within the restricted grounds of the U.S. Capitol building at around 1:30 p.m. on Jan. 6, 2021, near a line of police officers and bike-rack barricades preventing rioters from advancing toward the U.S. Capitol building. At about 1:40 p.m., rioters carried and passed a large metal-framed “Trump 2020” sign toward the police line.

                 It is alleged that when the sign reached the police line, Valentine joined the rioters who pushed the sign against the police officers. It is alleged that Valentine reached for the sign with his right hand and pushed the sign. The rioters used the large sign as a battering ram against the officers who were holding the line and attempted to breach the bike-rack barricades while the officers were attacked with the large sign.

                 Later, Valentine was identified on the West Plaza of Capitol grounds and was seen entering a lower part of the Inaugural stage within the West Plaza. Valentine then allegedly climbed into an area that appeared to be under construction and seemed to cut some wires with a folding knife.

                 At about 2:30 p.m., members of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) retreated to an area inside the archway of the U.S. Capitol building’s Lower West Terrace Doors, referred to as the Tunnel. The Tunnel was the site of some of the most violent attacks against law enforcement on January 6th.  There, rioters massed in front of the Tunnel and attacked police officers, pushing in a collective effort to overwhelm the police officers guarding this entrance to the building. Valentine was present outside the Tunnel.

                 At approximately 5:00 p.m., rioters collectively pushed against the police officers in the Tunnel, and Valentine allegedly joined the group, placing his hand against the back of the rioter in front of him before being repelled by a chemical irritant.

                 This case is being prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia and the Department of Justice National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section. Valuable assistance was provided by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Ohio and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

                 The case is being investigated by the FBI’s Cincinnati and Washington Field Offices. Valuable assistance was provided by the U.S. Capitol Police and the Metropolitan Police Department.

                 In the 43 months since Jan. 6, 2021, more than 1,488 individuals have been charged in nearly all 50 states for crimes related to the breach of the U.S. Capitol, including nearly 550 individuals charged with assaulting or impeding law enforcement, a felony. The investigation remains ongoing.

                 Anyone with tips can call 1-800-CALL-FBI (800-225-5324) or visit tips.fbi.gov.

                 A complaint is merely an allegation, and all defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Jury Finds Members of Violent Third World Mob Gang Guilty of Trafficking More Than 1,000 Kilograms of Marijuana

    Source: US FBI

    COLUMBUS, Ohio – A federal jury has convicted two members of the Third World Mob gang with conspiring to traffic more than 2,000 pounds of marijuana. Third World Mob is a violent criminal organization in Columbus.

    After an 8-day trial before U.S. District Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., jurors deliberated for less than six hours before finding Klegewerges Abate, 35, and Abubakarr Savage, 34, both of Columbus, guilty on all counts.

    Abate, who is also known as “Bells,” “Robell” and “Sosa,” was convicted of conspiring to traffic at least 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, firearms offenses, and wire fraud related to illegally obtaining COVID-19 pandemic relief funds.

    Savage was charged with and convicted of conspiring to distribute at least 1,000 kilograms of marijuana. Savage is also known as “Sav” and “Savdripp.”

    According to court documents and trial testimony, Third World Mob members brought hundreds of pounds of marijuana into Ohio from other states like California and Georgia to sell in central Ohio. They used U-Haul trucks and rental cars to move the drugs.  Coconspirators used rental houses or houses leased or owned in other individuals’ names as “stash houses” or “trap houses” to facilitate the drug trafficking and to store significant amounts of cash from the drug proceeds.

    For example, in August 2019, Abate and others possessed a suitcase with approximately $940,000 in cash in it in a house on Phlox Avenue in Blacklick.

    During a November 2022 search of a residence on Chapel Stone Road in Blacklick, law enforcement officials found Abate and two of his co-conspirators, along with more than 700 kilograms of marijuana and three firearms.

    Third World Mob leaders and members used violence and the threat of violence to maintain authority over their drug trafficking.

    Surveillance video presented at trial showed Abate, a convicted felon, shooting a man at a restaurant in Columbus. Jurors also heard testimony about numerous shootings, a pistol-whipping, and other acts of intimidation.

    Abate was also convicted of wire fraud for falsely applying for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, fraudulently claiming that he had been a self-employed landscaper during the time he trafficked drugs.

    In total, seven members of the Third World Mob have been charged federally since 2021. Fellow member Menelik Solomon pleaded guilty in November 2023 and was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison. Coconspirator Teddy Asefa entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and wire fraud just prior to trial. Another defendant stood trial with Abate and Savage and was acquitted of the single obstruction of justice charge against him.

    Kenneth L. Parker, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio; Elena Iatarola, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cincinnati Division; Orville O. Greene, Special Agent in Charge, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Detroit; and Franklin County Sheriff Dallas Baldwin announced the verdict. U.S. Attorney Parker recognized the assistance from the Columbus, Whitehall and Tucson, Arizona, police departments and the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation. Assistant United States Attorneys Elizabeth A. Geraghty and S. Courter Shimeall represented the United States in this case.

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    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Cincinnati Man Sentenced to More Than 13 Years in Prison for Sex Trafficking Missing Teen

    Source: US FBI

    CINCINNATI – A Cincinnati man was sentenced in federal court here today to 162 months in prison for sex trafficking a missing teen girl.

    As part of his conviction, Payton Jamar Brown, 26, was ordered to pay nearly $58,000 in restitution to the minor victim and forfeit his home on Niagara Street in Cincinnati. Proceeds of the sale of his forfeited home will be paid to Brown’s victim as restitution.

    According to court documents, from June until October 2022 and again in February 2023, Brown sex trafficked the teenaged girl.

    Brown met the victim online and began a relationship with her. The victim began to reside with Brown, who created prostitution advertisements of her. Brown would transport the victim to hotels for prostitution dates that he had arranged. Brown arranged at least 40 prostitution dates in this timeframe and collected the proceeds from the victim.

    In October 2022, Colerain police officers responded to Brown’s residence and recovered the victim, who was subsequently taken to a juvenile facility in another state.

    In February 2023, the juvenile escaped the facility and messaged Brown on Instagram to pick her up. Brown drove interstate to pick up the victim and her friend and bring them to his residence. Brown again created a prostitution advertisement of the victim and arranged sexual encounters with other men for money.

    Throughout his time with the victim, Brown would regularly engage in sex acts with the minor and record those acts with a cell phone. He would then sell the photos and videos to others online.

    Brown was arrested by the FBI in February 2023. He pleaded guilty in October 2023.

    Kenneth L. Parker, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio; Elena Iatarola, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cincinnati Division; Colerain Township Police Chief Edwin C. Cordie III; and members of the Regional Electronics and Computer Investigations (RECI) task force announced the sentence imposed today by U.S. District Judge Douglas R. Cole. Assistant United States Attorney Kyle J. Healey is representing the United States in this case.

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    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Former Columbus Police Officer Pleads Guilty to Stealing Cocaine From Crime Scenes, Police Evidence Room

    Source: US FBI

    COLUMBUS, Ohio – A former Columbus police officer pleaded guilty in federal court here today to crimes involving more than 10 kilograms of cocaine and money laundering.

    Joel M. Mefford, 35, of London, Ohio, pleaded guilty to two counts of possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, one count of possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, and one count of money laundering.

    According to court documents, Mefford was a Columbus police officer assigned to investigate drug crimes. On three occasions between February and April 2020, Mefford worked with another officer to steal and traffic cocaine.

    In February 2020, Mefford and the other officer were investigating a drug crime and unlawfully gained access to a detached garage belonging to the subject of the investigation. Without a warrant, they entered the garage and discovered two kilograms of cocaine in the rafters. They unlawfully seized one of the kilograms and left the other to be found during the execution of a search warrant the next morning. The other officer gave the stolen narcotics to another individual to sell.

    Similarly, in February and March 2020, Mefford and the other officer were investigating drug-trafficking activity at houses on Ambleside Drive and Kilbourne Avenue in Columbus. On March 7, 2020, the officers took a bag containing multiple kilograms of cocaine from the house on Ambleside Drive and arrested an individual there. They then traveled to the house on Kilbourne Avenue and removed a kilogram of cocaine. That same day, Mefford turned in one kilogram of cocaine to evidence, and the officers stole the other kilograms to be sold.

    In April 2020, Mefford and the other officer stole between 10 and 20 kilograms of cocaine from the Columbus police property room and replaced it with fake cocaine. Mefford transported the stolen cocaine in a police cruiser and the other officer later gave the drugs to another individual to sell. The drug proceeds were then given to the other officer, who provided Mefford his cut. Mefford personally received a total of approximately $130,000 from cocaine sales.

    Mefford deposited more than $72,000 of the cash derived from the cocaine sales into his personal bank account.

    Possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine is punishable by at least 10 years and up to life in prison. Possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine carries a potential penalty of five to 40 years in prison. Money laundering is punishable by up to 10 years in prison. Congress sets the minimum and maximum statutory sentences. Sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the Court at a future hearing based on the advisory sentencing guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Kenneth L. Parker, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio; and Elena Iatarola, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cincinnati Division, announced the plea entered today before U.S. District Judge Edmund A. Sargus Jr.

    Assistant United States Attorneys Peter K. Glenn-Applegate and Elizabeth A. Geraghty are representing the United States in this case.

    The case was investigated by the FBI’s Southern Ohio Public Corruption Task Force, which includes special agents and officers from the FBI, Ohio Attorney General’s Bureau of Criminal Investigation, the Ohio Auditor of State’s Office and the Columbus Division of Police.

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    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: BLM Activist Sentenced to Prison for Wire Fraud and Money Laundering

    Source: US FBI

    TOLEDO, Ohio – Sir Maejor Page, 35, of Toledo, has been sentenced to 42 months in prison by U.S. District Judge Jeffrey Helmick after a jury convicted him of wire fraud and money laundering for defrauding donors of more than $450,000 that they collectively gave to his nonprofit “Black Lives Matter of Greater Atlanta” (BLM of Greater Atlanta) based on Page’s false representations. He was also ordered to pay a $400 special assessment fee.

    Page continued to collect donations to his purported social justice charity through the organization’s Facebook page even after its tax-exempt status was revoked for failure to submit IRS Form 990 for three consecutive years.  He regularly posted content to Facebook about social and racial issues to give his nonprofit the appearance of legitimacy, despite no longer being tax-exempt. He also used Facebook to message privately with users, and he falsely represented that their donations would be used to “fight for George Floyd” and the “movement.” As a result, approximately 18,000 people donated to the BLM of Greater Atlanta charity through its Facebook account, which Page administered.

    Page used the donations to BLM for his own personal benefit. He purchased entertainment, hotel rooms, clothing, firearms, and a property that he intended to use as his personal residence. He attempted to conceal the purchase of the property by using the name “Hi Frequency Ohio” and asked the seller to sign a nondisclosure agreement that would have prevented the seller from listing Page as the actual buyer.

    “Mr. Page took advantage of a cause meant to fight social injustices, using it instead to line his own pockets with thousands of dollars of donations,” said U.S. Attorney Rebecca C. Lutzko for the Northern District of Ohio. “People donate their hard-earned money to support causes they believe in, and when a fraudster like Page comes along and tries to get away with a fake charity scheme, it hurts legitimate nonprofit organizations that rely on the generosity of others to advance their missions and make positive change in the world. This Office will hold accountable those who try to profit by scamming unsuspecting people out of their money like Page did here.”

    “The FBI will aggressively investigate individuals, like Sir Maejor Page, who engage in fraudulent charity schemes at the expense of the American public,” said FBI Cleveland Special Agent in Charge Greg Nelsen.  “Page is a calculating criminal who willingly conspired to steal hundreds of thousands of dollars through the trusting public. Today’s sentence holds him accountable and demonstrates that the FBI will steadfastly pursue perpetrators who target American citizens.”

    This case was investigated by the FBI Cleveland Division and prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Gene Crawford and Rob Melching.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Army Soldier Sentenced to 14 Years in Prison For Attempting to Assist ISIS to Conduct Deadly Ambush on U.S. Troops

    Source: US FBI

    U.S. Army Private First Class Provided Tactical Guidance in Attempt to Help ISIS Attack and Murder U.S. Service Members in the Middle East

    Cole Bridges, also known as Cole Gonzales, 24, of Stow, Ohio, was sentenced to 168 months in prison followed by 10 years of supervised release for attempting to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization and attempting to murder U.S. military service members, based on his efforts to assist the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to attack and kill U.S. soldiers in the Middle East.

    Bridges pleaded guilty to terrorism charges on June 14, 2023. According to court documents, Bridges joined the U.S. Army in approximately September 2019 and was assigned as a cavalry scout in the Third Infantry Division based in Fort Stewart, Georgia. Before he joined the Army, beginning in at least 2019, Bridges began researching and consuming online propaganda promoting jihadists and their violent ideology, and began to express his support for ISIS and jihad on social media. In or about October 2020, approximately one year after joining the Army, Bridges began communicating with an FBI online covert employee (the OCE), who was posing as an ISIS supporter in contact with ISIS fighters in the Middle East. During these communications, Bridges expressed his frustration with the U.S. military and his desire to aid ISIS. Bridges then provided training and guidance to purported ISIS fighters who were planning attacks, including advice about potential targets in New York City. Bridges also provided the OCE with portions of a U.S. Army training manual and guidance about military combat tactics, with the understanding that the materials would be used by ISIS in future attack planning.

    In or about December 2020, Bridges began to supply the OCE with instructions for the purported ISIS fighters on how to attack U.S. forces in the Middle East. Among other things, Bridges diagrammed specific military maneuvers intended to help ISIS fighters maximize the lethality of future attacks on U.S. troops. Bridges also provided advice about the best way to fortify an ISIS encampment to ambush U.S. Special Forces, including by wiring certain buildings with explosives to kill the U.S. troops. Then, in January 2021, Bridges provided the OCE with a video of himself in his U.S. Army body armor standing in front of a flag often used by ISIS fighters and making a gesture symbolic of support for ISIS. Approximately one week later, Bridges sent a second video in which Bridges, using a voice manipulator, narrated a propaganda speech in support of the anticipated ambush by ISIS on U.S. troops.

    The FBI’s New York Joint Terrorism Task Force investigated the case, with valuable assistance provided by the FBI field offices in Washington, Atlanta, and Cleveland; U.S. Army Counterintelligence, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Georgia, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, and U.S. Army Third Infantry Division.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sam Adelsberg and Matthew Hellman for the Southern District of New York prosecuted the case, with assistance from Trial Attorney Michael Dittoe of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Bryan County Resident Pleads Guilty to Assault with Intent to Commit Murder

    Source: US FBI

    MUSKOGEE, OKLAHOMA – The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Oklahoma announced that Jason Edward Lewis, age 48, of Kenefic, Oklahoma, entered a guilty plea to one count of Assault with Intent to Commit Murder in Indian Country.

    The Superseding Indictment alleged that on or about July 10, 2024, Lewis assaulted an individual with intent to commit murder.  The crime occurred in Bryan County, within the boundaries of the Choctaw Nation Reservation, in the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

    The charges arose from an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Choctaw Nation Lighthorse Police, and the Bryan County Sheriff’s Office.

    The Honorable D. Edward Snow, U.S. Magistrate Judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, accepted the plea and ordered the completion of a presentence investigation report.  Lewis will remain in the custody of the United States Marshals Service pending sentencing.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Rachel Geizura represented the United States.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Adair County Resident Sentenced for Child Abuse

    Source: US FBI

    MUSKOGEE, OKLAHOMA – The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Oklahoma announced that Brian Keith Bowen Jr., age 26, of Stilwell, Oklahoma, was sentenced to 48 months in prison for one count of Child Abuse in Indian Country.

    The charges arose from an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Cherokee Nation Marshals Service.

    On May 22, 2024, Bowen pleaded guilty to the charge.  According to investigators, between April and May of 2023, Bowen maliciously harmed a child entrusted in his care.  Bowen’s mistreatment came to light on May 2, 2023, when medical professionals treating the child observed numerous injuries, including fading bruises, petechiae, and a spiral bone fracture consistent with child abuse.

    The crimes occurred in Adair County, within the boundaries of the Cherokee Nation Reservation, in the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

    The Honorable Ronald A. White, Chief U.S. District Judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, presided over the hearing.  Bowen will remain in the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service pending transportation to a designated United States Bureau of Prisons facility to serve a non-paroleable sentence of incarceration.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Jessie K. Pippin represented the United States.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Adair County Resident Pleads Guilty to Involuntary Manslaughter

    Source: US FBI

    MUSKOGEE, OKLAHOMA – The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Oklahoma announced that Jade Larae Duncan, age 27, of Stilwell, Oklahoma, entered a guilty plea of one count of Involuntary Manslaughter in Indian Country.

    The Indictment alleged that on December 2, 2022, Duncan unlawfully killed an individual in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony and in the commission in an unlawful manner, without due caution and circumspection, while driving under the influence of alcohol and departing the roadway into a creek bed.  The crime occurred in Adair County, within the boundaries of the Cherokee Nation Reservation, in the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

    The charge arose from an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, and the Adair County Sheriff’s Department.

    The Honorable Gerald L. Jackson, U.S. Magistrate Judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, accepted the plea and ordered the completion of a presentence investigation report.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Patrick M. Flanigan, Lewis M. Reagan, and T. Cameron McEwen represented the United States.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Medford Man Sentenced to Federal Prison for Role in Fatal Fentanyl Overdose of a Teenager

    Source: US FBI

    MEDFORD, Ore.—A Medford man was sentenced to federal prison Monday for distributing fentanyl that caused the overdose death of a local teenager.

    John Rocha, 31, was sentenced to 78 months in federal prison and four years’ supervised release.

    According to court documents, on September 7, 2021, officers from the Medford Police Department responded to a report of an overdose death of a local 17-year-old high school student. Investigators soon learned that the teenager had taken counterfeit Percocet pills containing fentanyl. Within days, investigators identified Rocha as the victim’s fourth-level drug supplier and, when confronted by law enforcement, he admitted to having recently sold counterfeit pills.

    On February 3, 2022, a federal grand jury in Medford returned a five-count indictment charging Rocha and four others with distributing fentanyl, possessing with intent to distribute fentanyl, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.

    On February 20, 2024, Rocha pleaded guilty to distributing fentanyl.

    This case was investigated by the FBI and the Medford Area Drug and Gang Enforcement Team (MADGE). It was prosecuted by Marco A. Boccato, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Oregon.

    MADGE is a multi-jurisdictional narcotics task force that identifies, disrupts, and dismantles local, multi-state, and international drug trafficking organizations using an intelligence-driven, multi-agency prosecutor-supported approach. MADGE is supported by the Oregon-Idaho High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) and is composed of members from the Medford Police Department, the Jackson County Sheriff and District Attorney’s Offices, the Jackson County Community Corrections, FBI, and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI).

    The Oregon-Idaho HIDTA program is an Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) sponsored counterdrug grant program that coordinates with and provides funding resources to multi-agency drug enforcement initiatives.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: AI Data Security: Best Practices for Securing Data Used to Train & Operate AI Systems

    News In Brief – Source: US Computer Emergency Readiness Team

    Executive summary

    This Cybersecurity Information Sheet (CSI) provides essential guidance on securing data used in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) systems. It also highlights the importance of data security in ensuring the accuracy and integrity of AI outcomes and outlines potential risks arising from data integrity issues in various stages of AI development and deployment.

    This CSI provides a brief overview of the AI system lifecycle and general best practices to secure data used during the development, testing, and operation of AI-based systems. These best practices include the incorporation of techniques such as data encryption, digital signatures, data provenance tracking, secure storage, and trust infrastructure. This CSI also provides an in-depth examination of three significant areas of data security risks in AI systems: data supply chain, maliciously modified (“poisoned”) data, and data drift. Each section provides a detailed description of the risks and the corresponding best practices to mitigate those risks. 

    This guidance is intended primarily for organizations using AI systems in their operations, with a focus on protecting sensitive, proprietary, or mission critical data. The principles outlined in this information sheet provide a robust foundation for securing AI data and ensuring the reliability and accuracy of AI-driven outcomes.

    This document was authored by the National Security Agency’s Artificial Intelligence Security Center (AISC), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), the New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ), and the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK). 

    The goals of this guidance are to: 

    1. Raise awareness of the potential risks related to data security in the development, testing, and deployment of AI systems;
    2. Provide guidance and best practices for securing AI data across various stages of the AI lifecycle, with an in-depth description of the three aforementioned significant areas of data security risks; and
    3. Establish a strong foundation for data security in AI systems by promoting the adoption of robust data security measures and encouraging proactive risk mitigation strategies.

    Download the PDF version of this report: 

    Introduction

    The data resources used during the development, testing, and operation of an AI1 system are a critical component of the AI supply chain; therefore, the data resources must be protected and secured. In its Data Management Lexicon, [1] the Intelligence Community (IC) defines Data Security as “The ability to protect data resources from unauthorized discovery, access, use, modification, and/or destruction…. Data Security is a component of Data Protection.” 

    Data security is paramount in the development and deployment of AI systems. Therefore, it is a key component of strategies developed to safeguard and manage the overall security of AI-based systems. Successful data management strategies must ensure that the data has not been tampered with at any point throughout the entire AI system lifecycle; is free from malicious, unwanted, and unauthorized content; and does not have unintentional duplicative or anomalous information. Note that AI data security depends on robust, fundamental cybersecurity protection for all datasets used in designing, developing, deploying, operating, and maintaining AI systems and the ML models that enable them.

    Audience and scope

    This CSI outlines potential risks in AI systems stemming from data security issues that arise during different phases of an AI deployment, and it introduces recommended protocols to mitigate these risks. This guidance builds upon the NSA’s joint guidance on Deploying AI Systems Securely [2] and delves deeper into securing the data used to train and operate AI-based systems. This guidance is primarily developed for organizations that use AI systems in their day-to-day operations, including the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), National Security System (NSS) owners, Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies, and critical infrastructure owners and operators. Implementing these mitigations can help secure AI-enabled systems and protect proprietary, sensitive, and/or mission critical data.

    Securing data throughout the AI system lifecycle

    Data security is a critical enabler that spans all phases of the AI system lifecycle. ML models learn their decision logic from data, so an attacker who can manipulate the data can also manipulate the logic of an AI-based system. In the AI Risk Management Framework (RMF) [3], the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines six major stages in the lifecycle of AI systems, starting from Plan & Design and progressing all the way to Operate & Monitor. The following table highlights relevant data security factors for each stage of the AI lifecycle: 

    Table 1: The AI System Lifecycle with key dimensions, necessary ongoing assessments, focus areas for data security, and particular data security risks covered in this CSI. [3] 
    AI Lifecycle Stage Key Dimensions Test, Evaluation, Verification, & Validation (TEVV) Potential Focus Areas for Data Security Particular Data Security Risks Covered in this CSI
    1) Plan & Design Application Context Audit & Impact Assessment Incorporating data security measures from inception, designing robust security protocols, threat modeling, and including privacy by design Data supply chain
    2) Collect & Process Data Data & Input Internal & External Validation Ensuring data integrity, authenticity, encryption, access controls, data minimization, anonymization, and secure data transfer Data supply chain,
    maliciously modified data
    3) Build & Use Model AI Model Model Testing Protecting data from tampering, ensuring data quality and privacy (including differential privacy and secure multi-party computation when appropriate and possible), securing model training, and operating environments   Data supply chain,
    maliciously modified data
    4) Verify & Validate AI Model Model Testing Performing comprehensive security testing, identifying and mitigating risks, validating data integrity, adversarial testing, and formal verification when appropriate and possible Data supply chain,
    maliciously modified data
    5) Deploy & Use Task & Output Integration, Compliance Testing, Validation Implementing strict access controls, zero-trust infrastructure, secure data transmission and storage, secure API endpoints, and monitoring for anomalous behavior Data supply chain,
    maliciously modified data,
    data drift
    6) Operate & Monitor Application Context Audit & Impact Assessment Conducting continuous risk assessments, monitoring for data breaches, deleting data securely, complying with regulations, incident response planning, and regular security auditing Data supply chain,
    maliciously modified data, data drift

    Throughout the AI system lifecycle, securing data is paramount to maintaining information integrity and system reliability. Starting with the initial Plan & Design phase, carefully plan data protection measures to provide proactive mitigations of potential risks. In the Collect & Process Data phase, data must be carefully analyzed, labeled, sanitized, and protected from breaches and tampering. Securing data in the Build & Use Model phase helps ensure models are trained on reliably sourced, accurate, and representative information. In the Verify & Validate phase, comprehensive and thorough testing of AI models, derived from training data, can identify security flaws and enable their mitigation. 

    Note that Verification & Validation is necessary each time new data or user feedback is introduced into the model; therefore, that data also needs to be handled with the same security standards as AI training data. Implementing strict access controls protects data from unauthorized access, especially in the Deploy & Use phase. Lastly, continuous data risk assessments in the Operate & Monitor phase are necessary to adapt to evolving threats. Neglecting these practices can lead to data corruption, compromised models, data leaks, and non-compliance, emphasizing the critical importance of robust data security at every phase.

    Best practices to secure data for AI-based systems

    The following list contains recommended practical steps that system owners can take to better protect the data used to build and operate their AI-based systems, whether running on premises or in the cloud. For more details on general cybersecurity best practices, see also NIST SP 800-53, “Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations.” [33]

    1. Source reliable data and track data provenance
    Verify data sources use trusted, reliable, and accurate data for training and operating AI systems. To the extent possible, only use data from authoritative sources. Implement provenance tracking to enable the tracing of data origins, and log the path that data follows through an AI system. [7],[8],[9] Incorporate a secure provenance database that is cryptographically signed and maintains an immutable, append-only ledger of data changes. This facilitates data provenance tracking, helps identify sources of maliciously modified data, and helps ensure that no single entity can undetectably manipulate the data.
    2. Verify and maintain data integrity during storage and transport
    Maintaining data integrity2 is an essential component to preserve the accuracy, reliability, and trustworthiness of AI data. [4] Use checksums and cryptographic hashes to verify that data has not been altered or tampered with during storage or transmission. Generating such unique codes for AI datasets enables the detection of unauthorized changes or corruption, safeguarding the information’s authenticity.

    3. Employ digital signatures to authenticate trusted data revisions
    Digital signatures help ensure data integrity and prevent tampering by third parties. Adopt quantum-resistant digital signature standards [5][6] to authenticate and verify datasets used during AI model training, fine tuning, alignment, reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), and/or other post-training processes that affect model parameters. Original versions of the data should be cryptographically signed, and any subsequent data revisions should be signed by the person who made the change. Organizations are encouraged to use trusted certificate authorities to verify this process.
    4. Leverage trusted infrastructure
    Use a trusted computing environment that leverages Zero Trust architecture. [10] Provide secure enclaves for data processing and keep sensitive information protected and unaltered during computations. This approach fosters a secure foundation for data privacy and security in AI data workflows by isolating sensitive operations and mitigating risks of tampering. Trusted computing infrastructure supports the integrity of data processes, reduces risks associated with unverified or altered data, and ultimately creates a more robust and transparent AI ecosystem. Trusted environments are essential for AI applications where data accuracy directly impacts their decision-making processes.
    5. Classify data and use access controls
    Categorize data using a classification system based on sensitivity and required protection measures. [11] This process enables organizations to apply appropriate security controls to different data types. Classifying data enables the enforcement of robust protection measures like stringent encryption and access controls. [33] In general, the output of AI systems should be classified at the same level as the input data (rather than creating a separate set of guardrails).
    6. Encrypt data
    Adopt advanced encryption protocols proportional to the organizational data protection level. This includes securing data at rest, in transit, and during processing. AES-256 encryption is the de facto industry standard and is considered resistant to quantum computing threats. [12],[13] Use protocols, such as TLS with AES-256 or post-quantum encryption, for data in transit. Refer to NIST SP 800-52r2, “Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations” [14] for more details.
    7. Store data securely
    Store data in certified storage devices that enforce NIST FIPS 140-3 [15] compliance, ensuring that the cryptographic modules used to encrypt the data provide high-level security against advanced intrusion attempts. Note that Security Level 3 (defined in NIST FIPS 140-2 [16]) provides robust data protection; however, evaluate and determine the appropriate level of security based on organizational needs and risk assessments.
    8. Leverage privacy-preserving techniques 
    There are several privacy-preserving techniques [17] that can be leveraged for increased data security. Note that there may be practical limitations to their implementation due to computational cost.

    • Data depersonalization techniques (e.g., data masking [18]) involve replacing sensitive data with inauthentic but realistic information that maintains the distributions of values throughout the dataset. This enables AI systems to utilize datasets without exposing sensitive information, reducing the impact of data breaches and supporting secure data sharing and collaboration. When possible, use data masking to facilitate AI model training and development without compromising sensitive information (e.g., personally identifiable information [PII]).
    • Differential privacy is a framework that provides a mathematical guarantee quantifying the level of privacy of a dataset or query. It requires a pre-specified privacy budget for the level of noise added to the data, but there are tradeoffs between protecting the training data from membership inference techniques and target task accuracy. Refer to [17] for further details.
    • Decentralized learning techniques (e.g., federated learning [19]) permit AI system training over multiple local datasets with limited sharing of data among local instances. An aggregator model incorporates the results of the distributed models, limiting access on the local instance to the larger training dataset. Secure multi-party computation is recommended for training and inferencing processes.

    9. Delete data securely
    Prior to repurposing or decommissioning any functional drives used for AI data storage and processing, erase them using a secure deletion method such as cryptographic erase, block erase, or data overwrite. Refer to NIST SP 800-88, “Guidelines for Media Sanitization,” [20] for guidance on appropriate deletion methods.
    10. Conduct ongoing data security risk assessments
    Conduct ongoing risk assessments using industry-standard frameworks, such as the NIST SP 800-3r2, Risk Management Framework (RMF) [4][21], and the NIST AI 100-1, Artificial Intelligence RMF [3]. These assessments should evaluate the AI data security landscape, identify risks, and prioritize actions to minimize security incidents. Continuously improve data security measures to keep pace with evolving threats and vulnerabilities, learn from security incidents, stay up to date with emerging technologies, and maintain a robust security posture. 

    Data supply chain – risks and mitigations

    Relevant AI Lifecycle stages: 1) Plan & Design; 2) Collect & Process Data; 3) Build & Use Model; 4) Verify & Validate; 5) Deploy & Use; 6) Operate & Monitor

    Developing and deploying secure and reliable AI systems requires understanding potential risks and methods of introducing inaccurate or maliciously modified (a.k.a. “poisoned”) data into the system. In short, the security of AI systems depends on thorough verification of training data and proactive measures to detect and prevent the introduction of inaccurate material.

    Threats can stem from large-scale data collected and curated by third parties, as well as from data that is not sufficiently protected after ingestion. Data collected and/or curated by a third party may contain inaccurate information, either unintentionally or through malicious intent. Inaccurate material can compromise not only models trained using that data, but also any additional models that rely on compromised models as a foundation.  

    It is crucial, therefore, to verify the integrity of the training data used when building an AI system. Organizations that utilize third-party data must take appropriate measures to ensure that: 1) the data is not compromised upon ingestion; and 2) the data cannot be compromised after it has been incorporated into the AI system. As such, both data curators and data consumers should follow the best practices for digital signatures, data integrity, and data provenance that are described in detail above.

    General risks for data consumers3 

    The use of web-scale databases includes all of the risks outlined earlier, and one cannot simply assume that these datasets are clean, accurate, and free of malicious content. Third-party models trained on web-scraped data used to train a model for downstream tasks could also affect the model’s learning process and result in behavior that was unintended by the AI system designer.

    From the moment data is ingested for use with AI systems, the data acquirer must secure it against insider threats and malicious network activity to prevent unauthorized modification. 

    Mitigation strategies: 

    • Dataset verification: Before ingest, the consumer or curator should verify, as much as possible, that the dataset to be ingested is free of malicious or inaccurate material. Any detected abnormalities should be addressed, and suspicious data should not be stored. The dataset verification process should include a digital signature of the dataset at time of ingestion.
    • Content credentials: Use content credentials to track the provenance of media and other data. Content credentials are “metadata that are secured cryptographically and allow creators the ability to add information about themselves or their creative process, or both, directly to media content…. Content Credentials securely bind essential metadata to a media file that can track its origin(s), any edits made, and/or what was used to create or modify the content…. This metadata alone does not allow a consumer to determine whether a piece of content is ‘true,’ but rather provides contextual information that assists in determining the authenticity of the content.” [24]
    • Foundation model assurances: In the case where a consumer is not ingesting a dataset but a foundation model trained by another party, the developers of the foundation model need to be able to provide assurances regarding the data and sources used and certify that their training data did not contain any known compromised data. Take care to track the training data used in various model lineages. Exercise caution before using a model without such assurances.
    • Require certification: Data consumers should strongly consider requiring a formal certification from dataset and model providers, attesting that their systems are free from known compromised data before using third-party data and/or foundation models.
    • Secure storage: After ingest, data needs to be stored in a database that adheres to the best practices for digital signatures, data integrity, and data provenance that are described in detail above. Note that an append-only cryptographically signed database should be used where feasible, but there may be a need to delete older material that is no longer relevant. Each time a data element is updated (e.g., resized, cropped, flipped, etc.) for augmentation purposes in a non-temporary fashion, then the updated data should be stored as a new entry with documented changes. The database’s certificate should be verified at the time the database is accessed for a training run. If the database does not pass the certificate check, abort the training and conduct a comprehensive database audit to discover any data modifications. 

    2023 investigations by various industry professionals explored low-resource methods for introducing malicious or inaccurate material into web-scale datasets, and potential strategies to mitigate this risk.  [29] These vulnerabilities depend on the fact that curators or collectors do not have control over the data, as seen in cases of datasets curated by third parties (e.g., LAION) or datasets that are continually updated and released (e.g., Wikipedia). 

    Risk: Curated web-scale datasets

    Curated AI datasets (e.g., LAION-2B or COYO-700M) are vulnerable to a type of technique known as split-view poisoning. This risk arises because these datasets often contain data hosted on domains that may have expired or are no longer actively maintained by their original owners. In such cases, anyone who purchases these expired domains gains control over the content hosted on them. This situation creates an opportunity for malicious actors to modify or replace the data that the curated list points to, potentially introducing inaccurate or misleading information into the dataset. In many instances, it is possible to purchase enough control of a dataset to conduct effective poisoning for roughly $1,000 USD. In some cases, effective techniques can cost as little as $60 USD (e.g., COYO-700M), making this a viable threat from low-resource threat actors. 

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Raw data hashes: Data curators should attach a cryptographic hash to all raw data referenced in the dataset. This will enable follow-on data consumers to verify that the data has not changed since it was added to the list.
    • Hash verification: Data consumers should incorporate a hash check at time of download in order to detect any changes made to it, and the downloader should discard any data that does not pass the hash check.
    • Periodic checks: Curators should periodically scrape the data themselves to verify that the data has not been modified. If any changes are detected, the curator should take appropriate steps to ensure the data’s integrity.
    • Verifying data: Curators should verify that any changed data is clean and free from inaccurate or malicious material. If the content of the data has been altered in any way, the curator should either remove it from their list or flag it for further review.
    • Certification by curators: Since the data supply chain begins with the curators, the certification process must start there as well. To the best of their ability, curators should be able to certify that, at the time of publication, the dataset contains no malicious or inaccurate material. 

    Risk: Collected web-scale datasets

    Collected web-scale datasets (e.g., Wikipedia) are vulnerable to frontrunning poisoning techniques. Frontrunning poisoning occurs when an actor injects malicious examples in a short time window before websites with crowd-sourced content collect a snapshot of their data. Wikipedia in particular conducts twice-monthly snapshots of their data and publishes these snapshots for people to download. Since the snapshots happen at known times, it is possible for malicious actors to edit pages close enough to the snapshot time so that malicious edits will be captured and published before they can be discovered and corrected. Industry analysis demonstrated potential malicious actors would be able to successfully poison as much as 6.5% of Wikipedia. [29]

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Test & verify web-scale datasets: Be cautious when using web-scale datasets that are vulnerable to frontrunning poisoning. Check that the data hasn’t been manipulated, and only use snapshots verified by a trusted party.
    • (For web-scale data collectors) Randomize or lengthen snapshots: Collectors such as Wikipedia should defend against actors making malicious edits ahead of a planned snapshot by:
    1. Randomizing the snapshot order.
    2. Freezing edits to content long enough for edits to go through review before releasing the snapshot.

      These mitigations focus on increasing the amount of time a malicious actor must maintain control of the data for it to be included in the published snapshot. Any reasonable methods that increase the time a malicious actor must control the data are also recommended. 

      Note that these mitigations are limited since they rely on trusted curators who can detect malicious edits. It is more difficult to defend against subtle edits (e.g., attempts to insert hidden watermarks) that appear valid to human reviewers but impact machine understanding.

    Risk: Web-crawled datasets 

    Web-crawled datasets present a unique intersection of the risks discussed above. Since web-crawled datasets are substantially less curated than other web-scale datasets, they bring increased risk. There are no trusted curators to detect malicious edits. There are no original curated views to which cryptographic hashes can be attached. The unfortunate reality is that “updates to a web page have no realistic bound on the delta between versions which might act as a signal for attaching trust.” [29]

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Consensus approaches: Data consumers using web-crawled datasets should rely on consensus-based approaches, since notional determinations of which domains to trust are ad-hoc and insufficient. For example, an AI developer could choose to only trust an image-caption pair when it appears on many different websites to reduce susceptibility to poisoning techniques, since a malicious actor would have to poison a sufficiently large number of websites to be successful.
    • Data curation: Ultimately, it is incumbent on organizations to ensure malicious or inaccurate material is not present in the data they use. If an organization does not have resources to conduct the necessary due diligence, then the use of web-crawled datasets is not recommended until some sort of trust infrastructure can be implemented.

    Final note on web-scale datasets and data poisoning

    Both split-view and frontrunning poisoning are reasonably straightforward for a malicious actor to execute, since they do not require particularly sophisticated methodology. These poisoning techniques should be considered viable threats by anyone looking to incorporate web-scale data into their AI systems. The danger here comes not only from directly using compromised data, but also from using models which may themselves have been trained on compromised data. 

    Ultimately, data poisoning must be addressed from a supply chain perspective by those who train and fine-tune AI models. Proper supply chain integrity and security management (i.e., selecting reliable model providers and verifying the legitimacy of the models used) can reduce the risk of data poisoning and system compromise. The most reliable providers are those who assure that they do everything possible to prevent the influence and distribution of poisoned data and models. [34] 

    Every effort must be made by those building foundation models to filter out malicious and inaccurate data. Foundation models are evolving rapidly, and filtering out inaccurate, unauthorized, and malicious training data is an active area of research, particularly at web-scale. As such, is currently impractical to prescribe precise methods for doing so; it is a best-effort endeavor. Ideally, data curators and foundation model providers should be able to attest to their filtering methods and provide evidence (e.g. test results) of their effectiveness. Likewise, if possible, downstream model consumers should include a review of the security claims as part of their security processes before accepting a foundation model for use. 

    Maliciously modified data – risks and mitigations

    Relevant AI Lifecycle stages: 2) Collect & Process Data; 3) Build & Use Model; 4) Verify & Validate; 5) Deploy & Use; 6) Operate & Monitor

    Maliciously modified data presents a significant threat to the accuracy and integrity of AI systems. Deliberate manipulation of data can result in inaccurate outcomes, poor decisions, and compromised security. Note that there are also risks associated with unintentional data errors and duplications that can affect the security and performance of AI systems. Challenges like adversarial machine learning threats, statistical bias, and inaccurate information can impact the overall security of AI-driven outcomes.

    Risk: Adversarial Machine Learning threats

    Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) threats involve intentional, malicious attempts to deceive, manipulate, or disrupt AI systems. [7],[17],[22] Malicious actors employ data poisoning to corrupt the learning process, compromising the integrity of training datasets and leading to unreliable or malicious model behavior. Additionally, malicious actors may introduce adversarial examples into datasets that, while subtle, can evade correct classification, thereby undermining the model’s performance. Furthermore, sensitive information in training datasets can be indirectly extracted through techniques like model inversion4, posing significant data security risks.

    Mitigation Strategies:

    • Anomaly detection: Incorporate anomaly detection algorithms during data pre-processing to identify and remove malicious or suspicious data points before training. These algorithms can recognize statistically deviant patterns in the data, making it possible to isolate and eliminate poisoned inputs.
    • Data sanitization: Sanitize the training data by applying techniques like data filtering, sampling, and normalization. This helps reduce the impact of outliers, noisy data, and other potentially poisoned inputs, ensuring that models learn from high-quality, representative datasets. Perform sanitization on a regular basis, especially prior to each and every training, fine-tuning, or any other process that adjusts model parameters.
    • Secure training pipelines: Secure data collection, pre-processing, and training pipelines to prevent malicious actors from tampering with datasets or model parameters.
    • Ensemble methods / collaborative learning: Implement collaborative learning frameworks that combine an ensemble of multiple, distinct AI models to reach a consensus on output predictions. This approach can help counteract the impact of data poisoning, since malicious inputs may only affect a subset of the collaborative models, allowing the majority to maintain accuracy and reliability.
    • Data anonymization: Implement anonymization techniques to protect sensitive data attributes, keeping them confidential while allowing AI models to learn patterns and generate accurate predictions.

    Risk: Bad data statements

    Bad data statements5 [7][23], such as missing metadata, can significantly influence AI data security by introducing data integrity issues that can lead to faulty model performance. Error-free metadata provides valuable contextual information about the data, including its structure, purpose, and collection methods. When metadata is missing, it becomes difficult to interpret data accurately and draw meaningful conclusions. This situation can result in incomplete or inaccurate data representation, compromising AI system performance and reliability. If metadata is modified by a malicious actor, then the security of the AI system is also at risk.

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Metadata management: Implement strong data governance practices to help ensure metadata is well-documented, complete, accurate, and secured.
    • Metadata validation: Establish data validation processes to check the completeness and consistency of metadata before data is used for AI training.
    • Data enrichment: Use available resources, such as reference data and trusted third-party data, to supplement missing metadata and improve the overall quality of the training data.

    Risk: Statistical bias6 

    Robust data security and collection practices are key to mitigating statistical bias. Executive Order (EO) 14179 mandates that U.S. government entities “develop AI systems that are free from ideological bias or engineered social agendas.” [25] Note that “an AI system is said to be biased when it exhibits systematically inaccurate behavior.” [26] Statistical bias in AI systems can arise from artifacts present in training data that can lead to artificially slanted or inaccurate outcomes. Sampling biases or biases in data collection can affect the overall outcomes and performance of AI. Left unaddressed, statistical bias can degrade the accuracy and effectiveness of AI systems. 

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Regular training data audits: Regularly audit training data to detect, assess, and address potential issues that can result in systematically inaccurate AI systems.
    • Representative training data: Ensure that training data is representative of the totality of the information relevant to any given topic to reduce the risk of statistical bias. Also ensure that AI data is properly divided into training, development, and evaluation sets without overlap to properly measure statistical bias and other measures of performance.
    • Edge cases: Identify and mitigate edge cases that can cause models to malfunction.
    • Test and correct for statistical bias: Create a repository with instances of observed model output bias. Leverage that information to improve training data audits and with reinforcement learning to “undo” some of the measured bias.

    Risk: Data poisoning via inaccurate information

    One form of data poisoning (sometimes referred to as “disinformation” [27]) involves the intentional insertion of inaccurate or misleading information in AI training datasets, which can negatively impact AI system performance, outcomes, and decision-making processes. 

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Remove inaccurate information from training data: Identify and remove inaccurate or misleading information from AI datasets to the extent feasible.
    • Data provenance and verification: Implement provenance verification mechanisms during data collection to help ensure that only accurate and reliable data is used. This process can include methods such as cross-verification, fact-checking, source analysis, data provenance tracking, and content credentials.
    • Add more training data: Increasing the amount of non-malicious data makes training more robust against poisoned examples—provided that these poisoned examples are small in number. One way to do this is through data augmentation—the creation of artificial training set samples that are small variations of existing samples. The goal is to “outnumber” the poisoned samples so the model “forgets” them. Note that this mitigation can only be applied during training, and therefore does not apply to an already trained model. [28]
    • Data quality control: Perform quality control on data including detecting poisoned samples through integrity checks, statistical deviation, or pattern recognition. Proactively implement data quality controls during the training phase to prevent issues before they arise in production.

    Risk: Data duplications

    Unintended duplicate data elements [7] in training datasets can skew model performance and cause overfitting, reducing the AI model’s ability to generalize across a variety of real-world applications. Duplicates are not always exact; near-duplicates may contain minor differences like formatting, abbreviations, or errors, which makes detecting them more complex. Duplicate data often leads to inaccurate predictions, making the AI system less effective in real-world applications.

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Data deduplication: Implement deduplication techniques (such as fuzzy matching, hashing, clustering, etc.) to carefully identify and handle duplicates and near-duplicates in the data.

    Data drift – risks and mitigations

    Relevant AI Lifecycle stages: 5) Deploy & Use; 6) Operate & Monitor

    Data drift, or distribution shift, refers to changes in the underlying statistical properties of the input data to an operational AI system. Over time, the input data can become significantly different from the data originally used to train the model. [7],[8] Degradation caused by data drift is a natural and expected occurrence, and AI system developers and operators need to regularly update models to maintain accuracy and performance. Data drift ordinarily begins as small, seemingly insignificant degradations in model performance. Left unchecked, the degradation caused by data drift can snowball into substantial reductions in AI system accuracy and integrity that become increasingly difficult to correct. 

    It is crucial to distinguish between data drift and data poisoning attacks designed to affect an AI model. Continuous monitoring of system accuracy and performance provides important indicators based on the nature of the changes observed. If the changes are slow and gradual over time, it is more likely that the model is experiencing data drift. If the changes are abrupt and dramatic in one or more dimensions, it is more likely that an actor is trying to compromise the model. Cyber compromises often aim to manipulate the model’s performance quickly and significantly, leading to abrupt changes in the input data or model outputs.

    AI system operators and developers should employ a wide range of techniques for detecting and mitigating data drift, including data preprocessing, increasing dataset coverage of real-world scenarios, and adopting robust training and adaptation strategies. [30] Packages that automate dataset loading assist AI system developers in creating application-specific detection and mitigation techniques for data drift.

    There are many potential causes of data drift, including: 

    1. A change in the upstream data pipeline not represented in the model training data (e.g., the units of a particular data element change from miles to kilometers)
    2. The introduction of completely new data elements that the model had not previously seen (e.g., a new type of malware not recognized in the ML layer of an anti-virus product)
    3. A change in the context of how inputs and outputs are related (e.g., a change in organizational structure due to a merger or acquisition could lead to new data access patterns that might be misinterpreted as security threats by an AI system)

    The data associated with a given AI model should be regularly checked for any updates to help ensure the model still predicts as expected. [7],[8],[9] The interval for this update and check will depend on the particular AI system and application. For example, in high-stakes applications such as healthcare, early detection and mitigation of data drift are critical prior to patient impact. Thus, continuous monitoring of model performance with additional direct analysis of the input data is important in such applications. [30] 

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Data management: Employ a data management strategy in keeping with the best practices in this CSI to help ensure that it is easy to add and track new data elements for model training and adaptation. This management strategy enables identification of data elements causing drift for appropriate mitigation or action.
    • Data-quality testing: AI system developers should use data-quality assessment tools to assist in selecting and filtering data used for model training or adaptation. Understanding the current dataset and its impact on model behavior is critical to detecting data drift.
    • Input and output monitoring: Monitor the AI system inputs and outputs to verify the model is performing as expected. [9] Regularly update your model using current data. Utilize meaningful statistical methods that measure expected dataset metrics and compare the distribution of the training data to the test data to help determine if data drift is occurring. [7] 

    Data management tools and methods are currently an active area of research. However, data drift can be mitigated by incorporating application-specific data management protocols that include: continuous monitoring, retraining (regularly incorporating the latest data into the models), data cleansing (correcting errors or inconsistencies in the data), and using ensemble models (combining predictions of multiple models). Incorporation of a data management framework into the design of AI systems from the beginning is essential for improving the overall integrity and security posture. [31]

    Conclusion

    Data security is of paramount importance when developing and operating AI systems. As organizations in various sectors rely more and more on AI-driven outcomes, data security becomes crucial for maintaining accuracy, reliability, and integrity. The guidance provided in this CSI outlines a robust approach to securing AI data and addressing the risks associated with the data supply chain, malicious data, and data drift.

    Data security is an ever-evolving field, and continuous vigilance and adaptation are key to staying ahead of emerging threats and vulnerabilities. The best practices presented here encourage the highest standards of data security in AI while helping ensure the accuracy and integrity of AI-driven outcomes. By adopting these best practices and risk mitigation strategies, organizations can fortify their AI systems against potential threats and safeguard sensitive, proprietary, and mission critical data used in the development and operation of their AI systems. 

    References

    1 In this document, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the meaning set forth in 15 U.S.C. 9401(3): 
    “… a machine-based system that can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations, or decisions influencing real or virtual environments. AI systems use machine- and human-based inputs to:
      (A) Perceive real and virtual environments;
      (B) Take these perceptions and turn them into models through analysis in an automated manner; and
      (C) Use model inference to formulate options for information or action.”

    2 Data integrity is defined by the IC Data Management Lexicon [1] as “The degree to which data can be trusted due to its provenance, pedigree, lineage and conformance with all business rules regarding its relationship with other data. In the context of data movement, this is the degree to which data has verifiably not been changed unexpectedly by a person or NPE.”

    3 The term data consumers is defined as technical personnel (e.g. data scientists, engineers) who make use of data that they themselves did not produce or annotate to build and/or operate AI systems. 

    4 Model inversion refers to the process by which an attacker analyzes the output patterns of an AI system to reverse-engineer and uncover details about the training dataset, such as individual data points or patterns. This process can potentially expose confidential or proprietary information from the data that was used to train the AI models.

    5 “A data statement is a characterization of a dataset that provides context to allow developers and users to better understand how experimental results might generalize, how software might be appropriately deployed, and what biases might be reflected in systems built on the software.” [23] 

    6 “In technical systems, bias is most commonly understood and treated as a statistical phenomenon. Bias is an effect that deprives a statistical result of representativeness by systematically distorting it, as distinct from random error, which may distort on any one occasion but balances out on the average.” [26],[32] 

    Works cited

    [1] Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The Intelligence Community Data Management Lexicon. 2024. https://dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/IC_Data_Management_Lexicon.pdf   
    [2] National Security Agency et al. Deploying AI Systems Securely: Best Practices for Deploying Secure and Resilient AI Systems. 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Apr/15/2003439257/-1/-1/0/CSI-DEPLOYING-AI-SYSTEMS-SECURELY.PDF  
    [3] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST AI 100-1: Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0). 2023. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1  
    [4] NIST. NIST Special Publication 800-37 Rev. 2: Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems. 2018. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-37r2  
    [5] NIST. Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard. 2024. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204  
    [6] NIST. FIPS 205: Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard. 2024. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.205  
    [7] Bommasani, R. et al. On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models. arXiv:2108.07258v3. 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.07258v3  
    [8] Securing Artificial Intelligence (SAI); Data Supply Chain Security. ESTI GR SAI 002 V1.1.1. 2021. https://etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gr/SAI/001_099/002/01.01.01_60/gr_SAI002v010101p.pdf  
    [9] National Cyber Security Centre et al. Guidelines for Secure AI System Development. 2023. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Guidelines-for-secure-AI-system-development.pdf  
    [10] NIST. NIST Special Publication 800-207: Zero Trust Architecture. 2020. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207  
    [11] NIST. NIST IR 8496 ipd: Data Classification Concepts and Considerations for Improving Data Protection. 2023. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8496.ipd  
    [12] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), NSA, and NIST. Quantum-Readiness: Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography. 2023. https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/quantum-readiness-migration-post-quantum-cryptography 
    [13] NIST. FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard. 2024. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203  
    [14] NIST. NIST SP 800-52 Rev. 2: Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations. 2019. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-52r2  
    [15] NIST. FIPS 140-3, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. 2019. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3    
    [16] NIST. FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. 2001. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-2  
    [17] NIST. NIST AI 100-2e2023: Trustworthy and Responsible AI, Adversarial Machine Learning: A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigations. 2024. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-2e2023  
    [18] Adak, M. F., Kose, Z. N., & Akpinar, M. Dynamic Data Masking by Two-Step Encryption. In 2023 Innovations in Intelligent Systems and Applications Conference (ASYU) (pp. 1-5). IEEE. 2023 https://doi.org/10.1109/ASYU58738.2023.10296545    
    [19] Kairouz, P. et al. Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning. Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 14 (1-2): 1-210. arXiv:1912.04977. 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.04977  
    [20] NIST. NIST SP 800-88 Rev. 1: Guidelines for Media Sanitization. 2014. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-88r1  
    [21] NIST. NIST Special Publication 800-3 Rev. 2: Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations: A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy. 2018. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-37r2  
    [22] U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Preparedness Series June 2023: Risks and Mitigation Strategies for Adversarial Artificial Intelligence Threats: A DHS S&T Study. 2023. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-12/23_1222_st_risks_mitigation_strategies.pdf  
    [23] Bender, E. M., & Friedman, B. Data Statements for Natural Language Processing: Toward Mitigating System Bias and Enabling Better Science. Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics (TACL) 6, 587–604. 2018. https://doi.org/10.1162/tacl_a_00041  
    [24] NSA et al. Content Credentials: Strengthening Multimedia Integrity in the Generative AI Era. 2025. https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jan/29/2003634788/-1/-1/0/CSI-CONTENT-CREDENTIALS.PDF  
    [25] Executive Order (EO) 14179: “Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence” https://www.federalregister.gov/executive-order/14179   
    [26] NIST. NIST Special Publication 1270: Framework for Identifying and Managing Bias in Artificial Intelligence. 2023. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1270  
    [27] NIST. NIST AI 600-1: Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile. 2023. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.600-1  
    [28] Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP). AI Exchange. #Moretraindata. https://owaspai.org/goto/moretraindata/  
    [29] Carlini, N. et al. Poisoning Web-Scale Training Datasets is Practical. arXiv:2302.10149. 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.10149  
    [30] Kore, A., Abbasi Bavil, E., Subasri, V., Abdalla, M., Fine, B., Dolatabadi, E., & Abdalla, M. Empirical Data Drift Detection Experiments on Real-World Medical Image Data. Nature Communications 15, 1887. 2024. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-46142-w  
    [31] NIST. NIST Special Publication 800-208: Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes. 2020. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-208  
    [32] The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Glossary of statistical terms. 2008. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264055087-en  
    [33] NIST. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations. 2020. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5 
    [34] OWASP. AI Exchange. How to select relevant threats and controls? risk analysis. https://owaspai.org/goto/riskanalysis/  

    Disclaimer of Endorsement

    The information and opinions contained in this document are provided “as is” and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

    Purpose

    This document was developed in furtherance of the authoring organizations’ cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders. 

    Notice of Generative AI Use

    Generative AI technology was carefully and responsibly used in the development of this document. The authors maintain ultimate responsibility for the accuracy of the information provided herein.

    Contact 

    U.S. Organizations

    National Security Agency

    Australian organizations

    • Visit cyber.gov.au/report or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER1) to report cybersecurity incidents and vulnerabilities.

    New Zealand organizations

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Leader of Qakbot Malware Conspiracy Indicted for Involvement in Global Ransomware Scheme

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    A federal indictment unsealed today charges Rustam Rafailevich Gallyamov, 48, of Moscow, Russia, with leading a group of cyber criminals who developed and deployed the Qakbot malware. In connection with the charges, the Justice Department filed today a civil forfeiture complaint against over $24 million in cryptocurrency seized from Gallyamov over the course of the investigation. These actions are the latest step in an ongoing multinational effort by the United States, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Canada to combat cybercrime.

    “Today’s announcement of the Justice Department’s latest actions to counter the Qakbot malware scheme sends a clear message to the cybercrime community,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “We are determined to hold cybercriminals accountable and will use every legal tool at our disposal to identify you, charge you, forfeit your ill-gotten gains, and disrupt your criminal activity.”

    “The criminal charges and forfeiture case announced today are part of an ongoing effort with our domestic and international law enforcement partners to identify, disrupt, and hold accountable cybercriminals,” said U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli for the Central District of California. “The forfeiture action against more than $24 million in virtual assets also demonstrates the Justice Department’s commitment to seizing ill-gotten assets from criminals in order to ultimately compensate victims.”

    “Mr. Gallyamov’s bot network was crippled by the talented men and women of the FBI and our international partners in 2023, but he brazenly continued to deploy alternative methods to make his malware available to criminal cyber gangs conducting ransomware attacks against innocent victims globally,” said Assistant Director in Charge Akil Davis of the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office. “The charges announced today exemplify the FBI’s commitment to relentlessly hold accountable individuals who target Americans and demand ransom, even when they live halfway across the world.”

    According to court documents, Gallyamov developed, deployed, and controlled the Qakbot malware beginning in 2008. From 2019 onward, Gallyamov allegedly used the Qakbot malware to infect thousands of victim computers around the world in order to establish a network, or “botnet,” of infected computers. As alleged, once Gallyamov gained access to victim computers, he provided access to co-conspirators who infected the computers with ransomware, including Prolock, Dopplepaymer, Egregor, REvil, Conti, Name Locker, Black Basta, and Cactus. In exchange, Gallyamov was allegedly paid a portion of the ransoms received from ransomware victims.

    The announcement of charges today is the latest step taken by the Justice Department against the Qakbot conspiracy. In August 2023, a U.S.-led multinational operation disrupted the Qakbot botnet and malware. At that time, the Justice Department announced the seizure of illicit proceeds from Gallyamov, including over 170 bitcoin and over $4 million of USDT and USDC tokens.

    According to the indictment, after the disruption and takedown of the Qakbot botnet, Gallyamov and his co-conspirators continued their criminal activities. Instead of a botnet, they allegedly used different tactics, including “spam bomb” attacks on victim companies, where co-conspirators would trick employees at those victim companies into granting access to computer systems. The indictment alleges that Gallyamov orchestrated spam bomb attacks against victims in the United States as recently as January 2025. It also alleges that Gallyamov and his co-conspirators deployed Black Basta and Cactus ransomware on victim computers.

    On April 25, 2025, pursuant to a seizure warrant, the FBI seized additional illicit proceeds from Gallyamov, including over 30 bitcoin and over $700,000 of USDT tokens. Today, the Department filed a civil forfeiture complaint in the Central District of California against all of the illicit proceeds seized from Gallyamov — worth over $24 million as of today — in order to forfeit and ultimately return those funds to victims.

    The investigation of Gallyamov was led by the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office, which worked closely with investigators from Germany’s Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), the Netherlands National Police, The Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Netherlands, France’s Anti-Cybercrime Office (Office Anti-cybercriminalité) and Cyber Division of the Paris Prosecution Office, and Europol. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs and the FBI Milwaukee Field Office provided significant assistance.

    Trial Attorney Jessica Peck of the Justice Department’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Khaldoun Shobaki, Lauren Restrepo, and James Dochterman for the Central District of California are prosecuting the case.

    These law enforcement actions were taken in conjunction with Operation Endgame, an ongoing, coordinated effort among international law enforcement agencies aimed at dismantling and prosecuting cybercriminal organizations around the world.

    Resources for victims can be found on the following website, which will be updated as additional information becomes available: https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/divisions/national-security-division/qakbot-resources

    An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

     

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Colombian National Sentenced to Over 20 Years in Prison for Role in Conspiracy to Kidnap and Assault U.S. Army Soldiers in Colombia

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    A Colombian national was sentenced today in the Southern District of Florida for her role in kidnapping and assaulting two members of the U.S. military who were on temporary duty in Bogotá, Colombia.

    Kenny Julieth Uribe Chiran, 35, was sentenced to 262 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $24,115 in restitution. She is the third and final defendant to be sentenced and held accountable for this criminal conspiracy. She pleaded guilty in March 2025 to conspiracy to kidnap an internationally protected person.

    “Uribe Chiran and her co-defendants mercilessly preyed on U.S. soldiers when they drugged their drinks, stole their valuables, and left them incapacitated on the street,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “Kidnapping and assaulting two U.S. military service members is deplorable and the Criminal Division will continue to prioritize protecting our service members through these prosecutions. I thank the prosecutors and our law enforcement partners who work tirelessly to bring justice to these victims.”

    “Members of our military, whether serving here or abroad, can count on this Department of Justice’s respect, support, and protection,” said U.S. Attorney Hayden P. O’Byrne for the Southern District of Florida. “Kidnappings and assaults against U.S. service members will not be tolerated. To those who would dare commit such reprehensible acts against America’s heroes, know this: We will identify you; we will find you; and we will prosecute you as aggressively as the law permits.”

    “The FBI’s commitment to investigate criminal acts against the U.S. military beyond our borders is clearly demonstrated by our persistent pursuit of justice for the two kidnapped soldiers,” said Acting Special Agent in Charge Brett D. Skiles of the FBI Miami Field Office. “Our close cooperation with Colombian and Chilean law enforcement authorities was essential to this international investigation’s success. To all would be kidnappers the message is clear: target our citizens with violence anywhere in the world and we will hold you accountable for your actions.”

    According to court documents, the two U.S. soldiers went to an entertainment district in Bogotá to watch a soccer game on the evening of March 5, 2020. They later went to a pub, where Uribe Chiran and one of her co-defendants approached the soldiers and, without their knowledge, put drugs in their drinks that rendered them incapacitated. Medical examinations later confirmed the presence of benzodiazepines in the two soldiers’ systems. The defendants then kidnapped the soldiers, took their valuables, including their credit and debit card information, and left them incapacitated on the street in separate locations. The defendants used one victim’s credit card and the other victim’s debit card to make purchases and withdraw money.

    Uribe Chiran was extradited in September 2024 from Colombia to the United States. Co-defendant Pedro Jose Silva Ochoa was extradited in April 2024 from Chile to the United States, pleaded guilty in December 2024, and was sentenced in March 2025 to 27 years and three months in prison. Co-defendant Jeffersson Arango Castellanos was extradited in May 2023 from Colombia to the United States, pleaded guilty in January 2024, and was sentenced in May 2024 to 48 years and nine months in prison.

    The FBI Miami Field Office investigated the case. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs and the Criminal Division’s Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section’s Office of the Judicial Attaché in Bogotá provided significant assistance in this matter. The United States thanks Colombian law enforcement authorities for their valuable assistance.

    Trial Attorneys Clayton O’Connor and Elizabeth Nielsen of the Criminal Division’s Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Bertila Fernandez for the Southern District of Florida are prosecuting the case.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Fifteen Charged with Drug Conspiracy and Weapons Charges

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    A 29-count indictment was unsealed today charging 12 men and 3 women for their roles in a drug trafficking organization and related gun offenses.

    According to court documents, the defendants were part of a drug trafficking organization that distributed methamphetamine, powder cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, oxycodone, Xanax, psylocibin mushrooms, and marijuana. Six of the defendants face additional charges for gun crimes relating to their alleged drug trafficking. The defendants are alleged to have used several drug houses and a food truck to store illegal drugs and conduct drug transactions. As alleged, in one notable instance in June of 2023, U.S. Customs and Border Protection agents seized 29 kilograms of methamphetamine that one defendant was attempting to transport into the United States.

    “As alleged, this drug trafficking organization imported methamphetamine directly from Mexico and used the U.S. mail, a taco truck, and homes in different Houston neighborhoods to distribute and sell methamphetamine and other dangerous drugs,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “Several of the defendants are also alleged to have used firearms in furtherance of their narcotics trafficking and illegally possessed firearms despite having previously been convicted of felonies. The Criminal Division, along with our federal, state, and local partners, will continue to work tirelessly to combat the scourge of drug trafficking in communities.”

    “The defendants are alleged to have engaged in a multi-drug narcotics distribution ring, and, as often seen in the drug trade, are also alleged to have used illegal firearms to facilitate their enterprise,” said U.S. Attorney Nicholas J. Ganjei for the Southern District of Texas. “Some of the charges indicate methamphetamine was alleged to have been sourced from Mexico, and thus this investigation highlights why this office’s enforcement efforts on the border are so critical. The Southern District of Texas will do everything it can to prevent narcotics from entering our country and will be relentless in apprehending those that would distribute drugs in our communities.”

    “For years, the transnational criminal organization allegedly operated by these gang members has brazenly flooded our local communities with deadly narcotics,” said Special Agent in Charge Chad Plantz of ICE Homeland Security Investigations Houston. “​Working in conjunction with the Houston Police Department and our OCDETF partners, we were able to expose and dismantle their drug trafficking scheme, eliminating a significant contributor to violent crime in the area and saving an untold number of Houstonians from becoming addicted.”

    James Michael Brewer, also known as “Creeper,” 33; Jonathan Alvarado, also known as “Joker,” 28; Hector Luis Lopez, also known as “Capulito,”23; Alfredo Gomez, also known as “Fredo,” 26; and Victor Norris Ellison, 35, all of Houston, have been indicted on drug trafficking and firearm charges. If convicted, they each face a mandatory minimum penalty of 15 years in prison and a maximum penalty of life in prison.

    The following defendants, all of Houston unless otherwise noted, have been indicted on drug trafficking charges. If convicted, they each face a mandatory minimum penalty of 10 years in prison and a maximum penalty of life in prison.  

    • Jose Francisco Garcia-Martinez, also known as “Paco,” 29, a Mexican national,
    • Enzo Xavier Dominguez, also known as “Smiley,” 32,
    • Alexis Delgado, also known as “Chino,” 28,
    • Jose Eduardo Morales, also known as “Primo,” 22,
    • William Alexander Lazo, also known as “Miclo,” 21,
    • Kylie Rae Alvarado, 24,
    • Ruby Mata, 31,
    • Mexi Dyan Garcia, also known as “Mexi,” 31, and
    • Jesus Gomez-Rodriguez, also known as “Jr.,” 33.

    Marcos Rene Simaj-Guch, also known as “Taco Man,” 41, a Mexican national, is charged with drug trafficking. If convicted, he faces a mandatory minimum penalty of five years in prison and a maximum penalty of 40 years in prison.

    The Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security Investigations and the Houston Police Department conducted the investigation with the assistance of the FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and Texas Board of Criminal Justice Office of the Inspector General.

    Trial Attorneys Ralph Paradiso and Amanda Kotula of the Criminal Division’s Violent Crime and Racketeering Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Francisco Rodriguez for the Southern District of Texas are prosecuting the case.

    This case is part of the Criminal Division’s Violent Crime Initiative to prosecute violent crimes in Houston, Texas. The Criminal Division and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas have partnered, along with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, to confront violent crimes committed by gang members and associates through the enforcement of federal laws and use of federal resources to prosecute the violent offenders and prevent further violence.

    OCDETF identifies, disrupts and dismantles the highest-level drug traffickers, money launderers, gangs and transnational criminal organizations that threaten the United States by using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach that leverages the strengths of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies against criminal networks. For more information about Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, please visit Justice.gov/OCDETF.

    An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICE leads joint operation in southern Indiana

    Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

    INDIANAPOLIS — A coordinated, multi-agency law enforcement operation conducted April 29 to May 1, resulted in the arrest of 23 aliens in the Evansville and Bloomington areas, as part of an ongoing initiative to combat criminal activity and enhance public safety. The successful three-day operation was conducted by a coalition of federal partners, including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), and the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO).

    Of the 23 aliens taken into custody, 18 had prior criminal arrests or convictions, including:

    • 10 aliens with one or more Operating While Intoxicated (OWI) offenses
    • 10 aliens involved in crimes that resulted in injury to others
    • 3 aliens connected to drug possession and trafficking

    Additionally, four aliens were arrested on federal warrants, including one subject previously convicted of cocaine trafficking:

    • Martin Cortez-Lopez, 36, who was arrested as he left court in Bloomington, Indiana.
      • Criminal History: 2007 disorderly intoxication and resisting law enforcement with violence; 2010 possession of cocaine and failure to appear for resisting officer with violence; 2024 possession of cocaine x2 and operating while intoxicated/endangerment.
      • Previously removed 2011.  
    • Amin Reynosa-Diaz, 29, arrested in Evansville, Indiana. Reynosa-Diaz was located at a construction site and taken into custody.
      • Criminal History: 2020 driving while intoxicated; 2024 domestic violence.
      • Previously removed 2019.
    • Jaime Ortiz-Guzman, 46, arrested in Bloomington, Indiana.
      • Criminal History: 1999 federal arrest, fraud, imposter, false documents; 2006 battery; 2008 operating while intoxicated and operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license; 2024 operating while intoxicated and driving without a license.
      • Previously removed felon.
    • Jonathan Regules-Hernandez, 44, arrested in Bloomington, Indiana, after a short foot pursuit.
      • Criminal History: 2000 larceny and possession of stolen goods; 2004 maintaining a vehicle/dwelling/place with controlled substances and trafficking in cocaine; 2005 breaking and entering with the intent to commit felony and larceny after breaking and entering; 2025 operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license.
      • Previously removed felon.

    This operation underscores the effectiveness of interagency collaboration in addressing public safety threats. By combining investigative resources, intelligence sharing, and enforcement capabilities, federal agencies are better equipped to identify, locate, and apprehend aliens who pose risks to the community or have violated federal laws, including immigration statutes.

    “ICE officers are integral in keeping communities across our country safe from those who would commit violent, criminal acts,” said ERO Chicago’s Assistant Field Office Director Douglas Thompson. “Thanks to our federal law enforcement partnerships, criminal aliens with no lawful basis to remain in the U.S. will be held accountable to the immigration laws of our nation.”

    Members of the public can report crimes and suspicious activity by dialing 866-DHS-2-ICE (866-347-2423) or completing the online tip form.

    Learn more about ICE’s mission to increase public safety in your community on X at @EROChicago.

    MIL OSI USA News