Category: Finance

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 27, 2025

Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff mission, led by Mr. Tahsin Saadi Sedik, conducted discussions as part of the 2025 Article IV consultation with the Mongolian authorities in Ulaanbaatar during June 4–18, 2025. At the end of the visit, the mission issued the following statement, summarizing its key findings and recommendations.

• During 2023‒24, record-high coal exports and increased government spending led to buoyant economic activity, which, along with fiscal surpluses and successful debt rollovers, also helped reduce vulnerabilities.
• The resource boom is weakening amid rising risks. With coal exports declining in recent months, mainly due to falling prices, and increased global uncertainty, the near-term outlook has become less favorable, and downside risks have increased amid limited policy buffers.
• The policy priority is to increase resilience of the Mongolian economy to downside risks by restoring both internal and external balances, and by preserving buffers. This requires greater fiscal prudence and adherence to fiscal rules, tight monetary and macroprudential policies, and increased exchange rate flexibility.
• Should downside risks materialize, significant and timely policy adjustments—particularly fiscal tightening—will be required to safeguard macroeconomic and financial stability.

Recent economic developments, outlook, and risks

Since the 2023 Article IV consultation, Mongolia’s macroeconomic conditions have improved. A resource-driven boom during 2023‒24 led to buoyant economic activity, despite a sharp contraction in the agriculture sector. Budget revenues from the mining sector more than doubled, enabling fiscal surpluses and contributing to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and savings in the sovereign wealth fund despite a significant increase in public spending, which together with debt repayments helped reduce debt-to-GDP ratio from 64.5 percent in 2022 to 44.5 percent in 2024 (IMF staff definition). Rating agencies have upgraded Mongolia’s sovereign credit rating to B+/B2, and its sovereign spread narrowed to historically low levels before the volatility spiked amid global trade tensions. The IMF staff’s Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Framework (SRDSF) indicates a moderate risk rating compared to the high-risk rating in the 2023 SRDSF. However, the sharp increase in public spending in 2023-24, including wages and capital expenditures, resulted in a highly expansionary fiscal policy stance, which together with the policy rate cuts, despite the tightening of reserve requirements, fueled rapid credit growth and inflation pressures, and led to a surge in imports and a shift in the current account from surplus to deficit in 2024.

In early 2025, the commodity boom began to lose momentum, and the outlook has weakened amid rising downside risks. Mongolia’s coal export receipts declined sharply, mainly due to falling prices, resulting in a sizeable shortfall in budget revenues and a further widening of the current account deficit, which led to a reduction in foreign exchange reserves and increased depreciation. Credit growth and inflation remain high despite some recent moderation, with inflation standing above the Bank of Mongolia (BOM)’s target band.

Policies to Navigate a Weaker Outlook and Increased Risks 

Fiscal policy

Greater fiscal prudence and adherence to the fiscal rules are critical to restoring external and internal balances and preserving fiscal buffers. Despite the decline in revenues, the authorities plan to meet the structural fiscal balance target envisaged in the 2025 Budget and the recently approved medium-term fiscal framework through expenditure restraint. To achieve this objective, the government needs to articulate detailed and credible measures. It is critical that these measures safeguard social spending to protect the most vulnerable. Should downside risks materialize, an ambitious consolidation strategy would be needed to preserve macroeconomic stability. To ensure the credibility of fiscal rules as a policy anchor, compliance with the rules will be critical. In particular, large investment projects should be implemented within the fiscal deficit and debt rules, as defined in the Fiscal Stability Law.

As a priority, the tax package currently under discussion should be reconsidered. While the package includes several positive elements, such as modernizing the tax administration, broadening VAT base, introducing digital service tax and strengthening progressive tax structure, it would result in a substantial and permanent reduction in non-mining tax revenues. This would increase the overall deficit, reduce the government’s fiscal space to implement critically needed development projects, and hinder compliance with fiscal rules, while also increasing the budget’s vulnerability to volatile mining revenues. In addition, some elements of the tax package need to be further refined to align with international best practices. The package also includes some measures, such as a progressive VAT, for which Mongolia’s tax administration is not yet prepared. Instead, reform efforts should focus on strengthening non-mining revenue mobilization by streamlining tax incentives, collecting tax arrears, and implementing tax and customs administration reforms.

Further reforms are needed to mitigate fiscal risks. Efforts should focus on improving the targeting of social assistance, which would help address the perceived inequitable distribution of mining wealth. Implementation of mega projects should be prioritized according to the availability of external financing and the economy’s absorptive capacity. Coordination with subnational entities needs to be strengthened to ensure fiscal discipline of the general government. Legal frameworks governing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public-private partnerships should be enhanced. Building on recent efforts, the Ministry of Finance’s capacity to monitor and mitigate related fiscal risks should be further strengthened. The Development Bank of Mongolia’s long-standing balance-sheet and governance issues need to be addressed promptly. Expanding domestic debt issuance is critical to establishing a benchmark yield curve to help develop domestic markets and to reduce Mongolia’s reliance on external borrowing.

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies

Domestic financial conditions should remain tight to contain credit growth and inflation. Despite the policy rate hike in early 2025 and some moderation in recent months, inflation is expected to stay above the BOM’s target band over 2025–26. A further rate increase may be warranted if the recent decline in inflation reverses, including through exchange rate depreciation. At the same time, there is scope to recalibrate reserve requirements. Excessive reliance on reserve requirements may incentivize banks to seek external funds with more than one year maturity, which are excluded from these requirements, thus increasing the BOM’s exposure to exchange rate risks through its foreign exchange swaps with banks.

Greater exchange rate flexibility would strengthen Mongolia’s resilience to external shocks. The BOM should pursue opportunistic accumulation of reserves when market conditions allow. The BOM should support a more effective exchange rate price-discovery mechanism by gradually reducing its role as an intermediary and structural provider of FX to the market. In addition, the BOM should support the development of domestic FX derivatives markets and phase out its role as the dominant provider of FX hedging instruments to banks.

Reforms to strengthen the BOM’s effectiveness should be accelerated. As a priority, the BOM should fully withdraw from subsidized mortgage program, which undermines the transmission of monetary policy and jeopardizes the independence of the central bank. The government should expedite the transfer of the BOM’s subsidized mortgage program and relieve the BOM of its obligation to channel the newly established Savings Fund toward the expansion of the mortgage program. Moreover, the proposed amendments to the central bank law, aimed at strengthening the BOM’s mandate, as well as the operational autonomy, and governance, should be finalized and submitted to Parliament. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance and the BOM need to agree on a memorandum of understanding that outlines a gradual recapitalization strategy for the BOM that is consistent with fiscal sustainability.

Macroprudential and Financial Sector Policies

Macroprudential frameworks and financial oversight should be strengthened to mitigate financial stability risks, including rapid credit growth. The recent tightening of macroprudential measures, including the reduction of Debt-Service-To-Income (DSTI) limits, for banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) is a welcome development. Further efforts are needed, including aligning the DSTI limit for NBFIs with that of banks and expanding the BOM’s macroprudential toolkit to include countercyclical capital buffers, liquidity coverage ratios, and net stable funding ratios. Macroprudential and monetary policies should be separated in terms of formulation and implementation. The ongoing transition toward a risk-based, forward‑looking supervisory approach is welcome. The interconnections between banks and NBFIs should be closely monitored. Amendments to the BOM and Banking Laws are critical to ensure greater legal protection for supervisors and more effective inter-agency information sharing and coordination. The strengthening of crisis management arrangements and clarifying the resources available for resolutions would also help reduce financial stability risks.  

Reforms are also needed to enhance the financial sector’s ability to lend to creditworthy entities. The objective is to reduce the cost of lending, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises. This could be done by amending the Credit Information and Insolvency Laws to enable more effective and timely credit assessment and collateral evaluation, and to streamline foreclosure and insolvency processes. In addition, efforts to diversify bank ownership structures should continue, which may require increasing ownership limits, and allowing investment in multiple banks. This should be complemented with effective supervision of complex ownership structures to mitigate the risks associated with connected and related-party lending.  

Structural Policies

Further improvements to the business climate and governance that build on recent progress would boost Mongolia’s long-term growth prospects. The substantial state footprint in the economy and frequent regulatory changes dampen private sector initiatives and discourage FDI. Reform efforts should focus on reducing red tape, streamlining licensing procedures, improving tax compliance and land use processes, and ensuring consistent and transparent judicial and regulatory enforcement. Governance in the public sector also requires strengthening. This includes addressing corruption vulnerabilities in revenue institutions, strengthening the transparency and accountability of public procurement and SOEs, and implementing legislative reforms, including the SOE Law and Whistleblower Protection Law. Mongolia has made satisfactory progress in strengthening its anti‑money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism legal framework, though challenges related to effective implementation remain.

Climate adaptation, mitigation, and green transition will require significant investments and policy reforms. Adaptation actions are needed given increase in the frequency and intensity of natural hazards, such as harsh winters and floods, while mitigation actions are needed to address Mongolia’s high carbon intensity and to reduce air pollution. In addition, preparations are needed to address the expected decline in China’s coal demand as it advances its energy transition and decarbonization agenda. So far, implementation of Mongolia’s climate agenda remains limited. Climate adaptation measures have yet to be fully integrated into sectoral policies and budget processes. Moreover, there is no dedicated climate change law to mandate cross-sectoral coordination. Advancing Mongolia’s climate objectives will require significant financial contributions from both the public and private sectors, underscoring the importance of creating fiscal space.

The staff team expresses its sincere gratitude to the authorities and to a broad range of public and private sector counterparts for their warm hospitality and for the candid, constructive discussions.

 

Table 1. Mongolia: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2022-30

2022   2023 2024   2025   2026 2027 2028 2029 2030  Actual                         Projections      (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated) National Accounts                       Real GDP growth (percent change) 5.0 7.4 4.9 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.0 5.0 Nominal GDP (in USD million) 17,146 20,315 23,586 … … … … … … Contributions to Real GDP (ppts) Domestic Demand 11.4 5.6 21.2 6.6 4.4 7.1 7.2 6.5 6.2 Exports of G&S 13.9 17.9 0.5 4.2 5.4 2.8 2.3 1.7 1.8 Imports of G&S -20.3 -16.2 -16.8 -5.3 -4.2 -4.4 -4.2 -3.3 -3.0 Consumption 65.8 57.5 66.1   72.1 72.0 72.5 72.5 73.0 73.0   Private 51.9 44.5 49.8   55.6 55.9 56.6 56.6 57.2 57.3          Public 13.9 13.0 16.3 16.5 16.1 16.0 15.9 15.8 15.7 Gross Capital Formation 42.3 33.9 34.6 32.3 30.7 30.7 30.9 30.7 30.4 Gross Fixed Capital Formation 29.8 25.3 26.8 24.3 23.7 23.7 23.9 23.7 23.4 Public 7.1 7.4 9.9 8.3 8.0 7.9 7.8 7.8 7.9 FDI 14.2 10.7 11.6 9.5 9.0 8.8 8.6 7.8 7.7 Domestic Private (including SOEs) 8.6 7.3 5.3 6.5 6.7 7.0 7.5 8.0 7.8 Gross national saving 28.9 34.5 24.1 17.5 17.6 17.4 17.9 17.8 17.7   Prices Consumer Prices (Avg; percent change) 15.1 10.4 6.2 8.7 8.6 7.9 7.2 6.7 6.4 Consumer Prices (EoP; percent change) 13.3 7.7 8.3 9.0 8.2 7.5 6.8 6.5 6.2     Copper prices (US$ per ton) 8,829 8,491 9,142 8,981 8,897 8,983 9,056 9,122 9,167   Coal prices (US$ per ton) 123 131 107 68 73 72 72 72 72     GDP deflator (percent change) 17.7 21.8 8.2 6.1 8.0 7.5 7.3 6.5 6.5                     General government accounts 1/                     Primary balance (IMF definition) 2.2   4.3   2.8   1.0   0.5 -1.0 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 Total revenue and grants 34.4   34.6   39.2   35.1   33.6 31.5 31.2 31.1 30.9 Primary expenditure and net lending 32.2   30.3 36.5 34.1   33.0 32.5 32.1 31.8 31.6 Interest 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 Overall balance (IMF definition) 0.7 2.7 1.3 -0.7 -1.4 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.2 Non-mineral primary balance (in percent of GDP) -6.3 -5.7 -8.9 -7.4 -8.3 -9.4 -9.0 -8.6 -8.2 Gross financing needs 3.8 9.0 4.7 5.4 5.6 7.5 7.8 8.6 11.9    General government debt 2/ 64.5 45.9 44.5 44.7 46.8 49.5 51.5 53.0 53.7 Domestic 4.4 2.6 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.6            External 60.1 43.3 41.3 41.7 43.8 46.4 48.3 49.6 50.1   Monetary sector Broad money growth (percent change) 6.5 26.8 15.2 13.4 12.7 11.7 11.8 14.1 11.8 Reserve money growth (percent change) 39.9 7.4 51.9 0.7 12.7 11.7 11.8 14.1 12.7 Credit growth (percent change) 8.6 22.0 30.9 25.0 21.2 19.5 17.5 15.5 15.5     Balance of payments                           Current account balance -13.4 0.6 -10.5   -14.8 -13.1 -13.3 -13.0 -12.9 -12.7 Exports of goods 57.5 68.5 62.5 53.6 53.5 51.4 49.8 47.9 46.1 Imports of goods 50.3 46.1 49.5   46.2 45.1 44.2 43.7 42.9 41.5 Gross official reserves (in USD million) 3,400 4,922 5,510   4,566 4,627 4,669 4,864 5,045 5,212 (In months of imports) 3.0 3.6 4.0   3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 (net of bank’s FX deposits held at the BOM) 1,949 3,491 4,233   … … … … … … Net international reserves (NIR) 3/ -788 1,152 1,768   … … … … … …   Exchange rate                     Togrog per U.S. dollar (eop) 3,445 3,411 3,420 … … … … … … Sources: Mongolian authorities; and IMF staff projections.                               1/ These projections were prepared ahead of the supplementary budget for 2025 currently under discussion. They include the tax package approved by the previous Cabinet.                                                                                                                       2/ Includes DBM’s total debt, explicit government’s guarantees to SOE as well as government’s liabilities to BOM related to the TDB settlement regarding Erdenet. Excludes BOM liabilities to PBOC. 3/ NIR is defined as GIR excl. commercial banks’ and government’s US$ deposits held at the BOM, the PBOC swap line, and liabilities to the IMF.

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/27/mongolia-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

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