Category: Finance

  • MIL-OSI Security: Venezuelan National and Suspected Tren de Aragua Member Charged with Attempted Murder of Federal Officer

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    Attorney General Pamela Bondi, Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche and United States Attorney Lesley A. Woods announced today that Gabriel Hurtado-Cariaco, 30, a citizen of Venezuela residing illegally in Bellevue, Nebraska, was charged on June 19, 2025, by criminal complaint with one count of attempted murder of a federal officer.

    Special Agents with Homeland Security Investigations and the Federal Bureau of Investigation possessed an active immigration-related warrant for Hurtado-Cariaco’s arrest and encountered him in Sarpy County near his residence while he was driving. The agents initiated a traffic stop with lights and sirens. Hurtado-Cariaco pulled over and exited his vehicle with his arms raised. The agents gave instructive commands to Hurtado-Cariaco and attempted to place him in hand cuffs.

    According to the complaint, Hurtado-Cariaco, a suspected member of Tren de Aragua, began to fight with one Special Agent where both landed on the ground. Hurtado-Cariaco was able to throw the agent off him launching the agent through the air resulting in the agent forcefully striking their head and elbow on the pavement injuring them. A second Special Agent engaged with Hurtado-Cariaco to subdue and detain him. Hurtado-Cariaco resisted with both landing on the ground. While both agents tried to control Hurtado-Cariaco while on the ground, he maneuvered behind the injured agent and placed that agent in a chokehold. Hurtado-Cariaco ignored commands from the other agent and continued to choke the agent on the ground. The second agent placed Hurtado-Cariaco in a chokehold to stop the assault. Hurtado-Cariaco released his chokehold on the agent and then used his leverage, broke away from the second agent, and ran. The agents pursued Hurtado-Cariaco by foot, locating him at his apartment in Bellevue and arrested without further incident.

    After the arrest, the injured agent was transported to the hospital for treatment.

    “Deadly violence against law enforcement officers will not be tolerated by this Department of Justice,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “We have charged this illegal alien with attempted murder.”

    “The arrest and prosecution of this vicious Tren de Aragua gang member underscores our unwavering commitment to protecting our law enforcement officers in the line of duty,” said Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche. “Violent attacks from terrorists against those who serve our communities will be met with swift and decisive justice.”

    “Violence against federal law enforcement officers in the line of duty will not be tolerated in Nebraska,” said U.S. Attorney Lesley A. Woods.  “Federal law enforcement officers are tasked with enforcing the laws of the United States and they must be able to do so safely. These federal agents maintained their professionalism while being met with potentially fatal violence. Despite sustaining injuries, the agents did not give up and made a successful arrest.”

    Hurtado-Cariaco appeared before United States Magistrate Judge Ryan C. Carson on June 20, 2025. Magistrate Judge Carson ordered Hurtado-Cariaco detained. A criminal complaint is a charging document that contain one or more individual counts that are merely accusations. Every defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

    The maximum possible penalty if convicted is not more than 20 years in prison, a $250,000 fine, and a term of supervised release of not more than three years.  Hurtado-Cariaco was arrested on June 18, 2025, in Sarpy County, Nebraska.

    This case is being investigated by Homeland Security Investigations.

    Read the complaint.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: XRP Price Consolidates for 200 Days, PFMCrypto Launches XRP Mining Contract to Unlock a New Profit Model for XRP

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Farington, England, June 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — What Is PFMCrypto XRP Cloud Mining?

    PFMCrypto cloud mining is a remote digital asset mining platform that enables users to earn cryptocurrency by renting computing power from PFMCrypto’s eco-friendly, high-performance mining farms. Supporting a broad array of coins—including XRP, DOGE, BTC, LTC, SOL, etc. —PFMCrypto removes the technical and financial obstacles traditionally associated with crypto mining, making passive income more accessible than ever.

    Check the official website for details: https://pfmcrypto.net

    Key Highlights of the XRP Cloud Mining Contract:

    – Strategic Launch Timing: The contract was launched during a period of XRP price consolidation, offering investors a way to profit regardless of short-term market moves.

    – Stable Passive Returns: PFMCrypto’s new XRP contract provides fixed daily payouts with guaranteed principal return, appealing to both traders and long-term holders.

    – No Technical Barriers: The XRP mining model requires no hardware or maintenance—any user can participate instantly.

    New Profit Model: XRP Mining Meets AI Optimization

    PFMCrypto’s AI-powered mining architecture now supports XRP-specific contracts, leveraging intelligent allocation of hash power to maximize yields while reducing risk. This model is especially timely, given that XRP has traded in a narrow band for months, signaling the perfect moment for alternative yield strategies.

    Rather than waiting for a price breakout, PFMCrypto users can now earn XRP daily through smart mining contracts—without buying more tokens or attempting to time the market.

    Why This XRP Mining Contract Stands Out?

    – 100% Remote Access: No rigs, no tech know-how—just log in and activate a plan.

    – Principal Security: Contract terms guarantee full capital return after expiration.

    – AI-Driven Returns: Yield optimization ensures users earn even during price stagnation.

    – Daily Earnings: Predictable XRP payouts improve cash flow and reduce volatility exposure.

    Join PFMCrypto and receive a $10 sign-up bonus to begin XRP mining immediately.

    PFMCrypto’s CEO commented,

    “We view XRP’s consolidation not as stagnation, but as opportunity. Our new mining contract allows the XRP community to unlock value from this asset in a consistent, low-risk way.”

    Proven Mining Models for XRP Investors

    PFMCrypto’s XRP mining contracts have already shown strong user interest across multiple tiers. Sample return rates include:

    2-Day Plan: +6.0% return and $2 Bonus

    5-Day Plan: +6.15% return

    15-Day Plan: +20.7% return

    30-Day Plan: +47.1% return

    These results are based on historical contract data and reflect PFMCrypto’s commitment to transparency and performance.

    How to Start Mining XRP with PFMCrypto

    1. Sign Up: New users receive a $10 welcome bonus and $0.60 daily login rewards.
    2. Select a Contract: Choose from flexible XRP mining durations to match your investment goals.
    3. Start Earning: PFMCrypto’s AI-driven engine takes care of the rest—earning begins immediately upon activation.

    About PFMCrypto

    Founded in 2018, PFMCrypto is a leading provider of AI-powered cloud mining services. With over 9.2 million users in 190+ countries, the platform has paid out more than $1 billion in crypto rewards. Its offerings span BTC, LTC, XRP, DOGE, and more—enabling secure, hardware-free mining experiences backed by top-tier infrastructure.

    Explore the future of XRP mining at https://pfmcrypto.net 

    Disclaimer: The information provided in this press release does not constitute an investment solicitation, nor does it constitute investment advice, financial advice, or trading recommendations. Cryptocurrency mining and staking involve risks and the possibility of losing funds. It is strongly recommended that you perform due diligence before investing or trading in cryptocurrencies and securities, including consulting a professional financial advisor.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Great Southern Bancorp, Inc. Announces Second Quarter 2025 Preliminary Earnings Release Date and Conference Call

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SPRINGFIELD, Mo., June 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Great Southern Bancorp, Inc. (NASDAQ:GSBC), the holding company for Great Southern Bank, expects to report second quarter preliminary earnings after the market closes on Wednesday, July 16, 2025, and host a conference call on Thursday, July 17, 2025, at 2:00 p.m. Central Time (3:00 p.m. Eastern Time).

    The call will be available live or later in a recorded version at the Company’s Investor Relations website, https://investors.greatsouthernbank.com.

    Participants may register for the call here. While not required, it is recommended that participants join 10 minutes prior to the event start. Instructions are provided to ensure the necessary audio applications are downloaded and installed. Users can obtain these programs at no cost.

    The Company will notify the public that second quarter 2025 results have been issued through a news release and will post the results to the Company’s Investor Relations website. The earnings release will also be available on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) website, www.sec.gov, as an exhibit to a Current Report on Form 8-K that will be furnished by the Company to the SEC.

    About Great Southern Bank

    Headquartered in Springfield, Missouri, Great Southern offers a broad range of banking services to customers. The Company operates 89 retail banking centers in Missouri, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Arkansas and Nebraska and commercial lending offices in Atlanta, Charlotte, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Omaha, and Phoenix. The common stock of Great Southern Bancorp, Inc. is listed on the Nasdaq Global Select Market under the symbol “GSBC.”

    CONTACT:

    Jeff Tryka, CFA,
    Investor Relations,
    (616) 233-0500
    GSBC@lambert.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Wintrust Financial Corporation Announces Second Quarter and Year-to-Date 2025 Earnings Release Schedule

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ROSEMONT, Ill., June 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Wintrust Financial Corporation (“Wintrust”) (Nasdaq: WTFC) today announced it will release second quarter and year-to-date 2025 earnings results after the market closes on Monday, July 21, 2025 and host a conference call on Tuesday, July 22, 2025 at 10:00 a.m. (CDT).

    For individuals wanting to listen to a simultaneous audio-only web cast, this may be accessed at Webcast Link.

    Individuals interested in participating in the call by addressing questions to management should register for the call at Conference Call Link   to receive a dial-in number and unique PIN to access the call seamlessly. It is recommended that you join 10 minutes prior to the event start (although you may register and dial in at any time during the call).

    An accompanying slide presentation will be available on the Company’s web site at http://www.wintrust.com, Investor Relations link.

    A replay of the audio-only webcast and an accompanying slide presentation will subsequently be available at http://www.wintrust.com, Investor Relations, Investor News and Events, Presentations & Conference Calls link.   The text of the second quarter and year-to-date 2025 earnings release will be available at http://www.wintrust.com, Investor Relations, Investor News and Events, Press Releases link.

    About Wintrust

    Wintrust is a financial holding company with approximately $66 billion in assets whose common stock is traded on the NASDAQ Global Select Market. Guided by its “Different Approach, Better Results” philosophy, Wintrust offers the sophisticated resources of a large bank while providing a community banking experience to each customer. Wintrust operates more than 200 retail banking locations through 16 community bank subsidiaries in the greater Chicago, southern Wisconsin, west Michigan, northwest Indiana, and southwest Florida market areas. In addition, Wintrust operates various non-bank business units, providing residential mortgage origination, wealth management, commercial and life insurance premium financing, short-term accounts receivable financing/outsourced administrative services to the temporary staffing services industry, and qualified intermediary services for tax-deferred exchanges. For more information, please visit www.wintrust.com.

    Forward-Looking Information

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the federal securities laws. Investors are cautioned that such statements are predictions and that actual events or results may differ materially. Wintrust’s expected financial results or other plans are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties. For a discussion of such risks and uncertainties, which could cause actual results to differ from those contained in the forward-looking statements, see “Risk Factors” and the forward-looking statement disclosure contained in Wintrust’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the most recently ended fiscal year and in Wintrust’s subsequent Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date made and Wintrust undertakes no duty to update the information.

    FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT:
    Timothy S. Crane, President & Chief Executive Officer
    David A. Dykstra, Vice Chairman & Chief Operating Officer
    (847) 939-9000
    Website address: www.wintrust.com 

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cramer, Colleagues Lead Effort to Strengthen Review of Foreign Land Purchases Near Military Sites

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Kevin Cramer (R-ND)

    BISMARCK, N.D. – In 2021, the Chinese Fufeng Group purchased 370 acres of land for a wet-corn milling plant 12 miles from Grand Forks Air Force Base (GFAFB), alarming the community. U.S. Senator Kevin Cramer (R-ND) was a vocal opponent of the purchase due to national security concerns, given the food manufacturer’s ties to the Chinese Communist Party and the sensitive work performed at the base. He requested the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) review the investment. The committee ultimately concluded it lacked the legal jurisdiction to make a determination, regardless of the merits of the case. In a January 2023 letter, the U.S. Air Force officially asserted the Fufeng project “presents a significant threat to national security with both near- and long-term risks of significant impacts to our operations in the area.”

    In the years since, Cramer has been at the forefront of expanding CFIUS’ jurisdiction. He joined fellow Senate Banking Committee members U.S. Senators Tim Scott (R-SC), Mike Crapo (R-ID), Mike Rounds (R-SD), Thom Tillis (R-NC), John Kennedy (R-LA), Bill Hagerty (R-TN), Katie Britt (R-AL), Pete Ricketts (R-NE), Jim Banks (R-IN), Bernie Moreno (R-OH), and Dave McCormick (R-PA) in introducing the Protect Our Bases Act to update records of military, intelligence, and national laboratory facilities, which should be designated as sensitive sites for national security purposes.

    “Every time a foreign adversary acquires land near U.S. military installations and sensitive sites, the safety and security of our nation is at risk,” said Cramer. “The Protect our Bases Act will allow CFIUS to make necessary updates to hold our adversaries accountable, protect us from potential national security threats, and bring much-needed transparency and clarity to the table. We should discourage land being sold to bad people.”

    The Protect Our Bases Act provides CFIUS with streamlined authority to address foreign adversary investment near sensitive national security sites in the United States rather than rely on member agencies to maintain updated lists of sensitive sites. These lists are used as the basis to review transactions. The legislation will consolidate statutory authorities for CFIUS to utilize its list of sensitive national security sites, including U.S. military installations, intelligence facilities, and national laboratories. It also requires committee members to update their equities on the list annually and reporting to Congress on CFIUS actions and reviews related to listed sites.

    Following the Fufeng controversy, CFIUS expanded jurisdiction over GFAFB and seven other bases. Cramer cosponsored amendments included in the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act to defend national security against these concerning investments. The Fiscal Year 2024 Appropriations minibus included language Cramer supported to add the Secretary of Agriculture to CFIUS to review foreign agricultural and biotechnology purchases of national concern. He also introduced legislation empowering governors to proactively ask CFIUS whether a proposed transaction would warrant or trigger a review prior to the project’s development.

    Click here for bill text.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China to improve quality and efficiency of investment cooperation with Russia – Vice Premier of the State Council of China

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    St. Petersburg, June 20 (Xinhua) — China hopes to continuously improve the quality and effectiveness of investment cooperation with Russia to give additional impetus to the development and rise of both countries, Vice Premier of the State Council of China Ding Xuexiang said in St. Petersburg on Friday.

    Ding Xuexiang, who is also a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, made the corresponding statement during a meeting with First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Denis Manturov on the sidelines of the 28th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

    As the Vice Premier of the State Council noted, under the strategic leadership of Chairman Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin, Chinese-Russian investment cooperation has been continuously deepened and implemented in practice, which has made it possible to achieve a number of new achievements and brought tangible benefits to both countries and their peoples.

    According to Ding Xuexiang, the industrial development of China and Russia has its own distinctive features, and investment cooperation has great potential and broad scope. China is willing to work with Russia to create a more stable, fair and transparent business environment, further intensify investment cooperation between enterprises of the two countries, and stimulate the vitality of regional investment cooperation.

    D. Manturov, for his part, assured that Russia is ready to work together with China to further improve the efficiency of the Intergovernmental Russian-Chinese Commission on Investment Cooperation, promote practical cooperation, and defend common interests. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Newton County Man Indicted for Illegally Possessing Firearm

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    SPRINGFIELD, Mo. – A Diamond, Mo., man was indicted by a federal grand jury this week for illegally possessing firearms after a prior felony conviction.

    Jason A. Duncan, 40, was charged with three counts of being a felon in possession of firearms, by a federal grand jury in Springfield, Mo. The indictment, which replaces a complaint filed on June 3, 2025, alleges that Duncan possessed a Palmetto State Armory rifle and a Taurus pistol on Aug. 19, 2024, a Hi-Point pistol on Oct. 3, 2024, and Glock pistol on Jan. 23, 2025. Duncan has prior felony convictions and is prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal law.

    The charges contained in this indictment are simply accusations, and not evidence of guilt. Evidence supporting the charges must be presented to a federal trial jury, whose duty is to determine guilt or innocence.

    This case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephanie L. Wan. It was investigated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Joplin, Seneca, and Springfield, Mo., Police Departments.

    Operation Take Back America

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Cherokee County Man Sentenced to Life in Federal Prison for Sex Trafficking Teens

    Source: US FBI

    TYLER, Texas – A Jacksonville man has been sentenced to life in federal prison for sex trafficking violations in the Eastern District of Texas, announced Acting U.S. Attorney Jay R. Combs.

    Desnique Deshawn Herndon, 28, was sentenced to seven life sentences by U.S. District Judge J. Campbell Barker on June 18, 2025.  In 2023, Herndon was convicted by a jury of six counts of sex trafficking of children and one count of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of children following a five-day trial before Judge Barker.  Herndon remained in custody between the time of trial and sentencing.

    “Victimizing children through commercial sex trafficking is reprehensible and will be prosecuted vigorously in East Texas,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Jay R. Combs.  “We will not stand by and watch the lives of young people ruined by predators like Herndon to satisfy the wanton interests of commercial sex customers. Herndon’s life sentence demonstrates our society’s intolerance for such callous disregard for others. I want to thank our many law enforcement partners for their diligent work on this case.”

    “Sex trafficking is one of the most appalling crimes in our society, exploiting the most vulnerable among us. HSI remains committed to identifying traffickers, dismantling their criminal networks, and providing critical support to survivors,” said ICE Homeland Security Investigations Dallas Special Agent in Charge Travis Pickard. “Through our victim-centered investigations, we will spare no resource to protect communities and seek justice for those victimized by this modern-day slavery. “

    According to information presented in court, beginning in 2019, Herndon engaged in trafficking multiple teenage girls for commercial sex acts. Herndon recruited the girls by social media, deceived them by promising riches, and placed them in hotels in the Tyler area.  He then posted advertisements on sex trafficking websites showing explicit photos of the girls and offering commercial sex acts. Some of Herndon’s victims were as young as 13 years old. During trial, jurors heard testimony that Herndon used co-conspirators to continue to run his operation while he was in jail so that the victims could earn money to pay his bond.

    Three of Herndon’s co-conspirators previously pleaded guilty for their roles in the offenses. Malcolm Kadeem Roberts, 29, of Tyler, was sentenced on November 16, 2023, to over 12 years in federal prison for conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of children.  Roberts was also sentenced to 75 years in state prison in Smith County District Court for aggravated sexual assault of a child charges in relation to one of the minor victims in this case.  Tavarus D. Watkins, 29, of Jacksonville, was sentenced to 10 years in prison on November 16, 2023, for interstate transport of a minor for illegal sexual activity. Patrick Lamont Cross, Jr, 28, of Palestine, pleaded guilty on August 22, 2022, to conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of children.  Cross is scheduled to be sentenced on July 10, 2025.

    This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice. Led by United States Attorneys’ Offices and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS), Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to better locate, apprehend and prosecute individuals who exploit children via the Internet, as well as to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.projectsafechildhood.gov.

    This case was investigated by Homeland Security Investigations’ Tyler Resident Agency, North Texas Trafficking Task Force, FBI Tyler Resident Agency, Texas DPS Criminal Investigations Division, Texas Attorney General’s Human Trafficking Unit, Tyler Police Department, Henderson County Sherriff’s Office, Cherokee County Sherriff’s Office, Jacksonville Police Department, Smith County Sheriff’s Office, Panola County Sheriff’s Office, Palestine Police Department, Abilene Police Department, and the Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Lab.  This case was prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Ryan Locker and Alan Jackson, and Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Bryan Jiral.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Alexander Novak: It is necessary to ensure structural transformation and increased efficiency of the economy

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    The discussion was also attended by the CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, Special Representative of the President for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev, Chairman of the State Corporation VEB.RF Igor Shuvalov, Chief Executive Officer of Alfa-Bank Vladimir Verkhoshinsky, Chairman of the Management Board of Gazprom Neft PJSC Alexander Dyukov, Founder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the AEON Infrastructure Corporation Roman Trotsenko.

    In 2024, the IMF recognized Russia as the world’s fourth largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. In order to maintain and increase such results by 2030, it is necessary to continue growing steadily. This task, as Alexander Novak emphasized, will require serious efforts.

    “The President outlined the task of achieving growth rates of the Russian economy above the world average. For this purpose, the national project “Efficient and Competitive Economy” was formed and the President defined the national goal – a sustainable and dynamic economy. We need to create conditions for achieving economic growth,” said Alexander Novak.

    He added that the economy has been growing at a high rate over the past two years – above 4% per year. In the first four months of 2025, GDP growth was 1.5%. In April, according to the Ministry of Economic Development, it was 1.9%. There is a controlled cooling of the economy and a strict monetary policy is being implemented to combat inflation.

    “I am confident that as a result we will reach our potential for economic growth – 3% per year. To do this, it is necessary to structurally change and modernize the economy, increase the share of non-resource industries, support and ensure technological leadership. We are talking about such industries as microelectronics, pharmaceuticals, shipbuilding and aircraft construction, robotics, mechanical engineering and machine tool building, etc.,” said Alexander Novak.

    Speaking about systemic development, he stressed that it is also necessary to ensure the operation of basic industries that today form the basis of the economy. These are the fuel and energy complex, the forestry complex, transport, and infrastructure. At the same time, the task of increasing efficiency concerns all industries. To do this, it is necessary to introduce modern technologies, switch to platform digital solutions, and increase labor productivity. This will ensure investment growth. And the state, in turn, guarantees support for entrepreneurship through national projects, the creation and improvement of development institutions, and the training of professional personnel.

    “This work will be effective with the joint efforts of the federal center, regions and business, which will ensure sustainable economic growth, allowing it to be fourth in the world and move forward in the long term,” the Deputy Prime Minister concluded.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko: Implementation of AI will give BRICS economies about 2-3 trillion dollars by 2030

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Dmitry Chernyshenko held a plenary session entitled “AI Science: A New Path to Leadership.” Leading Russian and foreign scientists discussed how AI science and innovation are shaping Russia’s new technological path to global leadership.

    At the session, the Deputy Prime Minister emphasized that the expected effect of introducing AI into the economies of the BRICS countries by 2030 will be around 2–3 trillion dollars:

    “According to various estimates, the expected effect of using AI technologies in the BRICS countries is between 2 and 3 trillion dollars. There is something to fight for – the share of advanced generative AI systems in this market is currently about 20%. Those who are the first to see the “golden” directions in the development of AI will discover a new Klondike, and if we conduct exploratory research in all areas, we will increase our chances of getting there.”

    The Deputy Prime Minister recalled that in December 2024, at the AI Journey conference, President Vladimir Putin proposed holding an international foresight in Russia – a strategic session on the future of artificial intelligence – in order to determine the directions of technology development together with scientists from around the world.

    The foresight is being implemented by the International AI Alliance Network, an organization that unites industry associations from 14 countries. The Russian part of the foresight is supervised by the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia and the Strategic Agency for Support and Formation of AI Developments (SAPFIR), a project office created on the basis of the Skolkovo Foundation, on behalf of the President of Russia.

    “In Russia, the President has set a national goal – ‘Technological Leadership’. One of the tasks is to form a new AI market for Russia. We are building a complete system – a foundation for Russia’s long-term leadership in AI science. At the same time, we understand that scientific leadership in AI is impossible without international cooperation and coordination of efforts. The future of AI should be built in cooperation, taking into account various scientific schools, cultures and approaches. For this reason, the results of the foresight are published openly, and every scientist in the world can make a contribution. The alliance plans to present the results to the UN and to Russian President Vladimir Putin at the annual AI Journey conference before November this year. This is our manifesto of openness, accessibility and trust for every member of the global AI community,” the Deputy Prime Minister said.

    Last year, Russian experts identified 10 key areas of fundamental scientific research in the field of AI. They formed the basis for discussion at this year’s international foresight. Several sessions of the scientific dialogue on the global prospects of AI have already been held in Morocco, the UAE, Serbia and China. One of the foresight iterations took place at the Sber tech hub in St. Petersburg.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko emphasized that the state’s task is to ensure the completeness of research and competencies in the field of AI. To this end, within the framework of the federal project “Artificial Intelligence”, the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia is holding a grant competition among research centers, according to the results of which 13 teams were selected.

    “Investments in research centers have already demonstrated their success and effectiveness: 13 centers provide half of Russia’s entire scientific reserve in AI,” the Deputy Prime Minister noted.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko noted that the issue of personnel with knowledge of AI is also being addressed systematically.

    “Studying the effects of AI on humans, including dependence on AI decisions, is a meaningful scientific task, where major research is ahead. We are faced with a challenge: to provide not just education, but to cultivate a new type of thinking. To this end, a strategy for the development of education is being developed in Russia, which provides for the creation of a digital environment, individual educational, upbringing, career trajectories and assistants,” the Deputy Prime Minister said.

    An important topic of the session was international foresight – a joint initiative aimed at identifying priority areas of research and development of AI at the global level. Participants also discussed current issues of artificial intelligence development, consolidation of efforts at the international level, tools for accelerating scientific progress and new forms of financing.

    The discussion was attended by Professor Ajit Abraham from India, who created a unique network of machine intelligence laboratories, uniting more than 1,000 researchers from 100 countries.

    Another participant was the CEO of the AIRI Institute of Artificial Intelligence, Ivan Oseledets, one of the leading experts in the field of machine learning, the second most cited Russian mathematician, professor at the Russian Academy of Sciences, and laureate of the Russian Presidential Prize.

    The speakers also included First Deputy Chairman of the Board of Sberbank PJSC Alexander Vedyakhin, Vice-Rector for Research at Serbia’s Singidunum University Nebojsa Bakanin, Professor at China’s Anhui University Ye Tian, Rector of Innopolis University Alexander Gasnikov, and Skoltech Professor Anhui Fan from Vietnam.

    Speakers focused on the role of fundamental science and support for research initiatives, including issues of task-oriented machine learning algorithms (narrow AI), as well as computation and data for AI, fundamental and generative models, human-machine interactions, optimization and mathematics.

    The results of the discussions at the session will form the basis of a foresight study to identify fundamental scientific problems in the field of AI.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Collins Announces More Than $1.3 Million for Airport Improvements Across Maine

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Maine Susan Collins

    Washington, DC – U.S. Senator Susan Collins, Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, announced that five Maine airports will receive a total of $1,326,261 to support important infrastructure improvements. The funding comes from the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Fiscal Year 2025 Airport Infrastructure Grants (AIG) program, made possible by the Infrastructure Investment and Job Act (IIJA). Senator Collins was one of 10 senators who?negotiated the IIJA, which provided $15 billion for airport improvements nationwide.

    “Maine’s airports are vital pieces of our state’s transportation network that promote job creation and economic development. Throughout our state, airports play a critical role not only in carrying residents and visitors, but also in facilitating medical services for those in rural communities during emergencies when seconds count,”?said Senator Collins. “These significant investments will allow airports across Maine to make much-needed improvements to their infrastructure.”

    Specifically, the funding has been allocated as follows: 

    1. Belfast Municipal Airport (BST) – $389,500 to construct a new double pump fuel facility, which will assist the airport to be as self-sustaining as possible by generating revenue.
    1. Bethel Regional Airport (0B1) – $340,100 to update the existing airport master plan study and to construct a new 500-foot taxi lane west of the existing apron to provide airfield access to a non-exclusive hangar development area.
    1. Millinocket Municipal Airport (MLT) – $317,970 to extend Taxiway D an additional 670 feet to serve the hangar development area.
    1. Eastport Municipal Airport (EPM) – $150,821 to rehabilitate the existing 1,575 square foot non-revenue generating parking lot at non-primary airport to extend its useful life.
    1. Central Maine Regional Airport (OWK) – $127,870 to reconstruct the existing Taxiway A edge lighting with LED and to reconstruct the runway end identifier lights system and precision approach path indicator system for Runway 15/33.

    Since joining the Appropriations Committee in 2009, Senator Collins has helped to secure more than $1 billion in competitive transportation grants for the State of Maine.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Alexander Novak: For sustainable economic growth it is important to create a favorable investment climate

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak took part in the session “Business Climate of Russia. National Model and Regional Opportunities” at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. The session was also attended by Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov, General Director of JSC “Barkli” Leonid Kazinets, Chairman of the public organization “Business Russia”, founder of the R-Pharm group of companies Alexey Repik.

    Alexander Novak recalled that one of the key tasks for economic development set by the President is to increase investment by 60% by 2030 and ensure sustainable economic growth in the long term.

    “To achieve ambitious goals to attract investment to the economy, it is important to create a favorable investment climate. Much work has been done in this direction in recent years. The National Entrepreneurial Initiative, the National Investment Climate Rating, and “Business Climate Transformation” were launched. In 2020, as a result of this work, our country moved up in the Doing Business rating from 123rd to 28th place. In certain areas, the breakthrough was even more significant. We worked on simplifying procedures and reducing the time it takes for organizations to connect to networks in the electric power industry. Thanks to the successful joint work of businesses with the Government and the regions, we moved up from 168th to 8th place in the rating for this indicator,” said Alexander Novak.

    Among other important steps to improve the investment climate, he named the implementation of a project to reengineer industrial construction rules, the reform of regulatory authorities, the improvement of corporate regulation, and the introduction of regional and municipal investment standards. All of this has had a positive impact on investment activity in the regions and throughout the country, but today this work needs to be restarted in order to enter the top twenty countries among 180 participants in the World Bank’s Be Ready investment climate business rating by 2030.

    To this end, on the instructions of the President, a national model of target conditions for doing business is being developed jointly with the Agency for Strategic Initiatives. With the participation of businesses, representatives of federal and regional authorities, 11 working groups have been created for the entire life cycle of business: from registering a company to deploying work within the country and selling its products abroad. Business conditions will be improved according to 40 criteria and 150 indicators at the federal level and 27 indicators at the regional level.

    The national model of target conditions for doing business will be launched next year, which will help to achieve one of the national goals of attracting investment into the Russian economy.

    At the end of the session, Alexander Novak announced the results of the National Investment Climate Rating for 2025. The Deputy Prime Minister presented an honorary diploma for first place to Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin – the capital became the leader of the rating. Two regions at once took second place in the rating: Nizhny Novgorod and the Republic of Tatarstan. Third place was taken by the Moscow Region and the Republic of Bashkortostan.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Security: New Orleans Man Guilty of Third Drug Trafficking Offense and Multiple Firearms Offenses

    Source: US FBI

    NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA –ODINE DOMINICK (“DOMINICK”), age 34, a resident of New Orleans, pleaded guilty on June 10, 2025, the morning his jury trial was set to begin, before U.S. District Judge Lance M. Africk to possession with the intent to distribute more than 40 grams of fentanyl and a quantity of marijuana, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 841(b)(1)(D); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). 

    According to court documents, in the fall of 2023, law enforcement officers observed a photograph of DOMINICK with a rifle magazine in his waistband and a video of DOMINICK inside of a stolen car with a handgun.  On December 14, 2023, the New Orleans Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation executed a search warrant at DOMINICK’s residence and found over 100 grams of a mixture of fentanyl and heroin; vacuum sealed bags of marijuana weighing over a kilogram; eight digital scales; drug trafficking supplies; 400 rounds of various calibers of ammunition; and a loaded Glock Model 23 .40 caliber handgun with an extended magazine.

    Prior to his most recent arrest, DOMINICK had already been convicted of conspiracy to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in Orleans Parish, and being a felon in possesion of a firearm, in St. Bernard Parish.

    Because of his prior federal drug trafficking conviction, DOMINICK was charged with a sentencing enhancement.  As to Count 1, he faces a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years and up to life in prison, up to an $8,000,000 fine, and at least eight years of supervised release.  As to Count 2, he faces a mandatory minimum sentence of five years and up to life in prison, which must run consecutively to all other sentences, up to a $250,000 fine, and up to five years of supervised release.  As to Count 3, he faces up to 15 years in prison, up to a $250,000 fine, and up to three years of supervised release.  Each count also carries a mandatory special assessment fee of $100.

    This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone.  On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.

    The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the New Orleans Police Department.  It is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney David Berman of the Violent Crime Unit.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Missouri Man Sentenced to 57 Months in Prison for Travelling to Louisiana to Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct with 12-Year-Old Female

    Source: US FBI

    NEW ORLEANS – Acting U.S. Attorney Michael M. Simpson announced that ERIC CHARLES FULLER (“FULLER”), age 55, from Springfield, Missouri, was sentenced on June 10, 2025 by United States District Judge Greg Gerard Guidry to 57 months in prison, after previously pleading guilty to interstate travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2423(b).  Additionally, Judge Guidry ordered FULLER to serve five (5) years of supervised release after imprisonment, register as a sex offender, and pay a $100 mandatory special assessment fee.

    According to the court documents, on or about December 7, 2023, law enforcement personnel, operating online in an undercover capacity and pretending to be a twenty-nine-year-old mother with a twelve-year-old daughter, met FULLER on a social network and messaging application.  Over approximately the next month, on numerous occasions FULLER discussed his interest in engaging in various sexual acts with the “mother” and daughter,” culminating in FULLER making arrangements to travel from his residence in Springfield, Missouri, to the New Orleans area to engage in sexual contact, individually and collectively, with the “mother” and “daughter.”  During his conversation FULLER described the contact he anticipated as “highly taboo,” “highly illegal,” “risky,” “not the worst way to be,” and “a way to have a happier life.”  FULLER left Springfield, in his red, 2002 Chevrolet Prism, on about January 11, 2024, and arrived at a predetermined location in Mandeville, Louisiana on Friday, January 12, 2024, for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct with the individual FULLER believed to be a twelve-year-old female.

    This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice.  Led by United States Attorneys’ Offices and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS), Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state and local resources to better locate, apprehend and prosecute individuals who exploit children via the Internet, as well as to identify and rescue victims.  For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.projectsafechildhood.gov.

    Acting U.S. Attorney Simpson praised the work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in investigating this matter.  Assistant United States Attorney Jordan Ginsberg, Chief of the Public Integrity Unit, was in charge of the prosecution.

               

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: New Orleans Man Guilty of Being Felon in Possession of Firearms Stemming from New Orleans East Shooting

    Source: US FBI

    NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA – Acting U.S. Attorney Michael M. Simpson announced today that DANTRELL MCZEAL (“MCZEAL”), age 34, a resident of New Orleans, pleaded guilty on May 27, 2025 to being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8).  MCZEAL faces a maximum term of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years, a fine of up to $250,000.00, a period of supervised release of up to 3 years, and a mandatory special assessment fee of $100.00.

    The Honorable District Judge Darrel James Papillion will sentence MCZEAL on September 9, 2025.

    According to court documents, in July 2022, MCZEAL and an unknown individual, were involved in a shootout with each other in the parking lot of a gas station located on the corner of Downman Road and Morrison Road in New Orleans.  MCZEAL was shot in the leg during the gunfire exchange and the unknown individual fled in his vehicle.  MCZEAL also fled, but lost control of his vehicle, and struck a light pole.  MCZEAL was observed limping away from his vehicle while in possession of a firearm.

    New Orleans Police Department officers later recovered a Glock Model 30GEN4, .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol from inside MCZEAL’s vehicle.  While on the scene, officers also observed a trail of blood outside of the vehicle leading to a nearby residence.  Later, officers received a call from a nearby resident stating that an unknown male, later identified as MCZEAL, had entered her residence.  The resident reported that MCZEAL had a firearm, later determined to be a Palmetto State Armory Model PA-15, .223 REM/5.56 x 45 milli-meter semi-automatic rifle.  Federal law prohibits convicted felons, such as MCZEAL , from possessing firearms.

    This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone.  On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.

    The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the New Orleans Police Department.  It is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Brittany Reed of the Violent Crime Unit.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Macro-financial assistance to Egypt – P10_TA(2025)0125 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 212(2) thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

    Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure(1),

    Whereas:

    (1)  Relations between the Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt (‘Egypt’) are developed within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other part(2) (the ‘Association Agreement’), in force since 2004. The Union and Egypt adopted the latest EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities (2021-2027) at the ninth EU-Egypt Association Council, established by the Association Agreement, on 19 June 2022 (the ‘Partnership Priorities’). The Partnership Priorities reconfirm the joint aim of addressing common challenges facing the Union and Egypt, promoting joint interests and guaranteeing long-term stability and sustainable development on both sides of the Mediterranean. The shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights continues to underpin the Partnership Priorities, as is also reflected in the EU-Egypt Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for the period of 2021-2027 (the ‘EU-Egypt MIP’).

    (2)  The Partnership Priorities reflect the shared commitment of the Union and Egypt to reinforce cooperation in support of Egypt’s ‘Sustainable Development Strategy Vision 2030’ and the Union’s determination to act on a renewed impetus to strengthen the partnership with its Southern Neighbourhood. In particular, in the conclusions of the European Council of 10-11 December 2020, the Union identified a democratic, more stable, greener and more prosperous Southern Neighbourhood as a strategic priority. The EU Agenda for the Mediterranean, and the Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbours set out in the Joint Communication of the Commission and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood: A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’ present the Union’s objectives of achieving long-term, sustainable socioeconomic recovery and resilience and of advancing the twin green and digital transitions in the region.

    (3)   On 17 March 2024, Egypt and the Union jointly decided to upgrade their relations to a strategic and comprehensive partnership, based on the values of equity and mutual respect and trust in order to strengthen their common stability, peace and prosperity.

    (4)  In line with the Partnership Priorities, the Union and Egypt are committed to ensuring accountability, the rule of law, full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as promoting democracy, gender equality and equal opportunities as constitutional rights of all their citizens. Those commitments contribute to the advancement of the partnership and to Egypt’s sustainable social and economic development, good governance and socio-economic stability. The increased and constructive engagement between the Union and Egypt in the last period has opened the path to more meaningful dialogue on human rights-related issues. In the framework of the Association Agreement, the subcommittee on Political Matters, Human Rights and Democracy – International and Regional issues ▌ and the Association Committee provide the institutional platforms to exchange views on an array of human rights issues, which the Union would like to continue and build upon. The steady future improvement of the human rights situation in Egypt in key areas related to civil, political, economic, social rights and fundamental freedoms regularly addressed by both partners in bilateral and international fora will have a positive impact on relations between the Union and Egypt.

    (5)  Assistance to Egypt is funded mainly through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE), established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3). The Union’s indicative allocation for Egypt under the NDICI-GE for the first period (2021-2024) of the EU-Egypt MIP was EUR 240 million. This is in addition to the ongoing cooperation portfolio of EUR 1,3 billion and other budget support and emergency measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine amounting to EUR 307 million. The Partnership Priorities for 2021-2027 are reflected in the EU-Egypt MIP, which has been prepared in close consultation with all relevant stakeholders, and cover three broad areas: (i) Sustainable Modern Economy and Social Development; (ii) Partnering in Foreign Policy, and (iii) Enhancing Stability. The NDICI-GE replaces the European Neighbourhood Instrument under which the Union’s bilateral assistance to Egypt for the period 2014-2020 amounted to EUR 756 million.

    (6)  The Union recognises Egypt’s key role for regional security and stability, and has a strong interest in preventing short-term economic instability in Egypt that could have broader consequences and a negative impact on the geopolitical landscape. Terrorism, organised crime, such as human trafficking, irregular migration, disinformation and conflicts, are common threats against common security and the social fabric of nations across both sides of the Mediterranean. The Union acknowledges Egypt’s contribution to addressing such issues. Furthermore, energy security is one of the most pressing challenges facing countries on both sides of the Mediterranean. Energy cooperation between the Union and Egypt could not only offer a source of economic prosperity for the region, but also strengthen energy security by diversifying energy supplies and encouraging regional collaboration. Therefore, the Union and Egypt have a common interest in strengthening cooperation highlighted in the Partnership Priorities, in full compliance with international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as in promoting joint interests and addressing common challenges.

    (7)  Recalling the global and regional geopolitical challenges, such as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, resulting from the aftermath of the Hamas terrorist attacks across Israel on 7 October 2023, the escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa and the safety of navigation in the Red Sea, as well as migratory pressure from the conflict in Sudan, uncertainties in Syria, the instability in Libya, Egypt’s role as a host to large numbers of refugees and migrants, and the strategic importance of Egypt as the largest country in the region and a pillar of stability for the whole Middle East, the Union has embarked on a strategic and comprehensive partnership with Egypt as outlined in the Joint Declaration of the Union and Egypt, signed in Cairo on 17 March 2024 (the ‘Joint Declaration’).

    (8)  The objective of the strategic and comprehensive partnership with Egypt is to elevate the political relations of the Union and Egypt to a strategic partnership and to enable Egypt to fulfil its key role of providing stability in the region, the Middle East and North Africa. That partnership aims to contribute to supporting Egypt’s macroeconomic resilience and enabling the implementation of ambitious socio-economic reforms in a manner that complements and reinforces the reform process provided for under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme for Egypt. As outlined in the Joint Declaration, the strategic and comprehensive partnership will address a wide set of policy measures clustered across six pillars of intervention, namely political relations, economic stability, investment and trade, migration, security and law enforcement cooperation, demography and human capital. The strategic and comprehensive partnership should be developed in line with initiatives at Union and Member State level.

    (9)  Underpinning the strategic and comprehensive partnership is a financial package of EUR 7,4 billion consisting of short- and longer-term support for the macro-fiscal and socio-economic reform agenda, as well as increased amounts available to support investments in Egypt and targeted support for the implementation of the different strategic priorities, which include renewable energy and migration, amongst others. Part of the support package is the Union’s macro-financial assistance package of up to EUR 5 billion in loans, composed of two macro-financial assistance operations, a short-term operation of a maximum amount of EUR 1 billion and a medium-term operation of a maximum amount of EUR 4 billion. That financial package also includes financial instruments, such as guarantees and blending instruments, aimed to mobilise public and private investments with the objective of generating substantial new investments with positive economic impacts which can benefit all Egyptians. This will be complemented by programmes to support specific priorities under the strategic and comprehensive partnership through individual projects and technical assistance implemented under the NDICI-GE.

    (10)  Egypt’s macro-fiscal situation has faced significant challenges and has deteriorated substantially over recent months, as external pressures have intensified and public debt has increased further, with substantial downside risks to the economic outlook persisting. The repercussions of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the geopolitical tensions and conflicts in the Middle East have led to protracted capital outflows and lower foreign currency receipts, in particular due to sharply easing income from tourism, Suez Canal proceeds, and gas production amid volatility of confidence among foreign investors. This is particularly challenging in Egypt’s difficult fiscal situation, which is characterised by constant fiscal deficits and high and growing debt-to-GDP ratios. Despite that difficult external context, in 2024 Egypt was able to implement reforms, such as the unification of exchange rates and making progress in tightening monetary policy, to help preserve its macroeconomic stability.

    (11)  Egypt’s economic and financial situation has been supported by several disbursing IMF programmes since 2016. Those are a three-year Extended Fund Facility of USD 12 billion adopted in 2016, emergency financial assistance under the Rapid Financing Instrument of USD 2,8 billion adopted in 2020, a one-year Stand-By Arrangement of USD 5,2 billion adopted in 2020, and a four-year Extended Fund Facility of USD 3 billion adopted in 2022 and augmented to USD 8 billion in 2024. Egypt made considerable reform efforts during the first part of its engagement with the IMF in 2016-2021. Reforms included a significant currency devaluation, accompanied by monetary policy reforms focused on an inflation target corridor. Fuel subsidy reform was coupled with a significant strengthening of a targeted social transfer system. Public finance management was strengthened by developing medium-term revenue and debt management strategies. The Egyptian authorities also began improving the governance of state-owned enterprises.

    (12)  After the adoption of a follow-up IMF programme in December 2022, reform progress was less noticeable, although Egypt has implemented steps to level the playing field between public and private companies through a law to abolish the tax privileges of state-owned enterprises, albeit with exemptions on the basis of national security, and through the adoption of a state ownership policy, aimed to reduce the presence of the State in the economy, which remains large and distorting despite recent limited progress, and clarifying the rationale of continued State involvement in certain strategic sectors. However, Egypt did not implement its commitment to make the currency durably flexible in 2023, leading to a largely stable official exchange rate and a substantial parallel currency market with a significantly depreciated and highly volatile exchange rate. That fragmentation weighed heavily on foreign investment and domestic business activity.

    (13)  Egypt re-engaged with the IMF in early 2024, and reached a staff-level agreement on 6 March 2024 on a revamped extended fund facility programme scaled up to USD 8 billion. The new programme was adopted by a Decision of the IMF Executive Board on 29 March 2024, and it aims to address the areas of: (i) credible exchange rate flexibility; (ii) sustainable tightening of monetary policy; (iii) fiscal consolidation to preserve debt sustainability; (iv) a new framework to rein in infrastructure spending; (v) provision of adequate levels of social spending to protect vulnerable groups, including from rises in the cost of living and energy price; and (vi) implementation of the state ownership policy and reforms to level the playing field with a view to promoting the development of the private sector in the economy. Together with the signature of the staff-level agreement, Egypt also enacted a flexibilisation of the exchange rate, and raised the central bank’s key policy rate by a sizeable 600 basis points, in line with the priorities of the IMF programme. Staff-level agreement on the fourth review of Egypt’s economic reform programme was reached in December 2024, and the IMF Executive Board completed the review in March 2025.

    (14)  In view of a worsening economic situation and outlook clouded by substantial downside risks in relation to ongoing external shocks, Egypt requested complementary macro-financial assistance from the Union on 12 March 2024.

    (15)  Given that Egypt is a country covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy, it should be considered to be eligible to receive macro-financial assistance from the Union.

    (16)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be an exceptional instrument of untied and undesignated balance-of-payments support, which aims to address Egypt’s immediate external financing needs, and it should underpin the implementation of a policy programme containing strong immediate adjustment and structural reform measures designed to improve Egypt’s balance-of-payments position.

    (17)  Given that there is still a significant residual external financing gap in Egypt’s balance of payments over and above the resources provided by the IMF and other multilateral institutions and regional partners, the Union’s macro-financial assistance to be provided to Egypt is, under the current exceptional circumstances, considered to be an appropriate response to Egypt’s request to the Union to support Egypt’s economic stabilisation, in conjunction with the IMF programme. The Union’s EUR 5 billion macro-financial assistance package, including the macro-financial assistance of up to EUR 4 billion under this Decision, seeks to support the economic stabilisation and the structural reform agenda of Egypt, supplementing resources made available under the IMF programme. The first part of the package, a macro-financial assistance loan of EUR 1 billion, was disbursed in December 2024 after a positive assessment by the Commission.

    (18)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should aim to support the restoration of a sustainable external financing situation for Egypt, thereby supporting its economic and social development. By fostering stability and prosperity in its Neighbourhood, the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt could also contribute to the Union’s growth and economic resilience.

    (19)  The determination of the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should be based on a complete quantitative assessment of Egypt’s residual external financing needs and should take into account Egypt’s capacity to finance itself with its own resources, in particular the international reserves at its disposal. The Union’s macro-financial assistance is part of an international joint effort, effectively complementing the programmes and resources provided by the IMF and the World Bank. The determination of the amount of the assistance should also take into account expected financial contributions from multilateral donors and the need to ensure fair burden sharing between the Union and other donors, as well as the pre-existing deployment of the Union’s other external financing instruments in Egypt and the added value of the Union’s overall involvement in Egypt.

    (20)  The Commission should ensure that the Union’s macro-financial assistance is legally and substantially in accordance with the key principles and objectives of the different areas of external action, with measures taken in respect of those areas, and with other relevant Union policies and Union values, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

    (21)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support the Union’s external policy towards Egypt. The Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) should work closely together throughout the macro-financial assistance operation in order to coordinate, and ensure the consistency of, the Union’s external policy.

    (22)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should support Egypt’s commitment to foster values shared with the Union, including democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, sustainable development and poverty reduction, as well as its commitment to the principles of open, rule-based and fair trade.

    (23)  A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt should be that Egypt continue to make concrete, credible and tangible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights. In addition, the specific objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance should strengthen the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems, the governance and supervision of the financial sector in Egypt, and should promote structural reforms that aim to support sustainable and inclusive growth, decent employment creation and fiscal consolidation. The Commission and the EEAS should regularly monitor the fulfilment of that precondition and the achievement of those specific objectives.

    (24)  The link of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to an on-track disbursing IMF programme, with its strong macro-fiscal framework and rigorous debt sustainability analysis, provides reassurances in relation to Egypt’s repayment capacity. In addition, in order to ensure that the Union’s financial interests linked to the Union’s macro-financial assistance are protected efficiently, Egypt should take appropriate measures relating to the prevention of, and fight against, fraud, corruption and any other irregularities linked to that assistance. The transparent management of funds allocated under the Union’s macro-financial assistance is essential. In addition, a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities should contain provisions authorising the European Anti-Fraud Office to carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, in accordance with the provisions and procedures laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(4) and Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96(5), the Commission and the Court of Auditors to carry out audits and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to exercise its competences with regard to the provision of the Union’s macro-financial assistance during and after the availability period of that assistance.

    (25)  The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is without prejudice to the powers of the European Parliament and the Council as budgetary authority.

    (26)  The amounts of the provision required for macro-financial assistance in the form of loans should be consistent with the budgetary appropriations provided for in the multiannual financial framework.

    (27)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be managed by the Commission. In order to ensure that the European Parliament and the Council are able to follow the implementation of this Decision, the Commission should regularly inform them of developments relating to that assistance and provide them with relevant documents.

    (28)  The annual report on the implementation of this Decision should include information on concrete, tangible and credible steps taken by Egypt towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights.

    (29)  In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Decision, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6).

    (30)  The Union’s macro-financial assistance should be subject to economic policy conditions, to be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU). In order to ensure uniform conditions of implementation and for reasons of efficiency, the Commission should be empowered to negotiate such conditions with the Egyptian authorities under the supervision of the committee of representatives of the Member States in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. Under Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, the advisory procedure should, as a general rule, apply in all cases other than as provided for in that Regulation. Considering the potentially significant impact of assistance of more than EUR 90 million, it is appropriate that the examination procedure as specified in Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 be used for operations above that threshold. Considering the amount of the Union’s macro-financial assistance to Egypt, that examination procedure should apply to the adoption of the MoU, and to any reduction, suspension or cancellation of that assistance.

    (31)  Since the objective of this Decision, namely to address Egypt’s external financing needs cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Decision does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.

    (32)  In order to enable the prompt provision of macro-financial assistance to Egypt, this Decision should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

    Article 1

    1.  The Union shall make macro-financial assistance in the form of loans of a maximum amount of up to EUR 4 billion available to Egypt (the ‘Union’s macro-financial assistance’), with a view to supporting Egypt’s economic stabilisation and a substantive reform agenda. The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance is subject to the adoption of the Union budget for the relevant year by the European Parliament and the Council. The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall contribute to covering Egypt’s balance-of-payments needs as identified in the IMF programme.

    2.  In order to finance the Union’s macro-financial assistance, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions and to on-lend them to Egypt.

    3.  The release of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be managed by the Commission in a manner consistent with the agreements or understandings reached between the IMF and Egypt, and with the key principles and objectives of economic reforms set out in the Association Agreement.

    The Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments regarding the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including disbursements thereof, and shall provide those institutions with the relevant documents in due time.

    4.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be made available for a period of two and a half years, starting from the first day after the date of entry into force of the MoU referred to in Article 3(1).

    5.  Where the financing needs of Egypt decrease fundamentally during the period of the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance compared to the initial projections, the Commission, acting in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall reduce the amount of the assistance, suspend or cancel it.

    Article 2

    1.  A precondition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continue to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights.

    2.  The Commission and the EEAS shall monitor the fulfilment of the precondition set out in paragraph 1 throughout the life-cycle of the Union’s macro-financial assistance.

    3.  Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall apply in accordance with Council Decision 2010/427/EU(7).

    Article 3

    1.  The Commission, in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2), shall agree with the Egyptian authorities on clearly defined economic policy and financial conditions, focusing on structural reforms and sound public finances, to which the Union’s macro-financial assistance is to be subject. Those economic policy and financial conditions shall be set out in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) which shall include a timeframe for their fulfilment. Those economic policy and financial conditions shall be consistent with the agreements or understandings referred to in Article 1(3), including the macroeconomic adjustment and structural reform programmes implemented by Egypt with the support of the IMF.

    2.  The economic policy and financial conditions referred to in paragraph 1 shall aim, in particular, to enhance the efficiency, transparency and accountability of the public finance management systems in Egypt, including for the use of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. Progress in mutual market opening, including for small and medium-sized enterprises, the development of rule-based and fair trade, sustainable development, good governance and other priorities in the context of the Union’s external policy shall also be duly taken into account when designing the policy measures. The Commission shall regularly monitor Egypt’s progress in attaining those objectives.

    3.  The detailed financial terms of the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be laid down in a loan agreement to be concluded between the Commission and the Egyptian authorities in accordance with Article 223 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council(8) (the ‘Financial Regulation’) (the ‘loan agreement’).

    4.  The Commission shall verify, at regular intervals, that the conditions referred to in Article 4(3), first subparagraph, continue to be met, including whether the economic policies of Egypt are in accordance with the objectives of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. For the purposes of that verification, the Commission shall coordinate closely with the IMF and the World Bank, and, where necessary, with the European Parliament and with the Council.

    Article 4

    1.  Subject to the conditions referred to in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be made available by the Commission in instalments. The size of each of those instalments shall be set out in the MoU. An instalment may be disbursed in one or more tranches.

    2.  The amounts of the Union’s macro-financial assistance provided in the form of loans shall be provisioned, where required, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/947.

    3.  The Commission shall decide on the release of the instalments subject to the fulfilment of the following conditions:

    (a)  the precondition set out in Article 2(1);

    (b)  a continuous satisfactory track record of implementing a policy programme that contains strong adjustment and structural reform measures supported by a non-precautionary IMF credit arrangement; and

    (c)  the satisfactory implementation of the economic policy and financial conditions agreed in the MoU.

    The release of the second instalment shall not, in principle, take place earlier than three months after the release of the first instalment. The release of the third instalment shall not, in principle, take place earlier than three months after the release of the second instalment.

    4.  Where the conditions set out in paragraph 3, first subparagraph, are not met, the Commission shall temporarily suspend or cancel the disbursement of the Union’s macro-financial assistance. In such cases, it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council without delay of the reasons for that suspension or cancellation.

    5.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be disbursed to the Central Bank of Egypt. Subject to the agreed provisions set out in the MoU, including a confirmation of residual budgetary financing needs, the Union funds may be transferred by the Central Bank of Egypt to the Egyptian Ministry of Finance as the final beneficiary.

    Article 5

    1.  In order to finance the Union’s macro-financial assistance in the form of loans, the Commission shall be empowered, on behalf of the Union, to borrow the necessary funds on the capital markets or from financial institutions in accordance with Article 224 of the Financial Regulation.

    2.  The Commission shall enter into a loan agreement referred to in Article 3(3) in respect of the amount referred to in Article 1. The loan agreement shall lay down the availability period and the detailed terms of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, including in relation to the internal control systems. Egypt shall repay the loan, which shall be granted on terms that allow its repayment over a long period, including a possible grace period. The maximum duration of the loan shall be 35 years. ▌

    3.   The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of developments in the operations referred to in paragraph 2.

    Article 6

    1.  The Unions macro-financial assistance shall be implemented in accordance with the Financial Regulation.

    2.  The Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be implemented under direct management.

    3.  Before the implementation of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, the Commission shall assess, by means of an operational assessment, the soundness of Egypt’s financial arrangements, administrative procedures, and internal and external control mechanisms which are relevant to the assistance.

    Article 7

    1.  The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a committee within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.

    2.  Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall apply.

    Article 8

    1.  By 30 June of each year, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the implementation of this Decision in the preceding year, including an evaluation of that implementation. That report shall:

    (a)  examine the progress made in implementing the Union’s macro-financial assistance;

    (b)  assess the economic situation and prospects of Egypt, as well as progress made in implementing the policy measures referred to in Article 3(1);

    (c)  indicate the connection between the economic policy and financial conditions set out in the MoU, Egypt’s on-going economic and fiscal performance and the Commission’s decisions to release the instalments of the Union’s macro-financial assistance, while outlining concrete and credible steps taken towards respecting democratic mechanisms and the rule of law and guaranteeing human rights.

    2.  Not later than two years after the expiry of the availability period referred to in Article 1(4), the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and to the Council an ex post evaluation report, assessing the results and efficiency of the completed Union’s macro-financial assistance and the extent to which it has contributed to the aims of the assistance.

    Article 9

    This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    Done at …,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President The President

    (1) Position of the European Parliament of 18 June 2025.
    (2) OJ L 304, 30.9.2004, p. 39.
    (3) Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009 (OJ L 209, 14.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj).
    (4) Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ L 248, 18.9.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/883/oj).
    (5) Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292, 15.11.1996, p. 2, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/1996/2185/oj).
    (6) Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj).
    (7) Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (OJ L 201, 3.8.2010, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2010/427/oj).
    (8) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB backs new military base in Lithuania with €540 million loan

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • EIB approves €540 million loan for Lithuanian military base in Rūdninkai to strengthen NATO defence capabilities.
    • Base near border with Belarus to host German military brigade, feature training, medical and housing facilities.
    • EIB financing reflects commitment to European security and defence.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) plans to lend €540 million for Lithuania to build a military base south of the capital Vilnius, highlighting Europe’s collective commitment to bolster its defence infrastructure and deterrence capacity. The new base in Rūdninkai will host a German brigade, strengthening the rapid-response capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the region.

    Construction of the Rūdninkai military site, which will be located 35 kilometres from the border with Belarus, is due to begin in 2026. The project will span 170 hectares, lay out 11 kilometres of roads and feature around 150 buildings including medical centres, residential units, training facilities, warehouses, hangars and helipads.

    “This is a landmark step in how we support Europe’s security,” EIB Group President Nadia Calviño said in Luxembourg where she met Lithuanian Finance Minister Rimantas Šadžius. “By financing large-scale military infrastructure, we’re demonstrating our readiness to meet the region’s evolving defence needs. It reflects the EIB’s growing role in safeguarding stability across the European Union.”

    The initiative is strategically important for NATO’s eastern defence. Rūdninkai is near a narrow corridor that represents the only land route between the Baltic states and the rest of NATO as well as of the EU. The corridor, known as the Suwałki Gap, is bordered by Belarus to the southeast and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave to the northwest.

    The financing from the EIB is part of its recently expanded scope of activities in the areas of security and defence to include military investments that align with the EU’s goals of bolstering preparedness and crisis management. The approved EIB loan will be to private partners to be selected by the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence to carry out the project.

    “I greatly appreciate the invaluable expertise and financial support from the EIB in implementing the Rūdninkai project that will strengthen Lithuania’s defense capabilities,” said Lithuanian Finance Minister Šadžius. “We are already seeing the results of financial diplomacy and we can confidently state that the EIB’s involvement will contribute not only to Lithuania’s debt sustainability and stronger fiscal stance but also to the security of our country.”

    The EIB Board of Directors approved the €540 million loan at a meeting on 19 June in Luxembourg. The endorsement paves the way for legal and financial negotiations over the loan that are expected to be completed in the coming months. 

    “This investment marks a historic milestone for Lithuania’s national security and NATO’s collective defence,” said Lithuanian Minister of National Defence Dovilė Šakalienė. “The Rūdninkai military base will not only strengthen our defence posture but also serve as a permanent home for the German brigade – a cornerstone of NATO’s deterrence in the region. The EIB’s support is a clear sign that European resilience begins with shared responsibility.”

    The EIB backing for the Rūdninkai military site will help spread the costs of the project, easing the burden on Lithuanian finances and on companies involved in an initiative that takes the form of a public-private partnership (PPP). The EIB is also providing advisory services to ensure that the PPP agreements meet market standards and follow best practices.

    The Rūdninkai base will accommodate around 4,000 German troops and 750 civilian personnel.

    In April 2025 Germany activated the 45th Panzer Brigade of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), also known as the Lithuania Brigade. For Germany, it`s the first brigade-sized unit to be based abroad permanently since World War II.

    Background information   

    EIB Group

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, the EIB finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and the bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world.  

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.    

    The EIB Group stepped up its support to Europe’s security and defence industry by expanding the scope of projects eligible for financing and setting up a one-stop shop to streamline processes, doubling investment to €1 billion in 2024. The EIB Group expects to multiply this amount in 2025 to new record.

    The Board of Directors in March approved a series of additional measures to further contribute to European peace and included peace and security as a cross-cutting Public Policy Goal to finance large-scale strategic projects in areas such as land-border protection, military mobility, critical infrastructure, military transport, space, cybersecurity, anti-jamming technologies, radar systems, military equipment and facilities, drones, bio-hazard and seabed infrastructure protection, critical raw materials and research. 

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of the EIB Group’s headquarters for media use are available here

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Verizon announces expiration date results of its private exchange offers for 10 series of notes and expiration of related tender offers

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Verizon announces expiration date results of its private exchange offers for 10 series of notes and expiration of related tender offers

    NEW YORK, N.Y. –  Verizon Communications Inc. (“Verizon”) (NYSE, Nasdaq: VZ) today announced the expiration and preliminary expiration date results of its Exchange Offers (as defined below) and the expiration of its Cash Offers (as defined below).

    Exchange Offers

    The first transaction consists of 10 separate private offers to exchange (the “Exchange Offers”) any and all of the outstanding series of notes listed in the table below (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers (as defined below), collectively the “Old Notes”) in exchange for newly issued 5.401% Notes due 2037 of Verizon (the “New Notes”), on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offering Memorandum dated June 12, 2025 (the “Offering Memorandum”), the eligibility letter (the “Eligibility Letter”) and the accompanying exchange offer notice of guaranteed delivery (the “Exchange Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery” which, together with the Offering Memorandum and the Eligibility Letter, constitute the “Exchange Offer Documents”).

    The Exchange Offers expired at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on June 18, 2025 (the “Exchange Offer Expiration Date”). The “Exchange Offer Settlement Date” with respect to the Exchange Offers will be promptly following the Exchange Offer Expiration Date and is expected to be June 25, 2025. In addition to the applicable Total Exchange Price (as defined in the Offering Memorandum and set forth in the table below), Exchange Offer Eligible Holders (as defined below) whose Old Notes are accepted for exchange will receive a cash payment equal to the accrued and unpaid interest on such Old Notes from and including the immediately preceding interest payment date for such Old Notes to, but excluding, the Exchange Offer Settlement Date. Interest will cease to accrue on the Exchange Offer Settlement Date for all Old Notes accepted, including those tendered through the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures (as defined in the Offering Memorandum).

    Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used under the heading Exchange Offers have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Exchange Offer Documents.

    The table below indicates, among other things, the aggregate principal amount of each series of Old Notes validly tendered for exchange and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Exchange Offer Expiration Date in connection with Verizon’s offer to exchange any and all of its outstanding notes listed below for New Notes:

    Acceptance Priority Level(1)

    Title of Security

    CUSIP
    Number(s)

    Principal Amount Outstanding

    Principal Amount Tendered for Exchange by the Expiration Date(2)

    1

    1.450% Notes due 2026

    92343VGG3

    $838,579,000

    $1,689,000

    2

    Floating Rate Notes due 2026

    92343VGE8

    $212,932,000

    $4,987,000

    3

    4.125% Notes due 2027

    92343VDY7

    $2,903,541,000

    $316,360,000

    4

    3.000% Notes due 2027

    92343VFF6

    $569,992,000

    $64,673,000

    5

    4.329% Notes due 2028

    92343VER1/

    92343VEQ3/

    U9221ABK3

    $3,640,515,000

    $722,436,000

    6

    2.100% Notes due 2028

    92343VGH1

    $2,139,693,000

    $196,532,000

    7

    4.016% Notes due 2029

    92343VEU4/

    92343VET7/

    U9221ABL1

    $4,000,000,000

    $523,460,000

    8

    3.150% Notes due 2030

    92343VFE9

    $1,464,080,000

    $266,808,000

    9

    1.680% Notes due 2030

    92343VFX7/

    92343VFN9/

    U9221ABS6

    $1,098,195,000

    $270,138,000

    10

    7.750% Notes due 2030

    92344GAM8/

    92344GAC0

    $562,561,000

    $30,303,000

    (1) Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Exchange Offers described in the Offering Memorandum, if the New Notes Capacity Condition (as defined if the Offering Memorandum) and/or the corresponding Cash Offer Completion Condition (as defined if the Offering Memorandum) is not satisfied with respect to every series of Old Notes, Verizon will accept Old Notes for exchange in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Level specified in the table above (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers, each an “Acceptance Priority Level,” with 1 being the highest Acceptance Priority Level and 10 being the lowest Acceptance Priority Level). It is possible that a series of Old Notes with a particular Acceptance Priority Level will not be accepted for exchange even if one or more series with a higher or lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted for purchase.

    (2) The principal amounts tendered as reflected in the table above, does not include the aggregate principal amounts of Old Notes that may be validly tendered pursuant to Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and not validly withdrawn prior to the guaranteed delivery date and accepted for exchange.

    Verizon is offering to accept for exchange validly tendered Old Notes using a “waterfall” methodology under which such Old Notes of different series will be accepted in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, subject to a $2.5 billion cap on the maximum aggregate principal amount of New Notes that Verizon will issue in all of the Exchange Offers (the “New Notes Maximum Amount”). However, subject to applicable law, Verizon, in its sole discretion, has the option to waive or increase the New Notes Maximum Amount at any time.

    Based on the principal amount of Old Notes validly tendered for exchange and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Exchange Offer Expiration Date and the Total Exchange Prices set forth in the table above, Verizon expects that the Minimum Issue Requirement (as defined in the Offering Memorandum) will be satisfied.  Verizon will not receive any cash proceeds from the Exchange Offers. The actual aggregate principal amount of New Notes that will be issued on the Exchange Offer Settlement Date is subject to change, based on the amount of Old Notes delivered pursuant to the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and satisfaction or waiver of the conditions set forth in the Offering Memorandum, including the Cash Offer Completion Condition.

    If and when issued, the New Notes will not be registered under the Securities Act or any state securities laws. Therefore, the New Notes may not be offered or sold in the United States absent registration or an applicable exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act and any applicable state securities laws. Verizon will enter into a registration rights agreement with respect to the New Notes.

    Only a holder who had duly completed and returned an Eligibility Letter certifying that it was either (1) a “qualified institutional buyer” (as defined in Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”)); or (2) a person located outside the United States who is (i) not a “U.S. person” (as defined in Rule 902 under the Securities Act), (ii) not acting for the account or benefit of a U.S. person and (iii) a “Non-U.S. qualified offeree” (as defined below), was authorized to receive the Offering Memorandum and to participate in the Exchange Offers (such holders, “Exchange Offer Eligible Holders”).

    Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the Information Agent and the Exchange Agent for the Exchange Offers. Questions or requests for assistance related to the Exchange Offers or for additional copies of the Exchange Offer Documents may be directed to Global Bondholder Services Corporation at (212) 430-3774.You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank, trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Exchange Offers. The Exchange Offer Documents can be accessed at the following link: https://gbsc-usa.com/eligibility/verizon.

    Cash Offers

    The second transaction consists of 10 separate offers to purchase for cash (the “Cash Offers”) any and all of each series of Old Notes, on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offer to Purchase dated June 12, 2025 (the “Offer to Purchase”), the certification instructions letter (the “Certification Instructions Letter”) and the accompanying cash offer notice of guaranteed delivery (the “Cash Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery” which, together with the Offer to Purchase and the Certification Instructions Letter, constitute the “Tender Offer Documents”).

    The Cash Offers expired at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on June 18, 2025 (the “Cash Offer Expiration Date”). The “Cash Offer Settlement Date” with respect to the Cash Offers will be promptly following the Cash Offer Expiration Date and is expected to be June 25, 2025.

    Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used under the heading Cash Offers have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Tender Offer Documents.

    The table below indicates, among other things, the aggregate principal amount of each series of Old Notes tendered and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date in connection with Verizon’s offer to purchase any and all of its outstanding notes listed below:

    Acceptance Priority Level(1)

    Title of Security

    CUSIP
    Number(s)

    Principal Amount Outstanding

    Principal Amount Tendered for Purchase by the Expiration Date(2)

    1

    1.450% Notes due 2026

    92343VGG3

    $838,579,000

    $14,136,000

    2

    Floating Rate Notes due 2026

    92343VGE8

    $212,932,000

    $2,287,000

    3

    4.125% Notes due 2027

    92343VDY7

    $2,903,541,000

    $174,419,000

    4

    3.000% Notes due 2027

    92343VFF6

    $569,992,000

    $25,913,000

    5

    4.329% Notes due 2028

    92343VER1/

    92343VEQ3/

    U9221ABK3

    $3,640,515,000

    $158,375,000

    6

    2.100% Notes due 2028

    92343VGH1

    $2,139,693,000

    $255,691,000

    7

    4.016% Notes due 2029

    92343VEU4/

    92343VET7/

    U9221ABL1

    $4,000,000,000

    $109,039,000

    8

    3.150% Notes due 2030

    92343VFE9

    $1,464,080,000

    $43,536,000

    9

    1.680% Notes due 2030

    92343VFX7/

    92343VFN9/

    U9221ABS6

    $1,098,195,000

    $39,519,000

    10

    7.750% Notes due 2030

    92344GAM8/

    92344GAC0

    $562,561,000

    $2,818,000

    (1) Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Cash Offers described in the Offer to Purchase, including if the Maximum Total Consideration Condition (as defined in the Offer to Purchase) is not satisfied with respect to every series of Old Notes, Verizon will accept Notes for purchase in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Level specified in the table above. It is possible that a series of Old Notes with a particular Acceptance Priority Level will not be accepted for purchase even if one or more series with a higher or lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted for purchase.

    (2) The principal amounts tendered reflect the preliminary results of the Cash Offer and are subject to change following review of the documentation submitted by holders of Old Notes to determine the validity of the tenders received pursuant to the Tender Offer Documents. The principal amounts tendered does not include the aggregate principal amounts of Old Notes that may be validly tendered pursuant to Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and not validly withdrawn prior to the guaranteed delivery date and accepted for exchange.

    Verizon is offering to purchase validly tendered Old Notes using a “waterfall” methodology under which such Old Notes of different series will be accepted in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, subject to the Maximum Total Consideration Condition and the Exchange Offer Completion Condition (each as defined in the Offer to Purchase). However, subject to applicable law, Verizon, in its sole discretion, has the option to waive or increase the Maximum Total Consideration Condition at any time.

    In addition to the applicable Total Consideration, Cash Offer Eligible Holders (as defined below) whose Old Notes are accepted for purchase will be paid accrued and unpaid interest on such Old Notes from and including the immediately preceding interest payment date for such Old Notes to, but excluding, the Cash Offer Settlement Date. Interest will cease to accrue on the Cash Offer Settlement Date for all Old Notes accepted in the Cash Offers, including those Old Notes tendered through the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures.

    Only holders who were not Exchange Offer Eligible Holders (“Cash Offer Eligible Holders”) were eligible to participate in the Cash Offers. Holders of Old Notes participating in the Cash Offers were required to complete the Certification Instructions Letter and certify that they are Cash Offer Eligible Holders.

    Verizon is in the process of reviewing the documentation submitted by holders of Old Notes pursuant to the Cash Offers to determine the validity of the tenders received in the Cash Offers pursuant to the Tender Offer Documents. Verizon will announce the final principal amount of each series of Old Notes validly tendered and accepted for exchange and for purchase as soon as practicable, but no later than 9:00 a.m. (Eastern time) on June 23, 2025.

    Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the Information Agent and the Tender Agent for the Cash Offers. Questions or requests for assistance related to the Cash Offers or for additional copies of the Tender Offer Documents may be directed to Global Bondholder Services Corporation at (212) 430-3774. You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank, trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Cash Offers. The Tender Offer Documents can be accessed at the following link: https://www.gbsc-usa.com/verizon.

    Verizon refers to the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers, collectively, as the “Offers.”

    Verizon retained Barclays Capital Inc, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, RBC Capital Markets, LLC to act as lead dealer managers for the Offers and Scotia Capital (USA) Inc., Truist Securities, Inc. and U.S. Bancorp Investments, Inc. to act as co-dealer managers for the Offers.

    This announcement is for informational purposes only. This announcement is not an offer to purchase or a solicitation of an offer to purchase any Old Notes. The Exchange Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offering Memorandum and related documents and the Cash Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offer to Purchase and related documents. The Offers are not being made to holders of Old Notes in any jurisdiction in which the making or acceptance thereof would not be in compliance with the securities, blue sky or other laws of such jurisdiction. In any jurisdiction in which the securities laws or blue sky laws require the Offers to be made by a licensed broker or dealer, the Offers will be deemed to be made on behalf of Verizon by the dealer managers or one or more registered brokers or dealers that are licensed under the laws of such jurisdiction.

    This communication and any other documents or materials relating to the Exchange Offers have not been approved by an authorized person for the purposes of Section 21 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”). Accordingly, this announcement is not being distributed to, and must not be passed on to, persons within the United Kingdom save in circumstances where section 21(1) of the FSMA does not apply. Accordingly, this communication is only addressed to and directed at persons who are outside the United Kingdom and (i) persons falling within the definition of investment professionals (as defined in Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the “Financial Promotion Order”)), or (ii) within Article 43 of the Financial Promotion Order, or (iii) high net worth companies and other persons to whom it may lawfully be communicated falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) of the Financial Promotion Order, or (iv) to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of Section 21 of the FSMA) in connection with the issue or sale of any securities may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be communicated (such persons together being “relevant persons”). The New Notes are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such New Notes will be engaged in only with, relevant persons. Any person who is not a relevant person should not act or rely on any document relating to the Exchange Offers or any of their contents.

    This communication and any other documents or materials relating to the Exchange Offer are only addressed to and directed at persons in member states of the European Economic Area (the “EEA”), who are “Qualified Investors” within the meaning of Article 2(e) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129. The New Notes are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such New Notes, will be engaged in only with, Qualified Investors. The Exchange Offer is only available to Qualified Investors. None of the information in the Offering Memorandum and any other documents and materials relating to the Exchange Offer should be acted upon or relied upon in any member state of the EEA by persons who are not Qualified Investors.

    “Non-U.S. qualified offeree” means:

    (i)       in relation to any investor in the European Economic Area (the “EEA”), a qualified investor as defined in Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 (as amended or superseded) that is not a retail investor.  For these purposes, a retail investor means a person who is one (or more) of: (a) a retail client as defined in point (11) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU (as amended, “MiFID II”); or (b) a customer within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2016/97, where that customer would not qualify as a professional client as defined in point (10) of Article 4(1) of MiFID II;

    (ii)      in relation to any investor in the United Kingdom, a qualified investor as defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that is not a retail investor and that (a) has professional experience in matters relating to investments and qualifies as an investment professional within the meaning of Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (as amended, the “Financial Promotion Order”), (b) is a person falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) (“high net worth companies, unincorporated associations etc.”) of the Financial Promotion Order, or (c) is a person to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”)) in connection with the issue or sale of any notes may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be communicated (all such persons together being referred to as “relevant persons”). For these purposes, a retail investor means a person who is one (or more) of: (x) a retail client, as defined in point (8) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 2017/565 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (“EUWA”); or (y) a customer within the meaning of the provisions of the FSMA and any rules or regulations made under the FSMA to implement Directive (EU) 2016/97, where that customer would not qualify as a professional client, as defined in point (8) of Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the EUWA; or

    (iii)      any entity outside the U.S., the EEA and the United Kingdom to whom the Exchange Offer may be made in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations of any applicable jurisdiction without registration of the Exchange Offer or any related filing or approval.

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    In this communication Verizon has made forward-looking statements, including regarding the conduct and completion of the Offers. These forward-looking statements are not historical facts, but only predictions and generally can be identified by use of statements that include phrases such as “will,” “may,” “should,” “continue,” “anticipate,” “assume,” “believe,” “expect,” “plan,” “appear,” “project,” “estimate,” “hope,” “intend,” “target,” “forecast,” or other words or phrases of similar import. Similarly, statements that describe our objectives, plans or goals also are forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those currently anticipated, including those discussed in the Offering Memorandum and Offer to Purchase under the heading “Risk Factors” and under similar headings in other documents that are incorporated by reference in the Offering Memorandum and Offer to Purchase. Holders are urged to consider these risks and uncertainties carefully in evaluating the forward-looking statements and are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements included in this press release are made only as of the date of this press release, and Verizon undertakes no obligation to update publicly these forward-looking statements to reflect new information, future events or otherwise. In light of these risks, uncertainties and assumptions, the forward-looking events might or might not occur. Verizon cannot assure you that projected results or events will be achieved.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Banking: First “Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit” a success

    Source: – Press Release/Statement:

    Headline: First “Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit” a success

    A unique conference, presented by Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) in collaboration with Indigenous Clean Energy (ICE), recognizes the critical role of Indigenous engagement in Manitoba’s energy transition.

    Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 20, 2025—More than 120 people attended the Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit, held at the Winnipeg Art Gallery on June 18, 2025, presented by Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) in collaboration with Indigenous Clean Energy (ICE).

    This unique, invitation-only event brought together key representatives from Manitoba’s Indigenous and renewable energy communities to discuss Manitoba Hydro’s recently launched wind energy procurement, entitled “Call for Power: Indigenous Majority Owned Wind,” part of the Manitoba Affordable Energy Plan. This is the province’s first significant wind-energy procurement in many years. An RFP for 600 MWs of wind energy is expected to be issued in August of this year, with a majority Indigenous-ownership criteria.

    “In order for Manitoba’s new wind energy procurement to succeed, the renewable energy industry must commit to ensuring that development plans align with the priorities of Indigenous communities,” said Evan Wilson, CanREA’s Vice President of Policy—Western Canada and National Affairs.

    The Summit kicked off with opening remarks by the Hon. Mike Moyes, Manitoba’s Minister of Environment and Climate Change, as well as the Hon. Adrien Sala, Minister of Finance and Minister responsible for Manitoba Hydro, who spoke about the importance of collaboration and the value that such an event can bring to the process.

    In “Wind Energy 101 – Developer Spotlight Panel,” Wilson moderated a panel of wind energy developers with successful projects elsewhere in Canada, including Ina Gjoka (Innergex), Brian Hodder (Renewable Energy Systems / RES Group), Galvin Clancey (Nordex) and Jennifer Tuck (Potentia Renewables), who shared lessons learned and ideas for how best to work together for Manitoba’s energy transition.

    Following this discussion, ICE’s Founding Executive Director, Chris Henderson, moderated a panel on “Indigenous Nation: Wind Pathways Success,” featuring panelists Kory Wood (Kikinaw Energy Services), Troy Jerome (Sentii Energy, Kiruguj First Nation), and Drew Bernard (Lennox Island First Nation).

    “Indigenous 51% equity is essential to Manitoba’s wind call for power. The Government of Manitoba’s Indigenous inclusion goal was supported by CanREA members and Indigenous communities at the Indigenous Equity Summit in Winnipeg. Indigenous Clean Energy’s collaboration with CanREA was positive, reflecting this vision,” said Henderson.

    Later that morning, CanREA’s Director for Saskatchewan and Indigenous Engagement, Kelly Hall, emceed a session on “Indigenous Loan Guarantees & Financing Options,” in which the Canada Infrastructure Bank’s Justin Lok presented on Financing Indigenous Equity, the Manitoba Finance Treasury Division’s Nicoleta Oprea presented on the Government of Manitoba Treasury, and the Canada Indigenous Loan Guarantee Corporation’s Pearl Yuzicappi presented on the Canada Development Investment Corporation.

    The afternoon was split into two simultaneous tracks: The CanREA track consisted of a session on “Wind Energy Procurement Guidance,” in which CanREA’s Director for Manitoba & Saskatchewan and for Indigenous Engagement, Kelly Hall, hosted Bryce Wood and team from Manitoba Environment and Climate Change’s Environmental Approvals Branch, as well as Adrienne McGarrigle of Solas Energy, who offered guidance to help navigate the upcoming Wind Energy Procurement Process.

    The Indigenous Clean Energy track consisted of several sessions. It began with an “Indigenous Nation-Nation Experience Sharing Session,” with opening remarks by Kisik Energy Manitoba’s Darrell Brown, a Founding Chair at ICE. Next, the “Indigenous Renewables Turtle Island Landscape” session was facilitated by ICE’s Henderson and ICE Board Member Mihskakwan James Harper of NRStor.

    The “Indigenous Wind Project Development Discussion,” also facilitated by Henderson, featured Kory Wood (Kikinaw Energy Services), Troy Jerome (Sentii Energy, Kiruguj First Nation) and Drew Bernard (Lennox Island First Nation).

    The Summit closed with an open Q&A discussion with the audience, facilitated by CanREA & ICE, with special guest Isabelle Deguise of Renewable Energy Systems (RES) Canada Inc., who is also a CanREA Board member.

    “The first-ever Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit was a great success.  Indigenous engagement is a priority for the clean energy industry, as it is critical to the success of the energy transition in Manitoba, and across Canada. As Manitoba’s current Indigenous wind energy procurement progresses, CanREA will continue to advocate for Indigenous engagement, share our industry knowledge and be a voice for the industry in Manitoba,” said Hall.

    CanREA thanks all attendees and speakers for participating in the Summit, with a special thanks to ICE for their collaboration in organizing, supporting and executing the Summit, and to our generous sponsors, Northland Power (the Wellness and Networking Break Sponsor), and MLT Aikins (the Networking Lunch Sponsor). Doing double duty, Drew Lafond and Kevin Mehi of MLT Aikins also presented at the Summit, focusing on “Legal Considerations for Indigenous Equity Ownership.”

    Photos

    Photo: In “Wind Energy 101 – Developer Spotlight Panel,” CanREA’s Evan Wilson (far right) moderated a panel of wind energy developers with successful projects elsewhere in Canada, including (from L to R) Brian Hodder (Renewable Energy Systems / RES Group), Ina Gjoka (Innergex), Jennifer Tuck (Potentia Renewables) and Galvin Clancey (Nordex).

    Photo: The panel on “Indigenous Nation: Wind Pathways Success” featured, from left to right: moderator Mihskakwan James Harper (NRStor & ICE board member), and speakers Kory Wood (Kikinaw Energy Services), Drew Bernard (Lennox Island First Nation), and Chris Henderson (Indigenous Clean Energy). 

    Photo: The Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit kicked off with opening remarks by the Hon. Mike Moyes, Manitoba’s Minister of Environment and Climate Change (left), as well as the Hon. Adrien Sala, Minister of Finance and Minister responsible for Manitoba Hydro (right), who spoke about the importance of collaboration and the value that such an event can bring to the process. Centre: Kelly Hall, CanREA’s Director for Manitoba & Saskatchewan and for Indigenous Engagement.

    Quotes

    “In order for Manitoba’s new wind energy procurement to succeed, the renewable energy industry must commit to ensuring that development plans align with the priorities of Indigenous communities.”
    —Evan Wilson, Vice President of Policy—Western Canada and National Affairs, Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA)

    “Indigenous 51% equity is essential to Manitoba’s wind call for power. The Government of Manitoba’s Indigenous inclusion goal was supported by CanREA members and Indigenous communities at the Indigenous Equity Summit in Winnipeg. Indigenous Clean Energy’s collaboration with CanREA was positive, reflecting this vision.” 
    —Chris Henderson, Founding Executive Director, Indigenous Clean Energy (ICE)

    “The first-ever Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit was a great success. Indigenous engagement is a priority for the clean energy industry, as it is critical to the success of the energy transition in Manitoba, and across Canada. As Manitoba’s current Indigenous wind energy procurement progresses, CanREA will continue to advocate for Indigenous engagement, share our industry knowledge and be a voice for the industry in Manitoba.”
    —Kelly Hall, Director for Manitoba & Saskatchewan, and for Indigenous Engagement, Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA)

    For media inquiries or interview opportunities, please contact: 

    Communications Canadian Renewable Energy Association communications@renewablesassociation.ca 

    About CanREA 

    The Canadian Renewable Energy Association (CanREA) is the voice for wind energy, solar energy and energy storage solutions that will power Canada’s energy future. We work to create the conditions for a modern energy system through stakeholder advocacy and public engagement. Our diverse members are uniquely positioned to deliver clean, low-cost, reliable, flexible and scalable solutions for Canada’s energy needs. For more information on how Canada can use wind energy, solar energy and energy storage to help achieve its net-zero commitments, consult “Powering Canada’s Journey to Net-Zero: CanREA’s 2050 Vision.” Follow us on Bluesky and LinkedIn here. Learn more at renewablesassociation.ca. 

    The post First “Manitoba Wind Energy Indigenous Equity Summit” a success appeared first on Canadian Renewable Energy Association.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro – P10_TA(2025)0130 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

    –  having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

    –  having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

    –  having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B.  whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C.  whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D.  whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E.  whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F.  whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2.  Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3.  Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4.  Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5.  Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6.  Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7.  Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8.  Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9.  Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10.  Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11.  Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12.  Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13.  Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14.  Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights(6); urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15.  Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17.  Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19.  Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20.  Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary, and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21.  Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22.  Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23.  Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24.  Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25.  Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26.  Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28.  Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29.  Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30.  Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32.  Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33.  Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34.  Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35.  Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36.  Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37.  Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38.  Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39.  Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40.  Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41.  Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42.  Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43.  Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44.  Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45.  Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46.  Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48.  Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50.  Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51.  Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52.  Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53.  Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54.  Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56.  Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57.  Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58.  Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59.  Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60.  Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61.  Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62.  Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    (1) OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2010/224/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility – P10_TA(2025)0128 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility(1) (RRF Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC(2) (REPowerEU Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(3) (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(4) (MFF Regulation),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(5) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(6) (Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility(9),

    –  having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’(10),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

    –  having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

    –  having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

    –  having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

    –  having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

    –  having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’(11),

    –  having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

    –  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

    –  having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds(13),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    –  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

    A.  whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B.  whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C.  whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D.  whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E.  whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F.  whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G.  whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H.  whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I.  whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J.  whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K.  whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197,46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108,68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L.  whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M.  whereas according to the ECA, performance is a measure of the extent to which an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provides value for money; whereas moreover, financing not linked to costs does not, in itself, make an instrument performance-based;

    N.  whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    O.  whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    P.  whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    Q.  whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    R.  whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

    1.  Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2.  Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4.  Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5.  Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1,4 % compared with 2,3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0,8 %; notes that the long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6.  Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7.  Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8.  Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation(14); observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9.  Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10.  Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11.  Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12.  Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7,5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13.  Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14.  Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15.  Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16.  Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

    17.  Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18.  Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385,8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19.  Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20.  Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21.  Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

    22.  Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23.  Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25.  Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26.  Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27.  Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28.  Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29.  Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30.  Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31.  Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32.  Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33.  Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34.  Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35.  Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36.  Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37.  Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38.  Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39.  Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40.  Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41.  Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42.   Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43.  Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44.  Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

    45.  Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(9) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46.  Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47.  Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48.  Notes that the ECA considers that the RRF focuses on progress on implementation rather than performance, particularly because RRF-funded measures focus on outputs rather than results, vary in ambition, sometimes lack clarity and do not always cover a measure’s key implementation stages, including completion;

    49.  Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    50.  Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    51.  Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    52.  Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    53.  Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    54.  Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    55.  Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    56.  Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2,8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

    57.  Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    58.  Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    59.  Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    60.  Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    61.  Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    62.  Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    63.  Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    64.  Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    65.  Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    66.  Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    67.  Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    68.  Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    69.  Notes that, according to the ECA, it is essential that future performance-based instruments are not designed and implemented in a way that is detrimental to accountability and, in particular, that appropriate control systems are in place in the Member States and are checked by the Commission before implementation starts; notes that this would involve setting minimum requirements for the Member States’ controls and the Commission’s checks;

    70.  Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    71.  Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    72.  Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    73.  Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    74.  Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    75.  Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    76.  Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    77.  Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    78.  Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    79.  Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    80.  Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    81.  Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    82.  Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    83.  Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    84.  Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    85.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    86.  Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    o
    o   o

    87.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj.
    (2) OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (4) OJ L, 2024/765, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/765/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433 I, 22.12.2020, p. 28.
    (6) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (7) OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj.
    (8) OJ L, 2024/1263, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj.
    (9) OJ C 32, 27.1.2023, p. 42.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/4618, 22.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4618/oj.
    (11) OJ C, C/2024/7057, 4.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7057/oj.
    (12) European Parliament, Think Tank https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/research/advanced-search?textualSearch=RRF&startDate=01%2F07%2F2019&endDate=&sort=RELEVANCE.
    (13) OJ C, C/2024/5742, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5742/oj.
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • Amit Shah inaugurates new MACCIA headquarters in Mumbai; highlights Maharashtra’s role in India’s economic growth

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (2)

    nion Home Minister and Minister of Cooperation Amit Shah inaugurated the newly constructed headquarters of the Maharashtra Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (MACCIA) in Mumbai today. The event also featured a state-level cooperative industrial conference, with Maharashtra Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis, Union Minister of State for Cooperation Murlidhar Mohol, and other dignitaries in attendance.

    Shah reflected on the enduring legacy of Seth Walchand, a pioneering industrialist whose contributions have continued to benefit Maharashtra and the nation. Shah emphasized that institutions celebrating a centenary must not only take pride in their legacy but also use the occasion for introspection and renewal.

    He remarked that in the century since MACCIA’s founding, the global and national economic landscape has undergone transformative changes. With globalization reshaping commerce, industry, and agriculture, Shah called on Chambers of Commerce across the country to adapt their methods and reassess their relevance. He urged them to engage professional institutions to align operations with the evolving economic and policymaking frameworks of both state and central governments.

    Highlighting India’s economic trajectory, Shah said that the country has emerged as the world’s fourth-largest economy, overtaking former colonial powers. He credited policy reforms and their robust implementation under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership for this significant progress, including the rising global standing of the Indian passport.

    Shah said that Maharashtra has become a symbol of India’s industrial growth, hosting the country’s financial capital and contributing 39% of India’s total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). He cited that the state also leads in startups, tourism, income tax filings by women, and infrastructure development — including the upcoming Vadhavan Port and the bullet train project.

    Addressing the development of Mumbai and its surrounding areas, Shah revealed that the central and state governments, operating under a “double-engine” governance model, are investing over ₹7 lakh crore in transformative projects. This effort, he said, is infusing Maharashtra with new energy and fostering long-term development.

    Drawing a comparison between two decades, Shah stated that Maharashtra received ₹1.91 lakh crore in central devolution and grants between 2004 and 2014, whereas this amount increased to ₹7.82 lakh crore during the Modi government’s tenure from 2014 to 2024.

    Emphasizing the importance of cooperative federalism, Shah said that Prime Minister Modi’s vision of “Team India” is central to the nation’s development. He added that the joint efforts of the Centre and the States, along with a constructive mindset, are driving the country’s rapid progress.

    MACCIA’s role, he added, remains crucial as it continues to raise demands for policy changes, infrastructure upgrades, and solutions for issues in trade, industry, and agriculture. Shah called upon all Chambers of Commerce to evolve with the times and continue contributing meaningfully to India’s economic journey.

  • MIL-OSI Security: Southern District of Texas charges 215 people in third week of June in relation to border enforcement efforts

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    HOUSTON – A total of 204 new cases have been filed in the last week related to immigration, border security and related offenses from June 13-19, announced U.S. Attorney Nicholas J. Ganjei. 

    Among those are 65 people who face charges of illegally reentering the country. The majority have prior felony convictions for narcotics, violent crime, prior immigration crimes and more. A total of 125 people are charged with illegally entering the country, while five cases allege various instances of human smuggling with the remainder involving other immigration crimes and more, including assault on officers.

    Two such charged include Adrian Alberto Castillo-Contador and Lorenzo Ramirez. Castillo-Contador, a Mexican national, allegedly attempted to make entry into the United States through the Hidalgo port of entry. The charges allege he failed to comply with commands and attempted to evade a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer. Castillo-Contador allegedly pushed the officer and caused injury but was apprehended before able to exit.

    In another case, authorities allegedly found Lorenzo Ramirez near an abandoned vehicle after a failed smuggling event near Weslaco. The criminal complaint alleges that as a Border Patrol (BP) agent approached him, Ramirez fled, and a foot chase ensued. Law enforcement caught him, but during the struggle, Ramirez punched and elbowed the agent in the thigh and head, respectively, according to the charges. Ramirez also allegedly kicked another agent in the leg. The charges further allege authorities had to taser him. Both men face up to eight years in federal prison if convicted for assaulting an officer.

    Also part of the new cases are several complaints alleging previous felons had illegally reentered the United States. Mexican nationals Ivan Edgar Martinez, Carlos Bartolo Santiago-Hernandez and Hugo Jimenez-Castillo had all been previously removed from the country on various dates between 2017-2014, acceding to their respective charges. However, all were allegedly found in the Rio Grande Valley area this week. Martinez and Santiago-Hernandez have convictions for illegal reentry, while Jimenez-Castillo had been sentenced to two years in prison for his driving while intoxicated conviction, according to the allegations. If convicted, all face up to 20 years in prison.

    Throughout the district, law enforcement partners made multiple arrests, including nearly two dozen charged in large drug and money laundering operation. Grand juries in Houston and McAllen returned the five separate, but related indictments in May. The charges allegedly involve cocaine, heroin and methamphetamine trafficking, firearms-related offenses and money laundering. The arrests are the culmination of multiple months-long Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) investigations dubbed Operation Red Ranger, Borrowed Time and Resurrection. During the investigation and operations, law enforcement also seized over 170 kilograms of cocaine and heroin, over two thousand kilograms methamphetamine, more than 100 firearms and nearly $3 million as well as four properties valued at $1.2 million.

    In Laredo, two cartel firearms traffickers have now been sent to federal prison. Mexican national Jorge Alberto Morales-Calvo received a 41-month-term, while Homero Arteaga Jr. previously received 57 months. At the hearing, the court heard additional evidence that the firearms were going to be smuggled across the border and delivered to the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. On Sept. 18, 2024, they planned to purchase a Barrett .50 caliber rifle for $15,000 and a FN Herstal Belgium, 5.7 x 28 caliber pistol with a large capacity magazine for $850. They were both arrested as they tried to complete the transaction.

    “The Department of Justice is looking to hit the cartels from every angle and at every opportunity, which includes vigorously prosecuting not just the members of these terror groups, but those that enable them as well,” said Ganjei. “Those that arm or otherwise empower the cartels are going to the meet the full force of the federal criminal justice system.”

    In Corpus Christi, an Arkansas man was ordered to prison for 36 months for transporting illegal aliens in wheel well and fuel tank. The jury deliberated for less than 30 minutes following a less than two-day trial before finding Noel Mercado guilty on two counts of alien smuggling March 11. At the sentencing hearing, the court noted the egregious crime and said the smuggled individuals had been “treated like trash.” All the illegal aliens were from the countries of Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala with no authority to be in the United States.

    “As we continue our successful campaign to secure the border, human smugglers are going to get increasingly desperate,” said Ganjei. “No matter how creative they think they are in their methods, our law enforcement partners are always one step ahead.”

    A Laredo felon was also sentenced for transporting illegal aliens. Braulio Ivan Rueda was ordered to serve 21 months after he had engaged in a high-speed chase. Rueda picked up several people running from the Rio Grande River into his SUV. When authorities tried to block the vehicle, four Guatemalan nationals fled towards the river. Rueda sped away and led authorities on a three-mile chase before stopping in a commercial parking lot and attempted to escape on foot. He admitted he needed money and agreed to smuggle the aliens for “easy money.”

    Also in Laredo, Anthony Jacob Garza was suspiciously driving a Ford Expedition about 20 miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border in April. He admitted he stopped at a gas station, where authorities ultimately found three illegal aliens hiding under a blanket in the SUV’s cargo area. He had picked them up near a county road. He faces up to 10 years in prison.

    Two Mexican nationals and convicted felons, one who had previously assaulted public servant, are on their way back to prison for illegal reentry into the country. Abelino Hernandez-Torres was ordered to serve 60 months. He has prior convictions for illegal reentry as well as evading arrest with a motor vehicle and assault on a public servant. He was first ordered removed from the United States in 2015 and again in 2019 and 2020, and returned illegally.

    Authorities had encountered Hector Ruben Cardenas-Morales in jail following charges of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and unlawful restraint. He has other convictions, including burglary, evading arrest with a motor vehicle and illegal reentry and was last removed in 2023. At the sentencing hearing, the court noted how this was his fifth time coming back and was not serving himself by returning to the country or learning from his mistakes, stating “Sir, you have no future in the United States.” He was sentenced to 63 months in federal prison.

    These cases were referred or supported by federal law enforcement partners, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) – Homeland Security Investigations, ICE – Enforcement and Removal Operations, BP, CBP, Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, U.S. Marshals Service and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives with additional assistance from state and local law enforcement partners.

    The cases are part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s OCDTF and Project Safe Neighborhood.

    Under current leadership, public safety and a secure border are the top priorities for this district. Enhanced enforcement both at the border and in the interior of the district have yielded aliens engaged in unlawful activity or with serious criminal history, including human trafficking, sexual assault and violence against children.  

    The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas remains one of the busiest in the nation. It represents 43 counties and more than nine million people covering 44,000 square miles. Assistant U.S. Attorneys from all seven divisions including Houston, Galveston, Victoria, Corpus Christi, Brownsville, McAllen and Laredo work directly with our law enforcement partners on the federal, state and local levels to prosecute the suspected offenders of these and other federal crimes. 

    An indictment or criminal complaint is a formal accusation of criminal conduct, not evidence. A defendant is presumed innocent unless convicted through due process of law.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Cassa Depositi e Prestiti and SACE provide EUR250 Million to Africa Finance Corporation


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    Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) (www.AfricaFC.org), the continent’s leading infrastructure solutions provider, has secured a landmark EUR 250 million 10-year term loan facility from Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) the Italian Financial Institution for Development Cooperation. The transaction is backed by a guarantee from SACE, the Italian insurance and financial group fully owned by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance, covering up to 80% of the facility amount.

    The financing builds on engagement at the Mattei Plan-Global Gateway summit, attended by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, CDP, SACE and AFC, where the parties confirmed their intent to collaborate. The facility is structured to cultivate Italian supply chain opportunities in infrastructure and renewable energy generation, including the supply of components for the Lobito Railway Corridor – a commercial railway line that will run through Angola and extend to the borders of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

    This long-term facility deepens AFC’s strategic partnership with both CDP and SACE, while reinforcing its mandate to mobilise high-quality, long-tenor capital in support of delivering sustainable infrastructure across Africa.

    “Cassa Depositi e Prestiti confirms its role as a strategic partner in supporting infrastructure projects with a high social and economic impact in Africa. With this financing – said Dario Scannapieco, Chief Executive Officer of CDP – we are strengthening business and technological relations between Italy and Africa, enhancing talent and innovation. We are convinced that investing in strategic projects not only creates new opportunities for our companies but also helps to build lasting and shared ties capable of fostering growth and well-being for local communities.”

    “We are proud to contribute to the involvement of Italian companies in the transport and logistics sector to realise a significant strategic project like the Lobito Railway Corridor within the Mattei Plan,” said Alessandra Ricci, CEO of SACE. “This collaboration reaffirms SACE’s commitment to promoting new connections for Italian companies seeking to diversify their exports and embrace new growth opportunities.”

    Our partnership with CDP, further strengthened by SACE’s guarantee, exemplifies the power of blended finance in unlocking capital for infrastructure development in Africa,” said Banji Fehintola, Executive Board Member and Head, Financial Services, AFC. The Lobito Corridor is a transformational project that will open new trade routes for resources, support regional industrialisation, accelerate job creation and strengthen Africa’s position in global value chains, while delivering long-term, inclusive growth.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Africa Finance Corporation (AFC).

    SACE Media gallery: https://apo-opa.co/4ecSix5

    Media Enquiries:
    Communications
    Africa Finance Corporation
    Email: communications@africafc.org

    SACE
    Press Office
    ufficiostampa@sace.it

    CDP Media Relations
    ufficio.stampa@cdp.it 
    Tel: +39 06 42213990
    Website: www.CDP.it

    Follow CDP on:
    LinkedIn: https://apo-opa.co/4kNl4H7
    X: https://apo-opa.co/4kU1x8a
    Facebook: https://apo-opa.co/3T3VMbE
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    YouTube: https://apo-opa.co/3T3UZYh

    About Lobito Corridor Rail Project:
    The railway line will be approximately 830 km long and will connect Chingola in Zambia to Luacano in Angola with the aim of facilitating the transportation of agricultural products, minerals and consumer goods. The greatest opportunities for the Italian supply chain in the region lie in sectors such as energy, renewables, transportation and logistics.

    About CDP:
    Cassa Depositi e Prestiti is the National Promotional Institute which has been supporting the Italian economy since 1850. The main goal of CDP is to accelerate the industrial and infrastructural development of Italy to boost its economic and social growth. CDP focuses its activities on sustainable development at local level, supporting the innovation and growth of Italian enterprises, also in the international arena. It partners local authorities, in a financing and advisory capacity, to create infrastructures and improve services of public value. CDP also participates actively in international cooperation initiatives to realize projects in developing countries and emerging markets. Cassa Depositi e Prestiti is entirely financed by private capital, through the issuing of Postal Savings Bonds and Postal Savings Passbooks, and through issues on national and international financial markets.

    About SACE:
    SACE is the insurance and financial group controlled by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, specialising in supporting the growth of Italian companies through a wide range of solutions to facilitate export and innovation, including financial guarantees, factoring, risk management and protection, advisory services and business matching. With a network of 11 offices in Italy and 13 worldwide in target countries for Made in Italy products, SACE serves over 60,000 companies, supporting their growth in Italy and globally, with a portfolio of insured operations and guaranteed investments totalling EU 267 billion across approximately 200 foreign markets.

    About AFC:
    AFC was established in 2007 to be the catalyst for pragmatic infrastructure and industrial investments across Africa. AFC’s approach combines specialist industry expertise with a focus on financial and technical advisory, project structuring, project development, and risk capital to address Africa’s infrastructure development needs and drive sustainable economic growth. Eighteen years on, AFC has developed a track record as the partner of choice in Africa for investing and delivering on instrumental, high-quality infrastructure assets that provide essential services in core infrastructure sectors. AFC has 45 member countries and has invested over US$15 billion since its inception.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Taxpayers’ Ombudsperson releases his fifth and final annual report

    Source: Government of Canada News (2)

    OTTAWA, June 20, 2025 – Canada’s Taxpayers’ Ombudsperson, Mr. François Boileau, has released his annual report, Clearing the Path, which was tabled today in the House of Commons. The report provides an overview of the activities of the Office of the Taxpayers’ Ombudsperson (OTO) between April 1, 2024, and March 31, 2025.

    The report details how the OTO influenced service improvements at the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) by reviewing service issues and complaints. It also includes two recommendations to the Minister of Finance and National Revenue and the Chair of the CRA’s Board of Management to improve the CRA’s service to Canadians.

    During the last fiscal year, the OTO released two systemic examination reports: Unintended Consequences, about the CRA’s administration of the 2023 bare trust filing requirements, and Timing Is Everything, about issues that may be causing delays in Canada child benefit (CCB) payments for temporary residents. Between these two reports, we made 16 recommendations, and the CRA accepted 13 of them.

    As this is the final year of Mr. Boileau’s five-year mandate, the annual report also includes a chapter about his views on improving the CRA’s services for vulnerable and hard‑to-reach populations. This chapter analyzes the CRA’s efforts to make sure these populations get the benefits and credits they are entitled to. It looks at the CRA’s existing programs, including the Community Volunteer Income Tax Program, the Income Tax Assistance – Volunteer Program (in Quebec) and SimpleFile, and discusses how they could be improved to better meet Canadians’ needs.

    2024–2025 report highlights:

    Recommendations

    The Taxpayers’ Ombudsperson recommends:

    1. (…) that the CRA perform a comprehensive review of its content on Canada.ca, including its web page architecture and content, to remove redundant information and to make sure the information it provides is relevant, clear, concise and easy to find. It should complete this review by spring 2026 and start implementing changes by fall 2026.
    2. (…) that the CRA provide a permanently funded grant program for organizations participating in the Community Volunteer Income Tax Program and the Income Tax Assistance – Volunteer Program to support their free tax clinics for eligible taxpayers and help them offset their operating costs.

    Trends in complaints

    1. Contact centres: The top trend relates to issues with the information provided by contact centre agents. Many taxpayers who were able to reach the CRA’s contact centres claimed that agents provided them with incomplete, inaccurate, or unclear information, while others were unable to even reach an agent because the wait times were too long or they could not get into the queue.
    2. Income tax and benefit return processing and adjustments: Many complainants claimed that there were delays in processing returns beyond the CRA’s published service standard; however, it is important to note that the CRA’s service standard applies to returns received on or before filing due dates. As well, the standard excludes returns filed for deceased, bankruptcy, international and non-resident individuals as well as emigrants. It also does not apply in situations where returns are filed for multiple tax years or when the CRA has to contact the taxpayers for more information.
    3. Collection action: These complaints claimed the CRA did not consider the taxpayer’s personal circumstances when taking collection action, and in some cases the taxpayer claimed that the collection action put them in financial hardship.
    4. CCB: Many complainants said that the CRA’s review of their eligibility for the CCB put a burden on them. The CRA told them that the information they provided was not sufficient, even if they provided most of what was requested. They claimed that the CRA did not clearly inform them why what they provided was not sufficient and why additional documents were required.
    5. The CRA’s Service Feedback Program: These complainants said that the CRA’s Service Feedback Program did not respond to their complaint within its published service standard.

    Background information

    The Office of the Taxpayers’ Ombudsperson works independently from the CRA. Canadians can submit complaints to the Office if they feel they are not receiving the appropriate service from the CRA. Our main objective is to improve the service the CRA provides to taxpayers and benefit recipients by reviewing individual service complaints and service issues that affect more than one person or a segment of the population.

    The Taxpayers’ Ombudsperson assists, advises and informs the Minister of Finance and National Revenue about matters relating to services provided by the CRA. The Ombudsperson ensures, in particular, that the CRA respects eight of the service rights outlined in the Taxpayer Bill of Rights.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Questions Energy Secretary Why DOE is Spiking Clean Energy Projects, Increasing Electricity Costs

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell
    06.20.25
    Cantwell Questions Energy Secretary Why DOE is Spiking Clean Energy Projects, Increasing Electricity Costs
    Cantwell presses Secretary Wright on whether DOE will renege on $1B promised for PNW green hydrogen hub On hydropower, Secretary acknowledges to Cantwell that “hydro has been a great resource for this country” that is “quite beneficial to our electricity grid”
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), a senior member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, pressed U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright on whether the Trump Administration is attempting to roll back hydrogen production investments secured and awarded under the Biden Administration — including a $1 billion grant awarded to the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association in 2023 to become a one of seven Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs, as well as a 2022 tax credit aimed at spurring more investment in clean hydrogen production called 45V.  The budget reconciliation bill passed last month by the House of Representatives eliminates the hydrogen credit, as would the proposal released earlier this week by Senate Finance Committee Chairman Mike Crapo (R-ID).
    Sen. Cantwell: “I actually think getting rid of the tax credits that we have, some of the other ones, broadly, are going to lead to electricity increased cost. And so, can I get you to tell me about the hydrogen hubs, whether you believe you support the hydrogen hubs and moving forward on this?”
    Wright: “So, we put together, as I’m sure you’ve heard, and we’ve published it on the website, this project review process. We have a cross-functional team that evaluates every project. We’re going through 500 projects.”
    Sen. Cantwell: “But is that data call a way to kill the projects? Or no, you really believe in funding some?”
    Wright: “Oh, absolutely. No, we are funding plenty of projects right now, and we don’t stop funding any project. We’re funding all of the existing projects right now, and when we evaluate them – no, plenty of projects will pass. Plenty of projects will pass. Other projects we’ll say, “Hey, can you modify it this way to make it much more beneficial?” Some projects will be modified, and some projects will be ended. “
    Video of their Q&A is HERE; a transcript is HERE.
    Hydrogen is a clean fuel that, when consumed in a fuel cell, produces no dirty emissions — only water. Hydrogen can be produced from existing power resources, such as solar and hydropower.
    Sen. Cantwell helped secure the Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs (H2Hubs) program and other key hydrogen investments in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) during consideration in the Energy and Natural Resources Committee in July 2021, where she is a senior member, and push for its successful passage through the Senate. The H2Hubs program designated up to $7 billion in competitive grants to establish between six and 10 regional clean hydrogen hubs across the United States. These networks of hydrogen producers, consumers, and local connective infrastructure were meant to help accelerate the use of hydrogen as clean energy and work toward achieving former President Biden’s goal of a 100 percent clean electrical grid by 2035 and net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.
    In October 2023, with support from the region’s Congressional delegation led by Sen. Cantwell, the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association received a $1 billion grant through the H2Hubs program. With continued federal support, the Pacific Northwest Hydrogen Association will be able to build out a robust network of hydrogen suppliers and off-takers in both the western and eastern parts of Washington and Oregon, as well as parts of Montana. Clean hydrogen can support decarbonization efforts already being made in the transportation, industrial, and agricultural sectors, as well as the rapidly expanding zero-carbon aviation sector being pioneered in the Pacific Northwest.
    In 2022, President Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act into law, which included the 45V hydrogen production tax credit to incentivize projects that produce clean hydrogen power. In July 2024, Sen. Cantwell joined a group of colleagues in sending a letter urging then-Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to issue guidance on 45V eligibility that capitalizes on the “opportunity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions faster and enhance our energy security, while strengthening our economy, creating thousands of jobs, and combating the climate crisis.” The budget bill currently being negotiated in the House and the Senate would drastically shorten the timeline for projects to qualify for the 45V credits – requiring them to begin construction by Jan. 1, 2026 rather than the previous deadline of Jan. 1, 2033 – and cut funding for the H2Hubs program. The Trump Administration is also currently reviewing the remaining H2Hubs financing.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Urges Trump to Finally Bring TikTok Under U.S. Ownership: “We Are Allowing This National Security Issue to Fester”

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell

    06.20.25

    Cantwell Urges Trump to Finally Bring TikTok Under U.S. Ownership: “We Are Allowing This National Security Issue to Fester”

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – This week, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), ranking member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and a senior member of the Senate Finance Committee, delivered a speech on the Senate floor urging President Donald Trump to follow the law as passed by Congress and ensure TikTok is sold to a U.S. company so that America’s enemies will no longer be able to weaponize TikTok to spread their propaganda and turn the world against the United States. In her remarks, Sen. Cantwell cited studies that revealed an alarming rise in anti-Semitic content on TikTok.  

    Yesterday, President Trump announced that he would extend a June 19 deadline for ByteDance, the Chinese-owned company that owns TikTok, to sell the app. His extension – the third of its kind – would push the divestment date to mid-September.  Earlier today, he signed an Executive Order to extend the deadline until September 17, 2025  

    “I rise to express my concerns about reports that President Trump is going to again extend the deadline for getting TikTok out of the control of ByteDance and the Chinese government. Concern because that means that again, we are going to allow this national security issue to fester and to continue on, maybe for several more months,” she said.

    “I’m concerned that these extensions of the TikTok deal are illegal. Note that Congress passed this law, and the president extending the deadline to allow them to continue to operate in the United States under the control of ByteDance and the Chinese government is not what Congress intended,” Sen. Cantwell continued.

    “Simply put, we cannot continue to allow foreign adversaries to control technology that can fuel domestic and political polarization and civil unrest. We need the president to follow the law that Congress passed — bring TikTok under U.S. ownership.”

    Video of her floor speech is HERE; a transcript is HERE.

    In January 2025, following the Supreme Court’s 9-0 decision to uphold the law requiring the sale of TikTok, Sen. Cantwell issued a statement urging the administration to “find a solution to shut the Chinese government backdoor, improve the platform, and help content creators earn more revenue for their work.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Sagteс Finalizes Strategic AI Acquisition to Accelerate SaaS Revenue and Multi-Sector AI Deployment

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, June 20, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Sagtec Global Limited (NASDAQ: SAGT) (“Sagtec” or the “Company”), a next-generation provider of customizable AI and automation platforms, today announced the signing of a definitive Share Sale Agreement (SSA) to acquire an 80% equity stake in Smart Bridge Technology Limited (“Smart Bridge”), a rapidly scaling agentic AI software company with proven profitability. 

    The acquisition reinforces Sagtec’s strategic shift into an AI-first, SaaS-driven growth model. Closing remains subject to customary regulatory approvals and conditions.

    Profitable AI Acquisition to Fuel SaaS Margin Expansion

    Smart Bridge brings a profitable, enterprise-ready AI platform, having reported a net profit of US$2.1 million for FY2024. With successful deployments across fintech, retail, and logistics, its proprietary agentic AI engine offers:

    • Advanced behavioural analytics and fraud detection
    • Intelligent decision automation
    • Real-time pricing, demand forecasting, and optimization tools

    These capabilities seamlessly complement Sagtec’s hospitality and point-of-sale (POS) and hospitality infrastructure, enabling immediate integration and monetization through a unified AI stack.

    Sagtec expects the acquisition to be immediately earnings-accretive, while accelerating its rollout of high-margin, subscription-based AI modules. Key applications include:

    • AI-powered upselling engines and dynamic menu optimization
    • Behavioural anomaly detection and real-time fraud prevention
    • Predictive inventory automation and demand planning
    • Modular AI toolkits adaptable for logistics, fintech, and hospitality sectors

    This acquisition unlocks access to a combined total addressable market (TAM) exceeding US$130 billion. According to Markets and Markets, the global AI in retail market is projected to reach US$43 billion by 2032, driven by automation and personalized customer engagement. IDC forecasts that the SME-focused AI software segment will surpass US$25 billion as smaller enterprises increasingly adopt cost-effective intelligent tools. Meanwhile, Grand View Research estimates the intelligent point-of-sale (POS) and behavioral analytics market will exceed US$65 billion, fueled by digital transformation and enterprise optimization.

    “This acquisition delivers the intelligence layer our platform needed. With Smart Bridge, we can now scale high-margin, cross-vertical AI solutions across our client base and unlock exponential value,” said Kevin Ng, Chairman, Executive Director, and Chief Executive Officer of Sagtec.

    Strategic Integration and Product Launch Set for Q3 2025

    Following the closure of the transaction, integration will begin immediately. Sagtec plans to launch its first AI-powered SaaS modules in the third quarter of 2025, beginning with the hospitality segment and expanding into fintech and logistics through its existing distribution network.

    The transaction supports Sagtec’s commitment to driving scalable, recurring SaaS revenue, executing a disciplined AI-focused M&A strategy, and delivering long-term margin expansion and shareholder value creation.

    The Company will provide further updates on its product roadmap, earnings impact, and regional expansion strategy during its upcoming half-year investor call.

    About Sagtec Global Limited

    Sagtec is a leading provider of customizable software solutions, primarily serving the Food & Beverage (F&B) sector. The Company also offers software development, data management, and social media management to enhance operational efficiency across various industries. Additionally, Sagtec operates power-bank charging stations at 300 locations across Malaysia through its subsidiary, CL Technology (International) Sdn Bhd.

    For more information on the Company, please log on to https://www.sagtec-global.com/.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of applicable U.S. securities laws. These statements are not historical facts, but rather are based on the current expectations, assumptions, and projections of Sagtec Global Limited (the “Company”) regarding future events. Forward-looking statements are generally identified by words such as “anticipates,” “believes,” “expects,” “intends,” “plans,” “projects,” “seeks,” “may,” “will,” “should,” “could,” “estimates,” “potential,” or similar expressions, including the negative thereof.

    These statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties, and other factors that may cause actual results, performance, or achievements to differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Such factors include, but are not limited to, the Company’s ability to expand its regional presence, scale its Robotics-as-a-Service (RaaS) and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) offerings, strengthen its AI software and automation infrastructure platforms, and commercialize its AI-powered service robotics; as well as broader risks relating to macroeconomic conditions, geopolitical developments, global health crises, competitive dynamics, and evolving data privacy and cybersecurity regulations.

    The Company disclaims any obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements contained herein, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise, except as required under applicable law. Investors are cautioned not to place undue reliance on any such forward-looking statements.

    Further information on these and other risks is included in the Company’s filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

    Contact Information:

    Sagtec Global Limited Contact:
    Ng Chen Lok
    Chairman, Executive Director & Chief Executive Officer
    Phone: +6011-6217 3661
    Email: info@sagtec-global.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Africa: From Discovery to Delivery: Building a Legal Framework for Namibia’s Midstream Infrastructure (by Rachel Mushabati)

    By Rachel Mushabati, Senior Associate Attorney & Country Head – CLG Namibia (www.CLGGlobal.com)

    Namibia’s recent offshore oil discoveries mark a pivotal moment in the country’s energy sector. With major players such as Shell, TotalEnergies, QatarEnergy, and Galp uncovering significant reserves, Namibia is poised to become a key oil producer. However, while exploration and production activities have gained momentum, the midstream sector; involving transportation, storage, and refining of petroleum, remains underdeveloped.

    A strong legal framework for midstream infrastructure is essential to ensure that Namibia maximizes economic benefits, attracts investment, and builds a sustainable energy industry. CLG Legal and Business Advisory, with its extensive advisory experience across Africa, is uniquely positioned to support this transition. CLG has advised on midstream regulatory frameworks, infrastructure structuring, and investment promotion strategies in various jurisdictions, and brings this expertise to the Namibian context.

    Understanding Midstream Infrastructure and Its Importance

    Midstream infrastructure serves as the critical link between oil extraction and the end consumer. This includes pipelines, refineries, storage facilities, and specialized port infrastructure that facilitate the transportation of crude oil and natural gas. Without adequate midstream infrastructure, Namibia risks becoming an exporter of raw crude without capturing additional value through processing and distribution. A robust midstream sector can boost job creation, industrial development, and energy security, making it a strategic national priority.

    Market studies from other African producers have shown that well-developed midstream infrastructure can contribute up to 30% more in local value addition compared to direct crude exports.[1] In Ghana, for instance, domestic refining and pipeline infrastructure contributed significantly to its GDP growth in the petroleum sector between 2016–2022. Namibia has the opportunity to tap into similar economic potential.[2]

    Existing Legal Framework and Gaps

    Namibia’s petroleum sector is primarily governed by the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1991 and the Petroleum Products and Energy Act 13 of 1990. These laws focus largely on upstream activities and the regulation of downstream petroleum products. However, there is no dedicated midstream regulatory framework. The absence of clear midstream regulations means there is little guidance on ownership structures, investment incentives, and operational guidelines for pipelines, storage, and refining facilities.

    For example, Nigeria’s midstream sector prior to the Petroleum Industry Act (2021) faced significant bottlenecks due to the absence of a clear regulatory framework, particularly regarding third-party access and tariff setting for pipeline infrastructure. These issues led to investor reluctance and underinvestment, which were only addressed after the establishment of the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (Nigeria Petroleum Industry Act, 2021).

    Lessons from Other Oil-Producing Countries

    Namibia can draw inspiration from countries that have successfully developed midstream infrastructure through effective regulation. Norway, for example, has established a robust midstream legal framework that ensures state participation in pipelines and refineries while promoting private investment.[3] Ghana has a dedicated Petroleum Midstream Regulatory Authority that oversees infrastructure development and ensures compliance with environmental and safety standards. Similarly, Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Act (2021) introduced the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority, which provides clear guidelines on pipeline ownership and operations.

    The Role of Key Stakeholders in Strengthening Namibia’s Legal Framework

    To unlock the full potential of the midstream sector, coordinated action is required among various stakeholders:

    1. Government Ministries and Regulators: Responsible for drafting legislation, setting environmental and safety standards, and issuing licenses.
    2. Private Sector and Investors: Bring in capital and technical expertise, while also needing legal certainty to invest confidently.
    3. State-Owned Entities: Can serve as infrastructure operators and strategic partners in public-private partnerships.
    4. Civil Society and Communities: Essential for ensuring environmental accountability and social license to operate.
    5. Legal Advisory Firms: Provide technical assistance in drafting laws, structuring transactions, and navigating policy reform.

    Strengthening Namibia’s Midstream Legal Framework

    To address the existing gaps, Namibia must develop a comprehensive legal framework that clearly defines the governance of midstream activities. A dedicated Midstream Act would be a crucial first step, providing legal certainty on pipeline infrastructure, refineries, storage, and transportation. Encouraging public-private partnerships can drive midstream development while ensuring local participation. Establishing an independent regulatory authority will help enhance transparency, streamline approvals, and enforce compliance.

    Additionally, Namibia should implement policies that prioritize local employment and skills transfer, ensuring that midstream investors contribute to national workforce development. Environmental and safety standards must also be strengthened to mitigate risks associated with pipeline integrity, spill prevention, and emergency response. To further attract investors, tax breaks, duty exemptions, and streamlined licensing processes should be introduced to make Namibia a more competitive destination for midstream infrastructure development.

    Conclusion

    For Namibia to fully capitalize on its oil discoveries, it must establish a strong midstream legal framework that facilitates the efficient transportation, storage, and processing of petroleum resources. Without this, the country risks losing significant economic value and remaining dependent on crude exports.

    By adopting best practices from other oil-producing nations and implementing strategic legal reforms, Namibia can create a thriving midstream sector that benefits both investors and citizens alike. CLG stands ready to support this transformation, leveraging its pan-African expertise in midstream regulation, infrastructure development, and legal advisory. Our team has been instrumental in shaping midstream legal regimes across West and Central Africa, and we are committed to helping Namibia build a regulatory foundation that supports sustainable growth and long-term prosperity.


    [1] Ruben, R., Kuijpers, R., & Dijkxhoorn, Y. (2022). Mobilizing the Midstream for Supporting Smallholder Intensification. Land11(12), 2319. https://apo-opa.co/4ngI2bu

    [2] Oxford Business Group. “Ghana’s energy production targets and exploration attract investment”. Retrieved from https://apo-opa.co/4kUZQHu.

    [3] Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2021). ‘Midstream Regulatory Framework and Investment Guidelines’.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of CLG.

    Contact:
    Email: info@clgglobal.com
    Phone: +27 11 245 5900

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Government’s Fair Funding Review should benefit city residents, Cabinet member says

    Source: City of Plymouth

    Plymouth residents should see the benefits of Government proposals to create a fairer system of local government funding that will direct support to areas where it is most needed, Cabinet member for Finance Councillor Mark Lowry says.

    The shake-up of the funding system announced today aims to ensure those areas that have been overlooked get their fair share, while also cutting out bureaucracy in allocating funding and providing greater certainty for councils through multi-year settlements.

    “The proposals for consultation announced today show that at last we have a government that recognises the devastating impact 14 years of cuts by the previous government have had on councils, who are also struggling with the huge pressures in adult social care, children’s services and temporary accommodation,” Councillor Lowry said.

    “It recognises that areas with low historical tax bases from which to raise income also have high levels of need that drive up demand for services. This has put councils close to breaking point, so it is heartening to hear that we could be moving to a fairer system that at last begins to address the bureaucratic and opaque system of funding local government that has left the councils most in need starved of money.

    “In Plymouth we have worked hard to protect local services from the sort of devastating cuts seen elsewhere but we have been starved of funding for basic services and have a relatively low tax base compared to better off areas. A fairer funding system that addresses need, combined with a new approach to council tax, should in future bring tangible benefits in areas we know matter to people – keeping the streets clean, cutting grass and keeping roads well maintained.

    “While the proposals are very welcome, we need to be realistic. The scale of the challenges facing local government are massive and the demand and cost pressures in areas such as social care are systemic, so we know things won’t change overnight. We will need to continue be ruthless in driving greater efficiency in everything we do but at least now we can be confident that the long-awaited changes to local government finance will finally start to happen and that we have a government that is listening.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom