Category: Finance

  • MIL-OSI Security: South Bay Man Pleads Guilty to Sex Trafficking Woman Addicted to Fentanyl and Admits to Raping Her in Angeles National Forest

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    SANTA ANA, California – A South Bay man pleaded guilty today to a federal criminal charge for forcing a fentanyl-addicted woman to work for him as a prostitute in Orange County, then raping her and abandoning her in the Angeles National Forest.

    Leslie Anthony Bailey, 33, of Wilmington, pleaded guilty to one count of sex trafficking by force and coercion. He has been in custody since March 2024.

    According to his plea agreement, in February 2022, Bailey exchanged messages with a victim on a social media platform. The victim told Bailey she was in a treatment facility for fentanyl addiction and was experiencing withdrawal symptoms. Bailey offered to pick her up and provide her with fentanyl.

    On February 5, Bailey picked the victim up from the facility, took her to buy fentanyl pills, then brought her to his then-residence in Long Beach, where he provided some of the fentanyl pills.

    The next day, Bailey drove the victim from his Long Beach home to an area in Anaheim that is known for prostitution. Bailey told the victim he expected her to engage in sex acts for money and that she would provide him the money she earned from those acts. Bailey also told the victim he would provide more fentanyl to her after she completed the sex transactions. After the victim engaged in approximately four or five sex transactions, Bailey gave her more fentanyl pills and drove her back to his Long Beach residence.

    On February 7, Bailey prevented the victim from leaving his home and threatened to beat her up if she attempted to leave again. Later that day, he again drove her to Anaheim to engage in prostitution, after which time he provided her with more fentanyl.

    On February 8, the victim asked Bailey to drive her back to the drug treatment facility in Los Angeles. Although he promised her that he would do so, Bailey instead drove the victim to a remote area in the Angeles National Forest, ordered her out of the car, punched and kicked her, then raped her, ultimately driving away and leaving her there.

    Bailey further admitted in his plea agreement that in March 2023 he used social media to recruit another victim to work for him as a prostitute. In March and April of 2023, this victim worked for Bailey as a prostitute in Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego counties. Bailey admitted that at times, he used force and threats of force to exert control over her.

    United States District Judge John W. Holcomb scheduled a July 18 sentencing hearing, at which time Bailey will face a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in federal prison and a statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

    Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), the Orange County Human Trafficking Task Force, and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department investigated this matter. The Task Force includes HSI, the FBI, the Anaheim Police Department, the Irvine Police Department, the Santa Ana Police Department, and the California Highway Patrol.

    Assistant United States Attorney Kristin N. Spencer of the Orange County Office is prosecuting this case.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: AIFU Files Annual Report on Form 20-F on April 25, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    GUANGZHOU, China, April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — AIFU Inc. (Nasdaq: AIFU) (the “Company” or “AIFU”), a leading AI-driven independent financial services platform in China, today announced that it has filed its 2024 annual report on Form 20-F (the “2024 20-F”), which contains its audited financial statements for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on April 25, 2025. The 2024 20-F can be accessed on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov as well as on the Investor Relations page of the Company’s website at http://ir.aifugroup.com/financial-information/sec-filings. Hard copies of the annual report are available, free of charge, to its shareholders upon request.

    About AIFU Inc.

    Founded in 1998, AIFU Inc. (“AIFU”, or the “Company”, formerly known as AIX Inc.) is a leading AI-driven independent financial services platform in China. Through strategic partnerships and deep integration across the value chain, AIFU has created a comprehensive ecosystem that connects various financial institutions, service providers, agents, and independent insurance intermediaries.

    Building on this ecosystem, the company delivers comprehensive support and tailored solutions for individual agents and insurance intermediary organizations. By harnessing the power of AI, the Company enables precise matching of customer needs, enhances business development efficiency, and offers personalized, full-lifecycle insurance protection and value-added services.

    Furthermore, through its proprietary AI, big data analytics, and robotic automation platforms, the Company offers a full spectrum of services including automated underwriting, claims processing, risk management, intelligent customer engagement, smart marketing and client education, as well as compliance and security solutions. These advanced capabilities substantially improve intermediaries’ operational efficiency, empower partners to expand market presence, and enable more seamless personalized experiences for end customers.

    Forward-looking Statements

    This press release contains statements of a forward-looking nature. These statements, including the statements relating to the Company’s future financial and operating results, are made under the “safe harbor” provisions of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. You can identify these forward-looking statements by terminology such as “will”, “expects”, “believes”, “anticipates”, “intends”, “estimates” and similar statements. These forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties and are based on current expectations, assumptions, estimates and projections about AIFU Inc. and the industry. Potential risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to, those relating to its ability to attract and retain productive agents, especially entrepreneurial agents, its ability to maintain existing and develop new business relationships with insurance companies, its ability to execute its growth strategy, its ability to adapt to the evolving regulatory environment in the Chinese insurance industry, its ability to compete effectively against its competitors, quarterly variations in its operating results caused by factors beyond its control including macroeconomic conditions in China. Except as otherwise indicated, all information provided in this press release speaks as of the date hereof, and AIFU Inc. undertakes no obligation to update any forward-looking statements to reflect subsequent occurring events or circumstances, or changes in its expectations, except as may be required by law. Although AIFU Inc. believes that the expectations expressed in these forward-looking statements are reasonable, it cannot assure you that its expectations will turn out to be correct, and investors are cautioned that actual results may differ materially from the anticipated results. Further information regarding risks and uncertainties faced by AIFU Inc. is included in AIFU Inc.’s filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, including its annual report on Form 20-F.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: AGF Investments Announces Revised Final Distribution for AGF Systematic Global Multi-Sector Bond ETF

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TORONTO, April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — AGF Investments Inc. (AGF Investments) (TSX:AGF.B) today announced a revised final distribution amount for AGF Systematic Global Multi-Sector Bond ETF (ticker: QGB) (the “ETF”).

    This is an update from the distribution previously announced on April 17, 2025.

    Unitholders of record on April 25, 2025 will receive notional distributions payable in respect of the ETF on April 25, 2025.

    The final distributions will not be paid in cash but will be reinvested in the form of a notional distribution and reported as taxable. A notional distribution is when the units from a reinvested distribution are immediately consolidated with the units held prior to the distribution. The number of units held after the distribution is therefore identical to the number of units held before the distribution. The unitholder’s adjusted cost base for the ETF may increase.

    Details regarding the revised final “per unit” distribution amount is as follows:

    ETF
    Ticker Exchange Revised Final
    Distribution Per Unit
    ($)
    AGF Systematic
    Global Multi-Sector
    Bond ETF
    QGB Cboe Canada Inc. $2.336902

    Further information about the AGF ETFs can be found at AGF.com.

    About AGF Management Limited

    Founded in 1957, AGF Management Limited (AGF) is an independent and globally diverse asset management firm. Our companies deliver excellence in investing in the public and private markets through three business lines: AGF Investments, AGF Capital Partners and AGF Private Wealth.

    AGF brings a disciplined approach, focused on incorporating sound, responsible and sustainable corporate practices. The firm’s collective investment expertise, driven by its fundamental, quantitative and private investing capabilities, extends globally to a wide range of clients, from financial advisors and their clients to high-net worth and institutional investors including pension plans, corporate plans, sovereign wealth funds, endowments and foundations.

    Headquartered in Toronto, Canada, AGF has investment operations and client servicing teams on the ground in North America and Europe. With over $52 billion in total assets under management and fee-earning assets, AGF serves more than 815,000 investors. AGF trades on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol AGF.B.

    About AGF Investments

    AGF Investments is a group of wholly owned subsidiaries of AGF Management Limited, a Canadian reporting issuer. The subsidiaries included in AGF Investments are AGF Investments Inc. (AGFI), AGF Investments America Inc. (AGFA), AGF Investments LLC (AGFUS) and AGF International Advisors Company Limited (AGFIA). The term AGF Investments may refer to one or more of these subsidiaries or to all of them jointly. This term is used for convenience and does not precisely describe any of the separate companies, each of which manages its own affairs.

    AGF Investments entities only provide investment advisory services or offers investment funds in the jurisdiction where such firm and/or product is registered or authorized to provide such services.

    AGF Investments Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of AGF Management Limited and conducts the management and advisory of mutual funds in Canada.

    Disclaimer

    ETFs are listed and traded on organized Canadian exchanges and may only be bought and sold through licensed dealers. Commissions, management fees and expenses all may be associated with investing in ETFs. Exchange-traded funds are not guaranteed, their values change frequently and past performance may not be repeated. Tax, investment and all other decisions should be made, as appropriate, only with guidance from a qualified professional. There is no guarantee that ETFs will achieve their stated objectives and there is risk involved in investing in the ETFs. Before investing you should read the prospectus or relevant ETF Facts and carefully consider, among other things, each ETF’s investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses. A copy of the prospectus and ETF Facts is available on AGF.com.

    This information is not intended to provide legal, accounting, tax, investment, financial, or other advice, and should not be relied upon for providing such advice. Commissions, trailing commissions, management fees and expenses all may be associated with investment fund investments. Please read the prospectus before investing. Investment funds are not guaranteed, their values change frequently, and past performance may not be repeated.

    Media Contact

    Amanda Marchment
    Director, Corporate Communications
    416-865-4160
    amanda.marchment@agf.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: African Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 25, 2025

    PARTICIPANTS:

    Speaker: ABEBE AEMRO SELASSIE, Director, African Department, IMF

    Moderator: KWABENA AKUAMOAH-BOATENG, Communications Officer, IMF

    *  *  *  *  *

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening to all of you here in the room and those joining us online. My name is Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng.  I am with the Communications Department of the IMF, and

    I will be your moderator for today. 

    Welcome to today’s press briefing on the Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa. I am pleased to introduce Abebe Aemro Selassie, Director of the IMF’s African Department.  Abebe will share key insights from our new report titled Recovery Interrupted

    But before I turn to Abebe, a reminder that we have simultaneous interpretation in French and Portuguese, both online and in the room.  And the materials for this press briefing, the report, are all available online at IMF.org/Africa. Abebe, the floor is yours.

    MR. SELASSIE: Good morning and good afternoon to colleagues joining us from the region and beyond. Thank you for being here today for the release of our April Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa.

    Six months ago, I highlighted our region’s sluggish growth, and the steep political and social hurdles governments had to overcome to push through essential reforms.  Today, that fragile recovery faces a new test: the surge of global policy uncertainty so profound it is reshaping the region’s growth trajectory.

    Just when policy efforts began to bear fruit, with regional growth exceeding expectations in 2024, the region’s hard-won recovery has been overtaken by a sudden realignment of global priorities, casting a shadow over the outlook.  We now expect growth in Sub-Saharan Africa to ease to 3.8 percent in 2025 and 4.2 percent in 2026, marked down from our October projections, and these have been driven largely by difficult external conditions: weaker demand abroad, softer commodity prices, and tighter financial markets.

    Any further increase in trade tensions or tightening of financial conditions in advanced economies could further dampen regional confidence, raise borrowing costs further, and delay investment.  Meanwhile, official development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to decline further, placing extra strain on the most vulnerable population.

    These external headwinds come on top of longer-standing vulnerabilities. High debt levels constrain the ability of many countries to finance essential services and development priorities.  While inflationary pressures have moderated at the regional level, quite a few countries are still grappling with elevated inflation, necessitating a tighter monetary stance and careful fiscal policy.

    Against this challenging backdrop, our report underscores the importance of calibrating policies to balance growth, social development, and macroeconomic stability.  Building robust fiscal and external buffers is more important than ever, underpinned by credibility and consistency in policymaking.

    In particular, there is a premium on policies to strengthen resilience: mobilize domestic revenue, improve spending efficiency, and strengthen public finance management and fiscal framework and fiscal frameworks to lower borrowing costs.  Reforms that enhance growth, improve the business climate, and foster regional trade integration are also needed to lay the groundwork for private sector-led growth.  High growth is imperative to engender the millions of jobs our region needs. 

    A strong, stable, and prosperous Sub-Saharan Africa is important for its people but also the world.  It is the region that will be the main source of labor and incremental investment and consumption demand in the decades to come.  External support as the region goes through its demographic transition is of tremendous strategic importance for the future of our planet. 

    The Fund is doing its part to help, having dispersed over $65 billion since 2020 and more than $8 billion just over the last year.  Our policy advice and capacity development efforts support more countries still. 

    Thank you and I’m happy to answer your questions. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Thank you, Abebe. Before we turn to you for your questions, a couple of ground rules, please. If you want to ask a question, raise your hand, and we’ll come to you.  Identify yourself and your organization and please limit it to one question.  For those online, you can use the chat function, or you can also raise your hand, and then we’ll come to you.  I will start from my right. 

    QUESTIONER: Good morning.  Thank you for taking my question.  You mentioned several things in your report.  The recovery that is going on the continent as well as some of the challenges that the continent is facing and the dividends that the continent currently has in its youth.  Leaders on the continent are working — I was at an event yesterday where they are looking at ways to raise funds to develop projects.  So, what is your recommendation for projects?  We’re seeing a need for projects like this as well as revenue mobilization on the continent.  So, is your recommendation to leaders on the continent on how to source these funds that are needed, given that some of the advanced economies are cutting back? 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, any related questions before we go to Abebe?

    QUESTIONER: Abebe, you just made the point that the recovery has been hit by these uncertainties.  Beyond just policy direction, is there any scope to do anything in terms of, for example, maybe you dispense some money though, but maybe a little more to expect — to countries that are coming off defaults and what have you to help in this recovery, even at such a time?  This is also aided by, beyond the fact that some are coming, they have no buffers whatsoever.  And then, coming from defaults, things become very difficult for some of these countries to even have the money to do this.  Could there be any extra funding, even if on a regional level, to back the policy prescriptions that you have proposed? 

    MR. SELASSIE: I think there’s two different points here. The first one is more of a broader meta point, whether financing is the only constraint that is hindering more investment, more robust economic activity, and job creation. Of course, financing plays a role, but it is not the only constraint. It depends on country-to-country circumstances, what sectors we are talking about.  But it really is important to recognize that there are many other things that can be done to engender higher growth to facilitate more investment. 

    One of the issues that we have seen in our region over the years is that a lot of growth has –in many countries– been driven by public spending and public investment for many years.  That, of course, has made a major contribution.  It has facilitated all the investment that we have seen in infrastructure, building schools, building clinics.  So, that has a role to play. But I would say that going forward it will be as important to see if we can find ways in which the private sector is the main engine of growth. So, there are reforms that can be done to facilitate this growth. 

    The second one I am sensing from both your questions is about the circumstance right now where a combination of cuts in aid [and] tighter financing conditions are causing dislocation [and difficulties for governments. We have been, more than anybody else, stressing just what a difficult environment our governments have been facing.  We have been talking about the brutal funding squeeze that countries are under.  It has ebbed a little bit and flowed, you know, like the external market conditions, for example. There have been periods when they have been opened and some of our market access countries have been able to borrow, and then other periods where they have been closed, and we are going through one right now.  And this is on top of the cuts in aid that we have seen and tighter domestic financing conditions.  

    When this more cyclical point is playing out, I think it’s important for countries to be a bit more measured in how they are seeking to tackle their development needs.  So, maybe it means a bit more relying on domestic revenue mobilization, expenditure prioritization when conditions are particularly difficult as they are now, and, as I said earlier, going back to see what can be done to find ways to engender growth over the medium-term.  But it is a difficult period, as we note in our report, and one that is causing quite a bit of dislocation to our countries. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will come to the middle. The lady in the front.

    QUESTIONER: My first question is around recovery, of course, your reports are called “interrupted”.  So, with recovery slipping, growth downgraded, debt pressures mountain, is Sub-Saharan Africa at risk of another lost decade?  Because in your report you mentioned that the last four years have been quite turbulent for Africa, and we are trying to get back on track.  What is IMF’s message on bold actions that leaders must take now to avoid being left behind in the global economy and to avoid Africa being in a permanent state of vulnerability?  Because we always hear that we are in a permanent state of vulnerability.  Then for Nigeria, macros are under threat right now.  How can the government — what are your suggestions on how the government can actually push through deep reforms that deliver tangible growth for its people?  Of course, for your report, you did mention the millions and millions of people that you know live below $2.15 a day. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Any more Nigeria questions? I will take the gentleman right here.

    QUESTIONER: In your report you said that debt has stabilized.  And when you look at Nigeria’s debt profile, what insights can you share as to where the borrowings are going to?  Are you seeing more of long-term loans or short-term loans?  So that’s one.  So, what — recently the World Bank expressed concerns about the performance of Nigeria’s statistical body, saying that the institution is performing Sub optimally.  Do you share that sentiment?  Thank you very much. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will take one more on Nigeria. The gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTIONER: I [would] like to know in specific terms, Nigeria has already undertaken several reforms, especially removed oil subsidies and floated the naira.  What more specific things do you expect of Nigeria in terms of reform?

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. Abebe?

    MR. SELASSIE: So, in terms of the reforms that have been going on in Nigeria and the particularities of the challenge, the first thing to note is that we have been really impressed by how much reforms have been undertaken in recent years. Most notably, trying to go to the heart of the cause of the macroeconomic imbalances in Nigeria, which are related to the fact that, oil subsidies were taking up a very large share of the limited tax revenues that the government have and not necessarily being used in the most effective way to help the most vulnerable people. The issues related to the imbalances on the external side with the exchange rate extremely out of line. 

    So it’s been really good to see the government taking these on, head-on, address those, and also beginning to roll out the third component of the reforms that we have been advocating for and of course, the government has been pursuing, which is to expand social protection, to target generalized subsidies to help the most vulnerable.  This has all been very good to see, but more can be done, particularly on the latter front, expanding social protection and enhancing a lot more transparency in the oil sector so that the removal of subsidies does translate into flow of revenue into the government budget.  So, there is still a bit more work to do in these areas. 

    We just had a mission in Nigeria where there was extensive discussions on these and other issues on the macroeconomic area, but also other areas where there is a need to do reforms to engender more private sector investment and also how more resources can be devoted to help Nigeria generate the revenues it so desperately needs to build more schools, more universities, and, of course, more infrastructure.  So, there is a comprehensive set of reforms that Nigeria can pursue that would help engender more growth and help diversify the economy away from reliance on oil.  And this diversification is, of course, all the more important given what we are seeing happening to commodity prices.  So, I think this is an important agenda. 

    Second, as the government is doing this, of course there will be a financing need.  And here what is needed is really a judicious and agile way of dealing with the financing challenges the country faces.  In the long run, the financing gap can only be filled by permanent sources such as revenue mobilization.  But in the interim, carefully looking at all the options the country must borrow in a contained way will be part of that solution.  And I think the government has been going about this prudently and cautiously so far, and we are encouraged by that. 

    And lastly, on data issues in Nigeria we really applaud the effort the government’s making to try and revise and upgrade data quality in Nigeria.  This task is not an easy one in our countries, given the extent of informality there is, given the extent of relative price changes that play out in our economies.  So doing this cautiously is what is needed methodically.  And that is exactly what we see happening.  We welcome, though, the efforts the government is making because without good data, it is difficult to make good policies.  So, we really applaud the effort the government is making to try and upgrade data quality. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We will take a round of questions online.

    QUESTIONER: There are bills in the UK Parliament and the New York State Assembly that aim to force holdout private creditors to accept debt treatments on comparable terms to other creditors and to limit or stop such litigation.  Are these bills needed, do you think, or is the current international debt architecture sufficient?  So, you know, IMF, DSAs, creditor groups, the common framework, where applicable. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please go ahead with your question.

    QUESTIONER: Earlier this month, the IMF reached a staff-level agreement with Burkina Faso to complete the Third Review of the country’s program.  So as part of the review, the IMF allowed a greater fiscal flexibility, allowing Burkina Faso to raise its public deficit target to 4 percent, up from the 2 percent cap set by the West African Economic Monetary Union.  So, given that the country’s challenges, such as persistent insecurity, high social demands, are common across the region, wouldn’t it be wiser to consider applying this flexibility more broadly to the West African Economic Monetary Union?  And my second question will be about the downward revision of the growth forecast for 2025 and 2026 in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Does the IMF view this new crisis – I am talking about the global uncertainty and the recent U.S. tariff measures.  Does the IMF view this crisis as potentially more severe and with broader consequences for the region than previous shocks such as COVID and the war in Ukraine? 

    MR. SELASSIE: On the first question on debt workouts and the challenges there, I am not fully informed about the specifics of the bills that Rachel, you are talking about, indeed, we have seen from time to time some private creditor groups holding out, trying to hold out, but I am not sure that a bill is what’s needed, but rather, force of argument to try and bring people to the table. And in recent restructurings, at least I am not aware of this being the main hindrance in advancing discussions.  There have been many other factors, including just the complexity of the current creditor landscape, that have played a role. 

    On Burkina Faso, flexibility under the program or the deficit targets for the WAEMU countries more generally, just it is important to distinguish between particular years’ fiscal deficit targets that the government wants to pursue and we, incorporate in the program and just the more medium-term criteria, convergence criteria that there is for the WAEMU countries. 

    So, the 3 percent target criteria are for the medium- to long-term.  And it has been very clear that when there are shocks or when there are pressing social development needs, countries do have the scope to deviate from that.  In fact, often the constraint on the Sahel countries has been not having enough, sufficient, enough financing to be able to meet these to advance development objectives.  The other constraint of course is that overall, the more you exceed this 3 percent target and add to the overall debt burden, the more you are going to have – you are likely to build up debt vulnerabilities. 

    So, in the work that we do with countries, whether it is Burkina Faso or other WAEMU countries or indeed beyond, what we try and help with is of course to help countries strike this balance between addressing the immediate and pressing needs that they have while avoiding medium-term debt sustainability problems.  I think one is just thinking about how to strike this balance.  And then second, we put resources on the table very cheaply to help countries, avoid, at least in the near term, more difficult financing difficulties.  So, for Burkina and others, it is just about striking this balance.

    And on growth, whether this latest shock is as bad for the region as the previous ones. I think it is really important also to point out that as difficult, I mean the last four or five years have been incredibly difficult time for our countries, a lot of challenges, a lot of dislocation, but there is also been quite a lot of resilience, and I think that is important to stress.  I would note that, even now, it is this year, 11 out of the 20 fastest growing economies in the world are from Sub-Saharan Africa.  So, there are quite a lot of countries that are going to be sustaining significant growth in the region.  So, we should also not lose sight of this resilience. 

    Second, and more broadly, the buildup of uncertainties I think is very negative.  And this is interrupting what we are seeing in terms of a recovery.  But growth is not, we are not projecting growth to collapse.  And our hope is that as things calm down, the region can resume its growth trajectory also.

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We will take three more questions online, then we will come back to the room.

    QUESTIONER: I wanted to know about Senegal, in terms of whether funds would be repaid after the misreporting of data and if the IMF has learned anything from that?  And also, just if you can, the status of the IMF’s programs and even operations in Sudan and South Sudan? 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: The IMF is urging countries to focus on domestic revenue mobilization.  But you may have seen that South Africa’s Finance Minister has withdrawn the VAT increase that he had proposed in the budget, in the face of opposition from coalition partners.  Does the IMF see any alternative sources of revenue that are feasible for the South African government as the parties hoped?  And are there any lessons here for other countries trying to mobilize domestic revenue?                                                         

    QUESTIONER: Building on the question that Hilary has asked that the REO does make the case for domestic revenue mobilization, and you made that argument, I believe, in the last two Regional Economic Outlook reports as well.  But poverty is still endemic.  Incomes, as far as I can tell, have not really recovered to pre-pandemic levels.  So other than broadcast to tax exemptions what else can be done to raise tax-to-GDP ratios?  One last question on this.  Has there been any progress that has been made in the Sovereign Debt Roundtable in deciding how debt from Afreximbank, and Trade and Development Bank should be treated, at least under the common framework for countries like Ghana and Zambia?  Now, do they qualify to not have their debt restructured in the same way that the IMF, the World Bank’s credit lines?

    MR. SELASSIE: On Senegal, I was recently in Dakar for discussions building on work that our team has been doing. What we are waiting for is the government to finalize the work that’s ongoing.  Right now, the audits are going on and reconciliation work is going on. 

    On the extent of domestic and external debt.  We have been very clear in welcoming the transparency and really robust and collegial way in which the government has been engaging on the issues that have arisen in the misreporting case and we look forward to the numbers stabilizing, and engaging in discussions on the next steps in terms of bringing the, the findings to our Executive Board and next steps in our engagement with Senegal. 

    On South Sudan, it has just been a difficult period of course for South Sudan.  They have been hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from the conflict in the north.  The conflict has also interrupted, disrupted heavily their main source of tax revenue, oil exports through the pipeline.  So, it’s been a really wrenching period.  Over the last three, four years we have provided, you know, we have been trying to provide South Sudan with emergency financing and trying to find a way in which we can engage with a more structured longer-term program.  We remain hopeful that we are going to be able to do that.  But first and foremost, I think we need to see what can be done to make sure that the policy making environment is as robust and as strong as it is, and as transparent, so we can come in, step in and support South Sudan.

    On revenue mobilization, I want to just first link this to the point I made earlier that what we have observed and again there is a risk of generalizing, but what we’ve observed over the last 10, 15 years in the region is that governments have made a very significant effort to invest in really important infrastructure needs in building schools, in building health clinics and much else.  And you see very positive outcomes.  Look at the electricity coverage in our region, look at the human development indicators and how much they have moved over the years in the region. 

    But we have also seen that despite a lot of investment, for example, in electricity generation capacity and electricity coverage in our countries, many roads are being built.  The returns of all this investment have not been captured in the tax revenue, which is one of the points, the pressure points where debt levels have gone up and the interest-to-revenue ratio.  So, the interest payment-to-revenue ratio has also been rising.  And this has been one of the key points of vulnerability in many economies and why a few countries have gotten into debt difficulty and needed to restructure. 

    So going forward, I think it’s very clear that to be able to continue investing; to be able to continue expanding economies and the government doing its core function, it has to find more ways other than borrowing to address this. 

    Now, in the past, governments have been quick to cut spending, and that has, we found, again and again, to be very detrimental to development progress and growth outcomes.  I think this, again, at the risk of generalizing, was the approach that was generally pursued in the 1980s and found to be very problematic, very challenging, very depressing to growth.  So, we would very much love for countries to avoid this. When there are pressing spending needs, there’s generally only a couple of ways that you can finance this.  Spending cuts or revenue mobilization.  You can borrow, of course, but as I said, borrowing is not optimal. 

    Now, this doesn’t mean revenue mobilization is easy.  Far, far from it. It requires not only political engagement, but also a lot of communication, a lot of effort to show that the resources the government is trying to generate are going to be going to the right areas to help strengthen the social contract.  So, it’s a deep and engaged process, and we are very, very cognizant of that.  But I do think that this is the most optimal way, the most economically sensible way in which our countries can help address the tremendous development needs that we have.

    Now, specifically on South Africa, ultimately when issues like this arise, these are deeply domestic political issues to be resolved as to what the best way to do the financing is.  So, if a tax rate increase for a particular tax is not possible, then maybe finding ways to expand the tax base, maybe trying different tax angles or if all of those are not possible, then revisiting spending priorities may be one of the ways that countries must handle this.  And this is typically what we see playing out in countries in the region when financing constraints are binding. 

    So, whether it is in Kenya, South Africa, or other countries the issue of revenue mobilization is a live one, but one that is extremely complex.  We are very cognizant of that.  And one that requires quite a lot of consensus building, quite a lot of discussion to be able to advance, and of course, broader societal support.  And we absolutely see countries engaging in this and do what we can to help bring lessons from other countries where we are asked to.

    Then there was a question about the GSDR.  So, this Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, this is the initiative launched by the Fund and the Bank to try and bring creditors and debtors together around the table to find ways in which debt work[outs] can be easier because you are discussing general principles rather than country-specific debt restructuring issues. And we have seen this making quite a lot of progress. Perhaps the most recent development has been the preparation of a debt work[out] playbook that is a very helpful document that has been put out building on the experience of recent work[outs].  What has worked particularly well.  What kind of information sharing ahead of debt work[outs] have been helpful in terms of accelerating debt processes.  Debt restructurings are one of the most contentious and challenging issues that there are between states, between creditors and debtors, and it requires quite a lot of discussion, and it is not such an easy thing to do, including what the parameter of debt should be.  I think one of the questions that was raised is about the debt parameter.  This is fundamentally an issue for the debtor countries and creditors to resolve, and intra-creditor disputes also have to be done. 

    So, in terms of the principles that generally we see creditors apply when these kinds of disputes arise about what the right parameter should be or not and who gets preferential treatment. I think there’s generally been two rules of thumb. One is that the terms in which new financing is being provided or the financing is provided, whether it’s commercial or concessional has been a factor that most creditors look at in terms of whether a particular credit should be included in the parameter or not, and then also the extent to which new financing is being made available.  So, what differentiates senior creditors like the IMF, the World Bank, of course, is that for most countries we operate providing concessional financing very long-term.  And we are the ones that come in and provide financing consistently through crisis and otherwise. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We have time for one more round of questions. I will start with the gentleman in the front here. 

    QUESTIONER: The U.S. is your largest shareholder, and we are seeing mixed messages this week from the Treasury Secretary mentioning that he remains committed to the Fund but also calling on you to hold countries accountable to program performance, empower staff to walk away if reform commitment is lacking. 

    So, I wanted to ask you, should we expect the IMF spigot to start closing in response to U.S. pressure?  Or if not, are you changing your approach to countries, what you are telling them and how to deal with their issues?  Are you being a little more stringent in your requirements? 

    You have talked about Senegal, maybe Ghana, Ethiopia, related to that issue of the U.S stepping in.  The CEMAC negotiations this week, we saw American energy companies working with the CEMAC on repatriation of funds dedicated to the rehabilitation of oil sites.  I’m wondering if you have a stance on that, what the IMF position is?  I understand the U.S is trying to get the IMF involved in that.

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thanks. Gentleman. 

    QUESTIONER: Kenyan authorities here have indicated the need to present a credible fiscal framework as they try and unlock a new program for Kenya.  Would you offer more color into the discussions this week, noting again that the same credibility questions led to the cancellation or the termination of the program at its final review?  

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We have a question online “what is the IMF’s view on Kenya’s debt position?”

    MR. SELASSIE: So, on the first question, I would like to refer you to Kristalina who gave comprehensive responses to the Secretary’s IMFC Statement. What I want to add though is that in the region, in Sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of programs, the calibration of reforms, incorporation of reforms, I would say that we are always in terms of each program has its particularities and what we always try and do in these programs is make sure that we’re striking a balance of helping countries address the long term challenges and also the cyclical challenges that are often the ones that cause them to come to us.  And I would say that I don’t think there are many countries that think that the adjustment efforts that they’re being asked to make are easy ones.

    On CEMAC.  Just to be very clear there is this dispute that is going on between member states, the BEAC, and oil companies with respect to what are called restitution funds.  The funds under contracts that countries have with oil companies are meant to be available to help restore the sites where oil is extracted back to their pre-extraction standards. 

    What has been a bit frustrating is that we are not privy to the contents of these documents. We have been calling on members and the companies involved to be transparent about this, to publish these documents.  They are after all documents that are about how countries natural resource wealth are used.  And we’ve been on record going seven, eight, nine years pushing for production sharing agreements, the terms of these things to be published so that each side can hold the other accountable.  I think that is the first thing that could be done to bring more transparency and light and understanding to the rest of the world about what is going on in these discussions. 

    Second, we have also made it clear to both parties that given that we do not have full information, it is difficult for us to know what to say.  But in general, any encumbrances in terms of how we look at foreign exchange reserves and these standards are published, any encumbrances like the type that we think there may be in the document, i.e., that is the expectation that these resources will be used for specific purposes means they’re not general use reserves.  So, they would not be classified as part of reserves. 

    On Kenya, we have had a very strong engagement with Kenya over the years and will continue to have such engagement going forward.  As we have noted, government has asked for a follow-on program to try and address the remaining challenges in Kenya, and we are discussing how to do that including in the context of these meetings. 

    It has been good to hear and see that the economy has been performing quite well in some parts.  Particularly the external adjustment front seems to have been proceeding well.  The current account has been narrowing.  So, there are quite a lot of strengths.  But also of course there remain fiscal challenges which were a significant part of the last program’s objectives that need to be advanced.  So, we are going to engage with the government and do everything that we can to be able to help it go forward. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Unfortunately, that is all the time we have. So, if you have any questions that we didn’t get to, please send them to me or to Media at IMF.org and we will try and get back to you as soon as possible.  So, also to mention that the report is now available at IMF.org/Africa.  The Spring Meetings continue.  Later this morning, we have the press briefing for the European Department and later in the afternoon we have the IMFC, and the Western Hemisphere Department press briefings. 

    On behalf of Abebe and the African and Communications Departments, thank you all for coming to this press briefing and see you next time. 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/25/tr-04252025-african-department-press-briefing-transcript

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: IMFC, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 25, 2025

    Speaker:

    Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director, IMF

    Mohammed Aljadaan, IMFC Chair, Minister of Finance, Saudi Arabia

     

    Moderator:

    Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, IMF

     

     

    Ms.  Kozack: I am delighted to have with me the Chair of the IMFC, His Excellency Mohammed Aljadaan. He is also the Minister of Finance of Saudi Arabia. And of course, our Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva.

    Minister Aljadaan and the Managing Director will first share some takeaways with you and then when that is concludes we will turn to you for your questions.  Your Excellency, the floor is yours.

    Minister. Aljadaan: Thank you, Julie. Thank you, Kristalina. And thanks to all of you for being here. At the outset, let me highlight an important development that took place the first time in these meetings, which is the IMFC welcoming its 25th member, the third chair of Africa. Obviously, this is an important milestone that strengthens the voice and representation of the African continent in a global economic dialogue. I would like to thank all members who made this possible.  

    On the IMF agenda, going forward, the Fund must continue to focus on its core mandate, including supporting international monetary cooperation, encouraging the expansion of trade and economic growth, and discouraging policies that would harm prosperity.

    In recent days, the IMFC members welcomed steps to further strengthen the effectiveness of the IMF’s three core functions, its surveillance of global economic trends, its lending where we welcome the review of program design conditionality, and its capacity development assistance, which helps ensure growth in so many member countries and within countries.

    Addressing global debt vulnerabilities remains a priority for our members, especially for low‑income and vulnerable countries. They welcome the progress made in debt treatments under the G20 Common Framework. They also express their commitment to addressing global debt vulnerabilities in an effective, comprehensive, and systemic manner.

    Members encouraged the IMF and the World Bank to help advance the implementation of the three‑pillar approach to address debt service pressures. We appreciate the tremendous efforts of the members in shaping the medium‑term direction of the IMF and contributing to the Diriyah Declaration.

    The Diriyah Declaration represents a forward‑looking approach to strengthening the IMFC process and advancing governance reforms and has received full support from the members. Just to clarify, when I say the Diriyah Declaration, this is the Declaration that was prepared by the Deputies in their meetings in Saudi Arabia earlier this month in preparation for this meeting.

    Here we aim to ensure that the Fund remains well‑equipped to meet future challenges in line with its core mandate. Before I hand it over to Kristalina, I have to comment on the topic of the day, which I think a lot of people are talking about, trade tension. Many members have told me how the trade situation has created significant uncertainty. Indeed, the buzz word was uncertainty all over this week, and indeed it also carries with it market volatility, presenting real risks to the global growth and financial stability. But as Kristalina said recently, these threat conflicts have been like forgetting a pot boiling on a stove. Well, now that pot is boiling over. In other words, we should not be surprised that there are trade tensions. And this situation is an opportunity for us all to have constructive conversations about how we will move forward together. This is a challenging time, but I have always been optimist and absolutely make no apologies for that. I will explain to you why. History tells us that the bigger the challenge, the more it requires us to come together to convene and to have an honest conversation. That is exactly what happened this week. That is exactly the power of the IMF to actually be able to convene everybody around the same table in closed rooms and discuss issues in a constructive way.

    I have told colleagues, I arrived in Washington a week ago with a lot of noise in my ears from reading the news and following social media. I have told them, everyone that I met in the early days, please keep your thoughts cool, and we will see where we are going to end. Actually, today we are ending in a lot better position than when we started the week. People understand the consequences and are working together in a constructive manner to resolve tensions.  

    I am also confident that because of the IMF, the IMF is really watching us very closely, following the global situation and is really providing advice to its members in real‑time, offering an assessment of the potential impacts and the best way to proceed.  

    This week we have seen an incredible assurance confirming the position of the IMF and its convening power and contributing to positive development, including in relation to Syria. Gathering together to talk about Syria and building on our meetings in AIUla has given us a new sense of urgency and purpose, to turn a conflict‑affected state, which is Syria, into a stable and economically successful one, benefiting the region and the world. It is not just about the money. It is about the work that the IMF and other partners can deliver on capacity development, quality data, and timely advice.

    Again, I would like to thank Kristalina and the IMF staff. And I can tell you, it was an incredible, unanimous position today to thank the IMF for their incredible, incredible brain cells power, which was able really to produce a very comprehensive report about what is happening in the world in a very short period of time, and it was fantastic. Thank you, Kristalina. Thanks to all the IMF staff and thank you again for being here. The floor is yours.

    Managing Director: Thank you very much, Minister Aljadaan, for your kind words now, but above all for your exemplary leadership of the IMFC. I want to tell everybody here that the way you chaired the meetings brought the members together to speak openly, frankly and as a result to find a path to common understanding that is so necessary in the current environment because, as we all know, our meetings take place against a challenging backdrop. You have seen our World Economic Outlook. It shows that the global economy is facing a significant slowdown and also that risks are on the downside.

    Understandably Ministers and Governors are concerned, but at the same time they have also exhibited a remarkably constructive spirit in these meetings, coming together, showing willingness to take on the challenges facing the global economy. Minister Aljadaan laid out the substance and achievements of our discussions. Let me add just three points. First, Ministers and Governors agreed on the importance of reducing uncertainty and working together to clarify policies.

    Second, importantly, they recognized that they need to seize the moment to put their own houses in order. And I saw very firm resolve to tackle difficult and, in many cases, delayed reforms at home, to strengthen resilience, to remove impediments to productivity and lift up their medium and long‑term growth prospects, and to address underlying domestic imbalances which drive external imbalances. To put it simply, addressing external imbalances starts at home.

    Finally, we discussed how the IMF can help countries successfully navigate this period of change and build resilience. I was very heartened to hear from the membership strong support for our work to promote macroeconomic and financial stability and to do it through robust bilateral, multilateral and regional surveillance, be there for our members when they need to cope with balance of payments problems, finance—finance them, but also finance them with the clear objective that they can strengthen their economies. I can say the words of support for our capacity development, in other words, helping countries have strong institutions, strong policies. That support was overwhelming.

    At this period of complex challenges for the membership, they also gave us homework. I want to emphasize two areas where we will further deepen our work. One, do more work on external imbalances, dig deeper, when they could become a source of concern and provide advise how to address them through policies. Two, continue to scan the financial sector to identify potential sources of instability, especially in the non‑bank sector, and provide advice on how best to enhance resilience.

    Overall, what I can tell you is that what I heard this week was an incredible determination by our members to steer economies through this period of change and uncertainty. And it gave me confidence that we actually can take challenge and make opportunity, that we can have a more resilient, more balanced world economy.

    Like Minister Aljadaan, I started the week more anxious of our capacity as a global community to come together, and I finished the week with more confidence that this is exactly what we will do.

    Ms. Kozack: Thank you very much, Minister, Managing Director. We will now open the floor to your questions, so please raise your hand if you have a question and please identify yourself and your outlet. I will start here in the middle. I am going to go to the gentleman in the kind of White shirt. Yes, right here.

    Question: Thank you, Julie. Question for Minister Aljadaan and Managing Director Georgieva. You both pointed out that we ended a week in a way better position than when we started it. Managing Director, during your Curtain Raiser Speech, you also raised the hope that this week might be an opportunity for everybody to discuss. How do you feel like? Could you elaborate perhaps on how this week dialing down the uncertainty that you talked about and the global tensions when it comes to trade? Thank you very much.

    Managing Director: Finding a path to solutions starts from looking at the problem from a—seeing the problem with the same eye view. Let me start this again. To resolve a problem, you have different parties. To resolve a problem, they need to have information about the problem that allows them to have a meaningful conversation. I can say that I am very, very grateful to the staff of the IMF because what we did was to offer the members information that allows them to see what is ahead of them and expand their horizon. If you look at a problem only from a narrow point of view, it is difficult to have a meaningful conversation to resolve it.

    Secondly, what I saw was a genuine openness to present views in a candid way and to listen to each other.

    Third, and the third is the most important, it is a traction and engagement among members that could then bring a better—faster and better outcome. I do not want to sugarcoat. We still have quite a challenging time. It is challenging not just because of the tariffs and the uncertainty. It is also challenging that there are other transformational forces in play. Because of the overwhelming attention to tariffs, we stopped talking about other things, like artificial intelligence, demographics transition, and I think that that sense that we can have an engagement in a comprehensive way on a complex set of challenges, that came during the meetings quite strongly. Does it mean that everybody agrees with everybody else? No. But do we have an open conversation, engaged conversation with the fair space for everybody to present their views? Yes.

    Minister Aljadaan: Thank you. If I may, Julie, I think just to complement the Managing Director’s views, I think overall what do you need to resolve conflicts like this or tensions like this? A, you need to make sure that you understand the parties’ positions, where they are coming from, why they are taking these positions, and what are they seeking to achieve. Second, make sure that they actually talk. And that is largely what happened this week. So to have everybody who is party to all this trade tensions, which is almost everybody, all the members, around the same table in a candid discussion that is closed even—some of it has been in the restricted sessions—to really be open and talk about what are they doing, why they are doing it, what is their view of what is going to happen in the next even short period of time is very assuring. Sharing that information is very assuring. Understanding the implications of these actions on other nations, including low‑income countries, emerging economies and implications of that is actually very helpful for them to appreciate the consequences of their positions.

    I can tell you without—I cannot disclose some of the discussion that has taken place, but I can tell you there was a very clear, frank discussion, including a projection of a timeline for a resolution of some of these issues. So that is very assuring.

    Managing Director: Can I just add one point, that when people are in the same room, the abstract policies become more human because then we understand these policies are affecting people, and the whole world—the people of the whole world are then present, and that makes the conversation different. No longer it is an academic conversation. It is a very real-life conversation.

    Ms. Kozack: Thank you. I will go to this side. I will go to the second row, gentleman with the blue jacket and the glasses.

    Question: Thank you so much for taking my question. I am from Bangkok. Your Excellency, you have mentioned uncertainty around the world in your opening remarks. So, I want to ask specifically on the consequences for the emerging markets as a whole, and what is your policy advice for the situation and also do you see any short‑term lasting impacts to these countries? Thank you.

    Minister Aljadaan: I will give it a time and then you can complement. First of all, I look forward to our renewal meeting in Thailand next year and seeing the preparations from now, I think a lot of people are excited and waiting for our meetings there. I am sure it will be very constructive in the hospitable country of Thailand and the Kingdom of Thailand.

    Obviously emerging economies, particularly emerging economies with limited fiscal space have little room to maneuver to deal with shocks. And even if these shocks have been resolved, there is some lasting impact. The earlier, the faster that these shocks or trade tensions in this context is resolved, the better for everybody. But we are not in a perfect world and things may take time and countries may get an impact, and that is where the IMF excels. That is where is IMF capacity building, advice comes into actual real play. So, the Managing Director is here and her staff with an incredible talent will be able to actually provide that support to emerging economies.

    Managing Director: As a group, emerging markets by and large are generally highly open. They rely on—many of them rely on exports as an engine for growth. They are quite active in international bond markets, so because they are highly exposed, the impact on emerging markets is quite significant. Some of the emerging markets, especially those that were in a tougher position after the multiple shocks, also face very limited and some of them non‑existing policy space to act.

    We have downgraded growth projections for emerging markets and developing economies to 3.7 percent for 2025. This is a 0.6 percent downgrade. And to 3.9 percent for 2026. What does that mean? It means that some of them would see a significant slowdown in their convergence to higher‑income countries. And they are also seeking ways to overcome the challenges ahead. What works for them is emerging markets have been fantastic in building resilience to shocks. And when I look at the universe of emerging market economies, quite a number of countries have become more agile in their policymaking, are more mature in how they approach their fiscal and monetary policy. That puts them in a better position.

    To use an analogy, it is like they have gone through multiple periods of being tested and they got immune to shocks to a certain degree. They would be seeing possibly somewhat less inflationary pressure. Why? Because when you are on the receiving end of tariffs, what it means is that actually domestically you do not have pressure on prices. We can expect emerging markets to look at their policy tools very carefully. We urge them, be very careful with fiscal measures. Do not rush to provide fiscal support willy‑nilly because you cannot afford to lose fiscal space. Have a medium long‑term framework to rebuild this fiscal space. On the monetary policy side, watch pressures. We are saying inflation is likely to slow down but watch it and watch inflation expectations. Do what is necessary, given the data you have. And very important, allow the exchange rate to be a shock absorber.

    We have the integrated policy framework that offers advice to countries how to approach exchange rate issues with great care. You are an emerging market. Actually, the Minister is not saying that, but one thing emerging markets can do for themselves is, get your own house in order. Pursue reforms relentlessly because this is what makes you stronger.

    Ms. Kozack: We have time for just one last question. So, I am going to go second row, the gentleman in the blue suit.

    Question: Thank you, Ms. Kozack. Mr. Aljadaan, Managing Director Georgieva. I am from Lebanon. My question is addressed to both of you. How will the IMF support Syria and what role will it play in Syria’s reconstruction. Thank you.

    Ms. Kristalina Georgieva: Minister Aljadaan in the opening recognized that Syria has returned to the international community. We had a meeting with Syrian representatives in AIUla during an emerging market conference. We had a meeting on fragile and conflict‑affected states. And at that time, we made the first step to create a coordinating group so different institutions that can support Syria can start working together. We held a meeting here in Washington during the Spring Meetings. It was co‑chaired by Minister Aljadaan, President Banga and myself, with the Finance Minister and the Central Bank Governor of Syria. In this meeting we discussed how we can start rebuilding institutions and policy capacity in Syria and how different institutions can play on their comparative advantage to help. For the Fund specifically, what it means is, of course, cautiously but engage to first define data, what is available, how we can rebuild credible data capability.  

    Second, central bank capacity. How can we rebuild the functioning of Syria’s central bank.

    Third, tax policy and how can the country rebuild capacity to create revenues for its functions.

    We have appointed a Mission Chief for Syria. We have not had Article IV Consultations with Syria for a long, long time. We hope that we can contribute in putting the foundation of knowledge, economic policy knowledge in Syria to get the country back on track. 

    I mean, just imagine, they have been in a Civil War for 14 years. A big part of the population is not in Syria. They are in Lebanon. They are in Iraq. They are in Jordan. The fabric of the Syrian society is deeply wounded. It is going to take a lot of work by the Syrians themselves to rebuild it. This is when international organizations can play a constructive role. Lebanon, you are not asking about Lebanon.

    Question: I heard the meetings went quite well by the end, especially since the Lebanese Parliament voted about the banking sequencing. That is more in line with international standards, so what are you—

    Managing Director: You are not asking because you know. That is very good.

    Ms. Kozack: Minister, would you like to have the last word?

     

    Minister Aljadaan: I have a few things. First of all, I really thank the IMF and the World Bank in stepping up their support to Syria and other states who are emerging from fragility. Syria in particular is a case where we have an opportunity. We have a government that is willing, and we have regional partners who are also providing support and willing really to provide whatever it takes to make sure that we bring back Syria, support its people and make sure that we also move cautiously through that process, recognizing that obviously there are sanctions that we need to deal with and other impediments. But even with that, I think standing with them, providing capacity support and advice and some regional and bilateral, even financial support is very crucial. The Syrian people deserve that support. And that does not stop at Syria. We are talking about Syria as an example, we have Yemen, we have Palestine, we have Sudan, we have other countries that really need the support, including Lebanon. They need to know that the international community, if they put their act together, the international community will stand by them, so we will continue that.

    Ms. Kozack: We are almost five minutes over our time.

    Managing Director: Ask your question short, and we will try to answer.

    Ms. Kozack: And have a very brief answer.

    Managing Director: It is my fault. I am the one that is professorial.

     

    Question: My question is to the MD concerning the global uncertainty on trade tensions shaping sub‑Saharan Africa’s debt risk, servicing costs as well as our fiscal future and its coordination with creditors such as you, so how are Africa also in all of these conversations? Thank you.

     

    Managing Director: As Minister Aljadaan said, Africa was more present this time because we now have three sub‑Saharan African representatives in the IMFC. But beyond that, very much on our minds, quite a number of the Governors of the Fund spoke about the importance to pay attention to countries that are particularly severely affected by this turbulence because they have a high level of debt and that suppresses their ability to cope.

    By the way, countries with high level of debt are not just in sub‑Saharan Africa. We have them all over the world.

    What has been done during these meetings is threefold. First, very strong emphasis on the three‑pillar approach of the IMF and the World Bank for countries that experience liquidity constraints. They are not yet facing debt sustainability problems, but they are on the way to there. And for these countries to concentrate support for domestic resource mobilization, concentrate attention to how to mobilize more international financing and very important, concentrate on how the private sector can play a bigger role in the economy.   

    Second, for countries where debt is not sustainable, how to make debt restructuring faster and more effective. We have issued this week a playbook for debt restructuring that was the outcome of the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable. What it shows are the steps that need to be taken.

    As you recall under the Common Framework, there was some confusion around how exactly to go about it, what is the timeline, what is the exact sequencing of steps. This is now being clarified. If we follow the playbook, we play by the book, we get debt restructuring in less than 12 months. And the third thing, very important for the Fund, is that our members have put in place a way to expand our capacity to finance low‑income countries through the Poverty Reduction Growth Trust so the Fund can step up financing for countries, so they do not need to—they do not need to go through a super painful adjustment because of this burden of debt. We can ease their path. But, again, we want to see countries act decisively on reforms so they—you do not borrow your way out of debt. You grow your way out of debt. So, when countries have that growth potential enhanced, then they can also reduce debt vulnerability. It was not very short. My apologies.

    Ms. Kozack: Minister, would you like to add?          

    Minister Aljadaan: I am fine. I think the Managing Director did a great job in answering.

    Managing Director: Look, you have to forgive me. I was for 14 years a professor. It kicks in.

     

    Minister Aljadaan: We enjoy it, Kristalina

    Managing Director: Thank you very much, everybody.

    Ms. Kozack: This does bring us to an end, so thank you for joining us. And let me just add that the full transcript of the press briefing will be available online on the IMF website. And, of course, should you have further questions, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at IMF media.org. Thank you.

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/25/tr-04252025-imfc-press-briefing-transcript

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    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB extends over €525 million to Poland’s top utility PGE for renewable energy production

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • European Investment Bank and PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna seal new financing agreement worth PLN 2.25 billion (over 525 million).
    • EIB loan will support Poland’s energy transition, helping strengthen economic competitiveness and security.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) granted PLN 2.25 billion to Poland’s top utility PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna (PGE) to support renewable energy production. The favourable loan will allow PGE to develop its network of photovoltaic installations throughout the country and to modernise an existing pumped-storage power plant.

    The seventh agreement between the EIB and PGE will support the firm’s decarbonisation strategy by enabling planned investments in photovoltaic installations with a shared production capacity of nearly 730 MW, and the upgrade of a pumped-storage power plant (540 MW) in southern Poland. Provided under REPowerEU, the funding will support energy transition, as well as climate and environmental action in Poland, in line with the EIB’s role as the climate bank of the EU.

    “Developing green energy is a key part of energy transition, and a precondition for security and economic competitiveness. This agreement between the EIB and PGE will increase the available renewable energy capacity, supporting strategic development needs of Poland and the European Union as a whole,” said EIB Vice-President Teresa Czerwińska. “Providing financing for climate projects and energy transition is one of the EIB’s top priorities. Last year, we invested €2.5 billion in this area in Poland alone, including €850 million in power grid projects. This year, we have already provided a leading contribution to the construction a major offshore wind farm, Baltica 2, and today are adding further PGE renewable energy projects to our portfolio.”

    The planned investments will help reduce greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution related to power generation based on fossil fuels. They will mainly be located in regions of Poland where GDP per capita is below the EU average, thus strengthening territorial and economic cohesion.

    The development of renewable energy sources like wind and solar requires increased grid flexibility, including storage capacity, which is made possible by pumped-storage hydropower plants. PGE’s Porąbka-Żar plant, the second-largest pumped-storage power plant in Poland, can store clean energy during periods of higher production or lower demand.

    “Expanding renewables is a crucial element of Poland’s energy transition. We need to ensure stable supplies of clean energy to consumers in order to be able to effectively decarbonise the energy sector. The European Investment Bank’s support will allow PGE Group to increase the share of green energy in our mix,” said Dariusz Marzec, President of the Management Board of PGE Group.

     Background information

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union, and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world. 

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security. The Group’s financing in Poland increased to €5.7 billion last year.
    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.   

    Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers. Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average. 

    PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna is the largest electric power company and supplier of electricity and heat in Poland. By combining its fuel and power generation resources with distribution networks, PGE guarantees safe and stable supply of electricity and heat to nearly 6 million customers. The Group’s generating units produce over 40 percent of electricity in Poland. In the coming years, PGE plans to continue developing renewable energy sources – especially based on wind and sun energy – as well as carrying out investments in energy storage, distribution and decarbonisation of the heat generation segment. The PGE Group investment plan covers Poland’s largest offshore wind projects, the most advanced of which – Baltica 2 with a capacity of 1.5 GW and planned commissioning date in 2027 – is being implemented in cooperation with Ørsted.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee against Torture Praise Measures to Prevent Torture in Ukraine, Ask about Alleged Torture of Russian Prisoners of War and Reports of Corruption and Torture in Prisons

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee against Torture today concluded its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Ukraine, with Committee Experts praising the State’s legislative and policy measures to prevent torture, and raising questions about alleged torture of Russian prisoners of war, as well as reports of torture and corruption in prisons.

    Claude Heller, Committee Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, said Ukraine had suffered a devastating war since the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, in flagrant violation of international law and the United Nations Charter.  More than three years of war had led to numerous military and civilian deaths and serious violations of international human rights law, including summary executions, torture and ill-treatment, and arbitrary detentions.

    Mr. Heller said that, over the past decade, Ukraine had made considerable amendments to legislation and ministries, including with respect to the occupied territories.  He welcomed that the national strategy for human rights had been updated to include strategic goals for combatting torture, the appointment of human rights inspectors in places of detention, and the State’s ratification of the Rome Statute in 2024.

    Since February 2022, Mr. Heller said, 240 Russian prisoners of war had reported suffering torture during the armed conflict in Ukrainian detention centres.  What measures had been taken in cases where torture had been confirmed?  The Committee was concerned about reports of illegal detentions by Ukrainian authorities. How many people had been detained illegally?

    Peter Vedel Kessing, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said prisons under Ukrainian control were suffering under the war. Some faced frequent shelling by Russian troops, and were reportedly becoming hotbeds of torture and corruption. Newly arrived prisoners were reportedly routinely beaten, and there was reported overcrowding in prisons.  What steps had been taken to reduce overcrowding and improve prison conditions?

    Introducing the report, Liudmyla Suhak, Deputy Minister of Justice for European Integration of Ukraine and head of the delegation, said Ukraine was systematically implementing measures to prevent and combat torture at the national level. The 2021 strategy for combatting torture in the criminal justice system introduced a system for combatting torture by law enforcement, while the national human rights strategy had been updated to include specific strategic goals for combatting torture.

    Ms. Suhak said that the conditions of detention for Russian prisoners of war complied with international humanitarian law and had been inspected 112 times by the International Committee of the Red Cross between 2018 and 2024.  To ensure that prisoners of war were not tortured during transfers to detainment camps, the delegation added, clear legal procedures had been developed.  Military officials were trained on the rights of prisoners of war.

    The delegation said that the State party had undertaken measures to combat corruption and ill-treatment of inmates in the penitentiary system.  An internal security unit had been created to investigate reports of violations by penitentiary staff and inmates.  In 2024, persons responsible for observing the rights of convicts and preventing torture were also introduced into the staff of 56 penal institutions.

    In closing remarks, Mr. Heller said that the State party’s efforts to engage in the dialogue were commendable in the context of the bloodthirsty war.  The issues discussed were not issues of the past but were ongoing.  Ukraine sought to protect its territorial integrity and the well-being of its population.  The rest of the world was hoping for an end to the war that respected the territorial integrity of Ukraine.  The Committee hoped that its next dialogue with Ukraine would take place in conditions of peace, prosperity and democracy.

    In her concluding remarks, Ms. Suhak said that Ukraine would actively work to implement the Committee’s concluding observations.  Tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens were being held by Russia, and virtually every Ukrainian citizen who had been returned from Russia had suffered some form of torture.  Ukraine urged Russia to fully comply with its obligations under international law and to end its illegal war.  The Committee’s efforts would help to hold Russia to account.

    The delegation of Ukraine consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Social Policy; Coordination Centre for Legal Aid Provision; Prosecutor General’s Office; Security Service; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Justice; State Migration Service; State Bureau of Investigation; National Police; Ministry of Health; the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations Office at Geneva; and the European Court of Human Rights.

    The Committee will issue concluding observations on the report of Ukraine at the end of its eighty-second session on 2 May.  Those, and other documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, will be available on the session’s webpage.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Tuesday, 29 April at 4 p.m. to hear the presentation of reports on follow-up to articles 19 and 22 of the Convention and reprisals.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the seventh periodic report of Ukraine (CAT/C/UKR/7).

    Presentation of Report

    LIUDMYLA SUHAK, Deputy Minister of Justice for European Integration of Ukraine and head of the delegation, said Ukraine was systematically implementing measures to prevent and combat torture at the national level.  The 2021 strategy for combatting torture in the criminal justice system outlined the development of a national system for combatting torture committed by law enforcement personnel.  The national human rights strategy had been updated to include specific strategic goals for combatting torture and ensuring the right to liberty and security of person. The strategy for the reform of the penitentiary system 2021-2026 aimed to address structural problems and create a humanistic system for the execution of criminal penalties.

    During the reporting period, several amendments were made to criminal legislation.  The Criminal Code had been revised to bring the definition of torture into line with the provisions of the Convention, and to introduce criminal liability for the crime of enforced disappearance. Additionally, legislation was revised to guarantee the right of detainees to be held in proper conditions and to facilitate the consideration of complaints about improper detention conditions.  The criminal penalty system now also included probation supervision. 

    In 2024, amendments were made to the Code of Administrative Offences to distinguish between domestic violence, gender-based violence and sexual harassment, to increase administrative liability for such acts.  Several legislative initiatives were currently under consideration by Parliament, including a draft law on the penitentiary system, as well as other draft laws that would introduce a standard for minimum cell space of four square metres per detainee, the right of convicts to short-term visits outside the colony under certain conditions, and revised procedures for detaining persons.

    New internal regulations for the temporary detention centres of the national police adopted in 2023 stipulated that police officers were not allowed to carry out acts of torture or other forms of inhuman treatment on detainees.  In 2018 and 2019, internal regulations for pre-trial detention centres and penitentiary institutions of the State Penitentiary Service were approved.  These rules were regularly updated.  In 2024, the Security Service’s procedure for holding persons in temporary detention facilities was revised. 

    Ukraine provided unhindered access for both national and international monitoring mechanisms. In 2024, the national preventive mechanism of the Ombudsperson conducted 543 visits to penitentiary institutions, and the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine carried out 44 visits between 2018 and 2024.

    Efforts were being made to develop a child-friendly juvenile justice system.  As a result, over the past five years, there had been a steady reduction in juvenile crime, and over the past seven years, the number of minors registered by probation authorities had dropped three-fold.

    In 2024, a Commissioner for Missing Persons under Special Circumstances was appointed within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and a specialised unit for combatting torture and other ill-treatment of persons, staffed with 157 investigators, had been launched within the State Bureau of Investigation.  Within the Office of the Prosecutor General, separate specialised units had been established to combat human rights violations in the law enforcement and penitentiary sectors, as well as to combat crimes committed in the context of the armed conflict.  The Ministry of Justice also had a separate Department of Penitentiary Inspections.

    In 2024, persons responsible for observing the rights of convicts and preventing torture were introduced into the staff of 56 penal institutions.  The State had developed the digital infrastructure of both law enforcement agencies and the penitentiary system, launching registers of convicted persons, persons taken into custody, and missing persons under special circumstances.  An automated exchange of information on detained persons between law enforcement agencies and free legal aid centres was being introduced.  In cases of violence or torture against detainees and convicts, they had the right to free legal representation in court.

    State social programmes aimed at preventing and combatting domestic violence, gender-based violence, and human trafficking were being implemented.  Free secondary legal aid was provided to victims of domestic violence and human trafficking.

    In response to Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies had initiated investigations into 163,700 war crimes and crimes of aggression on Ukrainian territory.  In 2024, the Criminal Code was amended to ensure criminal prosecution for the most serious international crimes, as well as to bring it into line with the Rome Statute, which entered into force for Ukraine in 2025. 

    In 2022, the procedure for the detention of prisoners of war was approved.  It stipulated that the interrogation of prisoners of war should be carried out in a language they understood, without the use of torture or other coercive measures.  The conditions of detention for Russian prisoners of war complied with international humanitarian law and had been inspected 112 times by the International Committee of the Red Cross between 2018 and 2024.  Conversely, Russian authorities continued to deny access to Ukrainian prisoners of war, as well as civilian detainees, held by Russia in violation of international humanitarian law.

    Ukraine had also been taking measures to support victims and those affected by armed aggression. Since 2022, victims of a number of criminal offences, including torture or cruel treatment, had been entitled to free secondary legal aid.  In 2024, the legal status of victims of sexual violence related to Russia’s armed aggression and the legal basis for providing them with urgent interim reparations were determined at the legislative level.  An international compensation mechanism for damages caused by Russia’s aggression was being developed.  In 2024, 40 categories of claims that could be submitted to the International Register of Damages were approved, including some related to torture, deprivation of liberty, and sexual violence.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, welcomed the delegation’s presence, considering that Ukraine had suffered a devastating war since the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, in flagrant violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.  After more than three years of war, hundreds of thousands of military personnel on both sides were estimated to have died, with many more wounded, missing in action and in captivity.  From February 2022 to February 2025, there had been more than 12,800 civilian deaths and more than 30,000 injuries in systematic attacks on civilian towns, cities, and infrastructure, while the number of deaths of Russian civilians was expected to have risen to 360.  These were very conservative elements.

    The war had led to serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including summary executions; torture and ill-treatment; arbitrary detentions; forced transfer of people, including minors, to the occupying State; and acts of sexual violence. More than 13 million people required humanitarian assistance, more than two million homes had been destroyed in Ukraine, and there were 10.6 million displaced people in Ukraine.

    Over the past decade, Ukraine had made considerable amendments to legislation and ministries, including with respect to the occupied territories.  The national strategy for human rights had been updated to include strategic goals for combatting torture.  The adoption of the strategy to combat torture and the related plan of action and the appointment of human rights inspectors in places of detention would contribute to preventing torture and facilitating investigations.  It was also welcome that in 2024, a commissioner for disappeared persons was appointed within the police force, and that Ukraine had ratified the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

    The Committee was concerned that not all the elements of the Convention had been incorporated in the Criminal Code, which did not establish the State’s responsibility to hold public officials accountable when they committed acts of torture under orders from superiors.  Why was the number of cases of torture that reached court much smaller than the number of investigations carried out?

    The Ombudsperson carried out independent monitoring of constitutional rights and freedoms.  However, the body lacked financial resources and experts on monitoring.  There was a lack of transparency in the selection of its staff, and a lack of balanced regional representation.  The national preventive mechanism had also been criticised for its lack of experts and funding, delays in its investigations, and its lack of cooperation with civil society. There was a low level of implementation of recommendations made by the Ombudsperson; only one-third of the recommendations made in 2023 were addressed.  Could the delegation comment on these issues?

    State bodies responsible for guaranteeing the rights of detainees appeared to have been ineffective. Victims of torture were allegedly subjected to reprisals by authorities and the Istanbul Protocol was not applied well by the State.  Could the delegation comment on this?

    In 2015, Parliament had adopted a decision to suspend certain obligations stemming from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights and impose martial law until the cessation of the Russian aggression. The Committee was concerned by acts carried out by armed groups in eastern Ukraine from 2014 to 2017. During this period, more than 100 criminal cases were brought against Ukrainian security officials, including related to offences of torture and sexual violence.  Had court proceedings concluded?

    The State party had taken a significant step by ratifying the Rome Statute in 2024.  The implementation law partially harmonised criminal law with the Statute, requiring acts of torture systematically committed against the civilian population to be tried as crimes against humanity.  However, the law did not amend legislation on war crimes to bring it in line with the Statute.  Would the State do this?

    Both Russia and Ukraine had mutually accused each other of acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment against civilians.  There were more than 6,000 Ukrainian prisoners under Russian custody, who reportedly lacked access to food and medical support.  There were credible reports that Russian authorities had carried out around 80 executions of Ukrainian forces.  The United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine had reported widespread torture of civilians in areas under Russian control. Persons arrested in these territories were tried by non-recognised courts and were not granted access to lawyers of their choice.  Information on trials was not provided to families.  Could the State party provide information on the number of such trials carried out?

    Since February 2022, 240 Russian prisoners of war had reported suffering torture during the armed conflict in Ukrainian detention centres.  Could the delegation comment on these accusations?  What measures had been taken in cases where torture had been confirmed, and how was the State party preventing torture?  The Committee was concerned about reports of illegal detentions by Ukrainian authorities.  How many people had been detained illegally?  There had also been allegations of arbitrary detention of civilians suspected of collaborating with Russia after territories were reclaimed.

    The Committee was also concerned about the impact of the conflict on the rule of law.  Several cases of threats and violence against journalists had been reported.  Ukraine introduced a procedure in 2022 to prohibit broadcasts that “could jeopardise the independence and sovereignty of the country”.  Some journalists had been criminalised after working in occupied territories, despite there being no evidence of having committed unlawful acts. Could the delegation comment on this issue?

    More than 2,000 criminal lawsuits had been filed on the glorification of Russian actions.  This had reportedly given rise to 443 guilty verdicts involving non-custodial sentences.  Authorities had imposed security restrictions, including limiting access to information.  A bill before Parliament sought to restrict access to court decisions until the cessation of martial law, and several other bills had sought to limit certain rights for human rights defenders.  There was deep-rooted impunity for crimes against activists.

    There had been an unprecedented increase in gender-based violence in Ukraine.  The number of cases of domestic violence had increased by more than 30 per cent in 2024, with a number of these cases involving men returning from the front. The State was seemingly reluctant to hold members of the armed forces accountable for such crimes.

    A 2017 law amended legislation regarding psychiatric care in response to past violations of patients’ rights. Norms allowing for involuntary sterilisation were eliminated.  However, there were reports of excessive hospitalisation of persons with psychosocial disabilities, including children, and a lack of provision of alternative, community-based care services.  There were allegations of torture and ill-treatment in psychiatric hospitals; could the delegation comment on this?

    PETER VEDEL KESSING, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said that the situation in Ukraine was tragic after three years of war.  Mr. Kessing commended Ukraine’s commitment to its human rights obligations in these difficult times, adopting laws and policies to strengthen human rights protections.  Ukraine had continued to engage with the European Court of Human Rights since 2022, resulting in the closure of 75 cases.

    What steps had been taken to ensure that Ukrainian soldiers and State officials did not engage in torture? What training did these officials receive on the Convention?  Could the delegation confirm that its derogations from international law in the martial law period did not relate to the Convention?  Did Ukraine continue to apply international human rights law in situations of armed conflict?

    The State party needed to prosecute and hold accountable all those who committed torture on occupied territories when it regained control of the territory.  What steps had been taken to document such acts?  How had the State party ensured that Ukrainian citizens who were victims of torture had access to remedies when they returned to Ukraine? Ukraine had developed a draft law on compensation for victims of violent crimes and a related State fund.  Had this law been adopted?

    There had been reports of beatings of men who sought to avoid conscription.  In one case, a man claimed he had been drafted illegally as he had not undergone a medical examination.  Could the delegation provide statistical information on injuries and deaths linked to hazing and investigations into such incidents?  How did the State ensure that conscripts were treated in line with international obligations?

    There had been reports of excessive use of force by Ukrainian police over the reporting period.  Detainees in police detention did not have access to food or drinking water.  What steps had been taken to prevent ill-treatment in police detention? Access to a lawyer was not always provided for arrested persons; how would the State ensure this?  Video recording of interrogation was discretionary. Would the State make recording mandatory and ensure that recorded footage of interrogations was kept?  Were Russian prisoners of war and civilians arrested by Ukrainian forces provided with procedural safeguards?  How many children had been held in pre-trial detention over the last three years?  Were there time limits on the detention of children, and were children separated from adults in detention?

    Prisons under Ukrainian control were suffering under the war; some faced frequent shelling by Russian troops, and were reportedly becoming hotbeds of torture and corruption.  Since winter 2024, there had been increased raids on prisons by special forces.  The Committee commended that human rights observers had been appointed in some prisons. What actions did they carry out and were they now appointed in all prisons? 

    Newly arrived prisoners were reportedly routinely beaten, and special forces used illegal force against inmates. Was it necessary to deploy special forces in prisons?  Would the State abandon this practice?  There was reported overcrowding in prisons, with inmates in one prison forced to alternatively sleep on the floor.  There were also reports of limited access to fresh air, clean drinking water and sunlight in some prisons.  What steps had been taken to reduce overcrowding and improve prison conditions? Some prisoners were appointed as “duty” prisoners and given duties to oversee other prisoners.  Had steps been taken to eliminate this practice and protect all prisoners’ rights?

    Medical staff in prisons reportedly did not document inmates’ injuries.  Could the delegation provide information on the number of deaths in custody over the last three years?  What steps had been taken to strengthen healthcare in prisons?  There were no rules banning force-feeding in prisons; did the Government intend to elaborate such rules?  Did the Ukrainian Ombudsperson have access to all places of detention and could it conduct unannounced visits?  To what extent could non-governmental organizations access places of detention?  Article 391 of the Criminal Code made it an offence to disobey orders by prison staff. This provision was reportedly abused by staff to engage in corrupt practices; would it be revised?

    Other Committee Experts asked questions on measures taken by State authorities to respond to and prevent domestic violence; the status of the draft bill criminalising domestic violence and sexual violence; measures to ensure penalties for domestic and sexual violence were commensurate with the gravity of the crime; the number of investigations and convictions for domestic violence cases over the reporting period; efforts made to establish civil registries to facilitate birth registration and prevent trafficking of children; whether the State party held Ukrainian forces that were returned to the State accountable when they were accused of torture; how the State treated prisoners of war from third countries; and whether the clergy and staff of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had been provided with support after the banning of the Church.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the State party provided training on the Convention and other international and European human rights norms for penitentiary staff.  Currently, there were 119 children held in pre-trial detention and 177 children held in juvenile detention facilities, including just one girl. Judges assessed the necessity of detention for children once every three months.

    The State party had undertaken measures to combat corruption and ill-treatment of inmates in the penitentiary system.  An internal security unit had been created to investigate reports of violations by penitentiary staff and inmates and to initiate criminal proceedings against accused persons; the Government was currently recruiting staff for the unit. The State party had recruited 54 out of 56 human rights inspectors for its prisons and adopted a resolution on their scope of activity.  These inspectors reported directly to the State about the problems they witnessed.

    Currently, there were 37,000 inmates in places of deprivation of liberty in Ukraine.  The prison population was declining gradually.  More than 8,000 prisoners had been voluntarily mobilised at the beginning of the war.  The Government had allocated funds to build a new detention facility in Kyiv that could accommodate more than 1,000 detainees and decrease the population of other prisons. Norms on construction had been revised to protect prisons from shelling and improve security.  Despite budget cuts, over 7,500 places had been newly created in detention centres since 2022.

    The State party was fighting the spread of criminal influence and a criminal subculture in prisons.  It sought to proactively prosecute crimes occurring within prisons and to adopt a law on prison labour, which would increase salaries paid to prisoners who engaged in labour and improve conditions for prison labour.

    There had been 432, 376 and 368 deaths in prisons respectively in 2022, 2023 and 2024.  Some 98 per cent of prisoners infected with AIDS and 93 per cent of prisoners with disabilities were held in inclusive settings.  The Ministry of Justice supported the idea of transferring the management of healthcare services in prisons to the Ministry of Health; discussions on this would begin soon.  Rules on force-feeding were adopted two years ago.

    The Ombudsperson had not complained about not being able to access any detention facilities.  Some non-governmental organizations had been granted access to penitentiary facilities.  An anonymous, online complaints system for prisons had been set up; last year, 6,000 complaints had been submitted by prisoners on various topics. A commission was also being created that would handle complaints of improper conditions in prisons. Discussions were underway on the revision of article 391 of the Criminal Code.

    All prisoners of war were kept in common conditions.  Persons with criminal records were separated from those without.  Ukraine fully followed its international obligations under the Geneva Conventions.  It had allowed 400 monitoring missions to visit its detention facilities for prisoners of war.

    Since 2014, the State party had lost 34 penitentiary institutions located in occupied territories, including seven since 2022, in which more than 3,000 inmates were held.  More than 1,000 of these inmates had already served their sentences, but had no money or documents needed to return to Ukraine. The State was working with non-governmental organizations to support their return.  More than 500 persons had thus far returned.

    On 10 October last year, Parliament adopted a law on the ratification of the Rome Statute.  Ukraine had taken on board comments from the International Criminal Court regarding its legislation on crimes against humanity and the responsibility of superiors; the State had amended its Criminal Code in response.

    Certain restrictions could be imposed on rights and freedoms under martial law, but Ukraine had not restricted the right to freedom of religious belief.  The President had last year signed a Presidential Order that banned the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church, which was based on the ideology of the regime of the Russian Federation and condoned Russia’s war crimes.

    Ukraine had not introduced severe restrictions on freedom of expression.  Domestic media faced challenges, including the mobilisation of journalists as soldiers, dwindling resources, and damaged infrastructure caused by the Russian aggression.  The State party sought to bring its media legislation in line with that of the European Union.  Ukraine had risen 18 places in the World Press Freedom Index thanks to the reforms implemented.

    The national police continued to manage custody records, which recorded arrests, pre-trial detention and releases, as well as detainees’ injuries.  These records were kept for 25 years.  There was constant video surveillance of police detention sites and independent monitoring visits were carried out.  The Criminal Procedural Code had been amended to ensure that officials involved in arrests were not responsible for managing detainees’ stay in police detention. Detainees in temporary detention were provided with three hot meals per day.  Standards for detention facilities stipulated that cells needed to have a water supply that detainees could access.

    Since February 2022, 83,000 criminal proceedings had been instigated related to missing civilians and military officers.  Some 9,000 missing persons had been found alive, while many deaths were also identified. Specialised departments for the investigation of crimes committed in the armed conflict had been established in police departments in several regions and a centre for tracing missing persons had been established in Kyiv.

    The police force had recorded 179,000 administrative offences related to domestic violence, registered 19,000 perpetrators for monitoring, and had set up specialised units for tackling domestic violence in more than 60 regions.  In 2024, more than 5,000 officers were trained on combatting domestic and gender-based violence.

    The State constantly looked for crimes of human trafficking and took prompt responses when cases were identified. As of May 2025, 1,500 criminal offences of human trafficking had been investigated.  International organizations supported training for State officials on trafficking in persons.  Ukraine had joined two international taskforces to combat trafficking in persons, through which more than 3,000 Ukrainian victims of trafficking were identified across the world.

    Eleven years since the Maidan revolution, investigators were continuing to investigate crimes related to it. Courts had issued 11 guilty verdicts against 14 people.  The State Bureau of Investigation had suspected 340 people. The former President of Ukraine and other former high-level officials were under suspicion of having facilitated the murders of more than 67 persons between 2013 and 2014.  In this period, police officers were deployed to supress protests, and courts had found activists guilty on spurious grounds.  In some cases, police officers beat activists and even participated in premeditated murders.  In total, there were more than 4,000 cases of criminal activity and more than 2,000 victims.  There was now an opportunity to bring justice for these past crimes. There were three criminal proceedings underway related to armed gangs that had attacked individuals and homes.

    War crimes were investigated by the national security service and the police.  In 2024, 149 Ukrainians had been executed by Russians, and 54 had so far been executed this year.  These were conservative estimates.  Almost every Ukrainian prisoner of war had suffered some form of violence. 

    There were around 20 cases under examination of war crimes committed by Ukrainians.  Doctors who provided medical examinations of prisoners of war were required to document signs of torture.

    According to Ukrainian law, information about persons in detention was immediately communicated to the legal aid centre.  If evidence was gathered while a defence lawyer was absent, there was a high likelihood that courts would not admit it.  The State was providing legal support for prisoners who had been illegally transferred to Russia and supporting them to serve the remainder of their sentences in Ukraine.  Persons with disabilities and older persons could access legal aid if they had low income or were internally displaced.  Legal aid was provided to minors and victims of gender-based violence and trafficking in persons.

    National standards on detention of prisoners of war stipulated that detainees’ human dignity and international law needed to be respected.  No violations of human rights or cases of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment had been found while monitoring visits of places of detention.

    Pre-trial investigations were underway into alleged war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russia, including extrajudicial executions and the use of physical, psychological and sexual violence.  These prisoners were systematically subjected to violence over the course of their detention; this had been confirmed by medical examinations.  Some 4,000 prisoners had been returned to Ukraine.

    Since February 2022, some 433 persons were detained for crimes of collaboration with Russia.  The draft law of December 2022 on collaboration included provisions to improve liability for collaboration; it was currently under consideration.  Some 819 investigations were underway on cases of collaboration related to healthcare and education.  The teaching of school subjects based on the standards of the aggressor State did not constitute an offence.  Some teachers deliberately carried out propaganda in educational institutions; this could constitute an offence. 

    Around 22 doctors had been notified of being under suspicion of collaboration.  Criminal liability was excluded for actions carried out while providing healthcare to patients.  Since February 2022, pre-trial investigations on collaboration had been carried out into 97 affiliates of religious organizations, including more than 20 clerics of the Orthodox Church.  The security service had declared 197 minors as suspects in offences such as high treason, sabotage and damage to property.  Many cases involved minors who were recruited by the Russian special services. Training was provided for investigators who interviewed children on the best interests of the child.

    To ensure that prisoners of war were well-treated and not tortured during transfers to detainment camps, clear legal procedures had been developed.  The Chief of Defence had issued orders to ensure that international human rights law was strictly followed in this process. Military officials were trained on capturing enemy combatants and on the rights of prisoners of war.

    To ensure that human rights were followed during mobilisation and conscription, clear legislation had been established.  Persons could apply for deferment of conscription for medical or family reasons. An investigator had been appointed within the Land Force Command to investigate allegations of human rights violations occurring during conscription.

    The Ministry of Health had made changes to ensure that only psychiatric patients who posed a danger to themselves or others were isolated for legally defined periods.  All primary health care providers were obligated to undergo training on identifying mental health issues and referring patients to mental health care services.  These measures would help to decrease the number of patients needing institutionalisation.

    More than 34,000 persons with disabilities and older persons lived in residential institutions.  The Government had developed a strategy to reform these institutions and support community-based care and assisted living. Approximately 7,000 people received day care services.  There were around 4,600 children cared for in institutions.  The Government had approved a strategy to ensure the right of every child in Ukraine to grow up in a family environment by 2028.  A law preventing violence against children had been adopted in 2024 and the State was currently developing a procedure for responding to cases of violence against children.

    In 2024, around 182,000 reports of domestic violence had been received by the State.  A programme for addressing traumatic war experiences had been developed. Measures had been implemented to coordinate policies on domestic violence and protect victims.

    In 2022, Parliament adopted a law on amending the Criminal Code in line with the Convention.  The revised law’s definition of torture addressed the liability of persons who conspired to commit torture.  Discriminatory motives for the crime of torture were considered to be aggravating offences and carried a harsher penalty.  The law also addressed the criminal liability of officials who ordered acts of torture.  Amnesty was not issued to persons who committed torture crimes.

    No derogations had been made from the State party’s obligations under international human rights law during the martial law period.  Martial law foresaw the ability to prohibit peaceful assembly, but in practice, this restriction had not been applied.  The Government took steps to provide compensation for victims of various types of crimes.

    A special draft law had been developed that sought to improve the institutional capacity of the Ombudsperson, including by lowering the age limit for members of the Ombudsperson’s Office and imposing restrictions on reductions to the Office’s budget.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, welcomed information on measures to provide compensation for victims of human rights violations.  Up to mid-February 2025, 159,000 criminal cases had been recorded related to the armed conflict, but it was unclear how many of these cases related to torture.  The justice system had not been prepared to deal with the challenges brought by these cases.  Acts of torture committed in occupied territories, difficulties in verifying evidence, and the internal displacement of victims hindered investigations.  There was a lack of guarantees of a fair trial for trials in absentia, in which 95 per cent of accused persons were sentenced. Articles 27 and 28 of the Criminal Code needed to be amended to protect the victims and witnesses of serious international crimes.

    Crimea was annexed 11 years ago, and the freedom of the media had been called into question under the Russian occupation.  Russian authorities reportedly curtailed the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. Lawyers and human rights defenders had been victims of persecution and had been unable to perform their work. The European Court of Human Rights had recently found that Russia followed a pattern of criminally sentencing persons in Crimea who discredited the Russian forces.  Had there been cases of torture in Crimea?

    PETER VEDEL KESSING, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said it was positive that overcrowding had been reduced, that a new prison facility had been established, that an electronic register had been established, and that measures were taken to remove the prison hierarchy and improve access to health care.  How could prisoners access the internet to make complaints to the Prison Service?  How did the Service respond to complaints?  Did any concern torture?  Human rights monitors in prisons were commendable.  Did these monitors also perform other functions in prisons?  How many complaints had been received from human rights monitors and what follow-up had been conducted?  There was reportedly a risk of reprisals for prisoners who lodged complaints.  What measures were in place to counter reprisals against prisoners?

    Prisoners of war were at a high risk of ill-treatment.  What measures were taken to monitor that Russian prisoners of war were treated in line with requirements under international law?  Did they undergo medical exams and was there video recording of interrogations?  Was there a procedure for releasing prisoners of war who required medical treatment?

    Another Committee Expert asked follow-up questions on the situation of prisoners and prison conditions in Crimea, including on the transfer of prisoners and cases of torture occurring during transfers; the situation in closed psychiatric institutions and steps taken to protect vulnerable groups such as children, and to improve conditions and oversight of these institutions; and measures taken to promote the return of children forcibly transferred from Ukraine to Russia and to ensure accountability for such acts.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said around 7,000 complaints had been submitted by prisoners, around 1,700 of which were submitted electronically.  Inmates could access specific web pages where they could submit complaints using tablets in a dedicated room.  Human rights inspectors reported suspected cases of torture to the Chief of Police. Their work was supplemented by the internal security unit, which started disciplinary proceedings that could result in criminal investigations.  There had been complaints submitted to the Ombudsperson regarding reprisals against prisoners.  These were under investigation.

    The State party was gathering evidence on war crimes and crimes against humanity occurring in occupied territories. It transferred evidence of such crimes to the International Criminal Court on request.  A working group had been established to improve the implementation of the Rome Statute in Ukraine, including through legal amendments.  Last year, the State had documented over 2,800 Ukrainian civilians and over 4,000 prisoners of war who were victims of torture. Many liberated civilians chose to move to different countries rather than return to Ukraine, making investigations difficult.

    Ukrainian non-governmental organizations had reported that there were at least 4,700 transfers of detainees from Crimea to the territory of the Russian Federation, including 220 female detainees. The Russian Federation had failed to provide information in response to the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights that obliged Russia to return these prisoners to Ukraine.

    The Government had adopted several measures to address the issue of the forcible displacement of Ukrainian children, including a procedure for identifying and returning such children, a register of deported and forcibly displaced children, and an inter-agency commission on the issue.

    Concluding Remarks

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chair, said that, based on the dialogue, the Committee would issue concluding observations, which would include recommendations that the State party could implement within one year, as well as other recommendations that would require more time to implement.  The Committee believed that its recommendations would support the implementation of the Convention in Ukraine.

    The State party’s efforts to engage in the dialogue were commendable in the context of the bloodthirsty war.  The issues discussed were not issues of the past but were ongoing.  The last dialogue with Ukraine happened over 11 years ago and many things had happened since.  Ukraine sought to protect its territorial integrity and the well-being of its population. The rest of the world was looking on, hoping for an end to the war that respected the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The dialogue had been constructive and frank.  The Committee hoped that its next dialogue with Ukraine would take place in conditions of peace, prosperity and democracy.

    LIUDMYLA SUHAK, Deputy Minister of Justice for European Integration and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the dialogue and civil society organizations that had submitted alternative reports.  Ukraine would actively work to implement the Committee’s concluding observations.

    Tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens were being held by Russia.  More than 170 torture chambers had been identified in Russia and virtually every Ukrainian citizen who had been returned from Russia had suffered some form of torture, which was carried out in a systemic, widespread manner by Russian authorities.  The State party was grateful to the Committee for keeping the issue of Russian war crimes on the international agenda.  Ukraine urged Russia to fully comply with its obligations under international law and to end its illegal war of aggression.  The Committee’s efforts would help to hold Russia to account.

    ___________

     

     

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CAT.007E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Hold Half Day of General Discussion on Reparations for the Injustices from the Transatlantic Trade of Enslaved Africans

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination this afternoon held a half day of general discussion on reparations for the injustices from the transatlantic trade of enslaved Africans, their treatment as chattel, and the ongoing harms to and crimes against people of African descent.  The half-day consisted of opening statements two panel discussions, hearing from Committee members, experts in international law, representative from the diplomatic corps, and political and civil society leaders.

    Speaking in the first panel discussion on “Reparations and International Law: Legal Frameworks, Obligations and Enforcement” were Pela Boker-Wilson, Committee Expert; Joshua Castellino, Executive Dean, College of Arts, Law & Social Sciences, Brunel University of London; Patricia Sellers, former Special Advisor to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; Britta Redwood, Assistant Professor, Seton Hall School of Diplomacy and Seton Hall Law School; Adejoké Babington-Ashaye, former Investigator at the International Criminal Court; and Bernard Duhaime, Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence.

    Speaking in the second panel discussion on “The Legacy of Chattel Slavery: Structural Racism and Institutional Accountability” were Tendayi Achiume, former Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance; Matthew Anthony Wilson, Permanent Representative of Barbados to the United Nations Office at Geneva; Eric Phillips, Vice-Chairperson of the Caribbean Community’s Reparations Commission; Ibrahima Guissé, Committee Expert; and Dennis O’Brien, Founder of the Repair Campaign.

    The programme of work and other documents related to the session can be found here.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Monday, 28 April at 3 p.m. to begin its consideration of the combined twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth periodic reports of Mauritius (CERD/C/MUS/24-25).

    Opening Statements

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chairperson, welcomed participants to the half-day of general discussion to advance the development of a general recommendation on reparations for the historical injustices rooted in the chattel enslavement of Africans and the enduring harms experienced by people of African descent.  The proposed general recommendation sought to clarify the scope and content of the right to reparations under international human rights law and address the harms caused by the forced capture and transatlantic transport of Africans, their enslavement as chattel, and the lasting consequences of these crimes. 

    To inform this process, the Committee had issued a public call for input on 14 February 2025 and had been encouraged by the engagement, with 56 submissions received from a wide range of stakeholders.  Today’s discussion provided a space to reflect on the submissions received, deepen the collective understanding of applicable international legal standards, and further examine the contemporary legacy of the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans.  In the coming months, the Committee would prepare a draft text of the general recommendation, which would be made publicly available for input from all stakeholders prior to finalisation. 

    MAHAMANE CISSÉ-GOURO, Director, Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, said today’s topic addressed a matter of deep historical significance and urgent contemporary relevance: reparatory justice for the injustices arising from the trade in enslaved Africans, their treatment as chattel, and the continuing harms and crimes suffered by people of African descent.  In 2001, at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, States adopted by consensus the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, which recognised slavery and the slave trade as a crime against humanity, and among the major sources and manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.  Contemporary structures and systems, such as racial profiling, police brutality, unequal access to education and employment, disparities in health and housing, and the denial of political participation and justice were rooted in these enduring harms.

    International human rights law and political commitments by States provided a clear framework for attaining substantive racial justice and equality.  A central element of dismantling systemic racism was addressing the past and redressing its legacies through reparatory justice, to transform the present and secure a just and equitable future.  The High Commissioner had called for reparatory justice to transform structures and systems which were designed and shaped by enslavement, colonialism and successive racially discriminatory policies and systems. States and others that had benefited and continued to benefit from these legacies should make amends for centuries of violence and discrimination through wide-ranging and meaningful initiatives, including through formal apologies, truth-telling processes, and reparations in various forms.  This called for political leadership, and creative, effective and comprehensive responses to legacies of the past.  Since the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, the international community had taken important steps; however, as the Convention commemorated its sixtieth anniversary, it was evident that these commitments and recommendations had not resulted in durable, transformative change. 

    The development of this general recommendation was timely and necessary.  It would clarify the scope and content of the right to reparations for historical injustices under international human rights law and provide States with guidance to fulfil their obligations under the Convention.  Mr. Cissé-Gouro encouraged all participants to engage and emphasised that the Office of the High Commissioner supported the process. 

    GAY MCDOUGALL, Committee Vice-Chairperson, said this year marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention, which remained the normative centre of international efforts to end racism. In commemoration of the anniversary year, the Committee had decided to prepare a general recommendation on reparations to clarify and elaborate the legal obligations of States to repair the harms inflicted by the forced capture of Africans, the transatlantic transport of those captives, their enslavement as chattel, and the massive and continuing harms suffered by them and their descendants.  The transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans constituted the largest and most concentrated forced deportation of human beings ever recorded, implicating several regions of the world during more than four centuries. Between 12 to 13 million Africans were violently uprooted from Africa for sale and enslavement. 

    The system of colonial rule had enabled and facilitated the development of the uniquely brutal system of chattel enslavement, and the resulting massive gross abuses of human rights that followed for centuries.  The transatlantic slave trade was inextricably tied to European colonial domination of Africa, the Americas, the Caribbean and parts of Asia.  It was a system that enriched Europe, and the institutions in power, and it existed today in many contemporary forms.  Now it was widely agreed that all forms of slavery were violations of international law and most domestic laws gave rise to the responsibility to ensure reparations.  However, the harms inflicted by these events had never been addressed, including how they negatively impacted the economic, social, political, civic and cultural rights of countries around the world.   The Committee’s proposed general recommendation would provide guidance on the scope and content of the right to reparations under international human rights law. 

    Panel Discussion One on Reparations and International Law: Legal Frameworks, Obligations and Enforcement

    Opening Remarks by the Moderator of the Panel

    PELA BOKER-WILSON, Committee Expert and Panel Moderator, said the chattel enslavement of Africans was a human rights violation, and victims had a right to reparations based on their right to a remedy.  At the same time, today the legacies of chattel enslavement could be seen in daily lives.  Chattel enslavement and its legacies were the foundation on which systematic racism permeated and the history which drove discriminatory laws and policies based on race. Several legal challenges remained which would be discussed during the panel. 

    Summary of Remarks by the Panellists

    Some speakers, among other things, noted that the trade in enslaved Africans began in the fifteenth century, when Portuguese traders established sugar plantations in the Atlantic islands of Madeira, the Azores, and São Tomé.  At the time, the justification for the enslaved status of African labourers was based on the notion that these labourers had been enslaved because they had been taken captive in just wars.  The slave trade was the reduction of a free person to the status of being enslaved, by whatever means, including kidnap, capture, transfer, or sale.  Slave trading comprised not only the initial transatlantic passages, but internal acts of trade in enslaved persons throughout the Americas and the Caribbean.  These two prongs of the slave trade, trans-Atlantic and internal or domestic slave trading, had occurred for centuries. 

    One speaker said the photograph of a South African billionaire of European descent, arm raised in a Nazi salute, was perhaps the most apt icon for that particular civilization.  It epitomised success in generating wealth by extraction, disregarding surroundings in constructing systems where some had an inherent sense of entitlement to everything, even if it devastated others.  Another speaker said an immeasurable toll of sexual, reproductive and gendered practices and institutions had persisted throughout the hundreds of years of slavery and of slave trading in North and South America and in the Caribbean. 

    A speaker underscored that the transatlantic chattel slavery had created and entrenched anti-Black racism. Although slavery had been abolished, the persistence of the social, psychological, and economic harms of racial discrimination persisted until today.  Another speaker noted that the racial hierarchy that was at the root of the slave trade and slavery had no foundation in international law at that time, just as it had no legitimacy under international law today.  One speaker said reparations for people of African descent were not only a matter of justice for the past, but also a foundation for a more equitable and peaceful future.

    Reparations were vital in seeking justice for colonial crimes, but also to eliminate the root cause of historic and continuing colonial existence.  States must ensure that reparations were not merely symbolic, but concrete and enforceable, through judicial rulings as well as administrative or legislative reparation programmes.  These programmes could be supported by national or international funding and must be accessible, gender-sensitive, victim-centred, and rights-based.  In line with established standards, reparations needed to be comprehensive, encompassing restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.  States should establish robust legal and institutional frameworks and ensure stable financial allocations that were protected from political or economic fluctuations.  Crucially, reparation measures must be proportional to the gravity of the harm and address the full scope of the violations.  It was also important to ensure that victims participated in the reparations process. 

    Successful reparations had stemmed from attempts to seek victim-oriented justice. These included local revolutions achieving regime change and victims’ framing of legal arguments to hold power to account.  The dismissal of reparations as solely pertaining to the past needed to be confronted; reparations appeared to be about the past but they were also about the present.  Redress by reparations required recognition that sexual abuse was omnipresent in the lives of the enslaved.  The quest for reparations needed to be achieved through evidence-based reasoning. They had to be shaped to show how the few, irrespective of race, had benefitted from the exploitation of the many, irrespective of race. 

    The Convention was a power instrument for redress.  Under article 11, States could bring complaints against other States for violations of the Convention.  Article 14 allowed individuals and groups to submit petitions directly to the Committee provided that the respondent State had recognised the Committee’s jurisdiction to receive individual petitions.  The Basic Principles on Reparations, a United Nations resolution from 2005, established five aspects of reparations that must follow a significant human rights violation, including the need to guarantee the non-recurrence of the human rights violation at issue. 

    The Convention and subsequent jurisprudence of the Committee required material compensation and policy changes to address the legacy of transatlantic chattel slavery and the system of racial discrimination that was created to entrench it. 

    Structural discrimination that arose from anti-Black racism was an ongoing human rights violation and needed to be addressed by States parties to the Convention.   The Committee was urged to recognise the gendered injustices intrinsic of the transatlantic slave trade and slavery and to include them as germane to the redress considered in the forthcoming general recommendation on reparations. 

    Discussion 

    Several speakers spoke from the floor. One speaker welcomed the Committee’s initiative to develop a general recommendation on reparations, which was a vital step towards accountability.  Reparations were grounded in international law, carrying legal consequences which could not be erased by time.  Another speaker said that at the minimum, States parties were required to provide reparations for their failure to eliminate the systemic racism and inequality arising from their inadequate remediation of chattel slavery and its legacies.  The Committee was urged to adopt a comprehensive and transformative approach to address both systemic racism and structural economic inequalities arising from chattel slavery and colonialism in the general recommendation.  A speaker said the time had come to move from rhetoric to concrete measures for reparations for historical and cultural monuments destroyed and looted during centuries of colonialism and slavery. One speaker said reparations were not a favour, but were moral and political obligations of States. 

    Panel Discussion Two on the Legacy of Chattel Slavery: Structural Racism and Institutional Accountability

    Summary of Remarks by the Panellists

    Some speakers, among other things, commended the Committee for the draft general recommendation, which dealt with a vital issue and was long overdue.  The Committee should be applauded for its work and the call for input, and those who had answered the call were thanked.  The call for input document prepared by the Committee did an excellent job of highlighting the history, global responses and objectives, while pointing out the milestones along the way. 

    Chattel slavery was the first global regime of State-legalised racial capitalism, speakers said.  The laws that built it had been dismantled in name, but never in consequence.  The transatlantic slave trade was not just a chapter in history, but was a crime against humanity.  Slavery had funded the economic development of colonial countries, particularly the industrial revolution, and put Britain in the wealthy position that it was in today. The European Union and its members, particularly France, Holland and Spain, and other countries like Germany and Denmark had also participated in this genocide as well. 

    Racism was not a relic of the past; it was present, global, systemic and was still taking lives.  Yet Europe had yet to fully confront this issue.  One speaker commented that Black communities across Europe were too often overlooked, marginalised and ignored by those in power; this must change.   

    There was a painful trail of historical legal construction of racial hierarchy that had occurred during chattel slavery.  This included the British Board of Trade that codified economic enslavement through slave codes and land seizure laws; and France’s Code Noir that created racialised personhood in law.  Portugal and Spain had used religious sanction known as Papal Bulls to erase African legal identity, while the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 insulated colonial laws from challenge.  Today, these laws had mutated into many forms of structural, perceptual and institutional racism, including through education exclusion, Afrophobia, epistemicide and religious erasure.  These laws must be named, acknowledged, and formally repudiated by the United Kingdom and France as a first step in reparatory processes.

    Some speakers noted that chattel slavery was not just a legal and economic construct, it was also a social construct.  When the laws had changed and the cost benefit of slavery was eroded, what remained was institutional racism and structural racism – global inequalities caused by historical injustices.  Those who were descendants of the enslaved lived with the emotional scars of a society that kept ancestors as slaves for longer than people had equal rights under the law.  Chattel slaves were still impacted in deep and wide-ranging ways, with effects spanning economic, social, psychological, and cultural dimensions.  The descendants of the slave owners and the perpetrators of slavery should live with generational repentance. 

    One speaker noted that the 2013 Caribbean Community’s Reparations Commission continued to lead the call for reparations.  The Commission recognised that the persistent harm and suffering experienced today by victims of slavery and colonialism was the primary cause of development failure in the Caribbean.  Through its Ten-Point Reparations Plan, it sought to reposition reparations not in terms of a simple transfer of funds, but rather through a plurality of actions such as debt cancellation, education programmes and technology transfer, amongst other elements.

    The call for reparations and restorative justice did not come from a void; it had always been part of decolonisation.  The need for reparations was a pressing and current issue across all parts of the world affected by the African slave trade.  Reparations should be accessible in the form of compensation, addressing the deficits in equity and opportunity.  Reparations were about transforming systems, narratives and institutions, and creating a Europe where black lives were not just tolerated but celebrated and empowered. 

    Some speakers noted that the Convention needed to be more concertedly mobilised as a framework which was central to achieving reparations directly, including through article 6.  The Committee needed to underscore that reparations were required under the Convention.  It was recommended that European governments begin with a sincere formal apology.  However, apologies without material or structural redress were merely symbolic and could never compensate for the wealth extraction, trauma, or the ongoing inequalities faced by African descendants.  Reparations were about reforming entire legal, economic and social structures that still had forms of racism at their core in the present.  It was not just about addressing harms in the past, but also dealing with those in the present.  The Durban Declaration and Programme for Action and its framework provided for combatting racism and should be powerful guidance for the Committee as it prepared the general recommendation. 

    A speaker said the European Union and its Member States should ensure that the European Union’s anti-racism action plan was renewed, with a focus on reparatory justice.  The European Union and the United Kingdom should jointly fund a reparations programme on an intergenerational basis.  This was not a development issue; it was a justice issue. The United Kingdom and the European Union should start engaging with the political leadership of the Caribbean Community to achieve reparatory justice. 

    Discussion

    Several speakers spoke from the floor. One speaker said during the Second International Decade for People of African Descent, the international community should act to acknowledge and rectify longstanding economic and social inequities, which had economically stagnated the region and resulted in protracted inter-generational trauma.  Another speaker reiterated strong support for the general recommendation.  The sixtieth anniversary of the Convention should also be used as an opportunity to acknowledge the victories of civil society led by African people, including the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action. Racism was a disease, and the actions by the Committee to combat all forms of racism were appreciated.  A speaker said that according to research, stakeholders across the region in all 15 Caribbean Community countries had emphasised the connection between the transatlantic slave trade and unequal access to land ownership, which constituted a continuation of historical injustice. 

    Closing Remarks

    VERENE ALBERTHA SHEPHERD, Committee Vice-Chairperson, in closing remarks, thanked everyone for the amazing discussion which was a social justice exercise that would hopefully reset global relations.  Racism and racial discrimination were creatures of colonialism and many States parties to the Convention still suffered from the legacies of colonialism, especially those that suffered the ravages of the transatlantic trafficking in enslaved Africans, chattel enslavement, and socio-economic underdevelopment in the post-slavery period.  The interventions this afternoon had raised awareness on the racialised nature of the transatlantic trade in enslaved Africans and the ways in which, along with chattel enslavement and unjust enrichment, race and racism were attached to people from Africa and skin shade discrimination was further used to deny them rights.

    There had been several key takeaways from the discussion, including that African chattel enslavement was the first global regime of State-legalised racial capitalism.  Chattel enslavement, an invention of Europeans, was an organised and intentional system based on the legal determination that enslaved Africans were non-human.   

    Chattel enslavement was not gender neutral.  Racism was a direct legacy of the institution of transatlantic chattel slavery, and was an ongoing harm to all who experienced it.  Another takeaway issue was that as chattel enslavement ended, new anti-Black institutions were developed to maintain racial hierarchies, creating persistent economic and social disadvantages for Africans and people of African descent that continued to this present day.  Chattel slavery had no foundation in international law at that time, just as it had no legitimacy under international law today.

    However, as some of the legal experts on the panels had shown, there were legal tools which made reparations unavoidable.  The law could now be rightfully and effectively applied to deliver justice for the profound and continuing harms caused by the trafficking in Africans, chattel enslavement, and the colonisation of Africa.

    It was time that such an injustice be reversed by the payment of reparations to the descendants of those harmed, to ensure the development of areas exploited for the development of Europe. This must start with restitution of the ransom extracted from Haiti and the modern equivalent of the 20 million pounds paid by Britain to enslavers.

    Ms. Shepherd thanked all those who had made the discussion possible and pledged her support to the general recommendation. 

    GAY MCDOUGALL, Committee Vice-Chairperson, thanked all those who had been involved in the panel discussions and those who had made the half day of general discussion possible. 

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chairperson, thanked everyone who had been involved in the discussion, which would help inform the work of the Committee. 

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CERD25.004E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Marshals in Maryland Arrest Woman Wanted for Child Abuse

    Source: US Marshals Service

    Martinsburg, WV – Members of the U.S. Marshals Mountain State Fugitive Task Force, with the assistance of the Marshals Capital Area Regional Fugitive Task Force (CARFTF) arrested a woman on an outstanding felony warrant issued out of Berkeley County, West Virginia.

    Rhonda Shannon Cox, 36 was charged with one count of child abuse resulting in injury in Berkeley County, West Virginia in November 2022. In September of 2024, the warrant was referred to the U.S. Marshals Service task force for apprehension.

    Upon receipt of the case, Investigators from the U.S. Marshals Mountain State Fugitive Task Force developed information Cox had fled the area. Investigators believed she was now residing in Maryland. Earlier today, the Capital Area Regional Fugitive Task Force (CARFTF) received additional information, which led officers to the Wood Spring Suites in Camp Springs, Maryland. Officers located Cox at the hotel and arrested her without incident.

    Cox was charged as a fugitive from justice and taken to Prince Georges County Jail and awaits extradition back to West Virginia. Questions regarding this case should be directed to the Berkeley County Sheriff’s Department.

    “The Sheriff’s office did an outstanding job investigating the abuse of the children and obtaining a warrant for the alleged perpetrator.” Said Acting U.S. Marshal Terry Moore, “Their Deputy on our task force was able to use our extended resources to locate and arrest the subject of the investigation.”

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: Park National Corporation reports financial results for first quarter 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEWARK, Ohio, April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Park National Corporation (Park) (NYSE American: PRK) today reported financial results for the first quarter of 2025. Park’s board of directors declared a quarterly cash dividend of $1.07 per common share, payable on June 10, 2025, to common shareholders of record as of May 16, 2025.

    “Our first quarter performance reflects our commitment to providing consistent financial support and a measure of predictability in dynamic market conditions,” said Park Chairman and CEO David Trautman. “In a world buffeted by extremes, our greatest opportunity to serve more is through continuing to build authentic relationships and showing up as a steady, reliable partner.”

    Park’s net income for the first quarter of 2025 was $42.2 million, a 19.8 percent increase from $35.2 million for the first quarter of 2024. First quarter 2025 net income per diluted common share was $2.60, compared to $2.17 for the first quarter of 2024. Park’s total loans increased 0.9 percent (3.5 percent annualized) during the first quarter of 2025. Park’s reported period end deposits increased 0.7 percent (2.9 percent annualized) during the first quarter of 2025, with an increase of 2.3 percent (9.5 percent annualized), including deposits that Park moved off balance sheet as of March 31, 2025. The combination of solid loan growth and steady deposits continue to contribute to Park’s success in 2025.

    “Our bankers’ ability to serve others well is reflected in our first quarter results,” said Park President Matthew Miller. “We’re deeply grateful for the trust our communities, customers and neighbors place in us every day. We look forward to growing these and new relationships, consistently delivering on our promises and expanding our impact.”

    Headquartered in Newark, Ohio, Park National Corporation has $9.9 billion in total assets (as of March 31, 2025). Park’s banking operations are conducted through its subsidiary, The Park National Bank. Other Park subsidiaries are Scope Leasing, Inc. (d.b.a. Scope Aircraft Finance), Guardian Financial Services Company (d.b.a. Guardian Finance Company), Park Investments, Inc. and SE Property Holdings, LLC.

    Complete financial tables are listed below.

    Category: Earnings

    SAFE HARBOR STATEMENT UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995

    Park cautions that any forward-looking statements contained in this news release or made by management of Park are provided to assist in the understanding of anticipated future financial performance. Forward-looking statements provide current expectations or forecasts of future events and are not guarantees of future performance. The forward-looking statements are based on management’s expectations and are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties, including those described in Park’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024, as updated by our filings with the SEC. Although management believes that the expectations reflected in such forward-looking statements are reasonable, actual results may differ materially from those expressed or implied in such statements.

    Risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ include, without limitation: (1) the ability to execute our business plan successfully and manage strategic initiatives; (2) the impact of current and future economic and financial market conditions, including unemployment rates, inflation, interest rates, supply-demand imbalances, and geopolitical matters; (3) factors impacting the performance of our loan portfolio, including real estate values, financial health of borrowers, and loan concentrations; (4) the effects of monetary and fiscal policies, including interest rates, money supply, and inflation; (5) changes in federal, state, or local tax laws; (6) the impact of changes in governmental policy and regulatory requirements on our operations; (7) changes in consumer spending, borrowing, and saving habits; (8) changes in the performance and creditworthiness of customers, suppliers, and counterparties; (9) increased credit risk and higher credit losses due to loan concentrations; (10) volatility in mortgage banking income due to interest rates and demand; (11) adequacy of our internal controls and risk management programs; (12) competitive pressures among financial services organizations; (13) uncertainty regarding changes in banking regulations and other regulatory requirements; (14) our ability to meet heightened supervisory requirements and expectations; (15) the impact of changes in accounting policies and practices on our financial condition; (16) the reliability and accuracy of assumptions and estimates used in applying critical accounting estimates; (17) the potential for higher future credit losses due to changes in economic assumptions; (18) the ability to anticipate and respond to technological changes and our reliance on third-party vendors; (19) operational issues related to and capital spending necessitated by the implementation of information technology systems on which we are highly dependent; (20) the ability to secure confidential information and deliver products and services through computer systems and telecommunications networks; (21) the impact of security breaches or failures in operational systems; (22) the impact of geopolitical instability and trade policies on our operations including the imposition of tariffs and retaliatory tariffs; (23) the impact of changes in credit ratings of government debt and financial stability of sovereign governments; (24) the effect of stock market price fluctuations on our asset and wealth management businesses; (25) litigation and regulatory compliance exposure; (26) availability of earnings and excess capital for dividend declarations; (27) the impact of fraud, scams, and schemes on our business; (28) the impact of natural disasters, pandemics, and other emergencies on our operations; (29) potential deterioration of the economy due to financial, political, or other shocks; (30) impact of healthcare laws and potential changes on our costs and operations; (31) the ability to grow deposits and maintain adequate deposit levels, including by mitigating the effect of unexpected deposit outflows on our financial condition; and (32) other risk factors related to the banking industry.

    Park does not undertake, and specifically disclaims any obligation, to publicly release the results of any revisions that may be made to update any forward-looking statement to reflect the events or circumstances after the date on which the forward-looking statement was made, or reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events, except to the extent required by law.

    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION  
    Financial Highlights  
    As of or for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024 and March 31, 2024              
                     
        2025       2024       2024       Percent change vs.  
    (in thousands, except common share and per common share data and ratios) 1st QTR 4th QTR 1st QTR   4Q ’24   1Q ’24  
    INCOME STATEMENT:                
    Net interest income $ 104,377     $ 103,445     $ 95,623       0.9   % 9.2   %
    Provision for credit losses   756       3,935       2,180       (80.8 ) % (65.3 ) %
    Other income   25,746       31,064       26,200       (17.1 ) % (1.7 ) %
    Other expense   78,164       83,241       77,228       (6.1 ) % 1.2   %
    Income before income taxes $ 51,203     $ 47,333     $ 42,415       8.2   % 20.7   %
    Income taxes   9,046       8,703       7,211       3.9   % 25.4   %
    Net income $ 42,157     $ 38,630     $ 35,204       9.1   % 19.8   %
                     
    MARKET DATA:                
    Earnings per common share – basic (a) $ 2.61     $ 2.39     $ 2.18       9.2   % 19.7   %
    Earnings per common share – diluted (a)   2.60       2.37       2.17       9.7   % 19.8   %
    Quarterly cash dividend declared per common share   1.07       1.06       1.06       0.9   % 0.9   %
    Special cash dividend declared per common share         0.50             N.M.   N.M.  
    Book value per common share at period end   79.00       76.98       71.95       2.6   % 9.8   %
    Market price per common share at period end   151.40       171.43       135.85       (11.7 ) % 11.4   %
    Market capitalization at period end   2,451,370       2,770,134       2,199,556       (11.5 ) % 11.4   %
                     
    Weighted average common shares – basic (b)   16,159,342       16,156,827       16,116,842         % 0.3   %
    Weighted average common shares – diluted (b)   16,238,701       16,283,701       16,191,065       (0.3 ) % 0.3   %
    Common shares outstanding at period end   16,191,347       16,158,982       16,149,523       0.2   % 0.3   %
                     
    PERFORMANCE RATIOS: (annualized)                
    Return on average assets (a)(b)   1.70   %   1.54   %   1.44   %   10.4   % 18.1   %
    Return on average shareholders’ equity (a)(b)   13.46   %   12.32   %   12.23   %   9.3   % 10.1   %
    Yield on loans   6.26   %   6.21   %   5.99   %   0.8   % 4.5   %
    Yield on investment securities   3.25   %   3.46   %   3.90   %   (6.1 ) % (16.7 ) %
    Yield on money market instruments   4.46   %   4.75   %   5.48   %   (6.1 ) % (18.6 ) %
    Yield on interest earning assets   5.85   %   5.82   %   5.66   %   0.5   % 3.4   %
    Cost of interest bearing deposits   1.76   %   1.90   %   1.94   %   (7.4 ) % (9.3 ) %
    Cost of borrowings   3.94   %   3.86   %   4.25   %   2.1   % (7.3 ) %
    Cost of paying interest bearing liabilities   1.86   %   1.99   %   2.08   %   (6.5 ) % (10.6 ) %
    Net interest margin (g)   4.62   %   4.51   %   4.28   %   2.4   % 7.9   %
    Efficiency ratio (g)   59.79   %   61.60   %   63.07   %   (2.9 ) % (5.2 ) %
                     
    OTHER DATA (NON-GAAP) AND BALANCE SHEET INFORMATION:                
    Tangible book value per common share (d) $ 68.94     $ 66.89     $ 61.80       3.1   % 11.6   %
    Average interest earning assets   9,210,385       9,176,540       9,048,204       0.4   % 1.8   %
    Pre-tax, pre-provision net income (j)   51,959       51,268       44,595       1.3   % 16.5   %
                     
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.  
       
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION  
    Financial Highlights (continued)  
    As of or for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024 and March 31, 2024  
                     
              Percent change vs.  
    (in thousands, except ratios) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024   4Q ’24   1Q ’24  
    BALANCE SHEET:                
    Investment securities $ 1,042,163     $ 1,100,861     $ 1,339,747       (5.3 ) % (22.2 ) %
    Loans   7,883,735       7,817,128       7,525,005       0.9   % 4.8   %
    Allowance for credit losses   88,130       87,966       85,084       0.2   % 3.6   %
    Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,758       163,032       163,927       (0.2 ) % (0.7 ) %
    Other real estate owned (OREO)   119       938       1,674       (87.3 ) % (92.9 ) %
    Total assets   9,886,612       9,805,350       9,881,077       0.8   % 0.1   %
    Total deposits   8,201,695       8,143,526       8,306,032       0.7   % (1.3 ) %
    Borrowings   270,757       280,083       295,130       (3.3 ) % (8.3 ) %
    Total shareholders’ equity   1,279,042       1,243,848       1,161,979       2.8   % 10.1   %
    Tangible equity (d)   1,116,284       1,080,816       998,052       3.3   % 11.8   %
    Total nonperforming loans   63,148       69,932       71,759       (9.7 ) % (12.0 ) %
    Total nonperforming assets   63,267       70,870       73,433       (10.7 ) % (13.8 ) %
                     
    ASSET QUALITY RATIOS:                
    Loans as a % of period end total assets   79.74   %   79.72   %   76.16   %     % 4.7   %
    Total nonperforming loans as a % of period end loans   0.80   %   0.89   %   0.95   %   (10.1 ) % (15.8 ) %
    Total nonperforming assets as a % of period end loans + OREO + other nonperforming assets   0.80   %   0.91   %   0.98   %   (12.1 ) % (18.4 ) %
    Allowance for credit losses as a % of period end loans   1.12   %   1.13   %   1.13   %   (0.9 ) % (0.9 ) %
    Net loan charge-offs $ 592     $ 3,206     $ 841       (81.5 ) % (29.6 ) %
    Annualized net loan charge-offs as a % of average loans (b)   0.03   %   0.16   %   0.05   %   (81.3 ) % (40.0 ) %
                     
    CAPITAL & LIQUIDITY:                
    Total shareholders’ equity / Period end total assets   12.94   %   12.69   %   11.76   %   2.0   % 10.0   %
    Tangible equity (d) / Tangible assets (f)   11.48   %   11.21   %   10.27   %   2.4   % 11.8   %
    Average shareholders’ equity / Average assets (b)   12.64   %   12.47   %   11.74   %   1.4   % 7.7   %
    Average shareholders’ equity / Average loans (b)   16.22   %   16.08   %   15.48   %   0.9   % 4.8   %
    Average loans / Average deposits (b)   93.56   %   93.00   %   91.11   %   0.6   % 2.7   %
                     
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.  
       
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Consolidated Statements of Income
               
        Three Months Ended  
        March 31  
    (in thousands, except share and per share data)   2025   2024  
               
    Interest income:          
    Interest and fees on loans   $ 120,648   $ 111,211  
    Interest on debt securities:          
    Taxable     7,130     11,899  
    Tax-exempt     1,269     1,410  
    Other interest income     3,153     2,120  
    Total interest income     132,200     126,640  
               
    Interest expense:          
    Interest on deposits:          
    Demand and savings deposits     18,436     19,855  
    Time deposits     6,770     7,338  
    Interest on borrowings     2,617     3,824  
    Total interest expense     27,823     31,017  
               
    Net interest income     104,377     95,623  
               
    Provision for credit losses     756     2,180  
               
    Net interest income after provision for credit losses     103,621     93,443  
               
    Other income     25,746     26,200  
               
    Other expense     78,164     77,228  
               
    Income before income taxes     51,203     42,415  
               
    Income taxes     9,046     7,211  
               
    Net income   $ 42,157   $ 35,204  
               
    Per common share:          
    Net income – basic   $ 2.61   $ 2.18  
    Net income – diluted   $ 2.60   $ 2.17  
               
    Weighted average common shares – basic     16,159,342     16,116,842  
    Weighted average common shares – diluted     16,238,701     16,191,065  
               
    Cash dividends declared:          
      Quarterly dividend   $ 1.07   $ 1.06  
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Consolidated Balance Sheets
         
    (in thousands, except share data) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024
         
    Assets    
         
    Cash and due from banks $ 154,536   $ 122,363  
    Money market instruments   83,078     38,203  
    Investment securities   1,042,163     1,100,861  
    Loans   7,883,735     7,817,128  
    Allowance for credit losses   (88,130 )   (87,966 )
    Loans, net   7,795,605     7,729,162  
    Bank premises and equipment, net   66,327     69,522  
    Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,758     163,032  
    Other real estate owned   119     938  
    Other assets   582,026     581,269  
    Total assets $ 9,886,612   $ 9,805,350  
         
    Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity    
         
    Deposits:    
    Noninterest bearing $ 2,637,577   $ 2,612,708  
    Interest bearing   5,564,118     5,530,818  
    Total deposits   8,201,695     8,143,526  
    Borrowings   270,757     280,083  
    Other liabilities   135,118     137,893  
    Total liabilities $ 8,607,570   $ 8,561,502  
         
         
    Shareholders’ Equity:    
    Preferred shares (200,000 shares authorized; no shares outstanding at March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024) $   $  
    Common shares (No par value; 20,000,000 shares authorized; 17,623,104 shares issued at March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024)   459,529     463,706  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss, net of taxes   (34,659 )   (46,175 )
    Retained earnings   1,002,110     977,599  
    Treasury shares (1,431,757 shares at March 31, 2025 and 1,464,122 shares at December 31, 2024)   (147,938 )   (151,282 )
    Total shareholders’ equity $ 1,279,042   $ 1,243,848  
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $ 9,886,612   $ 9,805,350  
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Consolidated Average Balance Sheets
           
      Three Months Ended  
      March 31  
    (in thousands)   2025     2024    
           
    Assets      
           
    Cash and due from banks $ 127,229   $ 143,714    
    Money market instruments   287,016     155,511    
    Investment securities   1,069,620     1,368,527    
    Loans   7,833,234     7,482,650    
    Allowance for credit losses   (88,825 )   (84,067 )  
    Loans, net   7,744,409     7,398,583    
    Bank premises and equipment, net   68,992     74,919    
    Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,938     164,137    
    Other real estate owned   918     1,088    
    Other assets   584,485     556,899    
    Total assets $ 10,045,607   $ 9,863,378    
           
           
    Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity      
           
    Deposits:      
    Noninterest bearing $ 2,578,838   $ 2,569,030    
    Interest bearing   5,793,915     5,644,088    
    Total deposits   8,372,753     8,213,118    
    Borrowings   269,254     361,703    
    Other liabilities   133,341     130,373    
    Total liabilities $ 8,775,348   $ 8,705,194    
           
    Shareholders’ Equity:      
    Preferred shares $   $    
    Common shares   464,046     463,518    
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss, net of taxes   (39,942 )   (67,343 )  
    Retained earnings   997,399     917,645    
    Treasury shares   (151,244 )   (155,636 )  
    Total shareholders’ equity $ 1,270,259   $ 1,158,184    
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $ 10,045,607   $ 9,863,378    
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Consolidated Statements of Income – Linked Quarters
               
      2025 2024 2024 2024 2024
    (in thousands, except per share data) 1st QTR 4th QTR 3rd QTR 2nd QTR 1st QTR
               
    Interest income:          
    Interest and fees on loans $ 120,648   $ 120,870   $ 120,203   $ 115,318   $ 111,211  
    Interest on debt securities:          
    Taxable   7,130     8,641     10,228     10,950     11,899  
    Tax-exempt   1,269     1,351     1,381     1,382     1,410  
    Other interest income   3,153     2,751     1,996     1,254     2,120  
    Total interest income   132,200     133,613     133,808     128,904     126,640  
               
    Interest expense:          
    Interest on deposits:          
    Demand and savings deposits   18,436     19,802     22,762     20,370     19,855  
    Time deposits   6,770     7,658     7,073     7,525     7,338  
    Interest on borrowings   2,617     2,708     2,859     3,172     3,824  
    Total interest expense   27,823     30,168     32,694     31,067     31,017  
               
    Net interest income   104,377     103,445     101,114     97,837     95,623  
               
    Provision for credit losses   756     3,935     5,315     3,113     2,180  
               
    Net interest income after provision for credit losses   103,621     99,510     95,799     94,724     93,443  
               
    Other income   25,746     31,064     36,530     28,794     26,200  
               
    Other expense   78,164     83,241     85,681     75,189     77,228  
               
    Income before income taxes   51,203     47,333     46,648     48,329     42,415  
               
    Income taxes   9,046     8,703     8,431     8,960     7,211  
               
    Net income $ 42,157   $ 38,630   $ 38,217   $ 39,369   $ 35,204  
               
    Per common share:          
    Net income – basic $ 2.61   $ 2.39   $ 2.37   $ 2.44   $ 2.18  
    Net income – diluted $ 2.60   $ 2.37   $ 2.35   $ 2.42   $ 2.17  
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Detail of other income and other expense – Linked Quarters
               
        2025     2024     2024     2024     2024  
    (in thousands) 1st QTR 4th QTR 3rd QTR 2nd QTR 1st QTR
               
    Other income:          
    Income from fiduciary activities $ 10,994   $ 11,122   $ 10,615   $ 10,728   $ 10,024  
    Service charges on deposit accounts   2,407     2,319     2,362     2,214     2,106  
    Other service income   2,936     3,277     3,036     2,906     2,524  
    Debit card fee income   6,089     6,511     6,539     6,580     6,243  
    Bank owned life insurance income   1,512     1,519     2,057     1,565     2,629  
    ATM fees   335     415     471     458     496  
    Pension settlement gain       365     5,783          
    (Loss) gain on the sale of OREO, net   (229 )   (74 )   2     (7 )   121  
    Loss on sale of debt securities, net       (128 )           (398 )
    (Loss) gain on equity securities, net   (862 )   1,852     1,557     358     (687 )
    Other components of net periodic benefit income   2,344     2,651     2,204     2,204     2,204  
    Miscellaneous   220     1,235     1,904     1,788     938  
    Total other income $ 25,746   $ 31,064   $ 36,530   $ 28,794   $ 26,200  
               
    Other expense:          
    Salaries $ 36,216   $ 37,254   $ 38,370   $ 35,954   $ 35,733  
    Employee benefits   10,516     10,129     10,162     9,873     11,560  
    Occupancy expense   3,519     2,929     3,731     2,975     3,181  
    Furniture and equipment expense   2,301     2,375     2,571     2,454     2,583  
    Data processing fees   10,529     10,450     11,764     9,542     8,808  
    Professional fees and services   7,307     10,465     7,842     6,022     6,817  
    Marketing   1,528     1,949     1,464     1,164     1,741  
    Insurance   1,686     1,600     1,640     1,777     1,718  
    Communication   1,202     1,104     955     1,002     1,036  
    State tax expense   1,186     1,145     1,116     1,129     1,110  
    Amortization of intangible assets   274     288     287     320     320  
    Foundation contributions           2,000          
    Miscellaneous   1,900     3,553     3,779     2,977     2,621  
    Total other expense $ 78,164   $ 83,241   $ 85,681   $ 75,189   $ 77,228  
               
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Asset Quality Information
                   
          Year ended December 31,
    (in thousands, except ratios)   March 31, 2025   2024     2023     2022     2021     2020  
                   
    Allowance for credit losses:              
    Allowance for credit losses, beginning of period   $ 87,966   $ 83,745   $ 85,379   $ 83,197   $ 85,675   $ 56,679  
    Cumulative change in accounting principle; adoption of ASU 2022-02 in 2023 and ASU 2016-13 in 2021           383         6,090      
    Charge-offs     3,605     18,334     10,863     9,133     5,093     10,304  
    Recoveries     3,013     8,012     5,942     6,758     8,441     27,246  
    Net charge-offs (recoveries)     592     10,322     4,921     2,375     (3,348 )   (16,942 )
    Provision for (recovery of) credit losses     756     14,543     2,904     4,557     (11,916 )   12,054  
    Allowance for credit losses, end of period   $ 88,130   $ 87,966   $ 83,745   $ 85,379   $ 83,197   $ 85,675  
                   
    General reserve trends:              
    Allowance for credit losses, end of period   $ 88,130   $ 87,966   $ 83,745   $ 85,379   $ 83,197   $ 85,675  
    Allowance on accruing purchased credit deteriorated (“PCD”) loans (purchased credit impaired (“PCI”) loans for years 2020 and prior)                         167  
    Allowance on purchased loans excluded from collectively evaluated loans (for years 2020 and prior)   N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.   678  
    Specific reserves on individually evaluated loans – accrual                     42     44  
    Specific reserves on individually evaluated loans – nonaccrual     1,044     1,299     4,983     3,566     1,574     5,390  
    General reserves on collectively evaluated loans   $ 87,086   $ 86,667   $ 78,762   $ 81,813   $ 81,581   $ 79,396  
                   
    Total loans   $ 7,883,735   $ 7,817,128   $ 7,476,221   $ 7,141,891   $ 6,871,122   $ 7,177,785  
    Accruing PCD loans (PCI loans for years 2020 and prior)     2,139     2,174     2,835     4,653     7,149     11,153  
    Purchased loans excluded from collectively evaluated loans (for years 2020 and prior)   N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.   360,056  
    Individually evaluated loans – accrual (k)     13,935     15,290         11,477     17,517     8,756  
    Individually evaluated loans – nonaccrual     47,718     53,149     45,215     66,864     56,985     99,651  
    Collectively evaluated loans   $ 7,819,943   $ 7,746,515   $ 7,428,171   $ 7,058,897   $ 6,789,471   $ 6,698,169  
                   
    Asset Quality Ratios:              
    Net charge-offs (recoveries) as a % of average loans     0.03 %   0.14 %   0.07 %   0.03 %   (0.05) %   (0.24) %
    Allowance for credit losses as a % of period end loans     1.12 %   1.13 %   1.12 %   1.20 %   1.21 %   1.19 %
    General reserve as a % of collectively evaluated loans     1.11 %   1.12 %   1.06 %   1.16 %   1.20 %   1.19 %
                   
    Nonperforming assets:              
    Nonaccrual loans   $ 61,929   $ 68,178   $ 60,259   $ 79,696   $ 72,722   $ 117,368  
    Accruing troubled debt restructurings (for years 2022 and prior) (k)   N.A. N.A. N.A.   20,134     28,323     20,788  
    Loans past due 90 days or more     1,219     1,754     859     1,281     1,607     1,458  
    Total nonperforming loans   $ 63,148   $ 69,932   $ 61,118   $ 101,111   $ 102,652   $ 139,614  
    Other real estate owned     119     938     983     1,354     775     1,431  
    Other nonperforming assets                     2,750     3,164  
    Total nonperforming assets   $ 63,267   $ 70,870   $ 62,101   $ 102,465   $ 106,177   $ 144,209  
    Percentage of nonaccrual loans to period end loans     0.79 %   0.87 %   0.81 %   1.12 %   1.06 %   1.64 %
    Percentage of nonperforming loans to period end loans     0.80 %   0.89 %   0.82 %   1.42 %   1.49 %   1.95 %
    Percentage of nonperforming assets to period end loans     0.80 %   0.91 %   0.83 %   1.43 %   1.55 %   2.01 %
    Percentage of nonperforming assets to period end total assets     0.64 %   0.72 %   0.63 %   1.04 %   1.11 %   1.55 %
                   
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION
    Asset Quality Information (continued)
                   
          Year ended December 31,
    (in thousands, except ratios)   March 31, 2025 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020
                   
    New nonaccrual loan information:              
    Nonaccrual loans, beginning of period   $ 68,178 $ 60,259 $ 79,696 $ 72,722 $ 117,368 $ 90,080
    New nonaccrual loans     14,767   65,535   48,280   64,918   38,478   103,386
    Resolved nonaccrual loans     21,016   57,616   67,717   57,944   83,124   76,098
    Nonaccrual loans, end of period   $ 61,929 $ 68,178 $ 60,259 $ 79,696 $ 72,722 $ 117,368
                   
    Individually evaluated nonaccrual commercial loan portfolio information (period end):
    Unpaid principal balance   $ 51,134 $ 58,158 $ 47,564 $ 68,639 $ 57,609 $ 100,306
    Prior charge-offs     3,416   5,009   2,349   1,775   624   655
    Remaining principal balance     47,718   53,149   45,215   66,864   56,985   99,651
    Specific reserves     1,044   1,299   4,983   3,566   1,574   5,390
    Book value, after specific reserves   $ 46,674 $ 51,850 $ 40,232 $ 63,298 $ 55,411 $ 94,261
                   
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION  
    Financial Reconciliations        
    NON-GAAP RECONCILIATIONS        
      THREE MONTHS ENDED  
    (in thousands, except share and per share data) March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    Net interest income $ 104,377   $ 103,445   $ 95,623    
    less purchase accounting accretion related to NewDominion and Carolina Alliance acquisitions   175     250     352    
    less interest income on former Vision Bank relationships   1,019     38     2    
    Net interest income – adjusted $ 103,183   $ 103,157   $ 95,269    
             
    Provision for credit losses $ 756   $ 3,935   $ 2,180    
    less recoveries on former Vision Bank relationships   (1,097 )       (953 )  
    Provision for credit losses – adjusted $ 1,853   $ 3,935   $ 3,133    
             
    Other income $ 25,746   $ 31,064   $ 26,200    
    less loss on sale of debt securities, net       (128 )   (398 )  
    less pension settlement gain       365        
    less impact of strategic initiatives   (914 )   117     (155 )  
    less Vision related (loss) gain on the sale of OREO, net   (229 )       121    
    less other service income related to former Vision Bank relationships   3     299     7    
    Other income – adjusted $ 26,886   $ 30,411   $ 26,625    
             
    Other expense $ 78,164   $ 83,241   $ 77,228    
    less core deposit intangible amortization related to NewDominion and Carolina Alliance acquisitions   274     288     320    
    less building demolition costs       44     65    
    less direct expenses related to collection of payments on former Vision Bank loan relationships   276     215        
    Other expense – adjusted $ 77,614   $ 82,694   $ 76,843    
             
    Tax effect of adjustments to net income identified above (i) $ (126 ) $ (83 ) $ (104 )  
             
    Net income – reported $ 42,157   $ 38,630   $ 35,204    
    Net income – adjusted (h) $ 41,682   $ 38,319   $ 34,811    
             
    Diluted earnings per common share $ 2.60   $ 2.37   $ 2.17    
    Diluted earnings per common share, adjusted (h) $ 2.57   $ 2.35   $ 2.15    
             
    Annualized return on average assets (a)(b)   1.70 %   1.54 %   1.44 %  
    Annualized return on average assets, adjusted (a)(b)(h)   1.68 %   1.52 %   1.42 %  
             
    Annualized return on average tangible assets (a)(b)(e)   1.73 %   1.56 %   1.46 %  
    Annualized return on average tangible assets, adjusted (a)(b)(e)(h)   1.71 %   1.55 %   1.44 %  
             
    Annualized return on average shareholders’ equity (a)(b)   13.46 %   12.32 %   12.23 %  
    Annualized return on average shareholders’ equity, adjusted (a)(b)(h)   13.31 %   12.22 %   12.09 %  
             
    Annualized return on average tangible equity (a)(b)(c)   15.44 %   14.17 %   14.24 %  
    Annualized return on average tangible equity, adjusted (a)(b)(c)(h)   15.27 %   14.06 %   14.08 %  
             
    Efficiency ratio (g)   59.79 %   61.60 %   63.07 %  
    Efficiency ratio, adjusted (g)(h)   59.39 %   61.63 %   62.72 %  
             
    Annualized net interest margin (g)   4.62 %   4.51 %   4.28 %  
    Annualized net interest margin, adjusted (g)(h)   4.57 %   4.50 %   4.26 %  
    Note: Explanations for footnotes (a) – (k) are included at the end of the financial tables in the “Financial Reconciliations” section.
     
    PARK NATIONAL CORPORATION  
    Financial Reconciliations (continued)        
             
    (a) Reported measure uses net income
    (b) Averages are for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, as appropriate
    (c) Net income for each period divided by average tangible equity during the period. Average tangible equity equals average shareholders’ equity during the applicable period less average goodwill and other intangible assets during the applicable period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF AVERAGE SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY TO AVERAGE TANGIBLE EQUITY:  
      THREE MONTHS ENDED  
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    AVERAGE SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY $ 1,270,259 $ 1,247,680 $ 1,158,184  
    Less: Average goodwill and other intangible assets   162,938   163,221   164,137  
    AVERAGE TANGIBLE EQUITY $ 1,107,321 $ 1,084,459 $ 994,047  
             
    (d) Tangible equity divided by common shares outstanding at period end. Tangible equity equals total shareholders’ equity less goodwill and other intangible assets, in each case at the end of the period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF TOTAL SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY TO TANGIBLE EQUITY:
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    TOTAL SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY $ 1,279,042 $ 1,243,848 $ 1,161,979  
    Less: Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,758   163,032   163,927  
    TANGIBLE EQUITY $ 1,116,284 $ 1,080,816 $ 998,052  
             
    (e) Net income for each period divided by average tangible assets during the period. Average tangible assets equal average assets less average goodwill and other intangible assets, in each case during the applicable period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF AVERAGE ASSETS TO AVERAGE TANGIBLE ASSETS  
      THREE MONTHS ENDED  
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    AVERAGE ASSETS $ 10,045,607 $ 10,008,328 $ 9,863,378  
    Less: Average goodwill and other intangible assets   162,938   163,221   164,137  
    AVERAGE TANGIBLE ASSETS $ 9,882,669 $ 9,845,107 $ 9,699,241  
             
    (f) Tangible equity divided by tangible assets. Tangible assets equal total assets less goodwill and other intangible assets, in each case at the end of the period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF TOTAL ASSETS TO TANGIBLE ASSETS:
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    TOTAL ASSETS $ 9,886,612 $ 9,805,350 $ 9,881,077  
    Less: Goodwill and other intangible assets   162,758   163,032   163,927  
    TANGIBLE ASSETS $ 9,723,854 $ 9,642,318 $ 9,717,150  
             
    (g) Efficiency ratio is calculated by dividing total other expense by the sum of fully taxable equivalent net interest income and other income. Fully taxable equivalent net interest income reconciliation is shown assuming a 21% corporate federal income tax rate. Additionally, net interest margin is calculated on a fully taxable equivalent basis by dividing fully taxable equivalent net interest income by average interest earning assets, in each case during the applicable period.
             
    RECONCILIATION OF FULLY TAXABLE EQUIVALENT NET INTEREST INCOME TO NET INTEREST INCOME
      THREE MONTHS ENDED  
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024  
    Interest income $ 132,200 $ 133,613 $ 126,640  
    Fully taxable equivalent adjustment   607   617   616  
    Fully taxable equivalent interest income $ 132,807 $ 134,230 $ 127,256  
    Interest expense   27,823   30,168   31,017  
    Fully taxable equivalent net interest income $ 104,984 $ 104,062 $ 96,239  
             
    (h) Adjustments to net income for each period presented are detailed in the non-GAAP reconciliations of net interest income, provision for credit losses, other income, other expense and tax effect of adjustments to net income.
    (i) The tax effect of adjustments to net income was calculated assuming a 21% corporate federal income tax rate.
    (j) Pre-tax, pre-provision (“PTPP”) net income is calculated as net income, plus income taxes, plus the provision for credit losses, in each case during the applicable period. PTPP net income is a common industry metric utilized in capital analysis and review. PTPP is used to assess the operating performance of Park while excluding the impact of the provision for credit losses.
     
    RECONCILIATION OF PRE-TAX, PRE-PROVISION NET INCOME
      THREE MONTHS ENDED
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024
    Net income $ 42,157 $ 38,630 $ 35,204  
    Plus: Income taxes   9,046   8,703   7,211  
    Plus: Provision for credit losses   756   3,935   2,180  
    Pre-tax, pre-provision net income $ 51,959 $ 51,268 $ 44,595  
             
    (k) Effective January 1, 2023, Park adopted Accounting Standards Update (“ASU”) 2022-02. Among other things, this ASU eliminated the concept of troubled debt restructurings (“TDRs”). As a result of the adoption of this ASU and elimination of the concept of TDRs, total nonperforming loans (“NPLs”) and total nonperforming assets (“NPAs”) each decreased by $20.1 million effective January 1, 2023. Additionally, as a result of the adoption of this ASU, accruing individually evaluated loans decreased by $11.5 million effective January 1, 2023.
     

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Amplify Energy and Juniper Capital Announce Termination of Merger Agreement

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    HOUSTON, April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Amplify Energy Corp. (NYSE: AMPY) (“Amplify” or the “Company”) announced today that the Company and Juniper Capital Advisors, L.P. (“Juniper”) have entered into a mutual termination agreement (“Termination Agreement”) to terminate (the “Termination”) the previously announced Agreement and Plan of Merger (the “Merger Agreement”) in light of the extraordinary volatility in the market. In accordance with the terms of the Termination Agreement, Juniper is receiving a cash payment of $800,000 in lieu of any termination fee which might have been otherwise payable pursuant to the Merger Agreement.

    In view of the Termination, Amplify also announced its decision to cancel its special meeting of stockholders (the “Special Meeting”) and the withdrawal from consideration by the Company’s stockholders of the proposals set forth in the Company’s definitive proxy statement, as amended, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on March 4, 2025.

    Amplify intends to provide an update on the state of its business, including capital allocation and free cash flow outlook in the current macroeconomic environment, when it announces first quarter earnings. The Company plans to continue to evaluate strategic alternatives to maximize value to stockholders, including potential portfolio optimization strategies.

    About Amplify Energy

    Amplify Energy Corp. is an independent oil and natural gas company engaged in the acquisition, development, exploitation and production of oil and natural gas properties. Amplify’s operations are focused in Oklahoma, the Rockies (Bairoil), federal waters offshore Southern California (Beta), East Texas / North Louisiana, and the Eagle Ford (Non-op). For more information, visit www.amplifyenergy.com.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release includes “forward-looking statements.” All statements, other than statements of historical fact, included in this press release that address activities, events or developments that the Company expects, believes or anticipates will or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. Terminology such as “could,” “believe,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “estimate,” “expect,” “may,” “continue,” “predict,” “potential,” “project” and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties and other factors that could cause the Company’s actual results or financial condition to differ materially from those expressed or implied by forward-looking statements. Risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ from expectations include: the effects of disruption caused by the announcement of the Termination and the Termination making it more difficult to maintain relationships with employees, customers, vendors and other business partners; the risk that stockholder litigation in connection with the contemplated transaction and the Termination may result in significant costs of defense, indemnification and liability; transaction costs; and actual or contingent liabilities. Please read the Company’s filings with the SEC, including “Risk Factors” in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K, and if applicable, the Company’s Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and Current Reports on Form 8-K, which are available on the Company’s Investor Relations website at https://www.amplifyenergy.com/investor-relations/default.aspx or on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov, for a discussion of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ from those in such forward-looking statements. You are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date of this press release. All forward-looking statements in this press release are qualified in their entirety by these cautionary statements. Except as required by law, the Company undertakes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future results or otherwise.

    Contacts

    Amplify Energy

    Jim Frew — Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
    (832) 219-9044
    jim.frew@amplifyenergy.com

    Michael Jordan — Director, Finance and Treasurer
    (832) 219-9051
    michael.jordan@amplifyenergy.com

    FTI Consulting

    Tanner Kaufman / Brandon Elliott / Rose Zu
    amplifyenergy@fticonsulting.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: African Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    April 25, 2025

    PARTICIPANTS:

    Speaker: ABEBE AEMRO SELASSIE, Director, African Department, IMF

    Moderator: KWABENA AKUAMOAH-BOATENG, Communications Officer, IMF

    *  *  *  *  *

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening to all of you here in the room and those joining us online. My name is Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng.  I am with the Communications Department of the IMF, and

    I will be your moderator for today. 

    Welcome to today’s press briefing on the Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa. I am pleased to introduce Abebe Aemro Selassie, Director of the IMF’s African Department.  Abebe will share key insights from our new report titled Recovery Interrupted

    But before I turn to Abebe, a reminder that we have simultaneous interpretation in French and Portuguese, both online and in the room.  And the materials for this press briefing, the report, are all available online at IMF.org/Africa. Abebe, the floor is yours.

    MR. SELASSIE: Good morning and good afternoon to colleagues joining us from the region and beyond. Thank you for being here today for the release of our April Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa.

    Six months ago, I highlighted our region’s sluggish growth, and the steep political and social hurdles governments had to overcome to push through essential reforms.  Today, that fragile recovery faces a new test: the surge of global policy uncertainty so profound it is reshaping the region’s growth trajectory.

    Just when policy efforts began to bear fruit, with regional growth exceeding expectations in 2024, the region’s hard-won recovery has been overtaken by a sudden realignment of global priorities, casting a shadow over the outlook.  We now expect growth in Sub-Saharan Africa to ease to 3.8 percent in 2025 and 4.2 percent in 2026, marked down from our October projections, and these have been driven largely by difficult external conditions: weaker demand abroad, softer commodity prices, and tighter financial markets.

    Any further increase in trade tensions or tightening of financial conditions in advanced economies could further dampen regional confidence, raise borrowing costs further, and delay investment.  Meanwhile, official development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to decline further, placing extra strain on the most vulnerable population.

    These external headwinds come on top of longer-standing vulnerabilities. High debt levels constrain the ability of many countries to finance essential services and development priorities.  While inflationary pressures have moderated at the regional level, quite a few countries are still grappling with elevated inflation, necessitating a tighter monetary stance and careful fiscal policy.

    Against this challenging backdrop, our report underscores the importance of calibrating policies to balance growth, social development, and macroeconomic stability.  Building robust fiscal and external buffers is more important than ever, underpinned by credibility and consistency in policymaking.

    In particular, there is a premium on policies to strengthen resilience: mobilize domestic revenue, improve spending efficiency, and strengthen public finance management and fiscal framework and fiscal frameworks to lower borrowing costs.  Reforms that enhance growth, improve the business climate, and foster regional trade integration are also needed to lay the groundwork for private sector-led growth.  High growth is imperative to engender the millions of jobs our region needs. 

    A strong, stable, and prosperous Sub-Saharan Africa is important for its people but also the world.  It is the region that will be the main source of labor and incremental investment and consumption demand in the decades to come.  External support as the region goes through its demographic transition is of tremendous strategic importance for the future of our planet. 

    The Fund is doing its part to help, having dispersed over $65 billion since 2020 and more than $8 billion just over the last year.  Our policy advice and capacity development efforts support more countries still. 

    Thank you and I’m happy to answer your questions. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Thank you, Abebe. Before we turn to you for your questions, a couple of ground rules, please. If you want to ask a question, raise your hand, and we’ll come to you.  Identify yourself and your organization and please limit it to one question.  For those online, you can use the chat function, or you can also raise your hand, and then we’ll come to you.  I will start from my right. 

    QUESTIONER: Good morning.  Thank you for taking my question.  You mentioned several things in your report.  The recovery that is going on the continent as well as some of the challenges that the continent is facing and the dividends that the continent currently has in its youth.  Leaders on the continent are working — I was at an event yesterday where they are looking at ways to raise funds to develop projects.  So, what is your recommendation for projects?  We’re seeing a need for projects like this as well as revenue mobilization on the continent.  So, is your recommendation to leaders on the continent on how to source these funds that are needed, given that some of the advanced economies are cutting back? 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, any related questions before we go to Abebe?

    QUESTIONER: Abebe, you just made the point that the recovery has been hit by these uncertainties.  Beyond just policy direction, is there any scope to do anything in terms of, for example, maybe you dispense some money though, but maybe a little more to expect — to countries that are coming off defaults and what have you to help in this recovery, even at such a time?  This is also aided by, beyond the fact that some are coming, they have no buffers whatsoever.  And then, coming from defaults, things become very difficult for some of these countries to even have the money to do this.  Could there be any extra funding, even if on a regional level, to back the policy prescriptions that you have proposed? 

    MR. SELASSIE: I think there’s two different points here. The first one is more of a broader meta point, whether financing is the only constraint that is hindering more investment, more robust economic activity, and job creation. Of course, financing plays a role, but it is not the only constraint. It depends on country-to-country circumstances, what sectors we are talking about.  But it really is important to recognize that there are many other things that can be done to engender higher growth to facilitate more investment. 

    One of the issues that we have seen in our region over the years is that a lot of growth has –in many countries– been driven by public spending and public investment for many years.  That, of course, has made a major contribution.  It has facilitated all the investment that we have seen in infrastructure, building schools, building clinics.  So, that has a role to play. But I would say that going forward it will be as important to see if we can find ways in which the private sector is the main engine of growth. So, there are reforms that can be done to facilitate this growth. 

    The second one I am sensing from both your questions is about the circumstance right now where a combination of cuts in aid [and] tighter financing conditions are causing dislocation [and difficulties for governments. We have been, more than anybody else, stressing just what a difficult environment our governments have been facing.  We have been talking about the brutal funding squeeze that countries are under.  It has ebbed a little bit and flowed, you know, like the external market conditions, for example. There have been periods when they have been opened and some of our market access countries have been able to borrow, and then other periods where they have been closed, and we are going through one right now.  And this is on top of the cuts in aid that we have seen and tighter domestic financing conditions.  

    When this more cyclical point is playing out, I think it’s important for countries to be a bit more measured in how they are seeking to tackle their development needs.  So, maybe it means a bit more relying on domestic revenue mobilization, expenditure prioritization when conditions are particularly difficult as they are now, and, as I said earlier, going back to see what can be done to find ways to engender growth over the medium-term.  But it is a difficult period, as we note in our report, and one that is causing quite a bit of dislocation to our countries. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will come to the middle. The lady in the front.

    QUESTIONER: My first question is around recovery, of course, your reports are called “interrupted”.  So, with recovery slipping, growth downgraded, debt pressures mountain, is Sub-Saharan Africa at risk of another lost decade?  Because in your report you mentioned that the last four years have been quite turbulent for Africa, and we are trying to get back on track.  What is IMF’s message on bold actions that leaders must take now to avoid being left behind in the global economy and to avoid Africa being in a permanent state of vulnerability?  Because we always hear that we are in a permanent state of vulnerability.  Then for Nigeria, macros are under threat right now.  How can the government — what are your suggestions on how the government can actually push through deep reforms that deliver tangible growth for its people?  Of course, for your report, you did mention the millions and millions of people that you know live below $2.15 a day. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Any more Nigeria questions? I will take the gentleman right here.

    QUESTIONER: In your report you said that debt has stabilized.  And when you look at Nigeria’s debt profile, what insights can you share as to where the borrowings are going to?  Are you seeing more of long-term loans or short-term loans?  So that’s one.  So, what — recently the World Bank expressed concerns about the performance of Nigeria’s statistical body, saying that the institution is performing Sub optimally.  Do you share that sentiment?  Thank you very much. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will take one more on Nigeria. The gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTIONER: I [would] like to know in specific terms, Nigeria has already undertaken several reforms, especially removed oil subsidies and floated the naira.  What more specific things do you expect of Nigeria in terms of reform?

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. Abebe?

    MR. SELASSIE: So, in terms of the reforms that have been going on in Nigeria and the particularities of the challenge, the first thing to note is that we have been really impressed by how much reforms have been undertaken in recent years. Most notably, trying to go to the heart of the cause of the macroeconomic imbalances in Nigeria, which are related to the fact that, oil subsidies were taking up a very large share of the limited tax revenues that the government have and not necessarily being used in the most effective way to help the most vulnerable people. The issues related to the imbalances on the external side with the exchange rate extremely out of line. 

    So it’s been really good to see the government taking these on, head-on, address those, and also beginning to roll out the third component of the reforms that we have been advocating for and of course, the government has been pursuing, which is to expand social protection, to target generalized subsidies to help the most vulnerable.  This has all been very good to see, but more can be done, particularly on the latter front, expanding social protection and enhancing a lot more transparency in the oil sector so that the removal of subsidies does translate into flow of revenue into the government budget.  So, there is still a bit more work to do in these areas. 

    We just had a mission in Nigeria where there was extensive discussions on these and other issues on the macroeconomic area, but also other areas where there is a need to do reforms to engender more private sector investment and also how more resources can be devoted to help Nigeria generate the revenues it so desperately needs to build more schools, more universities, and, of course, more infrastructure.  So, there is a comprehensive set of reforms that Nigeria can pursue that would help engender more growth and help diversify the economy away from reliance on oil.  And this diversification is, of course, all the more important given what we are seeing happening to commodity prices.  So, I think this is an important agenda. 

    Second, as the government is doing this, of course there will be a financing need.  And here what is needed is really a judicious and agile way of dealing with the financing challenges the country faces.  In the long run, the financing gap can only be filled by permanent sources such as revenue mobilization.  But in the interim, carefully looking at all the options the country must borrow in a contained way will be part of that solution.  And I think the government has been going about this prudently and cautiously so far, and we are encouraged by that. 

    And lastly, on data issues in Nigeria we really applaud the effort the government’s making to try and revise and upgrade data quality in Nigeria.  This task is not an easy one in our countries, given the extent of informality there is, given the extent of relative price changes that play out in our economies.  So doing this cautiously is what is needed methodically.  And that is exactly what we see happening.  We welcome, though, the efforts the government is making because without good data, it is difficult to make good policies.  So, we really applaud the effort the government is making to try and upgrade data quality. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We will take a round of questions online.

    QUESTIONER: There are bills in the UK Parliament and the New York State Assembly that aim to force holdout private creditors to accept debt treatments on comparable terms to other creditors and to limit or stop such litigation.  Are these bills needed, do you think, or is the current international debt architecture sufficient?  So, you know, IMF, DSAs, creditor groups, the common framework, where applicable. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please go ahead with your question.

    QUESTIONER: Earlier this month, the IMF reached a staff-level agreement with Burkina Faso to complete the Third Review of the country’s program.  So as part of the review, the IMF allowed a greater fiscal flexibility, allowing Burkina Faso to raise its public deficit target to 4 percent, up from the 2 percent cap set by the West African Economic Monetary Union.  So, given that the country’s challenges, such as persistent insecurity, high social demands, are common across the region, wouldn’t it be wiser to consider applying this flexibility more broadly to the West African Economic Monetary Union?  And my second question will be about the downward revision of the growth forecast for 2025 and 2026 in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Does the IMF view this new crisis – I am talking about the global uncertainty and the recent U.S. tariff measures.  Does the IMF view this crisis as potentially more severe and with broader consequences for the region than previous shocks such as COVID and the war in Ukraine? 

    MR. SELASSIE: On the first question on debt workouts and the challenges there, I am not fully informed about the specifics of the bills that Rachel, you are talking about, indeed, we have seen from time to time some private creditor groups holding out, trying to hold out, but I am not sure that a bill is what’s needed, but rather, force of argument to try and bring people to the table. And in recent restructurings, at least I am not aware of this being the main hindrance in advancing discussions.  There have been many other factors, including just the complexity of the current creditor landscape, that have played a role. 

    On Burkina Faso, flexibility under the program or the deficit targets for the WAEMU countries more generally, just it is important to distinguish between particular years’ fiscal deficit targets that the government wants to pursue and we, incorporate in the program and just the more medium-term criteria, convergence criteria that there is for the WAEMU countries. 

    So, the 3 percent target criteria are for the medium- to long-term.  And it has been very clear that when there are shocks or when there are pressing social development needs, countries do have the scope to deviate from that.  In fact, often the constraint on the Sahel countries has been not having enough, sufficient, enough financing to be able to meet these to advance development objectives.  The other constraint of course is that overall, the more you exceed this 3 percent target and add to the overall debt burden, the more you are going to have – you are likely to build up debt vulnerabilities. 

    So, in the work that we do with countries, whether it is Burkina Faso or other WAEMU countries or indeed beyond, what we try and help with is of course to help countries strike this balance between addressing the immediate and pressing needs that they have while avoiding medium-term debt sustainability problems.  I think one is just thinking about how to strike this balance.  And then second, we put resources on the table very cheaply to help countries, avoid, at least in the near term, more difficult financing difficulties.  So, for Burkina and others, it is just about striking this balance.

    And on growth, whether this latest shock is as bad for the region as the previous ones. I think it is really important also to point out that as difficult, I mean the last four or five years have been incredibly difficult time for our countries, a lot of challenges, a lot of dislocation, but there is also been quite a lot of resilience, and I think that is important to stress.  I would note that, even now, it is this year, 11 out of the 20 fastest growing economies in the world are from Sub-Saharan Africa.  So, there are quite a lot of countries that are going to be sustaining significant growth in the region.  So, we should also not lose sight of this resilience. 

    Second, and more broadly, the buildup of uncertainties I think is very negative.  And this is interrupting what we are seeing in terms of a recovery.  But growth is not, we are not projecting growth to collapse.  And our hope is that as things calm down, the region can resume its growth trajectory also.

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We will take three more questions online, then we will come back to the room.

    QUESTIONER: I wanted to know about Senegal, in terms of whether funds would be repaid after the misreporting of data and if the IMF has learned anything from that?  And also, just if you can, the status of the IMF’s programs and even operations in Sudan and South Sudan? 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: The IMF is urging countries to focus on domestic revenue mobilization.  But you may have seen that South Africa’s Finance Minister has withdrawn the VAT increase that he had proposed in the budget, in the face of opposition from coalition partners.  Does the IMF see any alternative sources of revenue that are feasible for the South African government as the parties hoped?  And are there any lessons here for other countries trying to mobilize domestic revenue?                                                         

    QUESTIONER: Building on the question that Hilary has asked that the REO does make the case for domestic revenue mobilization, and you made that argument, I believe, in the last two Regional Economic Outlook reports as well.  But poverty is still endemic.  Incomes, as far as I can tell, have not really recovered to pre-pandemic levels.  So other than broadcast to tax exemptions what else can be done to raise tax-to-GDP ratios?  One last question on this.  Has there been any progress that has been made in the Sovereign Debt Roundtable in deciding how debt from Afreximbank, and Trade and Development Bank should be treated, at least under the common framework for countries like Ghana and Zambia?  Now, do they qualify to not have their debt restructured in the same way that the IMF, the World Bank’s credit lines?

    MR. SELASSIE: On Senegal, I was recently in Dakar for discussions building on work that our team has been doing. What we are waiting for is the government to finalize the work that’s ongoing.  Right now, the audits are going on and reconciliation work is going on. 

    On the extent of domestic and external debt.  We have been very clear in welcoming the transparency and really robust and collegial way in which the government has been engaging on the issues that have arisen in the misreporting case and we look forward to the numbers stabilizing, and engaging in discussions on the next steps in terms of bringing the, the findings to our Executive Board and next steps in our engagement with Senegal. 

    On South Sudan, it has just been a difficult period of course for South Sudan.  They have been hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from the conflict in the north.  The conflict has also interrupted, disrupted heavily their main source of tax revenue, oil exports through the pipeline.  So, it’s been a really wrenching period.  Over the last three, four years we have provided, you know, we have been trying to provide South Sudan with emergency financing and trying to find a way in which we can engage with a more structured longer-term program.  We remain hopeful that we are going to be able to do that.  But first and foremost, I think we need to see what can be done to make sure that the policy making environment is as robust and as strong as it is, and as transparent, so we can come in, step in and support South Sudan.

    On revenue mobilization, I want to just first link this to the point I made earlier that what we have observed and again there is a risk of generalizing, but what we’ve observed over the last 10, 15 years in the region is that governments have made a very significant effort to invest in really important infrastructure needs in building schools, in building health clinics and much else.  And you see very positive outcomes.  Look at the electricity coverage in our region, look at the human development indicators and how much they have moved over the years in the region. 

    But we have also seen that despite a lot of investment, for example, in electricity generation capacity and electricity coverage in our countries, many roads are being built.  The returns of all this investment have not been captured in the tax revenue, which is one of the points, the pressure points where debt levels have gone up and the interest-to-revenue ratio.  So, the interest payment-to-revenue ratio has also been rising.  And this has been one of the key points of vulnerability in many economies and why a few countries have gotten into debt difficulty and needed to restructure. 

    So going forward, I think it’s very clear that to be able to continue investing; to be able to continue expanding economies and the government doing its core function, it has to find more ways other than borrowing to address this. 

    Now, in the past, governments have been quick to cut spending, and that has, we found, again and again, to be very detrimental to development progress and growth outcomes.  I think this, again, at the risk of generalizing, was the approach that was generally pursued in the 1980s and found to be very problematic, very challenging, very depressing to growth.  So, we would very much love for countries to avoid this. When there are pressing spending needs, there’s generally only a couple of ways that you can finance this.  Spending cuts or revenue mobilization.  You can borrow, of course, but as I said, borrowing is not optimal. 

    Now, this doesn’t mean revenue mobilization is easy.  Far, far from it. It requires not only political engagement, but also a lot of communication, a lot of effort to show that the resources the government is trying to generate are going to be going to the right areas to help strengthen the social contract.  So, it’s a deep and engaged process, and we are very, very cognizant of that.  But I do think that this is the most optimal way, the most economically sensible way in which our countries can help address the tremendous development needs that we have.

    Now, specifically on South Africa, ultimately when issues like this arise, these are deeply domestic political issues to be resolved as to what the best way to do the financing is.  So, if a tax rate increase for a particular tax is not possible, then maybe finding ways to expand the tax base, maybe trying different tax angles or if all of those are not possible, then revisiting spending priorities may be one of the ways that countries must handle this.  And this is typically what we see playing out in countries in the region when financing constraints are binding. 

    So, whether it is in Kenya, South Africa, or other countries the issue of revenue mobilization is a live one, but one that is extremely complex.  We are very cognizant of that.  And one that requires quite a lot of consensus building, quite a lot of discussion to be able to advance, and of course, broader societal support.  And we absolutely see countries engaging in this and do what we can to help bring lessons from other countries where we are asked to.

    Then there was a question about the GSDR.  So, this Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, this is the initiative launched by the Fund and the Bank to try and bring creditors and debtors together around the table to find ways in which debt work[outs] can be easier because you are discussing general principles rather than country-specific debt restructuring issues. And we have seen this making quite a lot of progress. Perhaps the most recent development has been the preparation of a debt work[out] playbook that is a very helpful document that has been put out building on the experience of recent work[outs].  What has worked particularly well.  What kind of information sharing ahead of debt work[outs] have been helpful in terms of accelerating debt processes.  Debt restructurings are one of the most contentious and challenging issues that there are between states, between creditors and debtors, and it requires quite a lot of discussion, and it is not such an easy thing to do, including what the parameter of debt should be.  I think one of the questions that was raised is about the debt parameter.  This is fundamentally an issue for the debtor countries and creditors to resolve, and intra-creditor disputes also have to be done. 

    So, in terms of the principles that generally we see creditors apply when these kinds of disputes arise about what the right parameter should be or not and who gets preferential treatment. I think there’s generally been two rules of thumb. One is that the terms in which new financing is being provided or the financing is provided, whether it’s commercial or concessional has been a factor that most creditors look at in terms of whether a particular credit should be included in the parameter or not, and then also the extent to which new financing is being made available.  So, what differentiates senior creditors like the IMF, the World Bank, of course, is that for most countries we operate providing concessional financing very long-term.  And we are the ones that come in and provide financing consistently through crisis and otherwise. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We have time for one more round of questions. I will start with the gentleman in the front here. 

    QUESTIONER: The U.S. is your largest shareholder, and we are seeing mixed messages this week from the Treasury Secretary mentioning that he remains committed to the Fund but also calling on you to hold countries accountable to program performance, empower staff to walk away if reform commitment is lacking. 

    So, I wanted to ask you, should we expect the IMF spigot to start closing in response to U.S. pressure?  Or if not, are you changing your approach to countries, what you are telling them and how to deal with their issues?  Are you being a little more stringent in your requirements? 

    You have talked about Senegal, maybe Ghana, Ethiopia, related to that issue of the U.S stepping in.  The CEMAC negotiations this week, we saw American energy companies working with the CEMAC on repatriation of funds dedicated to the rehabilitation of oil sites.  I’m wondering if you have a stance on that, what the IMF position is?  I understand the U.S is trying to get the IMF involved in that.

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thanks. Gentleman. 

    QUESTIONER: Kenyan authorities here have indicated the need to present a credible fiscal framework as they try and unlock a new program for Kenya.  Would you offer more color into the discussions this week, noting again that the same credibility questions led to the cancellation or the termination of the program at its final review?  

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We have a question online “what is the IMF’s view on Kenya’s debt position?”

    MR. SELASSIE: So, on the first question, I would like to refer you to Kristalina who gave comprehensive responses to the Secretary’s IMFC Statement. What I want to add though is that in the region, in Sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of programs, the calibration of reforms, incorporation of reforms, I would say that we are always in terms of each program has its particularities and what we always try and do in these programs is make sure that we’re striking a balance of helping countries address the long term challenges and also the cyclical challenges that are often the ones that cause them to come to us.  And I would say that I don’t think there are many countries that think that the adjustment efforts that they’re being asked to make are easy ones.

    On CEMAC.  Just to be very clear there is this dispute that is going on between member states, the BEAC, and oil companies with respect to what are called restitution funds.  The funds under contracts that countries have with oil companies are meant to be available to help restore the sites where oil is extracted back to their pre-extraction standards. 

    What has been a bit frustrating is that we are not privy to the contents of these documents. We have been calling on members and the companies involved to be transparent about this, to publish these documents.  They are after all documents that are about how countries natural resource wealth are used.  And we’ve been on record going seven, eight, nine years pushing for production sharing agreements, the terms of these things to be published so that each side can hold the other accountable.  I think that is the first thing that could be done to bring more transparency and light and understanding to the rest of the world about what is going on in these discussions. 

    Second, we have also made it clear to both parties that given that we do not have full information, it is difficult for us to know what to say.  But in general, any encumbrances in terms of how we look at foreign exchange reserves and these standards are published, any encumbrances like the type that we think there may be in the document, i.e., that is the expectation that these resources will be used for specific purposes means they’re not general use reserves.  So, they would not be classified as part of reserves. 

    On Kenya, we have had a very strong engagement with Kenya over the years and will continue to have such engagement going forward.  As we have noted, government has asked for a follow-on program to try and address the remaining challenges in Kenya, and we are discussing how to do that including in the context of these meetings. 

    It has been good to hear and see that the economy has been performing quite well in some parts.  Particularly the external adjustment front seems to have been proceeding well.  The current account has been narrowing.  So, there are quite a lot of strengths.  But also of course there remain fiscal challenges which were a significant part of the last program’s objectives that need to be advanced.  So, we are going to engage with the government and do everything that we can to be able to help it go forward. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Unfortunately, that is all the time we have. So, if you have any questions that we didn’t get to, please send them to me or to Media at IMF.org and we will try and get back to you as soon as possible.  So, also to mention that the report is now available at IMF.org/Africa.  The Spring Meetings continue.  Later this morning, we have the press briefing for the European Department and later in the afternoon we have the IMFC, and the Western Hemisphere Department press briefings. 

    On behalf of Abebe and the African and Communications Departments, thank you all for coming to this press briefing and see you next time. 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: IMFC, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    April 25, 2025

    Speaker:

    Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director, IMF

    Mohammed Aljadaan, IMFC Chair, Minister of Finance, Saudi Arabia

     

    Moderator:

    Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, IMF

     

     

    Ms.  Kozack: I am delighted to have with me the Chair of the IMFC, His Excellency Mohammed Aljadaan. He is also the Minister of Finance of Saudi Arabia. And of course, our Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva.

    Minister Aljadaan and the Managing Director will first share some takeaways with you and then when that is concludes we will turn to you for your questions.  Your Excellency, the floor is yours.

    Minister. Aljadaan: Thank you, Julie. Thank you, Kristalina. And thanks to all of you for being here. At the outset, let me highlight an important development that took place the first time in these meetings, which is the IMFC welcoming its 25th member, the third chair of Africa. Obviously, this is an important milestone that strengthens the voice and representation of the African continent in a global economic dialogue. I would like to thank all members who made this possible.  

    On the IMF agenda, going forward, the Fund must continue to focus on its core mandate, including supporting international monetary cooperation, encouraging the expansion of trade and economic growth, and discouraging policies that would harm prosperity.

    In recent days, the IMFC members welcomed steps to further strengthen the effectiveness of the IMF’s three core functions, its surveillance of global economic trends, its lending where we welcome the review of program design conditionality, and its capacity development assistance, which helps ensure growth in so many member countries and within countries.

    Addressing global debt vulnerabilities remains a priority for our members, especially for low‑income and vulnerable countries. They welcome the progress made in debt treatments under the G20 Common Framework. They also express their commitment to addressing global debt vulnerabilities in an effective, comprehensive, and systemic manner.

    Members encouraged the IMF and the World Bank to help advance the implementation of the three‑pillar approach to address debt service pressures. We appreciate the tremendous efforts of the members in shaping the medium‑term direction of the IMF and contributing to the Diriyah Declaration.

    The Diriyah Declaration represents a forward‑looking approach to strengthening the IMFC process and advancing governance reforms and has received full support from the members. Just to clarify, when I say the Diriyah Declaration, this is the Declaration that was prepared by the Deputies in their meetings in Saudi Arabia earlier this month in preparation for this meeting.

    Here we aim to ensure that the Fund remains well‑equipped to meet future challenges in line with its core mandate. Before I hand it over to Kristalina, I have to comment on the topic of the day, which I think a lot of people are talking about, trade tension. Many members have told me how the trade situation has created significant uncertainty. Indeed, the buzz word was uncertainty all over this week, and indeed it also carries with it market volatility, presenting real risks to the global growth and financial stability. But as Kristalina said recently, these threat conflicts have been like forgetting a pot boiling on a stove. Well, now that pot is boiling over. In other words, we should not be surprised that there are trade tensions. And this situation is an opportunity for us all to have constructive conversations about how we will move forward together. This is a challenging time, but I have always been optimist and absolutely make no apologies for that. I will explain to you why. History tells us that the bigger the challenge, the more it requires us to come together to convene and to have an honest conversation. That is exactly what happened this week. That is exactly the power of the IMF to actually be able to convene everybody around the same table in closed rooms and discuss issues in a constructive way.

    I have told colleagues, I arrived in Washington a week ago with a lot of noise in my ears from reading the news and following social media. I have told them, everyone that I met in the early days, please keep your thoughts cool, and we will see where we are going to end. Actually, today we are ending in a lot better position than when we started the week. People understand the consequences and are working together in a constructive manner to resolve tensions.  

    I am also confident that because of the IMF, the IMF is really watching us very closely, following the global situation and is really providing advice to its members in real‑time, offering an assessment of the potential impacts and the best way to proceed.  

    This week we have seen an incredible assurance confirming the position of the IMF and its convening power and contributing to positive development, including in relation to Syria. Gathering together to talk about Syria and building on our meetings in AIUla has given us a new sense of urgency and purpose, to turn a conflict‑affected state, which is Syria, into a stable and economically successful one, benefiting the region and the world. It is not just about the money. It is about the work that the IMF and other partners can deliver on capacity development, quality data, and timely advice.

    Again, I would like to thank Kristalina and the IMF staff. And I can tell you, it was an incredible, unanimous position today to thank the IMF for their incredible, incredible brain cells power, which was able really to produce a very comprehensive report about what is happening in the world in a very short period of time, and it was fantastic. Thank you, Kristalina. Thanks to all the IMF staff and thank you again for being here. The floor is yours.

    Managing Director: Thank you very much, Minister Aljadaan, for your kind words now, but above all for your exemplary leadership of the IMFC. I want to tell everybody here that the way you chaired the meetings brought the members together to speak openly, frankly and as a result to find a path to common understanding that is so necessary in the current environment because, as we all know, our meetings take place against a challenging backdrop. You have seen our World Economic Outlook. It shows that the global economy is facing a significant slowdown and also that risks are on the downside.

    Understandably Ministers and Governors are concerned, but at the same time they have also exhibited a remarkably constructive spirit in these meetings, coming together, showing willingness to take on the challenges facing the global economy. Minister Aljadaan laid out the substance and achievements of our discussions. Let me add just three points. First, Ministers and Governors agreed on the importance of reducing uncertainty and working together to clarify policies.

    Second, importantly, they recognized that they need to seize the moment to put their own houses in order. And I saw very firm resolve to tackle difficult and, in many cases, delayed reforms at home, to strengthen resilience, to remove impediments to productivity and lift up their medium and long‑term growth prospects, and to address underlying domestic imbalances which drive external imbalances. To put it simply, addressing external imbalances starts at home.

    Finally, we discussed how the IMF can help countries successfully navigate this period of change and build resilience. I was very heartened to hear from the membership strong support for our work to promote macroeconomic and financial stability and to do it through robust bilateral, multilateral and regional surveillance, be there for our members when they need to cope with balance of payments problems, finance—finance them, but also finance them with the clear objective that they can strengthen their economies. I can say the words of support for our capacity development, in other words, helping countries have strong institutions, strong policies. That support was overwhelming.

    At this period of complex challenges for the membership, they also gave us homework. I want to emphasize two areas where we will further deepen our work. One, do more work on external imbalances, dig deeper, when they could become a source of concern and provide advise how to address them through policies. Two, continue to scan the financial sector to identify potential sources of instability, especially in the non‑bank sector, and provide advice on how best to enhance resilience.

    Overall, what I can tell you is that what I heard this week was an incredible determination by our members to steer economies through this period of change and uncertainty. And it gave me confidence that we actually can take challenge and make opportunity, that we can have a more resilient, more balanced world economy.

    Like Minister Aljadaan, I started the week more anxious of our capacity as a global community to come together, and I finished the week with more confidence that this is exactly what we will do.

    Ms. Kozack: Thank you very much, Minister, Managing Director. We will now open the floor to your questions, so please raise your hand if you have a question and please identify yourself and your outlet. I will start here in the middle. I am going to go to the gentleman in the kind of White shirt. Yes, right here.

    Question: Thank you, Julie. Question for Minister Aljadaan and Managing Director Georgieva. You both pointed out that we ended a week in a way better position than when we started it. Managing Director, during your Curtain Raiser Speech, you also raised the hope that this week might be an opportunity for everybody to discuss. How do you feel like? Could you elaborate perhaps on how this week dialing down the uncertainty that you talked about and the global tensions when it comes to trade? Thank you very much.

    Managing Director: Finding a path to solutions starts from looking at the problem from a—seeing the problem with the same eye view. Let me start this again. To resolve a problem, you have different parties. To resolve a problem, they need to have information about the problem that allows them to have a meaningful conversation. I can say that I am very, very grateful to the staff of the IMF because what we did was to offer the members information that allows them to see what is ahead of them and expand their horizon. If you look at a problem only from a narrow point of view, it is difficult to have a meaningful conversation to resolve it.

    Secondly, what I saw was a genuine openness to present views in a candid way and to listen to each other.

    Third, and the third is the most important, it is a traction and engagement among members that could then bring a better—faster and better outcome. I do not want to sugarcoat. We still have quite a challenging time. It is challenging not just because of the tariffs and the uncertainty. It is also challenging that there are other transformational forces in play. Because of the overwhelming attention to tariffs, we stopped talking about other things, like artificial intelligence, demographics transition, and I think that that sense that we can have an engagement in a comprehensive way on a complex set of challenges, that came during the meetings quite strongly. Does it mean that everybody agrees with everybody else? No. But do we have an open conversation, engaged conversation with the fair space for everybody to present their views? Yes.

    Minister Aljadaan: Thank you. If I may, Julie, I think just to complement the Managing Director’s views, I think overall what do you need to resolve conflicts like this or tensions like this? A, you need to make sure that you understand the parties’ positions, where they are coming from, why they are taking these positions, and what are they seeking to achieve. Second, make sure that they actually talk. And that is largely what happened this week. So to have everybody who is party to all this trade tensions, which is almost everybody, all the members, around the same table in a candid discussion that is closed even—some of it has been in the restricted sessions—to really be open and talk about what are they doing, why they are doing it, what is their view of what is going to happen in the next even short period of time is very assuring. Sharing that information is very assuring. Understanding the implications of these actions on other nations, including low‑income countries, emerging economies and implications of that is actually very helpful for them to appreciate the consequences of their positions.

    I can tell you without—I cannot disclose some of the discussion that has taken place, but I can tell you there was a very clear, frank discussion, including a projection of a timeline for a resolution of some of these issues. So that is very assuring.

    Managing Director: Can I just add one point, that when people are in the same room, the abstract policies become more human because then we understand these policies are affecting people, and the whole world—the people of the whole world are then present, and that makes the conversation different. No longer it is an academic conversation. It is a very real-life conversation.

    Ms. Kozack: Thank you. I will go to this side. I will go to the second row, gentleman with the blue jacket and the glasses.

    Question: Thank you so much for taking my question. I am from Bangkok. Your Excellency, you have mentioned uncertainty around the world in your opening remarks. So, I want to ask specifically on the consequences for the emerging markets as a whole, and what is your policy advice for the situation and also do you see any short‑term lasting impacts to these countries? Thank you.

    Minister Aljadaan: I will give it a time and then you can complement. First of all, I look forward to our renewal meeting in Thailand next year and seeing the preparations from now, I think a lot of people are excited and waiting for our meetings there. I am sure it will be very constructive in the hospitable country of Thailand and the Kingdom of Thailand.

    Obviously emerging economies, particularly emerging economies with limited fiscal space have little room to maneuver to deal with shocks. And even if these shocks have been resolved, there is some lasting impact. The earlier, the faster that these shocks or trade tensions in this context is resolved, the better for everybody. But we are not in a perfect world and things may take time and countries may get an impact, and that is where the IMF excels. That is where is IMF capacity building, advice comes into actual real play. So, the Managing Director is here and her staff with an incredible talent will be able to actually provide that support to emerging economies.

    Managing Director: As a group, emerging markets by and large are generally highly open. They rely on—many of them rely on exports as an engine for growth. They are quite active in international bond markets, so because they are highly exposed, the impact on emerging markets is quite significant. Some of the emerging markets, especially those that were in a tougher position after the multiple shocks, also face very limited and some of them non‑existing policy space to act.

    We have downgraded growth projections for emerging markets and developing economies to 3.7 percent for 2025. This is a 0.6 percent downgrade. And to 3.9 percent for 2026. What does that mean? It means that some of them would see a significant slowdown in their convergence to higher‑income countries. And they are also seeking ways to overcome the challenges ahead. What works for them is emerging markets have been fantastic in building resilience to shocks. And when I look at the universe of emerging market economies, quite a number of countries have become more agile in their policymaking, are more mature in how they approach their fiscal and monetary policy. That puts them in a better position.

    To use an analogy, it is like they have gone through multiple periods of being tested and they got immune to shocks to a certain degree. They would be seeing possibly somewhat less inflationary pressure. Why? Because when you are on the receiving end of tariffs, what it means is that actually domestically you do not have pressure on prices. We can expect emerging markets to look at their policy tools very carefully. We urge them, be very careful with fiscal measures. Do not rush to provide fiscal support willy‑nilly because you cannot afford to lose fiscal space. Have a medium long‑term framework to rebuild this fiscal space. On the monetary policy side, watch pressures. We are saying inflation is likely to slow down but watch it and watch inflation expectations. Do what is necessary, given the data you have. And very important, allow the exchange rate to be a shock absorber.

    We have the integrated policy framework that offers advice to countries how to approach exchange rate issues with great care. You are an emerging market. Actually, the Minister is not saying that, but one thing emerging markets can do for themselves is, get your own house in order. Pursue reforms relentlessly because this is what makes you stronger.

    Ms. Kozack: We have time for just one last question. So, I am going to go second row, the gentleman in the blue suit.

    Question: Thank you, Ms. Kozack. Mr. Aljadaan, Managing Director Georgieva. I am from Lebanon. My question is addressed to both of you. How will the IMF support Syria and what role will it play in Syria’s reconstruction. Thank you.

    Ms. Kristalina Georgieva: Minister Aljadaan in the opening recognized that Syria has returned to the international community. We had a meeting with Syrian representatives in AIUla during an emerging market conference. We had a meeting on fragile and conflict‑affected states. And at that time, we made the first step to create a coordinating group so different institutions that can support Syria can start working together. We held a meeting here in Washington during the Spring Meetings. It was co‑chaired by Minister Aljadaan, President Banga and myself, with the Finance Minister and the Central Bank Governor of Syria. In this meeting we discussed how we can start rebuilding institutions and policy capacity in Syria and how different institutions can play on their comparative advantage to help. For the Fund specifically, what it means is, of course, cautiously but engage to first define data, what is available, how we can rebuild credible data capability.  

    Second, central bank capacity. How can we rebuild the functioning of Syria’s central bank.

    Third, tax policy and how can the country rebuild capacity to create revenues for its functions.

    We have appointed a Mission Chief for Syria. We have not had Article IV Consultations with Syria for a long, long time. We hope that we can contribute in putting the foundation of knowledge, economic policy knowledge in Syria to get the country back on track. 

    I mean, just imagine, they have been in a Civil War for 14 years. A big part of the population is not in Syria. They are in Lebanon. They are in Iraq. They are in Jordan. The fabric of the Syrian society is deeply wounded. It is going to take a lot of work by the Syrians themselves to rebuild it. This is when international organizations can play a constructive role. Lebanon, you are not asking about Lebanon.

    Question: I heard the meetings went quite well by the end, especially since the Lebanese Parliament voted about the banking sequencing. That is more in line with international standards, so what are you—

    Managing Director: You are not asking because you know. That is very good.

    Ms. Kozack: Minister, would you like to have the last word?

     

    Minister Aljadaan: I have a few things. First of all, I really thank the IMF and the World Bank in stepping up their support to Syria and other states who are emerging from fragility. Syria in particular is a case where we have an opportunity. We have a government that is willing, and we have regional partners who are also providing support and willing really to provide whatever it takes to make sure that we bring back Syria, support its people and make sure that we also move cautiously through that process, recognizing that obviously there are sanctions that we need to deal with and other impediments. But even with that, I think standing with them, providing capacity support and advice and some regional and bilateral, even financial support is very crucial. The Syrian people deserve that support. And that does not stop at Syria. We are talking about Syria as an example, we have Yemen, we have Palestine, we have Sudan, we have other countries that really need the support, including Lebanon. They need to know that the international community, if they put their act together, the international community will stand by them, so we will continue that.

    Ms. Kozack: We are almost five minutes over our time.

    Managing Director: Ask your question short, and we will try to answer.

    Ms. Kozack: And have a very brief answer.

    Managing Director: It is my fault. I am the one that is professorial.

     

    Question: My question is to the MD concerning the global uncertainty on trade tensions shaping sub‑Saharan Africa’s debt risk, servicing costs as well as our fiscal future and its coordination with creditors such as you, so how are Africa also in all of these conversations? Thank you.

     

    Managing Director: As Minister Aljadaan said, Africa was more present this time because we now have three sub‑Saharan African representatives in the IMFC. But beyond that, very much on our minds, quite a number of the Governors of the Fund spoke about the importance to pay attention to countries that are particularly severely affected by this turbulence because they have a high level of debt and that suppresses their ability to cope.

    By the way, countries with high level of debt are not just in sub‑Saharan Africa. We have them all over the world.

    What has been done during these meetings is threefold. First, very strong emphasis on the three‑pillar approach of the IMF and the World Bank for countries that experience liquidity constraints. They are not yet facing debt sustainability problems, but they are on the way to there. And for these countries to concentrate support for domestic resource mobilization, concentrate attention to how to mobilize more international financing and very important, concentrate on how the private sector can play a bigger role in the economy.   

    Second, for countries where debt is not sustainable, how to make debt restructuring faster and more effective. We have issued this week a playbook for debt restructuring that was the outcome of the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable. What it shows are the steps that need to be taken.

    As you recall under the Common Framework, there was some confusion around how exactly to go about it, what is the timeline, what is the exact sequencing of steps. This is now being clarified. If we follow the playbook, we play by the book, we get debt restructuring in less than 12 months. And the third thing, very important for the Fund, is that our members have put in place a way to expand our capacity to finance low‑income countries through the Poverty Reduction Growth Trust so the Fund can step up financing for countries, so they do not need to—they do not need to go through a super painful adjustment because of this burden of debt. We can ease their path. But, again, we want to see countries act decisively on reforms so they—you do not borrow your way out of debt. You grow your way out of debt. So, when countries have that growth potential enhanced, then they can also reduce debt vulnerability. It was not very short. My apologies.

    Ms. Kozack: Minister, would you like to add?          

    Minister Aljadaan: I am fine. I think the Managing Director did a great job in answering.

    Managing Director: Look, you have to forgive me. I was for 14 years a professor. It kicks in.

     

    Minister Aljadaan: We enjoy it, Kristalina

    Managing Director: Thank you very much, everybody.

    Ms. Kozack: This does bring us to an end, so thank you for joining us. And let me just add that the full transcript of the press briefing will be available online on the IMF website. And, of course, should you have further questions, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at IMF media.org. Thank you.

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Security: Howe Residents Sentenced To Life In Prison For Crimes Relating To Sexual Abuse Of A Child

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    MUSKOGEE, OKLAHOMA – The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Oklahoma announced that Armondo Joseph Palma, age 23, and Brooklyn Elaine Wilson, age 28, of Howe, Oklahoma, were sentenced in federal district court for sexually abusing a child under the age of 12.

    On April 24, 2025, Palma was sentenced to life in prison for one count of Transportation of a Minor.

    On April 23, 2025, Wilson was sentenced to life in prison for four counts of Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Minor and to 10 years in prison for one count of Possession of Certain Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor.  The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.

    The charges arose from an investigation by Homeland Security Investigations-Tornado Alley Child Exploitation and Trafficking Task Force, the District 16 Drugs and Violent Crime Task Force, the LeFlore County Sheriff’s Office, the Rogers County Sheriff’s Office, the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office, the Choctaw Nation Lighthorse Police, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, and the Carl Albert State College Campus Police.

    On November 12, 2024, Palma and Wilson pleaded guilty to the charges.  According to investigators, law enforcement became aware that Palma was sending images of a child being sexually assaulted to another person over the internet.  The ensuing investigation revealed that between November 2023 and March 2024, Wilson and Palma sexually abused a child under the age of 12, often recording or photographing their abuse.  On more than one occasion, Wilson and Palma transported the child across state lines, where the abuse continued.  During the course of the investigation, law enforcement also seized electronic images from the defendants’ cell phones depicting the sexual abuse and the sexual exploitation of additional children.

    The crimes occurred primarily in LeFlore County, within the boundaries of the Choctaw Nation Reservation, in the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

    “These defendants routinely abused an innocent child, showing a complete lack of concern for the life-altering physical and emotional damage their sexually exploitative behavior would inflict,” said Travis Pickard, Special Agent in Charge for HSI North Texas and Oklahoma.  “The lengthy healing journey for this child’s unwarranted trauma can now begin with these child predators incarcerated for the rest of their lives.”

    “The sexual abuse the defendants perpetrated on the victim is sickening, and a prison cell is where they deserve to spend the remainder of their days,” said United States Attorney Christopher J. Wilson.  “Seeking justice for victims is a priority of the Department, and I commend the exceptional investigative work of HSI’s Tornado Alley Child Exploitation and Trafficking Task Force and the other law enforcement agencies that assisted in this case.”

    This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse.  Led by the United States Attorneys’ Offices and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to locate, apprehend, and prosecute individuals who sexually exploit children, and to identify and rescue victims.  For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.justice.gov/psc.

    We encourage anyone who suspects or has information regarding child sexual exploitation, trafficking of minors, sextortion, child pornography, or any other means of child exploitation to immediately contact law enforcement.  You can file a report through the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) at 1-800-843-5678 or online at www.cybertipline.com, through the FBI at 1-800-CALL-FBI (1-800-225-5324), or through Homeland Security Investigations at 1-877-4-HSI TIP.

    The Honorable Ronald A. White, Chief U.S. District Judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, presided over the hearings.  Palma and Wilson will remain in the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service pending transportation to a designated United States Bureau of Prisons facility to serve a non-paroleable sentence of incarceration.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Sarah McAmis represented the United States at the sentencing hearings.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Kansas City Man Sentenced to Five Years for Fentanyl Conspiracy

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    KANSAS CITY, Mo. – A Kansas City, Mo., man was sentenced in federal court today for his role in a conspiracy to distribute fentanyl.

    Colt Justin Draggoo, 22, was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Roseann Ketchmark to five years in federal prison without parole.

    On September 12, 2024, C. Draggoo plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute fentanyl.

    C. Draggoo admitted that he sold fentanyl pills and collected drug money for his brother and co-defendant, Tiger Dean Draggoo. Between December 29, 2021, and October 22, 2022, C. Draggoo either brokered or sold approximately 263 pills containing fentanyl on behalf of his brother.

    C. Draggoo is the third defendant in this case to be sentenced. On Oct. 16, 2024, Tiger Dean Draggoo plead guilty to his role in the fentanyl conspiracy and to three counts of distributing fentanyl resulting in death. Three additional defendants have plead guilty and await sentencing.

    This case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Brad K. Kavanaugh and Robert Smith. It was investigated by the Jackson County Drug Task Force, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Belton, Mo., Police Department, the Raymore, Mo., Police Department, the Cass County, Mo., Sheriff’s Department, and the FBI.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Washington, Missouri, Man Admits Recording Sexual Abuse of a Minor

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    ST. LOUIS – A man from Washington, Missouri on Wednesday admitted recording his sexual activity with a 14-year-old.

    Todd Kelly, 37, pleaded guilty to one count of producing child pornography. He admitted making the recordings on his cell phone in June and July of 2023. The victim’s father contacted authorities after learning about the relationship in August of 2023.

    Kelly is scheduled to be sentenced July 28. The U.S. Attorney’s office will recommend a prison sentence of 25 years.

    The Warren County Sheriff’s Department, the Franklin County Sheriff’s Office and the FBI investigated the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Tiffany Becker is prosecuting the case.

    This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice. Led by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and the Department of Justice Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state and local resources to better locate, apprehend and prosecute individuals who exploit children via the Internet, as well as to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.justice.gov/psc.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Ten Defendants Plead Guilty to Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering Charges in Connection with Transnational Criminal Operation

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

    PITTSBURGH, Pa. – Ten individuals from Arizona, Ohio, Washington, and Mexico—including a member of the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Cártel de Sinaloa and one person illegally residing in the United States—pleaded guilty in federal court this week to charges of violating federal narcotics and money laundering laws in relation to an international drug trafficking organization (DTO), Acting United States Attorney Troy Rivetti announced today. The defendants were among 35 individuals charged through a Second Superseding Indictment unsealed in January 2024 for their participation in a domestic and international narcotics and money laundering conspiracy involving substantial quantities of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine (read the Second Superseding Indictment news release here).

    Pleading guilty this week before United States District Judge J. Nicholas Ranjan were:

    Plea Date

    Defendant

    Age

    Residence

    April 21

    Humberto Arredondo-Soto

    25

    Culiacan, Mexico

     

    Jaime Ledesma

    27

    Phoenix, Arizona

     

    Stephanie Ortiz

    26

    Avondale, Arizona

     

     

     

     

    April 22

    Samuel Aguirre

    23

    Phoenix, Arizona

     

    Jesus Lopez

    24

    Phoenix, Arizona

     

    Diego Monarrez

    23

    Phoenix, Arizona

     

    Adrian Lopez Rivera

    24

    Phoenix, Arizona

     

     

     

     

    April 23

    Donnell Collins

    29

    Cleveland, Ohio

     

    Luis Fentanes

    24

    Phoenix, Arizona

     

    Mohamed Kariye

    36

    Kent, Washington

    In connection with the guilty pleas, the Court was advised that, on various dates from in and around August 2021 to in and around June 2023, in the Western District of Pennsylvania and elsewhere, the defendants conspired to possess with intent to distribute and distribute large quantities of cocaine, fentanyl, and/or methamphetamine. Specifically, Arredondo-Soto, Ledesma (who was residing in Phoenix illegally), Ortiz, Aguirre, Lopez, Rivera, and Monarrez each conspired to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl and 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, with all except Monarrez also having conspired to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. Similarly, from in and around August 2021 to in and around March 2023, Collins and Fentanes conspired to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl and 500 grams or more of cocaine, with Collins also having possessed with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine on March 2, 2023, while Kariye conspired to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl. The defendants were intercepted on a federal wiretap obtaining quantities of the drugs that they distributed to others. Further, from in and around April 2022 to in and around March 2023, Aguirre conspired to commit money laundering, packaging drug proceeds and delivering large amounts of U.S. currency to couriers to smuggle into Mexico to pay for re-supplies of drugs.

    Arredondo-Soto, a Mexican national with ties to the Sinaloa Cartel, was the source of supply for the DTO and was responsible for trafficking millions of fentanyl pills and hundreds of pounds of methamphetamine that the DTO distributed. Numerous military-grade firearms were trafficked into Mexico for Arredondo-Soto as payment from members of the DTO for the drugs. In coordination with Homeland Security Investigations, Arredondo-Soto was arrested in Mexico in November 2023 by Mexican law enforcement authorities and extradited to the United States in February 2024.

    Judge Ranjan scheduled sentencings for November 3-5, 2025. The law provides for a maximum total sentence of not less than 10 years and up to life in prison, a fine of up to $10 million, or both, or, for Kariye, not less than five years and up to 40 years in prison, a fine of up to $5 million, or both. Under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, the actual sentence imposed would be based upon the seriousness of the offense(s) and the prior criminal history, if any, of each defendant.

    With this week’s 10 guilty pleas, 19 of the 35 defendants charged in the Second Superseding Indictment have now pleaded guilty in the case, with six defendants having been sentenced thus far. Included among those sentencings is Mark Camacho, 26, of Phoenix, Arizona, who Judge Ranjan sentenced this week to 57 months in prison for his role in the conspiracy.

    Assistant United States Attorneys Arnold P. Bernard Jr. and Tonya S. Goodman are prosecuting this case on behalf of the government.

    The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Laurel Highlands Resident Agency and Homeland Security Investigations conducted the investigation that led to the prosecution of the defendants. Additional agencies participating in this investigation include the Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigation, United States Postal Inspection Service, and other local law enforcement agencies.

    The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs worked with law enforcement partners in Mexico to secure the arrest and extradition from Mexico of Arredondo-Soto.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations, combat illegal immigration, and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Colombian National Extradited to Houston to Face Narco-Terrorism and International Cocaine Distribution Charges

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

    HOUSTON – A 45-year-old Colombian national will make his initial appearance in U.S. federal court on charges of narco-terrorism and distributing kilogram quantities of cocaine from Colombia, announced U.S. Attorney Nicholas J. Ganjei.

    Adrian Alberto Cano Gomez, an alleged member of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional aka ELN), was extradited from Colombia and is now in Houston. He will make his initial appearance before U.S. Magistrate Judge Dena Hanovice Palermo April 25 at 2 p.m.

    The now unsealed indictment, returned March 23, 2023, alleges ELN is a Colombian guerrilla group officially designated as a foreign terrorist organization Oct. 8, 1997. It allegedly continues to operate as one of the largest narco-terrorism organizations in the world.

    Cano Gomez is charged with international cocaine distribution conspiracy. He is also charged with distribution of a controlled substance and knowing or intending to provide anything of pecuniary value to a person or organization that engages in terrorism or terrorist activity (narco-terrorism).

    “This is not a routine drug case, nor is the ELN the typical drug trafficking organization,” said Ganjei. “Rather, this terror group has used American communities to fund its violent activities and destroyed countless lives in the process. This extradition is a big step towards this office’s goal of dismantling the narcotics-to-terrorism pipeline, and a clear demonstration that no matter where you are, no matter who you are, you are not beyond the reach of the American justice system.”

    “The extradition of suspected narco-terrorists like Cano Gomez to the United States is another example of how FBI Houston’s reach extends beyond geographic borders,” said Special Agent in Charge Douglas Williams of the FBI. “For years, Cano Gomez has allegedly been a liaison of international drug trafficking for the ELN-drugs that are smuggled into the United States and make their way onto our streets. His arrest and extradition are a giant step into disrupting the drug trafficking operations and mass violence carried out at the hands of his foreign terrorist organization.”

    “For over a decade, this ELN foreign terrorist organization allegedly profited off American communities by trafficking in cocaine and devastating countless lives,” said acting Special Agent in Charge William Kimbell of the Houston division of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). “Gomez, who is an alleged ELN member believed to have facilitated cocaine distribution from Colombia, is now on American soil to face justice.”

    According to the indictment, Cano Gomez and others were involved in an ongoing 16-year conspiracy to distribute cocaine from Colombia to the United States knowing or intending to provide pecuniary support to the ELN.

    In November 2021, Cano Gomez and others allegedly participated in distributing approximately 15 kilograms of cocaine in Colombia, knowing it would be imported into the United States.

    Colombian authorities took him into custody at the request of the United States in March 2024.

    The indictment remains sealed as to those charged but not as yet in custody.

    The Houston Field Offices of the FBI and DEA conducted the investigation with assistance of U.S. Marshals Service as part of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF). FBI and DEA agents in Bogota provided substantial support as did the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) multi-agency Special Operations Division, including assigned attorneys from the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section (NDDS) and National Security Division, as well as the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division’s NDDS’ Office of Judicial Attaché in Bogotá, Colombia, with the cooperation of Colombian authorities and international partners including the Colombian Army, Colombian National Police, National Prosecutor’s Office and Technical Body of Investigation.

    The operation, dubbed Operation Selva Roja, is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces and Project Safe Neighborhood.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Casey N. MacDonald and Anibal Alaniz of the Southern District of Texas are prosecuting the case.

    An indictment is a formal accusation of criminal conduct, not evidence. A defendant is presumed innocent unless convicted through due process of law

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Jasper County Man Sentenced to 22 Years in Federal Prison for Drug Trafficking in Newton County

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

    BEAUMONT, Texas – A Jasper man has been sentenced to 22 years in federal prison for drug trafficking violations in the Eastern District of Texas, announced Acting U.S. Attorney Abe McGlothin, Jr.

    Jeremy O’Quinn Brown, 34, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and was sentenced to 264 months in federal prison by U.S. District Judge Marcia A. Crone on April 17, 2025.

    According to information presented in court, in October 2023, Brown was identified by law enforcement as a drug trafficker distributing large amounts of methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana in Newton County. A search warrant was executed at Brown’s residence resulting in the discovery of methamphetamine; cocaine; $94,997 in U.S. currency; and two firearms.  Brown is believed to have been responsible for distributing 497.44 grams of “actual” methamphetamine.

    This case was investigated by the FBI, Texas Department of Public Safety, Jasper Police Department, Newton County Sheriff’s Office and U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.  This case was prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Jonathan Lee.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: San Antonio Woman Sentenced to Federal Prison for Cocaine Trafficking

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

    SAN ANTONIO – A San Antonio woman was sentenced in federal court to 50 months in prison for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kgs or more of cocaine.

    According to court documents, Gisselle Cabrera Rodriguez, 25, was pulled over by Bexar County Sheriff’s Office deputies on Feb. 6, 2024, for committing multiple traffic violations. A search of her vehicle resulted in the discovery of 1.2 kgs of cocaine located in the front passenger compartment. Two cell phones were also seized in the search. Rodriguez was arrested and a federal search warrant was executed on her residence, leading to the discovery of another 2.3 kgs of cocaine packaged in two bundles. Agents also located $45,700 in cash, which was determined to be proceeds from Rodriguez’s drug trafficking activity. Rodriguez also admitted to trafficking at least five kgs of cocaine per week during the five to six months leading up to her arrest.

    Rodriguez pleaded guilty to one count of a two-count indictment. In addition to the imprisonment, Rodriguez was ordered to forfeit the $45,700 located in the search warrant.

    Acting U.S. Attorney Margaret Leachman for the Western District of Texas made the announcement.

    The FBI investigated the case with valuable assistance from BCSO and the San Antonio Police Department.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney John Fedock prosecuted the case.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Windham Man Sentenced to 36 Months in Federal Prison for Scheme to Defraud the United Way of Massachusetts Bay and Merrimack Valley

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    CONCORD – A Windham man was sentenced today in federal court in connection with his ownership of an international technology (IT) company that contracted with the United Way of Massachusetts Bay and Merrimack Valley (United Way) while being employed by United Way, Acting U.S. Attorney Jay McCormack announces.

    Imran Alrai, age 51, was sentenced by U.S. District Court Judge Joseph N. Laplante to 36 months in federal prison and 1 year of supervised release. Alrai was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2.3 million. In October 2024, Alrai was convicted by a federal jury of 12 counts of wire fraud and 6 counts of money laundering.

    “For six years, the defendant carried out a calculated and sophisticated scheme to steal millions from a non-profit dedicated to uplifting our most vulnerable communities,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Jay McCormack. “He exploited the organization’s trust, fabricating companies, employees, and invoices– all to line his own pockets at the expense of those the non-profit was meant to serve.”

    “The usual reward of nonprofit work is personal fulfillment, not financial enrichment,” said James Crowley, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Boston Division. “Imran Alrai, however, treated the United Way of Massachusetts and Merrimack Valley like his very own ATM, stealing millions of dollars and shortchanging their efforts and the community in the process. To anyone else engaged in a scheme like this, know that the FBI will work to shut you down and ensure you are held accountable for your actions.”

    “Alrai’s ploy to enrich himself with millions of dollars stolen from an organization focused on improving the lives of those in need ended today. He used his technical expertise to craft an elaborate fraud scheme that went undetected for years, allowing him to siphon millions to fulfill his own greed,” said Homeland Security Investigations New England Special Agent in Charge Michael J. Krol. “After today’s sentence, he’s finally facing the consequences of his crimes— a long term in federal prison.”

    Between 2012 and June 2018, Alrai, an IT professional at the United Way, obtained approximately $6.7 million in payments for IT services supposedly provided to United Way by an independent outside contractor, DigitalNet Technology Solutions, Inc. Alrai misrepresented material facts about DigitalNet and fraudulently concealed that he owned and controlled DigitalNet. Through DigitalNet, Alrai overcharged United Way for the services he provided.  In early 2013, Alrai rigged the bidding process for a major contract to provide managed IT services at the United Way so that DigitalNet was chosen. Alrai then gave fake references and false information about DigitalNet to United Way.

    For the next five years, while serving as United Way’s Vice President for IT Services, Alrai steered additional IT work to DigitalNet, so that his company soon became United Way’s second largest outside vendor, receiving more than $1 million annually. Alrai concealed his connection with DigitalNet from his colleagues. He routinely sent emails with attached invoices from a fictitious person to himself at United Way.

    After the fraud came to light, in June 2018, officials at the United Way confronted Alrai and terminated him. Federal agents executed search and seizure warrants and seized incriminating documents and data from Alrai’s home office in Windham, as well as approximately $2.2 million in fraud proceeds in bank and investment accounts.

    Homeland Security Investigations and the Federal Bureau of Investigation led the investigation. The Internal Revenue Service provided valuable assistance. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Charles L. Rombeau and John J. Kennedy prosecuted the case.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Federal Grand Jury in Louisville Indicts 7 Foreign Nationals For Money Laundering and Firearms Offenses

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Louisville, KY – A federal grand jury in Louisville, Kentucky, returned a multi-count indictment on April 16, 2025, charging seven foreign nationals with money laundering related offenses and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.   

    U.S. Attorney Michael A. Bennett of the Western District of Kentucky, Karen Wingerd, Special Agent in Charge, Cincinnati Field Office, IRS Criminal Investigation, Special Agent in Charge Rana Saoud of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Nashville, Special Agent in Charge John Nokes of the ATF Louisville Field Division, Special Agent in Charge Jim Scott of the DEA Louisville Field Division, Acting Special Agent in Charge Quincy R. Barnett of the FBI Louisville Field Office, and Chief Paul Humphrey of the Louisville Metro Police Department made the announcement.

    According to the indictment, Jose Malagon Castro, 49, a citizen of Mexico, operated three grocery stores in the Western District of Kentucky and offered, among other things, international money transmission services at each location. Yeimi Hernandez Barahona, 34, Kenia Hernandez Barahona, 35, Kelin Hernandez Barahona, 31, all citizens of Honduras, and Suri Rosmeri Hernandez Del Cid, 27, a citizen of Guatemala, were employed by Castro and conducted wire transfers as part of the money transmission service. Vanessa Avila Galaviz, 28, and Jose Martin Romero, 32, both citizens of Mexico, along with other individuals, were narcotics traffickers, who directed monetary wire transfers conducted at Castro’s stores to send drug proceeds to Mexico.

    The indictment alleges that between at least January 2020 and continuing until at least December 2024, all the named defendants engaged in a conspiracy to knowingly conduct, and attempt to conduct, millions of dollars’ worth of financial transactions affecting interstate and foreign commerce, knowing that the transactions were designed in whole or in part to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the drug proceeds and to avoid federal and state reporting requirements for the transmission of those proceeds.

    The indictment further alleges between August 6, 2024, and August 30, 2024, all the named defendants, aided and abetted by each other and others, knowingly conducted financial transactions affecting interstate and foreign commerce, which involved approximately $62,042 in proceeds from the sale and distribution of controlled substances knowing that the transactions were designed in whole and in part to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds of the drug trafficking and to avoid Federal and State reporting requirements for the transmission of those proceeds.

    The indictment further alleges that on April 23, 2024, Jose Malagon CastroKenia Hernandez Barahona, and Suri Rosmeri Hernandez Del Cid, aided and abetted by each other and others, knowingly conducted financial transactions, with undercover law enforcement agents acting as alleged narcotics traffickers, to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of property represented to be the proceeds of drug trafficking, and to promote the carrying on of the alleged drug trafficking, and to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state and federal law.

    The indictment further alleges that, Jose Malagon Castro, possessed firearms on December 4, 2024, in Jefferson County, Kentucky, knowing he was an alien illegally and unlawfully in the United States. On that date he illegally possessed the following firearms: an Aguirre y Aranzabal (AYA), model 4/53, 12-gauge shotgun; a Marlin Firearms Company, model 336W, 30-30 rifle; a Henry Repeating Rifle Company, model H004GE Golden Eagle, .22lr rifle; a Maverick Arms, model 88, 12-gauge shotgun; a Colt, model King Cobra, .357 magnum revolver; a Smith & Wesson, model CSX, 9mm pistol; and ammunition.

    On April 24, 2025, defendants Jose Malagon Castro, Yeimi Hernandez BarahonaKelin Hernandez Barahona, Suri Rosmeri Hernandez Del Cid, and Jose Martin Romero each made an initial court appearance before a U.S. Magistrate Judge in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Defendants Kenia Hernandez Barahona and Vanessa Avila Galaviz remain fugitives with outstanding warrants for their arrest.

    If convicted, Jose Malagon Castro faces a maximum sentence of 475 years in prison and Yeimi Hernandez Barahona, Kenia Hernandez BarahonaKelin Hernandez Barahona, Suri Rosmeri Hernandez Del CidVanessa Avila Galaviz, and Jose Martin Romero each face a maximum sentence of 460 years in prison. The United States is seeking forfeiture of $516,800.00 in United States Currency seized from Jose Malagon Castro. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the sentencing guidelines and other statutory factors.

    There is no parole in the federal system.

    This case is being investigated by the IRS, ATF, DEA, HSI, FBI, and LMPD.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Mac Shannon and Joseph Ansari are prosecuting this case.

    This investigation is a part of the IRS-CI’s Cincinnati Field Office’s Third Party Money Laundering (3PML) Project. This project focuses on Complicit Money Service Businesses (MSB) working for Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations. The purpose of this project is to develop high-impact 3PML cases for IRS-CI and other agencies across the United States, by utilizing data analytics.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: First Central Savings Bank Reports First Quarter 2025 Results Highlighted by Net Income of $1.8 million ($0.17 EPS), Net Interest Margin Expansion by 25 basis points on a linked quarter basis and Strong Non-Interest Income

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Performance Highlights

    • Net Income: Net income for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, was $1.8 million, or $0.17 per share, compared to $1.2 million, or $0.12 per share, recorded in the prior year quarter ended March 31, 2024.
    • Cash Net Income: Cash net income for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, was $2.1 million, or $0.19 per share, compared to $1.6 million or $0.15 per share, recorded in the comparable 2024 quarter.
    • Net Interest Margin and Spread: The Bank’s net interest margin increased by 25 basis points to 3.13% during the quarter ended March 31, 2025, from 2.88% in the linked quarter ended December 31, 2024. The Bank’s net interest spread increased to 2.19% during the quarter ended March 31, 2025, from 1.93% in the linked quarter ended December 31, 2024.
    • Non-Interest Income Growth: Due to an increase in loan sale volume and loan sale premiums received for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, non-interest income increased by $352 thousand or 21.2% from the prior year quarter.
    • Net Interest Income: Net interest income for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, was $7.3 million an increase of $782 thousand, or 12.0%, from the quarter ended March 31, 2024 and $383 thousand, or 5.5%, from the quarter ended December 31, 2024.
    • Financial Performance Metrics: Return on average assets and average stockholders’ equity were 0.75% and 8.21%, respectively, for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, compared to 0.51% and 5.89% in the comparable 2024 quarter end.
    • Regulatory Capital: The Bank’s Tier 1 leverage ratio was 9.62% and the Total Risk based capital ratio was 14.65% at March 31, 2025, each above the regulatory minimum for a well-capitalized institution.
    • Strong and Stable Liquidity: The Uninsured deposits base remains stable at 20.2% of total deposits. The Bank has significant available funding capacity to provide 208% coverage of our uninsured deposits.

    GLEN COVE, N.Y., April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Joseph Pistilli, Chairman of the Board, of First Central Savings Bank (“FCSB”, “the Bank”) today reported continued performance achievements for the quarter ended March 31, 2025.

    Cash and GAAP Basis Earnings

    The Bank’s cash earnings were $2.1 million, or $0.19 per share, for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, which represents a decrease of $142 thousand, or 6.4%, on a linked quarter basis and an increase of $492 thousand, or 31.1%, from the prior year quarter ended March 31, 2024.

    On a GAAP basis, net income for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, was $1.8 million, or $0.17 per share, compared with net income of $2.0 million, or $0.19, from the prior linked quarter basis and net income of $1.2 million, or $0.12 per share, for the quarter ended March 31, 2024.

    Joseph Pistilli, Chairman of the Board noted, “In the first quarter of 2025, First Central continued to build shareholder value by generating strong earnings, primarily due to gains on non-conforming residential loan sales and margin expansion. In addition, we increased our book value from $7.95 per share at March 31, 2024, to $8.44 at March 31, 2025, an increase of $0.49 or 6.2%. We are cautiously optimistic about the credit quality of our loan portfolio, as it relates to the commercial loan sector, specifically to office space and multi-family as our exposure to this type of lending is limited. I am extremely proud of the management team and the Board of Directors that we have assembled at the Bank and the expertise they have in managing net interest income and asset quality during the current market conditions.”

    Paul Hagan, President and Chief Operating Officer, reflected on the Bank’s results, “During the quarter ended March 31, 2025, the Bank expanded its net interest income and margin as a result of interest expense reductions. The cost of funds declined by 23 basis points during the first quarter of 2025. The pace of future deposit cost reductions will depend upon additional rate cuts from the Federal Reserve as well as competitor deposit pricing and their increased liquidity needs. We expect overall profitability to improve in the calendar year 2025 due to net interest margin expansion, growth in our loan portfolio, and increased loan sale income, however, we are very aware of potential credit quality deterioration, particularly in commercial and industrial loans that are present within our industry. Management will continue to effectively manage non-interest expenses to improve profitability and provide for any potential credit quality issues.”

    Balance Sheet

    On a year-over-year basis, total assets grew by $21.3 million, or 2.2%, driven by the Bank’s loan originations offset by non-conforming loan sales of $228.9 million during the period. Total assets for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, increased by $18.7 million to $983.6 million as the Bank continued to originate commercial and non-conforming loans while continuing to actively sell a portion of the non-conforming loans to the secondary market. The Bank sold $60.1 million of non-conforming loans during the quarter. As of March 31, 2025, the Bank has been able to generate a non-conforming loan pipeline of $118.1 million with a weighted average interest rate of 7.11%.

    Total deposits were $850.6 million as of March 31, 2025, an increase of $21.6 million, or 2.6%, from December 31, 2024. The Bank has been successful in growing non-interest-bearing deposits from our retail branches and through non-conforming loan originations. Year over year, non-interest-bearing deposits increased by $35.2 million or 32.4% to $144.0 million as of March 31, 2025, representing 16.9% of the total deposit base. With the growth of the retail deposit base, the Bank was able to reduce its brokered deposit holdings by $13.2 million, or 34.6%, and reduce borrowings by $5.0 million, or 16.7%, to $25.0 million when compared to December 31, 2024.

    The Bank’s overall average cost of funds was 3.28% for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, a decrease of 23 basis points from 3.51% from the prior linked quarter. Three overnight rate cuts by the Federal Reserve totaling 100 bps in the fourth quarter of 2024 contributed to the Bank’s ability to lower deposit costs. Management continues to be pro-active in securing lower rate certificates of deposit in the current interest rate environment to better position the interest-rate-risk profile of the Bank in anticipation of further interest rate reductions in 2025. Management believes this strategy will better protect and enhance future earnings as interest rates continue to decline, and our deposits reprice downward in the future.

    Loan Portfolio and Asset Quality

    For the twelve-month period ended March 31, 2025, the Bank’s loan portfolio grew by $47.2 million, or 5.6%, with the growth concentrated primarily in non-conforming residential loans. Management continues to employ a strategy of concentrating its loan growth in these products, which provides the Bank with traditionally safe credit quality at acceptable credit spreads, greater liquidity and an enhanced interest-rate-risk profile. Over the past twelve months, originations of the non-conforming product amounted to $323.2 million. At March 31, 2025, the entire non-conforming loan portfolio amounted to $486.8 million, with an average loan balance of $551.9 thousand and a weighted average loan-to-value ratio of 62.9%.

    As a result of the Bank’s robust non-conforming loan generation capabilities, the Bank had been able to generate additional income by strategically originating and selling its non-conforming loans to other financial institutions at premiums. The Bank expects that it will continue to originate, in the near term, for its own portfolio and, in the long term, for others, which will result in a continued increase in interest income while also realizing gains on sales of loans. For the three months ended March 31, 2025, the Bank earned $1.8 million in premiums on loans sold, net of FASB 91 fees and costs.

    The Bank’s asset quality ratios remain adequate. At March 31, 2025, the loan portfolio had non-performing loans of $15.9 million, or 1.84%, of total loans and 1.62% of total assets. The total allowance for credit losses at March 31, 2025, was $9.1 million, or 1.05%, of total loans held for investment. The higher level of non-performing loans is primarily due to one legacy commercial real estate loan in the amount of $7.1 million that went non-accrual during the quarter ended December 31, 2024. Management of the Bank has worked diligently to exit this borrowing relationship in April 2025 and expects to charge off approximately $1.1 million of the loan balance next quarter.

    About First Central Savings Bank

    With assets of $983.6 million at March 31, 2025, First Central Savings Bank is a locally owned and operated community savings bank, focusing on highly personalized and efficient services and products responsive to local needs. Management and the Board of Directors are comprised of a select group of successful local businessmen who are committed to the success of the Bank by knowing and understanding the metro-New York area’s financial needs and opportunities. Backed by state-of-the-art technology, First Central offers a full range of modern financial services. First Central employs a complete suite of consumer and commercial banking products and services, including multi-family and commercial mortgages, ADC and bridge loans, residential loans, middle market business loans and lines of credit. First Central also offers customers 24-hour ATM service with no fees attached, free checking with interest, mobile banking, the most advanced technologies in internet banking for our consumer and business customers, safe deposit boxes and much more. The Bank continues to roll out mobile banking software products as well as our “Zelle” money transfer product to our customers. First Central Savings Bank maintains its corporate office in Glen Cove, New York with an additional six branches throughout Queens New York, one branch in Nassau County, New York, and one branch in Suffolk County, New York.

    First Central Savings Bank is a member of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and is an Equal Housing/Equal Opportunity Lender. For further information, call 516-399-6010 or visit the Bank’s state-of-the-art website at www.myfcsb.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This release may contain certain “forward looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, and may be identified by the use of such words as “may,” “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “should,” “plan,” “estimate,” “predict,” “continue,” and “potential” or the negative of these terms or other comparable terminology. Examples of forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, estimates with respect to the financial condition, results of operations and business of First Central Savings Bank. Any or all of the forward-looking statements in this release and in any other public statements made by First Central Savings Bank may turn out to be incorrect. They can be affected by inaccurate assumptions First Central Savings Bank might make or by known or unknown risks and uncertainties. Consequently, no forward-looking statement can be guaranteed. First Central Savings Bank does not intend to update any of the forward-looking statements after the date of this release or to conform these statements to actual events.

      First Central Savings Bank            
      Statements of Condition – (unaudited)            
      (dollars in thousands)            
          3/31/2025   12/31/2024   3/31/2024
                   
      Assets            
      Cash and cash equivalents   $ 35,928     $ 49,156     $ 50,589  
      Certificates of deposit     3,000       2,000       2,000  
      Investments available-for-sale     30,085       29,802       41,791  
      Investments held-to-maturity     1,000       1,000       1,000  
                   
      Loans held-for-sale     17,187       14,892       4,343  
      Loans receivable     866,999       838,183       832,644  
      Less: allowance for credit losses     (9,144 )     (8,787 )     (8,538 )
      Loans, net     857,855       829,396       824,106  
                   
      Other assets     38,558       38,684       38,508  
                                Total assets   $ 983,613     $ 964,930     $ 962,337  
                   
                   
      Liabilities and stockholders’ equity            
      Deposits   $ 850,632     $ 829,003     $ 845,142  
      FHLB advances and other borrowings     25,000       30,000       14,500  
      Other liabilities     18,125       18,568       18,009  
                                Total liabilities     893,757       877,571       877,651  
                   
                   
      Total stockholders’ equity     89,856       87,359       84,686  
               Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity   $ 983,613     $ 964,930     $ 962,337  
                   
      First Central Savings Bank      
      Statements of Income – (unaudited)      
      (dollars in thousands, except per share data)      
             
        Quarter Ended
      Quarter Ended
        3/31/2025   3/31/2024
             
      Total Interest income $ 14,279     $ 14,185  
      Total interest expense   6,970       7,658  
                             Net interest income   7,309       6,527  
      Provision for credit losses   93       190  
          Net interest income after provision for credit losses   7,216       6,337  
             
      Net gain on loans sold   1,790       1,421  
      Other non-interest income   223       240  
               Total non-interest income   2,013       1,661  
             
      Compensation and benefits   4,022       3,747  
      Occupancy and equipment   968       906  
      Data processing   482       444  
      Federal insurance premium   183       165  
      Professional fees   335       329  
      Other   992       869  
               Total non-interest expense   6,982       6,460  
             
               Income before income taxes   2,247       1,538  
      Income tax expense   459       310  
                             Net income $ 1,788     $ 1,228  
             
      Basic earnings per share-GAAP basis $ 0.17     $ 0.12  
      Diluted earnings per share-GAAP basis $ 0.17     $ 0.12  
             
      Supplementary information:      
      Net income $ 1,788     $ 1,228  
             
      Add back non-cash items      
      Provision for credit losses   93       190  
      Depreciation expense   266       253  
      Tax on add back of non-cash items   (73 )     (89 )
                             Cash net income $ 2,074     $ 1,582  
             
      Basic earnings per share-GAAP basis $ 0.19     $ 0.15  
      Diluted earnings per share-GAAP basis $ 0.19     $ 0.15  
             
      First Central Savings Bank              
      Statements of Income – (unaudited)              
      (dollars in thousands, except per share data)              
        Quarter Ended Quarter Ended Quarter Ended Quarter Ended
        3/31/2025   12/31/2024   9/30/2024   6/30/2024
                     
      Total Interest income $ 14,279     $ 14,599     $ 14,972     $ 14,854  
      Total interest expense   6,970       7,673       8,210       8,064  
                             Net interest income   7,309       6,926       6,762       6,790  
      Provision for credit losses   93       1       950       117  
          Net interest income after provision for credit losses   7,216       6,925       5,812       6,673  
                     
      Net gain on loans sold   1,790       2,649       1,536       843  
      Net gains on sale of securities               142        
      Other non-interest income   223       247       210       337  
               Total non-interest income   2,013       2,896       1,888       1,180  
                     
      Compensation and benefits   4,022       4,355       3,663       3,596  
      Occupancy and equipment   968       912       936       918  
      Data processing   482       454       448       452  
      Federal insurance premium   183       161       174       166  
      Professional fees   335       291       360       368  
      Other   992       1,116       975       907  
               Total non-interest expense   6,982       7,289       6,556       6,407  
                     
               Income before income taxes   2,247       2,532       1,144       1,446  
      Income tax expense   459       524       225       290  
                             Net income $ 1,788     $ 2,008     $ 919     $ 1,156  
                     
      Basic earnings per share-GAAP basis $ 0.17     $ 0.19     $ 0.09     $ 0.11  
      Diluted earnings per share-GAAP basis $ 0.17     $ 0.19     $ 0.09     $ 0.11  
                     
      Supplementary information:              
      Net income $ 1,788     $ 2,008     $ 919     $ 1,156  
                     
      Add back non-cash items              
      Provision for credit losses   93       1       950       117  
      Depreciation expense   266       261       260       257  
      Tax on add back of non-cash items   (73 )     (54 )     (238 )     (75 )
                             Cash net income $ 2,074     $ 2,216     $ 1,891     $ 1,455  
                     
      Basic earnings per share-GAAP basis $ 0.19     $ 0.21     $ 0.18     $ 0.14  
      Diluted earnings per share-GAAP basis $ 0.19     $ 0.21     $ 0.18     $ 0.14  
                     
    First Central Savings Bank              
    Selected Financial Data – (unaudited)              
    (dollars in thousands, except per share data)            
      Quarter Ended   Quarter Ended   Quarter Ended   Quarter Ended
      3/31/2025   12/31/2024   9/30/2024   3/31/2024
                   
    Asset quality:              
        Allowance for credit losses $ 9,144     $ 8,787     $ 8,895     $ 8,538  
        Allowance for credit losses to total loans (1)   1.05 %     1.05 %     1.11 %     1.03 %
                   
        Non-performing loans $ 15,940     $ 11,649     $ 4,850     $ 4,917  
        Net (recovery) charge-off dollars   (92 )     (41 )     776       (2 )
        Non-performing loans/total loans (1)   1.84 %     1.39 %     0.61 %     0.59 %
        Non-performing loans/total assets   1.62 %     1.21 %     0.49 %     0.51 %
        Allowance for credit losses/non-performing loans   57.37 %     75.43 %     183.40 %     173.64 %
                   
    Capital: (dollars in thousands)              
        Tier 1 capital $ 93,664     $ 91,913     $ 91,502     $ 89,427  
        Tier 1 leverage ratio   9.62 %     9.36 %     9.26 %     9.23 %
        Common equity tier 1 capital ratio   13.40 %     13.42 %     13.20 %     13.32 %
        Tier 1 risk based capital ratio   13.40 %     13.42 %     13.20 %     13.32 %
        Total risk based capital ratio   14.65 %     14.67 %     14.45 %     14.57 %
                   
    Equity data              
        Common shares outstanding   10,648,345       10,648,345       10,648,345       10,648,345  
        Stockholders’ equity $ 89,856     $ 87,359     $ 87,852     $ 84,686  
        Book value per common share   8.44       8.20       8.25       7.95  
        Tangible common equity   89,856       87,359       87,852       84,686  
        Tangible book value per common share   8.44       8.20       8.25       7.95  
                   
    (1) Calculation excludes loans held-for-sale            
                   
    First Central Savings Bank              
    Selected Financial Data – (unaudited)              
    (dollars in thousands)              
      Quarter Ended Quarter Ended Quarter Ended Quarter Ended
      3/31/2025   12/31/2024   9/30/2024   3/31/2024
                   
    Other: (in thousands)              
        Average interest-earning assets $ 946,854     $ 956,169     $ 961,624     $ 941,314  
        Average interest-bearing liabilities   720,391       736,731       759,152       754,689  
        Average deposits and borrowings   861,096       868,871       877,100       860,638  
                   
    Profitability:              
        Return on average assets   0.75 %     0.82 %     0.37 % (3 )   0.51 %
        Return on average equity   8.21 %     9.08 %     4.22 % (3 )   5.89 %
        Yield on average interest earning assets   6.12 %     6.07 %     6.19 %     6.06 %
        Cost of average interest bearing liabilities   3.92 %     4.14 %     4.30 %     4.08 %
        Cost of funds   3.28 %     3.51 %     3.72 %     3.58 %
        Net interest rate spread (1)   2.19 %     1.93 %     1.89 %     1.98 %
        Net interest margin (2)   3.13 %     2.88 %     2.80 %     2.79 %
        Non-interest expense to average assets   2.92 %     2.97 %     2.65 %     2.70 %
        Efficiency ratio   74.80 %     74.21 %     77.05 %     78.90 %
                   
    (1) Net interest rate spread represents the difference between the average yield on average interest-earning assets and the average cost of average interest-bearing liabilities
    (2) Net interest margin represents net interest income divided by average interest earning assets        
    (3) ROA and ROE excluding a $776 thousand charge-off of a C&I loan as of September 30, 2024 would have been 0.61% and 6.95%
                   

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Peters Helps Lead Legislation to Aid Michigan Small Businesses Impacted by Unseasonably Warm Winters, Low Snowfall

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Michigan Gary Peters
    WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. Senator Gary Peters (MI) helped lead bipartisan legislation to provide financial relief to Michigan small businesses who are economically impacted by unseasonably warm winters and low snowfall totals. The Winter Recreation Small Business Recovery Act – which he introduced with U.S. Senators Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Susan Collins (R-ME), Tina Smith (D-MN), and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) – would allow businesses to qualify for the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program, which aids businesses that have been impacted by extreme weather situations.   
    “Mild winters can be devastating for the businesses and communities across Michigan that depend on winter tourism and recreation to drive their local economies,” said Senator Peters. “This bipartisan legislation would ensure small businesses are eligible for assistance when unseasonably warm winters impact our state.” 
    “Senator Peters continues to be a true champion for Michigan’s outdoor recreation economy. His support and introduction of the Winter Recreation Small Business Recovery Act recognizes that ski areas are not just businesses—they’re community hubs, job creators, and engines of winter tourism. When the weather doesn’t cooperate, it’s a relief to know we’ve got someone in Washington who understands the stakes and is working to ensure the industry can bounce back stronger,” said Mike Panich, Executive Director, Michigan Snowsports Industries Association.
    “The people and businesses of the Upper Peninsula are used to tough winters – in fact, with our SISU spirit, we embrace them. But as we learned last year, there are times no matter how resilient we may be that Mother Nature offers us a hard lesson on who is really in charge,” said Marty Fittante, CEO of InvestUP. “I join with U.P. businesses and institutions in expressing gratitude to Senator Peters for taking to heart the lessons that we learned from the unseasonably warm Winter of 2023 with this legislation so that we are better positioned next time we face such an extreme weather crisis to manage it and mitigate the adverse hardships that U.P. small businesses and our regional economy experienced.”
    “The option for small businesses to access SBA and EIDL support is a vital tool, especially as we face increasingly unpredictable winter weather,” said Susan Estler, CEO of Travel Marquette. “As we have seen in Marquette County, mild winters can impact local businesses, particularly those in the tourism sector. I recently spoke with a small business owner who is struggling to recover from financial shortfalls caused by the past few winters. This bill is a critical resource for businesses, helping them manage weather-related setbacks and remain resilient, ensuring they are ready to serve both locals and visitors.”
    “The UP200 Sled Dog Race draws thousands of tourists to the Upper Peninsula, injecting more than $2 million into our local economy. The increasing instability of winter events, due to weather, has taken a toll on small business in our area that depend on these tourism dollars generated,” said Ross Anthony, Treasurer of the Upper Peninsula Sled Dog Association. “We were proud to bring the race back to Marquette in 2025, but it was nowhere near enough to erase the loss of tourism from 2023 and 2024. This bill would ensure Marquette businesses can access the financial relief needed to offset those losses in the unfortunate event we have to cancel our event in the future.”
    Currently, EIDLs can only be awarded to businesses impacted by disaster situations currently defined by the Small Business Act – which only includes floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, fires, and landslides. This bill seeks to broaden the definition to make businesses impacted by low snowfall eligible to apply for financial assistance through the SBA.  
    This bill is introduced as Michigan communities have faced record-high temperatures and below average snowfall during recent winter seasons, leading to significant decreases in winter tourism and opportunities for winter recreation. According to the Michigan Snowsports Industries Association, data from 30 ski hills across Michigan shows a combined $41 million loss in revenue during the 2024 season. Unseasonably warm weather also contributed to more than 3,400 layoffs for employees that work in ski operations. 
    Mild winters have also led to the cancellation of events that are integral to Michigan’s communities and our local economies – including the UP200 Sled Dog Race in Marquette, which had to be cancelled for two years in a row due to low snowfall throughout the Upper Peninsula.  
    Weather data shows that winter is the fastest warming season for most of the United States, and the number of days below freezing is only expected to decline. To help address this warming trend, the bill would also direct the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct a study and make recommendations on how winter weather-dependent businesses can adapt their business model and become more resilient against changing weather patterns.  

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Foreign National Arrested for Making False Statement During Attempted Firearms Purchases

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Paducah, KY – A federal criminal complaint and arrest warrant was issued this week charging an illegal alien with making false statements during multiple attempts to purchase firearms as well as falsely claiming to be a U.S. Citizen.  

    U.S. Attorney Michael A. Bennett of the Western District of Kentucky, Special Agent in Charge John Nokes of the ATF Louisville Field Division, and Special Agent in Charge Rana Saoud of Homeland Security Investigations, Nashville, made the announcement.

    According to the complaint, Ulises Macario Gonzaga-Guillen, age 32, a citizen of Mexico, was charged with making multiple false statements during attempts to purchase firearms from licensed dealers between January 15 and February 16, 2025, in McCracken and Marshall Counties, Kentucky. Gonzaga-Guillen, during one of the attempted purchases, also falsely claimed to be a U.S. Citizen. Gonzaga-Guillen was not able to successfully purchase a firearm from any of the firearm dealers involved.  

    This case is being investigated by the ATF Paducah Satellite Office and the HSI Paducah Office.

    The defendant was taken into federal custody this week and will make his initial appearance before a U.S. Magistrate Judge in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky on April 28, 2025. If convicted on the charges in the complaint, the defendant faces a maximum sentence of 43 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the sentencing guidelines and other statutory factors.

    There is no parole in the federal system.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Seth A. Hancock, Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s Paducah Branch Office, is prosecuting the case.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: 5 Defendants Arrested on Complaints Alleging They Submitted Fraudulent Claims Seeking FEMA Funds for Wildfire Disaster Relief

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    LOS ANGELES – Five defendants have been arrested on federal criminal complaints alleging they fraudulently obtained federal disaster-relief funds by falsely claiming their properties were damaged in the wildfires that struck Los Angeles County in January 2025, the Justice Department announced today.

    The allegedly false claims were made in the wake of the Eaton and Palisades fires that started on January 7. Together, the wildfires burned nearly 60,000 acres, destroyed more than 16,000 structures, and resulted in the deaths of 30 people. As a result, the President approved a Major Disaster Declaration, which prompted the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to develop a program to provide financial assistance to fire victims.

    Victims of the Eaton and Palisades fires, including renters who lost their residences, could qualify for a one-time payment of $750 noted as a FEMA relief payment, $43,600 for other needs assistance (personal property, transportation, medical, etc.), and housing assistance for up to 18 months at varying rates. Homeowners are also potentially eligible for additional relief up to $43,600 for home repair.

    Each defendant listed below – four of whom were arrested on Thursday; one of whom was in state custody in Arizona on Wednesday – is charged with fraud in connection with major disaster or emergency benefits, which carries a statutory maximum sentence of 30 years in federal prison.

    • United States v. Hogan

    Deanniah Hogan, 32, of Compton, on January 26 allegedly submitted a false claim for federal disaster assistance related to the Palisades Fire, listing an address in the Pacific Palisades neighborhood of Los Angeles as the purportedly damaged dwelling in which she claimed to live and rent. After approving the application, FEMA sent a total of approximately $17,351 to Hogan, including for personal property damage and displacement assistance.

    The actual Pacific Palisades homeowner – and resident who lost the property in the fire – later confirmed to law enforcement that the property was not being rented out at that time.

    Hogan was arrested and made her initial appearance Thursday in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles. A federal magistrate judge ordered her released on $10,000 bond. Her arraignment is scheduled for May 20.

    Assistant United States Attorney Solomon Kim of the Major Frauds Section is prosecuting this case.

    • United States v. Johnson

    Delvonne Dashon Johnson, 31, of the East Hollywood area of Los Angeles, on February 4 allegedly submitted a fraudulent claim for FEMA benefits related to the Palisades Fire, listing an address in Pacific Palisades as his purported dwelling that he owned. Later in February 2025, FEMA sent Johnson a total of approximately $64,138 in federal disaster relief.

    On April 2, law enforcement interviewed the property’s actual owner, who stated she had lived at that residence since 2015, that it was her primary residence, and she was living there at the time of the Palisades Fire. She also said she never rented the property out to anyone and did not know Johnson. She further said when she submitted a disaster assistance application to advise authorities that her house had been destroyed, FEMA notified her that someone already filed such a claim on her property’s behalf.

    Johnson was arrested Thursday and is scheduled to make his initial appearance this afternoon in U.S. District Court in downtown Los Angeles.

    Assistant United States Attorney Steven M. Arkow of the Major Frauds Section is prosecuting this case.

    • United States v. Lowe

    Keandre Lowe, 21, of Long Beach, on January 22 allegedly submitted a fraudulent claim for FEMA benefits, claiming that he rented an Altadena property that was destroyed in the Eaton Fire. By February 13, FEMA had submitted approximately $28,286 in disaster relief to Lowe. 

    The actual property owner later confirmed to law enforcement that they were residing in the home at the time and since 2007 had not rented the property out to anyone.

    Lowe was arrested and made his initial appearance Thursday in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles. A federal magistrate judge ordered him released on $10,000 bond. Lowe’s arraignment is scheduled for May 27.

    Assistant United States Attorney Steven M. Arkow of the Major Frauds Section is prosecuting this case.

    • United States v. McIntre

    Zenalyn McIntre, 38, of Sherman Oaks, on January 20 allegedly submitted a false claim for federal disaster relief by claiming that she was a renter of a residence in Pacific Palisades that was destroyed in the Palisades Fire. Eight days later, she submitted additional documents online to FEMA, including her California driver’s license – which listed a Sherman Oaks address – and a natural gas utility bill that appeared to be fake.

    Based on her false claim, FEMA distributed approximately $25,229 in disaster-relief funds to McIntre.

    McIntre was arrested Thursday and is scheduled to make her initial appearance this afternoon in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles.

    Assistant United States Attorney Sarah S. Lee of the Major Frauds Section is prosecuting this case.

    • United States v. Woods

    Katrina Woods, 33, of Maricopa, Arizona, on January 30 allegedly submitted a fraudulent claim for disaster assistance, listing a nonexistent Altadena address as her primary residence that purportedly was destroyed in the Eaton Fire.

    FEMA eventually disbursed approximately $23,441 in disaster relief to Woods, who also made reservations through FEMA to stay at two hotels – one in downtown Los Angeles, the other in Hawthorne – during February and March of 2025 paid for by FEMA. On March 10, FEMA discontinued lodging for Woods at the hotel in downtown Los Angeles where she was staying.

    Woods has been in state custody in Arizona since Wednesday on an unrelated matter and is expected to make her initial appearance in federal court in the coming weeks.

    Assistant United States Attorney Steven M. Arkow of the Major Frauds Section is prosecuting this case.

    Complaints contain allegations of criminal conduct. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law. 

    One defendant arrested last month, Hedeshia Robertson, 36, of Lakewood, is scheduled to plead guilty on May 2 to one count of fraud in connection with major disaster or emergency benefits. Robertson admitted in her plea agreement that she filed a fraudulent application for FEMA benefits on January 28, seeking disaster relief for a Pacific Palisades property that she neither owned nor rented. As a result of her fraudulent application, Robertson fraudulently obtained approximately $24,899 in FEMA benefits.

    Assistant United States Attorneys Scott Paetty and Roger Hsieh of the Major Frauds Section are prosecuting this case.

    Another defendant, Jaime Arturo Carrillo, 48, of South Los Angeles, pleaded guilty on Wednesday to one count of fraud in connection with major disaster or emergency benefits. On January 13, Carrillo falsely stated to FEMA on an application for wildfire-relief benefits that he rented property in South Los Angeles – approximately 20 miles from the Palisades and Eaton fires – and had suffered personal property damage and a disruption in his utilities. Carrillo was not renting at the South Los Angeles residence.

    As a result of Carrillo’s false statements, FEMA authorized him to receive transitional sheltering assistance. Using these benefits, Carrillo received free lodging for 13 nights at two Los Angeles County hotels, with a total cost of approximately $2,173. Carrillo also charged approximately $107 to the room paid for by FEMA at an El Segundo hotel for food and incidental costs.

    Carrillo’s sentencing hearing is scheduled for June 11.

    Assistant United States Attorney Elizabeth S.P. Douglas of the Major Frauds Section is prosecuting this case.

    The cases announced today were investigated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General and Homeland Security Investigations’ (HSI) El Camino Real Financial Crimes Task Force, a multi-agency task force that includes federal and state investigators who are focused on financial crimes in Southern California, including the Small Business Administration Office of Inspector General (SBA-OIG).

    To report fraud related to FEMA disaster-relief public assistance, please contact the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS-OIG) hotline at (800) 323-8603. The HSI tip line may be contacted at (866) 347-2423.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Investing in Workforce Development: Shapiro Administration Highlights $2.4 Million Workforce Development Investment During Roundtable with Boys & Girls Club of Western PA

    Source: US State of Pennsylvania

    April 24, 2025McKeesport, PA

    Investing in Workforce Development: Shapiro Administration Highlights $2.4 Million Workforce Development Investment During Roundtable with Boys & Girls Club of Western PA

    Pennsylvania Department of Labor & Industry (L&I) Secretary Nancy A. Walker today visited the Boys & Girls Club of Western Pennsylvania’s Teen Center in McKeesport to highlight the Shapiro Administration’s $2.4 million investment in L&I’s Schools-to-Work Program (STWP). The grants will support 12 innovative initiatives aimed at creating pathways to family-sustaining careers for high school students.

    Secretary Walker joined a roundtable discussion with students, employers, and community partners focused on youth workforce development in Allegheny County and the surrounding region to learn more about how these grant dollars will be used in Western Pennsylvania.

    Through this investment, Partner4Work received $250,000 to launch Cybersecure Pittsburgh-a new registered pre-apprenticeship program focused on high school juniors and seniors interested in technology careers. Developed in partnership with Urban Pathways Charter School, Phase 4 Learning Center, and the Boys & Girls Club, the program provides a centralized, “one-stop-shop” model that combines innovative classroom instruction with hands-on learning experiences and credentialing opportunities. Cybersecure Pittsburgh aims to equip students with the foundational skills and credentials needed to enter and thrive in the technology industry.

    “The Boys & Girls Club of Western PA and Partner4Work are doing exactly the kind of work we need more of-meeting young people where they are and opening doors to real opportunity,” said Secretary Walker. “Cybersecure Pittsburgh is a model for how community partnerships can help students gain confidence, earn credentials, and step directly into high-growth careers. This is workforce development at its most impactful.”

    Speaker list:
    Secretary of Labor & Industry Nancy Walker
    Rob Cherry, Partner4Work, Chief Executive Officer
    Chris Watts, Boys & Girls Club, Vice President of Teen Programs & Partnerships

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Main Street Matters: Lt. Gov. Austin Davis Highlights Investments in Northwestern Pennsylvania Communities

    Source: US State of Pennsylvania

    April 25, 2025Meadville, PA

    Main Street Matters: Lt. Gov. Austin Davis Highlights Investments in Northwestern Pennsylvania Communities

    The historic Main Streets and downtowns of northwestern Pennsylvania are being restored, thanks to support from the Shapiro-Davis Administration, which is providing more than $1 million in state funding for eight projects in Crawford, Erie and Warren counties.

    “Pennsylvania’s historic Main Streets and downtowns are part of what makes the Commonwealth a great place to live, work and visit, said Lt. Gov. Austin Davis. “Unfortunately, many of them have been neglected for far too long, but with strategic investments, like the ones we’re making in Meadville and Titusville, they can be restored to their former glory for generations to come.”

    Davis stopped by Meadville’s historic Market House today and took a walking tour of the downtown with Mayor Jaime Kinder and Crawford County Commissioner Christopher Seeley.

    List of Speakers:
    Mayor Jaime Kinder
    Lieutenant Governor Austin Davis
    City Mgr. Maryanne Menanno
    Chair Ashley Mattocks-Rose
    Exec. Dir. Andy Walker

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Californians Report Over $2.5 Billion in Losses According to IC3 Annual Report

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

    LOS ANGELES—The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) has released its latest annual report. The 2024 Internet Crime Report combines information from 859,532 complaints of suspected Internet crime and details reported losses exceeding $16 billion – a 33% increase in losses from 2023.

    According to the 2024 report, California ranked #1 out of all states in the number of complaints received by the public. Moreover, California residents 60 and over, suffered the most losses at over $800 million and submitted the greatest number of complaints.

    The top three cybercrimes in California, by number of complaints reported by victims in 2024 were: Cryptocurrency Fraud, Extortion, and Phishing/Spoofing.

    “This report is a sobering reminder that we in California, especially our seniors, remain prime targets for scammers who will jump at every opportunity to defraud potential victims” said Akil Davis, assistant director in charge of the FBI Los Angeles Field Office. “It’s important for the public to remain vigilant to guard against ever-increasing cyber threats. At home, practicing good cyber hygiene is an effective way to create a safer online environment for you and your family. If anyone suspects they or someone they know may be a victim of fraud, we encourage them to report it to the FBI by calling our Los Angeles Field Office at 310-477-6565, online at tips.fbi.gov and submitting a report to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center at ic3.gov.”

    To promote public awareness, the IC3 produces an annual report to aggregate and highlight the data provided by the general public. The quality of the data is a direct reflection of the information the public provides through the IC3 website. The IC3 standardizes the data by categorizing each complaint and analyzes the data to identify and forecast trends in Internet crime. The annual report helps the FBI develop effective relationships with industry partners and share information for investigative and intelligence purposes for law enforcement and public awareness.

    The IC3, which was established in May 2000, houses nine million complaints from the public in its database and continues to encourage anyone who thinks they’ve been the victim of a cyber-enabled crime, regardless of dollar loss, to file a complaint through the IC3 website. The more comprehensive complaints the FBI receives, the more effective it will be in helping law enforcement gain a more accurate picture of the extent and nature of Internet-facilitated crimes.

    The FBI recommends that everyone frequently review consumer and industry alerts published by the IC3. If you or your business is a victim of an Internet crime, immediately notify all financial institutions involved in the relevant transactions, submit a complaint to www.ic3.gov, contact your nearest FBI field office, and contact local law enforcement.

    Learn more about the history of IC3 by listening to this previously released podcast: FBI podcast episode “Inside the FBI: IC3 Turns 20.”

    The full 2024 Internet Crime Report can be found here: https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2024_IC3Report.pdf

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: XRP News: Just 72 Hours Left to Join XploraDEX Presale, As XPL Token Distribution Nears Completion

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ZURICH, Switzerland, April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The final countdown is officially on. With just 72 hours remaining in the XploraDEX presale and the $XPL token distribution nearly complete, the window to join one of the XRP Ledger’s most transformative DeFi launches is rapidly closing.

    Buy $XPL Token Now

    XploraDEX is pioneering the next phase of decentralized finance on XRPL with the first AI-powered DEX, offering advanced trading automation, predictive analytics, and intelligent execution built directly into the heart of a lightning-fast blockchain.

    As token distribution nears its conclusion, thousands of early investors have already received their $XPL tokens. On-chain metrics confirm surging wallet activity, while community conversations across Telegram and X (Twitter) are dominated by excitement and urgency.

    What You Need to Know:

    • $XPL tokens are actively being distributed to eligible presale participants
    • Only 72 days remain before the presale officially ends
    • More than 76% of tokens have already been allocated
    • Post-distribution utility includes AI dashboards, staking, governance, and launchpad access

    For those who act now, there’s still time to lock in $XPL at presale pricing before listings go live on XRPL-based DEXs. Once the presale ends, entry will be determined entirely by the market.

    Purchase $XPL on Presale

    By joining now, investors gain:

    • First access to AI-enhanced trading tools
    • Early participation in staking pools and liquidity programs
    • Governance privileges in the XploraDEX protocol
    • Trading fee discounts and launchpad advantages

    XploraDEX has attracted attention not just for its vision—but for its execution. While many projects delay rollout, XploraDEX has delivered:

    • A fully functioning distribution process
    • A growing and engaged community
    • A development roadmap already in motion

    The buzz is everywhere. Influencers are signaling urgency. Crypto media is watching closely. And $XPL holders are already positioning themselves for what’s next.

    Participate in $XPL Presale

    If you’ve been watching from the sidelines, this is your final opportunity. The platform is launching. The token is live. And the presale is closing in 72 hours.

    Join $XPL Presale While You Still Can: https://sale.xploradex.io

    Follow the Final Countdown: TwitterTelegram

    Contact:
    Oliver Muller
    oliver@xploradex.io
    contact@xploradex.io

    Disclaimer: This press release is provided by the XploraDEX. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice.

    Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed.

    Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility.

    Globenewswire does not endorse any content on this page.

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    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/13ae6302-20c2-459a-ae54-d307b53a43b5

    The MIL Network