Category: Finance

MIL-OSI USA: SCHUMER DEMANDS ANSWERS: NEW YORK’S MEDICAID PORTAL JUST TEMPORARILY SHUT DOWN AGAIN FOLLOWING TRUMP’S FUNDING FREEZE FIASCO LAST WEEK; SENATOR CALLS FOR FULL INVESTIGATION TO PROTECT NEARLY 7 MILLION…

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for New York Charles E Schumer

This Morning The Medicaid Portal And All U.S. Department Of Health & Human Services Websites Were Inoperable, Affecting Payments For Approximately 7 Million New Yorkers & Blocking New Yorkers From Receiving Reimbursements For Health Care Expenses

Today’s Shutdown Marks Second Time In Two Weeks NY Has Been Locked Out Of Payments With No Explanation; Following Trump’s Illegal Federal Funding Freeze, Schumer Says Enough Is Enough And NY-ers Deserve Answers On What Is Happening With Their Healthcare Coverage

Schumer: Continued Medicaid Portal Shutdowns – And Fed Funding Freeze – Create Panic, Confusion & Unnecessary Frustration

After access to NY’s Medicaid portal was rendered inoperable once again this morning for the second time following Trump’s funding freeze fiasco, U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer today demanded answers from the Trump administration’s U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to explain why the federal platform responsible for disbursing Medicaid funds for NY and other state’s was shutdown. Despite OMB saying Medicaid would not be impacted by the freeze, every state across the country reported the payment system shutting down, temporarily jeopardizing payments needed for our doctors, rural clinics, community health centers, and hospitals and creating major concerns for the millions of New Yorkers who rely on this system.

Schumer said the unexplained shutdowns of the Medicaid portal demands a full investigation and immediate answers to ensure health care services can have the confidence they need to continue vital healthcare services.

“Following Trump’s funding freeze chaos, out of the blue and seemingly due to callousness and incompetence, the Medicaid Portal was inexplicably offline yet again today for the second time. Nearly 7 million New Yorkers were once again potentially left high and dry on healthcare. The repeated nationwide shutdown of the Medicaid payment system caused panic, confusion, and unnecessary frustration, especially following last week’s unexplained shutdown,” said Senator Schumer. “The federal government legally owes federal funding for New York State’s Medicaid program to provide reimbursement for health care costs for millions of fellow New Yorkers. Without it doctors and hospitals in New York can’t provide the care they need. The White House refused to clarify how their illegal federal funding freeze would impact Medicaid recipients and the shutdown of the portal both last week and today only intensifies people’s deep worry. I’m demanding HHS work with Congress to swiftly and transparently determine what caused the portal shutdown and how the administration can ensure a disruption like this doesn’t happen again. New Yorkers deserve nothing less.”

Schumer said the Medicaid portal shutdown is part of larger confusion surrounding President Trump’s executive order freezing all federal funding. Though the White House said the Medicaid program would “continue without pause,” Medicaid portals across the country temporarily stopped working. Though the portal was later restored, it again became inoperable for a few hours this morning. Schumer explained that continued shutdowns put reimbursement payments for millions of New Yorkers at risk and demanded answers to ensure a shutdown will not happen again.

Medicaid enrollment by region can be found below:

Region	Medicaid Enrollment
NYC	4,036,284
Long Island	679,724
Capital Region	214,632
Western New York	371,481
Rochester-Finger Lakes	304,234
Central New York	201,047
Southern Tier	181,450
Hudson Valley	678,375
North Country	106,160
Mohawk Valley	178,001

Schumer and Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Wyden letter to Acting Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Dorothy Fink sent prior to this morning’s shutdown can be found below:

Dear Acting Secretary Dorothy Fink:

We are writing to gain insight into the unlawful shutdown of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Payment Management Services (PMS) portal. As you know, the PMS portal, in addition to being the platform for hundreds of other transactions between states and HHS, serves as an interface between state Medicaid agencies and the federal government for drawing down federal funds to cover care provided to Medicaid beneficiaries in each state. As the health insurance program serving 80 million Americans, Medicaid is a key lifeline for communities across this country. The unexplained shutdown of the Medicaid portal raised questions about the continuity of care for beneficiaries and the financial stability of the providers and health centers that provide essential health care services.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) memo (M-25-13) released on January 27 instructed federal agencies to temporarily pause grant, loan, and other financial assistance programs in response to President Trump’s Executive Orders directed at freezing federal funding. Alongside the memo, OMB circulated a spreadsheet of around 2,600 federal programs, including the “Medical Assistance Program” (i.e., Medicaid), and requested federal agencies submit information on whether they complied with the executive orders. During a White House briefing on the OMB memo, Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, refused to clarify whether Medicaid was specifically implicated by the funding freeze, instead stating that she will “check back on that.” Following confusion and uncertainty about which programs were affected by the freeze, OMB released clarifications to the initial memo on January 28, stating “mandatory programs like Medicaid and SNAP will continue without pause.”

Despite this, all 56 state and territorial Medicaid programs were locked out of the PMS portal for hours, unable to access funding. Shortly after the OMB memo was circulated, the PMS portal had a red banner warning of “PAYMENT DELAYS.” It stated that “due to the Executive Orders regarding potentially unallowable grant payments,” PMS was taking additional steps to process payments that “will result in delays and/or rejections of payment.” Upon restoration of the PMS portal, some states are reporting slow and inefficient portal service, creating difficulties for providers across the country. Additionally, a red banner remains on the PMS portal, warning of truncated hours of operation – 5:00am – 4:00pm ET – “until a further notice.”

The lack of clarity on the cause of the portal shutdown creates concern that state partners cannot rely on the PMS portal. We request that HHS work to determine and disclose the cause of the portal shutdown and make necessary improvements to prevent future disruptions in the distribution of Medicaid funding.

Specifically, we request that you please provide answers to the following questions:

Since Medicaid is exempt from the Executive Order on freezing federal funding according to a clarifying OMB memo, why were state Medicaid offices locked out of the HHS PMS portal for hours after posting of the initial OMB memo on the funding freeze?
Since Medicaid is exempt from the funding freeze, what is the reason for the PMS portal’s truncated hours of operation? When will the PMS portal return to normal operating hours to ensure continuity of care for Medicaid beneficiaries?
What is HHS doing to restore normal operating speed and functioning to the PMS portal to support the reimbursement process?
The unexplained freeze to the PMS portal has worried state Medicaid programs that there will be delays and rejections in reimbursement claims. What is HHS doing to assure state Medicaid programs that, due to Medicaid’s exemption from the funding freeze, there will not be increases in delays or rejections of claims?
How is HHS working to analyze the amount of time that each state Medicaid program was locked out of the PMS portal?
How is HHS working to quickly process reimbursement claims that required prioritization during the period that state Medicaid programs were locked out of the PMS portal?
How will HHS better interpret and coordinate implementation of Executive Orders to prevent another unnecessary freeze to the PMS portal?
The White House has responded that the portal shutdown was due to an “outage.” If this is the case, what is HHS doing to support technical operations to prevent future shutdowns and slowdowns of the portal? What was the cause of the technical outage?

Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter. We request a response in 30 days, by March 3, 2025.

MIL-OSI Security: First Two Defendants in Omaha Methamphetamine Conspiracy Sentenced

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

United States Attorney Susan T. Lehr announced that Jody D. Webb, age 45, of Lincoln, Nebraska and Jason Unruh, age 51, of Omaha, Nebraska were sentenced on January 31, 2025, in federal court in Omaha for their roles in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Chief United States District Judge Robert F. Rossiter, Jr. sentenced Webb to 75 months’ and Unruh to 188 months’ imprisonment. There is no parole in the federal system. After their release from prison, Webb will begin a 2-year term of supervised release, and Unruh a 5-year term of supervised release.

On August 3, 2023, FBI surveillance observed Unruh meet with codefendant Jonathan Ovalle-Solis. During the observed meet, Unruh entered Ovalle’s vehicle and exited with a package of what appeared to be a white substance in a clear bag. This deal was recorded.

A subsequent TextNow search warrant on the phone number belonging to codefendant Ovalle-Solis and his known Mexican meth source of supply, confirmed that Unruh was coordinating with the Mexican source to buy a pound of meth. Messages showed Unruh would pick up pound quantities of meth on multiple occasions in August and September of 2023. The messages from the Mexican source to Unruh would typically give an address and vehicle description of who Unruh was to meet for meth deliveries.

On October 17, 2023, law enforcement officers were investigating this same drug trafficking organization when they observed Webb meet with a suspected drug courier. After the meet officers conducted a traffic stop on Webb who had approximately 2 pounds of meth in her vehicle. Messages obtained from a phone search warrant confirmed that Webb had arranged the 2-pound deal with the same Mexican source of supply.

Jonathan Ovalle Solis pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy and is scheduled to be sentenced on February 14, 2025.

This case was the result of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

MIL-OSI Economics: Japan: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: International Monetary Fund

February 7, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

Washington, DC – February 7, 2025^[1]:

After three decades of near-zero inflation, there are signs that Japan’s economy can sustainably converge to a new equilibrium. Inflation has surpassed the Bank of Japan’s 2-percent target for over two years and a tight labor market is delivering the strongest wage growth since the 1990s. But Japan continues to face challenges from its aging population and high public debt. Policy priorities are to re-anchor inflation expectations, rebuild fiscal buffers, and advance labor market reforms to support potential growth.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, OUTLOOK, AND RISKS

The economy contracted in the first half of 2024 due to temporary supply disruptions but gained momentum in the rest of the year. Domestic demand, private consumption in particular, has strengthened, while net external demand has been sluggish. Both headline and core inflation (excluding fresh food and energy) remain above the BoJ’s 2-percent headline inflation target. Goods inflation has been boosted by energy and food prices, while services price growth is relatively weaker and below 2 percent. Inflation expectations are becoming increasingly aligned with the inflation target, though some measures remain below that target. The yen-dollar exchange rate has experienced sizable swings, largely driven by shifts in interest rate differentials (which reflect broader macroeconomic developments), but also amplified by the build-up and subsequent unwinding of yen carry-trade positions. The pass-through to inflation is estimated to have been relatively mild so far. Wages are growing at their highest rate since the 1990s amid labor shortages and strong inflation, but they have remained lackluster in real terms.

Growth is expected to accelerate in 2025, with private consumption strengthening further, as above-inflation wage growth will boost households’ disposable income. Private investment is also expected to remain strong, supported by high corporate profits and accommodative financial conditions. The output gap is estimated to be closed, and growth is expected to converge to its potential of 0.5 percent in the medium term. Headline and core inflation are expected to converge to the BoJ’s 2-percent headline inflation target in late 2025, helped by a moderation in commodity prices for oil and food. The current account surplus is expected to moderate in 2025 as the income balance narrows, with the trade balance remaining in deficit. The external position is assessed as broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.

Risks to growth are tilted to the downside. On the external side, these include a slowdown in the global economy, deepening geoeconomic fragmentation and increasing trade restrictions, and more volatile food and energy prices. On the domestic side, the main downside risk is weak consumption if real wages do not pick up. Another domestic risk to the outlook is a possible decline in confidence in fiscal sustainability that leads to a tightening of financial conditions in the context of high public debt and gross financing needs. If downside risks materialize, it could result in Japan reverting to an effective-lower-bound constrained environment given the still-low level of the policy rate.

Risks to inflation are broadly balanced. On the downside, inflation expectations may stall below the headline inflation target following Japan’s prolonged experience with low inflation. Upside risks stem from rising food and energy prices, and from stronger-than-expected wages in the upcoming spring wage negotiations. Higher barriers to trade and cost pressures in major trading partners could spill over to Japan but the impact on domestic prices would be ambiguous given lower economic activity.

ECONOMIC POLICIES

Fiscal Policy

The estimated fiscal deficit in 2024 is smaller than expected at the time of the 2024 Article IV. Tax revenues have been boosted by high corporate profits, and expenditures to support the economic recovery (such as transfers to households and SMEs) have been partly phased out. The fiscal deficit is projected to increase slightly in 2025, with additional spending planned for defense, children-related measures, and industrial policies (IP). There is a significant risk that the deficit will widen further, given the political demands on the minority government. This should be avoided as fiscal space remains limited: any expansionary measure should be offset by higher revenues or expenditure savings elsewhere in the budget.

Public debt, as a share of GDP, is expected to decline in the near term, as nominal GDP growth is projected to exceed the effective interest rate on public debt. Public debt will remain high, however, and is estimated to start rising by 2030, driven by a higher interest bill and expenditure pressures related to spending on health and long-term care for an aging population. A clear consolidation plan is needed even in the near term to fully offset these pressures, ensure debt sustainability, and increase fiscal space needed to respond to shocks (including from natural disasters). This will require elaborating concrete and credible expenditure and revenue measures in the context of a robust medium-term fiscal framework:

The composition of public spending should be more growth-friendly, including by eliminating poorly targeted subsidies, notably energy subsidies, while preserving expenditure on high-quality public investment. Enhancing the targeting and efficiency of social security spending is critical to containing rising costs while preserving quality.
On the revenue side, options include strengthening financial income taxation for high-income earners, lowering exemptions and broadening the taxable valuation base under the property tax, streamlining income tax deductions, and unifying and eventually increasing the consumption tax rate. The PIT reform to the income deduction limit that is currently under consideration would need to be financed by additional revenues or savings elsewhere in the budget.

The repeated use, and incomplete execution of supplementary budgets undermines efficient resource allocation, budget transparency, and fiscal discipline. The use of supplementary budgets should be limited to responding to large, unexpected shocks that overwhelm automatic stabilizers, which would also avoid providing unwarranted stimulus in normal times. All medium-term spending commitments—including on IP and green transformation—should be incorporated into the regular budget process.

As interest rates rise, the cost of servicing the large public debt is expected to double by 2030, putting a premium on a robust debt management strategy. In the face of rising gross financing needs and a shrinking BoJ balance sheet, government bond issuance will need to rely on additional demand from foreign investors and domestic institutions.

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies

The current accommodative monetary policy stance is appropriate and will ensure inflation expectations rise sustainably to the 2-percent inflation target. Accommodation should continue to be withdrawn gradually if the baseline forecast bears out, under which we expect the policy rate would reach a neutral level by end-2027. High domestic and external uncertainty underscore the need for the BoJ to maintain its data-dependent and flexible approach and clear communications to anchor market expectations.

The BOJ’s ongoing reduction in the size of its balance sheet has been clearly communicated, is appropriately modest in pace, and is proceeding smoothly. The BoJ should stand ready to modify the pace of its purchases should disorderly bond market conditions arise or if financial conditions become inconsistent with the desired monetary policy stance.

Japan’s large stock of outstanding government debt and sizable net international investment position provide an important transmission channel for monetary policy to spill over into asset prices abroad. Clear communication and gradualism can limit adverse asset price reactions and outward spillovers.

The authorities’ continued commitment to a flexible exchange rate regime is welcome. Exchange rate flexibility should continue to help absorb external shocks and support monetary policy’s focus on price stability. At the same time, it will also help maintain an external position in line with fundamentals.

Financial Stability

Japan’s financial system remains broadly resilient, supported by strong capital and liquidity buffers. Banks’ revenues have generally increased as credit costs remain low, the rise in interest rates has been gradual, and the yen has depreciated. Major banks continue to manage interest rate risks proactively through portfolio rebalancing and diversifying their funding sources. Financial intermediation remains stable supported by continued demand for loans from both corporate and household sectors. The insurance sector is well-capitalized and profitable, despite challenges from market volatility and demographic shifts.

While the financial system remains generally resilient, systemic risk has risen slightly since the 2024 Article IV consultation, reflecting a combination of rising macroeconomic uncertainty, risk of faster than expected interest rates increases or unrealized losses, and rising bankruptcies among SMEs. Rising global macroeconomic uncertainty could impact Japanese banks’ investments. While gradually rising interest rates have helped bank profitability, faster-than-expected increases in interest rates or sudden changes in global financial conditions could amplify financial market volatility and interact with three persisting vulnerabilities identified in the 2024 FSAP: large securities held under mark-to-market accounting, significant foreign currency exposures—particularly through US dollar funding instruments—and signs of overheating in some areas of real estate. A faster-than-expected tightening of financial conditions could also disrupt the JGB market, amplifying interest rate risks for banks with larger exposures. Less-capitalized domestic banks are more vulnerable to rate hikes, facing heightened risks from unrealized losses and higher funding costs. Corporate defaults among smaller SMEs have been increasing, albeit from a low base, and could pose risks for regional banks with high SME loan exposure.

Strengthening systemic risk monitoring and the macroprudential policy framework is needed to better mitigate risks in the financial system. Ongoing efforts to expand data collection, enhance analytical capacity, and improve coordination between the FSA and BOJ are welcome. To further enhance systemic risk analysis, closing remaining data gaps and advancing analytical tools for a more comprehensive assessment of systemic vulnerabilities, including those related to foreign currency exposure, remain key priorities. Assigning a formal mandate to the Council for Cooperation on Financial Stability would reinforce the institutional framework, while expanding the macroprudential policy toolkit with targeted borrower-based measures would help mitigate vulnerabilities in the real estate sector.

Further strengthening financial sector oversight is essential to bolster stability and resilience against emerging risks and vulnerabilities. While progress has been made in expanding staffing resources in certain areas, additional allocations are needed to reinforce financial supervision. The authorities should continue to enhance risk-based supervision to respond flexibly to an evolving banking system. Strengthening the Early Warning System with more forward-looking indicators, especially for credit and liquidity risks, and establishing minimum liquidity requirements for domestic banks would enhance stability. Supervisors should also have the authority to adjust bank capital ratios above minimum requirements based on individual risk profiles and financial conditions.

The authorities should remain prepared to address market strains as they arise. The liquidity and functioning of the JGB market have improved since April but experienced temporary deterioration in early August amid a spike in market volatility. Rising foreign market volatility could impact domestic liquidity conditions, potentially triggering spillover effects. To mitigate these risks the central bank should closely monitor liquidity conditions and funding rates in money markets, while paying particular attention to the uneven distribution of liquidity among banks as well as the growth in repo transactions driven by demand from financial dealers and foreign investors. The scope of institutions eligible to receive emergency liquidity assistance could be expanded to nonbank financial institutions, prioritizing central counterparties. Recovery and Resolution Planning should be gradually expanded to all banks that could be systemic at failure, requiring more banks to maintain a minimum amount of loss-absorbing capacity tailored to their resolvability needs.

Structural Policies

Japan’s total factor productivity growth has been slowing for a decade and has fallen further behind the United States. A steady decline in allocative efficiency since the early 2000s has been a drag on productivity, and likely reflects an increase in market frictions. In addition, Japan’s ultra-low interest rates may have allowed low-productivity firms to survive longer than they otherwise would have, delaying necessary economic restructuring. Reforms aimed at improving labor mobility across firms would help improve Japan’s allocative efficiency and boost productivity.

Japan’s labor market is expected to witness a significant transformation driven by population aging and advances in artificial intelligence (AI). Japan is aging rapidly—a trend that is expected to continue over coming decades—and has been at the forefront in labor-saving automation to alleviate labor shortages. Policies can play a crucial role in mitigating the impact of aging on labor supply and facilitating mobility needed to benefit from AI adoption:

Thanks to government efforts, Japan’s seniors already have a relatively high labor force participation rate compared to other OECD countries. But policy frictions such as an income threshold that triggers a loss of pension benefits may be inducing seniors to work fewer hours than they otherwise would.
Japan has made significant progress in increasing female labor force participation during the last decade. Further supporting women’s ability to fully participate in the labor force will require continuing to expand childcare resources and facilitate fathers’ contribution to home/childcare, and further encouraging the use of flexible working arrangements.
Training programs are crucial to enhance the complementarity of AI with the labor force and improve the productivity of senior workers.
Improving mobility and reducing barriers to job switching are essential to address labor shortages due to aging and the potential job displacement impact of AI. Subsidized training programs that are targeted to in-demand occupations could help reskill and upskill the labor force and facilitate occupational mobility.

While AI may help to address some of Japan’s labor shortages, and since upskilling/reskilling the labor force takes time, attracting foreign workers could help alleviate labor shortages. Government programs have led to a tripling of the number of foreign workers in Japan during the past decade. However, foreigners continue to play a much smaller role in the Japanese labor force than they do in other OECD economies.

Similar to other G20 economies, Japan has increased its adoption of industrial policies. Japan’s industrial policies aim to advance several objectives, including economic security, resilience, inclusive growth, and green and digital transformation (the latter including support for the semiconductor industry). Under this umbrella, multi-year envelopes of 20 trillion and 10 trillion yen have been identified for green transformation and the semiconductor/AI industries, respectively. Given Japan’s limited fiscal space and the unclear growth impact of past IP, industrial policy schemes should be subjected to a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Going forward, IP should be narrowly targeted to specific objectives when externalities or market failures exist, to minimize distortions. It should avoid favoring domestic products over imports or creating incentives that lead to a fragmentation of the global system for trade and investment, in line with Japan’s commitment to multilateral economic cooperation.

Japan remains committed to green transformation, and further progress on policies would enable reaching its targets. Notable ongoing efforts—such as the issuance of climate transition bonds to finance government green investment, and the implementation of carbon credits trading—are in line with international practices and previous staff advice. Nevertheless, without further policy changes, Japan is likely to fall short of its targets. To help meet its green commitments while boosting growth, a combination of policies is needed. Options include the removal of energy subsidies, the expansion of carbon pricing, feebates and tradable performance standards. Carbon pricing would need to be accompanied by targeted cash transfers to protect the vulnerable from adverse distributional effects.

The IMF team would like to thank the authorities and other interlocutors in Japan for the frank and open discussions.

Table 1. Japan: Selected Economic Indicators, 2021-26

Nominal GDP: US$ 4,213 billion (2023)		GDP per capita: US$ 33,849 (2023)
Population: 124 million (2023)		Quota: SDR 30.8 billion (2023)

	2021	2022	2023		2024	2025		2026
				Est.	Proj.

	(In percent change)
Growth
Real GDP	2.7	0.9	1.5		-0.2		1.1	0.8
Domestic demand	1.7	1.5	0.4		0.2		1.2	0.8
Private consumption	0.7	2.1	0.8		-0.3		0.9	0.6
Gross Private Fixed Investment	1.3	1.6	1.5		0.6		1.1	0.8
Business investment	1.7	2.6	1.5		1.3		1.2	0.9
Residential investment	-0.3	-2.7	1.5		-2.4		0.8	0.4
Government consumption	3.4	1.4	-0.3		1.0		1.3	1.2
Public investment	-2.6	-8.3	1.5		-1.2		0.3	0.0
Stockbuilding	0.5	0.2	-0.3		0.1		0.1	0.0
Net exports	1.0	-0.5	1.0		-0.2		0.0	0.1
Exports of goods and services	11.9	5.5	3.0		0.7		2.9	2.0
Imports of goods and services	5.2	8.3	-1.5		2.0		2.9	1.8
Output Gap	-1.6	-0.9	0.2		0.1		0.2	0.0

	(In percent change, period average)
Inflation
Headline CPI	-0.2	2.5	3.2		2.8		2.4	2.0
GDP deflator	-0.2	0.4	4.1		3.0		2.3	2.1

	(In percent of GDP)
Government
Revenue	36.3	37.5	36.8		36.9		36.8	36.8
Expenditure	42.5	41.8	39.1		39.4		39.4	39.7
Overall Balance	-6.2	-4.3	-2.3		-2.5		-2.6	-2.9
Primary balance	-5.6	-3.9	-2.1		-2.1		-2.2	-2.2
Structural primary balance	-4.9	-3.8	-2.2		-2.1		-2.3	-2.2
Public debt, gross	253.7	248.3	240.0		237.0	232.7		230.0

	(In percent change, end-of-period)
Macro-financial
Base money	8.5	-5.6	6.4		-1.0		2.2	2.2
Broad money	2.9	2.3	2.2		1.1		2.1	2.1
Credit to the private sector	2.3	3.6	4.2		3.1		1.8	1.6
Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP	157.1	161.2	156.7		159.8		160.2	161.3

	(In percent)
Interest rate
Overnight call rate, uncollateralized (end-of-period)	0.0	0.0	0.0		…		…	…
10-year JGB yield (end-of-period)	0.1	0.4	0.6		…		…	…

	(In billions of USD)
Balance of payments
Current account balance	196.2	89.9	158.5		179.4		166.7	162.2
Percent of GDP	3.9	2.1	3.8		4.5		4.1	3.8
Trade balance	16.4	-115.8	-48.2		-31.5		-26.2	-24.1
Percent of GDP	0.3	-2.7	-1.1		-0.8		-0.6	-0.6
Exports of goods, f.o.b.	749.2	752.5	713.7		691.6		705.5	720.9
Imports of goods, f.o.b.	732.7	868.3	761.9		723.1		731.7	745.0
Energy imports	127.8	195.5	152.9		145.2		135.9	122.5

	(In percent of GDP)
FDI, net	3.5	3.0	4.1		4.8		4.2	4.1
Portfolio Investment	-3.9	-3.3	4.7		5.5		0.9	0.9

	(In billions of USD)
Change in reserves	62.8	-47.4	29.8		-74.7		11.5	11.5
Total reserves minus gold (in billions of US$)	1356.2	1178.3	1238.5		…		…	…

	(In units, period average)
Exchange rates
Yen/dollar rate	109.8	131.5	140.5		…		…	…
Yen/euro rate	129.9	138.6	152.0		…		…	…
Real effective exchange rate (ULC-based, 2010=100)	73.5	61.8	56.1		…		…	…
Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based, 2010=100)	70.7	61.0	58.1		…		…	…

	(In percent)
Demographic Indicators
Population Growth	-0.3	-0.3	-0.5		-0.5		-0.5	-0.5
Old-age dependency	48.7	48.8	48.9		49.2		49.7	50.1

Sources: Haver Analytics; OECD; Japanese authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

[1] An IMF mission, led by Nada Choueiri and including Kohei Asao, Yan Carrière-Swallow, Andrea Deghi, Shujaat Khan, Gene Kindberg-Hanlon, Haruki Seitani, Danila Smirnov and Ara Stepanyan, conducted meetings in Japan during January 23-February 6, 2025. The mission met with senior officials at the Ministry of Finance, Bank of Japan, and other ministries and government agencies, along with representatives of labor unions, the business community, financial sector, and academics.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Randa Elnagar

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

MIL OSI Economics –

MIL-OSI Russia: Japan: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

February 7, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

Washington, DC – February 7, 2025^[1]:

After three decades of near-zero inflation, there are signs that Japan’s economy can sustainably converge to a new equilibrium. Inflation has surpassed the Bank of Japan’s 2-percent target for over two years and a tight labor market is delivering the strongest wage growth since the 1990s. But Japan continues to face challenges from its aging population and high public debt. Policy priorities are to re-anchor inflation expectations, rebuild fiscal buffers, and advance labor market reforms to support potential growth.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, OUTLOOK, AND RISKS

The economy contracted in the first half of 2024 due to temporary supply disruptions but gained momentum in the rest of the year. Domestic demand, private consumption in particular, has strengthened, while net external demand has been sluggish. Both headline and core inflation (excluding fresh food and energy) remain above the BoJ’s 2-percent headline inflation target. Goods inflation has been boosted by energy and food prices, while services price growth is relatively weaker and below 2 percent. Inflation expectations are becoming increasingly aligned with the inflation target, though some measures remain below that target. The yen-dollar exchange rate has experienced sizable swings, largely driven by shifts in interest rate differentials (which reflect broader macroeconomic developments), but also amplified by the build-up and subsequent unwinding of yen carry-trade positions. The pass-through to inflation is estimated to have been relatively mild so far. Wages are growing at their highest rate since the 1990s amid labor shortages and strong inflation, but they have remained lackluster in real terms.

Growth is expected to accelerate in 2025, with private consumption strengthening further, as above-inflation wage growth will boost households’ disposable income. Private investment is also expected to remain strong, supported by high corporate profits and accommodative financial conditions. The output gap is estimated to be closed, and growth is expected to converge to its potential of 0.5 percent in the medium term. Headline and core inflation are expected to converge to the BoJ’s 2-percent headline inflation target in late 2025, helped by a moderation in commodity prices for oil and food. The current account surplus is expected to moderate in 2025 as the income balance narrows, with the trade balance remaining in deficit. The external position is assessed as broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.

Risks to growth are tilted to the downside. On the external side, these include a slowdown in the global economy, deepening geoeconomic fragmentation and increasing trade restrictions, and more volatile food and energy prices. On the domestic side, the main downside risk is weak consumption if real wages do not pick up. Another domestic risk to the outlook is a possible decline in confidence in fiscal sustainability that leads to a tightening of financial conditions in the context of high public debt and gross financing needs. If downside risks materialize, it could result in Japan reverting to an effective-lower-bound constrained environment given the still-low level of the policy rate.

Risks to inflation are broadly balanced. On the downside, inflation expectations may stall below the headline inflation target following Japan’s prolonged experience with low inflation. Upside risks stem from rising food and energy prices, and from stronger-than-expected wages in the upcoming spring wage negotiations. Higher barriers to trade and cost pressures in major trading partners could spill over to Japan but the impact on domestic prices would be ambiguous given lower economic activity.

ECONOMIC POLICIES

Fiscal Policy

The estimated fiscal deficit in 2024 is smaller than expected at the time of the 2024 Article IV. Tax revenues have been boosted by high corporate profits, and expenditures to support the economic recovery (such as transfers to households and SMEs) have been partly phased out. The fiscal deficit is projected to increase slightly in 2025, with additional spending planned for defense, children-related measures, and industrial policies (IP). There is a significant risk that the deficit will widen further, given the political demands on the minority government. This should be avoided as fiscal space remains limited: any expansionary measure should be offset by higher revenues or expenditure savings elsewhere in the budget.

Public debt, as a share of GDP, is expected to decline in the near term, as nominal GDP growth is projected to exceed the effective interest rate on public debt. Public debt will remain high, however, and is estimated to start rising by 2030, driven by a higher interest bill and expenditure pressures related to spending on health and long-term care for an aging population. A clear consolidation plan is needed even in the near term to fully offset these pressures, ensure debt sustainability, and increase fiscal space needed to respond to shocks (including from natural disasters). This will require elaborating concrete and credible expenditure and revenue measures in the context of a robust medium-term fiscal framework:

The composition of public spending should be more growth-friendly, including by eliminating poorly targeted subsidies, notably energy subsidies, while preserving expenditure on high-quality public investment. Enhancing the targeting and efficiency of social security spending is critical to containing rising costs while preserving quality.
On the revenue side, options include strengthening financial income taxation for high-income earners, lowering exemptions and broadening the taxable valuation base under the property tax, streamlining income tax deductions, and unifying and eventually increasing the consumption tax rate. The PIT reform to the income deduction limit that is currently under consideration would need to be financed by additional revenues or savings elsewhere in the budget.

The repeated use, and incomplete execution of supplementary budgets undermines efficient resource allocation, budget transparency, and fiscal discipline. The use of supplementary budgets should be limited to responding to large, unexpected shocks that overwhelm automatic stabilizers, which would also avoid providing unwarranted stimulus in normal times. All medium-term spending commitments—including on IP and green transformation—should be incorporated into the regular budget process.

As interest rates rise, the cost of servicing the large public debt is expected to double by 2030, putting a premium on a robust debt management strategy. In the face of rising gross financing needs and a shrinking BoJ balance sheet, government bond issuance will need to rely on additional demand from foreign investors and domestic institutions.

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies

The current accommodative monetary policy stance is appropriate and will ensure inflation expectations rise sustainably to the 2-percent inflation target. Accommodation should continue to be withdrawn gradually if the baseline forecast bears out, under which we expect the policy rate would reach a neutral level by end-2027. High domestic and external uncertainty underscore the need for the BoJ to maintain its data-dependent and flexible approach and clear communications to anchor market expectations.

The BOJ’s ongoing reduction in the size of its balance sheet has been clearly communicated, is appropriately modest in pace, and is proceeding smoothly. The BoJ should stand ready to modify the pace of its purchases should disorderly bond market conditions arise or if financial conditions become inconsistent with the desired monetary policy stance.

Japan’s large stock of outstanding government debt and sizable net international investment position provide an important transmission channel for monetary policy to spill over into asset prices abroad. Clear communication and gradualism can limit adverse asset price reactions and outward spillovers.

The authorities’ continued commitment to a flexible exchange rate regime is welcome. Exchange rate flexibility should continue to help absorb external shocks and support monetary policy’s focus on price stability. At the same time, it will also help maintain an external position in line with fundamentals.

Financial Stability

Japan’s financial system remains broadly resilient, supported by strong capital and liquidity buffers. Banks’ revenues have generally increased as credit costs remain low, the rise in interest rates has been gradual, and the yen has depreciated. Major banks continue to manage interest rate risks proactively through portfolio rebalancing and diversifying their funding sources. Financial intermediation remains stable supported by continued demand for loans from both corporate and household sectors. The insurance sector is well-capitalized and profitable, despite challenges from market volatility and demographic shifts.

While the financial system remains generally resilient, systemic risk has risen slightly since the 2024 Article IV consultation, reflecting a combination of rising macroeconomic uncertainty, risk of faster than expected interest rates increases or unrealized losses, and rising bankruptcies among SMEs. Rising global macroeconomic uncertainty could impact Japanese banks’ investments. While gradually rising interest rates have helped bank profitability, faster-than-expected increases in interest rates or sudden changes in global financial conditions could amplify financial market volatility and interact with three persisting vulnerabilities identified in the 2024 FSAP: large securities held under mark-to-market accounting, significant foreign currency exposures—particularly through US dollar funding instruments—and signs of overheating in some areas of real estate. A faster-than-expected tightening of financial conditions could also disrupt the JGB market, amplifying interest rate risks for banks with larger exposures. Less-capitalized domestic banks are more vulnerable to rate hikes, facing heightened risks from unrealized losses and higher funding costs. Corporate defaults among smaller SMEs have been increasing, albeit from a low base, and could pose risks for regional banks with high SME loan exposure.

Strengthening systemic risk monitoring and the macroprudential policy framework is needed to better mitigate risks in the financial system. Ongoing efforts to expand data collection, enhance analytical capacity, and improve coordination between the FSA and BOJ are welcome. To further enhance systemic risk analysis, closing remaining data gaps and advancing analytical tools for a more comprehensive assessment of systemic vulnerabilities, including those related to foreign currency exposure, remain key priorities. Assigning a formal mandate to the Council for Cooperation on Financial Stability would reinforce the institutional framework, while expanding the macroprudential policy toolkit with targeted borrower-based measures would help mitigate vulnerabilities in the real estate sector.

Further strengthening financial sector oversight is essential to bolster stability and resilience against emerging risks and vulnerabilities. While progress has been made in expanding staffing resources in certain areas, additional allocations are needed to reinforce financial supervision. The authorities should continue to enhance risk-based supervision to respond flexibly to an evolving banking system. Strengthening the Early Warning System with more forward-looking indicators, especially for credit and liquidity risks, and establishing minimum liquidity requirements for domestic banks would enhance stability. Supervisors should also have the authority to adjust bank capital ratios above minimum requirements based on individual risk profiles and financial conditions.

The authorities should remain prepared to address market strains as they arise. The liquidity and functioning of the JGB market have improved since April but experienced temporary deterioration in early August amid a spike in market volatility. Rising foreign market volatility could impact domestic liquidity conditions, potentially triggering spillover effects. To mitigate these risks the central bank should closely monitor liquidity conditions and funding rates in money markets, while paying particular attention to the uneven distribution of liquidity among banks as well as the growth in repo transactions driven by demand from financial dealers and foreign investors. The scope of institutions eligible to receive emergency liquidity assistance could be expanded to nonbank financial institutions, prioritizing central counterparties. Recovery and Resolution Planning should be gradually expanded to all banks that could be systemic at failure, requiring more banks to maintain a minimum amount of loss-absorbing capacity tailored to their resolvability needs.

Structural Policies

Japan’s total factor productivity growth has been slowing for a decade and has fallen further behind the United States. A steady decline in allocative efficiency since the early 2000s has been a drag on productivity, and likely reflects an increase in market frictions. In addition, Japan’s ultra-low interest rates may have allowed low-productivity firms to survive longer than they otherwise would have, delaying necessary economic restructuring. Reforms aimed at improving labor mobility across firms would help improve Japan’s allocative efficiency and boost productivity.

Japan’s labor market is expected to witness a significant transformation driven by population aging and advances in artificial intelligence (AI). Japan is aging rapidly—a trend that is expected to continue over coming decades—and has been at the forefront in labor-saving automation to alleviate labor shortages. Policies can play a crucial role in mitigating the impact of aging on labor supply and facilitating mobility needed to benefit from AI adoption:

Thanks to government efforts, Japan’s seniors already have a relatively high labor force participation rate compared to other OECD countries. But policy frictions such as an income threshold that triggers a loss of pension benefits may be inducing seniors to work fewer hours than they otherwise would.
Japan has made significant progress in increasing female labor force participation during the last decade. Further supporting women’s ability to fully participate in the labor force will require continuing to expand childcare resources and facilitate fathers’ contribution to home/childcare, and further encouraging the use of flexible working arrangements.
Training programs are crucial to enhance the complementarity of AI with the labor force and improve the productivity of senior workers.
Improving mobility and reducing barriers to job switching are essential to address labor shortages due to aging and the potential job displacement impact of AI. Subsidized training programs that are targeted to in-demand occupations could help reskill and upskill the labor force and facilitate occupational mobility.

While AI may help to address some of Japan’s labor shortages, and since upskilling/reskilling the labor force takes time, attracting foreign workers could help alleviate labor shortages. Government programs have led to a tripling of the number of foreign workers in Japan during the past decade. However, foreigners continue to play a much smaller role in the Japanese labor force than they do in other OECD economies.

Similar to other G20 economies, Japan has increased its adoption of industrial policies. Japan’s industrial policies aim to advance several objectives, including economic security, resilience, inclusive growth, and green and digital transformation (the latter including support for the semiconductor industry). Under this umbrella, multi-year envelopes of 20 trillion and 10 trillion yen have been identified for green transformation and the semiconductor/AI industries, respectively. Given Japan’s limited fiscal space and the unclear growth impact of past IP, industrial policy schemes should be subjected to a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Going forward, IP should be narrowly targeted to specific objectives when externalities or market failures exist, to minimize distortions. It should avoid favoring domestic products over imports or creating incentives that lead to a fragmentation of the global system for trade and investment, in line with Japan’s commitment to multilateral economic cooperation.

Japan remains committed to green transformation, and further progress on policies would enable reaching its targets. Notable ongoing efforts—such as the issuance of climate transition bonds to finance government green investment, and the implementation of carbon credits trading—are in line with international practices and previous staff advice. Nevertheless, without further policy changes, Japan is likely to fall short of its targets. To help meet its green commitments while boosting growth, a combination of policies is needed. Options include the removal of energy subsidies, the expansion of carbon pricing, feebates and tradable performance standards. Carbon pricing would need to be accompanied by targeted cash transfers to protect the vulnerable from adverse distributional effects.

The IMF team would like to thank the authorities and other interlocutors in Japan for the frank and open discussions.

Table 1. Japan: Selected Economic Indicators, 2021-26

Nominal GDP: US$ 4,213 billion (2023)		GDP per capita: US$ 33,849 (2023)
Population: 124 million (2023)		Quota: SDR 30.8 billion (2023)

	2021	2022	2023		2024	2025		2026
				Est.	Proj.

	(In percent change)
Growth
Real GDP	2.7	0.9	1.5		-0.2		1.1	0.8
Domestic demand	1.7	1.5	0.4		0.2		1.2	0.8
Private consumption	0.7	2.1	0.8		-0.3		0.9	0.6
Gross Private Fixed Investment	1.3	1.6	1.5		0.6		1.1	0.8
Business investment	1.7	2.6	1.5		1.3		1.2	0.9
Residential investment	-0.3	-2.7	1.5		-2.4		0.8	0.4
Government consumption	3.4	1.4	-0.3		1.0		1.3	1.2
Public investment	-2.6	-8.3	1.5		-1.2		0.3	0.0
Stockbuilding	0.5	0.2	-0.3		0.1		0.1	0.0
Net exports	1.0	-0.5	1.0		-0.2		0.0	0.1
Exports of goods and services	11.9	5.5	3.0		0.7		2.9	2.0
Imports of goods and services	5.2	8.3	-1.5		2.0		2.9	1.8
Output Gap	-1.6	-0.9	0.2		0.1		0.2	0.0

	(In percent change, period average)
Inflation
Headline CPI	-0.2	2.5	3.2		2.8		2.4	2.0
GDP deflator	-0.2	0.4	4.1		3.0		2.3	2.1

	(In percent of GDP)
Government
Revenue	36.3	37.5	36.8		36.9		36.8	36.8
Expenditure	42.5	41.8	39.1		39.4		39.4	39.7
Overall Balance	-6.2	-4.3	-2.3		-2.5		-2.6	-2.9
Primary balance	-5.6	-3.9	-2.1		-2.1		-2.2	-2.2
Structural primary balance	-4.9	-3.8	-2.2		-2.1		-2.3	-2.2
Public debt, gross	253.7	248.3	240.0		237.0	232.7		230.0

	(In percent change, end-of-period)
Macro-financial
Base money	8.5	-5.6	6.4		-1.0		2.2	2.2
Broad money	2.9	2.3	2.2		1.1		2.1	2.1
Credit to the private sector	2.3	3.6	4.2		3.1		1.8	1.6
Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP	157.1	161.2	156.7		159.8		160.2	161.3

	(In percent)
Interest rate
Overnight call rate, uncollateralized (end-of-period)	0.0	0.0	0.0		…		…	…
10-year JGB yield (end-of-period)	0.1	0.4	0.6		…		…	…

	(In billions of USD)
Balance of payments
Current account balance	196.2	89.9	158.5		179.4		166.7	162.2
Percent of GDP	3.9	2.1	3.8		4.5		4.1	3.8
Trade balance	16.4	-115.8	-48.2		-31.5		-26.2	-24.1
Percent of GDP	0.3	-2.7	-1.1		-0.8		-0.6	-0.6
Exports of goods, f.o.b.	749.2	752.5	713.7		691.6		705.5	720.9
Imports of goods, f.o.b.	732.7	868.3	761.9		723.1		731.7	745.0
Energy imports	127.8	195.5	152.9		145.2		135.9	122.5

	(In percent of GDP)
FDI, net	3.5	3.0	4.1		4.8		4.2	4.1
Portfolio Investment	-3.9	-3.3	4.7		5.5		0.9	0.9

	(In billions of USD)
Change in reserves	62.8	-47.4	29.8		-74.7		11.5	11.5
Total reserves minus gold (in billions of US$)	1356.2	1178.3	1238.5		…		…	…

	(In units, period average)
Exchange rates
Yen/dollar rate	109.8	131.5	140.5		…		…	…
Yen/euro rate	129.9	138.6	152.0		…		…	…
Real effective exchange rate (ULC-based, 2010=100)	73.5	61.8	56.1		…		…	…
Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based, 2010=100)	70.7	61.0	58.1		…		…	…

	(In percent)
Demographic Indicators
Population Growth	-0.3	-0.3	-0.5		-0.5		-0.5	-0.5
Old-age dependency	48.7	48.8	48.9		49.2		49.7	50.1

Sources: Haver Analytics; OECD; Japanese authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

[1] An IMF mission, led by Nada Choueiri and including Kohei Asao, Yan Carrière-Swallow, Andrea Deghi, Shujaat Khan, Gene Kindberg-Hanlon, Haruki Seitani, Danila Smirnov and Ara Stepanyan, conducted meetings in Japan during January 23-February 6, 2025. The mission met with senior officials at the Ministry of Finance, Bank of Japan, and other ministries and government agencies, along with representatives of labor unions, the business community, financial sector, and academics.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Randa Elnagar

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/07/mcs-020725-japan-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

MIL-OSI Security: Former Federal Juror Sentenced to 30 Days for Contempt of Court

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

Hagatña, Guam – SHAWN N. ANDERSON, United States Attorney for the Districts of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, announced that defendant, Gregorio Concepcion Tyquienco, age 72, was sentenced on February 4, 2025, in the District Court of Guam to 30 days imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release for Contempt of Court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). The Court ordered Tyquiengco to pay $1,537.04 as restitution (representing the fees and mileage paid to him as a juror during a trial), a $2,000 fine, and a mandatory $25 special assessment fee.

Tyquienco was a juror in the trial of United States vs. Raymond John Martinez and Juanita Marie Quitugua Moser in the District Court of Guam. Between October 11, 2018, and December 27, 2018, Tyquienco knowingly disobeyed the Court’s instruction not to discuss the case with anyone outside of the jury’s deliberative process. During the trial, and prior to jury deliberation, Tyquienco discussed what verdict he would render with brothers William Topasna Mantanona and John T. Mantanona, aka “Boom.” Tyquienco knew Boom was working as a member of the defense team. He knew Boom previously but did not disclose the association to the Court. Tyquienco was asked by William and Boom to be the jury foreman and to issue a “Not Guilty” verdict regardless of the evidence. These discussions violated the clear and specific daily orders of the Honorable Frances Tydingco-Gatewood, Chief Judge, District Court of Guam. After a mistrial was declared, Boom met with Tyquiengco and gave him $1,100 in cash.

“Jury tampering is an affront to the Rule of Law,” stated United States Attorney Anderson. “Our citizens and the accused expect fair legal proceedings that result in justice. Jurors and witnesses make great sacrifices to fulfil this important civic duty. This case sends a message that the Department of Justice will hold accountable those who violate this public trust.”

“The integrity and impartiality of jurors and their deliberations are essential to our criminal justice system,” said FBI Honolulu Special Agent in Charge David Porter. “Those who tamper with this important civic responsibility attempt to deny our communities the justice they deserve. As reflected by this investigation, the FBI is committed to protecting our legal processes and will bring to justice those who act to corrupt it.”

The case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Rosetta L. San Nicolas in the District of Guam.

MIL-OSI Security: Northern California Firearms Trafficker Sentenced to 3 Years in Prison

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

SACRAMENTO, Calif. — James Lane Winslett, 66, of Corning, was sentenced today by U.S. District Judge Daniel J. Calabretta to three years in prison to be followed by a year of supervised release for unlawfully dealing in and manufacturing firearms without a license, selling a firearm to a convicted felon, and possession of an unregistered firearm, Acting U.S. Attorney Michele Beckwith announced.

According to court documents, Winslett was a firearms trafficker who sold hundreds of firearms and silencers without a license to deal in or manufacture firearms. Winslett purchased firearm parts online and from licensed dealers, privately manufactured firearms using his home equipment and tools, and sold completed firearms to other people. In 2020, Winslett sold an AR‑15 style privately made firearm to a customer whom Winslett knew was prohibited from possessing firearms because the customer had previously been convicted of a felony.

Winslett also sold silencers, which he falsely labeled as “fuel filters” or “solvent traps.” In 2021, U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized a parcel addressed to Winslett’s house in Corning. The package contained 25 firearm silencers that were erroneously described as “car fuel filters.” ATF tested the items and determined they were all firearms silencers. Law enforcement later searched Winslett’s home and found 36 silencers, over 30 firearms, additional firearms parts, ammunition, and tools used to privately manufacture firearms.

Winslett did not and does not have a license to deal in firearms, and none of the silencers he possessed were registered with the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record as required by federal law.

This case was the product of an investigation by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and Homeland Security Investigations. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Emily G. Sauvageau and Justin Lee prosecuted the case.

This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.

MIL-OSI Security: Two Hacienda Heights Men Arrested in Alleged Large-Scale Smuggling Scheme from China through L.A.-Area Ports

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

LOS ANGELES – Two men have been arrested on a criminal complaint by federal law enforcement for allegedly participating in a conspiracy to smuggle contraband from China into the United States via the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, the Justice Department announced today.

Zhongliang Wang, 39, of Hacienda Heights, was arrested Wednesday. Chenyu Zhao, 31, also of Hacienda Heights, was arrested last Thursday as he was boarding a plane on a one-way ticket to China. Both defendants were charged with conspiracy and illegally removing goods from customs custody. Wang and Zhao allegedly directed cargo shipping containers flagged for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) secondary inspection to unauthorized off-site locations, where they unloaded the contraband in the containers, replaced it with filler cargo, and then returned the cargo containers to CBP for inspection, in an attempt to deceive customs officials and evade law enforcement.

To date, law enforcement has seized more than $1.3 billion worth of contraband associated with this and similar cargo-swapping schemes. According to the court documents, a search of one warehouse used by the group charged in this case led to the seizure of significant quantities of counterfeit goods, including luxury handbags and footwear, as well as approximately 19.5 kilograms of enobosarm, an illicit steroid.

“Protecting our nation’s borders from illegal smuggling is a top priority,” said Acting United States Attorney Joseph McNally. “These arrests highlight the unrelenting efforts of law enforcement to dismantle criminal networks that seek to exploit our trade system and endanger American businesses and consumers.”

According to court documents, Zhao and other co-conspirators maintained and operated warehouses to store, conceal and sell large amounts of contraband goods that were illegally imported into the United States from China. When the contraband containers were selected by CBP for inspection, the defendants hired commercial truck drivers to transport the containers from the ports to locations that the conspirators controlled, including at least one warehouse in the City of Industry that was controlled or managed by Zhao and others.

At these locations, co-conspirators broke the security seals on the shipping containers and removed the contraband from inside. Then, they affixed counterfeit security seals onto the containers to conceal that the cargo had been tampered with. Wang, Zhao and others then directed co-conspirators to transport the containers – after they had been emptied of much of their original cargo and re-secured with counterfeit seals – to CBP-authorized locations for the “filler” cargo to be presented to customs officials for inspection.

Wang, Zhao and others paid fees to co-conspirators that were substantially above normal trucking fees to transport the contraband shipping containers. As alleged in the complaint, Wang paid $15,000 to divert a single cargo container in December of 2024.

A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

If convicted of all charges, Wang and Zhao would face a statutory maximum sentence of five years in federal prison for each conspiracy count and up to 10 years in federal prison for each count of breaking customs seals.

Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and Coast Guard Investigative Services are investigating this matter.

This effort is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.

Assistant United States Attorneys Colin S. Scott and Amanda B. Elbogen of the Terrorism and Export Crimes Section are prosecuting this matter.

MIL-OSI USA: Warner Joins Colleagues In Demanding Secretary Bessent Meet With Senate Democrats To Bring Transparency And Clarity To “DOGE” Chaos At Treasury

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Commonwealth of Virginia Mark R Warner

WASHINGTON – Today, Select Committee on Intelligence Vice Chair Mark Warner (D-VA) joined Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Appropriations Committee Vice Chair Patty Murray (D-WA), Finance Committee Ranking Member Ron Wyden (D-OR), Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee Ranking Member Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Ranking Member Gary Peters (D-MI), in sending the following letter to the new Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, after the Treasury Department’s inadequate responses and evasive answers to a request for information following the hostile takeover of the Treasury Department by Elon Musk and the so-called “Department of Government Efficiency” (“DOGE”). Specifically, the Senators are concerned about “DOGE” having access to the management and disbursement of trillions of dollars and the highly sensitive information of millions of Americans.

“The Bureau of the Fiscal Service’s payment system is absolutely vital to our economic and national security. Any infiltration or manipulation must be immediately addressed. Frankly, the information your Department has provided on the matter to date is woefully inadequate,” said the Senators. “We speak for not just the caucus, but for the millions of impacted Americans, when we say this is an urgent matter and your participation is necessary for the American people to have confidence that our government will continue to function effectively and that their privacy remains protected.”

The full text of the letter can be seen here and below.

Dear Secretary Bessent:

Senate Democrats are deeply concerned with the so-called “Department of Government Efficiency” (“DOGE”), Elon Musk, and his unnamed team’s seemingly hostile takeover of the Bureau of the Fiscal Service’s central payment systems. As you know, this is a highly sensitive government system that manages, processes, and disburses trillions of dollars, including Social Security and Medicare payments, tax refunds, and other highly sensitive information for millions of Americans. The seemingly illicit penetration of the system under the guise of an “operational efficiency assessment” demands your immediate attention, and Congress requires answers about the purpose and scope of “DOGE’s” activity. To that end, we request your attendance at a meeting with the Democratic Caucus as soon as possible.

Although we know that you and your Department have been made aware of these concerns, we have found the Department’s written response to Finance Committee Ranking Member Wyden and Banking Committee Ranking Member Warren wholly insufficient, and even illusive, and evasive and, in many cases, the responses stand in direct conflict to Elon Musk’s public statements about the work of “DOGE.” As you know, the Bureau of the Fiscal Service’s payment system is absolutely vital to our economic and national security. Any infiltration or manipulation must be immediately addressed. Frankly, the information your Department has provided on the matter to date is woefully inadequate.

We speak for not just the caucus, but for the millions of impacted Americans, when we say this is an urgent matter and your participation is necessary for the American people to have confidence that our government will continue to function effectively and that their privacy remains protected.

We eagerly await your confirmation and are looking forward to your addressing the Senate Democratic Caucus.

We request your response by tomorrow, Thursday, February 6, 2025.

MIL-OSI USA: Cassidy Highlights His Plans to Hold China Accountable, Protect Louisiana Ricers, Shrimpers to Trump USTR Nominee

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Louisiana Bill Cassidy

[embedded content]

WASHINGTON –U.S. Senator Bill Cassidy, M.D. (R-LA) today outlined his plan to hold China accountable through his Foreign Pollution Fee and addressed the need to protect Louisiana ricers and shrimpers from foreign competitors during U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) nominee Jamieson Greer’s confirmation hearing before the U.S. Senate Finance Committee.
“You have been concerned—expressed skepticism—about the need for binding dispute mechanisms at the WTO, but my rice producers and others have won decisions at the WTO on commitments by other countries on agricultural subsidies, and yet they’re not enforced. And so, are my agricultural people just out in the cold? … Help my rice producer here. How are we going to handle that?” asked Dr. Cassidy.
“Senator, I think you’re exactly right, and that’s part of the reason why I show skepticism sometimes about the WTO,” replied Greer. “We have to have enforcement, and at the end of the day, what that means is USTR has to go to the country and enforce the law, and sometimes that means imposing tariffs on them.”
“About 40 percent of the imported shrimp to the United States come from India. Now the EU, Japan, and the U.S. finds illegal antibiotics in their shipments. And there’s also allegations that they use forced labor at every step of the supply chain… Would you commit to putting a— slapping a tariff on the shrimp if we can show that it’s being imported under those circumstances?” asked Dr. Cassidy.
“If we have an investigation and it shows their unfair trading practices, you can certainly impose a tariff or other measures if that trade practice isn’t remedied. I think it’s really important to work with you and the shrimpers because if they feel like they’re not getting the relief they need from trade remedies or other venues, then we need to explore whether it’s section 301, or other tools, to make sure that we’re detecting the unfairnesses and addressing it,” said Greer.
When discussing Cassidy’s Foreign Pollution Fee Act, Greer recognized the unlevel playfield that requires the use of tariffs to hold other countries accountable for unfair trade practices.
“[O]ne thing I am concerned about is that China is not using, not enforcing environmental regulations… [I]t lowers their cost of manufacturing by not enforcing those environmental regulations by 20 percent, and our industry moves there because they just lowered their manufacturing costs by 20 percent by dumping their air pollution on us. Now if this is classical economics, you would tax the externality, and I have proposed a fee on the carbon-intense product from countries which do not enforce internationally accepted norms on pollution control. Any thoughts upon that?” asked Dr. Cassidy.
“I think you’ve articulated the problem statement very well. I think there’s an unlevel playing field, and I think that other countries take advantage of total lack of environmental regulations,” said Greer.
Background
In December, Cassidy and U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) released a new discussion draft of their Foreign Pollution Fee Act to level the playing field with Chinese manufacturing and expand American production. In addition, the Steel Manufacturers Association, which represents 70 percent of the nation’s steel production, called on President-elect Trump and Congress to institute a foreign pollution fee.
The Foreign Pollution Fee Act was a key topic at Cassidy’s Louisiana Energy Security Summit last fall. The summit featured ten panels that explored protecting U.S. interests from unfair trade practices, Louisiana’s low-emission manufacturing advantage, and the role of natural gas in strengthening U.S. geopolitical influence. Panelists included the CEOs of Entergy, First Solar, Buzzi UnicemUSA, Orsted, and Aluminum Technologies, former Trump administration officials, and leaders from Louisiana trade associations and major energy and Fortune 500 companies.
In 2023, the Louisiana Senate and House of Representatives unanimously adopted a resolution urging Congress to pursue an industrial manufacturing and trade policy to counter competition from China.
On Louisiana shrimp and rice, Cassidy introduced two bills last Congress to protect both industries against China and India’s dumping of cheap agricultural products into U.S. markets. The Prioritizing Offensive Agricultural Disputes and Enforcement Act and the India Shrimp Tariff Act will protect the Louisiana agricultural industry while ensuring that food that appears on U.S. store shelves meets U.S. health standards.
Last year, Cassidy worked to secure $27,152,411.00 for Louisiana fisheries, shrimpers, and fishing communities affected by natural disasters between 2017 and 2022.
In April 2024, Cassidy advocated for Louisiana shrimpers and rice producers at a U.S. Senate Finance Committee hearing with USTR Ambassador Katherine Tai. He pressed her on progress USTR is making to prevent shrimp dumping from Asia. Cassidy also highlighted a whistleblower report on the safety of shrimp imported from India.

MIL-OSI USA: Cassidy, Britt, Warnock, Peters Reintroduce Retirement Fairness Legislation for Non-Profit Employees

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Louisiana Bill Cassidy

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Bill Cassidy, M.D. (R-LA), Katie Britt (R-AL), Raphael Warnock (D-GA), and Gary Peters (D-MI) reintroduced the Retirement Fairness for Charities and Educational Institutions Actto enhance investment options for 403(b) retirement plans. 403(b) plans are a type of retirement savings plan, similar to a 401(k), offered to employees of non-profit organizations like public universities, hospitals, churches, and charities.
“Non-profit employees should have the same access to investment strategies for their retirement plans as private sector employees,” said Dr. Cassidy. “Social Security is going insolvent. We need to give Americans every tool to help make their retirement more secure.”
“The Retirement Fairness for Charities and Educational Institutions Act would level the playing field so more hardworking Americans can access retirement resources that best fit their needs. Our legislation would allow Americans in the non-profit sector to access the same investment options available to those in the private sector,” said Senator Britt. “This commonsense bipartisan bill would help Americans who work for non-profits, including many of our hospitals, achieve long-term financial stability.”
“America’s retirees deserve the peace of mind that comes with financial security when they transition into retirement. This is especially true for non-profit workers who dedicate their lives to serving their communities— they deserve access to the same retirement investment opportunities private sector employees have,” said Senator Warnock. “That’s why I’m proud to help lead this bipartisan legislation which provides equal opportunity for non-profit employees and helps ensure they can retire with dignity.”
“Hardworking public service and non-profit employees who support our health care and human services, arts and culture, civic engagement, and more deserve access to all available financial tools that can help them plan for retirement,” said Senator Peters. “This legislation would put those using a 403(b) plan on a level playing field with other retirement plan participants by allowing them to invest in collective investment trusts, giving them an equal opportunity to achieve their financial goals.”
The Retirement Fairness for Charities and Educational Institutions Actwould expand retirement savings opportunities for non-profit employees by allowing 403(b) plan participants to invest in collective investment trusts (CITs). A CIT is a tax-exempt investment vehicle that provides a diversified, pooled investment option—similar to a mutual fund. CITs offer greater flexibility in investment strategies for retirement plans and reliable, often higher, net returns for plan participants.
Under current law, unlike 401(k) holders, 403(b) plan sponsors are not able to use this stable investment option in their plan. This legislation would create parity between 403(b) and 401(k) retirement savings plans, benefitting over 15 million hardworking employees at hospitals, universities, charities, and other non-profit organizations.
The Retirement Fairness for Charities and Educational Institutions Actis supported by the American Bankers Association, American Benefits Council, American Heart Association, American Life Insurance Association, American Retirement Association, Aon, Church Alliance, Great Gray, Insured Retirement Institute, Investment Company Institute, March of Dimes, MetLife, Mercer, Mission Square, National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, National Council of Nonprofits, Nationwide, Prudential, SPARK Institute, Stable Value Investment Association, United Way, and Vanguard.

MIL-OSI New Zealand: Universities – Green light for remote tech to sort the wood from the trees – Flinders

Source: Flinders University

New Zealand and Flinders University experts have deployed artificial intelligence and 3D laser scanning to accurately map planted pine (radiata) forests for most of NZ’s North Island.

The results, which distinguish planted large estates, small woodlots and newly established stands as young as three years old, showcase a new way of using remote sensing with other technology to reveal forest growth and update growth information.

This approach is just as relevant for Australia, where radiata pine is also widely grown, says Dr Grant Pearse, Senior Lecturer in Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) at Flinders University.

“In New Zealand, where radiata pine plantations dominate the forestry sector, the current national forest description lacks spatially explicit information and struggles to capture data on small-scale forests,” says Dr Pearse, from the College of Science and Engineering at Flinders University in Adelaide, South Australia.

“We combined deep learning-based forest mapping using high-resolution aerial imagery with regional airborne laser scanning data to map all planted forest and estimate key attributes.”

The spatially explicit forest description provides wall-to-wall information on forest extent, age, and volume for all sizes of forest. This facilitates stratification by key variables for wood supply forecasting, harvest planning, and infrastructure investment decisions – applications equally valuable for other forestry industries.

The research, with New Zealand timber industry researchers from Rotorua, Christchurch and Auckland, was carried out on planted forests in the Gisborne region, which has publicly available aerial imagery and airborne laser scanning data.

This region is particularly significant as it was severely impacted by Cyclone Gabrielle in early 2023, which caused widespread landslides and forest debris flows.

For such vulnerable terrain, knowing exactly where forests are located in the landscape, their age and condition is key to managing the risks of harvesting operations on the region’s steep slopes.

“We propose satellite-based harvest detection and digital photogrammetry to continuously update the initial forest description. This methodology enables near real-time monitoring of planted forests at all scales and is adaptable to other regions with similar data availability,” researchers say in a new article.

Along with the economic importance of NZ’s 1.8 million hectares of radiata pine forestry for export timber and fibre, these planted forests are a key part of the country’s emission trading scheme and are expected to play a significant role in achieving the government’s target of net-zero emissions by 2050.

The forest map derived from artificial intelligence can be viewed at: www.forestinsights.nz

In South Australia, plantation estates covering about 40,000 hectares support a $3 billion industry and employ 18,000 people as well as construction, manufacturing, tourism and regional communities.

The article. ‘Developing a forest description from remote sensing: Insights from New Zealand’ (2024) byGrant D Pearse (Flinders University), Sadeepa Jayathunga, Nicolò Camarretta, Melanie E Palmer, Benjamin SC Steer, Michael S Watt (all Scion), Pete Watt and Andrew Holdaway (both Indufor Asia Pacific) has been published in the journal Science of Remote Sensing. DOI: 10.1016/j.srs.2024.100183. (ref. https://www.forestinsights.nz/ )

Acknowledgements: This project was funded through the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) Strategic Science Investment Fund (administered by Scion, the New Zealand Forest Research Institute Ltd) and through the MBIE Programme (grant number C04X2101).

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

MIL-OSI Security: South Lake Tahoe Man Sentenced to over 2 Years in Prison for Impersonating Federal Officers

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

SACRAMENTO, Calif. — Anton Andreyevich Iagounov, 38, of South Lake Tahoe, was sentenced today by U.S. District Judge Daniel J. Calabretta to two years and three months in prison for four counts of impersonating a federal officer, Acting U.S. Attorney Michele Beckwith announced.

According to court documents, and evidence presented at a three-day trial in July 2024, Iagounov pretended to be a federal law enforcement agent by creating and sending counterfeit investigative documents, which he signed in the name of a fictional federal agent, seeking highly protected information from the Department of Defense.

“The defendant impersonated federal officers and tried multiple times to obtain protected information using fake court documents,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Beckwith. “Many federal agencies including NASA have devoted law enforcement officers, and we will not tolerate federal officers being illegally impersonated.”

“Mr. Iagounov’s attempt to undermine public trust in order to obtain sensitive government information posed a significant risk, potentially endangering national security and the integrity of NASA and government operations,” said Michael Graham, Acting Assistant Inspector General for Investigations. “This sentencing demonstrates the commitment of NASA OIG, the USAO, and our law enforcement partners to safeguarding Federal assets and holding accountable those who undermine justice.”

“The defendant impersonated a federal law enforcement officer and took advantage of the trust that exists between federal agencies,” said Acting Special Agent in Charge Jeremy N. Schwartz of the FBI Las Vegas Division. “All officers carry badges and credentials that are used to verify their identity. If you believe someone is impersonating an officer, you may ask their agency to confirm their official business. This sentencing demonstrates the excellent work achievable through partnerships.”

On July 5, 2022, Iagounov sent a search warrant he had created to the U.S. Capitol Police, falsely claiming it was signed by a Special Agent of NASA Office of Inspector General (NASA‑OIG) and appearing to be authorized by a U.S. District Court judge for the District of Columbia. The Capitol Police investigated the document, determined it was fake, and referred it to NASA-OIG for further investigation.

On July 11, 2022, Iagounov again pretended to be the same fictional NASA-OIG agent and sent the warrant to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. This time, he sent it without a judge’s signature, indicating it was for an “emergency filing” and required a judge’s signature. He sent it from an email address designed to look like it was from a United States government agency, but which Iagounov owned and had named to look like a government agency’s internet domain.

On July 18, 2022, Iagounov again sent the fake search warrant, purporting to be signed by the same fictitious NASA-OIG agent. He sent it to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia, again indicating that it was for an emergency filing and needed a judge’s signature immediately.

Finally, on July 24, 2022, Iagounov faxed a letter, under the name of a real NASA-OIG supervising agent, to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. In that letter, he claimed to be following up on the warrant, stating that an “exigent circumstance” required a judge’s signature immediately. The faxed letter included an anonymous email address for the agent that actually belonged to Iagounov. Several days earlier, on July 15, Iagounov had sent his warrant to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Florida but had received no response.

In each case, given the apparently sensitive nature of the materials Iagounov’s warrant sought, the receiving personnel for the Courts referred the matter to NASA-OIG for review and investigation.

This case was the product of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and NASA Office of Inspector General, with assistance by the South Lake Tahoe Police Department and the Carson City Sheriff’s Office. Assistant U.S. Attorneys James Conolly and Audrey Hemesath prosecuted the case.

MIL-OSI Security: Sacramento and Fairfield Residents Indicted for Firearms Offenses

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

SACRAMENTO, Calif. — The Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) initiative brings together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence. At the core of PSN is setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place. Acting U.S. Attorney Michele Beckwith announces the following indictments in federal PSN cases.

Marcus Anderson, 26, of Sacramento, was indicted today and charged with nine counts of firearms trafficking, unlicensed firearms dealing, and other firearms charges. According to court documents, from February 2022 to March 2023, Anderson unlawfully trafficked and possessed multiple firearms, and engaged in the business of unlawful firearms dealing in the Sacramento area. Anderson is prohibited from possessing firearms or ammunition because he has multiple state felony convictions. This case is the product of an investigation by the ATF with the assistance of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Special Service Unit, the Placer County Special Investigations Unit, the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office, and the Sacramento Police Department. Assistant U.S. Attorney Haddy Abouzeid is prosecuting the case.

Armond Bass, 39, of Fairfield, was indicted on Jan. 23, 2025, and charged with two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. According to court documents, in October 2024, Bass was found to have possessed a Colt .22‑caliber semi-automatic rifle and ammunition. Bass is prohibited from possessing firearms or ammunition because he has previous felony convictions for domestic violence, possession of a stolen vehicle, and possession of a controlled substance. This case is the product of an investigation by the FBI and the Vacaville Police Department, with assistance from the FBI’s Solano County Violent Crimes Task Force. Assistant U.S. Attorney Charles Campbell is prosecuting the case.

If convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition, the defendants face a maximum statutory penalty of 15 years in prison and a fine up to $250,000. Anderson also faces up to five years in prison, if convicted for unlicensed firearms dealing. Any sentence, however, would be determined at the discretion of the court after consideration of any applicable statutory factors and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which take into account a number of variables. The charges are only allegations; the defendants are presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

These cases are part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.

MIL-OSI USA: Crapo: Greer Capable and Qualified to be USTR

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Idaho Mike Crapo

Washington, D.C.–At a U.S. Senate Finance Committee hearing to consider the nomination of Jamieson Greer to be the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Chairman Mike Crapo (R-Idaho) praised Mr. Greer’s extensive trade experience and secured his commitment to expand global market access for American producers and manufacturers.

Chairman Crapo and Mr. Greer discussed agricultural exports, where Greer pledged to defend Idaho’s more-than 24,000 farms and ranches from unfair trade practices and grow global access for their products. They also discussed U.S. digital trade leadership, and the need for transparency and timely communication between USTR and Congress. Mr. Greer assured members of the Committee that he would “follow the law to a T,” adding that he is “convinced that American workers, farmers, ranchers and service providers can compete with anyone else in the world—in this market and beyond—so long as they have a level playing field.”

Crapo concluded the hearing by telling the nominee, “I think you’ve done a phenomenally good job. You have shown that you are completely capable and qualified for this job. I look forward to working with you and making sure that we get your nomination confirmed as soon as possible.”

Watch Chairman Crapo’s opening statement here, and the question-and-answer portion with Mr. Greer here.

On agricultural exports:

Crapo:

Agriculture is important to many Committee members and members of the Senate as a whole. Idaho’s 24,000 farms and ranches produce 185 commodities, and Idaho leads the nation in potato, barley and hay production and is the third largest producer of milk and cheese. We have not opened up any new markets for our farmers in the last four years. Farmers are also concerned that they may become the target of retaliation if we use tariffs to pressure other countries to change their ways. How will you support the interests of America’s farmers and ranchers once you’re confirmed as our nation’s chief trade negotiator?

Greer:

. . . In my view, American agricultural producers are the most competitive in the world, and they need to have markets commensurate with that competitiveness. To me, that means that we need to go and gain market access where things have been closed until now. For many decades, we have had a trading system where the United States opens its market over and over again, and others do not. In India, for example, their average bound tariff rate on agricultural products is 39 percent; in Turkey, it’s 39.8 percent. These are markets where they need to open to the United States, and I think we need to use all the tools at our disposal to do so.

On digital trade:

Crapo:

We lost ground during the last Administration because we turned our back on digital trade rules, including promoting data flows, combating forced technology transfer and promoting nondiscrimination. A number of jurisdictions, including the European Union and South Korea, utilize that opportunity to advance measures that target U.S. technology companies with special requirements or taxes while accepting their domestic companies or even Chinese companies. Do you agree that ensuring U.S. technological leadership means that we need to confront these types of measures?

Greer:

Yes, Chairman, I strongly believe that we need to do that. Again, this is an area where the United States is very competitive, and I understand that we are having a domestic conversation about how to regulate digital trade and technology companies, etc. My view is that is where the conversation should be happening. We should not be outsourcing our regulation to the European Union or Brazil or anyone else, and they can’t discriminate against us and won’t it be tolerated.

On Congressional oversight:

Crapo:

The law states that the USTR reports directly to the President and Congress, though my colleagues and I may disagree on policy, occasionally, we are united in defending this Committee’s jurisdiction. If confirmed, do you commit to provide timely and thorough briefings on trade negotiations and to share proposals with this Committee in advance of sharing them with foreign governments?

Greer:

Chairman Crapo, we certainly expect to follow the law to the T with respect to consultations with Congress. I agree with you exactly that the statute directs me to report directly to the President and to you, and that includes all of these consultation requirements, including before we approach foreign governments with serious offers that we need to come to you and talk about it so we can be on the same page.

Crapo:

Thank you, and will you also keep us apprised and consider our input with respect to USTR led investigations and reports in the January 20^th America First Trade Policy Memorandum?

Greer: Yes.

On reporting trade barriers:

Crapo:

Finally, with regard to trade reporting on trade barriers. By law, the USTR is required to issue an annual report called the National Trade Estimate that identifies foreign barriers of U.S. exports of goods and service or services. The last Administration decided it would not list a barrier if the Administration agreed with the foreign government’s ideology for enacting the barrier in the first place. If confirmed, this year’s National Trade Estimate may be one of the very first things you review. Do you agree that the USTR report should, as statutorily required, identify the full range of discriminatory barriers to U.S. trade, regardless of what agenda or excuse our trading partners may offer?

Greer:

I agree with that, Chairman.

MIL-OSI USA: Barrasso: USTR Nominee Greer Will Open New Markets for Wyoming Ag, Energy and Mining

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Wyoming John Barrasso

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator John Barrasso (R-Wyo.) discussed opening up new markets for Wyoming industries, specifically mining, energy production and agriculture, with Jamieson Greer, President Donald J. Trump’s nominee to be the United States Trade Representative.

Senator Barrasso and Mr. Greer also discussed how the Trump administration will protect American energy producers from Mexico’s violations of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement.

Mr. Greer’s confirmation hearing was held today by the Senate Committee on Finance.

On Opening Up New Markets for Wyoming Producers:

“Mr. Greer, thanks so much for being here, and thanks so much for taking the time to visit in my office.

“As U.S. Trade Rep, you’re going to be the tip of the sphere in advancing President Trump’s pro-growth and pro-worker trade agenda. You’re going to be working to open up new markets for our nation, for our producers, including for Wyoming mining, Wyoming energy production, and for our farmers and ranchers. You’ll also be protecting America’s interests and fighting back against abusive trade practices from foreign adversaries that undermine U.S. industries and our critical supply chains.

“You have a big task in front of you, as we discussed. We’re all counting on you. I have no doubt that, given your experience serving President Trump as Chief of Staff to the U.S. Trade Rep during his first term, that you’re ready and you’re equipped to lead the charge on behalf of the nation’s trade agenda for his second term.

“In regard to market access, I know we all talk a lot about market access today. We also talked about market access when we met in my office.

“I mentioned to you the importance of opening up new opportunities for the industries from my home state of Wyoming. We talked about how opening up markets in Japan for U.S. beef, that was a big win for Wyoming ranchers. I told you about how Wyoming is an energy powerhouse and the nation’s energy breadbasket. Wyoming also plays a major part in the world, providing abundant affordable energy to our allies around the world.

“We also have huge mineral deposits in Wyoming – a mineral called trona – which is refined into soda ash, a basic chemical building block used in manufacturing lots and lots of products, including glass, detergent, pharmaceuticals.

“Whether it’s oil, natural gas, coal, critical minerals, and agriculture. Wyoming’s economy, the U.S. economy is going to greatly benefit as we export resources to new markets.

“As U.S. Trade Rep, what types of emphasis are you going to place on opening up new markets for U.S. exporters and certainly for Wyoming producers?”

Follow Up:

“Could you add to that in terms of how you would do it differently than what we saw the last four years under the Biden administration? I thought they fell way short in opening access to new markets.”

Click here to watch Sen. Barrasso’s remarks.

On Protecting American Energy Producers from Hostile Mexico:

“I want to talk about Mexico and USMCA commitments. So Mexico has repeatedly violated the historic United States-Mexico-Canada agreement. They were ruled by a dispute panel to be in violation of USMCA with respect to U.S. corn. Mexico has taken hostile actions towards seizing assets of U.S. companies.

“An issue that I’ve weighed in on over the years has been Mexico’s hostility toward U.S. energy companies. Mexico’s previous president discriminated against U.S. energy producers, favoring the state-owned utilities and oil and gas companies.

“The Biden administration, I think, fell well short of fully protecting U.S. energy producers. And Biden’s U.S. Trade Rep failed tremendously to make any meaningful progress. That’s left great uncertainty, jeopardized lots and lots of money in U.S. investment.

“I’d like to enter into the record a bicameral letter that I led on the need to address this matter.

“And so, the question is going forward under the Trump administration and with Mexico’s new president, who is now in office, how important is it going to be for you, as U.S. Trade Rep, to help protect U.S. energy companies and their investments.”

Click here to watch Sen. Barrasso’s remarks.

MIL-OSI USA: ICAC Task Force Executes Three Search Warrants in Treasure Valley this Week

Source: US State of Idaho

[BOISE] – Attorney General Raúl Labrador has announced investigators with his Idaho Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force served three residential search warrants this past week in the Treasure Valley.
On Wednesday February 5th, 2025, Jacob Taylor (43) of Caldwell, was arrested for two (2) counts of possession of child sexual exploitation material. The Idaho State Police was the primary agency to assist the Idaho ICAC Task Force along with support from Canyon County Sheriff’s Office, Nampa Police Department, Homeland Security Investigations (HIS), and the Caldwell Police Department.
On Thursday February 6th, 2025, the Idaho ICAC Task Force Timothy Woods (52) from Boise for (1) count of possession of child sexual exploitation material after a search warrant was served at his residence. The Idaho ICAC Task Force was assisted by the Boise Police Department.
“Our growing network of partnerships and agencies across the state is showing that, together, we are making a difference in protecting children,” said Attorney General Labrador. “We are holding these predators accountable for their crimes and removing them from our communities.”
Information regarding the third search warrant served on Tuesday February 4th is forthcoming with charges still pending.
Anyone with information regarding the exploitation of children is encouraged to contact local police, the Attorney General’s ICAC Unit at 208-947-8700, or the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children at 1-800-843-5678.
The Attorney General’s ICAC Unit works with the Idaho ICAC Task Force, a coalition of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, to investigate and prosecute individuals who use the internet to criminally exploit children.
Parents, educators, and law enforcement officials can find more information and helpful resources at the ICAC website, ICACIdaho.org.

MIL-OSI USA: At Hearing, Trump Trade Nominee Agrees with Warren on Need for Transparency for Tariff Exemptions

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren

February 06, 2025

Warren: “[W]hen used strategically and fairly, [tariffs] can… protect the jobs of American workers. But we can’t have a get-out-of-tariff-free system for those that are very wealthy or politically-connected, because that will undermine the whole process.”

Video of Exchange (YouTube)

Washington, D.C. – At a hearing of the Senate Finance Committee, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) questioned Mr. Jamieson Greer, President Trump’s pick for U.S. Trade Representative, on his vision for Trump’s trade policy.

While there are open questions of how tariff exemptions will work under the Trump presidency, Mr. Greer agreed with Senator Warren that large corporations have outsized influence on trade deals and that U.S. trade policy needs to ensure “American businesses and American workers [are] prioritized,” and that any exemption program “needs to be transparent and have the rules outlined.”

“Any time we’re taking economic actions, whether it’s a tariff or an exclusion, we need to be careful about this and we need to be thoughtful..[a tariff exclusion process] needs to be transparent,” said Mr. Greer about exemptions favoring large, well-connected companies.

During President Trump’s first administration, well-connected companies were given tariff exemptions. A review by Senator Warren’s office found that the Trump Commerce Department was three times as likely to approve exemptions for Chinese and Japanese-headquartered companies than American ones. Right now, the door is still open for the administration to pursue a similar approach.

Transcript: Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Jamieson Greer, of Maryland, to be United States Trade Representative, with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Senate Finance Committee
February 6, 2025

Senator Elizabeth Warren: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations on your nomination, Mr. Greer. Tariffs are an important strategic economic tool. But I am concerned that President Trump is stumbling into a trade war that won’t help protect jobs, that won’t keep Americans safe, and that won’t bring down costs for families.

That said, I think you and I agree that for too long, U.S. trade policy has been a race to the bottom – with deal after deal that sold out American workers and helped multinational corporations offshore critical industries.

But lately, that’s been changing – under US Trade Rep Bob Lighthizer and then US Trade Rep Katherine Tai. And I appreciate your work as Chief of Staff under Ambassador Lighthizer.

Ambassador Lighthizer, I think, had it right when he wrote that problems in our trade relationship with China – and U.S. trade policy in general – can be traced to, “the political establishment, of both the Republican and Democratic parties, under the influence of multinational corporations and importers.”

Mr. Greer, do you agree with Mr. Lighthizer that multinational corporations have just had too much power over U.S. trade policy?

Mr. Jamieson Greer, nominee for United States Trade Representative: I agree with Ambassador Lighthizer, and I believe that trade policy in the past has been designed to help that sector and has ignored other sectors.

Senator Warren: Good, well, we’ve got to start by recognizing the problem, right? For too long, corporate lobbyists have bought their way into our trade policy. And I’ve been glad to see that changing.

But raising tariffs doesn’t necessarily mean an end to corporate capture. When the last Trump administration hiked tariffs, corporate lobbyists lined up to demand exemptions, and now, with President Trump threatening even more tariffs, they’re ready to do it again. So what did this tariff exemption process look like the last time around?

Well, I investigated, and I found that the Trump Commerce Department was three times as likely to approve exemptions for Chinese and Japanese-headquartered companies than American ones.

Mr. Greer – favoring foreign companies over American ones – is that good trade policy?

Mr. Greer: Senator, I think that our trade policy needs to make sure we have American businesses and American workers prioritized.

Senator Warren: Okay, let’s try another one. A recent study found that the Trump USTR officials were more likely to grant exemptions to China tariffs to companies that had made campaign contributions to Republicans or had lobbyists who had recently left the Trump administration.

Mr. Greer – favoring companies with deep pockets and political connections – is that good trade policy?

Mr. Greer: Of course not, any kind of program like that needs to be transparent and have the rules outlined, which it did.

Senator Warren: I appreciate that answer. This time around, President Trump has proposed far broader tariffs than we’ve seen before– potentially on all goods, from all countries. And with more and more tariffs, the corporate scramble for exemptions is more and more intense. One trade lobbyist recently said, and I quote, “Absolutely everyone is calling. It is nonstop.” And let’s be clear – most businesses across America cannot afford armies of lobbyists.

So, Mr. Greer, do you support tariff exclusions, these exemptions, and – if so – what changes would you make to ensure it’s a fair process and not a giveaway to political insiders and deep-pocketed corporations?

Mr. Greer: So, Senator, I know you’ve been a leader on this and you’ve given a lot of thought to it, which I think is important. Any time we’re taking economic actions, whether it’s a tariff or an exclusion, we need to be careful about this and we need to be thoughtful. I don’t know – in the event tariffs are applied – I don’t know if the President intends to have an exclusion policy or program at all. To the extent something like this happens, it needs to be transparent. One thing they did at USTR the first time around, if one company got an exclusion – any company got an exclusion. So if a big company got an exclusion for a certain product, a small business would too.

So again, I don’t know if there will be exclusion processes, but to the extent there is, they need to be transparent, they need to be fair for small and large.

Senator Warren: Well, I very much appreciate what you have to say around this. As I said before, I think tariffs are an important tool. And when used strategically and fairly, they can promote American industries, they can protect domestic supply chains, they can protect the jobs of American workers. But we can’t have a get-out-of-tariff-free system for those that are very wealthy or politically-connected, because that will undermine the whole process. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MIL-OSI USA: Guatemalan national charged with transportation, distribution and possession of child pornography following joint HSI and Oklahoma Police Department investigation

Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

OKLAHOMA CITY — A federal complaint was recently unsealed charging Gustavo Gordillo, 41, a citizen of Guatemala, with transportation, distribution, and possession of child pornography, announced Special Agent in Charge Travis Pickard, who oversees Homeland Security operations In North Texas and Oklahoma and U.S. Attorney Robert J. Troester of the Western District Oklahoma.

According to an affidavit filed in support of a criminal complaint, in July 2020, investigators with the Oklahoma City Police Department received a cyber tip after files containing child sexual abuse material were uploaded to a Google Photos account.

The affidavit alleges the suspect who uploaded the photos, later determined as Gordillo, lived in Oklahoma City. Oklahoma City police detectives investigated the tip, and others from Facebook, determining that Gordillo was communicating with a child living out of state. The affidavit further alleges Gordillo provided inappropriate materials to the minor and received inappropriate materials from the child.

In December 2024, additional investigations led law enforcement to a residence in the Oklahoma City area connected with Gordillo. Gordillo was charged by complaint on Jan. 27 and arrested by Homeland Security Investigations’ (HSI) Oklahoma field office and the Oklahoma City Police Department Jan. 29. U.S. Immigration Customs and Enforcement’s Oklahoma field office assisted in the apprehension.

Public records show Gordillo entered the United States on a temporary visa that had expired.

Gordillo faces up to sixty years in federal prison if found guilty of the charges.

This case is the result of an investigation by HSI and the Oklahoma City Police Department. Assistant U.S. Attorney Tiffany Edgmon is prosecuting the case.

Learn more about HSI Dallas’ mission to increase public safety In Northern Texas and Oklahoma communities on X, formerly known as Twitter, at @HSI_Dallas.

MIL-OSI USA: HSI El Paso announces arrests of violent criminal aliens in West Texas during targeted enforcement operation

Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

EL PASO, Texas — Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), in partnership with U.S. Border Patrol, FBI, ATF, DEA, and the El Paso Sheriff’s Office, arrested several criminal aliens during targeted enforcement actions in West Texas that began during the week of Jan. 20.

Following are summaries of four individuals arrested during this targeted enforcement operation:

A 56-year-old Cuban male with criminal convictions ranging from sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, and evading arrest to DWI. He is being detained pending his removal from the United States.
A 62-year-old Mexican male who has been arrested seven times for driving while intoxicated is now being detained pending removal from the United States.
A 27-year-old Mexican male with a criminal conviction for possession of narcotics is now being detained pending removal from the United States.
A 32-year-old Mexican male with a criminal history ranging from illegal re-entry after deportation to human smuggling. He is now in federal custody pending charges for transporting illegal aliens.

“Homeland Security Investigations remains steadfast in our commitment to safeguarding our communities. Through targeted enforcement operations, we focus on removing threats and ensuring public safety,” said HSI El Paso Special Agent in Charge Jason T. Stevens. “Our collaboration with federal, state, and local law enforcement partners is crucial in dismantling criminal organizations and protecting the well-being of our citizens. Together, we strive to create a safer environment for everyone.”

This type of work is essential in keeping the community safe from criminals. By focusing on enforcement operations and working hand-in-hand with our law enforcement partners, we prevent criminal activities and protect individuals from harm. Ensuring the security of our neighborhoods is a top priority, and we are dedicated to maintaining a strong, unified front against crime.

MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn Questions USTR Nominee Greer on China, Outbound Investment Prohibition Proposal

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn

WASHINGTON – Today during the Senate Finance Committee’s hearing on the nomination of Jamieson Greer to be United States Trade Representative (USTR) under the Trump administration, U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) discussed with him the importance of reciprocal trade relationships and his proposal to prohibit U.S. investment in certain technologies in China in order to restore American dominance on the world stage and safeguard our national security. Excerpts are below, and video can be found here.

CORNYN: “China cheats, China steals our intellectual property, and they don’t recognize a rules-based international order.”

“President Trump was the President who first raised this issue in a very dramatic sort of way, and I think he’s exactly right to insist upon reciprocity as a principle. Do you agree that reciprocity ought to be the basic principle that drives our trade policy?”

GREER: “You’ve been a leader on this issue, with respect to investment flows as well with China, and you watch this very closely, so I appreciate your insights here.”

“We do have to have a balanced relationship. I think the United States has always been willing to have a balanced relationship with China, but there’s Chinese agency in this matter, and they need to decide how open they want to be to us.”

CORNYN: “Your response reminds me of the conversation we had in my office, and thank you for coming by to visit. I talked to you a little bit about something that we’re working on in the Banking Committee—Senator Scott, Chairman of the Banking Committee, and others—on a bipartisan basis, working on an outbound investment transparency law.”

“Do you think it just makes sense that we should have transparency over investments being made in China that may well fuel the modernization of their military in a way that’s a threat to the peace in the Indo-Pacific and beyond?”

GREER: “Having this kind of transparency is very important. In fact, again, I keep referring back to the Trump administration’s policy memo on trade because it is so comprehensive and gives such a clear direction on these things. One of the things it talks about is looking at current efforts around outbound investment to foreign countries of concern, and so I think consideration of this kind of control or data gathering information, I think that goes right along with exploring that.”

MIL-OSI USA News: Eradicating Anti-Christian Bias

Source: The White House

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1. Purpose and Policy. It is the policy of the United States, and the purpose of this order, to protect the religious freedoms of Americans and end the anti-Christian weaponization of government. The Founders established a Nation in which people were free to practice their faith without fear of discrimination or retaliation by their government.

For that reason, the United States Constitution enshrines the fundamental right to religious liberty in the First Amendment. Federal laws like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.), further prohibit government interference with Americans’ rights to exercise their religion. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.), prohibits religious discrimination in employment while Federal hate-crime laws prohibit offenses committed due to religious animus.

Yet the previous Administration engaged in an egregious pattern of targeting peaceful Christians, while ignoring violent, anti-Christian offenses. The Biden Department of Justice sought to squelch faith in the public square by bringing Federal criminal charges and obtaining in numerous cases multi-year prison sentences against nearly two dozen peaceful pro-life Christians for praying and demonstrating outside abortion facilities. Those convicted included a Catholic priest and 75-year-old grandmother, as well as an 87-year-old woman and a father of 11 children who were arrested 18 months after praying and singing hymns outside an abortion facility in Tennessee as a part of a politically motivated prosecution campaign by the Biden Administration. I rectified this injustice on January 23, 2025, by issuing pardons in these cases.

At the same time, Catholic churches, charities, and pro-life centers sought justice for violence, theft, and arson perpetrated against them, which the Biden Department of Justice largely ignored. After more than 100 attacks, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning this violence and calling on the Biden Administration to enforce the law.

Then, in 2023, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) memorandum asserted that “radical-traditionalist” Catholics were domestic-terrorism threats and suggested infiltrating Catholic churches as “threat mitigation.” This later-retracted FBI memorandum cited as support evidence propaganda from highly partisan sources.

The Biden Department of Education sought to repeal religious-liberty protections for faith-based organizations on college campuses. The Biden Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sought to force Christians to affirm radical transgender ideology against their faith. And the Biden Department of Health and Human Services sought to drive Christians who do not conform to certain beliefs on sexual orientation and gender identity out of the foster-care system. The Biden Administration declared March 31, 2024 — Easter Sunday — as “Transgender Day of Visibility.”

In this atmosphere of anti-Christian government, hostility and vandalism against Christian churches and places of worship surged, with the number of such identified acts in 2023 exceeding by more than eight times the number from 2018. Catholic churches and institutions have been aggressively targeted with hundreds of acts of hostility, violence, and vandalism.

My Administration will not tolerate anti-Christian weaponization of government or unlawful conduct targeting Christians. The law protects the freedom of Americans and groups of Americans to practice their faith in peace, and my Administration will enforce the law and protect these freedoms. My Administration will ensure that any unlawful and improper conduct, policies, or practices that target Christians are identified, terminated, and rectified.

Sec. 2. Establishing a Task Force to Eradicate Anti-Christian Bias. (a) There is hereby established within the Department of Justice the Task Force to Eradicate Anti-Christian Bias (Task Force).
(b) The Attorney General shall serve as Chair of the Task Force.
(c) In addition to the Chair, the Task Force shall consist of the following other members:
   (i)     the Secretary of State;
   (ii)   the Secretary of the Treasury;
   (iii)   the Secretary of Defense;
   (iv)   the Secretary of Labor;
   (v)     the Secretary of Health and Human Services;
   (vi)    the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development;
   (vii)   the Secretary of Education;
   (viii) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs;
   (ix)   the Secretary of Homeland Security;
   (x)    the Director of the Office of Management and Budget;
   (xi)    Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations;
   (xii)   the Administrator of the Small Business Administration;
   (xiii) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
   (xiv)   the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy;
   (xv)    the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency;
   (xvi)   the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; and
   (xvii) the heads of such other executive departments, agencies, and offices that the Chair may, from time to time, invite to participate.

Sec. 3. Task Force Functions. (a) The Task Force shall meet as required by the Chair and shall take appropriate action to:
   (i)    review the activities of all executive departments and agencies (agencies), including the Department of State, the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Labor, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Education, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, over the previous Administration and identify any unlawful anti-Christian policies, practices, or conduct by an agency contrary to the purpose and policy of this order;
   (ii)   recommend to the head of the relevant agency steps to revoke or terminate any violative policies, practices, or conduct identified under subsection (3)(a)(i) of this section and remedial actions to fulfill the purpose and policy of this order;
   (iii) share information and develop strategies to protect the religious liberties of Americans and advance the purpose and policy of this order;
   (iv)   solicit information and ideas from a broad range of individuals and groups, including Americans affected by anti-Christian conduct, faith-based organizations, and State, local, and Tribal governments, in order to ensure that its work is informed by a broad spectrum of ideas and experiences;
   (v)   identify deficiencies in existing laws and enforcement and regulatory practices that have contributed to unlawful anti-Christian governmental or private conduct and recommend to the relevant agency head, or recommend to the President, through the Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, as applicable, appropriate actions that agencies may take to remedy failures to fully enforce the law against acts of anti-Christian hostility, vandalism, and violence; and
   (vi)     recommend to the President, through the Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, any additional Presidential or legislative action necessary to rectify past improper anti-Christian conduct, protect religious liberty, or otherwise fulfill the purpose and policy of this order.
(b) In order to advise the President regarding its work and assist the President in formulating future policy, the Task Force shall submit to the President, through the Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy:
   (i)    a report within 120 days from the date of this order regarding the Task Force’s initial work;
   (ii) a report within 1 year from the date of this order that summarizes the Task Force’s work; and
   (iii) a final report upon the dissolution of the Task Force.

Sec. 4. Administration. (a) The heads of agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, upon the request of the Chair, provide the Task Force with any information required by the Task Force for the purpose of carrying out its functions.
(b) The Department of Justice shall provide such funding and administrative and technical support as the Task Force may require, to the extent permitted by law and as authorized by existing appropriations.

Sec. 5. Termination. The Task Force shall terminate 2 years from the date of this order unless extended by the President.

Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
   (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
   (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
    February 6, 2025.

MIL-OSI USA: HSI RGV, Federal partners investigation results in the sentencing of a South Texas man for a deadly human smuggling event

Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

BROWNSVILLE, Texas — A South Texas man was sentenced for conspiring to smuggle illegal aliens, resulting in multiple deaths, following an investigation conducted by Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) in collaboration with U.S. Border Patrol; U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Air and Marine Operations; police departments in Port Mansfield and South Padre Island; Texas Rangers; Texas Game Wardens; sheriff’s offices in Kenedy, Duval, and Willacy Counties; and the Willacy County District Attorney’s Office.

Jose Refugio Torres, 28, from Roma, Texas, was sentenced on Feb. 5 by U.S. District Judge Rolando Olvera to serve 36 months in prison, immediately followed by one year of supervised release. In handing down the sentence, the court noted the severity of human smuggling involving death and admonished Torres that should he ever return to the smuggling business, he could be facing potential life in federal prison. Torres pleaded guilty on Sept. 27, 2023.

“HSI is dedicated to collaborating with our law enforcement partners to ensure the safety and security of citizens across all communities in the United States,” said HSI San Antonio Special Agent in Charge Craig Larrabee. “We will remain focused on investigating and dismantling transnational criminal organizations that jeopardize the well-being of individuals.”

“As this case sadly demonstrates, human smuggling is a crime that takes lives and puts the public at risk,” said U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Texas, Nicolas J. Ganjei. “Securing the border is the Southern District of Texas’ number one priority, and breaking up these smuggling rings is a key component of that. We will continue to use all available resources to aggressively pursue those who flout our immigration laws and put profit ahead of human lives.”

According to court documents, Torres was involved in the attempted smuggling of illegal aliens in March 2019 by motor vehicle from the Rio Grande Valley to destinations within the United States. During this failed attempt in Duval County, a vehicle rolled over and caused the deaths of four people and serious injuries to six others.

The victims included citizens of Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Ecuador, as well as a 17-year-old boy from Ecuador.

Torres was permitted to remain on bond and voluntarily surrender to a U.S. Bureau of Prisons, the specific facility will be determined at a later date.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jose E. Arreola Jr. and Jose Esquivel Jr. from the Southern District of Texas prosecuted the case.

MIL-OSI Security: Richmond felon convicted of illegally possessing firearms

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

RICHMOND, Va. – A federal jury convicted a Richmond man today on two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

According to court records and evidence presented at trial, on Jan. 12, 2022, investigators with the Richmond Police (RPD) Youth and Family Crimes Unit were conducting an investigation at 3443 Walmsley Ave. During that investigation, investigators learned that Randel Douglas Hoggard, 39, and his significant other, K.B. had outstanding arrest warrants and requested the assistance of the U.S. Marshals to complete the arrest at the couple’s Richmond apartment.

Marshals arrested Hoggard and RPD procured a search warrant for items relevant to the investigation at the apartment. During the search, investigators observed multiple firearms and indicia of narcotics trafficking in the residence. Investigators obtained and executed a second search warrant and recovered four firearms, ammunition, digital scales, and other drug paraphernalia. Hoggard was a convicted felon at the time and could not legally possess firearms or ammunition.

On Jan. 16, 2024, the Chesterfield County Police Department Homicide Unit, assisted by RPD, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the Virginia State Police, executed a search warrant at another apartment at 3447 Walmsley Ave. Hoggard was present during the execution of the search warrant. Investigators located a loaded .40 caliber handgun hidden within the void of his closet door. Investigators also located .40 caliber ammunition in the defendant’s bedroom and suspected drugs. Hoggard was arrested on and has been in custody since Jan. 16, 2024.

Hoggard faces a up to 10 years in prison for the 2022 charge and up to 15 years in prison for the 2024 charge when sentenced on June 3. Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Erik S. Siebert, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; Anthony A. Spotswood, Special Agent in Charge of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Washington Field Division; Rick Edwards, Chief of Richmond Police; and Col. Edward F. Carpenter Jr., Chief of Chesterfield County Police, made the announcement after Senior U.S. District Judge Roderick C. Young accepted the verdict.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Stephen E. Anthony and Janet Jin Ah Lee is prosecuting the case.

A copy of this press release is located on the website of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Related court documents and information are located on the website of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia or on PACER by searching for Case No. 3:24-cr-66.

MIL-OSI Economics: IMF Press Briefing Transcript – Julie Kozack

Source: International Monetary Fund

February 6, 2025

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND PRESS BRIEFING

Washington, D.C. Thursday, February 6, 2025

P R O C E E D I N G S

KOZACK: Good morning, everyone. It’s great to see you all, here in person and online. Welcome to the first IMF press briefing for 2025. I’m Julie Kozak, Director of the Communication Department. As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. U.S. Eastern Time. I’ll start with a few announcements and then I’ll move to take your questions in person, on WebEx, and via the Press Center.

First, Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva will travel to Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. The Managing Director will visit Ethiopia on February 8th and 9th to meet Prime Minister Abiy and his team, and this visit will take stock of the economic reforms and progress that is being made by the country. She will also meet with stakeholders, including representatives of the private sector.

The Managing Director will also travel to the United Arab Emirates to participate in the Arab Fiscal Forum on February 10th and the World Government Summit on February 11th where she will deliver keynote remarks. On February 16th and 17th, the Managing Director will participate in a two-day conference in Saudi Arabia on building resilience of emerging market economies. The conference is co-organized by the IMF and the Saudi Finance Ministry.

The First Deputy Managing Director Gita Gopinath will travel to Japan to join the Article IV mission. She will participate in meetings with the authorities and hold a press conference on February 7th at 10:30 a.m. Tokyo time.

Finally, Deputy Managing Director Okamura will travel to Japan to participate in a jointly organized IMF-JICA conference on Economic and Fiscal Policy Challenges and Prospects for Asia. And this is scheduled for February 12 and 13.

And with that I will now open the floor for your questions. For those connecting virtually, please do turn on both your camera and the microphone when speaking. Let’s get started.

QUESTIONER: Hi,I was just wondering, you mentioned Ethiopia. How concerned are you about sort of countries with large IMF programs which also receive a substantial amount of support from USAID, considering the recent executive order, countries like Ethiopia and Ukraine, for example. Thanks.

KOZACK: Thanks very much. So with respect to your question, you know we are closely following the announcements and developments regarding USAID. At this stage it’s too early to gauge the precise impact on the countries that it supports. We’ll wait for clarity on the next steps, including any changes to the scope of the work of USAID.

QUESTIONER: So, the IMF mission is going to start working in Ukraine this month. Could you specify please what main issues will the Fund plan to focus on during the Seventh Review of the EFF program. And the second question is about the pension reform in Ukraine. Ukrainian government committed to starting this reform this year. Could you elaborate on what key changes the IMF expects from Ukraine on this area? Thank you.

KOZACK: Are there any other questions on Ukraine?

QUESTIONER: So, according to latest information, the review of the EFF is scheduled to begin this month. When the decision on the disbursement is going to be made and what amount of funds are going to be provided with this fund? And the follow-up, how much money is left in the EFF according to the current situation? Are there any plans to expand this program? Thank you.

QUESTIONER: Just to follow up on the question about Ethiopia. Obviously, the USAID cuts also affect Ukraine pretty significantly. And I wonder, you know, both in those cases and in all cases involving USAID funding, whether you are working with the US ED here and sort of sending a message about the impact. So, whether you’ve kind of figured it out across the enterprise and across all the countries that the IMF works with as well. Thanks.

KOZACK: Anything else on Ukraine online? Okay. So, on Ukraine, just to remind everyone of the context. So, on December 20th, the IMF’s Executive Board approved the Sixth Review of the EFF program. That enabled the disbursement of $1.1 billion and that brought total disbursements under the program to $9.8 billion. And the total size of the program, I believe, was $15.6 billion. So, the difference between those two is what would be remaining. At that time, the Board assessed that program performance remained strong. The authorities had met all of the benchmarks and prior actions for the review.

With respect to the next mission, the technical work for the upcoming review is underway. The mission dates are in the process of being finalized, and once we have them, we’ll be sure to communicate that. During this upcoming mission, the IMF staff will engage with the authorities on fiscal policy, including progress on revenue mobilization, monetary policies for 2025, and also progress in ensuring that debt sustainability and fiscal sustainability are restored. Staff will also be reviewing governance reforms, which remain a key pillar for the program. Based on the approved calendar of disbursements, subject to completion of the next review and, of course, subject to Board approval, Ukraine would have access to about $900 million for that next review.

With respect to pension reform, the government has committed to launch pension reforms this year in 2025, and they would be spearheaded by the Ministry of Social Policy. And those reforms are supported by external partners, notably the World Bank. What I can also add is that the authorities are in the process of developing a comprehensive set of proposals for pension reforms, but it’s too early to tell exactly what will be included in those proposals and what the changes may be.

And on the second question, I don’t really have much to add to what I already said, other than obviously we’re paying close attention and we’re awaiting further details.

QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. Thank you for taking my question. Just on Syria, can you give us an update if the IMF has made any contact with the new government and if there are any plans to provide a loan package to the country? Thank you.

KOZACK: We’re closely monitoring, obviously, the situation in Syria, and we stand ready to support the international community’s efforts to assist Syria’s reconstruction as needed and when conditions allow. With respect to our engagement, we have not had a meaningful engagement with Syria since 2009, which was the time of the last Article IV Consultation, and this has been due to the difficult security situation in the country.

QUESTIONER: I have two questions, and they’re Caribbean-related questions. Can you provide a breakdown of the growth projections for the Caribbean region, more specifically, focusing on St. Kitts and Nevis, and what factors are driving the projected growth or decline outlook for the region, more specifically, the Caribbean region?

KOZACK: Okay. All right, let me step back and give a little bit of an overview of where we stand, what our view is on the Caribbean. So, following the rapid recovery after the Pandemic, real GDP growth in the region has normalized in recent years. Average GDP growth for the region, and this is excluding Guyana and Haiti, is estimated at 2.2 percent for 2023, 2.4 percent for 2024. And growth, our projection is for growth to remain relatively stable at 2.4 percent in 2025.

Broadly speaking, there are sort of two groups of countries in the Caribbean. So, we look at tourism-dependent economies, and there we see that growth in tourism economies has slowed as tourism arrivals have returned to pre-Pandemic levels. And then for commodity-exporting countries, they have faced challenges in the energy sector but have overall benefited from robust performance in their non-energy sector, and that has been driven by supportive and economic policies.

I can also add that inflation in most Caribbean countries has moderated significantly over the past few years, and the decline was due to lower global commodity prices and easing of supply chain disruptions. And we expect inflation to remain moderate in the years to come.

QUESTIONER: My question is on the comment by Managing Director Georgieva in Davos. MD mentioned in Davos clearly that more cooperation in the regional levels might be needed in the future in such a fragmented world and IMF would support such a movement. And could you give me some more detailed plans?

KOZACK: Thanks very much for the question. What the Managing Director noted in Davos is that we are seeing shifting patterns in global cooperation, in trade, and in other areas, including financial and capital flows. And of course, as a global institution, what will be important for us is as we engage with our membership, right, to take all of this into account to ensure that we can give our members the best policy advice within our mandate of economic and financial stability.

QUESTIONER: Thanks so much, Julie. I wanted to ask you very broadly about the changes that are happening in the United States and the tariffs that President Trump has announced. Now the implementation of the tariffs on Canada and Mexico has been delayed to March 1st. And, you know, it’s not clear what will happen there exactly. But one of the, you know, the tariffs on China have stayed in place. China has now announced tariffs that will kick in on February 10th. The IMF has warned repeatedly against rising protectionism and also kind of cataloged the thousands of trade restrictions that have been put in place and growing over time since COVID. Can you just walk us through what your perception is right now? The markets have been really all over the place, you know, sort of up and down depending on the day’s mood. Do you see this period of trade uncertainty that you warned about in the WEO, kind of really affecting and dampening global growth prospects? Thanks.

KOZACK: Thanks very much. Let me see if anyone else has questions on this broad topic.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. Yeah, I was just wondering, just to follow on the previous question, how you sort of think about the unpredictability of of these tariffs or the discussions around the tariffs, the uncertainty that that kind of brings up, and potentially how that could affect monetary policy. We’ve seen a lot of analysts talking about how they no longer expect the Fed to cut, or they expect the Fed to cut maybe only once this year. I’m just sort of wondering how you’re kind of in real time or as close to real time as you can, sort of taking on board that unpredictability when you think about the U.S. economy and the impacts for global growth. Thanks.

KOZACK: Great. And you also had a question.

QUESTIONER: Yes. Just following up with my colleagues. What sort of study, if any, has the IMF undertaken to better understand the global ramifications of these tariffs? We know they’re on pause for another 30 days or so or less. And what sort of impact would small states that are heavily dependent on the United States feel going forward?

KOZACK: And let me go online to see if anyone online has a question along these lines.

QUESTIONER: It is very similar. Just wondering the fact that it’s not just tariffs that have imposed on China, but the threat of tariffs on countries across the EU, Canada, and Mexico, and what effect that has on the global outlook. Thank you.

KOZACK: Okay. Thank you. Anyone else online want to come in on this topic? Okay. So, what I can say on this issue is we’re following the announcements by the U.S. with respect to tariffs on Chinese goods and potentially Canadian and Mexican goods. We’re following these announcements. We believe that it’s in the interest of all to find a constructive way forward to resolve this issue.

With respect to the assessment, assessing the full impact of these measures of tariffs, it’s actually going to depend on several factors, and let me lay those out. One of those factors is going to be the responses of the countries concerned. Another factor will be how firms and consumers react. And finally, how the measures evolve over time will also have an impact.

So, at this stage, that’s what I can share with you. We will, of course, have more information over time and in due course as the situation evolves.

QUESTIONER: Julie, I’m sorry, I think the question is, like, can you say something about what uncertainty does to the global economy? I mean, you’ve talked about this in WEO’s before, but do you see this as a period of heightened uncertainty now that Trump has taken office? And, you know, what is the impact of that uncertainty on things like investment and all this, you know, the sort of categories of economic indicators that we look at?

KOZACK: So, I think what I can say is, of course, I would refer you to the WEO for some of those analysis. And again, assessing the full impact of this will include all of the factors that I just laid out. And we would take into account issues related to uncertainty, market reactions, et cetera, in an assessment that we will ultimately undertake as the situation evolves and once we have more information.

Let me now go online. I see a couple of hands up. So, if you’re online, please go ahead and jump in.

QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. Thank you for taking my question. Well, has the letter of intent between the IMF and Argentina been prepared? Or let me ask in a different way. Are the negotiations between Argentina and the IMF already in the final stage?

KOZACK: Thanks. Other questions on Argentina?

QUESTIONER: Could you give me any updates on the negotiations of the new agreement and what are the most challenging issues they are facing right now? And also yesterday, Minister Luis Caputo said a new agreement will not imply a devaluation of the peso or the exit of the exchange restrictions the next day. Does the IMF agree with this statement?

KOZACK: Thanks. Others on Argentina?

QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie. I was wondering also if you could give some input regarding the meetings that the mission in Buenos Aires had, if they have only been talking to government officials or if they are also contacting unions and other opposition representatives. And also, the new crawling peg of 1 percent has started this February. I was wondering if that was a matter of discussion between the staff and the government.

KOZACK: Thanks, other questions?

QUESTIONER: Yes, thank you, Julie. So, my question is also on the crawling peg. So, is the IMF concerned about the greater exchange rate delay generated by this reduction of the crawling peg from 2 percent to 1 percent started the 1st of February?

KOZACK: Any other questions on Argentina? Okay, I hear two more. Please go ahead.

QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie, I wanted to know if Argentina has already paid a debt due on February 1st or when is it expected to do so? And if there is a meeting plan between Argentina authorities and the IMF network staff in Washington.

KOZACK: Thank you. Next.

QUESTIONER: Good morning. The question is if Argentina and the IMF comes to a new agreement, should it be like we are talking here in Argentina about $5 million? It will be for anything special, for example, to leave what we call cepo, or it depends on the Argentine authorities.

KOZACK: Any other questions on Argentina? Okay, I do not see anyone coming in.

So, on Argentina, what I can share is first that, as the Managing Director highlighted after her meeting with President Milei last month, we recognize Argentina’s tremendous progress in reducing inflation, stabilizing the economy, returning to growth, and with poverty finally starting to decline. We continue to engage constructively with the Argentine authorities. And a staff mission did recently visit Buenos Aires to advance discussions on a new program. The new program will aim to build on the gains that have been achieved so far, while also addressing the remaining challenges that the country faces. Constructive and frequent discussions continue, and we will provide further details on next steps when we have them.

I can also just add that to sustain early gains, there is a shared recognition between the Fund staff and the Argentine authorities about the need to continue to adopt a consistent set of fiscal, monetary, and foreign exchange policies while furthering growth-enhancing reforms. I also know that you have a lot of interest, and there were a lot of detailed questions here, but given that the discussions are continuing and there has been good progress so far, we do want to ensure that there is space for staff and the authorities to continue these constructive discussions. And of course, we will communicate more when we have further details.

Okay, let us go online because I see a few hands up.

QUESTIONER: My question is, when do we expect Board of Directors to discuss Egypt Fourth Review?

KOZACK: Do we have other questions on Egypt?

QUESTIONER: Hi, I’d like to ask, in addition to that, when the board does discuss Egypt’s Fourth Review, will it also be discussing an additional RSF for Egypt? There have been some reports that Egypt is in line to receive as much as $1 billion.

KOZACK: Other questions?

QUESTIONER: I just wanted to ask, in terms of the assessment of Egypt, but also other countries in the region, to what extent you are calculating additional costs and spending needs that have to do with Gaza and with the potential absorption of Palestinian refugees that has been proposed.

KOZACK: Okay, any other questions on Egypt? I see I have two questions that have come through the press center, which I will read aloud. So, the first is when will the IMF’s Executive Board complete the Fourth Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Egypt?

The second question is regarding the Executive Board’s approval of the Fourth Review of Egypt’s program, could it be this month? Does the IMF have updates on your projections for Egypt’s economy in light of regional updates?

Let me share with you where we are on Egypt. On December 24, the IMF staff and the Egyptian authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the Fourth Review of the EFF. This review is subject to approval of our Executive Board and subject to that approval, Egypt would have access to about $1.2 billion. Preparations for Board consideration are underway, and the Board meeting is expected to take place in the coming weeks.

In light of the difficult external conditions and challenging domestic environment, the IMF staff and the Egyptian authorities agreed to recalibrate the fiscal consolidation path, and this was agreed in December, I would highlight, to create fiscal space for critical social programs benefiting vulnerable groups and the middle class while ensuring debt sustainability.

Looking forward, reform priorities comprise lowering inflation, sustaining exchange rate flexibility, and liberalized access to foreign exchange. In addition, the program aims to boost domestic revenues. It aims to improve the business environment. It aims to accelerate disinvestment or divestment rather and leveling [of] the playing field between state-owned enterprises and the private sector. And of course, it also aims to enhance governance and transparency.

With respect to the question on the RSF, a policy package of reforms will be considered by the Fund’s Executive Board along with the Fourth Review of Egypt’s program.

And lastly, there is no connection at the moment between some of the announcements in Gaza and the and the Egypt program.

QUESTIONER: Hi, I wonder if I can just clarify. On the RSF, you say a policy package of reforms that also presumably comes with some additional funding. Can you confirm whether the amount of up to $1 billion is accurate?

KOZACK: I can’t confirm now the precise amount of the RSF, but of course as we have more information, we will provide that.

QUESTIONER: Thank you so much.

KOZACK: Let us go online. I see another hand online and then we will come back. Just one follow up, a follow up. Go ahead.

QUESTIONER: You cannot confirm the amount of the RSF. So just so we are clear, are you confirming that there are discussions around an RSF? Thanks.

KOZACK: Yes, there’s discussions on an RSF and the intention is to present the RSF with its package of reforms to our Executive Board at the same time as we present the Fourth Review of the EFF.

QUESTIONER: Question about Rwanda and Eastern Congo. I wanted to know, I know that the IMF has programs with both Rwanda and the DRC. And I wanted to know, you know, given the M23 incursion, the fall of Goma, how the programs can react to it, if there is anything you can say about that. And also, obviously, in El Salvador, they changed their cryptocurrency law, but it is also reported that they recently bought 50 bitcoins. So, some people are for the kind of national treasury. Some people are confused in terms of what the contours of the limitations put on. And I wonder if you could comment on that. Thanks a lot.

KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Any other questions on these countries? DRC, Rwanda, El Salvador?

Okay, let me start with DRC and I want to start by saying that, you know, we are deeply saddened by the loss of lives and the humanitarian crisis in the Eastern part of DRC. We are closely monitoring the situation, including its potential impact on neighboring countries and the region. And of course, we are also closely monitoring with respect to potential impact on our program.

With respect to Rwanda, what I can say on Rwanda is simply that the country continues to demonstrate a robust commitment to advancing policy reforms. And In December of 2024, our Executive Board concluded the Fourth Review of Rwanda’s programs.

With respect to El Salvador, just to step back and remind, IMF staff and the Salvadorian authorities reached a staff-level agreement on December 18th for a new arrangement, a new EFF arrangement. The arrangement would be for about $1.4 billion to support the government’s reform agenda, and this agreement is subject to approval by the IMF’s Executive Board.

I can also add that as explained in the press release that we issued following the staff-level agreement, the new Fund supported program aims to reduce the potential risks of the bitcoin project. Once in place, purchases of bitcoin will be confined under the program as agreed.

QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. Good morning, everyone. A few things. In Zimbabwe, when you expect a deal for the Staff Monitored Program? And on Lebanon, have you had any contact with the new government? Are there any signs that you are going to be able to work with them? Also on Senegal, can you give us any update on the resolution of the suspension of the financing program there? And lastly, are there any concerns of a drop in the commitment of funding from the U.S.? The 2025 project calls for the U.S. to stop putting money into the World Bank and the IMF. So, are you guys concerned about that?

KOZACK: Okay, thanks. Starting with Zimbabwe, I do not have an update for you for today on Zimbabwe, but we will come back to you bilaterally.

On Lebanon, what I can share is that, you know, we welcome the election of General Aoun as president of Lebanon, and we look forward to working with him and his new government to address the challenges facing the Lebanese economy. And just to remind, Lebanon continues to face profound economic challenges, and the conflict had exacerbated an already fragile macroeconomic and social situation. The election of the president, the formation of a new government, as well as the ceasefire, are critical to support policy actions and reforms that would allow the gradual return to the normalization of economic activity in Lebanon.

And what I can share on Senegal is that we are actively engaged in discussions with the authorities on addressing the misreporting case. Senegal’s Court of Auditors is expected to issue its final report this month. In parallel, IMF staff are working closely with the authorities to identify their capacity development needs and to implement corrective measures needed to address the root causes of the misreporting. These efforts are aimed at enhancing transparency, strengthening accountability, and preventing a recurrence of similar misreporting in the future.

And I think, on your final question, all I can say here is that the United States is the IMF’s largest shareholder, and it plays an extremely valuable role in helping ensure global financial stability. We have a long history of working with successive U.S. administrations, and we look forward to continuing to do so.

QUESTIONER: Thanks, Julie. Thank you for taking my question. When do you think we can expect the Executive Board’s approval on the next tranche for the Island Nation? And if there is any delay, what sort of reason is there? Is there more for the government to do? And secondly, the budget for the country is expected in a few weeks. Has the IMF given any input on preparing this budget, given the fact that the country is still in the EFF program?

KOZACK: Thanks. So, your question was on Sri Lanka? And yes, I see you nodding. So, if anyone else has questions on Sri Lanka, I can take them now. Okay. If not, let me go ahead with Sri Lanka.

So, on Sri Lanka on November 23rd, IMF staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the Third Review of Sri Lanka’s EFF program. Once approved by the IMF’s Executive Board, Sri Lanka will have access to about $333 million in financing. And we expect the Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.

Here, I would also just like to take the opportunity to emphasize that Sri Lanka’s ambitious reform agenda is delivering commendable outcomes. The economy expanded by 5.5 percent in the fourth — third quarter of 2024. Average headline and core inflation remain contained well below the target during the fourth quarter of 2024. And international reserves increased to $6.1 billion at the end of 2024.

With respect to the specific question on the budget, what I can share is that the staff-level agreement that I mentioned, which was reached in November, will be presented to the Executive Board or is subject to Executive Board approval, but it’s also contingent upon, among other things, implementation by the authorities of prior actions, including submission of the 2025 budget that is consistent with parameters identified under the program.

QUESTIONER: Most of the questions we had have been touched upon, and I would just reinforce as well what colleagues had said earlier about trying to get a sense of what all this uncertainty around tariffs will mean. I know there is a tendency to talk about the policies once they are implemented and the impact. But given the fact that policies get announced and withdrawn and swung around, it seems like the uncertainty has more of the impact than the actual policy. But all that seems to be covered. I will get to — actually, the only outstanding question we have now is if you could update us on the status of the Mozambique program and if there is a risk to that program’s existence right now, given what is going on. That is for our Africa colleagues. Everything else was covered. Thank you so much. I appreciate it.

KOZACK: Thank you very much. So, on Mozambique, what I can share is that the Article IV Consultation and the Fourth Review of the Extended Credit Facility, or ECF, were completed back in July of 2024. An IMF team will visit Maputo in the coming weeks to engage with the new government. We do remain engaged to support the country’s efforts toward remaining macroeconomic stability, accelerating growth and making growth more inclusive, in line with the arrangements. But given that there is a mission in the coming weeks, we will have more to report toward the end of that engagement.

QUESTIONER: Julie, regarding Russia, are there any developments concerning the postponed mission to Russia to evaluate progress in economy that was stopped in September due to necessity to gather additional information and make additional analysis. Anything we should expect this year, probably? Thank you.

KOZACK: Unfortunately, I don’t yet have an update for you or a timeline for the Article IV.

QUESTIONER: One final question. Thank you. Sorry, Julie, I’m going to try again with a sort of a similar question. But, you know, we are seeing a fundamental shift in the global and potentially in the support that is available for developing countries. The United States has ended foreign assistance. It has frozen funding for the World Food Program. It is pulling out of and talking about pulling out of the World Health Organization. These are institutions that are part, writ large, of the Bretton Woods system in which the IMF is such a key player.

So, I do not think it’s unfair of us to be asking for some guidance from you about how you at an institution like the IMF are approaching this period of time that is marked by uncertainty, not just for the markets or for global trade, but also for the institutions themselves. And, you know, we have seen some initial reports that Elon Musk’s DOGE employees or people who work with DOGE are starting to look at the World Bank and other institutions.

And I, you know, so I guess we want to hear something from you that is a little bit broader about the time that we’re in and what it means, because it obviously has implications for other countries, too, if they’re going to fill the gap in the developing thing. And, you know, you have been warning for years that the developing economies face a kind of perfect storm of different difficult circumstances. This seems like it adds to, to it. Thanks.

KOZACK: Thanks very much. Look, what I can say now is really what I’ve been saying. I really do not have much to add other than that we are a global institution. We have a clearly defined mandate to support economic and financial stability globally and just ultimately support growth and employment in the world economy. We are continuing as an institution to remain laser-focused, of course, on that mandate. And we, as a global institution, take our responsibility to serve our membership very, very seriously. And we will continue to do everything that we need to do to serve our membership in the best possible way. You know, we do, as I said, have a long history of working with successive U.S. administrations, and we look forward to continuing to do so as an institution for which the U.S. is our largest shareholder.

And with this, I’m going to bring this press briefing to an end. Thank you all for your participation today. As a reminder, this briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time today. A transcript will be made available later on IMF.org, and as usual, in case of clarifications, additional queries, or anything else, please reach out to my colleagues at media@mf.org.

This does conclude our first press briefing of the year. I wish everyone a wonderful day and I do look forward to seeing you next time. Thank you all so much for joining, and please be safe given the weather outside here in D.C. Thank you, everyone.

* * * * *

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER:

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

MIL OSI Economics –

MIL-OSI USA: Luján Highlights Potential Impacts of Trump’s Trade War on New Mexico Businesses in Trade Representative Hearing

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator Ben Ray Luján (D-New Mexico)

Trade Representative Nominee Cannot Guarantee New Mexico Business Won’t Get Hurt From Trump’s Trade War

Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.), a member of the Senate Committee on Finance, questioned U.S. Trade Representative nominee Jamieson Greer on the potential negative impacts President Trump’s trade war would have on New Mexico businesses and families. During the hearing, Mr. Greer could not guarantee that New Mexico businesses would not face negative impacts.

Senator Luján secured Mr. Greer’s commitment that if New Mexico businesses were negatively impacted, Mr. Greer would work with Senator Luján to address the impacts. Additionally, Senator Luján secured commitment from Mr. Greer on labor protections that exist in the current United States-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade agreement to protect workers.

Watch Senator Luján’s exchange with Mr. Greer here.

KEY MOMENTS:

On language in USMCA regarding labor protections:

Sen. Luján: Would you protect or change the language surrounding the clauses in the trade agreement to workers as it’s currently drafted?

Mr. Greer, in part: We worked closely in the first Trump administration with labor.

Sen. Luján: Mr. Greer, as my time is expiring, would you protect that language?

Mr. Greer: I would certainly protect it and see if we can improve it.

On Trump’s trade war:

Sen. Luján: So, Mr. Greer, can I get your commitment that if these tariffs negatively impact the businesses in New Mexico, that I have your word to get that corrected?

Mr. Greer, in part: Well, Senator, I want to hear from you on what those impacts are and what we can do to make sure they are able to benefit from the growth.

Sen. Luján: I believe your word should be good, but do I have your word that I can count on you to make sure that New Mexico’s businesses don’t get hurt by these threatened tariffs?

Mr. Greer, in part: Senator, I want to make sure that they don’t, I can’t guarantee economic outcomes.

MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Tells Trade Nominee to Focus on Opening More Export Markets, Not a Tariff-First Approach

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell

02.06.25

Cantwell Tells Trade Nominee to Focus on Opening More Export Markets, Not a Tariff-First Approach

“The biggest task at hand is to […] get U.S. products into more places,” Cantwell tells Trump’s pick for U.S. Trade Representative; In fallout of Trump’s tariff threats, Cantwell paints a clear path forward: Instead of imposing tariffs, we need to open new markets;

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), a senior member of the Senate Finance Committee and the ranking member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, emphasized the importance of open markets for farmers and exporters in the State of Washington and across the country during a Finance Committee hearing to consider the nomination of Jamieson Greer for U.S. Trade Representative.

“When you look at apples — and about [50%] of our market export is to Canada and Mexico,” said Sen. Cantwell, “and the U.S. Free Trade Agreement increased that capacity … why are we arguing with our closest neighbors, our biggest export markets for apples? And in the meantime, not going out and opening up more apple markets?

“The tariffs that were put on cost us an unbelievable retaliatory tariff in India,” Sen. Cantwell added. “It basically decimated the market. It went from 120 million in India down to 1 million. …. I fought hard and did get the Biden administration to work with India and reverse that tariff on apples. And I have to say we are now back to recapturing that market. But I don’t understand why you think a tariff-first approach is the way to capitalize on the biggest task at hand.”

As a front page article in today’s Yakima Herald-Republic warns: Potential trade war could hit Yakima Valley agriculture.

Yesterday, Sen. Cantwell voted against advancing the nomination of Howard Lutnick, President Trump’s choice to be Secretary of the Department of Commerce, citing concerns with Lutnick’s support for Trump’s proposed tariffs.

Tuesday, Sen. Cantwell delivered a major speech on the Senate floor, arguing that the President’s arbitrary tariffs threaten domestic job creation and economic growth in an Information Age. She outlined a strategy focused on building coalitions, growing exports, and establishing principles to support innovation in the Information Age.

Sen. Cantwell has remained a steadfast supporter of free trade to grow the economy in the State of Washington and nationwide. Sen. Cantwell was the leading voice in negotiations to end India’s 20 percent retaliatory tariff on American apples, which devastated Washington state’s apple exports. India had once been the second-largest export market for American apples, but after then-President Trump imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum in his first term, India imposed retaliatory tariffs in response and U.S. apple exports plummeted. The impact on Washington apple growers was severe: apple exports from the state dropped from $120 million in 2017 to less than $1 million by 2023. In September 2023, following several years of Sen. Cantwell’s advocacy, India ended its retaliatory tariffs on apples and pulse crops which was welcome news to the state’s more than 1,400 apple growers and the 68,000-plus workers they support.

In May 2023, Sen. Cantwell sent a letter urging the Biden Administration to help U.S. potato growers finally get approval to sell fresh potatoes in Japan. In June 2023, Sen. Cantwell hosted U.S. Sen. Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), then-chair of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, in Washington state for a forum with 30 local agricultural leaders in Wenatchee to discuss the Farm Bill.

In 2022, Sen. Cantwell spearheaded passage of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act, a law to crack down on skyrocketing international ocean shipping costs and ease supply chain backlogs that raise prices for consumers and make it harder for U.S. farmers and exporters to get their goods to the global market.

In August 2020, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, Sen. Cantwell sent a letter to then-Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue requesting aid funds be distributed to wheat growers. In December 2018, Sen. Cantwell celebrated the passage of the Farm Bill, which included $500 million of assistance for farmers, including those who grow wheat.

In 2019, Sen. Cantwell helped secure a provision in the $16 billion USDA relief package, ensuring sweet cherry growers could access emergency funding to offset the impacts of tariffs and other market disruptions.

In Washington state: Two out of every five jobs are tied to trade and related industries. In 2023, the state imported $19.9 billion of goods from Canada – primarily oil, gas, lumber, and electrical power — making our northern neighbors Washington state’s largest trade partner. Also in 2023, the state imported $1.7 billion in goods from Mexico, including motor vehicles, vehicle parts, and household appliances. More information about how President Trump’s proposed tariffs will impact businesses and consumers in the State of Washington is HERE.

Video of Sen. Cantwell’s remarks during today’s hearing is available HERE, audio is available HERE, and a transcript is available HERE.

MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Letter to Duffy: ‘You Must Make Sure That All Conflicts Of Interest Between The FAA & Elon Musk Are Removed’

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell

02.06.25

Cantwell Letter to Duffy: ‘You Must Make Sure That All Conflicts Of Interest Between The FAA & Elon Musk Are Removed’

In letter to Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy, Cantwell urges admin to protect flying public from Elon Musk’s clear conflicts of interest; Cantwell: “We have ethics and recusal laws for a reason – to prevent corporate interference in protecting the public interest.”

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), ranking member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and senior member of the Senate Finance Committee, sent a letter to Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy calling on him to ensure that Elon Musk stays out of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), citing Musk’s clear conflicts of interest.

“FAA has the legal responsibility for safety oversight of companies with commercial space transportation licenses. Elon Musk’s SpaceX rocket launches share the airspace with commercial airplanes, and the FAA has the responsibility for keeping the entire airspace safe. SpaceX has been fined by the FAA for failing to comply with specific requirements in its launch license. Mr. Musk, in turn, called for the firing of Mike Whitaker, the FAA Administrator who the Senate confirmed 98-0 because the FAA issued a fine against SpaceX for not following the rules. We have ethics and recusal laws for a reason—to prevent corporate interference in protecting the public interest,” Sen. Cantwell wrote.

“We are now without a permanent FAA Administrator to lead us through the biggest U.S. air crash we have had in years. Secretary Duffy, you must make sure that all conflicts of interest between the FAA and Elon Musk are removed.”

Yesterday, Duffy wrote on the social media platform X that he plans to use The Department of Government Efficiency, of which Musk is a leader, “to plug in to help upgrade our aviation system.” His post followed two weeks of DOGE employees disrupting operations across the federal government, including freezing the hiring of air traffic controllers and encouraging all FAA employees to take a buyout. This also included urging federal employees – including air traffic controllers and FAA safety inspectors – to end their employment through a new deferred resignation program in the midst of a shortage of about 3,000 certified controllers and need for more safety inspectors on aircraft production factory floors.

Elon Musk is the owner and founder of SpaceX, an aerospace company that launched 134 rockets last year. In September, the FAA fined the company $633,009 for failing to follow license requirements for two launches.

Earlier today, Sen. Cantwell told reporters in a press gaggle on Capitol Hill that Musk’s involvement in the FAA’s oversight of our air transportation system was “a clear conflict of interest.”

Last year, when Sen. Cantwell served as chair of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, she sounded the alarm about the staffing shortage of air traffic controllers, need for more FAA safety inspectors, a series of aviation incidents and near-misses on and around runways, and the midair blowout of a door plug in January 2024. She led the passage of the FAA Reauthorization Act, signed into law in May 2024, which boosts controller staffing, ensuring a five-year commitment to maximum hiring and training to close the current staffing gap. The law requires upgraded safety technologies – giving controllers better visibility into runway traffic – to be installed at every large and medium airport nationwide. The law also includes stricter safety standards for aircraft operators and plane manufacturers, as well as provisions to boost staffing to put more FAA safety inspectors on factory floors.

The full text of the letter is HERE and below:

February 6, 2025

The Honorable Sean Duffy

Secretary

U.S. Department of Transportation

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE

Washington DC, 20590

Secretary Duffy:

When you and I spoke the other day, you asked if we could work together to accelerate the implementation of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (Next Gen) —as we directed Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to do in the FAA Reauthorization that became law in May 2024. I agree we need to work together to galvanize support to continue getting the best technology in place as soon as possible and make federal investments to make aviation safer.

However, when we spoke, you did not discuss your intention to involve Elon Musk in the FAA’s safety systems or process. It is a conflict of interest for someone whose company is regulated by the federal government to be involved in anything that affects his personal financial interest, his company or his competitors.

FAA has the legal responsibility for safety oversight of companies with commercial space transportation licenses. Elon Musk’s SpaceX rocket launches share the airspace with commercial airplanes, and the FAA has the responsibility for keeping the entire airspace safe. SpaceX has been fined by the FAA for failing to comply with specific requirements in its launch license. Mr. Musk, in turn, called for the firing of Mike Whitaker, the FAA Administrator who the Senate confirmed 98-0 because the FAA issued a fine against SpaceX for not following the rules. We have ethics and recusal laws for a reason—to prevent corporate interference in protecting the public interest.

We are now without a permanent FAA Administrator to lead us through the biggest U.S. air crash we have had in years. Secretary Duffy, you must make sure that all conflicts of interest between the FAA and Elon Musk are removed.

I look forward to working with you to invest in our aviation safety and appreciate your cooperation in ensuring all ethics laws and regulations are followed.

Sincerely,

Maria Cantwell

Ranking Member

Cc: David Huitema, Director, Office of Government Ethics

Mitch Behm, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation