Category: France

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Use of Paragon Solutions spyware against journalists and civil society representatives – E-000600/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000600/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Pina Picierno (S&D), Giorgio Gori (S&D), Camilla Laureti (S&D), Estelle Ceulemans (S&D), Alessandra Moretti (S&D), Marc Angel (S&D), Birgit Sippel (S&D), Elisabetta Gualmini (S&D), Irene Tinagli (S&D), Kristian Vigenin (S&D), Brando Benifei (S&D), Alex Agius Saliba (S&D), Matjaž Nemec (S&D), Alessandro Zan (S&D), Maria Grapini (S&D)

    Several newspapers[1][2][3] revealed on 31 January 2025 that WhatsApp had informed more than 100 journalists and civil society representatives worldwide that they had been attacked by spyware developed by the Israeli company Paragon Solutions. Also among the victims is Francesco Cancellato, director of the online newspaper Fanpage.it.

    This attack allowed hackers to illegally gain full access to victims’ devices, collecting sensitive data and intercepting private communications on the encrypted platform.

    In the light of these events, can the Commission answer the following questions:

    • 1.What measures will the Commission take to launch an investigation to ascertain the extent of this violation?
    • 2.Will it launch an investigation to ascertain who is responsible and take action against the perpetrators?
    • 3.What measures will it take to protect press freedom and journalists from such cyber attacks given the violations of Directive 2009/136/EC, Directive (EU) 2018/1972, Regulation (EU) 2024/1083, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive 2013/40/EU?

    Submitted: 10.2.2025

    • [1] https://www.fanpage.it/attualita/giornalisti-presi-di-mira-dallo-spyware-israeliano-paragon-spiato-anche-il-direttore-di-fanpage-it/.
    • [2] https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/spiato-software-militare-israeliano-fondatore-ong-mediterranea-AGim5PjC?refresh_ce&nof.
    • [3] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/jan/31/italian-journalist-whatsapp-israeli-spyware.
    Last updated: 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Beam Global (Europe) Announces Record Orders in the First Two Months of 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SAN DIEGO, Feb. 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Beam Global, (Nasdaq: BEEM), a leading provider of innovative and sustainable infrastructure solutions for the electrification of transportation and energy security, today announced record sales for the first two months of 2025, in Europe. Beam Global has achieved a 79% increase in new contracted orders in its European division, compared to the same period in 2024, demonstrating that the European market represents a significant growth and diversification opportunity for the Company.

    Since the beginning of the year, contracted product sales have increased to a new record, driven by strong demand for street lighting and other infrastructure products.

    “Our expansion into Europe has created opportunities for sales growth, both in our renewably energized EV charging and energy security products, as well as in our smart cities and street lighting portfolios,” said Desmond Wheatley, CEO of Beam Global. “While the new administration has created uncertainty around U.S. government EV adoption, EV sales were actually up 30% in the U.S. in January compared to 2024, according to Cox Automotive, and 34% in Europe, according to EuroNews. We intend to focus heavily on growing sales through our European operations while continuing to support the growth of EV charging requirements in the U.S. Congratulations to our European team for setting this new January and February sales record.”

    To foster growth and diversify revenue streams beyond the U.S, Beam Global is expanding its European presence through aggressive sales strategies. Most recently, Beam Global CEO, Desmond Wheatley, along with members of the European sales team, met with prospective customers, government officials, airport representatives, EV charging and e-bike sharing companies, and others in the UK, France, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Greece.

    Greater Europe represents the largest automobile market in the world, with over 405 million cars. A 2035 EU mandate bans the sale of internal combustion vehicles in less than ten years, while the EU also mandated a reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions of at least 55% by 2030. As a result, interest in Beam Global’s innovative and sustainable EV ARC™, BeamSpot™ BeamBike™ and BeamPatrol™ products are growing significantly in the region.

    About Beam Global
    Beam Global is a clean technology innovator which develops and manufactures sustainable infrastructure products and technologies. We operate at the nexus of clean energy and transportation with a focus on sustainable energy infrastructure, rapidly deployed and scalable EV charging solutions, safe energy storage and vital energy security. With operations in the U.S. and Europe, Beam Global develops, patents, designs, engineers and manufactures unique and advanced clean technology solutions that power transportation, provide secure sources of electricity, save time and money and protect the environment. Beam Global is headquartered in San Diego, CA with facilities in Chicago, IL and Belgrade and Kraljevo, Serbia. Beam Global is listed on Nasdaq under the symbol BEEM. For more information visit BeamForAll.comLinkedInYouTube, Instagram and X (formerly Twitter).

    Forward-Looking Statements
    This Beam Global Press Release may contain forward-looking statements. All statements in this Press Release other than statements of historical facts are forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are generally accompanied by terms or phrases such as “estimate,” “project,” “predict,” “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “target,” “plan,” “intend,” “seek,” “goal,” “will,” “should,” “may,” or other words and similar expressions that convey the uncertainty of future events or results. These statements relate to future events or future results of operations. These statements are only predictions and involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors, which may cause Beam Global’s actual results to be materially different from these forward-looking statements. Except to the extent required by law, Beam Global expressly disclaims any obligation to update any forward-looking statements.

    Media Contact
    Andy Lovsted
    +1-858-335-8465
    Press@BeamForAll.com

    Investor Relations
    Luke Higgins
    +1-858-799-4583
    IR@BeamForAll.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New defibrillator installed at Belgrave Hall

    Source: City of Leicester

    A NEW life-saving defibrillator has been installed at Belgrave Hall in Leicester, as part of the Heartshield initiative.

    Heartshield was launched by Leicester City Council’s public health team, East Midlands Ambulance Service (EMAS) and local heart charity the Joe Humphries Memorial Trust (JHMT). Its aim is to map out the council’s available defibrillators and fill in the gaps by installing new ones where needed. As a result, in the last year, 10 new defibrillators have been installed at council venues across the city, including Belgrave Hall.

    All of the defibrillators are available for public use 24 hours a day, whenever they are needed.

    Every year in the UK, ambulance services attend more than 30,000 callouts to people who are in cardiac arrest (their heart has stopped beating). Currently, fewer than one in 10 of these people will survive. Early use of a defibrillator can make a huge difference to someone’s chances of survival.

    Cllr Vi Dempster, assistant city mayor responsible for public health, said: “Availability of public-access defibrillators and confidence in using them is vitally important to improving survival rates. We’ve made excellent progress, but there is always more to be done, which is why we’re delighted to be working with the ambulance service and the Joe Humphries Memorial Trust on this.

    “If you own a public building or a small business in Leicester, or any place where people gather, please consider installing a defibrillator to an external wall, so that it can be accessed easily at any time of the day or night. There are funding sources that can help with this. Together, we can help to make Leicester a heart-safe city.”

    The defibrillator at Belgrave Hall was funded by Leicester City Council’s public health team and Government funding. In other areas of the city, ward councillors have used community grants to support installation.

    Dr Laura French, consultant in public health at Leicester City Council, said: “By working together with communities, we aim to improve survival rates. As well as encouraging the installation of more defibs, it’s important that the ones we already have in Leicester are registered on a national database called The Circuit, so that emergency services can direct people to the nearest defibrillator in the event of a cardiac arrest. We also encourage people to access free training so that they know how to use a defibrillator.”

    Dr Mike Ferguson from the Joe Humphries Memorial Trust said: “Out of hospital cardiac arrests can happen to anyone, of any age, at any time. Together with our communities, the Heartshield project will continue in 2025 to help spread the word about this important issue and get more defibs installed.

    “Do you and the people you work with feel confident in how to give CPR if you were to see someone collapse? Would you feel confident using an automated defibrillator? If not, consider accessing some of the training freely available through us at JHMT, or through other sources such as EMAS. Being prepared is key to saving lives.”

    As well as providing free CPR and defibrillator training, the JHMT works hard to raise awareness of sudden, unexpected heart deaths (SADS), helps to provide community defibrillators and runs Inspire, a local grants scheme for inspirational young people in the city and county.

    To find out more about the work of the Trust, apply for training and support, or to help out with the charity’s work, visit the website at www.jhmt.org.uk

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: Gene Hackman will be remembered as the Hollywood actor’s actor

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Will Jeffery, Sessional Academic, Discipline of Film Studies, University of Sydney

    Gene Hackman, an acting titan of 1970s and ‘80s Hollywood with more than 80 screen credits to his name, has died at 95. He was found dead in his home with his wife, pianist Betsy Arakawa, and his dog.

    Hackman had a rugged, dominating and commanding presence on screen, known for his emotionally honest, raw and fierce performances. Always the tough guy, never the romantic lead, off camera he was shy and enjoyed the quiet life.

    I first saw Hackman as a child in The Poseidon Adventure (1972). My dad put the film on for the upside-down ocean liner disaster sequences, but it was Hackman who left a lasting impression. I vividly remember being so moved by his final speech berating God for deserting the ship’s passengers and crew while he hangs from a pressure valve door over flames.

    There is no actor who comes close to conveying authority with such humanity and reserve.

    He was often referred to as the actor’s actor and mentioned by Hollywood A-listers such as Kevin Costner as the best actor they’ve ever worked with. Clint Eastwood, once Hackman retired, described him as “too good not to be performing”.

    Hackman will leave a legacy to be studied and appreciated for years to come.

    Finding a foot in show business

    Born in San Bernardino, California, on January 30 1930, Hackman’s family moved to Danville, Illinois, when he was three. Hackman’s father left when he was 13, which he described to James Lipton on Inside the Actors Studio as his father “driving by with a casual wave goodbye”.

    Hackman joked to Lipton the departure of his father at an early age made him a better actor.

    Hackman left Danville at the age of 16 to join the marines, where he spent roughly four years. He was a rebellious child, but as Peter Shelley detailed in his biography of Hackman, the marine corps was the first time he gave in to authority.

    After the marine corps, Hackman moved to New York wanting to become an actor, telling people he was inspired by tough guy James “Jimmy” Cagney.

    In New York, Hackman struggled making a living as an artist while waiting for his breakthrough (his uncle told him to give up and get an honest job). Moving to California, he became friends early on with Dustin Hoffman (they finally appeared opposite each other in Hackman’s penultimate film, 2003’s Runaway Jury).

    After struggling for years, Hackman landed his first credited screen role in 1964’s Lilith at the age of 34. He played a small part opposite upcoming star Warren Beatty.

    As Hackman recounted to Lipton, Beatty told director Arthur Penn how great Hackman was in a scene they did together. That landed Hackman his breakthrough role playing Buck Barrow opposite Beatty and Faye Dunaway in the 1967 hit Bonnie and Clyde, earning him an Oscar nomination for best supporting actor.

    Breaking through in the 1970s

    It wasn’t until the 1970s that Hackman began his leading role career, starring in The French Connection (1971) as the unforgettable hard-boiled New York detective Jimmy “Popeye” Doyle. This role earned him his first Academy Award, for best actor.

    He was to wait more than 20 years for his second and final Academy Award, for playing the ruthless Little Bill Daggett opposite Clint Eastwood in Unforgiven (1992).

    Throughout the 1970s, Hackman was gaining huge popularity on screen, sharing records with the likes of Robert Redford and Harrison Ford as the highest grossing stars at the box office.

    There are too many great Hackman performances to mention, but my favourites are Unforgiven, The French Connection, The Poseidon Adventure, The Conversation (1974), Hoosiers (1986), Mississippi Burning (1988) and The Royal Tenenbaums (2001).

    The French Connection’s director, William Friedkin, said in an interview Hackman was anti-authority and anti-racism because of his upbringing in an area known for its large Ku Klux Klan presence, and his absent father.

    Hackman almost pulled out of The French Connection one week into shooting because he didn’t like “beating on people” for a four-month shoot. He told Friedkin “I don’t think I can do this,” but Friedkin refused to let him go.

    Hackman recalled he was eternally grateful Friedkin didn’t, as it was “the start of [his] career”.

    Hackman said his character Popeye Doyle was a “bigot, an antisemitic, and whatever else you wanted to call him”, and he famously struggled to say the N-word in one key scene. He initially protested the line but eventually went with it, believing “that’s who the guy is […] you couldn’t really whitewash him”.

    Hackman often played the character who had the greatest authority on the surface but slipped up, whether he was playing the hero or the villain. Even for a role such as Reverend Scott in The Poseidon Adventure, in which Hackman played a self-righteous preacher onboard the capsized SS Poseidon, he questions his religion as he leads the entire band of escapees to safety.

    A life after acting

    Hackman retired from acting in 2004 at age 74.

    There are many stories about why he retired, like, as Shelley writes, not wanting to play Hollywood “grandfathers” and his “heart wasn’t in shape”, but his life after acting gives a strong hint: he had other interests.

    Over the past 20 years, Hackman wrote three historical fiction novels, was a keen painter, and enjoyed exercise such as cycling. Married to classical pianist Arakawa from 1991 until their death, they lived in Santa Fe, New Mexico, where he designed his own home (yes, he also loved architecture!).

    A man of many talents who played a kaleidoscopic range of authoritative roles, Hackman will almost certainly be remembered mainly for his tough-guy performance in The French Connection – though many will also remember him as the Hollywood actor’s actor.

    Will Jeffery does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Gene Hackman will be remembered as the Hollywood actor’s actor – https://theconversation.com/gene-hackman-will-be-remembered-as-the-hollywood-actors-actor-233109

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-Evening Report: Gene Hackman will be remembered as the Hollywood actor’s actor

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Will Jeffery, Sessional Academic, Discipline of Film Studies, University of Sydney

    Gene Hackman, an acting titan of 1970s and ‘80s Hollywood with more than 80 screen credits to his name, has died at 95. He was found dead in his home with his wife, pianist Betsy Arakawa, and his dog.

    Hackman had a rugged, dominating and commanding presence on screen, known for his emotionally honest, raw and fierce performances. Always the tough guy, never the romantic lead, off camera he was shy and enjoyed the quiet life.

    I first saw Hackman as a child in The Poseidon Adventure (1972). My dad put the film on for the upside-down ocean liner disaster sequences, but it was Hackman who left a lasting impression. I vividly remember being so moved by his final speech berating God for deserting the ship’s passengers and crew while he hangs from a pressure valve door over flames.

    There is no actor who comes close to conveying authority with such humanity and reserve.

    He was often referred to as the actor’s actor and mentioned by Hollywood A-listers such as Kevin Costner as the best actor they’ve ever worked with. Clint Eastwood, once Hackman retired, described him as “too good not to be performing”.

    Hackman will leave a legacy to be studied and appreciated for years to come.

    Finding a foot in show business

    Born in San Bernardino, California, on January 30 1930, Hackman’s family moved to Danville, Illinois, when he was three. Hackman’s father left when he was 13, which he described to James Lipton on Inside the Actors Studio as his father “driving by with a casual wave goodbye”.

    Hackman joked to Lipton the departure of his father at an early age made him a better actor.

    Hackman left Danville at the age of 16 to join the marines, where he spent roughly four years. He was a rebellious child, but as Peter Shelley detailed in his biography of Hackman, the marine corps was the first time he gave in to authority.

    After the marine corps, Hackman moved to New York wanting to become an actor, telling people he was inspired by tough guy James “Jimmy” Cagney.

    In New York, Hackman struggled making a living as an artist while waiting for his breakthrough (his uncle told him to give up and get an honest job). Moving to California, he became friends early on with Dustin Hoffman (they finally appeared opposite each other in Hackman’s penultimate film, 2003’s Runaway Jury).

    After struggling for years, Hackman landed his first credited screen role in 1964’s Lilith at the age of 34. He played a small part opposite upcoming star Warren Beatty.

    As Hackman recounted to Lipton, Beatty told director Arthur Penn how great Hackman was in a scene they did together. That landed Hackman his breakthrough role playing Buck Barrow opposite Beatty and Faye Dunaway in the 1967 hit Bonnie and Clyde, earning him an Oscar nomination for best supporting actor.

    Breaking through in the 1970s

    It wasn’t until the 1970s that Hackman began his leading role career, starring in The French Connection (1971) as the unforgettable hard-boiled New York detective Jimmy “Popeye” Doyle. This role earned him his first Academy Award, for best actor.

    He was to wait more than 20 years for his second and final Academy Award, for playing the ruthless Little Bill Daggett opposite Clint Eastwood in Unforgiven (1992).

    Throughout the 1970s, Hackman was gaining huge popularity on screen, sharing records with the likes of Robert Redford and Harrison Ford as the highest grossing stars at the box office.

    There are too many great Hackman performances to mention, but my favourites are Unforgiven, The French Connection, The Poseidon Adventure, The Conversation (1974), Hoosiers (1986), Mississippi Burning (1988) and The Royal Tenenbaums (2001).

    The French Connection’s director, William Friedkin, said in an interview Hackman was anti-authority and anti-racism because of his upbringing in an area known for its large Ku Klux Klan presence, and his absent father.

    Hackman almost pulled out of The French Connection one week into shooting because he didn’t like “beating on people” for a four-month shoot. He told Friedkin “I don’t think I can do this,” but Friedkin refused to let him go.

    Hackman recalled he was eternally grateful Friedkin didn’t, as it was “the start of [his] career”.

    Hackman said his character Popeye Doyle was a “bigot, an antisemitic, and whatever else you wanted to call him”, and he famously struggled to say the N-word in one key scene. He initially protested the line but eventually went with it, believing “that’s who the guy is […] you couldn’t really whitewash him”.

    Hackman often played the character who had the greatest authority on the surface but slipped up, whether he was playing the hero or the villain. Even for a role such as Reverend Scott in The Poseidon Adventure, in which Hackman played a self-righteous preacher onboard the capsized SS Poseidon, he questions his religion as he leads the entire band of escapees to safety.

    A life after acting

    Hackman retired from acting in 2004 at age 74.

    There are many stories about why he retired, like, as Shelley writes, not wanting to play Hollywood “grandfathers” and his “heart wasn’t in shape”, but his life after acting gives a strong hint: he had other interests.

    Over the past 20 years, Hackman wrote three historical fiction novels, was a keen painter, and enjoyed exercise such as cycling. Married to classical pianist Arakawa from 1991 until their death, they lived in Santa Fe, New Mexico, where he designed his own home (yes, he also loved architecture!).

    A man of many talents who played a kaleidoscopic range of authoritative roles, Hackman will almost certainly be remembered mainly for his tough-guy performance in The French Connection – though many will also remember him as the Hollywood actor’s actor.

    Will Jeffery does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Gene Hackman will be remembered as the Hollywood actor’s actor – https://theconversation.com/gene-hackman-will-be-remembered-as-the-hollywood-actors-actor-233109

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: Eugene Doyle: Yellow Peril!  Red Peril! ‘We cannot hide anymore’. Chinese warships in the Tasman Sea. 

    Report by Dr David Robie – Café Pacific.

    COMMENTARY: By Eugene Doyle

    The Western media went into overdrive this week to work the laconic Kiwis into a mild frenzy over three Chinese naval vessels conducting exercises in the Tasman Sea a few thousand kilometres off our shores.

    What was really behind this orchestrated campaign?

    The New Zealand government led the rhetorical charge over the Hengyang, the Zunyi and the Weishanhu in mare nostrum (“Our Sea”, as the Romans liked to call the Mediterranean).

     “We cannot hide at this end of the world anymore,” Defence Minister Judith Collins said in light of three Chinese boats in the Tasman.

    Warrior academics were next . “We need to go to the cutting edge, and we need to do that really, really fast,” the ever-reliable China hawk Anne-Marie Brady of Canterbury University said, telling 1 News the message of the live-firing exercises was that China wants to rule the waves.

    The British Financial Times chimed in with a warning that “A confronting strategic future is arriving fast”.

    Could this have anything to do with the fact we are fast approaching the New Zealand government’s 2025 budget and that they — and their Australian, US and UK allies — are intent on a major increase in Kiwi defence funding, moving from around 1.2 percent of GDP to possibly two percent? A long-anticipated Defence Capability Review is also around the corner and is likely to come with quite a shopping list of expensive gear.

    The New Zealand government led the rhetorical charge over the Hengyang, the Zunyi and the Weishanhu in mare nostrum (“Our Sea”, as the Romans liked to call the Mediterranean). Image: www.solidarity.co.nz

    What’s good for the goose . . .
    It is worth pointing out that New Zealand and Australian warships sailed through the contested Taiwan Strait and elsewhere in the South China Sea as recently as September 2024. What’s good for the goose is good for the Panda.

    And, of course, at any one time about 20 US nuclear submarines are prowling in the deep waters of the Pacific Ocean and South China Sea. Each can carry missiles the equivalent of over 1000 Hiroshima bombs — truly apocalyptic.

    Veteran New Zealand peace campaigner Mike Smith (a friend) was not in total disagreement with the hawks when it came to the argy-bargy in the Tasman.

    “The emergence apparently from nowhere of a Chinese naval expedition in our waters I think may be intended to demonstrate that they have a large and very capable blue water navy now and won’t be penned in by AUKUS submarines when and if they arrive off their coast.

    “I think the main message is to the Australians: if you want to homebase nuclear-capable B-52s we have more than one way to come at you. That was also the message of the ICBM they sent into the Pacific: Australia is no longer an unsinkable aircraft carrier.”

    According to the Asia Times, China fired the ICBM — the first such shot into the Pacific by China — just days after HMNZS Aotearoa sailed through the Taiwan Strait with Australian vessel HMAS Sydney.

    Smith says our focus should be on building positive relationships in the Pacific on our terms. “Buying expensive popguns will not save us.”

    China Scare a page out of Australia’s Red Scare playbook
    For people good at pattern recognition this week’s China Scare was obviously a page or two out of the same playbook that duped a majority of Australians into believing China was going to invade Australia. They were lulled into a false sense of insecurity back in 2021 — the mediascape flooded with Red Alert, China panic stories about imminent war with the rising Asian power.

    As a sign of how successful the mainstream media can be in generating fear that precedes major policy shifts: research by Australia’s Institute of International & Security Affairs showed that more Australians thought that China would soon attack Australia than Taiwanese believed China would attack Taiwan!

    Once the population was conditioned, they woke one morning in September 2021 with the momentous news that Australia had ditched a $90 billion submarine defence deal with France and the country was now part of a new anti-Chinese military alliance called AUKUS. This was the playbook that came to mind last week.

    There are strong, rational arguments that could be made to increase our spending at this time. But I loathe and decry this kind of manipulation, this manufacturing of consent.

    I also fear what those billions of dollars will be used for. Defending our coastlines is one thing; joining an anti-Chinese military alliance to please the US is quite another.

    Prime Minister Luxon has called China — our biggest trading partner — a strategic competitor. He has also suggested, somewhat ludicrously, that our military could be a “force multiplier” for Team AUKUS.

    We are hitching ourselves to the US at the very time they have proven they treat allies as vassals, threatened to annex Greenland and the Panama Canal, continue to commit genocide in Gaza, and are now imposing an unequal treaty on Ukraine.


    Australia’s ABC News on Foreign Minister Winston Peter’s talks in China. Video: ABC

    Whose side – or calmer independence?
    Whose side should we be on? Or should we return to a calmer, more independent posture?

    And then there’s the question of priorities. The hawks may convince the New Zealand population that the China threat is serious enough that we should forgo spending money on child poverty, fixing our ageing infrastructure, investing in health and education and instead, as per pressure from our AUKUS partners, spend some serious coin — billions of dollars more — on defence.

    Climate change is one battle that is being fought and lost. Will climate funding get the bullet so we can spend on military hardware? That would certainly get a frosty reaction from Pacific nations at the front edge of sea rise.

    The government in New Zealand is literally taking the food out of children’s mouths to fund weapons systems. The Ka Ora, Ka Ako programme provides nutritious lunches every day to a quarter of a million of New Zealand’s most needy children.

    Its funding has recently been slashed by over $100 million by the government despite its own advisors telling it that such programmes have profound long-term wellbeing benefits and contribute significantly to equity. In the next breath we are told we need to boost funding for our military.

    The US appears determined to set itself on a collision course with China but we don’t have to be crash test dummies sitting alongside them. Prudence, preparedness, vigilance and risk-management are all to be devoutly wished for; hitching our fate to a hostile US containment strategy is bad policy both in economic and defence terms.

    In the absence of a functioning media — one that showcases diverse perspectives and challenges power rather than works hand-in-glove with it — populations have been enlisted in the most abhorrent and idiotic campaigns: the Red Peril, the Jewish Peril and the Black Peril (in South Africa and the southern states of the USA), to name three.

    Our media-political-military complex is at it again with this one — a kind of Yellow Peril Redux.

    New Zealand trails behind both Australia and China in development assistance to the Pacific. If we wish to “counter” China, supporting our neighbours would be a better investment than encouraging an unwinnable arms race.

    In tandem, I would advocate for a far deeper diplomatic and cultural push to understand and engage with China; that would do more to keep the region peaceful and may arrest the slow move in China towards seeking other markets for the high-quality primary produce that an increasingly bellicose New Zealand still wishes to sell them.

    Let’s be friends to all, enemies of none. Keep the Pacific peaceful, neutral and nuclear-free.

    Eugene Doyle is a community organiser and activist in Wellington, New Zealand. He received an Absolutely Positively Wellingtonian award in 2023 for community service. His first demonstration was at the age of 12 against the Vietnam War. This article was first published at his public policy website Solidarity and he is a regular contributor to Asia Pacific Report and Café Pacific.

    This article was first published on Café Pacific.

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Panasonic HD Announces Personnel Changes Relating to Executive Officers, Presidents of Operating Companies and Others

    Source: Panasonic

    Headline: Panasonic HD Announces Personnel Changes Relating to Executive Officers, Presidents of Operating Companies and Others

    The content in this website is accurate at the time of publication but may be subject to change without notice.Please note therefore that these documents may not always contain the most up-to-date information.Please note that German, French and Chinese versions are machine translations, so the quality and accuracy may vary.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI: Azerion publishes Interim Unaudited Financial Results Q4 2024 and Preliminary Unaudited Financial Results Full Year 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Strong Platform performance driving profitability

    Highlights of FY and Q4 2024

    Our FY 2024 performance reflects the year long focus on efficiency and profitability driven by continued investment in the advertising platform: 

    • FY 2024 Revenues up 13% from € 486.7 million1 to € 551.2 million
    • FY 2024 Adjusted EBITDA up 21% YoY from € 62.2 million1 to € 75.1 million

    Specifically in Q4 2024, we focused on driving synergies and eliminating redundant costs in the advertising platform: 

    • Q4 2024 Adjusted EBITDA up 14% YoY from € 26.4 million to € 30.1 million 
    • Core segment Platform outperformed the group with Adjusted EBITDA up 15% from € 22.8 million in Q4 2023 to € 26.2 million in Q4 2024
    • Maintained Q4 2024 Revenues at € 168 million (-2%) while integrating and reorganising 2022 and 2023 acquisitions in order to phase out low margin revenues and focus on increased profitability

    At the same time we used the last quarter to strengthen our position through new partnerships, acquisitions and further financing:

    • Signed 90 new publishers and connected 3 additional SSPs and DSPs to expand our digital audiences across Europe and the Americas and further integrated our publisher monetisation tool OneFMS across regions.
    • Finalised the acquisition of Goldbach Austria GmbH, one of the foremost digital and linear advertising brokers in the DACH region providing Azerion with additional digital out of home footprint and an annual revenue run rate of over € 20 million.  
    • Entered new partnerships with Produpress in Belgium and Moneytizer in France to enrich the unique content and audiences that we make available for brands and agencies.
    • Successfully completed the placement of additional bonds for an amount of € 50 million under Azerion’s existing Senior Secured Callable Floating Rate Bond framework of € 300 million.

    In addition, we further invested in our platform’s multi-cloud infrastructure and AI capabilities:

    • Added Huawei as cloud partner alongside AWS and Google in our Azerion multi-cloud setup reducing our reliance on single cloud vendors and decreasing our total cost of ownership.
    • Migration of Eniro to the Azerion multi-cloud bringing them higher quality, lower latency service and annual cost savings of over € 1.5 million once fully implemented.
    • Deployed our latest version of AI enhanced creative performance benchmark and outcome intelligence tools helping our advertisers and our operators to better understand which ads work best for various audiences in different circumstances and allowing for machine optimisation of campaigns.

    1 (excluding the divested social card games portfolio)

    Selected KPIs

    Financial Results – Azerion Group N.V.

    in millions of €

      Q4 2024 Q4 2023 Growth FY 2024 FY 2023 Growth
                 
    Platform Segment            
    Advertising Platform 126.3 126.0 0% 412.3 348.6 18%
    AAA Game Distribution (e-commerce) 26.9 31.7 (15)% 85.0 88.8 (4)%
    Revenue 153.2 157.7 (3)% 497.3 437.4 14%
    Operating profit / (loss) 7.2 5.6 29% (1.7) (2.0) (15)%
    Adj. EBITDA 26.2 22.8 15% 62.4 53.2 17%
                 
    Premium Games Segment1)            
    Revenue  14.8 14.1 5% 53.9 77.6 (31)%
    Operating profit / (loss) (0.1) 0.5 (120)% (0.7) 74.8 (101)%
    Adj EBITDA 3.9 3.6 8% 12.7 18.7 (32)%
                 
    Group (excluding social card games)            
    Revenue 168.0 171.8 (2)% 551.2 486.7 13%
    Operating profit / (loss)  7.1 6.1 16% (2.4) (8.2) (71)%
    Adj. EBITDA  30.1 26.4 14% 75.1 62.2 21%
                 
    Group (including social card games)            
    Revenue 168.0 171.8 (2)% 551.2 515.0 7%
    Operating profit / (loss)  7.1 6.1 16% (2.4) 72.8 (103)%
    Adj. EBITDA 30.1 26.4 14% 75.1 71.9 5%

    1)2023 figures for Premium Games contain results of the social cards game portfolio that was divested in Q3 2023. For detailed split of Premium Games results please refer to respective section below.

      Q4 2024 Q4 2023   FY 2024 FY 2023  
    Adj. EBITDA Margin %            
    Platform 17% 15%   13% 12%  
    Premium Games 26% 26%   24% 24%  
    Group (excluding social card games) 18% 15%   14% 13%  
    Group 18% 15%   14% 14%  

    Message from the CEO 

    Q4 was a strong quarter for us, marked by a clear focus on profitability. By maintaining operational discipline and executing on our strategic priorities, we successfully met our full-year 2024 guidance. This achievement reflects our commitment to sustainable growth and value creation for our shareholders.Throughout the year, we have dedicated significant time and resources to building an ecosystem that truly supports European publishers. Our platform empowers them to create engaging content, monetize effectively, and manage their resources with greater predictability. By fostering a high-performance environment, we are enabling European publishers to thrive in an increasingly competitive digital landscape by giving them a truly European choice.

    Looking ahead, we continue to see AI as a major opportunity to drive further innovation and efficiency. Managing over 250,000 auctions per second gives us a unique vantage point to leverage data at scale. We have developed generative AI advertising solutions that enhance campaign performance, while our latest AI-powered creative performance benchmarks and outcome intelligence tools are delivering valuable insights to our partners. These advancements position us at the forefront of AI-driven advertising, helping our customers achieve better results with greater precision thanks to a long history of machine learning at the core of our platform.

    At the same time, we also see an increasing number of opportunities to accelerate our growth through strategic partnerships and acquisitions. We have built a strong pipeline of actionable opportunities and are well-positioned to execute on them. Stay tuned to hear more about our expansion through partnerships throughout this year, alongside the continued deployment of our AI platform.

    – Umut Akpinar

    Financial overview

    Revenue

    Q4 2024

    Revenue for the quarter amounted to € 168.0 million, down (2.2)% from € 171.8 million in Q4 2023, mainly driven by lower consumer spending in AAA game distribution. 

    FY 2024

    Revenue for FY 2024 amounted to € 551.2 million, up 13.3% from € 486.7 million in FY 2023 excluding the social card games portfolio divested in Q3 2023, mainly driven by higher advertising spend across the Platform Segment, particularly in Direct Sales and the integration of past acquisitions. 

    Revenue was up 7.0% from € 515.0 million in FY 2023 including the revenue from the social card games portfolio of € 28.3 million in FY 2023.

    Earnings 

    Q4 2024

    Adjusted EBITDA for the quarter was € 30.1 million compared to € 26.4 million in Q4 2023, an increase of 14.0% driven by improved performance in both Platform and Premium Games segments. Platform increase was largely due to the mix of Advertising Platform Revenue, increased share of Direct Sales and an increasingly efficient delivery operation. The Premium Games result was driven by the ongoing strong performance of Habbo Hotel Origins and product development across social casino and other metaverse titles, as well as further consolidation and integration efforts resulting in improved operational performance.

    The operating profit for the quarter amounted to € 7.1 million, compared to a profit of € 6.1 million in Q4 2023, mainly due to the successful integration of acquisitions and the subsequent synergies and cost reductions that were realised in the Platform segment.

    FY 2024

    Adjusted EBITDA in FY 2024 was € 75.1 million compared to € 62.2 million in FY 2023 excluding the divested social card games portfolio, an increase of 20.7% driven by higher advertising spend across the Platform Segment and improved performance of Premium Games, specifically metaverse titles due to the release and ongoing strong performance of Habbo Hotel Origins and product development across the social casino titles, plus efficiencies from the integration of previous acquisitions.. 

    Adjusted EBITDA in FY 2024 was up 4.5% from € 71.9 million in FY 2023 including the contribution from the social card games portfolio of € 9.7 million in FY 2023.

    The operating loss in FY 2024 amounted to € (2.4) million, compared to € (8.2) million in FY 2023 (excluding gain on the sale and the result of the social card games portfolio of € 81.0 million), driven by increased Platform revenue and contribution from Direct sales, improved performance of Premium Games, specifically metaverse titles due to the release and ongoing success of Habbo Hotel Origins and product development across the social casino titles plus efficiencies from optimisation and consolidation efforts, and notwithstanding the one-off increase in operating expenses related to the settlement of a commercial dispute and renegotiation of contingent consideration terms for one of the acquisitions.

    Cash flow

    Q4 2024

    Cash flow from operating activities in Q4 2024 was an inflow of € 10.0 million, mainly due to strong operating profit after cancellation of non-cash items of € 22.5 million, offset by movements in net working capital reflecting an increase in trade and other payables of € 4.9 million and an increase in trade and other receivables of € (7.6) million, net € (8.3) million paid in interest and € (1.2) million paid in income tax. 

    Cash flow from investing activities was an outflow of € (18.2) million, due to payments for tangible and intangible assets of € (6.5) million and net cash outflow on acquisition of subsidiaries of € (11.7) million. 

    Cash flow from financing activities was an inflow of € 31.5 million, mainly due to net proceeds in the amount of € 34.5 million (net of transaction costs) from additional bonds placed under the existing Senior Secured Callable Floating Rate Bond framework offset by repayments of external borrowings and the principal portion of lease liabilities amounting in total to € (3.0) million.

    FY 2024

    Cash flow from operating activities in FY 2024 was an inflow of € 7.0 million, mainly due to strong operating profit after cancellation of non-cash items of € 52.6 million, offset by movements in net working capital reflecting a decrease in trade and other payables of € (32.5) million and a decrease in trade and other receivables of € 19.9 million, utilisation of provisions of € (3.1) million, net € (25.7) million paid on interest and € (4.2) million paid in income tax. 

    Cash flow from investing activities was an outflow of € (36.8) million, mainly due to payments for tangible and intangible assets of € (20.8) million and net cash outflow on acquisition of subsidiaries of € (27.7) million, partly offset by the receipt of net deferred consideration for the sale of social card games portfolio in amount of € 11.2 million. 

    Cash flow from financing activities was an inflow of € 80.9 million, mainly due to net proceeds in the amount of € 92.1 million (net of transaction costs), consisting of € 82.7 million from additional bonds placed under the existing Senior Secured Callable Floating Rate Bond framework and a Revolving Credit Facility of € 9.4 million, offset by repayments of external borrowings and the principal portion of lease liabilities amounting in total to € (11.0) million.

    Capex

    Azerion capitalises development costs related to the internal development of assets, a core activity to support innovation in its platform. These costs primarily relate to developers’ time devoted to the development of the platform, games and other new features. In Q4 2024 Azerion capitalised € 4.8 million, equivalent to 19.2% (Q4 2023: € 3.4 million, equivalent to 12.4%) of gross personnel costs excluding restructuring provision expense. In FY 2024 Azerion capitalised € 16.2 million, equivalent to 16.0% (FY 2023: € 17.5 million, equivalent of 16.2%) of gross personnel costs excluding restructuring provision expense.

    Financial position and borrowing 

    Net interest-bearing debt*) amounted to € 203.8 million as at 31 December 2024, mainly comprising the outstanding bond loan with a nominal value of € 265 million (part of a total € 300 million framework) and lease liabilities with a balance of € 19.4 million less the cash and cash equivalents position of € 90.6 million.

    *)As defined in the Terms & Conditions of the Senior Secured Callable Floating Rate Bonds ISIN: NO0013017657. Please also refer to the Definitions section and the notes of this Interim Report for more information.

    Platform Segment

    Our Platform segment includes our digital advertising activities, AAA Game Distribution (formerly referred to as e-commerce), Casual Game Distribution (being the operation and distribution of casual games) and Azerion Sports. The Platform segment generates Revenue mainly by displaying digital advertisements in both game and general content, as well as selling and distributing AAA games. Advertisers are serviced through two models: i) Direct sales, which involve a direct engagement between Azerion’s commercial teams and advertisers or their agencies in the placement of digital advertisements, and ii) Automated auction sales in which advertising inventory is purchased through the open market. Platform is also integrated with parts of our Premium Games segment, leveraging inter-segment synergies.

    Selected business highlights in Q4 2024 include:

    • Azerion rated as the leading advertising network in France by Médiamétrie in collaboration with NetRatings.
    • 90 new publishers signed and launched including tuttocampo.it and allermedia.se providing greater reach for digital advertising.
    • Eniro has deployed our Full Monetisation Solution which we are continuing to roll out across all our regions, including Italy in Q4 2024.
    • Azerion Intelligence launched enabling new demographic segments in the Azerion DMP.
    • Azerion DMP is now integrated with Magnite and OpenX SSPs and our audiences for CTV are available via Pubmatic SSP.
    • Launched Smart AI Curation in the Azerion Marketplace further improving the ability to create custom audiences.
    • Azerion Casual Games Distribution expanded its reach in Q4 by onboarding 40 new publishers, including third-party channels such as Samsung Instant Plays. By the end of the quarter, its casual games portfolio exceeded 21,000 titles, demonstrating steady year-over-year growth

    Platform – Selected Financial KPIs

    Financial results – Platform

    In millions of €

      Q4 2024 Q4 2023 FY 2024 FY 2023
    Advertising Platform 126.3 126.0 412.3 348.6
    AAA Game Distribution (formerly e-commerce) 26.9 31.7 85.0 88.8
    Total Revenue 153.2 157.7 497.3 437.4
    Operating profit / (loss) 7.2 5.6 (1.7) (2.0)
    Adj. EBITDA 26.2 22.8 62.4 53.2
             
    Revenue growth % – Advertising Platform 0.2%   18.3%  
    Revenue growth % – AAA Game Distribution  (15.1%)   (4.3%)  
    Total Revenue growth % (2.9%)   13.7%  
    Adjusted EBITDA growth / (decrease) % 14.9%   17.3%  
    Adjusted EBITDA margin % 17.1% 14.5% 12.5% 12.2%

    Total Platform Revenue of € 153.2 million in Q4 2024, compared to € 157.7 million in Q4 2023, a decrease of (2.9)% mainly due to lower revenues in our AAA Game distribution. Total Platform Revenue of € 497.3 million in FY 2024, an increase of 13.7% compared to € 437.4 million in FY 2023, mainly due to growth in advertising revenue from Direct sales.

    Advertising Platform Revenue of € 126.3 million in Q4 2024, almost flat compared to the € 126.0 million in Q4 2023, mostly the result of an offset between growth in the direct business and the integration of revenues from acquired businesses. In Q4 2024, Azerion’s Direct sales contributed approximately 70% of Platform advertising revenue, with the balance provided by Automated auction sales. FY 2024 Advertising Platform Revenue came to € 412.3 million, up 18.3% compared to € 348.6 m in 2023.

    In Q4 2024, AAA Game Distribution generated Revenue of € 26.9 million as compared to € 31.7 million in Q4 2023, a decrease of approximately (15.1)% due to fewer high-profile AAA game releases in Q4 2024 (for example Concord™ by PlayStation didn’t get the consumer traction Sony expected and was subsequently pulled from 3rd party distribution) and optimising towards profitability rather than revenue which meant that the business sold smaller but higher margin titles.  In Q4 2024, AAA Game Distribution Revenue represented 17.6% of total Platform Revenue, as compared to 20.1% in Q4 2023. 

    Total Platform Operating Profit of € 7.2 million in Q4 2024, compared to € 5.6 million in Q4 2023, a significant increase of 28.6% largely due to the successful integration of acquisitions and the subsequent synergies and cost reductions that were realised. Total Platform Operating Loss of € (1.7) million in FY 2024, compared to € (2.0) million in FY 2023, an improvement largely due the aforementioned results of our efforts to integrate acquisitions, create synergies and reduce costs throughout the year. 

    Total Platform Adjusted EBITDA of € 26.2 million in Q4 2024, compared to € 22.8 million in Q4 2023, an increase of 14.9% largely due to the mix of Advertising Platform Revenue, increased share of Direct Sales and an increasingly efficient delivery operation. Total Platform Adjusted EBITDA of € 62.4 million in FY 2024, compared to € 53.2 million in FY 2023, an increase of 17.3% mainly as a result of growth in advertising revenue from Direct sales and the integration of previous acquisitions.

    Advertising – Selected Operational KPIs

    Advertising – Operational KPIs

      Q4 2023 Q1 2024 Q2 2024 Q3 2024 Q4 2024
    Avg. Digital Ads Sold per Month (bn) 13.9 11.9 12.1 12.6 14.1
    Avg. Gross Revenue per Million Processed Ad Requests across the Azerion Platform (EUR)1) 34.5 25.4 29.0 23.4 24.3

    1)Average gross revenue per million processed ad requests across Azerion Platform is calculated by dividing gross advertising revenue (processed by Azerion’s advertising auction and monetisation platforms) by a million advertisement requests processed by Azerion’s advertising auction and monetisation platforms.

    Note: Both Advertising Operational KPIs now include data relating to the Hawk acquisition as of Q4 2023.

    The Average Digital Ads sold per Month increased to 14.1 billion in Q4 2024 from 13.9 billion in Q4 2023, an increase of 1.4%, reflecting the Platform’s demand side growth due to the integration of past acquisitions and the consolidation of Azerion’s monetisation technology into a single scalable media buying platform. 

    The Average Gross Revenue per Million Processed Ad Requests across the Azerion Platform in Q4 2024 was € 24.3, compared to € 34.5 in Q4 2023, a decline year on year as we onboarded several high volume but relatively low revenue publishing partners in Q4 2024.   

    Premium Games Segment

    Since the end of Q3 2023, the Premium Games segment has consisted of social casino games and metaverse games. Azerion completed the sale of its social card games portfolio to Playtika Holding Corp. on 28 August 2023 and its contribution to the Premium Games segment ceased at that date. The segment generates revenue mainly by offering users the ability to make in-game purchases for extra features and virtual goods to enhance their gameplay experience. This segment aims to stimulate social interaction among players and build communities, offering an extended value proposition to advertisers and generating cross-selling opportunities with the Platform segment. 

    Selected Q4 2024 business highlights

    • Habbo Origins revenue has continued to progress several months after its release demonstrating solid long term potential and we have released new features such as Boom, a new game within Habbo Origins, which is intended to increase user engagement.
    • ⁠New releases and packages for players of our Social Casino games such as dynamic bet sizes, bet roulette and Holiday themed collections.

    Premium Games – Selected Financial KPIs

    Financial results – Premium Games

    In millions of € 

      Q4 2024 Q4 2023 FY 2024 FY 2023
    Revenue (excluding social card games) 14.8 14.1 53.9 49.3
    Social card games portfolio 28.3
    Total Revenue 14.8 14.1 53.9 77.6
    Operating profit / (loss) (excluding social card games) (0.1) 0.5 (0.7) (6.2)
    Social card games portfolio 81.0
    Total Operating profit / (loss) (0.1) 0.5 (0.7) 74.8
    Adjusted EBITDA (excluding social card games) 3.9 3.6 12.7 9.0
    Social card games portfolio 9.7
    Total Adjusted EBITDA 3.9 3.6 12.7 18.7
             
    Revenue growth % (excluding social card games) 5.0% 9.3%
    Adjusted EBITDA growth % (excluding social card games) 8.3% 41.1%
    Adjusted EBITDA margin % (excluding social card games) 26.4% 25.5% 23.6% 18.3%

    Revenue of € 14.8 million in Q4 2024, as compared to € 14.1 million in Q4 2023, an increase of 5.0%, mainly driven by the increased number of paying users in metaverse titles due to the ongoing strong performance of Habbo Hotel Origins combined with new Social Casinos sale features, improved discount strategies and increased partner user acquisition spend. Revenue was € 53.9 million in FY 2024, as compared to € 49.3 million in FY 2023 (excluding social card games), an increase of 9.3%, driven by social casino and metaverse performance and the factors previously described for Q4 2024, partly offset by the sale of Woozworld at the start of January 2024 (totaling € 1.7 million Revenue in FY 2023).

    Adjusted EBITDA of € 3.9 million in Q4 2024, compared to € 3.6 million in Q4 2023, an increase of 8.3%, mainly driven by improved performance from metaverse titles due to the ongoing strong performance of Habbo Hotel Origins, consolidation and integration efforts resulting in improved operational performance and product development across the social casino and other metaverse titles. Adjusted EBITDA of € 12.7 million in FY 2024, as compared to € 9.0 million (excluding social card games), an increase of 41.1% compared to FY 2023 reflecting the increased performance of our metaverse titles due to the launch of Habbo Hotel origins, consolidation and integration efforts resulting in improved operational performance and product development across the social casino and other metaverse titles offset by the shift in new user generation to mobile in Azerion’s social casino environment which has higher growth potential over time, but also higher transaction costs as compared to web.

    Operating Loss of € (0.1) million in Q4 2024, compared to Operating Profit of € 0.5 million in Q4 2023, mainly driven by end of year adjustments in depreciation and amortisation.

    Operating Loss of € (0.7) million in FY 2024, compared to € (6.2) million in FY 2023 (excluding social card games), an improvement once again reflecting the developments described for Adjusted EBITDA above.

    Premium Games – Selected Operational KPIs

    Premium Games – Operational KPIs

      Q4 2023 Q1 2024 Q2 2024 Q3 2024 Q4 2024
    Avg. Time in Game per Day (min) 95.0 87.0 81.0 84.7 89.3
    Avg. DAUs (thousands) 255.4 251.2 252.9 239.4 227.4
    Avg. ARPDAU (EUR) 0.47 0.42 0.53 0.57 0.59
    • The Average Time in Game per Day (min) decreased by (6)% in Q4 2024 to 89.3 minutes per day as compared to 95.0 minutes per day in Q4 2023 due to slightly shorter average game time in the newly released Habbo Origins title compared with the rest of the metaverse games.
    • The Average Daily Active Users (DAUs) decreased by (11)% in Q4 2024 to 227.4 compared to Q4 2023 of 255.4, mainly due to lower user acquisition spend and increased focus on greater engagement with higher paying users.  
    • The Average Revenue per Daily Active User (ARPDAU) increased by 26% in Q4 2024 to € 0.59 compared to Q4 2023 of € 0.47, driven by improved in-game sales mechanics in social casino, features and events. 

    Outlook

    With our Full Year 2024 Net Revenue at € 551 million, the closing of several partnerships in the last months of the year, our subsequent bond issue in December, and the opportunities we see for the coming year, our Full Year 2025 Net Revenue is expected to be in the range of approximately € 600 million to € 650 million, with annual growth thereafter in the medium term expected to be approximately 10%. 

    Adjusted EBITDA for full year 2025 is expected to be at least approximately € 85 million, with annual Adjusted EBITDA margin thereafter in the medium term expected to be in the range of approximately 14% to 16% through further integrations, synergies and scale effects.

    Other information

    Interest-bearing debt

    Interest-bearing debt

    in millions of €

      31 December 2024 31 December 2023
    Total non-current indebtedness 268.7 172.0
    Total current indebtedness 25.9 12.6
    Total financial indebtedness 294.6 184.6
    Deduct Zero interest-bearing loans (0.2) (0.1)
    Interest-bearing debt 294.4 184.5
    Less: Cash and cash equivalents (90.6) (40.3)
    Net Interest-bearing debt (Bond terms) 203.8 144.2

    References to bond terms in the table above refer to the terms as defined in the Senior Secured Callable Floating Rate Bonds ISIN: NO0013017657

    Reconciliation of Profit / (loss) for the period to Adjusted EBITDA  

    Reconciliation of Profit / (loss) for the period to Adjusted EBITDA – Q4

    in millions of €

      Q4
      2024 2023
      Azerion Group Premium Games Platform Other Azerion Group Premium Games Platform Other
    Profit / (loss) for the period 3.3       (7.2)      
    Income Tax expense (6.7)       (2.4)      
    Profit / (loss) before tax (3.4)       (9.6)      
    Net finance costs 11.0       15.7      
    Share in profit/(loss) of associate (0.5)            
    Operating profit / (loss) 7.1 (0.1) 7.2 6.1 0.5 5.6
    Depreciation & Amortisation 15.5 3.6 11.9 13.9 3.3 10.6
    Share in profit/(loss) of associate 0.5 0.5
    Other 4.1 1.2 2.9 1.7 (0.2) 1.9
    Acquisition expenses1) 2.8 (0.9) 3.7 3.9 (0.1) 4.0
    Restructuring 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.7
    Adjusted EBITDA 30.1 3.9 26.2 26.4 3.6 22.8

    1)In the past, all changes to the fair value of liabilities for contingent considerations were adjusted out of EBITDA on the basis that these impacts were acquisition related. Management has decided to cease these adjustments where the consideration is contingent upon the achievement of financial targets, because these changes in fair value are offsetting opposite movements already included in the operational performance of the acquired entity. This change has been applied prospectively. 

    Reconciliation of Profit / (loss) for the period to Adjusted EBITDA – FY

    in millions of €

      FY
      2024 2023
      Azerion Group Premium Games Platform Other Azerion Group Premium Games Platform Other
    Profit / (loss) for the period (35.4)       25.1      
    Income Tax expense (6.0)       19.0      
    Profit / (loss) before tax (41.4)       44.1      
    Net finance costs 39.5       28.7      
    Share in profit/(loss) of associate (0.5)            
    Operating profit / (loss) (2.4) (0.7) (1.7) 72.8 74.8 (2.0)
    Depreciation & Amortisation 47.8 11.5 36.3 46.4 12.9 33.5
    Share in profit/(loss) of associate 0.5 0.5
    Social card games portfolio (72.6) (72.6)
    Other 5.7 1.5 4.2 3.2 0.7 2.5
    Acquisition expenses1) 22.2 22.2 14.4 1.1 13.3
    Restructuring 1.3 0.4 0.9 7.7 1.8 5.9
    Adjusted EBITDA 75.1 12.7 62.4 71.9 18.7 53.2

    1)In the past, all changes to the fair value of liabilities for contingent considerations were adjusted out of EBITDA on the basis that these impacts were acquisition related. Management has decided to cease these adjustments where the consideration is contingent upon the achievement of financial targets, because these changes in fair value are offsetting opposite movements already included in the operational performance of the acquired entity. This change has been applied prospectively. 

    Additional notes:

    Acquisition expenses for FY 2024 include € 7.7 million relating to:

    • € 4.8 million in Q2 2024 on one-off settlement of a commercial dispute and contingent consideration fair value loss (non-operational performance target) relating to a previous acquisition 
    • € 2.9 million in Q3 2024 on renegotiation of contingent consideration terms for one of the acquisitions.

    Operating expenses

    Breakdown of Operating expenses

    in millions of €

      Q4 FY
    2024 2023 2024 2023
    Personnel costs (20.2) (24.9) (86.2) (98.5)
    Includes:        
    Restructuring related expenses (0.1) (0.8) (1.3) (7.7)
    Acquisition related one-off items (1.7)
             
    Other expenses (12.5) (8.7) (40.7) (37.3)
    Includes:        
    One-off settlement expenses (3.0)
             
    Operating expenses (32.7) (33.6) (126.9) (135.8)

    Condensed consolidated statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income

    Condensed consolidated statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income

    In millions of €

      Q4 FY
      2024 2023 2024 2023
    Revenue 168.0 171.8 551.2 515.0
    Costs of services and materials (112.4) (117.9) (377.4) (332.3)
    Personnel costs (20.2) (24.9) (86.2) (98.5)
    Depreciation (3.0) (2.2) (9.0) (8.1)
    Amortisation (12.5) (11.7) (38.8) (38.3)
    Other gains and losses1) (0.3) (0.3) (1.5) 72.3
    Other expenses (12.5) (8.7) (40.7) (37.3)
    Operating profit / (loss) 7.1 6.1 (2.4) 72.8
             
    Finance income 3.1 1.0 7.0 8.5
    Finance costs (14.1) (16.7) (46.5) (37.2)
    Net Finance costs (11.0) (15.7) (39.5) (28.7)
             
    Share in profit/(loss) of associate 0.5 0.5
             
    Profit / (loss) before tax (3.4) (9.6) (41.4) 44.1
    Income tax expense 6.7 2.4 6.0 (19.0)
    Profit / (loss) for the period 3.3 (7.2) (35.4) 25.1
             
    Attributable to:        
    Owners of the company 3.3 (7.9) (36.7) 23.7
    Non-controlling interest 0.7 1.3 1.4
             
    Exchange difference on translation of foreign operations (0.3) (0.3) 1.0 (0.6)
    Financial assets fair value through OCI 0.0 (0.8)
    Total other comprehensive income (0.3) (0.3) 0.2 (0.6)
    Total comprehensive income/(loss) 3.0 (7.5) (35.2) 24.5
             
    Attributable to:        
    Owners of the company 3.0 (8.2) (36.5) 23.1
    Non-controlling interest 0.7 1.3 1.4

    1)Earn-out results have been reclassified from Other expenses to Other gains and losses

    Condensed consolidated statement of financial position

    Condensed consolidated statement of financial position

    in millions of €

      31 December 2024 31 December 2023
    Assets    
    Non-current assets 409.2 413.6
    Property, plant and equipment 24.3 17.0
    Goodwill 192.6 187.1
    Intangible assets 167.0 176.3
    Non-current financial assets 4.9 30.8
    Deferred tax asset 7.6 2.3
    Investment in joint venture and associate 12.8 0.1
         
    Current assets 299.6 238.4
    Trade and other receivables 208.4 196.7
    Current tax assets 0.6 1.4
    Cash and cash equivalents 90.6 40.3
    Total assets 708.8 652.0
         
    Equity    
    Share capital 1.2 1.2
    Share premium 143.6 140.2
    Legal reserve 33.2 27.7
    Share based payment reserve 12.6 12.7
    Currency translation reserve (1.0) (1.9)
    Fair value through OCI (0.8)
    Retained earnings (117.1) (75.6)
    Shareholders’ equity 71.7 104.3
    Non-controlling interest 6.2 5.3
    Total equity 77.9 109.6
         
    Liabilities    
    Non-current liabilities 310.9 220.1
    Borrowings 256.0 161.9
    Lease liabilities 12.7 10.1
    Provisions 1.6 1.6
    Deferred tax liability 25.3 30.0
    Other non-current liability 15.3 16.5
         
    Current liabilities 320.0 322.3
    Borrowings 19.2 8.4
    Provisions 2.2 3.6
    Trade payables 136.9 142.0
    Accrued liabilities 97.5 112.7
    Current tax liabilities 14.0 13.4
    Lease liabilities 6.7 4.2
    Other current liabilities 43.5 38.0
    Total liabilities 630.9 542.4
    Total equity and liabilities 708.8 652.0

    Condensed consolidated statement of cash flow

    Condensed consolidated statement of cash flow

    In millions of €

      Q4 Q4 FY FY
      2024 2023 2024 2023
    Cash flows from operating activities        
    Operating profit / (loss) 7.1 6.1 (2.4) 72.8
    Adjustments for operating profit / (loss):        
    Depreciation and amortisation & Impairments 15.5 13.9 47.8 46.4
    Movements in provisions per profit and loss (0.1) 0.9 1.1 8.8
    Gain on sale of social card game portfolio (72.6)
    Loss on sale of subsidiaries 0.1 0.1
    Share-based payments expense 0.1 0.4 0.8
    Adjustment for acquisitions and disposals presented under investing activities 5.7 (2.9)
             
    Changes in working capital items:         
    (Increase)/Decrease in trade and other receivables (7.6) (6.4) 19.9 12.2
    Increase (decrease) in trade payables and other payables 4.9 25.0 (32.5) 14.8
             
    Utilisation of provisions (0.3) (3.1) (3.1) (9.9)
    Interest received 0.2 0.3 1.1 0.3
    Interest paid (8.5) (3.2) (26.8) (17.2)
    Income tax paid (1.2) (2.7) (4.2) (3.7)
    Net cash provided by (used for) operating activities 10.0 31.0 7.0 49.9
             
    Cash flows from investing activities        
    Payments for property, plant and equipment (0.3) (0.1) (0.8) (1.5)
    Payments for intangibles (6.2) (3.7) (20.0) (23.3)
    Net cash outflow on acquisition of subsidiaries (11.7) (10.8) (27.7) (43.9)
    Net cash inflow/(outflow) from sale of business 11.2 66.0
    Distributions from equity method investees 0.5
    Net cash outflow on acquisition of securities and equity investments (2.6)
    Net cash provided by (used for) investing activities (18.2) (14.6) (36.8) (5.3)
             
    Cash flows from financing activities        
    Proceeds from external borrowings 34.5 162.6 92.1 163.1
    Repayment of external borrowings (0.1) (200.7) (3.3) (204.3)
    Payment of principal portion of lease liabilities (2.9) (1.8) (7.7) (6.8)
    Early cancelation of lease liability (1.5)
    Dividends paid to shareholders of non-controlling interests (0.2) (0.4)
    Costs related to the issuance of new bond (3.5) (3.5)
    Fees and costs related to the redemption of the old bond (1.5) (1.5)
    Other inflows (outflows) from financing activities (0.5) (0.5)
    Net cash provided by (used for) financing activities 31.5 (45.4) 80.9 (55.4)
             
    Net increase/(decrease) in cash and cash equivalents 23.3 (29.0) 51.1 (10.8)
    Effect of changes in exchange rates on cash and cash equivalents (1.0) 0.1 (0.8) 0.2
    Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the period 68.3 69.2 40.3 50.9
    Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the period 90.6 40.3 90.6 40.3

    Definitions

    Adjusted EBITDA represents Operating Profit / (Loss) excluding depreciation, amortisation, impairment of non-current assets, restructuring and acquisition related expenses and other items at management discretion, principally those assessed as extraordinary items or non-recurring items which are not in line with the ordinary course of business.

    Adjusted EBITDA Margin represents Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of Revenue.

    Average gross revenue per million processed ad requests across Azerion Platform is calculated by dividing gross advertising revenue (processed by Azerion’s advertising auction and monetisation platforms) by a million advertisement requests processed by Azerion’s advertising  auction and monetisation platforms.

    Average time in game per day measures how many minutes per day, on average, the players of Premium Games spend in the games. This demonstrates their engagement with the games, which generates more opportunities to grow the ARPDAU.

    Average DAUs represents average daily active users, which is the number of distinct users per day averaged across the relevant period.

    ARPDAU represents Average Revenue per Daily Active User, which is revenue per period divided by days in the period divided by average daily active users in that period and represents average per user in-game purchases for the period.

    Financial Indebtedness represents as defined in the terms and conditions of the Senior Secured Callable Floating Rate Bonds ISIN: NO0013017657 any indebtedness in respect of:

    • monies borrowed or raised, including Market Loans;
    • the amount of any liability in respect of any Finance Leases;
    • receivables sold or discounted (other than any receivables to the extent they are sold on a non-recourse basis);
    • any amount raised under any other transaction (including any forward sale or purchase agreement) having the commercial effect of a borrowing;
    • any derivative transaction entered into in connection with protection against or benefit from fluctuation in any rate or price (and, when calculating the value of any derivative transaction, only the mark to market value shall be taken into account, provided that if any actual amount is due as a result of a termination or a close-out, such amount shall be used instead);
    • any counter indemnity obligation in respect of a guarantee, indemnity, bond, standby or documentary letter of credit or any other instrument issued by a bank or financial institution; and
    • (without double counting) any guarantee or other assurance against financial loss in respect of a type referred to in the above paragraphs (1)-(6).

    Net Interest-bearing debt as defined in the terms and conditions of the Senior Secured Callable Floating Rate Bonds ISIN: NO0013017657 means the aggregate interest-bearing Financial Indebtedness less cash and cash equivalents (including any cash from a Subsequent Bond Issue standing to the credit on the Proceeds Account or another escrow arrangement for the benefit of the Bondholders) of the Group in accordance with the Accounting Principles (for the avoidance of doubt, excluding any Bonds owned by the Issuer, guarantees, bank guarantees, Subordinated Loans, any claims subordinated pursuant to a subordination agreement on terms and conditions satisfactory to the Agent and interest-bearing Financial Indebtedness borrowed from any Group Company) as such terms are defined in the terms and conditions of the Senior Secured Callable Floating Rate Bonds ISIN: NO0013017657.

    Operating expenses are defined as the aggregate of personnel costs and other expenses as reported in the statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income. More details on the reporting of cost by nature can be found in the published annual financial statements of 2023.

    Operating Profit / (Loss) represents revenue less costs of services and materials, operating expenses, depreciation and amortisation and other gains and losses.

    Disclaimer and Cautionary Statements

    This communication contains information that qualifies as inside information within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the EU Market Abuse Regulation.

    This communication may include forward-looking statements. All statements other than statements of historical facts are, or may be deemed to be, forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements include, among other things, statements concerning the potential exposure of Azerion to market risks and statements expressing management’s expectations, beliefs, estimates, forecasts, projections and assumptions. Words and expressions such as aims, ambition, anticipates, believes, could, estimates, expects, goals, intends, may, milestones, objectives, outlook, plans, projects, risks, schedules, seeks, should, target, will or other similar words or expressions are typically used to identify forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are statements of future expectations that are based on management’s current expectations and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that are difficult to predict and that could cause the actual results, performance or events to differ materially from future results expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements contained in this communication. Readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements.

    Any forward-looking statements reflect Azerion’s current views and assumptions based on information currently available to Azerion’s management. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made and Azerion does not assume any obligation to update or revise such statements as a result of new information, future events or other information, except as required by law.

    The interim financial results of Azerion Group N.V. as included in this communication are required to be disclosed pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Senior Secured Callable Floating Rate Bonds ISIN: NO0013017657.

    This report has not been reviewed or audited by Azerion’s external auditor.

    Certain financial data included in this communication consist of alternative performance measures (“non-IFRS financial measures”), including Adjusted EBITDA. The non-IFRS financial measures, along with comparable IFRS measures, are used by Azerion’s management to evaluate the business performance and are useful to investors. They may not be comparable to similarly titled measures as presented by other companies, nor should they be considered as an alternative to the historical financial results or other indicators of Azerion Group N.V.’s cash flow based on IFRS. Even though the non-IFRS financial measures are used by management to assess Azerion Group N.V.’s financial position, financial results and liquidity and these types of measures are commonly used by investors, they have important limitations as analytical tools, and the recipients should not consider them in isolation or as a substitute for analysis of Azerion Group N.V.’s financial position or results of operations as reported under IFRS.

    For all definitions and reconciliations of non-IFRS financial measures please also refer to www.azerion.com/investors.

    This report may contain forward-looking non-IFRS financial measures. The Company is unable to provide a reconciliation of these forward-looking non-IFRS financial measures to the most comparable IFRS financial measures because certain information needed to reconcile those non-IFRS financial measures to the most comparable IFRS financial measures is dependent on future events some of which are outside the control of Azerion. Moreover, estimating such IFRS financial measures with the required precision necessary to provide a meaningful reconciliation is extremely difficult and could not be accomplished without unreasonable effort. Non-IFRS financial measures in respect of future periods which cannot be reconciled to the most comparable IFRS financial measure are calculated in a manner which is consistent with the accounting policies applied in Azerion Group N.V.’s consolidated financial statements.

    This communication does not constitute an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy, any securities or any other financial instruments.

    Contact

    Investor Relations: ir@azerion.comMedia relations: press@azerion.com 

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: BW Offshore: Fourth quarter and full year results 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Fourth quarter and full year results 2024

    HIGHLIGHTS

    • Q4 EBITDA USD 72 million and 2024 EBITDA USD 318 million in line with guidance
    • Strong commercial performance with Q4 operating cashflow of USD 79 million and 2024 operating cashflow of USD 363 million
    • Robust balance sheet with an equity ratio 30.8% and USD 540 million in available liquidity
    • Q4 cash dividend raised to USD 0.14 per share
    • Increased cash flow in sight with Barossa FPSO on track for April sail-away
    • Full-year 2025 EBITDA guidance in the range of USD 220-250 million

    BW Offshore continues to progress the Barossa project according to schedule and well within the updated budget. As of end January 2025, construction and integration was 99% complete and commissioning at 85% completion. The vessel is currently being prepared for sail-away in late April. The FPSO is on track for first gas in mid-2025.

    For 2025, BW Offshore expects to report EBITDA in the range of USD 220 to 250 million. The EBITDA outlook reflects the firm backlog for BW Adolo and BW Catcher and the expected start of IFRS revenue recognition from BW Opal at full practical completion during the fourth quarter. Dayrate received for the BW Opal during the start-up and early production phase from mid-2025 will be amortised over the 15-year contract period. Contract negotiations for BW Pioneer are progressing well, however no guidance on EBITDA has been included beyond firm contract.

    The Board of Directors has declared a quarterly cash dividend of USD 0.14 per share. The shares will trade ex-dividend from 3 March 2025. Shareholders recorded in VPS following the close of trading on Oslo Børs on 4 March 2025, will be entitled to the distribution payable on or around 11 March 2025. The total dividend for 2024 amounts to USD 59.2 million, equal to 50% of net Income for the year.

    “We continue to maintain a strong balance sheet supported by consistent high commercial uptime and robust cash generation from the fleet with 2024 EBITDA above initial guidance. Our commitment to returning value to shareholders stands firm as reflected in the increased fourth-quarter dividend, and a total distribution for 2024 reflecting 50% of net profit for a second consecutive year,” said Marco Beenen, CEO of BW Offshore. “As BW Opal progresses to schedule and soon departs the yard in Singapore for the Barossa field, we are moving ahead with potential new FPSO projects that meet our selection criteria in a market with high tendering and FEED activity.”

    FINANCIALS
    EBITDA for the fourth quarter of 2024 was USD 71.9 million (USD 83.2 million in Q3). The EBITDA reflects solid operational performance across the FPSO fleet. Third quarter EBITDA was higher due to the final contribution from engineering and design work on the Sakarya project.

    EBIT for the fourth quarter was USD 30.8 million (USD 37.6 million).

    Net financial items were positive at USD 19.4 million (negative USD 16.4 million), of which net interest expense amounted to USD 3.0 million (USD 4.3 million). Fourth quarter was impacted by the recognition of a valuation gain on the finance liability related to the Barossa project, due to changes in timing of future expected cash flows and a positive mark-to-market adjustment on interest rate hedges resulting from an increase in swap rates.

    The share of loss from equity-accounted investments was USD 9.5 million, including a valuation adjustment on the Barossa finance receivable related to changes in timing of future expected cash flows (loss of USD 5.7 million).

    Net profit for the fourth quarter increased significantly to USD 40.8 million (USD 13.0 million).

    Total equity as of 31 December 2024 was USD 1 246.6 million (USD 1 208.6 million). The equity ratio was 30.8% at the end of the quarter (29.6%).

    As a result of strong cash generation from the fleet and the sale of BW Energy shares in 2024, the Company was net cash positive by USD 74.4 million as of 31 December 2024 (USD 38.4 million net cash positive at the end of September).

    Available liquidity was USD 540 million, excluding consolidated cash from BW Ideol and including USD 233.8 million available under the corporate loan facility.

    FPSO OPERATIONS
    The FPSO fleet continued to deliver stable uptime in the quarter with a weighted average fleet uptime of 99.2% (98.9% in the third quarter).

    BW Adolo delivered strong commercial performance as fourth quarter production increased to 37,150 barrels per day (bbls/day), resulting in strong cash flow stemming from the tariff under the contract that generate USD 1.5/bbl for the first 20,000 bbls/day of production and USD 3/bbl for production beyond 20,000 bbls/day.

    Performance from BW Catcher and BW Pioneer was stable and consistent with high commercial uptime.

    FPSO PROJECTS
    In January, BW Offshore was selected to perform the pre-FEED study for the Bay du Nord FPSO project by Equinor. The project reflects BW Offshore’s expertise in floating production solutions for harsh environment conditions, and commitment to delivering sustainable and innovative solutions. The pre-FEED study will play an important role in supporting Equinor’s strategic goals for the Bay du Nord development.

    LOW CARBON ENERGY SOLUTIONS
    BW Offshore is committed to contribute to the energy transition by developing low-carbon offshore energy production solutions, by leveraging FPSO expertise to deliver low-carbon energy and expand into new sectors, focusing on low-emission oil and gas, CO2 transport, gas-to-power and floating ammonia to meet evolving energy demands. The Company maintains a disciplined approach with selective and diligent allocation of capital and a commitment to creating shareholder value.

    BW Offshore also owns 64% of BW Ideol. BW Ideol is a leader in offshore floating wind technology and co-development, with over 14 years of experience in the development of floating wind projects.

    In December, BW Ideol’s project partners, EDF Renewables and Maple Power, were awarded the Mediterranean Tender (AO6) floating offshore wind project in France. The 250-megawatt (MW) development will leverage BW Ideol’s proprietary Damping Pool® technology, a proven solution that optimises the stability and performance of floating wind turbines in challenging marine environments. A total of 12 floating foundations and turbines are planned to be installed at the site.

    OUTLOOK
    Growing energy demand continues to drive interest in developing new infrastructure-type FPSO projects with long production profiles, low break-even costs and focus on lower emissions. Increased project complexity, combined with higher construction costs, necessitates financial structures with significant day rate prepayments during the construction period for new lease and operate projects.

    Alternatively, oil and gas majors may finance and own FPSOs, relying on FPSO specialists for the design, construction and installation scope, combined with operation and maintenance services. BW Offshore is well positioned to offer both solutions.

    In recent years, the number of sanctioned FPSO projects have lagged market expectations. Consequently, there is a growing number of projects at various stages of maturity, reflecting a pent-up demand for FPSOs. Increased FEED and tendering activity is a function of this, and BW Offshore expects that a number of the FPSO projects the Company is engaging with will reach a final investment decision over the next 12 to 36 months. The market dynamics, combined with the high competence levels required for project execution, should enable better risk-reward and improved margins for FPSO companies going forward.

    BW Offshore continues to selectively evaluate new projects that meet required return targets, offer contracts with no residual value risk after firm period, and provide a financeable structure with strong national or investment-grade counterparties.

    BW Offshore expects that the fleet will continue to generate significant cash flows in the time ahead, supported by the USD 5.3 billion firm contract backlog at the end of December 2024.

    Please see attached the Q4 Presentation. The earnings tables are available at:

    https://www.bwoffshore.com/ir/

    BW Offshore will host a webcast of the financial results 09:00 (CET) today. The presentation will be given by CEO Marco Beenen and CFO Ståle Andreassen.

    Webcast information:
    You can follow the presentation via webcast with supporting slides and a Q&A module, available on:

    BW Offshore Limited – Q4 Presentation Webcast

    Please note, that if you follow the webcast via the above URL, you will experience a 30 second delay compared to the main conference call. The web page works best in an updated browser – Chrome is recommended.

    For further information, please contact:
    Ståle Andreassen, CFO, +47 91 71 86 55
    IR@bwoffshore.com or www.bwoffshore.com

    About BW Offshore:
    BW Offshore engineers innovative floating production solutions. The Company has a fleet of 3 FPSOs with potential and ambition to grow. By leveraging four decades of offshore operations and project execution, the Company creates tailored offshore energy solutions for evolving markets world-wide. BW Offshore has around 1,100 employees and is publicly listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.

    This information is subject to the disclosure requirements pursuant to section 5-12 of the Norwegian Securities Trading Act.

    Attachments

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Unifiedpost delivers on strategic refocus and improves balance sheet strength

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Press  release – Regulated information –  Inside inforrmation

    La Hulpe, Belgium – February 27, 2025, 7:00 a.m. CET – [REGULATED INFORMATION] Unifiedpost Group SA (Euronext: UPG) (Unifiedpost), a leading provider of integrated business communications solutions, presents its results for FY 2024. Unifedpost has executed its strategic priorities, including portfolio rationalisation, while improving its balance sheet strength and operational efficiencies.

    Strategic & Operational Highlights

    • Completed divestments of FitekIN/ONEA and Wholesale Identity Access Business
    • De-risked balance sheet through partial repayment of Francisco Partners’ senior facility loan by €95m
    • Significantly reduced net debt position by ~€ 73m at year-end
    • Enhanced governance structure with a strengthened Board and new CEO
    • Strategic partnerships delivering value creation across key markets

    FY 2024 Financial Highlights – Continuing operations1

    • Reported first contributions from income from client money2 amounting to €0,7m
    • Steady growth in Subscription and Transaction3 revenue of 8,2% y/y and 9,3% y/y, respectively
    • Digital service gross margin (incl. net income from client money) increased by 1,7%pts y/y to 59,7%
    • EBITDA (incl. net income from client money) improved to € -9,2m from € -11,0m in FY 2024

    FY 2025 Guidance (based on current reporting structure)

    • ~25% increase in Subscription revenue, with a gradual improvement expected throughout the year
    • FCF4 positive by year-end

    Commenting on the FY 2024 results, Nicolas de Beco, CEO, remarked: “2024 was marked by strategic refocusing and important structural changes. We have streamlined our business with the completed divestments of FitekIN/ONEA and the Wholesale Identify Access Business, the reduction of complexity and the de-risking of our balance sheet. While our financial performance reflects these necessary adjustments, this marks a key turning point – we have established a solid framework which allows us to move forward with greater clarity and direction. There is strong engagement from our customers, teams, and stakeholders.

    Looking to 2025, we have a clear roadmap and a strong commitment to execution. Our focus will be on selected geographies where e-invoicing regulations are expected to come into force within the next 12-18 months, strengthening strategic partnerships, and embedding payment solutions as a key upselling driver. At the same time, we remain committed to disciplined cost and cash management. As a SaaS business, accelerating growth remains a priority. We have set clear subscription revenue targets for the next 12 months, and with continued discipline, collaboration, and focus, we are well-placed to make progress on our objectives.”

    Key financial figures – Continuing operations1 (unless otherwise stated)

    (EUR thousands) FY 2024 FY 2023 Change (%)
    Group revenue and income from client money 84.273 94.169 -10,5%
    Digital service revenue 47.132 50.336 -6,4%
               Subscription 14.435 13.343 +8,2%
               Transaction 20.192 18.472 +9,3%
    • of which includes income from client money2
    723 N/A
                Other 12.505 18.521 -32,5%
    Traditional communication service revenue 37.141 43.833 -15,3%
    Gross profit digital services (incl. net income from client money) 28.119 29.207 -3,7%
    Gross margin digital services 59,7% 58,0% +1,7%pts
    EBITDA (incl. net income from client money) (9.204) (11.032) 16,6%
    Profit/(loss) for the period (continuing and discontinuing operations)5 71.195 (83.146) N/A
    Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the period6 14.525 22.534 -35,5%

    Portfolio rationalisation and value crystallisation

    Throughout 2024, Unifiedpost executed several strategic divestments of non-core assets that substantially strengthened its financial position while maintaining valuable commercial partnerships.

    In July, Unifiedpost completed the divestment of FitekIN/ONEA for €7,2m and announced the sale of 21 Grams to PostNord Strålfors, which remains subject to regulatory approval from the Swedish Competition Authority.

    In December, Unifiedpost completed the sale of its Wholesale Identity Access Business to Your.World B.V. for an aggregate equity purchase price projected between € 108,4m and € 116,1m, subject to the realisation of the earn-out condition. Unifiedpost has utilised part of the proceeds from the sale of the Wholesale Identity Access business to reduce its debt obligations to Francisco Partners Credit. Upon completion of the transaction, Unifiedpost repaid a principal amount of €75 million, along with accrued and due interest, bringing the total repayment to €94,8 million. The remaining balance is expected to be paid back within 2025.

    Looking ahead, Unifiedpost will continue to evaluate opportunities for divesting non-digital services as part of its strategic focus on core digital offerings and platform development.

    Digital services business

    Both subscription and transaction revenue reported steady growth of 8,2% and 9,3% y/y, respectively. Meanwhile, other revenue decreased from € 18,5m to € 12,5m, reflecting a higher base effect from one-off deals in Q4 2023, and the ending of low margin professional service contracts.

    The gross margin percentage increased by 1,7% pts y/y to 59,7%, driven by two key factors: (i) improvement in cost efficiencies, and (ii) income from client money.

    The income from client money, results from leveraging our network and upselling embedded payment services. Income from client money amounted to € 0,7m in 2024, with momentum building in the fourth quarter.

    Moving forward, Unifiedpost will focus on accelerating subscription revenue growth as a key performance indicator. This growth will primarily be driven by opportunities in core European geographies where regulatory requirements for e-invoicing and digital business communications are expected to come into force within the next 12-18 months. Unifiedpost is positioned to capitalise on these regulatory catalysts, particularly in Benelux, France and Germany, where mandatory e-invoicing requirements will create market opportunities.

    Furthermore, the European Commission’s VAT in the Digital Age (ViDA) initiative represents a shift in digital reporting and e-invoicing requirements across the EU, creating additional momentum for digital adoption. This regulatory framework will require businesses to implement digital solutions for real-time transaction reporting and e-invoicing, aligning with Unifiedpost’s platform capabilities and market positioning.

    Traditional communication services business

    Traditional communication services revenue decreased as expected (€ 37,1m in FY 2024 compared to € 43,8m in FY 2023), driven by a continued shift towards digital solutions and a decrease in managed service volumes. This led to a corresponding reduction in gross profit of € 2,9m. Additionally, the gross margin percentage decreased by 3,0%pts to 23,9%.

    Execution of cost-saving plan 2023-2024

    Unifiedpost launched a cost-saving plan in 2023, resulting in an overall cost decrease of € 5,9m y/y and a decrease in cash outflows of € 6,9m y/y.

    • R&D expenses decreased from € 18,4m y/y to € 17,0m. The cash component within these costs decreased by € 3,2m, while non-cash expenses (amortisation) rose by € 1,8m.
    • G&A expenses decreased from € 34,0m y/y to € 30,9m. Expenses for 2024 included € 0,7m in non-recurring costs directly associated with legal and consultancy costs.
    • S&M expenses decreased from € 21,1m y/y to € 19,6m.

    Significantly reduced net debt position by ~73m at year end

    As at December 31, 2024, the net debt position amounts to € 29,5m, a decrease of € 72,9m compared to December 31, 2023.
    At the end of 2024, Unifiedpost reported a financial position with cash and cash equivalents totalling € 14,5m, including € 1,2m of restricted cash.

    Management remains committed to achieving a positive free cash flow7 position by the end of 2025. 

    Statement from the external auditor

    We are currently finalising the financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2024. Our independent auditor has confirmed that its audit procedures in relation to the financial information for the year ended 31 December 2024 as included in this press release are substantially completed and have not revealed any material corrections required to be made to the financial information included in this press release. Should any material changes arise during the audit’s finalisation, an additional press release will be issued.

    Investors & Media webcast

    Management will host a live video webcast for analysts, investors and media today at 11:00 a.m. CET.

    To register and attend the webcast, please click here:

    https://unifiedpost-group-full-year-2024-financial-results.open-exchange.net/registration

    A full replay will be available after the webcast at: https://investors.unifiedpostgroup.com/

    Financial Calendar:

    • 17 April 2025: Publication of the Annual Report for 2024
    • 20 May 2025: General Shareholder Meeting
    • 23 May 2025: Publication of the Q1 2025 business update
    • 26 August 2025: Publication of the H1 2025 results (webcast)

    Contact

    Alex Nicoll
    Investor Relations
    Unifiedpost Group
    alex.nicoll@unifiedpost.com

    Consolidated statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income (unaudited)

    Thousands of Euro, except per share data   For the period ended 31 December
        2024 2023 (*)
           
    Digital services revenues   46.409 50.336
    Digital services cost of services   (18.874) (21,129)
    Digital services gross profit   27,535 29.207
           
    Traditional communication services revenues   37.141 43.833
    Traditional communication services cost of services   (28.282) (32,075)
    Traditional communication services gross profit   8.859 11.758
           
    Research and development expenses   (17.022) (18.414)
    General and administrative expenses   (30.924) (33.961)
    Selling and marketing expenses   (19.592) (21.074)
    Other income / (expenses) – net   (1.160) (72)
    Net impairment losses   (39.000)
    Loss from operations   (32.305) (71.556)
           
    Net financial income from client money   584
    Financial income   268 62
    Financial expenses   (22.998) (15.441)
    Share of profit / (loss) of associates and joint ventures   146 (573)
    Gain upon losing control over a subsidiary   3,972
    Loss before tax   (50.333) (87.508)
           
    Corporate income tax   (846) (745)
    Deferred tax   152 243
    LOSS FOR THE PERIOD FROM CONTINUING OPERATIONS   (51.027) (88.011)
           
    Net profit from discontinued operations   122.222 4.865
    PROFIT / (LOSS) FOR THE PERIOD   71.195 (83.146)
    Other comprehensive income / (loss):   (656) (15)
    Items that will not be reclassified to profit or loss, net of tax:      
    Remeasurements of defined benefit pension obligations   (37) 123
    Items that will or may be reclassified to profit or loss, net of tax:      
    Exchange gains arising on translation of foreign operations   104 36
    Exchange losses arising on translation of foreign operations related to discontinued operations   (723) (174)
    TOTAL COMPREHENSIVE PROFIT / (LOSS) FOR THE PERIOD   70.539 (83.161)
    Total loss for the period is attributable to:      
    Owners of the parent   71,031 (83,899)
    Continuing operations   (51,191) (88,764)
    Discontinued operations   122,222 4,865
    Non-controlling interests   164 753
    Total comprehensive loss for the period is attributable to:      
    Owners of the parent   70,375 (83,914)
    Continuing operations   (51,124) (88,604)
    Discontinued operations   121,499 4,690
    Non-controlling interests   164 753
    Profit/(loss) per share attributable to the equity holders of the parent:      
    Basic   1,94 (2,32)
    Diluted   1,94 (2,32)
    Loss from continuing operations per share attributable to the equity holders of the parent:      
    Basic   (1,41) (2,46)
    Diluted   (1,41) (2,46)

    (*) The comparative figures for period ended 31 December 2023 have been restated to reflect the restatement of the profit and loss related to the discontinued operations in accordance with IFRS 5

    Consolidated statement of financial position (unaudited)

    Thousands of Euro   As at 31 December As at 31 December
        2024 2023
           
    ASSETS      
    Goodwill   92.048 113.069
    Other intangible assets   66.725 82.856
    Property and equipment   1.486 7.420
    Right-of-use-assets   9.391 9.734
    Investments in associates   2.400 1.493
    Deferred tax assets   39 776
    Other non-current assets   3.036 2.561
    Non-current assets   175.125 217.909
    Inventories   544 612
    Trade and other receivables   16.494 25.318
    Contingent consideration receivable   7.774
    Current tax assets   291 770
    Prepaid expenses   1.483 1.901
    Restricted cash related to client money8   75.798 3.789
    Cash and cash equivalents   14.525 22.534
    Current assets from continuing operations   116.909 54.924
    Assets classified as held for sale   31.250 5.145
    Current assets   148.159 60.069
    TOTAL ASSETS   323.284 277.978
           
    SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY AND LIABILITIES      
    Share capital   329.238 326.806
    Costs related to equity issuance   (16.029) (16.029)
    Share premium reserve   492 492
    Accumulated deficit   (164.603) (232.257)
    Reserve for share-based payments   175 1.831
    Other reserve   2.697 (1.581)
    Cumulative translation adjustment reserve   (4.470) (3.851)
    Equity attributable to equity holders of the parent   147.500 75.411
    Non-controlling interests   758 499
    Total shareholders’ equity   148.258 75.910
    Non-current loans and borrowings   29.010 110.517
    Liabilities associated with puttable non-controlling interests     200
    Non-current lease liabilities   6.376 6.193
    Non-current contract liabilities   387 4.430
    Deferred tax liabilities   1.463 4.636
    Non-current liabilities   37.236 125.976
    Current loans and borrowings   5.698 5.059
    Current liabilities associated with puttable non-controlling interests   3.980 7.560
    Current lease liabilities   3.232 3.547
    Trade and other payables   31.127 40.194
    Liabilities related to client money8   75.774 3.736
    Contract liabilities   5.330 13.487
    Current income tax liabilities   410 1.845
    Current liabilities from continuing operations   125.551 75.428
    Liabilities directly associated with assets classified as held for sale   12.239 664
    Current liabilities   137.790 76.092
    TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES   323.284 277.978

    Consolidated statement of changes in equity (unaudited)

    Thousands of Euro

     

     

     

     

     

    Share capital Costs related to equity issuance Share premium reserve Accumulated deficit Share based payments Other reserves Cumulative translation adjustment reserve Non-controlling interests Total equity
    Balance at 1 Jan 2024 326.806 (16.029) 492 (232.257) 1.831 (1.581) (3.851) 499 75.910
                         
    Result for the period   71.031 164 71.195
                         
    Other comprehensive income / (loss)   (37) (619) (656)
    Total comprehensive loss for the period   70.994 (619) 164 70.539
                         
    Conversion subscription rights   2.432 (1.656) 1.656 2.432
                         
    Current period profit AND OCI of NCI with put option   171 (171)
                         
    Changes in carrying value of liabilities associated with puttable NCI   280 280
                         
    Acquisition of 20% of the shares in Unifiedpost d.o.o.   (2.437) 2.437
                         
    Release of NCI due to acquisition of 20% of the shares in Unifiedpost d.o.o.   (266) 266
                         
    Dividend payments   (965) (965)
                         
    Other   62 62
                         
    Balance at 31 Dec 2024 329.238 (16.029) 492 (164.603) 175 2.697 (4.470) 758 148.258
    Thousands of Euro

     

     

     

    Share capital Costs related to equity issuance Share premium reserve Accumulated deficit Share based payments Other reserves Cumulative translation adjustment reserve Non-controlling interests Total equity
    Balance at 1 Jan 2023 326.806 (16.029) 492 (148.497) 1.813 (2.864) (3.713) 281 158.290
                         
    Result for the period   (83.899) 753 (83.146)
                         
    Other comprehensive income / (loss)   123 (138) (15)
    Total comprehensive loss for the period   (83.776) (138) 753 (83.161)
                         
    Share-based payments   18 18
                         
    Current period profit AND OCI of NCI with put option   535 (535)
                         
    Changes in carrying value of liabilities associated with puttable NCI   750 750
                         
    Other   16 (3) 13
                         
    Balance at 31 Dec 2023 326.806 (16.029) 492 (232.257) 1.831 (1.581) (3.851) 499 75.910

    Consolidated statement of cash flows (unaudited)

    Thousands of Euro For the period ended 31 December
        2024 2023
    CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES      
    Loss for the period   71.195 (83.146)
    Adjustments for:      
    • Amortisation and impairment of intangible fixed assets
      20.546 21.332
    • Impairment losses of goodwill
      38.574
    • Depreciation of property. plant & equipment
      1.041 1.489
    • Depreciation of right-of-use-assets
      4.129 4.429
    • Impairment of trade receivables
      (389) 335
    • Gain on disposal of fixed assets
      (15) (33)
    • Financial income
      (334) (174)
    • Financial expenses
      23.579 15.910
    • (Gain) realised upon losing control over subsidiaries
      (124.168)
    • Loss of remeasurement at fair value less costs to sell for disposal groups
      6.342
    • Share of profit / (loss) of associate
      (146) 573
    • Income tax expense / (income)
      3.894 2.319
    • Deferred income tax expense
      (841) (1.387)
    • Share-based payment expense / own shares
      18
    Subtotal   4.833 238
           
    Changes in Working Capital      
    • (Increase) / decrease in trade receivables and contract assets
      (5.318)                         6.145
    • (Increase) / decrease in other current and non-current receivables
      (448) (61)
    • (Increase) / decrease in inventories
      (93) 209
    • Increase / (decrease) in trade and other liabilities
      9.420 7.729
    Cash generated from / (used in) operations   8.394 14.260
    Income taxes paid   (1.763) (3.222)
    Net cash provided by / (used in) operating activities   6.631 11.038
           
    CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES      
    Payments made for the purchase of associate   (282)
    Payments received for divestment of business   114.388
    Payments made for the purchase of intangibles and development expenses   (16.015) (16.372)
    Proceeds from the disposal of intangibles and development expenses   415 15
    Payments made for the purchase of property, plant & equipment   (247) (739)
    Proceeds from the disposal of property, plant & equipment   442 17
    Interest received   175
    Net cash provided by / (used in) investing activities   98.701 (16.904)
           
    CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES      
    Conversion of subscription rights   2.432
    Proceeds from loans and borrowings   2.720 3.913
    Repayments of loans and borrowings – Francisco Partners   (75.000)
    Repayments of loans and borrowings – other   (6.813) (6.367)
    Repayment of lease liabilities   (4.485) (4.524)
    Interest received   334
    Interest paid on loans and borrowings – Francisco Partners   (21.590) (3.286)
    Interest paid on loans and borrowings – other   (1.898) (1.295)
    Net cash provided by / (used in) financing activities   (104.300) (11.559)
    FX impact cash   (487)
    Net increase / (decrease) in cash & cash equivalents   545 (17.425)
    Cash classified within current assets held for sale   (5.423) (74)
    Cash movement due to change in the consolidation range   (3.131)
    Net increase/(decrease) in cash & cash equivalents, including cash classified within current assets held for sale   (8.009) (17.499)
    Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the period   22.534 40.033
    Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the period   14.525 22.534
           
           
           
               

    About Unifiedpost Group

    Unifiedpost is a leading SaaS company for SME business services built on “Documents”, “Identity” and “Payments”. Unifiedpost operates and develops a 100% SaaS-based platform for administrative and financial services that allows real-time and seamless connections between Unifiedpost’s customers, their suppliers, their customers, and other parties along the financial value chain. With its one-stop-shop solutions, Unifiedpost’s mission is to make administrative and financial processes simple and smart for its customers. For more information about Unifiedpost Group and its offerings, please visit our website: Unifiedpost Group | Global leaders in digital solutions

    Cautionary note regarding forward-looking statements: The statements contained herein may include prospects, statements of future expectations, opinions, and other forward-looking statements in relation to the expected future performance of Unifiedpost Group and the markets in which it is active. Such forward-looking statements are based on management’s current views and assumptions regarding future events. By nature, they involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties, and other factors that appear justified at the time at which they are made but may not turn out to be accurate. Actual results, performance or events may, therefore, differ materially from those expressed or implied in such forward-looking statements. Except as required by applicable law, Unifiedpost Group does not undertake any obligation to update, clarify or correct any forward-looking statements contained in this press release in light of new information, future events or otherwise and disclaims any liability in respect hereto. The reader is cautioned not to place undue reliance on forward-looking statements.


    1 Excludes discontinued operations: Wholesale Identity Access Business and 21 Grams

    2 Money a company receives from or holds for, or on behalf of, a client (application IAS 7)

    3 Income from client money is a result of e-payment services and is included in digital services transaction revenue

    4 Free cash flow is defined as net income (i) plus non-cash items in the income statement, (ii) minus cash out for IFRS 16 adjustments, (iii) minus capital expenditure, (iv) minus reimbursement on loans and leasing for the reporting period

    5 Including capital gains from divested transactions

    6 Excluding restricted cash related to client money

    7 Free cash flow is defined as net income (i) plus non-cash items in the income statement, (ii) minus cash out for IFRS 16 adjustments, (iii) minus capital expenditure, (iv) minus reimbursement on loans and leasing for the reporting period

    8 The comparative figures 2023 have been restated to demonstrate the accounting policy related to client money.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Planisware delivered strong revenue growth, profitability and cash generation in 2024

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Planisware delivered strong revenue growth, profitability and cash generation in 2024

    • Revenue up +17.4% in constant currencies to € 183.4 million
    • Adjusted EBITDA* up +23.7% to € 64.6 million, representing 35.2% of revenue (+180bps year-on-year)
    • Adjusted FCF* up +24.5% to € 54.6 million, representing a 84.5% cash conversion rate*
    • Proposed dividend representing 50% of profit for the period, above Group policy
    • 2025 objectives:
      • Mid-to-high teens revenue growth in constant currencies
      • c. 35% adjusted EBITDA margin*
      • Cash Conversion Rate* of c. 80%

    Paris, France, February 27, 2025 – Planisware, a leading B2B provider of SaaS in the rapidly growing Project Economy market, announces today its FY 2024 results. Revenue amounted to € 183.4 million, up by +17.3% in current currencies, mainly led by the continued success of the Group’s market-leading SaaS platform. In constant currencies, revenue growth reached +17.4% (€+27.2 million), in line with the 17% to 18% 2024 objective. Recurring revenue amounted to € 162.7 million (89% of total revenue) and was up by +21.0% in constant currencies.

    Adjusted EBITDA1 reached € 64.6 million (+23.7% vs. FY 2023), representing 35.2% of revenue, above the c. 34% 2024 objective. The year-on-year improvement by c. +180 basis points resulted from revenue growth, positive mix effect, and further efficiency gains on employee-related costs, in particular on R&D spendings benefitting from increased usage of AI tools.

    Current operating profit reached € 51.8 million, up by +20.8% compared to FY 2023 and Profit for the period amounted to € 42.7 million.

    Cash generation was particularly strong with adjusted FCF* reaching € 54.6 million, up by +24.5% year-on-year. It represented a cash conversion rate* of 84.5%, above the c. 80% 2024 objective. Net cash position* was € 176.1 million as of December 31, 2024, compared to € 142.6 million as of December 31, 2023 and € 156.4 million as of June 30, 2024.

    Loïc Sautour, CEO of Planisware, commented: “In 2024, Planisware continued to deliver sustainable and profitable growth. Despite significant uncertainties in the macroeconomic and geopolitical context, our clients continued to trust Planisware for their digital transformation and operational excellence efforts. These close relationships enabled us to deliver a robust revenue growth.

    We also delivered profitability and cash generation above this year’s objectives thanks to the continuous positive mix effect of our activities and further efficiencies on employee-related costs, in particular on R&D spendings benefitting from increased usage of AI tools.

    In parallel, Planisware’s CSR efforts were recognized by the EcoVadis gold medal award, the all-round Great Place to Work certification, and by a satisfying B score for our first rating by CDP. These distinctions illustrate Planisware’s rapid progress and ongoing commitment to building a more responsible society.

    For 2025, taking into account our strong commercial pipeline on one hand and uncertainties in the timing of contract starts and the evolution of sales cycle length on the other hand, we set the mid-to-high teens range for revenue growth objective. We also intend to maintain a strong profitability and to keep delivering a best-in-class cash conversion rate.

    FY 2024 revenue by revenue stream

    To address the needs of strategic defense-sector clients who require mission-critical solutions to operate on their own infrastructures rather than through Cloud-based SaaS, Planisware has introduced a new delivery mode that includes annual licenses. These multi-year agreements allow the solution to be licensed on a yearly basis. Planisware anticipates that this innovative delivery mode will be particularly relevant for companies with specific security and sovereignty requirements. Planisware reports this line of revenue for the first time in 2024, within its recurring revenue (under Planisware’s SaaS model), since first such contracts was signed in Q4 2024.

    In € million FY 2024 FY 2023 Variation
    YoY
    Variation
    in cc*
    Recurring revenue 162.7 134.7 +20.8% +21.0%
    SaaS & Hosting 82.0 64.6 +27.1% +27.1%
    Annual licences 1.1 N/A N/A
    Evolutive support 48.7 42.0 +16.0% +16.3%
    Subscription support 11.9 9.4 +26.5% +26.4%
    Maintenance 19.1 18.8 +1.8% +1.8%
    Non-recurring revenue 20.7 21.1 -1.7% -1.7%
    Perpetual licenses 7.5 5.7 +30.8% +30.8%
    Implementation & others non-recurring 13.3 15.4 -13.8% -13.8%
    Revenue with customers 183.4 155.7 +17.8% +17.9%
    Other revenue 0.7    
    Total revenue 183.4 156.4 +17.3% +17.4%

    * Revenue evolution in constant currencies, i.e. at FY 2023 average exchange rates

    Reaching € 183.4 million in 2024, revenue was up by +17.3% in current currencies and +17.4% in constant currencies. The exchange rates effect was almost mostly related to the appreciation of the euro versus the Japanese yen compared to FY 2023. In order to reflect the underlying performance of the Company independently from exchange rate fluctuations, the following analysis refers to revenue evolution in constant currencies, applying FY 2023 average exchange rates to FY 2024 revenue figures, unless expressly stated otherwise.

    Recurring revenue

    Representing 89% of 2024 total revenue versus 86% in 2023, recurring revenue reached € 162.7 million, up by +21.0%.

    Revenue growth was led by +24.1% growth of Planisware’s SaaS model (i.e. SaaS & Hosting, Evolutive & Subscription support, and Annual licenses), of which SaaS & Hosting revenue was up by +27.1% thanks to contracts secured with new customers as well as continued expansion within the installed base. Revenue of support activities (Evolutive & Subscription support), intrinsically related to Planisware’s SaaS offering, grew by +18.1%. Finally, Annual licenses contributed for €+1.1 million in Q4 2024.

    Maintenance revenue was up by +1.8% in the context of the Group’s shift from its prior Perpetual license model to a SaaS model.

    Non-recurring revenue

    Non-recurring revenue was slightly down by -1.7% over the year, with a contrasted trend of Perpetual licenses up by +30.8% and Implementation down by -13.8%.

    Perpetual licenses benefited from a strong demand for extensions and upgrades from existing customers with specific on-premises needs, mostly in the defense industry. On the other hand, Planisware’s focus on shorter implementations and faster delivery to customers, combined with project start delays, led to revenue decline in Implementation.

    FY 2024 revenue by region

    In € million FY 2024 FY 2023 Variation
    YoY
    Variation
    in cc*
    Europe 87.2 76.1 +14.7% +14.5%
    North America 80.3 68.5 +17.3% +17.3%
    APAC & ROW 15.9 11.2 +41.8% +44.0%
    Revenue with customers 183.4 155.7 +17.8% +17.9%
    Other revenue 0.7    
    Total revenue 183.4 156.4 +17.3% +17.4%

    * Revenue evolution in constant currencies, i.e. at FY 2023 average exchange rates

    In 2024, all key geographies contributed to Planisware revenue growth, although with contrasted contributions for each semester of the year:

    • Representing 44% of total revenue in 2024, North America strongly contributed to year-end growth (+19.0% in H2 2024) after having faced elongated customer’ decision-making processes translating into slower growth in non-recurring activities and Implementation services in particular over the first periods of the year (+15.6% in H1 2024). All in all, thanks to a significant level of cross-selling and up-selling with existing customers and new customer wins, North America grew by +17.3% over the year.
    • By contrast, after a decent growth in H1 2024 (+18.1%) driven in particular by strong dynamics in Germany, revenue growth in Europe significantly slowed down in H2 2024 (+11.4%) due to macroeconomic uncertainties and political concerns in France as well as difficulties seen in some of the Group’s key verticals such as automotive. As a result, revenue in Europe grew by +14.5% in 2024.
    • Planisware’s growth in APAC & rest of the world of +44.0% resulted from a strong commercial momentum in Japan, Singapore, and the Middle East, as well as from the consolidation of IFT KK and, to a lesser extent, of Planisware MIS.

    FY 2024 revenue by pillar

    In € million FY 2024 FY 2023 Variation
    YoY
    Variation
    in cc*
    Product Development & Innovation 97.8 87.5 +11.8% +11.9%
    Project Controls & Engineering 37.2 27.4 +35.7% +35.6%
    IT Governance & Digital Transformation** 32.2 26.8 +20.2% +20.1%
    Project Business Automation 15.9 13.6 +16.5% +17.0%
    Others 0.4 0.4 -5.7% -5.7%
    Revenue with customers 183.4 155.7 +17.8% +17.9%
    Other revenue 0.7    
    Total revenue 183.4 156.4 +17.3% +17.4%

    * Revenue evolution in constant currencies, i.e. at FY 2023 average exchange rates

    In 2024, all key pillars contributed to Planisware’s revenue growth with the most recent ones ramping-up as growth relays:

    • Product Development & Innovation (“PD&I”) drives R&D and product development teams with a focus on companies in the life sciences, manufacturing and engineering, automotive design and fast-moving consumer goods sectors. In 2024, it remained Planisware’s principal pillar, with 53% of total revenue and +11.9% growth, resulting from both new customer wins and the expansion of offerings to existing customers.
    • Project Controls & Engineering (“PC&E”) supports production teams in industries with sophisticated products, plants and infrastructure, such as aerospace and defense, energy and utilities, manufacturing and engineering and life sciences. While still a recent pillar for Planisware, it represented 20% of 2024 total revenue. Supported by the successful roll-out of offerings in North America, PC&E grew by +35.6%.
    • IT Governance & Digital Transformation (“IT&DT)** helps IT teams across all sectors develop comprehensive solutions to automate IT portfolio management, accelerate digital transformation and simplify IT architecture. IT&DT represented 18% of 2024 total revenue and grew by +20.1%, fueled by continuous cross-sell to Planisware clients needing to accelerate their digital transformation.
    • Project Business Automation (“PBA”) supports companies in all industries that seek to increase their revenue-based projects and enhance their operating results through automated processes. Due to a more recent entry of Planisware in the market relating to this pillar, PBA represented only 9% of 2024 total revenue and was up by +17.0% thanks to new customer wins and cross-selling.

    Commercial dynamic

    In 2024, despite elongated sales cycles, Planisware welcomed a significant number of new clients from a wide range of industries, further diversifying its customer base and solidifying its position as a trusted partner for organizations of all sizes. Revenue growth is driven both by contracts with new customers and the expansion of Planisware’s solutions and services within its existing customer base.

    In 2024, Planisware’s customer loyalty remained high, as translated in the 121% Net Retention Rate* (NRR), reflecting Planisware ability to grow within its installed base. At 2.2% of revenue, 2024 churn rate* remained low thanks to Planisware’ ability to leverage strong product capabilities and high industry recognition, resulting in high customer loyalty.

    FY 2024 key financial figures

    In € million FY 2024 FY 2023 Variation
    YoY
    Total revenue 183.4 156.4 +17.3%
    Cost of sales -50.1 -45.1 +11.1%
    Gross profit 133.3 111.3 +19.8%
    Gross margin 72.7% 71.2% +150 bps
    Operating expenses -81.5 -68.4 +19.1%
    Current operating profit 51.8 42.9 +20.8%
    Other operating income & expenses -5.7 3.0  
    Share of profit of equity-accounted investees**              – 0.3 -100.0%
    Operating profit 46.1 46.2 -0.1%
    Profit for the period 42.7 41.8 +2.1%
           
    Adjusted EBITDA* 64.6 52.2 +23.7%
    Adjusted EBITDA margin* 35.2% 33.4% +180 bps
           
    Adjusted FCF* 54.6 43.8 +24.5%
    Cash Conversion Rate* 84.5% 84.0% +60 bps
    Net cash position* 176.1 142.6 +23.5%

    * Net of tax
    ** Non-IFRS measure. Non-IFRS measures included in this document are defined in the disclaimer at the end of this document

    Gross profit

    Cost of sales increased by €+5.0 million (or +11.1%) year-on-year to € 50.1 million. As a percentage of revenue, cost of sales decreased by -150 basis points thanks to a continued strict monitoring of costs, in particular with respect to recruitment, and the internalization of outsourced services.

    This enabled Planisware to deliver a € 133.3 million gross profit (+19.8% year-on-year), representing a 72.7% gross margin, a significant improvement of c. +150 basis points compared to 71.2% in 2023.

    Operating profit

    R&D expenses, consisting primarily of staff expenses directly associated with R&D teams, as well as amortization of capitalized development costs and the benefits from the French research tax credit, reached € 22.2 million and represented 12% of revenue compared to 13% in 2023. While Planisware intends to maintain a high level of R&D spending, the R&D efficiency improves thanks to the deployment of AI tools, boosting the Group’s ability to leverage its R&D efforts to provide innovative products and software solutions, expand its offering portfolio and promote its offerings in the project management market. In 2024, capitalized development costs amounted to € 2.5 million, +21.9% compared to € 2.0 million in 2023.

    Reaching € 33.3 million in 2024 (18% of revenue), Sales & marketing expenses increased by +23.1% compared to 2023, led in particular by the increase in employee-related costs in the salesforce and marketing team. Sales & marketing expenses are expected to increase in absolute amounts in the future as Planisware plans on strengthening its leading market position.

    Representing 14% of revenue in 2024, as in 2023, General & administrative expenses reached € 26.0 million. Planisware continued to strengthen its global support functions to contribute to the growth of the business and the international expansion of the Group. Planisware expects that, as the Company continues to scale up in the future, General & administrative expenses will slightly decrease as a percentage of revenue.

    As a result, current operating profit reached € 51.8 million in 2024, up by +20.8% compared to 2023.

    Other operating income & expenses amounted to a net expense of € 5.7 million related to IPO costs.

    As a results of the above, operating profit reached € 46.1 million in 2024, stable compared to € 46.2 million in 2023, which benefited from € 7.5 million non-taxable gains on remeasurement at fair value of investments in associates.

    Adjusted EBITDA

    Adjusted EBITDA** reached € 64.6 million, a strong increase compared to 2023 (€+12.4 million, or +23.7%). It represented 35.2% of 2024 revenue, c. +180 basis points compared to 33.4% in 2023. The increase of adjusted EBITDA reflects the revenue growth, a positive mix effect, and further efficiency gains on employee-related costs, in particular on R&D spending benefitting from increased usage of AI tools.

    Profit for the period and dividend

    Reaching € 5.4 million in 2024, financial income significantly increased compared to € 2.5 million in 2023. This was primarily driven by income from time deposits and realized and unrealized gains on marketable securities, as well as foreign exchange gains and losses arising from the revaluation at closing rates of cash and cash equivalents held in foreign currencies.

    Income tax expense amounted to € 8.8 million in 2024, up by +27.8% compared to € 6.9 million in 2023, in line with taxable profit increase.

    As a result of these evolutions, profit for the period reached € 42.7 million in 2024, up by +2.1% compared to 2023.

    Finally, subject to the approval of the Annual General Meeting of the Company’s shareholders and effective approbation of 2024 consolidated financial statements by the Board of directors, and in line with its historical dividend distribution, the Group will pay a dividend representing 50% of its profit for the period. This would represent € 21.4 million or € 0.31 per share.

    Cash generation and net cash position

    Reflecting the growth of subscription contracts billed in advance of the services rendered, change in working capital was €+2.5 million, compared to €+3.6 million in 2023 which benefited from a catch-up effect form negative change in 2022. Capital expenditures totaled € 5.5 million, representing 3.0% of revenue, compared to € 4.9 million in 2023 (3.1% of revenue), in line with the usual c. 3% level targeted. Tax paid in 2024 was € 8.4 million compared to € 7.5 million in 2023.

    As a result, Cash Conversion Rate* reached 84.5%, above the 80% level that the Group considers being the normative Cash Conversion Rate for the coming years, and adjusted Free Cash Flow* totaled € 54.6 million, +24.5% compared to € 43.8 million in 2023.

    As of December 31, 2024, except for lease liabilities related to offices and datacenter facilities which amounted to € 17.0 million (€ 14.9 million as of December 31, 2023) and small amounts of bank overdrafts, Planisware did not have any financial debt. As a result, the Group’s net cash position* as of December 31, 2024 amounted to € 176.1 million, compared to € 142.6 million as of December 31, 2023.

    2025 objectives

    Taking into account its strong commercial pipeline on one hand and uncertainties in the timing of contract starts and the evolution of sales cycle length on the other hand, Planisware’s 2025 objectives are:

    • Mid-to-high teens revenue growth in constant currencies
    • c. 35% adjusted EBITDA margin*
    • Cash Conversion Rate* of c. 80%

    Appendices

    Q4 2024 revenue by revenue stream

    In € million Q4 2024 Q4 2023 Variation
    YoY
    Variation
    in cc*
    Recurring revenue 44.7 38.3 +16.7% +16.2%
    SaaS & Hosting 22.4 17.9 +25.3% +24.8%
    Annual licences 1.1 N/A N/A
    Evolutive support 12.8 12.2 +5.0% +4.6%
    Subscription support 3.4 3.1 +9.8% +9.0%
    Maintenance 5.0 5.1 -2.5% -2.8%
    Non-recurring revenue 5.2 5.8 -11.2% -11.5%
    Perpetual licenses 1.3 2.1 -36.4% -36.7%
    Implementation & others non-recurring 3.8 3.7 +3.1% +2.8%
    Total revenue 49.9 44.1 +13.0% +12.5%

    * Revenue evolution in constant currencies, i.e. at Q4 2023 average exchange rates

    Non-IFRS measures reconciliations

    In € million FY 2024 FY 2023
    Current operating profit after share of profit of equity-accounted investee 51.8 43.2
    Depreciation and amortization of intangible, tangible and right-of-use assets 7.7 7.2
    Share-based payments 5.1 1.9
    Adjusted EBITDA** 64.6 52.2
    In € million FY 2024 FY 2023
    Net cash from operating activities 59.0 47.3
    Capital expenditures -5.5 -4.9
    Other finance income/costs -4.7 -2.8
    IPO costs paid 5.7 4.2
    Adjusted Free Cash Flow** 54.6 43.8

    ** Non-IFRS measure. Non-IFRS measures included in this document are defined in the disclaimer at the end of this document

    FY 2024 revenue Investors & Analysts conference call

    Planisware’s management team will host an international conference call on February 27, 2025 at 8:00am CET to details FY 2024 performance and key achievements, by means of a presentation followed by a Q&A session. The webcast and its subsequent replay will be available on planisware.com.

    Upcoming event

    • April 29, 2025:                 Q1 2025 revenue publication
    • June 19, 2025:                 Annual General Meeting of shareholders
    • July 31, 2025:                 H1 2025 results publication
    • October 21, 2025:         Q3 2025 revenue publication

    Contact

    About Planisware

    Planisware is a leading business-to-business (“B2B”) provider of Software-as-a-Service (“SaaS”) in the rapidly growing Project Economy. Planisware’s mission is to provide solutions that help organizations transform how they strategize, plan and deliver their projects, project portfolios, programs and products.

    With circa 750 employees across 16 offices, Planisware operates at significant scale serving around 600 organizational clients in a wide range of verticals and functions across more than 30 countries worldwide. Planisware’s clients include large international companies, medium-sized businesses and public sector entities.

    Planisware is listed on the regulated market of Euronext Paris (Compartment A, ISIN code FR001400PFU4, ticker symbol “PLNW”).

    For more information, visit: https://planisware.com/ and connect with Planisware on LinkedIn.

    Disclaimer

    The primary financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2024 were approved by the Board of Directors on February 26, 2025. The audit procedures and verifications related to the information contained in the sustainability report are in progress. The full consolidated financial statements will be published on completion of these procedures.

    Forward-looking statements

    This document contains statements regarding the prospects and growth strategies of Planisware. These statements are sometimes identified by the use of the future or conditional tense, or by the use of forward-looking terms such as “considers”, “envisages”, “believes”, “aims”, “expects”, “intends”, “should”, “anticipates”, “estimates”, “thinks”, “wishes” and “might”, or, if applicable, the negative form of such terms and similar expressions or similar terminology. Such information is not historical in nature and should not be interpreted as a guarantee of future performance. Such information is based on data, assumptions, and estimates that Planisware considers reasonable. Such information is subject to change or modification based on uncertainties in the economic, financial, competitive or regulatory environments.

    This information includes statements relating to Planisware’s intentions, estimates and targets with respect to its markets, strategies, growth, results of operations, financial situation and liquidity. Planisware’s forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this document. Absent any applicable legal or regulatory requirements, Planisware expressly disclaims any obligation to release any updates to any forward-looking statements contained in this document to reflect any change in its expectations or any change in events, conditions or circumstances, on which any forward-looking statement contained in this document is based. Planisware operates in a competitive and rapidly evolving environment; it is therefore unable to anticipate all risks, uncertainties or other factors that may affect its business, their potential impact on its business or the extent to which the occurrence of a risk or combination of risks could have significantly different results from those set out in any forward-looking statements, it being noted that such forward-looking statements do not constitute a guarantee of actual results.

    Rounded figures

    Certain numerical figures and data presented in this document (including financial data presented in millions or thousands and certain percentages) have been subject to rounding adjustments and, as a result, the corresponding totals in this document may vary slightly from the actual arithmetic totals of such information.

    Variation in constant currencies

    Variation in constant currencies represent figures based on constant exchange rates using as a base those used in the prior year. As a result, such figures may vary slightly from actual results based on current exchange rates.

    Non-IFRS measures

    This document includes certain unaudited measures and ratios of the Group’s financial or non-financial performance (the “non-IFRS measures”), such as “recurring revenue”, “non-recurring revenue”, “gross margin”, “Adjusted EBITDA”, “Adjusted EBITDA margin”, “Adjusted Free Cash Flow”, “cash conversion rate”, “Net cash position”, “churn rate” and “Net Retention Rate” (or “NRR”). Non-IFRS financial information may exclude certain items contained in the nearest IFRS financial measure or include certain non-IFRS components. Readers should not consider items which are not recognized measurements under IFRS as alternatives to the applicable measurements under IFRS. These measures have limitations as analytical tools and readers should not treat them as substitutes for IFRS measures. In particular, readers should not consider such measurements of the Group’s financial performance or liquidity as an alternative to profit for the period, operating income or other performance measures derived in accordance with IFRS or as an alternative to cash flow from (used in) operating activities as a measurement of the Group’s liquidity. Other companies with activities similar to or different from those of the Group could calculate non-IFRS measures differently from the calculations adopted by the Group.

    Non-IFRS measures included in this document are defined as follows:

    • Adjusted EBITDA is calculated as Current operating profit including share of profit of equity-accounted investees, plus amortization and depreciation as well as impairment of intangible assets and property, plant and equipment, plus either non-recurring items or non-operating items.
    • Adjusted EBITDA margin is the ratio of Adjusted EBITDA to total revenue.
    • Adjusted FCF (Free Cash Flow) is calculated as cash flows from operating activities, plus IPO costs paid, if any, less other financial income and expenses classified as operating activities in the cash-flow statement, and less net cash relating to capital expenditures.
    • Cash Conversion Rate is defined as Adjusted FCF divided by Adjusted EBITDA. Planisware considers Cash Conversion Rate to be a meaningful financial measure to assess and compare the Group’s capital intensity and efficiency.
    • Net cash position is defined as Cash minus indebtedness excluding lease liabilities.
    • Net Retention Rate (NRR) is the percentage of recurring revenue generated in a given year compared to the prior year by customers’ existing in the prior year, excluding terminated contracts, in constant currency.
    • Churn rate is defined as percentage of recurring revenue generated in year N-1, by customers terminating in year N, compared to recurring revenues generated by clients existing at the start of year N, in constant currency.

    1 Non-IFRS measure. Non-IFRS measures included in this document are defined in the disclaimer at the end of this document.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Tech and Business – Oracle Services Power IT Modernization in Asia Pacific

    Source: Information Services Group, Inc.

    Enterprises embrace providers with GenAI tools to improve enterprise cloud migrations, optimize Oracle investments, ISG Provider Lens report says.

    A growing number of enterprises in Asia Pacific are seeking Oracle ecosystem services to help them carry out digital transformations to remain competitive in rapidly changing markets, according to a new research report published today by Information Services Group (ISG) (Nasdaq: III), a global AI-centered technology research and advisory firm.

    The 2024 ISG Provider Lens Oracle Cloud and Technology Ecosystem report for Asia Pacific finds many large Oracle customers are modernizing legacy systems, navigating cloud migrations and evaluating hyperscale cloud options. Service providers are helping clients optimize their Oracle investments, often with the use of AI tools, while Oracle is increasingly investing in talent development and collaboration in the region, including partnerships with governments in Singapore, Australia and India for large-scale training programs.

    “Companies in Asia Pacific need digital transformation to stay relevant,” said Michael Gale, partner and regional leader, ISG Asia Pacific. “Oracle and its partners are rising to the challenge by strengthening their expertise and developing talent in the region.”

    Large organizations in manufacturing, retail, financial services, consumer packaged goods and the public sector are increasing their use of Oracle services, the report says. In addition to modernization planning and execution, many seek help addressing regional nuances such as data sovereignty and compliance requirements, especially in India, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand.

    Outdated legacy systems are holding back many organizations in the region, leading to rising demand for both consulting and advisory services to plan modernization initiatives, ISG says. To reach strategic goals and maximize Oracle investments, enterprises seek providers that demonstrate domain expertise and the ability to innovate. Carrying out transitions with minimal disruption and consistent data integrity is a key requirement.

    Companies seeking to maintain Oracle performance and uptime amid cost, compliance and complexity challenges are driving up demand for managed services in Asia Pacific, the report says. Comprehensive services allow clients to optimize resource management, enhance productivity and focus on strategy.

    More enterprises in the region are adopting Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI), often leveraging local data centers and integrating advanced tools, ISG says. A key requirement is the availability of generative AI for process automation and management of multicloud environments. Companies give priority to service providers that offer comprehensive support for Oracle and non-Oracle environments and enhance integration across cloud platforms.

    “Enterprises in Asia Pacific are choosing leading OCI providers with a strong local presence,” said Jan Erik Aase, partner and global leader, ISG Provider Lens Research. “Along with competitive pricing and proven track records in Oracle migrations, this fosters trust.”

    The report also examines other trends affecting Oracle users in Asia Pacific, including enterprises consolidating providers of comprehensive application management services and the impact of OCI’s recently introduced interoperability across AWS, Azure and Google Cloud.

    For more insights into the challenges faced by enterprises using Oracle in Asia Pacific, see the ISG Provider Lens Focal Points briefing here.

    The 2024 ISG Provider Lens Oracle Cloud and Technology Ecosystem report for Asia Pacific evaluates the capabilities of 28 providers across four quadrants: Consulting and Advisory Services, Implementation and Integration Services, Managed Services and OCI Solutions and Capabilities.

    The report names Accenture, Cognizant, Deloitte, HCLTech, Infosys, LTIMindtree, TCS, Tech Mahindra and Wipro as Leaders in all four quadrants. It names PwC as a Leader in three quadrants and KPMG as a Leader in two quadrants. Capgemini is named as a Leader in one quadrant.

    In addition, Capgemini, DXC Technology and Kyndryl are named as Rising Stars — companies with a “promising portfolio” and “high future potential” by ISG’s definition — in one quadrant each.

    In the area of customer experience, Capgemini is named the global ISG CX Star Performer for 2024 among Oracle Cloud and Technology Ecosystem providers. Capgemini earned the highest customer satisfaction scores in ISG’s Voice of the Customer survey, part of the ISG Star of Excellence program, the premier quality recognition for the technology and business services industry.

    The 2024 ISG Provider Lens Oracle Cloud and Technology Ecosystem report for Asia Pacific is available to subscribers or for one-time purchase on this webpage.

    About ISG Provider Lens Research

    The ISG Provider Lens Quadrant research series is the only service provider evaluation of its kind to combine empirical, data-driven research and market analysis with the real-world experience and observations of ISG’s global advisory team. Enterprises will find a wealth of detailed data and market analysis to help guide their selection of appropriate sourcing partners, while ISG advisors use the reports to validate their own market knowledge and make recommendations to ISG’s enterprise clients. The research currently covers providers offering their services globally, across Europe, as well as in the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Brazil, the U.K., France, Benelux, Germany, Switzerland, the Nordics, Australia and Singapore/Malaysia, with additional markets to be added in the future. For more information about ISG Provider Lens research, please visit this webpage.

    About ISG

    ISG (Nasdaq: III) is a global AI-centered technology research and advisory firm. A trusted partner to more than 900 clients, including 75 of the world’s top 100 enterprises, ISG is a long-time leader in technology and business services that is now at the forefront of leveraging AI to help organizations achieve operational excellence and faster growth. The firm, founded in 2006, is known for its proprietary market data, in-depth knowledge of provider ecosystems, and the expertise of its 1,600 professionals worldwide working together to help clients maximize the value of their technology investments.

    MIL OSI – Submitted News

  • MIL-OSI China: China builds extreme ‘super lab’ to assist global scientists in probing mysteries of matter

    Source: China State Council Information Office 2

    Researchers work at an experimental station of the Synergetic Extreme Condition User Facility (SECUF) in Beijing, capital of China, Oct. 16, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]
    What astonishing phenomena might materials reveal when they are subjected to conditions mimicking the extremes of the cosmos-ultra-low temperatures, magnetic fields that are hundreds of thousands of times stronger than Earth’s, and pressure close to that at the planet’s core?
    The Synergetic Extreme Condition User Facility (SECUF), located in Beijing’s suburban Huairou District, is opening a portal for scientists to observe the bizarre phenomena of matter under such extreme environments.
    After starting construction in September 2017, the SECUF passed national acceptance review on Wednesday, marking the completion of the internationally advanced experimental facility integrating extreme conditions such as ultra-low temperature, ultra-high pressure, strong magnetic fields, and ultra-fast optical fields.
    The facility, led by the Institute of Physics (IOP) under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, is a cluster of precision-controlled “extreme environment generators.” It serves as a “super lab” for probing the frontiers of materials science. Here, scientists can explore the mysteries of matter and uncover new phenomena or laws invisible under ordinary conditions.
    The SECUF can cool materials to an extremely low temperature of 1 millikelvin, which is 1,000 times lower than the cosmic background temperature. It is capable of producing a steady 30 Tesla magnetic field, which is 600,000 times stronger than Earth’s magnetic field, according to Lv Li, the leading scientist of SECUF.
    The facility can reach an ultra-high pressure of 300 GPa, nearly equivalent to the pressure at the Earth’s core. It can generate ultra-fast laser pulses lasting 100 attoseconds, which is a billionth of a billionth of a second, to capture electron dynamics in real time.
    Under extreme conditions, materials often exhibit “magical” behaviors. For instance, superconductivity–where electrical resistance vanishes–occurs only at ultra-low temperatures. Additionally, some ordinary materials transform into superconductors under high pressure.
    Based on the SECUF, scientists are expected to discover more superconducting materials under high pressure, and even room-temperature superconductors, which is of great significance for improving computer processing speed, Lv said.
    Strong magnetic fields and ultrafast light fields allow scientists to delve deeper into the microscopic structures and dynamic behaviors of materials, experts explained.
    These extreme conditions can be combined based on different research needs at the SECUF, enabling advanced experiments in material synthesis, quantum control, and ultrafast dynamics, providing an unprecedented experimental platform for research in the fields such as materials science, physics and chemistry, Lv said.
    The completion of the facility has significantly enhanced China’s comprehensive capabilities in basic and applied basic research in the field of materials science and related areas. Researchers can conduct studies on unconventional superconductivity, topological states of matter, and novel quantum materials and devices, according to Cheng Jinguang, deputy director of the IOP.
    This experimental platform is open to scientists worldwide. So far, 13 universities and research institutions from 10 countries, including Denmark, Germany, France and Japan, have conducted experiments at the SECUF, with some experimental stations already yielding scientific results, Cheng said.
    Scientists plan to further enhance SECUF’s capabilities while keeping its doors open to global researchers, to attract more pioneers to this “extreme challenge,” unlocking discoveries that reshape humanity’s understanding of the material world. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Keith Rankin Chart Analysis – Germany’s stale (and still pale) political mainstream

    Analysis by Keith Rankin.

    Chart by Keith Rankin.

    The above chart traces the vote-share of Germany’s establishment political parties: the right-wing CDU/CSU and the now-centre-right SPD (essentially the Christian Democrats, just like National in New Zealand) and the Social Democrats (just like Labour). And it compares Germany with England to show a similar process there.

    An increasingly stale political centre has consolidated power in both Germany and the United Kingdom, despite record low vote-shares for these establishment parties. In Germany, the ‘major party’ combined vote has fallen to 45% (nearly as low as that in last year’s election in France, for the Centre and the traditional Right). In the United Kingdom, the establishment (Labour, Conservative) vote has fallen to 60%; though, given a much lower turnout in the United Kingdom than Germany, 60% there represents a similar level of support to that of the equivalent parties in Germany.

    With these outcomes being at-best borderline-democratic (JD Vance had a point about the shutting-out of alternative voices), neither country is scheduled to have another election until 2029. And the ‘left’ establishment parties – in office in both countries in March 2025 – are as right-wing as their centre-right predecessor governments of Merkel and Sunak.

    We note that, for Germany, elections before 1991 are for West Germany only. And, for the United Kingdom, my aim has been to focus on England, where Celtic nationalist parties have not played a role; thus until 1979, the British data is for the United Kingdom, whereas from 1983 the data is for England only. We also note that Germany shows few signs of promoting the literally colourful characters who play such an important part in contemporary British politics.

    The waxing and waning of the postwar German mainstream

    Postwar German politics began in 1949, with its new MMP voting system; proportional voting featuring two disqualification mechanisms, a five percent party-vote threshold, and the failure to gain a local electorate using the simple-plurality (FPP) criterion. (In Germany, in the 1950s, the latter disqualification rule was tightened; three electorate seats were required, rather than one.)

    The rise in the two-party vote from 1949 to 1972 represented the consolidation of the major-party system, essentially in line with the post-war German economic miracle. From 1949 to 1969, the government was CDU-led. The SPD led the government from 1969 to 1982 (though with fewer votes than the CDU/CSU). All subsequent governments have been CDU-led, except for the relatively short-lived administrations of Gerhard Schröder (c.2000) and Olaf Scholz.

    The fall in establishment-party vote-share reflects the rise of the Green Party in Germany, which itself reflects the waning of the economic miracle.

    The 1990s’ political stability reflects the reunification era, the political dominance of Helmut Kohl; and the fact that, due to reunification, German politics suspended its characteristic debt-phobia.

    The 2000s and 2010s represents the Angela Merkel era. The 2009 result reflects the Global Financial Crisis. The 2005 vote reflects the early Eurozone period, in which investment within the European Union was diverted into the development of the southern EU countries (and to Ireland). In particular, the 2000s saw the rise of The Left Party, which was shunned by the Establishment parties; this was the beginning of the German ‘firewall’, which meant that ‘grand coalitions’ were favoured over the inclusion of ‘outsider’ parties into government. In that time, the Green Party became a centrist party; inside rather than outside ‘the tent’.

    In 2014 the debt-phobic way Germany ‘resolved’ the Euro crisis was popular in Germany, though ‘austerity’ ushered in the deflationary bias that has characterised subsequent fiscal policy in the European Union. (The adverse effect of deflationary fiscal policy was the use of a zero-interest-rate monetary policy by the European Central Bank; so the adverse consequences of the austerity policies played out more slowly than they might have.)

    Since the initial ‘triumph’ of austerity in 2014, we have seen a substantial and ongoing decline in the vote for the establishment parties. However, these parties managed to consolidate power despite haemorrhaging votes. The new 2025 Government will be a substantially right-wing government made up of German-National (CDU 28.5%) and German-Labour (SPD 16.4%); this represents easily the worst vote ever for the ‘left’ SPD and easily the second-worst vote ever for the ‘winning’ CDU/CSU.

    And, in the United Kingdom, the vote for Labour in 2024 was easily the worst vote of any ‘winning’ party in any election since 1945 (and possible since the time of Walpole in the 1720s).

    Democracy anyone?

    Postscript UK

    In the UK, the highest percentage vote for a political party in the postwar era was 48.8% for Clement Attlee’s Labour Party, seeking a third term in office (in a very-early election which Attlee was tricked into calling). Labour was defeated, despite its record-high poll! Winston Churchill’s Conservatives got 48.0% of the vote; but, crucially, more seats. Attlee’s government was the least stale government in the United Kingdom’s post-war history; Attlee, in the UK, had a popularity and significance comparable to that of Michael Joseph Savage in New Zealand.

    *******

    Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Remarks by President Trump Before Cabinet Meeting

    Source: The White House

    class=”has-text-align-center”>Cabinet Room

    11:42 A.M. EST

         THE PRESIDENT:  Okay.  Thank you very much.  We appreciate you being here.  And we’ve put together a great Cabinet.  And we’ve had tremendous success.  We’ve been given a lot of credit for having a very successful first month, and we want to make that many months — and years, actually.  But we’re going to have many good months, and we’re going to have many good years, I hope.  And we’re going to solve a lot of problems. 

         We’re doing very well with Russia-Ukraine.  President Zelenskyy is going to be coming on Friday.  It’s now confirmed.  And we’re going to be signing an agreement, which will be a very big agreement.  And I want to thank Howard and Scott for the job you guys did in putting it together.  Really did an amazing job.  And that’ll be on rare earth and other things. 

         And as you know, we’re in for, probably, $350 billion and Europe is in for $100 billion.  And that’s a big difference.  So, we’re in for, probably, three times as much.  And yet, it’s very important to everybody, but Europe is very close.  We have a big ocean separating us.  So, it’s very important for Europe.  And they, hopefully, will step up and do maybe more than they’re doing and maybe a lot more.

         The previous administration put us in a very bad position, but we’ve been able to make a deal where we’re going to get our money back and we’re going to get a lot of money in the future.  And I think that’s appropriate, because we have taxpayers that are — shouldn’t be footing the bill, and they shouldn’t be footing the bill at more than the Europeans are paying. 

         So, it’s all been worked out.  We’re happy about it.  And I think that, very importantly, we’re going to be able to make a deal. 

         Most importantly, by far, we’re going to make a deal with Russia and Ukraine to stop killing people.  They’ll stop killing young Russian soldiers and young Ukrainian soldiers and other people, in addition, in the towns and cities.  And we will consider that a very important thing and a big accomplishment, because it was going nowhere until this administration came in.  They hadn’t spoken to President Putin in two years.  And so, we’ll keep you advised.

         Before we begin the Cabinet, I’d like to have Scott

    and a couple of people say a few things.  But most importantly — where are you?

         SECRETARY TURNER:  I’m right here, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  This is a gentleman who’s going places — the head of HUD.  And he’s going to say — you all know him.  And you’re going to say grace —

         SECRETARY TURNER:  Yes, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  — and then we’ll have our meeting, right?

    SECRETARY TURNER:  Yes.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you very much. 

         SECRETARY TURNER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Let’s pray.

         Father, we thank you for this awesome privilege, Father, to be in your presence.  God, thank you that you’ve allowed us to see this day.  The Bible says that your mercies are new every morning.  And, Father God, we give you the glory and the honor.  Thank you, God, for President Trump, Father, for appointing us.  Father God, thank you for anointing us to do this job.  Father, we pray you’ll give the president and the vice president wisdom, Father God, as they lead. 

         Father, I pray for all of my colleagues that are here around the table and in this room.  Lord God, we pray that we would lead with a righteous clarity, Father God, and as we serve the people of this country and every perspective agency, every job that we have, Father, we would humble ourselves before you that we would lead in a manner that you’ve called us to lead and to serve. 

         Father, the Bible says the blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord.  But, Father, we today honor you.  And in your rightful place, Father, thank you for giving us this opportunity to restore faith in this country and be a blessing to the people of America.  And, Lord God, today in our meeting, we pray that you will be glorified in our conversation.
        
         In Jesus’ name, amen.

         PARTICIPANTS:  Amen.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Scott, that was a very good job you did.  You’ve done that before, haven’t you?  (Laughter.)  Wow. 

         So, Scott Turner is a terrific young guy.  He’s heading up HUD, and he’s going to make us all very proud, right?

         SECRETARY TURNER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Yes, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you very much.  Great job. 

         In just over one month, illegal border crossings have plummeted by numbers that nobody has actually ever seen before.  It’s much more than 100 percent. 

    And we’ve unleashed American energy at levels that will soon be reported, but we think we’re going to get it going very quickly.  We have incredible people on the energy front. 

    I think we have really great people on every front.  I’ll let you know if they’re not good, but I think they really are. 

    And we’re fighting every day to get the prices down.  The inflation is stopping slowly, but part of the reason it’s stopping is because of high interest rates and other problems that we inherited.  But we have to get the prices down — not the inflation down — the prices of eggs and various other things.  Eggs are a disaster. 

         The secretary of Agriculture is going to be showing you a chart that’s actually mindboggling what’s happened — how low they were with us and how high they are now.  But I think we can do something about it —

         SECRETARY ROLLINS:  Yes, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  — Madam Secretary.

         SECRETARY ROLLINS:  Yes, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  And I think you’re going to do a fantastic job in that position. 

    One of the most important initiatives is DOGE, and we have cut billions and billions and billions of dollars.  We’re looking to get it maybe to a trillion dollars.  If we can do that, we’re going to start getting to be at a point where we can think in terms of balancing budgets, believe it or not, something you haven’t heard in many, many years — decades, actually.  And it’s a big — whether it’s this year or next year, I think we’ll be very close to balancing budgets.  And the DOGE is very important. 

    And Elon is here to give you a summary of what’s happening, some of the things they found — some of the horrible things they found — some of the theft and fraud, and we call it waste and abuse, but a lot of fraud, and probably some fraud that we’re not going to be able to prove is fraud, but when you hear the names and the places where this money is going, it’s a disgrace. 

         But we’ve requested that a lot of people — we want to make sure that the people are working.  So, letters were sent out, and I think everyone at this table is very much behind it.  And if they aren’t, I’d want them to speak up.  But they’re very much behind it. 

         Letters were sent out to people just to find out, if the people exist, do they work?  Who do they work for?  Where are they?  You know, where have they been working?  Have they been working for other companies or other entities at all and being paid by the government, so they have two jobs, but they’re supposed to have one? 

    And the letter asks some simple questions like, “What have you done lately?”  And if they can answer that — because I can.  I can tell you everything I’ve done for the last long period of time — a lot more than a week. 

    And in many cases, we haven’t gotten responses.  Usually that means that maybe that person doesn’t exist or that person doesn’t want to say they’re working for another company while being paid by the United States government. 

    So, there’s a lot of interesting things.  It’s very unique, but we have a very unique situation because we have a lot of people that were scamming our country.  We have a lot of dishonest people.  We have a lot of people that took advantage of a lot of different situations, and we’re not going to let that happen. 

    So, I’m going to ask, if it’s possible, to have Elon get up first and talk about DOGE, because it seems to be of great interest to everyone. 

    I will say that there is a large group of people in this country that have such admiration for what we’re doing.  I got elected with a tremendous vote — winning every swing state, winning the popular vote, winning the counties by thousands of counties.  I think it was 2,800 to 500.  2,800 counties to 500 counties.  Think of that. 

    And so, we have a mandate to do this, and this is part of the reason I got elected.  I got elected based on taxes and based on many things, the border, but also based on balancing budgets and getting our country back into shape, and this is a big part of it. 

    So, Elon, if you could get up and explain where you are, how you’re doing, and how much we’re cutting.  And it’s an honor to have you.  He’s been a tremendously successful guy.  He’s really working so hard.  And he’s got businesses to run.  And in many ways, they say, “How do you do this?”  And, you know, he’s sacrificing a lot and — getting a lot of praise, I’ll tell you, but he’s also getting hit.  And we would expect that, and that’s the way it works. 

    So, I’d like to have Elon Musk please say a few words.

         MR. MUSK:  Well, tha- — thank you —
        
         THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you, Elon.

    MR. MUSK:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Well, I a- — I actually just call myself humble tech support here — (laughter) — because this is actually — as crazy as it sounds, that — that is almost a literal description of the work that the DOGE team is doing is helping fix the government computer systems.  Many of these systems are extremely old.  They don’t communicate.  There are a lot of mistakes in the systems.  The software doesn’t work.  The — so, we are actually tech support.  It’s — it’s a — it’s ironic, but it’s true.

    The — the overall goal here with the DOGE team is to help address the enormous deficit.  We simply cannot sustain, as a country, $2 trillion deficits.  The interest rates — just the interest on the national debt now exceeds the Defense Department spending. 

    We spend a lot on the Defense Department, but we’re spending, like, over a trillion dollars on interest.  If this continues, the country will go — become de facto bankrupt.  It’s — it’s not an optional thing.  It is an essential thing.  That — that’s — that’s the reason I’m here and taking a lot of flak and getting a lot of death threats, by the way.  I can, like, stack them up, you know.

    But if we don’t do this, America will go bankrupt.  That’s why it has to be done.  And I’m confident, at this point — knock on wood, you know — knock on my wooden head — (laughter) — the — there’s a lot of wood up there — that we can actually find a trillion dollars in savings.  That would be roughly 15 percent of the $7 trillion budget.

    And obviously, that can only be done with the support of everyone in this room.  And I’d like to thank everyone for — for your support.  Thank you very much this.  This — this can only be done with — with your support.

    So, this is — it’s really — DOGE is a support function for the president and for the — the agencies and departments to help achieve those savings and to effect- — effectively find 15 percent in reduction in fraud and — and waste.

    And — and we bring the receipts.  So, people say, like, “Well, is this real?”  Just go to DOGE.gov.  We l- — we — line item by line item, we specify each item.  So — and w- — and I — I should say, we — also, we will make mistakes.  We won’t be perfect.  But when we make mistake, we’ll fix it very quickly. 

    So, for example, with USAID, one of the things we accidentally canceled, very briefly, was Ebola — Ebola prevention.  I think we all wanted Ebola prevention.  So, we restored the Ebola prevention immediately, and there was no interruption.

    But we do need to move quickly if we’re — if we’re to achieve a trillion-dollar deficit reduction in tw- — in — in financial year 2026.  It requires saving $4 billion per day, every day from now through the end of September.  But we can do it, and we will do it.

    Thank you. 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, do you have any questions of Elon while we’re on the subject of DOGE?  Because we’ll finish off with that.  And if you would have any questions, please ask — you could ask me or Elon.

    Go ahead, please. 

    Q    Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank you, Mr. Musk.  I just wanted to ask you, the — President Trump put out a Truth Social today saying that everybody in the Cabinet was — was happy with you.  I just wondered if that — if you had heard otherwise, and if you had heard anything about members of the Cabinet who weren’t happy with the way things were going.  And if so, what are you doing to address those — any dissatisfaction?

    MR. MUSK:  To the best of —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Hey, Elon, let the Cabinet speak just for a second.  (Laughter.) 

         Is anybody unhappy with Elon?  If you are, we’ll throw them out of here.  (Laughter.)  Is anybody unhappy?  (Applause.)

    They are — they have a lot of respect for Elon and that he’s doing this.  And some disagree a little bit, but I will tell you, for the most part, I think everyone is not only happy, they’re thrilled. 

    So, go ahead, Elon.

    SECRETARY ROLLINS:  And grateful.

    MR. MUSK:  And President Trump has put together, I think, the best cabinet ever, literally.  So, I — and I do not give false praise.  This — this is an incredible group of people.  I don’t think such a talented team has actually ever been assembled.  I think it’s literally the best cabinet that the country has ever had.  And I think the companies should be incredibly appreciative of the people in this room.

    Q    Mr. President —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Please.  Yeah.  Go ahead.

    Q    Mr. President, thank you.  Mr. Musk.  Are there — about half of the government employees so far appear to have responded to your request for what they’ve been doing over the past week.  Is there a timeline in place for next moves for people being fired?  And when can the American people expect to see results from that?

    MR. MUSK:  Yes.  Well, to be — to be clear, like, the — I think that email, perhaps, was misinterpreted as a performance review, but actually it was a pulse check review.  “Do you have a pulse?”  (Laughter.)  “Do you have a pulse and two neurons?”  (Laughter.)  So, if you have a pulse and two neurons, you can reply to an email.

    This is, you know, I think, not a high bar, is what I’m saying.  This is a — should be — anyone could accomplish this. 

    But what we are trying to get to the bottom of is we think there are a number of people on the government payroll who are dead, which is probably why they can’t respond, and — and some people who are not real people, like they’re literally fictional individuals that are collecting payche- — well, somebody is collecting paychecks on a fictional individual.  So, we’re just literally trying to figure out are these people real, are they alive, and can they write an email, which I think is a reasonable expectation for the Amer- — you know, the American public would have at least that expectation of someone in the public sector.

    Q    Mr. Musk —

    Q    Mr. Musk —

    Q    — roughly a million employees —

    MR. MUSK:  (Laughs.)  This is not a — this is not a high bar, guys.  Come on.  (Laughter.)

    Q    Roughly a million employees have responded so far to this email.  Does that mean that the remaining 1 million or so federal employees now risk being terminated?  And is it your understanding and expectation when you post a directive on X that the Cabinet secretaries will follow that order?  Because several agencies have instructed employees that this is voluntary or not to respond.

    MR. MUSK:  Yeah.  Well, I mean, to be cl — so, I guess there was a — like, last week, the president en- — encouraged me, via Truth Social and also via phone call, to be more aggressive.  And I was like, “Okay.”  You know, “Yes, sir, Mr. President.  We will indeed do that.”  The president is the commander in chief.  I — I do what the president asks.

    So — and I said, “Can we send out an email to everyone, just saying, ‘What did you get done last week?’”  The president said yes.  So, I — I did that. 

    And, you know, we — we got a partial response.  But we — we’re going to send another email.  But we — our — our goal is not to be capricious or — or unfair.  It’s — we want to give people every opportunity to send an email and the email could simply be “What I’m working on is too sensitive or classified to — to describe.”  Like, literally, just re- — that would be sufficient.  We’re — we’re — you know, I think this is just common sense. 

    Q    And what is your target number for — for how many workers, employees you’re looking to cut total?

    MR. MUSK:  We — we wish to keep everyone who is doing a job that is essential and doing that job well.  But if — if they’re — if the job is not essential or they’re not doing the job well, they obviously should not be on the public payroll. 

    (Cross-talk.)

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, I have to — I would like to add —

    (Cross-talk.)

    Wait a minute.  Wait.  Wait.  I’d like to add that those million people that haven’t responded, though, Elon, they are on the bubble.  You know, I wouldn’t say that we’re thrilled about it.  You know, they haven’t responded.  Now, maybe they don’t exist.  Maybe we’re paying people that don’t exist.

    Don’t forget, we just got here.  This group just got here.  But those people are on the bubble, as they say.  You know, maybe they’re going to be gone.  Maybe they’re not around.  Maybe they have other jobs.  Maybe they moved and they’re not where they’re supposed to be.  A lot of things could have happened.

    I wouldn’t say that Biden ran a very tight administration.  They spent money like nobody has ever spent money before, wasted money — the Green New Scam, all of the different things they spent money on. 

    And you’ve seen that.  You’ve seen that with some of the things that I read in speeches.  I read them, and people can’t believe, when I read them, $20 million here, $30 million here for, you know, a little educational course on something.  Circumcision, right?  Circumcision.  $20 million to inform the people of such-and-such a country on other things and other things other than that.

    So, yeah, those people are — right now, we’re trying to find out who those people are that haven’t responded.  Now, there’ll be some agencies — like Marco has people within State that are right now doing very classified, very confidential work.  And we understand that, and we’ve talked.  And, you know, we’re being a little more surgical. 

    And Marco is doing a lot of things himself.  He’s — and some of the secretaries are.  We’re going to be going to them.  We’re going to be talking about it today.  We’re going to ask them to do their own DOGE.  In other words, they’ll look in their group and who —

    I spoke with Lee Zeldin, and he thinks he’s going to be cutting 65 or so percent of the people from Environmental, and we’re going to speed up the process, too, at the same time.  He had a lot of people that weren’t doing their job — they were just obstructionists — and a lot of people that didn’t exist, I guess, Lee, too.  You found a lot of empty spots that the people weren’t there.  They didn’t exist.

    And I think Education is going to be one of those.  You go around Washington, you see all these buildings — the Department of Education.  We want to move education back to the states, where it belongs.  Iowa should have education.  Indiana should run their own education.  You’re going to see education go way up.

    Right now, we’re ranked at the very bottom of the list, but we’re at the top of the list in one thing: the cost per pupil.  We spend more money per pupil than any other country in the world, and yet it’s Denmark and Norway, Sweden.  And I — you hate to say this — and, you know, we’re going to get along very well with China, but it’s a competitor: They’re at the top of the list.  They’re among the top 10, usually.  And they’re a very big country, so we can’t use that as an excuse — right? — because we’re a very big country too.

    But we’re – we were ranked last time — under Biden, we were ranked 40 out of 40.  They do the 40 certain nations that they’ve done for a long time.  It seems to be 40, for whatever reason.  And we were ranked number 40.  A year ago, we were 38.  Then we were 39.  We’re — we hit 40.  And so, we’re last in that, and we’re first in cost per pupil.  So, I would say that’s unacceptable.

    Lawrence, do you have something?  Go ahead.

    Q    So, Mr. President, I know you like competition, and I know it’s early.  So, which department are you most impressed with? 

    And then, to Mr. Mu- — (laughter).  That’s the first one.  And, Mr. Musk, which department have you received the most resistance from? 

         Mr. President, you first.

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, I think both of those questions are a little bit — well, you’re a pretty controversial guy.  (Laughter.)  Look, it’s very early.  Right now, I think I’m impressed with everybody.  So far, everybody.  If I wasn’t, in the first month, we’d — and some of them just got here.  They just got approved two days ago, right?

    But I think I’m very impressed with everybody.  So far, I’m very happy with all of the choices.

    I think that Elon has done incredibly with some groups.  And some groups are much easier than others.  It is true: State is a, you know, very difficult situation.  We’re right now negotiating very successfully, I think, with Russia and with Ukraine, and we have a lot of countries involved.  And we have to be a little bit careful what we do and who we’re terminating.  But Marco is doing that very — I think he’s going to be very precise.  It’s going to be —

    We’re cutting down government.  We’re cutting down the size of government.  We have to.  We’re bloated.  We’re sloppy.  We have a lot of people that aren’t doing their job.  We have a lot of people that don’t exist. 

         You look at Social Security as an example.  I mean, you have so many people in Social Security where, if you believe it, they’re 200 years old.  And what we’re doing is finding out: Are checks going out for that and is somebody cashing those checks who’s maybe 35 years old?  Okay? 

         So, there’s a lot of dishonesty.  There’s a lot of fraud. 

         But I think at this moment, I’ll take Elon off the spot.  I think that he’s impressed — he said it very well –better than I can say it — that he’s impressed with the people in this room.  Very impressed.  And I am too.  And it’s too early to say, but I think everybody is on board.  They all know — we want to balance a budget.  We want to have a balanced budget within a reasonably short period of time, meaning maybe by next year or the year after, but maybe — maybe even sooner than that. 

         Q    Mr. President, your — your number one issue was the border.  We just got new information that they’re doxing our federal agents.  They’re putting their personal information out there, these activists, and they’re disrupting the operations.  So, you got Tren de Aragua running all across the country —

         THE PRESIDENT:  Well, we have activists.  That’s true.  And a lot of those —

         Q    So, what are we going to do about the activists —

         THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.  A lot of those activists are acting illegally.  And we’ll give that to our attorney general, and she’ll take a look at that very strongly.  But we’re also having tremendous support from Border Patrol, from ICE.  The ICE agents have been unbelievable.  Border Patrol — their leadership at Border Patrol has been incredible, and they’re working very well. 

         And, as you know — and I saw you reporting it this morning, actually — we set records on the least number of illegal aliens coming in, migrants coming into our country that we’ve had in more than 50 years.  And we did this all within a period of weeks, because we took over a mess.  The world was pouring in.  And remember, they were coming in from jails and prisons and mental institutions and insane asylums, and they were gang members and drug dealers.  Anybody who wanted to come in, they came.  And from not just South America, from all over the world.  So, it’s amazing what they’ve done. 

         And Kristi and — and Tom Homan, the job they’ve done has been absolutely amazing.  We set records for — and we want people to come into our country, by the way, but they want to come in — they have to come in legally. 

         I want that to be really understood.  We want people in our country, but they have to come in legally. 

         Q    Can I follow on that, Mr. President?

    Q    Mr. President.

    Q    About the — the Trump gold card idea —

         THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

         Q    — that you unveiled yesterday.

         THE PRESIDENT:  I hope you liked it.  (Laughter.)

         Q    I await more information.  But the question is: Does this reflect a view, on your part, that the American immigration system has never been properly monetized as you feel it should be?
        

         THE PRESIDENT:  Well, not so much monetized.  It hasn’t been properly run.  I get calls from, as an example, companies where they want to hire the number one student at a school.  A person comes from India, China, Japan, lots of different places, and they go to Harvard, the Wharton School of Finance.  They go to Yale.  They go to all great schools.  And they graduate number one in their class, and they are made job offers, but the offer is immediately rescinded because you have no idea whether or not that person can stay in the country.  I want to be able to have that person stay in the country. 

         These companies can go and buy a gold card, and they can use it as a matter of recruitment. 

         At the same time, the company is using that money to pay down debt.  We’re going to — we’re going to pay down a lot of debt with that.

         Q    Are they going to have to —

         THE PRESIDENT:  And I think the gold card is going to be used by — not only for that.  I mean, they’ll be used by companies.  I mean, I could see Apple — I’ve spoken with Tim Cook — and, by the way, he’s going to make a $500 billion investment in the country only because of the results of the election and, I think, because of tariffs.  He’s going to want to be in the country because of tariffs.  Because if you’re in the country, there is no tariff.  If you’re out of the country, you got to pay tariffs.  And that’s going to be a great investment, I think, that he’s making.  I know it’s going to be a great investment. 

         But we have to be able to get people in the country, and we want people that are productive people.  And I will tell you, the people that can pay $5 million, they’re going to create jobs.  They’re going to spend a lot of money on jobs.  They’re going to have to pay taxes on that too.  So, they’re going to be hiring people, they’re going to be bringing people in and companies in.  And, I don’t know, maybe it will sell like crazy.  I happen to think it’s going to sell like crazy.  It’s a bargain.

         But we’ll —

         Q    Will they have to commit to a certain number?

         THE PRESIDENT:  — know fairly soon.  I think Howard and — and Scott — a few of you, really, are responsible for it.  But, Howard, if you want to discuss that for a couple of minutes, I think I’d like to have you.  I think it’s going to be a very successful program.

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  Sure.

         THE PRESIDENT:  This is Commerce.

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  So, the EB-5 program, which has been around for many years, had investment of a million dollars into projects in America.  And those projects were often suspect, they didn’t really work out, there wasn’t any oversight of it.  And so, for a million-dollar investment, you got a visa, and then you came into the country and ended up with a green card. 

         So, it was poorly overseen, poorly executed.  Then you had our border open, where millions of people came through. 

         So, the idea is we will have a proper business.  We will modify the EB-5 agreement.  Kristi and I are working on it together.  For $5 million, they’ll get a license from the Department of Commerce.  Then they’ll make a proper investment on the EB-5, right?  And we think Scott and I will design the EB-5 investment model, because Scott and I are the best people together to do that.  So, this is joint. 

         This is exactly the Trump administration.  We all work together.  We work it out to be the best.  And if we sell — just remember — 200,000 — there’s a line for EB-5 of 250,000 right now — 200,000 of these gold green cards is $1 trillion

    to pay down our debt, and that’s why the president is doing it, because we are going to balance this budget, and we are going to pay off the debt under President Trump. 

         Q    Mr. —

    Q    And to qualify, do you have to promise and make commitments to create a certain number of jobs here in the U.S.?

         THE PRESIDENT:  No.  No.  Because not all these people are going to be job builders.  They’ll be successful people, or they’ll be people that were hired from colleges, like — sort of like paying an athlete a bonus.  I mean, Apple or one of the companies will go out and they’ll spend five mil- — they’ll buy five of them, and they’re going to get five people. 

         Look, I’ve had the complaint where — I’ve had the complaint from a lot of companies where they go out to hire people, and they can’t hire them b- — out of colleges.  And you know what they do?  They go back to India, or they go back to the country where they came, and they open up a company, and they become billionaires.  They become — and they’re employing thousands and there are a lot of examples. 

    There are some really big examples where they were forced out of the country.  They graduated top in their class at a great school, and they weren’t able to stay.  This is all the time you hear it. 

    And the biggest complaint I get from companies, other than overregulation, which we took care of, but we’re going to have to take care of it here, because a lot of that was put back on by Biden.  But the biggest complaint is the fact that they can’t have any longevity with people.  This way, they have pretty much unlimited longevity. 

    Also, with the $5 million, you know, that’s a path to citizenship.  So, that’s going to be — it’s sort of a green card-plus, and it’s a path to citizenship.  We’re going to call it the gold card.  And I think it’s going to be very treasured.  I think it’s going to do very well.  And we’re going to start selling, hopefully, in about two weeks.

    Now, just so you understand, if we sell a million — right? — a million, that’s $5 trillion.  Five trillion.  Howard was using a different number, but that’s $5 trillion.  If we sell 10 million, which is possible — 10 million highly productive people coming in or people that we’re going to make productive — they’ll be young, but they’re talented, like a talented athlete — that’s $50 trillion. 

    That means our debt is totally paid off, and we have $15 trillion above that.  And — now, I don’t know that we’re going to sell that many.  Maybe we won’t so many at all.  But I think we’re going to sell a lot, because I think there’s — there really is a thirst. 

    No other country can do this, because people don’t want to go to other countries.  They want to come here.  Everybody wants to come here, especially since November 5th.  (Laughter.)

    (Cross-talk.)

    SECRETARY LUTNICK:  They’ll all be vetted, by the way.  All these people will be vetted. 

    Q    How?

    SECRETARY LUTNICK:  Okay?  They’ll be vetted.

    Q    Mr. President, on Ukraine.  Can you talk a lot — a little bit about what type of security guarantees you’re willing to make?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, I’m not going to make security guarantees beyond very much.  We’re going to have Europe do that, because it’s in — you know, we’re talking about Europe is their next-door neighbor.  But we’re going to make sure everything goes well. 

    And as you know, we’ll be making a — we’ll be really partnering with Ukraine in terms of rare earth.  We very much need rare earth.  They have great rare earth.  We’ll be working with Secretary Burgum and with Chris.  You’ll be working on that together. 

    And we’re going to be able to have tremendous — I mean, this gives us — because we don’t have that much of it here.  We have some, but we don’t have that much, and we need a lot more to really propel us to the next level of — to lead in every way.  We’re leading right now with AI.  We’re leading with everything right now, but we have to — we need resources. 

    We have to double our electric capacity.  We have to do many things.  We have to really triple, if you think of it, the electric capacity from what we have right now, if you can believe it.  (Laughter.) 

    Q    But will the United States — can I —

    THE PRESIDENT:  So, I just say this.  So, the deal we’re making gets us — it brings us great wealth.  We get back the money that we spent, and we hope that we’re going to be able to settle this up. 

    We want to settle it.  We want to stop — I tell you what.  I’m doing it for two reasons, but the number one reason, by far, is to watch — all these people being killed.  I see pictures every week from — I assume satellite pictures, mostly, but there’s some pictures on site of thousands of soldiers that are being killed.  They’re being decimated, because equipment today — military equipment is so powerful and so devastating.  And, number one, I want to see people stop. 

    And they’re not from here.  They’re from primarily two other countries. 

    And then, by the way, let’s talk about the Middle East.  We got to solve that problem too.  And that’s come a long way.  We’re doing very well in that also.  A lot of things are happening on that.  But I’m watching soldiers being killed — Ukrainian and Russian soldiers being killed.  My number one thing is to get that stopped. 

    My number two thing is I don’t want to have to pay any more money, because we’ve — Biden has spent $350 billion without any chance of getting it back.  Now we’re going to be getting all of that money back, plus a lot more.  And we provided a great thing.  I mean, we’ve provided something very important, and we’ll be working with Ukraine and — because we’ll be taking that — we’re going to be taking what we’re entitled to take. 

    Now, they spent $350 billion, and Europe spent $100 billion.  Now, does anybody really think that’s fair?  But then we find out, a little while ago — not so long ago, a few months ago, I found out that the money they spent, they get back, but the money we spent, we don’t get back.  I said, “Well, we’re going to get it back.” 

    And we’ll be able to make a deal.  And again, President Zelenskyy is coming to sign the deal.  And it’s a great thing.  It’s a great deal for Ukraine, too, because they get us over there, and we’re going to be working over there.  We’ll be on the land.  And, you know, in that way, it’s — there’s sort of automatic security, because nobody’s going to be messing around with our people when we’re there.  And so, we’ll be there in that way. 

    But Europe will be watching it very closely.  I know that UK has said and France has said that they want to put — they volunteered to put so-called peacekeepers on the site.  And I think that’s a good thing.

    (Cross-talk.)

    Q    Mr. President, you had mentioned the high cost of eggs, and we’ve seen consumer confidence this week have a sharp drop from last month — the biggest dip in, I believe, three years.  Why is that — your assessment, why is that the case and is there anything you can do? 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, I think that consumer confidence — if you look at confidence in the nation, it had the biggest increase in the history of the chart.  It went up 42 points in a period of, like, days after the election, since the election.  So, since the election, the confidence in our nation — including right track, wrong track — the first time it’s ever happened, where we were on the right track, because this country has been on the wrong track for a long time. 

    So, the confidence in business, confidence in the country has reached an all-time high.  We have never reached levels like we are right now.

    Okay.

    (Cross-talk.)

    Q    Mr. President, you said — Mr. President, you’ve been very clear in saying that as long as you’re president, Iran will never get a nuclear weapon. 

    THE PRESIDENT:  That’s true. 

    Q    Is it also your policy that as long as you’re president, China will never take Taiwan by force?

    THE PRESIDENT:  I never comment on that.  I don’t comment on any — because I don’t want to ever put myself in that position.  And if I said it, I certainly wouldn’t be saying it to you.  I’d be saying it to other people, maybe people around this table — (laughter) — and very specific people around this table.  

    Q    Is it a concern (inaudible)?

    THE PRESIDENT:  So, I don’t want to put myself in that position.  But I can tell you what, I have a great relationship with President Xi.  I’ve had a great relationship with him.  We want them to come in and invest. 

    I see so many things saying that we don’t want China in this country.  That’s not right.  We want them to invest in the United States.  That’s good.  That’s a lot of money coming in.  And we’ll invest in China.  We’ll do things with China. 

    The relationship we’ll have with China would be a very good one.  I see all of these phony reports that we don’t want their money; we don’t want anything to do with them.  That’s wrong. 

    We’re going to have a good relationship with China, but they won’t be able to take advantage of us.  What they did to Biden was — he didn’t know what was happening.  He didn’t know what he was doing.  The administration didn’t know what they were doing.  It was very sad to watch. 

         But we’re going to have a good relationship with China and Russia and Ukraine and the Middle East.  We’re doing things that —

    Look, when I left, we had no wars.  We had defeated ISIS totally.  We had no inflation.  We didn’t have the Afghanistan withdrawal — the worst withdrawal anybody has ever seen.  I think that’s one of the reasons that President Putin looked at that.  He said, “Wow, these guys are a paper tiger.  Look at” — we’re no paper tiger. 

    Don’t forget: We got rid of ISIS in three weeks.  People said it would take five years.  We did it, because when I came in, I let them do what they had to do.  And the man that headed that operation is now going to be your — your chairman, right?

    SECRETARY HEGSETH:  Yes, sir.

    THE PRESIDENT:  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 

    SECRETARY HEGSETH:  Yes, sir.

    THE PRESIDENT:  And — “Razin” Caine.  I liked him right from the beginning.  As soon as I heard his name, I said, “That’s my guy.” 

    Okay.  Any other questions?

    (Cross-talk.)

    Q    Mr. President, has there been enough de- — decreases in crossings at the border for you to continue the pause on tariffs against Mexico and Canada?  And, if not —

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, no.  I’m going to — I’m not stopping the tariffs, no.  Millions of people have died because of the fentanyl that comes over the border. 

    Q    Even with the 90 percent drop in border crossings, though, this —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, that’s — well —

    Q    — last month compared to about a year ago?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, they’ve been good, but that’s also due to us.  Mostly due to us.  I mean —

    Q    Mr. President —

         Q    Mr. President, on CBS — 

    THE PRESIDENT:  — it’s very hard.  It’s, right now, very hard to come through the border.  But the — look, the damage has been done.  We’ve lost millions of people due to fentanyl.  It comes mostly from China, but it comes through Mexico, and it comes through Canada. 

    Q    Mr. Presi- —

    THE PRESIDENT:  And I have to tell you that, you know, on April 2nd — I was going to do it on April 1st, but I’m a little bit superstitious, so I made it April 2nd — the tariffs go on, not all of them but a lot of them.  And I think you’re going to see something that’s going to be amazing. 

    We’ve been taken advantage of as a country for a long period of time.  We’ve been — we’ve been tariffed, but we didn’t tariff.  Now, I did.  When I was here, I tariffed.  We took in $700 billion from China — $700 billion.  Not one president in this — in the history of our country took in 10 cents from China.  At the same time, China respected us. 

    Now, when COVID came in, that was a different deal.  I used to call it the China virus.  I guess I can call it the China virus again, but, you know, it was — it’s an accurate term, but I won’t do that out of respect to China.  Okay?

    (Cross-talk.)

    Say it again.  What?

    Q    On Gaza.  I just wondered if there’s any progress towards the second phase of the ceasefire that you can tell us about.

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, I’m very disappointed when I see four — four bodies came in today.  These are young people.  Young people don’t die.  Okay?  Young people don’t die.  These are young people.  Four bodies came in today.  They think they’re doing us a favor by sending us bodies. 

    So, look, that’s a decision that has to be made by Israel, by Bibi, but Israel has to make that decision.  We got a lot of hostages back, but it’s very sad what happened to those people.  I mean, you had a young lady with her hand practically blown off.  You know why it blew up?  Because she put up her hand to try and stop a bullet that was coming her way, and it hit her hand and blew off her fingers, big part of her hand. 

    This is a vicious group of people, and Israel is going to have to decide what they’re doing.  Phase one is going to be ending.  Think of it: Today, they sent in four bodies.  Bodies. 

    And I will say one thing, though.  I’ve spoken to a lot of the parents and a lot of the people involved.  They want those bodies almost as much and maybe even just as much as they wanted their son or their daughter.  Amazing.  “Please, sir.  Please.  My son is dead, but they have his body.  Please can you get it for us?”  They — it’s the biggest thing.  It’s incredible the level — they want the bodies of these people.  They’re dead.  They’re dead. 

    And, you know, when I saw the ones that came in two weeks ago, they looked like they just got out of a concentration camp.  Then, the following week, a group came in, and they weren’t as bad — in as bad of shape.

    But Israel is going to have to make a decision.  You’re right, phase one, and now phase two has started.  And today, we got some, you know, very, very sad — we knew they were dead, by the way.  We knew they were going to be bodies, as opposed to people that were living.  But it’s a very sad situation. 

    At some point, somebody is going to say we got to do something about this.

    (Cross-talk.)

    Q    Mr. President, you were just talking about Afghanistan and the botched withdrawal.  Have all the generals or command staff that were involved with the withdrawal been fired or relieved of duty?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, that’s a great idea.  It’s — (laughter) — sorry, I’m not going to tell this man what to do, but I will say that.  If I had his place, I’d fire every single one of them, Pete.  Pete, that’s a very good question. 

    SECRETARY HEGSETH:  Well, it’s a question we’ve thought a lot about.  We’re doing a complete review of every single aspect of what happened with the botched withdrawal of Afghanistan and plan to have full accountability.  It’s one of the first things we announced at the Defense Department for that reason, sir. 

    Certainly General “Razin” Caine, who’s on his way in, was not a part of that.  Instead, was a part of leading the effort against ISIS by untying the hands of war fighters and finishing the job properly and then bringing our troops home. 

    So, we’re taking a very different view, obviously, than the previous administration, and there will be full accountability. 

    THE PRESIDENT:  I don’t see big promotions in that group.  (Laughter.)  And I think they’re going to be largely gone.  I know the man on my left.  I think they’re going to be largely gone. 

    That was a horrible display.  And, you know, I’ve dealt with the parents and the family of the 13 that were killed.  But, you know, nobody ever talks about the 40 that were so badly hurt, with the arms and the legs and the face and the whole thing — the missing arms and legs.  It was so terrible, the way that was handled.

    And it should have been gone through Bagram.  We have a big base with big fences that nobody can get in, and you have, you know, hundreds of acres, instead of a little local airport where the whole place went crazy.  That was so badly handled.  And I would think that most of those people are going to be gone. 

    Q    Are we going to take Bagram back?

    THE PRESIDENT:  So, I’ll tell you what has bothered me very much — very, very much: We give billions of dollars to Afghanistan.  Nobody knows that.  Nobody knew that.  Do you know we give billions of dollars to Afghanistan?  And yet we left behind all of that equipment, which wouldn’t have happened. 

    You know, we were getting out under me.  I’m the one that got it down to 5,000 people.  We were going to get out, but we were going to keep Bagram, not because of Afghanistan but because of China, because it’s exactly one hour away from where China makes its nuclear missiles. 

    So, we were going to keep Bagram.  We were going to keep a small force on Bagram.  We were going to have Bagram Air Base, one of the biggest air bases in the world.  One of the biggest runways, one of the most powerful runways, in the sense that it was very heavy concrete and steel.  You could carry about anything.  You could land anything on those runways. 

    We gave it up.  And you know who’s occupying it right now?  China.  China.  Biden gave it up.  So, we’re going to keep that, and we’re going to have a withdrawal, and we’re going to take our equipment.  We’re going to do it properly.  We’re going to do it very — we’re going to keep the equipment. 

         Well, they ran out.  It was — what happened there was a — in fact, you know, in all fairness to Putin, when he saw that, he said, “Well, this is our time to go and go into Ukraine,” I guess, because it was — the timing seemed to be about right. 

         But we send them billions of dollars in aid, which nobody knows.  If they — if the American public knew that — they know it now.  And if we’re doing that, I think they should give our equipment back.  And I told Pete to study that. 

    But we left billions — tens of billions of dollars’ worth of equipment behind.  Brand-new trucks.  You see them display it every year on their little roadway someplace where they have a road and they drive the — you know, waving the flag and talking about America.  Beautiful equipment that’s all — I mean, the top-of-the-line stuff, brand-new stuff.  Now it’s getting older. 

         But you know what?  We’re going to pay them.  I think we should get a lot of that equipment back. 

         You know that Afghanistan is one of the biggest sellers of military equipment in the world.  You know why?  They’re selling the equipment that we left.  We’re first.  They were second or third.  Can you believe it?  They’re selling 777,000

    rifles, 70,000 armor-plated — many of them were armor-plated trucks and vehicles — 70,000. 

         If you think of a used car lot, the biggest one in the country, you have — I would say, JD, if somebody had 500 cars, that would be a lot. 

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, that would be quite a lot.

    THE PRESIDENT:  This is 70,000 vehicles we had there, and we left it for them.  I think we should get it back.

         (Cross-talk.)

         Q    Mr. President, the spending bill that passed last night aims to cut $2 trillion.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Right.

         Q    Can you guarantee that Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security will not be touched?

         THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.  I mean, I have said it so many times, you shouldn’t be asking me that question.  Okay?  This will not be “read my lips.”  It won’t be “read my lips” anymore: We’re not going to touch it.

         Now, we are going to look for fraud.  I’m sure you’re okay with that, like people that shouldn’t be on, people that are illegal aliens and others — criminals, in many cases.  And that’s with Social Security.  We have a lot of people — you see that immediately.  When you see people that are 200 years old that are being sent checks for Social Security — some of them are actually being sent checks. 

    So, we’re tracing that down, and I have a feeling that Pam is going to do a very good job with that.  But you have a lot of fraud. 

         But, no, I’m not — we’re not doing anything on that.

         Q    Mr. President, part of your mission, sir —

         Q    Mr. President — Mr. President, on CBS News.  Mr. President, you’re in litigation —
        
         Q    Part of your mission has been — thank you.  I’m sorry. 

         Part of your mission has been to restore executive control over the executive branch.  Is it your view of your authority that you have the power to call up any one of or all of the people seated at this table and issue orders that they’re bound to follow?

         THE PRESIDENT:  Oh, yeah.  They’ll follow the orders.  Yes, they will. 

         Q    No exceptions? 

         THE PRESIDENT:  No except- — well, let’s see.  Let me think.  Oh, yeah.  Yeah.  She’ll have an exception.  (The president points at Secretary Rollins.)  (Laughter.)

         Of course, no exceptions.  You know that.

         Q    Mr. President, can you clarify the Canada/Mexico tariffs.  You had put that 30-day pause. 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    Q    You just referred to —

         THE PRESIDENT:  It’s 25 percent.

         Q    Twenty-five percent.  When does it go into effect?

         THE PRESIDENT:  April 2nd. 

         Q    April 2nd for Canada and Mexico?

         THE PRESIDENT:  Correct.  And for —

         Q    And for the reciprocal?

         THE PRESIDENT:  — and for everything. 

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  Well, we have the — the — fentanyl-related is a pause.  If they can prove to the president they’ve done an excellent job, that’s what they first do in 30 days.

         Q    Have you guys seen any changes?

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  But then the overall is April 2nd.  So, the big transaction is April 2nd, but the fentanyl-related things, if they’re working hard on the border, at the end of that 30 days, they have to prove to the president that they’ve satisfied him to that regard.  If they have —

         THE PRESIDENT:  It’s going to be hard to satisfy.

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  — then we’ll give them a pause or he won’t. 

         THE PRESIDENT:  It’s going to be hard to satisfy.

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  But that’s up to him to see.

         THE PRESIDENT:  We lose 300,000 people a year to fentanyl.  Not 100-, not 95-, not 60-, like you read.  You know, you’ve been reading it for years. 

         We lost, in my opinion, over the last couple of years, on average, maybe close to 300,000 people dead, and the families are ruined.  You know, when they lose a daughter, when they lose a son, the families are never the same.  You’re never going to be the same.  So, you’re talking about a million people. 

         But when the daughters die, I see it — daughters die and the sons die because of fentanyl.  And in some cases, they don’t even know they’re taking it.  They — they’re buying something else, and it’s laced with fentanyl, and they end up dying.  And I’ve known many people who have lost children to fentanyl and for other reasons, but to fentanyl.  It’s such a big killer.  And those people are never the same people. 
        
         I mean, I’ve seen people that — for the rest of their lives, they’re not the same people.  They’re so different, it’s not even believable.  Dynamic people, happy people that are — they die a miserable death.  And that’s because of the crap that comes in through China and through Mexico and through Canada.  A lot of it comes through Canada. 

         The — Canada — look, we support Canada $200 billion a year in subsidies one way or the other.  We let them make millions of cars.  We let them send us lumber.  We don’t need their lumber.  We’re going to free up our lumber.  Lee is going to do — the head of environmental.  We’re going to free up our lumber.  We have the best lumber there is.  We don’t need their lumber.  What do we need their lumber for?

         When you look at the — we subsidize them $200 billion a year.  Without us, Canada can’t make it.  You know, Canada relies on us 95 percent.  We rely on them 4 percent.  Big difference.  And I say Canada should be our 51st state.  There’s no tariffs, no nothing. 
        
         And — and I say that, we give them military protection.  They have a very small military.  They spend very little money on military.  Or NATO, they’re just about last in terms of payment, because they say, “Why should we spend on military?”  That’s a tremendous cost.  Most nations can’t afford to even think about it.  “Why should we spend on military?  The United States protects us.” 

         And I would say that’s largely true.  We protect Canada.  But it’s not fair.  It’s not fair that they’re not paying their way.  And if they had to pay their way, they couldn’t exist. 

         When I spoke to — let’s call it the prime minister, rather than the governor.  (Laughter.)  But when I spoke to him, I said, “Why are we giving you $200 billion a year?”  He was unable to answer the question.  I said, “Why are we letting you make millions of cars and send them in?”  He was unable to answer the question — Justin Trudeau, a nice guy.  I think he’s a very good guy.  I call him Governor Trudeau. 

         He should be governor, because the fact is that if we don’t give them cars — we don’t have to give them cars.  The c- — tariffs will make it impossible for them to sell cars into the United States.  The tariffs will make it impossible to — for them to sell lumber or anything else into the United States. 

    And all I’m asking to do is break even or lose a little bit, but not lose $200 million.  And we love Canada.  I love Canada.  I love the people of Canada.  And — but, honestly, it’s not fair for us to be supporting Canada.  And if we don’t support them, they don’t subsist as a — as a nation. 

    Okay.

    Q    Mr. President, when you were talking to Elon —

    Q    Mr. President, on the EU tariffs.  Mr. President, have you made a decision on what level you will seek on tariffs on the European Union?

    THE PRESIDENT:  We have made a decision, and we’ll be announcing it very soon.  And it’ll be 25 percent, generally speaking, and that’ll be on cars and all other things. 

    And European Union is a different case than Canada — different kind of case.  They’ve really taken advantage of us in a different way.  They don’t accept our cars.  They don’t accept, essentially, our farm products.  They use all sorts of reasons why not.  And we accept everything of them, and we have about a $300 billion deficit with the European Union. 

    Now, I love the countries of Europe.  I guess I’m from there at some point, a long time ago, right?  (Laughter.)  But indirectly — well, pretty directly, too, I guess.  But I love the countries of Europe.  I — I love all countries, frankly.  All different.

    But European Union has been — it was formed in order to screw the United States.  I mean, look, let’s be honest.  The European Union was formed in order to screw the United States.  That’s the purpose of it, and they’ve done a good job of it, but now I’m president.

    Q    What will happen if these countries or the EU retaliate?

    THE PRESIDENT:  They can’t.  I mean, they can try, but they can’t. 

    Q    China did.  They imposed tariffs —

    Q    They are pledging to, sir.

    Q    — that are — went into effect, China’s retaliatory tariffs —

    THE PRESIDENT:  That’s right.  That’s right.  But —

    Q    — on the — the 10th of February.  Has there been any —

    THE PRESIDENT:  That’s right.

    Q    — impact that you’ve been able to observe?

    THE PRESIDENT:  That’s right.  No, they can do it, and they can try, but the numbers can never equal what ours, because we can go off.  We are the pot of gold.  We’re the one that everybody wants.  And they can retaliate, but it cannot be a successful retaliation, because we just go cold turkey.  We don’t buy anymore.  And if that happens, we win. 

    Q    Are you talking to Erik Prince about privatat- —

    THE PRESIDENT:  No.

    Q    — privatizing deportations?

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, I haven’t.  I haven’t.

    Q    Mr. President, you’re in litigation with CBS News.  Is this a case that you’d like to see go to trial, or are you open a settelm- —

    THE PRESIDENT:  With who?

    Q    CBS, the — “60 Minutes.”

    THE PRESIDENT:  CBS?

    Q    Yes.

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, CBS did something that was amazing.  Kamala was unable to answer a question properly, and they took the question that they asked, and they inserted an answer.  They gave her an answer.  This was two days before the election, right before — the Sunday night before the election.  And they wrote out a — they put her words from another question that was asked about a half an hour later, and they put that into the question. 

    Nobody’s ever even heard of it before.  Nobody’s ever heard of anything like this before.  But they then did it, they say, on numerous occasions.  And the FCC is looking at it very strongly, and everybody’s looking at it, and I’m — but nobody’s ever seen anything. 

    Think of it.  They took her answers, and they changed them.  And I don’t mean they changed a word or two, or they cut off a half a sentence, or they cut off a couple of words.  I mean, I’ve had that happen too.  But that, you — you just say — you know, then they say, “Well, we want brevity.  You know, we wanted to do it for time.” 

    Q    Would — would you encourage —

    THE PRESIDENT:  They took out her answer, and they inserted an entirely different answer that made her sound competent.  And they did this, and nobody’s ever — I thought I’ve heard of everything when it comes to that stuff.  No — I’ve never heard of it.  Nobody has ever seen.  So, we sued, and we are in discussions of settlement. 

    Q    What would a number be?  Like a hu- — what — what’s a number that you would think would be appropriate?

    THE PRESIDENT:  I think it’s a lot.  (Laughter.) 

    Q    What’s the timeline and process —

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, I mean, it — look, it could have — it probably did affect the election.  I mean, we won by a lot.  As I said, “Too big to rig.”  But it probably did affect the election.  Yeah, probably could have won by more, but I could have lost the election because of that. 

    It’s — we have to get to honest elections.  We have to go back to paper ballots.  We have to go back to voter ID.  One-day election, ideally, or short term, not these 48-day and 61-day elections where boxes are put in a room, and, “Oh, let’s move the boxes, because we’re putting in a new air conditioning system.”  Then you see the boxes move, and then you say, “Well, where are all the boxes?”  You know, —

    Q    But would you —

    THE PRESIDENT:  “What happened to the boxes that never came back?” 

    No, our elections are extremely dishonest.  We’re the only country in the world that has mail-in voting and all of these different things that we put in.  Nobody — no other country in the world has it. 

    You know, France went to — they had some of the things that we had, and they went to same-day voting, all paper.  And, you know, paper is very sophisticated now.  It’s a very sophisticated — it’s a very sophisticated form of voting right now.  It’s a very safe form of voting. 

    You know, the other thing is for the governors.  I wish the governors would do it, because the paper ballots will cost 9 percent of the machines, and they’re 100 percent.  You know, they’re — I don’t — nothing’s foolproof, but they’re as close as you get.  So, we’ll see what happens. 

    But on the “60 Minute” thing, nobody’s ever seen anything like it. 

    Q    And would you link the FCC action to the litigation?  I mean, does it make se- —

    THE PRESIDENT:  I don’t think it’s linked, but probably the lawyers look at it, you know, because I know it’s going along.  FCC is headed by a very competent person, and you have some very competent people on the board, and so I think they’re looking at it very seriously. 

    Yeah.

    Q    Mr. President —

    Q    Sir, of all the deals that you’ve done in your life, all the people you’ve sat across from and negotiated with, is President Putin distinct in any way?

    THE PRESIDENT:  He’s a very smart guy.  He’s a very cunning person.  But I’ve dealt with some people that — I’ve dealt with some really bad people.  But I will tell you, as far as this is concerned, we’ve — you have to understand, he was — he had no intention, in my opinion, of settling this war.  I think he wanted the whole thing. 

    When I got elected, we spoke, and I think we’re going to have a deal.  I can’t guarantee you that.  You know, a deal is a deal.  Lots of crazy things happen in deals, right?  But I think we’re going to have a deal. 

    If I didn’t get elected, I believe he would have just continued to go through Ukraine, and over a period of time, a lot of people — a lot of people would have been killed.  It would have lasted for a period of time. 

    And the reason that Ukraine — and I give — I have great respect for the Ukraine as fighters.  They have great fighters.  But without our equipment, that war would have been over, like people said, in a very short period of time. 

    Q    Is there a timeline (inaudible) — 

    THE PRESIDENT:  And if you remember, I gave the Javelins, and the Javelins are the things that knocked out those tanks right at the beginning of the war.  They said that — that Obama, at the time, gave sheets, and Trump gave Javelins.  Well, I was the one that did that.  But I want to see it come to an end. 

    Q    Will he have to make concessions — President Putin?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, he will.  He will.  He’s going to have to.  And —

    Q    Can you preview that?

    THE PRESIDENT:  And I think — I believe that, because we got elected, that war will come to an end.  And I also believe, if we didn’t get elected, if this administration didn’t win the election by a lot, that that war would go on for a long time, and he would want to take the whole thing. 

    Q    What concessions?  What concessions?

    Q    On the — on the —

    THE PRESIDENT:  The big question I had is: Does he want to take the whole thing?  But the reason — and — and the Ukrainians are good fighters, I have to say, but without the equipment — without our equipment — we have the best equipment in the world.  We have the best military equipment in the world.  Without our equipment, that would have been over very quickly. 

    Q    What concessions would you like to see? 

    Q    On the (inaudible), sir?  On — on the —

    Q    What concessions would you like to see?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Oh, I don’t want to tell right now.  But I can tell you that NATO, you can forget about.  That’s been — I think that’s probably the reason the whole thing started.  And I think, JD, we can say that. 

    What — do you have a statement on that?  You’ve been very much involved. 

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  (Laughs.)

    THE PRESIDENT:  I gave him the beauty.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Great.  You gave me the — the hardest question, sir. 

    Q    Concessions from Russia.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  I mean, look, as the president said, we’re not going to do the negotiation in public with the American media.  He’s going to do it in private with the president of — of Russia, with the president of Ukraine, and with other leaders.  And I think that’s how this has to go. 

    I think the — I just want to push back against some of the criticism I’ve seen in the administration on this, because every single time the president engages in diplomacy, you guys preemptively accuse him of conceding to Russia.  He hasn’t conceded anything to anyone.  He’s doing the job of a diplomat, and he is, of course, the diplomat in chief as the president of the United States. 

    Q    On the gold cards, sir.  Can you talk a little bit more about the vetting process, you know —

    THE PRESIDENT:  They’ll go through a process.  The process is being worked out right now, and we’re going to be — we’re going to be very careful. 

    Q    And will there be restrictions on, for instance, can Chinese nationals get one? 

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, we’re not going to restrict. 

    Q    Can Iranian nationals get —

    THE PRESIDENT:  We’re probably not going to be restricting too much in — in terms of countries, but maybe in terms of individuals.  We want to make sure we have people that love our country and are capable of loving the country.

    Q    Is there a process, sir —

    Q    Mr. President, there is a measles outbreak in Texas at the moment in which a child is reported to have died.  Do you have concerns about that?  And have you asked Secretary Kennedy to look into that outbreak? 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, why don’t we — Bobby, do you want to speak on that, please?

    SECRETARY KENNEDY:  We are following the measles epidemic every day.  I think there’s 124 people who have contracted measles at this point, mainly in Gaines County, Texas; mainly, we’re told, in the Mennonite community. 

    There are two people who have died, but the — we’re watching it.  And there — there are about 20 people hospitalized, mainly for quarantine. 

    We’re watching it.  We put out a post on it yesterday, and we’re going to continue to follow it. 

    Q    Mr. President —

    SECRETARY KENNEDY:  Inci- — incidentally, there have been four measles outbreaks this year in this country.  Last year, there were 16.  So, it’s not unusual.  We have measles outbreaks every year. 

    Q    You sound a little under the weather yourself right now.  Are you all right?

    SECRETARY KENNEDY:  I just — I have a permanently bad throat. 

    Q    (Inaudible) coughing.

    Q    Mr. President, would you — would you send U.S. peacekeepers to just — to support the — the European peacekeepers?  Would you do any sort of U.S. —

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, we’re going to support Europe, yeah. 

    Q    And how would we do that?  How would the United States do that?

    THE PRESIDENT:  We’re very friendly with Europe.  We have a great relationship with Europe.  I mean, you could ask — you could talk about France.  You could talk about any of them.  Yeah, we have a great relationship with Europe. 

    Q    But how will we — how will the United States do that?  Would there be boots on —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, how?  I mean, you’re asking me a question: What are we doing in the — let’s worry — I hope we have that problem, where we can worry about peacekeeping.  We got to get there first.

    (Secretary Lutnick knocks on the table.)

    But I hope we have the problem of worrying about peacekeeping.  That’ll be the easiest problem, I think, JD, that we’ve ever had.  (Laughter.)

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  I think so, sir.

    Q    That would be part of the deal, presumably, that the Ukrainians —

    THE PRESIDENT:  We’ll — we’re —

    Q    — would want —

    THE PRESIDENT:  We’ll do it at the time, but we’ll — peacekeeping is very easy.  It’s making the deal that’s very tough. 

    And, again, nobody was speaking to Russia at all.  And, you know, probably a million and a half soldiers have been killed — close to a million and a half soldiers, not to mention a treme- — I will tell you, the — the thing with that horrible war that should have never started — it would have never started if I were president, and it didn’t start for four years, and it was not even thought about starting.  But the thing with that war is that you’re highly underestimating the number of people that have been killed.  Far more people have been killed in that war than you talk about.  You know, you like to talk about numbers, like, a million people.  Well, they had much more than a million soldiers killed.

    But you have a lot of cities that have been knocked to the ground.  They’re demolition sites.  Literally, demolition sites.  Every single building is knocked to the ground, and a lot of people were killed in those buildings.  And you’ll hear a report, “Two people were minorly injured” or “just injured a little bit.”  No.  No.  People were killed by the thousands.

    And there are a lot more people killed in that war than the media wants to talk about, because Biden did a horrible, horrible job.  He should have prevented that war.  He could have prevented that war. 

    Putin would have never gone in.  I’ll tell you one thing: He would have never gone in.  That war would never have taken place if I were president. 

    Q    I think what people are trying to understand, Mr. President —

    Q    Mr. President —

    Q    — is how would the United States — what would you be willing to do to support this European peacekeeping effort?  Would there be —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Again, you’re asking me the same question?  (Laughter.)

    Q    I’m just trying —

    THE PRESIDENT:  How many times do you have to answer it?  You’re talking about after we make peace.  Let me make peace first. 

    Once we make peace, I’ll give you all the answers you want.  But how many times can you ask the same question?

    Q    Mr. President, on the Middle East.  Did you receive —

    Q    Is loosening the sanctions on —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, go ahead.  Behind.

    Q    Is loosening the sanctions on Russia a potential option as part of an overall deal?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Not now, no.  No.  We have sanctions on Russia.  No, I want to see if we make a deal first.  But I think we will.  I’ve had very —

    Q    But is it a bargaining chip, I’m asking.

    THE PRESIDENT:  I’ve had very good conversations with President Putin.  I’ve had very good conversations with President Zelenskyy.  And until four weeks ago, nobody had conversations with anybody.  It wasn’t even a consideration.  Nobody thought you could make peace.  I think you can. 

    Q    Mr. President, just —

    Q    But if Mr. Putin gets to keep his —

    Q    — just to bring this —

    Q    — the land that was claimed by force, if the Russians get to keep the territory that they — they claimed by force, doesn’t that send a dangerous message, let’s say, to China about Taiwan?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Oh, okay.  You try and take it away, right?  We’re going to do the best we can.  (Laughter.)  We’re going to do the best we can to make the best deal we can for both sides.  But for Ukraine, we’re going to try very hard to make a good deal so that they can get as much back as possible.  We want to get as much back as possible. 

    Q    Mr. President, just to bring this full —

    THE PRESIDENT:  And we’ll — we’ll cut it out after maybe this question.  Go ahead.

    Q    To bring this full circle, back to —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Unless it’s a bad question, and then we’ll (inaudible).  (Laughter.)

    Q    And back to —

    THE PRESIDENT:  You always like to finish on a good one.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  But, sir, they want you to negotiate with them instead of President Putin.

    THE PRESIDENT:  I know.  I know.

    Q    Back to the question about the —

    THE PRESIDENT:  They want to continue to talk about the peacekeepers.  (Laughter.)  They’re — you have a lot of confidence in us, because you assume there’s going to be peace.  You know, it’s possible it doesn’t work out.  There is possibility. 

         Q    And I had —

         THE PRESIDENT:  But I hope it does, for the sake of humanity, because if you look at the pictures that I’ve looked at, you don’t want to look at them. 

         Go ahead.

         Q    I had a question back on these cuts to the federal workforce.  You mentioned you — you’re interested in doing another round of this email.  When would you like to

    see that?  What would be the deadline?  And —

         THE PRESIDENT:  I — I’m not — I think —

         Q    — this time, would it be mandatory?

         THE PRESIDENT:  I think Elon — I think Elon wants to.  And I think it’s a good idea because, you know, those people, as I said before, they’re on the bubble.  You got a lot of people that have not responded, so we’re trying to figure out, do they exist?  Who are they?  And it’s possible that a lot of those people will be actually fired. 

         Q    And —

         THE PRESIDENT:  And if that happened, that’s okay, because that’s what we’re trying to do. 

         This country has gotten bloated and fat and disgusting and incompetently run. 

         I think we had the worst president in the history of our country.  He just left office.  I think he’s a disgrace.  What he’s done to our country by allowing millions of people to come into our country like that and all of the other things — the inflation, which he caused because of energy and stupid spending.  To spend hundreds of millions, trillions and trillions of dollars on the Green New Scam — a total scam.  I have the best energy people, the best environmental people in the world around this table, and they — they can’t even believe he got away with it. 

         And then, in leaving office, to send $20 billion here and $20 million there and $10 million and $5 million, and they couldn’t spend the money fast enough, and “Let’s get it out before Trump gets in.  Let’s just get it out to anybody.”  This is a disgrace to our nation.

         And you don’t write the fair thing.  But, look, you know the good news?  The people see it, and that’s why we won the election by so much. 

         Thank you very much, everybody.  I appreciate it.  Thank you.  Thank you.   

         Q    Thank you, Mr. President.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you very much, Doug.  Pulitzer Prize.

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Sir, how many peacekeepers are you going to send to — (laughter) —

         THE PRESIDENT:  “What will you do?”  “How will it be?”  (Laughter.)

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  “How will you address this?”

                                    END            12:47 P.M. EST

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Amid ‘Hellscape’, Uptick in Violence in North Darfur, Senior Humanitarian Official Urges Security Council to Take Immediate Action to Protect Civilians in Sudan

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    12 Million People Displaced, 24.6 Million Face Acute Hunger Nationwide, Yet Aid Groups Forced to Suspend Operations in Zamzam Displacement Camp Due to Insecurity

    The “already catastrophic” situation in Sudan has worsened in recent weeks, a senior United Nations humanitarian official warned today, as she outlined alarming developments in North Darfur, and urged the Security Council to take immediate action to ensure all actors abide by international humanitarian law and protect civilians in Zamzam camp and beyond. 

    “Nearly two years of relentless conflict in Sudan have inflicted immense suffering and turned parts of the country into a hellscape,” said Edem Wosornu, Director, Operations and Advocacy Division, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.  Ms. Wosornu briefed the 15-member body on behalf of Tom Fletcher, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. 

    More than 12 million people in Sudan have been displaced while 24.6 million people are experiencing acute hunger, she told the Council.  In North Darfur, violence in and around the Zamzam displacement camp — which hosts hundreds of thousands of civilians — has further intensified.  Satellite imagery confirms the use of heavy weaponry there in recent weeks.  Many have been killed, including at least two humanitarian workers, she said. 

    Earlier this week, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the main provider of health and nutrition services in Zamzam, announced that it has been forced to halt its operations in the camp due to the deteriorating security situation.  The World Food Programme (WFP) has also confirmed the suspension of voucher-based food assistance due to insecurity and the destruction of the market at Zamzam. 

    Moreover, the UN Human Rights Office has verified reports of summary executions of civilians in areas that have changed hands, she went on to say.  In the south of the country, fighting has spread into new areas in North Kordofan and South Kordofan.  “We have also seen shocking reports of further atrocities in While Nile state, including a wave of attacks earlier this month reported to have killed scores of civilians,” she said, welcoming the decision by the Sudanese authorities to extend the authorization of the use of the Adre crossing for humanitarian aid. 

    United Nations 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan Requires $6 Billion

    She said that the UN’s 2025 response plan for Sudan and the region requires $6 billion to support close to 21 million people in Sudan and up to 5 million others in neighbouring countries.  “The international community — in particular members of the Council — must spare no effort in trying to mitigate this,” she stressed. 

    In the ensuing discussion, Council members expressed alarm over the increasing attacks on civilians, underscoring the harrowing plight of the Sudanese people, particularly children, and urging all parties to the conflict to put down their weapons. 

    World’s Greatest Crisis of Displaced Children 

    “Sudan is experiencing one of the most devastating conflicts of our times,” said Panama’s delegate, noting that the country is home to the world’s greatest crisis of displaced children.  Slovenia’s delegate echoed a similar sentiment, saying that Sudanese children are left with the deepest scars of this war.  “These young lives plead for an end to the massacre, for the guns that keep them awake to be silenced, and they ask for food,” he added. 

    ‘Unspeakable Violence’ against Women and Girls Must Stop 

    “This conflict has unleashed a wave of unspeakable violence against women and girls,” Denmark’s delegate also added, underscoring that survivors need urgent access to healthcare and post-rape support.  The “entrenched impunity” has become one of the main drivers of conflict, she said.  Greece’s representative said that addressing the crimes against women and girls requires gender-sensitive interventions such as specialized healthcare, psychosocial support, and legal assistance. 

    Delegates Condemn Rapid Support Forces’ Attacks in Internally Displaced Persons Camps 

    Pakistan’s representative condemned the Rapid Support Forces’ attack on the only functioning hospital in the besieged El Fasher — the Saudi Teaching Maternal Hospital — which killed over 70 people.  “RSF must immediately stop its killing campaigns in Zamzam and Abu Shouk IDP camps,” he asserted, calling on the Council to ensure the implementation of resolution 2736 (2024). 

    “It does not need to be this way”, said the delegate from the United Kingdom, urging the parties to end their military ambitions and focus on creating the conditions for peace.  While welcoming the Sudanese Armed Forces’ decision to keep the Adré border crossing open, she underscored that — with over 30 million people in humanitarian need — “it is simply not enough”. 

    The representative of the Russian Federation said that the “shortest way to settle” the humanitarian situation is via “very close cooperation” with the Sudanese Government and its related parties.  “We cannot recall a single instance where the authorities refuse to cooperate with the humanitarians,” he said.  Sudanese authorities are working on simplifying logistical chains and streamlining document processing for humanitarian cargo.  No one will provide more support to the peaceful civilians in Sudan than their Government and the army. 

    “Both belligerents have committed atrocities,” emphasized the representative of the United States, expressing concern over attacks on the Zamzam refugee camp by the Rapid Support Forces and the use of civilians as human shields by militias allied with the Sudanese Armed Forces.  “We cannot let Sudan again become a permissive environment for terrorists and transnational criminal organizations,” he added.

    The humanitarian crisis is the direct result of the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, France’s delegate echoed, adding that it is vital to respect the territorial integrity of Sudan.  All actors must engage in good faith in an intra-Sudanese political dialogue, facilitated by the African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

    Speakers Urge Ceasefire during Holy Month of Ramadan 

    Several speakers highlighted the upcoming holy month of Ramadan as an opportunity for all parties to lay down their arms, with the representative of the Republic of Korea urging all parties to immediately seize hostilities.  “If both parties to the conflict in Sudan continue to rely on a military solution and persist in the belief that political victory can be achieved on the battlefield the fragmentation of Sudan may soon become a reality,” he warned. 

    African Solutions, African-Owned Initiatives Key to Resolving Conflict 

    Algeria’s delegate also speaking for Guyana, Somalia and Sierra Leone, echoed the call for a ceasefire during Ramadan, and welcomed the transition road map announced by the Government, which includes “the formation of a civilian Government to be led by a civilian technocratic personality”. Expressing concern over the announcement by the leaders of the Rapid Support Forces to establish a parallel authority, he stressed the need to coordinate diplomatic initiatives, while preserving the central role of the African Union and the United Nations. “Foreign interferences” remain a persistent challenge in the search for a lasting solution to the conflict in Sudan, he said. 

    African solutions and African-owned initiatives must continue to play a leading role, added Angola’s delegate.  “While the root cause of this conflict is reportedly linked to the internal ethnic tensions, we must recognize that it has been exacerbated by a few external factors,” he added.  The Jeddah Process, facilitated by Saudi Arabia and United States, and the African Union’s Peace and Security Council Ad Hoc Presidential Committee on Sudan remain hopeful prospects.  

    International Community Must Do More to Alleviate Suffering 

    Several Council members called on the international community to do more to alleviate the suffering in Sudan and warned that the conflict could spill over.  China’s delegate stressed the need to fund the 2025 Humanitarian Needs Response Plan in order for Sudan to meet the challenges of food insecurity, refugee displacement and conflict spillover. 

    “We all share the responsibility of supporting the Sudan so that its crisis does not turn from a regional crisis with repercussions limited to neighbouring countries in Africa to a crisis that threatens international peace and security,” said Egypt’s delegate.  The crisis in Sudan could threaten the safety of navigation in the Red Sea, increase illegal migration to Europe, and turn Sudan into a haven for criminal groups or armed militias. 

    Kenya’s delegate said that his country has received and engaged “official delegations” from Sudan, “who reaffirm their commitment to end the war and restore Sudan to civilian administration”.  Spotlighting the recent signing of a peace charter in Nairobi — which “must be viewed in that context” — he noted that a collective of 24 groups, drawn from an inclusive cross-section of civilian, political and military actors, associated themselves with that instrument.  He emphasized, however:  “Neither President William Ruto nor the Government of Kenya has recognized any independent entity in the Sudan or elsewhere.”

    Sudan’s Speaker Cites Cooperation with UN Special Envoy, Urges Militias to End Attacks on El Fasher 

    Sudan’s representative said that on his Government’s cooperation with the Special Envoy, Sudanese authorities have facilitated meetings with the leadership in the political, civilian and diplomatic spheres without interference.  “We have facilitated a briefing for him on the dynamics of the conflict […] and presented our readiness to reach a peaceful settlement,” he said, emphasizing the neutrality and centrality of the UN.

    However, “certain elements behind the scenes” sabotaged his Government’s efforts with the aim “to achieve their demonic aims”, he cautioned, noting that the main reason for the continuation of the war is the United Arab Emirates’ support for the Rapid Support Forces. For its part, Khartoum presented a national plan to protect civilians and implement the Jeddah Agreement and resolutions 1591 (2005) and 2736 (2024).  It has also designated airports in several areas for air transport of humanitarian assistance.  Calling on the militias to end their attacks on the Sudanese capital of El Fasher — which target civilians, health facilities and basic infrastructure — he stated:  “We welcome any practical and implementable humanitarian pause.”  Nevertheless, “any ceasefire is rejected if El Fasher’s siege is not lifted”, he asserted, urging the rebels to withdraw from the areas they occupy.

    Sudan’s Government is exerting great efforts to fulfil refugee and internally displaced persons’ needs through coordination with organizations active in Sudan as well as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. To that end, he spotlighted several projects, including rehabilitating schools, higher education and rural hospitals, providing health services, repairing water networks and restoring police stations.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-Evening Report: DeepSeek is now a global force. But it’s just one player in China’s booming AI industry

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Mimi Zou, Professor, School of Private & Commercial Law, UNSW Sydney

    Dorason/Shutterstock

    When small Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) company DeepSeek released a family of extremely efficient and highly competitive AI models last month, it rocked the global tech community. The release revealed China’s growing technological prowess. It also showcased a distinctly Chinese approach to AI advancement.

    This approach is characterised by strategic investment, efficient innovation and careful regulatory oversight. And it’s evident throughout China’s broader AI landscape, of which DeepSeek is just one player.

    In fact, the country has a vast ecosystem of AI companies.

    They may not be globally recognisable names like other AI companies such as DeepSeek, OpenAI and Anthropic. But each has carved out their own speciality and is contributing to the development of this rapidly evolving technology.

    Tech giants and startups

    The giants of China’s technology industry include Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent. All these companies are investing heavily in AI development.

    Alibaba CEO Eddie Wu earlier this month said the multibillion dollar company plans to “aggressively invest” in its pursuit of developing AI that is equal to, or more advanced than, human intelligence.

    The company is already working with Apple to incorporate its existing AI models into Chinese iPhones. (Outside China, iPhones offer similar integration with OpenAI’s ChatGPT.)

    But a new generation of smaller, specialised AI companies has also emerged.

    For example, Shanghai-listed Cambricon Technologies focuses on AI chip development. Yitu Technology specialises in healthcare and smart city applications.

    Megvii Technology and CloudWalk Technology have carved out niches in image recognition and computer vision, while iFLYTEK creates voice recognition technology.

    Multibillion dollar Chinese tech company Alibaba plans to aggressively invest in AI.
    testing/Shutterstock

    Innovative paths to success

    Despite United States’ chip sanctions and China’s restricted information environment, these Chinese AI companies have found paths to success.

    US companies such as OpenAI have trained their large language models on the open internet. But Chinese companies have used vast datasets from domestic platforms such as WeChat, Weibo and Zhihu. They also use government-authorised data sources.

    Many Chinese AI companies also embrace open-source development. This means they publish detailed technical papers and release their models for others to build upon. This approach focuses on efficiency and practical application rather than raw computing power.

    The result is a distinctly Chinese approach to AI.

    Importantly, China’s state support for AI development has also been substantial. Besides the central government, local and provincial governments have provided massive funding through venture funds, subsidies and tax incentives.

    China has also established at least 48 data exchanges across different cities in recent years. These are authorised marketplaces where AI companies can purchase massive datasets in a regulated environment.

    By 2028, China also plans to establish more than 100 “trusted data spaces”.

    These are secure, regulated environments designed to standardise data exchanges across sectors and regions. They will form the foundation of a comprehensive national data market, allowing access to and use of diverse datasets within a controlled framework.

    A strong education push

    The growth of the AI industry in China is also tied to a strong AI education push.

    In 2018, China’s Ministry of Education launched an action plan for accelerating AI innovation in universities.

    Publicly available data shows 535 universities have established AI undergraduate majors and some 43 specialised AI schools and research institutes have also been created since 2017. (In comparison, there are at least 14 colleges and universities in the United States offering formal AI undergraduate degrees.)

    Together, these institutions are building an AI talent pipeline in China. This is crucial to Beijing’s ambition of becoming a global AI innovation leader by 2030.

    China’s AI strategy combines extensive state support with targeted regulation. Rather than imposing blanket controls, regulators have developed a targeted approach to managing AI risks.

    The 2023 regulations on generative AI are particularly revealing of Beijing’s approach.

    They impose content-related obligations specifically on public-facing generative AI services, such as ensuring all content created and services provided are lawful, uphold core socialist values and respect intellectual property rights. These obligations, however, exclude generative AI used for enterprise, research and development. This allows for some unrestricted innovation.

    There are 43 specialised AI schools and research institutes in China, including at Renmen University in Beijing.
    humphery/Shutterstock

    International players

    China and the US dominate the global AI landscape. But several significant players are emerging elsewhere.

    For example, France’s Mistral AI has raised over €1 billion (A$1.6 billion) to date to build large language models. In comparison, OpenAI raised US$6.6 billion (A$9.4 billion) in a recent funding round, and is in talks to raise a further US$40 billion.

    Other European companies are focused on specialised applications, specific industries or regional markets. For example, Germany’s Aleph Alpha offers an AI tool that allows companies to customise third-party models for their own purposes

    In the United Kingdom, Graphcore is manufacturing AI chips and Wayve is making autonomous driving AI systems.

    Challenging conventional wisdom

    DeepSeek’s breakthrough last month demonstrated massive computing infrastructure and multibillion dollar budgets aren’t always necessary for the successful development of AI.

    For those invested in the technology’s future, companies that achieve DeepSeek-level efficiencies could significantly influence the trajectory of AI development.

    We may see a global landscape where innovative AI companies elsewhere can achieve breakthroughs, while still operating within ecosystems dominated by American and Chinese advantages in talent, data and investment.

    The future of AI may not be determined solely by who leads the race. Instead, it may be determined by how different approaches shape the technology’s development.

    China’s model offers important lessons for other countries seeking to build their AI capabilities while managing certain risks.

    Mimi Zou has previously received funding from the British Academy. She is affiliated with the Asia Society Australia.

    ref. DeepSeek is now a global force. But it’s just one player in China’s booming AI industry – https://theconversation.com/deepseek-is-now-a-global-force-but-its-just-one-player-in-chinas-booming-ai-industry-250494

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn, Blumenthal Introduce Bill to Ensure U.S. Victims of Terrorism Receive Compensation

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn

    Cornyn, Blumenthal Introduce Bill to Ensure U.S. Victims of Terrorism Receive Compensation

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators John Cornyn (R-TX) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) today introduced the American Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, which would strengthen the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism (USVSST) Act to provide financial compensation to Americans injured in acts of international state-sponsored terrorism and their families:
    “It’s unacceptable that many victims and their families are still without justice for the tremendous trauma they have experienced at the hands of terrorists,” said Sen. Cornyn. “This bipartisan legislation would help ensure these brave Americans receive compensation when terrorist defendants refuse to pay for their heinous acts, and I’m glad to lead my colleagues in introducing it to show each and every American victim of terrorism they are not alone.”
    “This measure will help ensure victims of state-sponsored terrorism are justly compensated,” said Sen. Blumenthal. “The existing law is in dire need of an update, as the fund intended for the victims has not achieved its goals. This bill will start to correct course, providing victims of terror with the compensation they deserve and setting up a mechanism to help new victims.”
     The legislation is cosponsored by Sens. Kevin Cramer (R-ND), Chuck Schumer (D-NY), and Adam Schiff (D-CA) and led by Congressmen Mike Lawler (NY-17) and Josh Gottheimer (NJ-05) in the House of Representatives.
    Background:
    Enacted in 2015, the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism (USVSST) Act provided American victims who hold court judgments against state sponsors of terrorism a mechanism to recover on those judgments given the terrorist defendants’ refusal to pay. However, the fund created by the Justice for USVSST Act has made few distributions since its inception.
    The USVSST fund depends almost exclusively on fines and penalties collected by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) against wrongdoers who have violated U.S. sanctions by doing business with state sponsors of terrorism. Due to the DOJ’s decreased enforcement actions, narrow interpretation of the statute, and diversion of funds to other buckets, the USVSST fund has left victims without meaningful distributions for many years.
    The American Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act would ensure there is a clear path to help compensate victims for the losses and harms they’ve suffered by:
    Providing an immediate distribution in 2025 and providing a mechanism to ensure that the USVSST fund has a backstop for regular, consistent, and predictable distributions in the future;
    Establishing a sustainable mechanism to help new victims seek and receive judgments against state sponsors of terrorism;
    And ensuring that existing uses and pending claims for asset forfeiture are covered before any funds can be transferred to the USVSST fund. 
    The legislation is endorsed by American victims of the October 7th terrorist attack by Hamas on Israel, IED attacks on U.S. military in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, the 2016 Bastille Day attack in Nice, France, the September 11th terrorist attacks, the 2000 U.S.S. Cole attack, the 1998 East African Embassy bombings, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, the passengers of TWA Flight 847 hijacked in 1985 by Iran-backed Hezbollah terrorists while on route to the United States, the 1983 and 1984 U.S. Embassy and Embassy Annex bombings in Beirut, the 1983 Beirut Marine Barracks bombing, the 1979 hostage taking of Americans at the diplomatic compound in Tehran, and the 1968 U.S.S. Pueblo attack.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 – A10-0012/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024

    (2024/2081(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

     having regard to Articles 2, 3, 8, 21 and 23 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

     having regard to Articles 17 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other United Nations human rights treaties and instruments,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

     having regard to the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,

     having regard to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 43/29 of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment  of 10 December 1984 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 18 December 2002,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  of 12 December 2006 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 13 December 2006,

     having regard to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1976,

     having regard to the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 18 December 1992,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/144 on 9 December 1998,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 13 September 2007,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas of 28 September 2018,

     having regard to the Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference of Population and Development in 1994 and its review conferences,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto, adopted on 25 May 2000,

     having regard to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force on 24 December 2014, and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 5 June 1998,

     having regard to the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of September 1995 and its review conferences,

     having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted on 25 September 2015, in particular goals 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16 thereof,

     having regard to the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted on 19 December 2018 and the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees adopted on 17 December 2018,

     having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on 17 July 1998, which entered into force on 1 July 2002,

     having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the International Criminal Court on cooperation and assistance of 10 April 2006[1],

     having regard to the Council of Europe Conventions of 4 April 1997 for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, and the Additional Protocols thereto, of 16 May 2005 on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and of 25 October 2007 on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,

     having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 11 May 2011 on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which not all Member States have ratified but which entered into force for the EU on 1 October 2023,

     having regard to Protocols Nos 6 and 13 to the Council of Europe Convention of 28 April 1983 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty,

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe[3],

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2024 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2024,

     having regard to the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, adopted by the Council on 17 November 2020 and its Mid-term Review adopted on 9 June 2023,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 on the alignment of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 with the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027,

     having regard to the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – an ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action (JOIN(2020)0017),

     having regard to the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0152),

     having regard to the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0698),

     having regard to the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142),

     having regard to the EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 (COM(2021)0101),

     having regard to the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0565),

     having regard to the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation (COM(2020)0620),

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on human rights defenders, adopted by the Council on 14 June 2004 and revised in 2008, and the second guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation, endorsed in 2020,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, adopted by the Council on 8 December 2008,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) of 2005, as updated in 2009,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, as updated by the Council on 12 April 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by LGBTI persons, adopted on 24 June 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, adopted by the Council on 12 May 2014,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on non-discrimination in external action, adopted by the Council on 18 March 2019,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, adopted by the Council on 17 June 2019,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on EU policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on human rights dialogues with partner/third countries, approved by the Council on 22 February 2021,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on children and armed conflict, approved by the Council on 24 June 2024,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2012 entitled ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations’ (COM(2012)0492),

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 March 2023 on the role of the civic space in protecting and promoting fundamental rights in the EU,

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859[4],

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 September 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453),

     having regard to the joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 for a Council regulation on restrictive measures against serious acts of corruption (JOIN(2023)0013),

     having regard to the 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World,

     having regard to its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, which in 2024 was awarded to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy,

     having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2019 on EU Guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU[5],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act)[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023[9], and to its previous resolutions on earlier annual reports,

     having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (known as urgency resolutions), adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure, in particular those adopted in 2023 and 2024,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0012/2025),

    A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as set out in Articles 2 and 21 TEU; whereas the EU’s action worldwide must be guided by the universality and indivisibility of human rights and by the fact that the effective protection and defence of human rights and democracy is at the core of the EU’s external action;

    B. whereas consistency and coherence across the EU’s internal and external policies are key for achieving an effective and credible EU human rights policy, and in defending and supporting freedom and democracy;

    C. whereas democratic systems are the most suitable to guarantee that every person has the ability to enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas effective rules-based multilateralism is the best organisational system to defend democracies;

    D. whereas the EU strongly believes in and fully supports multilateralism, a rules-based global order and the set of universal values, principles and norms that guide the UN member states and that the UN member states have pledged to uphold, in accordance with the UN Charter; whereas a world of democracies, understood as a world of political systems that defend and protect human rights worldwide, is a safer world, as democracies have significant checks and balances in place to prevent the unpredictability of autocracies;

    E. whereas the rise in authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism threatens the global rules-based order, the protection and promotion of freedom and human rights in the world, as well as the values and principles on which the EU is founded;

    F. whereas in December 2023, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights celebrated its 75th anniversary; whereas today, more than ever since the UN’s foundation, totalitarian regimes challenge the UN Charter’s basic principles, seek to rewrite international norms, undermine multilateral institutions and threaten peace and security globally;

    G. whereas in November 2024, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child celebrated its 35th anniversary;

    H. whereas the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action is regarded as a turning point for the global agenda on gender equality and will celebrate its 30th anniversary in 2025;

    I. whereas the legitimacy and functioning of the international rules-based order are dependent on compliance with the orders of, and respect for, international bodies, such as United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and orders and decisions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC); whereas multilateralism is being challenged by increasing global threats, such as terrorism and extremism, which threaten compliance with such orders and decisions, as well as, generally, with provisions of international law, human rights law and international humanitarian law in emerging and ongoing conflict situations; whereas international institutions, their officials, and those cooperating with them, are the subject of attacks and threats; whereas the international community, including the EU, has a responsibility to uphold the international rules-based order by enforcing universal compliance, including by its partners;

    J. whereas the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court establishes a framework of accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; whereas the independence of the ICC is vital to ensure that justice is delivered impartially and without political interference;

    K. whereas the 2023 Mid-term Review of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, now extended to 2027, has shown that, despite the progress achieved so far, more needs to be done, in cooperation with like-minded democratic partners, especially in the context of the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption;

    L. whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) are crucial partners in the EU’s efforts to safeguard and advance human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as to prevent conflicts globally; whereas state and non-state actors around the world are increasingly censoring, silencing and harassing, among others, HRDs, CSOs, journalists, religious communities, opposition leaders and other vulnerable groups in their work, shrinking the civil space ever further; whereas this behaviour includes measures encompassing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), restrictive government policies, transnational repression, defamation campaigns, discrimination, intimidation and violence, including extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings, abductions, and arbitrary arrests and detention; whereas attacks on HRDs are increasingly extending to their families and communities, including those living in exile;

    M. whereas gender equality is a core EU value, and the human rights of women and girls, including their sexual and reproductive rights, continue to be violated across the world; whereas women experience unique and disproportionate impacts from conflicts, climate change and migration, including increased risks of gender-based violence, economic marginalisation and barriers to accessing resources; whereas women HRDs and CSOs continue to experience shrinking space for their critical work, as well as threats of violence, harassment and intimidation;

    N. whereas the past year has been marked by a further proliferation of laws on ‘foreign agents’ or foreign influence, including in countries with EU candidate status, targeting CSOs and media outlets and attempting to prevent them from receiving financial support from abroad, including from the EU and its Member States, fostering a climate of fear and self-censorship;

    O. whereas in 2024, more than half the world’s population went to the polls, and many of these elections were marked by manipulation, disinformation and attempts at interference from inside or outside the country;

    P. whereas the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) warns of a decline in the intent of states and other political forces to protect press freedom; whereas, according to RSF, 47 journalists and media workers have been killed, most of them in conflict zones, and 573 have been imprisoned since 1 January 2024;

    Q. whereas 251 million children and young people are deprived of their fundamental right to education and remain out of school, according to the UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report 2024; whereas girls and women are affected not only by poverty but also by cultural norms, gender bias, child marriage and violence through official, discriminatory policies that prevent them from accessing education and the labour market and attempt to erase them from public life;

    R. whereas at least one million people are unjustly imprisoned for political reasons, among them several laureates and finalists of Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought;

    S. whereas environmental harm and the impacts of climate change are intensifying precariousness, marginalisation and inequality, and increasingly displacing people from their homes or trapping them in unsafe conditions, thereby heightening their vulnerability and jeopardising their human rights;

    Global challenges to democracy and human rights

    1. Reasserts the universality, interdependence, interrelatedness and indivisibility of human rights and the inherent dignity of every human being; reaffirms the duty of the EU and its Member States to promote and protect democracy and the universality of human rights around the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to lead by example, in line with its values, to promote and strictly uphold human rights and international justice;

    2. Insists that respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be the cornerstone of the EU’s external policy, in line with its founding principles; strongly encourages the EU and its Member States, to that end, to strive for a continued ambitious commitment to make freedom, democracy and human rights and their protection a central part of all EU policies in a streamlined manner and to enhance the consistency between the EU’s internal and external policies in this field, including through all of its international agreements;

    3. Stresses that the EU must be fully prepared to counter the rise of authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism, as well as the increasing violations of the principles of universality of human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law;

    4. Condemns the increasing trend of violations and abuses of human rights and democratic principles and values across the world, such as, among others, threats of backsliding on human rights, notably women’s rights, as well as executions, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill treatment, gender-based violence, clampdowns on civil society, political opponents, marginalised and vulnerable groups including children and elderly people, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and  ethnic and religious minorities; condemns, equally, slavery and forced labour, excessive use of violence by public authorities, including violent crackdowns on peaceful protests and other assemblies, systematic and structural discrimination, instrumentalisation of the judiciary, censorship and threats to independent media, including threats in the digital sphere such as online surveillance and internet shutdowns, political attacks against international institutions and the rules-based international order, and increasing use of unlawful methods of war in grave breach of international humanitarian law and human rights law; deplores the weakening of the protection of democratic institutions and processes, and the shrinking space for civil societies around the world; denounces the transnational repression, by illiberal regimes, of citizens and activists who have sought refuge abroad, including on EU soil;

    5. Notes with deep concern the ongoing international crisis of accountability and the challenge to the pursuit of ending impunity for violations of core norms of international human rights and humanitarian law in conflicts around the world; reaffirms the neutrality and importance of humanitarian aid in all conflicts and crises; underlines the serious consequences of discrediting and attacking the organisations of multilateral forums, such as the UN, which can foster a culture of impunity and undermine the trust in and functioning of the UN system; calls for the EU to uphold the international legal system and take effective measures to enforce compliance;

    6. Notes with satisfaction that there are also ‘human rights bright spots’ within this context of major challenges to human rights worldwide; highlights, in particular, the work of CSOs and HRDs; underlines the need for a more strategic communication on human rights and democracy by spreading news about positive results, policies and best practices; supports the Good Human Rights Stories initiative[10] as a way of promoting positive stories about human rights and recommends that it be updated; underlines the role of the EU’s public and cultural diplomacy, as well as international cultural relations, in the promotion of human rights, and calls for the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to increase its efforts in this regard;

    Strengthening the EU’s toolbox for the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy around the world

    7. Notes with concern the increasing divide worldwide; stresses the shared responsibility of the EU to continue defending democratic values and principles and human rights, international justice, peace and dignity around the world, which are even more important to defend in the current volatile state of global politics; calls upon the EU to keep communication channels open with different stakeholders and to continue to develop a comprehensive toolbox to strengthen human rights and democracy globally;

    EU action plan on human rights and democracy

    8. Observes that the EU and its Member States have made substantial progress in implementing the EU action plan on human rights and democracy, although they have not reached all of its goals, in part also due to the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption; welcomes, in this sense, the extension of the action plan until 2027, with a view to maximising the synergies and complementarity between human rights and democracy at local, national and global levels;

    EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Human Rights

    9. Fully supports the work of the EUSR for Human Rights in contributing to the visibility and coherence of the EU’s human rights actions in its external relations; upholds the EUSR’s central role in the EU’s promotion and protection of human rights by engaging with non-EU countries and like-minded partners; underlines the need for close cooperation between the EUSR for Human Rights and other EUSRs and Special Envoys in order to further improve this coherence, and calls for greater visibility for the role of the EUSR for Human Rights; calls for the EUSR to be supported in his work with increased resources and better coordination with EU delegations around the world; regrets, despite continuous calls, Parliament’s exclusion from the process of selecting the EUSR; insists on the need for the EUSR to report back to Parliament regularly;

    Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe and the human rights and democracy thematic programme

    10. Recalls the fundamental role of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, including its thematic programme on human rights and democracy, as a flagship EU instrument in promoting and protecting human rights and democracy around the world; highlights the need to engage with civil society in all the EU’s relevant external activities, including the Global Gateway Strategy which is financed through the NDICI-Global Europe; reiterates the importance of streamlining a human-rights based approach in the EU’s external action instruments; underlines Parliament’s role in the instrument’s programming process and calls on the Commission and the EEAS to share all relevant information in a timely manner in order to enable Parliament to play its role accordingly, in particular during high-level geopolitical dialogues with the Commission and in the mid-term review process as well as in its resolutions; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that a response is provided to the recommendation letters following each geopolitical dialogue and each resolution; urges the Commission to develop and launch a comprehensive, centralised website dedicated to the NDICI-Global Europe, including information on all the multiannual indicative programmes, detailing their respective budgets, associated actions and the financial allocations they are backing, organised both by country and by theme; notes that the NDICI-Global Europe and all future instruments must focus on the fundamental drivers of ongoing challenges, including the need to strengthen the resilience of local communities and democracy support activities by supporting economic development;

    11. Calls for independent, ex ante assessments to determine the possible implications and risks of projects with regard to human rights, in line with Article 25(5) of  Regulation (EU) 2021/947; calls for independent human rights monitoring throughout the implementation of projects in third countries, especially in relation to projects entailing a high risk of violations; calls for a suspension of projects that (in)directly contribute to human rights violations in non-EU countries; reiterates the prohibition on allocating EU funds to activities that are contrary to EU fundamental values, such as terrorism or extremism; calls on the Commission to share all human rights-related assessments with Parliament in a proactive manner;

    EU trade and international agreements

    12. Reiterates its call to integrate human rights assessments and include robust clauses on human rights in agreements between the EU and non-EU countries, supported by a clear set of benchmarks and procedures to be followed in the event of violations; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the human rights clauses in current international agreements are actively monitored and effectively enforced and to improve their communication with Parliament concerning considerations and decisions regarding this enforcement; reiterates that in the face of persistent breaches of human rights clauses by its partner countries, including those related to the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus programme, the EU should react swiftly and decisively, including by suspending the agreements in question if other options prove ineffective; calls for the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal to be implemented, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, or for the Commission’s Single Entry Point to be adapted to allow complaints regarding failure to comply with human rights clauses to be submitted; calls on the EU institutions to engage regularly with the business community and civil society in order to strengthen the links between international trade, human rights and economic security; calls for the EU to ensure human rights promotion and protection through its Global Gateway investments and projects, by ensuring that they do no harm;

    EU human rights dialogues

    13. Stresses the important role of human rights dialogues within the EU’s human rights toolbox and as a key vehicle for the implementation of the EU action plan on human rights and democracy; highlights that these dialogues must address the overall situation of human rights and democracy with the relevant countries; notes that human rights dialogues should be seen as a key element of sustained EU engagement and not as a free-standing instrument, and that the persistent failure of non-EU countries to genuinely engage in dialogues and to implement key deliverables should lead to the use of other appropriate foreign policy tools; recalls that these dialogues need to be used in conjunction and synergy with other instruments, using a more-for-more and a less-for-less approach; reiterates the need to raise individual cases, in particular those of Sakharov Prize laureates and those highlighted by Parliament in its resolutions, and ensure adequate follow-up; calls on the EEAS and EU delegations to increase the visibility of these dialogues and their outcomes, ensuring that they are results-oriented and based on a clear set of benchmarks that can be included in a published joint press statement, and to conduct suitable follow-up action on it; calls for the enhanced and meaningful involvement of civil society in the dialogues; stresses that genuine CSOs must not be impeded from participating in human rights dialogues and that any dialogue must include all genuine CSOs without any limitations;

    EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act)

    14. Welcomes the increasing use of the EU GHRSR as a key political tool in the EU’s defence of human rights and democracy across the world; regrets, however, that its use has continued to be limited, especially in the current geopolitical landscape; notes, however, the challenges that the requirement of unanimity poses in the adoption of sanctions and reiterates its call on the Council to introduce qualified majority voting for decisions on the GHRSR; recalls, in this regard, the formal request submitted by Parliament to the Council in 2023, on calling an EU reform convention, with the aim, among others, of increasing the number of decisions taken by qualified majority; calls for a stronger use of the GHRSR and other ad hoc sanctions regimes on those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including high-level officials; fully supports the possibility of imposing targeted anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework in this regard, which has been a long-standing priority of Parliament, whether through its inclusion in the GHRSR or under a different regime; highlights the need for the complete enforcement of sanctions and calls for circumventions to be tackled;

    Democracy support activities

    15. Reiterates its concern regarding the increasing attacks by authoritarian and illiberal regimes on democratic principles, values and pluralism; stresses that the defence and support of democracy around the world is increasingly becoming of geopolitical and strategic interest; emphasises the importance of Parliament’s efforts in capacity-building for partner parliaments, promoting mediation and encouraging a culture of dialogue and compromise, especially among young political leaders, and empowering women parliamentarians, HRDs and representatives from civil society and independent media; reiterates its call on the Commission to continue and expand its activities in these areas by increasing funding and support for EU bodies, agencies and other grant-based organisations; stresses the critical importance of directly supporting civil society and persons expressing dissenting views, particularly in the current climate of growing global tensions and repression in increasing numbers of countries; reiterates the importance of EU election observation missions and Parliament’s contribution to developing and enhancing their methodology; calls for the development of an EU toolbox to be used in cases of disputed or non-transparent election results in order to prevent political and military crises in the post-election environment; calls for enhanced EU action to counter manipulative and false messages against the EU in election campaigns, in particular in countries that receive significant EU humanitarian and development assistance and in countries that are candidates for EU membership; calls for enhanced collaboration between Parliament’s Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group, the relevant Commission directorates-general and the EEAS;

    EU support for human rights defenders

    16. Is extremely concerned by the continuing restriction of civil society space and rising threats to the work of HRDs and members of CSOs, as well as their families, communities and lawyers, and finds particularly concerning the increasingly sophisticated means used to persecute them; strongly condemns their arbitrary detentions and killings; deplores the harassment of CSOs through legislative provisions such as foreign agents laws and similar, and other restrictions they face; deplores the fact that women HRDs continue to face relentless and ever more sophisticated violations against them, including targeted killings, physical attacks, disappearances, smear campaigns, arrests, judicial harassment and intimidation; notes with concern that these attacks seem designed to systematically silence women HRDs and erase their voices from the public sphere; supports wholeheartedly the work of HRDs and EU action to ensure their protection worldwide; underscores the pressing need for a comprehensive and timely revision of the EU Guidelines on HRDs, with a view to addressing the emerging challenges and threats, and to ensuring their applicability and effectiveness in the protection of HRDs globally, while integrating gender-sensitive and intersectional approaches in the updated Guidelines, reflecting the diverse backgrounds and experiences of HRDs, and taking into account the specific vulnerabilities they may face; calls for the complete and consistent application of the EU Guidelines on HRDs by the EU and its Member States; calls for efforts to enhance communication strategies to increase the visibility of EU actions and channels for the protection of and the support mechanisms for HRDs;

    17. Raises serious concerns over the increasing phenomenon of transnational repression against HRDs, journalists and civil society; calls for the formulation of an EU strategy harmonising national responses to transnational repression;

    18. Expresses deep concern regarding the increasingly precarious financial landscape faced by HRDs and communities advocating for rights, particularly within a global context characterised by intensifying repression; notes that, as a result of the current geopolitical context, HRDs’ need for support has increased; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to make full use of their financial support for HRDs, ensuring the establishment of flexible, accessible and sustained funding mechanisms that enable these defenders to continue their vital work in the face of mounting challenges;

    19. Insists that the EEAS, the Commission and the EU delegations pay particular attention to the situation of the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists at risk and take resolute action, in coordination with the Member States and Parliament, to ensure their well-being, safety or liberation;

    20. Welcomes the update of the EU Visa Code Handbook in relation to HRDs and calls for its full and consistent application by the Member States; reiterates its call for the Commission to take a proactive role in the establishment of a coordinated approach among the Member States for HRDs at risk, for instance streamlining visa procedures and promoting harmonisation in the EU’s visa application process;

    Combating impunity and corruption

    21. Underlines that both impunity and corruption enable and aggravate human rights violations and abuses and the erosion of democratic principles; welcomes the anti-corruption actions in EU external policies in the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012); supports the anti-corruption provisions included in the EU trade agreements with non-EU countries; stresses the important role of civil society and journalists in non-EU countries in the oversight of the fight against impunity and corruption; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their efforts in justice reforms, the fight against impunity, and the improvement of transparency and of anti-corruption institutions in non-EU countries; encourages the EU and its Member States to coordinate more closely with allies and partners wherever possible in order to counter systemic corruption that enables autocrats to maintain power, deprives societies of key resources and undermines democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

    22. Insists on the need for the EU to take clear steps to recognise the close link between corruption and human rights violations in order to target economic and financial enablers of human rights abusers;

    EU actions at multilateral level

    23. Reaffirms that promoting the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights around the world requires strong international cooperation at a multilateral level; underlines the particularly important role of the UN and its bodies as the main forum which must be able to effectively advance efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and respect for human rights and international law; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue supporting the work of the UN, its agencies and special procedures, both politically and financially, to ensure that it is fit for purpose, and to push back against the influence of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes; stresses that the current multilateral order needs to fully incorporate into its architecture the new global actors, especially those focusing on democracy and human rights; reiterates the need for the EU and its Member States to speak with one voice at the UN and in other multilateral forums in order to effectively tackle global challenges to human rights and democracy in multilateral forums and to support the strongest possible language in line with international human rights standards; calls, to this end, for progress in ensuring that the EU has a seat in international organisations, including the UN Security Council, in addition to the existing Member States’ seats; calls for EU delegations to play a stronger role in multilateral forums, for which they should have appropriate resources available;

    24. Is deeply concerned by growing attacks against the rules-based global order by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, including through unprovoked and unjustified aggression against peaceful neighbours and through the undermining of the functioning of UN bodies, namely the abuse of veto power at the UN Security Council; underlines that the diminished effectiveness of these bodies brings with it real costs in terms of conflicts, lives lost and human suffering, and seriously weakens the general ability of countries to deal with global challenges; calls on the Member States and like minded partners to develop a robust strategy and to intensify their efforts to reverse this trend and to send a united and strong message of support to those organisations when they are attacked or threatened; believes that the UN, its bodies, and other multilateral organisations are in need of reform, in order to address these growing challenges and threats;

    25. Reiterates the strong support of the EU for the International Court of Justice and the ICC as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions amid a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls that a well-funded ICC is essential for the effective prosecution of serious international crimes; welcomes the political and financial support the EU has given to the ICC, including the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC, and the launch of the ‘Global initiative to fight against impunity for international crimes’ offering financial support to CSOs dedicated to fostering justice and accountability for international crimes and serious human rights violations, including by facilitating survivors’ participation in legal proceedings; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and intensify their support to the ICC – including to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims – with the necessary means, including resources and political backing, and to use all instruments at their disposal to combat impunity worldwide and enable the ICC to fulfil its mandate effectively; calls on all the Member States to respect and implement the actions and decisions of the International Court of Justice and all organs of the ICC, including the OTP and the Chambers, to urge other countries to join and cooperate with the court, including to enforce ICC arrest warrants, and to support their work as an independent and impartial international justice institution everywhere in the world; regrets the failure of some ICC member states to execute ICC arrest warrants, thereby undermining the court’s work; calls for the EU to urge non-EU countries, including its major partners, to recognise the ICC and become a state party to the Rome Statute;

    26. Stresses the importance of not politicising the ICC, as trust in the court is eroded if its mandate is misused; condemns, in particular and in the most critical terms, the political attacks, sanctions and other coercive measures introduced or envisaged against the ICC itself and against its staff; calls on the Member States and the EU institutions to cooperate to work on solutions in order to protect the institution of the ICC and its staff from any future sanctions that would threaten the functioning of the court;

    27. Recognises universal jurisdiction as an important tool of the international criminal justice system to prevent and combat impunity and promote international accountability; calls on the Member States to apply universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity;

    28. Calls for the EU and its Member States to lead the global fight against all forms of extremism and welcomes the adoption of an EU strategy to this end; demands that the fight against terrorism be at the top of the EU’s domestic and foreign affairs agenda;

    Upholding international humanitarian law

    29. Notes with concern the increasing disregard for international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly in the form of ongoing conflicts around the world; strongly condemns the increase in deliberate, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians and civilian objects in multiple conflict settings; underlines that it is of the utmost importance that all UN and humanitarian aid agencies are able to provide full, timely and unhindered assistance to all people in vulnerable situations and calls on all parties to armed conflicts to fully respect the work of these agencies and ensure they can meet the basic needs of civilians without interference; denounces attempts to undermine UN agencies delivering humanitarian aid; urges all parties to armed conflicts to protect civilian populations, humanitarian and medical workers, and journalists and media workers; calls on all parties to armed conflicts to respect the legitimacy and inviolability of UN peacekeeping missions; calls on all states to unconditionally and fully conform with international humanitarian law; calls on the international community, and the Member States in particular, to promote accountability and the fight against impunity for grave breaches of international humanitarian law; calls for the systematic creation of humanitarian corridors in regions at war and in combat situations, whenever necessary, in order to allow civilians at risk to escape conflicts, and strongly condemns any attacks on them; demands unhindered access for humanitarian organisations monitoring and assisting prisoners of war, as provided for in the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War; expects international organisations to abide by international law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war; calls for international cooperation and assistance in the return of forcibly deported persons, in particular children and hostages;

    30. Reiterates its call on the Member States to help contain armed conflicts and serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law by strictly abiding by the provisions of Article 7 of the UN Arms Trade Treaty of 2 April 2013 on Export and Export Assessment and Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment;

    31. Given the gendered impacts of armed conflicts, deplores the insufficient priority and focus given to sexual and gender-based violence and to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) across the EU’s humanitarian and refugee response; reiterates that humanitarian crises intensify SRHR- and gender-related challenges and recalls that in crisis zones, particularly among vulnerable groups such as refugees and migrants, women and girls are particularly exposed to sexual violence, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual exploitation, rape as a weapon of war and unwanted pregnancies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to give high priority to gender equality and SRHR in their humanitarian aid and refugee response, as well as accountability and access to justice and redress for sexual and reproductive rights violations and gender-based violence, including in terms of training for humanitarian actors, and existing and future funding;

    Team Europe approach

    32. Recognises the potential for stronger alignment in approaches to human rights protection and promotion between EU institutions, Member States’ embassies and EU delegations in non-EU countries, particularly in encouraging those countries to comply with their international obligations and to refrain from harassment and persecution of critical voices; emphasises the opportunity for Member States’ embassies to take an increasingly active role in advancing and safeguarding human rights, while also supporting civil society in these countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to use all possible means to urge countries to release political prisoners; highlights the importance of shared responsibility between Member States and EU delegations in these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to intensify their collective efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and to support democracy worldwide; encourages careful monitoring and assessment of the capacity of EU delegations to ensure that each one has a designated point of contact for cases of human rights violations, and that this mandate is allocated sufficient resources to respond in an effective and timely manner; reiterates, in this context, the importance, for the EU delegations, of existing EU guidelines related to specific areas of human rights;

    Responding to universal human rights and democracy challenges

    Right to freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

    33. Condemns any action or attempt to legalise, instigate, authorise, consent or acquiesce to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment methods under any circumstances; condemns the increasing reports of the use of torture by state actors in many different contexts, including in custodial and extra-custodial settings – of political prisoners, among others – and in conflict situations around the world, notably in violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, as well as the killing of prisoners of war, which amounts to a war crime, and reiterates the non-derogable nature of the right to be free from torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment; reiterates the EU’s zero-tolerance policy to torture and other ill-treatment and calls on the relevant institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights, to take a thorough stance on any such case;

    34. Reiterates its calls for universal ratification of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol thereto, and for the need for states to bring their national provisions in this respect in line with international standards; reiterates, in accordance with the revised Guidelines on the EU’s policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019, the importance of engaging with relevant stakeholders in the fight to eradicate torture, and to monitor places of detention;

    Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association

    35. Reiterates the need to protect the EU democratic space and the exercise of fundamental freedoms therein, particularly freedoms of assembly and association; highlights the growing violent repression of protest and peaceful assemblies within the EU civic space, with cases of torture and ill-treatment resulting in deaths and other serious violations; underscores the need to strengthen this fundamental right in conjunction with the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment;

    Right to food, water and sanitation

    36. Recalls that the right to food, including having physical and economic access to adequate food or the means to its procurement, is a human right; is extremely concerned about the challenges to the right to food worldwide, especially in situations of war and conflicts; condemns the increasing reports of the weaponisation of food in situations of armed conflict; calls for the EU and its Member States to promote mandatory guidelines on the right to food without discrimination within the UN system; urges the EU and the Member States to fully support, politically and financially, organisations and agencies working to secure the right to food in conflict zones; recalls the importance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas in view of attaining food security; commends the work of the UN World Food Programme, in this regard;

    37. Reaffirms the rights to safe drinking water and to sanitation as human rights, both rights being complementary; underlines that access to clean drinking water is indispensable to a healthy and dignified life and is essential for the maintenance of human dignity; highlights the fact that the right to water is a fundamental precondition for the enjoyment of other rights, and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest, and in common public and global goods; underscores the importance of the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, and urges the EU institutions and the Member States to implement and promote their application in non-EU countries and in multilateral forums;

    Climate change and the environment

    38. Highlights that climate change and its impact on the environment has direct effects on the effective enjoyment of all human rights; recognises the important work of CSOs, indigenous peoples and local communities, land and environmental HRDs and indigenous activists for the protection of a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, including access to land and water sources; deplores the risks that environmental HRDs and indigenous activists face and calls for their effective protection to be guaranteed; notes that communities contributing the least to climate change are the ones more likely to be affected by climate risks and natural disasters and calls, in this regard, for increasing support to the most vulnerable groups; recalls that indigenous peoples and local communities play an important role in the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity; recalls that the transition to clean energy must be fair and respect everyone’s fundamental rights; reiterates the importance of the achievement of the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the protection of the human rights of present and future generations;

    39. Notes with deep concern the increasing threats to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment posed by the deployment of weapons of mass destruction and other forms of warfare that adversely and disproportionately affect the environment; stresses the need to effectively address the displacement of people caused by environmental destruction and climate change, which increases the risk of human rights violations and heightens vulnerabilities to different forms of exploitation; recognises that children face more acute risks from climate-related disasters and are also one of the largest groups to be affected; calls for the EU to focus on addressing the impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of the rights of the child;

    Rights of the child

    40. Calls for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights, including for those most marginalised and those in the most vulnerable situations, through all of the EU’s external policies; calls for more concerted efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of children’s rights in crisis or emergency situations; condemns the decline in respect for the rights of the child and the increasing violations and abuses of these rights, including through violence, early and forced marriage, sexual abuse including genital mutilation, trafficking, child labour, honour killings, recruitment of child soldiers, lack of access to education and healthcare, malnutrition and extreme poverty; further condemns the increase in deaths of children in situations of armed conflict and stresses the need for effective protection of children’s rights in active warfare; calls for new EU initiatives to promote and protect children’s rights, with a view to rehabilitating and reintegrating conflict-affected children, ensuring that they have a protected, family- and community-based environment as a natural context for their lives, in which assistance and education are fundamental elements; reiterates its call for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights through all EU external policies; calls on all countries to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as a matter of urgency, in order to allow for the universal ratification of this foundational instrument;

    41. Stresses the importance of closing the financing gap that would enable countries to meet their SDG 4 targets on quality education and ensure access to education for all children and young people; reiterates its calls to address cultural norms and gender biases that prevent girls and women from receiving an education and urges the creation of gender-responsive education systems worldwide;

    42. Stresses that education represents the starting point for cultivating principles and values that contribute to the personal development of children, as well as to social cohesion and democracy, and the rule of law around the world; to that end calls for the EU to promote its values through supporting access to education and learning for women and girls;

    Rights of women and gender equality

    43. Stresses that women’s rights and gender equality are indispensable and indivisible human rights, as well as a basis for the rule of law and inclusive resilient democracies; deplores the fact that millions of women and girls continue to experience discrimination and violence, especially in the context of conflicts, post-conflict situations and displacements, and are denied their dignity, autonomy and even life; condemns the impunity with which perpetrators commit violations against women HRDs; is appalled by the use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war and stresses the need to shed light on these instances, and for better international cooperation on fighting impunity for these crimes; calls for the EU, its Member States and like-minded partners to step up their efforts to ensure the full enjoyment and protection of women’s and girls’ human rights, and to incorporate a gender mainstreaming approach across all policies, taking into account the differentiated impacts of global challenges such as climate change or conflicts; condemns in the strongest terms the increasing attacks on SRHR around the world, as well as gender-based violence; strongly deplores cases of female genital mutilation, honour killings, child marriages and forced marriages; welcomes the accession of the EU to the Istanbul Convention and strongly encourages the remaining EU Member States to ratify the Istanbul Convention without further delay; calls for the EU and its international partners to strengthen their efforts to ensure that women fully enjoy human rights and are treated equally to men; emphasises the importance of safeguarding the rights of women, ensuring that their health, safety and dignity are protected, particularly in the context of healthcare access and workplace protections; underlines the need to keep opposing and condemning, in the strongest terms, anti-abortion laws that punish women and girls with decades-long jail sentences, even in cases of rape, incest or when the life of the pregnant woman is at risk; stresses the need to pursue efforts to fully eradicate the practice of female genital mutilation; fully supports the role of the EU Ambassador for Gender and Diversity;

    44. Recognises that gender apartheid constitutes a systematic and institutionalised form of oppression, depriving women and girls of fundamental rights solely on the basis of their gender; notes with deep concern the entrenchment of gender apartheid in certain regions, where women face extensive restrictions on education, employment, healthcare and freedom of movement, often underpinned by legal and cultural frameworks that reinforce gender-based discrimination; urges the EU and the Member States to proactively address gender apartheid through strengthened diplomatic efforts, targeted economic measures and accountability mechanisms that support civil society organisations advocating for gender equality; calls for the formal recognition of gender apartheid as a distinct human rights violation and for support for international initiatives for its classification as a crime against humanity, thus contributing to the establishment of a global accountability standard;

    Rights of refugees and asylum seekers

    45. Denounces the erosion of the human rights and the safety of refugees, asylum seekers and forcibly displaced persons; reaffirms their inalienable human rights and fundamental right to seek asylum; recalls the obligation of states to protect them in accordance with international law; underlines the importance of identification and registration of individuals, including children, as a key tool for protecting refugees and ensuring the integrity of refugee protection systems, preventing human trafficking and the recruitment of children into armed militias; calls for the EU and its Member States to effectively uphold their rights in the EU’s asylum and migration policy and in the EU’s cooperation with partner countries in this regard; deplores the increasing xenophobia, racism and discrimination towards migrants, as well as the different forms of violence they face, including during their displacement, and the many barriers they face, including in access to healthcare; condemns the instrumentalisation of migration at EU borders by foreign actors, which constitutes hybrid attacks against the Member States as well as a dehumanisation of migrants; stresses that the EU should step up its efforts to acknowledge and develop ways to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, building the resilience of migrants’ communities of origin and helping them offer their members the possibility to enjoy a decent life in their home country; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and, where possible, step up their support for countries hosting the most refugees, as well as for transit countries; reiterates that close cooperation and engagement with non-EU countries, with full respect for fundamental rights, remain key to preventing migrant smuggling; stresses, in this regard, that the dissemination of information and awareness-raising campaigns on the risks of smuggling are crucial, as well as of the migration laws of the destination countries, in order to prevent the undertaking of unnecessarily risky journeys by those who do not have grounds for asylum; calls for EU-funded humanitarian operations to take into consideration the specific needs and vulnerabilities of children and to ensure their protection while they are displaced; underlines the importance of developing an effective framework of safe and legal pathways to the EU and welcomes, in this regard, the Commission communication on attracting skills and talent to the EU[11], including the development of talent partnerships with partner countries; calls for respect for the principle of non-refoulement to countries where the life and liberty of people would be threatened; calls for the EU and its Member States to discuss the phenomenon of instrumentalised migration orchestrated by authoritarian regimes and organised crime groups, and emphasises the need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, develop effective countermeasures, and consider its implications for the human rights framework;

    46. Reaffirms that no agreement with a non-EU country designated as a transit country should be concluded without Parliament’s scrutiny, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to include robust human rights clauses, monitoring mechanisms and impact assessments therein; reiterates its call on the Commission to integrate ex ante human rights impact assessments into such agreements;

    Rights of LGBTIQ+ persons

    47. Deplores the human rights violations, including discrimination, persecution, violence and killings, against lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons around the world; is extremely concerned by the spreading of hatred and anti-LGBTIQ+ narratives and legislation that target LGBTIQ+ persons and HRDs; calls for the adoption of policies that protect LGBTIQ+ people and give them the tools to safely report a violation of their rights, in line with the EU Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by LGBTI Persons; expresses special concern over LGBTIQ+ people living under non-democratic regimes or in conflict situations, and calls for rapid response mechanisms to protect them as well as their defenders; reiterates its calls for the full implementation of the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 as the EU’s tool for improving the situation of LGBTIQ+ people around the world; calls for  the use of the death penalty to be rejected under all circumstances, including any legislation that would impose the death penalty for homosexuality; calls for the EU and its Member States to further engage the countries with such legislation in reconsidering their position on the death penalty; notes further that the imposition of the death penalty on the basis of such legislation is arbitrary killing per se, and a breach of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

    Rights of persons with disabilities

    48. Is concerned by the challenges to the full enjoyment of the rights of persons with disabilities; reiterates its calls for the EU to assist partner countries in the development of policies in support of carers of persons with disabilities; calls for the raising of social awareness and the combating of discriminatory behaviours against persons with disabilities; points to the additional complications faced by persons with disabilities in conflict situations and natural disasters, as they are more vulnerable to violence and often do not receive adequate support; urges all parties to conflict situations worldwide to take adequate measures to mitigate the risks to them as much as possible; emphasises the need to safeguard children with disabilities from any form of exploitation; calls for the EU, in its external policy, to make use of the strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030 as a tool to improve the situation of persons with disabilities, particularly concerning poverty and discrimination, but also problems with access to education, healthcare and employment, and participation in political life; encourages the EU to support partner countries in developing inclusive economic policies that promote accessible vocational training and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, fostering their full and active economic participation;

    Rights of elderly people

    49. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to develop new avenues to strengthen the rights of elderly people, taking into account the multiple challenges they face, such as age-based discrimination, poverty, violence and a lack of social protection, healthcare and other essential services, as well as barriers to employment; calls for the implementation of specific measures to combat the risk of poverty for older women through increased social support; underlines the work of the UN Open-ended Working Group on Ageing on a legally binding instrument to strengthen the protection of the human rights of older people and calls for the EU and its Member States to consider actively supporting that work; stresses the need for a cross-cutting intergenerational approach in EU policies, in order to build and encourage solidarity between young people and elderly people;

    Right to equality and non-discrimination

    50. Reiterates its condemnation of all forms of racism, intolerance, antisemitism, Islamophobia, persecution of Christians, xenophobia and discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, social class, disability, caste, religion, belief, age, sexual orientation or gender identity; condemns the growing international threat of hate speech and speech that incites violence, including online; reiterates the crucial role of education and dialogue in promoting tolerance, understanding and diversity; calls for the adoption or the strengthening of mechanisms for reporting discriminatory behaviours as well as access to effective legal remedies, to help end the impunity of those who engage in this behaviour;

    Right to life: towards the universal abolition of the death penalty

    51. Reiterates its principled opposition to the death penalty, which is irreversible and incompatible with the right to life and with the prohibition of torture, and a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment; stresses that the EU must be relentless in its pursuit of the universal abolition of the death penalty as a major objective of its human rights foreign policy; notes that despite the trend in some non-EU countries to take steps towards abolishing the death penalty, significant challenges in this regard still exist; deplores the fact that in other non-EU countries the number of death sentences that have been carried out has reached its highest level in the last five years; reiterates its call for all countries to completely abolish the death penalty or establish an immediate moratorium on the use of the death penalty (sentences and executions) as a first step towards its abolition; urges, in this regard, the EU to intensify diplomatic engagement with countries that continue to practise the death penalty, encouraging dialogue and cooperation on human rights issues and providing support for the development of judicial reforms that could lead towards its abolition;

    Right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief

    52. Reiterates its concern regarding violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; is concerned about the worldwide increase in intolerance towards different religious communities; deplores the instrumentalisation of religious or belief identities for political purposes and the exclusion of persons belonging to religious and belief minorities and religious communities, including from political participation, as well as the destruction and vandalism of sites and works of art of cultural and historical value, in certain non-EU countries; stresses that the freedom to choose one’s religion, to believe or not to believe is a human right that cannot be punished; condemns, therefore, the existence and implementation of so-called apostasy laws and blasphemy laws that lead to harsh penalties, degrading treatment and, in some cases, even to death sentences; calls for the abolition of apostasy laws and blasphemy laws; stresses that the Special Envoy for the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU should be granted more resources so that he can efficiently carry out his mandate; highlights the need for the Special Envoy to continue to work closely and in a complementary manner with the EUSR for Human Rights and the Council Working Party on Human Rights; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, to raise these issues at UN human rights forums and to continue working with the relevant UN mechanisms and committees; calls for the EU to request and consolidate reports by EU delegations on the state of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief;

    53. Recalls that most of the drivers of violent conflicts worldwide involve minority grievances of exclusion, discrimination and inequalities linked to violations of the human rights of minorities, as observed by the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues; stresses the need to mainstream the protection of the rights of minorities and for the development of protection mechanisms at the level of the UN; recalls the obligations of states to protect the rights of their national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic minorities within their respective territories; calls on the Commission to support the protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities worldwide, including this as a priority under the human rights and democracy thematic programme of the EU’s NDICI-Global Europe;

    Right to freedom of expression, academic freedom, media freedom and the right to information

    54. Emphasises the critical significance of freedom of expression and access to trustworthy and diverse sources of information for sustaining democracy and a thriving civic space; recalls that democracies can only function when citizens have access to independent and reliable information, making journalists key players in the safeguarding of democracy; is therefore seriously concerned about the increasing restrictions on freedom of expression in numerous countries worldwide, particularly for journalists, through censorship, enforced self-censorship, so-called foreign agents laws and the misuse of counter-terrorism or anti-corruption laws to suppress journalists and civil society groups; is concerned by the use of hate speech against journalists, both online and offline, leading to a deterrent effect; raises concerns, additionally, about the physical security of journalists and media workers and their being targeted in conflict zones; notes the number of journalists killed in conflict situations in 2023, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, has increased alarmingly – by 85 % – since 2022;

    55. Calls urgently for the EU to back trustworthy media and information outlets that promote the accountability of authorities and support democratic transitions, while stressing the need to preserve the principles of pluralism, transparency and independence; highlights the role played by fact checkers in the media landscape, ensuring that the public can trust the information they receive; is concerned that they are therefore major targets for attacks by illiberal regimes that originate and disseminate disinformation, propaganda and fake news; condemns the extensive use of SLAPPs to silence journalists, activists, trade unionists and HRDs globally; welcomes, in this context, the directive designed to shield journalists and HRDs from abusive legal actions and SLAPPs; encourages lawmakers in non-EU countries to develop legislation with the same goal, as part of broader efforts to promote and protect media freedom and pluralism; requests that attacks on media freedom, as well as the persistent and systematic erosion of the right to information, be taken into account in the EU’s monitoring of the compliance of international agreements;

    56. Welcomes the Commission’s plan to finance initiatives that support journalists on legal and practical matters, including beyond the EU, through the European Democracy Action Plan; calls for the EU to strengthen its efforts to aid targeted journalists globally, recalling that independent journalists are on the frontline of the fight against disinformation, which undermines democracies; acknowledges the contribution to achieving this goal of programmes such as the now-defunct Media4Democracy and other EU-funded activities, including those of the European Endowment for Democracy; urges the EU to help make reliable news sources available to more people living in countries that restrict press freedom;

    57. Remains deeply concerned by the deteriorating state of press freedom around the world; condemns the censorship of journalists, HRDs and CSOs through the application of so-called foreign agents laws, as well as other legislative and non-legislative measures adopted by authoritarian and illiberal regimes;

    58. Reaffirms its commitment to protecting and promoting academic freedom as a key component of open and democratic societies; underlines the attacks to academic freedom not only by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, but also by extreme and populist forces worldwide; calls for the development of benchmarks for academic freedom into institutional quality assurance within academic rankings, procedures and criteria;

    59. Notes with concern that more than half of the world’s population lives within environments of completely or severely restricted levels of academic freedom, which has severe consequences for the right to education, the enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress and the freedom of opinion and expression; urges the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to halt censorship, threats or attacks on academic freedom, and especially the imprisonment of scholars worldwide; welcomes the inclusion of academics at risk in the EU Human Rights Defenders Mechanism; calls on the Commission to ensure continued high-level support for the Global Campus of Human Rights, which has provided a safe space for students and scholars who had to flee their countries for defending democracy and human rights;

    Rights of indigenous peoples

    60. Notes with regret that indigenous peoples continue to face widespread and systematic discrimination and persecution worldwide, including forced displacements; condemns arbitrary arrests and the killing of human rights and land defenders who stand up for the rights of indigenous peoples; stresses that the promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples and their traditional practices are key to achieving sustainable development, combating climate change and conserving biodiversity; urges governments to pursue development and environmental policies that respect economic, social and cultural rights, and that are inclusive of indigenous peoples and local populations, in line with the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for the EU, its Member States and their partners in the international community to adopt all necessary measures for the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of indigenous people, including as regards their languages, lands, territories and resources, as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including the principle of free, prior and informed consent; calls on all states to ensure that indigenous peoples and local communities are included in the deliberations and decision-making processes of international climate diplomacy; encourages the Commission to continue to promote dialogue and collaboration between indigenous peoples and the EU;

    Right to public participation

    61. Deplores that the right to participate in free and fair elections is not respected in authoritarian, illiberal, and totalitarian regimes; highlights that these regimes conduct fake elections with the aim of entrenching their power, as they lack real political contestation and pluralism; is alarmed by current trends in electoral processes, such as the increasing decline in electoral participation and democratic performance or the growing disputes concerning the credibility of elections; highlights with deep concern the growing interference by some states in other countries’ elections through hybrid tactics; reaffirms the necessity of increasing political representation of women, young people and vulnerable groups and to guarantee the public participation of minorities; underlines that distrust in the electoral process can be exacerbated not only by irregularities but also by public statements, including from participants; emphasises that public perception of electoral process is as crucial as the process itself, as its manipulation can lead to polarisation or targeted attacks; calls on non-EU countries to reinforce their efforts to clearly communicate all the steps of their respective electoral processes and systems, as well as the existing accountability mechanisms in case of irregularities; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to analyse and report to Parliament their initiatives to tackle the challenges posed by articifical intelligence (AI) in electoral processes;

    Human rights, business and trade

    62. Stresses the role of trade as a major instrument to promote and improve the human rights situation in the EU’s partner countries; urges the Commission to improve coordination between the EU’s trade, investment and development policies and prioritise and promote the development of human rights through EU trade policies, including the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus; notes, however, that there has been little to no improvement in some of the countries concerned; stresses the responsibilities of states and other actors, such as corporations, to mitigate the effects of climate change, prevent their negative impact on human rights and promote appropriate policies in compliance with human rights obligations; deplores the detrimental effects of some excessive and exploitative business activities on human rights and democracy; welcomes the harmonisation resulting from the adoption of the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence with binding EU rules on responsible corporate behaviour with regard to human, labour and environmental rights; further welcomes the Regulation on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market[12] and calls for its swift implementation at Member State level; calls for the implementation of the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, and for the adaptation of the Commission’s Single Entry Point to allow for the submission of complaints regarding failures to comply with human rights clauses, which should be accessible, citizen-friendly and transparent; calls for the EU to continue its efforts to eliminate child labour, and forced and bonded labour; stresses the importance of remediation and access to justice measures that are in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, including financial and non-financial measures in consultation with the victims; calls on the Council to adopt an ambitious mandate for the EU to engage in the ongoing negotiations on the UN legally binding instrument on business and human rights as soon as possible;

    63. Highlights that in many regions of the world, micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are often the driving force of local economies with an increasing number of women running them; underlines that MSMEs account for 90 % of businesses, 60 to 70 % of employment and 50 % of gross domestic product worldwide; highlights the importance of MSMEs in their contribution to the 2030 Agenda and the achievement of the SDGs, namely those on the eradication of poverty and decent working conditions for all;

    Human rights and digital technologies

    64. Is concerned by the threat that AI can pose to democracy and human rights, especially if it is not duly regulated; highlights the need for oversight, robust transparency and appropriate safeguards for new and emergent technologies, as well as a human-rights based approach; welcomes the Council conclusions on Digital Diplomacy of 26 June 2023 to strengthen the EU’s role and leadership in global digital governance, in particular its position as a shaper of the global digital rulebook based on democratic principles; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act which aims to harmonise the rules on AI for protecting human rights, and the advantages that AI can bring to human wellbeing; is deeply concerned about the harmful consequences of the misuse of AI and deepfakes, particularly for women and children; notes with concern the adverse effects of the ‘fake content industry’ on the right to information and press freedom, including the rapid development of AI and the subsequent empowerment of the disinformation industry[13]; condemns the use of new and emerging technologies, such as facial recognition technology and digital surveillance, as coercive instruments and their use in the increasing harassment, intimidation and persecution of HRDs, activists, journalists and lawyers; calls on the Council for the listing under the EUGHRSR of state and non-state actors that are engaging in these practices; notes with concern the rapid development of AI in military applications, as well as the potential development and deployment of autonomous systems that could make life-or-death decisions without human input;

    65. Recalls that the international trade in spyware to non-EU countries where such tools are used against human rights activists, journalists and government critics, is a violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter;

    66. Welcomes the adoption in May 2024 of the first Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, aimed at ensuring that activities within the entire life cycle of AI systems are fully consistent with human rights, democracy and the rule of law; reiterates the need for greater legislative attention to be paid to the profound changes arising from activities within the life cycle of AI systems, which have the potential to promote human prosperity, individual and social well-being, sustainable development, gender equality, and the empowerment of all women and girls, but also pose the risk of creating or exacerbating inequalities and incentivising cyber and physical violence, including violence experienced by women and individuals in vulnerable situations;

    67. Stresses that the internet should be a place where freedom of expression prevails; considers, nevertheless, that the rights of individuals need to be respected; is of the opinion that, where applicable, what is considered to be illegal offline, should be considered illegal online; expresses concern for the growing number of internet shutdowns; highlights that internet shutdowns are often used by authoritarian regimes, among others, to silence political dissidence and curb political freedom; calls urgently for the EU to combat this alarming phenomenon, including considering allowing EU-based providers to offer safe communication tools to people who have been thereby deprived of online access; urges the EU to take a firm stance against any attempts by tech giants to circumvent or undermine national legal systems and independent court decisions, and to protect democratic principles and implement measures to maintain the integrity of elections, as well as to protect the right to information, especially during electoral periods;

    °

    ° °

    68. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Union Heads of Delegation.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Each year, the European Parliament adopts three annual reports on the EU’s foreign, security and defence, and human rights policies.

     

    The three reports are on:

     

     the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – annual report 2024 (based on the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) – competence of the AFET Committee,

     Human Rights and Democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 (based on the EU Annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World) – competence of the DROI Subcommittee, and

     the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2024 (based on the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) – competence of the SEDE Subcommittee.

     

    These reports monitor and assess the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the EU policy on Human Rights and the Common Security and Defence Policy. They are a key component of the European Parliament’s contribution to EU foreign policy making, most notably in regard to the strengthened right of scrutiny conferred to the European Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon. It is essential that the European Parliament responds to the annual reports issued by other institutions as soon as they are published.

    ANNEX I: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, until the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Partnership for Democracy/International Dalit Solidarity Network

    Clean Clothes Campaign

    Protection International

    Race & Equality

    FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights

    International Partnership for Human Rights

    Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

    Front Line Defenders

    Save the Children

    Avocats Sans Frontières

    Center for Reproductive Rights

    Reporters without Borders

    End FGM European Network

     

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

     

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do ), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

    ANNEX II: INDIVIDUAL CASES RAISED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT FROM DECEMBER 2023 TO JANUARY 2025

     

    COUNTRY

     

    Individual

    BACKGROUND

    ACTION TAKEN BY THE PARLIAMENT

    AFGHANISTAN

     

    Manizha Seddiqi Ahmad Fahim Azimi

    Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee  Ezatullah Zwab

    Manizha Seddiqi, Ahmad Fahim Azimi, Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee and Ezatullah Zwab are human rights defenders who have been detained in Afghanistan.

    In its resolution of 14 March 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the arbitrary detention of human rights defenders, including Manizha Seddiqi, Ahmad Fahim Azimi, Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee and Ezatullah Zwab;

     

    – Calls for victims of violence against women and girls to be released from prison, where they are being held in inhumane conditions to the detriment of their mental and physical health.

     

    ALGERIA

     

    Boualem Sansal

    French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal was detained on 16 November 2024 by the Algerian authorities, his whereabouts remained unknown for over a week, during which time he was denied access to his family and legal counsel; he was subsequently charged with national security-related offences under Article 87bis of the Algerian Penal Code, and he is awaiting trial.

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the arrest and detention of Boualem Sansal and calls for his immediate and unconditional release;

     

    – Equally condemns the arrests of all other activists, political prisoners, journalists, human rights defenders and others detained or sentenced for exercising their right to freedom of opinion and expression, including journalist Abdelwakil Blamm and writer Tadjadit Mohamed, and calls for their release;

     

    – Reiterates, as enshrined in the EU-Algeria Partnership Priorities, the importance of the rule of law in order to consolidate freedom of expression; stresses that renewing this agreement must be based upon continued and substantial progress in the aforementioned domains and underscores that all future disbursements of EU funds should consider the progress made in this regard.

     

    AZERBAIJAN

     

    Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu

    Ilhamiz Guliyev

    Ulvi Hasanli Sevinj Vagifgizi

    Nargiz Absalamova

    Hafiz Babali,

    Elnara Gasimova Aziz Orujov

    Rufat Muradli

    Avaz Zeynalli

    Elnur Shukurov

    Alasgar Mammadli

    Farid Ismayilov

     

    Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist and opposition figure, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life.

     

    Ilhamiz Guliyev, a human rights defender, was arbitrarily arrested on 4 December 2023 on dubious accusations of drug trafficking after he testified as whistleblower about the police tampering with evidence against government critics; he is facing up to 12 years in prison.

     

    Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev are political prisoners, and Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov are human rights defenders and journalists.

    In its resolution of 25 April 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release Ilhamiz Guliyev; notes that Gubad Ibadoghlu has been released and placed under house arrest and calls on the authorities to lift the travel ban and drop all charges against him; calls on Azerbaijan to urgently ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad;

     

    – Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release all other political prisoners, including Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, human rights defenders and journalists Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov, as well as EU and other nationals.

     

    AZERBAIJAN

     

    Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Kamran Mammadli, Rufat Safarov and Meydan TV

    Political prisoner and 2024 Sakharov Prize finalist Gubad Ibadoghlu remains under house arrest; the European Court of Human Rights ruled that his health condition is critical, requiring hospitalisation and urgent heart surgery.

     

    Civil society leader Anar Mammadli has been in pre-trial detention since April 2024 on bogus charges, with his health deteriorating due to denied healthcare.

     

    In early December 2024, the Azerbaijani authorities arrested MeydanTV journalists Aynur Ganbarova, Aytaj Ahmadova, Khayala Agayeva, Natig Javadli and Aysel Umudova, and journalists Ramin Jabrayilzade and Ahmad Mukhtar; they also arrested Baku Journalism School deputy director Ulvi Tahirov, political leader Azer Gasimli and human rights defender Rufat Safarov; all face unfounded, politically motivated charges.

     

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately end the crackdown on all dissident groups and unconditionally release and drop all charges against human rights defenders, journalists and political and other activists prosecuted under fabricated, politically motivated charges;

     

    – Demands that the authorities immediately lift the travel ban on Ibadoghlu, unconditionally drop all charges against him and allow him to receive urgent treatment abroad; deplores the fact that Ibadoghlu was not allowed to attend the Sakharov Prize ceremony or connect remotely;

     

    – Calls on Azerbaijan to lift undue restrictions on independent media by aligning its laws on the registration and funding of non-governmental groups and media with Venice Commission recommendations; demands that the authorities end the repression of MeydanTV, ToplumTV, Abaz Media and Kanal13;

     

    – Calls for EU sanctions under its global human rights sanctions regime to be imposed on Azerbaijani officials responsible for serious human rights violations, including Fuad Alasgarov, Vilayat Eyvazov and Ali Naghiyev.

     

    BELARUS

     

    Marina Adamovich, Mikalai Statkevich  Tatsiana Seviarynets, Pavel Seviarynets Daria Losik

    Ihar Losik

    Mikalai Kazlou

    Ryhor Kastusiou Mikalai Statkevich Pavel Seviarynets

    Marina Adamovich, wife of Mikalai Statkevich (political prisoner), Tatsiana Seviarynets, mother of Pavel Seviarynets (political prisoner), and earlier-arrested Daria Losik, wife of Ihar Losik (political prisoner), have suffered interrogations and detentions by the KGB. 

     

    Mikalai Kazlou, Ryhor Kastusiou, Mikalai Statkevich and Pavel Seviarynets, all political prisoners, face isolation, torture, denial of medical care and forced labour.

    In its resolution of 14 December 2023, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the recent wave of mass arrests in Belarus and urges the illegitimate Lukashenka regime to cease repression, especially any gender-based persecution, and reminds the regime of its international obligations;

     

    – Calls for the immediate unconditional release and compensation of all more than 1 400 political prisoners, as well as their families and arbitrarily detained persons, while restoring their full rights.

     

    BELARUS

     

    Mikola Statkevich

    Ales Bialiatski

    Maria Kalesnikava Siarhei Tsikhanouski Viktar Babaryka Maksim Znak

    Pavel Sevyarynets Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk

    Andrzej Poczobut  Ihar Losik

    Former presidential candidate and 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate Mikola Statkevich has been imprisoned on politically motivated charges for 14 years; he is kept in solitary confinement under maximum security; his health is deteriorating and his lawyers and family have been denied information and contact for over 300 days.

     

    Prominent Belarusian political prisoners, including Ales Bialiatski, Maria Kalesnikava, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Viktar Babaryka, Maksim Znak, Pavel Sevyarynets, Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk, Andrzej Poczobut and Ihar Losik, have been subjected to similar isolation.

    In its resolution of 8 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Demands the immediate, unconditional release of Mikola Statkevich and all 1 500 political prisoners; calls for the withdrawal of all charges against them, their full rehabilitation and financial compensation for the damage suffered as a result of being deprived of liberty;

     

    – Insists that the prisoners must receive proper medical assistance and access to lawyers, family, diplomats and international organisations, which can assess their condition and provide aid; regrets the inaction of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Belarus;

     

    – Strongly condemns the unjustified, politically motivated sentences and continued repression of Belarusian democratic forces, civil society, human rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists, clergy, political activists and their family members.

     

    CHINA

     

    Ding Yuande

    Ma Ruimei

     

    On 12 May 2023 Falun Gong practitioners Mr Ding Yuande and his wife Ms Ma Ruimei were arrested without a warrant; Ms Ma was released on bail, but was then intimidated by police because of a rescue campaign launched by their son abroad.

     

    Mr Ding was detained with no family visits for eight months; on 15 December 2023 he was sentenced to three years in prison with a CNY 15 000 fine.

    In its resolution of 18 January 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly urges the PRC to immediately end the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and other minorities, including Uyghurs and Tibetans; demands the immediate and unconditional release of Mr Ding and all Falun Gong practitioners in China;

     

    – Calls for the PRC to end domestic and transnational surveillance and control and the suppression of religious freedom; urges the PRC to abide by its obligations under international law and its own constitution to respect and protect human rights.

     

    CHINA

     

    Ilham Tohti

    Gulshan Abbas

    In 2014 Ilham Tohti was convicted of politically motivated charges of ‘separatism’ and sentenced to life imprisonment; he worked to foster dialogue between Uyghurs and Han Chinese; he was awarded the 2019 Sakharov Prize. Gulshan Abbas has been serving a 20-year sentence on fallacious terrorism-related charges relating to activities of her sister, a defender of the human rights of persecuted Uyghurs in the PRC.

     

     

    Gulshan Abbas, is a Uyghur retired doctor, who was forcibly disappeared in retaliation of her sisters public criticism of the treatment of Uyghurs. She has received a 20-year sentence in 2020, for participating in a terrorist organisation.

     

    In its resolution of 10 October 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the PRC’s violations of the human rights of Uyghurs and people in Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and mainland China;

     

    – Urges the PRC to immediately and unconditionally release Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas, as well as those arbitrarily detained in China and those mentioned by the EU during the 57th session of the UN Human Rights Council, guarantee their access to medical care and lawyers, provide information on their whereabouts and ensure family visiting rights; calls for the EU and the Member States to apply pressure in this respect at every high-level contact;

     

    – Demands that the PRC authorities halt their repression and targeting of Uyghurs with abusive policies, including intense surveillance, forced labour, sterilisation, birth prevention measures and the destruction of Uyghur identity, which amount to crimes against humanity and a serious risk of genocide; calls for the closure of all internment camps;

     

    – Strongly condemns the PRC for not implementing the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); calls on the PRC to allow the OHCHR independent access to XUAR and invites the OHCHR to issue a comprehensive situational update and an action plan for holding the PRC accountable;

     

    – Welcomes the EU’s forced labour regulation and insists on its full implementation; calls on businesses operating in the PRC, particularly in XUAR, to comply with their HR due diligence obligations.

     

    CUBA

     

    José Daniel Ferrer Garcia

     

    Human rights defender and opposition leader José Daniel Ferrer García was detained on 11 July 2021 in the context of widespread protests in Cuba, and has been held in isolation since 14 August 2021; the Cuban regime has imprisoned, harassed and intimidated him for over a decade for his peaceful political activism; since March 2023, he has been held incommunicado and his family have received no information about his health and have been denied the right to visit him.

    In its resolution of 19 September 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – The Cuban regime holds political prisoners in the most appalling conditions; whereas reports indicate that José Daniel Ferrer is in a critical condition and has been held without access to medical treatment, with inadequate food and in unsanitary conditions, which constitute forms of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment;

     

    – The human rights situation in Cuba is alarming, particularly for dissidents, who are subjected to worrying levels of surveillance and arbitrary detention; whereas the number of political prisoners is unknown but reliable sources state that the regime holds over a thousand prisoners, including minors; whereas among the many political prisoners are Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara and Lizandra Gongora, whose health condition is critical;

     

    – Urges the Cuban regime to immediately and unconditionally release José Daniel Ferrer and all persons politically and arbitrarily detained for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;

     

    – Condemns the torture and inhuman, degrading and ill-treatment perpetrated by the Cuban authorities against José Daniel Ferrer and the other political prisoners; calls for the families of victims of the regime’s persecution to be granted immediate access to them, pending their release, and for the victims to be given medical care.

     

    CRIMEA

    Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov

    Crimean journalist and human rights defender Iryna Danylovych was abducted in 2022, accused of possessing explosives and sentenced to 6 years and 11 months of imprisonment; NGO activist Tofik Abdulhaziiev was arrested in 2019 and sentenced to 12 years in a maximum security prison on trumped-up charges, and since 2023 is being held in a prison some 2 700 km away from Crimea; citizen journalist Amet Suleymanov was sentenced to 12 years of prison in 2021.

     

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns Russia’s continuous targeting of ethnic Ukrainians and systematic persecution of indigenous Crimean Tatars, which aims to erase their identity, heritage and culture, echoing, for the Crimean Tatars, the genocidal deportations of 1944; considers that Crimea’s future is tied to its recognition as the Crimean Tatars’ historic homeland;

     

    – Condemns the persecution of journalists, civil society activists and human rights defenders and the deportation of civilians including political prisoners from Crimea to penitentiary institutions across Russia, contrary to international law;

     

    – Demands the immediate and unconditional release of Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov and other political prisoners; calls for immediate medical care to be provided; denounces the upholding of verdicts against seriously ill individuals, which constitutes a blatant violation of international human rights standards; calls on the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN to establish the whereabouts of civilian detainees from Crimea.

     

    DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

     

    Jean-Jacques Wondo

    Jean-Jacques Wondo, a Belgian-Congolese security, military and political expert, was arrested following a failed coup on 19 May 2024, for which he was accused of being the ‘intellectual perpetrator’, on 13 September 2024, Wondo and 36 others were sentenced to death by a military court.

     

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the sentencing to death of Wondo and others and the grave violations of their right to a fair trial;

     

    – Urges the DRC Government to immediately overturn the death sentences, reinstate a moratorium on executions and take steps towards the full abolition of the death penalty;

     

    –  Expresses deep concern about Wondo’s deteriorating health, calls for him to be given immediate access to medical treatment and insists on his immediate release;

     

    – Calls for systemic reforms to be implemented in the DRC to rebuild the judiciary into an independent, fair and efficient institution that guarantees due process and the protection of fundamental rights.

     

    GREECE

     

    George Karaivaz

    George Karaivaz was a journalist who have been murdered on 9 April 2021.

    In its resolution of 7 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Is deeply concerned by the failure of law enforcement and the judicial authorities in Greece to make progress in the investigation into the murder of the Greek journalist George Karaivaz on 9 April 2021; notes that two suspects were arrested in April 2023, but otherwise there has not been any discernible activity in the police investigation; strongly urges the authorities to take all the necessary steps towards conducting a thorough and effective investigation, and to bring those involved in the murder, at any level, to justice; urges the authorities to request assistance from Europol.

     

    HONG KONG

     

    Andy Li

    Joseph John

    Andy Li, a pro-democracy activist and key witness in Jimmy Lai’s trial, allegedly confessed, under torture, to conspiracy and collusion with foreign entities.

     

    Joseph John, a HK-Portuguese dual national, is the first extraterritorial application of the NSL to an EU citizen; John was arrested for allegedly posting anti-China social media content and committing, from Europe, incitement to ‘secession’, and was sentenced on 11 April 2024 to five years’ imprisonment.

    In its resolution of 25 April 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release Li, John, Lai, Kok Tsz-lun and all other pro-democracy representatives and activists detained for exercising their freedoms and democratic rights, and to drop all charges against them;

     

    – Highlights the SNSO’s undermining of press freedoms; calls on the authorities to stop harassing and prosecuting journalists.

     

    HONG KONG/ CHINA

     

    Jimmy Lai

    Jimmy Lai has been detained since 2020 on trumped-up charges; his trial started in 2023 after various delays; he denied these charges and faces life imprisonment; his British lawyer has been refused permission to represent him. Jimmy Lai a British national since 1996, is a Hong Kong media tycoon, and a known pro- democracy supporter.  Political prisoners in HK endure difficult conditions, often affecting their health, throughout lengthy pre-trial detentions, as with 76-year-old Lai, who has diabetes and has been denied Communion in prison.

     

    45 pro-democracy politicians, activists and journalists were sentenced for subversion, in the ‘Hong Kong 47’ case, for organising unofficial election primaries; their trials were the largest national security trials to date;

     

    In its resolution of 28 November 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the sentencing of pro-democracy activists on national security charges, in violation of international law; calls for the repeal of the NSL and the SNSO; denounces the degradation of basic freedoms in HK;

     

    – Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release all pro-democracy activists, including Lai and Chung, and to drop all charges against them;

     

    – Calls on the EEAS and the Member States to warn China that its actions in HK will have consequences for EU-China relations; calls on the Council to review its 2020 conclusions on HK and to impose targeted sanctions on John Lee and other HK and Chinese officials responsible for human rights violations, to revoke HK’s favourable customs treatment and review the status of the HK Economic Trade Office in Brussels; urges the Member States to file an ICJ case against China’s decision to impose the NSL on HK and Macau.

     

    IRAN

     

    Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi

    Kurdish activists, social worker Pakhshan Azizi and advocate for women’s rights Verisheh (Wrisha) Moradi were sentenced to death for ‘armed rebellion against the state’.

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Denounces the Iranian regime’s unrestrained repression of human rights, in particular the targeting of women activists; strongly condemns the death sentence against Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi; demands that Iran immediately and unconditionally release all unjustly imprisoned human rights defenders and political prisoners, including Pakhshan Azizi, Wrisha Moradi and at least 56 other political prisoners on death row;

     

    – Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase support for Iranian human rights defenders and expresses its full support and solidarity with Iranians united in the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement;

     

    – Urges the Iranian authorities to immediately release, safely repatriate and drop all charges against EU nationals, including Olivier Grondeau, Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and Ahmadreza Djalali; strongly condemns Iran’s use of hostage diplomacy; calls for the EU and its Member States to undertake joint diplomatic efforts and work collectively towards their release;

     

    – Strongly condemns the murder of Jamshid Sharmahd; urges the Islamic regime in Iran to provide details of the circumstances of his death and for his remains to be immediately returned to his family;

     

    – Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and to extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for human rights violations, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, Prosecutor-General Mohammad Movahedi-Azad and Judge Iman Afshari;

     

    – Urges the Iranian authorities to provide the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Iran and the UN fact-finding mission with full, unimpeded access to enact their mandates.

     

    KYRGYZSTAN

     

    Temirlan Sultanbekov

    Temirlan Sultanbekov is the leader of the Kyrgyzstan Social Democrats party (SDK), he and other party officials have been arrested for vote-buying allegations, with an audiotape of unknown origin serving as the primary evidence, for which the judicial authorisation is unclear and its connection with the detainees unknown.

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to immediately release Mr Sultanbekov and other party officials and adopt alternative measures to detention, while respecting their right to due process in line with the civil and political rights guaranteed under the Kyrgyz constitution and international obligations; calls on the authorities to ensure his safety and well-being;

     

    – Urges the Kyrgyz government to halt its campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, independent media outlets and journalists; is concerned by the adoption of the Russian-style ‘foreign agents’ law; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to drop all charges against human rights defenders, including Makhabat Tazhibek Kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aktilek Kaparov and Ayke Beishekeeva, journalists from the Temirov Live and Ait Ait Dese channels.

     

    RUSSIA

     

    Alexei Navalny

    Vladimir Kara-Murza

    Yuri Dmitriev

    Ilya Yashin

    Alexei Gorinov

    Lilia Chanysheva Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin

    Daniel Kholodny Vadim Kobzev

    Igor Sergunin

    Alexei Liptser Viktoria Petrova Maria Ponomarenko Alexandra Skochilenko

    Svetlana Petriychuk Evgenia Berkovich Dmitry Ivanov

    Ioann Kurmoyarov Igor Baryshnikov Dmitry Talantov Alexei Moskalev

    Oleg Orlov

    Boris Kagarlitsky

    Ivan Safronov

     

    Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian political figure and the 2021 laureate of the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, perished in a Siberian penal colony north of the Arctic Circle while serving a unfounded, politically motivated prison sentence. He had been in detention since 17 January 2021, the date on which he returned to Russia following medical rehabilitation after an attempted state-sponsored assassination using the internationally banned nerve agent Novichok; he had previously been detained and arrested many times and had been sentenced, on fabricated and politically motivated grounds, to long prison terms in evident attempts to stop his political activities and anti-corruption campaigns.

     

    Vladimir Kara-Murza, Yuri Dmitriev, Ilya Yashin, Alexei Gorinov, Lilia Chanysheva, Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin, Daniel Kholodny, Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin, Alexei Liptser, Viktoria Petrova, Maria Ponomarenko, Alexandra Skochilenko, Svetlana Petriychuk, Evgenia Berkovich, Dmitry Ivanov, Ioann Kurmoyarov, Igor Baryshnikov, Dmitry Talantov, Alexei Moskalev, Oleg Orlov, Boris Kagarlitsky and Ivan Safronov are political prisoners.

     

    In its resolution of 29 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the murder of Alexei Navalny; expresses its wholehearted condolences to his family, associates and colleagues, and to his countless supporters across Russia; expresses its full support to Yulia Navalnaya in her determination to continue the work started by Alexei Navalny with her support, and to the Anti-Corruption Foundation founded by Navalny, which is continuing its work under the new circumstances;

     

    – Calls on the Russian authorities to drop all arbitrary charges and to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons.

    TAJIKISTAN

     

    Abdullo Ghurbati Daler Imomali Zavqibek Saidamini Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva Khushruz Jumayev Khurshed Fozilov

    Manuchehr Kholiknazarov Buzurgmehr Yorov

     

    Abdullo Ghurbati, Daler Imomali, Zavqibek Saidamini, Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda, Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, Khushruz Jumayev and Khurshed Fozilov are journalists who have been sentenced to between seven and over 20 years in prison in retaliation for their coverage of social issues and human rights abuses, including in GBAO.

     

    Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Buzurgmehr Yorov  are human rights lawyers who have been detained.

    In its resolution of 18 January 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the ongoing crackdown, including anti-extremism legislation, against independent media, government critics, human rights activists and independent lawyers; condemns the closure of independent media and websites, including the online media outlets Pamir Daily News, New Tajikistan 2 and Akhbor.com;

     

    – Condemns all politically motivated trials and the lack of fair and public hearings by independent courts; urges the authorities to stop persecuting journalists, immediately and unconditionally release those who have been arbitrarily detained and drop all charges against them, stop the persecution of lawyers defending government critics and release human rights lawyers Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Buzurgmehr Yorov;

     

    – Urges the government to ensure that detainees have access to adequate healthcare; calls for a thorough investigation into allegations of mistreatment in custody and forced confessions, and those responsible to be brought to justice.

     

    TÜRKIYE

     

    Bülent Mumay

    Bülent Mumay is a Turkish journalist and coordinator of the Istanbul bureau of Deutsche Welle’s Turkish editorial office, was sentenced to 20 months in prison for social media posts about a pro-government company’s seizure of Istanbul Municipality’s subway funds during the AKP administration; his appeal was rejected, and his tweets removed.

    In its resolution of 10 October 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the sentence against Bülent Mumay, which follows a broader pattern of silencing critical journalism; calls on the Turkish authorities to drop the charges against Bülent Mumay, and all arbitrarily detained media workers and journalists, as well as political opponents, human rights defenders, civil servants and academics;

     

      Is deeply concerned about the ongoing deterioration of democratic standards in Türkiye, relentless crackdown on any critical voices and targeting of independent journalists, activists and opposition members amid frequent reports of legal intimidation, censorship and financial coercion as ways to suppress criticism and investigative journalism.

     

    VENEZUELA

     

    Rocío San Miguel

    General Hernández Da Costa 

    Ronald Ojeda

    María Corina Machado

    Juan Freites

    Luis Camacaro Guillermo Lopez Emil Brandt

     

    Rocío San Miguel is a lawyer and human rights activist with Spanish nationality, who got kidnapped by the Venezuelan regime on 9 February 2024, and sentenced on politically motivated grounds of suspected conspiracy against Nicolás Maduro and his regime; she is currently being detained in El Helicoide prison, which is known for human rights abuses, including torture.

     

    Hernández Da Costa has been a political prisoner since August 2018; on 19 February 2024, he was forcibly transferred to El Rodeo 1 prison, designed to detain political prisoners; an unknown number of prisoners, including some EU citizens, were also transferred; the general suffers from medical ailments that require constant treatment, which he is being denied.

     

    Ronald Ojeda was a former political prisoner who escaped the Maduro regime, and got murdered in Chile.

     

    Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro, Guillermo Lopez and Emil Brandt are four campaign coordinators working for the opposition to the regime’s presidential candidate, and have been detained on political grounds.

     

    In its resolution of 14 March 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Demands the immediate unconditional release of all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons, and the full restoration of their rights; exhorts the regime to cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition;

     

    – Strongly condemns the Maduro regime for imprisoning hundreds of political prisoners;

     

    – Calls on the international community to support a return to democracy in Venezuela, particularly in the light of the upcoming elections, in which the leader of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, must be allowed to fully participate.

    VENEZUELA

     

    Maria Corina Machado

    Juan Freites

    Luis Camacaro Guillermo López

    Maria Corina Machado was selected as the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, winning with 92,35 % of the votes in the primary elections. She got a disqualification of 15 years.

     

    For several months, members of María Corina Machado’s campaign team – including Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo López, who were unlawfully detained and have since been reported missing.

    In its resolution of 8 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all the arbitrarily arrested political and social leaders, including three campaign staffers of the presidential candidate of the opposition to the regime María Corina Machado, namely Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo Lopez;

     

    – Strongly condemns the attempts to disqualify the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and others, such as Henrique Capriles, from holding public office;

     

    – Urges the Venezuelan regime to immediately stop the persecution of the primary winner and thus fully legitimate candidate of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and other opposition politicians.

     

     

     

     

    ANNEX III: LIST OF SAKHAROV PRIZE LAUREATES AND FINALISTS IMPRISONED AND DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY

     

    Year of Sakharov Prize award

    Name and surname

    Laureate / Finalist

    Country

    Situation (Detention / house arrest / temporarily released)

    Length of prison sentence

    Start date of detention

    2024

    Gubad Ibadoghlu

    Finalist

    Azerbaijan

    Under travel ban

     

    A court rejected Ibadoglu’s appeal against the travel ban on 3/12/2024

    2021

    Alexei Navalny

    Laureate

     

    Russia

    Deceased in prison on 16/2/2024

     

    3,5 + 9 + 19 years

    Last detained 17/2/21, last sentenced 4/8/23

    2020

    Siarhei Tsikhanouski

     

    Maryia Kalesnikava

     

    Mikola Statkevich

     

     

    Ales Bialiatski

    Laureate

     

    Laureate

     

    Laureate

     

     

    Laureate

    Belarus

     

    Detention

     

    Detention

     

    Detention

     

     

    Detention

    18 years

     

    11 years

     

    14 years

     

     

    10 years

     

    Detained 29/5/20, sentenced 14/12/21

    Detained 07/9/20, sentenced 06/9/21

    Last detained 31/5/20, last sentenced 14/12/21

    Last detained 15/7/21, last sentenced 03/03/23

    2020

    Porfirio Sorto Cedillo, José Avelino Cedillo, Orbin Naún Hernández, Kevin Alejandro Romero, Arnold Javier Aleman, Ever Alexander Cedillo, Daniel Marquez and Jeremías Martínez Díaz

    Finalists

    Honduras

    Detention

    Unknown

    1/9/2019, released on 24/2/2022, after a ruling by the Supreme Court of Honduras

    2019

    Ilham Tohti

    Laureate

    China

    Detention

    Unknown

    23/9/2014

    2018

    Nasser Zefzafi

     

    Finalist

    Morocco

    Detention

    20 years

    5/4/2019

    2017

    Dawit Isaak

    Finalist

    Eritrea

    Incommunicado detention

    Unknown

    23/9/2001

    2015

    Raif Badawi

    Laureate

    Saudi Arabia

    Released on 11/3/2022, since then under a 10-year travel ban

     

    10 years

    First sentenced on 17/12/2012, but announced on 30/3/2013

    2012

    Nasrin Sotoudeh

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Jafar Panahi

    Laureate

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Laureate

    Iran

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Iran

    Detention, on temporary medical furlough since July 2021, arrested again 29/10/2023 and released 15/11/2023

     

    Detained in 2022,

    released on 3/2/2023 after hunger strike

    38 years

     

     

     

     

     

     

    6 years

    6/3/2019 (most recent)

     

     

     

     

     

    compelled in July 2022 to serve a 10-years old prison sentence

    2011

    Razan Zaitouneh

    Laureate

    Syria

    Kidnapped in 2013. Presumptions of detention and death.

     

    9/12/2013

    2009

    Memorial – Oleg Orlov

    Laureate

     

     

    Russia

    Released on 1/8/2024 as part of a prisoner exchange with the US and Germany

    2.5 years

    Latest sentence in February 2024. Memorial as legal entity liquidated in January 2022.

     

     

    ANNEX IV: LIST OF RESOLUTIONS

    List of resolutions adopted by the European Parliament from December 2023 to January 2025 and related directly or indirectly to human rights violations in the world

     

     

    Country/Region

    Date of adoption in plenary

     

    Title

    Africa

     

     

    Algeria

    23.01.2025

    The case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria

    Democratic Republic of the Congo

    23.01.2025

    The case of Jean-Jacques Wondo

     

    Gambia

     

    25.04.2024

    On the proposed repeal of the law banning female genital mutilation in The Gambia

    Nigeria

    08.02.2024

    On the recent attacks on Christmas Eve in Plateau State in Nigeria

    Sudan

    18.01.2024

    On the threat of famine following the spread of the conflict in Sudan

    Tanzania

    14.12.2023

    On the Maasai Communities in Tanzania

    Americas

     

     

    Cuba

    29.02.2024

    On the critical situation in Cuba

    Cuba

    19.09.2024

    The case of José Daniel Ferrer García in Cuba

    Guatemala

    14.12.2023

    On the attempt at a coup d’état in Guatemala

    Venezuela

    08.02.2024

    On further repression against the democratic forces in Venezuela: attacks on presidential candidate María Corina Machado

     

    Venezuela

     

    14.03.2024

    On the case of Rocío San Miguel and General Hernández Da Costa, among other political prisoners in Venezuela

    Venezuela

    19.09.2024

    Situation on Venezuela

    Venezuela

    23.01.2025

    Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025

    Asia

     

     

     

    Afghanistan

     

     

    14.03.2024

    On the repressive environment in Afghanistan, including public executions and violence against women

    Afghanistan

    19.09.2024

    The deteriorating situation of women in Afghanistan due to the recent adoption of the law on the “Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice”

     

    Azerbaijan

     

    25.04.2024

    On Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev

    Azerbaijan

    19.12.2024

    Continued repression of civil society and independent media in Azerbaijan and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Kamran Mammadli, Rufat Safarov and Meydan TV

    Cambodia

    28.11.2024

    The shrinking space for civil society in Cambodia, in particular the case of the labour rights organisation CENTRAL

     

    China

     

    18.01.2024

    On the ongoing persecution of Falun Gong in China, notably the case of Mr Ding Yuande

    China

     

    10.10.2024

    The cases of unjustly imprisoned Uyghurs in China, notably Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas

    China/ Taiwan

    24.10.2024

    Misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

     

    Hong Kong

     

    25.04.2024

    On the new security law in Hong Kong and the cases of Andy Li and Joseph John

    Hong Kong/ China

     

    28.11.2024

    Hong Kong, notably the cases of Jimmy Lai and the 45 activists recently convicted under the national security law

    Kyrgyzstan

    19.12.2024

    Human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov

    Tajikistan

    18.01.2024

    On Tajikistan: state repression against the independent media

     

    Tibet

     

    14.12.2023

    On the abduction of Tibetan children and forced assimilation practices through Chinese boarding schools in Tibet

    Middle East

     

     

     

    Iran/Israel

     

    25.04.2024

    On Iran’s unprecedented attack against Israel, the need for de-escalation and an EU response

     

    Iran

     

    08.02.2024

    On the increased number of executions in Iran, in particular the case of Mohammad Ghobadlou

    Iran

    28.11.2024

    The increasing and systematic repression of women in Iran

    Iran

    23.01.2025

    Systematic repression of human rights in Iran

    Iraq

    10.10.2024

    Iraq, notably the situation of women’s rights and the recent proposal to amend the Personal Status Law

     

    Palestine

     

    18.01.2024

    On the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the need to reach a ceasefire and the risks of regional escalation

     

    Palestine

     

    14.03.2024

    On the immediate risk of mass starvation in Gaza and the attacks on humanitarian aid deliveries

    Europe and Eastern Partnership countries

     

     

     

    Azerbaijan/Armenia

     

    13.03.2024

    On closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia

    Azerbaijan/ Armenia

    24.10.2024

    Situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

     

    Belarus

     

    14.12.2023

    On the unknown status of Mikola Statkevich and the recent attacks on Belarusian politicians’ and activists’ family members

     

    Belarus

     

    08.02.2024

    on the new wave of mass arrests in Belarus of opposition activists and their family members

    Belarus

    19.09.2024

    The severe situation of political prisoners in Belarus

    Belarus

    22.01.2025

    Actions to address the continued oppression and fake elections in Belarus

    Crimea

    19.12.2024

    11th year of the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and the deteriorating human rights situation in occupied Crimea, notably the cases of Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov

     

    Georgia

     

    25.04.2024

    On attempts to reintroduce a foreign agent law in Georgia and its restrictions on civil society

    Georgia

    09.10.2024

    The democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia

    Georgia

    28.11.2024

    Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud

    Greece

    07.02.2024

    On the rule of law and media freedom in Greece

     

    Hungary

     

    24.04.2024

    On ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications

    Hungary

    18.01.2024

    On the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds

    Moldova

    09.10.2024

    Strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration

     

    Russia

     

    29.02.2024

    On the murder of Alexei Navalny and the need for EU action in support of political prisoners and oppressed civil society in Russia

     

    Russia

     

    08.02.2024

    On Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

     

     

    Russia

     

     

    25.04.2024

    On new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the European Union

     

    Russia

     

    25.04.2024

    On Russia’s undemocratic presidential elections and their illegitimate extension to the occupied territories

    Russia

     

    14.11.2024

    EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia

    Russia

     

    23.01.2025

    Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine

    Russia/ North Korea

    28.11.2024

    Reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia

    Serbia

    08.02.2024

    On the situation in Serbia following the elections

     

    Slovakia

     

    17.01.2024

    On the planned dissolution of key anti-corruption structures in Slovakia and its implications for the rule of law

    Türkiye

    10.10.2024

    European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye

    Cross-cutting issues

     

     

    Children liberty

    13.12.2023

    On the situation of children deprived of liberty in the world

     

    LGBTIQ rights

     

    08.02.2024

    On the implementation of the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025

     

     

    Protection of journalists

     

     

    27.02.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings

     

    Human rights and democracy

     

    28.02.2024

    Human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023

    Foreign and security policy

    28.02.2024

    Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2023

     

     

    Media freedom

     

     

    13.03.2024

    On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market

     

     

    Forced labour

     

     

    23.04.2024

    On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market

    Right of abortion

    11.04.2024

    On including the right to abortion in the EU Fundamental Rights Charter

     

     

    Due diligence

     

     

    24.04.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and amending Directive

     

    Fundamental rights

     

    18.01.2024

    On the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023

    Hate speech

    18.01.2024

    On extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime

     

     

    Business and human rights

     

     

    18.01.2024

    On shaping the EU’s position on the UN binding instrument on business and human rights, in particular on access to remedy and the protection of victims

    Freedom of scientific research

    17.01.2024

    On promotion of the freedom of scientific research in the EU

    Citizens, equality, rights and values

    16.01.2024

    On the implementation of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme 2021-2027

     

     

    Violence against women

     

     

    24.04.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating violence against women and domestic violence

     

    Human beings traffic

     

    23.04.2024

    On preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Theatre’s thriving horror revival reflects a cultural moment of collective anxiety

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Richard Hand, Professor of Media Practice, University of East Anglia

    The stage has long presented horror as entertainment, from 19th-century ghost and revenge melodramas to the blood-soaked spectacles of the grand-guignol, the Parisian “theatre of horror’.

    In recent decades, horror theatre has often been perceived as a relic of the past, overshadowed by its more commercially dominant and popular cinematic and digital counterparts. This may have seemed evident in 2023 when The Woman in Black finally closed after 33 years of haunting London’s West End.

    Yet, a recent wave of new and revived horror plays suggests that the genre is once again thriving on stage. With audiences flocking to 2:22 A Ghost Story, Paranormal Activity, Saint Maud, Inside No. 9 Stage/Fright and two concurrent but unrelated adaptations of the infamous Enfield poltergeist case, it begs the question: what is driving this resurgence? And could it be a reflection of our cultural moment – one that echoes the anxieties and uncertainties of previous gothic ages?


    Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.


    The original 19th-century gothic period in theatre was characterised by its fascination with the supernatural, the macabre and psychological extremes. Drawing inspiration from gothic literature, these plays often featured doomed heroines, villainous aristocrats and vengeful spectres, creating a haunting atmosphere of terror, suspense and unease.

    Melodrama played a key role, with heightened emotions, moral polarities, and elaborate stage effects – such as trapdoors, phantasmagorical projections and eerie soundscapes – enhancing the spectacle. Gothic theatre reflected contemporary anxieties about the unknown, scientific progress, and the boundaries between reason and madness, captivating audiences with its thrilling blend of horror and theatrical illusion.

    The demise of the neo-Victorian gothic The Woman in Black aside, horror theatre is anything but exorcised from the stage. The Leeds Playhouse stage adaptation of Paranormal Activity, directed by Felix Barrett, used technology, scene staging and ingeniously deployed magic tricks for a spine-chilling experience as compellingly immersive as many of the director’s more famous Punchdrunk shows.

    Danny Robins, whose podcast and TV show Uncanny has captivated audiences with real-life supernatural tales, enjoyed success when his 2:22 A Ghost Story materialised in the nervous context of a post-lockdown London in 2021. The play has continued in revivals and on tour while, in parallel, Robins’ podcast became a live stage tour, Uncanny: I Know What I Saw, filling theatres across the UK.

    Similarly, Inside No. 9 Stage/Fright has recently opened in London giving the beloved but concluded television programme an afterlife, and proving its signature brand of macabre storytelling is highly suited to a live environment.

    These productions, and others like them, are drawing significant audiences, not just for their jump scares and eerie atmospheres but because they tap into something deeper: a desire to engage with horror in a way that feels immediate and unfiltered by the distraction of screens.

    Live performance offers something that no digital medium can fully replicate: physical presence, unpredictability, and the heightened emotional responses that come from sharing an experience in real time with real people, most of whom will be complete strangers.

    Horror theatre’s resurgence taps into a collective psychological need to process fear in a safe space. Stage horror offers audiences a cathartic release – a chance to confront, experience, and ultimately purge fear in a controlled environment.

    The communal nature of theatre makes this experience all the more potent: the gasps, shrieks, and laughter of fellow audience members reinforce the sense of shared vulnerability and nervousness, exhilaration and hilarity.

    At a time when people are overwhelmed by an endless stream of manipulated digital content, horror theatre provides a real and visceral alternative. The genre’s success also speaks to theatre’s ability to evolve with changing audience expectations, incorporating elements of interactivity, immersion and technological innovation that mirror trends in gaming, VR, and participatory storytelling.

    Horror theatre’s return is about more than just entertainment and escapism: it reflects a cultural shift reminiscent of past gothic revivals. Historically, horror has flourished during times of social and political upheaval.

    The 19th-century fascination with ghosts, revenge narratives and heightened melodramas coincided with anxieties about revolution, industrialisation, urbanisation, shifting morality, and scientific progress that threatened religious beliefs. The French grand-guignol mirrored a period of deep social unrest, shifting political landscapes and the simultaneous awe and angst about technological and medical advances.

    Theatre, as a medium, has always been uniquely responsive to “the moment”. Today, as we grapple with global crises, from pandemics and climate change to political volatility and technological overreach, it is no surprise that horror has found renewed cultural relevance.

    The horror stories that dominate recent productions are not just exercises in fright – they are reflections of contemporary anxieties. The current touring revival of Jeremy Dyson and Andy Nyman’s Ghost Stories, the stage adaptations of Peter James’ macabre thrillers, and other unnerving productions signals a fascination with the blurred boundary between everyday reality and our phobias, mirroring wider societal debates around truth, belief, and uncertainty.

    What we are witnessing, then, is not just a nostalgic resurgence of the old-fashioned genre of horror theatre but the reflection of a new gothic age, one shaped by our era’s profound fears and instabilities. The success of these productions suggests that horror is not only commercially viable in the theatre but culturally necessary.

    Whether through traditional ghost stories, psychological thrillers, or experimental immersive experiences, horror theatre is asserting its place as a genre that speaks to the present moment. As long as there are cultural fears to be explored and exorcised, horror theatre will continue to haunt our stages – and our imaginations.

    Richard Hand does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Theatre’s thriving horror revival reflects a cultural moment of collective anxiety – https://theconversation.com/theatres-thriving-horror-revival-reflects-a-cultural-moment-of-collective-anxiety-249651

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: Haffner Energy successfully commissioned its hydrogen-from-biomass production unit in Marolles, France – a breakthrough for the hydrogen industry

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Vitry-le-François, France – February 26, 2025, 6:00 PM (CEST)

    • Commissioning of the world’s first plant producing hydrogen from solid biomass at the Marolles site (Champagne region, France).
    • Unique thermochemical process that significantly reduces green hydrogen costs.
    • “Super green”1 hydrogen available for commercial use beginning the second half of 2025.

    Haffner Energy (ISIN: FR0014007ND6 – Ticker: ALHAF) announces the commencement of hydrogen2 production utilizing its proprietary solid biomass thermolysis technology at its Marolles hydrogen production, testing, and training center, as was announced in the 12/17/2024 press release. This unique technology enables the production of renewable hydrogen at a substantially lower cost compared to conventional methods, while offering an unparalleled carbon footprint.

    Achieving the continuous production of competitive green hydrogen is a decisive step. Currently, the industry faces significant delays due to the excessive cost of decarbonized hydrogen. We are confident that our solution will accelerate the adoption of renewable hydrogen and enhance the sector’s competitiveness. I want to congratulate the Haffner Energy team and our partners for this remarkable achievement, ushering the company into a new era,” stated Philippe Haffner, Co-founder and CEO of Haffner Energy.

    A Flexible and Economically Advantageous Production Model

    The site’s production capacity will be 15 kg of hydrogen per hour (kg/h), with an initial phase temporarily limited to 11 kg/h due to the existing PSA (Pressure Swing Adsorption) purification equipment. This equipment will be replaced in the coming months by a PSA designed to reach a 15 kg/h capacity. The unit already produces hydrogen at 8 bar pressure, ready for commercial distribution starting in the second half of 2025 to serve transportation and industrial markets.

    Anticipated since late 2024, this commissioning required the site to be connected to the medium-voltage electrical grid, which was completed earlier this year, followed by the on-site presence of commissioning engineers focused on the main equipment suppliers for hydrogen purification.

    The biomass thermolysis unit, operational since June 2024, exceeds the capacity required to produce 15 kg/h of hydrogen. The new PSA, already received by Haffner Energy, will be complemented by a compressor reaching 35 bar pressure, supplying an H14 distribution station provided by HRS.

    Marolles is designed to operate 8,000 hours per year. As part of this site’s operations, 120 metric tons of mobility-grade hydrogen per year (15 kg/hour) will be produced, contributing to the decarbonization of mobility and industry. This is equivalent to 12 million kilometers traveled with hydrogen vehicles. Approximately 2,400 metric tons of CO₂ per year will be avoided or captured through hydrogen and biocarbon (char or biochar) combined.

    A memorandum of understanding for the offtake has been signed for the supply of 90 tonnes of hydrogen per year, mainly for mobility applications, which is designed to ensure a commercial outlet within the next few months.

    Hydrogen Production from Residual Solid Biomass: A Game Changer

    The scaling up of Haffner Energy’s proprietary biomass thermolysis technology is poised to disrupt the global and French renewable hydrogen markets, facilitating accelerated commercial and industrial development. This technology offers several key advantages:

    • Economically Competitive Solution: Already capable of competing with gray hydrogen for installations of 20 MW and above – a feat far from achievable by alternative technologies.
    • Economic Model Based on Low-Cost Biomass Energy: Hydrogen from biomass thermolysis is significantly cheaper to produce than hydrogen from the electrolysis of water thanks to low primary energy costs (<30€/MWh and often even <20€/MWh, compared with >70€/MWh for decarbonized electricity) and optimal energy efficiency (generally >70%).
    • Independence from the Electrical Grid: Unlike electrolysis, thermolysis is minimally dependent on electricity availability and cost, ensuring stable and predictable production.
    • Negative Carbon Footprint: This technology sequesters biogenic carbon through biochar co-production, achieving a negative carbon footprint when considering the full LCA.3
    • Flexible Sourcing: This biomass-agnostic technology is able to utilize various residual biomasses, in particular from agriculture, ensuring greater autonomy and resilience against feedstock market fluctuations while significantly expanding available resources.

    Towards Commercial and Industrial Expansion

    The commissioning of the Marolles unit marks a strategic milestone for Haffner Energy. This success accelerates commercial discussions with several partners interested in this disruptive technology and, as announced in previous communications, will enable the Company’s project pipeline to be converted into firm orders, thereby generating revenue. In particular, the effective commissioning of the site is a catalyst for finalizing the signing of two major contracts.

    The continuous operation of hydrogen and renewable gas production equipment on site will also enable Haffner Energy’s team to conduct tests using specific biomasses for each potential client, including non-conventional biomasses such as organic sludge, manure, and algae, thereby confirming the compatibility of Haffner Energy’s technology.

    Furthermore, Haffner Energy is now positioned to leverage a previously untapped technological solution that converts hydrogen into electricity at an extremely competitive cost, highly valuable during peak consumption periods.

    Despite a global context that remains unfavorable to the development of the hydrogen market, particularly in Europe and in France—where the national hydrogen strategy has yet to be announced—Haffner Energy’s position in this high-potential market is now strengthened.

    Additional resources

    Next events 

    • Annual results 2024-2025                         June 18, 2025
    • Annual Shareholders Meeting                  September 10, 2025

    About Haffner Energy

    Haffner Energy is a French company providing solutions for competitive clean fuels production. With a 32- year experience converting biomass into renewable energies, it has developed innovative proprietary biomass thermolysis and gasification technologies to produce renewable gas, hydrogen and methanol, as well as Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF). The company also contributes to regenerating the planet through the co-production of biogenic CO2 and biocarbon (or char/biochar). Haffner Energy is listed on Euronext Growth (ISIN code : FR0014007ND6 – Ticker : ALHAF).

    Investor Relations

    investisseurs@haffner-energy.com

    Media Relations

    Laure BOURDON
    laure.bourdon@haffner-energy.com
    +33 (0) 7 87 96 35 15

    Glossary:

    * Biocarbon is a carbon-rich solid material. Biocarbon contains biogenic carbon absorbed from the atmosphere by plants via photosynthesis. This characteristic makes it a major carbon sink when used as a soil amendment, either applied directly or incorporated into fertilizers (known as biochar), or incorporated into building materials (known as char). Biocarbon is also a very dense source of renewable energy (31 MJ/kg) that can be gasified on site to increase the production of biofuels such as bio-SAF or the production of renewable hydrogen, but can also be shipped and gasified at another site, notably for the production of e-fuels.

    1 In accordance with the order of July 1, 2024 specifying the greenhouse gas emission threshold and the methodology for qualifying hydrogen as renewable or low-carbon.

    2 Samples were taken today by an independent laboratory to validate the mobility quality of this hydrogen.

    3 In accordance with the life cycle assessment study carried out by the LCA consultancy EVEA at the end of 2021.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: ‘Last Chance’ to Achieve Two-State Solution, UN Mediator Tells Security Council, as Speakers Highlight Need to Sustain Gaza Ceasefire

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    This may be “the last chance” to achieve a two-State solution — the creation of independent Israel and Palestine coexisting peacefully side by side — a United Nations mediator told the Security Council today, as it considered the fragile ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the first phase of which is set to expire on 1 March.

    While welcoming the implementation of this initial phase, including the release of 34 hostages, Sigrid Kaag, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process ad interim, added:  “None of us will forget the harrowing pictures of the coffins of the Bibas children taken hostage with their mother and killed while in captivity.” Condemning Hamas’ public parading of hostages, she also noted the release of 1,135 Palestinian prisoners and detainees, and reports of the ill treatment and humiliation they experienced.

    In Gaza, far more remains to be done to address over 15 months of deprivation of basic human necessities and “above all, a loss of human dignity”, she said, while noting some improvements in humanitarian aid access.  “Palestinians must be able to resume their lives, to rebuild and to construct their future in Gaza,” she stressed, adding that there can be no question of forced displacement.  Gaza must remain an integral part of a future Palestinian State, and the Strip must be unified with the West Bank including East Jerusalem, “politically, economically and administratively”, she said, calling on the Council to ensure continued support for the full realization of the ceasefire deal, urgent de-escalation in West Bank and support for Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction — which would cost $53 billion.

    Also briefing the Council today was Daniel Levy, President of the US/Middle East Project, who stressed that Israelis and Palestinians both deserve security, while acknowledging the “power asymmetry” between a colonizing State and a colonized people.  Recalling the Israeli ambassador’s “gimmick” of shredding the UN Charter at the General Assembly podium, he said:  “When a State like Israel conducts itself in ways that render the Charter meaningless and which assault [international] conventions, including on genocide […] then that is a challenge that cannot be allowed to pass.”

    Calling for a full ceasefire, the release of all Israeli hostages and a surge in humanitarian assistance, he cautioned:  “There is good reason to fear that this could collapse.”  In that vein, he warned against the attempt to permanently depopulate the north of Gaza, adding:  “Hamas non-governance in Gaza is achievable, the movement itself has said so.”  But, there will be resistance if the structural violence of occupation and apartheid continue.  He also cautioned against zero-sum thinking, also stressing that the unlawful forced displacement of Palestinians must not be endorsed or encouraged by any State, let alone, one of the permanent five.

    Testimony from Ex-Hostage

    “I was kidnapped by Hamas terrorists on 7 October 2023 from the Nova music festival with my partner,” recalled Noa Argamani, who also addressed the Council today.  She added that she was taken by force into Gaza and “held in total fear, living in a nightmare”.  Noting that she was rescued by Israeli soldiers after eight months in captivity, she said:  “Being here today is a miracle, but I’m here today to tell you we have no time.” There are still 63 hostages in captivity — 24 believed to still be alive — “the [ceasefire] deal must go on, in full”, she urged.

    Recalling that her captors murdered her friend, she underscored:  “Every second in captivity is dangerous.”  The Council must “not let the darkness take over”, she warned, stating that she came to the Council so that the international community understands that “the hostages are in hell” and deserve to return home immediately.

    Determined to Eradicate Hamas

    “This is the story of every hostage and every family shattered by Hamas’ terror,” said Israel’s delegate, urging the Council to adopt a resolution condemning the group — a move he argued the 15-member organ could have taken 16 months ago.  Stressing that the tragedy will not end “until each one of them is back home”, he continued: “The question now is whether this Council will help write that ending, or continue to look away.”

    “No matter what happens, our commitment to freeing all the hostages and completely eradicating Hamas is unshakeable,” he underscored. Turning to the humanitarian situation, he pointed to thousands of trucks entering Gaza every week to deliver aid and stressed:  “The only starved people in Gaza are the hostages.”  He added that “it is time to think beyond the frameworks of the past and build a new reality — one where terrorists do not hold entire communities hostage and where life is sacred once more”.

    Recordings of Gunfire at Family 

    Riyad H. Mansour, Permanent Observer for the State of Palestine, said while “nothing justifies” what happened to the Bibas family, Palestinian children are “not any less deserving of your outrage for their killing”.  He went on to play recordings of the calls made to emergency services by 15-year-old Layan Hamadeh and her 6-year-old cousin Hind Rajab — both found dead later — after their family members were shot dead while evacuating Gaza City by car. He also remembered the Palestinian parents who had to collect “what remained of their children’s bodies in plastic bags”.

    “Did you see the images of our released prisoners, often starved, with marks and scars on their bodies?”, he asked, noting that Israel subjects them to beatings and humiliating treatments.  “How many hostages were released by military actions and how many hundreds of Palestinians have perished in these military attacks that were supposed to rescue the hostages but led to the death of many of them?”, he asked, adding:  “Ceasefire works.”  The next few days is a test of Israel’s true priorities, he said.

    Support for Ceasefire’s Second Phase

    Council members stressed the need to uphold the ceasefire and reach an agreement on the second phase, which aims to establish a permanent truce.  Under this phase, Israel would fully withdraw from Gaza, while Hamas would release all remaining hostages in exchange for additional detainees.

    The representative of Sierra Leone, voiced a “renewed sense of relief and optimism” despite “the uncertainty that still looms”.  The representative of the Republic of Korea noted that the agreement shows “what firm political will can bring to the region” as Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners reunite with their families.  The ceasefire is also saving lives, Denmark’s delegate said, adding that it is vital that it moves to its second phase.  Georgios Gerapetritis, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, added that the ceasefire will “allow planning for a more prosperous and secure ‘day after’ for the whole region”.

    The representative of France said that his country has deployed specialized personnel within the framework of the European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point to support the ceasefire.  He also noted that his country and Saudi Arabia will co-chair an international conference for the implementation of a two-State solution in June.

    The Russian Federation’s delegate expressed concern about the “opaque monitoring mechanism”, highlighting accusations from both sides about the other side’s bad faith in the implementation of individual steps.  Somalia’s delegate said that the continued attacks, illegal arrests, settlement-expansion and excessive use of force “undermine the spirit of the ceasefire deal” and that “mediation efforts will not succeed if the aggression continues unchecked”.  If the ceasefire fails, Panama’s delegate warned, “then the human toll will be incalculable and prospects for regional peace and stability will fade further”.

    The representative of the United Kingdom welcomed improved aid supplies since the ceasefire agreement as having “demonstrated the central role of the UN and humanitarian actors, including UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East]”.  She also expressed concern over tightening humanitarian space, as well as the expansion of Israel’s operations killing and displacing civilians in the West Bank.

    Gaza’s Future without Hamas

    The representative of the United States expressed support for Israel’s “sovereign decision” to close UNRWA offices in Jerusalem, adding:  “UNRWA is not and never has been the only option for providing humanitarian assistance in Gaza”.  Her country stands with all hostages, she said, adding that the desecration of the remains of Shiri Bibas shows “the depth of Hamas’s cruelty”.  President Donald J. Trump has made clear that the future of Gaza must look different, she said, adding that Hamas must be fully removed from power and held accountable for its 7 October 2023 terrorist massacre.

    Save West Bank from Becoming Next Gaza

    Other speakers, however, highlighted the impact of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories, and the escalation of settlements and violence in the West Bank.  “Israel is not trying to return to calm,” said Kuwait’s delegate, speaking for the Arab Group.  Asking the Council if it is waiting for a repeat of the Gaza tragedy, he called on the international community to help end the occupying Power’s aggression in the West Bank and its attacks on Christian and Muslim holy sites in the Aqsa Mosque compound.

    Algeria’s delegate drew attention to the Israeli Finance Minister’s declaration that the “goal for 2025 is to demolish more than what Palestinian are building in the West Bank”.  Stressing the need to support UNRWA and empower the Palestinian Authority, he added that weakening the Authority is a deliberate strategy by the Israeli occupying Power which dreams “of a land free of Palestinians”, from the river to the sea.  Five newborn babies froze to death yesterday in a hospital in Gaza City, he noted, adding “we have no more time to waste”.  The ceasefire agreement should serve as a foundation for a durable peace plan.

    Slovenia’s delegate stressed:  “Gaza belongs to Gazans and it is an integral part of the Palestinian State.”  Pointing to the “many more steps” needed for lasting peace to persist in the Middle East, he observed:  “While peace seems to be a big word, it essentially boils down to everyday decisions to work for it.”

    “The cumulative effect of Israel’s violent occupation of Palestinian territories has entrapped the Palestinian people in a cycle of violence and poverty,” Guyana’s delegate noted.  Pakistan’s representative pointed to the forcible displacement, military raids, settler violence and illegal land annexations Israel is conducting, describing these as “ethnic cleansing in real time”.

    The representative of China, Council President for February, speaking in his national capacity, urged the international community to support the parties in moving ahead with negotiations on the second phase of the ceasefire and called on Israel to cease its military and settler activity in the West Bank, underscoring:  “The West Bank must not become the next Gaza.”

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI: BlueCat appoints Peter Brennan as Chief Revenue Officer

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TORONTO, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — BlueCat Networks, a leading provider of Intelligent Network Operations solutions that help organizations modernize, optimize, and secure their network infrastructure, announced Peter Brennan as its new Chief Revenue Officer (CRO).

    Brennan, who joined the company in January, is responsible for driving revenue growth and providing leadership for field teams, including sales, technical, channel, and alliances. Previously, he was the CEO for Scality, Inc., a leader in software-defined storage and data management, and the worldwide CRO for Scality, Grp.

    “BlueCat delivers important network infrastructure solutions to some of the biggest companies in the world,” said Brennan. “Our recent acquisition of LiveAction enhanced BlueCat’s industry-recognized offerings with industry leading network intelligence capabilities and I’m excited to show our prospects and customers how our technology can help them achieve their biggest goals.”

    Earlier in his career, Brennan achieved record growth over two decades in executive roles at Hewlett Packard Enterprise and VMware. “His decades of experience with infrastructure software companies, sales execution, and ability to transform go to market organizations is aligned with our mission to greatly accelerate growth and expand our reach,” said BlueCat CEO Stephen Devito. “We deliver products and services that help our customers spend less time managing the network and more time helping their businesses grow, and Peter is key to amplifying that story.”

    In October, BlueCat announced it was acquiring LiveAction, Inc., a global provider of network observability and intelligence solutions. Adding LiveAction’s industry-leading network performance monitoring, packet capture, and forensics offerings has strengthened BlueCat’s mission-critical DNS, DHCP, and IP address management (together known as DDI) and network infrastructure management solutions. Audax Private Equity is a strategic growth investor in BlueCat Networks.

    About BlueCat

    BlueCat’s Intelligent Network Operations (NetOps) provide the analytics and intelligence needed to enable, optimize, and secure the network to achieve business goals. With an Intelligent NetOps suite, organizations can more easily change and modernize the network as business requirements demand. BlueCat’s growing portfolio includes unified core network services, security and compliance, network observability and intelligence. These solutions can be deployed in hybrid or multicloud environments, in the data center, at remote or branch locations, and via SD-WAN. BlueCat’s DDI management platform was recognized as a market leader and outperformer in GigaOm’s 2024 Radar report. The company is headquartered in Toronto and New York and has additional offices in the United States, France, Germany, Iceland, Japan, Singapore, Serbia, and the United Kingdom. Learn more at bluecat.com.

    About Audax Private Equity

    Based in Boston and San Francisco, Audax Private Equity is a leading capital partner for middle and lower middle market companies that seeks to facilitate transformational growth. With approximately $19 billion of assets under management, over 250 employees, and 100-plus investment professionals, the firm has invested in more than 170 platforms and 1,250 add-on acquisitions since its founding in 1999. Through our disciplined Buy & Build approach, across six core industry verticals, Audax helps portfolio companies execute organic and inorganic growth initiatives that fuel revenue expansion, optimize operations, and significantly increase equity value. For more information, visit audaxprivateequity.com or follow us on LinkedIn.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: REMINDER: Boralex will release its 2024 fourth quarter financial results on February 28

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MONTREAL, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Boralex inc. (“Boralex” or the “Company”) (TSX: BLX) announces that the release of the 2024 fourth quarter results will take place on Friday, February 28, 2025, at 11 a.m.

    Financial analysts and investors are invited to attend a conference call during which the financial results will be presented.

    Date and time

    Friday, February 28, 2025, at 11 a.m. ET

    To attend the conference

    Webcast link: https://edge.media-server.com/mmc/p/fifq2sc5

    To attend the event by phone: Click here to register for the earnings call. Once you have completed your registration, you will receive a confirmation email containing the link and your personal PIN to connect to the call. If you lose this link and your PIN, you will be able to register again. You must register if you wish to attend the call by phone.

    Media and other interested individuals are invited to listen to the conference and view a presentation which will be broadcasted live and on a deferred basis on Boralex’s website at www.boralex.com. A full replay will also be available on Boralex’s website until February 28, 2026.

    The financial information will be released through a press release and on Boralex’s website on February 28, 2025, at 7 a.m.

    About Boralex

    At Boralex, we have been providing affordable renewable energy accessible to everyone for over 30 years. As a leader in the Canadian market and France’s largest independent producer of onshore wind power, we also have facilities in the United States and development projects in the United Kingdom. Over the past five years, our installed capacity has more than doubled to over 3.1 GW. We are developing a portfolio of more than 7.2 GW in wind, solar projects and storage projects, guided by our values and our corporate social responsibility (CSR) approach. Through profitable and sustainable growth, Boralex is actively participating in the fight against global warming. Thanks to our fearlessness, our discipline, our expertise and our diversity, we continue to be an industry leader. Boralex’s shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol BLX.  

    For more information, visit boralex.com or sedarplus.com. Follow us on Facebook, LinkedIn and Instagram.  

    For more information

    Source: Boralex inc.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Samsung 2025 Bespoke AI Appliances Now Available to Reserve

    Source: Samsung

    Samsung Electronics America is introducing a new line of Bespoke AI appliances this spring, with advanced AI-powered features that offer greater personalization and connectivity in your home. You can reserve a new 2025 Bespoke AI appliance now through March 24 and receive a $100 credit toward your pre-order purchase. With the reserve offer, you will automatically be entered for a chance to win a $5,000 Samsung credit to be used on new Bespoke AI appliances.1

    Samsung debuted its first-ever suite of Bespoke AI appliances in 2024, introducing innovative products that integrate advanced AI technology with powerful connectivity and thoughtful design to help automate everyday tasks at home. The 2025 Bespoke AI line builds on these capabilities to offer a new level of AI-powered convenience that makes cooking, cleaning and doing laundry easier than ever. With seamless SmartThings integration2, AI sensors and cameras, and intuitive AI Home3 LCD touchscreen displays on more Samsung appliances, you can effortlessly monitor and manage your connected home from anywhere and multi-task with ease.
    The AI camera in Samsung’s new Bespoke 4-Door French Door Refrigerator with 9” AI Home LCD Screen keeps tabs on the food you store and remove, automatically updating your SmartThings grocery list when items are running low and sharing alerts when you should use ingredients because they are approaching the end of the produce’s freshness dates.4  And with the touchscreen display, it’s easy to look up recipes that incorporate the food you have on hand and send cooking instructions directly to your Bespoke Wall Oven with 7” AI Home. The Bespoke Wall Oven also has an AI camera that will recognize meals and suggest how to cook them, automatically optimizing cook times and temperatures, so you can focus on other things.

    In the laundry room, Samsung is introducing exciting new Bespoke AI Laundry Combo models, offering even more options to consumers looking for a format that works in a small space without compromising on performance or style. Like Samsung’s other 2025 Bespoke AI appliances, the new Bespoke AI Laundry Combos and the new Bespoke Front Load Washer and Dryer with AI Home are all equipped with 7” LCD touchscreen displays that enable convenient operation and seamless multi-device experiences across your Samsung appliances. You can even check on the status of dinner cooking in your Bespoke AI Wall Oven while you start a new load of laundry.
    Bespoke AI appliances can also automatically optimize performance according to your habits and personal needs, and routine maintenance reminders and service alerts make it easy to care for them, giving you the peace of mind that comes with knowing they will run smoothly and reliably for years to come.5
    For more information and to reserve your new 2025 Bespoke AI appliance, visit Samsung.com.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump and Europe: US ‘transactionalism on steroids’ is the challenge facing leaders now

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Andrew Glencross, Directeur d’ESPOL, Professeur de Science Politique, Institut catholique de Lille (ICL)

    Donald Trump has always been an avowed transactionalist rather than a transatlanticist. The author of The Art of the Deal made it clear during his first term as US president that he thought Nato was a bad deal for the US. He publicly berated European allies, notably Germany, for not spending enough on defence and leaving the US to pick up the tab.

    But with his Ukraine policy, Trump 2.0 is forcing Europeans to confront the previously unthinkable: an international order where the US is no longer an automatic ally of European security.

    Lord Ismay, the first secretary-general of Nato, quipped that the purpose of the transatlantic alliance was to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”. For the following decades, Nato worked pretty much as intended. It provided the political and organisational basis for a significant US military presence, including an active US nuclear deterrent.

    The transatlantic alliance nevertheless witnessed some significant disagreements. In 1966, French president Charles de Gaulle forced US and other allied troops to leave French soil and withdrew from Nato’s integrated military command. The 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq generated enormous tension among Nato allies as France and Germany opposed American attempts to get UN backing for military action. Yet within months, these two countries made a major commitment to the Nato force that was deployed to Afghanistan for 20 years.

    Like any international organisation, Nato’s history thus reflects a mix of success, failure, and muddling through. Ukraine-Nato relations encapsulate this reality. In 2008, the US was pushing European allies to welcome Ukraine as a Nato member. Back then, it was the leaders of France and Germany who refused to back the proposal.

    No longer an ally

    In the aftermath of the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, Ukraine pursued a twin track of seeking EU and Nato membership. This strategy is based on the longstanding complementary nature of European integration and transatlantic collective security. Central and eastern European countries embraced this arrangement after the collapse of the Soviet Union, much to the displeasure of Vladimir Putin.

    But Trump’s actions since January have fundamentally called into question the reliability of the US as a European ally. His insistence on doing a minerals deal to guarantee that Ukraine pays back US support for the war effort is transactionalism on steroids. It is also a unilateral move that contradicts the multilateral approach for supporting Ukraine that the US coordinated via the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, an alliance of 57 nations founded in 2022.

    More worrying still is Trump’s break with the underlying common values underpinning Nato. An alliance committed to defending its territorial integrity, including through the use of its nuclear arsenal, requires a commitment to a higher political goal. Since the end of the cold war, that overriding objective has been defined as freedom and democracy.

    The second Trump administration does not even seem to want to pay lip service to these transatlantic values. Trump has labelled Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky a “dictator”. And at the latest UN summit, the US delegation voted with Russia, Belarus and North Korea against a resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.




    Read more:
    US says European security no longer its primary focus – the shift has been years in the making


    EU defence without the US

    Shell-shocked European leaders are adapting to this harsh new reality. An initial reaction, as illustrated by UK prime minister Keir Starmer and French president Emmanuel Macron, has been to promise more money for defence spending. This move constitutes a hedge: it ought to please Trump, while providing a platform for a future reconfiguration of European security.

    How to defend Europe is now an existential question rather than a purely material one. De Gaulle always insisted that Europe’s defence and foreign policy needed to serve its own interests rather than America’s. He lost that battle, but the newly elected German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, is sounding rather Gaullist in his recent calls for a more independent European security policy.

    Another move taken from de Gaulle’s playbook is the EU’s focus on defence industrial strategy. A strong technological and industrial base is a pre-requisite of an independent security policy, and with this in mind, the EU’s defence industry programme was announced in spring 2024. The details of this new policy are currently being hashed out, but are likely to include some type of “made in Europe” requirement.




    Read more:
    Ukraine: prospects for peace are slim unless Europe grips the reality of Trump’s world


    Europe has to renew its purpose

    What is clear is that an independent security policy for Europe is both costly and a political minefield – one reliable estimate puts the cost at 250 billion euros per year. Getting public backing for this big spending increase is not impossible, yet it means tough choices, as shown by Starmer’s cuts to the UK’s foreign aid budget.

    Trickier still is finding the leadership to coordinate defence spending and strategy. European decision-makers and the parties they represent are far from aligned over the need to find an alternative to the US security guarantee. Indeed, Polish president Andrzej Duda responded to Merz’s calls for greater EU independence from the US by offering to host the US troops currently based in Germany.

    Trump has shattered a number of European illusions. Creating a new European security architecture will depend on finding more than just cash – it needs a new shared objective, not just a repudiation of grubby transactionalism.

    Andrew Glencross does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Trump and Europe: US ‘transactionalism on steroids’ is the challenge facing leaders now – https://theconversation.com/trump-and-europe-us-transactionalism-on-steroids-is-the-challenge-facing-leaders-now-250836

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Media Release – Hustings Thurs 6 March 2025 Wednesday 26 February 2025

    Source: Channel Islands – States of Alderney

    Hustings on Thursday 6 March 2025 for election of two States Members

    I will be hosting a Hustings on the 6th of March in the Island Hall.

    The candidates will be available in the Anne French Room at the Island Hall from 5.30pm to 6.45pm, to answer questions on a one-to-one basis.

    At 7.00pm I will chair a “Question Time” format for a maximum of 90 minutes.

    Members of the community are invited to submit questions in advance to me.

    The topics that receive the most number of questions will, time permitting, be put by one member of the community on behalf of all those who have submitted a question on the same topic.  All four candidates will be asked to respond to each question.  Members of the community are invited to submit their questions to my office on president.alderney@gov.gg by 5pm on Tuesday 4th of March.

    It is not intended to share the questions in advance.  This will enable those who attend to assess the strengths and potential weaknesses of each candidate in order to assist in deciding where to place their votes.

    It is hoped that the combination of both formats will provide the best opportunity for the candidates to persuade the members of the community who attend to vote for them.

    Whether selected to ask a question or not, all members of the community are invited to attend.

    William Tate, President

    Note to editors:For further information please contact The President’s Office by telephoning 01481 820001 or by email topresident.alderney@gov.gg.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 26 February 2025 UHC-Partnership: Namibia tackles antimicrobial resistance

    Source: World Health Organisation

    In June 2024, a 66-year-old woman was admitted to the Medical Intensive Care Unit at Intermediate Hospital Katutura in Windhoek, Namibia. She was diagnosed with pneumonia, and tests showed that the organism responsible for her severe illness was resistant to all antibiotics except tigecycline. At the hospital, the pharmacy department had to obtain a compassionate clearance permit to procure and import tigecycline for the patient.

    “The patient completed the course, stabilized, and was discharged from the intensive care unit to a general ward. Unfortunately, due to various complicated comorbidities, the patient eventually passed away”, said Ms Taimi Ipinge, a Chief Pharmacist at Intermediate Hospital Katutura.

    Tragically, this type of resistance to antibiotics is all too common in Namibia, as with elsewhere in the world.

    Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) occurs when bacteria, viruses, fungi, and parasites change over time and no longer respond to medicines, making infections harder to treat and increasing the risk of disease spread, severe illness, and death. As a result, the medicines become ineffective and infections persist in the body, increasing the risk of spread to others.

    AMR is one of the top global public health and development threats. It is estimated that bacterial AMR was directly responsible for 1.27 million global deaths in 2019 and contributed to 4.95 million deaths.

    In 2019, Namibia recorded 451 deaths attributable to AMR and 1,900 deaths were associated with AMR.

    Acting to stop AMR

    The Government of Namibia recognizes that AMR is a threat to health security across the country and region and that a range of health system interventions are necessary to protect the population’s health and ensure good progress towards universal health coverage (UHC).

    The Ministry of Health and Social Services (MoHSS), with support from WHO through the UHC Partnership and others, is implementing various activities in line with the AMR National Action Plan in compliance with the Global Action Plan to address AMR.

    The Government responded to the overuse of antibiotics by setting up a national multi-sectoral AMR governance to guide, oversee, coordinate, and monitor AMR-related activities in all sectors to ensure a systematic and comprehensive implementation of Namibia’s National Action Plan on AMR.

    In November 2021, Namibia commemorated its first World Antimicrobial Awareness Week (WAAW). In 2023, MoHSS in collaboration with AMR quadripartite organizations, commemorated the week under the theme of ‘Preventing antimicrobial resistance together’ with the slogan ‘Antimicrobials: handle with care’. The event brought together the Ministry of Health and Social Services, the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Land Reform, and the Ministry of Environment, Forestry and Tourism.

    Namibia launched its infection prevention and control action plan and national guidelines. WHO provided support to a range of activities for this including distribution of information, education and communication materials around infection prevention and control, regional orientation on quality standards, in-service training focal points, and training on water, sanitation, and hygiene for hospital quality improvement plans. Thanks to capacity-building support from WHO, Namibia also reached a significant milestone for the first submission of data on AMR to GLASS in December 2023.

    “AMR is extremely serious. If left unchecked it means we are heading to a world where medical treatment of routine ailments or operations is life threatening and a greater number of people might stop responding to drugs. It challenges all our efforts to strengthen health systems and achieve universal health coverage. WHO commends the Namibian Government for the strategic and multiple approaches taken through collaboration between sectors and work across the region to raise awareness amongst the public,” said Dr Richard Banda, WHO Representative to Namibia.

    Strengthening health security

    Namibia’s response to antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is part of the broader effort to strengthen health security across the country. By integrating a One Health approach and engaging key sectors, Namibia is actively working to strengthen its health systems, improve surveillance, and ensure that it is prepared to respond to emerging health threats. The launch of the National Tripartite One Health Strategy 2024-2028 further underlines the government’s commitment to safeguarding public health, both within the country and in collaboration with regional and international partners.

    The UHC Partnership operates in over 125 countries, representing over 3 billion people. It is supported and funded by Belgium, Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Japan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and WHO.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Boosting the European video game industry – E-000032/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The video games market is global, where most commercially released video games (with few exceptions) become available to all potential customers worldwide.

    Due to limited aggregated data available across geographies, it is difficult to establish the exact percentage of EU consumers’ spending for the European productions as well as the revenues that an EU video games’ company would generate on the EU market.

    The Commission acknowledges the importance of a strong and competitive video game industry within the EU.

    Funding under the Creative Europe programme’s Video Games development calls for proposals is only available to companies established in a country participating fully in the MEDIA strand and owned directly or indirectly, wholly or by majority participation, by nationals from such countries[1].

    In addition, Member States can provide support to the video games industry under EU State aid rules. The Commission has approved, under Article 107(3)(d) of the TFEU, aid schemes for video games which serve a cultural or educational purpose in several Member States (including France[2]).

    The Commission recognises the transformative potential of generative artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including their application in the video game sector.

    While there are currently no specific plans to create a dedicated European database for training generative AI models for video games, video games companies, just like other EU Small and medium-sized enterprises, can benefit from existing EU initiatives aimed at strengthening their AI capabilities[3].

    • [1] https://culture.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2024-10/2025-creative-europe-annual-work-programme-C%282024%296503%2018-09-2024.pdf
    • [2] See, for example, Commission Decision C(2024) 6525 final of 13 September 2024 in state aid case SA.115028 (2024/N) — France, Fonds d’aides sélectives à la création de jeux vidéo — Prolongation de l’aide d’État SA.60845 (2021/N), OJ C/2024/6002, 8.10.2024, p. 1: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:C_202406002
    • [3] For example, the GenAI4EU initiative, part of the AI innovation package, aims to stimulate the uptake of generative AI across the EU’s fourteen strategic industrial ecosystems, including virtual worlds and digital twins, which are essential for creating immersive virtual environments like the ones used in video games.
    Last updated: 26 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the verification of credentials – A10-0016/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on the verification of credentials

    (2024/2100(REG))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Articles 10(1), 14(2) and 14(3) of the Treaty on European Union,

     having regard to the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976[1],

     having regard to its Decision 2005/684/EC, Euratom of 28 September 2005 adopting the Statute for Members of the European Parliament[2], in particular Articles 2(1) and 3(1) thereof,

     having regard to Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals[3],

     having regard to European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023 establishing the composition of the European Parliament[4],

     having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 7 July 2005[5], 30 April 2009[6], 19 December 2019[7] and 26 September 2024[8],

     having regard to Rules 3, 4 and 11 of, and Annex I to, its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the official notifications from the competent authorities of the Member States of the results of the election to the European Parliament,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs (A10-0016/2025),

    A. whereas, pursuant to Article 12 of the Act of 20 September 1976, Parliament is obliged to verify the credentials of Members of the European Parliament and for this purpose it must take note of the results declared officially by the Member States and rule on any disputes that may arise out of the provisions of the 1976 Act other than those arising out of the national provisions to which that 1976 Act refers;

    B. whereas Article 7(1) and (2) of the Act of 20 September 1976 sets out the offices that are incompatible with the office of Member of the European Parliament;

    C. whereas all Member States have notified Parliament of the names of elected Members pursuant to Rule 3(1) of the Rules of Procedure;

    D. whereas some Member States were late in forwarding, and others have not yet forwarded at all, the lists of any substitutes, together with their ranking in accordance with the results of the vote, as required under Rule 3(3) of the Rules of Procedure;

    E. whereas objections to the election of some Members of the European Parliament may be considered in Member States in accordance with national legislation and these procedures could result in the annulment of the election of the Members concerned; whereas no disputes arose before Parliament pursuant to the provisions of the Act of 20 September 1976;

    F. whereas, according to Article 3 of European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061 of 22 September 2023, the number of representatives in the European Parliament allocated to Spain is currently 61, while the notification from the Spanish competent authorities only contains 60 names; whereas, in accordance with Articles 8 and 12 of the Act of 20 September 1976, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union[9], Parliament takes note of the list of Members elected in Spain in the elections held on 9 June 2024, communicated to it by the Junta Electoral Central; whereas the Junta Electoral Central has not notified Parliament of the name of one of the Members elected in Spain;

    G. whereas, in accordance with Rule 3(2) of and Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, Members are required to declare in writing that they do not hold any office incompatible with that of Member of the European Parliament, as well as providing written declarations of private interests and of assets, failing any of which the validity of the mandate of the Member concerned may not be confirmed;

    1. Declares valid, subject to any decisions by the competent authorities of Member States in which the election results have been disputed, the mandate of the Members of the European Parliament listed in Annex I to this decision whose election has been notified by the competent national authorities and who have made the written declarations required on the basis of Article 7(1) and (2) of the Act of 20 September 1976 and of Rule 3 of, and Annex I to the Rules of Procedure;

    2. Repeats its request to the authorities of the Member States to inform it of the names of substitutes, together with their ranking in accordance with the results of the vote;

    3. Calls on the competent authorities of the Member States to complete without delay the examination of the possible disputes referred to them and to notify Parliament of the result;

    4. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the competent national authorities and the parliaments of the Member States.

     

     

    ANNEX I: List of Members of the European Parliament whose mandate is declared valid

     

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Belgium (22 Members)

     

     

     

    ANNEMANS Gerolf

    ARIMONT Pascal

    BEKE Wouter

    BONTE Barbara

    BOTENGA Marc

    BRICMONT Saskia

    CASSART Benoit

    CEULEMANS Estelle

    CHASTEL Olivier

    DI RUPO Elio

    KANKO Assita

    KENNES Rudi

    MATTHIEU Sara

    SOMMEN Liesbet

    TOBBACK Bruno

    VAN BREMPT Kathleen

    VANDENDRIESSCHE Tom

    VAN DIJCK Kris

    VAN OVERTVELDT Johan

    VAUTMANS Hilde

    VEROUGSTRAETE Yvan

    WILMÈS Sophie

     

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Bulgaria (17 Members)

     

     

     

    KABILOV Taner

    KANEV Radan

    KOVATCHEV Andrey

    KYUCHYUK Ilhan

    LAYKOVA Rada

    LAZAROV Ilia

    MAYDELL Eva

    MINCHEV Nikola

    NOVAKOV Andrey

    PENKOVA Tsvetelina

    PETROV Hristo

    RADEV Emil

    STOYANOV Stanislav

    VALCHEV Ivaylo

    VIGENIN Kristian

    VOLGIN Petar

    YONCHEVA Elena

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Czech Republic (21 Members)

     

     

     

    BARTŮŠEK Nikola

    BŽOCH Jaroslav

    DAVID Ivan

    DOSTÁL Ondřej

    DOSTALOVA Klara

    FARSKÝ Jan

    GREGOROVÁ Markéta

    KNOTEK Ondřej

    KOLÁŘ Ondřej

    KONEČNÁ Kateřina

    KOVAŘÍK Ondřej

    KRUTÍLEK Ondřej

    KUBÍN Tomáš (*)

    NAGYOVÁ Jana

    NERUDOVÁ Danuše

    NIEDERMAYER Luděk

    POKORNÁ JERMANOVÁ Jaroslava

    TUREK Filip

    VONDRA Alexandr

    VRECIONOVÁ Veronika

    ZDECHOVSKÝ Tomáš

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    (*) Mandate valid with effect from 1 August 2024, i.e. the date indicated in the notification by the competent national authority of the election of Mr Tomáš KUBÍN to replace Mr Martin HLAVÁČEK.

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Denmark (15 Members)

     

     

     

    BOSSE Stine

    CHRISTENSEN Asger

    CLAUSEN Per

    DAHL Henrik

    FRIIS Sigrid

    FUGLSANG Niels

    HANSEN Niels Flemming

    LØKKEGAARD Morten

    NORDQVIST Rasmus

    PETER-HANSEN Kira Marie

    SCHALDEMOSE Christel

    SØVNDAL Villy

    STORM Kristoffer

    VIND Marianne

    VISTISEN Anders

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Germany (96 Members)

     

     

     

    ANDERSON Christine

    ANDRESEN Rasmus

    ARNDT Anja

    AUST René

    BARLEY Katarina

    BAUSEMER Arno

    BENTELE Hildegard

    BERG Sibylle

    BERGER Stefan

    BISCHOFF Gabriele

    BLOSS Michael

    BOESELAGER Damian

    BOẞDORF Irmhild

    BUCHHEIT Markus

    BULLMANN Udo

    BURKHARDT Delara

    BYSTRON Petr

    CASPARY Daniel

    CAVAZZINI Anna

    COSTANZO Vivien

    CREMER Tobias

    DE MASI Fabio

    DEMIREL Özlem

    DOLESCHAL Christian

    DROESE Siegbert Frank

    DÜPONT Lena

    ECKE Matthias

    EHLER Christian

    EROGLU Engin

    EVERDING Sebastian

    FERBER Markus

    FIRMENICH Ruth

    FREUND Daniel

    FROELICH Tomasz

    GAHLER Michael

    GEESE Alexandra

    GEIER  Jens

    GEISEL Thomas

    GEUKING Niels

    GIESEKE Jens

    GLÜCK Andreas

    HAHN Svenja

    HÄUSLING Martin

    HERBST Niclas

    HOHLMEIER Monika

    JONGEN Marc

    JUNGBLUTH Alexander

    KHAN Mary

    KÖHLER Stefan

    KÖRNER Moritz

    KRAH Maximilian

    LAGODINSKY Sergey

    LANGE Bernd

    LANGENSIEPEN Katrin

    LIESE Peter

    LINS Norbert

    MARQUARDT Erik

    MCALLISTER David

    MEHNERT Alexandra

    MERTENS Verena

    NEUHOFF Hans

    NEUMANN Hannah

    NIEBLER Angelika

    NOICHL Maria

    OETJEN Jan-Christoph

    PAULUS Jutta

    PÜRNER Friedrich

    RACKETE Carola

    RADTKE Dennis

    REINTKE Terry

    REPASI René

    REPP Sabrina

    RIEHL Nela

    RIPA Manuela

    SCHENK Oliver

    SCHIRDEWAN Martin

    SCHNEIDER Christine

    SCHWAB Andreas

    SEEKATZ Ralf

    SELL Alexander

    SIEPER Lukas

    SIMON Sven

    SINGER Christine

    SIPPEL Birgit

    SONNEBORN Martin

    STRACK-ZIMMERMANN Marie-Agnes

    STREIT Joachim

    TEGETHOFF Kai

    VERHEYEN Sabine

    VON DER SCHULENBURG Michael

    VOSS Axel

    WALSMANN Marion

    WARNKE Jan-Peter

    WEBER Manfred

    WECHSLER Andrea

    WÖLKEN Tiemo

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Estonia (7 Members)

     

     

     

    KALJURAND Marina

    MADISON Jaak

    MIKSER Sven

    PAET Urmas

    RATAS Jüri

    TERRAS Riho

    TOOM  Jana

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Ireland (14 Members)

     

     

     

    ANDREWS Barry

    BOYLAN Lynn

    CARBERRY Nina

    COWEN Barry

    DOHERTY Regina

    FLANAGAN Luke Ming

    FUNCHION Kathleen

    KELLEHER Billy

    KELLY Seán

    MCNAMARA Michael

    MULLOOLY Ciaran

    NÍ MHURCHÚ Cynthia

    Ó RÍORDÁIN Aodhán

    WALSH Maria

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Greece (21 Members)

     

     

     

    AFTIAS Georgios

    ALEXANDRAKI Galato

    ANADIOTIS Nikolaos

    ARNAOUTOGLOU Sakis

    ARVANITIS Konstantinos

    BELERIS Fredis

    FARANTOURIS Nikolas

    FRAGKOS Emmanouil

    KEFALOGIANNIS Emmanouil

    KOUNTOURA Elena

    LATINOPOULOU Afroditi

    MANIATIS Yannis

    MEIMARAKIS Vangelis

    MELETI Eleonora

    NIKOLAOU-ALAVANOS Lefteris

    PAPADAKIS Kostas

    PAPANDREOU Nikos

    PAPPAS Nikos

    TSIODRAS Dimitris

    VOZEMBERG-VRIONIDI Elissavet

    ZACHARIA Maria

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Spain (60 Members)

     

     

     

    ABADÍA JOVER Maravillas

    AGIRREGOITIA MARTÍNEZ Oihane

    ARIAS ECHEVERRÍA Pablo

    ASENS LLODRÀ Jaume

    BALLARÍN CEREZA Laura

    BARRENA ARZA Pernando

    BENJUMEA BENJUMEA Isabel

    BORRÁS PABÓN Mireia

    BUXADÉ VILLALBA Jorge

    CEPEDA José

    CRESPO DÍAZ Carmen

    DE LA HOZ QUINTANO Raúl

    DE LA PISA CARRIÓN Margarita

    DEL CASTILLO VERA Pilar

    ESTARÀS FERRAGUT Rosa

    EZCURRA ALMANSA Alma

    FERNÁNDEZ Jonás

    GALÁN Estrella

    GÁLVEZ Lina

    GARCÍA PÉREZ Iratxe

    GIMÉNEZ LARRAZ Borja

    GIRAUTA VIDAL Juan Carlos

    GÓMEZ LÓPEZ Sandra

    GONZÁLEZ CASARES Nicolás

    GONZÁLEZ PONS Esteban

    HERRANZ GARCÍA Esther

    HOMS GINEL Alicia

    JALLOUL MURO Hana

    JUNCO GARCÍA Nora

    LÓPEZ Javi

    LÓPEZ AGUILAR Juan Fernando

    LÓPEZ-ISTÚRIZ WHITE Antonio

    LUENA César

    MAESTRE Cristina

    MARTÍN FRÍAS Jorge

    MARZÀ IBÁÑEZ Vicent

    MATO Gabriel

    MENDIA Idoia

    MILLÁN MON Francisco José

    MIRANDA PAZ Ana

    MONTERO Irene

    MONTSERRAT Dolors

    MORENO SÁNCHEZ Javier

    NAVARRETE ROJAS Fernando

    NEVADO DEL CAMPO Elena

    PAJÍN Leire

    PASCUAL DE LA PARTE Nicolás

    PÉREZ Alvise

    RIBA I GINER Diana

    ROS SEMPERE Marcos

    SÁNCHEZ AMOR Nacho

    SANCHO MURILLO Elena

    SERRA SÁNCHEZ Isabel

    SERRANO SIERRA Rosa

    SOLIER Diego

    SOLÍS PÉREZ Susana

    TERTSCH Hermann

    VÁZQUEZ LÁZARA Adrián

    ZARZALEJOS Javier

    ZOIDO ÁLVAREZ Juan Ignacio

    (16 July 2024)

     

    France (81 Members)

     

     

     

    ALLIONE Grégory

    ANDROUËT Mathilde

    AUBRY Manon

    BARDELLA Jordan

    BAY Christophe (*)

    BAY Nicolas

    BELLAMY François-Xavier

    BOYER Gilles

    BRASIER-CLAIN Marie-Luce

    CAMARA Mélissa

    CANFIN Pascal

    CARÊME Damien

    CASTILLO Laurent

    CHAIBI Leila

    CLERGEAU Christophe

    CORMAND David

    DAUCHY Marie

    DELOGE Valérie

    DEVAUX Valérie

    DISDIER Mélanie

    DUSSAUSAYE Gaëtan (**)

    FARRENG Laurence

    FITA Claire

    FOURREAU Emma

    FRIGOUT Anne-Sophie

    FURET Angéline

    GARRAUD Jean-Paul

    GERMAIN Jean-Marc

    GLUCKSMANN Raphaël

    GOMART Christophe

    GOZI Sandro

    GRISET Catherine

    GRUDLER Christophe

    GUETTA Bernard

    HASSAN Rima

    HAYER Valérie

    IMART Céline

    JAMET France

    JORON Virginie

    JOUVET Pierre

    KALFON François

    KELLER Fabienne

    KNAFO Sarah

    LALUCQ Aurore

    LAURENT Murielle

    LE CALLENNEC Isabelle

    LEGGERI Fabrice

    LEONARDELLI Julien

    LOISEAU Nathalie

    MARÉCHAL Marion

    MARIANI Thierry

    MEBAREK Nora

    MESURE Marina

    MORANO Nadine

    NIKOLIC Aleksandar

    OLIVIER Philippe

    OMARJEE Younous

    PELLERIN-CARLIN Thomas

    PELTIER Guillaume

    PENNELLE Gilles

    PIERA Pascale

    PIMPIE Pierre

    RAFOWICZ Emma

    RECHAGNEUX Julie

    RIDEL Chloé

    ROUGÉ André

    SAEIDI Arash

    SANCHEZ Julien

    SARGIACOMO Eric

    SATOURI Mounir

    SBAI Majdouline

    SMITH Anthony

    SOREL Malika

    THIONNET Pierre-Romain

    TOLASSY Rody

    TOUSSAINT Marie

    TROCHU Laurence

    VALET Matthieu

    VARAUT Alexandre

    VEDRENNE Marie-Pierre

    WERBROUCK Séverine (***)

    YON-COURTIN Stéphanie

     

     

     

    (*) Mandate valid with effect from 27 September 2024, i.e. the date indicated in the notification by the competent national authority of the election of Mr Christophe BAY to replace Mr Gaëtan DUSSAUSAYE.

    (**) Mr Gaëtan DUSSAUSAYE’s mandate ended on 25 September 2024.

    (***) Mandate valid with effect from 27 September 2024, i.e. the date indicated in the notification by the competent national authority of the election of Ms Séverine WERBROUCK to replace Ms Sylvie JOSSERAND.

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Croatia (12 Members)

     

     

     

    BARTULICA  Stephen Nikola

    BORZAN Biljana

    BOSANAC Gordan

    BRNJAC Nikolina

    GLAVAK Sunčana

    JERKOVIĆ Romana

    PICULA Tonino

    RESSLER Karlo

    SOKOL Tomislav

    STIER Davor Ivo

    VEŠLIGAJ Marko (*)

    ZOVKO Željana

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    (*) Mandate valid with effect from 5 September 2024, i.e. the date of the notification by the competent national authority of the election of Mr Marko VEŠLIGAJ to replace Mr Predrag Fred MATIĆ.

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Italy (76 Members)

     

     

     

    ANNUNZIATA Lucia

    ANTOCI Giuseppe

    BENIFEI Brando

    BERLATO Sergio

    BONACCINI Stefano

    BORCHIA Paolo

    CAVEDAGNA Stefano

    CECCARDI Susanna

    CHINNICI Caterina

    CICCIOLI Carlo

    CIRIANI Alessandro

    CISINT Anna Maria

    CORRADO Annalisa

    CROSETTO Giovanni

    DE MEO Salvatore

    DECARO Antonio

    DELLA VALLE Danilo

    DONAZZAN Elena

    DORFMANN Herbert

    FALCONE Marco

    FIDANZA Carlo

    FIOCCHI Pietro

    FURORE Mario

    GAMBINO Alberico

    GEMMA Chiara

    GORI Giorgio

    GUALMINI Elisabetta

    GUARDA Cristina

    INSELVINI Paolo

    LAURETI Camilla

    LUCANO Mimmo

    LUPO Giuseppe

    MAGONI Lara

    MANTOVANI Mario

    MARAN Pierfrancesco

    MARINO Ignazio Roberto

    MARTUSCIELLO Fulvio

    MILAZZO Giuseppe

    MORACE Carolina

    MORATTI Letizia

    MORETTI Alessandra

    NARDELLA Dario

    NESCI Denis

    ORLANDO Leoluca

    PALMISANO Valentina

    PATRICIELLO Aldo

    PEDULLA’ Gaetano

    PICARO Michele

    PICIERNO Pina

    POLATO Daniele

    PRINCI Giusi

    PROCACCINI Nicola

    RAZZA Ruggero

    RICCI Matteo

    RUOTOLO Sandro

    SALINI Massimiliano

    SALIS Ilaria

    SARDONE Silvia

    SBERNA Antonella

    SCUDERI Benedetta

    SQUARTA Marco

    STANCANELLI Raffaele

    STRADA Cecilia

    TAMBURRANO Dario

    TARQUINIO Marco

    TINAGLI Irene

    TOPO Raffaele

    TORSELLI Francesco

    TOSI Flavio

    TOVAGLIERI Isabella

    TRIDICO Pasquale

    VANNACCI Roberto

    VENTOLA Francesco

    VIVALDINI Mariateresa

    ZAN Alessandro

    ZINGARETTI Nicola

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Cyprus (6 Members)

     

     

     

    FOURLAS Loucas

    GEADI Geadis

    GEORGIOU Giorgos

    HADJIPANTELA Michalis

    MAVRIDES Costas

    PANAYIOTOU Fidias

     

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Latvia (9 Members)

     

     

     

    IJABS Ivars

    KALNIETE Sandra

    KOLS Rihards

    KRIŠTOPANS Vilis

    POZŅAKS Reinis

    STAĶIS Mārtiņš

    UŠAKOVS Nils

    VAIDERE Inese

    ZĪLE Roberts

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Lithuania (11 Members)

     

     

     

    ANDRIUKAITIS Vytenis Povilas

    AUŠTREVIČIUS Petras

    BLINKEVIČIŪTĖ Vilija

    GRAŽULIS Petras

    JUKNEVIČIENĖ Rasa

    KUBILIUS Andrius (*)

    SAUDARGAS Paulius

    SINKEVIČIUS Virginijus 

    TOMASZEWSKI Waldemar

    VERYGA Aurelijus

    ŽALIMAS Dainius

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    (*) Mr Andrius KUBILIUS’ mandate ended on 30 November 2024.

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Luxembourg (6 Members)

     

     

     

    ANGEL Marc

    GOERENS Charles

    HANSEN Christophe (*)

    KARTHEISER Fernand

    KEMP Martine (**)

    METZ Tilly

    WISELER-LIMA Isabel

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    (*) Mr Christophe HANSEN’s mandate ended on 30 November 2024.

    (**) Mandate valid with effect from 3 December 2024, the date indicated in the notification by the competent national authority of the election of Ms Martine KEMP to replace Mr Christophe HANSEN.

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Hungary (21 Members)

     

     

     

    BORVENDÉG Zsuzsanna

    DÁVID Dóra

    DEUTSCH Tamás

    DOBREV Klára

    DÖMÖTÖR Csaba (*)

    FERENC Viktória

    GÁL Kinga

    GERZSENYI Gabriella

    GYŐRFFY Balázs (**)

    GYŐRI Enikő

    GYÜRK András

    HÖLVÉNYI György

    KOLLÁR Kinga

    KULJA András Tivadar

    LAKOS Eszter

    LÁSZLÓ András

    MAGYAR Péter

    MOLNÁR Csaba

    SCHALLER-BAROSS Ernő

    SZEKERES Pál

    TARR Zoltán

    VICSEK Annamária

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    (*) Mandate valid with effect from 22 September 2024, i.e. the date indicated in the notification by the competent national authority of the election of Mr Csaba DÖMÖTÖR to replace Mr Balázs GYŐRFFY.

    (**) Mr Balázs GYŐRFFY’s mandate ended on 1 September 2024.

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Malta (6 Members)

     

     

     

    AGIUS Peter

    AGIUS SALIBA Alex

    ATTARD Daniel

    BAJADA Thomas

    CASA David

    METSOLA Roberta

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Netherlands (31 Members)

     

     

     

    AZMANI Malik

    BALJEU Jeannette

    BERENDSEN Tom

    BLOM Rachel

    CHAHIM Mohammed

    DIEPEVEEN Ton

    EHLERS Marieke

    EICKHOUT Bas

    GARCÍA HERMIDA-VAN DER WALLE Raquel

    GERBRANDY Gerben-Jan

    GOTINK Dirk

    GROOTHUIS Bart

    HAZEKAMP Anja

    KRUIS Sebastian

    LENAERS Jeroen

    MAIJ Marit

    REUTEN Thijs

    RUISSEN Bert-Jan

    SMIT Sander

    STÖTELER Sebastiaan

    STRIK Tineke

    STROLENBERG Anna

    TER LAAK Ingeborg

    VAN BRUG Anouk

    VAN DEN BERG Brigitte

    VAN LANSCHOT Reinier

    VAN LEEUWEN Jessika

    VAN SPARRENTAK Kim

    VIEIRA Catarina

    WOLTERS Lara

    ZIJLSTRA Auke

     

     

     

     

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Austria (20 Members)

     

     

     

    BERNHUBER Alexander

    BRANDSTÄTTER Helmut

    DIERINGER Elisabeth

    GROSSMANN Elisabeth

    HAIDER Roman

    HAUSER Gerald

    HEIDE Hannes

    KIRCHER Sophia

    LOPATKA Reinhold

    MANDL Lukas

    MAYER Georg

    REGNER Evelyn

    SCHIEDER Andreas

    SCHILLING Lena

    SIDL Günther

    STEGER Petra

    STÜRGKH Anna

    VILIMSKY Harald

    WAITZ Thomas

    WINZIG Angelika

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Poland (53 Members)

     

     

     

    ADAMOWICZ Magdalena

    ARŁUKOWICZ Bartosz

    BIEDROŃ Robert

    BIELAN Adam

    BOCHEŃSKI Tobiasz

    BRAUN Grzegorz

    BREJZA Krzysztof

    BRUDZIŃSKI Joachim Stanisław

    BRYŁKA Anna

    BUCZEK Tomasz

    BUDA Waldemar

    BUDKA Borys

    BUŁA Andrzej

    DWORCZYK Michał

    GASIUK-PIHOWICZ Kamila

    GOSIEWSKA Małgorzata

    GRONKIEWICZ-WALTZ Hanna (*)

    HALICKI Andrzej

    HETMAN Krzysztof

    JAKI Patryk

    JARUBAS Adam

    JOŃSKI Dariusz

    KAMIŃSKI Mariusz

    KIERWIŃSKI Marcin (**)

    KOBOSKO Michał

    KOHUT Łukasz

    KOPACZ Ewa

    LEWANDOWSKI Janusz

    ŁUKACIJEWSKA Elżbieta Katarzyna

    MALĄG Marlena

    MARCZUŁAJTIS-WALCZAK Jagna

    MULARCZYK Arkadiusz

    MÜLLER Piotr

    NYKIEL Mirosława

    OBAJTEK Daniel

    OZDOBA Jacek

    PROTAS Jacek

    RZOŃCA Bogdan

    SCHEURING-WIELGUS Joanna

    SIENKIEWICZ Bartłomiej

    ŚMISZEK Krzysztof

    SYPNIEWSKI Marcin

    SZCZERBA Michał

    SZYDŁO Beata

    TARCZYŃSKI Dominik

    TYSZKA Stanisław

    WĄSIK Maciej

    WAWRYKIEWICZ Michał

    WCISŁO Marta

    WIŚNIEWSKA Jadwiga

    ZAJĄCZKOWSKA-HERNIK Ewa

    ZALEWSKA Anna

    ZDROJEWSKI Bogdan Andrzej

    ZŁOTOWSKI Kosma

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    (*) Mandate valid with effect from 10 October 2024, i.e. the date indicated in the notification by the competent national authority of the election of Ms Hanna GRONKIEWICZ-WALTZ to replace Mr Marcin KIERWIŃSKI.

    (**) Mr Marcin KIERWIŃSKI’s mandate ended on 25 September 2024.

     

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Portugal (21 Members)

     

     

     

    ASSIS Francisco

    BUGALHO Sebastião

    COTRIM DE FIGUEIREDO João

    CUNHA Paulo

    DO NASCIMENTO CABRAL Paulo

    GOMES Isilda

    GONÇALVES Bruno

    GONÇALVES Sérgio

    HUMBERTO Sérgio

    MARTINS Catarina

    MENDES Ana Catarina

    MOREIRA DE SÁ Tiago

    OLIVEIRA João

    PEDRO Ana Miguel

    PEREIRA Lídia

    RODRIGUES André

    SOUSA SILVA Hélder

    TÂNGER CORRÊA António

    TAVARES Carla

    TEMIDO Marta

    VASCONCELOS Ana

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Romania (33 Members)

     

     

     

    AXINIA Adrian-George

    BARNA Dan

    BENEA Adrian-Dragoş

    BOGDAN Ioan-Rareş

    BUDA Daniel

    CÂRCIU Gheorghe

    DÎNCU Vasile

    FALCĂ Gheorghe

    FIREA Gabriela

    GRAPINI Maria

    HAVA Mircea-Gheorghe

    IOVANOVICI ȘOȘOACĂ Diana

    LAZARUS Luis-Vicențiu

    MANDA Claudiu

    MÎNZATU Roxana (*)

    MOTREANU  Dan-Ştefan

    MUREŞAN Siegfried

    MUŞOIU Ştefan

    NEGRESCU Victor

    NICA Dan

    PIPEREA Gheorghe

    POPESCU Virgil-Daniel

    ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ Nicolae

    STURDZA Șerban-Dimitrie

    TÂRZIU Claudiu-Richard

    TEODORESCU Georgiana

    TERHEŞ Cristian

    TOMAC Eugen

    TUDOSE Mihai

    VĂLEAN Adina

    VASILE-VOICULESCU Vlad

    VINCZE Loránt

    WINKLER Iuliu

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    (*) Ms Roxana MÎNZATU’s mandate ended on 30 November 2024.

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Slovenia (9 Members)

     

     

     

    GRIMS Branko

    JOVEVA Irena

    NEMEC Matjaž

    PREBILIČ Vladimir

    ŠAREC Marjan

    TOMAŠIČ Zala

    TOMC Romana

    TONIN Matej

    ZVER Milan

     

     

     

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Slovakia (15 Members)

     

     

     

    BEŇOVÁ Monika

    BLAHA Ľuboš

    CIFROVÁ OSTRIHOŇOVÁ Veronika

    HOJSÍK Martin

    KALIŇÁK Erik

    KARVAŠOVÁ Ľubica

    LAŠŠÁKOVÁ Judita

    LEXMANN Miriam

    MAZUREK Milan

    ÓDOR Ľudovít

    ONDRUŠ Branislav

    ROTH NEVEĎALOVÁ Katarína

    UHRÍK Milan

    WIEZIK Michal

    YAR Lucia

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Finland (15 Members)

     

     

     

    AALTOLA Mika

    ANDERSSON Li

    GUZENINA Maria

    HEINÄLUOMA Eero

    HENRIKSSON Anna-Maja

    KATAINEN Elsi

    KULMUNI Katri

    KYLLÖNEN Merja

    NIINISTÖ Ville

    OHISALO Maria

    SALLA Aura

    SARAMO Jussi

    TOVERI Pekka

    TYNKKYNEN Sebastian

    VIRKKUNEN Henna (*)

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    (*) Ms Henna VIRKKUNEN’s mandate ended on 30 November 2024.

    (16 July 2024)

     

    Sweden (21 Members)

     

     

     

    AL-SAHLANI Abir

    DANIELSSON Johan

    DIBRANI Adnan

    ERIKSSON Sofie

    ERIXON Dick

    FRITZON Heléne

    GEDIN Hanna

    HOLMGREN Pär

    INCIR Evin

    KARLSBRO Karin

    KOKALARI Arba

    KUHNKE Alice

    LÖVIN Isabella

    POLFJÄRD Jessica

    SJÖSTEDT Jonas

    TEODORESCU MÅWE Alice

    TIMGREN Beatrice

    TOBÉ Tomas

    WARBORN Jörgen

    WEIMERS Charlie

    WIESNER Emma

     

    NOTIFICATIONS BY THE MEMBER STATES

     

    BE

    11.07.2024

    BG

    21.06.2024

    CZ

    24.06.2024

    DK

    25.06.2024

    DE

    09.07.2024; 10.07.2024

    EE

    19.06.2024

    IE

    18.06.2024

    GR

    17.06.2024

    ES

    01.07.2024; 03.07.2024

    FR

    05.07.2024; 18.06.2024; 04.10.2024

    HR

    21.06.2024; 09.07.2024; 05.09.2024

    IT

    03.07.2024

    CY

    11.06.2024

    LV

    20.06.2024; 11.07.2024

    LT

    17.06.2024

    LU

    25.06.2024

    HU

    20.06.2024; 19.09.2024

    MT

    10.06.2024; 11.06.2024

    NL

    03.07.2024

    AU

    26.06.2024

    PL

    11.06.2024

    PT

    28.06.2024

    RO

    10.07.2024

    SL

    08.07.2024

    SK

    11.06.2024

    FI

    13.06.2024

    SV

    17.06.2024

     

     

     

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News