Category: France

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Shein – Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

    Source: European Parliament

    E-commerce ©BELGA_BELPRESS

    On 25 June 2025, IMCO will hold an exchange of views on the ongoing investigations against e-commerce platforms and will discuss the latest developments. On 26 May 2025, the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Network of national consumer authorities and the European Commission, following a coordinated investigation at European level, notified the online marketplace and e-retailer Shein of a number of practices on its platform that infringe EU consumer law.

    The CPC Network directed Shein to bring those practices in line with EU consumer laws. The CPC Network’s action is led by the competent national authorities of Belgium, France, Ireland and The Netherlands, under the coordination of the European Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Minutes – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg – Final edition

    Source: European Parliament

    PV-10-2025-06-18

    EN

    EN

    iPlPv_Sit

    Minutes
    Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

     Abbreviations and symbols

    + adopted
    rejected
    lapsed
    W withdrawn
    RCV roll-call votes
    EV electronic vote
    SEC secret ballot
    split split vote
    sep separate vote
    am amendment
    CA compromise amendment
    CP corresponding part
    D deleting amendment
    = identical amendments
    § paragraph

    EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

    2025 – 2026 SESSION

    Sittings of 16 to 19 June 2025

    STRASBOURG

    MINUTES

    WEDNESDAY 18 JUNE 2025

    IN THE CHAIR: Roberta METSOLA
    President

    1. Opening of the sitting

    The sitting opened at 09:02.



    2. Negotiations ahead of Parliament’s first reading (Rule 72) (action taken)

    The decision of the LIBE Committee to enter into interinstitutional negotiations had been announced on 16 June 2025 (minutes of 16.6.2025, item 12).

    As no request for a vote pursuant to Rule 72(2) had been made, the committee responsible had been able to enter into negotiations upon expiry of the deadline.



    3. Upcoming NATO summit on 24-26 June 2025 (debate)

    Commission statement: Upcoming NATO summit on 24-26 June 2025 (2025/2748(RSP))

    The President provided some clarifications on the arrangements for the conduct of the debate, for which a test format was to be used.

    Kaja Kallas (Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, on behalf of the PPE Group, Yannis Maniatis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Harald Vilimsky, on behalf of the PfE Group, Alexandr Vondra, on behalf of the ECR Group, Valérie Hayer, on behalf of the Renew Group, Bas Eickhout, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Marc Botenga, on behalf of The Left Group, René Aust, on behalf of the ESN Group, Michael Gahler, Sven Mikser, Jean-Paul Garraud, Adam Bielan, Dan Barna, Mārtiņš Staķis, Özlem Demirel, Milan Uhrík, Ruth Firmenich, Ingeborg Ter Laak and Eero Heinäluoma.

    IN THE CHAIR: Sabine VERHEYEN
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Anna Bryłka, Rasa Juknevičienė, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Petras Auštrevičius, Sebastião Bugalho, Hannah Neumann, Merja Kyllönen, Pekka Toveri, Elio Di Rupo, Roberto Vannacci, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Wouter Beke, Dan Nica, Hans Neuhoff, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Branislav Ondruš, who also answered a blue-card question from Maria Grapini, Riho Terras, Tobias Cremer, Jaak Madison, Markéta Gregorová, Michał Szczerba, Marina Mesure, Sarah Knafo, Ondřej Dostál, Angelika Niebler, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Özlem Demirel, Tonino Picula, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Massimiliano Salini, Evin Incir, Lucia Yar, Mika Aaltola, Giorgos Georgiou, Davor Ivo Stier, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Georgiana Teodorescu, Reinier Van Lanschot, Željana Zovko, Rihards Kols, Irene Montero, Eszter Lakos, Petar Volgin and Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez.

    IN THE CHAIR: Javi LÓPEZ
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: José Cepeda, Petra Steger, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Marta Wcisło, Jüri Ratas, Loucas Fourlas, Niels Fuglsang, Engin Eroglu, Miriam Lexmann, Kathleen Funchion, Ana Miguel Pedro, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Francisco Assis, Matej Tonin, Johan Van Overtveldt, Anders Vistisen, Marta Wcisło, Ville Niinistö, Sandra Kalniete and Danilo Della Valle.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Hélder Sousa Silva, Maria Grapini, João Oliveira, Petras Gražulis, Lukas Sieper, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos and Juan Fernando López Aguilar.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas.

    The debate closed.

    (The sitting was suspended at 11:43.)



    IN THE CHAIR: Roberta METSOLA
    President

    4. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 12:00.



    5. Voting time

    For detailed results of the votes, see also ‘Results of votes’ and ‘Results of roll-call votes’.



    5.1. Macro-financial assistance to Egypt ***I (vote)

    Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt [COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)] – Committee on International Trade. Rapporteur: Céline Imart (A10-0037/2025)

    An initial vote had been held on 1 April 2025 and the matter had been referred back to the committee responsible for interinstitutional negotiations under Rule 60(4) (minutes of 1.4.2025, item 6.11).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    REQUEST FROM THE LEFT GROUP TO PROCEED WITH A VOTE ON THE AMENDMENTS (Rule 60(3))

    Rejected

    PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)125)

    Parliament’s first reading thus closed.

    Detailed voting results



    5.2. Adoption by the Union of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty ***I (vote)

    Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adoption by the Union of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty between the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States [COM(2024)0257 – C10-0058/2024 – 2024/0148(COD)] – Committee on International Trade – Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. Rapporteurs: Anna Cavazzini and Borys Budka (A10-0009/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    COMMISSION PROPOSAL and AMENDMENTS

    Approved (P10_TA(2025)126)

    Parliament’s first reading thus closed.

    Detailed voting results

    2

    The following had spoken:

    Anna Cavazzini (rapporteur), before the vote, to make a statement on the basis of Rule 165(4).



    5.3. EU/Euratom Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty: adoption by Euratom * (vote)

    Report on the Proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by the European Atomic Energy Community of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty between the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States [COM(2024)0256 – C10-0092/2024 – 2024/0146(NLE)] – Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. Rapporteur: Borys Budka (A10-0008/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    COMMISSION PROPOSAL TO THE COUNCIL

    Approved by single vote (P10_TA(2025)127)

    Detailed voting results



    5.4. Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (vote)

    Report on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility [2024/2085(INI)] – Committee on Budgets – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. Rapporteurs: Victor Negrescu and Siegfried Mureşan (A10-0098/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 10).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)128)

    Detailed voting results



    5.5. The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report (vote)

    Report on The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report [2024/2078(INI)] – Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Rapporteur: Ana Catarina Mendes (A10-0100/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 11).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)129)

    Detailed voting results



    5.6. 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro (vote)

    Report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro [2025/2020(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Marjan Šarec (A10-0093/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 12).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)130)

    Detailed voting results



    5.7. 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova (vote)

    Report on 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova [2025/2025(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Sven Mikser (A10-0096/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 13).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)131)

    Detailed voting results

    7

    (The sitting was suspended for a few moments.)



    IN THE CHAIR: Christel SCHALDEMOSE
    Vice-President

    6. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 12:35.



    7. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

    The minutes of the previous sitting were approved.



    8. Stopping the genocide in Gaza: time for EU sanctions (topical debate)

    The following spoke: Manon Aubry to open the debate proposed by the The Left Group.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas (Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy).

    The following spoke: Hildegard Bentele, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nacho Sánchez Amor, on behalf of the S&D Group, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, on behalf of the PfE Group (the President noted that some comments needed to be checked), Sebastian Tynkkynen, on behalf of the ECR Group, Hilde Vautmans, on behalf of the Renew Group, Tineke Strik, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Hanna Gedin, on behalf of The Left Group, Marc Jongen, on behalf of the ESN Group, Seán Kelly, Evin Incir, Beatrice Timgren, Barry Andrews, Jaume Asens Llodrà, Nikos Pappas, Kateřina Konečná, Matjaž Nemec, Christophe Bay, Kristoffer Storm, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Ana Miranda Paz, Isabel Serra Sánchez, Ruth Firmenich, Francisco Assis, Abir Al-Sahlani, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Per Clausen, Cecilia Strada, Irena Joveva, Ville Niinistö, Özlem Demirel, Alex Agius Saliba, Lucia Yar, Giorgos Georgiou, Elio Di Rupo, Billy Kelleher, Estrella Galán, Ciaran Mullooly, Mimmo Lucano, Pernando Barrena Arza and Jussi Saramo (once the checks had been carried out, the President provided some clarifications).

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas.

    The debate closed.



    9. Freedom of assembly in Hungary and the need for the Commission to act (debate)

    Commission statement: Freedom of assembly in Hungary and the need for the Commission to act (2025/2758(RSP))

    Michael McGrath (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Tomas Tobé, on behalf of the PPE Group, Iratxe García Pérez, on behalf of the S&D Group, Kinga Gál, on behalf of the PfE Group, Paolo Inselvini, on behalf of the ECR Group, Fabienne Keller, on behalf of the Renew Group, Terry Reintke, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Konstantinos Arvanitis, on behalf of The Left Group, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, on behalf of the ESN Group, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Klára Dobrev, Harald Vilimsky, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Nicolae Ştefănuță, Nicolas Bay, who also answered a blue-card question from Mélissa Camara, Dainius Žalimas, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper, Tineke Strik, Ilaria Salis, who also declined to take a blue-card question, Christine Anderson, who also declined to take a blue-card question, Judita Laššáková, Maria Walsh, Ana Catarina Mendes and Hermann Tertsch.

    IN THE CHAIR: Martin HOJSÍK
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Arkadiusz Mularczyk, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper, Moritz Körner, Mélissa Camara, who also answered a blue-card question from Jacek Ozdoba, Carolina Morace, Milan Mazurek, Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Arba Kokalari, Marc Angel, Paolo Borchia, Jacek Ozdoba, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Daniel Freund (the President reminded him of the rules on conduct), Li Andersson, Tomasz Froelich, Lukas Sieper, Mirosława Nykiel, Alessandro Zan, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Tobiasz Bocheński, who also answered a blue-card question from Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Kim Van Sparrentak, Lena Düpont, Krzysztof Śmiszek, András László, who also answered a blue-card question from Michał Wawrykiewicz, Rasmus Nordqvist, who also answered a blue-card question from Tomasz Froelich, Evin Incir, Juan Fernando López Aguilar and Chloé Ridel.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Sebastian Tynkkynen and Alexander Jungbluth.

    The following spoke: Michael McGrath.

    The debate closed.



    10. Safeguarding the rule of law in Spain, ensuring an independent and autonomous prosecutor’s office to fight crime and corruption (debate)

    Commission statement: Safeguarding the rule of law in Spain, ensuring an independent and autonomous prosecutor’s office to fight crime and corruption (2025/2759(RSP))

    Michael McGrath (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Tomas Tobé, on behalf of the PPE Group, Javier Moreno Sánchez, on behalf of the S&D Group, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, on behalf of the PfE Group, Diego Solier, on behalf of the ECR Group, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, on behalf of the Renew Group, Diana Riba i Giner, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Isabel Serra Sánchez, on behalf of The Left Group, Dolors Montserrat, Evelyn Regner, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Enikő Győri, Hermann Tertsch, Nora Junco García, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Jaume Asens Llodrà, Lena Düpont, Francisco Assis, Petra Steger, Siegfried Mureşan, who also answered a blue-card question from Maria Grapini, and Sandro Ruotolo.

    IN THE CHAIR: Younous OMARJEE
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Enikő Győri, who also answered a blue-card question from Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Michał Wawrykiewicz, who also answered a blue-card question from Nicolás González Casares, Evin Incir, who also declined to take a blue-card question from François-Xavier Bellamy, Csaba Dömötör, Sebastião Bugalho, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, who also declined to take a blue-card question from François-Xavier Bellamy, Fabrice Leggeri, François-Xavier Bellamy to raise a point of order (the President cut off the speaker as his remarks did not constitute a point of order), Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, who also accepted a blue-card question from François-Xavier Bellamy (the President cut him off and made some clarifications on the blue-card procedure), David Casa, Ana Miguel Pedro, Dirk Gotink, Andrey Kovatchev and Javier Zarzalejos.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: José Cepeda, András László, Sebastian Tynkkynen and Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Michael McGrath.

    The debate closed.



    11. Clean Industrial Deal (debate)

    Question for oral answer O-000020/2025 by Tom Berendsen, on behalf of the ITRE Committee to the Commission: Clean Industrial Deal (B10-0006/2025) (2025/2656(RSP))

    Tom Berendsen moved the question.

    Stéphane Séjourné (Executive Vice-President of the Commission) answered the question.

    The following spoke: Angelika Winzig, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nicolás González Casares, on behalf of the S&D Group, Paolo Borchia, on behalf of the PfE Group, Daniel Obajtek, on behalf of the ECR Group, Christophe Grudler, on behalf of the Renew Group, Sara Matthieu, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Per Clausen, on behalf of The Left Group, and Anja Arndt, on behalf of the ESN Group.

    The following spoke: Stéphane Séjourné.

    Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 142(5) to wind up the debate: minutes of 19.6.2025, item I.

    The debate closed.

    Vote: 19 June 2025.



    12. Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system (debate)

    Report on electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system [2025/2006(INI)] – Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. Rapporteur: Anna Stürgkh (A10-0091/2025)

    Anna Stürgkh introduced the report.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The following spoke: Seán Kelly, on behalf of the PPE Group, Bruno Tobback, on behalf of the S&D Group, András Gyürk, on behalf of the PfE Group, Ondřej Krutílek, on behalf of the ECR Group, Christophe Grudler, on behalf of the Renew Group, Kira Marie Peter-Hansen, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Dario Tamburrano, on behalf of The Left Group, Sarah Knafo, on behalf of the ESN Group, Angelika Winzig, Mohammed Chahim, Aleksandar Nikolic, Diego Solier, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Jutta Paulus, Markus Buchheit, who also answered a blue-card question from Jutta Paulus, Fernand Kartheiser, Paulo Cunha, Tsvetelina Penkova, Isabella Tovaglieri, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Dario Nardella, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Barry Andrews, Benedetta Scuderi, Marcin Sypniewski, who also answered a blue-card question from Stine Bosse, Fidias Panayiotou, Mirosława Nykiel, Yannis Maniatis and Julie Rechagneux.

    IN THE CHAIR: Antonella SBERNA
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Ivars Ijabs, Michael Bloss, Andrea Wechsler, Dario Nardella, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Marion Maréchal, Bart Groothuis, Virgil-Daniel Popescu, Jens Geier, Nikola Bartůšek, Beatrice Timgren, Wouter Beke, Nicolás González Casares, who also answered blue-card questions from João Oliveira and Mireia Borrás Pabón, Gilles Pennelle, Hildegard Bentele, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper, Sofie Eriksson, Niels Flemming Hansen, Jüri Ratas, Michał Szczerba, Dimitris Tsiodras, Krzysztof Hetman, Andreas Schwab, Regina Doherty and Tomislav Sokol.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Billy Kelleher, João Oliveira, Maria Zacharia and Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva and Anna Stürgkh.

    The debate closed.

    Vote: 19 June 2025.



    13. Composition of committees and delegations

    The ECR Group had notified the President of the following decision changing the composition of the committees and delegations:

    – ITRE Committee: Anna Zalewska

    The decision took effect as of that day.



    14. Rise in violence and the deepening humanitarian crisis in South Sudan (debate)

    Commission statement: Rise in violence and the deepening humanitarian crisis in South Sudan (2025/2751(RSP))

    Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Michael Gahler, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marit Maij, on behalf of the S&D Group, György Hölvényi, on behalf of the PfE Group, Adam Bielan, on behalf of the ECR Group, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, on behalf of the Renew Group, Erik Marquardt, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Özlem Demirel, on behalf of The Left Group, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Francisco Assis, Barry Andrews, Murielle Laurent and Leire Pajín.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Alessandra Moretti, Nikos Papandreou and Sebastian Tynkkynen.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva.

    IN THE CHAIR: Roberts ZĪLE
    Vice-President

    The debate closed.



    15. Debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (debate)

    (For the titles and authors of the motions for resolutions, see minutes of 18.6.2025, item I.)



    15.1. Media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli

    Motions for resolutions B10-0282/2025, B10-0283/2025, B10-0287/2025, B10-0288/2025, B10-0289/2025, B10-0290/2025 and B10-0295/2025 (2025/2752(RSP))

    Rasa Juknevičienė, Tobias Cremer, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Dainius Žalimas, Lena Schilling, Danilo Della Valle and Petr Bystron introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.

    The following spoke: Liudas Mažylis, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nacho Sánchez Amor, on behalf of the S&D Group, and Thierry Mariani, on behalf of the PfE Group.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The debate closed.

    Vote: minutes of 19.6.2025, item 5.1.



    15.2. Case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran

    Motions for resolutions B10-0280/2025, B10-0284/2025, B10-0285/2025, B10-0286/2025, B10-0296/2025, B10-0299/2025 and B10-0300/2025 (2025/2753(RSP))

    Michał Wawrykiewicz, Evin Incir, Veronika Vrecionová, Abir Al-Sahlani, Alice Kuhnke, Jonas Sjöstedt and Sebastiaan Stöteler introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.

    The following spoke: Alice Teodorescu Måwe, on behalf of the PPE Group, Francisco Assis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Gerolf Annemans, on behalf of the PfE Group, Hilde Vautmans, on behalf of the Renew Group, Wouter Beke, Daniel Attard and Danuše Nerudová.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The debate closed.

    Vote: minutes of 19.6.2025, item 5.2.



    15.3. Dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali

    Motions for resolutions B10-0281/2025, B10-0291/2025, B10-0292/2025, B10-0293/2025, B10-0294/2025, B10-0297/2025 and B10-0298/2025 (2025/2754(RSP))

    Christophe Gomart, Laura Ballarín Cereza and Catarina Vieira introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.

    The following spoke: Ingeborg Ter Laak, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marta Temido, on behalf of the S&D Group, and Reinhold Lopatka.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The debate closed.

    Vote: minutes of 19.6.2025, item 5.3.



    16. Digital Markets, Digital Euro, Digital Identities: economical stimuli or trends toward dystopia (topical debate)

    The following spoke: Rada Laykova to open the debate proposed by the ESN Group.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The following spoke: Fernando Navarrete Rojas, on behalf of the PPE Group, Aurore Lalucq, on behalf of the S&D Group, Piotr Müller, on behalf of the ECR Group, Billy Kelleher, on behalf of the Renew Group, Sergey Lagodinsky, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Jussi Saramo, on behalf of The Left Group, Siegbert Frank Droese, on behalf of the ESN Group, Lídia Pereira, Stefano Cavedagna, Katri Kulmuni, Damian Boeselager, Milan Mazurek, Fabio De Masi, Paulius Saudargas, Marlena Maląg, Diego Solier, Gheorghe Piperea, Dick Erixon and Claudiu-Richard Târziu.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva.

    The debate closed.



    17. Oral explanations of votes (Rule 201)

    No oral explanations of votes were made.



    18. Explanations of votes in writing (Rule 201)

    Explanations of votes given in writing would appear on the Members’ pages on Parliament’s website



    19. Agenda of the next sitting

    The next sitting would be held the following day, 19 June 2025, starting at 09:00. The agenda was available on Parliament’s website.



    20. Approval of the minutes of the sitting

    In accordance with Rule 208(3), the minutes of the sitting would be put to the House for approval at the beginning of the afternoon of the next sitting.



    21. Closure of the sitting

    The sitting closed at 21:10.



    LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVING AS A BASIS FOR THE DEBATES AND DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENT



    I. Motions for resolutions tabled

    Media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli

    The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0282/2025)
    Lena Schilling, Mélissa Camara, Mounir Satouri, Ville Niinistö, Maria Ohisalo, Mārtiņš Staķis, Nicolae
    Ştefănuță, Markéta Gregorová
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0283/2025)
    Danilo Della Valle
    on behalf of The Left Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0287/2025)
    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas, Olivier Chastel
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0288/2025)
    Petr Bystron, Tomasz Froelich, Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell
    on behalf of the ESN Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0289/2025)
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Tobias Cremer
    on behalf of the S&D Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0290/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere, Rasa Juknevičienė
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0295/2025)
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Reinis Pozņaks, Rihards Kols, Alexandr Vondra, Mariusz Kamiński, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Assita Kanko, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    Case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran

    The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0280/2025)
    Jonas Sjöstedt
    on behalf of The Left Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0284/2025)
    Alice Kuhnke, Maria Ohisalo, Mounir Satouri, Nicolae
    Ştefănuță, Mélissa Camara, Ville Niinistö, Hannah Neumann
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali’s illegal arrest and detention in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0285/2025)
    Abir Al-Sahlani, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Bart Groothuis, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0286/2025)
    Sebastiaan Stöteler, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa, Nikola Bartůšek, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Gerolf Annemans, Hermann Tertsch
    on behalf of the PfE Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0296/2025)
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Chloé Ridel
    on behalf of the S&D Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0299/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Željana Zovko, David McAllister, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Loucas Fourlas, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0300/2025)
    Adam Bielan, Reinis Pozņaks, Rihards Kols, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Mariusz Kamiński, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alberico Gambino, Carlo Fidanza, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Assita Kanko, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Cristian Terheş, Diego Solier, Nora Junco García, Michał Dworczyk, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Marion Maréchal
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    Dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali

    The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0281/2025)
    Merja Kyllönen
    on behalf of The Left Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0291/2025)
    Nathalie Loiseau, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Yvan Verougstraete, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0292/2025)
    Tomasz Froelich, Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell
    on behalf of the ESN Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0293/2025)
    Matthieu Valet, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Nikola Bartůšek
    on behalf of the PfE Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0294/2025)
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Laura Ballarín Cereza
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Catarina Vieira
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0297/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, Christophe Gomart, Željana Zovko, David McAllister, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0298/2025)
    Adam Bielan, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Assita Kanko, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Małgorzata Gosiewska
    on behalf of the ECR Group



    II. Delegated acts (Rule 114(2))

    Draft delegated acts forwarded to Parliament

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the identification of sub-categories within net-zero technologies and the list of specific components used for those technologies. (C(2025)02901 – 2025/2733(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 23 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ITRE
    opinion: ECON, EMPL, ENVI, IMCO, REGI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/125 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (C(2025)03066 – 2025/2727(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 21 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: INTA

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the addition of vehicle sub-groups for extra-heavy-combination lorries (C(2025)03071 – 2025/2726(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 20 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ENVI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards measures adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organisation for the monitoring, reporting and verification of aviation emissions for the purpose of implementing a global market-based measure and repealing Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/1603 (C(2025)03075 – 2025/2725(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 20 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ENVI
    opinion: ITRE

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 as regards the inclusion of the drug precursors 4-piperidone and 1-boc-4-piperidone in the list of scheduled substances (C(2025)03079 – 2025/2729(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 21 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: LIBE

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on the authorisation and organisational requirements for approved publication arrangements and approved reporting mechanisms, and on the authorisation requirements for consolidated tape providers, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/571 (C(2025)03100 – 2025/2765(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the input and output data of consolidated tapes, the synchronisation of business clocks and the revenue redistribution by the consolidated tape provider for shares and ETFs, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/574 (C(2025)03102 – 2025/2761(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on the obligation to make market data available to the public on a reasonable commercial basis (C(2025)03103 – 2025/2762(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council with detailed rules and procedures on the acceptance of air traffic controller licences and certificates issued by third countries. (C(2025)03114 – 2025/2732(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 23 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: TRAN

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council by specifying the rules on the identification of authorised oil and gas producers who are required to contribute to the objective of reaching the Union-target for available CO2 injection capacity by 2030, on the calculation of their respective contributions, and on their reporting obligations (C(2025)03218 – 2025/2730(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 21 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ITRE
    opinion: ECON, EMPL, ENVI, IMCO, REGI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the information in an application for authorisation to offer asset-referenced tokens to the public or to seek their admission to trading (C(2025)03221 – 2025/2737(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 5 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 as regards updating the references to the environmental protection requirements and correcting that Regulation (C(2025)03287 – 2025/2735(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 28 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: TRAN

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards geographic coordinates in Annexes VII and XIII thereto (C(2025)03293 – 2025/2734(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 28 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: PECH

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending the Annex to Regulation (EU) No 609/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council to allow the use of monosodium salt of L-5-methyltetrahydrofolic acid as a source of folate in infant formula and follow-on formula, processed cereal-based food and baby food, total diet replacement for weight control and in food for special medical purposes (C(2025)03411 – 2025/2736(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 4 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ENVI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards the assignment of Unique Device Identifiers for spectacle frames, spectacle lenses and ready-to-wear reading spectacles (C(2025)03484 – 2025/2763(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: SANT

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 of the European Parliament and of the Council to take into account regulatory developments concerning amendments to UN Regulations Nos 25, 34, 79, 100, 117, 127 and 152, and the new UN Regulations Nos 167, 169 and 171 adopted by the World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (C(2025)03502 – 2025/2738(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 5 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: IMCO

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) No 876/2013 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards changes to the functioning and management of colleges for central counterparties (C(2025)03626 – 2025/2755(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 11 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk (C(2025)03643 – 2025/2764(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation on the implementation of the Union’s international obligations, as referred to in Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part, as regards picked dogfish (C(2025)03715 – 2025/2768(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 13 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: PECH

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list (C(2025)03815 – 2025/2740(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 1 month from the date of receipt of 10 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON, LIBE

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/530 as regards its date of application (C(2025)03819 – 2025/2766(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: INTA



    ATTENDANCE REGISTER

    Present:

    Aaltola Mika, Abadía Jover Maravillas, Adamowicz Magdalena, Aftias Georgios, Agirregoitia Martínez Oihane, Agius Peter, Agius Saliba Alex, Alexandraki Galato, Allione Grégory, Al-Sahlani Abir, Anadiotis Nikolaos, Anderson Christine, Andersson Li, Andresen Rasmus, Andrews Barry, Andriukaitis Vytenis Povilas, Androuët Mathilde, Angel Marc, Annemans Gerolf, Annunziata Lucia, Antoci Giuseppe, Arias Echeverría Pablo, Arimont Pascal, Arłukowicz Bartosz, Arnaoutoglou Sakis, Arndt Anja, Arvanitis Konstantinos, Asens Llodrà Jaume, Assis Francisco, Attard Daniel, Aubry Manon, Auštrevičius Petras, Axinia Adrian-George, Azmani Malik, Bajada Thomas, Baljeu Jeannette, Ballarín Cereza Laura, Bardella Jordan, Barley Katarina, Barna Dan, Barrena Arza Pernando, Bartulica Stephen Nikola, Bartůšek Nikola, Bausemer Arno, Bay Nicolas, Bay Christophe, Beke Wouter, Bellamy François-Xavier, Benea Dragoş, Benjumea Benjumea Isabel, Beňová Monika, Bentele Hildegard, Berendsen Tom, Berg Sibylle, Berlato Sergio, Bernhuber Alexander, Biedroń Robert, Bielan Adam, Bischoff Gabriele, Blaha Ľuboš, Blinkevičiūtė Vilija, Blom Rachel, Bloss Michael, Bocheński Tobiasz, Boeselager Damian, Bogdan Ioan-Rareş, Bonaccini Stefano, Bonte Barbara, Borchia Paolo, Borrás Pabón Mireia, Borvendég Zsuzsanna, Borzan Biljana, Bosanac Gordan, Boßdorf Irmhild, Bosse Stine, Botenga Marc, Boyer Gilles, Brasier-Clain Marie-Luce, Braun Grzegorz, Brejza Krzysztof, Bricmont Saskia, Brnjac Nikolina, Bryłka Anna, Buchheit Markus, Buczek Tomasz, Buda Daniel, Buda Waldemar, Budka Borys, Bugalho Sebastião, Buła Andrzej, Buxadé Villalba Jorge, Bystron Petr, Bžoch Jaroslav, Camara Mélissa, Canfin Pascal, Carberry Nina, Cârciu Gheorghe, Carême Damien, Casa David, Caspary Daniel, Cassart Benoit, Castillo Laurent, del Castillo Vera Pilar, Cavazzini Anna, Cavedagna Stefano, Ceccardi Susanna, Cepeda José, Ceulemans Estelle, Chahim Mohammed, Chaibi Leila, Chastel Olivier, Christensen Asger, Ciccioli Carlo, Cifrová Ostrihoňová Veronika, Ciriani Alessandro, Cisint Anna Maria, Clausen Per, Clergeau Christophe, Cormand David, Corrado Annalisa, Costanzo Vivien, Cotrim De Figueiredo João, Cowen Barry, Cremer Tobias, Cristea Andi, Crosetto Giovanni, Cunha Paulo, Dahl Henrik, Danielsson Johan, Dauchy Marie, Dávid Dóra, David Ivan, Decaro Antonio, de la Hoz Quintano Raúl, Della Valle Danilo, Deloge Valérie, De Masi Fabio, Demirel Özlem, Deutsch Tamás, Devaux Valérie, Dibrani Adnan, Dieringer Elisabeth, Dîncu Vasile, Di Rupo Elio, Disdier Mélanie, Dobrev Klára, Doherty Regina, Doleschal Christian, Dömötör Csaba, Do Nascimento Cabral Paulo, Donazzan Elena, Dorfmann Herbert, Dostalova Klara, Dostál Ondřej, Droese Siegbert Frank, Düpont Lena, Dworczyk Michał, Ecke Matthias, Ehler Christian, Ehlers Marieke, Eriksson Sofie, Erixon Dick, Eroglu Engin, Estaràs Ferragut Rosa, Everding Sebastian, Falcă Gheorghe, Falcone Marco, Farreng Laurence, Farský Jan, Ferber Markus, Ferenc Viktória, Fernández Jonás, Fidanza Carlo, Fiocchi Pietro, Firmenich Ruth, Flanagan Luke Ming, Fourlas Loucas, Fourreau Emma, Fragkos Emmanouil, Freund Daniel, Fritzon Heléne, Froelich Tomasz, Fuglsang Niels, Funchion Kathleen, Furet Angéline, Furore Mario, Gahler Michael, Gál Kinga, Galán Estrella, Gálvez Lina, Gambino Alberico, García Hermida-Van Der Walle Raquel, Garraud Jean-Paul, Gasiuk-Pihowicz Kamila, Geadi Geadis, Gedin Hanna, Geese Alexandra, Geier Jens, Geisel Thomas, Gemma Chiara, Georgiou Giorgos, Gerbrandy Gerben-Jan, Gerzsenyi Gabriella, Geuking Niels, Gieseke Jens, Giménez Larraz Borja, Girauta Vidal Juan Carlos, Glavak Sunčana, Glucksmann Raphaël, Goerens Charles, Gomart Christophe, Gomes Isilda, Gómez López Sandra, Gonçalves Bruno, Gonçalves Sérgio, González Casares Nicolás, González Pons Esteban, Gori Giorgio, Gosiewska Małgorzata, Gotink Dirk, Gozi Sandro, Grapini Maria, Gražulis Petras, Gregorová Markéta, Grims Branko, Griset Catherine, Gronkiewicz-Waltz Hanna, Groothuis Bart, Grossmann Elisabeth, Grudler Christophe, Gualmini Elisabetta, Guarda Cristina, Guetta Bernard, Guzenina Maria, Győri Enikő, Gyürk András, Haider Roman, Halicki Andrzej, Hansen Niels Flemming, Hassan Rima, Hauser Gerald, Häusling Martin, Hava Mircea-Gheorghe, Heinäluoma Eero, Henriksson Anna-Maja, Herbst Niclas, Herranz García Esther, Hetman Krzysztof, Hojsík Martin, Holmgren Pär, Hölvényi György, Homs Ginel Alicia, Humberto Sérgio, Ijabs Ivars, Imart Céline, Incir Evin, Inselvini Paolo, Iovanovici Şoşoacă Diana, Jalloul Muro Hana, Jamet France, Jarubas Adam, Jerković Romana, Jongen Marc, Joński Dariusz, Joron Virginie, Jouvet Pierre, Joveva Irena, Juknevičienė Rasa, Junco García Nora, Jungbluth Alexander, Kabilov Taner, Kalfon François, Kaliňák Erik, Kaljurand Marina, Kalniete Sandra, Kamiński Mariusz, Kanev Radan, Kanko Assita, Karlsbro Karin, Kartheiser Fernand, Karvašová Ľubica, Katainen Elsi, Kefalogiannis Emmanouil, Kelleher Billy, Keller Fabienne, Kelly Seán, Kennes Rudi, Khan Mary, Kircher Sophia, Knafo Sarah, Knotek Ondřej, Kobosko Michał, Köhler Stefan, Kohut Łukasz, Kokalari Arba, Kolář Ondřej, Kollár Kinga, Kols Rihards, Konečná Kateřina, Kopacz Ewa, Körner Moritz, Kountoura Elena, Kovařík Ondřej, Kovatchev Andrey, Krištopans Vilis, Kruis Sebastian, Krutílek Ondřej, Kubín Tomáš, Kuhnke Alice, Kulmuni Katri, Kyllönen Merja, Kyuchyuk Ilhan, Lagodinsky Sergey, Lakos Eszter, Lalucq Aurore, Lange Bernd, Langensiepen Katrin, Laššáková Judita, László András, Latinopoulou Afroditi, Laurent Murielle, Laureti Camilla, Laykova Rada, Lazarov Ilia, Lazarus Luis-Vicențiu, Le Callennec Isabelle, Leggeri Fabrice, Lenaers Jeroen, Leonardelli Julien, Lewandowski Janusz, Lexmann Miriam, Liese Peter, Lins Norbert, Loiseau Nathalie, Løkkegaard Morten, Lopatka Reinhold, López Javi, López Aguilar Juan Fernando, López-Istúriz White Antonio, Lövin Isabella, Lucano Mimmo, Luena César, Łukacijewska Elżbieta Katarzyna, Lupo Giuseppe, McAllister David, Madison Jaak, Maestre Cristina, Magoni Lara, Magyar Péter, Maij Marit, Maląg Marlena, Mandl Lukas, Maniatis Yannis, Mantovani Mario, Maran Pierfrancesco, Marczułajtis-Walczak Jagna, Maréchal Marion, Mariani Thierry, Marino Ignazio Roberto, Marquardt Erik, Martín Frías Jorge, Martins Catarina, Martusciello Fulvio, Marzà Ibáñez Vicent, Mato Gabriel, Matthieu Sara, Mavrides Costas, Mayer Georg, Mazurek Milan, Mažylis Liudas, McNamara Michael, Mebarek Nora, Mehnert Alexandra, Meimarakis Vangelis, Meleti Eleonora, Mendes Ana Catarina, Mendia Idoia, Mertens Verena, Mesure Marina, Metsola Roberta, Metz Tilly, Mikser Sven, Milazzo Giuseppe, Millán Mon Francisco José, Minchev Nikola, Miranda Paz Ana, Molnár Csaba, Montero Irene, Montserrat Dolors, Morace Carolina, Morano Nadine, Moreira de Sá Tiago, Moreno Sánchez Javier, Moretti Alessandra, Motreanu Dan-Ştefan, Mularczyk Arkadiusz, Müller Piotr, Mullooly Ciaran, Mureşan Siegfried, Muşoiu Ştefan, Nagyová Jana, Nardella Dario, Navarrete Rojas Fernando, Negrescu Victor, Nemec Matjaž, Nerudová Danuše, Nesci Denis, Neuhoff Hans, Neumann Hannah, Nevado del Campo Elena, Nica Dan, Niebler Angelika, Niedermayer Luděk, Niinistö Ville, Nikolaou-Alavanos Lefteris, Nikolic Aleksandar, Ní Mhurchú Cynthia, Noichl Maria, Nordqvist Rasmus, Novakov Andrey, Nykiel Mirosława, Obajtek Daniel, Ódor Ľudovít, Oetjen Jan-Christoph, Oliveira João, Olivier Philippe, Omarjee Younous, Ondruš Branislav, Ó Ríordáin Aodhán, Orlando Leoluca, Ozdoba Jacek, Paet Urmas, Pajín Leire, Palmisano Valentina, Panayiotou Fidias, Papadakis Kostas, Papandreou Nikos, Pappas Nikos, Pascual de la Parte Nicolás, Paulus Jutta, Pedro Ana Miguel, Pedulla’ Gaetano, Pellerin-Carlin Thomas, Peltier Guillaume, Penkova Tsvetelina, Pennelle Gilles, Pereira Lídia, Peter-Hansen Kira Marie, Petrov Hristo, Picaro Michele, Picierno Pina, Picula Tonino, Piera Pascale, Pietikäinen Sirpa, Pimpie Pierre, Piperea Gheorghe, de la Pisa Carrión Margarita, Polato Daniele, Polfjärd Jessica, Popescu Virgil-Daniel, Pozņaks Reinis, Prebilič Vladimir, Princi Giusi, Protas Jacek, Pürner Friedrich, Rackete Carola, Radev Emil, Radtke Dennis, Rafowicz Emma, Ratas Jüri, Razza Ruggero, Rechagneux Julie, Regner Evelyn, Repasi René, Repp Sabrina, Ressler Karlo, Reuten Thijs, Riba i Giner Diana, Ricci Matteo, Ridel Chloé, Riehl Nela, Ripa Manuela, Rodrigues André, Roth Neveďalová Katarína, Rougé André, Ruissen Bert-Jan, Ruotolo Sandro, Rzońca Bogdan, Saeidi Arash, Salini Massimiliano, Salis Ilaria, Salla Aura, Sánchez Amor Nacho, Sanchez Julien, Sancho Murillo Elena, Saramo Jussi, Sardone Silvia, Šarec Marjan, Sargiacomo Eric, Satouri Mounir, Saudargas Paulius, Sbai Majdouline, Sberna Antonella, Schaldemose Christel, Schaller-Baross Ernő, Schenk Oliver, Scheuring-Wielgus Joanna, Schieder Andreas, Schilling Lena, Schneider Christine, Schnurrbusch Volker, Schwab Andreas, Scuderi Benedetta, Seekatz Ralf, Sell Alexander, Serrano Sierra Rosa, Serra Sánchez Isabel, Sidl Günther, Sienkiewicz Bartłomiej, Sieper Lukas, Singer Christine, Sinkevičius Virginijus, Sjöstedt Jonas, Śmiszek Krzysztof, Smith Anthony, Smit Sander, Sokol Tomislav, Solier Diego, Solís Pérez Susana, Sommen Liesbet, Sonneborn Martin, Sorel Malika, Sousa Silva Hélder, Søvndal Villy, Squarta Marco, Staķis Mārtiņš, Stancanelli Raffaele, Ștefănuță Nicolae, Steger Petra, Stier Davor Ivo, Storm Kristoffer, Stöteler Sebastiaan, Stoyanov Stanislav, Strada Cecilia, Streit Joachim, Strik Tineke, Strolenberg Anna, Sturdza Şerban Dimitrie, Stürgkh Anna, Sypniewski Marcin, Szczerba Michał, Szekeres Pál, Tamburrano Dario, Tânger Corrêa António, Tarquinio Marco, Tarr Zoltán, Târziu Claudiu-Richard, Tavares Carla, Tegethoff Kai, Temido Marta, Teodorescu Georgiana, Teodorescu Måwe Alice, Terheş Cristian, Ter Laak Ingeborg, Terras Riho, Tertsch Hermann, Thionnet Pierre-Romain, Timgren Beatrice, Tinagli Irene, Tobback Bruno, Tobé Tomas, Tolassy Rody, Tomac Eugen, Tomašič Zala, Tomaszewski Waldemar, Tomc Romana, Tonin Matej, Toom Jana, Topo Raffaele, Torselli Francesco, Tosi Flavio, Toussaint Marie, Tovaglieri Isabella, Toveri Pekka, Tridico Pasquale, Trochu Laurence, Tsiodras Dimitris, Tudose Mihai, Turek Filip, Tynkkynen Sebastian, Uhrík Milan, Ušakovs Nils, Vaidere Inese, Valchev Ivaylo, Vălean Adina, Valet Matthieu, Van Brempt Kathleen, Vandendriessche Tom, Van Dijck Kris, Van Lanschot Reinier, Van Leeuwen Jessika, Vannacci Roberto, Van Overtveldt Johan, Van Sparrentak Kim, Varaut Alexandre, Vasconcelos Ana, Vasile-Voiculescu Vlad, Vautmans Hilde, Vedrenne Marie-Pierre, Ventola Francesco, Verheyen Sabine, Verougstraete Yvan, Veryga Aurelijus, Vešligaj Marko, Vicsek Annamária, Vieira Catarina, Vigenin Kristian, Vilimsky Harald, Vind Marianne, Vistisen Anders, Vivaldini Mariateresa, Volgin Petar, von der Schulenburg Michael, Vondra Alexandr, Voss Axel, Vozemberg-Vrionidi Elissavet, Vrecionová Veronika, Vázquez Lázara Adrián, Waitz Thomas, Walsh Maria, Walsmann Marion, Warborn Jörgen, Warnke Jan-Peter, Wąsik Maciej, Wawrykiewicz Michał, Wcisło Marta, Wechsler Andrea, Weimers Charlie, Werbrouck Séverine, Wiezik Michal, Winkler Iuliu, Winzig Angelika, Wiseler-Lima Isabel, Wiśniewska Jadwiga, Wölken Tiemo, Wolters Lara, Yar Lucia, Yon-Courtin Stéphanie, Zacharia Maria, Zajączkowska-Hernik Ewa, Zalewska Anna, Žalimas Dainius, Zan Alessandro, Zarzalejos Javier, Zdechovský Tomáš, Zdrojewski Bogdan Andrzej, Zijlstra Auke, Zīle Roberts, Zingaretti Nicola, Złotowski Kosma, Zoido Álvarez Juan Ignacio, Zovko Željana

    Excused:

    Burkhardt Delara, Friis Sigrid, Hazekamp Anja, Kemp Martine

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Serious negligence in the protection of minors in France – E-002372/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002372/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Catherine Griset (PfE), Aleksandar Nikolic (PfE), Virginie Joron (PfE), Valérie Deloge (PfE), Marie-Luce Brasier-Clain (PfE), Mathilde Androuët (PfE), Julie Rechagneux (PfE), Jean-Paul Garraud (PfE)

    As reported in the press[1], the state of affairs in France’s juvenile detention centres in France is scandalous: girls are exposed to prostitution, boys to drug trafficking, and now Islamist networks, particularly those run by the Muslim Brotherhood, are infiltrating them:

    Despite repeated warnings, this criminal neglect of children and teenagers, who are among the most vulnerable members of society, has been completely ignored by successive French governments.

    Worse still, through their irresponsible migration policy, these governments have aggravated the security situation in juvenile detention centres, even going so far as to place children of Jihadists returning from Syria in these centres.

    Furthermore, the French authorities do not monitor the training of professionals in secularism, which allows religious rules to be imposed in the canteens of these establishments.

    • 1.Is the Commission aware of similar cases of negligence in the protection of minors in other Member States?
    • 2.Are any European agencies, such as Europol or Eurojust, monitoring Islamist or criminal tendencies in homes for minors in Europe?

    Submitted: 12.6.2025

    • [1] https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/les-islamistes-ont-infiltre-les-foyers-pour-mineurs-et-les-associations-de-protection-de-l-enfance-20250601
    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Respect for national sovereignty in arms export control – E-002359/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002359/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mathilde Androuët (PfE)

    The Commission wants to relax national rules governing the movement of defence equipment between Member States, in order to reduce the administrative burden and speed up production of weapons in the EU[1]. Germany, Italy and Spain in particular share France’s concerns about this attempt to deregulate.

    A majority in the Council of the EU seems to be in favour, arguing that ‘EU arms deliveries to Ukraine were one of the factors to drive this review’, but reaffirmed ‘the EU’s commitment (…) to preventing diversion’[2], which poses a serious risk to the protection of critical technologies developed by our industrial firms.

    Seeking to accelerate arms production by removing national safeguards amounts to sacrificing the sovereignty of the peoples of Europe, as decisions on arms exports traditionally fall within the sovereign powers of our nations. Those decisions directly involve their diplomatic responsibility, their strategic security and their industrial autonomy.

    • 1.How will the Commission prevent this relaxation from facilitating unwanted transfers of sensitive know-how?
    • 2.Can it confirm that the Member States will retain control of their arms export policy, without any pressure or binding mechanism, in line with their freedom to make political assessments?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    • [1] “France says ‘non’ to loosening rules for arms exports in Europe”, 28 April 2025, Aurélie Pugnet, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence/news/france-launches-battle-against-looser-intra-eu-defence-export-controls/
    • [2] ‘Arms export control: Council reviews EU framework strengthening the control and accountability of international arms trade’, 14 April 2025, Council of the European Union press release, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/04/14/arms-export-control-council-reviews-eu-framework-strengthening-the-control-and-accountability-of-international-arms-trade/?
    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Degrowth and fashion: how upcycling innovators show us how to rethink and reuse waste

    Source: The Conversation – France – By Handan Vicdan, Associate professor of marketing, EM Lyon Business School

    Every year, some 100 billion garments are produced worldwide, and 92 million tonnes of clothing waste end up in landfills. Given this enormous amount of waste, it is logical to think that the only way forward is to degrow fashion. But can fashion and degrowth co-exist?

    Degrowth is defined as the planned reduction of production and consumption in a way that ensures equitable living. Degrowth principles, such as sufficiency, cooperation and care, clash with growth principles of maximization, commodification and efficiency. For the fashion industry, which is responsible for immense resource extraction and waste creation, reducing resource throughput and ensuring equitable value creation pose enduring challenges.

    While some governments and corporations encourage consumers to shop responsibly and reduce waste, collective responsibility is needed to facilitate a degrowth transition, which urges a fundamental shift in the way designers, manufacturers and brands approach fashion waste. Will circular practices help create a just and equitable industry? Is it possible to produce clothing locally and differently than “fast fashion” retailers?


    A weekly e-mail in English featuring expertise from scholars and researchers. It provides an introduction to the diversity of research coming out of the continent and considers some of the key issues facing European countries. Get the newsletter!

    Upcycling as a radical rethinking of our relationship with waste

    In a recent study, we explored how the circular fashion practice of upcycling – creative and caring transformation of discarded or waste clothes into something of higher value – pushes industry actors to rethink their relationship to fashion waste and give it value as a resource compatible with degrowth values. We examined how upcycling is practiced across institutions – brands, manufacturers, designers and NGOs – in Turkey, one of Europe’s largest textile producers.

    It is important to note that while conversations about recycling – the practice of breaking down textile waste into raw material through mechanical or chemical processes – are prevalent in the fashion world, the painful fact is that only 1% of clothes are recycled into new garments, meaning the majority of fashion waste is doomed to remain as waste. Through upcycling, on the other hand, waste is treated as a resource. Rather than viewing clothes as disposable, upcycling enables us to understand and care about our clothes’ journey and the people and ecosystems behind them. Converting discarded food into natural dyes for colouring fabric, or using sailcloth to make handbags, creates value through the creativity, materials, skill sharing, and caring involved.

    As part of green-growth efforts, some circular fashion actors treat waste as a commodity and try to maximize growth through efficient waste reduction. However, this is incompatible with degrowth. We need to reduce production of textiles and make use of existing textile waste, not just discard textile waste efficiently.




    À lire aussi :
    Green growth or degrowth: what is the right way to tackle climate change?


    Relational ways of working with waste, technology, nature and people

    Our research highlights the importance of the socio-ecological value of waste in industry upcycling practices. Such value is generated through social and solidarity networks of relations around waste, including between designers, manufacturers and upcycling brands, and involving nature and technology.

    We emphasise the growing interest in the story of waste material, which is reinforcing strong connections to waste and its origins. Upcycling designers highlight local and material heritage in the production of upcycled clothes, which is necessary to foster the ecological and material consciousness required for a degrowth transition. Designers we interviewed evoked the idea that “nature doesn’t waste anything”, and mentioned being inspired by and mimicking nature’s cycles in the design process.

    We also reflect on the kind of technology needed to support more relational, localised systems. The practices of upcycling designers and small brands highlight the value of the creation of waste-sharing platforms among industry actors. These platforms serve as waste libraries and provide opportunities to purchase different kinds of textile waste for upcycling.

    Making waste valuable

    Industry actors we interviewed said they are not simply trend chasers focused on profit, but seeking to build alternative ways of working with each other, nature, waste and technology. For example, designers partnered with local women in rural areas in Erzurum, Mugla and Kilis provinces to upcycle discarded fabrics into handwoven garments, preserving cultural heritage. A brand collected food waste to create natural textile dyes, collaborating with local cafés and friends in Istanbul. During the Covid-19 crisis, solidarity networks emerged between hospitals, textile manufacturers and designers to make upcycled uniforms for doctors and nurses. We have observed that manufacturers also repurpose waste to give gifts to employees, children and others. These practices aim to reduce waste and reconnect people to waste material, and enable the sharing of local knowledge and skills.

    Our data also demonstrates a concern over lack of circular literacy among industry actors. Currently, access to upcycling knowledge and skills, as well as waste material, happens through knowledge hubs and waste-sharing platforms. For example, working with sectoral representatives and local governments, one knowledge hub created a circular economy guide to raise industry awareness about ways to revalue and reduce textile waste.

    Upcycling is still a niche circular practice, and access to waste resources for initiatives, as well as lack of public funding and policy support for projects, remain important concerns. Nonetheless, when it is grounded in local communities, new narratives about materials, and care, upcycling can foster degrowth values in fashion.

    Handan Vicdan ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

    ref. Degrowth and fashion: how upcycling innovators show us how to rethink and reuse waste – https://theconversation.com/degrowth-and-fashion-how-upcycling-innovators-show-us-how-to-rethink-and-reuse-waste-258869

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Anti-ageing drug rapamycin extends life as effectively as restricting calories – new research

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Zahida Sultanova, Post Doctoral Research Fellow, School of Biological Sciences, University of East Anglia

    There’s a better way. Africa Studio/Shutterstock

    For centuries, humans have searched for ways to extend life. Alchemists never found the philosopher’s stone, but scientists have consistently shown that a longer life can be attained by eating less – at least in certain lab animals. But can we find a way to live longer while still enjoying our food?

    Compounds that mimic the biological effects of dieting could be the answer, and the two most popular diet-mimicking drugs are rapamycin and metformin. In a new study, my colleagues and I found that rapamycin prolongs life almost as consistently as eating less, whereas metformin does not.

    Eating less, or dietary restriction, has been the gold standard for achieving a longer life ever since a study nearly a century ago in which laboratory rats that ate less surprised scientists by outliving their well-fed lab mates.

    But for many people, sticking to a permanent diet is hard and far from enjoyable. Also, if taken to extremes, it can even be bad for health. That is why we wanted to know whether drugs that are dieting mimics could bring the same benefit of eating less without the unwanted side-effects.

    Rapamycin was first discovered in bacteria living in Easter Island soil in the 1970s, and medical professionals now use it to prevent organ-transplant rejection, as it is a powerful immunosuppressant. It works by blocking a molecular switch that tells cells when nutrients are abundant.

    Metformin, meanwhile, is a synthetic descendant of a compound found in French lilac (also known as goat’s rue) and is widely prescribed to control blood sugar in type 2 diabetes. Both drugs are involved in the body’s ability to sense nutrients and energy, so biologists like us hoped they might copy the mechanisms activated by eating less.

    To find out, we pooled the results of many studies to see if there were any overall patterns. We carefully examined thousands of scientific papers to finally home in on 167 studies on eight vertebrate species, from fish to monkeys, that provided sufficient details on survival and how the study was done. Then we compared three longevity strategies: eating less, taking rapamycin and taking metformin.

    We found that eating less still came out on top as the most consistent way to prolong life in all animals but rapamycin was close behind. Metformin, in contrast, showed no clear benefit. The life-extension effect of eating less was the same in both sexes, and it didn’t matter whether the diet plan involved eating smaller portions or intermittent fasting.

    That makes rapamycin one of the most exciting leads for new anti-ageing therapies. Ageing might not be considered a disease, but it is a risk factor behind many diseases from cancer to dementia. If we slow that underlying process, the benefit will be extra years of quality life and lower healthcare bills as the world’s population grows older.

    Rapamycin was first isolated from bacteria found in the soil on Easter Island.
    JHVEPhoto/Shutterstock.com

    Encouraging early signs, but we’re not quite there yet

    However, there are some important points to consider. First, we discovered considerable variation from experiment to experiment with some studies even showing that eating less or taking rapamycin reduced lifespan.

    Also, most of the evidence originates from mice and rats that have many of our genes but are clearly not exactly like us.

    Finally, rapamycin may have side-effects such as repressing immunity and reproduction. Researchers are now investigating milder doses of rapamycin to see if they provide the advantages without the side-effects.

    The preliminary signs are encouraging. In an ongoing human rapamycin trial, volunteers given low, intermittent doses of rapamycin have experienced positive effects on indicators of healthspan. For metformin, the human trial is still in progress and the findings are expected to be out in a few years time.

    For now, nobody should run to their doctor asking for prescriptions of rapamycin to live longer. But this drug, extracted from obscure soil bacteria, shows us that interfering with a single molecular pathway can be enough to mimic the benefits of eating less. The challenge is to use this discovery to produce therapies that make us healthier for longer without compromising our quality of life – or our taste for the occasional slice of chocolate cake.

    Dr. Zahida Sultanova works for the University of East Anglia and is funded by the Leverhulme Trust. She is a member of European Society of Evolutionary Biology (ESEB) and Ecology and Evolutionary Biology Society of Turkey (EkoEvo).

    ref. Anti-ageing drug rapamycin extends life as effectively as restricting calories – new research – https://theconversation.com/anti-ageing-drug-rapamycin-extends-life-as-effectively-as-restricting-calories-new-research-259169

    MIL OSI Analysis

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: New climate targets set

    Source: Scottish Government

    Carbon budgets to tackle climate change.

    Limits on the amount of greenhouse gases Scotland will emit over the coming decades have been announced as part of action to tackle climate change.

    The Carbon Budgets propose five-year, statutory limits on emissions from 2026 to 2045. The proposed budgets are in line with the advice from the independent Climate Change Committee (CCC) and the Scottish Government’s own assessments.

    The average level of emissions for Scotland over each five-year period are:

    • 57% lower than 1990 levels for 2026 – 2030
    • 69% lower than 1990 levels for 2031- 2035
    • 80% lower than 1990 levels for 2036 – 2040
    • 94% lower than 1990 levels for 2041 – 2045

    The proposals will be scrutinised by Parliament before being voted on in the autumn.

    Once the Carbon Budgets have been agreed, the Scottish Government will publish and consult on a new draft Climate Change Plan outlining the specific actions required to reduce emissions so as to meet each of the first three carbon budget targets, as well as setting out the associated costs and benefits.

    Cabinet Secretary for Climate Action and Energy Gillian Martin said:

    “Scotland is now halfway to our 2045 climate change target and is ahead of the UK as a whole in reducing long term emissions.

    “These Carbon Budgets will set clear limits on emissions for the coming decades in line with the independent advice of the UK Climate Change Committee.

    “When we publish our draft Climate Change Plan later this year, it will set out the policies needed to continue to reduce our emissions and meet our first three carbon budget targets.

    “It will not ask the impossible of people. We will not sacrifice people’s health or wealth.

    “While we welcome the UK CCC’s advice on how to stay within these limits, as they make clear, it is always for Scotland to decide whether those policies are right for us.

    “This means, for example, that we will chart our own path on forestry, going further than the CCC suggest. And, to ensure we protect rural communities and have a thriving rural economy, we will not adopt all their recommendations on agriculture and peatland and will instead meet our targets in a way which works for rural Scotland, including supporting and protecting our iconic livestock industries.  

    “These Carbon Budgets keep Scotland at the forefront of efforts to protect the planet and our Climate Change Plan will ensure the action we take is fair, ambitious and capable of rising to the emergency before us.”

    Background

    Carbon budgets provide a reliable and consistent framework to measure progress to net zero and are used by other countries including Japan, France, England and Wales. They are less prone to fluctuations than the Scottish Government’s previous approach of interim and annual targets, which could be affected by annual variations such as unseasonable weather or a global pandemic.

    Each carbon budget period will run from 1 January of the start year to 31 December of the final year.

    The budgets would continue to include emissions from international aviation and shipping, and there are no provisions to ‘carry over’ emissions from one carbon budget period to the next.

    Carbon budget breakdown totals:

    • 175  mega tonne 2026 – 2030
    • 126  mega tonne 2031- 2035
    • 81  mega tonne 2036 – 2040
    • 24  mega tonne 2040 – 2045

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Christine Lagarde: Strengthening economies in a stormy and fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the ninth Annual Research Conference “Economic and financial integration in a stormy and fragmenting world” organised by the National Bank of Ukraine and Narodowy Bank Polski in Kyiv, Ukraine

    Kyiv, 19 June 2025

    It is an honour to be here in Kyiv – a city that has come to symbolise resilience, dignity and the enduring spirit of freedom. Kyiv stands not only as the heart of Ukraine, but as a beacon of what it means to hold fast to democratic values in the face of immense challenge.

    As the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko once wrote, “In your own house – your own truth. Your own strength and freedom.” Ukraine’s fight today reminds all of Europe of this powerful truth: our security and prosperity rely on unity, on integration with our neighbours.

    In the face of Russia’s unjustified war of aggression, Ukrainians have demonstrated extraordinary courage and resilience in defence of their country.

    In my remarks today, and in keeping with the theme of this conference, I would like to reflect on the historical lessons we have learned about strengthening and integrating economies in an increasingly stormy and fragmented world.

    Experience shows that closer ties with the European neighbourhood can provide a strong foundation for Ukraine to rebuild and emerge stronger. And as geopolitical tensions rise and global supply chains fragment, the case for deeper regional cooperation has never been clearer.

    Europe’s own long history of integration offers valuable insights that can help guide Ukraine’s path forwards. Two key lessons stand out.

    First, while deeper integration increases the potential rewards, it also raises the risks if not managed wisely. Sound domestic policy frameworks are essential to maximise growth and safeguard stability.

    Second, the benefits of integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Maintaining them depends on continuous reform – but reforms must also deliver tangible improvements for people’s lives, and do so relatively quickly.

    The benefits of integration in a fragmenting world

    During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain fractured the European economy. Trade between East and West fell by half. This division was like imposing a 48% tariff – leading to immense welfare losses and isolating the Eastern bloc from global markets.[1]

    But the transformation since Europe’s eastern enlargement has been nothing short of remarkable. On average, countries that joined the EU in 2004 have nearly doubled their GDP per capita over the past two decades.

    Critically, this was not just about catching up from a low base. Between 2004 and 2019, the EU’s new Member States saw their GDP per capita grow 32% more than comparable non-EU countries.[2] The difference was deeper economic integration – and those that were already highly embedded in the regional economy gained the most.

    While all new members experienced gains, countries with stronger integration into regional value chains recorded nearly 10 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth compared with less integrated peers – regardless of geographic proximity.[3]

    This difference was driven mainly by technology and productivity spillovers. ECB research shows that a 10% increase in productivity among western EU firms translated into a 5% productivity gain for central and eastern European firms linked to their supply chains.[4]

    The case for regional integration is therefore clear – and in today’s increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape, it has become even more compelling.

    First, regional integration underpins growth.

    European economies are highly open, which means a world splintering into rival trading blocs poses clear risks to prosperity. Yet Europe’s most important trading partner is Europe itself: around 65% of euro area exports go to other European countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. For Ukraine too, Europe is the principal trading partner, accounting for over 50% of its goods trade in 2024.

    By deepening economic ties – more closely linking neighbouring economies – we can reduce our exposure to external shocks. Rising trade within our region can help offset losses in global markets.

    Second, regional integration strengthens resilience.

    One consequence of geopolitical fragmentation is the realignment of supply chains toward trusted partners. Nearly half of firms involved in external trade have already revised their strategies – or intend to do so – including relocating parts of their operations closer to home.[5] While this trend reduces strategic dependencies, it can also raise costs.

    Yet large integrated regions can mitigate these costs by replicating many of the benefits of globalisation at the regional level. Supply chains can be reorganised regionally, allowing each country to specialise based on its comparative advantage within regional value chains.

    Ukraine stands to benefit significantly from expanding these networks across the region – and the EU stands to benefit, too, from having Ukraine as a partner.[6]

    In the automotive sector, for example, Ukrainian firms already produce around 7% of all wire harnesses used in EU vehicles.[7] As the industry shifts towards electric vehicles, which require more complex wiring systems, Ukraine’s manufacturing base is well positioned to scale up and play a larger role in the EU value chain.

    Equally transformative is Ukraine’s drone industry, which has become one of the most advanced in the region. Drones are not only a critical component of modern warfare, but also a technology with substantial spillover effects and far-reaching dual-use applications.

    Indeed, the country’s ambitious goal of producing 4.5 million drones by 2025 has accelerated innovation in materials science, battery technology and 3D printing. These advances are already finding civilian applications in sectors such as logistics, agriculture and emergency response.

    In short, for both existing EU members and neighbouring countries like Ukraine, regional integration is both a path to prosperity and a strategic anchor in an increasingly fragmented world.

    Managing the risks of integration

    But examining the experience of countries that have used regional integration as a platform for growth and reform reveals two important lessons.

    The first is that if integration is not accompanied by appropriate reforms, it can create new vulnerabilities – especially in the financial sphere.

    Financial integration often brings volatile capital inflows, which can make it difficult to distinguish sustainable growth from unsustainable excesses in real time.

    One way this can happen is when productivity gains in tradable sectors, such as manufacturing, drive up wages in those sectors, which then spill over into higher wages in non-tradable sectors and push up overall inflation.[8]

    While this effect is a normal feature of catching-up, it can make it easy to mistake genuine convergence for economic overheating. If foreign capital is in fact driving financial imbalances – such as unsustainable real estate booms – countries may exhibit the same patterns of rising wages and inflation, masking underlying vulnerabilities.

    Another potential distortion is that capital inflows can significantly affect government fiscal positions by boosting tax revenues and creating the illusion of permanently greater fiscal space. This often leads to procyclical fiscal policies, with governments increasing spending or cutting taxes during boom periods – only to face fiscal stress when inflows reverse or growth slows.

    Both dynamics have been visible during Europe’s recent experience with regional integration.

    After the eastern enlargement, financial integration accelerated rapidly. Between 2003 and 2008, the new Member States experienced an extraordinary surge in capital inflows, averaging over 12% of GDP annually – twice the typical level for emerging markets globally.[9]

    Initially, this rapid financial integration brought clear benefits: it expanded access to credit, fuelled growth and enabled much-needed development. However, in many countries, foreign capital was disproportionately channelled into consumption and construction booms, while tax revenues rose sharply on the back of property transactions and buoyant domestic demand.[10] This led to widespread misallocation of private capital and inefficient public spending.

    Capital flows then reversed sharply when the global financial crisis struck, exposing these imbalances. Between December 2008 and May 2013, external bank liabilities in non-euro area central and eastern European countries declined by an average of 27% – with some countries experiencing drops of more than 50%.[11]

    Yet the risks associated with financial integration can be avoided. Not all countries in the region were affected equally. Those that performed better typically shared two key features.

    First, they had clear policies to channel foreign investment into productive sectors. Strong industrial strategies, a skilled workforce and integration into global supply chains helped direct capital towards manufacturing and tradable services – sectors that drive export growth and are less prone to unsustainable booms and asset bubbles.[12]

    Second, they maintained robust financial policy frameworks. Tighter capital requirements, active macroprudential measures and countercyclical buffers strengthened domestic banking sectors and curbed excessive mortgage lending. These tools enabled those countries to absorb large capital inflows without creating destabilising imbalances.[13]

    The lesson is clear: as countries integrate into the region, strong domestic policy frameworks are critical to ensuring that capital inflows support long-term growth rather than generating financial instability or inefficient allocation.

    This insight is especially relevant for Ukraine today as it charts its path towards recovery. If reconstruction proceeds as planned, the country could attract significant capital inflows over the next decade. But without the right safeguards, that capital risks being misallocated – undermining long-term productivity instead of strengthening it.

    There are encouraging signs. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area have already driven significant reforms in the financial sector. Ukraine’s banking regulation now aligns with more than 75% of EU standards, covering critical areas such as capital adequacy, governance and auditing.[14]

    The National Bank of Ukraine has adopted a risk-based supervisory model inspired by the Single Supervisory Mechanism – the system of banking supervision in Europe – markedly improving oversight. Despite extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine is also modernising its capital markets – consolidating exchanges, upgrading settlement systems and strengthening regulatory enforcement to attract long-term investors.

    These reforms are already delivering results: in 2023, Ukraine’s banking sector remained profitable and well capitalised despite the ongoing war – an outcome that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

    Still, further progress is essential, especially in fiscal governance. Strengthening public investment management will be critical to ensure that reconstruction funds are allocated transparently and efficiently.

    This is not just about meeting external standards. It is about ensuring that every euro, and every hryvnia, delivers real returns for the Ukrainian people.[15]

    Making integration sustainable

    However, reforms cannot be treated as a one-time effort.

    So, the second key lesson is that the benefits of regional integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Sustaining them requires continuous reform – and, just as importantly, it requires citizens to see visible, tangible improvements in their daily lives.

    In this context, there are two risks to watch out for.

    The first is that institutional reform momentum can fade if economic benefits do not follow quickly.

    Deeper regional integration typically begins with aligning framework conditions, such as legal systems, regulation and public administration. These areas often improve rapidly. But for the economic gains to materialise, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors must respond to the new incentives created – and this takes time.

    In the long run, evidence shows that countries with initially weaker institutions benefit the most from adopting higher standards.[16] But in the short run, if people only see the effort and not the payoff, public support for further reforms can weaken, putting long-term convergence at risk.

    The second risk is that structural shifts in the economy may weaken the link between integration and economic convergence over time.

    The integration of goods markets has traditionally driven convergence almost automatically, as foreign direct investment flows to countries with lower land and labour costs, supply chains relocate and lower-income countries benefit from technology transfers.

    As I mentioned earlier, this will remain an important mechanism even in an era of supply chain reshoring. But countries cannot rely on it as heavily as in the past. Future growth in intra-EU trade is expected to depend increasingly on services – particularly digital services.

    However, research shows that services sector activity tends to concentrate in larger, more affluent urban areas that exhibit the hallmarks of a knowledge economy: high tertiary education rates, strong technology and science sectors and robust digital infrastructure.[17]

    This means that deeper integration alone will not guarantee broad-based convergence across all regions. Over time, countries will need to invest more in education, skills and digitalisation to ensure they can build high levels of human capital.

    Maintaining the path of convergence is therefore not easy. But slowing down reform efforts is not the answer – especially in the shock-prone world we face today.

    There is a clear link between strong institutions and economic resilience. ECB research indicates that, during the pandemic, regions with lower institutional quality experienced – all else equal – an additional decline of around 4 percentage points in GDP per capita compared with the ten regions with the highest quality of government.[18]

    As our economies are increasingly buffeted by global turbulence, institutional backsliding therefore risks creating a vicious circle: repeated shocks can undermine economic convergence and further erode public confidence in the reform process.

    The best way for countries to sustain reform momentum is to recognise the importance of maintaining public support and, as far as possible, pair governance improvements with a focus on sectors where they have a clear competitive edge – and where deeper integration with the region can unlock significant and rapid growth opportunities.

    This way, the benefits of reforms will be felt more quickly and more widely.

    Ukraine is well positioned to put this into practice. Its IT sector is already relatively strong: IT services exports reached nearly USD 7 billion in 2023, making it one of the country’s leading export sectors despite the war.[19]

    Ukraine also produces around 130,000 STEM graduates each year – exceeding Germany and France[20] – and it ranks among the top five countries globally for certified IT professionals.[21] Successful IT clusters are active in several cities, and major foreign firms – including Apple, Microsoft, Boeing and Siemens – have established R&D operations in the country.

    A dynamic defence tech ecosystem is also taking shape[22], with Ukrainian start-ups attracting almost half a billion US dollars in funding in 2024 – surpassing many of their peers across central and eastern Europe.[23] Experience from countries like Israel suggests that such a foundation can enable the country to emerge as a broader technology hub in the years ahead.

    If Ukraine stays the course on institutional reform and continues to adapt its economy to new opportunities, despite the stormy environment, it can emerge as a vital engine of growth and a key contributor to the region’s future.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Ukraine stands at a pivotal moment – facing the hardships of war, the challenge of reconstruction and the opportunity of deeper regional integration.

    In a world marked by shifting geopolitical realities, such integration offers a clear path to recovery and lasting prosperity.

    The recent history of regional integration shows not only its immense benefits, but also the importance of managing transitional risks through robust policy frameworks. It also underlines the need to sustain reform over time by ensuring that people feel its benefits.

    I am confident that Ukraine will be able to fully realise its economic potential, turning the upheaval of today into the foundation for a dynamic future.

    As Ivan Franko, one of Ukraine’s greatest poets, once wrote: “even though life is but a moment and made up of moments, we carry eternity in our souls.”

    This enduring spirit captures the resilience and potential of Ukraine’s people and its economy – a spirit that will continue to drive advancement and renewal in the years ahead.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Christine Lagarde: Strengthening economies in a stormy and fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the ninth Annual Research Conference “Economic and financial integration in a stormy and fragmenting world” organised by the National Bank of Ukraine and Narodowy Bank Polski in Kyiv, Ukraine

    Kyiv, 19 June 2025

    It is an honour to be here in Kyiv – a city that has come to symbolise resilience, dignity and the enduring spirit of freedom. Kyiv stands not only as the heart of Ukraine, but as a beacon of what it means to hold fast to democratic values in the face of immense challenge.

    As the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko once wrote, “In your own house – your own truth. Your own strength and freedom.” Ukraine’s fight today reminds all of Europe of this powerful truth: our security and prosperity rely on unity, on integration with our neighbours.

    In the face of Russia’s unjustified war of aggression, Ukrainians have demonstrated extraordinary courage and resilience in defence of their country.

    In my remarks today, and in keeping with the theme of this conference, I would like to reflect on the historical lessons we have learned about strengthening and integrating economies in an increasingly stormy and fragmented world.

    Experience shows that closer ties with the European neighbourhood can provide a strong foundation for Ukraine to rebuild and emerge stronger. And as geopolitical tensions rise and global supply chains fragment, the case for deeper regional cooperation has never been clearer.

    Europe’s own long history of integration offers valuable insights that can help guide Ukraine’s path forwards. Two key lessons stand out.

    First, while deeper integration increases the potential rewards, it also raises the risks if not managed wisely. Sound domestic policy frameworks are essential to maximise growth and safeguard stability.

    Second, the benefits of integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Maintaining them depends on continuous reform – but reforms must also deliver tangible improvements for people’s lives, and do so relatively quickly.

    The benefits of integration in a fragmenting world

    During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain fractured the European economy. Trade between East and West fell by half. This division was like imposing a 48% tariff – leading to immense welfare losses and isolating the Eastern bloc from global markets.[1]

    But the transformation since Europe’s eastern enlargement has been nothing short of remarkable. On average, countries that joined the EU in 2004 have nearly doubled their GDP per capita over the past two decades.

    Critically, this was not just about catching up from a low base. Between 2004 and 2019, the EU’s new Member States saw their GDP per capita grow 32% more than comparable non-EU countries.[2] The difference was deeper economic integration – and those that were already highly embedded in the regional economy gained the most.

    While all new members experienced gains, countries with stronger integration into regional value chains recorded nearly 10 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth compared with less integrated peers – regardless of geographic proximity.[3]

    This difference was driven mainly by technology and productivity spillovers. ECB research shows that a 10% increase in productivity among western EU firms translated into a 5% productivity gain for central and eastern European firms linked to their supply chains.[4]

    The case for regional integration is therefore clear – and in today’s increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape, it has become even more compelling.

    First, regional integration underpins growth.

    European economies are highly open, which means a world splintering into rival trading blocs poses clear risks to prosperity. Yet Europe’s most important trading partner is Europe itself: around 65% of euro area exports go to other European countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. For Ukraine too, Europe is the principal trading partner, accounting for over 50% of its goods trade in 2024.

    By deepening economic ties – more closely linking neighbouring economies – we can reduce our exposure to external shocks. Rising trade within our region can help offset losses in global markets.

    Second, regional integration strengthens resilience.

    One consequence of geopolitical fragmentation is the realignment of supply chains toward trusted partners. Nearly half of firms involved in external trade have already revised their strategies – or intend to do so – including relocating parts of their operations closer to home.[5] While this trend reduces strategic dependencies, it can also raise costs.

    Yet large integrated regions can mitigate these costs by replicating many of the benefits of globalisation at the regional level. Supply chains can be reorganised regionally, allowing each country to specialise based on its comparative advantage within regional value chains.

    Ukraine stands to benefit significantly from expanding these networks across the region – and the EU stands to benefit, too, from having Ukraine as a partner.[6]

    In the automotive sector, for example, Ukrainian firms already produce around 7% of all wire harnesses used in EU vehicles.[7] As the industry shifts towards electric vehicles, which require more complex wiring systems, Ukraine’s manufacturing base is well positioned to scale up and play a larger role in the EU value chain.

    Equally transformative is Ukraine’s drone industry, which has become one of the most advanced in the region. Drones are not only a critical component of modern warfare, but also a technology with substantial spillover effects and far-reaching dual-use applications.

    Indeed, the country’s ambitious goal of producing 4.5 million drones by 2025 has accelerated innovation in materials science, battery technology and 3D printing. These advances are already finding civilian applications in sectors such as logistics, agriculture and emergency response.

    In short, for both existing EU members and neighbouring countries like Ukraine, regional integration is both a path to prosperity and a strategic anchor in an increasingly fragmented world.

    Managing the risks of integration

    But examining the experience of countries that have used regional integration as a platform for growth and reform reveals two important lessons.

    The first is that if integration is not accompanied by appropriate reforms, it can create new vulnerabilities – especially in the financial sphere.

    Financial integration often brings volatile capital inflows, which can make it difficult to distinguish sustainable growth from unsustainable excesses in real time.

    One way this can happen is when productivity gains in tradable sectors, such as manufacturing, drive up wages in those sectors, which then spill over into higher wages in non-tradable sectors and push up overall inflation.[8]

    While this effect is a normal feature of catching-up, it can make it easy to mistake genuine convergence for economic overheating. If foreign capital is in fact driving financial imbalances – such as unsustainable real estate booms – countries may exhibit the same patterns of rising wages and inflation, masking underlying vulnerabilities.

    Another potential distortion is that capital inflows can significantly affect government fiscal positions by boosting tax revenues and creating the illusion of permanently greater fiscal space. This often leads to procyclical fiscal policies, with governments increasing spending or cutting taxes during boom periods – only to face fiscal stress when inflows reverse or growth slows.

    Both dynamics have been visible during Europe’s recent experience with regional integration.

    After the eastern enlargement, financial integration accelerated rapidly. Between 2003 and 2008, the new Member States experienced an extraordinary surge in capital inflows, averaging over 12% of GDP annually – twice the typical level for emerging markets globally.[9]

    Initially, this rapid financial integration brought clear benefits: it expanded access to credit, fuelled growth and enabled much-needed development. However, in many countries, foreign capital was disproportionately channelled into consumption and construction booms, while tax revenues rose sharply on the back of property transactions and buoyant domestic demand.[10] This led to widespread misallocation of private capital and inefficient public spending.

    Capital flows then reversed sharply when the global financial crisis struck, exposing these imbalances. Between December 2008 and May 2013, external bank liabilities in non-euro area central and eastern European countries declined by an average of 27% – with some countries experiencing drops of more than 50%.[11]

    Yet the risks associated with financial integration can be avoided. Not all countries in the region were affected equally. Those that performed better typically shared two key features.

    First, they had clear policies to channel foreign investment into productive sectors. Strong industrial strategies, a skilled workforce and integration into global supply chains helped direct capital towards manufacturing and tradable services – sectors that drive export growth and are less prone to unsustainable booms and asset bubbles.[12]

    Second, they maintained robust financial policy frameworks. Tighter capital requirements, active macroprudential measures and countercyclical buffers strengthened domestic banking sectors and curbed excessive mortgage lending. These tools enabled those countries to absorb large capital inflows without creating destabilising imbalances.[13]

    The lesson is clear: as countries integrate into the region, strong domestic policy frameworks are critical to ensuring that capital inflows support long-term growth rather than generating financial instability or inefficient allocation.

    This insight is especially relevant for Ukraine today as it charts its path towards recovery. If reconstruction proceeds as planned, the country could attract significant capital inflows over the next decade. But without the right safeguards, that capital risks being misallocated – undermining long-term productivity instead of strengthening it.

    There are encouraging signs. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area have already driven significant reforms in the financial sector. Ukraine’s banking regulation now aligns with more than 75% of EU standards, covering critical areas such as capital adequacy, governance and auditing.[14]

    The National Bank of Ukraine has adopted a risk-based supervisory model inspired by the Single Supervisory Mechanism – the system of banking supervision in Europe – markedly improving oversight. Despite extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine is also modernising its capital markets – consolidating exchanges, upgrading settlement systems and strengthening regulatory enforcement to attract long-term investors.

    These reforms are already delivering results: in 2023, Ukraine’s banking sector remained profitable and well capitalised despite the ongoing war – an outcome that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

    Still, further progress is essential, especially in fiscal governance. Strengthening public investment management will be critical to ensure that reconstruction funds are allocated transparently and efficiently.

    This is not just about meeting external standards. It is about ensuring that every euro, and every hryvnia, delivers real returns for the Ukrainian people.[15]

    Making integration sustainable

    However, reforms cannot be treated as a one-time effort.

    So, the second key lesson is that the benefits of regional integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Sustaining them requires continuous reform – and, just as importantly, it requires citizens to see visible, tangible improvements in their daily lives.

    In this context, there are two risks to watch out for.

    The first is that institutional reform momentum can fade if economic benefits do not follow quickly.

    Deeper regional integration typically begins with aligning framework conditions, such as legal systems, regulation and public administration. These areas often improve rapidly. But for the economic gains to materialise, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors must respond to the new incentives created – and this takes time.

    In the long run, evidence shows that countries with initially weaker institutions benefit the most from adopting higher standards.[16] But in the short run, if people only see the effort and not the payoff, public support for further reforms can weaken, putting long-term convergence at risk.

    The second risk is that structural shifts in the economy may weaken the link between integration and economic convergence over time.

    The integration of goods markets has traditionally driven convergence almost automatically, as foreign direct investment flows to countries with lower land and labour costs, supply chains relocate and lower-income countries benefit from technology transfers.

    As I mentioned earlier, this will remain an important mechanism even in an era of supply chain reshoring. But countries cannot rely on it as heavily as in the past. Future growth in intra-EU trade is expected to depend increasingly on services – particularly digital services.

    However, research shows that services sector activity tends to concentrate in larger, more affluent urban areas that exhibit the hallmarks of a knowledge economy: high tertiary education rates, strong technology and science sectors and robust digital infrastructure.[17]

    This means that deeper integration alone will not guarantee broad-based convergence across all regions. Over time, countries will need to invest more in education, skills and digitalisation to ensure they can build high levels of human capital.

    Maintaining the path of convergence is therefore not easy. But slowing down reform efforts is not the answer – especially in the shock-prone world we face today.

    There is a clear link between strong institutions and economic resilience. ECB research indicates that, during the pandemic, regions with lower institutional quality experienced – all else equal – an additional decline of around 4 percentage points in GDP per capita compared with the ten regions with the highest quality of government.[18]

    As our economies are increasingly buffeted by global turbulence, institutional backsliding therefore risks creating a vicious circle: repeated shocks can undermine economic convergence and further erode public confidence in the reform process.

    The best way for countries to sustain reform momentum is to recognise the importance of maintaining public support and, as far as possible, pair governance improvements with a focus on sectors where they have a clear competitive edge – and where deeper integration with the region can unlock significant and rapid growth opportunities.

    This way, the benefits of reforms will be felt more quickly and more widely.

    Ukraine is well positioned to put this into practice. Its IT sector is already relatively strong: IT services exports reached nearly USD 7 billion in 2023, making it one of the country’s leading export sectors despite the war.[19]

    Ukraine also produces around 130,000 STEM graduates each year – exceeding Germany and France[20] – and it ranks among the top five countries globally for certified IT professionals.[21] Successful IT clusters are active in several cities, and major foreign firms – including Apple, Microsoft, Boeing and Siemens – have established R&D operations in the country.

    A dynamic defence tech ecosystem is also taking shape[22], with Ukrainian start-ups attracting almost half a billion US dollars in funding in 2024 – surpassing many of their peers across central and eastern Europe.[23] Experience from countries like Israel suggests that such a foundation can enable the country to emerge as a broader technology hub in the years ahead.

    If Ukraine stays the course on institutional reform and continues to adapt its economy to new opportunities, despite the stormy environment, it can emerge as a vital engine of growth and a key contributor to the region’s future.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Ukraine stands at a pivotal moment – facing the hardships of war, the challenge of reconstruction and the opportunity of deeper regional integration.

    In a world marked by shifting geopolitical realities, such integration offers a clear path to recovery and lasting prosperity.

    The recent history of regional integration shows not only its immense benefits, but also the importance of managing transitional risks through robust policy frameworks. It also underlines the need to sustain reform over time by ensuring that people feel its benefits.

    I am confident that Ukraine will be able to fully realise its economic potential, turning the upheaval of today into the foundation for a dynamic future.

    As Ivan Franko, one of Ukraine’s greatest poets, once wrote: “even though life is but a moment and made up of moments, we carry eternity in our souls.”

    This enduring spirit captures the resilience and potential of Ukraine’s people and its economy – a spirit that will continue to drive advancement and renewal in the years ahead.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Taisugar Holds 2025 Annual Shareholders’ Meeting, Approves NT$0.9 Cash Dividend per Share

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    Taiwan Sugar Corporation (Taisugar) convened its 2025 Annual Shareholders’ Meeting at 10 a.m. today (June 12) at the Tainan Head Office. According to reports presented at the meeting, Taisugar recorded NT$31.435 billion in operating revenue and NT$2.941 billion in operating profit for 2024, exceeding budgeted figures by NT$1.641 billion and NT$1.363 billion, respectively. Taisugar successfully achieved its financial targets and approved a cash dividend of NT$0.9 per share for the fiscal year.

    Taisugar stated that in response to changes in the market environment, it continued to refine its business operations and implement goal-oriented management, resulting in steady growth in revenue and profit. In support of the government’s net-zero carbon policy, Taisugar had installed a total of 543.64 MW in solar photovoltaic facilities by the end of 2024. Additional initiatives include forest carbon sink projects, international smallholder carbon farming projects, conversion of factory boilers to natural gas (reducing annual carbon emissions by more than 20,000 tCO2e), and a sugar mill biomass carbon capture and utilization project. Taisugar is also accelerating the modernization of eco-friendly pig farms to advance its low-carbon transformation goals. Moreover, Taisugar continues to make land available to support the development of social housing and long-term care services in line with government policies. Six educational campuses under its administration have been converted into social housing units, addressing the housing needs of youth and underprivileged groups.

    Taisugar also reported strong performance over the past year in both sustainability and product and service excellence. The company received numerous honors, including the Taiwan Top 100 Sustainability Exemplary Enterprises Award, the TSAA Sustainability Action Award, the National Enterprise Environmental Protection Silver Award, an award at the Taiwan International Orchid Show, the Eco-Friendly Hotel Certification, the ITI Superior Taste Award-often referred to as the “Michelin Guide of the food industry”-and the Gold Award for Excellence in Occupational Safety and Health Engineering. In terms of innovation, Taisugar received the Agri-Tech Startups Award. In collaboration with the National Kaohsiung. University of Hospitality and Tourism, the company developed terroir-inspired rhum agricole using fresh sugarcane juice . After winning recognition at the World Spirits Competition in both 2023 and 2024, the rum once again shone this year, receiving two Grand Gold Medals at the Vinalies Internationales Competition in France. Taisugar also teamed up with Michelin-starred restaurants to launch curated food and rum pairing events, fully showcasing the achievements of local food and beverage innovation through industry-academia collaboration.

    Taisugar stated that these awards are not only a form of recognition but also a source of motivation. Looking ahead, the company will continue to strengthen corporate governance, fulfill its corporate social responsibilities, and stay committed to its sustainable net-zero goals. This year, under the theme of “Safe to Eat, Fun to Explore, and Green Living, ” Taisugar has thoughtfully curated a set of shareholder gifts that are both practical and aligned with sustainability values. The gift set includes one pack each of Taisugar’s “Tang Gan Mi Tian” organic white rice and brown rice (900g per pack), two one-way 50% discount coupons for the Chiayi Suantou Sugar Factory Cultural Park’s vintage narrow-gauge train ride to the Southern Branch of the National Palace Museum, and a reusable canvas tote bag featuring the “Xun Mi Narrow-Gauge Train” as its key visual. This well-rounded and distinctive selection reflects Taisugar’s corporate culture and brand philosophy. With these gifts, shareholders can enjoy premium, safe, and chemical-free organic rice; experience a nostalgic journey on the vintage narrow-gauge train celebrating a century of sugar history and millennia of cultural heritage; and embrace eco-friendly habits by using the canvas tote bag in daily life-collectively supporting a greener and more sustainable lifestyle.

    TSC News Contact Person:
    Chang Mu-Jung
    Public Relations, Department of Secretariat, TSC
    Contact Number: 886-6-337-8819 / 886-920-636-951
    Email:a63449@taisugar.com.tw

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: E. Macron called for talks to resolve Iranian nuclear crisis and condemned escalation of conflict

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    PARIS, June 19 (Xinhua) — French President Emmanuel Macron said on Wednesday that a lasting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue can only be achieved through negotiations.

    During a meeting of the National Defense and Security Council, he reiterated that France is committed to an uncompromising dialogue with Iran.

    The president also expressed concern about the ongoing escalation of tensions between Israel and Iran, with strikes increasingly targeting targets unrelated to the Islamic Republic’s nuclear and missile programs, the Elysee Palace said in a press release.

    “It is urgent to stop these military operations, which pose a serious threat to regional security,” the Elysee Palace said.

    E. Macron also instructed the Minister of Foreign Affairs to propose in the coming days, in close consultation with key European partners, a credible plan for a negotiated settlement that would end the conflict. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • Young guns shine as Juventus hammer Al-Ain 5-0 at Club World Cup

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Randal Kolo Muani and Francisco Conceicao both scored twice as the young guns of Juventus made a statement in their Club World Cup opener with a dominant 5-0 win over Emirati club Al-Ain on Wednesday.

    Kolo Muani grabbed both of his goals in the first half, Conceicao scored either side of the break while Turkey forward Kenan Yildiz also found the net as Juventus dazzled the crowd at Audi Field with some mesmeric football.

    “I’m very happy to win the game, the team played a great game so we’re happy and now we’ll get ready for the next game,” said Kolo Muani.

    “I finished last season well and we’ve started this good as well.”

    The convincing victory sent Juventus top of Group G level on three points with England’s Manchester City, who beat Wydad Casablanca 2-0 earlier on Wednesday.

    Twice Asian champions Al-Ain conceded two thirds of the pitch for much of the first half and Juventus midfielder Khephren Thuram ran the show from about 35 metres out with Conceicao and Yildiz buzzing around in front of him.

    A neat exchange of passing in the 11th minute set Alberto Costa free on the edge of the box and the young Portuguese right back lofted over a cross which Kolo Muani met with a powerful header at the far post for the opening goal.

    Costa’s fine work down the right flank 10 minutes later set up the second goal for Conceicao, who ghosted across the box before unleashing a shot which took a deflection and flew over the outstretched arms of Rui Patricio in the Al-Ain goal.

    A further 10 minutes on and the lively Yildiz took the ball on the left before cutting inside, taking two touches and firing a shot into the net off the post.

    Al-Ain had to push forward if they were going to get anything out of the game but they paid the price for their ambition in stoppage time at the end of the first half.

    A through ball from Thuram found Kolo Muani peeling off the last defender and the French striker slotted the ball into net with the outside of his right foot to take his tally to five goals in his last six games for The Old Lady.

    The Emirati side had a goal ruled out for offside at the start of the second half and skipper Kodjo Laba drew a fine save out of Juventus goalkeeper Michele Di Gregorio in the 49th minute.

    Conceicao, however, put the game well beyond them in the 58th minute when he skipped into the box from the right wing and beat Portuguese Patricio for the second time with a fine low strike.

    Patricio finally showed the quality that earned him 108 Portugal caps to deny Kolo Muani a hat-trick in the 66th minute and Juventus substitute Douglas Luiz came close to further blowing out the scoreline in the last couple of minutes.

    Juventus next play Morroco’s Wydad in Philadephia on Sunday, while Al-Ain, who lost to Real Madrid in the 2018 Club World Cup final, face City in Atlanta later the same day.

    -Reuters

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Can a foreign government hack WhatsApp? A cybersecurity expert explains how that might work

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By David Tuffley, Senior Lecturer in Applied Ethics & CyberSecurity, Griffith University

    On The Back Of Camera/Shutterstock

    Earlier today, Iranian officials urged the country’s citizens to remove the messaging platform WhatsApp from their smartphones. Without providing any supporting evidence, they alleged the app gathers user information to send to Israel.

    WhatsApp has rejected the allegations. In a statement to Associated Press, the Meta-owned messaging platform said it was concerned “these false reports will be an excuse for our services to be blocked at a time when people need them most”. It added that it does not track users’ location nor the personal messages people are sending one another.

    It is impossible to independently assess the allegations, given Iran provided no publicly accessible supporting evidence.

    But we do know that even though WhatsApp has strong privacy and security features, it isn’t impenetrable. And there is at least one country that has previously been able to penetrate it: Israel.

    3 billion users

    WhatsApp is a free messaging app owned by Meta. With around 3 billion users worldwide and growing fast, it can send text messages, calls and media over the internet.

    It uses strong end-to-end encryption meaning only the sender and recipient can read messages; not even WhatsApp can access their content. This ensures strong privacy and security.

    Advanced cyber capability

    The United States is the world leader in cyber capability. This term describes the skills, technologies and resources that enable nations to defend, attack, or exploit digital systems and networks as a powerful instrument of national power.

    But Israel also has advanced cyber capability, ranking alongside the United Kingdom, China, Russia, France and Canada.

    Israel has a documented history of conducting sophisticated cyber operations. This includes the widely cited Stuxnet attack that targeted Iran’s nuclear program more than 15 years ago. Israeli cyber units, such as Unit 8200, are renowned for their technical expertise and innovation in both offensive and defensive operations.

    Seven of the top 10 global cybersecurity firms maintain R&D centers in Israel, and Israeli startups frequently lead in developing novel offensive and defensive cyber tools.

    A historical precedent

    Israeli firms have repeatedly been linked to hacking WhatsApp accounts, most notably through the Pegasus spyware developed by Israeli-based cyber intelligence company NSO Group. In 2019, it exploited WhatsApp vulnerabilities to compromise 1,400 users, including journalists, activists and politicians.

    Last month, a US federal court ordered the NSO Group to pay WhatsApp and Meta nearly US$170 million in damages for the hack.

    Another Israeli company, Paragon Solutions, also recently targeted nearly 100 WhatsApp accounts. The company used advanced spyware to access private communications after they had been de-encrypted.

    These kinds of attacks often use “spearphishing”. This is distinct from regular phishing attacks, which generally involve an attacker sending malicious links to thousands of people.

    Instead, spearphishing involves sending targeted, deceptive messages or files to trick specific individuals into installing spyware. This grants attackers full access to their devices – including de-encrypted WhatsApp messages.

    A spearphishing email might appear to come from a trusted colleague or organisation. It might ask the recipient to urgently review a document or reset a password, leading them to a fake login page or triggering a malware download.

    Protecting yourself from ‘spearphishing’

    To avoid spearphishing, people should scrutinise unexpected emails or messages, especially those conveying a sense of urgency, and never click suspicious links or download unknown attachments.

    Hovering the mouse cursor over a link will reveal the name of the destination. Suspicious links are those with strange domain names and garbled text that has nothing to do with the purported sender. Simply hovering without clicking is not dangerous.

    Enable two-factor authentication, keep your software updated, and verify requests coming through trusted channels. Regular cybersecurity training also helps users spot and resist these targeted attacks.

    David Tuffley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Can a foreign government hack WhatsApp? A cybersecurity expert explains how that might work – https://theconversation.com/can-a-foreign-government-hack-whatsapp-a-cybersecurity-expert-explains-how-that-might-work-259261

    MIL OSI Analysis

  • Iran, Israel trade fresh air attacks as Trump weighs US involvement

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Iran and Israel traded further air attacks on Thursday as President Donald Trump kept the world guessing about whether the United States would join Israel’s bombardment of Iranian nuclear facilities.

    A week of Israeli air and missile strikes against its major rival has wiped out the top echelon of Iran’s military command, damaged its nuclear capabilities and killed hundreds of people, while Iranian retaliatory strikes have killed two dozen civilians in Israel.

    The worst-ever conflict between the rivals has raised fears that it will draw in world powers and rock regional stability already undermined by the spillover effects of the Gaza war.

    Speaking to reporters outside the White House on Wednesday, Trump declined to say if he had made any decision on whether to join Israel’s air campaign. “I may do it. I may not do it. I mean, nobody knows what I’m going to do,” he said.

    Trump in later remarks said Iranian officials wanted to come to Washington for a meeting and that “we may do that.” But he added, “It’s a little late” for such talks.

    Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rebuked Trump’s earlier call for Iran to surrender in a recorded speech played on television, his first appearance since Friday.

    The Americans “should know that any U.S. military intervention will undoubtedly be accompanied by irreparable damage,” he said. “The Iranian nation will not surrender.”

    Iran denies it is seeking nuclear weapons and says its program is for peaceful purposes only. The International Atomic Energy Agency said last week Tehran was in breach of its non-proliferation obligations for the first time in 20 years.

    The foreign ministers of Germany, France and Britain plan to hold nuclear talks with their Iranian counterpart on Friday in Geneva to urge Iran to return to the negotiating table, a German diplomatic source told Reuters.

    But while diplomatic efforts continue, some residents of Tehran, a city of 10 million people, on Wednesday jammed highways out of the city as they sought sanctuary from intensified Israeli airstrikes.

    The Wall Street Journal said Trump had told senior aides he approved attack plans on Iran but was holding off on giving the final order to see if Tehran would abandon its nuclear program.

    Senior U.S. officials are preparing for the possibility of a strike on Iran in the coming days, Bloomberg News reported on Wednesday, citing people familiar with the matter.

    DRONE ATTACKS

    Early on Thursday, air defences were activated in Tehran, intercepting drones on the outskirts of the capital, the semi-official SNN news agency reported. Iranian news agencies also reported it had arrested 18 “enemy agents” who were building drones for Israeli attacks in the northeastern city of Mashhad.

    Israel’s military said sirens sounded in northern Israel and in the Jordan Valley on Thursday and that it had intercepted two drones launched from Iran.

    The Iranian missile salvoes mark the first time in decades of shadow war and proxy conflict that a significant number of projectiles fired from Iran have penetrated defences, killing Israelis in their homes.

    Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in a video released by his office on Wednesday, said Israel was “progressing step by step” towards eliminating threats posed by Iran’s nuclear sites and ballistic missile arsenal.

    “We are hitting the nuclear sites, the missiles, the headquarters, the symbols of the regime,” Netanyahu said.

    Israel, which is not a party to the international Non-Proliferation Treaty, is the only country in the Middle East believed to have nuclear weapons. Israel does not deny or confirm that.

    Netanyahu also thanked Trump, “a great friend of the state of Israel,” for standing by its side in the conflict, saying the two were in continuous contact.

    Trump has veered from proposing a swift diplomatic end to the war to suggesting the United States might join it.

    In social media posts on Tuesday, he mused about killing Khamenei.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin, asked what his reaction would be if Israel did kill Iran’s Supreme Leader with the assistance of the United States, said on Thursday: “I do not even want to discuss this possibility. I do not want to.”

    Putin said all sides should look for ways to end hostilities in a way that ensured both Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear power and Israel’s right to the unconditional security of the Jewish state.

    A source familiar with internal discussions said Trump and his team were considering options that included joining Israel in strikes against Iranian nuclear installations.

    Since Friday, Iran has fired around 400 missiles at Israel, some 40 of which have pierced air defences, killing 24 people, all of them civilians, according to Israeli authorities.

    Iran has reported at least 224 deaths in Israeli attacks, mostly civilians, but has not updated that toll for days.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Nirmala Naidoo to the annual conference of the National Campus and Community Radio Association

    Source: Government of Canada News

    Nanaimo, British Columbia
    June 18, 2025

    Nirmala Naidoo, Commissioner for Alberta and the Northwest Territories
    Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC)

    Check against delivery

    Thank you for the invitation to speak today and for that warm welcome. Before I begin, I would like to acknowledge that we are on the traditional territory of the Coast Salish Peoples, including the traditional territories of the Snuneymuxw and Snaw-Naw-As First Nations. I thank them and pay respect to their Elders.

    Let me begin by saying: it’s great to be among my fellow broadcasters. In my short time with you today so far, I can see the excitement and exuberance for community broadcasting and news that so many of you have. It’s wonderful to be around that energy once again.

    My background is in the other side of broadcasting, of course, in television. But as a former journalist and anchor, and current CRTC Commissioner for Alberta and the Northwest Territories, I share your passion. Across my career I have seen firsthand how broadcasting connects people and how trusted sources of news can help inform public debate.

    And community and campus radio, as you all know, is all about connecting people. From its beginnings at Queen’s University amongst some student hobbyists in the 1920s, community and campus radio has blossomed into a vibrant community. There are stations across our country, from CHLY-FM here in Nanaimo to CJBI-FM broadcasting from Bell Island in Newfoundland and Labrador, and everywhere in between. Each of them plays a vital role in connecting Canadians in their communities to new opportunities, new artists, and the local news and information that matters to them.

    Campus and community stations continue to be a great entry point into radio for so many Canadians. I will give you a personal example from my own time at the University of Alberta to illustrate what I mean. For myself and so many of my fellow students, our campus radio station at the University of Alberta, CJSR, was our gateway into the world of local broadcasting. At CJSR we created content tailored specifically to our audience – our fellow students and the surrounding community.

    It was staffed and supported by the community it served. It was a place of hands-on learning, where students gained the real-world experience that would later become a career for some. It might have been only a few steps from our classrooms, but our time there prepared us better than any textbook could have.

    For some, campus and community radio provided the first step to a career in broadcast journalism or radio production. For others, community and campus radio provided a launching pad to stardom: Bob Cole, the longtime Hockey Night in Canada announcer started his career as a volunteer at CHFM in St. John’s; Tom Green hosted an overnight program in Ottawa on CHUO-FM; and back at the University of Alberta, I was lucky enough to witness k.d. lang’s rise from precocious talent to international star. Though lang would have certainly risen to the top regardless, I like to think CJSR played a small role in her emergence as we continually wore out recordings of her local band k.d. and the Reclines long before the artist’s Grammy wins and appearances on David Letterman.

    Connecting Canadians through broadcasting

    These are the types of Canadian success stories we love to see. And currently at the CRTC, we are focused on modernizing our broadcasting framework so we can ensure those same opportunities are still there for Canada’s next generation of radio producers, broadcast journalists, and yes, hockey announcers, comedians, and country western virtuosos.

    But before I get to the details of some of our ongoing proceedings, I’d like to give you one more example from my experiences, this one from earlier this year. I want to show you how the goals of NCRA members and those of the CRTC are often aligned and, importantly, how you can help us reach our goals together.

    Earlier this year I had the privilege of being on a panel that was considering two applications for a new radio licence to serve the community of Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories. The CRTC is still considering the applications and the public record, and we expect to issue our decision in the coming weeks.

    But I bring up that hearing not to discuss the decision, but to relate the incredible levels of engagement we saw in Yellowknife concerning local radio. Over two days in Yellowknife we convened in front of a packed and engaged audience, many of whom lined up first thing in the morning to ensure a seat. And in February, that meant braving temperatures of minus forty – you would have thought k.d. lang herself was going to be there.

    We heard from local and Indigenous residents, musicians, journalists, business owners and more. We heard, and could clearly see, how important local radio was to this community. How they depended on local news from trusted local sources. How evacuees and first responders relied on local radio for vital information during last year’s devastating wildfires. And we heard how important it was for those stations to be staffed and run by people in their communities who know their markets.

    I imagine for many of you that is starting to sound familiar, and well it should. Local radio is grounded in the communities they serve, whether they are broadcasting in remote areas or for localized communities living in our largest cities. And at the CRTC, we are working to ensure the conditions are favourable for radio stations to be part of the future of Canadian broadcasting.

    But to do that, we need your help. The CRTC is an independent quasi-judicial tribunal that regulates the Canadian communications sector in the public interest and makes decisions based on the public record. And that last point is key. All of our decisions are based on the interventions, submissions, and contributions of anyone who wants to provide input on our proceedings – from the largest broadcasters to members of the public.

    So when it comes to shaping the future of Canadian broadcasting, everyone has a role to play. You know your communities better than anyone else – we need your input to help us understand the needs of your stations and the communities you serve.

    Public participation is critical to CRTC proceedings. It’s how we ensure that the decisions we make are in the public interest, and how we ensure Canadians have access to the media, entertainment, and news that they enjoy and need.

    There are so many ways you can engage with the CRTC: by submitting a formal intervention, chatting with me here today, or simply giving us a call with your questions. Some of my colleagues are here with me today. They would be happy to answer your questions, and we have brought some cards in case you need to contact us in the future.

    When you take part in our proceedings, you are giving your stations and the communities you serve a voice in the regulatory process. So I encourage you to do so, either as part of the NCRA, your individual station, or simply as someone who listens and watches to content on radio, television or online.

    I would like to take the rest of my time today to turn to the broadcasting modernization process, our environment, and a few of our ongoing proceedings.

    Modernizing the broadcasting industry and ongoing radio policy proceedings

    We started the modernization process soon after Parliament adopted the Online Streaming Act, which amended the Broadcasting Act. While we have been moving quickly, this is the first major overhaul of Canada’s broadcasting frameworks since 1993 – it’s a big job.

    And as we have been working, we have been watching alongside all of you as the world in which we operate has become more unstable and uncertain. We know that the broadcasting industry is not immune to those currents of change.

    So it has made our job doubly difficult: we must do what we can to address the current challenges facing the broadcasting industry while also ensuring the frameworks we create will sustain a successful broadcasting system years into the future.

    We are taking into account both of these goals in all of our proceedings. There are two ongoing in particular concerning audio broadcasting that I would like to touch on.

    The first is our proceeding focused on reducing the regulatory burden on radio stations operating in Canada. By streamlining requirements, our goal is to help radio stations remain dynamic and competitive while still ensuring their programming serves the public interest.

    I know the NCRA submitted an intervention in this proceeding, and we thank you for it. We will continue to review all the information submitted on the public record, and will make a decision on this key issue as quickly as possible.

    Secondly, there is a review of the definition of Canadian content for audio services. In line with our efforts on the audio-visual side, we need to modernize our approach to radio and audio regulatory policy. So earlier this year, we sought comments on the definition for audio services, and received comments from a wide range of groups, communities, and industry members. Everything submitted to us will help us update the definition of Canadian content for audio services.

    This included French-speaking, Indigenous and official language-minority communities – many of which I know your members serve. If we are going to ensure our broadcasting system supports our homegrown musicians, we need to ensure the definition of Canadian content captures the full breadth of our country.

    The updated definition will be used to support the creation, distribution, and discoverability of Canadian and Indigenous audio content across radio and online audio streaming platforms.

    Ultimately, we want to ensure our system gives Canadians access to the audio and music content they want, and our aim is to help ensure that content can be easily discovered and enjoyed.

    And the timing for this update is fortuitous – we can see that perhaps at no other time in Canadian history has there been such an appetite for Canadian talent and a desire across the country to see Canadians succeed. We want to help ensure our broadcasting frameworks are creating the conditions for Canadian musicians, artists, and performers to excel. 

    Supporting local news

    At the same time, we are focused on ensuring local news is part of the Canadian broadcasting system and widely available. Given the instability I mentioned before and the growing prevalence of natural disasters like the wildfires currently affecting the Prairies, ensuring local news and information is widely available is more critical than it has ever been.

    Just as we heard in Yellowknife, we know this includes community radio stations. That’s why we decided the Community Radio Fund of Canada would receive additional funding as part of last year’s decision on base contributions that online services must make to support the Canadian broadcasting system. Community, campus and Indigenous stations can benefit through the Local Journalism Initiative administered by the Fund.

    And we are also currently looking at how to help support local news produced by commercial radio stations. Late last year we held a consultation on this, and we are exploring how we can best support local stations in rural and remote communities. We are currently considering an application submitted by the Canadian Association of Broadcasters to run this fund, as well as all submissions made to us as part of this proceeding. We hope to have a decision ready in the coming weeks.

    Additionally, as part of our implementation of the Online News Act, we have established a framework which aims to ensure the largest online platforms fairly compensate Canadian news organizations when their content appears on those services. Google has secured an exemption from the mandatory bargaining under the Act and has committed $100 million annually for five years to support Canadian news organizations. Google’s initial contribution is being disbursed by the Canadian Journalism Collective, and news organizations across Canada are now receiving funding as a result of the Act. 

    Finally, I want to mention a decision we made just last week to modify the Independent Local News Fund, or ILNF. The decision was made after a consultation last fall reviewing the ILNF and its support for local news. We wanted to make sure that local, independent television stations across the country were supported as they produced news. We also wanted to address how any additional funding coming into the audio-visual broadcasting system should be allocated.

    The decision is an important step in supporting local news and information, and confirms that high-quality and diverse local news are an integral part of the Canadian broadcasting system. It also ensures that Canadians have access to local news and information in whatever medium they prefer: all recipients of ILNF funding are now required to make their local news and information available online.

    Although this recent decision supports television broadcasters, I mention it to point out how seriously we are taking the importance of local news and content. It remains a central part of Canadian broadcasting, and impartial news and information is something to be protected and preserved for years into the future.

    Conclusion

    The decisions and proceedings I have detailed today are key pieces of our ongoing work, but they are just a part of our overall modernizing of Canada’s broadcasting frameworks.

    And the message I want to leave you with today is that taken together, all of our proceedings, whether we are talking about removing regulatory burden or revising Canadian content definitions, are about connecting people.

    These are goals the CRTC and NCRA members share.

    We want to connect Canadians to the music and content they enjoy.

    We want to connect artists to new opportunities and new audiences.

    And we want to connect all Canadians to the local news and information they need, when they need it.

    These goals shape our decisions in the same way they guide the work you do each and every day at your local station.

    So, as I mentioned before, work with us. Contribute to our proceedings. Help give your communities and your stations a voice.

    Let’s work together to set up the next generation of Canadian broadcasting to succeed, to excel, and to thrive.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Tracing the Drax family’s millions – a story of British landed gentry, slavery and sugar plantations

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Paul Lashmar, Reader in Journalism, City St George’s, University of London

    ‘Planting the sugar-cane’: vast fortunes were made from the trades in both sugar and human slaves in the Americas. Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, Photographs and Prints Division, The New York Public Library

    Rich British aristocratic families with a legacy of owning colonial slave plantations are often accused by campaigners that their wealth solely originates from these plantations. One frequent target of this criticism has been the Drax family of Dorset, which is headed by Richard Grosvenor Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax, who was the Conservative MP for South Dorset until July 2024.

    Historian Alan Lester of the University of Sussex has noted of Drax (as he is commonly known): “Much of his fortune is inherited, coming down the family line from ownership of the Drax sugar plantations and the 30,000 enslaved people who worked them as Drax property for 180 years before emancipation in Barbados.”

    Recently, I have researched and written a book on the Drax family’s history and involvement in the slave trade in the Caribbean, Drax of Drax Hall, that gives fresh insights into the level of wealth they derived from the sugar trade and the trade in African slaves who worked their plantations – as well as the family’s other income sources.

    I searched the archives in the UK and Caribbean for evidence of their revenue streams until Britain’s 1834 abolition of slavery in the colonies. I estimate that the family today are worth more than £150 million from their land and property in Dorset and Yorkshire.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    Over a period of two centuries until 1834, eight generations of Drax ancestors owned and worked hundreds of enslaved African captives at any one time. The latest beneficiary of primogeniture – the legal concept that recognises the first-born child as heir to a familiy’s fortune – Richard Drax inherited the family’s still-operating 621-acre Drax Hall plantation in Barbados in 2021.

    Drax, 67, has said: “I am keenly aware of the slave trade in the West Indies, and the role my very distant ancestor played in it is deeply, deeply regrettable. But no one can be held responsible today for what happened many hundreds of years ago. This is a part of the nation’s history, from which we must all learn.”

    My research reveals the sources of his family’s wealth are more complex than the critics’ claims that it all derives from the slave-worked plantations.

    Like most British landed gentry, much of the Drax family income has come as extensive landlords of their British estates which, in 1883, exceeded 23,000 acres across various counties. Today, it includes nearly 16,000 acres in Dorset and 2,520 acres in the Yorkshire Dales.

    However, my research also shows the Drax family made more money from slavery than was previously thought, when taking into account the way revenues from their plantations were channelled into the family’s British estates over the two centuries of slavery.

    Drax Hall plantation in Barbados

    The Drax Hall plantation in the Barbados parish of Saint George has been described by Barbadian historian Sir Hilary Beckles, chair of the Caribbean Community reparations commission, as a “killing field” where as many as 30,000 slaves died in brutal conditions. Despite pressure from reparation campaigners in the Caribbean, Britain and elsewhere, Richard Drax has declined to make a formal public apology or gesture of recompense in the Caribbean for the years of slavery.

    A 19th-century drawing of Drax Hall plantation in Barbados.
    Unknown source, Wikimedia Commons

    As the prime minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley, explained in April 2024, despite the efforts of her government Drax has yet to agree to a settlement, pay reparations or contribute all or part of his family’s Drax Hall plantation to provide affordable housing or become a memorial to those who worked and died in colonial enslavement on the island.

    Some other British landed families whose ancestors owned slave plantations in the Caribbean, including the Trevelyans (who owned six slave plantations in Grenada) and the Gladstones (British prime minister William Gladstone’s father owned plantations in Guyana), have made formal apologies and reparations. And while some families have kept the terms of these reparations private, longtime BBC reporter Laura Trevelyan made a US$100,000 (£73,000) donation to a Caribbean development fund.

    The largest family estate

    Four thousand miles from Barbados, Richard Drax lives in Charborough House, a historic 17th-century mansion in Dorset. He oversees the 23.5-square mile estate, the largest family estate in Dorset with over 120 properties, many of which are rented out.

    Charborough was acquired by Drax’s ancestor Walter Erle by marriage in 1549. The family has gradually increased the estate over the centuries. Historically, their income comes from renting land to tenant farmers and cottages to agricultural workers. This, I identified, is where the bulk of their income has come from.

    Charborough House: the Drax family seat in Dorset.
    John Lamper/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

    However, profits from sugar produced by slavery also poured into the family coffers over 200 years. Richard Drax’s remote ancestor James Drax (1609-1661) was one of the first settler group to arrive in the then-uninhabited island of Barbados in 1627. In his introduction to my book, TV historian David Olusoga writes that the Drax family were key players – arguably the key players – in the origin story of British slavery:

    The Drax Hall plantation, the first estate on which a crop of sugar was commercially grown and processed by any English planter, became one of the laboratories in which early English slavery was developed and finessed.

    Built around 1650, the Jacobean plantation house is thought to be the one of the three oldest extant residential buildings in the Americas. From the 17th into the 18th century, the Draxes created and owned the largest acreage in Barbados with the Drax Hall and and Mount plantations – plus a 3,000-acre estate, also called Drax Hall, in Jamaica. The family became enormously wealthy: James Drax was said by a visitor to Drax Hall in the 1640s to “live like a prince”, putting on lavish dinners for friends and guests.

    In addition to owning slaves, James Drax shipped African captives to Barbados as a key part of the trade in slaves. Knighted by both Oliver Cromwell and Charles I, by 1660 he was a director and investor in the English East India Company which, in part, traded and exploited enslaved people.

    Paul Lashmar’s book, Drax of Drax Hall.
    Bookshop.com

    In her 1930 study, American historian Elizabeth Donnan presented evidence that the Draxes of the 17th century operated “off the books” – buying enslaved people from, and selling them to, “interloper” ships that circumvented the Royal African Company’s monopoly of slave trading to the colonies.

    The Drax family married into the Erle family in 1719, combining three fortunes: that of the Erles of Charborough, the Draxes of Yorkshire, Barbados and Jamaica, and the landed-gentry Ernles of Wiltshire.

    Despite being deeply involved in the South Sea Bubble scandal, the Drax family flourished. The slave registers in the National Archives show that between 1825 and 1834, the Drax Hall plantation in Barbados produced an average of 163 tonnes of sugar and 4,845 gallons of rum per year. This gave the family an average annual net profit of £3,591 – equivalent to about £600,000 now. Today, the plantation still produces 700 tonnes of sugar a year, earning the family something in the region of £250,000.

    Pressure for reparations

    In recent years, the value of Drax Hall’s land in Barbados has greatly increased as it is sought after for housing, and could now be worth as much as Bds$150,000 (£60,000) per acre. At the same time, pressure for reparations is growing. In 2023, the African Union threw its weight behind the Caribbean reparations campaign.

    David Comissiong, deputy chairman of the Barbados reparations task force, has said: “Other families are involved, though not as prominently as the Draxes. This reparations journey has begun.”

    Yet to date, the only reparations paid in the story of the Drax family’s involvement in the slave trade were to the family itself. In 1837, Jane-Frances Erle-Drax, the heiress of Charborough, received £4,293 12s 6d (worth more than £614,000 today) in reparations for freeing 189 slaves from Drax Hall plantation after the abolition of slavery in the colonies.

    In the course of researching and writing my book, I approached Richard Drax both directly and through his lawyers and put the claims made here to him. He had no comment to add.

    This page contains references to books included for editorial reasons, which may include links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something from bookshop.org, The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

    Paul Lashmar is affiliated with the Labour Party.

    ref. Tracing the Drax family’s millions – a story of British landed gentry, slavery and sugar plantations – https://theconversation.com/tracing-the-drax-familys-millions-a-story-of-british-landed-gentry-slavery-and-sugar-plantations-257376

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Banking: The European Space Agency, Thales Alenia Space and Blue Origin to explore collaboration opportunities

    Source: Thales Group

    Headline: The European Space Agency, Thales Alenia Space and Blue Origin to explore collaboration opportunities

    The cooperation will cover human spaceflight, science, technology and commercial capabilities

    Paris Air Show, June 18th 2025 – The European Space Agency (ESA) has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Thales Alenia Space, a joint venture between Thales (67%) and Leonardo (33%), and Blue Origin to foster and facilitate commercial and industrial advancements in the area of space exploration in Low Earth Orbit.

    Signature Ceremony – from left to right: Giampiero Di Paolo,Deputy CEO and Senior Vice President of Observation, Exploration, and Navigation at Thales Alenia Space, Daniel Neuenschwander, Director of Human and Robotic Exploration at ESA and Pat Remias, Vice President, Advanced Concepts and Enterprise Engineering, Blue Origin © ESA

    The signatories will explore opportunities for European payloads and/or crew members to utilize on a non-exclusive basis the low-Earth orbit (LEO) space station Orbital Reef which will offer end-to-end services, including transportation of crew and cargo, astronaut accommodations, and payload utilization services.

    Through this MoU, the European Space Agency intends to develop a closer relationship with Blue Origin and Thales Alenia Space for the development of Orbital Reef, that could provide services meeting Europe’s long-term research and commercial needs in alignment with ESA’s recently announced requirements. 

    The MoU will also support European industry in preparing to supply modules, systems, subsystems, and equipment for Orbital Reef, and conducting risk-mitigation activities. Furthermore, Thales Alenia Space and Blue Origin are considering using future qualified European LEO cargo and/or crew transportation services under commercially viable terms and conditions as a means to transport astronauts and supplies to and from the station.

    “I am thrilled to witness an opening of a new economic dimension on Low Earth Orbit, to which this MoU is contributing,” said Daniel Neuenschwander, Director of Human and Robotic Exploration at ESA. “Our core mission at ESA is to support our Member States’ ambitions, and to do so, we are always keen to investigate potential collaborations in a renewed ecosystem with a growing commercial segment.” 

    “We’re truly honored that ESA has placed its trust in our company to explore opportunities in the LEO ecosystem together with Blue Origin to meet Europe’s commercial needs,” said Giampiero Di Paolo, Deputy CEO and Senior Vice President of Observation, Exploration, and Navigation at Thales Alenia Space.“Thales Alenia Space has played a key role in achieving humanity’s ambitions in LEO in recent years. By leveraging our expertise in space exploration infrastructures and vehicles, we’re committed to competing and investing in the development of technological solutions to empower Europe’s plans for the commercialization of low-Earth orbit. We’re excited about our collaboration with Blue Origin and are ready to implement whatever’s required to prepare for human presence and life in space, laying the groundwork for the post-ISS era while addressing new economic needs for research and science.”

    “This alliance is a unique opportunity to not only enable a new era of research and progress in orbit, but to welcome the broadest spectrum of partners in constructing humanity’s future beyond Earth,” said Pat Remias, Vice President, Advanced Concepts and Enterprise Engineering, Blue Origin. “Together, we are building foundations for industries and missions yet to be imagined.” 

    About the European Space Agency

    The European Space Agency (ESA) provides Europe’s gateway to space.
    ESA is an intergovernmental organisation, created in 1975, with the mission to shape the development of Europe’s space capability and ensure that investment in space delivers benefits to the citizens of Europe and the world. 
    ESA has 23 Member States: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia are Associate Members. 
    ESA has established formal cooperation with other four Member States of the EU. Canada takes part in some ESA programmes under a Cooperation Agreement. 

    By coordinating the financial and intellectual resources of its members, ESA can undertake programmes and activities far beyond the scope of any single European country. It is working in particular with the EU on advancing the Galileo and Copernicus programmes as well as with Eumetsat for the development of meteorological missions. 

    About Thales Alenia Space

    Drawing on over 40 years of experience and a unique combination of skills, expertise and cultures, Thales Alenia Space delivers cost-effective solutions for telecommunications, navigation, Earth observation, environmental monitoring, exploration, science and orbital infrastructures. Governments and private industry alike count on Thales Alenia Space to design satellite-based systems that provide anytime, anywhere connections and positioning, monitor our planet, enhance management of its resources, and explore our Solar System and beyond. Thales Alenia Space sees space as a new horizon, helping to build a better, more sustainable life on Earth. A joint venture between Thales (67%) and Leonardo (33%), Thales Alenia Space also teams up with Telespazio to form the Space Alliance, which offers a complete range of solutions including services. Thales Alenia Space posted consolidated revenues of €2.23 billion in 2024 and has more than 8,100 employees in 7 countries with 15 sites in Europe.

    About Blue Origin

    We are building a road to space for the benefit of Earth, humanity’s blue origin. Our team is focused on radically reducing the cost of access to space and harnessing its vast resources while mobilizing future generations to realize this mission. Blue Origin builds and operates reusable rocket engines, launch vehicles, in-space systems, and lunar landers. 
     

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Expansion of TikTok Shop in Europe and the impact on minors – E-001421/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission was informed that the provider of TikTok expanded its e-commerce platform, TikTok Shop, to users in France, Germany and Italy on 31 March 2025.

    The provider of TikTok has carried out and submitted to the Commission a specific ad-hoc risk assessment ahead of the deployment of TikTok Shop in the EU, pursuant to Article 34(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (The Digital Services Act, or ‘DSA’)[1].

    The Commission continues to supervise the evolution of the deployment of the new TikTok Shop features in the EU and monitor compliance with the DSA.

    In particular, the Commission examines whether the provider of TikTok has diligently identified, analysed, assessed and mitigated any systemic risks stemming from the design, functioning and use made of its service and related systems, including any actual and foreseeable negative effects in relation to the protection of minors and serious negative consequences to the person’s physical and mental well-being.

    The Commission is also supervising the compliance by the provider of TikTok of the obligations applicable to providers of online marketplaces, such as ensuring the traceability of traders. The Commission would ensure a swift enforcement if it finds potential infringements of the DSA.

    Following the publication of its findings of the Digital Fairness Fitness Check[2], the Commission is working on a Digital Fairness Act which will aim at addressing identified gaps in EU consumer protection, in order to ensure a high level of protection in the digital environment. The Digital Fairness Act thus aims, notably, at complementing areas that are not regulated under the DSA.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng.
    • [2] https://commission.europa.eu/document/707d7404-78e5-4aef-acfa-82b4cf639f55_en.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Presence of alien ibis in Europe and their ecological impact: Threskiornis melanocephalus and Threskiornis aethiopicus – E-001770/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The Commission is aware of the presence and dynamics of the African sacred ibis in Europe. Because of its environmental impact, this species was prioritised and added to the list of invasive alien species (IAS) of Union Concern in 2016[1]. In some countries like France, the Netherlands and Spain, management has led to a decrease in its population size in the past years.

    In principle, there is no established population of the Black-headed ibis (Threskiornis melanocephalus) in the wild in the EU. Records in the EU are scarce. This species is classified as ‘Least Concern’ by the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s Red List, and while it faces localised threats, its numbers are increasing in much of its native range.

    2. Regulation EU 1143/2014[2] provides the framework for coordination and management of invasive alien species in the EU.

    3. The list of alien species managed and monitored at European level is updated regularly[3]. It contains several bird species. The Commission’s proposal for the next update of the Union list will be submitted to the IAS Committee for examination and delivery of opinion in 2025.

    • [1] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1141 of 13 July 2016 adopting a list of invasive alien species of Union concern pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 189, 14.7.2016, p. 4-8.
    • [2] Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the prevention and management of the introduction and spread of invasive alien species, OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, p. 35.
    • [3] A consolidated version of the Union list is available at the following address: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02016R1141-20220802&from=EN.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Commend Mexico’s Equality Achievements in Political and Public Life, Raise Questions on the Judiciary’s Response to Gender Crimes and Gender-Based Violence in Schools

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women today concluded its consideration of the tenth periodic report of Mexico, with Committee Experts commending Mexico’s achievements in guaranteeing equality in political and public life, while raising questions on how the judiciary responded to gender crimes and how the State was tackling gender-based violence in schools.

    A Committee Expert said the Committee commended the State party’s achievements in guaranteeing equality in political and public life.  Reforms had been implemented towards preventing and eliminating gender discrimination.  This had resulted in a 43 per cent improvement in women’s public leadership positions.  The Committee lauded the 2019 constitutional reform, entitled “gender parity in everything”, which guaranteed political rights of women towards certifying gender parity for all candidates for elected political office, including municipalities with indigenous and Afro-Mexican populations. 

    An Expert asked what mechanisms the State had put in place to guarantee an effective, gender-sensitive judicial response?  Were there reparations available for victims of gender crimes?  What measures were being planned to ensure elected judges had knowledge to judge with a gender perspective?  Could statistics be provided on the fast-track and pretrial procedure, to illustrate how female victims had benefitted from these changes? Had the performances of judges who had been trained been assessed? 

     

    A Committee Expert said the Committee noted with concern the high school dropout rates due to pregnancy and violence.  The ongoing persistence and increase of violence against women and adolescents, at all educational levels, was also concerning, particularly high levels of sexual violence.  What measures had the State taken to guarantee education for pregnant teenagers and to prevent them from leaving school?  How was it ensured that comprehensive sexual education was provided at all levels and in all states?  Was there a plan to ensure the eradication of gender-based violence in schools?  What measures was the State taking to guarantee standardisation and the enforcement of penalties?

     

    The delegation said Mexico had special prosecution services in different bodies.  These ensured that the highest standards were used when investigating cases of femicide.  In cases of femicide, it was important to comply with standards relating to the crime.  Protocols had been standardised for the crimes of femicide.  The Tribunal of Judicial Discipline had been created to combat impunity.  The Women’s Secretariat was working with the Department of Prosecutions to create a network of female lawyers to provide advice and organise strategic lawsuits.

    The delegation said in 2024, Mexico significantly invested in the training of teachers, as part of the national strategy to deal with and prevent teenage pregnancy.  This also focused on keeping teenagers who were pregnant in school.  A programme called violence free schools supported people working in schools.  A protocol had been ratified to ensure the referral, channelling, follow-up and prevention of sexual violence in schools.  School dropout rates had fallen by 75 per cent for basic education, 26 per cent for secondary education, and 18 per cent in further education.  A national strategy was in place to prevent early pregnancy and there had been a 10 per cent drop in early pregnancy in Mexico over the past three years.   

    Introducing the report, Citlalli Hernández Mora, Secretary, Women’s Secretariat of Mexico and head of the delegation, said for decades, there had been a system of structural inequality which had intensified violence against women in Mexico. Legislative reforms by the President, which came into force in November 2024, established reinforced duties of the State to combat all types of violence against women, as well as the eradication of the gender wage gap.  The reforms also created the Women’s Secretariat, tasked with preventing violence against women, promoting a society of care, and reducing structural gaps. From 2019 to 2024, the gender pay gap was reduced by 29 per cent at the local level.

    In closing remarks, Ms. Hernández Mora commended the Committee for its work and the experts for their questions and comments.  The Committee’s recommendations were very important for the Government, and the dialogue had been an enriching experience.  Mexico was committed to changing the lives of all women in the country.

    In her closing remarks, Nahla Haidar, Committee Chair, thanked Mexico for the constructive dialogue which had provided further insight into the situation of women and girls in the country. 

    The delegation of Mexico was comprised of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Public Education; the Ministry of Health; the Secretariat of Women; the Mexican Social Security Institute; the Legislative Branch; the Judiciary; the National Institute of Statistics and Geography; the Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Branch of the Federation; the National Electoral Institute; the National Council of Indigenous Peoples; and the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’s ninety-first session is being held from 16 June to 4 July.  All documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 19 June, to begin its consideration of the eighth periodic report of Thailand (CEDAW/C/THA/8).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the tenth periodic report of Mexico (CEDAW/C/MEX/10).

    Presentation of Report

    FRANCISCA E. MÉNDEZ ESCOBAR, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said Mexico had hosted the First World Conference on Women in 1975 and was an active promoter of the Convention. Mexico was also involved in the creation of numerous mechanisms and groups, including United Nations Women. The State was committed to respecting, protecting, and promoting the human rights of women and girls in all their diversity.

    CITLALLI HERNÁNDEZ MORA, Secretary, Women’s Secretariat of Mexico and head of the delegation, said under the leadership of the first woman President of Mexico and as the State’s first Secretary for Women, she was pleased to lead the delegation. 

    For decades, there had been a system of structural inequality which had intensified violence against women in Mexico.  Legislative reforms by the President, which came into force in November 2024, established reinforced duties of the State to combat all types of violence against women, as well as the eradication of the gender wage gap.  The reforms also created the Women’s Secretariat, tasked with preventing violence against women, promoting a society of care, and reducing structural gaps. 

    In 2024, Mexico had 132.27 million inhabitants, of which 51.08 per cent were women; 9 per cent were indigenous women; 2 per cent were women with disabilities; and 1 per cent were Afro-Mexican women, requiring the State to build inclusive and intercultural policies.  The poorest person in Mexico was an indigenous girl with disabilities, which was why 45 billion dollars had been invested, allowing 3.5 million women to escape moderate poverty over the past six years. 

    From 2019 to 2024, the gender pay gap was reduced by 29 per cent at the local level.  The implementation of the New Mexican School System with a gender perspective had promoted actions to guarantee inclusive, egalitarian and quality education for children and young people in Mexico.  The first 12 of the 200 Education and Child Centres were being built, prioritising highly vulnerable areas such as the maquiladoras on the northern border.  The Pension Fund was launched this year for women between 60 and 64 years of age and had reached over 900,000 women. 

    The Women’s Secretariat had installed 678 LIBRE centres throughout the national territory, with an investment of almost 40 million dollars per year, which sought to offer comprehensive care, legal and psycho-emotional support to those who experience violence.  In March of this year, the Tejedoras de la Patria initiative was launched, which encompassed a national network of women protagonists to guide, lead and support their communities. 

    INGRID GÓMEZ, Undersecretary for the Right to a Life Free of Violence, Women’s Secretariat of Mexico, said femicide violence was one of the greatest challenges faced by the Mexican State.  The implementation of targeted territorial strategies, the strengthening of protection mechanisms for women at risk, and the improvement of victim care systems had resulted in a sustained downward trend in the incidence of femicides. During the first two months of 2025, there had been a decrease of 29.23 per cent reported cases compared to the same period in 2024.  This was the result of a coordinated institutional response, which included early warning of risk, strengthening and expanding the Women’s Justice Centres, specialised shelters, mobile units, and other protection measures. 

    Following the recommendation of the Committee, Mexico had made progress in the legislative harmonisation of the criminal category of femicide, which had been achieved in 28 of the 32 states.  The National Programme against Trafficking in Persons had been the backbone, promoting prevention, protection, prosecution and comprehensive care for victims.  The Office of the Special Prosecutor for the Investigation of Crimes in the Matter of Trafficking in Persons was created, which was a significant step. 

    JENNIFER FELLER, Director General of Human Rights and Democracy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, said the Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists was a key tool to guarantee the safety and integrity of women human rights defenders and journalists.  As of April 2025, it had a total of 2,341 people, including female journalists, human rights defenders and their family members. 

    The Mexican State was sensitive to cases of disappearance of persons, including women. In 2019, the National Search Commission was created and, for the first time, a National Registry of Missing and Unlocated Persons was developed.  With the Attorney General’s Office and the State Prosecutors’ Offices, visits had been made to expert service institutions, temporary protection centres, cemeteries and shelters, to carry out human identification processes and interventions to recover remains deposited in mass graves.  The Mexican State continued with the search actions to locate all these people and had undertaken dialogue with almost 200 collectives of relatives of disappeared persons, with multiple Government institutions. 

    TERESA RAMOS ARREOLA, Head of the National Centre for Gender Equity, Sexual and Reproductive Health of Mexico, said 100 commitments had been made for the President’s six-year term, including the Care Programme from the first 1,000 days of life, which guaranteed access to women’s health services, especially reproductive health, bodily autonomy, and the prevention of gender violence.  In Mexico, contraception was free and 24 of the country’s 32 states had decriminalised abortion.  A technical note had been issued which outlined the obligation of the health sector to have available personnel and the necessary technical capacities to provide safe abortion services.

     

    YANETH DEL ROSARIO CRUZ GÓMEZ, Representative of Mexico’s National Council of Indigenous Peoples, said the reform of the second article of the Constitution, published in September 2024, should be celebrated.  It constituted a historic advance in the recognition of indigenous peoples as rights holders, with legal recognition and their own assets. However, the implementation of these rights was a challenge.  It was urgent for indigenous rights to be effectively implemented. 

    Indigenous and Afro-Mexican women were developing the general law on the rights of indigenous and Afro-Mexican peoples.  The resources allocated to indigenous peoples and communities, through the Contribution Fund for Social Infrastructure for Indigenous and Afro-Mexican Peoples, were welcomed. 

    MARTHA LUCÍA MICHER CAMARENA, Federal Senator and President of the Commission for Gender Equality of the Senate of the Republic, said in Mexico, they had a parity legislative power; there were 14 female governors in 32 states.  In December 2024, amendments were approved to various secondary laws, including the general law for equality between women and men; the general law on women’s access to a life free of violence; the National Code of Criminal Procedure; and the general law of the national public security system, among others.  Between 2021 and 2024, key legislative reforms were also adopted, including amendments to the Federal Penal Code and 22 local penal codes that now criminalised acid attacks, as well as other types of violence, within the criminal category of family violence. 

    MÓNICA SOTO, Presiding Magistrate of the Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Branch of the Federation, said the Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Branch of the Federation had issued rulings to seek balanced representation in the Government. In 2024, the first parity federal Congress was constituted, after 108 years as an independent Republic. Despite this, there were significant challenges, with only 28 per cent of municipal presidencies headed by women. In many cases, violations of their rights persisted. 

    Gender-based political violence against women continued to be a reality.  However, in a historical precedent in 2021, the Superior Chamber of the Court annulled the election results in Iliatenco, Guerrero for gender-based political violence against an indigenous woman.  Authorities had been trained, and guides and protocols had been issued for judgment with a gender perspective in electoral matters and, in May 2024, the Specialised Ombudsman’s Office for the Care of Women was created. 

    MARYCARMEN COLOR VARGAS, Director of Gender Equality of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, said the Supreme Court of Justice had issued a protocol for judging with a gender perspective, which was updated in 2020.  To ensure its implementation, the Court and the Council of the Federal Judiciary had deployed a training strategy with case law notebooks, manuals, thematic notes, specialised works, and self-management courses. To date, 59 per cent of federal civil servants had completed mandatory training in gender and human rights.  The Comprehensive Inclusion Policy had been adopted, which increased the participation of women at the highest judicial levels from 20 per cent to 31 per cent. 

    CITLALLI HERNÁNDEZ MORA, Secretary, Women’s Secretariat of Mexico and head of the delegation, said Mexico reaffirmed at the highest level its commitment to this Committee, to peace, and to the fight against discrimination against women and girls in all their diversity.

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    YAMILA GONZÁLEZ FERRER, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said Mexico was a great country which faced colossal challenges.  Mexico should be congratulated on electing its first female President in its history, and the Committee recognised the State’s decision to adopt a feminist foreign policy, as well as the 2024 constitutional reform that incorporated the right to substantive equality, a life free from violence, and decent care.  The Committee also welcomed the constitutionalisation of the National Care System, the ratification of International Labour Organization Convention 189 on domestic work, and the progressive decriminalisation of abortion in several states.

    However, there were several issues.  The National Council to prevent discrimination seemed to have been weakened and seemed to lack power to strengthen itself; what had been done to strengthen this institution?   What steps had been taken to put in place criminal legislation which provided legal certainty for women?  What measures had the State taken to strengthen the independence of the National Human Rights Commission?  What help had it provided to women searching for the disappeared?   

    What mechanisms did the State put in place to guarantee an effective, gender-sensitive judicial response?  Were there interpreters available in indigenous languages?  Were there reparations available for victims of gender crimes? What measures were being planned to ensure elected judges had knowledge to judge with a gender perspective? Could statistics be provided on the fast-track and pretrial procedure, to illustrate how female victims had benefitted from these changes?  Had the performances of judges who had been trained been assessed? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said that since 2018, the country had been experiencing deep seated change, including in the public administration system.  Mexico was a federal republic with 32 different constitutional bodies. It was important to mention the inclusion of discrimination in article 1 of Mexico’s Constitution.  The law on equality between men and women included a new law on discrimination.  There was a worsening situation for women in Mexico.  In non-progressive States, the situation was worse for women.  This was due to religious ideas, which impacted women’s sexual and reproductive health rights. 

    Mexico had special prosecution services in different bodies.  These ensured that the highest standards were used when investigating cases of femicide.  In cases of femicide, it was important to comply with standards relating to the crime. Protocols had been standardised for the crimes of femicide.  The Tribunal of Judicial Discipline had been created to combat impunity.  Lack of access to justice often took the form of impunity.  The Women’s Secretariat was working with the Department of Prosecutions to create a network of female lawyers to provide advice and organise strategic lawsuits.

    The National Human Rights Commission was a public independent body, with independence guaranteed in Mexican laws.  It issued recommendations on human rights violations when there was a gender element, and had general recommendations on femicide.  The Constitutional reform outlined the rights of indigenous peoples to be assisted by an interpreter, which must be taken into account to ensure appropriate defence in court. 

    The reform of the judiciary began with a desire to see parity in access, including equal representation of men and women as judges and magistrates.  Currently, only 30 per cent of these positions were held by women.  A judicial school would focus specifically on training.  A guidebook was being created for gender-based judgements which would represent a crucial tool.  There was one training programme which was binding for all members of the judiciary, and it was helping the State achieve progress. 

    The previous corruption of the judiciary did not allow women or relatives of killed women to defend themselves.  Unofficial pretrial was used due to the corruption of the judiciary.  Many judges would free perpetrators of femicide who would then threaten the relatives of murdered women. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert congratulated Mexico on the election of the first female President, and recognised the steps taken to achieve gender equality, including the creation of the first Ministry for Women in 2024.  What concrete steps was Mexico taking to strengthen effective coordination between national institutions on policies relating to the rights of women and girls, in light of technical and financial challenges; what concrete steps were being provided to strengthen their international capacity?  How was it ensured that institutions received technical resources to support their work? 

    Another Expert said Parliament had a high level of women’s representation, and as heads of Government.  However, while women comprised 50 per cent of candidates for mayoral elections, they were not being elected at the same rate, and faced barriers, including political violence and stereotypes.  Why had Mexico not adopted temporary special measures in this regard?  What temporary special measures had the State adopted to ensure parity in decision-making positions?  What about for the heads of corporate and private companies? Would the State consider adopting a positive discrimination act?   

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said since 2018, Mexico had promoted the participation of women in the peace and security sector.  Work had been carried out to mainstream gender issues in all budgets and Government actions.  This year, half the budget was allocated for men, and half for women.  The budget aimed to make up areas of weakness in inequality.  The National Programme for Equality between men and women had mechanisms for follow-up and for impact assistance.  A national system was in place for the prevention and eradication of violence. A national database included a recording or registration of incidents of violence of women and girls; this was a register which different bodies fed information into.  The State aimed to have a living database which gave a clear overview of cases. 

    Mexico already had a law on equality.  As part of the 2021 electoral process, the competitive block system had been used. As part of the block, three levels of competitiveness were established in different areas.  This aimed to ensure women were candidates in places where they had a real chance of winning, which aimed to improve women’s participation at the local political levels.  In Mexico, there was no quota in place, but legislation was amended to bring about equality between men and women in elections. 

    A network of defenders had been put in place throughout the country, and within the network, there was now a defenders training network.  These people were selected to train and pass on their knowledge and skills, including on electoral justice.  The recent 2024 election had resulted in 540 female local authority council leaders.  The burden of proof had been reversed to ensure defendants had to provide they were not violent to women in the local council. 

    During the pandemic in 2021, the health system put in place special measures for women and girls to deal with the additional burden on them to provide caring in the home. This meant there had to be coordination on mental health services.  There were now centres which provided services to workers in the mental health sector and users of the mental health system.  Issues such as anxiety, post-traumatic stress, and depression, and their treatments, were key focuses.  Mental health services had been provided during lockdowns.

    There had been political party shenanigans when quotas were in place.  Mexico had equality.  Any electoral list needed to be composed of 50 per cent women and 50 per cent men. Positive discrimination and quotas were previously essential, but the State did not need them now because political equality had been achieved and Mexico was working to maintain it.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    An Expert said the Committee was concerned about the different definitions of feminicide, which meant many murders of women were not classified as feminicide.  Currently just 20 per cent of female murders were classed as femicide.  The persistence of stereotypes in the media, which mainly impacted minority women, was concerning.  Nonconsensual surgeries which impacted women with disabilities and indigenous women were also concerning.  What training was provided to the judiciary?  Was its impact assessed?  The search protocol for women and girls who had been disappeared was not effectively implemented throughout the country, which was concerning. 

    The Committee was also worried at the lack of inclusion of an intersectional approach in investigation protocols.  The lack of access to information, including rulings on violence against women, was additionally concerning.  The Committee was worried about the lack of a broad reparations policy for victims, particularly victims of violence or those who had been disappeared.  Data was lacking in many areas, including for women and girls who had been disappeared. 

    What measures were put in place for companies running social media to ensure they sanctioned criminal postings on their websites?  Could information be provided about women who were deprived of liberty? 

    A Committee Expert said the improvement of legislation on trafficking, including the general law to prevent, punish and eradicate trafficking in persons, was a positive step, as well as the creation of the Inter-Secretarial Commission on Trafficking, and the work of the Commission for Victim Support.  Nevertheless, the lack of sufficient implementation and coordination persisted as well as inefficient investigations, and the complicity of authorities with organised crime related to trafficking.

    What specific measures had the State adopted to prevent, investigate and punish trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation, and with what results?  How was it ensured that trafficking policies did not criminalise or re-victimise victims?  What actions had been developed against trafficking networks affecting migrant women and girls?  What programmes existed to guarantee reparation and mental health care to victims?  How were victims, who had been forced to engage in illegal acts by the cartels, protected?  How would the State party maintain a gender focus in their security policy?  Weapons in the United States were the main reasons for killings in the country. What follow-up measures did the Government consider in regard to United States manufacturers of weapons? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said 71 justice centres existed in the country.  A programme was in place to shed light on situations of violence which took place in different parts of the country, and bring down the levels of violence nation-wide.  In 2024, the Charter was created to protect citizens from trafficking in persons, published in multiple languages, as well as in indigenous languages, and disseminated throughout the Government and federal bodies.  A manual on trafficking and an agreement had been developed, allowing local staff to be used to assist victims of femicide.  There was now a legal obligation to disseminate all decisions; these were now publicly available.  All persons were required to undergo mandatory training from the judiciary. 

    Mexico was aware that gender needed to be mainstreamed.  Around 62 per cent of mothers seeking the disappeared were located in seven federal states of Mexico.  Among the Constitutional reforms carried out, the comprehensive act on the national system of public security had been amended to create a special chapter on protection measures.  The Women’s Secretariat was raising the visibility of these measures to prevent violence against women.  The Mexican State had committed to developing a register to track orphans who were victims of femicide.  The State had been working on the harmonisation of the search protocols for women and girls.  The coverage of the justice centres for women had been enlarged, and there were now almost 80 in operation. 

    The fast-track procedure for femicide should not be compared to impunity.  This process was an opportunity to have access to truth, if the accused was convicted.  It enabled important information to be secured to ensure no further information escaped the prosecution.  The programme to combat trafficking was being updated this year. 

    Mexico had 33 criminal codes nationwide, due to the country’s federal makeup.  In the national criminal procedure, there was one single definition; femicide was criminalised, with gender stipulated as a ground.  Work had been undertaken on media violence, and several secondary laws which suppressed online and media violence had been amended.  Anyone guilty of online violence was liable to be punished.  The definition of femicide had been reworked, as had the measures to provide compensation to victims.  Mexico had developed protection measures for victims of online and media violence, which was something no other country had done before. 

    Legal reforms and awareness campaigns had been put in place to eradicate forced marriage.  It was essential to put in place a law which stipulated that marriage should only take place at the age of 18.  It was vital to eradicate child marriage in indigenous communities.  There had been a drop in this phenomenon of four per cent since 2018. 

    The State recognised the difficult situation of women in a mobility situation and the risk of gender-based violence.  The right to apply for refugee status was recognised in Mexico and was supported by various agreements. 

    There was no militarisation of Mexico’s security system.  It was acknowledged that violations had been committed by Mexico’s armed forces, and the State was committed to ensuring these events did not reoccur.   Mexico would ensure that codes were in line, so all crimes were dealt with the same way across the whole country.  The State would review communications and assess how femicide was reported, which could often lead to revictimisation of the victim.  It was vital to combat impunity in order to combat violence. 

    Civil society organizations had been key in achieving progress in Mexico, including in the areas of digital violence.  The State aimed to work together with social media platforms to prevent digital violence from occurring.  Mexico was a victim of trafficking in weapons.  It was essential for the State to continue to wage war on this phenomenon. 

    When considering how to classify crimes of femicide, the rulings related to several factors, including the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator.  Criteria were now in place which mandated that any violent death of a woman was to be investigated as a femicide.  It was vital to ensure the prosecution services were strengthened.  There were now 40 prosecutors and around 100 people investigating cases of femicide. For 2024, there had been 2,564 first degree murders of women, as well as more than 800 femicides. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said the Committee commended the State party’s achievements of guaranteeing equality in political and public life.  Reforms had been implemented towards preventing and eliminating gender discrimination.  This had resulted in a 43 per cent improvement in women’s public leadership positions.  The Committee lauded the 2019 constitutional reform entitled “gender parity in everything”, which guaranteed the political rights of women towards certifying gender parity for all candidates for elected political office, including municipalities with indigenous and Afro-Mexican populations.  Law 303 against violence was also lauded, which prevented male aggressors or those sentenced for violence from holding public office. However, concerns remained. 

    Could the State party outline existing measures to prevent political violence against women? What special measures had been adopted to ensure the political participation of indigenous women and other minority groups?  What percentage of women heading embassies and multilateral organizations was held by traditionally marginalised women?  What plans existed to combat women’s low levels of political participation and strengthen their participation in the community and social participation beyond elections?   

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said Mexico produced disaggregated data regarding the situation of women.  There were 78 programmes desegregating data by gender.  The national survey on domestic relationships provided information on violence against women at home.  It reflected a falling trend in domestic violence.  Concerning financial issues, according to data, more than 26 per cent of women now had increased access to financial products, including loans and credit. The State was using available data to design and monitor public policies which were evidence-based.

    Around 200,000 firearms unlawfully entered Mexico every year.  Mexico was awaiting the decision of the International Criminal Court of Justice on this.  Trafficking in arms was a scourge in the country, and it was important to combat this. Gender gaps needed to be reduced in leadership roles.  The most recent survey stated that women made up 37 per cent of the diplomatic core, only 25 per cent of whom were ministers.  There were training programmes in place for public officials regarding political violence against women.  Specialised meetings had been carried out to disseminate the rights of women, including those with disabilities, migrant women, and rural women. In connection with civil society, a network had been created with women human rights defenders, guaranteeing the participation of these groups in courts.  It was mandatory to ensure parity in municipal bodies. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert welcomed the provision in the law which permitted the transmission of nationality to descendants, including children born abroad.  What measures had the State adopted to ensure universal birth registration?  Had rural offices for birth registration been established?  What measures had been adopted to overcome barriers that indigenous women faced when they sought to register their children?  How was access to identity documents ensured?  What measures had been taken to facilitate the return of Mexican citizens to Mexico and guarantee their access to identity papers? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said coordination groups had been established with the state civil registry, and registration campaigns had been launched.  Mobile units addressed issues regarding the registration of migrant births. There was no restriction on the status of a migrant person, whether documented or undocumented, to process their application to have access to services.

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert commended Mexico for progress made in the area of education, including the education act which recognised the right to secular, free, inclusive education, which was gender and human rights based.  The State party was encouraged to continue and consolidate these efforts. What measures were underway to guarantee access to education?  What was Mexico doing to ensure that gender equality was truly maintained in school curricula?  What percentage of the educational budget was set aside for gender-based programmes? How were their impacts assessed? 

    The Committee noted with concern the high school drop-out rates due to pregnancy and violence. The ongoing persistence and increase of violence against women and adolescents, at all educational levels, was also concerning, particularly high levels of sexual violence.  What measures had Mexico taken to guarantee education for pregnant teenagers and to prevent them from leaving school?  How was it ensured that comprehensive sexual education was provided at all levels and in all states?  Was there a plan to ensure the eradication of gender-based violence in schools?  What measures was the State taking to guarantee standardisation and the enforcement of penalties?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the new school model was based on the gender perspective, and the new sexual education syllabus had been created under this model.  In 2024, Mexico significantly invested in the training of teachers, as part of the national strategy to deal with and prevent teenage pregnancy.  This also focused on keeping teenagers who were pregnant in school.  A programme called violence-free schools supported people working in schools.  A protocol had been ratified to ensure the referral, channelling, follow-up and prevention of sexual violence in schools. 

    School dropout rates had fallen by 75 per cent for basic education, 26 per cent for secondary education, and 18 per cent in further education.  Mexico had invested just over 500,000 dollars on school infrastructure.  A national strategy was in place to prevent early pregnancy and there had been a 10 per cent drop in early pregnancy in Mexico over the past three years. Particular focus was paid to rural and isolated areas, where the issue was connected to others such as forced marriage.  Schools feeding programmes offered food and support to Afro and indigenous students. There were also scholarships available for higher education. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said the Government had adopted gender responsive labour reforms which promoted women’s access to employment, which was commendable.  However, the majority of women were concentrated in the informal market, and only 25 per cent of managers were women in private and public sectors.  Women also faced sexual harassment and threats in the workplace. 

    What actions had Mexico taken to close the gender wage gap between women and men?  How could women be helped to improve their digital literacy to start their own businesses and ensure employment?  How was it ensured that women employed in the domestic, care and agricultural sectors enjoyed social security and paid care benefits? How could indigenous women, women with disabilities, and migrant women have access to paid employment and social security?  What complaints mechanisms were in place for women in the labour market? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said a programme was in place for rural and agricultural workers and temporary workers, with more than 20,000 women enrolled.  A programme had been put in place for domestic workers, with 60,000 domestic workers enrolled.  Nearly 200,000 persons benefitted from childcare schemes.  Legislation had been drafted allowing for pregnant persons to ask to be placed back on their post when they returned to work.  Short-term contracts were available for pregnant persons, which had to be extended after maternity leave had been taken. 

    A pilot project was being developed in Mexico, and legislation had been promulgated on rights for domestic workers.  Mexico had made progress in the areas of health, education and welfare.  A new minimum wage policy had been instigated to ensure a decent wage to those who earned the least.  The gender pay gap had been reduced by 29 per cent at the local level between 2019 and 2024.  The minimum wage for workers in border areas with the United States had increased significantly.  Over the past six years, there had been an 18.7 per cent increase in the number of women covered by social security systems.  In 2022, an agreement was struck between the private and public sector which aimed to monitor and assess the gender pay gap. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said since the last meeting with Mexico, there had been significant progress in sexual and reproductive health, but challenges still remained.  How was care for women guaranteed in State hospitals? Why did vaccination coverage dramatically drop from 100 per cent to 28 per cent to 2021?  What was the reason for the increase in breast cancer cases in the country?  What was the State doing to target women’s health? 

    Mexico should be commended for progress made in legalising abortion; however, it had still not been decriminalised in nine jurisdictions.  Care services for women who had chosen to have an abortion due to rape were still linked to the judicial system.  Some young children were detained because they had had an abortion. How was the State party planning to resolve these challenges?  How did the State intend to address issues such as hostile health workers or access to modern contraception? 

    How would the State combat the forced sterilisation of indigenous women and those with disabilities? Had there been reparations for victims? What measures were being taken to ensure a gender perspective when assessing the disabilities of women?  How could women who were victims of gender-based violence have access to mental health services without stigmatisation? Were there special services for the rehabilitation of children whose mothers were victims of violence? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The State was revising the law to ensure that cases of rape were not linked to the judicial system. It did not need to be proven that sexual violence had taken place to have access to a safe abortion.  The federal system continued to work with the nine states where abortion had not been decriminalised.  All contraception products were free and provided by the health care system for anyone who required them.  Mexico was reviewing all informed consent in relation to the health system to ensure they were accessible to persons with disabilities, and to allow anyone to have full control over decisions being taken or any procedure recommended for them. 

    The new health system guaranteed all women had the same quality, standardised care throughout the country.  One of the emblematic programmes of the new administration covered treatment for the elderly and persons with disabilities.  Thousands of doctors and nurses had been recruited and went door to door seeking out these people and helping them to create a medical file to receive the care they needed.  More than 80 justice centres provided free psychological and counselling services. The State needed to recruit additional specialised healthcare workers to bolster mental health services. 

    Mexico was working closely with offices that defended the rights of children and adolescents to enable them to identify children and adolescents at risk in all areas. Guidelines had been issued in February this year, focusing on obstetric violence.  No woman in Mexico was in prison because she had carried out an abortion. An amnesty had been declared last year for anyone in prison for this reason.  The State had been working to ensure all these women were released. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert commended the State party on its notable initiatives to advance the economic and social benefits of women, including the microcredits for wellbeing programme, with over 70.5 per cent of the 1.25 million loans allocated to women. Nonetheless, their impact was limited. Mexico had the lowest rate of women’s economic participation in the region and would not reach gender parity on corporate boards until 2052.  What plans were in place to integrate unpaid care and domestic work into macroeconomic frameworks?  Were women non-governmental organizations consulted to capture their views and voices in the design? 

    What measures were in place to increase female leadership in economic sectors, financial portfolios, and procurement opportunities?  How were women, particularly indigenous, Afro-Mexican, rural and migrant women, and women with disabilities benefiting from targeted economic interventions?  What concrete plans existed to expand women’s participation in sports leadership?  Were there gender targets within the investment plan and the sovereign wealth fund?  The State should be commended on the act which regulated the digital sector. Was there data available on the level of reparations provided by companies regarding violations of women’s rights? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said Mexico aimed to boost domestic trade through a number of credit lines, and aimed to empower workers economically.  The President had created the very first cooperative with the cleaners in the Presidential Palace.  Significant progress had been recorded in the reduction of poverty. 

    There had been a 12 percent increase in the income of rural women.  There had been a financial transfer to women between the ages of 60 and 64.  Women athletes earned up to 500 per cent less than men for the same sport.  An initiative had been developed to ensure that women who were professional sports persons were entitled to a basic wage, which so far did not exist for female athletes.  Around 5,403 economic projects had been supported by the State to drive forward activities for productive education for communities and regions. This year, Mexico would be creating 200 childcare centres to ensure that women, particularly rural and indigenous women, did not have to leave their job to care for their children.

    All economic projects had a gender-based approach.  Everything began with consultations with the community.  Many new governmental funds were earmarked for the fostering of the participation of women in rural areas, including for land titles. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert asked if the Mexico City law for the murder of trans people for reasons of identity would be extended to all 32 states?  Would the ratification of the new United Nations Cybercrime Convention of 2025 be considered?  While Mexico had seen an 18 per cent reduction in rural poverty, this issue persisted.  How would the plan developed address rural poverty?  Would rural women be able to overcome cultural taboos to land ownership? 

    Around 46.1 per cent of those in pretrial detention were women.  Women were sometimes kept in prison awaiting sentencing for many years. How would the State strengthen their due process rights in this regard?  How would the State bring a survivor-centred approach to justice for the disappeared and their families?  It was acknowledged that the President had committed her office to addressing enforced disappearance; however, it was important to bring a gender perspective to this. 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said more than 10 million people had come out of poverty over the past seven years, due to the social policies in place specifically targeting rural and indigenous areas.  Mexico had social protection caravans, ensuring protection and advice was taken to women in different areas.  Training was provided to rural women and they were given special tools and knowledge to exercise their land rights.  The State had reached the goal to issue 150,000 land titles. 

    Special gynaecological and trauma services had been provided for women in prisons.  There was special care for pregnant women in prison and children detained with their mothers.  A mechanism was in place to follow-up on cases of torture.  The Public Defender had carried out 5,600 visits to female detainees, and ensured that measures they had implemented had yielded results, including special care for trans women.  Lengthy pre-trial detention periods had to be overseen by a court.  Mexico had stated at the Conference of States parties that they did not agree with the implementation of a declaration which rid the Convention against Enforced Disappearances of its meaning.  This was a unilateral decision by the Committee.   

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert asked what was being done to help women facing intersectional discrimination to claim their rights in court?  What would be done to harmonise indigenous rules with gender equality?  What had been the impact of efforts targeting law enforcement authorities?  What were the plans for the future to make family judges and lawyers, social workers and local authorities fully aware of women’s rights?  The Committee commended Mexico for positive trends in combatting child marriage.  What was being done to raise awareness about the minimum age of marriage and further improve respect for the prohibition of early marriage? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said Mexico had made constitutional reforms and reforms to secondary law to protect all women in their diversity, including migrant women, domestic workers, and indigenous women. A lot of progress had been made in protecting the intersectional rights of women.  A court had noted that it was mainly women who had caring responsibilities, and the State was focusing on the situation on the division of labour. Measures had been taken to provide information in indigenous languages.

    Closing Remarks 

    CITLALLI HERNÁNDEZ MORA, Secretary, Women’s Secretariat of Mexico and head of the delegation, commended the Committee for its work and the Experts for their questions and comments.  All the different sectors of the State were involved in drafting the report.  Mexico had made progress but there were areas where challenges remained.  Mexico had a striving civil society and a strong feminist movement, as well as the first woman President.  The Committee’s recommendations were very important for the Government, and the dialogue had been an enriching experience.  Mexico was committed to changing the lives of all women in the country.

    NAHLA HAIDAR, Committee Chair, said she had been privileged to meet the President of Mexico and was hopeful about her vision.  It was an exceptional opportunity for the world to have a female in this position.  Ms. Haidar thanked Mexico for the constructive dialogue which had provided further insight into the situation of women and girls in the country. 

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

     

    CEDAW25.0013E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: France: The EIB and Banque Populaire and Caisse d’Epargne sign an agreement to support French small and medium-sized enterprises in the defence sector

    Source: European Investment Bank

    EIB

    • A €300 million loan from the European Investment Bank will enable the BPCE banking group, through its network made of Banque Populaire and Caisse d’Epargne, to increase its financing to the sector.
    • This operation is the first signed by the EIB in France, and the second in Europe, under the new €3 billion envelope dedicated to European SMEs active in security and defence.
    • The objective is to facilitate access to financing for SMEs investing in strategic areas such as cybersecurity, surveillance, resilience, and defence technologies.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) and the BPCE banking group have signed a €300 million loan agreement in favor of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the security and defence sector in France.

    This is the first operation signed by the EIB in France as part of the recently announced €3 billion envelope to support companies active in the defence value chain. The EIB has increased intermediated loans and guarantees available for key defence-industry segment to €3 billion from €1 billion originally, and has signed a first deal with Deutsche Bank last week.

    The loan granted to BPCE is specifically intended to address the financing needs of French SMEs investing in cybersecurity, surveillance, resilience, and new technologies related to defence.

    Ambroise Fayolle, Vice-President of the EIB responsible for operations in France: “We are delighted to sign with BPCE the first agreement in France to support small and medium-sized enterprises active in the security and defence industry. To ensure the security of our continent, we must support the entire ecosystem of the defence industry, including companies present in the value chain, as they often have a significant impact on their territory in terms of innovation and employment.”

    Robert de Groot, Vice-President of the EIB responsible for security and defence: “In the space of one week, two major operations have been signed between the EIB and European banking partners to support SMEs active in security and defence. Facilitating financing is a critical step toward unlocking the full potential of these companies in strengthening Europe’s strategic capabilities.”

    Cédric Glorieux, Head of Products and Solutions Banque Populaire and Caisse d’Epargne: « We are very pleased that BPCE, through its network Banque Populaire and Caisse d’Epargne, is the first banking group in France to sign this strategic agreement with the EIB. This agreement underlines our determination to step up our support for French small and medium-sized enterprises in the defence sector. Thanks to this €300 million financing envelope, BPCE will play a key role in strengthening the competitiveness and innovation of French companies, while meeting the challenges of our country’s sovereignty. » 

    The €3 billion EIB envelope also follows the agreement between the EIB and the promotional institutions of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain to explore co-financing opportunities in support of the European security and defence industry. This cooperation, announced on June 6, aims to promote a pan-European vision in areas such as research, industrial capabilities, and infrastructure.

    Background information

    EIB
    The European Investment Bank (EIB), whose shareholders are the Member States of the European Union (EU), is the EU’s long-term financing institution. Across eight major priorities, we support investments that contribute to achieving the EU’s key objectives. In 2024, the EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing in support of more than 900 high-impact projects, thereby strengthening Europe’s competitiveness and security. In France, the EIB Group signed more than one hundred operations in 2024 for a total amount of €12.6 billion, which made it possible to mobilize €62 billion in investments in the real economy. Nearly 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation and adaptation. More information about the EIB Group financing for security and defence is available here.

    Media services can find recent high-resolution photos of our headquarters in Luxembourg here.

    Groupe BPCE

    Groupe BPCE is the second-largest banking group in France and the fourth-largest in the euro zone in terms of capital. Through its 100,000 staff, the group serves 35 million customers – individuals, professionals, companies, investors and local government bodies – around the world. It operates in the retail banking and insurance fields in France via its two major networks, Banque Populaire and Caisse d’Epargne, along with Banque Palatine and Oney. It also pursues its activities worldwide with the asset & wealth management services provided by Natixis Investment Managers and the wholesale banking expertise of Natixis Corporate & Investment Banking. The Group’s financial strength is recognized by four credit rating agencies with the following senior preferred LT ratings: Moody’s (A1, stable outlook), Standard & Poor’s (A+, stable outlook), Fitch (A+, stable outlook) and R&I (A+, stable outlook).

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Adoption by the Union of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty – P10_TA(2025)0126 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194 thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

    Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee(1),

    After consulting the Committee of the Regions,

    Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure(2),

    Whereas:

    (1)  In its judgment of 2 September 2021 in case C‑741/19(3), Republic of Moldova v Komstroy (the ‘Komstroy judgment’), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that Article 26(2), point (c), of the Energy Charter Treaty, approved on behalf of the European Communities by Council and Commission Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom(4), is to be interpreted as not being applicable to disputes between a Member State and an investor of another Member State concerning an investment made by that investor in the first Member State, i.e. intra-EU disputes.

    (2)  Despite the Komstroy judgment, arbitral tribunals have continued to accept jurisdiction and to issue awards in intra-EU arbitration proceedings which are purportedly based on Article 26(2), point (c), of the Energy Charter Treaty. According to the CJEU, any such award is incompatible with Union law, in particular Articles 267 and 344 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Therefore, such awards cannot produce legal effects and the payment of compensation further to those awards cannot be enforced.

    (3)  The effective implementation of Union law is being undermined by the issuing of awards violating Union law in intra-EU arbitration proceedings. There is a risk of a conflict between the Treaties, on the one hand, and the Energy Charter Treaty as interpreted by some arbitral tribunals, on the other, which would, if confirmed by the courts of a third country, become a de facto legal conflict where such awards were circulating in the legal orders of third countries.

    (4)  According to the case law of the CJEU, the risk of a legal conflict is sufficient to render an international agreement incompatible with Union law. The risk of such a conflict between the Treaties and the Energy Charter Treaty should therefore be eliminated. The adoption of an instrument of international law, in the form of an agreement setting out the common understanding of the parties to that agreement on the non-applicability of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty as a basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings, would help to eliminate that risk.

    (5)  The Commission, on behalf of the Union, and the ▌ Member States have ▌ concluded negotiations on the terms of an agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty. The common understanding contained in that agreement has been reiterated in the ‘Declaration on the legal consequences of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Komstroy and common understanding on the non-applicability of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty as a basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings’ of 26 June 2024(5).

    (6)  The Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty should therefore be approved in order to enable its signature by the Union and to express the Union’s consent to be bound by it,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

    Article 1

    The Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty accompanying this Decision is hereby approved.

    Article 2

    This Decision shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    Done at …,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President The President

    AGREEMENT ON THE INTERPRETATION

    AND APPLICATION OF THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY ▌

    THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM,

    THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA,

    THE CZECH REPUBLIC,

    THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK,

    THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,

    THE REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA,

    IRELAND,

    THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC,

    THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN,

    THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,

    THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA,

    THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC,

    THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS,

    THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA,

    THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA,

    THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG,

    THE REPUBLIC OF MALTA,

    THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS,

    THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA,

    THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND,

    THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC,

    ROMANIA,

    THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA,

    THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC,

    THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND,

    THE KINGDOM OF SWEDEN and

    THE EUROPEAN UNION ▌

    hereinafter jointly referred to as the ‘Parties’

    HAVING in mind the Energy Charter Treaty, signed in Lisbon on 17 December 1994(6) and approved on behalf of the European Communities by Council and Commission Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom on 23 September 1997(7), as last amended ,

    HAVING in mind the rules of customary international law as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna on 23 May 1969,

    CONSIDERING that the members of a Regional Economic Integration Organisation within the meaning of Article 1, point 3, of the Energy Charter Treaty hereby express a common understanding on the interpretation and application of a treaty in their inter se relations,

    RECALLING that withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty does not affect the composition of the Regional Economic Integration Organisation referred to in that Treaty, nor does it preclude an interest in expressing a common understanding on the interpretation and application of that Treaty for as long as it may be held to produce legal effects in relation to a Party that withdrew, and in particular in respect of Article 47(3) of the Energy Charter Treaty,

    HAVING in mind the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) ▌ and the general principles of European Union ▌ law,

    CONSIDERING that the references to the European Union in this Agreement are to be understood also as references to its predecessor, the European Economic Community and, subsequently, the European Community, until the latter was superseded by the European Union,

    RECALLING that, in line with the case-law of the Permanent Court of International Justice(8) and of the International Court of Justice(9), the right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal rule belongs to the parties to an international agreement in relation to that agreement,

    RECALLING that the Member States of the European Union (‘Member States’) have assigned the right of giving authoritative interpretations of Union ▌law to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), as explained by the CJEU in its judgment of 30 May 2006 in case C-459/03, Commission v Ireland (Mox Plant)(10), which held that the exclusive competence to interpret and apply Union ▌law extends to the interpretation and application of international agreements to which the European Union and its Member States are parties in the case of a dispute between two Member States or between the European Union and a Member State,

    RECALLING that, in accordance with Article 344 TFEU ▌, Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to a method of settlement other than those provided for therein,

    RECALLING that in its judgment of 6 March 2018 in case C-284/16, Achmea(11), the CJEU held that Articles 267 and 344 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a provision in an international agreement concluded between Member States under which an investor from one of those Member States may, in the event of a dispute concerning investments in the other Member State, bring proceedings against the latter Member State before an arbitral tribunal whose jurisdiction that Member State has undertaken to accept,

    RECALLING the consistently reiterated position of the European Union that the Energy Charter Treaty was not meant to apply in intra-EU relations and that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of the European Union, of the European Atomic Energy Community and of their Member States that the Energy Charter Treaty would create any obligations among them since it was negotiated as an instrument of the European Union’s external energy policy with a view to establishing a framework for energy cooperation with third countries whereas, by contrast, the European Union’s internal energy policy consists of an elaborate system of rules designed to create an internal market in the field of energy which exclusively regulates relations between Member States in that field,

    RECALLING that in its judgment of 2 September 2021 in case C-741/19, Republic of Moldova v Komstroy(12) (the ‘Komstroy judgment’), as confirmed in its opinion of 16 June 2022, 1/20(13), the CJEU held that Article 26(2), point (c), of the Energy Charter Treaty must be interpreted as not being applicable to disputes between a Member State and an investor of another Member State concerning an investment made by the latter in the former Member State,

    RECALLING that, as an interpretation by the competent court and reflecting a general principle of public international law, the interpretation of the Energy Charter Treaty in the Komstroy judgment applies as of the approval of the Energy Charter Treaty by the European Communities and their Member States,

    CONSIDERING that Articles 267 and 344 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding an interpretation of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty that allows for disputes between, on the one hand, an investor of one Member State and, on the other hand, another Member State or the European Union ▌to be resolved before an arbitral tribunal (‘intra-EU arbitration proceedings’),

    CONSIDERING, in any event, that, where a dispute between, on the one hand, an investor of one Member State and, on the other hand, another Member State or the European Union cannot be settled amicably, a party to that dispute may as always choose to submit it for resolution to the competent courts or administrative tribunals in accordance with national law, as guaranteed by general principles of law and respect for fundamental rights enshrined, inter alia, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

    SHARING the common understanding expressed in this Agreement ▌that, as a result, a clause such as Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty could not in the past and cannot now or in the future serve as the legal basis for arbitration proceedings initiated by an investor from one Member State concerning investments in another Member State,

    REITERATING Declaration No 17 concerning primacy, annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, which recalls that the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of the Member States, and that the principle of primacy constitutes a conflict rule in their mutual relations,

    RECALLING, consequently, that, in order to resolve any conflict of norms, an international agreement concluded by the Member States under international law may apply in intra-EU relations only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with the EU Treaties,

    CONSIDERING that, as a result of the non-applicability of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty as a legal basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings, Article 47(3) of the Energy Charter Treaty cannot extend, and was not intended to extend, to such proceedings,

    CONSIDERING that, as a result of the non-applicability of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty as a legal basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings, Parties▌ that are concerned by pending intra-EU arbitration proceedings, whether as respondent or as the Member State of an investor, should cooperate in order to ensure that the existence of this Agreement is brought to the attention of the arbitral tribunal concerned to allow the appropriate conclusion to be drawn as to the absence of jurisdiction of that tribunal,

    CONSIDERING, in addition, that no new intra-EU arbitration proceedings should be registered, and AGREEING that, where a notice of arbitration is nevertheless delivered, the ▌ Parties that are concerned by those proceedings, whether as respondent or as the Member State of an investor, should cooperate in order to ensure that the existence of this Agreement is brought to the attention of the arbitral tribunal concerned to allow the appropriate conclusion to be drawn that Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty cannot serve as a legal basis for such proceedings,

    CONSIDERING, nevertheless, that settlements and awards in intra-EU investment arbitration cases that can no longer be annulled or set aside and that were voluntarily complied with or definitively enforced should not be challenged,

    REGRETTING that arbitral awards have already been rendered, continue to be rendered and could still be rendered, by arbitral tribunals in intra-EU arbitration proceedings initiated with reference to Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty, in a manner contrary to European Union law▌, including as expressed in the case-law of the CJEU,

    also REGRETTING that such arbitral awards are the subject of enforcement proceedings, including in third countries, that in pending intra-EU arbitration proceedings purportedly based on Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty arbitral tribunals do not decline competence and jurisdiction, and that arbitral institutions continue to register new arbitration proceedings and do not reject them as manifestly inadmissible due to lack of consent to submit to arbitration,

    CONSIDERING, therefore, that it is necessary to reiterate, expressly and unambiguously, the consistent position of the Parties by means of an agreement reaffirming their common understanding on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty, as interpreted by the CJEU, to the extent that it concerns intra-EU arbitration proceedings,

    CONSIDERING that, in accordance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 5 February 1970, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited(14), and as explained by the CJEU in the Komstroy judgment, certain provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty are intended to govern bilateral relations,

    CONSIDERING therefore that this Agreement only concerns bilateral relationships between the Parties and, by extension, investors from those Member States as Contracting Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty, and that, as a result, this Agreement affects only those Contracting Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty that are governed by the law of the European Union▌ as a Regional Economic Integration Organisation within the meaning of Article 1, point 3, of the Energy Charter Treaty and does not affect the enjoyment by the other Contracting Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty of their rights under that Treaty or the performance of their obligations,

    RECALLING that the Parties have informed the ▌ Contracting Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty of their intention to conclude this Agreement,

    CONSIDERING that by concluding this Agreement and in line with their legal obligations under European Union ▌law, but without prejudice to their right to make such claims as they consider appropriate in relation to costs incurred by them as respondents in relation to intra-EU arbitration proceedings, the Parties ensure full and effective compliance with the Komstroy judgment, and underline the unenforceability of existing arbitral awards, the obligation for arbitral tribunals to immediately terminate any pending intra-EU arbitration proceedings, the obligation for arbitral institutions not to register any future intra-EU arbitration proceedings, in line with their respective powers under Article 36(3) of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (‘ICSID’), concluded in Washington on 18 March 1965, and Article 12 of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (‘SCC’) arbitration rules, and the obligation for arbitral tribunals to declare that any intra-EU arbitration proceedings sought to be registered before them lack a legal basis,

    UNDERSTANDING that this Agreement covers investor-State arbitration proceedings involving the ▌Parties in intra-EU disputes based on Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty under any arbitration convention or set of rules, including ICSID and the ICSID arbitration rules, the Arbitration Institute of the SCC arbitration rules, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law arbitration rules and ad hoc arbitration, and

    BEARING in mind that the provisions of this Agreement are without prejudice to the right of the European Commission or any Member State to bring an action before the CJEU based on Articles 258, 259 and 260 TFEU,

    HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

    SECTION 1

    Common understanding on the non-applicability of article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty as a basis for Intra-EU arbitration proceedings

    Article 1

    Definitions

    For the purposes of this Agreement, the following definitions shall apply:

    (1)  “Energy Charter Treaty” means the Energy Charter Treaty signed at Lisbon on 17 December 1994 and approved on behalf of the European Communities by Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom on 23 September 1997, as it may be amended from time to time;

    (2)  “intra-EU relations” means relations between Member States ▌ or between a Member State and the European Union ▌;

    (3)  “intra-EU arbitration proceedings” means any proceedings before an arbitral tribunal initiated with reference to Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty to resolve a dispute between, on the one hand, an investor of one Member State and, on the other hand, another Member State or the European Union ▌.

    Article 2

    Common understanding ▌on the interpretation and continued non-applicability of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty and the lack of legal basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings

    1.  The ▌ Parties hereby reaffirm, for greater certainty, that they share a common understanding on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty according to which Article 26 of that Treaty cannot and never could serve as a legal basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings.

    The common understanding expressed in the first subparagraph is based on the following elements of European Union law:

    (a)  the interpretation by the CJEU of Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty to mean that that provision does not apply, and should never have been applied, as a basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings; and

    (b)  the primacy of European Union law, recalled in Declaration No 17, annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, as a rule of international law governing conflict of norms in their mutual relations, with the result that, in any event, Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty does not and could not apply as a basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings.

    2.  The ▌ Parties reaffirm, for greater certainty, that they share the common understanding that, as a result of the absence of a legal basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings pursuant to Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty, Article 47(3) of the Energy Charter Treaty does not extend, and could not have extended at any time, to such proceedings. Accordingly, Article 47(3) of the Energy Charter Treaty cannot have produced legal effects in intra-EU relations when a Member State withdrew from the Energy Charter Treaty prior to the conclusion of this Agreement and would not produce legal effects in intra-EU relations if a ▌ Party withdrew from the Energy Charter Treaty subsequently.

    3.  For greater certainty, the ▌ Parties are in agreement that, in accordance with the common understanding expressed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, and without prejudice thereto, Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty does not apply as a basis for intra-EU arbitration proceedings and Article 47(3) of the Energy Charter Treaty does not produce legal effects in intra-EU relations.

    4.  Paragraphs 1 to 3 are without prejudice to the interpretation and application of other provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty to the extent that they concern intra-EU relations.

    SECTION 2

    Final Provisions

    Article 3

    Depositary

    1.  The Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union shall act as depositary of this Agreement (the ‘Depositary’).

    2.  The Depositary shall notify the ▌ Parties of:

    (a)  the deposit of any instrument of ratification, approval or acceptance in accordance with Article 5;

    (b)  the date of entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with Article 6(1);

    (c)  the date of entry into force of this Agreement for each ▌ Party in accordance with Article 6(2).

    3.  The Depositary shall publish this Agreement in the Official Journal of the European Union and notify the depositary of the Energy Charter Treaty, as well as the Energy Charter Secretariat, of its adoption and entry into force.

    4.  The Depositary shall invite the depositary of the Energy Charter Treaty to notify this Agreement to the other Contracting Parties to the Energy Charter Treaty.

    5.  This Agreement shall be registered by the Depositary with the United Nations Secretariat, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, following its entry into force.

    Article 4

    Reservations

    No reservations shall be made to this Agreement.

    Article 5

    Ratification, approval or acceptance

    This Agreement shall be subject to ratification, approval or acceptance.

    The ▌ Parties shall deposit their instruments of ratification, approval or acceptance with the Depositary.

    Article 6

    Entry into force

    1.  This Agreement shall enter into force 30 calendar days after the date on which the Depositary receives the second instrument of ratification, approval or acceptance.

    2.  For each ▌ Party which ratifies, approves or accepts it after its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 1, this Agreement shall enter into force 30 calendar days after the date of deposit by such ▌ Party of its instrument of ratification, approval or acceptance.

    Article 7

    Authentic texts

    This Agreement, drawn up in a single original in the Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish languages, each text being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary.

    IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorised to this effect, have signed this Agreement.

    Done at …, this … day of … in the year …

    For the Kingdom of Belgium,

    For the Republic of Bulgaria,

    For the Czech Republic,

    For the Kingdom of Denmark,

    For the Federal Republic of Germany,

    For the Republic of Estonia,

    For Ireland,

    For the Hellenic Republic,

    For the Kingdom of Spain,

    For the French Republic,

    For the Republic of Croatia,

    For the Italian Republic,

    For the Republic of Cyprus,

    For the Republic of Latvia,

    For the Republic of Lithuania,

    For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,

    For the Republic of Malta,

    For the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

    For the Republic of Austria,

    For the Republic of Poland,

    For the Portuguese Republic,

    For Romania,

    For the Republic of Slovenia,

    For the Slovak Republic,

    For the Republic of Finland,

    For the Kingdom of Sweden and

    For the European Union

    __________________

    (1) Opinion of 4 December 2024 (OJ C, C/2025/776, 11.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/776/oj).
    (2) Position of the European Parliament of 18 June 2025.
    (3) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 2 September 2021, Republic of Moldova v Komstroy, C‑741/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:655, paragraph 66.
    (4) Council and Commission Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 23 September 1997 on the conclusion, by the European Communities, of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on energy efficiency and related environmental aspects (OJ L 69, 9.3.1998, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/181/oj).
    (5) OJ L, 2024/2121, 6.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/declar/2024/2121/oj.
    (6) Final Act of the Conference on the European Energy Charter (OJ L 380, 31.12.1994, p. 24, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/1994/998/oj).
    (7) Council and Commission Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 23 September 1997 on the conclusion, by the European Communities, of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on energy efficiency and related environmental aspects (OJ L 69, 9.3.1998, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/181/oj).
    (8) Permanent Court of International Justice, Question of Jaworzina (Polish-Czechoslovakian Frontier), Advisory Opinion, [1923] PCIJ Series B, No. 8, p. 37.
    (9) International Court of Justice, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, [1951] I.C.J. Reports, 15, p. 20.
    (10) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 30 May 2006, Commission v Ireland, C-459/03, ECLI EU:C:2006:345, paragraphs 129 to 137.
    (11) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 March 2018, Achmea, C-284/16, ECLI EU:C:2018:158.
    (12) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 2 September 2021, Republic of Moldova v Komstroy, C‑741/19, ECLI:EU:C:2021:655, paragraph 66.
    (13) Opinion of the Court of Justice of 16 June 2022, 1/20, EU:C:2022:485, paragraph 47.
    (14) Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 5 February 1970, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, paragraphs 33 and 35).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Cadmium – a health bomb: what will Europe do about it? – E-002316/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002316/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Marie Toussaint (Verts/ALE)

    On 2 June, the French National Conference of Regional Unions of Health Professionals and General Practitioners alerted the authorities to the exposure of the French population to cadmium. France, along with Poland, Spain and Portugal, is among the European countries most affected by this toxic substance. Children are particularly susceptible to it and the incidence of related pancreatic cancers is exploding.

    Cadmium, contained in phosphate rock used for fertiliser production, is found in cereals, potatoes and leaf vegetables.

    While the EU plans to gradually reduce exposure standards, France has just adopted much higher thresholds than those which should apply by 2034, which risks prolonging the contamination for several decades due to the persistence of cadmium in the environment.

    In this context, several questions arise:

    • 1.How is the Commission supporting Member States in their strategies to reduce exposure to cadmium?
    • 2.Can the Commission set out an accelerated strategy for disengaging from phosphate fertilisers, particularly imported fertilisers, and not just those from Russia, since the majority of fertilisers used in France come from Morocco?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Living Together, a documentary by Halima Elkhatabi, coming to NFB platforms July 1

    Source: Government of Canada News

    June 18, 2025 – Montreal – National Film Board of Canada (NFB)

    The feature-length documentary Living Together, directed by Halima Elkhatabi, launches on NFB streaming platforms on Tuesday, July 1. It’s an engaging portrait of Gen Y and Gen Z set against the backdrop of the housing crisis. The film had its world premiere at the prestigious Toronto International Film Festival (TIFF) and has since been an official selection at Canadian festivals—including Vancouver, Victoria and the Rendez-vous Québec Cinéma—as well as at festivals in Europe and Morocco. It also had a theatrical release in Quebec in fall 2024.

    About the film

    Living Together by Halima Elkhatabi (2024, NFB, 75 min)
    Press kit: mediaspace.nfb.ca/epk/living-together

    • In a series of inquisitive encounters and captivating conversations, young people looking for a roommate explore the prospect of forging genuine connections. Placing her camera in 15 Montreal apartments advertising a “room for rent,” director Halima Elkhatabi paints a complex and engaging picture of a generation accustomed to playing all their identity cards to find their place in the world.
    • Everyone reveals themselves with candour and vulnerability, hoping for that rare discovery: someone to share their space with who also shares their values. The debut feature-length documentary by a filmmaker with a compassionate and generous eye, Living Togethermaps a mosaic of cultures and ideas, with explorations of community, individualism and the right to housing in constant interplay.

    About the filmmaker

    Born in France, Halima Elkhatabi is a Montreal writer and director of Moroccan descent. A graduate of the Institut national de l’image et du son (INIS), Elkhatabi works in documentary and fiction film as well as audio documentary production. She co-directed the NFB collaborative doc St-Henri, the 26th of August, directed the short fiction films Nina (TIFF’s Canada’s Top Ten 2015) and Fantas (TIFF 2024), and authored the podcasts La route du bled, Chloé et Abdi, Songe d’une nuit d’hiver and La route de l’Eldorado.

    – 30 –

    Stay Connected

    Online Screening Room: nfb.ca
    NFB Facebook | NFB X | NFB Instagram | NFB Blog | NFB YouTube | NFB Vimeo
    Curator’s perspective | Director’s notes

    About the NFB

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Merck Foundation’s 7th Edition of First Ladies Initiative Summit Brings Together 14 African and Asian First Ladies to discuss the impact of their programs

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    • Link to Live Stream of Inaugural Session of Merck Foundation First Ladies Initiative – MFFLI Summit 2025: https://apo-opa.co/3G1Afxo

    Merck Foundation (www.Merck-Foundation.com), the philanthropic arm of Merck KGaA Germany, conducted the 7th Edition of Merck Foundation First Ladies Initiative – MFFLI Summit 2025 on 19th and 20th June in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. It was inaugurated by Prof. Dr. Frank Stangenberg-Haverkamp, Chairman of Merck Foundation Board of Trustees, and Senator, Dr. Rasha Kelej, CEO of Merck Foundation and President of Merck Foundation First Ladies Initiative along with The First Ladies of 14 African and Asian countries, who joined as the Guests of Honor and Keynote Speakers.

    Senator Dr. Rasha Kelej, CEO of Merck Foundation and President of “Merck Foundation First Ladies Initiative” emphasized, “It is my great honor to welcome our esteemed Guests of Honor and Keynote Speakers, The First Ladies of Africa and Asia, and Ambassadors of our ‘More Than a Mother’ campaign to the 7th Edition of the Merck Foundation First Ladies Initiative – MFFLI Summit.

    Through this important platform, we have collectively exchanged valuable experiences and engaged in meaningful discussions on the impact of our programs, which are aimed at transforming patient care and raising awareness of a wide range of critical social and health issues.”

    Prof. Dr. Frank Stangenberg Haverkamp, Chairman of Merck Foundation Board of Trustees added, “At Merck Foundation, our goal is improving overall health and well-being by building healthcare capacity and by providing access to quality & equitable healthcare solutions in the Africa, Asia and beyond. I would like to sincerely thank our Ambassadors and partners. Together, with your unwavering support and collaboration, we will continue to work towards our vision of a world where everyone can lead a healthy and happy life.”

    The First Ladies of 14 countries, who are also the Ambassadors of “Merck Foundation More Than a Mother”, joined as Guests of Honor and Keynote Speakers. They are:

    • H.E. Dr. ANA DIAS LOURENÇO, The First Lady of the Republic of Angola
    • H.E. Dr. DÉBORA KATISA CARVALHO, The First Lady of the Republic of Cabo Verde
    • H.E. Madam BRIGITTE TOUADERA, The First Lady of the Central African Republic
    • H.E. Madam ZITA OLIGUI NGUEMA, The First Lady of the Gabonese Republic
    • H.E. Mrs. FATOUMATTA BAH-BARROW, The First Lady of the Republic of The Gambia
    • H.E. Mrs. LORDINA DRAMANI MAHAMA, The First Lady of the Republic of Ghana
    • H.E. Mrs. RACHEL RUTO E.G.H., The First Lady of the Republic of Kenya
    • H.E. Mrs. KARTUMU YARTA BOAKAI, The First Lady of the Republic of Liberia
    • H.E. Mrs. SAJIDHA MOHAMED, The First Lady of the Republic of Maldives
    • H.E. Dr. GUETA SELEMANE CHAPO, The First Lady of the Republic of Mozambique
    • H.E. Senator OLUREMI TINUBU, CON, The First Lady of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
    • H.E. Mrs. MARIA DE FATIMA VILA NOVA, The First Lady of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe
    • H.E. Madam MARIE KHONE FAYE, The First Lady of the Republic of Senegal
    • H.E. Amai Dr. AUXILLIA MNANGAGWA, The First Lady of the Republic of Zimbabwe

    Senator, Dr. Rasha Kelej stated, “I am proud to share that Merck Foundation has provided more than 2280 scholarships for young doctors from 52 countries in 44 critical and underserved specialties. Many of our Merck Foundation Alumni are becoming the first specialists in their countries. Together with our Ambassadors and Partners, we are making history and transforming the patient care landscape across Africa and beyond. Many of them are becoming the first specialists in their countries.”

    “During our Conference, we also marked together the World Infertility Awareness Month, observed in June, through our signature campaign “Merck Foundation More Than a Mother”, which aims to empower infertile and childless women by providing access to information, education, and change of mindset. I am happy to share that out of the total 2280 scholarships, more than 700 scholarships have been provided for training in Fertility, Embryology, Sexual and Reproductive Medicine, Clinical Psychiatry, Women’s Health, Urology, Laparoscopic Surgical Skills, and Family Medicine, to improve access to fertility care and women’s health”, she further added. 

    During the 7th Edition of Merck Foundation First Ladies Initiative -MFFLI Summit, two important occasions were marked; the 8th Anniversary of Merck Foundation and 13 years of Merck Foundation’s development programs that started in 2012.

    On the first day, the Plenary Session of the Merck Foundation First Ladies Initiative -MFFLI Summit took place, featuring a high-level panel discussion with the participating First Ladies of Africa and Asia. Moreover, a high-level ministerial panel discussion was held with African Ministers and top healthcare experts from across the globe.

    The Day 2 of the conference will have three key parallel session will be held- Two medical and scientific sessions covering Oncology and Fertility Topics, and a community awareness session, Merck Foundation Health Media Training. This session will emphasize the critical role of the media in influencing communities and driving cultural change, with regards to a wide range of social and health issues like Breaking Infertility Stigma, Supporting Girls’ Education, Stopping GBV, Ending Child Marriage & FGM, Empowering Women, Diabetes and Hypertension Awareness.

    The conference is being conducted in a hybrid format, enabling over 6,000 audiences from more than 70 countries to benefit, meet and discuss strategies and solutions for the health and social challenges in their countries safely and effectively.

    Countries participating in the 7th Edition of Merck Foundation First Ladies Initiative:

    Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central Africa Republic, Cambodia, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Guinea – Bissau, Guinea – Conakry, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, The Gambia, Togo, Tunisia, U.A.E, UK, Uganda, US, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe and more.

    The 7th Edition of Merck Foundation First Ladies Initiative is streamed live on the social media handles of Merck Foundation and Senator, Dr. Rasha Kelej, CEO of Merck Foundation:

    @ Merck Foundation: Facebook (https://apo-opa.co/4edCwCi), X (https://apo-opa.co/4n8k2qI), Instagram (https://apo-opa.co/3G4ZQ8w), and YouTube (https://apo-opa.co/4kQbVOf).

    @ Rasha Kelej: Facebook (https://apo-opa.co/3ZBhIi7), X (https://apo-opa.co/3FT5D13), Instagram (https://apo-opa.co/3HNpOOr), and YouTube (https://apo-opa.co/3ZF3Xiq).

    Link to the Facebook live stream of Inaugural Session of Merck Foundation First Ladies High Level Panel: https://apo-opa.co/3G1Afxo

    Merck Foundation is transforming the Patient care landscape and making history together with their partners in Africa, Asia, and beyond, through:

    • 2280+ Scholarships provided by Merck Foundation for doctors from 52 Countries in more than 44 critical and underserved medical specialties.  

    Merck Foundation is also creating a culture shift and breaking the silence about a wide range of social and health issues in Africa and underserved communities through:

    3700+ Media Persons from more than 35 countries trained to better raise awareness about different social and health issues

    8 Different Awards launched annually for best media coverage, fashion designers, films, and songs

    • Around 30 songs to address health and social issues, by local singers across Africa

    8 Children’s Storybooks in three languages – English, French, and Portuguese

    7 Awareness Animation films in five languages – English, French, Portuguese, Spanish and Swahili to raise awareness about prevention and early detection of Diabetes & Hypertension and supporting girl education.

    Pan African TV Program “Our Africa by Merck Foundation” addressing Social and Health Issues in Africa through “Fashion and ART with Purpose” Community

    950+ Scholarships provided to high performing but under-privileged African schoolgirls to empower them to complete their studies

    15 Social Media Channels with more than 8 Million Followers.

    – on behalf of Merck Foundation.

    Contact:
    Mehak Handa
    Community Awareness Program Manager
    +91 9310087613
    +91 9319606669
    mehak.handa@external.merckgroup.com

    Join the conversation on our social media platforms below and let your voice be heard!
    Facebook: https://apo-opa.co/4edCwCi
    X: https://apo-opa.co/4n8k2qI
    YouTube: https://apo-opa.co/4kQbVOf
    Instagram: https://apo-opa.co/3G4ZQ8w
    Threads: https://apo-opa.co/460CnzW
    Flickr: https://apo-opa.co/460Conu
    Website: www.Merck-Foundation.com
    Download Merck Foundation App: https://apo-opa.co/460ClIk

    About Merck Foundation:
    The Merck Foundation, established in 2017, is the philanthropic arm of Merck KGaA Germany, aims to improve the health and wellbeing of people and advance their lives through science and technology. Our efforts are primarily focused on improving access to quality & equitable healthcare solutions in underserved communities, building healthcare & scientific research capacity, empowering girls in education and empowering people in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) with a special focus on women and youth. All Merck Foundation press releases are distributed by e-mail at the same time they become available on the Merck Foundation Website.  Please visit www.Merck-Foundation.com to read more. Follow the social media of Merck Foundation: Facebook (https://apo-opa.co/4edCwCi), X (https://apo-opa.co/4n8k2qI), Instagram (https://apo-opa.co/3G4ZQ8w), YouTube (https://apo-opa.co/4kQbVOf), Threads (https://apo-opa.co/460CnzW) and Flickr (https://apo-opa.co/460Conu).

    The Merck Foundation is dedicated to improving social and health outcomes for communities in need. While it collaborates with various partners, including governments to achieve its humanitarian goals, the foundation remains strictly neutral in political matters. It does not engage in or support any political activities, elections, or regimes, focusing solely on its mission to elevate humanity and enhance well-being while maintaining a strict non-political stance in all of its endeavors.

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    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 18 June 2025 Donors making a difference: refugees and migrants

    Source: World Health Organisation

    Today, more than one billion people, about one in eight globally, are on the move, driven by war, conflict, disasters, environmental degradation or economic instability. Migration and displacement are powerful social determinants of health, shaping how and whether people can access the health conditions they need to survive and thrive.

    Climate change, recognized as a “threat multiplier”, worsens food insecurity, disrupts livelihoods, and fuels further displacement. Whether by choice or forced, being on the move is a part of human life, but for many, it brings disproportionate exposure to risk, inequality, and exclusion from basic health services.

    Refugees, migrants, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) frequently face unsafe journeys and precarious living conditions, often with limited access to clean water, adequate nutrition, sanitation, or shelter. Their susceptibility to communicable diseases is increased by the environmental risk factors related to their precarious living and working conditions. Many also face barriers to managing noncommunicable diseases, accessing maternal and newborn care, or receiving mental health support.

    Thanks to the support of donors and partners, WHO works with governments and communities to deliver inclusive, equitable, and context-sensitive health services to people on the move. This includes immunization, disease surveillance, chronic disease management, reproductive and mental health care, support for health system resilience, amongst other efforts.

    These contributions are grounded in the recognition that health is a human right, and that universal health coverage must be inclusive of all people, regardless of migratory status. The stories presented below show how rapid, compassionate action can protect lives and advance dignity, equity, and resilience, especially in times of crisis.

    Landmark cholera vaccination campaign offers hope to Rohingya refugee camps

    A young girl receives the OCV vaccine in one of the remote blocks of camp. Photo by: WHO/Mehnaz Manzur

    Cholera has been endemic in Bangladesh for decades, with seasonal peaks. It has remained a major health concern in the Rohingya refugee camps since 2017.

    In a major joint effort, the Government of Bangladesh, with support from WHO, UNHCR, and health sector partners, launched a landmark cholera vaccination campaign in the Rohingya refugee camps on 12 January 2025. This initiative focused on children aged one year and older, following a rise in cholera cases detected through WHO’s disease monitoring system in both the camps and nearby host communities.

    The five-day vaccination campaign aimed to reach 943 174 people across 33 camps and Bhasan Char Island. Over 1 700 community health workers, supervisors, and health sector partners visited 194 907 households to administer the single-dose Euvichol Plus vaccine.

    Read the full story.

    Delivering lifesaving health services for flood-displaced families in Nigeria

    Delivering lifesaving health services for flood-displaced families in Nigeria. Photo by: WHO/Nigeria

    Borno state, in northeastern Nigeria, was severely impacted by recent floods, in September 2024, which displaced over 400 000 people. Almost 90 000 people in vulnerable situations were forced to take shelter in temporary camps with limited access to food, clean water and health services.

    Displaced populations are at especially high risk from malnutrition, and diseases such as cholera, malaria and measles in a region where health systems are already fragile and strained.

    Recognizing urgent health need, WHO, with financial support from USAID and the Government of Germany, deployed five mobile health teams made up of 35 public health experts, to provide routine immunization, maternal care and clinical services. So far, 34 camps and over 93 000 households have been reached and informed about how to prevent epidemic-prone diseases and adopt healthy household practices.

    Read the full story.

    Bringing health care closer to displaced communities in Somalia

    WHO drought response activities in affected districts in Somalia. Photo by: WHO/Somalia

    Somalia experienced a severe drought in 2022-2023. Donors responded swiftly with increased funding to save lives by treating severe acute malnutrition and the prevention and management of disease outbreaks.

    This support enabled WHO to meet urgent health needs while also investing in the long-term capacity of local health services. For example, the Sinkadheer health centre in Al-Adalada camp, west of Mogadishu, provides a full range of services through the Integrated Health and Nutrition Programme. The centre helps ensure access to essential health care for families who might otherwise face financial or logistical barriers to treatment.

    Supported by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), the German Federal Foreign Office, and other partners, the programme continues to improve health outcomes for Somali mothers and children, promoting dignity and resilience in the context of displacement. Each day, the centre serves around 200 patients, primarily from nearby internally displaced communities, offering primary health care, nutritional support, and services to prevent malnutrition.

    Read the full story.

    Bridging gaps in health and nutrition services for IDPs and crisis-affected communities in Ethiopia

    Bridging gaps in health and nutrition services for IDPs and crisis-affected communities in Amhara, Ethiopia. Photo by: WHO/Ethiopia

    Since November 2021, Ethiopia’s Amhara region has faced complex and protracted humanitarian crises driven by internal armed conflict, multiple disease outbreaks, and climate-related shocks- including drought and floods. The region also witnessed a growing influx of people fleeing conflict in neighbouring Sudan. Nearly a million internally displaced persons (IDPs) are living across 38 collective sites and host communities, alongside hundreds of thousands of refugees and returnees.

    To ensure access to essential health services for displaced and crisis-impacted populations, WHO, in collaboration with regional government authorities, deployed Mobile Health and Nutrition Teams. As displacements increased, the number of mobile teams was scaled up to 19 in April 2024, comprising 132 health workers. This increase was made possible through support from the European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (UNCERF), and the People and Government of Japan.

    These teams have provided over 124 250 medical consultations, including referrals for patients requiring specialized care. Services include primary health care, immunizations, maternal and child health support, nutritional care, mental health and psychosocial support, and first-line assistance for survivors of gender-based violence. They also address both communicable and noncommunicable diseases, helping ensure that health care is available and accessible to all.

    Read the full story.

    Health on the frontlines: caring for Haiti’s displaced population

    A mobile clinic organized at the Lycée Argentine Bellegarde IDP site. Photo by: WHO/PAHO

    Since February 2024, Haiti has faced an escalating security crisis from escalating gang violence, political instability, and a humanitarian emergency, placing further strain on the country’s already overstretched health system. This has significantly disrupted access to health care for millions in Haiti.

    The crisis has most severely affected people living in precarious conditions, including the approximately 86 000 individuals residing across 84 IDPs sites of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince.

    To help maintain access to essential services, mobile clinics have been established by the Ouest Department’s health authorities with the support from PAHO/WHO and other partners such as UNCERF. Disease surveillance activities have also been reactivated, including for cholera, through the deployment of surveillance and response teams to each site- helping to detect and respond efficiently to potential outbreaks.

    Read the full story.

    Support for public health emergency preparedness and response in Niger

    WHO medicines and medical supplies donation in Diffa, Niger. Photo by: WHO/Niger

    In March 2024, WHO delivered 16 tons of medicines and medical supplies valued at nearly 100 million FCFA (US$ 170 000) to health facilities across eight regions of Niger, which host large numbers of IDPs, refugees, and returnees.

    This donation, funded through UNCERF and WHO’s own resources, include medical consumables and treatment kits for pneumonia, meningitis, malaria, diphtheria, cholera, and other common illnesses.

    “This donation comes at a crucial time when our health system in the Diffa region is under significant pressure. We will be able to strengthen access to quality health care and save the lives of the people of Diffa, who are already facing emergencies related to the growing number of IDPs, refugees and returnees,” said Colonel-Major Dr Garba Hakimi, Minister of Public Health, Population and Social Affairs.

    Read the full story (French).

    Lessons from Malta: advancing refugee and migrant health

    Valetta from waterfront. Photo by: WHO/Marc Gallego

    As an island located at the heart of the Mediterranean, Malta has long been a transitional stop for people on the move. Today, it is home to over 11 000 refugees and 2 000 asylum seekers, primarily from Bangladesh, Libya, Syria, Sudan and Ukraine.

    With co-funding from the European Union, WHO, in partnership with Malta’s Ministry for Health and Active Ageing, hosted the first Knowledge Forum on Refugee and Migrant Health in Malta in April 2024.

    The Forum brought together government officials, humanitarian organizations, civil society, United Nations agencies, and other stakeholders to share knowledge, exchange experiences, identify opportunities for collaboration, and advance the implementation of WHO’s European Region Action Plan for Refugee and Migrant Health 2023–2030.

    Read the full story.

    Acknowledgments

    The donors and partners acknowledged in this story are (in alphabetical order) European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), European Union, Germany, Japan, United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (UNCERF), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

    Thank you also to UNHCR for its strong partnership in responding to the needs of refugees.

    WHO’s work is made possible through all contributions of our Member States and partners. WHO thanks all donor countries, governments, organizations and individuals who are contributing to the Organization’s work, with special appreciation for those who provide fully flexible contributions to maintain a strong, independent WHO.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: The Government of Canada invests in flood mapping and adaptation projects

    Source: Government of Canada News

    On June 18, 2025, the Government of Canada announced an investment of $6.8 million in 20 projects across the country through the Flood Hazard Identification and Mapping Program (FHIMP), which is funded under Canada’s National Adaptation Strategy.

    Environment and Climate Change Canada is investing $3.3 million in nine projects focused on advancing flood mapping science nationally and bringing together Canadian research institutions and departmental scientists. The projects will leverage the expertise of Canadian universities and researchers to advance the science used in the creation of current, accessible flood maps that can account for the uncertainty of climate change.

    (Please see below for Natural Resources Canada’s project descriptions.)

    Here are the project descriptions:

    Probabilistic predictions of hydrological extremes across timescales and their information—theoretical evaluation

    Recipient: University of British Columbia – $165,900

    This project will use machine learning to improve flood predictions for areas with and without water level monitoring stations. The project goal is to create models that predict the chances of floods for multiple locations in British Columbia and the Yukon, making these predictions more accurate and reliable for extreme events.

    Hydrologic-hydraulic modelling framework for improving dynamic ice-jam flood mapping under a changing climate

    Recipient: The Governors of the University of Alberta – $612,400

    Researchers will develop a system using surface water, river, and ice modelling to better understand stream flows during ice jams and breakup, specifically in areas where data is limited. This will improve ice-jam flood mapping while considering the effects of climate change.

    Developing a consolidated flood frequency analysis system for Canada in a changing climate

    Lead Recipient: University of Calgary – $770,200

    Consortium with University of Saskatchewan and McMaster University

    Researchers will use weather and water-related models, along with statistical methods, to understand how climate change affects surface water across Canada. The goal of this work is to better understand future flood risks, improve flood mapping methods and standards, and support better decision-making and policy development. This project will also make it easier for researchers and flood mapping professionals to share knowledge and information.

    Integrated framework for assessing compound coastal and inland flooding under climate change across Canada 

    Recipient: University of Western Ontario – $180,000

    The goal of this project is to better understand how different types of floods combine (like coastal and river floods) by studying different causes of flooding in a changing climate. The project will develop a system for analyzing data to look at the expected changes in how often and how intense coastal and inland floods will be. The impacts of these combined floods will be studied through the creation of models and maps.

    Climate change and hurricane impacts to Atlantic coasts

    Lead Recipient: Queen’s University – $350,800

    Consortium with Dalhousie University

    Researchers will develop computer models to predict flooding from extreme storms along Atlantic coastlines. The goal of this research is to improve floodplain mapping and to predict future coastal flood risks under changing environmental conditions.

    Assessment of emerging technologies to optimize ice-jam flood risk assessment and mapping

    Recipient: Université Laval – $232,200

    Researchers will use satellite and computer mapping techniques to better predict flood risks caused by ice jams along the Peace River and Athabasca River in Alberta, and the Chaudière River in Quebec. Researchers hope to assess a new method for measuring water levels with ice cover and develop a tool to help identify areas prone to ice jams. By increasing the understanding of winter water levels and ice conditions, the project aims to improve flood modelling and flood risk assessments.

    Estimation of intensity-duration-frequency curves for precipitation under current and future climatic conditions across the entire Canadian territory

    Recipient: Polytechnique Montréal – $272,900

    Researchers will use existing rainfall data, along with weather and climate data available from the Canadian Surface Reanalysis (CaSR) to develop new rainfall predictions that can be applied to any location in Canada. The results of this project will help with infrastructure design, stormwater management, and safety planning.

    Machine learning for enhanced hydrodynamic and flood-impact modelling in cold-region rivers

    Recipient: Polytechnique Montréal – $330,900

    Researchers will develop a new system that can quickly and accurately predict river flow in cold regions. The system will combine machine learning with surface water, river, and physics-based models. The goal of this project is to improve flood modelling and management, infrastructure planning, and environmental studies.

    Accounting for hydroclimate modelling uncertainty in the assessment of future flood zones

    Recipient: Ouranos – $365,400

    This project aims to improve the Province of Quebec’s ability to assess future flood risks in a changing climate. Multiple Environment and Climate Change Canada modelling tools will be added to the Government of Quebec’s flood mapping program. This research will create regional forecasts for all of Canada, model river flows in southern Quebec and add peak flow data into a tool to help engineers study future climate risks.

    Natural Resources Canada is investing $2.8 million in eight projects to develop and improve approaches to regional flood modelling. Natural Resources Canada is investing an additional $750,000 to support three projects focused on the exchange between Indigenous Traditional Knowledge and other scientific practices related to flood hazard mapping.

    From fine to regional scales: Using physics-informed artificial intelligence and remote sensing for flood modelling and hazard mapping

    Recipient: University of Saskatchewan – $181,700

    The project will create innovative methods to generate and produce flood hazard maps for the Assiniboine River Basin to help decision-makers better understand risk and uncertainty. Lastly, the recipient will design a user-friendly interface to view the maps.

    Deep learning-based resolution enhancement of flood maps

    Recipient: CE Flood Analytics Ltd. – $143,812

    The project will deliver a tool for local, regional, and national stakeholders to enhance the resolution of existing flood map products using machine learning and Natural Resources Canada’s high-resolution terrain model, the High-Resolution Digital Elevation Model (HRDEM). This tool will offer a low-cost solution to create high-resolution flood maps from global or regional models, making it accessible for non-expert stakeholders.

    Regional flood modelling and mapping in the South Nation River Basin: Using new and innovative tools to map floods and build knowledge of flood risk under different flood scenarios

    Recipient: South Nation River Conservation Authority – $430,355

    The project will compare innovative flood mapping techniques with traditional methods and assess flood risks under various climate scenarios. The results will support land-use planning and establish new flood mapping techniques, aiding both scientific research and practical decision-making in a rapidly growing region.

    Improved model-based techniques for estimating low-frequency flood event magnitudes across Canada

    Recipient: University of Waterloo – $595,000

    The project will develop advanced techniques for estimating the uncertain magnitude of low-frequency flood events (e.g., 50-year, 100-year, and 200-year floods) using hydrological models enhanced by machine learning. They will assess alternative data sources to improve predictions of flood magnitudes at a regional scale.

    Local-scale current and projected future total flood hazard mapping for Canada – literature review

    Recipient: Slobodan P. Simonović Consulting Ltd. – $45,453

    The recipient will review global methodologies for creating national-scale flood hazard maps to identify approaches suitable for implementation in Canada. This review will cover methods for mapping fluvial, pluvial, and coastal flood hazards at various scales under changing climate conditions. The project will explore the integration of AI and remote sensing to refine regional flood maps and will identify applicable and climate-focused methods and tools to support flood hazard assessment in Canada.

    State-of-the-art AI model development for reliable and accurate flood mapping under climate change: Supercharging flood mapping

    Recipient: The Royal Institution for the Advancement of Learning/McGill University – $257,600

    The project will evaluate the use of transformer models for predicting water levels in Canadian watersheds that consider the uncertainty of climate change. They will deliver improved prediction models for approximately 300 locations (gauges) across Canada, making these tools accessible to researchers, decision-makers, and local communities. Expected results include detailed water level predictions for three climate scenarios.

    Amélioration de la modélisation régionale des inondations fluviales basée sur les données LiDAR dans différents contextes géomorphologiques au Canada (French only)

    Recipient: Concordia University – $773,741

    The project will result in a simplified methodology for flood zone mapping, including open access computer programs and an application guide. Expected results include flood maps, hydraulic models, and a final report for governments and other stakeholders to improve flood risk management and raise public awareness.

    Research investigation towards the compound flooding risks and the accuracy and uncertainty of island-wide flood mapping for Prince Edward Island

    Recipient: Canadian Centre for Climate Change and Adaptation, University of Prince Edward Island – $459,266

    This project will enhance island-wide pluvial flood modeling for Prince Edward Island, addressing critical challenges to support the provincial government in developing more robust flood hazard maps.

    Dene Nàhodhe (in tune with nature): Indigenous perspectives on flood hazard and response in Kluane First Nation (KFN) traditional territory

    Recipient: Kátł’odeeche First Nation – $250,000

    The recipient will create Kluane First Nation (KFN) flood hazard datasets that integrate Indigenous Knowledge and western science to improve flood data availability and understanding. The project will also develop culturally appropriate policy tools for flood mitigation and support knowledge transfer of Indigenous flood response strategies within the community, especially from Elders to Youth.

    Sqéwqel’s Indigenous Knowledge interweaving

    Recipient: Seabird Island Band – $250,000

    The project will enhance resilience and preparedness among Seabird Island Band and neighbouring communities against flood hazards by leveraging Indigenous Traditional Knowledge through the development of participatory tools, comprehensive traditional knowledge studies, and inclusive engagement processes.

    Harmonizing hydrology and heritage: Indigenous Knowledge-driven flood mapping for six First Nations

    Recipient: Tribal Chiefs Ventures Inc. (TCVI) – $250,000

    The recipient will create a robust, culturally informed flood hazard mapping system that integrates traditional Indigenous Knowledge with modern GIS and hydrological modelling techniques. The goal is to strengthen community resilience to flooding by improving preparedness, risk identification, and disaster management planning.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Tracing the Drax family’s millions – a story of British landed gentry, slavery and sugar plantations

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Paul Lashmar, Reader in Journalism, City St George’s, University of London

    ‘Planting the sugar-cane’: vast fortunes were made from the trades in both sugar and human slaves in the Americas. Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, Photographs and Prints Division, The New York Public Library

    Rich British aristocratic families with a legacy of owning colonial slave plantations are often accused by campaigners that their wealth solely originates from these plantations. One frequent target of this criticism has been the Drax family of Dorset, which is headed by Richard Grosvenor Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax, who was the Conservative MP for South Dorset until July 2024.

    Historian Alan Lester of the University of Sussex has noted of Drax (as he is commonly known): “Much of his fortune is inherited, coming down the family line from ownership of the Drax sugar plantations and the 30,000 enslaved people who worked them as Drax property for 180 years before emancipation in Barbados.”

    Recently, I have researched and written a book on the Drax family’s history and involvement in the slave trade in the Caribbean, Drax of Drax Hall, that gives fresh insights into the level of wealth they derived from the sugar trade and the trade in African slaves who worked their plantations – as well as the family’s other income sources.

    I searched the archives in the UK and Caribbean for evidence of their revenue streams until Britain’s 1834 abolition of slavery in the colonies. I estimate that the family today are worth more than £150 million from their land and property in Dorset and Yorkshire.


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    Over a period of two centuries until 1834, eight generations of Drax ancestors owned and worked hundreds of enslaved African captives at any one time. The latest beneficiary of primogeniture – the legal concept that recognises the first-born child as heir to a familiy’s fortune – Richard Drax inherited the family’s still-operating 621-acre Drax Hall plantation in Barbados in 2021.

    Drax, 67, has said: “I am keenly aware of the slave trade in the West Indies, and the role my very distant ancestor played in it is deeply, deeply regrettable. But no one can be held responsible today for what happened many hundreds of years ago. This is a part of the nation’s history, from which we must all learn.”

    My research reveals the sources of his family’s wealth are more complex than the critics’ claims that it all derives from the slave-worked plantations.

    Like most British landed gentry, much of the Drax family income has come as extensive landlords of their British estates which, in 1883, exceeded 23,000 acres across various counties. Today, it includes nearly 16,000 acres in Dorset and 2,520 acres in the Yorkshire Dales.

    However, my research also shows the Drax family made more money from slavery than was previously thought, when taking into account the way revenues from their plantations were channelled into the family’s British estates over the two centuries of slavery.

    Drax Hall plantation in Barbados

    The Drax Hall plantation in the Barbados parish of Saint George has been described by Barbadian historian Sir Hilary Beckles, chair of the Caribbean Community reparations commission, as a “killing field” where as many as 30,000 slaves died in brutal conditions. Despite pressure from reparation campaigners in the Caribbean, Britain and elsewhere, Richard Drax has declined to make a formal public apology or gesture of recompense in the Caribbean for the years of slavery.

    A 19th-century drawing of Drax Hall plantation in Barbados.
    Unknown source, Wikimedia Commons

    As the prime minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley, explained in April 2024, despite the efforts of her government Drax has yet to agree to a settlement, pay reparations or contribute all or part of his family’s Drax Hall plantation to provide affordable housing or become a memorial to those who worked and died in colonial enslavement on the island.

    Some other British landed families whose ancestors owned slave plantations in the Caribbean, including the Trevelyans (who owned six slave plantations in Grenada) and the Gladstones (British prime minister William Gladstone’s father owned plantations in Guyana), have made formal apologies and reparations. And while some families have kept the terms of these reparations private, longtime BBC reporter Laura Trevelyan made a US$100,000 (£73,000) donation to a Caribbean development fund.

    The largest family estate

    Four thousand miles from Barbados, Richard Drax lives in Charborough House, a historic 17th-century mansion in Dorset. He oversees the 23.5-square mile estate, the largest family estate in Dorset with over 120 properties, many of which are rented out.

    Charborough was acquired by Drax’s ancestor Walter Erle by marriage in 1549. The family has gradually increased the estate over the centuries. Historically, their income comes from renting land to tenant farmers and cottages to agricultural workers. This, I identified, is where the bulk of their income has come from.

    Charborough House: the Drax family seat in Dorset.
    John Lamper/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

    However, profits from sugar produced by slavery also poured into the family coffers over 200 years. Richard Drax’s remote ancestor James Drax (1609-1661) was one of the first settler group to arrive in the then-uninhabited island of Barbados in 1627. In his introduction to my book, TV historian David Olusoga writes that the Drax family were key players – arguably the key players – in the origin story of British slavery:

    The Drax Hall plantation, the first estate on which a crop of sugar was commercially grown and processed by any English planter, became one of the laboratories in which early English slavery was developed and finessed.

    Built around 1650, the Jacobean plantation house is thought to be the one of the three oldest extant residential buildings in the Americas. From the 17th into the 18th century, the Draxes created and owned the largest acreage in Barbados with the Drax Hall and and Mount plantations – plus a 3,000-acre estate, also called Drax Hall, in Jamaica. The family became enormously wealthy: James Drax was said by a visitor to Drax Hall in the 1640s to “live like a prince”, putting on lavish dinners for friends and guests.

    In addition to owning slaves, James Drax shipped African captives to Barbados as a key part of the trade in slaves. Knighted by both Oliver Cromwell and Charles I, by 1660 he was a director and investor in the English East India Company which, in part, traded and exploited enslaved people.

    Paul Lashmar’s book, Drax of Drax Hall.
    Bookshop.com

    In her 1930 study, American historian Elizabeth Donnan presented evidence that the Draxes of the 17th century operated “off the books” – buying enslaved people from, and selling them to, “interloper” ships that circumvented the Royal African Company’s monopoly of slave trading to the colonies.

    The Drax family married into the Erle family in 1719, combining three fortunes: that of the Erles of Charborough, the Draxes of Yorkshire, Barbados and Jamaica, and the landed-gentry Ernles of Wiltshire.

    Despite being deeply involved in the South Sea Bubble scandal, the Drax family flourished. The slave registers in the National Archives show that between 1825 and 1834, the Drax Hall plantation in Barbados produced an average of 163 tonnes of sugar and 4,845 gallons of rum per year. This gave the family an average annual net profit of £3,591 – equivalent to about £600,000 now. Today, the plantation still produces 700 tonnes of sugar a year, earning the family something in the region of £250,000.

    Pressure for reparations

    In recent years, the value of Drax Hall’s land in Barbados has greatly increased as it is sought after for housing, and could now be worth as much as Bds$150,000 (£60,000) per acre. At the same time, pressure for reparations is growing. In 2023, the African Union threw its weight behind the Caribbean reparations campaign.

    David Comissiong, deputy chairman of the Barbados reparations task force, has said: “Other families are involved, though not as prominently as the Draxes. This reparations journey has begun.”

    Yet to date, the only reparations paid in the story of the Drax family’s involvement in the slave trade were to the family itself. In 1837, Jane-Frances Erle-Drax, the heiress of Charborough, received £4,293 12s 6d (worth more than £614,000 today) in reparations for freeing 189 slaves from Drax Hall plantation after the abolition of slavery in the colonies.

    In the course of researching and writing my book, I approached Richard Drax both directly and through his lawyers and put the claims made here to him. He had no comment to add.

    This page contains references to books included for editorial reasons, which may include links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something from bookshop.org, The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

    Paul Lashmar is affiliated with the Labour Party.

    ref. Tracing the Drax family’s millions – a story of British landed gentry, slavery and sugar plantations – https://theconversation.com/tracing-the-drax-familys-millions-a-story-of-british-landed-gentry-slavery-and-sugar-plantations-257376

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump breaks from western allies at G7 summit as US weighs joining Iran strikes

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex

    Working alongside western democratic allies has not been a natural fit for Donald Trump. The US president left the recently concluded G7 summit in Canada early, with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron assuming this was to work on addressing the most severe escalation between Iran and Israel in decades.

    But Trump offered little communication with other G7 members, which include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK, of what his plans were. He said he had to leave the summit “for obvious reasons”, though failed to elaborate on what he meant.

    After exiting the summit, he lambasted Macron on social media. Trump wrote: “Wrong! He has no idea why I am now on my way to Washington, but it certainly has nothing to do with a Cease Fire”. Trump continued by saying his exit was due to something “much bigger than that”, adding: “Emmanuel always gets it wrong.”

    This has prompted discussion over whether US forces may join Israel’s strikes on Iran. Despite initially distancing the US from the Israeli attacks, Trump said on June 17: “We now have complete and total control of the skies over Iran.”


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    He has since demanded Tehran’s “unconditional surrender”, while also issuing a chilling threat to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, describing him as an “easy target”.

    The pressure campaign employed by Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to convince Trump that the time is right for a military assault on Iran seems to be working.

    Exploiting Trump’s impulsive nature, Netanyahu may soon be able to convince Trump to give Israel what it needs to destroy Iran’s underground uranium enrichment sites: a 30,000-pound “bunker buster” bomb and a B-2 bomber to carry it.

    The US’s western allies have been left scrambling to interpret Trump’s social media posts and figure out the real reason he left the G7 summit early.

    The only aircraft capable of carrying ‘bunker-buster’ bombs is the B-2.
    Mariusz Lopusiewicz / Shutterstock

    This wasn’t the first time that Trump has left a G7 forum early. In 2018, the last time such a meeting was held in Canada, Trump also left early after Macron and the then Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau, promised to confront Trump over the imposition of tariffs on US allies.

    The latest G7 summit also wasn’t the first time Trump has treated traditional US allies with suspicion. Trump has cast doubt on US willingness to defend Nato allies if they don’t pay more for their own defence. He has repeatedly threatened to leave the alliance and has frequently denigrated it – even calling alliance members “delinquent”.

    Trump thinks the US gains an advantage by abandoning relationships with “free riders”. But experts have made clear alienating allies makes the US weaker. While the alliance system has given the US unprecedented influence over the foreign policies of US allies in the past, Trump’s pressure to increase their defence spending will make them more independent from the US in the long-term.

    Trump seems to prefer a world guided by short-term self-interest at the expense of long-term collective security. Indeed, with an “America first” agenda, multilateral cooperation is not Trump’s strong suit. With the G7, Trump is yet again making clear that he does not fit in, nor does he want to.

    Because the G7 is small and relatively homogenous in membership, meetings between members are supposed to promote collective and decisive decision-making. However, even the task of coming up with a joint statement on the escalating conflict between Iran and Israel proved challenging.

    Trump eventually joined other leaders in calling for deescalation in the Middle East, and the G7 was in agreement that Iran cannot acquire nuclear weapons. But Trump’s social media activity since then has left US allies in the dark over what role the US might play in the conflict.

    Trump also alarmed G7 members with calls for Russia to return to the forum. He claimed that the war in Ukraine would not have happened had Moscow not been ejected from the former G8 grouping in 2014.

    Then, on his way out of the summit, Trump bragged to reporters that Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin, “doesn’t speak to anybody else” but him. Trump added that Putin was insulted when Russia was thrown out of the G8, “as I would be, as you would be, as anybody would be”.

    Following weeks of frustration over Russia’s refusal to engage in serious peace talks about ending the war in Ukraine, Trump seems to have returned to being Putin’s most loyal advocate.

    Hostility toward multilateralism

    During Trump’s first term, he pushed multilateralism to the brink. But he did not completely disengage. The US withdrew from the Paris climate accords, the nuclear deal with Iran, negotiations for a trade deal with Pacific nations, and imposed sanctions against officials of the International Criminal Court.

    However, when multilateral initiatives served Trump’s short-term objectives, he was willing to get on board. A trade deal struck with Canada and Mexico that Trump described as “the most important” ever agreed by the US. He said the deal would bring thousands of jobs back to North America.

    The second Trump administration has been even more hostile to multilateralism. Not only has the trade deal with Canada and Mexico been undermined by Trump’s love of tariffs, his administration has been more antagonistic toward almost all of the US’s traditional allies. In fact, most of Trump’s ire is reserved for democracies not autocracies.

    In contrast to the G7, where he clearly felt out of place, Trump was in his element during his May trip to the Middle East. Trump has a more natural connection to the leaders of the Gulf who do not have to adhere to democratic norms and human rights, and where deals can get done immediately.

    Trump left the Middle East revelling in all of the billion dollar deals he made, which he exaggerated were worth US$2 trillion (£1.5 trillion). The G7, on the other hand, doesn’t offer much to Trump. He sees it as more of a nuisance.

    The G7 forum is supposed to reassure the public that the most powerful countries in the world are united in their commitment to stability. But Trump’s antics are undermining the credibility of that message. It is these antics that risk dragging the west into a dangerous confrontation with Iran.

    Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Trump breaks from western allies at G7 summit as US weighs joining Iran strikes – https://theconversation.com/trump-breaks-from-western-allies-at-g7-summit-as-us-weighs-joining-iran-strikes-259214

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI China: Foreign Minister Lin presents Friendship Medal of Diplomacy to former French Senator Gattolin

    Source: Republic of Taiwan – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

    Foreign Minister Lin presents Friendship Medal of Diplomacy to former French Senator Gattolin

    • Date:2025-06-16
    • Data Source:Department of European Affairs

    June 16, 2025  

    No. 211  

    Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung presented the Friendship Medal of Diplomacy to former French Senator André Gattolin at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on the morning of June 16 in recognition of his long-standing efforts to promote Taiwan-France relations and his staunch support of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.

     

    In his speech, Minister Lin stated that Mr. Gattolin had long been a good friend of Taiwan in the French Senate, sparing no effort to speak up for Taiwan over the years. He pointed out that during the COVID-19 outbreak of 2020, Mr. Gattolin had taken the lead in bringing together a total of 110 members from both chambers of the French Parliament to sign an open letter calling for Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization, helping Taiwan gain widespread recognition in France and paving the way for the first passage of resolutions supportive of Taiwan in 2021 by both chambers. 

     

    He also mentioned that Mr. Gattolin had worked with French parliamentarians friendly to Taiwan to facilitate the adoption of the seven-year Military Programming Law in 2023, reiterating France’s continued defense of freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait. He added that during Mr. Gattolin’s tenure as French cochair of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) in 2020, he had enthusiastically encouraged French parliamentarians to participate in various IPAC initiatives. On behalf of MOFA, Minister Lin extended sincere appreciation to Mr. Gattolin for having actively deepened Taiwan-France relations and expressed hope that he would continue to leverage his influence to further this bilateral friendship.

     

    Mr. Gattolin said in his remarks that the honor of receiving the medal was not only a recognition of him personally but also a commendation of the French Senate’s Taiwan Friendship Group. He observed that the French Parliament’s support for Taiwan had continued to expand, noting that the Senate’s Taiwan Friendship Group had grown to over 60 members and that they continued to exhort the French government to attach greater importance to Taiwan. He stated that he was profoundly pleased to have been able to facilitate the training of Taiwan’s Olympic and Paralympic teams in his electoral district of Levallois-Perret last year. And as current vice chair of the IPAC Alumni Council, Mr. Gattolin affirmed that he continued to pay close attention to the situation across the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific region.

     

    Deputy Director of the French Office in Taipei Cléa Le Cardeur, former Minister of Taiwan’s Council for Cultural Affairs Tchen Yu-chiou, and Chair of the Egret Cultural and Educational Foundation Lu Chia-hui attended the award ceremony and offered their congratulations. The atmosphere was heartfelt and earnest. (E)

    MIL OSI China News