Category: France

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Nanette Barragán Leads Letter Demanding Protections for Multilingual Weather Alerts and Forecasts

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Nanette Diaz Barragán (CA-44)

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

    June 4, 2025

    Rep. Nanette Barragán Leads Letter Demanding Protections for Multilingual Weather Alerts and Forecasts

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Congresswoman Nanette Barragán (CA-44) led a letter to National Weather Service (NWS) Director Ken Graham urging immediate action to protect and strengthen access to multilingual weather alerts and forecasts. The letter was co-led by the current and most recent chairs of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC), Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus (CAPAC), and Congressional Black Caucus (CBC)— key caucuses whose members represent communities most impacted by language-access failures.

    Rep. Barragán’s letter follows a recent disruption in the NWS’s multilingual alert services, which occurred when NWS allowed its contract with a third-party translation firm to lapse. Although the service has since been restored, the letter highlights that the gap placed millions of Americans with limited English proficiency at risk and exposed dangerous vulnerabilities in the country’s emergency communication system.

    “Ensuring that all Americans, regardless of the language they speak, have access to life-saving weather information is not optional—it is a core responsibility of the National Weather Service,” said Rep. Barragán. “In a nation as diverse as ours, language access must be treated as an essential component of emergency preparedness and public communication— not an expendable service.”

    In the letter, CHC, CAPAC, and CBC members posed specific questions to the NWS about how it plans to prevent future lapses, evaluate translation service providers, and ensure inclusive outreach to limited-English-proficient communities. The lawmakers also pressed for transparency on the criteria used to select which languages are included in multilingual alerts and how the agency plans to update those lists to reflect shifting demographics.

    Nearly 68 million people in the U.S. speak a language other than English at home— roughly one in five Americans, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. The letter underscores that access to accurate weather information in one’s language is essential, not just during emergencies, but also for everyday decisions that affect safety, health, and economic security.

    Rep. Barragán has long championed language accessibility and continues to lead efforts in Congress to ensure that language is never a barrier to safety or survival. 

    The letter was signed by the following Tri-Caucus leaders and members: Reps. Adriano Espaillat, Judy Chu, Grace Meng, Steven Horsford, Yvette Clarke, Robin Kelly, Maxwell Frost, Debbie Dingell, Dan Goldman, Sydney Kamlager-Dove, Danny Davis, Raja Krishnamoorthi, Robert Menendez, Nydia Velázquez, Lizzie Fletcher, Kevin Mullin, Doris Matsui, Frederica Wilson, Gilbert Cisneros, Andrea Salinas, Dave Min, Emilia Sykes, Jill Tokuda, Robert Garcia, Sara Jacobs, and Senator Ben Ray Luján.

    The full letter to NWS Director Graham can be found here and below:

    Director Graham:

    We write to express our serious concern regarding the National Weather Service’s (NWS) recent decision to discontinue the translation of weather alerts and forecasts into languages other than English. This change, purportedly prompted by the lapse of a contract with a third-party provider, created a dangerous gap in access to information for the many Americans who rely on multilingual alerts and forecasts to stay safe during critical emergencies and make everyday decisions that impact their families, livelihoods, and our nation’s economy.

    We are relieved that multilingual translation services have now been restored. However, the disruption highlighted the vulnerabilities in the current system and the unacceptable risk created by lapses in language access. For tens of millions of Americans, receiving weather alerts in a language they understand can mean the difference between life and death. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, nearly 68 million people in the United States speak a language other than English at home.[1]That number has nearly tripled since 1980 and now represents one in five Americans.[2]For these individuals and families, multilingual alerts are critical for preparing for severe weather events, which increase in frequency and intensity every year. The absence of accessible warnings can—and likely will—lead to avoidable tragedy. ​

    The real-world consequences of inaccessible alerts are not hypothetical. Take, for example, the 2021 deadly tornado outbreak that hit Mayfield, Kentucky, a city with a large Spanish-speaking population. According to news coverage of the outbreak, a Spanish-speaking family in the impacted area had initially ignored a tornado alert delivered only in English because they could not read the warning.[3]It was not until the family received a Spanish-language alert that they quickly took shelter​ on the first floor of their home—shortly before the second floor of their home was wiped out. If they had not received the alert in Spanish, the outcome could have been fatal.[4]Communities across the United States — including speakers of Vietnamese, Chinese, Tagalog, Korean, French, Haitian Creole, and many African languages — also face significant barriers during emergencies when alerts are not available in their primary language. No one should be left without life-saving information simply because of the language they speak.

    Beyond the immediate risk to public safety, this abrupt lapse in translation services also risked creating operational challenges for those on the front lines of weather communication. During the lapse, local meteorologists and alert originators—who rely on NWS-provided multilingual content—were forced to fill the gap themselves. Unfortunately, on-site translation is something not many have the staff or resources to do quickly and accurately. Many communities that rely on NWS-provided multilingual content are unlikely to continue sending multilingual weather alerts should NWS’s centralized translation support halt or lapse again.

    Multilingual access to weather forecasts is not only critical during emergencies—it is equally vital for day-to-day planning and economic stability. Families rely on accurate, understandable forecasts to decide whether it’s safe to send their children to school or for parents to travel to work. Businesses across key sectors—including agriculture, construction, transportation, energy, and tourism—depend on timely weather information to operate safely and efficiently. When forecasts are delivered in clear, accessible language, they empower individuals and industries alike to make informed decisions, reduce risk, and maintain productivity. Stripping away multilingual access undermines this everyday functionality and places non-English-speaking communities and families at a great disadvantage.

    Ensuring that all Americans—regardless of the language they speak—have access to life-saving weather information is not optional; it is a core responsibility of the NWS. In a nation as diverse as ours, language access must be treated as an essential component of emergency preparedness and public communication—not an expendable service.

    In light of the recent disruption and the restoration of multilingual services, we respectfully request responses to the following questions no later than August 1, 2025, to better understand how NWS plans to ensure long-term, uninterrupted language access for all communities:

    What is the scope of the new contract for multilingual translation services? Does it include options for renewal or extension to ensure service continuity beyond the initial term?

    What safeguards has NWS put in place to prevent future gaps in translation services, particularly during contract transitions or vendor changes?

    Has NWS conducted a risk assessment or after-action review to identify what led to the previous lapse and how similar disruptions can be avoided in the future? If so, what were the findings and resulting action steps?

    Is there a contingency plan or backup system in place to provide uninterrupted translation services in the event of a contract lapse, provider failure, or other unexpected disruption?

    How does NWS evaluate and monitor the performance and reliability of its language service providers? Are there benchmarks or quality assurance measures to ensure timely and accurate translations in all covered languages?

    What criteria does NWS use to determine which languages are included in its multilingual alerts? How frequently is this list updated to reflect demographic shifts and community needs?

    How is NWS engaging with non-English-speaking communities and local emergency managers to ensure that multilingual weather communication is effective, culturally appropriate, and broadly accessible?

    We strongly urge NWS to institutionalize safeguards to prevent future interruptions to multilingual services and to treat language access as a permanent, non-negotiable aspect of public safety.

    We stand ready to support your efforts to secure the necessary resources to sustain and strengthen language access in weather communications. The safety, preparedness, and economic resilience of our communities depend on it.

    Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Georgia Resident Sentenced for Leading Bank Fraud and ID Theft Scheme

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Defendant Created Fake Recruiting Website to Steal Identifications; 14 Others Convicted

    ALBANY, Ga. – The final defendant and ringleader of a bank fraud and aggravated identity theft scheme involving stolen checks and a fake online recruiting website was sentenced to federal prison today.

    Jalen Tylee Hill, aka “Roscoe Hill,” 26, of Americus, was sentenced to serve 81 months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release. The Court will determine restitution at a later date. Hill previously pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud, one count of aggravated identity theft and one count of conspiracy to possess stolen mail on May 14, 2024. A codefendant, Victoria Lynn Carter, 25, of Americus, was sentenced to serve one year of supervised release after she previously pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud. The sentences were handed down by Chief U.S. District Judge Leslie Abrams Gardner on June 4. There is no parole in the federal system.

    “Schemes to defraud and steal from citizens will not be tolerated in the Middle District of Georgia,” said Acting U.S. Attorney C. Shanelle Booker. “This case serves as a reminder for all of us to be as vigilant as possible with what we share online and monitor our financial accounts. I commend the good investigative work of our local and federal law enforcement partners for helping to prevent any more people and businesses from falling victim to this fraud.”

    “The sentencing of this defendant and co-defendants exemplifies the dedication of the investigative efforts which sends a strong message to individuals to consider the consequences of stealing mail and committing financial fraud,” said Rodney M. Hopkins, Inspector in Charge of the Atlanta Division. “I commend the hard work and countless hours put forth by all of the law enforcement agencies involved, which resulted in the dismantling of this criminal network.”

    According to court documents and statements made in court, the Sumter County Sheriff’s Office received a complaint from a local church in December 2021 about mail theft and forged checks. During the investigation, law enforcement discovered that numerous checks had been stolen out of mailboxes at residential and commercial locations in Georgia. The checks were then forged and deposited into other bank accounts. Specifically, the checks were often altered by having the “Pay To” designation changed to an individual involved in the fraud. That individual would then

    make a deposit into their banking account. Other times, the checks would be altered by computer software.

    Investigators discovered that Hill directed the scheme and would recruit people via Facebook. Hill would often offer to deposit stolen, forged or duplicated checks into the bank accounts of the recruits on condition that they would split half the funds. Investigators were able to determine that in six months, Hill stole hundreds of pieces of mail, participated in at least 68 incidents of bank fraud, and unlawfully used debit cards belonging to other individuals at least 14 occasions. Hill then deposited, or attempted to deposit, the numerous stolen, forged or otherwise fraudulent checks of more than ten financial institutions into other bank accounts, resulting in an intended loss of approximately $165,743.68. As part of another scheme discovered by investigators, Hill created a fake solar panel installation company recruiting page online from which he stole the identities of 28 individuals, including their driver’s licenses, social security cards, birth certificates, instructional permits and other documents depicting personally identifiable information.

    The following codefendants have been convicted for their participation in the crime:

    Quontavius Markeese Hill, 34, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and after serving more than eight months in custody was sentenced to time served plus three years of supervised release and to pay $10,815.89 restitution on Nov. 8, 2023;

    Accacia Renae Gordon, 24, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve four months in prison to be followed by four years of supervised release and to pay $14,970.35 restitution on Jan. 15, 2025;

    Shaneria Sharae Murray, 33, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve 45 days in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release and to pay $2,000 restitution on Dec. 2, 2024;

    Chelsea Ja’Nay Tullis, 29, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve one month in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release on March 15, 2024;

    LaQuashia Nichole French, 24, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve 15 days in prison to be followed by four years of supervised release and to pay $2,227.91 restitution on Oct. 23, 2024;

    Jazmon Lace Whitehead, 31, of Oglethorpe, Georgia, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve three years of supervised release and to pay $7,658.59 restitution on March 17, 2025;

    Chasity LaCole Wellons, 31, of Cordele, Georgia, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve three years of supervised release and to pay $2,000 restitution on Jan. 22, 2025;

    DeKeyvia Moasha Blackshear, 26, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve three years of supervised release on Aug. 16, 2024;

    Janita Bre’Shaye Terry, 24, of Columbus, Georgia, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve three years of supervised release on Dec. 2, 2024;

    Kelbresha Danielle Thomas, 30, of Oglethorpe, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve three years of supervised release on Dec. 2, 2024;

    Jenetta Small, 29, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve two years of supervised release on March 14, 2025;

    Tyavia Deashia Richardson, 24, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to one year of supervised release and to pay $4,740 restitution on Aug. 14, 2024; and

    Kimbreyanna Andranique Peeples, 23, of Butler, Georgia, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve one year of supervised release on Dec. 2, 2024.

    The case was investigated by the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) and the Sumter County Sheriff’s Office with assistance from the FBI and the U.S Secret Service (USSS).

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Matthew Redavid prosecuted the case for the Government.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Europe Subcommittee Chairman Self Delivers Opening Remarks at Hearing on NATO

    Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Media Contact 202-321-9747

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, House Foreign Affairs Europe Subcommittee Chairman Keith Self delivered opening remarks at a subcommittee hearing titled, “Assessing the Challenges Facing NATO.”

    Watch Here

    -Remarks-

    The purpose of this hearing is to provide members with an informed perspective of the U.S. policy toward NATO and an opportunity to discuss NATO’s trajectory in advance of the June summit in The Hague. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

    The Hague will be focused on funding for NATO, This first chart […] shows the NATO nations. They, they are listed top to bottom by GDP. They are listed on the right side by the percentage that they provide.

    Of course, the U.S. is at the top with Almost $29 trillion in GDP then you go down to Germany, UK, France, Italy, Canada, and Spain. Down here you’ve got the frontline countries you’ve got Lithuania, you’ve got Latvia, you’ve got Estonia. Uh, some of the Balkan countries are down below. The ones that I want to point out. The summit tells us that they are going to be going above 3% somewhere.

    I want to point out right here we have got some the major economies in NATO — specifically France, Italy, Canada [and Spain] — that are well below […] their current 2% commitment. These are major economies. This is a major change that needs to happen at the summit.

     Now just a couple of comparisons. This compares Poland to everyone else on the Eastern Flank, the eastern flank being defined as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Poland has a GDP of about 840 billion dollars, eastern flank is 890, so they’re not dissimilar. The defense budgets are quite a bit disimilar.

    Their percentage though Poland is at over 4% currently and going higher. The Eastern Flank is a 2.36 and going higher and has already committed to go higher.

    And one more just to give you an idea of where the funding in NATO. stands, this is Germany versus the Eastern Flank, so we’ve added Poland to the East of Germany. So Germany has the 4.6, the Eastern Flank has 1.7. Here are the defense budgets. The Eastern Flank is providing a higher percentage than Germany is.

    So, my point in all of these three slides is [that] there is work to do in the summit later this month. Now I know that people have made commitments, but what you just saw were 2024, the last year we had a full year’s funding toward NATO. That is, that is a major problem that I wanted to highlight. We’ve got other issues in this, in this briefing, but that’s the one that I wanted to start with. The first thing we have to start with is everyone pulling their weight in NATO.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Israel’s new aid system is inhumane. Israel needs to end its restrictions on aid now: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Israel’s new aid system is inhumane. Israel needs to end its restrictions on aid now: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Explanation of vote by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, following the vote on the E10 draft UN Security Council resolution on Gaza.

    The United Kingdom voted in favour of this resolution today because the intolerable situation in Gaza needs to end.

    We are determined to see an end to this war, secure the release of the hostages held by Hamas and alleviate the catastrophic humanitarian situation for Palestinians in Gaza. 

    This Israeli Government’s decisions to expand its military operations in Gaza and severely restrict aid are unjustifiable, disproportionate and counterproductive, and the UK completely opposes them.

    The Israeli Government says it has opened up aid access with its new system.

    But Palestinians, desperate to feed their families, have been killed as they try to reach the very few aid sites that have been permitted by Israel. 

    This is inhumane.

    We support the UN’s call for an immediate and independent investigation into these events and for perpetrators to be held accountable.

    Israel needs to end its restrictions on aid now: let the UN and humanitarians do their job to save lives, reduce suffering and maintain dignity.

    President, we regret that the Council was unable to reach consensus today, but we remain committed to the vision of this text.

    We will continue to strongly support the efforts led by the United States, Qatar and Egypt to secure an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. 

    A ceasefire is the best way to secure the release of all remaining hostages and achieve a long-term political solution.

    And we repeat our condemnation of the heinous attack by Hamas on 7th October and demand that it release all the hostages immediately and unconditionally. Hamas can have no role in the future governance of Gaza.

    A two-state solution is the only way to bring the long-lasting peace, stability and security that both Israelis and Palestinians deserve. 

    We welcome France and Saudi Arabia’s leadership in chairing an international conference later this month.

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – Next DPAL Meeting on the situation of disabled Palestinians in the oPt – 05/06/2025 – Delegation for relations with Palestine

    Source: European Parliament

    Next meeting of the delegation will take place in Brussels, on Thursday, 5 June 2025 at 10:00 – 11:30 and will be devoted to an exchange of views on the situation of disabled Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories with:

    • MsMilena Ansari, Palestinian lawyer and Human Rights Watch researcher based in Jerusalem
    • Ms Nadia Hadad, from European Disability Forum Executive Committee
    • Ms Shatha Abusrour and Mr Mohammed Al-Arabi, Palestinian disability right activists

    The meeting will be web-streamed through the European Parliament’s Multimedia Centre. Interpretation services will be available in English, French, Italian, and Arabic

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Increase in number of attacks with explosives in the Netherlands – Need for European action – E-002111/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002111/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tom Berendsen (PPE), Jeroen Lenaers (PPE)

    Nowhere in Europe are there as many attacks with powerful fireworks and explosives as in the Netherlands. In 2024, there were as many as 1543. In addition, we see this trend spreading further in Europe to Germany, Belgium, France and Sweden. At issue, in particular, are flash bangers (as sold under the brand name Cobra) – fireworks belonging to category F4, intended for professional use only. Flash bangers indeed fall under this category but are rarely, if ever, used professionally and mainly end up in the hands of criminals.

    Legal production and storage take place largely outside the Netherlands. Flash bangers from abroad then enter the black market through criminal networks and are then resold cheaply and easily, for example on online platforms.

    To counter the worrying developments, European action is necessary. Both trade in and production of powerful fireworks such as flash bangers need to be more strictly regulated and controlled.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.Is the Commission prepared to introduce a ban on the production of powerful, loud-bang fireworks such as flash bangers, as they are not being used for professional purposes?
    • 2.In the meantime, what action will the Commission take to prevent this type of explosive from entering the black market?

    Submitted: 27.5.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Missions – Mission report following the ECON mission to Paris, France, from 14 to 16 April 2025 – 14-04-2025 – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    During its mission to Paris, the ECON delegation met the French Finance Minister, the Governor of the Banque de France and the Premier Président of the Cour des comptes, as well as other French government officials, regulatory agencies, businesses, economists and trade unions’ representatives.

    The ECON delegation also met with the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

    Location : Paris, France

    Source : © European Union, 2025 – EP

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: G7 Foreign Ministers Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Office of the Spokesperson

    The text of the following statement was released by the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union.

    Begin Text:

    1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, reaffirm the G7’s steadfast commitment to contribute towards a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources.
    2. Maritime security and prosperity are fundamental to global stability, economic resilience, and the well-being of all nations, and the conservation and sustainable use of ocean ecosystems is essential to all life on Earth. Over 80% of global trade is transported by sea, and 97% of global data flows through submarine cables. Disruptions to maritime routes pose a direct threat to international food security, critical minerals, energy security, global supply chains, and economic stability. We express deep concern over the growing risks to maritime security, including strategic contestation, threats to freedom of navigation and overflight, and illicit shipping activities. State behaviour in these areas has increased the risk of conflict and environmental damage, and imperils all nations’ prosperity and living standards, especially for the world’s poorest.
    3. We recognize the role of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework for governing all activities in the oceans and the seas.
    4. We recall the G7 Statements on Maritime Security adopted in Lübeck (2015) and Hiroshima (2016). We welcome related work presently underway through other G7 ministerial tracks and working groups, on a range of issues including securing undersea cable networks and combating abandoned fishing gear. We welcome, as well, G7 work relating to transnational organized crime and terrorism that touches on the maritime domain, including in relation to piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking in persons, and strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of coastal states. We acknowledge the importance of regional maritime security frameworks, to support coastal states to address collectively threats to their maritime security. We welcome existing initiatives, such as the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++ FoGG, that Canada chairs this year), which has been, the primary forum for dialogue among G7 members and partners on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

    Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

    1. Enhancing Stability: We underscore the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the high seas and the exclusive economic zones as well as to the related rights and freedoms in other maritime zones, including the rights of innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, as provided for under international law. We share a growing concern at recent, unjustifiable efforts to restrict such freedom and to expand jurisdiction through use of force and other forms of coercion, including across the Taiwan Strait, and in the South China Sea, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea. We condemn China’s illicit, provocative, coercive and dangerous actions that seek unilaterally to alter the status quo in such a way as to risk undermining the stability of regions, including through land reclamations, and building of outposts, as well as their use for military purpose. In areas pending final delimitation, we underline the importance of coastal states refraining from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment insofar as such actions jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement, as well as the importance of making every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, in those areas. We condemn, as well, dangerous vessel maneuvers, the indiscriminate attacks against commercial vessels and other maritime actions that undermine maritime order based on the rule of law and international law. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on 12 July 2016 is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties. We reaffirm that our basic policies on Taiwan remain unchanged and emphasize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to international security and prosperity. We welcome the resumption of exports from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Freedom of navigation for commercial shipping in the Black Sea must be upheld.
    2. Attempts to Change the Status Quo by Force: We oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force or coercion including in the East and South China Seas. We undertake to implement means through which to track systematically and report on attempts to change the status quo by force and by the establishment of new geographical facts, including through coercive and dangerous actions on the oceans and seas that might threaten regional and international peace and security.
    3. Protecting Critical Maritime and Undersea Infrastructure: We are seized of the fact that vital energy and telecommunications infrastructure under the oceans and seas connects our economies and is vital to our prosperity. We recall the G7 Joint Statement on Cable Connectivity for Secure and Resilient Digital Communications Networks (2024) and the New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World (2024). We share a growing concern that undersea communications cables, subsea interconnectors and other critical undersea infrastructure have been subject to critical damage through sabotage, poor seamanship or irresponsible behaviour which have resulted in potential internet or energy disruption in affected regions, delays in global data transmission, or compromised sensitive communications. We will enhance our cooperation with industry mitigate risks, reduce bottlenecks to operational tasks while strengthening repair capacities in order to improve the overall resilience of critical undersea and maritime infrastructure. In this respect, we welcome the EU Action Plan on Cable Security adopted in February 2025 by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
    4. Maritime Crime: Maritime crime, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, maritime arms trafficking and sanctions evasion, human trafficking, illegal drug trafficking and Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, continues to impede maritime security, freedom of navigation, and our economy and prosperity. We have been working together to tackle these maritime crimes, but maritime illegal activities have extended into new areas, to become an urgent issue to be addressed. We welcome the G7 Action Plan to combat migrant smuggling adopted under Italy’s 2024 G7 Presidency.
    5. Protecting Freedom of Trade: In the past year, indiscriminate Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have endangered maritime security of vessels and their crews, disturbed international trade, and exposed neighboring countries to environmental hazards. Enabled by Iran’s military, financial, and intelligence support, these illegal attacks have also contributed to increased tension in the Middle East and Yemen, with severe repercussions on the intra-Yemeni peace process. The vessel “Galaxy Leader” seized by the Houthis must be released immediately. We appreciate the efforts of all those countries that have engaged to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, protecting crucial shipping lanes and helping to restore regular flows of trade through the Suez Canal connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, we commend the efforts of EU’s maritime operation “Aspides” and U.S.-led operation “Prosperity Guardian”.

    Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security

    1. Curtailing Unsafe and Illicit Shipping Practices: The rise of unsafe and illicit shipping practices, including fraudulent registration and registries, poses a significant threat to global trade and environmental sustainability. We are concerned that unsafe and illicit shipping imposes heavy costs on industry, governments and citizens. Russia’s ability to earn revenue has been sustained through its extensive effort to circumvent the G7+ oil price cap policy through its shadow fleet of often older, underinsured, and poorly maintained ships that routinely disable their automatic identification systems or engage in “spoofing” to avoid detection and circumvent international safety, environmental, and liability rules and standards. North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and evade sanctions, particularly through its illicit maritime activities, including prohibited ship to-ship transfers of petroleum and other UN-banned commodities. Through G7 coordination, we have exposed North Korea uses of “dark” vessels – those that engage in illicit activity – to circumvent United Nations Security Council mandated sanctions. Russia and North Korea are strengthening their economic relations including through maritime routes, such as the reported transfer of petroleum products from Russia to North Korea Unregulated, “dark” vessels undertake IUU fishing, destroying marine habitats and depleting fish stocks, with negative impacts for biodiversity and food security. Unregulated, inadequately insured “dark” vessels also pose a high risk of maritime accidents, including in fragile ecosystems such as the Arctic and Antarctic. We commit to strengthen our coordination, amongst the G7 and with other partners, to prevent the use of unregistered or fraudulently registered, uninsured and substandard vessels engaged in sanctions evasion, arms transfers, illegal fishing and illicit trade. We encourage relevant International Organizations to improve maritime domain awareness by expanding satellite-based vessel tracking and establishing comprehensive data records of the movement of individual ships and of ship-to-ship transfers, as a means of identifying and tracking illicit maritime activities. We are also committed to capacity building of the countries in the region in law enforcement and Maritime Domain Awareness.
    2. Shadow Fleet Task Force: We invite members of the Nordic-Baltic 8 (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden), and possibly others, to join participating G7 members in a Shadow Fleet Task Force to enhance monitoring and detection and to otherwise constrain the use of shadow fleets engaged in illegal, unsafe or environmentally perilous activities, building on the work of others active in this area. The Task Force will constitute a response by the participating States to the call by the International Maritime Organization in its Resolution A.1192(33) of 6 December 2023 for Members States and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by shadow fleets and their flag states, including illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs, or engaging in other illegal activities.
    3. Enhancing Maritime Supply Chain Resilience and Energy and Food Security: Maritime supply chains will continue to underpin the global economy, but these face a variety of threats, both present and future, stemming from both geopolitical tensions and environmental factors. Maritime disruptions raise consumer costs, increase transit times, and can reduce demand in importing countries, which in turn means lower revenues and diminished competitiveness for producers in exporting countries. Such vulnerabilities in maritime transport can undermine energy and food security, particularly for developing nations reliant on stable shipping routes, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). We welcome maritime initiatives involving and supported by G7 partners intended to promote energy and food security, such as the Grain from Ukraine scheme, and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We invite cooperation with the African Union (pursuant to Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050) and other relevant International Organizations to identify best practices for enhancing maritime supply chain resilience and for safeguarding energy and food security, including in times of geopolitical crisis.
    4. Promoting Safe and Resilient Ports and Strategic Waterways: Port ownership and operational control matter to national security, as foreign control or influence over critical port infrastructure can create vulnerabilities in trade, in defense and security, and in economic stability. Port resilience is also crucial to economic stability and global trade and yet ports face growing risks from environmental degradation, extreme weather events and geopolitical conflicts. Strengthening port security and modernizing infrastructure are essential to maintaining safe and efficient maritime trade. Ensuring that the ownership and management of strategic waterways and key maritime choke points are not vulnerable to undue influence by potential adversaries is also essential to national security. We underscore the importance of scrutiny of ownership structures and port management and resilience within our own national jurisdictions, including with regard to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, to ensure that adversaries do not gain leverage over supply chains, military operations, or the flow of strategic resources. We will work with partners and with relevant International Organizations to encourage robust cybersecurity standards for port ICT infrastructure, to increase resilience against malicious cyber incidents on maritime logistical networks, to reduce monopolistic power over key supply chain nodes, to promote secure and transparent port ownership, to limit unsolicited or undue foreign influence over critical infrastructures and strategic waterways, and to otherwise encourage greater focus on such potential vulnerabilities.
    5. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) at sea poses a significant hazard to the marine environment, to the safety of fishermen and other users of the maritime space, and to various marine economic activities. We commit to enhancing diplomatic efforts and to exchanging best practices among national authorities, relevant international and regional organizations, and relevant industry sectors to accelerate the clean-up of UXO from the seas and ocean.

    Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources

    1. Strengthen Enforcement Against IUU Fishing: IUU fishing is a major contributor to declining fish stocks and to marine habitat destruction. It may account for a third of all fishing activity worldwide, at a cost to the global economy of more than US$23 billion per year and with negative consequences for fisheries as an enduring economic asset, including for developing countries. We welcome the Canadian-led Dark Vessel Detection System in Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and would see value in replicating the model to support other partners whose fisheries are under threat from IUU fishing. We recognize that data sharing and transparency play a key role in this fight by exposing bad actors and that technological advances can support a robust Monitoring, Control and Surveillance and enforcement landscape. We encourage further progress in addressing IUU fishing, working with and through relevant International Organizations to establish and strengthen rules to sustainably manage fish stocks on the high seas and to improve the enforcement of these measures, including through the further development of detection technologies, aircraft patrols and high seas boarding and inspection of vessels, building upon the 2022 G7 Ocean Deal.
    2. We welcome the Third UN Ocean Conference, in Nice, France, from 9 to 13 June 2025.

    PARTNERSHIPS

    1. This G7 Maritime Security and Prosperity Declaration provides a framework for cooperation with non-G7 Partners, including countries hosting major ports, large merchant fleets, or extensive flag registries as well as relevant regional and International Organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization and ASEAN. We would welcome robust cooperation with Partners to take forward the goals set out in this Declaration, consistent with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, under the efforts of the G7 countries, including a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region, to build a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, and of commitment to the sustainable development of the world’s maritime spaces.
    2. We welcome the cooperation on Coast Guard Functions, including the Global Coast Guard Forum hosted by Italy in 2025, as well as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, which could also support the objectives of this Declaration.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with the Minister of International Trade of Canada

    Source: ASEAN

    Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, met with the Minister of International Trade of Canada, H.E Maninder Sidhu, at the OECD Headquarters in Paris, France, on 4 June 2025. Their discussions explored potential opportunities to deepen ASEAN- OECD cooperation, aligned with the implementation of the OECD Southeast Asia Regional Programme (SEARP) in 2026, including specific areas to support the ASEAN Community Vision 2045.
     

    The post Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with the Minister of International Trade of Canada appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Major General Diodato Abagnara of Italy – Head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

    Source: United Nations MIL-OSI 2

    nited Nations Secretary-General António Guterres announced today the appointment of Major General Diodato Abagnara of Italy as Head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

    Major General Abagnara succeeds Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz of Spain.  The Secretary-General extends his sincere gratitude to Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz for his dedication and leadership of UNIFIL during one of the mission’s most challenging periods.

    Major General Abagnara brings to the position over 36 years of military service, including extensive leadership roles within the Italian Armed Forces.  Most recently, he served as Commander and Chair of the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon (MTC4L), where he oversaw multinational coordination efforts in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces.  Prior to that, he held several key appointments, including Personnel Division Chief and Adviser to the Chief of Defence Staff in the Defence General Staff, Commander of an infantry brigade, and Chief of the Officers’ Employment Office.  From 2018 to 2019, he was also UNIFIL Sector West Commander.  In addition, he chaired the Joint Gender Perspective Council within the Defence General Staff, underscoring his commitment to inclusive leadership and institutional reform.

    Major General Abagnara holds four Bachelor’s degrees:  in Political Science from the University of Turin; in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Trieste; in Business Management and Communication from the University of Teramo; and in Strategic Sciences from the University of Turin, all in Italy.  He also holds six Master’s degrees:  in Law from the University of Rome; in Strategic Sciences from the University of Turin; in International Strategic-Military Studies, Advanced Studies in Intelligence and Security, and Cybersecurity and Information Security from the University of Rome; and in Strategic Leadership and Digital Transformation from the Luiss Business School, Rome, all in Italy.  He is fluent in English and Italian, and speaks French and Spanish.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Endometriosis diagnosed prevalent cases in women to reach 2.8 million across 7MM in 2034, forecasts GlobalData

    Source: GlobalData

    Endometriosis diagnosed prevalent cases in women to reach 2.8 million across 7MM in 2034, forecasts GlobalData

    Posted in Pharma

    The diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis among women ages 12–54 years in the seven major markets (7MM*) are set to register an annual growth rate (AGR) of 0.09% from 2.77 million in 2024 to 2.8 million in 2034, forecasts GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

    GlobalData’s latest report, “Endometriosis – Epidemiology Forecast to 2034,” reveals that the US will have the highest number of diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis among the 7MM at 1.51 million cases, whereas Japan will have the lowest number at 0.09 million cases in 2034.

    Antara Bhattacharya, Associate Project Manager, Epidemiology team at GlobalData, comments: “In 2024, women in ages 30–54 years accounted for almost 92% of the diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis in the 7MM, while younger women in ages 12–29 years accounted for approximately 8% of the cases.”

    GlobalData estimates that in 2024, approximately 64% of diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis in the 7MM were laparoscopy confirmed, whereas 36% of diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis suspected cases. In 2024, approximately 28% of diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis were in stage IV, whereas 22% of diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis were in stage I.

    In the 7MM, approximately 44% of diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis were superficial peritoneal endometriosis, whereas 19% of diagnosed prevalent cases were deep infiltrating endometriosis in 2024. Approximately 44% of diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis were with dysmenorrhea.

    Bhattacharya concludes: “Endometriosis significantly impacts quality of life among women of reproductive age due to pain, fatigue, and other symptoms that can affect daily activities, work productivity, and relationships. This may further lead to psychological consequences. Diagnostic delay, limited capacity of health systems, and sub-optimal access to specialized surgery such as laparoscopy further exacerbate the condition, since prompt access to available treatment methods, including non-steroidal analgesics, progestin-based contraceptives, is often not achieved.

    “Addressing endometriosis through various treatments and supportive care can help improve the quality of life for those affected. Additionally, capacity development of primary healthcare providers is essential to initiate treatment for patients who could benefit from medical symptomatic management.”

    *7MM: The US, 5EU (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK), and Japan.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Security: London — RCMP statement regarding media reports on the structural investigation into the Israel-Hamas conflict

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    In light of recent media coverage regarding the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP) involvement in matters related to the Israel-Hamas armed conflict, we wish to clarify the nature and scope of our activities.

    In early 2024, the RCMP initiated a structural investigation in connection with this ongoing conflict. A structural investigation is a broad, intelligence-led intake process designed to collect, preserve, and assess information potentially relevant under Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act. This includes gathering open-source material and voluntary submissions from individuals wishing to provide information. The primary objective is to proactively collect relevant information that may support future investigative steps, should jurisdictional and legal thresholds be met.

    It is important to emphasize that a structural investigation is not a criminal investigation. The RCMP employs a well-established structured protocol to efficiently triage and process incoming information related to global conflicts, this standardized initial procedure serves as a foundation for every case, after which specialized investigative techniques are applied to address the unique aspects of each investigation, including the Israel-Hamas structural investigation. Should a perpetrator of core international crimes—such as genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity—with the appropriate nexus to Canada be identified, the RCMP will initiate a separate criminal investigation. To date, the RCMP has not initiated any related criminal investigations.

    Although this work has been underway in a developmental capacity since early 2024, it has not been publicly announced as the RCMP continues to develop essential supporting operational tools. This includes a secure online portal available in French, English, Hebrew and Arabic, to facilitate the structured and secure any submissions of information by the public and potential witnesses. Unfortunately, technical challenges have resulted in delays to the rollout of this critical tool; once this online portal is ready for access, we will advise the public.

    The RCMP remains committed to its mandate under Canadian law, to assess credible allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity. We conduct this work with impartiality, relying on evidence-based assessments in alignment with the principles of the rule of law.

    Given the sensitivity of the matter, we urge the public to refrain from drawing premature conclusions about the RCMP’s role or intent. This initiative is solely focused on collecting relevant information and does not target any community or group.

    Further updates will be provided once the public reporting portal has been made available.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Minister Sidhu meets with United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Business and Trade and President of the Board of Trade Jonathan Reynolds

    Source: Government of Canada News

    June 4, 2025 – Paris, France – Global Affairs Canada

    The Honourable Maninder Sidhu, Minister of International Trade, met with Jonathan Reynolds, the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Business and Trade and President of the Board of Trade, on the margins of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Ministerial Council Meeting in Paris, France.

    Minister Sidhu and Secretary of State Reynolds discussed expanding trade and investment through the Canada-United Kingdom Trade Continuity Agreement. Minister Sidhu highlighted the importance of Canada continuing to work with the United Kingdom through forums such as the G7, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, and with international organizations in support of the rules-based global trading system.

    Minister Sidhu looks forward to continuing working with Secretary of State Reynolds on the Canada-UK trade relationship.

    Associated links

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI: IKB Collective Launches exPricer, a Dynamic Pricing Tool for Digital Art Creators

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Nice, France, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The International Klein Blue (IKB) Collective, a global network of techno-artists federated by a community token on the Solana blockchain, today announced the launch of exPricer — an open-source pricing engine designed to transform how digital artworks are valued and sold.

    The IKB Collective introduces exPricer — an open-source pricing system redefining digital art value through scarcity and choice.

    exPricer is a dynamic pricing algorithm and checkout system that enables digital artists to control the scarcity of their works through the pricing choices of their patrons. Buyers are offered the option to pay more for greater exclusivity; in response, fewer (or no more) additional editions are ever to be released. The system includes a pricing API for developers, as well as a ready-made Stripe-powered checkout interface that can be used by artists looking to sell their work online.

    Key Features of exPricer

    • Dynamic Pricing Algorithm – Enables variable pricing based on exclusivity, allowing collectors to pay more for fewer, or even unique, copies of a limited edition.
    • Open-Source & Developer Friendly – Includes an open API for integration with other platforms or marketplaces.
    • Stripe-Powered Checkout Interface – Comes with a ready-to-use web checkout system tailored for the payment of digital media.
    • Support for Multiple Digital File Types – Best suited for images, audio, ZIP files, and other downloadable assets.
    • Using Scarcity to Better Support Artists – Aligns pricing with artistic intent of exclusivity, enabling new economic models in digital art.

    The development of exPricer draws conceptual inspiration from avant-garde movements that have historically challenged traditional notions of ownership and value in art. The system reflects the IKB Collective’s ongoing interest in exploring how scarcity, perception, and pricing can be used as creative tools in the digital realm.

    exPricer is our way of continuing Yves Klein’s inquiry into how art is valued — not by material or medium, but by perception, context, and choice,” said a member of the IKB collective. “It’s pricing as performance.

    Though the exPricer checkout interface prices art works in dollars, to ensure immediate applicability and easy-of-use for less tech-savvy artists, the collective is committed to the continued development of the IKB token, the collective’s blockchain-based token. Originally conceived as a decentralized reference to the iconic ultramarine pigment International Klein Blue, the token functions both as a community anchor and governance mechanism, allowing for experiments at the intersection of art and technology.

    The IKB Collective invites digital creators and developers to explore and build upon exPricer through its open-source repository.

    Explore the project on GitHub: https://github.com/ikb-token/exPricer
    Website: https://ikb-token.co

    An example of a ready-to-use checkout page for selling digital art works generated by exPricer

    About IKB token community

    A Solana blockchain community meme token based on the original meme, International Klein Blue, created more than 60 years ago. The decentralized organization was started by an international collective of like-minded techno-artists, brought together by admiration of the deep blue color of International Klein Blue as well as the thought-provoking questions asked by the french artist Yves Klein related to the valuation of modern art, in particular artistic works that are conceptual and immaterial.

    Press inquiries

    IKB token community
    https://ikb-token.co
    IKB token team
    pr@ikb-token.co

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: ‘Blue Whales’ exhibition opens at Museum of Natural Sciences June 21

    Source: US State of North Carolina

    Headline: ‘Blue Whales’ exhibition opens at Museum of Natural Sciences June 21

    ‘Blue Whales’ exhibition opens at Museum of Natural Sciences June 21
    jejohnson6

    Blue whales are BIG! How big are they? They can grow up to 110 feet long, weigh up to 400,000 pounds, and have a heart the size of a small car. Even their appetites are big: they can eat 16 tons of tiny, shrimp-like krill in a day. And their voices? Blue whale songs can travel 1,000 miles underwater and measure 190+ decibels. Dive into the details behind their mind-blowing biology and discover how these mammals became and remain our planet’s largest animals ever in “Blue Whales,” a new special exhibition opening at the North Carolina Museum of Natural Sciences on June 21. The Museum is an agency of the N.C. Department of Natural and Cultural Resources.

    Visitors to “Blue Whales” will see the enormous skeleton of a recovered blue whale and the only blue whale heart model in the world, then discover how these giant creatures evolved from land to sea, how they became so giant and how they breathe. Or step into the exhibition’s Whale Sound Chamber and experience surround-sound whale calls, compare different whale songs, and learn how and what exactly whales are communicating.

    Visitors will also learn about blue whales’ remarkable feeding behavior. Their enormous mouths contain rows of baleen — made of keratin like human nails or hair — that hang in “plates” from their upper jaw and act like a sieve. During feeding, blue whales open their mouths wide and engulf large volumes of water and krill, then push the water out of their mouth with their tongue while their baleen keeps the krill trapped inside. The exhibition even offers “License to Krill,” an exciting game of survival where visitors try to dodge dangerous obstacles and “dive deep” to capture and eat krill.

    Despite their massive size, blue whales are very vulnerable, and their population is only a small fraction of what it was before commercial whaling significantly reduced their numbers during the early 1900s. This immersive exhibition provides insight into what caused the decline of blue whales, what’s being done to protect them, and how scientists are using DNA to unlock some of the secrets of these elusive creatures.

    “Blue Whales” is produced and circulated by the ROM (Royal Ontario Museum), Toronto, Canada. Sponsored by Friends of the NC Museum of Natural Sciences. After nine blue whales were trapped beneath sea ice and died off the coast of Newfoundland in 2014, researchers from ROM worked with community partners to recover two of the whales, one of which is featured in this exhibition.

    “Blue Whales” runs through Jan. 11, 2026, and is offered in English and French.

    Admission: Museum Members get in FREE. Join today at naturalsciences.org/membership. Non-member Adults $18, Children (3–12) $14. Tickets are available onsite at the Museum Box Office or online at naturalsciences.org/whales. Exhibition Hours: Tuesday – Sunday, 10 a.m. – 5 p.m. (last entry at 4 p.m.); also open Mondays (May 26 – Sept. 1 only), 10 a.m. – 5 p.m. (last entry at 4 p.m.).

    About the NC Museum of Natural Sciences
    The North Carolina Museum of Natural Sciences in downtown Raleigh (11 and 121 W. Jones St.) is an active research institution that engages visitors of every age and stage of learning in the wonders of science and the natural world. In addition to two downtown buildings showcasing seven floors of world-class exhibits, the Museum runs Prairie Ridge Ecostation, a 45-acre outdoor education and research facility in west Raleigh, as well as satellite facilities in Whiteville, Greenville and Grifton (Contentnea Creek). Our mission is to illuminate the natural world and inspire its conservation. Downtown Raleigh Hours: Tuesday–Sunday, 10 a.m.–5 p.m. General admission is free. For more information, visit www.naturalsciences.org.

    About the North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources
    The N.C. Department of Natural and Cultural Resources (DNCR) manages, promotes, and enhances the things that people love about North Carolina – its diverse arts and culture, rich history, and spectacular natural areas. Through its programs, the department enhances education, stimulates economic development, improves public health, expands accessibility, and strengthens community resiliency.

    The department manages over 100 locations across the state, including 27 historic sites, seven history museums, two art museums, five science museums, four aquariums, 35 state parks, four recreation areas, dozens of state trails and natural areas, the North Carolina Zoo, the State Library, the State Archives, the N.C. Arts Council, the African American Heritage Commission, the American Indian Heritage Commission, the State Historic Preservation Office, the Office of State Archaeology, the Highway Historical Markers program, the N.C. Land and Water Fund, and the Natural Heritage Program. For more information, please visit www.dncr.nc.gov.
    Jun 2, 2025

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: From sovereignty to sustainability: a brief history of ocean governance

    Source: The Conversation – France – By Kevin Parthenay, Professeur des Universités en science politique, membre de l’Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), Université de Tours

    The United Nations Ocean Conference (UNOC 3) will open in Nice, France, on June 9, 2025. It is the third conference of its kind, following events in New York in 2017 and Lisbon in 2022. Co-hosted by France and Costa Rica, the conference will bring together 150 countries and nearly 30,000 individuals to discuss the sustainable management of our planet’s oceans.

    This event is presented as a pivotal moment, but it is actually part of a significant shift in marine governance that has been going on for decades. While ocean governance was once designed to protect the marine interests of states, nowadays it must also address the numerous climate and environmental challenges facing the oceans.

    Media coverage of this “political moment” however should not overshadow the urgent need to reform the international law applicable to the oceans. Failing that, this summit will risk being nothing more than another platform for vacuous rhetoric.

    To understand what is at stake, it is helpful to begin with a brief historical overview of marine governance.

    The meaning of ocean governance

    Ocean governance changed radically over the past few decades. The focus shifted from the interests of states and the corresponding body of international law, solidified in the 1980s, to a multilateral approach initiated at the end of the Cold War, involving a wide range of actors (international organizations, NGOs, businesses, etc.).

    This governance has gradually moved from a system of obligations pertaining to different marine areas and regimes of sovereignty associated to them (territorial seas, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and the high seas) to a system that takes into consideration the “health of the oceans.” The aim of this new system is to manage the oceans in line with the sustainable development goals.

    Understanding how this shift occurred can help us grasp what is at stake in Nice. The 1990s were marked by declarations, summits and other global initiatives. However, as evidenced below, the success of these numerous initiatives has so far been limited. This explains why we are now seeing a return to an approach more firmly rooted in international law, as evidenced by the negotiations on the international treaty on plastic pollution, for example.

    The “Constitution of the Seas”

    The law of the sea emerged from the Hague Conference in 1930. However, the structure of marine governance gradually came to be defined in the 1980s, with the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982.

    UNOC 3 is a direct offshoot of this convention: discussions on sustainable ocean management stem from the limitations of this founding text, often referred to as the “Constitution of the Seas”.

    UNCLOS was adopted in December 1982 at the Montego Bay Convention in Jamaica and came into force in November 1994, following a lengthy process of international negotiations that resulted in 60 states ratifying the text. At the outset, the discussions focused on the interests of developing countries, especially those located along the coast, in the midst of a crisis in multilateralism. The United States managed to exert its influence in this arena without ever officially adopting the Convention. Since then, the convention has been a pillar of marine governance.

    It established new institutions, including the International Seabed Authority, entrusted with the responsibility of regulating the exploitation of mineral resources on the seabed in areas that fall outside the scope of national jurisdiction. UNCLOS is the source of nearly all international case law on the subject.

    Although the convention did define maritime areas and regulate their exploitation, new challenges quickly emerged: on the one hand, the Convention was essentially rendered meaningless by the eleven-year delay between its adoption and implementation. On the other hand, the text also became obsolete due to new developments in the use of the seas, particularly technological advances in fishing and seabed exploitation.

    The early 1990s marked a turning point in the traditional maritime legal order. The management of the seas and oceans came to be viewed within an environmental perspective, a process that was driven by major international conferences and declarations such as the Rio Declaration (1992), the Millennium Declaration (2005), and the Rio+20 Summit (2012). These resulted in the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the UN’s 17 goals aimed at protecting the planet (with SDG 14, “Life Below Water”, directly addressing issues related to the oceans) and the world’s population by 2030.



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    The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, or Earth Summit), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, ushered in the era of “sustainable development” and, thanks to scientific discoveries made in the previous decade, helped link environmental and maritime issues.

    From 2008 to 2015, environmental issues became more important as evidenced by the regular adoption of environmental and climate resolutions.

    A shift in UN language

    Biodiversity and the sustainable use of the oceans (SDG 14) are the two core themes that became recurring topics in the international agenda since 2015, with ocean-related issues now including items like acidification, plastic pollution and the decline of marine biodiversity.

    The United Nations General Assembly resolution on oceans and the law of the seas (LOS is a particularly useful tool to acknowledge this evolution: drafted annually since 1984, the resolution has covered all aspects of the United Nations maritime regime while reflecting new issues and concerns.

    Some environmental terms were initially absent from the text but have become more prevalent since the 2000s.

    This evolution is also reflected in the choice of words.

    While LOS resolutions from 1984 to 1995 focused mainly on the implementation of the treaty and the economic exploitation of marine resources, more recent resolutions have used terms related to sustainability, ecosystems, and maritime issues.

    Toward a new law of the oceans?

    As awareness of the issues surrounding the oceans and their link to climate change has grown, the oceans gradually became a global “final frontier” in terms of knowledge.

    The types of stakeholders involved in ocean issues have also changed. The expansion of the ocean agenda has been driven by a more “environmentalist” orientation, with scientific communities and environmental NGOs standing at the forefront of this battle. This approach, which represents a shift away from a monopoly held by international law and legal practitioners, clearly is a positive development.

    However, marine governance has so far relied mainly on non-binding declaratory measures (such as the SDGs) and remains ineffective. A cycle of legal consolidation toward a “new law of the oceans” therefore appears to be underway and the challenge is now to supplement international maritime law with a new set of measures. These include:

    Of these agreements, the BBNJ is arguably the most ambitious: since 2004, negotiators have been working toward filling the gaps of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by creating an instrument on marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.

    The agreement addresses two major concerns for states: sovereignty and the equitable distribution of resources.

    Adopted in 2023, this historic agreement has yet to enter into force. For this to happen, sixty ratifications are required and to date, only 29 states have ratified the treaty (including France in February 2025, editor’s note).

    The BBNJ process is therefore at a crossroads and the priority today is not to make new commitments or waste time on complicated high-level declarations, but to address concrete and urgent issues of ocean management, such as the frantic quest for critical minerals launched in the context of the Sino-American rivalry, and exemplified by Donald Trump’s signing of a presidential decree in April 2025 allowing seabed mining – a decision that violates the International Seabed Authority’s well established rules on the exploitation of these deep-sea resources.

    At a time when U.S. unilateralism is leading to a policy of fait accompli, the UNOC 3 should, more than anything and within the framework of multilateralism, consolidate the existing obligations regarding the protection and sustainability of the oceans.

    Kevin Parthenay is a member of the Institut Universitaire de France (IUF).

    Rafael Mesquita ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

    ref. From sovereignty to sustainability: a brief history of ocean governance – https://theconversation.com/from-sovereignty-to-sustainability-a-brief-history-of-ocean-governance-258200

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Europe: UN – Election of Annalena Baerbock as President of the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (4 Jun. 2025)

    Source: Republic of France in English
    The Republic of France has issued the following statement:

    France congratulates Annalena Baerbock, Germany’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs, on her June 2nd election as President of the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly, which will begin on September 9.

    France will be delighted to work closely with Ms. Baerbock on all of the issues followed by the UN General Assembly and to promote an open, strengthened multilateral system. This year, as we mark the UN’s 80th anniversary, we reaffirm our commitment to the goals and principles enshrined in the UN Charter.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: UN – Election of new non-permanent Security Council members (4 Jun. 2025)

    Source: Republic of France in English
    The Republic of France has issued the following statement:

    France congratulates Bahrain, Colombia, Latvia, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo on their June 3rd election as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council.

    The Security Council’s main responsibility under the UN Charter is maintaining international peace and security. France will work closely with each of these partners, whose two-year terms will begin on January 1, 2026, so that the Council can fulfill its mandate of conflict resolution and peacekeeping.

    As we celebrate the 80th anniversary of the UN Charter this month, France reaffirms its commitment to a rules-based international system and to a Security Council that guarantees our collective security. As a Permanent Member of the Security Council, we advocate open, more effective multilateralism.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with the Secretary-General of OECD

    Source: ASEAN

    Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, met with the Secretary-General of OECD, Mathias Cormann, at the sidelines of the OECD Headquarters in Paris, France, on 4 June 2025. Their discussions explored opportunities to deepen ASEAN-OECD engagement and align OECD’s support with the ASEAN Community Vision 2045.

    The post Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with the Secretary-General of OECD appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the World Trade Organization (WTO)

    Source: ASEAN

    Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, met with the Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the World Trade Organization (WTO), H.E. Syahril Syazli Ghazali, at the OECD Headquarters, in Paris, France, on 4 June 2025. SG Dr. Kao congratulated Malaysia on the success of the recently-concluded 46th ASEAN Summit and Related Summits, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, as well as underscored ASEAN’s commitment to upholding an open, transparent, rules-based multilateral trading system based on the WTO.

    The post Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the World Trade Organization (WTO) appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Gaza: Minister for the Middle East statement, 4 June 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Oral statement to Parliament

    Gaza: Minister for the Middle East statement, 4 June 2025

    Minister for the Middle East Hamish Falconer made a statement to the House of Commons on Gaza.

    Madam Deputy Speaker,

    We are appalled by repeated reports of mass casualty incidents, in which Palestinians have been killed when trying to access aid sites in Gaza. 

    Desperate civilians who have endured 20 months of war should never face the risk of death or injury to simply feed themselves and their families.

    We call for an immediate and independent investigation into these events, and for the perpetrators to be held to account.

    It is deeply disturbing that these incidents happened near the new Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) distribution sites.  

    They highlight the utterly desperate need to get aid in. 

    The Israeli Government says it has opened up aid access with its new system. 

    But the warnings raised by the United Kingdom, the United Nations, aid partners and the international community about these operations have materialised and the results are agonising.

    Israel’s newly introduced measures for aid delivery are inhumane, foster desperation and endanger civilians. 

    Israel’s unjustified block on aid into Gaza needs to end. It is inhumane. 

    Israel must immediately allow the UN and aid partners to safely deliver all types of aid at scale to save lives, reduce suffering and maintain dignity. It must ensure food and other critical supplies can reach people safely where they are across the whole of the Gaza Strip. Civilians, medical and humanitarian workers and facilities must be protected.  

    We will continue to be steadfast in our support for the UN and other trusted INGOs as the most effective and principled partners for aid delivery. 

    Our support has meant over 465,000 people have received essential healthcare, 640,000 have received food, and 275,000 people have improved access to water, sanitation and hygiene services.

     Just two weeks ago, my honourable friend, the Minister for Development, announced £4m additional funding to support the British Red Cross, enabling the delivery humanitarian relief in Gaza through their partner the Palestinian Red Crescent. Th was part of our wider £101m support package for this financial year. Aid must be allowed in so this support can continue. 

    Today, the UN Security Council is expected to consider a resolution for an immediate ceasefire, the release of all the hostages and the lifting of all Israeli restrictions on humanitarian aid, and supporting delivery by the UN.  

    And we will once again use our vote in support of these goals.  

    Following our leadership in coordinating dozens of countries to address the humanitarian situation, the joint statement from the UK, France and Canada, as well as the actions announced by my Right Honourable Friend the Foreign Secretary on 20 May, we will continue to convene international partners to increase the pressure and take further steps to address the catastrophic situation on the ground.  

    We will continue to strongly support the efforts led by the United States, Qatar and Egypt to secure an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. As the Prime Minister has said, a ceasefire is the best way to secure the release of all remaining hostages and achieve a long-term political solution. 

    This Israeli Government’s decision to expand its military operations in Gaza and severely restrict aid undermine all these goals. 

    Madam Deputy Speaker,

    We repeat our utter condemnation of Hamas, our demand that it releases all the hostages immediately and unconditionally. They can have no role in the future governance of Gaza. 

    A two-state solution is the only way to bring the long-lasting peace, stability and security that both Israelis and Palestinians deserve. We welcome France and Saudi Arabia’s leadership in chairing an international conference later this month.

    I commend this statement to the House.

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: What a sunny van Gogh painting of ‘The Sower’ tells us about Pope Leo’s message of hope

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Virginia Raguin, Distinguished Professor of Humanities Emerita, College of the Holy Cross

    Vincent van Gogh’s ‘Sower at Sunset’ painting. Vincent van Gogh/ Kröller-Müller Museum via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-NC-SA

    In his first general audience in Rome, Pope Leo XIV referred to Vincent van Gogh’s painting “Sower at Sunset” and called it a symbol of hope. A brilliant setting sun illuminates a field as a farmer walks toward the right, sowing seeds.

    Leo referred to Christ’s Parable of the Sower, a story in the Gospel that speaks to the need to do good works. “Every word of the Gospel is like a seed sown in the soil of our lives,” he said, and highlighted that the soil is not only our heart, “but also the world, the community, the church.”

    He noted that “behind the sower, van Gogh painted the grain already ripe,” and Leo called it an image of hope which shows that somehow the seed has borne fruit.

    Van Gogh painted “Sower at Sunset” in 1888, when he was living in Arles in southern France. At the time, he was creating art alongside his friend Paul Gauguin and feeling very happy about the future. The painting reflects his optimism.

    Van Gogh’s inspiration

    In November 1888, van Gogh wrote to his brother Theo, in whom he frequently confided, about “Sower at Sunset.” He described its beautiful colors: “Immense lemon-yellow disc for the sun. Green-yellow sky with pink clouds. The field is violet, the sower and the tree Prussian Blue.”

    ‘The Sower,’ by Jean-François Millet.
    Museum of Fine Arts, Boston via Wikimedia Commons

    Van Gogh’s painting was inspired by French artist Jean-Francois Millet’s 1860 painting, “The Sower.” But he transformed Millet’s composition, in which a dark, isolated figure dominates, and deliberately set the sower in the midst of a landscape transformed by the sun.

    Other artists, including the Norwegian Emanuel Vigeland, explicitly depicted the Parable of the Sower. Vigeland’s series of stained-glass windows in an Oslo church explains each passage’s meaning. As the sower works, some seeds fall by the wayside and the birds immediately eat them, indicating those who hear the word of God but do not listen.

    Norwegian artist Emanuel Vigeland’s ‘Parable of the Sower,’ 1917-19, Lutheran church of Borgestad, near Oslo, Norway.
    Virginia Raguin

    Some seeds fall on stony ground and cannot take root, a symbol of those with little tenacity. Others fall among thorns and are choked. Vigeland juxtaposed a dramatic image of a miser counting piles of money, indicating how the man’s life has become choked by desire for material gain.

    The final passage of the parable states that some seeds fell on good ground and yielded a hundredfold. Vigeland’s depiction shows an image of an abundant harvest of grain next to a man seated on the ground and cradling a child in his lap.

    What it says about Leo

    Van Gogh’s painting corresponds to many of the ideas the new pope expressed in the first days of his papacy. Leo observed: “In the center of the painting is the sun, not the sower, [which reminds us that] it is God who moves history, even if he sometimes seems absent or distant. It is the sun that warms the clods of the earth and ripens the seed.”

    The theme of the dignity of labor is also inherent in the image of the sower being deeply engrossed in physical labor, which relates to the pope’s choice of his name. The pope stated that he took on the name Leo XIV “mainly because Pope Leo XIII in his historic encyclical Rerum Novarum addressed the social question in the context of the first great industrial revolution.” Leo XIII was referring to the social question of economic injustice in the meager rewards for workers even as owners made great profits from the Industrial Revolution.

    The pope saw Van Gogh’s image of the sower, like Vigeland’s, as a message of hope. That message, to him, fits with the theme of hope of The Jubilee Year proclaimed by Leo’s predecessor, Francis. Leo also expressed hope that humans listening to God would embrace service to others.

    Virginia Raguin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. What a sunny van Gogh painting of ‘The Sower’ tells us about Pope Leo’s message of hope – https://theconversation.com/what-a-sunny-van-gogh-painting-of-the-sower-tells-us-about-pope-leos-message-of-hope-258040

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: From One-Size-Fits-All to Custom Built Models: Personal AI Charts an Alternative Path – ”No LLM” Required

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SAN FRANCISCO, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Personal AI today made a public declaration: “No LLM.”

    While Personal Language Models (PLMs) have quietly emerged as an alternative to general-purpose AI, Personal AI is the first to fully lean in, framing PLMs as the smarter, safer choice for organizations that demand privacy, precision, and control. This movement marks a clear stance on AI optionality: one-size-fits-all models aren’t the only way forward, and in many cases, they’re not the right one.

    At the heart of this movement is a simple belief: AI doesn’t need to be bigger; it needs to be better for you, the individual. PLMs are designed to reflect your data, your rules, and your expertise, helping workers and workforces reclaim control in an AI landscape dominated by common systems.

    “PLMs put people back at the center of AI,” said Suman Kanuganti, CEO of Personal AI. “We’ve been conditioned to believe that scale equals intelligence. But the future of AI is personal. It’s secure, efficient, and uniquely yours.”

    From General Purpose to Personal Power

    While LLMs operate on massive public datasets, PLMs are built on a different architecture that’s privacy-first, memory-based, and programmable to specific needs.

    “PLMs distinguish themselves through a memory-based transformer architecture that combines scalability, efficiency, and high performance,” said Kanuganti, “Built on two foundational pillars, a memory and mixture-of-experts framework and an advanced transformer-based design, this hybrid approach enables Personal AI to handle tasks requiring deep contextual understanding with exceptional accuracy and predictability. It’s an architectural leap, much like the shift from CPUs to GPUs for specialized workloads.”

    PLMs offer a new path for AI adoption that’s grounded in:

    • Privacy by Design: Your data stays in your control—never scraped or shared. This is particularly important as 72% of Americans believe there should be more government regulation on what can be done with personal data.
    • Programmability: Models are tailored to your context, not trained on the internet’s average.
    • Precision at Scale: PLMs deliver efficient, accurate responses without the infrastructure bloat of LLMs.
    • Contextual Intelligence: PLMs go deep in specific domains, not wide on general trivia.
    • AI That Works With You: Every PLM reflects its user—offering decisions, insights, and actions that align with how you work.

    Kanuganti and his team envision a future where every worker partners with a trusted network of PLMs, embedded across every function, from operations to strategy.

    Drawing Inspiration From the Campaign That Changed Software Forever

    Personal AI’s “No LLM” movement draws inspiration from Salesforce’s iconic 1999 “No Software” campaign, a bold declaration that helped redefine a market. Just as Salesforce challenged the prevailing belief that software had to be packaged and installed, Personal AI is challenging the assumption that bigger models mean better results.

    Rolling out at major tech events in 2025, the “No LLM” movement is designed to provoke a critical question: why settle for generic intelligence when you can build your own, specific intelligence?

    Jean-Yves Couput, Senior Executive Advisor on Corporate Strategies and Communications at Salomon, a French sporting goods company, said “LLMs like ChatGPT opened the door, but they are generalists and often too vague or off-mark for our needs. With PLMs, we are in control. We train the model on our content, our tone, our strategy. It speaks Salomon. That level of personalization is not just convenient — it is transformative. From inventory management to employee onboarding to executive communications, we are seeing 50-75% gains in speed, accuracy, and consistency. And frankly, it is the only way we can meet our compliance standards while scaling AI securely across the company.”

    “LLMs aren’t going away, but they alone don’t serve all customer needs,” added Kanuganti. “Our message is about expanding what’s possible. About giving people tools that serve their interests, not just the industry’s.”

    About Personal AI

    Personal AI is the largest supplier of AI workers, serving Enterprise and SMB markets with proprietary Personal Language Models (PLMs). Each PLM (or “Persona”) has a specific function or role, with deep knowledge in its area, and is designed for both human collaboration and autonomous workflows. The Company was founded in 2020 by Suman Kanuganti, Sharon Zhang, and Kristie Kaiser. For more information, visit https://personal.ai

    Media Contact:
    Susanna Kalnes
    Sparkpr
    susanna.kalnes@sparkpr.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/8b3748a8-8f20-47da-94c9-2e7b0a6f40e8

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Thales Unveils State-of-the-Art Inflight Entertainment & Services Lab at its Engineering Competence Centre in Bengaluru

    Source: Thales Group

    Headline: Thales Unveils State-of-the-Art Inflight Entertainment & Services Lab at its Engineering Competence Centre in Bengaluru

    • The new lab, dedicated to development of Inflight Entertainment (IFE) solutions and advanced tools for support and services to airlines, reinforces India’s strategic position as an innovation hub for Thales.
    • Our engineers at Thales in India will design, develop, and test innovative solutions to support the needs of Indian airlines and global customers.
    • Aligned with Aatmanirbhar Bharat vision, the facility will significantly contribute to localisation of R&D activities along with job creation in India.

    Thales today unveiled a state-of-the-art Inflight Entertainment (IFE) and Services lab at its Engineering Competence Centre (ECC) in Bengaluru. Aligned with the vision of ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’, this lab will serve as a hub for the design, development, and testing of next-generation IFE systems. The lab is equipped with advanced tools to support and serve airlines in India and around the world.

    The inauguration ceremony was held in the presence of Honourable Minister of Industries, Government of Karnataka, Shri MB Patil, Consul General of France in Bengaluru Mr Marc Lamy, executives from Air India, Indo-French Chamber of Commerce & Industry, along with Olivier Flous, Senior Vice President, Engineering and Digital Transformation, and Francois Colonna, Director Engineering Competence Centre, Bengaluru from Thales, among other dignitaries.

    Thales’s Engineering Competence Centre in Bengaluru is a key force driving the development of advanced aerospace and defence solutions. With the addition of the new IFE and Services lab, Thales is further expanding its R&D capabilities in India supporting the country’s journey to become a global innovation hub for civil aviation. This state-of-the-art facility replicates an aircraft equipped with an IFE system, allowing for comprehensive testing and an immersive customer experience review. The lab is a hub for software design, development, and rigorous testing crucial for secured aircraft data deployment, alongside meticulous hardware inspection and testing.

    Commenting on the inauguration, Hon’ble Minister Shri MB Patil said, “Today’s inauguration of Thales’s Inflight Entertainment and Services Lab at its Engineering Competence Centre reinforces Bengaluru’s position as a global innovation hub. It’s a testament to Karnataka’s robust aerospace and defence ecosystem. Thales’s footprint in India, particularly here in Bengaluru, is already substantial and has been contributing significantly towards the growth of aerospace, defence and cybersecurity & digital identity for years. Their Engineering Competence Centre has become an integral part of the local industry. Many congratulations to the Thales team for this significant milestone that will strengthen the aviation sector not just within Karnataka, but across the nation.”

    Mr Marc Lamy, Consul General of France in Bengaluru, said, “Thales is a name synonymous with French excellence, a global leader at the forefront of advanced technologies. The inauguration of this IFE (Inflight Entertainment) and services lab is a moment of immense pride, reflecting the vibrant spirit of innovation and partnership that defines both our nations, France and India. This perfectly embodies the spirit of the upcoming year 2026 designated by President Emmanuel Macron and Prime Minister Narendra Modi as the ‘Indo-French Year of Innovation’.”

    Olivier Flous, Senior Vice President, Engineering & Digital Transformation, Thales, said, “The inauguration of our new lab dedicated to Inflight Entertainment solutions and support and services for airlines marks a significant step towards enhancing both the passenger experience and operational efficiency of carriers. This new facility at our Engineering Competence Centre in Bengaluru underscores our commitment to the ‘Aatmanirbhar Bharat’ vision, developing future-ready aviation technologies in India, for India, and for the world. We look forward to continue leveraging our global technological expertise and India’s vast talent pool to foster a robust local civil aviation ecosystem.”

    About Thales

    Thales (Euronext Paris: HO) is a global leader in advanced technologies for the Defence, Aerospace, and Cyber & Digital sectors. Its portfolio of innovative products and services addresses several major challenges: sovereignty, security, sustainability and inclusion.

    The Group invests more than €4 billion per year in Research & Development in key areas, particularly for critical environments, such as Artificial Intelligence, cybersecurity, quantum and cloud technologies.

    Thales has more than 83,000 employees in 68 countries. In 2024, the Group generated sales of €20.6 billion.

    About Thales in India

    Present in India since 1953, Thales is headquartered in Noida and has other operational offices and sites spread across Delhi, Gurugram, Bengaluru and Mumbai, among others. Over 2200 employees are working with Thales and its joint ventures in India. Since the beginning, Thales has been playing an essential role in India’s growth story by sharing its technologies and expertise in Defence, Aerospace and Cyber & Digital sectors. Thales has two engineering competence centres in India – one in Noida focused on Cyber & Digital business, while the one in Bengaluru focuses on hardware, software and systems engineering capabilities for both the civil and defence sectors, serving global needs. Thales significantly contributes to the growth of India’s aviation sector. Thales provides avionics and IFE systems for many Indian civil aircraft. It also provides solutions to enhance airport security and is working on an advanced UTM system for drone operations. The Group has also established an MRO facility in Gurugram to provide comprehensive avionics maintenance and repair services to Indian airlines.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with the Minister of Finance of Viet Nam

    Source: ASEAN

    Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, met with the Minister of Finance of Viet Nam, H.E. Nguyen Van Thang, at the OECD Headquarters in Paris, France, on 4 June 2025. They discussed current global economic developments, regional finance cooperation, and the formulation of the forthcoming sectoral plan on finance to support the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Strategic Plan 2026–2030—an integral component of the ASEAN Community Vision 2045.

    The post Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with the Minister of Finance of Viet Nam appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • Piyush Goyal begins official visit to Italy to strengthen bilateral economic ties

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Union Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal began his official visit to Italy on Wednesday, marking a key step in strengthening India’s economic and strategic ties with one of its important European partners. The two-day visit, scheduled for June 4–5, follows Minister Goyal’s engagements in France aimed at enhancing India–France trade and investment relations.

    During his stay, Goyal will co-chair the 22nd Session of the India–Italy Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation (JCEC) alongside Antonio Tajani, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy. The JCEC serves as a critical bilateral platform for shaping economic collaboration between the two nations.

    This year’s session is set against the backdrop of the India–Italy Joint Strategic Action Plan (JSAP) 2025–2029, which was launched following a meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro in November 2024. The JSAP outlines ten key thematic pillars for cooperation, with economic engagement and innovation as central priorities.

    The Rome meeting will focus on assessing progress and expanding bilateral cooperation in pivotal sectors such as Industry 4.0, agritech, digital transformation, clean energy, sustainable mobility, and infrastructure development under the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). These discussions are expected to open new doors for strategic industrial partnerships and strengthen economic connectivity between the two nations.

    Goyal will lead a high-level Indian business delegation to the India–Italy Growth Forum in Brescia, a leading industrial and innovation hub in northern Italy. The forum is designed to foster dialogue between key businesses, promote investment flows, and boost B2B collaborations in areas such as sustainable manufacturing, circular economy, and advanced engineering.

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system – A10-0091/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system

    (2025/2006(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194 thereof,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2020 entitled ‘Powering a climate-neutral economy: An EU Strategy for Energy System Integration’ (COM(2020)0299),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 28 November 2023 entitled ‘Grids, the missing link – An EU Action Plan for Grids’ (COM(2023)0757),

     having regard to the Commission report of January 2025 entitled ‘Investment needs of European energy infrastructure to enable a decarbonised economy’[1],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy – Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans’ (COM(2025)0079),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector’ (COM(2025)0095),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014[2] (the CEF Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EC) No 715/2009, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 and Directives 2009/73/EC and (EU) 2019/944, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013[3] (the TEN-E Regulation),

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity[5],

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652[6] (the Renewable Energy Directive),

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1275 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the energy performance of buildings[7],

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1711 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design[8],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design[9] (Electricity Market Design (EMD) Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Regulations (EC) No 663/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 2009/31/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Directives 2009/119/EC and (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council[10], which reflects the EU’s electricity interconnection targets,

     having regard to the Council conclusions on ‘Advancing Sustainable Electricity Grid Infrastructure’, as approved by the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council at its meeting on 30 May 2024,

     having regard to its resolution of 10 July 2020 on a comprehensive European approach to energy storage[11],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on a European strategy for energy system integration[12],

     having regard to the report of January 2023 by the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) on electricity transmission and distribution tariff methodologies in Europe,

     having regard to the report of 19 December 2023 by ACER entitled ‘Demand response and other distributed energy resources: what barriers are holding them back?’,

     having regard to the report of April 2025 by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) entitled ‘Bidding Zone Review of the 2025 Target Year’[13],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0091/2025),

    A. whereas electricity grids are essential for the Union to achieve its clean energy transition and to deliver renewable energy while supporting economic growth and prosperity; whereas inefficiencies and lack of full integration negatively impact energy prices for consumers and companies;

    B. whereas in light of the growing demand for electricity, significant investments and upgrades are required, along with regulatory oversight, to increase cross-border and national-level transmission capacity and modernise infrastructure, ensuring a decarbonised, flexible, more decentralised, digitalised and resilient electricity system;

    C. whereas poor connectivity and grid bottlenecks are among the main reasons the EU cannot fully benefit from the significant installed capacities of wind and solar energy, thereby ensuring affordable prices for households and industry; whereas the lack of strong interconnection between regions with different natural and climatic characteristics leads to the overproduction of energy and administrative limitation on renewable production in some regions, while other regions are struggling with insufficient supply and high prices;

    D. whereas transmission system operators (TSOs) are essential for integrating offshore renewable energy into the EU grid, in particular for those connected to more than one market; whereas, if TSOs fail to provide the agreed grid capacity, compensation should be paid to developers for lost export capacity, funded by congestion income; whereas such compensation should be shared fairly among TSOs and align with principles of non-discrimination and maximising cross-border trade; whereas this highlights the importance of maintaining a functioning interconnector backbone, as failures in interconnector capacity may result in costs for both producers and TSOs;

    E. whereas Europe will only reach its decarbonisation objectives if there is a coordinated, pan-European approach to electricity system planning, connecting borders, sectors and regions;

    F. whereas the planning of electricity transmission and distribution networks must be coordinated to ensure the effective development of the EU electricity system;

    G. whereas the EU electricity grid was built for a 20th century economy based on centralised, fossil fuel-fired electricity generation, and must be modernised to meet the demands of a digitalised economy with increased levels of electrification and a higher share of decentralised and variable renewable energy sources;

    H. whereas cross-border interconnectors, transmission and distribution grid infrastructure are critical for integrating renewables, reducing costs for European consumers and increasing the security of energy supply;

    I. whereas distribution level grid projects are already eligible for funds under the Connecting Europe Facility – Energy (CEF-E); whereas, however, only a small share has been allocated to distribution grids under the most recent Projects of Common Interest (PCI) list; whereas CEF-E should better reflect the role of distribution grids for the achievement of EU energy and climate targets;

    J. whereas ENTSO-E has calculated that cross-border electricity investment of EUR 13 billion per year until 2050 would reduce system costs by EUR 23 billion per year;

    K. whereas the ‘energy efficiency first’ principle is a fundamental principle of EU energy policy and is legally binding; notes that the correct implementation of this principle will significantly reduce energy consumption, thereby lowering the need for investment in electricity grids and interconnectors;

    L. whereas keeping the EU energy policy triangle of sustainability, security of supply and affordability in balance is key to a successful energy transition and to a reliable European energy system;

    M. whereas energy network planning is a long-term process closely linked to investment stability;

    N. whereas energy system flexibility needs are expected to double by 2030, in light of an increased share of renewables; whereas demand-side flexibility is therefore crucial for grid stability; whereas individual citizens, businesses and communities participating in the electricity market may bring manifold benefits to the grids, such as enhanced system efficiency, resilience, investment optimisation, improved social acceptance and lower energy costs; whereas serious delays and inconsistencies in implementing existing EU provisions on citizens’ energy, demand flexibility and smart network operations remain a concern;

    O. whereas although recycling meets between 40 % and 55 % of Europe’s aluminium and copper needs, further measures to extend recycling capacity, waste collection and supply chain efficiency must be considered;

    P. whereas the Commission and High Representative’s joint communication entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ highlights the importance of ensuring the secure supply of spare cable parts and the stockpiling of essential material and equipment;

    Q. whereas the electricity system blackout experienced in the Iberian Peninsula and parts of France on 28 April 2025 illustrated how important it is to increase the energy grid’s resilience by ensuring that it is well maintained, protected and balanced at all times, including through flexible system services and enhanced cross-border interconnections, to allow for an agile recovery in the event of system failure;

    R. whereas national and regional level system operators hold important responsibilities, particularly in the area of energy supply security; whereas all tasks of a regulatory nature should be performed by regulatory agencies acting in the public interest; whereas, however, alongside these responsibilities, a strengthened role for regulators and ACER in the planning processes can contribute to addressing shortcomings, such as ENTSO-E’s current 10-year network development plan (TYNDP) grid planning, as identified in the grid monitoring report; whereas, while acknowledging the TSOs’ responsibilities in drawing up these scenarios, ACER’s early involvement in the drawing-up process could help to ensure that the guidelines for the drawing-up of the scenarios are followed in accordance with the TEN-E Regulation;

    S. whereas interconnection development will contribute to further integrating the EU electricity market, which not only increases system flexibility and resilience, but also unlocks economies of scale in renewable electricity production;

    T. whereas the energy workforce will need to increase by 50 % to deploy the requisite renewable energy, grid and energy efficiency technologies[14];

    U. whereas small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are the backbone of the EU’s economy, entrepreneurship and innovation, comprising 99 % of businesses, providing jobs to more than 85 million EU citizens and generating more than 58 % of the EU’s GDP;

    V. whereas increasing decentralised electricity generation and demand response are important to reduce reliance on centralised production, which may be easily targeted by physical threats or cyberthreats, or compromised by climate-related events;

    1. Calls on the Member States to fully explore, optimise, modernise and expand their electricity grid capacity, including transmission and distribution; considers electricity grids to be the central element in the EU’s transition to a competitive, net zero economy by 2050, one that is capable of accommodating high volumes of variable renewable energy technologies and/or evolving demand sources driven by increased levels of electrification and the advancement of digital technologies; notes the Member States’ prerogative to determine their own energy mix;

    2. Calls on the Commission, the Member States, ACER, EU DSO Entity[15] and ENTSO-E[16] to implement the actions of the EU grid action plan, the action plan for affordable energy, the reform of the EU’s electricity market design and the Renewable Energy Directive without delay;

    3. Points out that the completion of the EU’s energy market integration will save up to EUR 40 billion annually, and that a 50 % increase in cross-border electricity trade could increase the EU’s annual GDP by 0.1 %[17];

    Relevance of electricity grids for the European energy transition

    4. Welcomes the Commission’s communication on grids[18]; underlines the expected increase in electricity consumption of 60 % by 2030, the rising need to integrate a large share of variable renewable power into the grid, and the need for grids to adapt to a more decentralised, digitalised and flexible electricity system, including the optimisation of system operations and the full utilisation of local flexibility resources, demand response and energy storage solutions to complement wholesale markets and enhance grid resilience, resulting in an additional 23 GW of cross-border capacity by 2025 and a further 64 GW of capacity by 2030; notes that over 40 % of the Union’s distribution grids are over 40 years old and need to be updated[19];

    5. Reiterates that, by 2030, the Union needs to invest around EUR375 to 425billion in distribution grids, and, overall, EUR 584 billion, in transmission and distribution electricity grids[20], including cross-border interconnectors and the adaptation of distribution grids to the energy transition;

    6. Notes with concern that in 2023 the costs of managing transmission electricity grid congestion in the EU were EUR 4.2 billion[21] and continue to rise, and that curtailment is an obstacle to increasing the share of renewable energy sources; notes that this figure does not include the distribution electricity grid; stresses that in 2023 nearly 30 TWh of renewable electricity were curtailed across several Member States due to insufficient grid capacity; further notes the sharp increase in annual hours of negative electricity prices, rising from 154 in 2018 to 1 031 as of September 2024[22], largely driven by grid congestion at borders, and the lack of sufficient storage, flexibility and demand response in the electricity market to temporally match variable renewable electricity supply with electricity demand; stresses that addressing these issues could help to absorb surplus supply, thereby maximising the use of existing grid infrastructure, but that existing market and regulatory frameworks often fail to provide adequate incentives for achieving this;

    7. Highlights that a failure to modernise and expand the EU’s electricity grid, alongside the rapid deployment of the high volumes of variable renewable energy required to deliver on its targets, has and will continue to result in high levels of dispatch-down (instructions to reduce output); believes that the dispatch-down of renewables, caused by grid congestion and curtailment, represents an unacceptable waste of high-value renewable electricity and money; calls on the Commission, as part of its forthcoming European Grids Package, to set out an EU strategy to vastly reduce the dispatch-down of renewable electricity;

    8. Highlights the role of smart grids in improving congestion management and optimising the electricity distribution of renewables; stresses their contribution to network flexibility by integrating digital tools that facilitate demand-side response and collective self-consumption; underlines that better grid management enhances energy resilience, reduces curtailments and secures supply during peak demand periods;

    9. Highlights that the electricity grid infrastructure is a priority for achieving the EU’s strategic autonomy and its climate and energy targets; notes the Clean Industrial Deal’s commitment to electrification with a key performance indicator of a 32 % economy-wide electrification rate by 2030, which would necessitate a significant and continuous update and deployment of grids; regrets that delays in responding to requests for connection to grids result in a slower pace of electrification, even in Member States where generation from renewables is rapidly increasing;

    10. Highlights, in particular, the crucial role that energy communities can play in supporting local economies; regrets that energy communities and smaller operators face disproportionate barriers to grid access and grid funding access due to regulatory hurdles and resource constraints; calls, therefore, on the Member States that are lagging behind in this regard to fully implement the Clean Energy Package, Fit for 55 and Renewable Energy Directive provisions, empowering citizens, municipalities, SMEs and companies to actively participate in the electricity market, in particular by developing enabling frameworks for renewable energy communities and the promotion of energy-sharing schemes; calls for grid-related EU and national level funding to take into account the specific needs of projects promoted by energy communities;

    Regulatory situation and challenges

    11. Is convinced that regulatory stability is a key condition for unlocking private investments in the electricity grid and, where feasible, enabling the affordable electrification of the EU’s economy, and reiterates the need to implement already adopted legislation before assessing potential new reviews;

    12. Underlines that integrated grid planning across sectors at local, regional, national and EU levels will lead to increased system efficiency and reduced costs; calls, therefore, on the Commission and on the Member States to work towards integrated planning and to ensure that electricity network development plans are aligned with the 2021-2030 national energy and climate plans (NECPs) for all voltage levels; notes that a strengthened governance framework would help to ensure alignment between grid development plans and national and EU level policy objectives; recognises that, while the Member States are required to report on their contributions to EU targets through the NECPs, there is currently no equivalent obligation on TSOs to systematically report at EU level;

    13. Underlines that the TEN-E Regulation and the Projects of Common Interest (PCI) and Projects of Mutual Interest (PMI) are powerful tools in the development of the Union’s cross-border energy infrastructure; regrets the shortcomings in the current TYNDP for European electricity infrastructure, which results in investment interests falling short of cross-border needs[23], and that grid planning does not fully leverage cross-border and cross-sectoral savings[24]; further regrets delays regarding to the completion of PCIs; urges the Commission to introduce more coordinated, long-term cross-sectoral planning to deliver the related savings and benefits across the EU; highlights that such coordinated planning could better inform cost sharing of infrastructure across the Member States; notes that, although the TEN-E Regulation enables smart electricity grid projects with a cross-border impact to obtain PCI status, even if such projects do not cross a physical border, the PCI list in 2023 included only five such projects; strongly believes, therefore, that the PCI process needs to be strengthened, simplified and streamlined for more clarity and transparency; calls on the Member States to fully complete the PCIs; calls on the Commission to urgently propose a targeted revision of the TEN-E Regulation in order to (1) introduce a robust planning process that combines system operators’ responsibilities with a strengthened role for ACER by mandating ACER to request amendments to the scenarios and the TYNDP, (2) ensure scenarios are drawn up in line with the decarbonisation agenda and enable easier access for smart electricity grid projects, and (3) introduce a simplified application process for small and medium-sized distribution system operators (DSOs);

    14. Emphasises that network planning is a long-term process closely linked to investment stability; proposes, therefore, extending the time frame for network development plans to 20 years; highlights that grid investment is urgently required by the EU’s competitive agenda and should not be delayed;

    15. Additionally notes that the EU will continue to have strong electricity links with its neighbouring countries and therefore believes the Commission should enhance such cooperation with neighbouring countries through PMIs with non-EU countries, as provided for in the TEN-E Regulation;

    16. Strongly emphasises that CEF-E has proven to be the crucial instrument for co-financing cross-border energy infrastructure and insists on its continuation; welcomes the inclusion of offshore electricity grid projects in the Commission’s most recent allocation of grants under CEF-E;

    17. Considers the lack of detailed, reliable and comparable data on national and EU grid planning an obstacle to more efficient grids; calls therefore on the Member States to thoroughly implement the relevant provision in the Electricity Directive[25], in particular Article 32, and to encourage smaller DSOs to apply this Article’s provision;

    18. Welcomes the EU DSO Entity’s report on good practices on Distribution Network Development Plans[26] (DNDPs), which calls on the Member States to include cost-benefit analyses in their DNDPs, in order to evaluate investment opportunities; urges the Commission to develop guidelines based on this report, in cooperation with the EU DSO Entity, to harmonise and increase transparency of national development planning for distribution grids, to publish a European overview of the DNDPs and to require all transmission and distribution operators to provide energy regulators with the necessary data about their current and future grid hosting capacity information and grid planning, to enable energy regulators to properly scrutinise grid planning; calls on the Member States to implement Article 31(3) of Directive 2024/1711, which requests grid operators to publish information on the capacity available in their area of operation, in order to ensure transparency and enable stakeholders to make informed investment decisions; calls on the Commission to develop a centralised online repository for all transmission plans and DNDPs;

    19. Highlights the significant risk posed by curtailment to the viability of renewable energy investment, especially considering that many Member States fail to compensate market participants for curtailed electricity volumes, despite the requirements set out in Articles 12 and 13 of Regulation (EU) 2019/943; regrets the lack of transparency, availability and data granularity regarding curtailed renewable energy volumes and congestion management costs;

    20. Highlights the value of putting clear metrics in place to measure whether the EU is on track to deliver the grid expansion and reinforcements needed to meet its 2050 objectives; notes that such metrics could include reductions in renewable energy curtailment, lower grid development costs relative to the amount of capacity delivered, increases in the efficient use of existing infrastructure, a reduction in losses and lower raw material intensity;

    21. Notes the work done by ENTSO-E and the EU DSO Entity on harmonised definitions of available grid hosting capacity for system operators and to establish an Union-wide overview thereof; believes that national regulatory authorities (NRAs) could benefit from clear legislative provisions as to how Member States can prioritise grid connections, so as to abandon the ‘first-come, first-served’ principle; therefore asks the Commission to amend Article 6 of Directive (EU) 2019/944 on the internal market for electricity, as part of the implementation review that the Commission must complete by 31 December 2025, and to consequently introduce transparent priority connection criteria to be chosen and further defined by the Member States for (1) generation connection, such as quality and maturity of the project, level of commitment, contribution to decarbonisation, social value, and for (2) consumer connection, such as quality and maturity of the project, level of commitment, contribution to decarbonisation, public interest or its strategic and/or social value, and grid optimisation; calls on the NRAs and the Member States to provide clear prioritisation rules according to their local and national specificities to allow the ‘first-come, first-served’ approach to be abandoned by disincentivising applications for connection that are not substantiated by a solid project, that are speculative or where the developer cannot show sufficient commitment to the realisation of a project;

    22. Underlines that improved cross-border interconnections offer substantial cost-saving potential at the system level, with annual reductions in generation costs estimated at EUR 9 billion up to 2040, while requiring annual investments of EUR 6 billion in cross-border infrastructure and storage capacity;

    23. Regrets that some Member States did not achieve the 10% interconnection target by 2020 and urges them to strive to achieve the current  15% interconnection target for 2030, as set out in Regulation (EU) 2018/1999, since interconnection capacity is crucial for the functioning of the EU’s internal electricity market, leading to significant cost savings at system level and decreasing generation costs by EUR 9 billion annually to 2040[27]; regrets that the 32 GW of cross-border capacity needed by 2030 remains unaddressed[28]; deplores the delays and uncertainties regarding several interconnection projects; calls, therefore, on the Commission to propose, by June 2026 at the latest, a binding interconnection target for 2036 based on a needs assessment; stresses the need for cooperation with non-hosting Member States and for the EU and its neighbouring countries to be involved in negotiations, in order to ensure the projects’ finalisation;

    24. Highlights the need to accelerate permitting procedures for electricity infrastructure; stresses that grid expansion should not be delayed by lengthy permitting procedures or excessive reporting requirements; therefore welcomes the positive progress made regarding provisions adopted in the latest revision of the Renewable Energy Directive, specifically Article 16f thereof, and the Emergency Regulation on Permitting[29] to accelerate, streamline and simplify permit-granting procedures for grid and renewable energy projects, especially the principle of public overriding interest for grid projects; notes, however, that some of the Member States have not seen a material improvement in project permitting timelines, despite the ambitious frameworks set out at EU level; therefore urges the Member States to implement these measures without delay and calls on the Commission to closely monitor the implementation of the Renewable Energy Directive, and regularly assess if revised permitting provisions are sufficient to deliver on the EU’s objectives; additionally calls on the Commission to set out guidelines for the Member States to include a principle of tacit approval in their national planning systems, as described in Article 16a of the Renewable Energy Directive; stresses that reinforcing administrative capacity, including through adequate staffing of planning and permitting authorities, will accelerate permitting procedures;

    25. Encourages the Member States to draw up plans to designate dedicated infrastructure areas for grid projects, as outlined in Article 15e of the Renewable Energy Directive; stresses that such plans are essential to account for local specificities and ensure respect for protected areas; emphasises that these plans should be closely coordinated with the designation of acceleration areas for renewables, to ensure a streamlined, efficient and integrated approach to energy infrastructure development;

    26. Notes that often documents need to be submitted in paper form; calls on the Member States to increase the digitalisation of these processes in order to accelerate permitting procedures; calls on the Commission and the Member States to revise all EU legislation relevant to permitting, such as the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive[30], with a view to introducing mandatory digital application, submission and processing requirements;

    27. Highlights the importance of public acceptance and public engagement when developing new grid projects and calls on the Commission to develop a set of best practices to be shared among the Member States in this regard; highlights the critical importance of effective communication with citizens and communities regarding grid projects and reinforcement; notes that local-level support can help to accelerate the delivery of critical infrastructure and thus meet national and EU level objectives; urges the swift implementation of the EU’s pact for engagement with the electricity sector and coordination with national signatories (TSOs, DSOs, NRAs) to guarantee early, meaningful and regular public participation in grid projects;

    28. Calls for the convening of a TAIEX[31] Group on Permitting within the forthcoming European Grids Package to support the Member States in addressing administrative bottlenecks, enhancing regulatory capacity and accelerating project approvals through the sharing of best practices and cross-border coordination;

    29. Welcomes the initiatives announced under the Action Plan for Affordable Energy; recommends that the Commission extend the ‘tripartite contract for affordable energy for Europe’s industry’ to smaller energy producers, including energy communities, SMEs and businesses, leveraging flexibility and demand response, and link the outcome of these cooperation structures with grid planning processes at national and EU level, in order to optimise planning, investment and grid utilisation from the outset;

    30. Highlights the need for improvements to be made to the public procurement framework, in order to tackle the challenges to grid operators regarding supply chains; therefore welcomes the Commission communication on the Clean Industrial Deal and the announcement by the Commission of a forthcoming review of the Public Procurement Directives[32]; stresses public procurement’s potential for the continued development of a strong EU manufacturing supply chain for electricity grid equipment, software and services; encourages the Commission to promote resilience, sustainability and security in public procurement procedures for grid operators; advocates for greater consistency between EU regulations on public procurement; calls on the Commission to adapt EU rules on public procurement with a view to harmonising and simplifying functional tendering specifications, in order to ramp up the production capacities of grid components;

    31. Believes that adequate standardisation and common technical specifications are necessary for achieving economies of scale, and to speed up technological development; considers, additionally, that it is essential to ensure the right level of standardisation so that manufacturers’ capacity to innovate is not reduced;

    32. Reiterates the need to consider new business models between equipment manufacturers and operators, such as long-term framework agreements that encourage the shift from one-off ‘grid projects’ to sustained and structured ‘grid programmes’, which result in more predictable planning for grid technology manufacturers; calls for the streamlining of tendering processes for the provision of grid equipment and services;

    33. Stresses that this forthcoming revision of the Public Procurement Directives will allow the inclusion of sustainability, resilience and European preference criteria in EU public procurement processes for strategic sectors, in line with the provisions set out in Article 25 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1735[33]; calls for grids and related technologies to be explicitly recognised as strategic sectors, to ensure their eligibility under the revised framework; underlines that strengthening European preference in public procurement processes is essential for reducing the EU’s dependence on non-EU suppliers, enhancing supply chain security, and fostering a resilient EU industrial base capable of supporting the energy transition; welcomes the introduction by the European Investment Bank (EIB) of a ‘Grids Manufacturing Package’ to support the European supply chain with at least EUR 1.5 billion in counter-guarantees for grid component manufacturers; calls for further similar financial instruments to be developed to provide long-term investment certainty and to accelerate the scaling-up of European production capacity;

    Financing

    34. Notes that over the past five years, global investment in power capacity has increased by nearly 40 %, while investment in grid infrastructure has lagged behind; notes that estimates of investment that the EU will need to make in its grid over the 2025-2050 period range from EUR 1 950 billion to EUR 2 600 billion[34];

    35. Observes with concern that the budget allocated under CEF-E has been insufficient to expedite all PCI and PMI categories; notes that with a EUR 5.84 billion budget for 2021-2027, the programme has restricted capacity and may struggle to keep pace with investment needs; calls on the Commission and the Member States to significantly increase the CEF-E envelope and the percentage of CEF-E funds dedicated to electricity infrastructure as a separate adequate resource, when proposing the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), and to ensure that projects both at the distribution and at the transmission levels with an EU added value are eligible for budget allocated under CEF-E; encourages the Commission to further explore co-financing possibilities between CEF-E and the Renewable Energy Financing Mechanism;

    36. States that EU funding is predominantly allocated to transmission grids with relatively insignificant allocations to distribution grids, despite their significant role in the EU energy transition, demonstrated by the fact that, between 2014 and 2020, CEF-E funded around EUR 5.3 billion worth of projects, of which around EUR 1.7 billion went to transmission grids and EUR 237 million to smart distribution grids; notes that the last PCI list only contained five smart electricity projects;

    37. Deeply regrets that, whereas regional funds such as the Cohesion Fund, the European Regional Development Fund or the Recovery and Resilience Facility provide for grid investments in principle, in practice they are underutilised for grid projects; regrets also that the evaluation criteria applied to the assessment of projects submitted in response to the EU Innovation Fund’s calls for proposals prevent funding for the demonstration and manufacturing of grid technologies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that a proportionate amount of such funding is also spent on grid investment;

    38. Calls on the Member States to simplify access to the EU funds managed by the Member States for grid operators, for instance through the establishment of a one-stop-shop in those Member States in which a large share of DSOs are of a small or medium size;

    39. Calls on the Commission to propose a dedicated funding instrument, such as one based on revenues from the market-based emission reduction scheme, to allow the Member States to support decentralised and innovative grid projects with a clear EU added value, including smaller projects, ensuring its effective use by the Member States for these purposes;

    40. Emphasises the need for regulatory frameworks to attract private investment and ensure cost-reflective tariffs, in addition to public funding mechanisms;

    41. Is convinced that anticipatory investments and forward-looking investments will help to address grid bottlenecks and prevent curtailment; points out that the EMD Regulation sets out regulatory elements for anticipatory investments but lacks a harmonised definition and implementation across the Union; calls on the Member States to swiftly implement the aforementioned provisions of the EMD Regulation and remove national legal barriers, on NRAs to remove barriers as regards regulatory incentives and disincentives, and on the Commission to urgently provide guidance regarding the approval of anticipatory investments, as announced in its Action Plan for Grids[35]; believes that further harmonisation in this respect might be beneficial; calls for detailed cost-benefit analyses and scenario-based planning to assess the likelihood of future utilisation, and recommends a two-step approval process for projects with a higher risk level by first approving smaller budgets for studies or planning, followed by a second approval for the more costly steps, in order to reduce the risk of stranded assets;

    42. Acknowledges that grid investments from capital markets can be incentivised by providing market-oriented conditions, such as suitable rates of return and a robust regulatory framework; emphasises that the EU and the Member States should encourage private investments by providing risk mitigation tools or Member State guarantees; calls on the Commission and the EIB to further strengthen financing and de-risking initiatives and tools, such as counter-guarantees, to support additional electricity grid expansion and modernisation at affordable rates for system operators; emphasises the relevance of ensuring that the EU’s electricity grid is financed and therefore owned by public and private capital only from EU actors, or previously screened non-EU investors, in view of the criticality of the infrastructure;

    43. Underlines that, while investment decisions should be guided by efficiencies, including energy and cost efficiency, investments should not only be focused on capital expenditure, and that investments optimising, renewing and modernising the existing infrastructure should be equally considered; therefore welcomes Article 18 of the EMD Regulation, which calls for tariff methodologies to give equal consideration to capital and operational expenditure, and remunerate operators to increase efficiencies in the operation and development of their networks, including through energy efficiency, flexibility and digitalisation; calls on the Commission and the Member States to thoroughly implement its provisions and to focus on ensuring fair and timely compensation to system operators for the costs borne by them;

    44. Notes that the electrification of the EU economy, where technically and economically feasible, would help to drive down network tariffs by spreading the costs across a wider range of users; highlights, therefore, the importance of ensuring that the development of the future network is fully aligned with demand projections driven by increases in the level of electrification; is concerned by experts’ forecasts of network tariff increases of around  50% to 100% by 2050[36]; stresses, therefore, the need for instruments and incentives that support grid operators in efficiently managing available grid capacity, including through procuring flexibility services, with a view to reducing imminent grid investment needs; highlights that flexible connection agreements, flexible network tariffs and local flexibility markets contribute to grid efficiency; invites NRAs to promote these flexible tariffs that allow consumers to easily react to price signals while shielding vulnerable households and businesses from price peaks; calls on the Commission and the Member States to actively address bottlenecks in tariffs, connection fees and regulations to facilitate cross-border and offshore hybrid grid investment;

    45. Calls on the Member States to implement the relevant EU legal framework to unlock demand-side flexibility by accelerating the deployment of smart meters, enabling access to data from all metering devices and ensuring efficient price signals, to allow industries and households to optimise their consumption and reduce their electricity bills, and at the same time help reduce operational costs and the need for additional grid investment;

    46. Stresses that the relaxation of network tariffs and certain charges, which could have the effect of lowering electricity prices, as proposed in the Affordable Energy Action Plan, has to be accompanied by a plan to replace the sources of the funds needed for grid investment with alternatives, in order to avoid facing underinvestment of the grids in the future;

    47. Highlights the importance of minimising the additional costs on consumers’ bills resulting from the investments required to deliver the grid modernisation and expansion needed to meet the EU’s climate and competitiveness goals; asks the Commission to work with the Member States to develop a coordinated set of best practices for investments and equitable network tariff composition, with a strong emphasis on increasing transparency and removing non-energy related charges from the tariffs;

    48. Points out that transmission infrastructure and availability of cross-zonal capacities are vital for an integrated market and for the exchange of low-marginal cost renewable energies, while respecting system security; notes that the EMD Regulation sets a minimum 70 % target of capacities available for cross-zonal trade by 2025 but Member States are far from reaching it; therefore urges the Member States and their TSOs to speed up their efforts to maximise cross-zonal trading opportunities, to ensure an efficient internal electricity market, appropriate investment decisions and renewable energy integration; regrets that achieving this target has often resulted in re-dispatch costs; notes that existing cost sharing mechanisms, such as cross-border cost allocation (CBCA), inter-transmission system operator (TSO) compensation and re-dispatching cost sharing, are limited and difficult to implement, which does not encourage cross-border investments, such as in offshore grids; calls on the Commission to holistically review and improve these mechanisms to ensure that they reflect the shared benefits of infrastructure and address the diversity of electricity flows, whether internal or cross-border, including a fair and balanced cost-benefit sharing mechanism for cross-border infrastructure projects that is based on objective criteria;

    49. Takes note of the report of April 2025 by ENTSO-E on potential alternative bidding zone configurations based on location marginal pricing simulations provided by TSOs;

    Grid-enhancing technologies, digitalisation, innovative solutions and resilience

    50. Underlines that grid-enhancing technologies, digital solutions, ancillary services and data management technologies, as well as smart energy appliances, often leveraging artificial intelligence, can significantly increase the efficiency of existing grid capacities and maximise the use of existing assets, reducing the requirement for new infrastructure, for instance by providing real-time information on energy flows; therefore insists that these technologies and innovative solutions must be explored; urges NRAs to incentivise TSOs and DSOs to rely more on such technologies, weighing up the costs and benefits of their use versus grid expansion and by using remuneration schemes based on benefits rather than costs, and to benchmark the TSOs and DSOs on their uptake of such technologies; invites the Commission to further promote such innovative technologies when assessing projects that apply for EU funding;

    51. Welcomes the work accomplished by ENTSO-E and the EU DSO Entity in developing the TSO/DSO Technopedia[37] so far, and calls on the Commission to mandate the biannual updating of the Technopedia to accurately reflect the technology readiness levels (TRLs) of technologies included;

    52. Urges the Commission and the Member States to further enable and increase the digitalisation of the European electricity system, enabling the optimisation of the operation of its power system and reducing pressure on the supply chain; underlines that data sharing and data interoperability are essential for grid planning and optimisation; encourages the Member States, the NRAs, the EU DSO Entity and ACER to continue to accelerate their work on the monitoring system based on indicators measuring the performance of smart grids (‘smart grid indicators’), as set out in the Electricity Directive;

    53. Stresses the urgent need to enhance the security of critical electricity infrastructure, including interconnectors and subsea cables at risk of sabotage, and increase its resilience to extreme weather events, climate change and physical and digital attacks; highlights the need to strengthen cooperation at national, regional and EU levels;

    54. Stresses the growing risk of coordinated cyberattacks targeting the EU’s entire electricity network; recalls the importance of the rapid implementation of cybersecurity and other related network codes and the related legislation, such as the NIS 2 Directive[38] and the Cybersecurity Act[39], and encourages the Commission to correct, in upcoming legislative reviews, the status of physical grid equipment, including remotely controllable grid equipment, such as inverters, which is currently not held to a high enough cybersecurity standard, especially in cases where the manufacturer is required, under the jurisdiction of a non-EU country, to report information on software or hardware vulnerabilities to the authorities of that non-EU country; calls for enhanced EU level cooperation between all parties to strengthen preparedness and resilience; considers that NRAs should acknowledge the costs incurred by operators in adopting cybersecurity and resilience measures, and provide incentives for investments pertaining to increasing the resilience of the energy infrastructure to cyberthreats, and physical and hybrid threats, including climate adaptation measures;

    55. Underlines the need to step up efforts to protect existing and future critical undersea and onshore energy infrastructure; considers that the EU should play a broader role in preventing incidents that threaten this infrastructure, in promoting surveillance and in restoring any damaged infrastructure using state of the art technologies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to find solutions to increase the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure, including solutions to financing such measures and technologies;

    56. Recognises that new high-voltage electricity grid projects provide a multifunctional and cost-efficient opportunity to integrate additional security measures (i.e. sensors, sonar, etc.) and environmental solutions (i.e. bird deflectors, fire detectors, nature corridors, etc.) if planned in a holistic manner; asks the Commission to develop guidelines for NRAs to ensure that initial grid project planning is carried out and financed with these elements in mind;

    57. Urges the Commission, DSOs and TSOs to develop an EU-owned Common European Energy Data Space, based on technical expertise and practice utilising the available data[40] and based on a common set of rules ensuring the secure, transparent portability and interoperability of energy data, where harmonised data is safely managed, exchanged and stored in the EU; stresses that this Common European Energy Data Space should facilitate data pooling and sharing through appropriate governance structures and data sharing services, supporting critical energy operations including transmission and distribution; underlines that European TSOs, DSOs and other previously screened electricity grid actors must be able to securely and smartly operate the grid, optimising its use by integrating flexibility and innovative technologies, in line with key principles of interoperability, trust, data value and governance; notes that data exchange arrangements must also take into account interactions with non-EU parties;

    58. Recognises the potential of flexibility as a necessary tool for optimising system operations, maintaining the stability of the system and empowering consumers by incentivising them to shift their consumption patterns; stresses the importance of implementing appropriate measures to guarantee efficient price signals that incentivise flexibility, including from all end-consumers, and ensuring that all resources contribute to system security, including by accelerating the deployment of smart meters, smart energy-efficient buildings, and enabling access to data from all metering devices; asks NRAs to recognise flexibility innovations and pilot projects in the system, insofar as these do not negatively impact the grid’s overall balance and stability, in order to continue incentivising innovation;

    59. Calls on NRAs to work closely with TSOs and DSOs to assess the flexibility potential, and needs of the national systems in current and future planning, taking into consideration the presence of industry, large consumers, large generators and storage; highlights in particular the critical role that storage assets, including long-duration electricity storage, capable of providing up to 100 hours of electricity, can play in providing congestion management services to the grid; notes that in order to provide these essential system services, investors in storage assets require stable, long-term revenue models, similar to the way in which support schemes have successfully provided revenue certainty for renewable generation assets;

    Supply chain, raw materials and the need for skills

    60. Notes with concern that global growth in the demand for grid technologies has put pressure on supply chains and the availability of cables, transformers, components and critical technologies; highlights the findings in the February 2025 International Energy Agency report, ‘Building the Future Transmission Grid’[41], that it now takes two to three years to procure cables and up to four years to secure large power transformers, and that average lead times for cables and large power transformers have almost doubled since 2021;

    61. Is concerned about the long lead times for many grid technology components and remains determined to maintain European technology leadership in grid technology, emphasising the need for innovation to develop, demonstrate and scale European high-capacity grid technologies and innovative grid-enhancing technologies;

    62. Stresses that critical and strategic raw materials are essential for grid infrastructure, with aluminium and copper demand set to rise by 33 % and 35 % respectively by 2050[42]; takes note of the Commission decision recognising certain critical raw materials projects as strategic projects under the Critical Raw Materials Act[43], in order to secure access to these key materials and diversify sources of supply; calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance recycling, and support strategic partnerships and trade agreements to this end;

    63. Highlights the need to strengthen grid supply chains to increase the supply of grid technologies at affordable costs, and thereby limit the costs borne by consumers via network charges; calls for a strategic approach to acquiring energy technologies, components or critical materials related to grids, in order to avoid developing dependencies on single suppliers outside of the EU;

    64. Believes that holistic, coordinated, long-term grid planning across the entire European energy system is needed to solve the supply chain capacity bottleneck, and that such planning provides manufacturers with essential transparency and predictability for adequately planning manufacturing capacity increases; considers that such planning must be reliable and enable new business models, such as long-term framework agreements and capacity reservation contracts;

    65. Urges the maximum standardisation of key electricity grid equipment, insofar as is technically possible, via a joint technical assessment by the Commission, DSOs, TSOs and industry, covering all voltage levels in order to scale up production, lower prices and delivery times, and promote the interoperability of systems;

    66. Stresses the urgent need to address labour shortages in the energy sector; notes that the Commission has projected that the energy workforce needs to significantly increase in order to deploy renewable energies, upgrade and expand grids, and manufacture energy efficiency, grid and other relevant technologies; regrets the shortages of electrical mechanics and fitters reported in 15 of the Member States, increasing the staffing needs of DSOs and TSOs; highlights that the energy workforce must grow by 50 % by 2030 to support the deployment of renewables[44], grid expansion and energy efficiency, with an estimated 2 million additional jobs required in electricity distribution by 2050; calls for training, upskilling and reskilling initiatives, prioritising grid-related skills to close skills gaps; welcomes university-business partnerships and targeted EU skills academies for strategic sectors, including grids; encourages DSOs and TSOs to diversify their workforce, including by increasing women’s participation;

    67. Reiterates that the Member States and the EU should cooperate to adapt the relevant skills programmes and develop best practices to fulfil the growing skills demand across all educational levels, with a strong emphasis on encouraging gender balance in the sector;

    68. Highlights the crucial role of SMEs and EU businesses in supplying the technology sector for the electricity grid; points out the need to access affordable electrification, limiting the costs related to the supply chain and ensuring a skilled workforce;

    Offshore

    69. Acknowledges the strategic relevance of offshore development in delivering the EU’s objectives of energy autonomy, increased use of renewable energy, a resilient and cost-effective electricity system and climate neutrality by 2050; stresses the importance of fully utilising the potential of Europe’s five sea basins for offshore energy generation; highlights the particular significance of the North Seas (covering the geographical area of the North Seas, including the Irish and Celtic Seas), which offer favourable conditions and the highest potential, with an agreed target of 300 GW of installed offshore generation capacity by 2050 within the framework of the North Seas Energy Cooperation; welcomes the progress made in this regard; emphasises the need to develop a meshed offshore grid, including hybrid interconnectors, particularly in the North Seas, to fully harness offshore potential and improve electricity market integration; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen regional cooperation on grid planning and energy cooperation across all sea basins with the EU’s neighbouring countries, in particular the UK and Norway, specifically in offshore wind energy development and the planning and manufacturing of electricity grids;

    70. Highlights the need for a stable and predictable regulatory framework that ensures the most optimal trading arrangements to provide the required investor confidence to support the development and interconnection of offshore grid and offshore wind projects, ensuring market efficiency and efficient cross-border flows, including with non-EU countries; underlines the necessity of strengthening national grids where required to maximise the benefits of offshore energy; acknowledges that combining offshore transmission with generation assets (offshore hybrids) will be an integral part of an efficient network system, as this comes with several advantages for the European energy system but still lacks the right regulatory framework to incentivise necessary investment;

    Cooperation with non-EU countries

    71. Calls on the Member States to increase cooperation and coordination with like-minded non-EU countries such as Norway and the UK; recalls that the development of electricity infrastructure to harness the offshore wind potential of the North Seas is a shared priority for both the EU and the UK;

    72. Highlights the need for a pragmatic and cooperative approach to EU-UK electricity trading; calls on the Commission to work closely with the UK administration to agree on a mutually beneficial trading arrangement that strengthens security of supply and the pathway to net zero for both jurisdictions; additionally, believes that efficiencies of trading arrangements can be improved further; calls on the Commission to engage with its UK counterparts constructively on this matter;

    Outermost regions

    73. Stresses the unique challenges faced by the EU’s outermost regions and other areas not connected to the European electricity grid; highlights their reliance on imports and high vulnerability to electricity blackouts and extreme climate hazards; notes the importance of developing resilient and autonomous energy systems through local grid development and cleaner energy production; calls on the Commission to address these regions’ specific needs in the European Grids Package and to propose additional financial support to improve the autonomy of their energy systems, and address their lack of interconnection and absence of broader grid connection benefits;

    °

    ° °

    74. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council decision on the termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union – A10-0094/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union

    (05673/2025 – C10‑0012/2025 – 2024/0245M(NLE))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 2 October 2024 for a Council decision on the termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union (COM(2024)0446),

     having regard to the draft Council decision on the termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union (C10‑0012/2025),

     having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 207(4), first subparagraph, and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10-0012/2025),

     having regard to the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the European Union (FLEGT)[1],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2173/2005 of 20 December 2005 on the establishment of a FLEGT licensing scheme for imports of timber into the European Community[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market[3] (EU Timber Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on the making available on the Union market and the export from the Union of certain commodities and products associated with deforestation and forest degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010[4] (EU Deforestation Regulation),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

     having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal[5],

     having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2020 on the EU’s role in protecting and restoring the world’s forests[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 22 October 2020 with recommendations to the Commission on an EU legal framework to halt and reverse EU-driven global deforestation[7],

     having regard to the Paris Agreement and to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework on halting and reversing nature loss,

     having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part[8],

     having regard to the UN Sustainable Development Goals,

     having regard to the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forest and Land Use,

     having regard to its legislative resolution of [XXXX][9] on the draft Council decision,

     having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Development,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0094/2025),

    A. whereas the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the Union (FLEGT) entered into force on 1 December 2011 and is one of the first agreements of this kind to be concluded; whereas the VPA’s objective is to provide a framework of legislation, systems, controls and verification procedures to ensure that all timber exports from Cameroon into the EU market have been acquired, harvested, transported and exported legally;

    B. whereas Cameroon has over 18 million hectares of forest, which accounts for approximately 40 % of its national territory; whereas Cameroon is Africa’s largest exporter of tropical hardwoods to the EU; whereas illegal logging and forest conversion, enabled by poor forest governance and driven by trade, are major contributors to deforestation in Cameroon; whereas 900 000 hectares of forest cover were lost between 2011 and 2022, representing 5 % of the country’s forest cover during this period;

    C. whereas nearly half of the total exports from Cameroon are directed to European markets, with timber as the third most important product after oil and cocoa; whereas all three of these sectors generally contribute to deforestation, and the growth of their production is part of Cameroon’s national development strategy for 2020-2030;

    D. whereas all shipments of timber and timber products from Cameroon destined for the EU market should comply with the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) requiring operators to perform due diligence checks to ensure the timber products they place on the EU market are legal; whereas since 2015, Cameroon has been developing a timber legality assurance system (TLAS), as required by the VPA; whereas to date, Cameroon has not fully established the TLAS and thereby cannot qualify for a FLEGT licence; whereas the TLAS is based on a legality definition, supply chain controls, verification of compliance, FLEGT licensing and an independent audit; whereas this legality verification system is not yet operational;

    E. whereas the purpose and expected benefits of FLEGT VPAs go beyond the facilitation of trade in legal timber, as they are also designed to bring about systemic changes in forest governance, law enforcement, transparency and the inclusion of various stakeholders in the political decision-making process, including indigenous and local communities and civil society organisations;

    F. whereas the FLEGT licensing scheme, which forms an integral part of the VPA, was expected to be in place within five years of the reform of the legal framework; whereas this licensing scheme is not yet in place, implying that the VPA between the EU and Cameroon is not operational to date; whereas the EU FLEGT VPA programme, coordinated by the French Development Agency, was not implemented in Cameroon as planned for the years 2021-2025;

    G. whereas the forest reform, launched in 2008 with the aim of revising the 1994 forest code, was finalised in July 2024 with the publication of the new Forest Code; whereas illegal logging is conducted partly on the basis of small logging titles (ventes de coupe) that do not require management plans and are more difficult to control compared to the oversight of large-scale concessions; whereas the national control systems are not operational, due to corruption and insufficient resources, so enforcement and governance remain weak, making it possible for illegal and unsustainable logging operations to continue;

    H. whereas the development of the legality verification module in the traceability system is still pending, and the little progress made so far has not been independently audited, which would help build its credibility;

    I. whereas Cameroon has not been able to meet its VPA obligations over the last 10 years and the governance of the forest sector has worsened despite the existence of the VPA;

    J. whereas timber exports have shifted to Asian markets, particularly China and Vietnam diluting the economic incentive of the VPA, and consequently the relevance of the FLEGT licence; whereas Vietnam has become the second largest market for Cameroonian timber (after China), while Cameroon has become the largest supplier of tropical logs to Vietnam (accounting for 25 % of the logs imported between 2016 and 2019, in value); whereas a large part of timber trade flows concerns illegal logging, which deprives the Government of Cameroon of revenue and local communities of shared benefits; whereas the United States and the EU supported discussions between Cameroon and Vietnam to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding with the aim of improving the transparency of the timber trade between both countries; whereas transparency and traceability in timber trade flows are essential for the credibility of legality assurance schemes; whereas, in this context, the EU should continue encouraging partner countries to strengthen import controls and ensure that timber sourced from them complies with legal requirements under national and VPA frameworks;

    K. whereas the Cameroon-EU VPA entered into force in 2011; whereas, despite the initial positive impacts on legal reform, multi-stakeholder participation, access to information and transparency, the VPA process was stalled in 2018; whereas the parties agreed in 2023 to undertake a joint VPA review, with the resulting report presenting four options for next steps, one of which was termination of the VPA by consensus; whereas this report was not made public until after the Commission notified the Council of the decision to terminate; whereas the Commission made the unilateral call to end the partnership;

    L. whereas key exports from Central Africa to the EU include timber, cocoa and tropical fruits; whereas the EU and the Republic of Cameroon signed a provisional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) in 2009, which remains in force as an interim arrangement while negotiations on a full regional EPA for Central Africa are ongoing; whereas future EU-Cameroon cooperation should aim to align trade policy instruments with sustainability goals, particularly under the EU Deforestation Regulation, in order to promote consistency, mutual benefit and predictability for operators on both sides;

    M. whereas the VPA is tacitly renewed every seven years, unless one party terminates it by notifying the other party of its decision at least 12 months before the expiry of the current seven-year period; whereas each party may terminate the VPA at any time by notifying the other party; whereas the VPA is terminated 12 months following that notification;

    N. whereas the continuation of the VPA could affect the credibility of the EU as a global champion of forest protection, sustainable and multifunctional agroforestry, soil and landscape protection, biodiversity, local rural economy and human rights standards and the integrity of VPAs as EU trade instruments; whereas the unilateral termination of the agreement could also tarnish the reputation of the EU as a reliable forestry actor and defender;

    O. whereas in its communication of 7 November 2024 on a strategic framework for international cooperation engagement, the Commission suggests that forest partnerships could build on or even replace VPAs; whereas, despite the challenges, VPAs have proven to be a key instrument in laying the groundwork for improved forest governance; whereas VPAs are legally binding agreements that can be complemented by forest partnerships; whereas there is a lack of information regarding the impacts of existing forest partnerships on the improvement of governance; whereas the Commission has not informed Parliament of the criteria underpinning its engagement in forest partnerships; whereas this failure to involve Parliament prior to developing partnerships with third countries has already occurred in the past; underscores the need for the EU to remain firmly committed to other existing VPAs;

    P. whereas a move away from the VPA model towards more extractive agreements such as raw materials partnerships or non-binding memoranda of understanding will undermine the EU’s credibility when it comes to the protection of biodiversity and the fight against deforestation;

    Q. whereas civil society in Cameroon is increasingly confronted with hostility and a shrinking space; whereas a circular published on 13 August 2024 obliges NGOs active in the forest sector to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife;

    1. Highlights that deforestation and forest degradation are key environmental challenges and are among the main drivers of climate change and biodiversity loss, while also having major negative social and economic impacts on producing communities and countries, especially on the more vulnerable parts of society and groups such as indigenous communities;

    2. Highlights that the environmental damage caused by deforestation will have hugely negative social and economic consequences for communities engaged in forestry;

    3. Recalls that the Samoa Agreement[10] between the EU and its Member States, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States reaffirms that the parties must promote a multi-stakeholder approach, enabling the active engagement of a wide variety of actors in partnership dialogue and cooperation processes, including parliaments, local authorities, civil society and the private sector, that inclusive partnership dialogue and action tailored to the specificities of the parties are the main tools to achieve these objectives, and that there is a need for a high level of environmental protection, while committing to halting deforestation and forest degradation as a means of protecting ecosystems as well as vulnerable communities and indigenous people, preserving biodiversity and mitigating climate change;

    4. Recalls that sustainable and inclusive forest management and governance are essential for achieving the objectives set out in the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement and the Kunming Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework on halting and reversing nature loss;

    5. Recalls that in the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forest and Land Use, the EU and Cameroon reaffirmed their commitment to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030;

    6. Recalls Team Europe’s efforts in promoting political stability and economic development through sustainable and resilient territorial development in response to climate change;

    7. Underlines that the Global Gateway strategy should support Cameroon in promoting sustainable, inclusive and green development throughout its territory;

    8. Recalls that trade is an engine for inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction that helps to promote sustainable development; believes that VPAs provide an important legal framework for both the EU and its partner countries, but that this requires effective multi-stakeholder dialogue and good cooperation with and commitment from the countries concerned; recalls that in its early stages, the EU-Cameroon VPA resulted in concrete improvements, including on stakeholder participation and access to information, but that unfortunately this progress has stalled over the past 10 years; deplores the lack of progress in the implementation of the VPA with Cameroon, especially with regard to the enforcement, transparency and traceability of commitments, and is highly concerned about the ongoing deforestation and forest degradation not only by illegal logging, but also by other key drivers of deforestation, such as forest conversion for agricultural use and mining;

    9. Highlights the fact that addressing the root causes of deforestation, such as weak governance, ineffective law enforcement, insecure land tenures, lack of access to finance, shrinking civic space and corruption, requires the EU and its partner countries to carry out joint assessments based on the meaningful engagement of relevant stakeholders, such as indigenous people and local communities, with a view to overcoming regulatory implementation hurdles regarding transparency and traceability;

    10. Stresses that a robust and credible TLAS offers forest businesses greater legal certainty, simplified controls and more transparent processes, discouraging informal payments and corruption, while increasing revenues for both communities and the state;

    11. Underlines the importance of including civil society and local authorities in decision-making processes, of benefit-sharing with local communities and of reinforcing security and accountability;

    12. Regrets the need to end the legally binding VPA with Cameroon; agrees with the Commission that, in the light of the VPA’s shortcomings, this is the best policy option for the time being and stresses the need for the Commission to keep engaging with the Government of Cameroon on forestry; expresses concern about the impact of the termination of the VPA on diplomatic and economic relations between Cameroon and the EU and on the EU’s capacity to build meaningful future partnerships with the country; points out the potential negative impact on civic space, as the VPA facilitated dialogue between the Government of Cameroon and civil society; calls on the Commission to assess the impact of this decision on European businesses operating in or sourcing from Cameroon and to explore support mechanisms to preserve responsible trade channels and to ensure the sustainable management of natural resources;

    13. Underlines that the EU remains a committed partner of Cameroon in fostering economic growth and comprehensive human development; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to engage in dialogue with the authorities of Cameroon to explore possibilities for constructive cooperation based on areas of mutual interest, combat illegal logging, support forest conservation and boost economic cooperation and trade;

    14. Notes with concern that Cameroon ranks 140th out of 180 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index; urges the Government of Cameroon to work towards stopping widespread corruption and to address other factors fuelling illegal logging and forest degradation, with particular regard to customs, in cooperation with other authorities; stresses the importance of protecting human, labour and indigenous people’s rights, notably by respecting the principle of free, prior and informed consent in all circumstances when sourcing goods and products for the EU market; calls, in this context, on local authorities to extend special protections to children and indigenous communities; emphasises the importance of ensuring that civil society actors are given the necessary space and possibilities to engage with governmental actors;

    15. Highlights the fact that joint consultations with local authorities in Cameroon should be strengthened to drive positive change and reinforce and boost the credibility of local governance;

    16. Stresses that countries all over the world that either have or aim to have regulated import markets for legal timber would benefit from cooperating with and, where possible, endorsing each other’s rules and systems, such as the EU’s FLEGT and VPAs; emphasises that international standards would be more effective and would promote long-term legal security for businesses and consumers;

    17. Recognises the shortcomings of the current forestry zoning system; acknowledges that forest management plans, intended to ensure sustainability, have largely failed due to corruption and weak governance; calls for renewed cooperation between the EU and its partner countries in order to develop new practices and governance mechanisms to address these challenges;

    18. Calls on the Commission to explore alternatives in close dialogue with Cameroon to ensure the legality of timber and timber products originating from Cameroon and to properly address the problem of illegal timber logging; considers that a forest partnership, as outlined in the EU Deforestation Regulation, could be a possible option for cooperation between the EU and Cameroon; emphasises the importance of conducting a thorough diagnostic and independent evaluation of forest governance and trade trends in Cameroon, building on existing assessments, prior to entering into negotiations on a forest partnership; underlines that in order to be effective, any potential future partnerships would have to be developed through an open, transparent, inclusive, deliberative and non-discriminatory process with meaningful participation from civil society, trade unions and local and international NGOs, the private sector including microenterprises and other small and medium-sized enterprises, local authorities, local and indigenous communities, and farmers; stresses that ending impunity in the forest sector is a cornerstone of this process, which requires the protection of environmental defenders as well as an effective system to tackle human rights violations; calls for the EU to continue supporting and engaging in dialogue with Cameroon in order to tackle the challenges arising from deforestation in a spirit of equal partnership, and to promote sustainable and inclusive development throughout its territory including by establishing the robust and transformative timber traceability systems that are necessary to comply with the expanding requirements of consumer market regulations worldwide, whether under the EU Deforestation Regulation or other foreign legislation;

    19. Stresses the importance of the parliamentary oversight and monitoring of the VPA by Parliament’s Committee on International Trade; underlines the need for the meaningful and timely involvement of Parliament with regard to the assessment of the implementation of existing VPAs, as well as the negotiation, signing and implementation of any future forest partnerships; stresses the need to also include consultations with civil society organisations, the private sector and particularly indigenous communities, environmental and human rights defenders and trade unions; asks the Commission to regularly report to Parliament on the implementation of the VPAs and forest partnerships, including on the work of the joint implementation committees and on the strategies to be pursued in the coming years; highlights the need for an in-depth diagnostic and independent assessment of forest governance in Cameroon and for the relevant experiences and lessons learnt from the VPA process to be integrated into any future forest partnership;

    20. Underlines that despite the unprecedented unilateral termination of the VPA with Cameroon, VPAs continue to provide an important legal framework for both the EU and its partner countries, which has been made possible through good cooperation with and commitment from the countries concerned; stresses that the EU should remain fully committed to existing VPAs and that new VPAs with additional partners should be promoted, as they play a crucial role in facilitating transparent and accountable forest management, addressing the root causes of illegal logging, combating climate change, strengthening local people’s land tenure rights and providing a tool for civil society and forest communities to be involved in decision-making processes;

    21. Calls on the Commission to ensure coherence between the EU’s trade and sustainability frameworks when engaging with Cameroon and the broader central African region; encourages the Commission to ensure that the requirements and objectives of the EU Deforestation Regulation and related legislation are adequately taken into account in the context of the ongoing negotiations on a full regional economic partnership agreement; underlines the importance of providing technical assistance and regulatory guidance to partner countries to help align trade practices with environmental standards, particularly in sectors such as timber, cocoa and tropical agriculture;

    22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Cameroon and all relevant stakeholders in the Voluntary Partnership Agreement process.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    The Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between the European Union and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance and trade in timber and derived products to the European Union (FLEGT) entered into force on 1 December 2011 and is one of the first agreements of this kind that was concluded. The rapporteur regrets that Cameroon has not been able to honour its VPA obligations over the last 10 years and the governance of the forest sector has worsened despite the existence of the agreement. While the rapporteur believes that FLEGT VPAs provide an important legal framework for both the EU and its partner countries, they can only work properly when both sides are willing to cooperate and to adhere to their commitments. In the present case, the rapporteur believes that the best alternative is to terminate the agreement.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: “Young Architects Are Changing the Face of Moscow” — Hussam Shakuf on New Principles in Organizing the Urban Environment

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    Monumentality, modern technologies and movement into the future – this is how British architect and urban designer Hussam Shakuf sees Moscow. He visited the capital in 2021, and when he returned four years later, he did not recognize it at first – and does not hide his delight at the changes.

    Hussam Shakuf visited the 6th Moscow Interior and Design Week, which took place in the Manezh Central Exhibition Hall. There he gave a lecture entitled “Beyond Borders: Creating Inspiring Interiors and Public Spaces”. And in an interview with a correspondent from the mos.ru portal, the architect talked about what he likes about the Russian capital, whether new buildings should be combined with cultural heritage monuments, and what his vision of a smart city is.

    From old to new

    Hussam Shaqouf is best known for the projects he worked on with the renowned British firm Zaha Hadid Architects for 17 years. Among others, he designed an asymmetrical diamond-shaped shell in North Africa and the ellipsoidal headquarters of a major smartphone manufacturer in Shenzhen. Hussam Shaqouf also participated in the design of a business center in the southeast of Moscow, consisting of flat squares stacked on top of each other.

    The specialist highly praised the changes that have taken place in the capital’s architecture in recent years.

    “In Moscow, there are more buildings created by young architects who use parametrics in their design – computer modeling based on mathematical algorithms. These buildings feel dynamic, moving into the future,” the architect believes.

    From his point of view, there is also dynamism in the proximity of cultural heritage sites to modern buildings – this is a hint at the transition from the past to the present and future.

    “On the one hand, it is important when the city has buildings that are reminiscent of past eras. In those distant times, they were also a symbol of progress, and, of course, they need to be restored and maintained. On the other hand, when planning new objects, we always look ahead, asking ourselves: how will they fit into the metropolis in five years? Is it worth building retro-style buildings now just so as not to violate the concept of the street? I admit, I am for contrast. Let old mansions and avant-garde towers stand next to modern houses. After all, the future belongs to the new. Of the old that I see in Moscow now, Stalinist architecture is closest to me: these houses, although built in the middle of the 20th century, seem to be a foundation, a model for creating ultra-modern buildings, they have a sense of monumentality,” says Hussam Shakuf.

    He calls himself a bearer of the avant-garde DNA. At the same time, the architect admits that even in postmodernist projects it is important to take into account the cultural characteristics of the country and the city and organically integrate them into fantastic ideas and new technologies. Such is, for example, the Heydar Aliyev Center in Baku, created by Zaha Hadid Architects: the outlines of its roof reflect the waves of the Caspian Sea, and the swaying flames, referring to the ancient cult of fire that existed in Azerbaijan, and geometric figures – a triangle, a rectangle, a trapezoid.

    A city built with intelligence

    According to Hussam Shakuf, a modern city should be comfortable to live in. However, despite the architect’s commitment to everything modern, he is against a metropolis consisting entirely of roads and cars.

    “It’s healthier to walk. If you walk for 35 minutes, you’ll quickly relieve stress, which means you’ll be happier and more productive. I’d also install smart traffic lights everywhere, which would reduce car traffic,” says our interlocutor.

    Another thing is that the size of Moscow and other world capitals hardly allows for walking. But Hussam Shakuf knows how to solve this problem.

    “Large cities need large multifunctional complexes where people can live, study, work, and have fun, then they won’t have to go anywhere, and the economy of the area where such a complex is built will develop. And this is exactly the concept I call a smart city,” the architect notes.

    He also does not support the widespread launch of air taxis, as is planned in some cities in the future. “This means that passengers will land on roofs and enter buildings from above. What is the point of having a ground floor then? If this is the method of moving around the city that wins in the future, we will have to design buildings completely differently,” says Hussam Shakuf.

    Places for communication

    According to Hussam Shaqouf, the interior structure of a building is what connects architecture with man.

    “I recently worked on a project for a business center for a Chinese smartphone manufacturer in Shenzhen. First of all, I tried to put myself in the shoes of the company’s employees and understand what could inspire them when they come to work. Firstly, it is a view of the city and the Shenzhen Bay, so the walls are glass. Secondly, convenient passages from one tower to another, and you can get into the buildings both from the street and from the interior. Thirdly, spacious rooms where people communicate with each other and drink coffee,” the architect says.

    In his opinion, the most important thing in the interior is accessible and at the same time isolated public spaces. In particular, he would like to build houses in Moscow where the courtyard is at the level of the second floor and is a podium: so residents could walk with their children and talk to each other without being distracted by passers-by and what is happening on the streets.

    “We currently discuss business and personal interests mainly on social networks. But is it really possible to really get to know a person this way? If every home or office had a place to meet with neighbors and colleagues, there would be no need for online correspondence,” Hussam Shakuf sums up.

    More than 50 applications have already been submitted for the competition “Best Implemented Project in the Field of Construction”A Round Kindergarten, a Ribbon Roof, and a “Flying” Metro. The Laureates of the City’s Architectural Prize in Different Years — in DetailFrom Denmark with Love. Urbanist and Architect Jan Gehl Shares His Impressions of MoscowFirm determination. French urbanist Nicolas Bouchaud on changes in Moscow, similarities with Paris, and climate strategyDavid Adjaye’s Utopia and Zaha Hadid’s Curves: Architecture of the Future in Moscow

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/154800073/

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • US-backed Gaza aid group halts distribution, UN to vote on ceasefire demand

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The U.S.-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation will not give out any aid on Wednesday as it presses Israel to boost civilian safety beyond the perimeter of its distribution sites, a day after dozens of Palestinians seeking aid were killed.

    The GHF said it has asked the Israeli military to “guide foot traffic in a way that minimizes confusion or escalation risks” near military perimeters; develop clearer guidance for civilians; and enhance training to support civilian safety.

    “Our top priority remains ensuring the safety and dignity of civilians receiving aid,” said a GHF spokesperson. An Israeli military spokesperson warned civilians against moving in areas leading to GHF sites on Wednesday, deeming them “combat zones”.

    The Israeli military said on Tuesday that it opened fire on a group of people it viewed as a threat near a GHF food aid distribution site. The International Committee of the Red Cross said at least 27 people were killed and dozens injured. The GHF said the incident was “well beyond” its site.

    Palestinians who collected food GHF boxes on Tuesday described scenes of pandemonium, with no-one overseeing the handover of supplies or checking IDs, as crowds jostled for aid.

    The U.N. Security Council is also set to vote on Wednesday on a demand for a ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian militants Hamas and humanitarian access across Gaza, where aid has trickled amid chaos and bloodshed after Israel lifted an 11-week blockade on the enclave where famine looms.

    “It is unacceptable. Civilians are risking – and in several instances losing – their lives just trying to get food,” U.N. spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said on Tuesday, adding that the aid distribution model backed by the U.S. and Israel was “all a recipe for disaster, which is exactly what is going on.”

    That model is run by the newly created GHF, which started operations in the enclave a week ago and said on Tuesday that it has given out more than seven million meals from three so-called secure distribution sites. GHF Interim Executive Director John Acree urged humanitarians in Gaza: “Work with us and we will get your aid delivered to those who are depending on it.”

    U.S. VETO?

    The U.N. and other aid groups have refused to work with the GHF because they say it is not neutral and the distribution model militarizes aid. GHF uses private U.S. security and logistics companies to get aid to the distribution sites.

    It is the latest in a string of efforts to get more aid into the enclave, where experts say the entire population of some 2.1 million people is at risk of famine. Jordan last year spearheaded humanitarian air drops, while the U.S. briefly installed a floating aid pier, but it was beset by challenges.

    The U.N. has long-blamed Israel and lawlessness in the enclave for hindering the delivery of aid into Gaza and its distribution throughout the war zone. Israel accuses Hamas of stealing aid, which the group denies.

    Israel said on Tuesday that three of its soldiers had been killed in fighting in northern Gaza. Gaza health officials said at least 18 more Palestinians were killed in other military strikes in the territory on Tuesday. Reuters could not independently verify the reports in northern and southern Gaza.

    The 10 elected members of the U.N. Security Council have asked for the 15-member body to vote on Wednesday on a draft resolution that demands “an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire in Gaza respected by all parties.”

    The draft text, seen by Reuters, also demands the release of all hostages held by Hamas and others, and the immediate lifting of all restrictions on the entry of aid and its safe and unhindered distribution, including by the U.N., throughout Gaza.

    “The time to act has already passed,” Slovenia’s U.N. Ambassador Samuel Zbogar told Reuters. “It is our historical responsibility not to remain silent.”

    As U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration tries to broker a ceasefire in Gaza, it was not immediately clear if Washington would veto the draft text. A spokesperson for the U.S. mission to the U.N. said: “We cannot preview our actions currently under consideration.”

    A resolution needs nine votes in favor and no vetoes by the permanent members – the United States, Russia, China, Britain or France – to pass.

    The war in Gaza has raged since 2023 after Hamas militants killed 1,200 people in Israel in an October 7 attack and took some 250 hostages back to the enclave, according to Israeli tallies.

    Israel responded with a military campaign that has killed over 54,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza health authorities, which do not distinguish between fighters and non-combatants.

    (Reuters)