Category: France

  • MIL-OSI: Boralex reports net earnings of $41 million for the first quarter of 2025 and the start of production at the Limekiln wind farm, its first operational project in the United Kingdom

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MONTREAL, May 14, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Boralex Inc. (“Boralex” or the “Corporation”) (TSX: BLX) is pleased to report its results for the first quarter of 2025.

    Highlights

    Financial results

    • Lower EBITDA(A)1, operating income and net earnings in Q1-2025
      • Production down 4% (1% on a Combined1 basis)2 from Q1-2024 and 10% (11%) below anticipated production1. Good weather conditions in Canada partially offset less favourable conditions in France.
      • EBITDA(A) of $176 million ($199 million) in Q1-2025, down $19 million ($19 million) from Q1-2024, mainly attributable to lower production and short-term power purchase agreements prices that were more favourable in Q1-2024, in France.
      • Operating income of $65 million ($99 million) in Q1-2025, down $41 million ($35 million) from Q1-2024.
      • Net earnings of $41 million in Q1-2025, down $32 million from Q1-2024.
    • Lower cash flow related to operating activities for the quarter but consistently strong balance sheet
      • Net cash flows related to operating activities of $172 million for Q1-2025 compared to $230 million for Q1-2024.
      • Discretionary cash flows1 of $74 million for Q1-2025, down $4 million from Q1-2024.
      • $388 million in cash and cash equivalents and $504 million in available cash resources and authorized financing1 as at March 31, 2025.
      • Extension of the term of the revolving credit facility to 2030 in April 2025, along with an increase in the letter-of-credit facility guaranteed by Export Development Canada from $350 million to $470 million in April.

    Update on development and construction activities

    • Start of production at the 106 MW Limekiln wind farm in Scotland
    • Progress in under-construction and ready-to-build projects in spite of supply chain and construction costs challenges
      • Ongoing construction at the Apuiat wind project in Québec (total 200 MW, Boralex’s share 100 MW), with commissioning scheduled for summer 2025.
      • Construction of the Hagersville (300 MW) and Tilbury (80 MW) storage projects in Ontario progressing on schedule, with commissioning planned for the fourth quarter of 2025.
      • Ongoing work on the Des Neiges Sud wind project in Québec (total 400 MW, Boralex’s share 133 MW), with phased commissioning scheduled for in late 2026/early 2027.
    • 129 MW added to early-stage project pipeline

    “Boralex has had a good start to 2025 with the commissioning of Limekiln, our first wind farm in Scotland, which is a major step toward achieving our growth objectives in the United Kingdom, a market with strong development potential. I am very grateful to our teams, whose dedication continue to ensure the company’s growth in our strategic markets. In a context of increasingly volatile resources, the geographic and technological diversification of our operations makes us more resilient,” said Patrick Decostre, President and Chief Executive Officer of Boralex.

    “During the quarter, our wind assets in Canada delivered a strong performance, partially offsetting lower contributions from wind farms in France, which were adversely affected by less favourable wind conditions and the impact of lower contribution from short term contracts. Our teams remain fully focused on improving the operating performance of our assets, pursuing with our cost optimization initiatives and strengthening our selling price optimization strategy. In the coming quarters, Boralex is planning to bid on multiple projects under the calls for tender to be issued this year in each of our target markets. We look forward to sharing news on our 2025-2030 strategic plan at our Investor Day, which will be held on June 17 in Toronto,” Mr. Decostre added.

    ______________________________________________
    1 EBITDA(A) is a total of segment measures. Anticipated production is an additional financial measure. “Combined,” “discretionary cash flows” and “available cash resources and authorized financing” are non-GAAP financial measures and do not have a standardized definition under IFRS. Consequently, these measures may not be comparable to similar measures used by other companies. For more details, see the Non-IFRS financial measures and other financial measures section of this press release.
    2 Figures in brackets indicate results on a Combined basis as opposed to a Consolidated basis.

    1st quarter highlights

    Three-month periods ended March 31

        Consolidated   Combined  
    (in millions of Canadian dollars, unless otherwise specified) (unaudited)   2025   2024   Change   2025   2024   Change  
                $   %           $   %  
    Power production (GWh)(1)   1,691   1,767   (76 ) (4 ) 2,334   2,355   (21 ) (1 )
    Revenues from energy sales and                                  
    feed-in premium   226   259   (33 ) (13 ) 267   291   (24 ) (8 )
    Operating income   65   106   (41 ) (39 ) 99   134   (35 ) (26 )
    EBITDA(A)   176   195   (19 ) (10 ) 199   218   (19 ) (9 )
    Net earnings   41   73   (32 ) (44 ) 41   73   (32 ) (44 )
    Net earnings attributable to                                  
    shareholders of Boralex   30   55   (25 ) (46 ) 30   55   (25 ) (46 )
    Per share – basic and diluted   $0.29   $0.53   ($0.24 ) (46 ) $0.29   $0.53   ($0.24 ) (46 )
    Net cash flows related to operating                                  
    activities   172   230   (58 ) (25 )        
    Cash flows from operations(2)   135   157   (22 ) (14 )        
    Discretionary cash flows   74   78   (4 ) (5 )        
    (1) Power production includes the production for which Boralex received financial compensation following power generation limitations as management uses this measure to evaluate the Corporation’s performance. This adjustment facilitates the correlation between power production and revenues from energy sales and feed- in premium.
    (2) The cash flows from operations is a non-GAAP financial measure and does not have a standardized meaning under IFRS. Accordingly, it may not be comparable to similarly named measures used by other companies. For more details, see the Non-IFRS and other financial measures section of this press release.

    In the first quarter of 2025, Boralex produced 1,691 GWh (2,334 GWh) of electricity, 4% (1%) less than the 1,767 GWh (2,355 GWh) produced in the same quarter of 2024. The decrease was attributable mainly to unfavourable wind conditions in France and to a lesser degree to hydropower in the United States. Boralex ended the quarter with production that was 10% (11%) below anticipated production.

    Revenues from energy sales and feed-in premiums for the three-month period ended March 31, 2025, amounted to $226 million ($267 million), 13% (8%) lower than in the first quarter of 2024. The decrease was mainly attributable to the lower production and price impact in France, where Boralex had benefited from higher prices in the previous year. EBITDA(A) amounted to
    $176 million ($199 million), down 10% (9%) from the first quarter of 2024. The lower prices in France were partly offset by a decrease in the inframarginal rent contribution, which no longer applies in 2025. Operating income totalled $65 million ($99 million), compared to $106 million ($134 million) for the same quarter of 2024. Boralex posted net earnings of $41 million, down $32 million from $73 million in the same quarter of 2024.

    Outlook

    Boralex’s 2025 Strategic Plan is built around the same four strategic directions as the plan launched in 2019 – growth, diversification, customers and optimization – and six corporate targets. The details of the plan, which also sets out Boralex’s corporate social responsibility strategy, are found in the Corporation’s annual report. Highlights of the main achievements of fiscal 2024 in relation to the 2025 Strategic Plan can be found in the 2024 Annual Report, which is available in the Investors section of the Boralex website.

    In the coming quarters, Boralex will continue to work on its various initiatives under the strategic plan, including project development, analysis of acquisition targets and optimization of power sales and operating costs.

    Finally, to fuel its organic growth, the Corporation has a pipeline of projects at various stages of development defined on the basis of clearly identified criteria, totalling 8 GW of wind, solar and energy storage projects.

    Dividend declaration

    The Company’s Board of Directors has authorized and announced a quarterly dividend of $0.1650 per common share. This dividend will be paid on June 16, 2025, to shareholders of record at the close of business on May 30, 2025. Boralex designates this dividend as an “eligible dividend” pursuant to paragraph 89 (14) of the Income Tax Act (Canada) and all provincial legislation applicable to eligible dividends.

    About Boralex

    At Boralex, we have been providing affordable renewable energy accessible to everyone for over 30 years. As a leader in the Canadian market and France’s largest independent producer of onshore wind power, we also have facilities in the United States and development projects in the United Kingdom. Over the past five years, our installed capacity has increased by more than 50% to over 3.2 GW. We are developing a portfolio of projects in development and construction of more than 8 GW in wind, solar and storage projects, guided by our values and our corporate social responsibility (CSR) approach. Through profitable and sustainable growth, Boralex is actively participating in the fight against global warming. Thanks to our fearlessness, our discipline, our expertise and our diversity, we continue to be an industry leader. Boralex’s shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol BLX.

    For more information, visit www.boralex.com or www.sedarplus.ca. Follow us on Facebook and LinkedIn.

    Non-IFRS measures

    Performance measures

    In order to assess the performance of its assets and reporting segments, Boralex uses various performance measures. Management believes that these measures are widely accepted financial indicators used by investors to assess the operational performance of a company and its ability to generate cash through operations. The non-IFRS and other financial measures also provide investors with insight into the Corporation’s decision making as the Corporation uses these non-IFRS financial measures to make financial, strategic and operating decisions. It is important to note that the non-IFRS financial measures should not be considered as substitutes for IFRS measures. They are primarily derived from the audited consolidated financial statements, but do not have a standardized meaning under IFRS; accordingly, they may not be comparable to similarly named measures used by other companies. In addition, these non-IFRS financial measures are not audited and have important limitations as analytical tools. Investors are therefore cautioned not to consider them in isolation or place undue reliance on ratios or percentages calculated using these non-IFRS financial measures.

    Non-IFRS financial measures
    Specific financial measure Use Composition Most directly comparable IFRS measure
    Financial data – Combined (all disclosed financial data) To assess the performance and the ability of a company to generate cash from its operations and investments in joint ventures and associates. Results from the combination of the financial information of Boralex Inc. under IFRS and the share of the financial information of the Interests.

    Interests in the Joint Ventures and associates, Share in earnings (losses) of the Joint Ventures and associates and Distributions received from the Joint Ventures and associates are then replaced with Boralex’s respective share in the financial statements of the Interests (revenues, expenses, assets, liabilities, etc.)

    Respective financial data – Consolidated
    Discretionary cash flows To assess the cash generated from operations and the amount available for future development or to be paid as dividends to common shareholders while preserving the long-term value of the business.

    Corporate objectives for 2025 from the strategic plan.

    Net cash flows related to operating activities before “change in non-cash items related to operating activities,” less:

    (i) distributions paid to non-controlling shareholders;
    (ii) additions to property, plant and equipment (maintenance of operations);
    (iii) repayments on non-current debt (projects) and repayments to tax equity investors;(iv) principal payments related to lease liabilities;
    (v) adjustments for non-operational items; plus
    (vi) development costs (from the statement of earnings).

    Net cash flows related to operating activities
    Cash flows from operations To assess the cash generated by the Corporation’s operations and its ability to finance its expansion from these funds. Net cash flows related to operating activities before changes in non-cash items related to operating activities. Net cash flows related to operating activities
    Available cash and cash equivalents(1) To assess the cash and cash equivalents available, as at the balance sheet date, to fund the Corporation’s growth. Represents cash and cash equivalents, as stated on the balance sheet, from which known short-term cash requirements are excluded. Cash and cash equivalents
    Available cash resources and authorized financing(1) To assess the total cash resources available, as at the balance sheet date, to fund the Corporation’s growth. Results from the combination of credit facilities available to fund growth and the available cash and cash equivalents. Cash and cash equivalents


    (1)
    For more details on the reconciliation between the non-GAAP financial measure and the most directly comparable financial measure, see the Capital and liquidity – Available cash resources and authorized financing section in this report.

    Other financial measures – Total of segments measure
    Specific financial measure Most directly comparable IFRS measure
    EBITDA(A) Operating income
    Other financial measures – Supplementary Financial Measures
    Specific financial measure Composition
    Credit facilities available for growth The credit facilities available for growth include the unused tranche of the parent company’s credit facility, apart from the accordion clause, as well as the unused tranche credit facilities of subsidiaries which includes the unused tranche of the credit facility – France and the unused tranche of the construction facility.
    Anticipated production For older sites, anticipated production by the Corporation is based on adjusted historical averages, planned commissioning and shutdowns and, for all other sites, on the production studies carried out.


    Combined

    The following tables reconcile Consolidated financial data with data presented on a Combined basis:

          2025     2024
    (in millions of Canadian dollars) (unaudited) Consolidated Reconciliation(1) Combined Consolidated  Reconciliation(1) Combined
    Three-month periods ended March 31:            
    Power production (GWh)(2) 1,691 643 2,334 1,767 588 2,355
    Revenues from energy sales and feed-in            
    premium 226 41 267 259 32 291
    Operating income 65 34 99 106 28 134
    EBITDA(A) 176 23 199 195 23 218
    Net earnings 41 41 73 73
      As at March 31, 2025 As at December 31, 2024
    Total assets 7,582 924 8,506 7,604 872 8,476
    Debt – Principal balance 4,095 554 4,649 4,032 556 4,588
    (1) Includes the respective contribution of joint ventures and associates as a percentage of Boralex’s interest less adjustments to reverse recognition of these interests under IFRS. This contribution is attributable to the North America segment’s wind farms and includes corporate expenses of $1 million under EBITDA(A) for the three-month period ended March 31, 2025 ($1 million as at March 31, 2024).
    (2) Includes compensation following electricity production limitations.


    EBITDA(A)

    EBITDA(A) is a total of segment financial measures and represents earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, adjusted to exclude other items such as acquisition and restructuring costs, other losses (gains), net loss (gain) on financial instruments and foreign exchange loss (gain), with the last two items included under Other.

    EBITDA(A) is used to assess the performance of the Corporation’s reporting segments.

    EBITDA(A) is reconciled to the most comparable IFRS measure, namely, operating income, in the following table:

              2025           2024   Change
    2025 vs 2024
    (in millions of Canadian dollars) (unaudited) Consolidated   Reconciliation(1)   Combined   Consolidated   Reconciliation(1)   Combined   Consolidated   Combined
    Three-month periods ended March 31:                              
    EBITDA(A) 176   23   199   195   23   218   (19 ) (19)
    Amortization (74 ) (16 ) (90 ) (73 ) (15 ) (88 ) (1 ) (2)
    Impairment (6 )   (6 )       (6 ) (6)
    Other gains (losses) (4 )   (4 ) 4     4   (8 ) (8)
    Share in earnings of joint ventures                              
    and associates (28 ) 28     (19 ) 19     (9 )
    Change in fair value of a derivative                              
    included in the share in earnings of                              
    a joint venture 1   (1 )   (1 ) 1     2  
    Operating income 65   34   99   106   28   134   (41 ) (35)
    (1) Includes the respective contribution of joint ventures and associates as a percentage of Boralex’s interest less adjustments to reverse recognition of these interests under IFRS.


    Cash flow from operations and discretionary cash flows

    The Corporation computes the cash flow from operations and discretionary cash flows as follows:

      Consolidated
      Three-month periods ended   Twelve-month periods ended  
      March 31   March 31   December 31  
    (in millions of Canadian dollars) (unaudited) 2025   2024   2025   2024  
    Net cash flows related to operating activities 172   230   157   215  
    Change in non-cash items relating to operating activities (37 ) (73 ) 236   200  
    Cash flows from operations 135   157   393   415  
    Repayments on non-current debt (projects)(1) (64 ) (65 ) (238 ) (240 )
    Adjustment for non-operating items(2) 5     11   7  
      76   92   166   182  
    Principal payments related to lease liabilities(3) (7 ) (6 ) (20 ) (19 )
    Distributions paid to non-controlling shareholders(4) (4 ) (18 ) (38 ) (52 )
    Additions to property, plant and equipment        
    (maintenance of operations) (2 ) (2 ) (10 ) (10 )
    Development costs (from statement of earnings) 11   12   56   57  
    Discretionary cash flows 74   78   154   158  
    (1) Includes repayments on non-current debt (projects) and repayments to tax equity investors, and excludes VAT bridge financing, early debt repayments and repayments under the construction facility – Boralex Energy Investments portfolio.
    (2) For the twelve-month periods ended March 31, 2025 and December 31, 2024, favourable adjustment consisting mainly of acquisition and restructuring costs.
    (3) Excludes the principal payments related to lease liabilities for projects under development and construction.
    (4) Includes distributions paid to non-controlling shareholders as well as the portion of discretionary cash flows attributable to the non-controlling shareholder of Boralex Europe Sàrl.


    Available cash resources and authorized financing

    The Corporation computes the cash flow from operations and discretionary cash flows, as well as available cash resources and authorized financing, as follows:

    (in millions of Canadian dollars) (unaudited) As at March 31,
    2025
      As at December 31,
    2024
     
    Available cash and cash equivalents(1)        
    Cash and cash equivalents 388   592  
    Cash and cash equivalents held by entities subject to project debt agreements and restrictions (318 ) (526 )
    Bank overdraft (13 ) (5 )
    Available cash and cash equivalents 57   61  
    Credit facilities of the parent company    
    Authorized credit facility(2) 550   550  
    Amounts drawn under the authorized credit facility(3) (178 ) (157 )
    Unused tranche of the parent company’s credit facility 372   393  
    Unused tranche of the subsidiary’s credit facilities 75   69  
    Credit facilities available for growth(4) 447   462  
    Available cash resources and authorized financing 504   523  
    (1) Available cash and cash equivalents is a non-GAAP measure and doesn’t have a standardized meaning under IFRS. Accordingly, it may not be comparable to similarly named measures used by other companies. For more details, see the Non-IFRS and other financial measures section in this report.
    (2) Excluding the accordion clause of $200 million ($150 million as at December 31, 2024).
    (3) As at March 31, 2025, this amount included $13 million in letters of credit ($33 million as at December 31, 2024).
    (4) Credit facilities available for growth is a supplementary financial measure. For more details, see the Non-IFRS and other financial measures section in this report.


    Disclaimer regarding forward-looking statements

    Certain statements contained in this release, including those related to results and performance for future periods, installed capacity targets, EBITDA(A) and discretionary cash flows, the Corporation’s strategic plan, business model and growth strategy, organic growth and growth through mergers and acquisitions, obtaining an investment grade credit rating, payment of a quarterly dividend, the Corporation’s financial targets, the projects commissioning dates, the portfolio of renewable energy projects, the Corporation’s Growth Path, the bids for new storage and solar projects and its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) objectives are forward-looking statements based on current forecasts, as defined by securities legislation. Positive or negative verbs such as “will,” “would,” “forecast,” “anticipate,” “expect,” “plan,” “project,” “continue,” “intend,” “assess,” “estimate” or “believe,” or expressions such as “toward,” “about,” “approximately,” “to be of the opinion,” “potential” or similar words or the negative thereof or other comparable terminology, are used to identify such statements.

    Forward-looking statements are based on major assumptions, including those about the Corporation’s return on its projects, as projected by management with respect to wind and other factors, opportunities that may be available in the various sectors targeted for growth or diversification, assumptions made about EBITDA(A) margins, assumptions made about the sector realities and general economic conditions, competition, exchange rates as well as the availability of funding and partners. While the Corporation considers these factors and assumptions to be reasonable, based on the information currently available to the Corporation, they may prove to be inaccurate.

    Boralex wishes to clarify that, by their very nature, forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties, and that its results, or the measures it adopts, could be significantly different from those indicated or underlying those statements, or could affect the degree to which a given forward-looking statement is achieved. The main factors that may result in any significant discrepancy between the Corporation’s actual results and the forward-looking financial information or expectations expressed in forward-looking statements include the general impact of economic conditions, fluctuations in various currencies, fluctuations in energy prices, the risk of not renewing PPAs or being unable to sign new corporate PPA, the risk of not being able to capture the US or Canadian investment tax credit, counterparty risk, the Corporation’s financing capacity, cybersecurity risks, competition, changes in general market conditions, industry regulations and amendments thereto, particularly the legislation, regulations and emergency measures that could be implemented for time to time to address high energy prices in Europe, litigation and other regulatory issues related to projects in operation or under development, as well as certain other factors considered in the sections dealing with risk factors and uncertainties appearing in Boralex’s MD&A for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024.

    Unless otherwise specified by the Corporation, forward-looking statements do not take into account the effect that transactions, non-recurring items or other exceptional items announced or occurring after such statements have been made may have on the Corporation’s activities. There is no guarantee that the results, performance or accomplishments, as expressed or implied in the forward-looking statements, will materialize. Readers are therefore urged not to rely unduly on these forward-looking statements.

    Unless required by applicable securities legislation, Boralex’s management assumes no obligation to update or revise forward- looking statements in light of new information, future events or other changes.

    For more information:

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Mauritania Shifts to Private Power with 550 Megawatt (MW) Gas Plant, Bids to Start Within Weeks

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    PARIS, France, May 14, 2025/APO Group/ —

    Mauritania is accelerating its shift toward a fully privatized power generation model, with bids due in the next two to three weeks for a new independent power plant tied to the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) gas project. The country’s Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Mohamed Ould Khaled, made the announcement at the Invest in African Energy 2025 Forum in Paris on Tuesday.

    “All new power generation projects in Mauritania will be private. State-owned companies will no longer be involved in power generation,” said the Minister. He added that two projects currently being developed as IPPs will be fueled by domestic gas and will contribute a combined 550 MW to the national grid over the next couple of years.

    The power sector reform is part of a wider transformation aimed at enabling Mauritania to harness its significant gas and renewable energy resources to power industrialization, expand electricity access and drive inclusive growth.

    “We want to develop large-scale natural gas and renewable energy resources. We want to expand affordable, clean power access to our people and industries and power inclusive economic growth, especially to unleash our mining potential.” 

    Mauritania currently has 57% energy access and aims to achieve full national coverage by 2030, according to the Minister. Gas from the GTA project – shared with Senegal – will play a central role in this transition, supplying enough fuel for a 250 MW combined-cycle power plant in each country during the project’s first phase, he said.

    The Minister described Mauritania as uniquely positioned for energy leadership on the continent and beyond, citing its combination of gas, solar, wind and strategic proximity to Europe. He also highlighted Mauritania’s position as the African leader in green hydrogen project development, backed by newly modernized regulatory frameworks.

    “Mauritania holds the largest pipeline of green hydrogen projects in Africa, which are designed not only to export molecules, but to catalyze industrialization in Mauritania and decarbonize hard-to-abate sectors. We have the potential to produce 12 million tons of green hydrogen production per year, with wind speeds of 10 meters per second and amazing solar.”

    “To support this transformation, we have completely modernized our framework,” the Minister continued. “We have opened up the electricity sector to private investments, introduced a new local content policy, and implemented new PPP and investment codes. Additionally, we have launched Africa’s first green hydrogen code, which provides clarity and long-term stability for investors.”

    Looking ahead, Mauritania’s integrated energy vision includes the expanded development of the BirAllah gas field – another major deepwater discovery – along with subsequent phases of the GTA project to reach 10 million tons of LNG per year, cross-border electricity trade with neighboring countries and further development of its mining sector.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Thousands of Civil Service roles moved out of London in latest reform to the state

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Thousands of Civil Service roles moved out of London in latest reform to the state

    Civil servant roles, including senior leadership, will be relocated to 13 locations across the UK to develop and deliver policy closer to communities

    • Thousands of Civil Servants – including senior leaders – will be based in towns and cities across the UK to work with frontline workers and local leaders.

    • New digital and AI campus in Manchester and energy campus in Aberdeen to turbocharge local talent and expertise in these communities.

    • As part of our Plan for Change to re-wire the state, 11 central London offices will be closed including one of the largest Whitehall buildings – saving £94m per year – as the number of roles in the capital is reduced by 12,000.

    Thousands of civil service jobs will be relocated to 13 towns and cities across the country as part of our Plan for Change.

    The shake up will require more senior and policy roles to be based outside London. This will deliver and develop government policy closer to the communities it affects as part of a more productive and agile state.

    The plans will see officials working closely with frontline workers, facilitating greater understanding of the real issues facing local services and people, and how central government policy can support them.

    Changes will be introduced so talented young people from across the UK are able to progress straight from school or university into the Civil Service and rise all the way up to the most senior roles, without ever having worked in Whitehall.

    Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster Pat McFadden, said:

    To deliver our Plan for Change, we are taking more decision-making out of Whitehall and moving it closer to communities all across the UK.

    By relocating thousands of Civil Service roles we will not only save taxpayers money, we will make this Government one that better reflects the country it serves. We will also be making sure that Government jobs support economic growth throughout the country.

    As we radically reform the state, we are going to make it much easier for talented people everywhere to join the Civil Service and help us rebuild Britain.

    As part of the spending review, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster Pat McFadden has written to all departments requiring them to relocate key roles and strengthen the Government’s presence around the UK. 

    Government departments now will submit plans for how many roles they plan to move to each of the locations as part of the spending review.

    Departments will be assessed on their commitments to the programme as part of the spending review. As well as increasing the number of officials working in Greater Manchester and Aberdeen, where two new government campuses will be created, roles will be created in Birmingham, Leeds, Cardiff, Glasgow, Darlington, Newcastle and Tyneside, Sheffield, Bristol, Edinburgh, Belfast and York.

    The changes are projected to bring £729m in local economic benefits to these areas between 2024 and 2030.

    New Regional Government Campuses

    Under the plans and to accelerate the delivery of the Missions, three major new Government campuses will be created. 

    Government campuses involve departments moving skilled roles to the same town or city to boost collaboration – bringing civil servants with different skills and expertise but the same policy or delivery focus, to solve issues and improve services for working people across the country.

    The first two of these, the new Government Digital and AI Innovation Campus and Energy Campus, will be in Manchester and Aberdeen.

    Manchester is already home to the second HQs of DSIT and DCMS, as well as a key base for GCHQ. The new campus will harness the city’s reputation as a global digital hub. 

    Aberdeen is the site of DESNZ’s second HQ, and the new HQ for Great British Energy.

    The new campuses will partner with local government and universities to deliver the government’s missions, improve the talent pipeline into Government and boost growth and opportunity. 

    Supporting Senior Civil Service Careers Outside London

    To ensure those based outside of London have equal professional growth and development opportunities, with full end-to-end careers, the Government will locate 50% of UK-based Senior Civil Servants in regional offices by 2030. 

    This will be supported by a new ambition for the Fast Stream programme to have 50% of placements offered outside of London by 2030, making it increasingly possible for future leaders and managers to progress in their careers without ever needing to work in the capital. 

    A new ‘Career Launch Apprenticeship’ programme will also open for applications this Summer, starting in 2026. The Level 3 Business Administrator apprenticeship programme will train up future civil servants based in Birmingham and Manchester, as well as London. 

    A new secondment scheme will also be developed and launched, in partnership with the Local Government Association, with Civil Servants placed directly with local authorities, building links within regions, and ensuring those delivering policy, experience first hand the work of local government and the services they provide.

    Making Savings in London

    Alongside the relocation of jobs, 11 London office buildings will be closed over the next five years and the number of London based civil servants will reduce by 12,000 by 2030 – down from 95,000 FTE staff to 83,000 – as the government focuses on saving taxpayer money and delivering better public services across all parts of the UK. 

    The move is set to deliver £94 million in savings annually by 2032, by getting rid of large, expensive London real estate. The plans include the closure of two major Westminster government buildings – 102 Petty France, one of the largest government buildings in London and home to 7,000 FTE staff, and 39 Victoria Street – which together cost tens of millions of pounds a year. 

    Updates to this page

    Published 14 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI: Best Crypto Casinos Canada: JACKBIT Rated Top Bitcoin Online Casino For Canadian Players!

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

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    “We’re thrilled to be named the best crypto casino Canada offers in 2025. Our mission is to deliver a seamless, rewarding experience rooted in trust and transparency,” said a JACKBIT spokesperson.

    For Canadian casino fans, JACKBIT provides a low-risk entry into real-money gaming with instant crypto rewards and access to over 7,000 top-tier games. Whether you’re dipping your toes into crypto or are a seasoned gambler, JACKBIT sets a new benchmark for crypto casinos Canada adores. From immersive slots and live dealer tables to a robust sportsbook, JACKBIT caters to every gaming preference, standing out in a crowded online casino market.

    JACKBIT stands out as one of the best crypto casinos in Canada for 2025, offering players a seamless gaming experience with fast Bitcoin payouts and generous bonuses. Known for its no-KYC gaming, JACKBIT ensures privacy and security while players enjoy a wide variety of slots, table games, and live dealer options.

    Whether you’re new to crypto gaming or a seasoned player, JACKBIT’s player-centric features, including instant rewards and VIP perks, make it a top choice for Canadian players seeking excitement and reliable payouts.

    Getting Started with JACKBIT

    Joining JACKBIT is a breeze, tailored for Canadians eager to explore a new crypto casino:

    1. Visit the official JACKBIT website.
    2. Click “Sign Up” in the top-right corner.
    3. Enter minimal details (email, password, preferred currency).
    4. Choose a payment method (crypto or fiat) and deposit.
    5. Claim your 30% Rakeback and 100 free spins.
    6. Dive into 7,000+ games or the sportsbook.

    JACKBIT’s streamlined process makes it the best crypto casino Canada offers for accessibility.

    Bonuses & Promotions: Rewards That Deliver

    JACKBIT’s promotional offers are a key reason it’s ranked as the best crypto casino Canada has in 2025. New players kick off with a 30% Rakeback and 100 wager-free spins, with ongoing promotions including:

    • Weekly giveaways with $10,000 and 10,000 free spins.
      • Frequent Opportunities: Regular events mean more chances to win without extra deposits.
      • Player Value: High prize pools add excitement to every week.
      • Why It’s Great: Keeps you engaged with fresh rewards.
    • VIP Rakeback up to 30%, scaling with loyalty tiers.
      • Loyalty Boost: The more you play, the bigger the cashback.
      • Tailored Perks: Higher tiers unlock exclusive benefits.
      • Why It’s Great: Rewards dedication with tangible returns.
    • Pragmatic Drops & Wins with a €2,000,000 prize pool.
      • Massive Stakes: Huge prizes elevate everyday gaming.
      • Wide Reach: Available across multiple games for broad appeal.
      • Why It’s Great: Offers a shot at life-changing wins.
    • Social media bonuses for engaging on Twitter and Telegram.
      • Community Connection: Bonuses for joining the JACKBIT conversation.
      • Easy Access: Simple tasks like retweeting unlock rewards.
      • Why It’s Great: Adds fun beyond the games.
    • Regular slot and table game tournaments with cash prizes.
      • Competitive Edge: Battle for leaderboard spots and cash.
      • Inclusive Play: Open to all skill levels.
      • Why It’s Great: Adds a thrilling competitive layer.

    These fair, high-value bonuses make JACKBIT a standout among Canadian bitcoin casinos.

    <<>>

    A Deep Dive into JACKBIT’s Excellence

    JACKBIT’s 2025 ranking as Canada’s top crypto casino stems from a rigorous evaluation of player-focused criteria:

    • Licensing and Regulation
    • Game Variety and Quality
    • Bonuses and Promotions
    • Payment Flexibility and Speed
    • Security and Fair Play
    • Mobile Gaming Experience
    • Customer Support Quality
    • Sportsbook Features
    • Responsible Gambling Tools
    • No-KYC Benefits

    JACKBIT outperformed competitors in every category, cementing its status as the best bitcoin casino Canada trusts. Let’s unpack why with added insights and details.

    Licensing: A Pillar of Trust

    JACKBIT operates under a Curacao Gaming License, a respected credential in the crypto gambling world. This license mandates adherence to fair play and security standards, with regular audits ensuring compliance. While some players may prefer licenses from Malta or Ontario’s iGaming authority, Curacao’s framework enables JACKBIT to serve a global audience, including Canadians, while maintaining transparency.

    • Global Accessibility: The Curacao license allows JACKBIT to welcome players from diverse regions, making it a versatile choice for Canadians seeking international gaming options.
    • Player Confidence: Regular audits mean your gameplay and funds are protected, letting you focus on the fun.
    • Regulatory Balance: Curacao strikes a balance between flexibility and oversight, ideal for crypto-focused platforms.

    For those searching for the best BTC casino, JACKBIT’s licensing provides a secure, reliable foundation for worry-free gaming.

    Game Variety: A World of Choices

    With over 7,000 games from 85 premier providers like NetEnt, Evolution Gaming, Microgaming, and Pragmatic Play, JACKBIT’s library is a major draw. It’s a cornerstone of why it’s hailed as the best crypto casino Canada offers. Here’s the breakdown:

    • Slots: Over 5,000 titles, from classic fruit machines to modern video slots like Gold Party and Chilli Heat. Players can explore 180+ Megaways titles and progressive jackpots with life-changing payouts.
      • Endless Themes: From adventure to mythology, slots cater to every interest, keeping sessions fresh.
      • Jackpot Appeal: Games like Mega Moolah offer million-dollar prizes, drawing thrill-seekers.
      • Why It’s Great: Variety ensures there’s always a new slot to discover.
    • Table Games: A rich selection including blackjack (Power Blackjack, Infinite Blackjack), roulette (European, Lightning), poker (Texas Hold’em), baccarat, and craps.
      • Strategic Depth: These games reward skill, appealing to players who enjoy outsmarting the house.
      • Variety Boost: Multiple variants keep classics exciting.
      • Why It’s Great: Perfect for both casual and seasoned players.
    • Live Dealer Games: Powered by Evolution Gaming, the live section features Live Blackjack, Live Roulette, Live Baccarat, and game shows like Dream Catcher and Crazy Time.
      • Real-Time Thrills: Interact with professional dealers for an authentic casino vibe.
      • Social Edge: Chat features create a community feel.
      • Why It’s Great: Brings the casino floor to your screen.
    • Sportsbook: A comprehensive platform covering 140+ sports, with 82,000+ live monthly events and 4,500+ betting types, including hockey, basketball, and e-sports.
      • Canadian Focus: Heavy emphasis on hockey aligns with national passion.
      • Live Betting: Real-time odds keep the action intense.
      • Why It’s Great: Ideal for sports fans and casual bettors alike.
    • Specialty Games: Casual options like bingo (Shamrock Bingo), scratch cards, and crypto-friendly mini-games such as Aviator and Plinko.
      • Quick Play: Low-stakes games for relaxed fun.
      • Crypto Fit: Mini-games designed for fast crypto bets.
      • Why It’s Great: Perfect for a quick gaming break.
    • Virtual Sports: 24/7 betting on simulated events like virtual football, horse racing, and greyhound racing.
      • Non-Stop Action: Bet anytime, regardless of real-world schedules.
      • Realistic Graphics: Advanced algorithms mimic live sports.
      • Why It’s Great: Keeps the excitement going around the clock.

    This vast selection ensures JACKBIT remains a top Canada bitcoin casino for players seeking variety and quality.

    <<>>

    Payment Flexibility: Fast and Secure

    JACKBIT excels as an instant payout casino, supporting over 17 cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tether, Solana, and Dogecoin. Crypto transactions are instant and fee-free, offering unmatched convenience. Traditional options include:

    • Visa and MasterCard: Instant deposits, withdrawals in 1-3 days.
    • Google Pay and Apple Pay: Instant mobile deposits.
    • Bank transfers: Withdrawals in 3-5 days.

    With high withdrawal limits (up to $10,000 weekly) and robust SSL encryption, JACKBIT ensures secure, flexible banking, reinforcing its position as the best bitcoin casino Canada has.

    <<>>

    Security: A Safe Haven

    Security is paramount at JACKBIT, a trusted online casino. The platform uses SSL encryption and blockchain technology to protect player data and transactions. Provably fair games and Random Number Generators (RNGs) guarantee unbiased outcomes, making JACKBIT one of the safest crypto casinos Canada offers. The no-KYC policy enhances privacy, allowing instant withdrawals without verification while maintaining trust.

    • Blockchain Transparency: Verify transactions for added peace of mind.
    • Fairness Certified: Independent audits confirm game integrity.
    • Why It’s Great: Play confidently knowing your experience is secure.

    Mobile Gaming: Play on the Go

    JACKBIT’s mobile-optimized platform delivers a seamless experience on iOS and Android without a dedicated app. Players can access the full game library, deposit instantly, and claim bonuses anywhere. The responsive design ensures smooth navigation, making JACKBIT a top choice for mobile gamblers seeking the best crypto casino Canada has.

    • Cross-Device Sync: Switch between phone and desktop without losing progress.
    • Intuitive Interface: Easy navigation on smaller screens.
    • Why It’s Great: Game wherever life takes you.

    Customer Support: Always Ready

    JACKBIT offers 24/7 live chat support in multiple languages, including English, French, and Spanish, resolving queries within minutes. Email support and a comprehensive FAQ section provide additional resources. Player feedback highlights the team’s professionalism, cementing JACKBIT’s reputation as a trusted Canada bitcoin casino.

    • Bilingual Support: French options cater to Canada’s diverse population.
    • Fast Response: Issues are handled promptly, day or night.
    • Why It’s Great: Reliable help enhances the player experience.

    Sportsbook: Betting Done Right

    JACKBIT’s sportsbook is a standout, covering 140+ sports, including hockey, basketball, tennis, and e-sports. With 82,000+ live monthly events and 4,500+ betting types, it caters to sports enthusiasts. Live streaming and competitive odds make JACKBIT the best BTC casino for Canadian sports fans.

    • Hockey Focus: Extensive NHL betting options resonate with Canadians.
    • Live Action: Real-time updates keep bets engaging.
    • Why It’s Great: A must for sports betting lovers.

    Responsible Gambling: Prioritizing Well-Being

    JACKBIT promotes player safety with tools like deposit limits, self-exclusion, reality checks, and links to organizations like GamCare and Gambling Therapy. These features ensure a fun, controlled experience, aligning with the standards of safe crypto casinos Canada trusts.

    • Proactive Measures: Tools help you set boundaries before issues arise.
    • Support Access: Resources are a click away for those needing help.
    • Why It’s Great: Keeps gaming enjoyable and responsible.

    No-KYC Benefits: Privacy First

    JACKBIT’s no-KYC policy allows anonymous play and withdrawals, a game-changer for privacy-conscious players. This feature, paired with fast crypto payouts, makes it the best crypto casino Canada offers for discreet gaming.

    • Hassle-Free: Skip ID checks and play instantly.
    • Secure Anonymity: Your data stays private without compromising safety.
    • Why It’s Great: Ideal for players valuing personal freedom.

    Crypto Gambling Trends in Canada

    Crypto gambling is booming in Canada, driven by growing cryptocurrency adoption and frustrations with traditional banking restrictions. Platforms like JACKBIT are at the forefront, offering solutions that align with these trends:

    • Increased Crypto Use: More Canadians hold Bitcoin and Ethereum, making crypto casinos a natural fit.
    • Privacy Demand: No-KYC platforms like JACKBIT cater to players seeking discretion.
    • Tech Integration: Blockchain and fast transactions enhance gameplay.
    • Why JACKBIT Leads: Its crypto-first approach makes it the best crypto casino Canada embraces.

    This alignment with market shifts positions JACKBIT as a leader in the new crypto casino space.

    Player Psychology: Why Canadians Choose JACKBIT

    Canadians are drawn to crypto casinos like JACKBIT for several psychological reasons:

    • Control and Freedom: No-KYC and instant payouts empower players to manage their gaming.
    • Risk-Reward Balance: Bonuses like Rakeback offer rewards without high stakes.
    • Community Appeal: Social media bonuses and tournaments foster a sense of belonging.
    • Why It Works: JACKBIT taps into these drivers, making it a top Canada bitcoin casino.

    Understanding these motivations highlights why JACKBIT resonates as the best online crypto casino.

    JACKBIT’s Community Initiatives

    Beyond gaming, JACKBIT builds a vibrant community:

    • Charity Drives: Partners with Canadian organizations to support local causes.
    • Player Events: Hosts virtual meetups for fans to connect.
    • Feedback Forums: Actively incorporates player suggestions for platform improvements.
    • Why It Matters: Strengthens loyalty and makes JACKBIT a crypto casino Canada loves.

    These efforts create a dynamic, inclusive environment for players.

    Regulatory Landscape for Crypto Gambling in Canada

    Canada’s gambling laws are evolving, with provinces like Ontario regulating online gaming while crypto remains a gray area. JACKBIT’s Curacao license ensures compliance with international standards, but future Canadian regulations could shape the industry:

    • Potential Licensing: Provinces may introduce crypto-specific rules.
    • Player Protections: Enhanced safeguards could boost trust.
    • JACKBIT’s Advantage: Its global license and no-KYC model keep it flexible, reinforcing its status as the best crypto casino Canada offers.

    Staying ahead of these changes ensures JACKBIT’s long-term success.

    JACKBIT’s Innovation Pipeline

    JACKBIT is poised to stay ahead with planned enhancements:

    • New Cryptos: Adding support for emerging coins like Cardano.
    • AR/VR Gaming: Testing immersive slot and live dealer experiences.
    • AI Personalization: Tailoring game suggestions based on player habits.
    • Why It’s Exciting: These innovations keep JACKBIT the best crypto casino Canada looks to in the future.

    This forward-thinking approach ensures continued leadership.

    Why JACKBIT Reigns Supreme in 2025

    JACKBIT’s blend of no-KYC freedom, instant crypto payouts, and an unmatched game library makes it the best crypto casino Canada offers. Its focus on security, player rewards, and innovation creates a gaming experience that’s hard to beat, whether you’re a casual player or a high roller.

    <<>>

    Final Words About The Best Crypto Casino Canada

    JACKBIT combines anonymous, no-KYC gameplay with lightning-fast crypto payouts and an extensive game selection, setting a new benchmark in online gaming. With generous promotions, strong security measures, and a user-first approach, it offers both excitement and peace of mind. While its Curacao license may not be the strictest, JACKBIT reinforces player trust through transparent practices and responsible gambling features.

    Despite being a newer name in the industry, JACKBIT has quickly emerged as a leader among the best online casinos Canada, delivering a seamless experience tailored to both casual players and high-stakes users.

    Contact: support@jackbit.com

    Disclaimer & Affiliate Disclosure

    This article is for informational and entertainment purposes only and does not constitute legal or financial advice. Gambling carries risks; verify information and play responsibly. You must be 19 (or 18 in some provinces) to gamble legally in Canada. Laws vary, so comply accordingly. We may earn commissions from links at no extra cost to you. Our JACKBIT review is unbiased, based on thorough research.

    Photos accompanying this announcement are available at

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/7840cef4-dbeb-4803-a97c-446bf76ebb69

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/7f7df58a-8a1d-4354-939e-cf0308241911

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/4806fed5-7d61-4c01-bd3a-78d597ea26bd

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Best Crypto Casinos Australia: JACKBIT Picked As Top Bitcoin Casino For Aussie Gamblers!

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SYDNEY, May 14, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Looking for the best crypto casino in Australia? Our expert team has carefully reviewed and selected the top platform for Aussie players, focusing on strict criteria and real feedback from the local gaming community. After evaluating numerous options, we’ve identified a standout that excels in game variety, bonuses, security, and user experience, delivering a top-notch crypto gambling Australia experience.

    VISIT JACKBIT NOW & CLAIM YOUR WELCOME BONUSES!

    Among the contenders, JACKBIT shines as the leading Bitcoin casino Australia for 2025, earning a stellar 4.9/5 rating. Launched in 2022, this crypto casino Australia offers a no KYC policy, lightning-fast crypto transactions, and a massive library of over 6,600 games, making it ideal for online casino real money play. In this detailed review, we’ll dive into why JACKBIT is likely the best crypto casino Australia, covering its features, bonuses, games, and more.

    JACKBIT: The Best Crypto Casino Australia

    JACKBIT ticks all the boxes for the best crypto casinos in Australia, making it our top pick for 2025. Established in 2022, JACKBIT operates under a Curacao eGaming license, ensuring it meets international standards for fairness and security.

    It’s no KYC policy lets Australian players sign up and play anonymously, a major plus for those prioritizing privacy in crypto gambling in Australia. With instant crypto withdrawals processed in seconds, JACKBIT delivers the speed expected from a high-payout Australian crypto casino, allowing players to access winnings without delay.

    The welcome bonus—a 30% rakeback, no KYC, and 100 free spins with no wagering requirements—gives new players a great start, letting them explore the platform’s vast game selection. Ongoing promotions, like VIP rakeback and exciting tournaments, keep the rewards flowing, enhancing the Bitcoin casino bonus offerings.

    Boasting over 6,600 games from 91 top providers and a robust sportsbook, JACKBIT caters to every taste, cementing its status as a premier Bitcoin casino in Australia.

    READY TO PLAY? JOIN JACKBIT CASINO AND CLAIM YOUR BONUS!

    JACKBIT – The Top Bitcoin Casino Australia for Fast Payouts

    Since its debut in 2022, JACKBIT has likely transformed the best crypto casino Australia landscape with its innovative features and player-centric design. The no KYC policy is a standout, allowing Aussie players to register and play without sharing personal details, ensuring maximum privacy.

    As a leading crypto casino in Australia, JACKBIT processes crypto transactions instantly, enabling deposits, gameplay, and withdrawals in minutes—a hallmark of new crypto casinos.

    New players enjoy a 30% rakeback, no KYC, and 100 free spins with no wagering requirements on select promotions, making it one of the most enticing Bitcoin casino bonuses available.

    Ongoing offers include a VIP Rakeback Club with up to 30% rakeback, weekly giveaways with $10,000 prize pools, and Pragmatic Play’s Drops & Wins tournaments with a €2,000,000 prize pool, adding significant value for crypto gambling Australia fans.

    JACKBIT’s game library, powered by industry giants like Pragmatic Play, Evolution Gaming, and Play’n GO, features over 6,600 titles, from high-RTP crypto slots Australia to live dealer tables and a sportsbook covering 140+ sports. Its sleek, intuitive interface, available in 10 languages including English, ensures easy navigation for Australian players. Advanced SSL encryption safeguards player data, and 24/7 customer support via live chat and email offers prompt assistance, making JACKBIT a top Australian crypto casino.

    Bonuses at JACKBIT Casino

    JACKBIT offers a range of bonuses to enhance the crypto casino Australia experience:

    • Welcome Bonus: 30% rakeback + 100 free spins with no wagering requirements, plus no KYC for crypto users.
    • VIP Rakeback Club: Up to 30% rakeback for loyal players.
    • Weekly Giveaways: $10,000 prize pools for exciting competitions.
    • Pragmatic Play Drops & Wins: €2,000,000 prize pool in tournaments.
    • 3+1 FreeBet: Place three bets, get one free in the sportsbook.
    • Bet Insurance: 10% cashback on select sports bets.
    • Social Media Bonuses: Exclusive offers via JACKBIT’s social channels.
    • NBA Playoffs Cashback: Special promotions during major sports events.

    CLAIM YOUR 30% RAKEBACK + 100 FREE SPINS AT JACKBIT!

    Always review bonus terms to ensure eligibility and maximize rewards.

    Pros and Cons of JACKBIT Casino

    Here’s a balanced look at JACKBIT as a crypto casino Australia:

    Pros:

    • No KYC policy for maximum privacy in crypto gambling Australia.
    • Instant crypto deposits and withdrawals, perfect for online Bitcoin casino play.
    • Over 6,600 games, including crypto slots Australia, live dealers, and sports betting.
    • Generous 30% rakeback + 100 free spins with no wagering requirements.
    • Supports 16+ cryptocurrencies for secure, seamless transactions.
    • 24/7 multilingual customer support via live chat and email.
    • Mobile-optimized for best crypto casino Australia gaming on the go.
    • High-payout games with competitive RTPs for online casino real money play.

    Cons:

    • Launched in 2022, it may lack the long-term reputation of older Bitcoin casinos Australia.
    • Some bonuses have specific terms that require careful review.
    • Traditional payment withdrawals (1-3 days) are slower than crypto.

    How to Join JACKBIT – The Best Crypto Casino Australia

    Joining JACKBIT, likely the best crypto casino Australia, is quick and straightforward for Aussie players:

    1. Visit JACKBIT Casino: Click Here to Head to JACKBIT Casino and click the sign-up button.
    2. Create Your Account: Enter an email and password. The no KYC policy means no personal details are needed for crypto users.
    3. Make Your First Deposit: Choose a payment method (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum, Visa, or PayID) and deposit at least $10 or equivalent to unlock the welcome bonus. For crypto, scan the QR code or copy the wallet address.
    4. Claim Your Bonus: Get 100 free spins instantly for top crypto slots Australia like Gates of Olympus.
    5. Start Playing: Dive into 6,600+ games or bet on sports with your Bitcoin casino bonus.

    Pro Tip: Verify your email and check the promotions page for the latest bonus codes to ensure smooth activation. Save your wallet address for faster future deposits to enhance your crypto casino Australia experience.

    How We Selected JACKBIT as the Best Crypto Casino Australia

    Our selection of JACKBIT as the best crypto casino Australia involved a thorough evaluation tailored to Australian players’ needs in crypto gambling Australia. Here’s how we assessed it:

    • Licensing and Regulation: JACKBIT holds a Curacao eGaming license, ensuring compliance with global standards. We confirmed its legitimacy for Aussie players.
    • Security Measures: Advanced SSL encryption and provably fair games protect data and ensure transparency.
    • Game Variety and Quality: Over 6,600 games from 91 providers, including slots, table games, live dealers, and a sportsbook, cater to all preferences.
    • Bonuses and Promotions: The 30% rakeback + 100 free spins welcome bonus, with no wagering on select offers, outshines competitors. Ongoing promotions add value.
    • Payment Methods: Supports 16+ cryptocurrencies and traditional options like PayID, with instant crypto transactions and low fees.
    • Customer Support: 24/7 live chat and email support in multiple languages ensure quick query resolution.
    • User Experience: A mobile-optimized, intuitive interface in 10 languages offers seamless navigation.
    • Player Feedback and Reputation: Positive reviews on platforms like Trustpilot (4.4/5) highlight fast payouts and game variety, though some note bonus term complexity.
    • Responsible Gambling Measures: Tools like deposit limits and self-exclusion promote safe play.
    • Market Position and Innovation: Support for emerging cryptocurrencies like Solana and provably fair games positions JACKBIT as forward-thinking.

    JACKBIT’s outstanding performance, especially its no KYC policy and instant withdrawals, makes it the best crypto casino Australia for 2025.

    START WINNING WITH NO KYC AND INSTANT WITHDRAWALS AT JACKBIT!

    Best Crypto Casino Australia Games at JACKBIT

    JACKBIT’s game library is a key reason it’s the best crypto casino Australia, offering over 6,600 titles from 91 providers for online casino real money play:

    • Online Slots:
      • Gates of Olympus (Pragmatic Play, 96.50% RTP): Mythological slot with 5,000x max win.
      • Sweet Bonanza (Pragmatic Play, 96.49% RTP): Candy-themed slot with 21,175x max win.
      • Book of Dead (Play’n GO, 96.21% RTP): Adventure slot with 5,000x max win.
      • Mega Moolah (Microgaming, 88.12% RTP): Progressive jackpot slot with multi-million-dollar payouts.
      • Wolf Gold (Pragmatic Play, 96.01% RTP): 5-reel slot with 5,000x max win.
      • Starburst (NetEnt, 96.09% RTP): Vibrant slot with 500x max win.
    • Table Games:
      • Blackjack: Variants like Classic and Multi-Hand with low house edges.
      • Roulette: European, American, and French options for classic thrills.
      • Poker: Caribbean Stud, Three Card Poker, and Texas Hold’em.
      • Baccarat: Simple rules and high payouts for high rollers.
    • Live Dealer Games: Over 250 tables from Evolution Gaming, including:
      • Lightning Roulette: Multipliers up to 500x.
      • Infinite Blackjack: Unlimited players with side bets.
      • Crazy Time: Interactive game show with bonus rounds.
      • Baccarat Squeeze: Suspenseful card reveals.
    • Sportsbook: Covers 140+ sports, with 82,000+ monthly live events and 75,000+ pre-match events, including AFL, NRL, and esports like CS:GO.
    • Specialty Games:
      • Scratch Cards: Quick-win games like Scratch Dice.
      • Keno: Lottery-style games for casual play.
      • Virtual Sports: Simulated events like virtual football.

    START PLAYING AND WIN BIG AT JACKBIT CASINO!

    Best Crypto Casino Australia Payment Methods at JACKBIT

    JACKBIT’s payment system is built for speed and flexibility, making it a top no KYC crypto casino for Australian players:

    Payment Method Type Processing Time Minimum Deposit Notes
    Bitcoin (BTC) Cryptocurrency Instant $ 10 Fee-free, anonymous
    Ethereum (ETH) Cryptocurrency Instant $ 10 High security
    Tether (USDT) Cryptocurrency Instant $ 10 Stablecoin, low volatility
    Solana (SOL) Cryptocurrency Instant $ 10 Low fees, fast transactions
    Binance Coin (BNB) Cryptocurrency Instant $ 10 Versatile, ecosystem support
    Visa/MasterCard Traditional Instant (deposits), 1-3 days (withdrawals) $ 10 Widely accepted
    PayID Traditional Instant (deposits), 1-3 days (withdrawals) $ 10 Fast, linked to bank accounts
    Bank Transfer Traditional 1-5 days $ 50 Suitable for high rollers
    Skrill/Neteller E-Wallet Instant (deposits), 1-2 days (withdrawals) $ 10 Secure, private transactions

    JACKBIT’s crypto focus, alongside traditional options like PayID, ensures seamless transactions for online casino real money play.

    ENJOY FAST, SECURE TRANSACTIONS AND BIG WINS AT JACKBIT!

    Why Choose Crypto Casinos Australia?

    Crypto casinos offer unique benefits over traditional platforms, making them a top choice for crypto gambling Australia:

    • Privacy and Anonymity: No KYC policies like JACKBIT’s allow anonymous play.
    • Speed and Efficiency: Crypto transactions are near-instant, unlike traditional methods.
    • Enhanced Security: Blockchain ensures secure, transparent transactions.
    • Lower Costs: Minimal or no fees compared to bank transfers.
    • Innovative Features: Provably fair games enhance trust.
    • Global Access: Bypasses banking restrictions for Aussie players.

    These advantages make JACKBIT a leading new crypto casino for 2025.

    The Rise of Crypto Gambling Australia: Why JACKBIT Leads

    The crypto gambling Australia market is booming, fueled by growing cryptocurrency adoption and demand for privacy-focused gaming. As Australians increasingly embrace digital currencies, platforms like JACKBIT lead the charge with innovative features. Its no KYC policy, support for emerging cryptocurrencies like Solana, and extensive game library position it as a top Bitcoin casino Australia, meeting the evolving needs of Aussie players.

    Tips for Winning Big at JACKBIT

    Maximize your success at JACKBIT with these strategies for crypto casino Australia players:

    1. Pick High-RTP Games: Choose slots like Gates of Olympus (96.50% RTP) for better odds.
    2. Use Bonuses Smartly: Leverage the 30% rakeback and free spins to boost your bankroll.
    3. Manage Your Bankroll: Set a budget for each session to play responsibly.
    4. Learn Game Strategies: Study blackjack or poker tactics to reduce the house edge.
    5. Join Tournaments: Participate in Drops & Wins for a chance at €2,000,000 prizes.
    6. Bet Wisely on Sports: Research AFL or NRL teams for smarter bets.
    7. Use Responsible Gambling Tools: Set deposit and time limits for safe play.
    8. Stay Updated: Follow JACKBIT’s social media for exclusive Bitcoin casino bonus offers.

    These tips can enhance your online Bitcoin casino experience at JACKBIT.

    JACKBIT Conclusion: The Best Crypto Casino in Australia for 2025

    After a comprehensive review, JACKBIT stands out as the best crypto casino Australia for 2025. It’s no KYC policy ensures privacy, while instant crypto transactions offer unmatched convenience. With over 6,600 games, a robust sportsbook, and generous bonuses, JACKBIT delivers endless entertainment and value. Advanced security, 24/7 support, and a mobile-friendly platform make it the ultimate Australian crypto casino. Join JACKBIT Casino today to experience the future of Bitcoin gambling in Australia!

    Frequently Asked Questions

    • What makes JACKBIT the best crypto casino Australia?

    JACKBIT offers no KYC privacy, instant crypto withdrawals, 6,600+ games, and a 30% rakeback bonus.

    • Is JACKBIT legal for Australian players?

    Licensed by Curacao eGaming, JACKBIT is accessible, but check local gambling laws.

    • What cryptocurrencies does JACKBIT accept?

    Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tether, Solana, Binance Coin, and 16+ others.

    • How fast are withdrawals at JACKBIT?

    Crypto withdrawals are instant; traditional methods take 1-3 days.

    • Does JACKBIT offer a welcome bonus?

    Yes, 30% rakeback + 100 free spins with no wagering requirements.

    • What games are available at JACKBIT?

    Slots, table games, live dealers, and a sportsbook with 140+ sports.

    • Is there customer support at JACKBIT?

    24/7 live chat and email support in multiple languages.

    • How does the no KYC policy work at JACKBIT?

    Crypto users play anonymously without identity verification.

    • Are there fees for transactions at JACKBIT?

    Crypto transactions are fee-free; traditional methods may have fees.

    • What responsible gambling tools does JACKBIT provide?

    Deposit limits, loss limits, session time limits, and self-exclusion.

    Email: support@JACKBIT.com

    Legal Disclaimer

    This content is for informational and entertainment purposes only and does not constitute legal, financial, or gambling advice. Information is provided “as is,” with no warranties regarding accuracy or completeness. Readers must verify details and ensure compliance with Australian gambling laws. Gambling carries financial risks and potential addiction. Gamble responsibly, wagering only what you can afford to lose. Seek help from organizations like Gambling Help Online if needed. Some links may be affiliate links, earning a commission at no cost to you. JACKBIT is licensed outside Australia and may be restricted in some regions.

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    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Alternative Budget – Green’s Budget Gets Thumbs Up from Tax Reform Group

    Source: Better Taxes for a Better Future Campaign

    The Better Taxes for a Better Future Campaign welcomes the Green Party’s alternative budget released today, for recognising the need to grow revenue and ensuring that those who can afford it get to contribute more.

    “The Green Budget recognises that we face enormous challenges as a country and we need to fund government better in order to respond to them,” says Glenn Barclay, spokesperson for the Better Taxes Campaign.

    “They also promote a range of new taxes that will help ensure that we all contribute according to our ability to pay.”

    “When compared to other countries like Denmark, Germany, Austria and France we are a low tax country. At the same time we face growing inequality, an enormous infrastructure deficit, the challenges of climate change, health services that are in crisis and public services that are struggling to cope. The need to increase government revenue is urgent,” says Glenn Barclay.

    The Green’s proposals include a wealth tax, a more progressive income tax (including a tax free threshold), reversing interest deductibility for rental properties, and raising the tax on corporations.  The Green Budget stops short of introducing a full capital gains tax but restores the Bright Line Test for taxing the capital gains on housing to 10 years.

    “These changes are important steps towards a more progressive tax system. They would help address the sources of inequality in our tax system while raising more revenue,” says Glenn Barclay.

    “The lack of a full capital gains tax is interesting and we would like to better understand the rationale for this, but we do welcome the restoration of the Bright Line Test as a step in the right direction.”

    “In many ways we are outliers when you look at countries we like to compare ourselves to and most of these initiatives will just bring us into line with them”.

    “We would also encourage all parties to consider tax system reforms to ensure that multinational companies operating in New Zealand are not escaping paying tax and improve tax transparency for more effective and efficient revenue gathering.”

    The Better taxes for a Better Future Campaign was launched in June 2023 with the support of 21 partner organisations. It is seeking a tax system that:

    Is fully transparent.
    Ensures people who have more to contribute make that contribution: that we gather more revenue from wealth, gains from wealth, all forms of income, and corporates.
    Makes greater use of fair taxes to promote good health and environmental health.
    Addresses the tax impact on the least well-off in our society.
    Raises more revenue to enable us to address the social, economic and environmental challenges we face.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: MEDIA ADVISORY: JOINT PRESS BRIEFING ON GAZA’S ESCALATING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

    Source: Oxfam –

     What

    Representatives from leading humanitarian organisations, including those who are in or just left the Gaza Strip, will brief the press on the impact of Israel’s total siege on Gaza – which has lasted now more than 70 days, and Israel’s plan to control and limit aid distribution moving forward.  

    Areas of focus:   

    • The catastrophic conditions for Palestinians in Gaza after 10 weeks of a full blockade of aid, water and medical supplies
    • The militarization of aid, including:
    • Israel’s plan to control and limit the distribution of aid, through the use of private organisations and security contractors
    • The impact of forcibly displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians into designated areas
    • Aid being withheld from people who are not registered and aid being limited to the bare minimum
    • Israel’s new rules for the registration of international NGOs amid a continued crackdown on civil society 

    When

    Wednesday, May 14, 2025 –  9am ET/2pm UK/3pm CET/4pm Gaza 

    Where

    Please register in advance for this webinar: https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_fsCVX0UHTY6xuBRaMsRCVA 

    After registering, you will receive a confirmation email containing information about joining the webinar. 

    Who 

    Moderated by: Soraya Ali, Global Media Manager MEANEE, Save the Children 

    Speakers to include: 

    • Bushra Khalidi, Policy Lead, Oxfam
    • Mohammed Saleh, Director of Al-Awda Hospital in North Gaza
    • Mahmoud Isleem, General Coordinator/ Country Director, Médecins du Monde France
    • Yazdan El Amawi, Gaza Director, Anera
    • Salwa Al Tibi, Palestine/Gaza Country Director, MedGlobal
    • Amande Bazerolle, Gaza Coordinator, Médecins Sans Frontières France 

    Spokespeople’s Bios: 

    • Bushra Khalidi is the Palestinian Territory Policy Lead at Oxfam, specialising in protection, humanitarian access, and accountability. She influences decision-makers, engages with international institutions, and advocates for rights-based humanitarian action, ensuring Palestinian voices are represented. Bushra leads initiatives on ceasefire efforts, humanitarian space protection, and ending settlement trade.
    • Dr Mohammed Saleh is the current Director of Al-Awda Hospital near Jabaliya, North Gaza. When the former director, Dr. Ahmed Muhanna, was taken into custody by Israeli forces on 17 December 2023, Dr Saleh stepped in and led the hospital through the devastating four-month siege of Jabaliya of October 2024-January 2025 — the second siege faced by the hospital since the beginning of the escalation. Since his family had to flee to southern Gaza, he has had minimal contact with them, as he chose to stand by the hospital’s patients and staff.
    • Salwa Al-Tibi is Country Director for Palestine/Gaza at MedGlobal. Herself a refugee whose family has faced numerous displacements, she lives in Gaza City and specializes in community mental health. She has over 25 years of experience working with different NGOs and local organizations in Gaza, including previous senior positions at Save the Children, CARE international, and Catholic Relief Services.
    • Mahmoud Isleem is General Coordinator/ Country Director of Médecins du Monde France (MdM) in the occupied Palestinian territory. He has 20 years of humanitarian work experience in Palestine in both Gaza and the West Bank. As a Palestinian of the West Bank, he is currently based in Ramallah due to access restrictions to the Gaza Strip imposed by Israeli authorities on WB ID-holder humanitarians.
    • Amande Bazerolle is an emergency coordinator with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) France. After her first mission in Palestine in 2011, she has worked for MSF Asia programs, notably as a head of mission for Pakistan. Since September 2024 she has been overseeing MSF emergency response in Gaza. She has just spent four months in Gaza, coordinating the work of 900 Palestinian staff.
    • Yazdan El Amawi is the Gaza Director at Anera. He has over two decades of experience working across the humanitarian and development fields in Gaza and has managed many programs on livelihoods, health, water, sanitation, education, and emergency response. He holds an MBA from the University of Northern Virginia and a bachelor’s degree in Communications from Marquette University. 

    For more information and for interviews, please contact:

    Oxfam Media office | Media.OPTI@oxfam.org   

    Jacqui Crocoran | Oxfam Media Lead in Jerusalem, Occupied Palestinian TerritoryOxfam |  jacqui.corcoran@oxfam.org

    For real-time updates, follow us on X and Bluesky, and join our WhatsApp channel. 

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Africa Rallies for Gas-Driven Growth at Invest in African Energy (IAE) 2025

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    PARIS, France, May 14, 2025/APO Group/ —

    African energy leaders kicked off the Invest in African Energy (IAE) 2025 Forum in Paris with a resounding call for deeper cross-border collaboration, strategic gas monetization and inclusive national development policies, signaling a united front in shaping Africa’s energy future.

    Leading the charge, NJ Ayuk, Executive Chairman of the African Energy Chamber, lauded the successful execution of the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim (GTA) gas project by Mauritania and Senegal – which loaded its first LNG cargo last month – as a model for regional cooperation.

    “No country has been able to do cross-border projects like Mauritania and Senegal. They showed that it is possible in Africa to come together and do cross-border collaboration,” he said, emphasizing that regionalism and pragmatism must outweigh isolationist tendencies. “Resource nationalism slows down projects.”

    Technip Energies’ Chief Business Officer, Marco Villa, echoed Ayuk’s sentiment on the continent’s energy potential, calling natural gas a “strategic driver” rather than just a tradable commodity.

    “Resources alone are not enough – the real opportunity is transforming this potential into sustainable, prosperous and inclusive growth,” said Villa. “We believe natural gas is more than a commodity – it is a strategic driver for countries and for Africa – in terms of industrialization, energy security and global integration.”

    Villa stressed the importance of both large-scale export infrastructure and domestic gas valorization, positioning gas as a dual solution for global competitiveness and local economic development.

    “While exports are important, local valorization of gas is equally crucial. Africa cannot only be an exporter of gas – gas can be a lever for domestic transportation, power generation, enabling petrochemical industries, modernizing refineries and supporting agribusiness.”

    Petroleum Commissioner at Namibia’s Ministry of Mines and Energy, Maggy Shino, highlighted Namibia’s rapid emergence as a global hydrocarbon hotspot, following massive offshore discoveries from Shell, TotalEnergies, Galp and Rhino Resources in the deepwater Orange Basin.

    “Namibia has emerged as one of the world’s most exciting hydrocarbon frontiers… These discoveries are among the largest of our decade. With more than 80% of our offshore unexplored, Namibia is not only a frontier – it’s a first mover advantage waiting to be seized,” said Shino.

    She also emphasized Namibia’s commitment to fast-tracking development and fostering a responsible investment environment, highlighting the ongoing development of the National Upstream Petroleum Local Content Policy as a key step toward embedding local content from the outset.

    “This policy is more than a regulation for us. It’s a platform to align global expertise with Namibian empowerment. We are actively engaging industry stakeholders to create a framework that balances skill development, supplier integration and the upliftment of Namibian citizens with operational efficiency.”

    Meanwhile, Anibor Kragha, Executive Secretary of the African Refiners & Distributors Association, cautioned against overdependence on petroleum imports and underscored the urgency of building domestic refining capacity and storage resilience.

    “If you’re going to maximize your returns, then you have to run the full value chain and refine… What happens to Africa if we cannot import a single petroleum product for 30 days? How many countries have strategic storage beyond two weeks?” said Kragha. “Africa’s energy boom is not just about oil and gas.”

    The opening keynotes set the tone for a forward-looking IAE 2025 agenda – one centered on transforming Africa’s resource wealth into tangible, inclusive and strategically driven development. The forum continues in Paris through May 14.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: African Mining Week (AMW) 2025 to Spotlight the Impact of Gabon’s Mining Code

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    CAPE TOWN, South Africa, May 14, 2025/APO Group/ —

    Gabon strives to expand the mining industry’s GDP contribution to over 30% by the mid-2030s, using policies such as the Mining Code to attract investment and fuel development. By offering competitive incentives such as tax holidays ranging from three to eight years and a modest 3-5% royalty on base metals, the Mining Code offers improved terms for investors, thereby providing positive implications for the country’s mineral sector.

    African Mining Week – Africa’s premier gathering for African mining stakeholders, scheduled for October 1–3, 2025 in Cape Town – will provide an overview of Gabon’s Mining Code. A dedicated panel discussion, titled Navigating Gabon’s Mining Code: A Guide for Investors, will explore how the country is using the Mining Code to catalyze mining development and attract capital.

    Already the world’s third-largest producer of manganese (apo-opa.co/44ES9QA), Gabon is leveraging the code to strengthen the sector though international partnerships and new investments. French mining major Eramet, operator of the high-grade Moanda Minesin Gabon, signed a manganese supply agreement with Australia’s Firebird Metals (apo-opa.co/44yGrXD) to support electric vehicle (EV) battery production in China. Similarly, India’s state-run MOIL (apo-opa.co/4koDe1z) is in talks to develop manganese assets in Gabon, highlighting the country’s growing role in the global manganese, EV and battery storage market.

    Beyond manganese, Gabon is diversifying its mineral production base. Canadian company Millennial Potash Corp (apo-opa.co/43gSiHB) is advancing the Banio Potash Project, where high-grade potash intersections were confirmed in May 2025. Once operational, the project will be Gabon’s first commercial potash facility, supplying a global market driven by demand for fertilizers and pharmaceutical applications.

    Iron ore is another growth frontier where the country is using the Mining Code to secure investment. In partnership with Australia’s Genmin and China’s Sinohydro (apo-opa.co/43e25xN), the country is progressing the Baniaka Iron Ore Project, which targets five million tons of annual output initially, ramping up to 10 million tons in the future. Australia’s Fortescue is also expanding its Belinga iron ore project while South Africa’s Menar (apo-opa.co/3F7k0OO) signed agreements to invest in the sector, illustrating growing investor confidence fostered by Gabon’s Mining Code.

    Amid this growth, African Mining Week will connect investors, government officials and private sector leaders to advance projects. With a focus on legal clarity, resource potential and project-ready opportunities, the event will foster high-level dialogue and promote Gabon as a rising hub for responsible, high-return mining investment in Africa.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Africa’s Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Growth Hinges on Investment, Strategic Partnerships

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    PARIS, France, May 14, 2025/APO Group/ —

    Accelerating Africa’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) ambitions will depend on mobilizing risk-tolerant investment, building strong technical and commercial partnerships, and committing to local capacity-building, according to panelists at the Invest in African Energy (IAE) Forum in Paris.

    Speaking during a discussion on monetizing African gas sponsored by Perenco, UTM Offshore Managing Director Julius Rone emphasized that LNG demand remains robust, but the missing piece is financing.  “Investment is required. The market is there. LNG is not going anywhere – global gas demand is increasing every year. Therefore, we need the right investors to enable us to monetize our gas.”

    The $5 billion UTM FLNG project offshore Nigeria is currently in its pre-construction phase. Rone emphasized that indigenous players like UTM Offshore are capable of forming the right partnerships to drive development, with plans to take FID in the coming months, move into the construction phase and expand the company’s FLNG technologies beyond Nigeria into other African markets.

    Competitiveness Starts at the Wellhead

    For international players, the viability of LNG in Africa hinges on low-cost resources and predictable legal frameworks. Golar LNG’s Chief Commercial Officer Federico Petersen noted that while Africa holds a geographic edge over the U.S. in terms of access to global markets, project economics must work from the start.

    “In the U.S., both the liquefaction and transport sides are increasing – if Africa can beat the U.S. at the wellhead, then it can have competitive liquefaction and it is closer to Europe and Asia,” said Petersen.

    He added that technical capability and financial strength are key to delivering projects at scale, along with speed and access to low-cost gas. “The asset needs to be cheap gas. We look at the asset, the contract and the partner… On the contract side, the legal framework and the stability needs to be there, both for upstream operators and for us.”

    Infrastructure-First Approach

    Gas infrastructure must come before LNG exports, according to Denis Chatelan, Head of Business Development at Perenco. The company’s strategy has focused on domestic gas use as a foundation for future liquefaction, citing gas-to-power and gas-to-industry projects in Gabon and Cameroon.

    “We did not start with liquefaction, but to develop the gas resources… We managed to find the right compromise of investment, ROI and infrastructure,” said Chatelan. “At Perenco, we have deployed equity. If you want big rewards, then you have to take some risk. We have taken the risk of infrastructure, which is a very important first step to develop the gas resources of a country.”

    Local Support Critical to Long-Term Success

    Jiří Rus, Sales & Business Development Director at Neuman & Esser, stressed the importance of original equipment manufacturers building in-country operational support to sustain LNG and gas projects.

    “Within our partnerships, we focus on operation. We need to support projects not from Germany, but through local service centers. We have one in Port Harcourt in Nigeria, for example, to support future projects, and now we are doing so in Mozambique,” said Rus.

    Dominique Gadelle, VP of Upstream & LNG at Technip Energies, echoed the importance of anchoring projects in local benefits. “Boosting local economies, power generation… This is a must before going to international exports,” he said. “We can also look at monetizing gas in different ways – fertilizers, for instance. We also need to promote regional cooperation, and we cannot forget local skills, employment and education and training programs.”

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: DECLARATION OF DENGUE FEVER OUTBREAK FOR SAMOA

    Source:

    Share this:

    [PRESS RELEASE – APIA, 17 April 2025] – The Ministry of Health is officially declaring a dengue fever outbreak in Samoa. There has been a significant increase in the number of suspected and confirmed cases, particularly in Upolu, over the past two weeks.

    Since January a total of 15 confirmed cases have been reported from the laboratory, with I of these cases identified within the past two weeks. Most cases have been reported at the Moto’otua Main Hospital (TTM), where patients initially presented with other flu-like symptoms before testing positive for dengue.

    The majority of these individuals have recovered well without requiring admission to hospital.

    The most affected areas are those located in the North west of Upolu, with cases reported across all age groups. Tragically, one death has been confirmed as related to dengue. Our thoughts and prayers are with the affected family during this difficult time.

    Dengue fever is a viral illness caused by four (U) different types of dengue virus (DENV-1, DENV-2), DENV-3 and DENV-4) and is spread by mosquitoes. It is transmitted from person to person through the bites of infected mosquitoes.

    All four (U) types of the virus can lead to severe infections, including Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever, a potentially life-threatening condition that may cause internal bleeding and organ failure. Hemorrhagic dengue can progress rapidly and may lead to death if not treated promptly.

    Common symptoms of dengue include;

    • High fever

    • Severe headache

    • Pain behind the eyes

    • Joint and muscle pain

    • Nausea

    • Rash

    • Fatigue.

    Severe symptoms of dengue include abdominal pain, bleeding gums, and vomiting blood, all of which require urgent medical attention.

    The Ministry of Health is actively monitoring the situation and continues to strengthen its response efforts.

    We are learning from regional trend, as neighboring countries such as Tonga, Fiji and the French Polynesia are experiencing similar dengue outbreaks.

    We urge the public to be vigilant and work together to help prevent the spread of this disease by taking simple, yet important actions:

    • Remove standing water around homes, buckets, Eres, and containers where mosquitoes can breed

    • Use mosquito repellents, nets, and coils, especially during the day

    • Wear protective clothing to reduce mosquito bites

    • Seek medical attention if you or a family member experience symptoms of dengue.

    The Ministry will continue to provide regular updates and is in communication with the World Health Organization (WHO) to further strengthen its response. Let’s stay informed, take acEon, and support one another.

    For further information please contact the Ministry of Health at telephone numbers: 21212 or 66600.

    You can also follow our official channels on our website: www.health.gov.ws and Facebook page: @healthsamoa.

    Ma le fa’aaloalo,

    END.

    SOURCE – Ministry of Health Samoa

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: NTT Anode Energy and Panasonic Complete the Implementation of a Hydrogen Supply Chain Model at the Expo 2025 Site

    Source: Panasonic

    Headline: NTT Anode Energy and Panasonic Complete the Implementation of a Hydrogen Supply Chain Model at the Expo 2025 Site

    The content in this website is accurate at the time of publication but may be subject to change without notice.Please note therefore that these documents may not always contain the most up-to-date information.Please note that German, French and Chinese versions are machine translations, so the quality and accuracy may vary.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Online job fair attracts global talent

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    Hong Kong Talent Engage (HKTE) held a two-day Global Online Career Fair last week, featuring nearly 50 renowned Hong Kong enterprises that offered over 700 quality job vacancies across sectors such as accounting, finance, consultancy services, legal compliance and engineering.

     

    The online career fair recorded over 26,000 visits in two days, with about 3,000 curricula vitae received.

     

    To facilitate a connection between talent and enterprises, a one-to-one online meeting session was set up specifically at the career fair, resulting in about 4,800 direct dialogues between talent and enterprises. Participating enterprises expressed that about half of such dialogues would be taken forward.

     

    According to participating accounting firms, they learnt through the online career fair that many international professionals were interested in coming to Hong Kong.

     

    The event effectively linked global talent with enterprises in Hong Kong, thereby enabling direct engagement, enhancing the talent’s understanding of the structure and recruitment process of Hong Kong enterprises, and enhancing the experience of such talent.

     

    Participating talent came from over 12 countries or regions, such as the Mainland, Singapore, India, the UK, Australia, the US, Malaysia, France and Canada, with 62% of them holding master’s degrees.

     

    The HKTE said that the online career fair enables talent on the Mainland and overseas to exchange views directly with enterprises prior to relocation to Hong Kong, gain insights into the city’s job market, and reinforce their confidence in pursuing development in Hong Kong.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI: Atos Group: new strategic and transformation plan “Genesis” to leverage core strengths and restore sustainable profitable growth. Cash generation and disciplined capital allocation as key drivers to deleveraging

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

                                                                    Press Release

    Atos Group: new strategic and transformation plan “Genesis” to leverage core strengths and restore sustainable profitable growth

    Cash generation and disciplined capital allocation as key drivers to deleveraging

    • Paving the way to become a global AI-powered technology partner of choice delivering secure end-to-end digital journeys
    • Simplifying branding, geographic footprint, governance and offering to refocus on most promising and strategically valuable businesses
    • Renewed and streamlined leadership team and stronger operating model for a more efficient organization
    • Leaner cost structure to deliver industry standard performance
    • Accelerated investment in innovation and rapidly scaling technology services with a significant AI drive
    • Ambitious and achievable financial targets for FY 2028 fueled by cash generation and disciplined capital allocation:
      • €9-10 Billion revenues
      • c. 10% operating margin
      • towards investment grade credit rating profile

    Paris – May 14th, 2025. Atos Group today announces its four-year strategic and transformation plan to return the Company to sustainable growth and improved profitability following the successful completion of its financial restructuring in 2024. At a Capital Markets Day in Paris today, Chairman and CEO Philippe Salle outlines a bold strategy to deliver revenues of €9-10 billion with an operating margin of around 10 per cent in 2028.

    Philippe Salle, Atos Group Chairman and CEO, says: “Atos Group is at an exciting inflexion point. With the Group’s financial structure now secure, our “Genesis” strategic and transformation plan will ensure that we strengthen our position as a global leader in cutting-edge technology solutions and deliver appreciable growth in revenue and profitability over the next four years.

    “There are very few companies in the world that can provide true end-to-end digital solutions for clients, at scale, in some of our most challenging and complex industries. Atos Group is one of them. Our competitive advantage lies in our highly skilled and committed colleagues, the depth of our technical expertise, our global capability with deep local roots, and our proven track record of delivery to a worldwide loyal customer base. We fully intend to leverage this advantage over the coming years and thereby deliver significant, growing value for our shareholders, clients and employees.”
    Streamlined and refocused Group with a clear plan for growth

    At the heart of this strategy is the repositioning of Atos Group as a global AI-powered technology partner delivering secure end-to-end digital journeys for its clients, through:

    • A simplified structure: transforming Atos portfolio of assets to a unified Group with two clear brands focused on high-growth and high-impact activities:

    Atos, a services business organized around six business lines:

    • Cloud & Modern Infrastructure – Covering the full cloud spectrum, from design to build to run, with expertise spanning hybrid, multi-cloud, infrastructure modernization, and FinOps-enabled delivery
    • Cyber Services – Delivering end-to-end security, from advisory, testing and compliance to Managed Detection & Response (MDR), OT security, and identity management
    • Data & AI (newly created) – Powering transformation through data enablement, AI development, AI-run (MLOps) and GenAI integration into operations and offerings
    • Digital Applications – Providing custom app design, development, modernization, and next-gen Application Managed Services (AI-powered, observable, secure-by-design)
    • Smart Platforms – Driving digital design, transformation and management services on key enterprise platforms including SAP and ServiceNow
    • Digital Workplace – Enabling secure, accessible, AI-powered workplace experiences aligned with employee engagement, accessibility and ESG priorities

    Eviden, a product business organized around four product lines: Cybersecurity products, Advanced Computing, Mission-Critical Systems and Vision AI.

    • A focused global footprint, anchored in strong local businesses: a key element of Atos Group’s transformation plan is the streamlining of its global network, to refocus on its most profitable and highest-growth territories.
      Atos Group will now operate from six regional hubs where it already has a strong and growing presence: France; Germany, Austria & Eastern Europe; Belux & Netherlands & Nordics; United Kingdom & Ireland; North America; and International Markets. In due course it will exit several non-core countries which do not meet its strategic or financial objectives, mainly within International Markets.
    • A simplified governance: defining clear accountability and ownership between the business lines, the geographies and a lean corporate structure and allowing for increased transparency and teams empowerment.

    Strengthened leadership team and operating model

    A new Leadership team has been appointed to drive the Group’s transformation plan, comprising the Heads of the Atos six business lines and Global Delivery Centers, the six regional Leaders, the Heads of Eviden and Advanced Computing, and the Heads of Group functions. They are supported by a highly skilled workforce, with a record of over 90 per cent retention on key talents, which has achieved more than 250,000 digital accreditations over the past three years, primarily in Cybersecurity, Cloud and AI.

    Building on Atos’ recognized core strengths in Infrastructure, Workplace and Digital with rapidly scaling technology services as ‘strategic boosters’, including Advanced Cybersecurity, Data and AI, the Group will target significant incremental income from its current customer base, coupled with sizeable new business revenue streams and accelerated growth from new product and industry offerings.

    Leaner cost base

    The Group has defined and started to implement a cost reduction program to adapt its cost structure to its current size and reflect the new organization and more efficient operating model. It will optimize service delivery through enhanced billability and bench management, increased offshoring, industrialized execution model and stricter contract management. It also plans to reduce G&A to around five per cent of revenues by 2028, implying a 2-points reduction compared to the current level, through headcount reduction and 10% lower discretionary spend.

    AI-powered organization

    With creation of a business line dedicated to Data and AI, Atos Group will fully leverage its expertise to deliver improved, higher-value offerings to clients through a full-stack data and AI engine industrialized for scale, while achieving higher delivery efficiency and lower costs within the Group. The business line will be a key growth driver, growing from 2,000 to 10,000 employees by 2028 and at the scale of the Group, 100 per cent of the workforce will be AI-certified by 2026.

    Committed investment in innovation

    To secure its leading position in future growth markets, Atos Group plans to invest €500 million in research & development over next 4 years and €100 million in start-ups and new ecosystem players, with the emphasis on emerging technologies and rapidly scaling technology services, including GenAI and Agentic AI, Cybersecurity and Quantum, under the leadership of an upcoming new Group CTO.

    Update on ongoing disposal processes

    On November 25, 2024, Atos announced that it has received a non-binding offer from the French State for the potential acquisition of 100% of the Advanced Computing activities, based on an enterprise value of €500 million, to be potentially increased to €625 million including earn-outs. The offer received from the French State provides for an exclusivity period until May 31, 2025. Discussions are still ongoing.

    In addition, the sale process for its Mission Critical Systems and Cybersecurity Products businesses has been put on hold.

    Sustainable financial structure and clear financial trajectory

    At the occasion of its Capital Markets Day held today, Atos Group announces an update of its strategy and organization. Building on its strengthened leadership team and following the closing of its financial restructuring at the end of 2024, the Atos Group also provides a guidance for 20251 and indications on its mid-term financial trajectory.

    In 2025, the Group expects to generate:

    • c.8.5 billion euros revenue, down from reported revenues of 9.6 billion euros in 2024 due to perimeter changes, voluntary contract reviews and low business traction prior to the completion of the financial restructuring
    • around 4% operating margin, up c.2pp from FY 2024, benefiting from voluntary contract reviews and the initial impact of cost reduction initiatives
    • net change in cash before debt repayment of c. -350 million euros

    In 2026, the Group expects to generate positive organic growth and net change in cash before debt repayment and M&A.

    In 2028, taking the assumption of a disposal of Advanced Computing and a progressive reduction of its geographic footprint, the Group expects:

    • to grow revenues organically to 8.5 to 9 billion euros, representing a 5-7% CAGR between 2025 and 2028. Strategic, targeted and disciplined M&A could further increase revenue to up to 9 to 10 billion euros;
    • to reach operating margin of around 10 per cent with full benefit of the cost reduction initiatives and structurally profitable growth, partially offset by accelerated investment in R&D;
    • to achieve a leverage ratio below 1.5x net debt/OMDAL2. On the path to an investment grade rating, the Group expects to achieve a BB profile in 2027.

    Following the financial restructuring last year, Atos Group now has a strong liquidity3 position of c.2 billion euros at March 31, 2025, with no debt maturing before end of 2029. This secures its balance sheet and provides with the time and flexibility necessary to deliver its strategy, which is expected to enable significant deleveraging.

    Disciplined capital allocation

    Strong cumulative cashflow generated over the period will be allocated as a priority to deleveraging, coupled with targeted strategic and disciplined acquisitions and ventures. No dividend payment or share-buyback programs are expected before 2028.

    Reinforced commitment to sustainability

    Atos Group reaffirms its commitment to ESG leadership as a core pillar of its transformation and strategic journey. The Group remains on track to reach Net Zero Target by 2050, aligned with SBTi, while helping clients decarbonize. It is also accelerating progress on diversity, advancing digital inclusion initiatives globally and targeting 40 per cent female new hires by end-2025. Governance has been reinforced under new leadership, with stronger oversight of ESG. These efforts have earned Atos top-tier ESG ratings, including EcoVadis Platinum and inclusion in the S&P Global Sustainability Yearbook.

    ***

    About Atos Group

    Atos Group is a global leader in digital transformation with c. 74,000 employees and annual revenue of c. € 10 billion. European number one in cybersecurity, cloud and high-performance computing, the Group provides tailored end-to-end solutions for all industries in 68 countries. A pioneer in decarbonization services and products, Atos Group is committed to a secure and decarbonized digital for its clients. Atos is a SE (Societas Europaea) and listed on Euronext Paris.

    The purpose of Atos Group is to help design the future of the information space. Its expertise and services support the development of knowledge, education and research in a multicultural approach and contribute to the development of scientific and technological excellence. Across the world, the Group enables its customers and employees, and members of societies at large to live, work and develop sustainably, in a safe and secure information space.

    Press contact

    Investor relations: investors@atos.net

    Individual shareholders: +33 8 05 65 00 75

    Media relations: globalprteam@atos.net


    1 The Group had suspended the communication of any guidance for 2025, since the press release dated March 26, 2024.
    2 Defined as Operating Margin before Depreciations, Amortization and Leases
    3 Defined as the sum of (i) the consolidated cash and cash-equivalent position of the Group and (ii) the amounts available under any undrawn committed facilities (including committed overdrafts). Consolidated cash and cash-equivalent includes trapped cash and unpooled cash and excludes cash held in escrow accounts in order to provide cash collateral.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: UN Secretary-General – Remarks to the Ministerial Meeting on the Future of Peacekeeping

    Source: United Nations – Peacekeeping

    [Bilingual, as delivered]

    Dear Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, our generous hosts.

    Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

    My thanks to Germany for bringing us together at this consequential moment.

    This year marks the 80th anniversary of the United Nations.

    Our organization was founded on the conviction that peace is possible if we work as one united human family.

    That is what our peace operations are about. 

    From preventive diplomacy to peacekeeping…

    From negotiating ceasefires to helping to implement them…

    From electoral support and observer missions to de-mining operations and protection of civilians…

    To the focus of today’s Ministerial meeting — peacekeeping.

    Excellencies,

    UN Blue Helmets are the most globally recognized symbol of the world’s ability to come together to help countries move from conflict to peace.

    Peacekeepers hail from every corner of the world.

    But they are united in their commitment to peace.

    As we meet today, UN peacekeepers are hard at work helping to ensure that ceasefires are respected…

    Protecting civilians caught in the line of fire…

    Helping provide the conditions for lifesaving aid to flow to those in need…

    And laying the foundations for long-term recovery.

    In trouble spots around the world, Blue Helmets can mean the difference between life and death.

    And they are also a clear demonstration of the power of multilateral action to maintain, achieve and sustain peace.

    There is a long list of countries that have achieved durable peace with the support of UN Peacekeeping — including Cambodia, Cote d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Liberia, Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Timor Leste.  

    Many of these countries now themselves contribute troops. 

    At the same time, we recognize that peace comes at a price.

    Through the decades, 4,400 peacekeepers have fallen in the line of duty.

    Their service and sacrifice will never be forgotten.  

    Please join me in a moment of silence to honour all those who lost their lives in the pursuit of peace.

    [MOMENT OF SILENCE]

    Thank you.

    Excellencies,

    We owe it to peacekeepers — and the populations they protect — to continue strengthening their ability to answer this call to peace.

    And to do so in the face of daunting challenges.

    Complex, intertwined and frequently borderless conflicts…

    Growing polarization and division around the globe…

    Targeting of peacekeepers through deadly misinformation spreading through social media…

    Terrorism and transnational crime, which find fertile ground in instability…

    The ongoing climate crisis that is exacerbating conflict while leaving more of the planet uninhabitable…

    All the continued trampling of international law and international humanitarian law.

    As a result, we are now facing the highest number of conflicts since the foundation of the United Nations, and record numbers of people fleeing across borders in search of safety and refuge.

    We must recognize that peacekeeping operations are only as effective as the mandates directing them, and can struggle in contexts where political support and clearly defined outcomes and solutions are absent or elusive.

    Meanwhile, we see increasing differences of views around how peacekeeping operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.

    And we face dramatic financial constraints across the board.

    We’ve worked to adapt in the face of these challenges.

    But we need to do more.

    Today, I want to highlight three areas of focus.

    First — help us shape peacekeeping operations that are fit for the future.     

    The Pact for the Future called for a Review of Peace Operations — including peacekeeping.

    The review will examine how we can make peacekeeping operations more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep.

    It will also aim to critically examine the tools we have today and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for the future.  

    Through this review, we must ensure that the United Nations is prepared to deploy peace operations tailored to each individual conflict, while preparing for the challenges of tomorrow.

    We can draw inspiration from our UNIFIL operation, which recently developed an adaptation plan to keep peace along the Blue Line, and ensure lifesaving aid can flow to civilians in southern Lebanon.

    In the Central African Republic, we see MINUSCA protecting civilians and assisting the government to extend its reach beyond the capital where people are in desperate need. 

    In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite ongoing fighting, UN Peacekeepers remain in the field, protecting vulnerable populations. 

    We’re also seeking efficiencies through partnerships — from Member States to regional and sub-regional organizations, to local communities.

    Most important among them is our strong partnership with the African Union.

    Security Council resolution 2719 has lifted this partnership to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the AU’s responsibility, supported by the United Nations through assessed contributions.

    Today, the Review of Peace Operations will need to be informed — and inspired — by your views.

    Member States make peacekeeping possible.

    They must lead the way as we strengthen it for the future.

    Second — as we make our operations more adaptable and flexible, we need to do the same in the use of our resources.

    Peace operations can only succeed when backed by robust mandates and clear, predictable and sustained contributions, both financial and logistical. 

    But these are tough times for the financing of our work across the board.

    Peacekeeping is no exception.

    It is crucial that we are able to use the increasingly limited resources we have — and use them well.

    That requires more flexible rules and processes.

    This means updating our approach to abolishing or establishing positions, and working with troop-contributing countries to ensure we can deliver.

    It means working with Member States and the UN Security Council to ensure that any new mandates are prioritized and achievable with the resources available and with a clear exit strategy.

    And it means driving efficiencies and improvements across our work in light of the continued funding challenges we face.

    Our Review of Peace Operations will work hand-in-hand with our UN80 initiative, to ensure we maximize efficiencies wherever possible, supported at every step by Member States.

    We look forward to your governments’ support and ideas as we tackle these challenges together.

    Troisièmement, nous avons besoin de votre soutien politique – qui passe notamment par les engagements que vous prendrez demain.

    Sans solution politique, les opérations de paix sont vouées à l’échec.

    Ensemble, nous devons rallier un soutien accru en faveur des solutions politiques pour toutes les missions de maintien de la paix.

    Faire avancer ces solutions politiques nécessite d’avoir les moyens nécessaires pour mener à bien nos opérations – notamment un soutien politique unifié de la part des États Membres, un leadership fort, des troupes bien préparées, du matériel et des technologies.

    Ces éléments peuvent renforcer nos opérations et améliorer sensiblement la vie des gens.

    Cela nécessite aussi un soutien de tous les États membres pour assurer la sécurité des Casques bleus sur le terrain, ainsi que le plein respect des privilèges et immunités pertinentes de notre Organisation et de son personnel.

    Nous sommes profondément reconnaissants de votre soutien et des contributions concrètes que nombre d’entre vous annonceront demain.

    Excellences,

    Le budget des opérations de la paix des Nations Unies, réparti entre les 193 États Membres, ne représente qu’une infime partie des dépenses militaires mondiales – environ 0,5 %. Ces opérations demeurent donc l’un des moyens les plus efficaces et les plus économiques de consolider la paix et la sécurité internationales.

    Toutefois, leur force est tributaire de l’engagement des États Membres à leur égard.

    Malheureusement, les opérations de maintien de la paix sont soumises a un sérieux problème de liquidité. Il est absolument essentiel que tous les Etats Membres respectent leurs obligations financières en payant les contributions intégralement et dans les temps.

    Aujourd’hui plus que jamais, le monde a besoin de l’ONU.

    Et l’ONU a besoin que les opérations de maintien de la paix disposent de tous les moyens nécessaires pour faire face aux réalités d’aujourd’hui et relever les défis de demain.

    Ensemble, faisons en sorte que les opérations de maintien de la paix de l’ONU répondent aux défis du moment, aux attentes des États Membres, et aux besoins légitimes de nos soldates et soldats de la paix – et des personnes à qui ils viennent en aide.

    Je vous remercie.

    Full translation in English.

    Full translation in French.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congresswoman Ann Wagner to Attend Funeral of His Holiness Pope Francis with Bipartisan Congressional Delegation

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Ann Wagner (R-MO-02)

    Washington, D.C. – Speaker Johnson today announced a Congressional delegation, led by Majority Leader Scalise, along with Congresswoman Ann Wagner (R-MO) and a bipartisan group of their House colleagues, is traveling to the Vatican to attend the funeral service of His Holiness Pope Francis. The funeral will take place on Saturday, April 26, in St. Peter’s Square.

    “I am humbled and honored to represent Missouri on this Congressional Delegation with Leader Scalise to the funeral of His Holiness Pope Francis.  It was just a year ago yesterday that Ray and I were blessed to meet with the Holy Father at the Vatican and pray,” said Congresswoman Wagner.  “He has left a legacy of service and selflessness that will echo through future generations.  Tomorrow we will be mourning with those touched by his faith and devotion to the Greater Glory of God.” 

    “Our prayers are with the many Christians who mourn the passing of Pope Francis,” Speaker Johnson said. “It is my honor to send this Congressional delegation, during which participating Members will celebrate the life of Pope Francis and the teaching of the Catholic Church. I’ve asked the House’s highest ranking Catholic, Majority Leader Steve Scalise, to lead this bipartisan group on this faith-filled visit.”

    “I am honored to be asked to lead the Congressional delegation of the House Representatives to attend the funeral of Pope Francis at the Vatican this weekend. The Holy Father humbly devoted his life in service to the Church, and he was dedicated to spreading the Gospel of the Lord to the world,” said Leader Scalise. “As a lifelong Catholic, I am honored to represent the House in paying our respects and praying for the soul of Pope Francis, as Catholics all around the world grieve, and as Church leaders prepare to elect a new pope in the coming weeks.”

    The Members of the Congressional delegation are:

    1.         The Honorable Steve Scalise

    2.         The Honorable French Hill 

    3.         The Honorable Nancy Pelosi 

    4.         The Honorable Brendan Boyle 

    5.         The Honorable Ann Wagner 

    6.         The Honorable Tom Suozzi 

    7.         The Honorable John Joyce 

    8.         The Honorable Pete Stauber 

    9.         The Honorable Scott Fitzgerald 

    10.       The Honorable Laura Gillen

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: E. Macron calls for Europe’s strategic independence amid weakening US support

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    PARIS, May 14 (Xinhua) — It would be irresponsible for Europeans not to prepare for strategic independence from the United States within the next five to 10 years, French President Emmanuel Macron said in an interview with TF1 television on Tuesday.

    Because of the systematic “America First” policy, “US interests will become less and less /focused/ on Europe,” he is sure.

    The president pointed to a clear trend of Washington’s disengagement from its European allies over the past 15 years. It began “when the United States decided not to join us in Syria, when they unilaterally withdrew from Afghanistan, and you can see it in recent months,” Macron said, referring to tariffs imposed by U.S. President Donald Trump.

    Calling the current global climate a “moment of geopolitical awakening,” the French leader stressed that the European Union, originally created as a project for peace, must now solve the problem of how to remain “free.”

    Asked how the EU should respond to US tariffs, Macron vehemently opposed a trade war but stressed Europe’s resolve. “We are here and we will fight to the end,” he said. -0-

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Defence News – NZDF joins large South Pacific disaster exercise as new response group starts work

    Source: New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)

    The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) has joined 18 other nations for a large French-led multinational training exercise scenario of a hypothetical cyclone striking the islands of Wallis & Futuna.

    Exercise Croix Du Sud was based in New Caledonia, about 1900km southwest of Wallis & Futuna, and involved about 2000 personnel.

    New Zealand Army Captain Zoe Williamson and a small number of Kiwi staff officers bolstered the exercise headquarters.

    “This has been a great opportunity allowing us to work with our partner nations in a likely humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) scenario, developing relationships and an understanding of how we work individually but are able to come together as a whole,” she said.

    “Training with our Pacific neighbours is important to ensure we are ready to respond when the time comes, and Exercise Croix Du Sud is a valuable test, ensuring we can deliver this critical capability when and where it’s needed.”

    Exercise Croix Du Sud also provided the opportunity for two NZDF officers to deploy with the Pacific Response Group (PRG), a new multinational support group consisting of personnel from Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, France, Australia, and New Zealand with Chile in support.  

    The PRG was established in 2024 by recommendation of the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting to address the need for pan-Pacific HADR cooperation.

    The Royal New Zealand Navy’s Lieutenant Commander Nikita Lawson said the Pacific Response Group was a short-notice deployable team with strong planning skills designed to assist civilian authorities and other organisations in any response to a disaster.

    “The PRG deployed a small team forward to Wallis & Futuna to assess the situation on the ground, determine where military assistance was required and what humanitarian assistance was needed,” she said.

    The PRG command team remained in New Caledonia to coordinate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and critical capabilities.

    “Information, assessments and the ‘ground truth’ provided by our PRG team were invaluable at shaping the HADR response plans formed by the wider exercise headquarters,” Lieutenant Commander Lawson said.

    The two-week exercise ended earlier this month.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: REP. HILL’S BILL TO PRESERVE MORE OF ARKANSAS’S NATURAL BEAUTY PASSES THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman French Hill (AR-02)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Rep. French Hill’s (AR-02) bill, H.R. 1612, the Flatside Wilderness Additions Act, to expand the Flatside Wilderness Area in central Arkansas by approximately 2,200 acres, passed the House of Representatives by a voice vote.

    Rep. Hill’s bill designates an additional 2,200 acres as part of the Flatside Wilderness Area, fulfilling the vision Arkansas leaders first set forth in the 1984 Arkansas Wilderness Act. It marks the culmination of Rep. Hill’s determined effort to complete the Flatside Wilderness footprint and reflects a decades-long, bipartisan commitment to conserving one of The Natural State’s most treasured landscapes for future generations.

    Rep. Hill said, “For over 40 years, Arkansas leaders have worked to secure the future of the Flatside Wilderness. My legislation completes that vision. It maintains what is best about The Natural State and conserves a place of cultural, ecological, and personal significance for Arkansans and visitors alike.”

    “My bill reflects a thoughtful approach that balances conservation with access and ensures this extraordinary landscape remains available for generations to come. I am proud to complete what former Sen. Dale Bumpers and my predecessor, Rep. Ed Bethune, started four decades ago, and I am grateful for the strong support from Governor Sanders and local leaders, as well as for Chairman Westerman’s help in getting this bill to the House Floor.” 

    Rep. Hill’s leadership in preserving the Flatside Wilderness Area reflects a decade-long effort to expand and protect one of Arkansas’s most scenic and ecologically significant landscapes. In 2019, he successfully passed legislation to add 640 acres to the Flatside Wilderness, which was signed into law by President Trump. That same year, Congress directed the U.S. Forest Service to study surrounding lands for potential inclusion. The recommendations from that study form the basis for today’s legislation.

    The Flatside Wilderness Area is part of the larger Ouachita National Forest, the oldest and largest national forest in the South, stretching across central Arkansas into eastern Oklahoma. Known for its rugged terrain and iconic views, the area is a popular destination for hikers, hunters, wildlife enthusiasts, and families across the region.

    The bill has received broad support from Arkansas leaders, including Governor Sarah Sanders, the Arkansas Department of Parks, Heritage and Tourism, the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, and local officials and outdoor recreation advocates throughout the region.

    Governor Sanders said, “I am proud to support Rep. French Hill and his bill to expand and complete the Flatside Wilderness Area in our state. This legislation complements the Natural State Initiative my administration established to make Arkansas a leading destination for year-round outdoor adventure, growing our tourism industry, getting families off screens and outdoors, and preserving our world-class natural beauty.”

    Chris Racey, interim director for the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, said, “There are twelve wilderness areas in Arkansas that Arkansas Game and Fish Commission partners to bring these unique natural areas to Arkansans for recreation. Thank you to Congressman Hill for his work to further expand the wild lands of Flatside Wilderness.”

    Anders Reynolds, federal legislative director for the Southern Environmental Law Center, said, “The Flatside Wilderness Additions Act would bolster an already strong outdoor recreation economy in The Natural State and preserve for future generations some of the Ouachita National Forest’s most rugged places. SELC applauds Representative Hill’s leadership on this bill, and joins countless hikers, hunters, campers, and paddlers in celebrating its passage through the House of Representatives today.”

    Barry Hyde, Pulaski County judge, said, “I fully support H.R. 1612, the Flatside Wilderness Additions Act. This legislation safeguards one of our region’s most treasured natural areas while providing meaningful benefits to the people of Pulaski County. Expanding the Flatside Wilderness will enhance access to outdoor recreation, attract tourism, and contribute to the well-being of our residents — all while preserving the scenic beauty and ecological integrity of the Ouachita Mountains. I commend Rep. French Hill and our congressional delegation for their leadership in protecting these irreplaceable public lands for future generations.”

    Larry Blackmon, Perry County judge, said, “The Flatside Wilderness Area is truly a treasure to the state of Arkansas and Perry County. Its natural beauty draws visitors from all over the United States. The citizens of Perry County are very appreciative of Congressman Hill’s efforts to expand the Flatside Wilderness Area and hope you will show your support for H.R. 1612 and allow the Flatside Wilderness Area to become an even greater beauty than it already is.”

    Brian Thompson, president of the Ozark Society, said, “These Flatside additions will make a good wilderness even better, by including Cedar Creek Watershed lands, and by securing long-term protection for spectacular views from Flatside Pinnacle.”

    Jill Gottesman, southeastern states director for The Wilderness Society, said, “TWS applauds the introduction of Congressman Hill’s Flatside Wilderness Additions Act to expand the existing Flatside Wilderness Area in the Ouachita National Forest. This expansion will improve the protection, restoration and manageability of the wilderness area. The bill supports Arkansas’ rich biodiversity, strengthens the growing outdoor recreation economy, and enhances rugged outdoor experiences for hikers, hunters, campers and other public land users.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Minister welcomes Zelenskyy-Putin meeting to end fighting in Ukraine

    Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

    Published on May 13, 2025

    Statements to the press by M. Jean-Noël Barrot, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, on the sidelines of his visit to Calvados department (Caen, May 12, 2025)

    Can you confirm that you had a call today with Marco Rubio and other foreign-minister counterparts? And what was the nature of these discussions?

    THE MINISTER – Yes, at President Macron’s request, I spoke to my counterpart the US Secretary of State [and] the foreign ministers of the European countries present in Kyiv at the weekend, then the Ukrainian minister. We reiterated our desire to see an immediate, unconditional 30-day ceasefire. And then we signalled our support for the idea of a meeting on Thursday between President Zelenskyy of Ukraine and President Putin of Russia.

    Vladimir Putin declared today that any ultimatum was unacceptable. What do you say to him?

    THE MINISTER – I say that Vladimir Putin proposed a direct meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Volodymyr Zelenskyy agreed to it. Vladimir Putin must now keep to his part of the bargain. He must turn up in Istanbul on Thursday for a meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Then, in order for discussions to take place calmly and lead to peace, there absolutely must be a ceasefire, because you can’t negotiate while under attack from bombs or drones.

    If this doesn’t happen, what sanctions could there be?

    THE MINISTER – We’re preparing to put in place particularly powerful, massive sanctions that would force Vladimir Putin to observe a ceasefire if he didn’t move towards one. These sanctions would be coordinated with the American sanctions that the American senators have prepared, with 500% tariffs on oil imports and on countries importing Russian oil today.

    And France, specifically?

    THE MINISTER – We adopt sanctions at European level. We’ve adopted 17 sanctions packages targeting Russian entities and individuals helping to circumvent the sanctions, helping to destabilize European public opinion, and also the financial institutions, the energy institutions. What we’re preparing are additional sanctions that will be massive and target the energy and financial sectors.

    Can you give details of these sanctions on the oil sectors, for example?

    THE MINISTER – A number of sanctions have already been adopted, and at the weekend, following the discussions that took place in Kyiv, we asked the European Commission to prepare further, even more substantial sanctions to force Vladimir Putin to begin a peace process.

    On gas and oil?

    THE MINISTER – On oil, in particular, which now accounts for 25% of Russia’s budget.

    Donald Trump said he’s ready to join the negotiations. Is that a good thing?

    THE MINISTER – He’s obviously welcome. He was the one from the outset who proposed an unconditional 30-day ceasefire in the air, at sea and on land – a proposal accepted by the Ukrainians two months ago now, and which Vladimir Putin must now in turn accept./.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Combating the misuse of national symbols on food packaging – E-001805/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001805/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Gilles Pennelle (PfE), Christophe Bay (PfE), France Jamet (PfE), Catherine Griset (PfE), André Rougé (PfE), Séverine Werbrouck (PfE), Pascale Piera (PfE), Jean-Paul Garraud (PfE), Julien Leonardelli (PfE), Philippe Olivier (PfE), Julien Sanchez (PfE), Pierre Pimpie (PfE)

    In recent years, there has been a noticeable shift in the purchasing decisions of French consumers, who are attaching increasing importance to the provenance of products. To meet these expectations, the French Parliament passed a law known as ‘EGalim 2’, which was enacted on 18 October 2021. Article 12 of this law prohibits the display of the French flag, a map of France or any symbol representing France on food packaging when the primary ingredients do not originate in France. However, the French Government never published the necessary implementing decree for this provision, on the grounds that it would be incompatible with the INCO Regulation and Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices.

    • 1.Does the Commission consider it acceptable that jam processed in France containing fruit originating in another Member State can display the flag of the country of processing?
    • 2.Can it confirm whether the INCO Regulation and Directive 2005/29/EC prevent the French State from prohibiting the use of a French flag, a map of France or any symbol representing France on food packaging when the primary ingredients do not originate in France?

    Supporter[1]

    Submitted: 5.5.2025

    • [1] This question is supported by a Member other than the authors: Mathilde Androuët (PfE)
    Last updated: 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB takes part in World Circular Economy Forum 2025 in Brazil to foster competitiveness and sustainable growth

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • EIB to participate in more than 10 sessions at WCEF 2025 from 13-16 May 2025 to discuss circular economy advances
    • EIB financing for circular economy grows to record €1.4 billion in 2024
    • EIB lending to circular economy projects amounts to €5.1 billion over the past five years

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) is participating in the World Circular Economy Forum 2025 (WCEF 2025) from 13-16 May 2025 in São Paulo, Brazil, and online around the globe. The annual WCEF, an initiative of Finland and the Finnish Innovation Fund (Sitra), is one of the world’s leading events on the circular economy, which aims to make production and consumption more sustainable by extending the life cycle of resources, materials and goods.

    The WCEF provides a platform for sharing knowledge and expertise, building networks and advancing the transition to a circular economy. This year’s edition will shed light on the bottlenecks to sustainable growth and the root causes that urgently require circular solutions.

    The EIB, one of the biggest multilateral providers of climate and environment finance, will present to conference participants its array of financing and advisory products to develop and support the circular economy. The EIB will also discuss the role of the circular economy in securing the supply of strategic materials and the benefits of pursuing projects across entire value chains.

    “We are stepping up our support for the circular economy in line with the European Union’s objectives that put circularity at the core of our decarbonisation strategy,” said EIB Vice-President Ambroise Fayolle. “In the past five years, we provided more than €5 billion to co-finance 153 circular economy projects in a variety of sectors. Circularity is key to conserve limited and strategic materials, enhance resilience and competitiveness and reduce our impact on the climate and the environment.”

    EIB lending to circular economy projects has consistently increased over the years, amounting to €5.1 billion in 2020-2024, with a record level of €1.4 billion last year alone. Recently financed projects include a €17 million loan to Europe’s largest iPhone refurbisher Swappie, venture debt financing of €25 million to Fairmat, a French company pioneering the recycling of carbon fibre composite materials, and a €75 million loan to improve solid waste management in Benin.

    Earlier this year, the EIB’s Board of Directors also approved an action plan to step up support for critical raw materials (CRM) with the aim of doubling annual financing for such projects – including circular solutions – to €2 billion. The plan also includes a new CRM Task Force and a dedicated one-stop shop to build and manage a pipeline of CRM operations and advisory activities and increased technical expertise and partnerships

    Join the EIB at WCEF 202

    Vice-President Fayolle is leading the EIB’s participation, starting with a panel at the opening plenary on 13 May. In total, EIB experts will take part in more than 10 sessions. The full list of sessions with EIB speakers is available here.

    People on site can meet staff of the EIB at its stand at the OCA in the Ibirapuera park in São Paulo on 13-14 May.

    For interview requests, please reach out to the press contact below.

    For more information about the EIB’s support to the circular economy visit: Circular economy (eib.org)

    Background information  

    EIB 

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, we finance investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, high-impact investments outside the European Union, and the capital markets union.  

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.  

    All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.  

    Fostering market integration and mobilising investment, the Group supported a record of over €100 billion in new investment for Europe’s energy security in 2024 and mobilised €110 billion in growth capital for startups, scale-ups and European pioneers. Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower than the EU average.

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of our headquarters for media use are available here.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Greenpeace flagship Rainbow Warrior returns for 40th anniversary of French bombing in Auckland on 10 July

    Source: Greenpeace

    The iconic Greenpeace flagship Rainbow Warrior will return to Aotearoa this year to mark the 40th anniversary of the bombing of the original Rainbow Warrior at Marsden Wharf in Auckland by French government agents on 10th July 1985.
    Russel Norman says, “The Rainbow Warrior’s return to Aotearoa comes at a pivotal moment-when the fight to protect our planet’s fragile life-support systems has never been as urgent, or more critical.
    “Here in Aotearoa, the Luxon Government is waging an all-out war on nature, and on a planetary scale, climate change, ecosystem collapse, and accelerating species extinction pose an existential threat.
    “As we remember the bombing and the murder of our crew member, Fernando Pereira, it’s important to remember why the French Government was compelled to commit such a cowardly act of violence.
    “Our ship was targeted because Greenpeace and the campaign to stop nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific were so effective. We posed a very real threat to the French Government’s military programme and colonial power.
    “It’s also critical to remember that they failed to stop us. They failed to intimidate us, and they failed to silence us. Greenpeace only grew stronger and continued the successful campaign against nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific.
    “Forty years later, it’s the oil industry that’s trying to stop us. This time, not with bombs but with a legal attack that threatens the existence of Greenpeace in the US and beyond.
    “But just like in 1985 when the French bombed our ship, now too in 2025, we will not be intimidated, we will not back down, and we will not be silenced.
    “We cannot be silenced because we are a movement of people committed to peace and to protecting Earth’s ability to sustain life, protecting the blue oceans, the forests and the life we share this planet with,” says Norman.
    “In the 40 years since, the Rainbow Warrior has sailed on the front lines of our campaigns around the world to protect nature and promote peace. In the fight to end oil exploration, turn the tide of plastic production, stop the destruction of ancient forests and protect the ocean, the Rainbow Warrior has been there to this day.
    “Right now the Rainbow Warrior is preparing to sail through the Tasman Sea to expose the damage being done to ocean life, continuing a decades-long tradition of defending ocean health,” says Norman.
    This follows the Rainbow Warrior spending six weeks in the Marshall Islands where the original ship carried out Operation Exodus, in which the Greenpeace crew evacuated the people of Rongelap from their home island that had been made uninhabitable by nuclear weapons testing by the US Government.
    In Auckland this year, several events will be held on and around the ship to mark the anniversary, including open days with tours of the ship for the public.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The UK calls on Israel to lift its block on aid: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    The UK calls on Israel to lift its block on aid: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Statement by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

    The UK called this meeting alongside Denmark, France, Greece and Slovenia in response to the alarming warnings that the humanitarian situation in Gaza is worse than it has ever been.

    So we are calling for three urgent things.

    First, the UK calls on Israel to lift its block on aid.

    The World Food Programme warned us over a week ago that they have no food left. 

    And IPC data released yesterday shows that the whole of Gaza is at the risk of famine. 

    Meanwhile, tonnes of food are currently sitting rotting at the border, blocked from reaching people who are starving. 

    This is cruel and it is inexcusable. 

    And it risks further deaths that should be avoidable. 

    Second, the UK will not support any aid mechanism that seeks to deliver political or military objectives or puts vulnerable civilians at risk. 

    We call on Israel to urgently engage with the UN to ensure a return to delivery of aid in line with humanitarian principles. 

    International law requires Israel to allow the rapid and unimpeded provision of humanitarian aid to all civilians.

    Third, the UK reiterates our outrage at the killing of Palestinian Red Crescent workers and the strikes on a UNOPS compound in March. 

    We are disappointed that Israel has not yet released the final findings of its investigation into the UNOPS incident or taken concrete action to ensure these incidents can never happen again.

    President, the release of Edan Alexander yesterday after 17 months of cruel Hamas captivity offers a rare moment of hope. 

    We must never forget the suffering of those hostages that remain in Gaza and those families awaiting the return of their loved ones’ remains.

    It is ceasefire deals that have delivered the release of over 180 hostages and allowed a massive scale-up of aid for desperate Palestinians. 

    This shows what is possible with political will. 

    This is why we strongly oppose an expansion of this conflict, as do many hostages’ families.

    And it is a ceasefire deal that now offers the best hope of ending the agony of the hostages and their families, alleviating the suffering of civilians in Gaza, ending Hamas’ control of Gaza and achieving a pathway to a two-state solution.

    Updates to this page

    Published 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Rights of the Child Commend Norway on Child Welfare Act, Raise Questions on Proposed Increased Use of Force in Schools and Data on Children with Disabilities

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Rights of the Child today concluded its review of the seventh periodic report of Norway, with Committee Experts commending the State on the new child welfare act, while raising questions about the proposed increased use of force in schools and the lack of data on children with disabilities. 

    Bragi Gudbrandsson, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, commended Norway for the child welfare act which was a wonderful piece of legislation. 

     

    Mr. Gudbrandsson said the Committee was concerned that Norway planned to use stronger force and constraints.  How had the country reached this situation?

    Faith Marshall Harris, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, also emphasised her concern, stating that instead of teachers being trained to de-escalate violence, they were given the power to use more force than police officers.  It seemed that the Government had responded in a knee-jerk reaction to media pressure; however, the situation was more about training teachers to deal with these situations in a non-violent way.  Norway was encouraged to rethink this approach. 

    Thuwayba Al Barwani, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said Norway had excellent data but when it came to disability, there was no disaggregated data to better understand the situation of children with disabilities in the country.  How many of these children lived with their families? How many lived in residential care? How many were receiving support services?  What awareness raising campaigns were in place to remove stigma and educate about disability? 

    What measures were in place to provide quality psychological care for children with mental health disabilities in all municipalities?   

    The delegation said the new education act introduced a broader scope for exercising force and restraint.  Employees could now intervene against pupils when necessary.  Norway shared the Committee’s concerns and had tried to state explicitly in the provision that this was a last resort, with strict measures for physical restriction to take place.  The Government and municipalities focused on the competence of the staff to put pre-emptive measures in place so that physical interventions were a last resort and only used when necessary. 

    The delegation said the Norwegian strategy for equality for all ran until 2030, with an important competence to increase the visibility of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in all municipalities.  In 2025, the Government allocated 280 million kroner for grants for people with disabilities.  Norway could not definitively say how many people with disabilities were living in the country.  A recent report by Statistic Norway, focused on the different definitions of disability, which would hopefully assist the State in future.

    Introducing the report, Lene Vågslid, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, said since the last dialogue with the Committee in 2018, Norway had taken significant steps to further strengthen children’s rights. 

    Last month, the Government presented a proposal for a new children’s act to Parliament, which included a new provision on the child’s right to privacy, and the parents’ responsibility in this regard.  Norway had introduced a range of measures in recent years to develop and improve the child welfare sector, including the new child welfare act, which entered into force in 2023, placing greater emphasis on prevention and helping children and parents as early as possible.  For the first time, a white paper on “Safe digital upbringing” would soon be presented to Parliament to develop policies that empowered and protected children in their digital lives. 

    In closing remarks, Mr. Gudbrandsson said it was clear Norway was on an exciting journey in revisiting the fundamental principles of the Convention, which was reflected in the new legislation, guidelines and action plans; the Committee was very impressed and appreciated these efforts. 

    In her closing remarks, Ms. Vågslid thanked the Committee for the important questions and the dialogue.  Norway aimed to highlight that all sectors were working towards the best possible outcomes for children. 

    The delegation of Norway was comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Children and Families; the Ministry of Culture and Equality; the Ministry of Education and Research; the Ministry of Justice and Public Security; the Ministry of Health Services; the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion; and the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva. 

    Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here. The programme of work of the Committee’s ninety-ninth session and other documents related to the session can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3. pm on Wednesday, 14 May to begin its consideration of the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Indonesia (CRC/C/IDN/5-6).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the seventh periodic report of Norway (CRC/C/NOR/7).

    Presentation of Report

    LENE VÅGSLID, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, said since the last dialogue with the Committee in 2018, Norway had taken significant steps to further strengthen children’s rights.  Fundamental children’s rights were included in the Norwegian Constitution, including that the best interests of the child must be a key consideration, and that children had a right to be heard regarding issues affecting them.  Moreover, the Convention was implemented through the human rights act, meaning it was applied as Norwegian law and prevailed if in conflict with other legislation. 

    Last month, the Government presented a proposal for a new children’s act to Parliament, which included a new provision on the child’s right to privacy, and the parents’ responsibility in this regard.  There were also several amendments to strengthen children’s rights when parents separated, including mandatory mediation for the parents and children. Additionally, the new education act of 2023 applied to all public primary and secondary education and contained general provisions stating that the best interests of pupils should be a fundamental consideration in actions and decisions concerning them. 

    Norway had introduced a range of measures in recent years to develop and improve the child welfare sector, including the new child welfare act, which entered into force in 2023, placing greater emphasis on prevention and helping children and parents as early as possible.  Last month, the Government launched the Quality Improvement Initiative, to give children relying on child welfare services greater predictability and stability. 

    It was only in exceptional cases, and as a matter of last resort, that the best interest of the child could lead to children being separated from their parents.  From 2023, children in health institutions had the right to be accompanied by a parent or guardian throughout their stay.  Families who had a child with a serious illness, injury or disability now had a right to a coordinator.  The Government also recently decided to incorporate the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities into the human rights act. 

    Since 2022, Norway had offered collective protection to around 90,000 refugees from Ukraine, many of them children.  The State had also increased the earmarked budget line for strengthened child expertise in asylum reception centres, and the County Governor’s supervision of unaccompanied minors was increased.  A national strategy for children in low-income families (2020-2023) was put forward in 2020 and renewed in 2024, aiming to strengthen the economy of low-income families and reduce economic barriers to kindergartens and after-school programmes. 

    In 2023, the Government introduced a “youth guarantee” which ensured young people close follow-up and individual support.  Since 2022, a cross-sector initiative called the Core Group for Vulnerable Children and Youth coordinated efforts across eight ministries and 14 agencies to address the needs of at-risk children.  Two weeks ago, Norway launched a national mission on the inclusion of children in education, work and societal life, with the key goal of reducing exclusion among children by 2035. 

    For the first time, a white paper on “Safe digital upbringing” would soon be presented to Parliament to develop policies that empowered and protected children in their digital lives.  Norway had also, for the first time, established a Ministry of Digitalisation, working closely together on children’s behalf.  Norway had high ambitions for all its children and was committed to advancing their well-being.  Ms. Vågslid concluded by commending the important role played by the United Nations treaty bodies in improving States’ implementation of human rights. 

    TORMOD C. ENDRESEN, Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said Norway was looking forward to doing a deep dive with the Committee on the Rights of the Child in the country.  He then introduced the Norwegian delegation. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said the Committee was aware of Norway’s exemplary record in children’s rights, being the first country to incorporate the Convention into domestic legislation, and the first in the world to establish the position of Ombudsman for children.  For this reason, the Committee would do its best to give Norway a critical appraisal. 

    The Government of Norway had been criticised in the law-making process, including the lack of a child rights assessment impact, and that children’s views were not included in the process of lawmaking.  It was understood that steps had been taken to address this; could the delegation share these with the Committee?  Could some examples be provided?  How was it ensured that the public administration act contributed to strong policies for children?  It was interesting that Norway had not yet formulated a comprehensive implementation plan for the Convention on a national, regional or sectoral basis. Could the delegation comment on this? 

    Norway was commended for collaboration between the Ministries and the Core Group for Vulnerable People.  Had it addressed the discrepancies in resources between the different municipalities? Had a strategy been devised in this regard?  Were children regularly consulted by the Core Group?  Norway currently did not collect disaggregated data which was of concern to the Committee.  Could the State use a safeguard strategy, rather than simply not collecting the statistics?  How did the State address the concerns of unaccompanied minors in reception centres? What was the status of amendments to the legal aid act?  To what extent were local politicians aware of the Committee’s observations since 2018? What was being done to improve this situation?  How were the concluding observations applied in the Government? 

    Mr. Gudbrandsson commended Norway for the child welfare act which was a wonderful piece of legislation.  The lack of participation of children in Norway was of concern, with many pieces of legislation being implemented without children having a chance to provide their views.  Were steps being taken to follow-up the child welfare act to ensure children were heard? Was there a possibility to accommodate the views of the children during child abuse cases through the Barnahus model? Would the State consider the age limit for accessing Barnahus services to 18?  It was important to provide young offenders with inappropriate sexual behaviour with good therapy, and Norway was commended for thinking about this.  The Committee welcomed the State’s action plan to address violence against children.  Had an evaluation of the previous plans been conducted?  How had this impacted the new plan? 

    The Committee was concerned that Norway planned to use stronger force and constraints.  How had the country reached this situation? Would Norway ban child marriages completely without any exceptions?  There was a lack of specific prohibition of the sale and sexual exploitation of children; could this be explained? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, said Norway’s high-level delegation present before the Committee highlighted the country’s commitment to human rights.  Norway was an exemplary country in so many ways.  Why did discrimination still persist in such an egalitarian community, particularly when it came to Sami, migrant, asylum and refugee children? Where did the root causes lie? Were there any plans to diminish the levels of discrimination seen against children? 

    All State practices in Norway kept the best interests of the child in mind.  However, there were certain cases where questions arose. Was there an instrument for local and national authorities for this purpose?  How could the best interest of the child be reconciled with chemical restraints or practices of confinement?  How was it assessed whether the best interests of the children involved were satisfied? 

    If a child needed to be removed from their family, was there a protocol in place to ensure that the best interests of the child were still respected?  How was the situation of brothers and sisters assessed and the impact on children’s mental health?  Was there sufficient information to provide a solution to deportation or family reunification as it pertained to refugees?  How did “extended detention” reconcile with the best interests of the child?

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the proposed children’s act strengthened the rights of all children in Norway and put their safety first, with the best interests of the child always considered most important.  The act aimed to facilitate the child’s contact with both parents and reduce conflict in situations of separation of parents.  The new act also included special provisions for cases of abuse of children.

    Norway placed a great emphasis on human rights and had implemented human rights conventions in the national law; in case of conflict, the conventions would prevail.  Norway’s Parliament had considered the ratification of the third Optional Protocol on several occasions, most recently in 2022, but given several reservations expressed, had voted not to implement it by an 80 per cent majority.  Given that recent decision, the Government was currently not considering ratifying the third Optional Protocol.  The Government remained adamant to develop a national complaints procedure and had taken steps in this regard.  A child-friendly website had been designed, allowing children to access the complaints procedure more easily. 

    The participation of children was becoming an increasingly valued part of Norway’s decision-making process.  The right to be heard was enshrined in the Constitution, and there were now established youth councils and mandated conversations with the Government and youth-oriented non-governmental organizations.  In March this year, the Government developed and clarified the role of the Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family which would now oversee all aspects pertaining to children and participation, and provide guidance to the public sector in this regard. 

    There were many national complaints bodies in Norway which had the competence to handle complaints concerning children.  Several measures had been taken to strengthen children’s right to complain. Politicians at all levels were responsible for following Norwegian law in all their decisions, and the Convention was part of Norwegian law.  Politicians received a copy of the Convention on the first day of work and an informative poster.  All general comments made by the Committee were published on the Government’s website in Norwegian and English. 

    The Norwegian Human Rights Institution had created a guide on children’s rights which was available online.  Since 2018, it was forbidden to enter a marriage with someone under 18 in Norway, and from this year, foreign marriages of a person under the age of 18 were not recognised. 

    In April, a bill was submitted to parliament for a new administrative procedural act.  The legal aid act stipulated the right to free legal aid for natural citizens, including minors.  The Norwegian Barnahus model was evaluated in 2021, with the system seeming to work well and in accordance with international conventions.  The Government aimed to strengthen the legal protection of child suspects, including around interrogation of minors. The evaluation of the Barnahus model did not delve further into the proposal to raise the age for access to services to 18. 

    Residents in asylum reception centres took part in an information programme about the Norwegian society and its fundamental values.  The objective was to help residents take care of their own living situations and also inform them of their rights.  In cases of expulsion, an extended right to free legal aid was granted. 

    In recent years, Norway had taken significant steps to strengthen the child welfare services through policies, research, and financial commitments.  The child welfare services aimed to do everything within their power to allow children to live at home.  The municipalities were vital in this regard.  In Norway, around 54,000 children and adolescents received help from child welfare services annually.  The new child welfare act entered into force in 2023, and children were provided with additional rights, including speaking to child welfare authorities without parental consent.  The new participation regulation came into force in 2024 and clarified the duty of the child welfare services to provide child participation in cases.  Norway was working to improve the system, including through evaluating the new rules, developing more child friendly processes, and ensuring access to qualified legal representation to children, among other measures.   

    Norway had been working hard on foster homes; nine out of 10 children living in alternative care lived in foster homes.  Several measures had been launched to improve the situation of foster parents, including for them to be given clearer decision-making authority.  Children who had lived in a foster home for at least two years could be proposed a permanent residence in the home, if the aim of reunification had been abandoned.  The State was currently investing in models for foster homes for siblings. 

    The responsibility of the treatment and follow-up of intersex children was assigned to two hospitals, and necessary medical treatment was initiated when relevant. Treatment practices in Norway were aligned with the rest of the Nordic countries.    Norway did not collect any data or statistics based on the ethnicity of the population.  The Government was strengthening and renewing its efforts to combat hate and discrimination based on ethnicity and religion, and had delivered four action plans, including against anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim racism and hate speech, as well as discrimination against the Sami.  A study showed that a high number of children with ethnic backgrounds had experienced racism. 

    The kindergarten act and education act stated that children had the right to an education free from discrimination.  The new education act introduced a broader scope for exercising force and restraint. Employees could now intervene against pupils when necessary.  Norway shared the Committee’s concerns and had tried to state explicitly in the provision that this was a last resort, with strict measures for physical restriction to take place.   

    Several guidelines had been produced by the immigration service and the appeals board on how to hear children in the case-handling process.   

    Questions by Committee Experts

    THUWAYBA AL BARWANI, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, acknowledged the hard work Norway had put into the strategy of equality for persons with disabilities 2020 to 2030.  How had the strategy helped mitigate the discrimination of vulnerable children? What interventions were envisaged to address access to services for children with disabilities to ensure their rights were upheld?  The Committee had heard reports of abuse of children with psychosocial disabilities, particularly girls.  What measures had been taken to address this problem?  To what extent did these children know their rights?  Was the State party making efforts to give them opportunities to be heard and their views taken into account? 

    There had been violations found in 76 per cent of respite homes; how was the Government planning to regulate these homes?  Were there efforts to reduce and phase out these institutions and replace them with more community-based care? 

    Norway had excellent data but when it came to disability, there was no disaggregated data to better understand the situation of children with disabilities in the country. How many of these children lived with their families?  How many lived in residential care?  How many were receiving support services?  What awareness raising campaigns were in place to remove stigma and educate about disability? 

    What measures were in place to provide quality psychological care for children with mental health disabilities in all municipalities?   

    The Committee had received reports that children without resident permits could not be seen by a general practitioner, and could only receive emergency health care, which was of concern.  Was the Government planning to change this practice?  The Committee welcomed Norway’s commitment to protect intersex children from violence; however, it was concerned that unnecessary irreversible surgeries had been performed on intersex children without their informed consent.  Was this the case?  Had data been collected on these practices?  Had there been redress for these children?  How was the Government planning to protect children from these practices?  What measures did the Government have to combat family poverty?  What additional measures were in place to improve the living conditions of children in municipal housing? 

    FAITH MARSHALL HARRIS, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said Norway had been the envy of the world in terms of the environment and had an incredible record. Why was the State now granting more licenses for gas and extraction and exports?  The Committee was concerned about this change of direction.  Why was the State turning its back on the commitments made in the Paris Agreement?  Why was Norway undermining its incredible heritage in this direction?  Given the fact that this was so important to the lives of children, was there a mechanism in place for consulting them on these major decisions?

    Children with disabilities in Svalbard could not receive special education and had to move with their parents to the mainland; could more information be provided on this? The use of force by teachers in the classroom against disruptive pupils was concerning and seemed to escalate violence. Instead of teachers being trained to de-escalate violence, they were given the power to use more force than police officers.  It seemed that the Government had responded in a knee-jerk reaction to media pressure; however, the situation was more about training teachers to deal with these situations in a non-violent way.  Norway was encouraged to rethink this approach. 

    Could Norway provide more information about programmes and strategies for the Sami people?  Had Norway developed a national referral mechanism for trafficking?  Was legal representation available to children from the very start of an investigation?  How were children who had come out of warzones being rehabilitated? 

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, asked what services children with challenging behaviours were entitled to by law? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, asked how children were heard in cases where the State legally granted a sex change?  Had a legal definition of statelessness been adopted? What mechanisms existed to protect children who had been exposed on the internet?  Did children deprived of liberty receive information on their rights?

    A Committee Expert said Norway did not participate in the ministerial conference on ending violence against children; was there a specific reason for this? 

    Another Expert asked about the Norwegian children’s act.  When would this be finished?  How much were children involved in that act? 

    An Expert asked what was being done to prevent violence against children, including risks in the digital environment?  How was the birth declaration of refugee or stateless individuals conducted?  What was being done to support those parents?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said children’s rights would always be work in progress; it was important to evolve and improve.  Children in Norway were among the highest users of screens, social media and digital technology globally.  How could the State protect them in their everyday life?  This was a difficult problem to solve. 

    The work with the Core Group for Vulnerable Children and Youth started in 2021.  There was a need for a better cross-sectoral collaboration to ensure children, youth and their families received the necessary support and follow-up.  The Core Group was comprised of representatives from seven ministries. Last year, the Core Group was evaluated, with conclusions finding that it was well established.  The Core Group did not consult children directly in its work. 

    To combat complex forms of discrimination, it was important to apply a cross-sectional approach when developing legislation.  The action plan to combat hate speech and discrimination against the Sami was launched in January this year, and included 32 measures under headings such as dialogue, democracy, safety and security, among others.  Many valuable inputs from those concerned had been received, including from young people, as well as the Sami Parliament, which was actively involved in the development of the plan.

    The Norwegian strategy for equality for all ran until 2030, with an important competence to increase the visibility of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in all municipalities.  In 2025, the Government allocated 280 million kroner for grants for persons with disabilities.  Norway could not definitively say how many persons with disabilities were living in the country.  A recent report by Statistic Norway focused on the different definitions of disability, which would hopefully assist the State in the future.

    Every year, the Government submitted a forward-looking white paper to the Sami Parliament.  The Government aimed to get more qualified teachers in Sami schools and kindergartens.  The lack of Sami language competence was the biggest challenge to provide good services to the Sami population.  The Government had financed a school programme to assist students with a Roma background to complete primary and secondary education.  The unique framework of the Svalbard community determined what services could be provided.  It was not possible to ensure all needs could be met in the archipelago as on the mainland, including the educational offering, particularly special education, which required a tailored, individual approach.  Any additional needs needed to be met on the mainland. 

    The education act and the private school act that clarified employees to use physical interventions, included an obligation to prevent physical intervention from occurring. The Government and municipalities focused on the competence of the staff to put pre-emptive measures in place so that physical interventions were a last resort and only used when necessary. Schools should have an environment where all students thrived and benefited from education, including those who exhibited disruptive behaviours.  The solutions for these students needed to be adapted to each individual pupil.  This year, the Norwegian Government had allocated money to municipalities to address these issues.   

    Minors who came to Norway alone were a particularly vulnerable group and given high priority. In 2022, an independent evaluation of minors in asylum reception centres was conducted to ensure they received the necessary care, and violations were detected in several centres.  In 2025, the Government increased the funding of independent supervision and funding in several reception centres.  Norway worked systematically to improve the care provided to children in reception centres.  It was mandatory for reception centres to have routines in place to handle violence against children, with staff required to report any violent behaviour to relevant authorities.  The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration had instructed follow-up procedures for minor asylum seekers who may be victims of human trafficking, violence or child marriage. The Directorate of Immigration had developed specific action cards for the reception centres, for each of these specific issues.

    The Directorate of Immigration required that cooperation resident councils were established within asylum centres to ensure residents could express their views on the operation of the centre.  When applying for protection, all unaccompanied asylum-seeking minors were offered an asylum interview, either in person or online.  Clear child-friendly guidelines had been prepared on interviewing children which needed to be followed by police units.  The Immigration Appeal Board heard children orally if deemed necessary.  It was rare for children to be involved in the Board meetings.  Child hearings were conducted orally by the local police in Norway. The police had received guidance on how to hear children in a child-friendly manner. 

    A person charged with a criminal offence who was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense would only be sentenced to preventive detention in extraordinary circumstances. Unfortunately, there were cases where the court had found there were no alternative ways to safeguard public security. In light of the recommendation from the Committee, the Norwegian Government was monitoring this situation. 

    Human trafficking was a grave violation of human rights and a crime with serious consequences. The level of trafficking was low in Norway.  The Government had decided to release a strategy on trafficking in human beings which would be presented in 2025.  Training to detect victims of torture and trafficking was of utmost importance; a national guideline was published in this regard in 2023.  There were several provisions in the criminal procedure act which granted the right to a publicly appointed defence council, which was an unconditional right if the individual was a minor at the time of the offence. 

    More than 89 per cent of children in Norway participated in kindergartens.  The Government’s strategy to 2030 aimed to ensure all children could participate in high quality kindergartens, regardless of where they lived and their financial situation.  The Government had taken steps in 2024 to reduce the price of kindergarten places, significantly lowering barriers for families to enrol their children in kindergartens.  Children of minority backgrounds had lower levels of enrolment.  Children in asylum reception centres were not entitled to a place in kindergarten, but grants were provided to assist them in this regard. 

    Municipalities were strengthening formal competence in education.  School absenteeism could have many different courses and the severity of cases varied.  Absenteeism early in the school year could have significant consequences for pupils. The Government was strengthening efforts to prevent students from developing school absenteeism.

    The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ project was an important measure to ensure the Convention was implemented throughout the whole country. A guide had been created to help the municipalities understand and implement the Convention, and films and other materials had been made to increase the understanding of using the Convention in practice. 

    Children and young people would have to live with the climate, and the decisions made today would affect their future.  It was crucial to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Norway was contributing to this effort by striving to complete its own climate goals and it collaborated with the European Union in this regard.  The Government involved children and young people in the development of the climate policy.  An agreement had been reached which safeguarded the rights of reindeer herders. The State had taken a responsibility to ensure that reindeer herders could utilise additional land for winter grazing.  Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the supply of gas from Norway to Europe had helped free Europe from Russian gas.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    FAITH MARSHALL HARRIS, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, congratulated Norway on the outcome for the reindeer herders.  The issues of violence and bullying in schools was an increasing worldwide phenomenon which had reached even Norway.  Did Norway consider that the socialisation in schools needed to increase?  What would be done about this?  Was the issue of displacement among indigenous peoples being addressed?  Was their free, prior and informed consent being obtained for development activities? 

    A Committee Expert asked if the Immigration Appeals Board had an administrative and judicial competency?  What kind of appeals did it hear?  Were there age assessment appeals before this Board?  How was the right of children to be heard guaranteed if the Board did not hear children directly?  Did the Board hear appeals from detention conditions?  Was there mandatory reporting with regards to the best interest of the child?  Did permanency only apply to children in residential care or those in all care settings?

    Another Expert said developing countries were most vulnerable to the impact of greenhouse gases. What was Norway doing for those countries? 

    A Committee Expert asked if children in Norway had been consulted regarding the ratification of the third Optional Protocol?  Norway should be commended regarding its commitment to the landmine treaty, as landmines were some of the worst arms affecting children.  Did the State plan to take a stronger stance?

    Another Committee Expert asked if there were positive parenting programmes in place in Norway? How was artificial intelligence used in Norway and how did the State protect children from its threats? 

    MARY BELOFF, Committee Vice-Chair and Taskforce Member, asked why Norway did not feel the need to have a differentiated response between the ages of 15 to 18? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said three quarters of the country’s child and adolescent mental health services had implemented cognitive behaviour therapies to address trauma.  The Norwegian Board of Health Supervision conducted nationwide inspections of children in respite homes between 2022 and 2023, and had provided several recommendations, with follow-up measures now initiated.  Since 1991, Norway had implemented a reform for the care of people with developmental disabilities, with the goal to phase out institutional care.  Data showed that almost 20,000 children had received one or more municipal care services. 

    Children with disabilities should be treated equally and protected against discrimination. The Ombudsman for Children played an important role in raising awareness about children’s rights.  Illegal substance use among children and young people in Norway was relatively low.  However, there had been a concerning increase in cocaine use among young men and boys.  The Government was particularly focused on preventing substance use among children and young people.  Most children and young people in Norway reported a good quality of life and satisfaction; however, there had been an increase of poor self-mental health diagnosis among young people in Norway, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic. The Government aimed to ensure that everyone had access to good quality, low-threshold mental health services, and municipal capacities had been developed in this regard.

    Combatting violence against children was a high priority for the Norwegian Government and a national action plan had been developed.  A whitepaper on safe digital upbringing would soon be submitted to Parliament.  The development of social media was being debated, and Norway was assessing an age limit for social media services.  Most social media services were not developed with children’s wellbeing in mind. Children of any age could refuse a parent sharing videos or photos of them on social media.

    In cases of separation, parents should have shared daily authority as a general rule, to safeguard the child’s right to family life and reduce conflict.  Norway had a free and low threshold counselling service for families to prevent disputes.  The Norwegian Directorate of Children and Youth offered a wealth of online resources for parents to help them navigate different aspects of parenting. 

    The Government had proposed legislative amendments to ensure foster parents could be given direct authority to make decisions on behalf of the child.  Foster parents were given the right to appeal the decision to move a child.  The child welfare act regulated follow-up between parents and monitored the child’s development. 

    Children could be placed in child welfare institutions if they had serious behavioural problems; this was the case for approximately 20 per cent of children residing in these institutions.  The State had a duty to ensure these children received the necessary care and help required. 

    Norway’s housing allowance had been strengthened in 2024 and 2025 to help those struggling in the housing market.  The Government had strengthened the grants scheme for the inclusion of children and youth. Policies targeted newly arrived refugees and immigrants who had lived in Norway for years, to increase their access to the labour market.   

    The Government had initiated a series of measures to improve the school environment and was further strengthening this effort.  Studies showed that pupils who did not use their phones in school hours experienced less bullying, and for this reason there was a directive for schools to keep school-hours mobile free.  Schools and kindergartens had an obligation to act if a child was experiencing bullying.

    An age assessment was considered during the asylum decision.  It was not the case that the Immigration Appeal Board never heard the child. When it was assessed that the case was sufficiently informed, the Board could decide on the case without a hearing. Usually, it was assessed that the case was sufficiently informed, as the child had previously been heard through an asylum-seeking interview.  The detention of children was only used to carry out an immediate pending return. Minors above 16 years old could be granted a resident permit if they reached the age of 18.  This was important to reduce the number of asylum-seeking minors embarking on dangerous journeys to Norway and Europe.  There were special penal sentences in place for juvenile offenders.

    Norway regretted the decision of some countries to withdraw from the mine ban treaty and had no plans to withdraw. 

    Gender affirming treatment was not provided to intersex children based on this diagnosis alone; it was only after a diagnosis of gender dysmorphia where treatment could be received, following years of monitoring.  Surgeries were not performed on the psychosocial indications of intersex children.  The last time this occurred was several decades ago. 

    When giving birth in Norway, most births took place in a hospital, where the birth was then registered.  If the birth took place at home without a doctor or midwife present, it was up to the mother to report the birth within one month. 

    Closing Remarks

    BRAGI GUDBRANDSSON, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, appreciated the rich, comprehensive information shared by the delegation.  It was clear Norway was on an exciting journey in revisiting the fundamental principles of the Convention, which was reflected in the new legislation, guidelines and action plans; the Committee was very impressed and appreciated these efforts.  The proposal to expand the use of force in schools and residential care was of concern to the Committee and it was hoped this would be carefully considered before being enacted. 

    LENE VÅGSLID, Minister of Children and Families of Norway and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the important questions and the dialogue.  Norway had seen a rise in the exclusion of children which it wished to turn around.  The proposed children’s act aimed to secure the child’s right to family life, provided it was in their best interest.  Norway aimed to highlight that all sectors were working towards the best possible outcomes for children.  Norway looked forward to receiving the Committee’s concluding observations.

    SOPIO KILADZE, Committee Chair, thanked Norway for the dialogue and for acknowledging the challenges faced by the country.  The concluding observations would contain recommendations to make Norway a better place for children.  Ms. Kiladze extended warm regards on behalf of the Committee to the children of Norway.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CRC25.010E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Addressing menstrual poverty in the EU – 13-05-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Menstrual poverty, defined as insufficient access to menstrual hygiene products and facilities, affects an estimated 10 % of the half of the EU population who menstruate, with a higher prevalence among people with a low income, refugees, young people, and people with disabilities. Studies from Belgium, France, Germany, and Spain highlight the economic burden menstruation imposes, particularly on vulnerable persons. The COVID 19 pandemic exacerbated this issue by disrupting supply chains and intensifying financial strains. To address menstrual poverty, the European Union has facilitated access to menstrual hygiene products primarily through fiscal reform. The revision of the EU VAT Directive introduced greater flexibility for Member States to apply reduced or zero VAT rates to female sanitary products, shifting their classification from luxury to essential goods. Practices remain quite divergent, with some Member States, such as Ireland, Cyprus and Malta, adopting a zero rate, while others, such as Hungary, Sweden and Denmark, maintain standard rates. EU funding programmes such as Erasmus+ and ESF+ have indirectly supported menstrual health initiatives through education, social inclusion, and material assistance projects. Partnerships with non-governmental organisations, such as the Red Cross, have helped distribute products to marginalised groups. Likewise, numerous local initiatives in Member States increasingly provide free menstrual products in schools, universities, and public spaces. The European Parliament recognises menstrual poverty as a gender equality issue and calls for greater access to free menstrual products. Members continue to urge Member States and the European Commission to introduce concrete initiatives to combat period poverty.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Exclusion of forest products from the regulation on agricultural geographical indications – E-001835/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001835/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Céline Imart (PPE)

    Since 2001, France has granted the registered designation of origin (AOC) to certain forest products, such as wood from Chartreuse and Jura. These labels promote sustainable forestry practices, protect local know-how and support the economy of these upland areas.

    However, Regulation (EU) 2024/1143 on geographical indications for agricultural products now excludes forest products, which are covered by the new Regulation (EU) 2023/2411 on craft and industrial products. This recategorisation deprives these products of access to the European Protected Designation of Origin (PDO), which is an essential condition for maintaining their national AOC.

    Furthermore, the transition to the craft geographical indication label is unsatisfactory because it lacks visibility among consumers, even though the production process is more in line with that of an AOC, given its concentration in a particular territory.

    • 1.Does the Commission intend to revise Regulation (EU) 2024/1143 to bring forest products back within its scope?
    • 2.In the absence of a revision in the immediate future, what solutions can the Commission propose to preserve European recognition of forest AOCs such as those of Chartreuse and Jura wood?

    Submitted: 7.5.2025

    Last updated: 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Commission, executive agencies and European Development Funds – P10_TA(2025)0077 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section III – Commission,

    –  having regard to its decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budgets of the executive agencies for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0074/2025),

    A.  whereas the eleventh EDF has reached its final stage as its sunset clause came into effect on 31 December 2020; whereas, however, specific contracts for existing financing agreements were signed until 31 December 2023, and the implementation of the ongoing projects funded by the EDF will continue until their final completion;

    B.  whereas the ninth, tenth and eleventh(1) EDFs were not incorporated into the Union general budget and continue to be implemented and reported on separately until their closure;

    C.  whereas, for the 2021-2027 MFF, development cooperation aid to ACP countries is integrated in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (‘NDICI-Global Europe’) as part of the EU general budget, and development cooperation aid to OCTs, including Greenland, has been incorporated into the Decision on the Overseas Association;

    D.  whereas the EDFs are managed almost entirely by the Commission’s DG INTPA with a small proportion (7 %) of the 2023 EDF expenditure being managed by DG NEAR;

    Political priorities

    1.  Underlines its strong commitment to the Union’s fundamental values and principles which are enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); in the framework of the discharge process, stresses especially the principles of sound financial management as set out in Article 317 TFEU and the combatting of fraud and protection of the financial interests of the Union as set out in Article 325 TFEU;

    2.  Underlines the importance of the principle of separation of powers in the Union and recalls that according to the Treaty, the institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation; believes that under no circumstances the actions of one Union institution should affect the independence of another institution; urges all other institutions to respect the role of the Parliament as the sole Union institution directly elected by the citizens and to refrain from any undue, direct or indirect interference in its legislative processes, thereby ensuring that Parliament’s decision making-process remains free and independent from other Union institutions or any other entities;

    3.  Highlights the importance of the Union budget for achieving the Union’s political priorities, as well as its role in assisting Member States in unforeseen situations such as international conflicts or crises and their consequences; points out in this regard the continuing relevance of investments and support from the Union budget for reducing disparities between Member States and regions, for promoting economic growth and employment, for combating poverty and social exclusion, and thus for improving the daily life of European citizens;

    4.  Notes that the Court of Auditors (the Court) for the financial year 2023 has issued a clean opinion concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, regrets that the Court has had to issue for the 5th consecutive year an adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of Union budget expenditure and a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of expenditure under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF);

    5.  Expresses its deep concerns that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been on a rising trend since the financial year 2020 and has reached 5,6 % for the financial year 2023; notes that there are significant differences in the error rates between headings which range from spending areas with error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 % up to an error rate of 9,3 % in the case of cohesion policy; further notes that discharge is a political process where all issues related to a specific financial year may be taken into consideration and that the decision on whether to grant or refuse discharge should remain factual and anchored in the Union acquis, and that it is taken for the budget as a whole; urges the Commission, finally, to take into account the Court’s recommendations and to reduce the overall error rate over the coming years; further asks the Commission to present an Action Plan within the four months on reducing the error rate;

    6.  Is concerned that the Commission and the Court have different interpretations of what the “error rate” represents, thus generating confusion; expresses its support for a common audit approach and methodology and strongly calls on both institutions to find a solution to the divergent approaches before the 2024 discharge; is concerned that the Commission is systematically underestimating the existing error level and that this could lead to an ineffective protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    7.  Expresses again its deep its concern that the accumulated outstanding commitments (RAL – reste à liquider) have reached a record level of EUR 543 billion, equivalent to 3,2 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023 and representing more than double the Union annual budget for 2023; underlines that such a record high level of outstanding commitments risks creating challenges for the future smooth implementation of extraordinary high levels of payments and/or leading to significant decommitments to the detriment of the implementation of Union policy objectives;

    8.  Further expresses its concern that the outstanding debt from borrowing has reached EUR 458,5 billion, equivalent to 2,7 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023; notes that the increase in outstanding debt during 2023, equivalent to EUR 110,5 billion, has made the Union one of the largest debt issuers in Europe; further notes that the amount of outstanding debt is projected to increase further during the coming years, especially due to increased borrowing linked to the RRF and financial assistance to a number of countries including Ukraine which is the victim of a war of aggression by Russia; reiterates its deep concerns that the increase in debt makes the Union budget more vulnerable to increases in interest rates since a part of the debt will have to be serviced and repaid by the Union budget;

    9.  Recalls the importance of a strict application of the financial rules of the Union in all programmes and on all beneficiaries, in order to avoid all forms of fraud, conflicts of interest, corruption, double funding and money laundering;

    10.  Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect the principles of the rule of law; reiterates its deep concerns about the deteriorating rule of law situation in certain Member States including attacks or restrictions to the activities of civil society organisations, which not only poses a significant threat to democratic values but also leads to an increased risk of financial losses for the Union budget; calls for the provision of adequate support to civil society organisations active in the field; acknowledges the emergence of new forms of rule of law violations by national governments and calls on the Commission to address these evolving challenges; calls on the Commission to ensure strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach the principles of the rule of law where such breaches affect, or risk affecting, the financial interests of the Union; at the same time, underlines the need for complete and timely information on decisions related to the implementation of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism; encourages the Commission to explicitly assess when shortcomings in the rule of law are of a systemic nature; calls for a stronger emphasis on the implementation of country-specific recommendations, coupled with effective follow-up mechanisms and measurable benchmarks; proposes the establishment of a comprehensive rule of law monitoring framework involving all Union institutions, Member States, and candidate countries, aimed at ensuring coherence and uniformity across the Union, while at the same time ensuring a fair and impartial application; calls on the Commission to propose measures to ensure the protection of final beneficiaries in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without undermining the application and effectiveness of the regulation;

    11.  Takes note of the innovative nature of the RRF and its contribution to supporting Member States in recovering from the economic and social consequences of the pandemic and creating a more resilient European economy; is of the opinion that any shift to a performance-based approach based on the RRF as a model requires addressing the many issues identified in its implementation, as well as assessing data on its full impact, before using such a model; recalls the many problems identified in the implementation of the RRF which would need to be addressed, including, but not limited to: the lack of adequate consultation of the regional and local authorities and other relevant stakeholders, such as social partners and civil society organisations and the lack of their involvement in the implementation; the weak cross border dimension, which may hint to a reduced EU added value in that respect; the lack of a clear definition of the milestones and targets and their satisfactorily fulfilment; the insufficient flexibility; the common debt with long-term debt payment as a consequence; the serious transparency, audit and control problems of the program which make it impossible for the citizens to be informed about the final beneficiaries of actions funded by the Union and pushes Member States to use RRF funds to cover projects very similar to those financed by Cohesion funds but with a much more limited capacity of control; reiterates the concern about the interpretation of the Commission and Member States on what a “final recipient” of RRF funding represents, which is not in line with the agreement of the REPowerEU negotiations and maintains that ministries, public authorities or other contracting authorities cannot be listed as final recipients of RRF funding; further expresses concern about the findings of the Court in relation to the risk of double funding and financing of recurring budgetary expenditure which are not in line with the RRF legal basis;

    12.  Notes that the set-up of the NGEU mechanism implies that the repayment of NGEU loans must start before the end of 2027 and be completed by 2058 at the latest; is concerned that the increase in interest rates over the last years has increased the borrowing costs under the NGEU significantly compared with original estimates; reiterates the need to fully respect the timeline of the legally binding roadmap for the introduction of new own resources and underlines that swift progress on new own resources is essential to repay NGEU and safeguard the current and future MFFs;

    13.  Stresses the urgent need for significant de-bureaucratisation, streamlining and simplification of all Union policies and their funding in line with the recommendations in the Draghi report(2) in order to ease the burdens for European businesses and increase European competitiveness, while ensuring the protection of the financial interests of the Union; underlines that simplification will also have a positive effect on error rates in the implementation of policies because many errors happen because of overcomplicated rules which are difficult to navigate, especially for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), new applicants, spin-offs and start-ups;

    14.  Reiterates the need to balance the further simplification of rules and procedures with much more systematic use of digitalised reporting, better and more robust controls and adequate ex post checks on the most repeated areas of irregular spending that do not add excessive bureaucratic complexity for beneficiaries, develop training sessions and practical information for applicants, in particular new applicants, and improve the assistance and guidelines for SMEs, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies and all other relevant stakeholders; reminds that a robust control system under the responsibility of the Commission is particularly needed for the RRF;

    15.  Stresses the need and highlights the importance of the NDICI programme for the support to global challenges, the promotion of human rights, freedoms and democracy; underlines the importance of reinforcing the Eastern Neighbourhood line in order to support political, economic and social reforms in this challenged region;

    16.  Underlines that it is imperative for the credibility of the Union that the Commission ensures that no Union funds are allocated to individuals or organisations linked to any kind of terrorist movements or any other movement expressing extremist views, inciting violence and/or hatred, that are directly in opposition to the European Union’s fundamental values, including Islamist anti-Semitic, anti-Christian and anti-Islamic movements; in this context, recalls that there have been allegations that 19 of 13 000 UNRWA employees in Gaza were involved in the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October; recalls that in 9 cases their employment was formally terminated in the interests of UNRWA; takes note of the results of the investigation launched by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS); underlines that the Commission should also establish better controls ensuring that no such funding happens indirectly through third parties and organise better traceability of Union funds to final beneficiaries;

    17.  Reiterates deep concerns about the increase in the exploitation of Union funds against Union principles and values, especially when the use of funds and transfers to other organisations are not entirely traceable; warns of the danger of Union funds ultimately being used within corrupt circles and being subject to fraud and irregularities, foreign interference or entrism; emphasises the importance of ‘final beneficiary transparency’ for Union funds;

    18.  Emphasises the importance of maintaining institutional integrity and preventing potential foreign interference; condemns any improper attempt to influence the legislative activities of the European Parliament; insists on the responsibility of OLAF to conduct all necessary in-depth investigations; stresses the importance of the work carried out by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in protecting the European Union’s financial interests; insists to provide to the EPPO adequate financial and human resources; recalls the Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union, and insist on its swift implementation in all EU institutions;

    19.  Recalls the crucial role of civil society organisations (CSOs), including NGOs, in upholding democratic values to support a vibrant and lively democratic society, ensuring a sound basis for broad coverage of all relevant views in different debates and highlights that CSOs may receive support from Union funds to exercise these functions, as provided in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union;

    20.  Notes that there have been allegations from some Members of the Budgetary Control committee that grant agreements, concluded by the Commission included detailed lobbying activities which could be interpreted as potentially interfering with internal decision making in the Union Institutions; notes that the Commission took a series of measures to address the allegations by adopting guidance on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy, stating that while such grant agreements did not breach the EU legal framework, they could potentially entail a reputational risk for the Union; notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’; notes that such a disclaimer was further added in the 2024 call for proposals for operation grants;

    21.  Notes that a screening of grant agreements in all portfolios to verify their alignment with the new guidance is ongoing and that, so far, the Commission has not communicated to the Parliament the full results of the screening nor other measures that the Commission might take, if necessary; calls the Commission to keep the discharge authority informed at all times; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with Union institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability;

    22.  Recalls that EU funding requires stringent accountability and transparency standards; in line with the ECA recommendations in the Special Report 05/2024(3) and the recent special Report 11/2025(4), urges the Commission to ensure that the information disclosed in the Financial Transparency System is frequently updated, reliable, comparable and useful; stresses the need to allocate additional resources to the EUTR Secretariat to enable a systematic and thorough monitoring of the Transparency Register; this should include allocating resources towards AI implementation to develop an AI based search mechanism; recalls the need to proactively check that all entities beneficiaries of EU funds respect EU values;

    23.  Welcomes the reply of Commissioner Serafin to the written question(5), once again confirming EU funding was granted and used by NGOs in full respect of EU Treaties and LIFE Regulation(6); takes further note of the recent ECA Special Report on transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs(7), which, while stating that the use of EU funding for NGO advocacy is legal, also confirms it is in line with EU’s legal transparency requirements as laid down in the EU Financial Regulation; at the same time ECA SR 11/2025 points to the fact that more should be done to improve transparency of EU funding received by all beneficiaries; calls in this regard on the Commission to implement ECA recommendations regarding screening of self-declarations in the EU’s Financial Transparency System, as well as proactive monitoring of the respect to EU fundamental values and principles by the beneficiaries;

    24.  Welcomes the entry into force of the recast of the Financial Regulation; welcomes, in particular, the enhancements related to tracking Union funds through digital tools and interoperability that will bolster the protection of the Union Financial Interests, the targeted extension of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management following MFF 2027, the reference to the Rule of Law conditionality mechanism and the introduction of a conditionality based on Union values as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as well as the opportunity to streamline SMEs and individual applicants with the introduction of very low-value grants;

    CHAPTER 1 – Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF)

    The European Court of Auditors’ statement of assurance and budgetary and financial management

    Reliability of the accounts

    25.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023(8), that the consolidated accounts of the European Union for that year are reliable; notes that the Court has issued a clean opinion on the reliability of the accounts every year since 2007;

    26.  Notes that on 31 December 2023, total liabilities amounted to EUR 679,9 billion, and total assets amounted to EUR 467,7 billion; notes that the difference of EUR 212,2 billion represents the negative net assets, comprising debt and the portion of expenses already incurred by the Union up to 31 December 2023 that must be funded by future budgets;

    27.  Notes that at the end of 2023, the estimated value of incurred but not yet claimed eligible expenses due to beneficiaries, recorded as accrued expenses, was EUR 155,2 billion (2021: EUR 148,7 billion), of which EUR 7,4 billion is related to accrued RRF expenditure;

    28.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion that the assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses, including those related to NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the estimate related to the UK’s withdrawal process, and the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, are presented fairly in the consolidated annual accounts;

    Legality and regularity of Union revenue

    29.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the Union’s revenue is free from material error and that the managing systems examined by the Court were generally effective;

    Legality and regularity of Union expenditure

    30.  Strongly regrets the adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of the Union budget expenditure issued by the Court for the fifth year in a row; considers this increasingly problematic, as the Commission seems unable, or unwilling, to identify the cause and address the underlying issues; regrets the Commission is not accepting some recommendations of the Court of Auditors; notes in particular the importance of reinforcement of financial management of the Commission and Member States, that is considered as not reliable by the Court and therefore compromises the reliability of the Annual Management and Performance Report; calls on the Commission to present a clear action plan on reducing the error rate within the following four months; stresses that Parliament shall duly scrutinise such an action plan;

    31.  Is seriously concerned by the Court’s estimation of the error level of 5,6 % in 2023 expenditure; notes that this is an accelerated deterioration compared to the previous two years (4,2 % in 2022 and 3.0 % in 2021); notes with concern that the Court continues to detect substantial issues in reimbursement-based expenditure where the estimated level of error is 7,9 %; notes that the effect of the errors found by the Court is estimated to be both material and pervasive; calls for the Commission’s financial management to be tightened up, in accordance with the recommendations made by the Court in its Annual Reports and Special Reports, in order to resolutely tackle the high error rate over the next few years; underlines the Court’s warning that the increasing European debt is placing growing pressure on the Union budget;

    32.  Notes that the Commission in its Annual Management and Performance Report categorises the expenditure into higher, medium and lower risk categories, in order to focus action on high-risk areas; while the Court uses only two risk categories in order to produce an opinion on the legality and regularity of the expenditures; is worried that the Court’s work revealed limitations in the Commission’s ex-post work, which, taken together, affect the robustness of the Commission’s risk assessment; notes with concern that one of the areas most impacted was ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, where the Court assessed the majority of the spending to be high risk, while the Commission classified only a minority in this way;

    33.  Reiterates the concerns about the Court observation that the Commission’s risk assessment is likely to underestimate the level of risk in several areas; is also worried by recurrent weaknesses identified by the Court in Member States’ management and control systems, which are still not still preventing or detecting irregularities in heading 2, thus limiting the reliance that can be placed on their work, while the Commission’s error rates do still rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively;

    34.  Notes that the increase is primarily caused by the estimated level of error under MFF heading 2 – cohesion, resilience and values, where the Court found 9,3 % of expenditure to be in breach of Union rules and regulations; recalls the underlying issues that are reported by the Court and that have been known for several years;

    35.  Underlines that the estimated level of error in the Union’s expenditure, as presented in the Court’s statement of assurance, is an estimate of the money that should not have been paid out because it was not used in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations; considers that, though not an indicator of fraud or corruption, the estimated level of error represents expenditure where corrective actions are necessary, and thus shows a wasteful use of resources; regrets that, while being a problem in itself, this will also give a negative impression to citizens, and may even call into question the Commission’s ability to effectively protect the Union’s financial interests;

    36.  Notes with concern that the Commission´s own estimate of the risk at payment is only 1,9 % for 2023 and has been at that level since 2020; notes that the Commission estimates its capacity to correct and recover irregular expenditure during implementation of the associated programmes at 1,0 %, resulting in a risk at closure of 0,9 %; is concerned that again for this year the Commission’s risk at payment is not only below the Court estimated level of error of 5,6 % but also below the Court range, which is between 4,4 % and 6,8 %; highlights that the divergence between the Court’s overall error rate and the Commission’s risk at payment is also evident in some of the specific spending areas, in particular in heading 2, even more than in the past; welcomes the Court’s estimate of the level of error as an important indicator for the existing risks;

    37.  Notes the multi-annual perspective of the Commission’s risk at closure, as corrections and recoveries after year-end are not reflected in the Court’s estimate of the level of error; regrets, however, the confusion caused by the Commission’s presentation of the risk at payment;

    38.  Recalls the positions expressed in the 2022 discharge resolution and the exchanges of views in the discharge hearings for the financial year 2023 on the diverging methodologies and estimates between the Court and the Commission of errors made in Union expenditure; notes in particular that the Court’s error rate is based on a statistical sample, whereas the Commission’s risk at payment is to a large extent compiled from the error rates reported by national auditing authorities in Member States and calculated only after corrections and repayments; reminds that the Court’s error rate includes the errors that remained undetected by the Member States and the Commission, which demonstrates that the Commission’s error rates are an underestimation; notes with concern an even wider gap between the Court’s and Commission’s estimates; further notes that the Commission and the Court are organising joint workshops on this issue; notes that the Court recently aligned its methodology on procurement in the decentralised agencies with the methodology of the Commission; reiterates its support for the independent audit approach and methodology of the Court and invites the Commission to cooperate with the Court with a view to increasing harmonisation and providing for more comparable estimates of the level of error;

    39.  Recalls that the discharge authority needs a statement of assurance, provided by the Court, on the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions at year-end for its decision on discharge for that year; notes that Union spending programmes are multiannual and that their management and control systems cover multiple years, allowing for corrections and recoveries after year-end;

    40.  Recalls that the Commission is responsible for preventing and detecting fraud; notes that the Court, in the exercise of its mandate, is obliged to report any cases of irregularity; notes that the Court forwards to the EPPO suspicions of criminal offences falling under its competences and to OLAF suspicions of fraud, corruption or other illegal activity affecting the Union’s financial interests; notes that, in 2023, the Court reported 20 cases of suspected fraud to OLAF, and in parallel reported 12 of these cases to the EPPO, resulting so far in four OLAF investigations and nine EPPO investigations; commends the Court for its reporting of cases of irregularity to OLAF and the EPPO, as information resulting from audit engagements usually has a high degree of reliability; reminds in this framework of the key role played by the whole Union’s anti-fraud architecture and expresses some concerns about the refusal of some Member States to cooperate with one of its elements, the EPPO;

    Budgetary and financial management

    41.  Notes that in 2023, 98,9 % of the available commitment appropriations were used (EUR 184,4 billion out of EUR 186,5 billion); notes that the available appropriations were higher than the MFF ceiling of EUR 182,7 billion due to the use of special instruments for new or unforeseen events; notes that 90,0 % of payment appropriations were used (EUR 162,0 billion of EUR 165,2 billion available);

    42.  Notes with concern that the total outstanding commitments, which represent future debts if not decommitted, reached an all-time high of EUR 543 billion (2022: EUR 450 billion); notes that the Commission foresees a decrease from 2025 to 2029 when committed amounts for both NGEU and the 2021-2027 programming period should be paid out; notes however that the actual amounts for 2023 (EUR 543 billion) are much higher than the forecasted amount (EUR 490 billion), calling the Commission’s estimates into question;

    43.  Recalls that the time available for implementing shared management funds under the 2021-2027 MFF is shorter than under previous MFFs because of the n+2 for the last year, which, coupled with the high RAL, will raise the risk of decommitments; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission has increased its forecasted amount of decommitments from EUR 7,6 billion for 2023-2027, to EUR 8,1 billion for 2024-2027 to EUR 8,8 billion for 2025-2027, a 15 % increase in 2 years; underlines with concern that the Commission has underestimated its projections for the RAL in the last two years, and that the Commission therefore likely underestimates the amount of decommitments that will be made until 2027; notes the introduction of the “cascade mechanism” following the mid-term review of the MFF 2021-2027 and the incentive to use decommitted amounts to cover increased interest costs for amounts borrowed by the Commission for NGEU;

    44.   Notes that the latest long-term payment forecast produced by the Commission foresees substantial decommitments as of 2027 unless Member States undertake additional efforts and implement at a much faster pace than in the period 2014-2020; notes that for the CF, ERDF, and ESF+ cohesion policy funds, the Commission forecast total decommitments for 2024-2027 at EUR 2,2 billion, more than five times its 2022 forecast of EUR 0,4 billion; warns that for the Just Transition Fund (JTF), the low implementation in 2023 puts important amounts at risk from 2025 onwards; calls on the Commission and on the Member States to use all of the available possibilities to avoid decommitments;

    45.  Notes with concern that Union debt increased from EUR 344,3 billion in 2022 to EUR 458,5 billion in 2023, 60 % of which is related to NGEU; notes that only for the debt issued for NGEU, associated interest costs need to be paid directly from the Union Budget and that, due to increased interest rates, these costs for the current MFF (until the end of 2027) are estimated to be between EUR 17 billion and EUR 27 billion higher than the initially forecasted EUR 14,9 billion;

    46.  Notes with concern that the total exposure of the Union budget because of guarantees and contingent liabilities for loans rose to EUR 298,0 billion; notes that assumptions on capital-market interest should be made conservatively, both for existing debt and new debt and that for both categories a viable plan for its repayment is necessary; notes that the Court received information from the Commission that indicates that the exposure will steadily increase in the coming years, putting additional pressure on the headroom of the budget and further reducing the flexibility of the Union budget; supports the Court recommendations to the Commission to act more proactively to ensure that its mitigating tools (such as the Common Provisioning Fund) have sufficient capacity as well as to provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure, making its estimate public;

    47.  Notes with concern that the Court in its Special Report 07/2024(9) observed that a significant share of recovery orders issued between 2014 and 2022 were still outstanding at the time of their audit; further notes that the Commission, in its replies to the Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control’s (CONT Committee) written questions for the 2023 discharge, mentioned that there are 1 357 overdue recovery orders for a total outstanding amount of approximately EUR 335 million for the period 2014-2023; calls on the Commission to prioritise collecting monies under overdue recovery orders and to keep the Committee on Budgetary Control informed about progress made;

    48.  Highlights that equality is a founding value of the Union and is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; recalls the commitment of the Union to gender mainstreaming in its policy-making and implementation of Union funds, including gender budgeting; encourages the Commission to continue the efforts made in gender budgeting and in tracking the impact of the Union budget to foster gender equality; recalls the obligation of the Commission to accompany all legislative proposals with an impact assessment when they are projected to have a significant economic, social, and environmental impact in order to guarantee, among other things, fair distribution of funds;

    49.  Notes that the review of the Interinstitutional Agreement on the Transparency Register is due by July 2025; calls on the Commission to ensure that the process is as open as possible, to align financial reporting requirements across all categories of registrants (including funding sources and lobbying budgets), addressing also the risk identified in the Court’s Special Report on the EU Transparency Register (SR 05/2024) regarding self-declarations on the category of interest representation; believes that, in order to address the recommendations of the Court, the resources of the secretariat of the Transparency Register should be increased;

    50.  Recalls the following findings of the Court of Auditors’ Special Report 11/2025: (i) that the identification and registration of entities as NGOs are not always consistent and reliable; (ii) that despite a more streamlined granting process, issues with the completeness and accuracy of data remain; (iii) that the lack of a reliable overview of Union spending on NGOs hampers useful analysis; (iv) that the calls for proposals in the Court’s sample were transparent; (v) that respect for Union values is not pro-actively verified; and (vi) that transparency practices vary widely in the Court’s sample, with larger NGOs performing better. calls on the Commission to fully implement the recommendations in the Court’s Special Report;

    Recommendations

    51.  Strongly supports the recommendations of the Court in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (annual report for the 2023 financial year)(10) as well as in related special reports; calls on the Commission to implement them without delay and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    52.  Calls on the Court to look for ways, together with the Commission, to align their methodologies for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;

    53.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) continue to engage with the Court in order to increase understanding, convergence and comparability of the two approaches to the diverging estimates of errors in Union expenditure;
       (ii) qualify the impact of corrective measures on the overall level of error;
       (iii) look for ways, together with the Court, to align their methodologies as regards the evaluation of procurement errors, and the estimation of the level of error for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;
       (iv) present the discharge authority with a strategy to strengthen the use of funds for their intended purpose, increase absorption and prevent decommitments in order to maximise the EU-added value of the Union Budget;
       (v) increase the reliability of the forecast of the outstanding commitments with a more realistic estimate of the absorption of Union funds to give the discharge authority a better forecast of the development of the RAL over the years and better protect the Union budget;
       (vi) report on, and provide sufficient measures to, protecting the Union budget from the different risks identified beyond the RAL, such as decommitments in cohesion policy, the increasing debt, increased budget exposure and the impact of increasing inflation;
       (vii) provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure by presenting, in the Annual Management and Performance Report, a multi-annual outlook on the exposure of the Union Budget to budgetary guarantees;
       (viii) substantially simplify rules and procedures and improve the assistance to, and ensure consistent and user-friendly guidelines for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies, CSOs and all other relevant stakeholders, without compromising the quality of the controls;
       (ix) make sure that the mitigation tools in place have sufficient capacity to effectively face the exposure risks of the Union budget;
       (x) boost efforts to improve transparency in the use of funds, including as regards information on final beneficiaries, including on the funds that are allocated for the preparation of policy and legislative proposals;
       (xi) put in place all necessary means for ensuring that all interest representatives that approach Union institutions are registered in the Transparency Register; further asks the Commission to set up an effective mechanism to ensure that entities funded by the Union in the Transparency Register are aligned with Union values and demand full transparency on their financing, providing a deeper insight into the financing of all entities registered and which should be the condition to approach all Union institutions, bodies and agencies;
       (xii) together with Parliament and Council, guarantee adequate resources for the secretariat of the Transparency Register in order to ensure that the entries on the lobbying activities of all interest representatives can be checked for accuracy and that lobbying become more transparent as requested in the Court in Special Report 05/2024 on the EU Transparency Register; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to identify irregularities to guarantee a wide range of search capabilities;
       (xiii) require interest representatives in the Transparency Register to list their financial supporters by self-declaring that they are only representing their interests or the collective interests of their members and to propose an amendment to Annex II to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 to require them to list their financial supporters in the EU Transparency Register, even if they state in that register that they are only representing the interests of their own members; urges entities already registered that have not listed their financial resources by self-declaration to declare them voluntarily before the interinstitutional agreement is amended;
       (xiv) continue to support Member States in improving both the quality and the quantity of checks and to share best practices in the fight against fraud and corruption;
       (xv) address the situation regarding late recovery orders and to take all necessary measures to recover the majority of the amount outstanding for the period 2014-2023, including implementation of corporate escalation mechanisms, and keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made in recovering the sums;
       (xvi) reinforce the capacity of the Anti-fraud Architecture of the Union, including the provision of sufficient financial and human resources, and facilitate the cooperation between them;

    Revenue

    54.  Welcomes that for 2023, the Court is also able to issue a clean opinion on the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, stresses that the problems with customs duties not being declared or being incorrectly declared (a customs gap) leading to a shortfall in collected import duties has been a persistent problem for many years and could potentially entail a loss of traditional own resources for the Union and for the Member States;

    55.  Notes with serious concern that the Court has examined the implementation of the Commission’s Customs Action Plan, which has the potential to lead to a significant reduction of the customs gap, and has again identified insufficient progress in the implementation of some actions from this plan; notes that the Commission, as part of this plan, proposed a customs reform in May 2023(11), including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub;

    56.  Recalls that the Court has highlighted the risks to the EU’s financial interests from inadequate or ineffective customs controls of imported goods; commends the efforts made by OLAF on the fight against Fraud linked to customs duties and VAT; underlines the rise of the ecommerce and the online platforms risks due to potential security and safety threats and risk of non-compliance with EU taxation and customs rules, product standards, intellectual property rights, prohibitions and restrictions;

    57.  Notes with concern that the Court revealed that the Commission did not charge late interest payments for six cases related to late corrections to GNI data by Member States where the Commission has expressed reservations; agrees with the Court that the Commission, as a matter of principle, ought to charge late interest payments in such cases in order to create an incentive for Member States to address the reservations within the deadlines;

    58.  Notes with satisfaction that the new own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste generated by Member States in 2023 amounted to EUR 7,2 billion, equivalent to 4,0 % of the EU’s total revenue; further notes that the Court identified(12) some problems related to the reliability and comparability of data; stresses that it provides an excellent example of a new own resource, as it creates positive incentives for Member States to reduce the volume of non-recycled plastic packaging while at the same time generating a new revenue stream for the Union;

    59.  Stresses that the Commission’s proposals concerning new own resources from 2021 comprising three elements, the first based on revenues from emissions trading (ETS), the second drawing on the resources generated by the Union’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, and the third based on the share of residual profits from multinationals that will be re-allocated to Member States under the OECD/G20 agreement on a re-allocation of taxing rights (“Pillar One”) are obvious candidates for such new resources; at the same time, points out that other sources might also be considered if they should prove to be easier for Member States to approve; welcomes other initiatives that may lead to new own resources for the Union budget;

    60.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) increase focus and pressure on the implementation of the Customs Action Plan and not least the proposal for a significant customs reform from May 2023, including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub; ensure that Member States implement effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for non-compliance with reporting obligations; initiate infringement proceedings in those cases where there is sufficient evidence that Member States are implementing a manifestly inadequate penalty system for breaches of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation 6(13) (DAC 6);
       (ii) insist on the importance of intensifying and diversifying the International customs cooperation with trade partners and stresses the need to strengthen the fight against cross-border tax and customs fraud in the context of the expansion of e-commerce;
       (iii) create incentives for Member States to address reservations related to corrections of GNI data by Member States within the deadlines by charging late interest payments;
       (iv) continue work towards the introduction of additional new own resources;

    Single market, Innovation and Digital

    61.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 1 ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ was EUR 25,3 billion (13,2 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: EUR 15,3 billion (60,5 %) for Research, EUR 4,1 billion (16,1 %) for Transport, Energy and Digital, EUR 2,3 billion (9,1 %) for the InvestEU Programme, EUR 2,2 billion (8,7 %) for Space, and EUR 1,4 billion (5,6 %) for other areas;

    62.  Notes that the Court has examined 127 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading, notably the Horizon 2020 programme (90 transactions), Horizon Europe (7 transactions), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), space programmes and financial instruments, and also that it has reviewed the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA) ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors and the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) and the European Health and Digital Executive Agency (HaDEA);

    63.  Notes that the Court estimates that the level of error in spending on ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ in 2023 was material at 3,3 %; notes the Court’s observation that research and innovation expenditure is most affected by error, particularly in the area of personnel costs; further notes that the Commission estimates the risk at payment as 1,4 % for this heading, which is in the lower half of the range of the Court’s estimate; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that the Commission’s risk at payment for this heading remains an underestimate, because of weaknesses identified by the Court in the Commission’s ex post audits in this area since the financial year 2019(14);

    64.  Notes with concern that 39 (31 %) of the 127 transactions that the Court examined contained errors; is deeply concerned that for seven cases of quantifiable errors made by beneficiaries, the Commission (or the auditors contracted by the beneficiaries) had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure, and thus, had the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1,4 percentage points lower; highlights that this points to weaknesses in the Commission’s controls;

    Research and innovation

    65.  Highlights the importance of Union research and innovation (R&I) funding programmes for the scientific, societal, economic and technological development of the Union, reducing inequalities, achieving the green and digital transitions and decreasing the Union’s energy dependency on Russia; recalls that Horizon Europe is the most significant research and innovation programme in Europe, with a total budget of EUR 95,5 billion for 2021-2027, including EUR 5,4 billion from the NGEU instrument; notes that the RRF has allocated around EUR 48 billion in investments to R&I; underlines that in order to enhance the Union’s competitiveness and close the innovation gap, additional funding for R&I is needed, taking into account the Draghi report’s pertinent recommendations; highlights, in particular, the need to increase defence-related R&I spending due to the current geopolitical conditions, which could serve as an important component of the innovation policy strategy;

    66.  Notes that its predecessor, Horizon 2020, with a budget of EUR 75,6 billion funded more than 35 000 projects between 2014 and 2020 and its calls attracted over a million individual applications from 177 countries; further notes that in her hearing for the 2023 discharge, Commissioner Ivanova underlined the EU added value of EU R&I funding programmes, explaining that the final evaluation of Horizon 2020 estimated that, for each euro of costs linked to the programme five euros worth of benefits would be generated for society by 2040; deeply regrets that 74 % of proposals assessed as high quality by independent experts could not be funded due to budget constraints; notes that an additional EUR 159 billion would have been needed to fund all high-quality proposals; stresses the importance of ensuring sufficient funding for Union research and innovation, not the least to increase the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity, in line with the Union’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029;

    67.  Notes the late adoption of the Horizon Europe legal bases in 2021 and welcomes that the Commission managed to reach close to 100 % budget implementation in 2023; notes that the number of grant agreements signed by the end of 2023 was 10 674 and a further two framework agreements were signed;

    68.  Notes with concern that the Court found errors relating to ineligible costs in 30 of the 97 research and innovation transactions in its sample, and that these errors represent 71 % of the Court’s estimated level of error for this heading in 2023; reiterates its concern that after 9 years of implementation of the Horizon 2020 programme, the calculation of personnel costs remains a major source of errors, as 22 of the 30 research transactions with quantifiable errors in the Court’s sample (around 73 %) are affected by the incorrect application of the methodology for calculating personnel costs; acknowledges both the Commission’s and the Court’s continued efforts to remedy this situation; welcomes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendations to enhance beneficiaries’ compliance with the daily-rate rules and to ensure clarity concerning daily-rate rules in Horizon Europe documents;

    69.  Underlines the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures governing Union R&I funding; notes that in 2023 the Commission has continued the roll out of simplified cost options such as lump sums and unit costs in Horizon Europe; further notes the remarks made by the Director-General for Research and Innovation in the exchange of views with the CONT Committee that the Commission intends to increase the disbursement of Horizon Europe funds through lump sums to 50 % by 2027; welcomes that the Commission, taking the Court’s recommendations issued in its annual reports for 2022 into account, will further specify the requirements defining the proper implementation of lump sum grants, including the elements of each work package triggering payment, and will also provide detailed guidance to those involved in assessing the implementation of projects; further notes that, as described in the Commission’s assessment of Lump Sum Funding in Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe 2018-2024, beneficiaries would welcome more clarity on how lump sum grants would be audited; is concerned that the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe is not yet developed;

    70.  Stresses the crucial role of the private sector in addressing the innovation gap in the Union and improving the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity; believes, in particular, that it is imperative to continue to promote and facilitate as much as possible the participation of SMEs in Union R&I funding programmes; notes the Court’s conclusion that SMEs and newcomers are more prone to making errors than other beneficiaries since they lack the experience and resources to administer the funds; welcomes the efforts made by the Commission to support SMEs specifically, for example through information campaigns, contacts with the system of National Contact Points and the dedicated helpdesk of the Research Enquiry Service; considers that the simplification of rules and procedures is the major driver for increased participation of SMEs;

    Energy, Transport and Digital

    71.  Highlights the importance of Union investments in the development of high performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks in the fields of transport, energy and digital services and notes that the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), with EUR 4,1 billion of expenditure in 2023, is a key Union instrument in delivering these objectives;

    72.  Draws attention to the need to simplify the application procedures under the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) in order to enable greater participation of smaller entities and local initiatives in the development of European transport infrastructure; regrets that the CEF-T budget does not cover all the needs for sustainable transport investments and that most of the CEF-T budget has already been allocated, leaving a funding gap until 2027;

    73.  Recalls that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the resulting sanctions imposed on Russia continued to adversely impact the Union’s transport sector in 2023, leading to traffic shortages, supply chain bottlenecks, and the necessity to bypass traditional routes, thereby extending journey times and increasing costs; points out that the Eastern border regions, especially in the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Romania, have been particularly affected by economic losses and a halt of cross-border mobility as a consequence of the Russian aggression; calls on the Commission to introduce targeted measures, including in the next MFF, to facilitate recovery of the affected regions;

    74.  Calls on the Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of the funding allocated to the cross-border and multi-country infrastructure projects, facing significant implementation challenges, financial difficulties, or delays, such as Rail Baltica; points out that this review should address inefficiencies in planning and management as well as escalating construction costs that threaten project timelines and objectives; reiterates that greater transparency in the management of public funds increases citizens’ trust in the Union institutions;

    75.  Notes with concern that the Court found two errors in CEF projects in its 2023 sample, and that one of these relates to a serious breach of the Union’s public procurement rules, and has led to the contract being awarded to a consortium that did not fulfil the selection criteria and that this error contributed 28 % to the estimated error rate for heading 1;

    76.  Is deeply concerned by the Court’s findings in relation to the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA)ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors, in particular the Court’s conclusion that while the strategies for both CEF1 (2014-2020) and CEF2 (2021-2027) are based on a sound analysis of risks and past irregularities, the guidelines for ex-ante checks on procurement were not detailed enough; fully supports the Court’s recommendation that the Commission should further develop these guidelines;

    Recommendations

    77.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) secure the provision of adequate resources to support high-quality research and innovation project proposals with an EU added value in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework;
       (ii) continue to simplify rules and procedures in line with the new financial regulation, to support training sessions and user-friendly, consistent and practical information for applicants in Member States, in particular for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, CSOs or local action groups and to encourage applications from beneficiaries in Member States with more limited participation, as well as from smaller entities;
       (iii) continue to apply simplified rules and procedures, digitalisation measures and simplified cost options (SCOs) while addressing, in particular, the risk of irregularities and fraud and the costs of controls, and finalising the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe as soon as possible;
       (iv) further specify the requirements for defining proper implementation of lump sum grants, taking into account the Court’s pertinent recommendations from its 2022 Annual Report, and verify the actual implementation of projects using lump sums;
       (v) undertake a thorough analysis of procurement errors found and further develop the guidelines describing the extent of the checks to be performed for ex ante controls on procurement for CEF projects, as recommended by the Court;

    Cohesion, Resilience and Values

    78.  Stresses the importance of Union cohesion policy for economic and territorial convergence and development in the regions of the Union, as well as for supporting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 2 ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ was EUR 73,3 billion (38,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 47,8 % for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and other regional operations, 18,9 % for the European Social Fund (ESF), 9,8 % for the Cohesion Fund (CF), 3,8 % for Erasmus+, 2,1 % for CEF Transport, and 3,8 % for other areas;

    79.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 238 transactions covering the full range of spending under MFF Heading 2; notes with concern that the Court’s estimated overall level of error in expenditure under this heading in 2023 increased to 9,3 %, which is significantly above the materiality threshold; draws attention to the marked increase in the overall level of error estimated by the Court in 2023 compared to previous years (6,4 % in 2022, 3,6 % in 2021);

    80.  Is concerned about the Court’s observation that the significant additional resources made available under the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU), the approaching end of the eligibility period for 2014-2020 programmes (31 December 2023), and parallel implementation of the NGEU programme have put additional pressure on Member State’s administrations, increasing the risk of errors; is in particular concerned by the practice of reducing Member States’ co-funding, as is the case under REACT-EU, the Coronavirus Investment Initiative (CRII) and CRII+, which reduces the ownership and associated incentives for properly overseeing expenditure; notes from the Commission replies the acknowledgement that some authorities may have carried out less effective controls and verifications due to the heavy overload and increasing pressure of parallel implementation of 2014-2020 programmes and of additional funding under NGEU;

    81.  Notes the Court’s analysis of transactions with additional funding through REACT-EU and flexibility through CRII+ and Cohesion’s Action for Refugees (CARE) and their contribution to the estimated levels of error; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities, without either decreasing requirements or increasing preventive checks and controls at the same time, contributed to the high error rate;

    82.  Notes the Court’s Review 03/2024 “An overview of the assurance framework and the key factors contributing to errors in 2014-2020 cohesion spending” that provides a multi-annual overview covering six years of audit results, including an assessment of management and control issues, aiming to strengthen the assurance model; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that, although the assurance framework for cohesion policy has helped to reduce the level of error, it has not been effective in bringing the overall level of error below the materiality threshold of 2 %; is worried that the Commission can rely only to a limited degree on the work of the national audit authorities, because of the systematic weaknesses; supports the Court’s recommendation to the Commission to strengthen the implementation of the assurance framework for the 2021-2027 cohesion spending; reminds the Commission of the discharge authority’s call to work closely with the Member States to improve the management and control system for Union expenditure to reduce the high error rate to below the 2 % materiality threshold;

    83.  Notes the Court’s observation in its review on the reliability of the work of key actors in the control system for cohesion policy; is concerned by the Court’s finding that during a 6-year period managing authorities, the first line of defence for detection and prevention of errors, are not sufficiently effective in mitigating the inherent high risk of error in cohesion policy; considers it even more worrying that the Court found that the second line of defence, the Member States’ audit authorities, are not able to determine the correct error rate for the packages of expenditure they audit and provide assurance on, since the Court detected additional errors in at least 39 % of these packages; notes that these errors have been detected and reported by the Court annually for more than 6 years and that there is therefore a systemic issue;

    84.  Notes the Court’s categorisation of errors found in cohesion expenditure, with ineligible projects accounting for 29 %, ineligible costs for 26 % and serious non-compliance in public procurement procedures accounting for 21 % of errors and ERDF and CF related expenditure accounting for the largest share of errors (80 %); notes that expenditure under the ESF+, YEI and FEAD are proportionally less affected by error, as they together account for 16 % of errors, while they together account for around 20 % of the budget under this heading;

    85.  Notes the study commissioned by the Committee on Budgetary Control on ‘Lessons learned from the implementation of crisis response tools’ that shows that absorption of uncommitted cohesion resources was supported by the flexibilities introduced under CRII and CRII+; is concerned by the finding of the researchers that quality of fast-tracked projects might not have reached the same level as investments before the pandemic; is further concerned by the researchers’ observation that the risk of low-quality projects is entirely borne by the Union Budget, because of 100 % EU-funding in CRII, CRII+ and REACT-EU; considers that 100 % EU-funding might help absorption, but that absorption is not a goal in itself;

    86.  Stresses that, in its most recent discharge opinions, the Committee on Regional Development called for additional advisory support from the Commission to national, local and regional authorities to avoid a situation of administrative overload; recognises the Commission’s efforts but, observes that, regrettably, these have not been sufficient to mitigate the risk of error; warns that a similar administrative overload might occur at the end of the RRF eligibility period and the final years of the MFF; underlines the need to address the insufficient administrative capacity of national, local and regional authorities as a matter of urgency; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to provide them with clear guidance, and to increase its support for administrative capacity building, including through staff training, best practice sharing, peer-to-peer reviews and technical assistance to ensure effective fund management;

    87.  Notes the public discussions on the post-2027 multiannual financial framework that may indicate a shift towards a performance-based model, coupling investments and reforms, and a desire to simplify rules and procedures; calls on the Commission to prioritise the financial responses to the current threats resulting from the geopolitical situation; warns that any decision on the future design of spending programmes must not be to the detriment of oversight and control of Union expenditure in terms of transparency and information at Union level about non-compliance with rules and regulations; considers that the errors identified by the Court and the way the Commission handles those errors are also an indication of a properly functioning management and control system and notes that both institutions stated their commitment to improve the system and bring down the error rate;

    88.  Notes, as in previous years, the Court’s observation that the Commission’s desk reviews, to review and assess the work of audit authorities, are aimed at checking only consistency of regularity information, and that they are therefore too limited to confirm the residual error rate reported by the national authorities in their assurance packages; notes the Commission’s reply that it complements its desk review with on-the-spot audit work covering the programmes and assurance packages, which enables it to establish a reasonable and fair estimate of the error rates for each programme; considers that the Court’s observation is about the scope of the desk reviews and the fact that they are only aimed at consistency and therefore too limited to provide the Commission with information that is sufficiently reliable;

    89.  Is concerned about the persistent shortcomings observed by the Court in the work of national audit authorities as visible in the weaknesses identified in the assurance packages, with a residual error rate above the materiality threshold for more than 60 % of the value of assurance packages audited in 2023; stresses with concern that managing authorities consistently do not effectively succeed in preventing or detecting irregularities in expenditure declared by beneficiaries and that this reduces the extent to which the Commission can rely on their work;

    90.  Reminds that in shared management, it is the Commission’s responsibility to make sure that Member States set up management and control systems that function effectively during the implementation of programmes; is worried that both the Commission and the Court have identified that not all Member States’ management and control systems function effectively, thus negatively effecting the reliability of the Commission error rates, as they rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively; calls into question the possibility for the Commission to continue to rely on national systems;

    91.  Considers that for the single audit approach to work well, and in order to achieve reduced administrative burden for beneficiaries and managing authorities, adherence to audit standards at all levels of control and audit is of essential importance; is therefore worried by the Court’s finding in its annual report that essential supporting documents about compliance with eligibility conditions were not presented by programme authorities and beneficiaries, and also by the finding by the Court presented in its review that insufficient documentation of audit work from audit authorities limits the reliance that can be placed on audit work of national audit authorities;

    92.  Recalls that following Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council(15) (CPR) for the programming period 2021-2027, Member States need to comply with horizontal and thematic enabling conditions, which need to remain fulfilled and respected throughout the implementation period of the funds; recalls that when enabling conditions are not fulfilled at the time of submission of a payment application to the Commission for the specific objective concerned, the related expenditure will not be reimbursed from the Union budget until the Commission is satisfied that the enabling condition has been fulfilled; recalls the strong regrets of the discharge authority in relation to the Commission decision of 13 December 2023(16) considering that Hungary fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition related to judicial independence that enabled the Hungarian authorities to submit reimbursement claims of up to EUR 10,2 billion; notes with concern that since the release of these funds, the Hungarian government has not taken steps to reinstate the independence of the judiciary but on the contrary; reiterates its worries about the lack of adequate control mechanisms or unreliable public procurement procedures to guarantee sound financial management and the protection of the Union budget; believes that this decision politically contradicts the prolongation of the measures adopted under Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(17) (the ‘Conditionality Regulation’);

    93.  Expresses deep concern over the findings in the 2023 Rule of Law Report regarding the rule of law situation in Hungary, particularly the persistent and systemic challenges in the judiciary and the media sectors; notes with alarm the increasing pressure on judicial independence, including concerns over the selection and promotion of judges, and recent reports of intimidation and interference in judicial decisions, as exemplified by the resignations of judges in protest against political influence; notes with concern in the same vein that the head of the Hungarian Integrity Authority, a key institution established as a condition set by the Commission for the release of Union funds under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, is facing increasing pressure from the Hungarian government; calls on the Commission to ensure a coordinated and holistic approach across all relevant Union funds and legislative tools, emphasizing that Union funds must not be allocated to activities undermining democracy or reinforcing authoritarianism;

    94.  Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation establishes a mechanism and measures to protect the Union Budget from breaches of the rule of law when other procedures set out in Union legislation would not protect the budget more efficiently; recalls that this mechanism was activated on 15 December 2022 in the case of Hungary over concerns related to its system of public procurement, resulting in a temporary suspension of 55 % of budgetary commitments for three cohesion policy programmes; recalls that the same regulation, in line with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093(18) (the ‘MFF Regulation’), stipulates that suspended commitments of 2022 (year n), may not be re-entered into the budget beyond 2024 (year n+2) and that therefore 55 % of commitments from 2022, around EUR 1 billion, were decommitted in December 2024; notes that no other procedures under the Conditionality Regulation are ongoing;

    95.  Notes that the Commission allocated an equivalent of five full-time staff members to the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation and reiterates the European Court of Auditor’s concerns raised in its Special Report 03/2024 that current staff numbers appear to be insufficient to ensure a strict and coherent application of the Regulation;

    96.  Reiterates the need to treat as a single, integral package all the measures required for the release of Union funding under the Conditionality Regulation, the CPR and Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council(19) (the ‘RRF Regulation’); stresses the importance of the protection of the Union financial interests also for disbursement of pre-financing;

    97.  Notes that some investments which would have been eligible for financing under cohesion are included in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans; recalls that the general objective of the RRF enshrined in Article 4 of the RRF Regulation is to promote the Union’s economic, social and territorial cohesion, and that one of its six pillars is specifically dedicated to this purpose; acknowledges that the wide scope of the RRF results in limited overlap with other Union funding programmes, as intended by the co-legislators when establishing the Article 9 of the RRF Regulation, which establishes additionality and complementarity funding as key principles; draws attention, however, to the risks of double funding emerging from such situations;

    98.  Expresses its preoccupation about the visible delays in implementation of cohesion policy in Member States and the lack of capacity of national administrations to deal in parallel with different spending programmes (e.g. cohesion programmes and RRF programmes) covering complementary or even similar objectives; calls on the Commission to ensure that sufficient technical assistance is provided to Member States facing difficulties in order to address existing delays in the implementation of cohesion programmes;

    99.  Recognises the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly direct public funding into security, defence and preparedness, while facing dramatically reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes, particularly Interreg programmes; notes the measures taken by the European Commission to support these regions, notably through flexibilities provided under cohesion policy; welcomes that providing support to eastern border regions most affected by Russia’s aggression is included in the mission letter of the Executive Vice President for Cohesion and Reforms; calls on the Commission to ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression, both in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;

    100.  Stresses the importance of ESF+ which aims to achieve high employment, fair social protection, a skilled and resilient workforce, and inclusive/cohesive societies as key in eradicating poverty; expresses the need to provide it with the continued financial and political support of the Union, national and regional institutions in the delivery of its objectives and targets in the years to come; underlines the importance of closely involving regional actors, in particular civil society organisations and social partners working on the ground in the implementation of ESF+ funded activities;

    101.  Welcomes the frontloading of EUR 100 million from the 2027 budget of Erasmus+ to the 2023 budget of Erasmus+, which enabled continued support to pupils, students, teachers and qualified staff fleeing from Ukraine, and the extra EUR 20 million awarded to Erasmus+ in 2023 as a result of Parliament’s insistence; stresses that frontloading must remain an exception to rapid response to unforeseen acute crisis situations; underlines that any frontloading of Erasmus+ cannot result in cuts for the programme at the end of current MFF; emphasises that every effort must be made to respond to such situations preferentially with additional funding;

    102.  Emphasises the need for strict oversight of the allocation of funds to prevent misuse within the Erasmus programme; asks the Commission to gather evidence to investigate any case of fraudulent or suspicious recipients, in accordance with its duties outlined in the Financial Regulation and Erasmus+ grant agreements; calls for adequate safeguarding of the programme from abuse by organizations whose activities are not aligned with the fundamental values of the Union (human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, human rights); recalls that the Commission is legally bound to ensure that programme beneficiaries commit to and ensure the respect of these values and do not commit professional misconduct;

    103.  Notes that in 2023, the budget of the EU4Health programme, the main financial instrument to support Union health initiatives, was EUR 735 million, mainly managed by Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety and the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and implemented through the European Health and Digital Executive Agency; acknowledges the progress of initiatives funded under this programme, notably in the areas of health emergency preparedness, the Beating Cancer Plan, the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe and in the implementation of Union health legislation;

    Recommendations

    104.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) re-consider the practice of 100 % Union funding in Union crisis response instruments, where increasing pre-financing might provide faster availability of funds, while maintaining a shared financial budgetary control responsibility in implementation of the funds by maintaining financial involvement from both national and Union level;
       (ii) ensure selection of qualitatively good projects with cohesion policy funds by favouring long-term investments, and duly justifying 100 % Union funding while limiting its application;
       (iii) address the systemic issue of non-detection of errors at Member State level in cohesion policy spending with an action plan, aimed at reporting an accurate error rate in assurance packages, and detection of errors at the first lines of defence by making available more, and/or better targeting existing resources and increase detection capacity at Member State and Commission level;
       (iv) calculate and report to the discharge authority the cost of control for all expenditure handled by national authorities concerning cohesion policy funds, and NGEU, and compare these figures with the cost of control when only Cohesion policy funds were handled by the same authorities;
       (v) address the recurrent issue of insufficient documentation at beneficiary, programme authority and audit authority level, not only through checks, awareness raising and information on requirements, but also through increased digitalisation and where possible, through financial incentives to penalise non-respect of the requirements for sound financial management;
       (vi) expand the scope of its desk review of assurance packages to review more quality criteria in addition to consistency to make a reliable estimate of the residual error rate for the assurance package under review, as well as of the risk at payment as a whole;
       (vii) step up its monitoring of the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions in all Member States to identify potential threats for the protection of the Union Budget and ensure enhanced transparency and stakeholder participation in the application of this tool;
       (viii) closely align the rule of law report with the Conditionality Regulation and report in more detail on the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that can be used as input to trigger the Conditionality Regulation;
       (ix) continuously monitor the implementation by the Hungarian Government of measures foreseen in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022; assess to what extent the situation has improved or worsened, including in relation to the challenges faced by the Hungarian Integrity Authority, and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation;
       (x) provide Member States with increased technical assistance in order to address delays in the implementation of national programmes in order to increase the absorption rate;
       (xi) closely monitor and mitigate the increasing risk of double funding between Cohesion programmes and RRF funding and address any such occurrences without delay;
       (xii) further enhance simplification in the implementation of cohesion programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xiii) take all necessary measures to bring down the error rate in close cooperation with the Court of Auditors;
       (xiv) ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, both in the short-term and in the medium-term;

    Natural resources

    105.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 3 ‘Natural resources’ was EUR 59,5 billion (31,1 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 65,0 % for direct payments under the European Agricultural Guarantee fund (EAGF), 27,6 % for the Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 4,2 % for market-related expenditure under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), 1,9 % for Maritime and Fisheries, 0,9 % for Environment and Climate (LIFE), and 0,4 % for other areas;

    106.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 218 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading; notes that the Court also examined the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) and the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), as well as selected systems in 20 Member States and the United Kingdom; notes that the Court estimates the level of error for ‘Natural Resources’ to be 2,2 % (2,2 % in 2022) and that the majority of the errors found affected rural development transactions;

    107.  Points out, however, that this is partly due to the complexity of environmental schemes in rural development programmes and the recognized negative issue of “gold plating” at national level;

    108.  Notes, in this context, the lower-than-expected implementation rate of EAFRD funding for the period 2023-2027, with an absorption rate of only 1 % at the end of 2023, with payments amounting to EUR 0,7 billion, and expects the absorption rate to increase significantly in the course of the next reporting period;

    109.  Notes that the Court found 16 quantifiable errors in rural development, 15 in direct payments, three in expenditure related to market measures, and three in non-CAP expenditure; is reassured by the Commission’s assessment that most errors concern clerical mistakes and by the actions taken by the Commission to prevent errors in the future;

    110.  Notes the categorisation of errors by the Court, with ineligible claims accounting for 35 % of the errors, and administrative errors and inaccurate information on areas or animals for 21 % and 20 % respectively; notes with concern, that as in previous years, that the Court found in several cases that the Member State authorities and the Commission had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure and that, had the Member State authorities and the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1.0 percentage point lower;

    111.  Notes that 2023 was the first year of the CAP 2023-2027 new delivery model, which integrates performance elements, agreed with the Member States in Strategic Plans, as basis for payments; notes that 2023 was a modest start of the new delivery model, EUR 63,65 million declared on the basis of generated outputs and therefore subject to a ‘performance clearance’ by DG AGRI out of EUR 215,52 million declared under the CAP Strategic plans under sectoral interventions and rural development; notes that in 2024 payments under the new delivery model will have increased substantially; notes the Court’s observations as regards processing performance data for the Annual Performance Reports where Member States are in the process of setting-up systems and procedures and at times manually aggregate data, with associated risks for the reliability of data;

    112.  Recalls the farmers’ protests across Europe towards the end of 2023 and early 2024 and the Commission’s response aimed at simplification, in particular for small farmers, and increasing discretionary powers for Member States; stresses that simplification should go hand in hand with sound financial management and take into account the Union’s climate commitments; welcomes the Commission’s targeted approach, especially concerning the distinction between farm size in terms of agricultural land and number of farms; cautions that discretion given to Member States should also be accompanied by thorough oversight by the Commission;

    113.  Recalls that both the Commission and Member States are responsible for addressing fraud in CAP spending; welcomes in that regard the work done in terms of anti-fraud risk assessments and the update of its anti-fraud strategy by DG AGRI;

    114.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 07/2024 on the Commission’s systems for recovering irregular expenditure, and the Commission’s reply; notes the Court’s observation that recoveries concerning agricultural expenditure have been relatively successful, attributed in part to the so-called 50-50 rule that incentivised Member States to recover funds; notes that this rule has not been retained in the 2023-2027 CAP and the Court’s warning that this might lead to a deterioration of the rate of recovery for agricultural expenditure;

    115.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 20/2024 on Common Agriculture Policy Plans and the Commission’s reply; stresses the importance of ensuring that all key elements for assessing performance are provided; considers that plans need to account for specific situations in specific Member States and that therefore a certain level of divergence is even desirable, is however worried that divergence in ambitions may mean that there is no level playing field for farmers across Member States; is further disappointed by the Court’s finding that although the new monitoring framework has been simplified, the CAP objectives lack clarity and indicators focus on outputs rather than results, and that important result indicators are missing; notes that the Court recommends the Commission to promote exchange of best practices in the plans and strengthening the future CAP monitoring framework;

    116.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 19/2024 on Organic farming in the EU, and the Commission’s reply; is once more worried by the Court’s finding that a weak strategic framework and data constraints prevent the measurement of the impact of the policy; considers that the increased focus on performance and definition of targets and indicators, and the related monitoring of results across Union policies needs to be supported by an equal increase of the Commission’s capacity to define performance frameworks and monitor performance;

    117.  Welcomes the increased competitiveness achieved through market measures in the wine sector and encourages the Commission and Member States to persevere in their efforts to replicate this success in other sectors;

    118.  Recalls that democracy and pluralism are fundamental values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU; further recalls that, in line with Article 11 TEU, Union institutions shall give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action in order to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue; underlines that separation of powers between the institutions as laid down in Article 13 TEU must always be respected and that Union institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation;

    119.  Recognises the importance of the LIFE programme; recalls the provisions of the LIFE+ Regulation, including those related to operating grants, the eligibility conditions, the award criteria, the overall allocation for 2021-2027 and the distribution of funds within the programme;

    120.  Notes that some members of the Budgetary Control committee requested access to a series of grant agreements under the LIFE programme, as well as other Union funding programmes, and after scrutinising them expressed concerns on the content of several of the programmes in February 2024; notes that the Commission, including the Internal Audit Service (IAS), was initially not aware of any issue, but adopted a series of measures with the aim of addressing the concerns; recalls the discharge written questions and hearings with the Secretary-General of the Commission on 5 November 2024, the responsible Commissioners for MFF Heading 3 on 12 November, and the Commissioner responsible for Budget and administration on 9 December 2024 where the concerns and the Commission’s response were discussed;

    121.  Notes the concerns expressed by some members of the Budgetary Control Committee that certain grant agreements between the European Union Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA) and beneficiaries, such as CSOs and private companies, under the LIFE Programme include ‘work plans’ containing detailed advocacy actions towards Union institutions or their representatives, as well as other actions directed towards certain trade agreements which the Union was negotiating, or litigation measures to be pursued by the respective entities; acknowledges that this could be potentially interpreted as interfering with internal decision making in Union institutions; notes that the Commission has performed a legal analysis of the grant agreements that raised concerns of some Members of the CONT Committee, which concluded that there was no evidence that the entities concerned had breached their contractual or code of conduct obligations, yet the Commission asked some beneficiaries to make amendments to the grant agreements that contained the specific provisions that potentially entailed a reputational risk; further notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’;

    122.  Underlines that Union financing should not contribute to undermining the rule of law, nor the values on which the Union is founded; recalls the provisions of Article 163 of the Financial Regulation; considers it crucial that there should be no funding without traceability of funds;

    123.  Notes the actions taken by the Commission to address the allegations which included the issuance of guidance for Commission services on funding activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy and screening of their contract portfolios to determine which agreements were not in line with the guidance; takes note of the measures adopted so far by the Commission while awaiting the results of the screening of the grant agreements with all the beneficiaries, which was requested by the Commission’s Corporate Management Board;

    124.  Notes the decision-making structure, including the evaluation board within CINEA, for deciding on contracts between the Commission and beneficiaries; urges the Commission to ensure that the decision-making structure of CINEA for deciding on contracts to be awarded features clear accountability, clear responsibilities and a practical structure;

    125.  Notes that the executive agency conducts annual bottom-up risk management exercises and that these bottom-up risk management exercises did not identify any critical risks; notes that irrespective of the financing programme, evaluation procedures should be constantly reviewed and adapted if needed;

    126.  Notes reports in the media that the President of the Commission hired a paid special adviser to deliver a report on the “Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture” who received a salary equal to a Director-General in the Commission; is concerned by the remuneration of all the special advisers and the discretion the Commission has in deciding their remuneration, which creates arbitrary inequalities;

    Recommendations

    127.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) closely monitor the Member States’ progress as regards the processing of performance data and the aggregation of data for the annual performance report and keep the discharge authority informed about issues with reliability of performance data, in particular where it concerns manually aggregated data;
       (ii) inform the discharge authority why the Court concludes that for several years several errors could have been prevented, had the Commission and Member States used all information at their disposal and why the Commission and Member States do not manage to address this issue appropriately;
       (iii) apply the lessons learned as regards the reduction of the administrative burden from its response to the farmers’ protests in future policy initiatives, while taking due account of the risk of abuse of funds where control measures are reduced, or risk of too much divergence between Member States when discretionary powers are used without proper oversight;
       (iv) keep the discharge authority informed about the recovery rates of agricultural expenditure, in particular if the rate deteriorates in comparison to the recovery rate under the previous CAP and swiftly mitigate the causes for the deterioration, including considering the introduction of new incentives for Member State authorities to recover funds;
       (v) assess the differences in ambition of strategic plans and inform the discharge authority whether there is divergence between Member States, threatening the level-playing field for farmers, and assess how the Commission addresses those differences;
       (vi) make better use of its capacity for setting-up performance frameworks, for defining objectives and indicators and holding those contributing to the achievements, be they Member States or beneficiaries, accountable for their contributions;
       (vii) update the Commission’s anti-fraud strategy to devote attention to advocating for and upholding a clear separation of executive and legislative power in the Union;
       (viii) have a clear and comprehensive strategy at Commission level as to how to better protect the financial interests of the Union and ensure that Union funds are spent for their intended purposes and diligently apply the Financial Regulation provisions, including by ensuring that grant agreements can be suspended or terminated when beneficiaries violate the Union’s legislation;
       (ix) ensure a fair distribution of Union funds to CSOs to contribute to a pluralistic and vibrant society;
       (x) ensure that the Commission’s guidance adopted in 2024 is applied by all authorising officers and, if necessary, further develop guidance to fully align grant agreements with Treaty provisions and existing legislation;
       (xi) make the results of the screening of grant agreements available to the discharge authority in order to allow an assessment of the extent to which the Commission may be exposed to a reputational risk;
       (xii) adequately address issues such as revolving doors, transparency in financing and donations, the fight against money laundering, limiting foreign interference, independence from political and economic influence, whistleblowing and transparent governance structures, in respect of all entities receiving Union funds;
       (xiii) review the template for MoUs between the Commission and executive agencies to ensure clearer division of responsibilities;
       (xiv) instruct the audit structure to review contracts with beneficiaries and to flag in case they identify contracts that are not in line with applicable financial rules;
       (xv) have the IAS review contracts between the Commission and grantees, specifically to search for content that is not in line with applicable financial rules within work packages;
       (xvi) evaluate the decision-making structure in the areas of the awarding of contracts and instruct Commission services and executive agencies to perform better checks on the content of contracts at all stages, including by ensuring that work packages and key performance indicators as listed by applicants align with the objectives of respective funding programmes;
       (xvii) adopt more precise categorisation of entities listed in the Financial Transparency System;
       (xviii) review its rules for special advisers to remove the arbitrary selection and remuneration;
       (xix) further enhance simplification in the implementation of programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xx) improve the quality of dialogue with farmers from all Member States;
       (xxi) react more quickly when serious concerns of the discharge authority are flagged to the Commission;
       (xxii) perform adequate checks of entities listed in the Transparency Register, in order to ensure that they comprehensively list their activities in the Register;
       (xxiii) draw clearer lines of responsibility when implementing collaborative platforms;
       (xxiv) instruct the Corporate Management Board to submit consolidated information on the list of critical risks to the internal audit service and ensure executive agencies address potential risks and ensure a transparent selection of independent evaluators to prevent conflict of interest and guarantee their independence;
       (xxv) instruct all DGs and executive agencies to review the distribution of funds dedicated to auditing in order to ensure sufficient resources;
       (xxvi) ensure that proposals for Multiannual Work Programmes of any Union funding instrument have clear guidelines on the activities eligible for funding, clearer rules on screening of applications and on admissible content as well as clearer requirements for transparency and traceability of the use of Union funds, including in relation to the disclosure requirements under the EU Transparency Register;
       (xxvii) ensure that all grant agreements respect the necessary requirements related to transparency, traceability and visibility of funds;

    Migration and Border management

    128.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 4 ‘Migration and Border Management’ was EUR 2,7 billion (1,4 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 1,2 billion (46,5 %) for three decentralised agencies, the European Boarder Coast Agency (FRONTEX), the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU- LISA); 1 billion (38,6 %) for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), and 0,4 billion (14,9 %) for the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF);

    129.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 4 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 18 % of AMIF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    130.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 23 transactions, which is not large enough to be representative of the spending under MFF headings 4 and 5 and, thus, it cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for these headings; further notes that the Court’s audit results show that the expenditure under MFF headings 4 and 5 is affected by eligibility and procurement issues and that it is a high-risk area (7 out of 23 transactions audited, i.e. 30,4 %, were affected by errors); is concerned that the Court detected four quantifiable errors which had a financial impact on the amounts charged to the Union budget and that it also found further ten cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions (which had no direct financial impact on the Union budget); therefore, invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for heading 4; notes that the Commission concludes that the risk at payment in 2023 is 1,1 % for the expenditure on migration and border management;

    131.  Notes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendation made in its annual report for 2023 to provide further guidance on applicable rules to the Member State authorities responsible for implementing DG HOME funding via shared management; regrets that the Commission has not yet fully implemented the Court’s previous recommendations that were due to be addressed by the end of 2023; notes that DG HOME is undertaking a reassessment of its ex-ante methodology to ensure the respect of the rules applicable to post-2021 generation of grants, and that this reassessment will also address the Court’s relevant recommendations and those of the IAS audit on the preparedness for closing actions and programmes funded under the Internal Security Fund (ISF) and the AMIF 2014-2020 through direct and shared management;

    132.  Notes with concern that two reservations on the declaration of assurance were issued in DG HOME’s Annual Activity Report for 2023 and that one reservation concerns the implementation of AMIF and ISF 2014-2020 in several Member States and the other reservation concerns the implementation of Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 2021-2027 in one Member State; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to take remedial measures for the underlying issues that necessitated the reservations;

    133.  Welcomes the progress identified by the Court in its review of the preparatory work done by five member state audit authorities in managing the transition of the AMIF, BMVI and ISF funds to the CPR of the 2021-2027 MFF; observes that these audit authorities reported to the Court that the support and guidance DG HOME provided to them was satisfactory; notes with concern that at the time of the Court’s audit four out of five Member State audit authorities had not finalised their audit strategies;

    134.  Takes note of the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; welcomes that the mid-term revision of the MFF 2021-2027 allocated an additional EUR 2 billion to migration and border management for 2024-2027 to address the growing challenges in migration and border management resulting from the current geopolitical context; notes, however, that additional funds might be needed with a view to ensuring the full implementation of the Pact; calls for the quick implementation of the Pact in the Member States;

    135.  Stresses that securing the Union’s external borders is a pillar of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; notes with concern that the Commission reported that the number of irregular border crossings in the Union increased in 2023 to 380 000, compared to 330 000 in 2022; observes that the BMVI can support frontline Member States to ensure they have the resources for infrastructure, facilities and installations necessary to secure the external borders of the Union, including electronic border security enhancements and other tools for border surveillance as provided for in annex III of the BMVI regulation; notes the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 that the Union will step up its action to prevent irregular departures and loss of life, to reduce pressure on the borders of the Union and on reception capacities, to fight against smugglers and to increase returns; underlines the need to better protect vulnerable people from smuggling and trafficking networks and address the negative effects of the instrumentalisation of migrants as part of hybrid attacks, notably by pro-Russian forces, as well as by the Belarusian regime;

    136.  Recalls that, according to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States and the Commission must ensure respect for fundamental rights and compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the implementation of Union funds;

    137.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the AMIF 2014-2020 was performing below expectations in terms of facilitating returns of migrants: also takes note of the fact that the Court and the Commission agree that progress in this area was particularly affected by COVID-19-related travel restrictions; further notes that in 2023 return measures were supported with EUR 29,8 million from the AMIF; considers that the Commission must provide stronger efforts to assist Member States in addressing irregular border crossing and in successfully implementing returns of third-country nationals, as well as the integration of legal migrants; looks forward to receiving consolidated information in 2025 on progress in this regard through the ex-post evaluation AMIF 2014-2020; highlights that the Commission should continue to take action on migration and asylum within the framework of external action, including the ‘Team Europe’ approach while also increasing the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries and safeguarding the role of the Parliament;

    Recommendations

    138.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) address the Court’s recommendations in a thorough and timely manner and share DG HOME’s revised ex-ante methodology, once completed, with the discharge authority;
       (ii) continue to support the Member State managing and audit authorities in the timely finalisation of their audit strategies for MFF 2021-2027 funds, paying particular attention to eligibility and procurement issues, as well as all other recurrent findings of the Court;
       (iii) take action to improve the performance of actions funded by the Union in terms of effective returns and combatting irregular migration, while ensuring the full respect of Union legislation and the fundamental values of the Union;
       (iv) take action to increase the efficiency of Union spending on the protection and management of the European Union’s external borders;
       (v) monitor, assist in and scrutinise the timely progress of the administrative, operational and legal steps required by Member States and Union agencies for the full implementation of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum by 2026;
       (vi) increase the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries, while safeguarding the role of Parliament in ensuring the democratic scrutiny of Union spending;
       (vii) continuously assess, in the implementation of the Union Budget, compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulation;

    Security and Defence

    139.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ was EUR 1,4 billion (0,7 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 500 million (38,4 %) for the European Defence Fund (EDF), 300 million (19 %) for military mobility, 200 million (17,1 %) for decentralised agencies, namely the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Europol and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), 200 million (13,1 %) for the ISF, and 200 million (12,4 %) for nuclear safety, decommissioning and other areas;

    140.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 5 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 25 % of ISF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    141.  Notes with concern that, for the reasons explained in the section on migration and border management, the Court cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ and that, based on its audit results, the Court considers expenditure from this heading to be high-risk; therefore, invites the Court to provide an estimate of the error rate for this heading as well; notes that the Commission concludes that in 2023 the risk at payment was 0,5 % for the expenditure on security and defence;

    142.  Observes that the Commission has not accepted the Court’s recommendation to carefully check and document the technical aspects of military mobility grant applications to the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) during the grant award procedure and that the Commission considers that its current processes already ensure a check on whether dual-use infrastructure projects meet the eligibility conditions;

    143.  Recalls the highly unstable geopolitical situation in the Union’s neighbourhood giving rise to greater security and defence challenges, including hybrid threats, and thereby to greater investment needs in security, defence and preparedness, since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; draws attention to the fact that MFF heading 5, dedicated to security and defence, is the smallest of all MFF headings and regrets that the Union’s current budget for ensuring the security and defence of its citizens is not equal to the challenges to be met either in the short or the long term; notes that in 2023 Union funding in support of the defence industry came exclusively from the EDF; recalls the role played by the EDF in supporting European technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies; welcomes that submissions to the 2023 EDF calls increased by 72 % compared to the previous year, demonstrating the strong and constantly growing interest of European defence industry actors and research organisations in the EDF and the high demand for funding in this sector; notes that under the 2023 calls, the Union committed EUR 1,15 billion for 61 defence R&D projects, benefiting 581 legal entities from 26 Member States and Norway; notes that on average 17 entities from eight different Member States and Norway participate in each project; underlines the importance of a level playing field in supporting cross-border defence R&D cooperation;

    144.  Welcomes the Commission’s actions to enhance support for SMEs in the defence sector, in particular appreciates that the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), which provides a diverse range of instruments tailored to support SMEs within the defence ecosystem, became fully operational in 2023, with EUR 224 million allocated to it from the EDF budget; appreciates, further, the role of the SME bonus under the EDF in facilitating the access of smaller actors and innovators in defence supply chains; notes that in the 2023 EDF calls, 42 % of the entities selected for funding were SMEs, an increased share compared to 2022 (38,2 %), and that 18 % of the total funding available through the EDF calls is allocated to SMEs;

    145.  Recalls that the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) was a precursor programme of the EDF with a budget of EUR 90 million that funded 18 research projects selected following calls for proposals in the years 2017 to 2019; further recalls that the Court, in its Special Report 10/2023 ‘The Preparatory action on defence research’, has observed that the Union still lacked a long-term strategy for the projects under the EDF, particularly in terms of impact, additional research, development, manufacturing and procurement; welcomes that the Commission has accepted all of the Court’s recommendations and has confirmed that their implementation is ongoing; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s adoption of a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and legislative proposal establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) as well as its commitment to build up the EDF; nevertheless, in view of the geopolitical realities the Union faces, is concerned that the full implementation of the Court’s recommendations is expected only in 2026;

    146.  Recalls the Court’s observations in its Special Report 10/2023 regarding the limited availability of human resources at the Commission and the subsequent risk for the EDF; notes that the growing number of proposals to evaluate and projects to manage puts considerable pressure on human resources; further notes the large share of seconded national experts (17 %) among DG DEFIS staff in 2023 and DG DEFIS’s intention to reinforce staff by the selection of officials through specialised EPSO competitions in the field of space and defence, for which the reserve lists were finalised in November 2023;

    147.  Notes that the implementation of ‘Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0’ is ongoing, with EUR 1,74 billion allocated for dual-use transport infrastructure projects under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) between 2021-2027; notes that so far the Union has co-funded 95 military mobility projects in 21 Member States and that 94 of these projects are still ongoing and most of them are expected to be finalised between 2026 and 2027; notes with concern that following three calls for proposals organised in 2021, 2022 and 2023, the entirety of the military mobility envelope under the CEF for the current programming period has thereby already been exhausted; considers that although making the budget quickly available by frontloading amounts into the 2022 and 2023 calls responded to the need to take into account the evolution of the security situation in Europe following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it simultaneously led to Union funding being unstable and unpredictable by leaving a gap of more than four years with no more Union funds available for military mobility calls to finance dual-use infrastructure projects until the post-2027 MFF; recalls the Court’s conclusions in its Special Report 04/2025 that the Action Plan was not built on sufficiently solid foundations and that progress towards its objective, namely ensuring swift and seamless movement of personnel, materiel and assets at short notice and on a large scale, has been variable due to design weaknesses and remaining obstacles to implementation; notes that the Commission considers that more action is needed to strengthen dual-use transport infrastructure corridors, including on regulatory issues such as cross-border movement permission procedures; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission had not carried out a robust assessment of the overall funding required to make its objectives and targets achievable; regrets that only EUR 300 million was spent on military mobility in 2023 and is concerned that calls for proposals under the military mobility envelope faced a four-time oversubscription rate, demonstrating the increased interest among Member States and project beneficiaries;

    148.  Expresses deep concern over the Commission’s decision to proceed with the adoption of the “Rearm EU” initiative without prior consultation of the European Parliament; regrets that such a decision bypasses the principle of institutional balance and undermines Parliament’s role as co-legislator in shaping strategic and budgetary priorities; urges the Commission to refrain from initiating substantial policy instruments that impact the Union’s financial and strategic architecture without ensuring full respect for the prerogatives of the Parliament;

    149.  Notes that the European Parliament has called on the Union and its Member States to put in place a legal framework enabling Russia to be classified as a State sponsor of terrorism;

    Recommendations

    150.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) develop a longer-term strategy for the EDF, building on the experience with Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the Court’s recommendations, as soon as possible;
       (ii) secure the provision of adequate resources to enhance Union defence cooperation, in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and the timely recruitment of expert staff, and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;
       (iii) further strengthen military mobility in the Union by substantially increasing the funding available to improve dual-use transport infrastructure corridors and by taking action to eliminate administrative, procedural and regulatory barriers to cross-border military movements, while prioritising Union funding to projects that best respond to the current European threat landscape; taking into account the Court’s findings and recommendations in special report 04/2025;
       (iv) take action to ensure due diligence in relation to project criteria for dual-use military mobility infrastructure projects, in line with the Court’s recommendation;

    Neighbourhood and the world

    151.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 6 ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ was EUR 15,2 billion (7,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 63,4 % for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe), 16,4 % for Humanitarian Aid (HUMA), 16 % for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) and 4.2 % for other actions and programmes; notes that in total, payments for ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ reached 15,2 billion in 2023, representing approximatively 8 % of the overall Union expenditure excluding RRF;

    152.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 72 transactions, which is not adequately representative of the spending under this MFF heading and, therefore, cannot provide an estimate of the error rate; considering that the Court’s audit results show that this is a high-risk area (of 37 out of 72 transactions audited, i.e. 51.4 %, were affected by errors), invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for this chapter; notes that the Court found 31 errors that had a financial impact on the Union budget, relating to ineligible beneficiaries, ineligible costs, expenditure not incurred, and breaches of public procurement rules, areas that could point to risks of unreliable functioning of control mechanisms;

    153.  Notes, additionally, that the Court detected 19 cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions, none of which had direct financial impact on the Union budget, and which included issues such as ambiguous cost allocations, non-compliance with visibility rules, and inadequate documentation;

    154.  Is concerned that the Court found a significant non-compliance with visibility rules in an EU-funded project under indirect management by DG NEAR, which concerned a contribution agreement worth EUR 21,2 million signed with an international organisation in a project where the aim was to support Eastern partnership countries in tackling COVID-19; notes that the Court found that most donation certificates it checked did not contain any acknowledgment that the medical equipment donated was funded by the Union; recalls that beneficiaries of Union funds are required to clearly publicise the fact that the Union has financed or co-financed the action they are implementing; notes the Commission’s replies that it is discussing new communication and visibility guidelines with the United Nations to reduce the risks of errors on compliance with visibility rules;

    155.  Expresses concern that the Court, in its IT audit on the information system OPSYS’ component for managing user access and rights, found three shortcomings including (i) that the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) had not formalised a procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users; (ii) four cases in which standard users had more access rights than they needed for their jobs, which is not in line with the Commission’s IT standards; and that (iii) DG INTPA did not manage all administrator accounts belonging to staff of other directorates-general; is concerned that these weaknesses increase the risks of both inappropriate access to the system and non-compliance with the rules and procedures for implementing external action projects, and also undermine the integrity of system processes and data;

    156.  Notes that the Commission intensified communication with international organisations in order to raise awareness of the need to ensure that the Court’s auditors obtain full access to documents when auditing projects funded by the Union, and that the Commission has supported initiatives to find permanent solutions to the issues of access to and retention of documents; notes, however, the Commission’s acknowledgment that despite efforts, some constraints regarding access to documents persist due to the existing legal frameworks of the implementing partners, which are not expected to change in the near future;

    157.  Urges the Commission to enhance the rule of law conditionality-based approach of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) III funding in order for the instrument to serve its purpose of effectively preparing accession countries to fulfil the conditions of becoming Member States of the Union; reiterates its calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the Court’s Special Report 01/2022 in order to ensure an effective impact of Union financial assistance in support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans, in particular by developing guidelines on the application of the provisions on modulation and conditionality under IPA III;

    158.  Stresses that Union aid should under no circumstances – directly or indirectly – be financing terrorism, hence it should not support any entity connected to Hamas or any other terrorist or extremist organisation; notes to this end, it is legitimate and necessary to be able to clearly know and identify all the final beneficiaries of European aid in third countries; emphasises the need for strict control over the distribution and use of aid to ensure no misuse of funds;

    159.  Notes with regret that the European Commission financed the Gaziantep Islamic Science and Technology University, which has proven ties to terrorist organisation of Hamas; calls on the Commission to cancel all ties to this university and other universities with ties to terrorist organisations;

    160.  Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering enhanced support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population, to also make full use of trusted partners, such as the WHO, WFP UNICEF or different Red Crescent organisations; recalls the importance for the Commission to guarantee independent controls of UNRWA by external experts, the Court and experienced international partners;

    161.  Notes that the Commission has been working in the last months with UNRWA, to enhance the neutrality processes and control systems in the Agency, in line with findings of the investigations by the UN OIOS on the allegations of involvement of 19 of its staff in the 7th October 2023 attack, and to monitor the application of the action plan presented by UNRWA on the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent Review Group led by former French Minister of Foreign Affairs Colonna to strengthen control and oversight; notes that the Commission has reassessed the Union’s 2024 funding decision for UNRWA and that, through an exchange of letters between Commissioner Várhelyi and UNRWA Commissioner General Lazzarini in April 2024, the Union reached an agreement about the Union’s conditional assistance for UNRWA, linked to a number of milestones in relation to three work streams, including the screening of UNRWA staff, an audit by the Union, as well as the reinforcement of the Department of Internal Investigations and Ethics office; notes that Union assistance was resumed;

    162.  Recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards by the next school year, in particular those that contain antisemitism as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance classification endorsed by the Union, incitement to violence, hate speech, and glorification of terrorism; recalls the provisions of previous discharge resolutions; stresses that financial support from the Union for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that textbook content is aligned with UNESCO standards, that all anti-Semitic references are deleted, and that examples which incite to hatred and violence are removed, as repeatedly requested in the resolutions accompanying the discharge decisions; recalls the findings of the Georg Eckert Institute’s report funded by the Union, which revealed a complex picture on the textbooks; notes that the Union does not fund the Palestinian textbooks, and that neither are they the responsibility of UNRWA, which nevertheless reviews all issued textbooks to address any problematic content;); notes that the Commission will carry out close scrutiny to ensure that no Union funds are allocated, directly or indirectly, to the drafting, teaching, or exposure of such educational materials to Palestinian children, including those provided by UN organisations;

    163.  Notes DG NEAR’s acknowledgement in its AAR 2023 that projects in Kyiv received regular visits but security constraints limited on-site monitoring and project visits in other Ukrainian regions; further notes that the constraints on adequately monitoring projects in Ukraine led to a renewed reservation in the 2023 AAR of DG NEAR and that corrective actions are being implemented, such as monitoring progress on project implementation through desk reviews, remote solutions and using a service provider;

    164.  Welcomes that OLAF provides targeted anti-fraud assistance to authorities and supports the accession of Ukraine to the Union Anti-Fraud Programme; notes that the Framework Agreement for the Ukraine Facility, which entered into force in June 2024, provides for legally binding arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as measures to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and provisions on the roles of OLAF and EPPO; welcomes, in addition, that, pursuant to article 36 of the Ukraine Facility Regulation, the Commission established in June 2024 an Audit Board, with the mission of assisting the Commission in assessing the effectiveness of Ukraine’s management and control systems regarding the funds provided under the Facility and in fighting mismanagement of Union funding under the Ukraine Facility; calls on the Commission to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about the activities and findings of the Audit Board in order to ensure proper parliamentary oversight;

    165.  Notes with concern the recent reports on the findings of a draft audit report paid for by the Commission on the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) Secretariat which allege to suspected fraud, unpaid salaries and further liabilities; notes that as reported the Commission has contributed EUR 3,7 million to the Secretariat in 2023 and is trying to recover EUR 3,6 million as of March 2024; asks the Commission to ensure full transparency and accountability, grant access to the audit report and inform the members of Parliament on the concrete steps taken;

    166.  Calls on the Commission in line with the Court’s recommendations in its opinion 03/2024 to integrate into the new MFF legislative proposal the recommendations of the External Action Guarantee complementing the Commission’s evaluation, including increased use of blending (grants) in LDCs, fragile or conflict-affected countries and engaged coordination with stakeholders such as civil society;

    167.  Is concerned about the allocation of EFSD+ under the new flexible ‘Support to Investments’ envelope in favour of benefiting countries where the Global Gateway investments are easier to implement at the expense of prioritising LDCs, and fragile and conflict-affected countries; calls for reporting on the volume of EFSD+ amounts allocated and contractualised in these countries and for transparency on how the quota of allocations to LDCs within country MIPs is respected within allocations of the regional MIPs;

    168.  While recognising the Global Gateway strategy as a concerted Union response to global challenges, reiterates that actions bringing together public and private investment must always be guided by the legal framework as provided by the NDICI Regulation, the Agenda 2030, and the needs of partner countries, as communicated by way of an honest dialogue at eye level; is concerned about inconsistencies surrounding Global Gateway programmes; calls, therefore, for improved transparency, democratic accountability, robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in Global Gateway and Team Europe initiatives; calls for a centralised, publicly accessible platform, regularly updated, to detail Global Gateway projects, including their objectives, funding sources, implementing partners, and expected outcomes;

    European Development Fund (EDF)

    169.  Notes that to audit the regularity of transactions, the Court examined a sample of 140 transactions, representing the full range of spending from the EDFs; notes, furthermore, that this comprised 31 transactions related to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 87 transactions authorised by 14 EU delegations(20) and 19 payments approved by Commission headquarters;

    170.  Notes with concern that, out of the 140 transactions examined, 62 (44,3 %) contained errors, compared to 57 (40,7 %) in 2022 for the same number of transactions; stresses, moreover, that the Court quantified 52 errors (48 in 2022), on the basis of which it estimated the level of error for the financial year 2023 to be 8,9 % (7,1 % in 2022);

    171.  Highlights with concern that the three most common types of errors in the financial year 2023 related to expenditure not incurred at 45 % (51 % in 2022), to absence of essential supporting documents at 31 % (7 % in 2022) and to ineligible expenditure at 23 % (24 % in 2022);

    172.  Notes the Commission’s replies to written questions to Commissioners Jutta Urpilainen and Oliver Varhelyi that in 2023 approximately 45 % of the total errors are due to excess clearing, a practice where expenditure not incurred is included in the accounts as expenditure incurred, and that therefore such errors are temporary, since they will no longer exist after the final clearings; notes furthermore that, to reduce these temporary errors, the Commission has requested its partners to review their reporting templates to allow for easier identification of incurred expenditure, and that DG INTPA launched a special working group to screen the compliance of relevant organisations through a risk management framework; also notes that DG INTPA is currently reviewing its control strategy, which aims also to identify how ex-ante controls can be strengthened and to improve the reporting of the pillar-assessed organisations to the Commission; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the effects of these actions;

    173.  Notes that the expected outcomes of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy include the reinforcement of guidance on financial reporting and also on enhanced ex-ante controls so as to prevent errors including on excess clearing; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the remedial measures taken upon finalisation of this review;

    174.  Is concerned that, as in previous years, some international organisations provided only limited access to documents (e.g., in read-only format), which hindered the planning, execution and quality control of the Court’s audit and led to delays; notes that audit and control issues were discussed with UN entities on several occasions, including in the context of joint technical reference group meetings and the relevant EU-UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) working group; notes furthermore that the Commission is working with the International Organisations concerned and has intensified communication with them on the Court’s access to documents; encourages, as in previous years, the Commission to increase these efforts;

    175.  Stresses that, according to Court’s assessment, the Residual Error Rate (RER) study does not constitute an assurance engagement or an audit and is based on the RER methodology and manual provided by DG INTPA; notes that DG INTPA clarifies that the RER study is meant to be a key indicator for the estimated financial impact of residual errors, i.e., it measures the proper functioning of the internal control system and thus, demonstrates the Commission’s corrective capacity; stresses that, as in previous years, the Court has found limitations in the study; notes, furthermore, the Court’s opinion, as in previous years, that the RER methodology allows the contractor to rely entirely on the results of DG INTPA´s controls, and that relying on the work of other auditors is contrary to the purpose of an RER study; highlights the Court’s finding that in cases where these previous checks were carried out under the FAFA between the European Commission and the United Nations, the contractor is not always able to carry out additional substantive testing as the FAFA limits the Commission’s verification rights; highlights the Commission’s reply which recognised the limitations in terms of controls set in the FAFA; urges the Commission to look for workable solutions to resolve this issue;

    176.  Recalls that two EUTFs were created under the EDFs; recalls that EUTF for Africa has mobilised over EUR 5 billion, with 88 % of contributions (EUR 4,4 billion) coming from the EDF and the Union budget; deplores that, despite several requests from Parliament, the process of managing and allocating these funds still lacks transparency; is concerned by the Court’s findings in its Special report 17/2024 “The EU trust fund for Africa Despite new approaches, support remained unfocused; notes that, despite an innovative approach to identifying human rights risks in a difficult environment, these risks were not comprehensively addressed and that the Court found that the assessment of potential risks to human rights was not comprehensive; recalls that the Commission is unable to identify and report on the most efficient and effective approaches to reducing irregular migration and forced displacements in Africa according to the Court; regrets that the new monitoring system aggregates information from all EUTF projects, but suffers from issues of data accuracy; notes that the Union’s Africa trust fund is set to be phased out in 2025;

    Recommendations

    177.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations:

       (i) as regards the OPSYS application system, formalise and enhance the procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users, enhance the quality of the new software, and allocate resources needed to enhance its maturity and robustness;
       (ii) strengthen guidance and controls to ensure that organisations implementing contracts under indirect management, including international organisations, international financial institutions and state agencies, comply with visibility rules;
       (iii) continue to intensify its communication with international organisations in order to provide the Court with complete, unlimited and timely access to documents necessary to carry out its task in accordance with the TFEU, and not just in read-only format;
       (iv) put in place adequate ex ante and ex post control measures in unstable or conflict zones to ensure the proper control of spending of Union funds and ways to recover the Union funds;
       (v) take measures to improve controls systems for the clearing of pre-financing paid to international organisations;
       (vi) strengthen ex ante controls before accepting expenditure;

    178.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) strictly monitor through all available mechanisms and work with UNRWA to ensure the implementation of all agreed actions to guarantee that UNRWA works in full compliance with humanitarian principles and neutrality, including in the forthcoming EU-UNRWA joint declaration and the upcoming financing decisions for conditional Union assistance;
       (ii) ensure that all contracts involving Union funds fully respect applicable Union legislation, including accountability, transparency, and sound financial management, and that this includes verifying that there are no subcontractors, natural persons, participants in workshops and/or trainings or recipients of financial support made to third parties subject to Union restrictive measures or involved in the financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism as well as other acts of hatred and incitement to hatred;
       (iii) increase evidence-based targeting of geographical areas and beneficiaries, and improve the accuracy of reported achievements of future development action, including through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe;

    European public Administration

    179.  Notes that the Commission is directly responsible for the implementation of 59,1 % of the overall administrative budget of the Union, equivalent to EUR 7,2 billion; further notes that 70 % of the administrative expenditure relates to human resources including pensions while the remaining primarily covers expenditure related to buildings, equipment, energy, communications and IT; notes with satisfaction that also for 2023 the Court concludes that the spending area is low risk;

    180.  Notes that during 2023, 2152 civil servants left the Commission primarily due to retirement, resignation or the end of their contracts; notes that this represents a relatively high turnover, which should give the Commission ample possibilities to address persistent imbalances in geographical representation throughout the services;

    181.  Encourages the Commission together with EPSO to ensure that necessary technical systems are put in place as quickly as possible and that processes are accelerated in order for the Commission and other Union institutions to be able to rely on EPSO for the selection of highly qualified and motivated candidates for all types of jobs in the institutions;

    182.  Appreciates that female representation in management positions increased from 46,1 % in December 2022 to 47,8 % in December 2023; encourages the Commission to continue to focus on ensuring and maintaining gender balance on all levels of management;

    183.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission has implemented policies to enhance work-life balance and staff well-being, including the right to disconnect; at the same time commends that a new decision on the prevention and fight against harassment was adopted which establishes the position of a Chief Confidential Counsellor as key figure in the fight against harassment; stresses the need to provide this position with the appropriate resources to effectively carry out multiple challenging tasks;

    184.  Acknowledges the progress of the Commission with regard to the internalisation of crèche staff;

    185.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission issued updated versions of the guidelines on ethical standards for participation of the Members of the European Commission in the election campaign to the European Parliament and guidelines for the participation of Members of the Commission in election campaigns at Member State level; further commends that in March 2023, the Commission adopted much needed strengthened rules on missions and costs paid by third parties;

    186.  Stresses the need to ensure that all the Union Institutions in Luxembourg can attract staff to all types of jobs and careers; notes that especially for servants in lower pay grades Luxembourg can be a less attractive option due to the costs of living; notes that with the agreement on the budget for 2025 the first step has been taken by establishing a special housing allowance for staff in lower grades working in Union institutions in Luxembourg;

    187.  Notes that the Commission has an ambitious goal of reducing the overall office space of the Commission by 25 % and the number of buildings by 50 % by 2030 compared to 2020; notes that the total reduction in overall space reached a little over 83 000 m2 in 2023, equal to a reduction of 11 %; welcomes that this goal is an important element in the Commission achieving carbon neutrality and reducing administrative costs; stresses that it is important that the reduction in the number of building and office space and the resulting roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;

    188.  Is concerned about the severe delays, including delays of up to 6 months, faced by civil servants across the institutions when receiving the reimbursements of healthcare costs under the institutions’ sickness insurance scheme; is also concerned about the inadequate treatment of civil servants and MEPs with autoimmune diseases, neurological disorders, COPD (obstructive pulmonary disease), long COVID, undiagnosed and rare diseases by the sickness insurance scheme of the institutions; notes that patients with these symptoms are often not reimbursed for their diagnostic tests;

    189.  Notes that, in 2023, the Ombudsman launched 398 inquiries concerning the Commission; further notes that during 2023 the Commission received 187 closing decisions without remarks and 17 decisions of maladministration; notes with concern that the Ombudsman receives many citizens’ complaints about extreme delays in gaining access to requested documents from the Commission and encourages the Commission to strive to speed up the processing of such requests and further reduce the number of decisions of maladministration and establish clear rules concerning access to all types of written texts whether on paper, email, text messages or any other form of communication, which is part of an administrative process related to Commission policies or decisions; notes that out of the nine investigations related to the Commission concluded by OLAF in 2023, seven were closed with recommendations; calls on the Commission to ensure transparency and accountability in the follow-up to these cases;

    190.  Expresses deep concern that there has been allegations of corruption linked to the Commission; at the same time deplores that there has been allegations about officials from the Commission that allegedly accepted gifts from a country that the Union was negotiating an agreement with; stresses the need for a clear and systematic approach to ensure that all OLAF cases involving relevant potential criminal offences are promptly referred to the EPPO and the competent national authorities; calls on the Commission to reinforce relevant rules and procedures in order to ensure that all cases are handled in a strict, correct and efficient way;

    191.  Notes that only very few cases of psychological and sexual harassment have been recognised as such in the past years and expresses concern that this may point to institutional blind spots in the Commission, given the significant number of employees of the institution;

    192.  Expresses deep concern regarding reports of an ongoing investigation involving the former Commissioner for Justice, who is alleged to have been engaged, during his time in office, in money laundering activities involving funds of unknown origin; calls on the Commission to fully cooperate with the Belgian authorities and to urgently clarify whether these activities were in any way connected to his official duties within the Commission;

    193.  Calls on the Commission to prioritise permanent staff over external consultants and contractual staff, in order to guarantee high quality working conditions and to prevent knowledge and experience from being lost; calls for flexibility for DGs with a high proportion of seconded national experts (SNE) in the establishment plan to convert SNE posts into temporary agent posts with the aim of ensuring better expertise retention, operational functionality and business continuity; further insists on avoiding the externalisation of tasks to consultancies when available know-how can be found in-house;

    194.  Notes that, in recent years, the Commission has increasingly outsourced impact assessments to external companies, raising concerns about potential conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to strengthen provisions to prevent possible conflicts of interest and to provide better guidance to staff handling public procurement procedures for policy-related service contracts;

    195.  Regrets the alleged espionage organised by the Hungarian Government against OLAF staff during an investigative mission; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and to prevent any violations;

    196.  Welcomes the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2023/2841(21); takes note of cybersecurity investments, including EUR 30 million allocated to enhancing digital security in the Commission; calls on the Commission to spare no effort in further developing a cybersecurity culture, promoting training and awareness within the Union institution; stresses the importance of continued adequate investments in cybersecurity towards the longer term indicative target in the order of at least 10 % of total IT spending;

    197.  Reiterates its concern that the significant risks to the security and protection of the registry and operating mechanism of the Union system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading against cyberattacks have still not been adequately addressed; points out that this issue has been highlighted in the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) since 2010, with reservations raised in each report; notes that this concern is once again emphasised in the Directorate-General for Climate Action’s 2023 AAR, further underscoring the persistent failure to prioritise the security of the system;

    European Schools

    198.  Notes that the European Schools’ overall budget for 2023 was EUR 417,5 million primarily funded by the Commission, other Union institutions, Member States and fees from parents; further notes that almost 80 % of the budget was spent on staff costs;

    199.  Notes with satisfaction that the Court is able to conclude that nothing has come to their attention that causes them to believe that the consolidated accounts for 2023 are not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards;

    200.  Observes that the Court found some systematic or recurrent weaknesses in payments and related human resources (HR) and procurement procedures including insufficient verification of supporting evidence affecting the regularity of some HR procedures and payments;

    201.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) ensure that Union Institutions can rely on EPSO to efficiently organise and complete selection procedures and other staff related procedures in order to provide Union Institutions with sufficient highly qualified and motivated candidates for open positions;
       (ii) explore all possibilities to correct significant geographical and gender imbalances in different categories of the staff;
       (iii) continue work on measures that will ensure that Union Institutions based in Luxembourg can continue to attract highly qualified staff for all types of job profiles;
       (iv) ensure that the roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;
       (v) make more staff available for processing of reimbursement requests for the sickness insurance scheme, to improve staff training and to have better IT software available to process requests more quickly;
       (vi) act as a role model, particularly for diseases that do not fall into classical fields and rare diseases; urges the Commission to expand their technical knowledge and handling of these cases; urges the Commission to expand the catalogue of tests eligible for reimbursement to include a wider bandwidth for laboratory tests and other diagnostic procedures and exams as well as treatments; urges the Commission to do this promptly;
       (vii) ensure the rapid introduction of strong protective mechanisms for Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and third countries, safeguarding their rights;
       (viii) support the European Schools in their implementation, as soon as possible, of recommendations by the Court from previous years and the recommendation from the report concerning the financial year 2023 which asks the schools to perform systematic checks of supporting evidence on allowances paid to seconded staff;
       (ix) prepare a report analysing the reasons why the vast majority of harassment complaints (requests for assistance) in the Commission are dismissed, most of them without even opening an administrative inquiry, and recommending how such dysfunctionality of the formal procedure can be addressed;
       (x) ensure that as of 2025, requests for assistance in harassment cases are followed up with a proper administrative inquiry by the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) or OLAF so as to ensure that harassers are held accountable and sanctioned proportionately to their wrongdoing;

    CHAPTER II – Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

    General remarks

    202.  Notes that in 2023, 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) were revised, and that these revisions had an impact on the pace of implementation of the existing plans, causing delays; notes at the same time that the political priorities in Member States can change; notes that increased energy prices, high inflation and supply chain disruptions caused by Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, and, in some cases, natural disasters, contributed to the revision of the RRPs; underlines that the delays caused by the revisions of the RRPs came in addition to existing ones, as shown by the significant differences between the foreseen calendar of payments requests and the actual transmission of these requests by the Member States to the Commission; remains concerned by the risk of under-implementation and of failure to reach the milestones and targets (M&Ts) as agreed in the RRPs; emphasises the need for enhanced monitoring mechanisms to ensure that delays do not disproportionately impact key projects;

    203.  Notes that there should be a clear thematic link between reforms and investments and that there may be, in certain cases, a long delay between the creation of the national recovery plans and the completion of milestones and targets; regrets that the RRF design does not allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to emerging crises in a prompt manner;

    204.  Draws attention with utmost concern to the statement of the President of the Court, arguing that approximately half of the RRF disbursements had not reached the real economy, and questions if the other half may have been used either to substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or generate profit to Member States from the increased interest rates;

    205.  Recalls that the RRF is a temporary recovery instrument based on performance, i.e. that payments are linked to the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts related to reforms and investments included in the national RRPs; stresses that the effectiveness of the RRF must be assessed, not only in terms of disbursement, but also in terms of its ability to generate tangible, long-term improvements of the consequences of the pandemic; recalls that there is no definition in the RRF Regulation of the “satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts”; recalls that each national plan should effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the European Semester, particularly the country- specific recommendations (CSRs) adopted by the Council; notes the fact that, thanks to the RRF, the percentage of CSRs with progress has increased by 17 % between 2021 and 2023;

    206.  Notes that in 2023, the Commission disbursed a total of EUR 75 billion, and additional pre-financing payments of EUR 7,1 billion, which brought the total disbursements by the end of 2023 to EUR 220,8 billion, divided into EUR 141,6 billion in grants (40 % of the total EUR 357 billion for grants under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) envelope) and EUR 79,2 billion in loans (27 % of the total EUR 291 billion for loans under the RRF envelope); mandates detailed reporting requirements on how Member States allocate funds, preventing substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures, and ensuring funds reach intended beneficiaries;

    Court’s observations

    207.  Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; is concerned that the Court concluded that seven out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were affected by quantitative findings and that six of these payments were affected by material error; notes that in the Court’s opinion, except for those matters, the RRF expenditure accepted in the accounts for the year 2023 is legal and regular in all material respects; notes that the nature of the RRF spending model relies on the assessments of milestones and targets (M&Ts) to be made by the Commission; notes that in 2023, the Court checked 452 M&Ts included in 23 grant payments and that it does not provide an error rate due to the nature of the RRF’s spending model but estimates the minimum financial impact of its findings to be above the materiality threshold; is convinced that Member States should also bear responsibility for errors detected in post-disbursement;

    208.  Expresses deep concern that the Court was unable to verify the actual financial impact of erroneous or ineligible RRF payments due to the inherent limitations of the milestone and target-based assessment model; calls on the Commission to develop a more transparent error-tracking methodology to prevent misallocation and inefficiency;

    209.  Notes that the Court audited 325 out of 542 milestones and 127 out of 135 targets included in 2023 payment requests for grants; regrets that the Court considers that 16 of them were affected by regularity issues (2.4 % of the total); is concerned by the fact that the Court considers that the requirements had not been satisfactorily fulfilled for seven M&Ts in six payments and that the Commission had still made the corresponding payments; notes that the Court’s conclusions are based on extensive audit work and regrets that the Commission contests some of the Court’s conclusions; notes that all of the RRF payments must be assessed against the framework communicated and applied by the Commission, which must take into consideration for each payment the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee and the scrutiny by Member State experts under the comitology procedure; requests the Commission to ensure that all disputed payments related to unsatisfactorily fulfilled M&Ts undergo independent external review to strengthen public trust in the process; recommends an introduction of real-time tracking systems for disbursements and expenditures to prevent misallocations under the RRF and the MFF;

    210.  Notes with particular concern that the Court has identified nine potential cases of ineligible M&Ts linked to the continuation of a pre-existing project that either started before the eligibility period, or that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure; regrets the lack of clarity in the RRF Regulation, and does not share the Commission’s interpretation that the eligibility period concerns only the date of start of works on a specific project rather than the beginning of the preparatory or projection phase; regrets that such a view led to measures which were planned before the RRF eligibility period being included in the RRPs, and acknowledges that any measure must respect the scope, objectives and eligibility conditions set by the RRF Regulation; calls on the Commission to implement stricter verification mechanisms to prevent the inclusion of pre-existing projects that do not provide added value under the RRF framework;

    211.  Recalls that RRF funds shall not be used to replace recurring budgetary expenditure, unless in duly justified case; and is preoccupied by the Court’s findings that some M&Ts that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure were not adequately justified in the RRPs;

    212.  Notes with concern the Court’s finding that NGEU borrowing may more than double by 2026 while the bulk of repayment is deferred to future MFFs; recalls that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must start before the end of 2027, if unused appropriations remain available in the budget line to cover NGEU financing costs, and be completed by 2058 at the latest; notes that the Union budget exposure at the end of 2023 is expected to rise in 2024 and 2025, mainly due to RRF loans; is concerned that potential changes in market conditions might result in higher borrowing costs which, for the NGEU debt relating to grants, will have to be borne by the Union budget; is concerned that there is to date still no repayment plan for the NGEU common debt, and that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument, NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences for the Union’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas;

    213.  Notes the Court’s finding that payments from RRF were lower than expected in 2023; emphasises that the Court has criticised the slow disbursement and absorption of RRF funds; is concerned by the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that absorption of RRF funds has progressed with some delays, that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period for which a significant proportion of funds have already been paid out, and that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period is more challenging with an increase in number of M&Ts, a shift from reforms to investments and more advanced stage of implementation, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year;

    214.  Notes, conversely, that according to the Commission the achievement of M&Ts is broadly on track, as by 31 August 2024, over 40 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed to Member States, with the disbursement of grants reaching 48 % and loans slightly exceeding 30 %; notes that the pace of payment requests has also accelerated since the second half of 2023 with the revision of the RRPs linked to the introduction of the REPowerEU chapters was finalised in 2023;

    215.  Notes the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that additional reasons for slow absorption included measures not being suited to the RRF’s timeframe and underestimation of the time needed to implement them (due to public procurement and state aid rules); as well as uncertainties on implementing rules and how they should be applied including lacking guidance on the ‘do no significant harm’ principle (DNSH) and how to ascribe to it;

    216.  Expresses strong concerns about the Court’s observation that point to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member States control systems as this poses a risk to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the Union’s financial interests; recalls that, according to the RRF Regulation, Member State control systems have a key role to play in ensuring that the financial interests of the Union are protected effectively; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary, including imposing financial corrections, and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

    217.  Expresses concern about the Court’s findings in Special Report N°22/2024 on ‘Double funding from the EU budget: Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to cost’; highlights that Member States can propose so-called ‘zero cost measures’, i.e. measures estimated to have no costs to be financed by the RRF, and for which there is no check at all for double-funding, as the Commission considers that measures which receive no RRF funds are free of risk from that perspective; also notes with concern the Court’s findings that from Member States’ perspective, the many layers of governance involved including national, regional or municipality level, make coordination and oversight very challenging; is concerned that when checks are performed, (i) they suffer from a very complicated environment with different IT tools used often not interoperable and data recorded in an often non-standardised way, leaving manual cross-checks across databases as the only possible tool to check for double funding, and (ii) Member States’ control systems rely to a large extent on self-declarations by recipients of Union funds; notes, however, that the Court did not find any case of double funding;

    218.  Notes the Commission’s observation that, according to the RRF Regulation, double funding is explicitly linked to budgetary costs and thus, there can be no double funding if the Member State has not submitted any cost estimate linked to a specific measure as part of its national plan; notes that the Commission underlines that no-cost reforms do not increase the financial envelope but are nevertheless essential criteria for the Commission’s positive assessment of RRPs, as well as their full implementation for the relevant payments; points out that the Commission, shortly after the Court audit field work, acknowledged it had identified the first two potential cases of double funding;

    219.  Recalls that Article 9 of the RRF Regulation establishes additionality and complementarity between Union programmes and instruments funding as key principles; believes that, to respect these principles but avoid the risk of double financing, the same measures already included in other national plans benefiting from Union funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should either not be included in RRPs or more thoroughly described, even if they do not incur any costs, in order to avoid double funding; underlines that due to the different model of implementation, double funding between RRF and other Union financing instruments might be more difficult to identify, and urges the Commission to remain vigilant and pro-active in identifying any potential situation of double funding;

    220.  Regrets the lack of adequate safeguards to prevent double funding of projects under both the RRF and other Union financial instruments; calls for an automated cross-checking system between RRF and cohesion Funds, the Common Agricultural Policy, and other Union funding programmes to detect and eliminate duplicate claims;

    221.  Expresses concern about the Court’s finding in its Review 01/2023: ‘EU financing through cohesion policy and the RRF: A comparative analysis’ that reporting of fraud involving RRF expenditure still lacks a standardised approach with strong coordination and cooperation between Member States, which are obliged to report on cases of suspected fraud not in an integrated IT system, but in the management declaration accompanying every payment request, although Member States have also reported cases outside of the management declarations; regrets that there are no clear guidelines about exactly when a case of suspected fraud should be reported, whether there is a reporting threshold, and what standard information should be reported for each case and about the remedial measures taken; furthermore supports the request made by the Court to the Commission in the same review 01/2023 to obtain sufficient assurance from the Member States on the effectiveness of national systems to prevent, detect and correct fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest;

    222.  Expresses concerns that in 2023 the Commission had to introduce 10 additional control milestones for seven Members States to address the weaknesses identified in their control systems; reminds and supports the Court’s evaluation that the fact control milestones were introduced, which means that Member states systems were not fully functional when the plans started to be implemented, posing a serious risk to the regularity of the of the RRF expenditure and to the protection of financial interests;

    223.  Regrets the findings of the Court’s Special Report No 26/2023 that several policy areas in the RRF’s pillar containing health policies lack a corresponding common indicator to measure progress; is concerned that this impedes the proper monitoring and understanding of progress made towards achieving milestones and targets linked to health policies;

    224.  Welcomes that, in 2023, the Commission made progress in eliminating any possibility of misinterpretation of figures of the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard and that the Scoreboard further addressed the related recommendation of the Court to improve the presentation of data displayed on the Scoreboard and to improve explanations with regard to its limitations, in particular by better explaining the underlying methodologies and explicitly stating, where applicable, that the data is estimated;

    Audit and control

    225.  Welcomes that, based on the Court’s recommendations and the experience gained, the Commission, in 2023, published three methodological notes to clarify the application of the RRF Regulation, including its framework for (i) assessing the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts, upon conducting an assessment, and (ii) the application of the provisions related to the reversal of M&Ts, as well as a methodology to determine the amount to be suspended if a milestone or target is not satisfactorily fulfilled; takes note of the updated Guidance on RRPs, adopted on 19 July 2024, which provides additional guidance to ensure the continued adequacy of controls to identify and avoid any risk of double funding as well as the methodology for reductions and recoveries under the RRF in accordance with Article 24(8) of the RRF Regulation;

    226.  Calls on the Commission to increase the number of ex-post audits and on-the-ground inspections for RRF-funded projects, particularly in high-risk sectors such as digital infrastructure, energy where previous Union funding programmes have identified significant irregularities;

    227.  Warns that the inclusion of pre-existing projects and the substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures within the RRF framework undermines the additionality principle, effectively converting the instrument into a backdoor financing mechanism for Member States’ regular budgets, rather than fostering genuine post-crisis recovery and resilience; calls for an urgent review to prevent further dilution of the RRF’s purpose;

    228.  Advocates more decisiveness on the part of both the Commission and Member States in order to detect irregularities in the spending of RRF funds and to recover undue payments;

    229.  Is concerned with the Court’s counter-reply to the Commission’s replies on the existence of an assurance gap at Union level regarding compliance with Union and national rules on public procurement and State aid; notes that the Commission argues that the assurance provided by DG ECFIN covers the effectiveness of Member States’ controls on compliance with public procurement and state aid rules. however, stresses that while DG ECFIN’s AAR refers to Commission assessments of the existence and effectiveness of Member States’ controls, there is no conclusion regarding their effectiveness; expresses concern that, according to the Court, this represents an important limitation of the scope of the Commission’s declaration of assurance, meaning that the Commission still does not provide full assurance as to whether RRF expenditure – which the Commission manages directly – complies with the rules;

    230.  Stresses that delays in disbursement and absorption of RRF funds not only slow down economic recovery but also create substantial risks of last-minute, low-quality spending towards the end of the RRF period; calls on the Commission to introduce stricter interim evaluations to prevent a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rush that could lead to waste and misallocation;

    231.  Notes with serious concern that Member States may strategically forego their final payment requests to avoid fulfilling politically sensitive milestones and targets, thereby evading necessary but unpopular reforms; calls on the Commission to introduce financial penalties for incomplete RRF implementation to prevent manipulation of the payment structure;

    232.  Notes that the Commission’s replies that it extended the scope of its audit work beyond that required by the RRF Regulation to verify that the control procedures put in place in the Member States give the necessary assurance that Member States regularly and effectively verify compliance with public procurement and State aid rules and eligibility for RRF measures, but disagrees with the Commission’s opinion that the conclusions of DG ECFIN’s Annual activity report cover this;

    233.  Notes with concern that, as stated by the Commission in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, a majority of Member States consider that the payment suspension methodology remains unclear when it comes to reforms because of the discretion given to the Commission in applying the methodology; urges the Commission to revise this methodology in order to avoid any double standards in its application;

    234.  Notes that the Commission’s IAS, in its audit on ex-ante controls of the RRF payment requests carried out in 2023, identified a very important issue according to which DG ECFIN, in cooperation with the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, should further develop and formalise the existing guidance for the cases where DG ECFIN requests that Member States make additional commitments concerning action stemming from audit and control milestones, in particular that the guidance should define (i) how DG ECFIN should follow up the fulfilment of the formal confirmation on the Member State’s commitment, (ii) the criteria for determining the deadlines for the Member States to fulfil the commitments, and (iii) the relations between the ‘commitment framework’, the ‘framework for assessing M&Ts under the RRF Regulation’ and the ‘Reversal of M&Ts under the Facility’;

    235.  Notes that the Commission checks during its “Protection of the Financial Interest of the Union” audits that Member States have a clear and codified process for transmitting cases of fraud, corruption, conflict of interest and double funding to all competent authorities, including the EPPO where relevant;

    236.  Is concerned by the Court reporting in its annual reports that by the end of 2023, the EPPO had 206 active investigations related to funds used to implement RRF measures and estimated potential damages of over EUR 1,8 billion (concerning both national and Union funding); notes that the 206 open investigations concern ten Member States, with around 75 % of these cases coming from one country; is worried that at the end of 2023 the Member States’ management declarations had not reported a single case of detected suspected fraud, meaning that none of the EPPO open cases were reported by Member States themselves, casting doubts on Member States’ ability to detect and fight frauds; stresses that, while no investigation has yet been completed, the figures presented by the EPPO confirm that the risk of fraud is present in the RRF, and that they call into question the reliability of Member State management declarations in terms of reporting detected fraud and the remedial measures taken; calls for urgent reinforcement of fraud detection mechanisms, including a mandatory fraud risk assessment for all large-scale RRF projects; calls on the Commission to ensure that the EPPO has adequate resources to investigate cases of fraud related to RRF expenditure, given the increasing number of investigations and high estimated damages;

    237.  Warns that Member States’ self-reported fraud cases under RRF remain significantly underreported, creating a misleading picture of financial integrity;

    238.  Strongly regrets the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations and use the Irregularity Management System (IMS);

    239.  Recalls that the Financial Regulation recast in force since 30 September 2024 (‘FR recast’) provides for the extension of its scope of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management and direct management in cases where the budget is implemented with Member States, for programmes adopted or financed as from 1 January 2028; calls on the Commission to act on the most serious grounds for exclusion in order to better protect the financial interests of the Union;

    240.  Notes that, with a view to reducing the margin between the Commission and the Court, for different interpretations of M&Ts, the Commission has published its approach to the concepts of the start date of a measure and the concept of ‘substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure’ as Annex II and Annex III of its 2024 Annual Report on the implementation of the RRF; re-iterate its calls on the Commission to keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;

    Implementation and impact

    241.  Urges the Commission to minimise risks that Member States might chose not to receive parts or the entire amounts of the last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last M&Ts and jeopardising the overall implementation of the RRPs; is extremely concerned about the additional risks of measures being reversed after the RRF lifetime, and urges the Commission, when making the final payments, to ensure that such situations will not occur;

    242.  Emphasises that, according to the Commission’s mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, Member States highlighted the need to mobilise more resources than initially planned to revise the RRPs, and that the efficiency of the performance-based approach is reduced by the ‘excessively complex procedures’ for the plan modifications, which do not distinguish between major or minor amendments and require Council approval for any modification;

    243.  Stresses that for control and audits in the RRF, Member States should put in place arrangements to prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud and conflicts of interests, and that the Commission performs ex-post and system audits on M&Ts; stresses that some confusion persists with respect to the role of the Court, which has developed a strategy (2021-2025 Strategy) for carrying out its responsibilities for the NGEU programme and the RRF, which some Member States perceive as an unnecessary overlap and administrative burden; is concerned that the Commission, both in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024 and its RRF Annual Report of 10 October 2024, acknowledged that Member States’ authorities at all levels found the audit and control procedures to be too complex, and that Member States complained about overlapping audits by national authorities, the Commission and the Court; fully supports the Court work on the RRF; welcomes that the Commission has admitted and accepted that the Court has a full audit mandate on RRF, which is one of the foundation for the Parliament discharge on the RRF funds; recommends to the Member States to cooperate with the European Court of Auditors;

    244.  Is concerned that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation highlighted the entry costs for Member States’ administrations, with room for further simplification; notes, according to this Commission’s Annual Report, that concerning the design of the instrument, in the mid-term evaluation Member States referred to the combined obligations linked to (i) the evidence needed to prove fulfilment of M&Ts, (ii) demanding reporting requirements, for example the common indicators and the bi-annual data; and (iii) the audit and control framework; recalls that Member States see room for simplifying control and audit procedures, ensuring better coordination among the actors involved and avoiding multiple checks; also notes, again according to the Commission RRF Annual Report 2024, that some national authorities also pointed to inflexibility in the Commission’s assessment of milestones and targets and the rigid and resource-intensive procedures to revise RRPs;

    245.  Notes that one of the objectives of the RRF is to help Member States to implement ambitious reforms and investments that make their economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and prepared for the green and digital transitions; highlights with concerns the finding of the Court in its Special Report 15/2024 underlining the lack of relevance, quality and comparability of data submitted by the Member States, with data insufficient to evaluate progress on climate adaptation in the Member States, and thus paving the way for possible greenwashing; expresses concern that the RRF could become a financial vehicle for superficial rebranding of conventional expenditures as ‘green’; encourages the Commission to introduce a mechanism within the RRF framework to track the environmental impact of investments and ensure alignment with the Union’s climate objectives;

    246.  Highlights the RRF impact on the Union business and SMEs; notes that RRF has provided EUR 78 billion in direct support to SMEs, representing 12 % of total RRF expenditure, and that broader measures benefiting businesses amount to EUR 152 billion (23 % of total RRF spending); notes that EUR 2,75 million SMEs, approximately 11 % of all active SMEs in the Union, have received support through the RRF; underlines that nearly 600 000 businesses have benefited from digitalisation initiatives, while EUR 5,2 billion have been allocated to green transition projects, including renewable energy and hydrogen;

    247.  Highlights with concern that the facilitation of cross-border projects has not worked out; deplores that, despite the inclusion in the RRPs of several measures linked to Important Projects of Common Interest (‘IPCEIs’) and cross-border measures in the REPowerEU chapters, the national governance of the Facility has not sufficiently promoted cross-border cooperation; strongly insists that Union financing should be better linked with the achievement of common Union objectives and should generate EU added value;

    248.  Emphasises that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation acknowledged the insufficient involvement of Member States of regional and local authorities, civil society organisations, social partners, and other relevant stakeholders in the preparation and the implementation of the national RRPs; calls for their close involvement in the implementation of the national RRPs on the ground;

    249.  Urges the Commission not to approve any revision of RRPs, which may lead to a re-packaging of planned reforms or investments into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation; notes that any revision should always aim to create added value and increase synergies;

    Transparency

    250.  Recalls that, while Member States are not required to publish all data on final recipients, Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council(22) amending the RRF Regulation requires Member States to publish information on the 100 final recipients receiving the highest amount of funding under the RRF; welcomes that on 10 October 2024, the Commission published, as part of the RRF Annual Report 2024, a dedicated Annex to provide further clarity on the concept of final recipients under the RRF Regulation and the scope of the publication of data on the largest 100 final recipients; expresses deep concern over the interpretation of the Commission of the concept of “final recipient” under the RRF, as often they are listed only at the ministry level, and that the descriptions are vague, with many examples available in almost all lists provided by Member States; reiterates its demand that the list of 100 largest final recipients provides the factual natural person or entity that is the last in a chain of money transfers to be made available in a publicly accessible database to enhance accountability and enable independent oversight, while respecting the legal framework of Union data protection; is concerned that otherwise it will be problematic to measure the impact and guarantee visibility of the RRF funds to the citizens, although also takes into account the RRF Scoreboard and the project map; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance, to prevent a similar interpretation from being applied to the transparency provisions in other financial regulations;

    251.  Reminds the Commission that the letter and spirit of the RRF Regulation must be strictly followed, and that the adoption of guidelines or other internal documents must be fully in line with the results of the negotiations between the co-legislators; is convinced that this has not been the case when the Commission adopted the provisions related to the interpretation of what a “final recipient” is in its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU;

    252.  Notes that not being able to ascertain final recipients of RRF funding poses a severe risk to the transparency and traceability of Union funds and thus to the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    253.  Recalls that a robust IT infrastructure is essential for data collection, programme monitoring and evaluation, and that managing authorities and beneficiaries are critical of the level of information required and duplication with other domestic systems; notes that, in contrast to the Cohesion Policy, the Court under the RRF pointed to the different structures and approaches used by national monitoring authorities, which could be perceived as less reliable by providing non-homogeneous information and leaving room for a potentially high number of errors; stresses that, in this respect, centralised interoperable systems facilitate efficient data collection and reporting, while fragmented systems underscore the need for streamlined approaches;

    254.  Welcomes that the ‘FR recast’ establishes horizontal measures for a centralised website (Financial Transparency System) at Union level, covering all recipients of Union funding, and notes that this website is due to overcome the current fragmentation, enhance transparency, and facilitate public scrutiny of recipients; notes that the Commission, as from the next MFF (i.e. post 2027) will be required to use the relevant data stored in the data mining and risk-scoring tool, Arachne, to feed the centralised website for transparency purposes, and that, in line with data protection rules, the website will include only public data, e.g. relevant data on recipients, contractors, subcontractors, and beneficiaries; further stresses that all Member States will have an obligation to provide the Commission with access to this data, to be fed into Arachne by automated means; regrets that the use of Arachne by Member States is not compulsory;

    255.  Notes that the final M&T of the national RRPs must be completed by 31 August 2026 according to Articles 18(4) and 20(5) of the Regulation; recalls the need for the Commission to work closely with every Member State to speed up implementation on the ground including through providing regular guidance and, upon request, technical assistance to help the implementation of the plans; re-iterates its concerns about the possibility of the reversal of M&Ts after the lifetime of the RRF, and urges the Commission to prevent such situations;

    256.  Calls on the Commission to reject any request of revision of RRPs which would lower the overall ambition of the plan or would eliminate important structural reforms from the RRPs, and to prioritise the completion of measures related to CSRs in RRPs; further calls on the Commission to step up its technical assistance to Member States lagging behind in the RRF implementation;

    Recommendations

    257.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations from its Annual Report as well as those of its related special reports, and welcomes that the Commission accepts the vast majority of them; calls on the Commission to implement them and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    258.  Calls on the Commission to grant full access to the Court to the new reporting tool on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), FENIX as soon as possible;

    259.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) carefully balance auditing and control requirements with the administrative burden imposed on Member States and beneficiaries of future performance-based instruments, while maintaining a sufficient level of control and audit that would grant a solid protection of the Union financial interests;
       (ii) closely monitor the continued fulfilment of M&Ts, in particular those related to audit, monitoring and control and ensure an adequate monitoring of any potential reversal of previously completed M&Ts;
       (iii) use the results of its checks on Member States control systems to express a clear conclusion on their effectiveness and take all appropriate measures;
       (iv) establish one single contact point for Member States on the Statement of Assurance at the Commission to which the Court can have access without further burdening Member States with requests for additional proofs;
       (v) record and monitor systematically all irregularities and all frauds affecting RRF funds;
       (vi) consistently and accurately apply the provisions related to the “final recipients”, of the RRF Regulation, by revising its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU, and to communicate with Member States on the correct application of the definition of “final recipients”; calls on the Commission to come forward with proposals requiring Member States to publish details of all final recipients;
       (vii) streamline its control on the M&Ts through the implementation of a Single Audit approach, which would allow reduction of the administrative burden, the consolidation of audit responsibilities between the Commission and the Court, the coordination of audit timelines and requirements to avoid duplication and overlapping controls and audits, but at the same time ensuring the full protection of the Union financial interests;
       (viii) support Member States in making IT systems truly interoperable, so as to facilitate efficient data collection, reporting and exchange between various government departments and agencies to allow the minimisation of the risks of double funding, actively cross-check between relevant databases, and communicate with Member States about their administrative capacities to ensure double funding does not occur; notes in this regard, the positive examples provided at the Court Conference on Transparency and Traceability of EU Recovery and Resilience Funding in October 2024;
       (ix) work closely with Member States to ensure that M&Ts, in particular those of a structural nature or linked with CSRs, are fully and diligently implemented, and that no revision of RRPs will be approved in cases where ambition has been lowered or important measures have been weakened; avoid, to the extent possible, the revision of plans that would represent a “re-packaging” of planned measures into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation;
       (x) strictly apply the provisions of the RRF Regulation, including those regarding suspension of payments or recoveries of amounts, in particular if the protection of the financial interests of the Union is not ensured;
       (xi) apply very strictly the methodology on partial payments, including as regards structural measures and measures linked to the implementation of CSRs;
       (xii) develop a methodology based on quality and comparability of data to evaluate progress on green and digital transitions, as well as the tangible benefits, in the Member States;
       (xiii) ensure that Member States diligently apply the visibility provisions of the RRF, making sure that measures implemented through the Facility are adequately flagged as funded by the Union;
       (xiv) provide technical assistance, administrative support and advice to Member States to strengthen their administrative capacity, including through the organisation of regular meetings of the Informal Expert Group on the implementation of the RRF to discuss technical aspects and encourage the exchange of good practices amongst national authorities;
       (xv) perform, whenever a revision of the RRPs is proposed, a comprehensive analysis of new and existing measures and whether they would substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or would be in breach of other eligibility conditions of the RRPs;
       (xvi) provide training and support to Member States to increase administrative capacities including training on specialised skills, knowledge and providing examples of best practices;
       (xvii) keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;
       (xviii) use the recommendations of the Court from its work on the RRF and the experience gained in the implementation for the design of the next multiannual financial framework architecture including the implementation of future Union performance-based instruments;
       (xix) strengthen the design of future performance-based instruments by ensuring a closer link between disbursements and progress in implementation;
       (xx) ensure that any future revision, as well as the overall implementation, of RRPs is done in close cooperation with and consultation of local and regional authorities, and other relevant stakeholders in order to maximise the RRP’s impact;
       (xxi) analyse the weaknesses present in performance-based instruments, and address these weaknesses when designing new programmes in the future;
       (xxii) build, in the next MFF, on a high-level of interoperability and data exchange between various government departments and agencies to facilitate efficient data sharing and real-time updates across multiple platforms in order to allow to track overlapping projects, minimising the risks of double counting and double funding.
    (1) The 11th EDF covers the 2021-2027 MFF.
    (2) ‘The future of European competitiveness’, 9 September 2024.
    (3) Special report 05/2024: EU Transparency Register – provides useful but limited information on lobbying activities.
    (4) Special Report 11/2025 Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs – despite progress, the overview is still not reliable.
    (5) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (6) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0783.
    (7) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (8) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (9) ECA Special Report 07/2024: The Commission’s systems for recovering irregular EU expenditure – Potential to recover more and faster.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (11) COM(2023) 258.
    (12) ECA Special Report 16/2024: EU revenue based on non‑recycled plastic packaging waste – A challenging start hindered by data that is not sufficiently comparable or reliable.
    (13) Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements (OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/822/oj).
    (14) ECA 2023 Annual Report para 1.35.
    (15) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).
    (16) Commission Decision of 13.12.2023 on the reassessment, on the Commission’s initiative, of the fulfilment of the conditions under Article 4 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 following Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 regarding Hungary, C(2023)8999.
    (17) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).
    (18) Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj).
    (19) Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj).
    (20) Angola, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, The Gambia, Togo and Uganda.
    (21) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj).
    (22) Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Actions to strengthen the resilience of European crisis infrastructure – E-001795/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001795/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Dimitris Tsiodras (PPE)

    Infrastructure in the EU – such as energy, telecommunications and transport networks – is particularly vulnerable to significant risks, threats and extreme situations. At the same time, the impact of crises is exacerbated by the interconnection and interdependence of this infrastructure. Such crises can cause widespread damage with serious repercussions for citizens and the economy, as seen this week with the power cuts in Spain, Portugal and parts of France.

    In light of the above, can the Commission say:

    • 1.What steps will it take to strengthen the resilience of European infrastructure and how will it help increase investment and mobilise funding to this end?
    • 2.How will it support Member States with regard to preparedness and planning, including identifying, assessing and responding to similar risks and threats, which may affect European infrastructure and the operation thereof?
    • 3.Is it looking into the possibility of drawing up updated risk and threat response plans?

    Submitted: 2.5.2025

    Last updated: 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Humanitarian aid must never be used as a political tool or military tactic: Joint statement on the humanitarian situation in Gaza

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Speech

    Humanitarian aid must never be used as a political tool or military tactic: Joint statement on the humanitarian situation in Gaza

    Joint statement delivered by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, on behalf of Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.

    We, the UK, Denmark, France, Greece and Slovenia, called for today’s urgent meeting of the Security Council on the situation in Gaza.

    First, we first want to welcome the release of Edan Alexander yesterday and reiterate our call for all of the remaining hostages who have been cruelly held by Hamas for over 18 months to be released immediately.

    Their suffering must end. The Security Council has been consistent and clear on this since the brutal terror attack on 7 October.  

    Hamas must have no future role in Gaza or be in a position to threaten Israel.

    Israel has now fully blocked aid entering Gaza for over two months. 

    Blocking aid as a “pressure lever” is unacceptable. 

    And last week, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved plans to expand its military operations in Gaza.

    We strongly oppose both these actions, which will add to Palestinian suffering, while doing nothing to serve the long-term interests of peace and security in the region, nor to secure the safe return of the hostages.

    Any attempt by Israel to annex land in Gaza would be unacceptable and violate international law.

    Palestinian territory must not be reduced nor subjected to any demographic change.

    On the humanitarian situation, the World Food Programme have told us they already have no food left. Palestinian civilians, including children, face starvation as a result. 

    Just yesterday, the IPC released a report warning that Gaza’s entire population is already at critical risk of famine. 

    Without an urgent lifting of the aid block, more Palestinians are at risk of dying. Deaths that could easily be avoided.

    Humanitarian aid must never be used as a political tool or a military tactic.

    We are also deeply concerned at proposals to establish a new mechanism for the delivery of aid, which the UN has said would not meet humanitarian principles.

    International law requires Israel to allow and facilitate the safe, rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian aid and ensure that basic services are provided for all Gazan civilians.

    This applies to all armed conflicts around the world.

    Gaza is not an exception.

    We have two clear messages for the Government of Israel: lift the block on aid entering Gaza now and enable the UN and all humanitarians to save lives.

    Any model for distributing humanitarian aid must be independent, impartial and neutral, and in line with international humanitarian law and principles. 

    We cannot support any model that places political or military objectives above the needs of civilians. Or that undermines the UN and other partners’ ability to operate independently.

    We are also outraged by the killing of Palestinian Red Crescent workers and the hit on a UN compound on 19 March. Humanitarian aid workers and UN premises must be protected.

    We call on Israel to complete and release the findings of its investigation into the UN compound incident and take concrete action to ensure this can never happen again.

    At least 418 aid workers have been killed in Gaza since the conflict began.

    That is at least 418 too many.

    We urge Israel to investigate all incidents transparently, to be clear on the steps taken to hold those responsible to account and reinstate an effective deconfliction system.

    The only way to end the suffering of both Palestinians and Israelis is for an immediate return to a ceasefire, the release of all the hostages, and to urgently advance efforts to achieve a two-state solution. 

    This is the only way to achieve long-term peace and security for both Palestinians and Israelis, and we welcome France and Saudi Arabia’s leadership in chairing an international conference on the two-state solution here in New York in June.

    Updates to this page

    Published 13 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom