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Category: Germany

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Largest amphibious exercise on Braunton Burrows since WW2

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Largest amphibious exercise on Braunton Burrows since WW2

    Exercise Catamaran brought together more than 3,000 personnel from several NATO allies to carry out training on the North Devon coast.

    Personnel from several NATO allies took part in the exercise. Copyright: MOD Crown Copyright.

    The Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) has enabled a major multi-national training exercise alongside NATO allies on Braunton Burrows Training Area, demonstrating its crucial role in supporting military capability.  

    Exercise Catamaran ran between 30 May and 7 June, bringing together military personnel from France, the UK, Brazil, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the US. Royal Marines from 40 and 47 Commando led British involvement in the exercise.  

    It is the largest amphibious exercise of this scale to have been conducted on the training area since it was used by US troops in 1943 to rehearse for the D-Day landings on Utah and Omaha beaches.  

    Ex Catamaran formed part of the wider French-led POLARIS 25 exercise, a month-long training exercise which sees more than 3,000 military personnel from allied nations working on warfighting skills together. The amphibious exercise involved more than 20 surface ships and 40 aircraft in the Atlantic and the Channel and included landing exercises taking place on the beach at Braunton Burrows. 

    Braunton Burrows Training Area is home to one of the largest sand dune systems in the UK and offers a unique place to train.  

    DIO’s Overseas and Training team played an important part in planning and facilitating the exercise. The Foreign Forces team acted as the liaison between the French exercise planners and the Ministry of Defence. They provided expert advice on how the training area could be best utilised to meet training objectives, ensuring that all partners were informed and engaged. 

    Alongside that, Braunton Burrows’ Deputy Training Safety Officer led safety briefings for military personnel, flexibly supported training requirements and ensured a safe place to train was maintained, carefully managing the balance between military training and public access on the area. This technical guidance proved crucial in developing realistic training scenarios that couldn’t be replicated elsewhere in the UK.  

    Braunton Burrows: Enabling Exercise Catamaran

    Brigadier Gavin Hatcher CBE, DIO’s Head of Overseas and Training Region, said:  

    As custodians of the Defence Training Estate, DIO proudly provides a safe and high-quality environment for our Armed Forces and allies to train. While we enable and support important military training year-round, the scale and complexity of Exercise Catamaran has really showcased the versatility and diversity of what we can facilitate.  

    My team has been working closely with the French military for some time to meticulously plan this phase of the exercise on Braunton Burrows Training Area. It has been great to see this collaboration brought to fruition this week with UK military personnel training alongside our allies as they prepare for potential deployments.

    Major Martyn Heenan, Royal Marines, said:  

    Braunton Burrows and the amphibious training it allows is so important as it is one of the most complex operations you can carry out and there’s very few places you can do it. It allows the allied nations involved in this exercise to get onto the same space in a challenging area and work together, which is very difficult to do anywhere else in the world.  

    It’s been a long planning process but DIO have been there all the way through, be it the Foreign Forces team, the Training Safety Officers or the regional commanders, they have really helped with the planning and delivering everything to make this a success.

    Braunton Burrows has to remain accessible to the public at all times, and the site’s Deputy Training Safety Officer conducts careful planning and continuous monitoring alongside colleagues from our industry partner, Landmarc, to ensure military activities can go ahead safely without endangering personnel or members of the public.  

    Updates to this page

    Published 12 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: Resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors, June 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments 3

    Speech

    NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: Resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors, June 2025

    France, Germany, the UK and United States (the Quad) delivered a joint statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board meeting introducing a resolution on Iran’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement.

    Thank you, Chair.

    On behalf of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we express our sincere gratitude to Director General Grossi and to his team for their patient and exhaustive efforts to verify Iran’s implementation of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement required under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and to clarify the critical safeguards issues that have been outstanding for more than six years. Unfortunately, as a result of Iran’s long-time failure to cooperate in resolving these issues, the Agency is not able to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

    Since 2019, Iran has had every opportunity to provide the required, technically credible explanations in response to the IAEA’s questions, which relate to Iran’s core legal obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Regrettably, though, Iran has again refused to engage constructively with the IAEA to provide such explanations, despite multiple requests by the Board to do so since 2020.

    Now, at this Board’s request, Director General Grossi has produced a comprehensive and updated assessment of the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program, addressing the Agency’s ability to verify Iran’s implementation of its safeguards obligations.

    The Director General’s report speaks for itself in describing the full extent of the outstanding safeguards issues in Iran, their connection with Iran’s past nuclear activities, and Iran’s extensive record of obstruction, concealment, deception, and obfuscation in its approach to the work of the IAEA and the implementation of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

    The report makes clear that:

    Iran has refused to declare nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at three undeclared locations in Iran.

    Until the early 2000s, those locations and possibly others formed part of Iran’s undeclared structured nuclear program.

    Iran retained, at Turquzabad, up until 2018, unknown nuclear material and/or heavily contaminated equipment and other assets arising from various locations, the whereabouts of which remain unknown to the Agency.

    These locations, as well as several others, were sanitized through various means, including the wholesale demolition of buildings, at key times in the IAEA’s investigation and despite direct requests by the Agency to preserve them.

    In addition, the Director General’s report underscores that:

    Iran is the only country that is not meeting its obligations related to the implementation of the modified Code 3.1, which it accepted in 2003, even as Iran talks openly about constructing new nuclear facilities. As the Agency has recalled multiple times, the modified Code 3.1 is a legal obligation for Iran under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Iran cannot unilaterally modify or suspend implementation of these Subsidiary Arrangements.

    Iran is the only State in the world without nuclear weapons that is producing and accumulating uranium enriched to 60%, which has potential proliferation implications.

    There have been repeated statements by former high-level officials in Iran related to Iran having the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, which continue to provide concerns.

    The report’s overall assessment is alarming: as a result of Iran’s failure to cooperate with the IAEA, the Director General cannot rule out that nuclear material remains unaccounted for and outside of safeguards in Iran today and he cannot provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. These serious findings should give all of us pause.

    Chair,

    Given the issues reported by the Director General and Iran’s ongoing failure to cooperate with the IAEA, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and United States are bringing forward a resolution for the Board’s consideration finding Iran in noncompliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Our resolution contains the following main points:

    First, it expresses continued, strong support for the Agency’s professional and impartial efforts in carrying out its mandate to verify the implementation of Iran’s safeguards obligations.

    Second, it deeply regrets that Iran has failed to co-operate fully with the Agency, as required by its safeguards agreement.

    Third, it finds Iran in non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute.

    Fourth, it also finds that the Director General’s inability to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful gives rise to questions that are within the competence of the United Nations Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, consistent with Article III.B.4 of the Agency’s Statute.

    Fifth, it calls upon Iran to urgently remedy its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement by taking all steps deemed necessary by the Agency and the Board, and reaffirms its decision that Iran must urgently act to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material and abide by its legal obligation to implement modified Code 3.1.

    Chair,

    The resolution defers the timing and content of the report that the Board is required to take pursuant to the IAEA Statute. We hope that Iran takes this final opportunity to provide full and immediate cooperation with the IAEA so that the Director General can report that these matters have been clarified and resolved, and so that the Board can swiftly consider action to find that Iran’s non-compliance has been remedied.

    We do not take this step lightly. The Board of Governors has given Iran every opportunity over the past six years to resolve questions related to undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. We firmly believe that all IAEA Member States must work together to uphold the integrity of the IAEA safeguards system and the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime, and this shared responsibility includes holding states accountable to their obligations under their NPT-required safeguards agreements. Simply put: the facts are clear, the legal basis is ironclad, and the action is long overdue. That is why we strongly urge all Board members to support this important resolution.

    We understand there are questions about how this resolution may impact separate, ongoing diplomatic efforts with Iran. The IAEA Statute is clear on the Board’s authority to act and find non-compliance when a state is not complying with its obligations under its safeguards agreement. Iran’s legally binding obligation to implement its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement cannot be subject to separate political considerations. This resolution will not undermine diplomatic efforts with Iran – it will only strengthen them. It underscores the importance of Iran’s full cooperation with the IAEA, and its full implementation of its legal safeguards obligations, as the necessary foundation for any enduring agreement that addresses international concerns related to Iran’s nuclear activities. The Director General’s comprehensive report echoes this essential point.

    We also regret that Iran, instead of providing the full cooperation required by its safeguards agreement, has continued to threaten escalation and confrontation. However, let us be clear: this resolution is not an act of escalation by the Board; it is an acknowledgement of the legal and factual reality of Iran’s noncompliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement after many years of concerted effort by the Director General and the Secretariat to resolve fundamental questions related to undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran. It is not the Board that is forcing this step on Iran, but Iran who is forcing this step on the Board.

    Chair,

    The Board cannot be intimidated into inaction by Iran’s threats. A failure to act would only embolden Iran’s continued non-cooperation and escalation. Iran has an opportunity it can and should seize – an opportunity to cooperate meaningfully with the IAEA to finally answer the serious and longstanding questions raised by the Director General.

    With these thoughts, we encourage all members of this Board to join us today in upholding the nonproliferation regime.

    Thank you, Chair.

    Updates to this page

    Published 12 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: France spent €90,000 to discredit the impact of Pacific nuclear testing – Greenpeace response

    Source: Greenpeace Statement –

    Paris, France – New documents obtained by investigative outlet Disclose suggests that France spent €90,000 to discredit research into the impacts of its nuclear testing in the Pacific. In response: 

    Shiva Gounden, Head of Pacific at Greenpeace Australia Pacific said:

    “This act by France is not just a denial of truth — it is an insult to generations who continue to live with the radioactive legacy of these experiments. From the scarred atolls of the Marshall Islands to the irradiated lands of Maohi Nui (French Polynesia), our people carry the enduring fallout of nuclear colonialism – cancers, displacement, environmental devastation, deaths, and loss of generations. Instead of reckoning with its past, France chooses to fund distraction over accountability, image over integrity. This is not the act of a nation seeking justice — it is the act of a nation running from it. The Pacific does not forget and our people will not be silenced. No amount of money can erase the truth written into our Pacific families’ bodies, our lands, and our histories.”

    Pauline Boyer, energy campaigner and nuclear expert at Greenpeace France said: 

    “This is a shamelessly ramped up disinformation campaign by the CEA [France’s Atomic Energy Commission]. Nuclear proponents continue to defend the law of silence at all costs when it comes to the victims of civilian and military nuclear industries. It’s high time the CEA, as well as the French government, acknowledged the facts with transparency and honesty: they deliberately chose to expose populations and their land to radioactive fallout and contamination from French nuclear bomb explosions. Underestimating the number of victims and the extent of the devastating impact on the health of civilian and military populations, in order to reduce the number of compensation claims and minimize this dark chapter in history, is utterly indecent. All the more that France’s choice of the Pacific islands for these nuclear explosions clearly follows a colonialist logic”.

    Last month, a new study by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER) and commissioned by Greenpeace Germany, revealed that US nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands from 1946-1958 had impacted all atolls, but only three of the 24 atolls, all northern and inhabited at the time of radioactive fallout, received medical cancer screening.

    In July, Greenpeace and the Rainbow Warrior will mark the 40 year anniversary of the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior I by the French secret service, who were attempting to halt Greenpeace’s campaign against nuclear testing in French Polynesia (Maohi Nui) at the time.  

    ENDS

    A collection of archival images of the Rainbow Warrior bombing can be found in the Greenpeace Media Library. Other archival images of Greenpeace protests against French nuclear testing can also be found in the Library.

    Contacts:

    Mary Chevallier, energy and nuclear comms, Greenpeace France, +33(0)614739229, [email protected]

    Shuk-Wah Chung, Communications Lead – Marshall Islands project, Greenpeace International, (+852) 5420 4186, [email protected]

    Greenpeace International Press Desk, +31 (0)20 718 2470 (available 24 hours), [email protected]

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • Solar Orbiter spacecraft obtains first images of the sun’s poles

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The robotic Solar Orbiter spacecraft has obtained the first images ever taken of our sun’s two poles as scientists seek a deeper understanding of Earth’s host star, including its magnetic field, its 11-year cycle of activity and the solar wind.

    The European Space Agency on Wednesday released images taken in March using three of Solar Orbiter’s onboard instruments. They show the sun’s south pole from a distance of roughly 40 million miles (65 million km), obtained at a period of maximum solar activity. Images of the north pole are still being transmitted by the spacecraft back to Earth.

    Solar Orbiter, developed by ESA in collaboration with the U.S. space agency NASA, was launched in 2020 from Florida.

    Until now, all the views of the sun have come from the same vantage point – looking face-on toward its equator from the plane on which Earth and most of the solar system’s other planets orbit, called the ecliptic plane.

    Solar Orbiter used a slingshot flyby around Venus in February to get out of this plane to view the sun from up to 17 degrees below the solar equator. Future slingshot flybys will provide an even better view, at beyond 30 degrees.

    “The best is still to come. What we have seen is just a first quick peek,” said solar physicist Sami Solanki of the Max Planck Institute for Solar System Research in Germany, who heads the scientific team for the spacecraft’s Polarimetric and Helioseismic Imager instrument.

    “The spacecraft observed both poles, first the south pole, then the north pole,” Solanki said. “The north pole’s data will arrive in the coming weeks or months.”

    Solar Orbiter is gathering data on phenomena including the sun’s magnetic field, its activity cycle, and the solar wind, a relentless high-speed flow of charged particles emanating from the sun’s outermost atmospheric layer that fills interplanetary space.

    “We are not sure what we will find, and it is likely we will see things that we didn’t know about before,” said solar physicist Hamish Reid of University College London’s Mullard Space Science Laboratory, UK co-principal investigator of Solar Orbiter’s Extreme Ultraviolet Imager instrument.

    The sun is a ball of hot electrically charged gas that, as it moves, generates a powerful magnetic field, which flips from south to north and back again every 11 years in what is called the solar cycle.

    The magnetic field drives the formation of sunspots, cooler regions on the solar surface that appear as dark blotches. At the cycle’s beginning, the sun has fewer sunspots. Their number increases as the cycle progresses, before starting all over again.

    “What we have been missing to really understand this (solar cycle) is what is actually happening at the top and bottom of the sun,” Reid said.

    The sun’s diameter is about 865,000 miles (1.4 million km), more than 100 times wider than Earth.

    “Whilst the Earth has a clear north and south pole, the Solar Orbiter measurements show both north and south polarity magnetic fields are currently present at the south pole of the sun. This happens during the maximum in activity of the solar cycle, when the sun’s magnetic field is about to flip. In the coming years, the sun will reach solar minimum, and we expect to see a more orderly magnetic field around the poles of the sun,” Reid said.

    “We see in the images and movies of the polar regions that the sun’s magnetic field is chaotic at the poles at the (current) phase of the solar cycle – high solar activity, cycle maximum,” Solanki said.

    The sun is located about 93 million miles (149 million km) from our planet.

    “The data that Solar Orbiter obtains during the coming years will help modelers in predicting the solar cycle. This is important for us on Earth because the sun’s activity causes solar flares and coronal mass ejections which can result in radio communication blackouts, destabilize our power grids, but also drive the sensational auroras,” Reid said.

    “Solar Orbiter’s new vantage point out of the ecliptic will also allow us to get a better picture of how the solar wind expands to form the heliosphere, a vast bubble around the sun and its planets,” Reid added.

    A previous spacecraft, Ulysses, flew over the solar poles in the 1990s.

    “Ulysses, however, was blind in the sense that it did not carry any optical instruments – telescopes or cameras – and hence could only sense the solar wind passing the spacecraft directly, but could not image the sun,” Solanki said.

    (REUTERS)

  • Trump met with cheers, boos at Kennedy Center as he attends ‘Les Miserables’

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    U.S. President Donald Trump was greeted with a high-volume mix of boos and cheers on Wednesday as he took his seat for his first production at the Kennedy Center, the performing arts facility he has subjected to a conservative takeover.

    The mixed reception for Trump and his wife Melania as they arrived in the presidential box before a performance of “Les Miserables” reflected the heightened emotions that have been unleashed by his overhaul of the cultural center.

    Trump has pushed out its former chairman,fired its longtime president and pledged to overhaul an institution that he criticized as too liberal. The center, a leading U.S. arts facility, had long enjoyed bipartisan support.

    Ticket sales have fallen since and some shows, including the hit “Hamilton,” have canceled their appearances at the 2,300-capacity theater.

    At Wednesday’s performance, several drag queens in full regalia sat in the audience, likely in response to Trump’s criticism of the venue for hosting drag shows.

    One person shouted “Viva Los Angeles” as Trump stepped out of the presidential box at the intermission. Trump has sent military troops to quell protests against his immigration raids in that city.

    Trump’s appearance was meant to boost fundraising for the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, and he said donors raised over $10 million.

    “We’re going to make it incredible. We have all the funding. We raised a lot tonight, and we’ll put in a lot of money to bring it back to the highest level,” a tuxedo-clad Trump told reporters after other administration officials arrived on the red carpet.

    SUBSCRIPTIONS DOWN

    Still, overall year-on-year subscription revenue was down 36% to $2.8 million as of early June for next season, which begins in the autumn, according to a person briefed on the data. Theater subscriptions, normally a major revenue driver for the center, were down 82%.

    A Kennedy Center official said the comparisons reflected in those subscription sales were not accurate because the center had launched its subscription renewal campaign later in 2025 than 2024.

    “Our renewal campaign is just kicking off,” Kim Cooper, senior vice president of marketing, said in a statement. Cooper also noted the center had launched a new subscription option that allowed customers to “mix and match” genres and said more announcements of shows were coming.

    The Kennedy Center depends on revenue from tickets and subscriptions as well as donations to operate. Ticket sales for “Les Miserables” have been robust, according to another Kennedy Center official.

    Donors who pay $100,000 to $2 million got to attend a reception before the show, receive a photo with the president and be seated in good locations in the theater.

    “We’ve raised a little more than $10 million for tonight, which is pretty remarkable, and it’s an organization that needs the money right now,” said Ric Grenell, a close Trump ally and former ambassador to Germany who now heads the Kennedy Center.

    Under his leadership, the center has sought to add more conservative-leaning programming, including a show that Grenell has described as a celebration of the birth of Christ.

    Trump said he particularly enjoyed “Les Miserables,” a musical about citizens rising up against their government. “I’ve seen it many times, it’s one of my favorites,” he said.

    Along with the first lady, Vice President JD Vance, Attorney General Pam Bondi and Health and Human Services Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. also attended.

    Vance was likewise met with boos when he attended a Kennedy Center show with his wife earlier this year.

    Trump has zeroed in on drag shows to argue that the Kennedy Center had lost its way before he took office. But multiple upcoming musicals on the Kennedy Center’s agenda include characters dressed in drag, such as “Mrs. Doubtfire” and “Chicago.”

    Other musicals have pulled out, according to a former Kennedy Center official.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI Economics: ASEAN TVET Council advances inclusive skills development for rural and regional communities

    Source: ASEAN

    MELAKA, 12 June 2025 -The 4th Regional Policy Dialogue of ASEAN TVET Council on “TVET for Rural and Regional Advancement” was successfully convened on 11–12 June 2025 in Melaka, Malaysia. The Dialogue brought together approximately 220 participants both onsite and online from ASEAN Member States and partner organisations, representing ministries of labour, education, and economic planning, TVET institutions, industry leaders, and international development partners.
     
    Hosted by the Ministry of Rural and Regional Development of Malaysia with the support of the ASEAN Secretariat, Aus4ASEAN Digital Transformation and Future Skills Initiative (funded by the Government of Australia), and RECOTwin (funded by the Government of Germany), and the Dialogue provided a platform for participants to exchange strategies and good practices on how TVET can serve as a driver of inclusive, sustainable growth in rural and regional communities across ASEAN.
     
    Key discussions focused on expanding access to TVET, fostering technopreneurship, promoting green and digital skills, and aligning curricula with the demands of high-growth, high-value sectors. The Dialogue concluded with actionable insights and recommendations to guide ASEAN’s collective efforts toward enhancing employability, productivity, and socio-economic resilience through skills development.
     
    During the Dialogue, the Study Report on the Promotion of Business Engagement Models for Upskilling and Reskilling of the ASEAN Workforce was launched on 12 June 2025. Coordinated by the ASEAN Secretariat under the guidance of ASEAN Senior Labour Officials Meeting (SLOM) and with the support of the Aus4ASEAN Digital Transformation and Future Skills Initiative, the Study explores how ASEAN businesses are adapting to rapid changes in technology, Industry 4.0, and the green economy by investing in workforce upskilling and reskilling. It emphasises the importance of inclusive training and stronger engagement between governments, businesses, and TVET institutes. Find out more about the Study here.
     
    ###

    The post ASEAN TVET Council advances inclusive skills development for rural and regional communities appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Merck Foundation Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and African First Ladies mark World Hypertension Day 2025 by launching their Annual Awards for Best Media, Fashion, Song, and Film to raise awareness on hypertension, diabetes and importance of healthy lifestyle

    Merck Foundation (www.Merck-Foundation.com), the philanthropic arm of Merck KGaA Germany, marks ‘World Hypertension Day 2025’ in partnership with Africa’s First Ladies, Ministries of Health, Medical Societies and Academia through their “Nationwide Diabetes & Hypertension Blue Points Program, by reinforcing its commitment to improving cardiovascular and diabetes care across Africa, and beyond.

    Senator, Dr. Rasha Kelej, CEO of Merck Foundation stated, “At Merck Foundation we observe “World Hypertension Day” by expanding access to quality and equitable care in Hypertension, Diabetes, Endocrinnology and Cardiovascular preventive care, which are all co-related, by providing scholarships for young doctors from across Africa and beyond.

    “Together with our Ambassadors, The First Ladies of Africa, and partners like Ministries of Health, Medical Societies and Academia, we have till today provided more than 860 scholarships for young doctors from 52 countries, of One-Year Online PG Diplomas and Two-Year Online Master’s Degrees in Diabetes, Preventative Cardiovascular Medicine, Endocrinology, Cardiology, and Obesity & Weight Management, as well as One-Year Clinical Cardiovascular Care and Clinical Diabetes Onsite Fellowship Programs in India, a special 3-month Diabetes Mastercourse in English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish languages.

    What is special about these scholarships is that they have been provided not only to doctors from capital cities, but also to those from across the country — ensuring wider geographic coverage of healthcare capacity. We remain committed to continuing our efforts to improve healthcare capacity and access to hypertension and diabetes care.”

    Merck Foundation has in total provided more than 2270 scholarships for doctors from 52 countries in 44 critical and underserved medical specialties.

    Dr. Dzifa Ahadzi, Merck Foundation alumnus from Ghana shares, “I have completed my Postgraduate Diploma in Cardiology and currently pursuing MSc in Cardiology. Being a practicing cardiologist, this program has provided me with the opportunity to consolidate my knowledge and apply current advances in cardiovascular care to my clinical practice. Since completing the PG Diploma in Cardiology, I have been involved in establishing a Heart Failure clinic in my hospital that caters to the needs of a diverse population of Heart Failure patients including women with Postpartum cardiomyopathy and Cardio-oncology patients.

    I am extremely grateful to Merck Foundation for the support and exposure it has provided me. It has inspired me and helped me to improve cardiovascular care amongst the population that I serve.”

    Merck Foundation scholarships are of great value, given that as per WHO data, the African region has the highest prevalence of hypertension, with approximately 27% of adults affected.

    Therefore, Merck Foundation has launched several community awareness programs to emphasize on the importance of a healthy lifestyle and raise awareness about diabetes and hypertension prevention, early detection and management.

    Merck Foundation, together with The First Ladies of Africa has launched a storybook and its adapted animation Film “Mark’s Pressure”.

    “I believe early education is key to building a healthier community. Through our storybook and animation film “Mark’s Pressure”, we aim to instill healthy habits in children and youth — like reducing salt and sugar, eating well, exercising, and avoiding smoking. I believe that this is the only way to to prevent and manage hypertension and diabetes, which are major risk factors for many serious complications and illnesses.”

    Watch the “Mark’s Pressure” Animation Film here:

    https://apo-opa.co/45pQuid

    Moreover, Merck Foundation’s pan African TV program “Our Africa” conceptualized, produced, directed, and co-hosted by Senator, Dr. Rasha Kelej, CEO of Merck Foundation has episodes dedicated to raising awareness about Diabetes and Promoting Healthy Lifestyle.

    Watch the Episodes here:

    https://apo-opa.co/4jMij7M

    https://apo-opa.co/43VGaf9

    “Our Africa” TV Program has been broadcasted on National and Prime TV stations of many African countries like Burundi, Botswana, Ghana, The Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia and is currently on social media handles of Senator, Dr. Rasha Kelej [Facebook (https://apo-opa.co/4jMijEO), Instagram (https://apo-opa.co/4jPaTkd), Twitter (https://apo-opa.co/43XKSco) and YouTube (https://apo-opa.co/4l3tpX8)] and Merck Foundation [Facebook (https://apo-opa.co/445Av6G), Instagram (https://apo-opa.co/3SMH2Ok), Twitter (https://apo-opa.co/403N1Cb) and YouTube (https://apo-opa.co/3HD4xXz)].

    Additionally, Merck Foundation together with African First Ladies, also launches annually, their Awards for best Media, Fashion Designers, Filmmakers, Musicians/ Singers, and new potential talents in these fields from African countries to Promote a healthy lifestyle and raise awareness about prevention and early detection of Diabetes and Hypertension.

    1. Merck Foundation Media Recognition Awards 2025 “Diabetes & Hypertension”: Media representatives are invited to showcase their work through strong and influential messages to promote a healthy lifestyle and raise awareness about the prevention and early detection of Diabetes and Hypertension.

    Submission deadline: 30th October 2025.

    2. Merck Foundation Film Awards 2025 “Diabetes & Hypertension”: All African Filmmakers, Students of Film Making Training Institutions, or Young Talents of Africa are invited to create and share a long or short FILMS, either drama, documentary, or docudrama to deliver strong and influential messages to promote a healthy lifestyle raise awareness about prevention and early detection of Diabetes and Hypertension.

    Submission deadline: 30th October 2025.

    3. Merck Foundation Fashion Awards 2025 “Diabetes & Hypertension”: All African Fashion Students and Designers are invited to create and share designs to deliver strong and influential messages to promote a healthy lifestyle and raise awareness about the prevention and early detection of Diabetes and Hypertension.

    Submission deadline: 30th October 2025.

    4. Merck Foundation Song Awards 2025 “Diabetes & Hypertension”: All African Singers and Musical Artists are invited to create and share a SONG with the aim to promote a healthy lifestyle and raise awareness about the prevention and early detection of Diabetes and Hypertension.

    Submission deadline: 30th October 2025.

    Entries for all the awards are to be submitted via email to:

    submit@merck-foundation.com

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Merck Foundation.

    Contact:
    Mehak Handa
    Community Awareness Program Manager 
    Phone: +91 9310087613/ +91 9319606669
    Email: mehak.handa@external.merckgroup.com

    Join the conversation on our social media platforms below and let your voice be heard:
    Facebook: https://apo-opa.co/445Av6G
    X: https://apo-opa.co/403N1Cb
    YouTube: https://apo-opa.co/3HD4xXz
    Instagram: https://apo-opa.co/3SMH2Ok
    Threads: https://apo-opa.co/4l5X9CL
    Flickr: https://apo-opa.co/4jMiwrA
    Website: www.Merck-Foundation.com
    Download Merck Foundation App: www.Merck-Foundation.com/MF_StoreRedirection

    About Merck Foundation:
    The Merck Foundation, established in 2017, is the philanthropic arm of Merck KGaA Germany, aims to improve the health and wellbeing of people and advance their lives through science and technology. Our efforts are primarily focused on improving access to quality & equitable healthcare solutions in underserved communities, building healthcare & scientific research capacity, empowering girls in education and empowering people in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) with a special focus on women and youth. All Merck Foundation press releases are distributed by e-mail at the same time they become available on the Merck Foundation Website. Please visit www.Merck-Foundation.com to read more. Follow the social media of Merck Foundation: Facebook (https://apo-opa.co/445Av6G), X (https://apo-opa.co/403N1Cb), Instagram (https://apo-opa.co/3SMH2Ok), YouTube (https://apo-opa.co/3HD4xXz), Threads (https://apo-opa.co/4l5X9CL) and Flickr (https://apo-opa.co/4jMiwrA).

    The Merck Foundation is dedicated to improving social and health outcomes for communities in need. While it collaborates with various partners, including governments to achieve its humanitarian goals, the foundation remains strictly neutral in political matters. It does not engage in or support 

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: What family firms like Rothschild can teach Canadian businesses about resilience

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Liena Kano, Professor, Haskayne School of Business, University of Calgary

    The Gunnersbury Estate, which was purchased by merchant and financier Nathan Mayer Rothschild in 1835, is seen in London in 2022. (Shutterstock)

    Family businesses constitute a vital component of Canada’s economic landscape. They make up 63 per cent of privately held firms, employ nearly seven million people and generate about $575 billion a year.

    While Canadian family-run businesses express international ambitions, their overseas engagement tends to be more conservative compared to their non-family counterparts.

    In today’s turbulent economic environment — marked by geopolitical tensions, technological disruption and shifting trade patterns — international competitiveness is more important than ever.

    Around the world, family firms have shown remarkable resilience in the face of external shocks. Some of the world’s longest-standing corporations are family-owned, having endured world wars, revolutions, natural disasters and pandemics. For Canadian family firms aspiring to expand abroad, such examples offer both inspiration and insight.

    Among such long-standing multinationals is Rothschild, a centuries-old European family-run investment bank. Our case study of Rothschild, based on historical analysis, highlights how the family’s enduring relationships, reliable routines and long-term goals gave it significant advantages in international business.

    At the same time, however, families can contribute unique biases, especially “bifurcation bias” — a tendency to favour family resources over equally or more valuable non-family ones. Our study reveals that bifurcation bias can compromise a firm’s international trajectory, especially in distant and complex markets.

    A brief history of Rothschild

    Mayer Amschel Rothschild was a German-Jewish banker and the founder of the Rothschild banking dynasty.
    (Wikimedia Commons)

    Initially a merchant business, the firm was founded in the late 18th century by Mayer Amschel Rothschild, a Frankfurt Jew.

    Rothschild and his wife, Guttle, had 10 children, including five sons: Amschel, Salomon, Nathan, Carl and James.

    In 1798, Rothschild sent Nathan to Manchester, England, which initiated the firm’s growth in that country and a transition from merchant operations to financial transactions.

    By the 1820s, Rothschild became a multinational bank, with Amschel, Salomon, Nathan, Carl and James leading banking houses in Frankfurt, Vienna, London, Naples and Paris, respectively.

    Bonuses and burdens of family bonds

    Nathan Mayer Rothschild was sent to Manchester in 1798.
    (Wikimedia Commons)

    In the 19th century, the Rothschild’s strategy of relying on family members initially worked well for the firm.

    The five Rothschild brothers corresponded in a coded language and shared a common pool of resources at a time when shared balance sheets were uncommon in international banking.

    Their close familial bonds allowed the brothers to move information, money and goods across international borders with a speed and reach that wasn’t accessible to competitors. Rivals, by contrast, had to worry about protecting sensitive information and enforcing commitments.

    This internal cohesiveness safeguarded the Rothschild’s business, facilitated transactions and allowed them to maintain resilience through the periods of significant political upheaval: the Napoleonic wars, revolutions and, ultimately, the First World War, which interrupted economic and social progress in Europe.

    However, this same over-reliance on family became a disadvantage when Rothschild expanded into the United States.

    Missed opportunity and bifurcation bias

    The Rothschilds showed an interest in the American market as early as the 1820s. However, their repeated attempts to send family members to the U.S to expand operations failed, as none were willing to stay, preferring the comforts of European life.

    August Belmont was a German-Jewish immigrant to New York City in 1837 as an agent of the Rothschild bank in Frankfurt.
    (Shutterstock)

    Since they were unable to establish a family-based anchor in the country, the Rothschilds appointed an agent, August Belmont, to run the U.S. operations on their behalf in 1837.

    However, Belmont wasn’t given the authority to exercise entrepreneurial judgment, make investments or enter into deals. He also didn’t have unrestricted access to capital, was never entrusted with an official Rothschild mandate or acknowledged as a full-fledged partner.

    The Rothschilds were unwilling to delegate such decisions to someone who was not a direct male descendant of the founder, Mayer Amschel Rothschild.

    This failure to use Belmont as a link between the family — with its successful experiences, capabilities, routines and connections in Europe — and the American market — with its growing opportunities and the valuable networks Belmont had begun to develop — ultimately prevented Rothschild from replicating its success in the U.S.

    The Rothschilds were eventually eclipsed by the Barings and JP Morgan banks in America. Both competitors followed a different path in the market by opening full-fledged U.S. subsidiaries under their corporate brands with significant funds and decision-making autonomy.

    Escaping the trap of bifurcation bias

    Bifurcation bias does not always have an immediate negative impact. In fact, biased governance practices remained inconsequential for the Rothschilds — as long as there were enough capable family heirs available to lead the bank’s dispersed operations.

    In the short- to medium-term, the family’s connections, time-tested routines and mutual reliability built a well of resilience that sustained the bank through the 19th century, one of the most volatile political periods in European history.

    But as a firm’s international ambitions outgrow the size of the family, bifurcation bias can damage competitiveness, both in international markets and at home.

    At some point, family firms must shift from emotional, biased decision-making to efficient governance systems, which may involve incorporating non-family managers and selecting resources, locations and projects that do not carry emotional significance.

    A Cargill factory building in Wroclaw, Poland in 2020. American business executive William Wallace Cargill founded the Cargill company as an Iowa grain storage business in 1865.
    (Shutterstock)

    Many successful family firms implement tools in their governance systems to detect and eliminate biased behaviour. For instance, family-owned multinationals such as Merck (Germany), Cargill (U.S.) and Tata Group (India) have checks and balances that prevent decision-makers from thinking only in family terms.

    The most successful strategies to safeguard against bifurcation bias invite outside scrutiny into corporate decision-making: appointing non-family CEOs, establishing independent boards, hiring consultants and granting partners decision-making powers.

    Lessons for family firms

    Today, as the global business environment faces arguably unprecedented volatility, firms are seeking to build resilience to survive the turbulence.

    While multi-generational family firms must learn to guard against bifurcation bias to thrive in international markets, their demonstrated ability to withstand external shocks offers valuable lessons for other companies.

    How can non-family firms emulate the Rothschild’s success and longevity? The Rothschild case teaches us the value of having a shared organizational language, setting long-term goals, maintaining stable routines and placing a strong emphasis on brand reputation.

    These strategies can help any company, family-owned or not, build resilience during volatile times.

    Liena Kano receives funding from SSHRC.

    Alain Verbeke receives funding from SSHRC.

    Luciano Ciravegna receives funding from INCAE Business School, where he leads the Steve Aronson Endowed Chair.

    Andrew Kent Johnston does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. What family firms like Rothschild can teach Canadian businesses about resilience – https://theconversation.com/what-family-firms-like-rothschild-can-teach-canadian-businesses-about-resilience-254279

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Spending review delivers big boosts for health and defence – but Rachel Reeves is focused on investment

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Linda Yueh, Fellow in Economics/Adjunct Professor of Economics, University of Oxford

    UK chancellor Rachel Reeves has delivered the government’s spending review, setting out its plans and priorities for the next three years. The aim of the review is of course to allocate spending over that time period – but this government is keen for economic growth and so has directed the funds to try to boost GDP. This approach could work but is particularly challenging in an uncertain global environment.

    The parameters of the UK’s fiscal policy were set in the budget last October and the spring statement in March when the chancellor confirmed her fiscal rules, which allowed borrowing only for investment. Day-to-day spending on public services like the NHS and schools has to be met by tax revenues.

    As a result of an earlier tweak to the fiscal rules, public investment – spending on things like roads and hospitals – will total about £113 billion from now until nearly the end of this parliament.

    Many investors and creditors will have been looking out for this boost, as the UK has lagged behind comparable economies partly due to its lower levels of investment. The announcements have the potential to bring in private funding if more investors see an opportunity to benefit from increased economic growth, particularly if the UK’s relatively high energy costs are also addressed.

    Also in line for government investment is social and affordable housing. The announcement of £39 billion for this sector in England was a centrepiece of Reeves’ announcement. Coupled with planning reforms, the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) judged in March that this could indeed boost growth.

    There will be more money for social housing – £39 billion over ten years in England.
    Irene Miller/Shutterstock

    In terms of day-to-day spending, health and defence received the biggest increases among government departments because of, respectively, pressures on the NHS arising from COVID-19 and the ageing population, and from geopolitical challenges like the war in Ukraine.

    Both departments, though, also have the potential to raise economic growth. Rates of economic inactivity (people who aren’t in paid work, for example) in the UK have not fallen back to their pre-COVID levels as they have in other major economies such as the US, France and Germany. Improving health services, cutting waiting lists and widening access to mental health support could help get more people back to work, which would boost employment and support growth.

    And on defence, spending in this area has the potential (depending greatly on the type of spend) to create technology that could eventually boost the nation’s productivity. GPS, for example, was developed by the US Department of Defense, as were many innovations now used in smartphones. Boosting UK defence spending to 2.6% of GDP by 2027 and investing in technology has the potential to unlock advances in equipment for the UK.

    Who loses out?

    This is not to say that increasing the settlements to other government departments would not support growth too. But some of those departments, including the Home Office, Foreign Office and transport, are now facing cuts in real terms to their spending. And they may find themselves under even more pressure should GDP growth slow.

    This is because of the chancellor’s fiscal rule about funding current spending from taxes. This would mean cuts if these receipts fall as a result of slowing growth, since Reeves has very little “fiscal headroom” (spare cash) to ensure she can meet her rules – only £9.9 billion.

    But the reverse may also prove to be true. Should investment in research and development (£22.6 billion per year by 2029‑30), renewable energy and infrastructure, alongside planning reforms, increase GDP growth, then the chancellor may find that she has more funding to allocate to day-to-day departmental spending to support public services.

    However, it takes time for investment to generate growth. OBR forecasts only expect increased growth of around 1.7% to 1.8% in the second half of this parliament. But those growth forecasts pre-date the US president Donald Trump’s tariffs announced in April, which are causing turmoil in global trade.

    This is why it is even more important for the UK to raise domestic economic growth through investing in people, technology and productivity. To govern is to choose, as the saying goes, and the government will hope that these are the right trade-offs to have made in order to grow during such shaky times. Despite the uncertain global picture, the chancellor has laid some promising foundations. Now the challenge will be delivering the growth.

    Linda Yueh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Spending review delivers big boosts for health and defence – but Rachel Reeves is focused on investment – https://theconversation.com/spending-review-delivers-big-boosts-for-health-and-defence-but-rachel-reeves-is-focused-on-investment-258746

    MIL OSI Analysis –

  • MIL-OSI Global: You’re probably richer than you think because of the safety net – but you’d have more of that hidden wealth if you lived in Norway

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Robert Manduca, Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Michigan

    You may be wealthier than you realize. Deagreez/iStock via Getty Images Plus

    How wealthy are you?

    Like most people, you probably would do some math before answering this question. You would add up the money in your bank accounts, the value of your investments and any equity in a home you own, then subtract your debts, such as mortgages and car loans.

    But many economists believe this approach, known as calculating your net worth, leaves out a big chunk of your wealth: the benefits you’ll get in the future from Social Security, if you live in the United States, or similar government benefits programs that help retirees pay their bills in other countries.

    As a sociologist who studies income and wealth inequality, I wanted to figure out just how much government safety net programs are worth to their recipients, and whether they truly can substitute for private savings.

    A $40 trillion trove

    A team of researchers recently estimated that future Social Security payments amounted to more than US$40 trillion as of 2019 – about $123,000 for everyone in the U.S. That huge number, which is not adjusted for inflation, was nearly one-third of the $110 trillion of Americans’ collective net worth in that year.

    In a recent peer-reviewed study, published in April 2025 in Socio-Economic Review, I found that even this expanded definition of wealth leaves some important things out: unemployment insurance, the child tax credit and other widely available benefits. People who have access to these programs don’t have to dip into their savings as much when unexpected costs come up.

    Social Security is by far the largest of these programs. As of 2019, the typical worker nearing retirement had banked about $412,000 in future Social Security benefits, I found – nearly as much as the $472,000 in private retirement savings such workers had. This estimate doesn’t include Social Security benefits to orphans, widows or people with disabilities.

    The value of Social Security retirement benefits varies according to workers’ income and work history, ranging from $271,000 for the poorest 10% of recipients to $669,000 for the richest 10%.

    Benefits from smaller safety net programs can also add up. Because some programs differ by state, I analyzed California and Texas, the two largest states. In California, I calculated that the average 45-year-old worker can count on almost $12,000 in unemployment insurance over 26 weeks, while in Texas the same worker would be eligible for more than $15,000 over the same period.

    Meanwhile, under current law, many families having a child in 2025 can expect to receive about $29,000 through the federal child tax credit over the course of that kid’s lifetime.

    Texas doesn’t mandate paid family leave, but California requires that each parent receive eight weeks of their salary. That’s worth another $13,000 to a family earning $90,000 a year – the median in my study – and more if the parents have higher incomes.

    Where there’s even more hidden wealth

    These somewhat hidden sources of wealth are worth far more in many other countries, especially Scandinavian ones. Norway provides a useful contrast.

    The typical Norwegian worker retires with more than $510,000 in public pension wealth, I calculated. The exact amount they collect will vary depending on what they’ve earned and how long they live, as is the case with Social Security. But, unlike in the U.S., if they get sick, Norwegians are eligible for a up to a year of paid sick leave – worth about $57,000 to the median worker.

    Norwegians can get unemployment insurance benefits for almost two years, amounting to $70,000 for the average worker, depending on their wages. And the combination of Norway’s child benefit and parental leave is worth between $60,000 and $80,000 from the time each child is born until they turn 18, depending on the parents’ exact income.

    In the past few years, researchers have estimated the wealth value of public pensions – though not other government benefits – in several countries, including Australia, Austria, Germany, Poland and Switzerland, among others.

    In many nations, this value rivals or exceeds that of all stocks, real estate and other private assets held by their residents combined.

    Because so many people are eligible for Social Security or its equivalent public pension programs in other countries, there is also much less inequality in total retirement wealth than in standard measures of net worth.

    Wealth vs. income

    Wealth is much more unequally distributed than income just about everywhere. In the United States, for example, the richest 5% of the population has 32% of all income, but 70% of all wealth.

    Wealth inequality has grown over time, and the Black-white wealth gap in the United States is particularly large. While typical Black families have incomes that are about 56% of what white families earn, they own only 18% as much wealth as the typical white family.

    For these reasons, many politicians, scholars and activists have proposed ambitious policies to reduce inequality in private wealth, such as a wealth tax. Another idea gaining in popularity is to start issuing “baby bonds,” which give each newborn a prefunded savings account.

    Wealth embedded in government benefits offers a complementary method of addressing wealth inequality. Even today, when Social Security and similar pension programs in other places are counted alongside private savings, inequality in retirement wealth is much lower than in privately held wealth alone.

    Less flexible source of wealth

    To be sure, the wealth you’re eventually due through Social Security and other government programs isn’t the same as the private assets you might own.

    You can’t sell or borrow against your future Social Security benefits to meet an unexpected expense or make a down payment on a home. And if you die before reaching retirement age, you won’t receive any payments from the Social Security system yourself, although your spouse or heirs may be eligible for survivor benefits.

    Also, government programs are not set in stone. Eligibility requirements can change, and benefit levels can be cut.

    For instance, if the Social Security trust fund is depleted, retirees could see their benefits decline. But private wealth is also never guaranteed to last: Stock values can fluctuate wildly, and inflation erodes the value of any cash you’ve saved over time.

    For these reasons, having a combination of private savings and government benefits offers the most promising way for everyone to prepare for their future. This can also help society address wealth inequality.

    Robert Manduca has received funding from the Washington Center for Equitable Growth.

    – ref. You’re probably richer than you think because of the safety net – but you’d have more of that hidden wealth if you lived in Norway – https://theconversation.com/youre-probably-richer-than-you-think-because-of-the-safety-net-but-youd-have-more-of-that-hidden-wealth-if-you-lived-in-norway-255833

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: A field guide to ‘accelerationism’: White supremacist groups using violence to spur race war and create social chaos

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Art Jipson, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Dayton

    Demonstrators clash with counterdemonstrators at the entrance to Lee Park in Charlottesville, Va., on Aug. 12, 2017. AP Photo/Steve Helber

    A man named Regan Prater was charged with arson for the burning of Highlander Center in New Market, Tennessee, on May 7, 2025. The nonprofit has a long history of involvement in the Civil Rights Movement. The FBI stated in a court document that Prater participated in neo-Nazi Telegram group chats online.

    Earlier this year, Brandon Clint Russell, founder of Atomwaffen Divison, also known as the National Socialist Resistance Front, a onetime neo-Nazi terrorist organization, according to the Department of Justice, was convicted of conspiracy to damage an energy facility in Baltimore.

    In the fall of 2024, a 24-year-old man, Skyler Philippi, targeted the Nashville power grid with an explosive drone. Federal authorities allege that Philippi was motivated by white supremacist ideologies and affiliated with the extremist group the National Alliance.

    In my research on right-wing extremism over 30 years, a disturbing pattern has emerged: White supremacists and white nationalists are increasingly willing to use violence targeting critical infrastructure in an effort to destabilize society.

    Since the Ku Klux Klan’s resurgence in 1915, white supremacists have pushed for white control of society. In particular, white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups have long advocated violence to establish a white ethnostate, a proposed political entity or nation-state where residency and citizenship are exclusively limited to whites.

    In the past several years, extremists have started using the term “accelerationism” to describe their desire to create social chaos and societal collapse that leads to a race war and the destruction of liberal democratic systems, paving the way for a white ethnostate.

    What is accelerationism?

    The motivating idea behind accelerationism is that social chaos creates an opportunity for extremists to create a racially or ideologically “pure” future.

    Scholars who study extremism have used the term “accelerationism” since the 1980s, but it wasn’t widely associated with right-wing extremist violence until the late 2010s. People calling themselves “eco-fascists,” for example, often endorse mass violence as a means to reduce population and spark societal collapse.

    Accelerationism is often connected to the white replacement theory, a white nationalist conspiracy theory that falsely asserts that there is a deliberate plot to diminish the influence and power of white people by replacing them with nonwhite populations.

    While not all extremists who advocate violent confrontation use the label, the calls for violent disruption strive for the same results. Brenton Harrison Tarrant, the Australian white supremacist who perpetrated the Christchurch mosque shootings on March 15, 2019, in New Zealand, labeled an entire section of his online manifesto Destabilization and Accelerationism: Tactics for Victory.

    Members of the neo-Nazi National Socialist Movement salute and shout ‘sieg heil’ during a rally in front of the State House in Trenton, N.J., on April 16, 2011.
    AP Photo/Mel Evans

    This primer provides an overview of some of the key groups that have embraced accelerationist thinking, posing significant threats to public safety, democratic institutions and social cohesion.

    The Order

    One of the first American groups to embody this ideology was The Order – also known as Brüder Schweigen, or the Silent Brotherhood – which continues to influence newer generations of extremist organizations, both directly and indirectly.

    Robert Jay Mathews, who founded The Order in 1983, was inspired by the apocalyptic vision laid out in the novel “The Turner Diaries.” The 1978 book by William Luther Pierce – under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald – calls for a violent, apocalyptic race war to overthrow the U.S. government and exterminate Jews, nonwhite people and political enemies. Pierce founded the National Alliance – a neo-Nazi, white supremacist organization advocating for a white ethnostate and violent revolution – in 1974.

    The call for violent insurrection and radical societal overhaul has since served as a blueprint for white supremacists and right-wing extremists.

    The Order believed the U.S. federal government was under the control of Jews and other minority groups, and it aimed to overthrow it to create a white ethnostate. The Order funded its activities through robberies, including US$3.6 million taken from an armored car near Ukiah, California, on July 19, 1984.

    Its criminal and violent actions escalated to murder, most notably the 1984 assassination of Jewish radio host Alan Berg in Denver by Order member Bruce Pierce.

    Atomwaffen Division (AWD)

    The Atomwaffen Division, one of the most violent neo-Nazi accelerationist groups in the U.S., was officially founded in October 2015 by Brandon Clint Russell, a former Florida National Guardsman.

    Russell had been active on a neo-Nazi web forum IronMarch.org since 2014 and announced the group’s formation on the site. He used the handle “Odin” to connect with other far-right extremists.

    AWD quickly gained notoriety for its violent, neo-Nazi ideology, advocating for a race war and the collapse of the U.S. government through terrorism. The group drew inspiration from the writings of white supremacist James Mason, particularly his collection of essays titled “Siege.”

    AWD’s activities included recruiting members on university campuses and among military personnel, engaging in paramilitary training, and promoting accelerationist violence. The group has been linked to multiple murders and plots in the United States and has inspired offshoots in Europe and other regions.

    By 2020, AWD unraveled due to law enforcement pressure, prosecutions and internal splits. Though not fully gone, it effectively stopped operating under its name. Members helped form the National Socialist Order, which continues to promote Mason’s “Siege” and violent accelerationism.

    Active Club Network

    Active clubs are loosely organized, often regional groups of white supremacists and neofascists who combine fitness, combat training and ideology to promote violence and white nationalist goals. Members protest Pride and multicultual events and recruit members through fighting and combat sports. Active clubs and similar extremist networks use a multipronged recruitment strategy, combining online reach via Telegram and other social media with in-person, fighting-based community-building to attract new members.

    Neo-Nazi counterdemonstrators shout angrily at the marchers from behind police barricades during the Lesbian and Gay Pride March on Fifth Avenue in New York, on June 25, 1995.
    AP Photo/Kathy Willens

    Emerging in 2017 from the street-fighting “Rise Above Movement” in Southern California and gaining prominence in the 2020s through the rise of The Active Club Network, or ACN, this movement demonstrated a shift from online-only, far-right groups to groups willing to fight.

    Beginning in December 2020, The Active Club Network formed as a loosely affiliated, decentralized web of white supremacist, fascist and accelerationist groups that operate under a shared banner promoting physical training, brotherhood and militant white nationalism.

    The Base

    Founded around 2018, The Base represents one of the most explicit modern expressions of white nationalist accelerationism: as it is known by members, its “Siege Culture.”

    Founded by Rinaldo Nazzaro, an American living in Russia who used the name Roman Wolf, the group recruited ex-military and survivalists preparing for collapse through self-sufficiency, aiming to spark a race war. The Base was directly influenced by James Mason’s book “Siege.”

    The Base operates as a decentralized network of cells trained in paramilitary tactics, sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Their online propaganda explicitly calls for violent action to destabilize society.

    Its members have been involved in plots to murder anti-fascist activists, poison water supplies, derail trains and attack critical infrastructure. In 2020, multiple members were arrested before they could carry out an armed assault at a pro-gun rally in Richmond, Virginia, where they planned to attack police officers and civilians.

    Although several members have been arrested and convicted on a variety of crimes, including conspiracy to commit murder, civil disorder, firearm charges, vandalism and other violent crimes, The Base illustrates a fundamental feature of accelerationism: “leaderless resistance,” or a lack of a centralized leadership, which helps it survive and thrive. Its ideology and tactics are spread through online forums dedicated to white supremacist propaganda.

    Patriot Front

    Founded in 2017 by Thomas Rousseau, Patriot Front is a white supremacist group that emerged from a split with Vanguard America following the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. Vanguard America was a white supremacist group that opposed multiculturalism and whose members believed America should be an exclusively white nation.

    The goals of the organizers of the Unite the Right rally included unifying the American white nationalist movement and opposing the proposed removal of the statue of Robert E. Lee, the general who led the Confederate troops of slave states during the Civil War, from Charlottesville’s former Lee Park. The rally sparked a national debate over Confederate iconography, racial violence and white supremacy.

    The Patriot Front defines itself as an organization of “American nationalists.” According to the Anti-Defamation League, since 2019 the Patriot Front has been responsible for a majority of white supremacist propaganda distributed in the United States, using flyers, posters, stickers, banners and the internet to spread its ideology.

    The group frequently participates in localized “flash demonstrations” where it marches near city halls. Such demonstrations have also increasingly made it one of the United States’ most visible white supremacist groups. In 2024, Patriot Front held demonstrations on patriotic holidays such as Memorial Day, the Fourth of July and Labor Day.

    Although the group claims loyalty to America, the Patriot Front’s ultimate goal is to form a new state that advocates for the “descendants of its creators” – namely, white men.

    Understanding the motivations and tactics of accelerationist groups and individuals, I believe, is critical to recognizing and countering the dangers they represent.

    Art Jipson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. A field guide to ‘accelerationism’: White supremacist groups using violence to spur race war and create social chaos – https://theconversation.com/a-field-guide-to-accelerationism-white-supremacist-groups-using-violence-to-spur-race-war-and-create-social-chaos-255699

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: IAEA Board of Governors on the JCPoA, June 2025: E3 statement

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    IAEA Board of Governors on the JCPoA, June 2025: E3 statement

    France, Germany and the UK (E3) gave a joint statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on Iran’s implementation of its nuclear commitments under the JCPoA

    Chair,

    On behalf of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, I thank Director General Grossi for his latest report on Iran’s nuclear programme, which once again demonstrates the Agency’s professional, independent and impartial work providing objective reporting on Iran’s nuclear programme and its implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under UN Security Council resolution 2231.

    The content of this latest report is far from positive. As we have heard many times before, it details more escalation in Iran’s nuclear programme, moving Iran even further from its JCPoA commitments, while at the same time Iran fails to improve its cooperation with the IAEA, despite the Board’s appeals. As the DG notes, Iran’s enrichment to 60% is unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons, and has no credible civilian justification. The IAEA is currently unable to verify that Iran’s escalating nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. That must be a concern for us all.

    Since the last report, Iran has continued expanding its enriched uranium stockpile, particularly its production of high enriched uranium, far exceeding its JCPoA commitments. Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 % has increased by roughly 50 % since the last Board and now is more than 400 kg. This is very concerning. Iran now has more than nine IAEA significant quantities of high enriched uranium and is producing just under one significant quantity of high enriched uranium per month. As a reminder, a significant quantity is the approximate amount required, as defined by the IAEA, of material from which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. Iran’s overall stockpile exceeds the limits laid out in the JCPoA by more than 40 times. We echo the DG’s “serious concern” with this issue.

    And Iran is not stopping there. In his latest report, the DG points out that Iran has continued to expand its enrichment infrastructure by installing and partly operating new advanced centrifuges. Iran’s installed enrichment capacity is over ten times the limits Iran agreed in the JCPoA. Likewise, Iran’s continued operation of the Fordow underground facility is another breach of Iran’s JCPoA commitments and is alarming given Fordow’s status as a former undeclared enrichment facility.

    Meanwhile, Iran refuses to re-designate several experienced Agency inspectors. This is a politically motivated decision which seriously affects the IAEA’s ability to conduct its verification in Iran, particularly at its enrichment facilities.

    As a result of Iran’s continued non-cooperation and lack of implementation of almost all transparency commitments made under the JCPoA, the DG’s latest report restates that the Agency has permanently lost the continuity of knowledge on key parts of Iran’s nuclear programme that relate to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate.

    The DG also observes that it has been four years since Iran stopped provisionally applying its Additional Protocol, thus denying the Agency complementary access to any sites or other locations in Iran.

    As a result of all these shortcomings, the Agency is yet again not able to ascertain whether Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. This fact, taken together with continued rhetoric from Iranian officials about Iran’s capability to assemble a nuclear weapon and about the option to change Iran’s so-called ‘nuclear doctrine’, as well as Iran’s threats to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, pose a serious threat to international security, and the non-proliferation regime.

    Chair,

    The E3 have consistently worked towards a diplomatic solution to address Iran’s nuclear programme and to remove all doubts about its exclusively peaceful nature. Yet, in 2022, Iran twice refused a viable deal that would have brought it back into compliance with the JCPoA, with a return to United States participation, and instead Iran chose to continue to expand its nuclear activities. And this year, while engaging in dialogue with the United States and the E3, Iran has continued its nuclear escalation unabatedly, even further beyond any credible civilian justification.

    We therefore call again on Iran to urgently change course:

    Iran must halt and reverse its nuclear escalation and refrain from making threats regarding a change of its nuclear doctrine, which are in themselves highly destabilising and not consistent with Iran’s status as a state without nuclear weapons under the NPT;

    Iran must return to compliance with its JCPoA commitments;

    Iran must restore full transparency with its nuclear programme and implement the verification measures it committed to under the JCPoA and other transparency commitments, in particular its legal obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. It must also reverse its September 2023 decision to de-designate several experienced IAEA inspectors in order to allow the Agency to fully implement its mandate; and finally:

    Iran must urgently re-implement and ratify the Additional Protocol.

    Chair,

    We, the IAEA, and many in this Board have repeated this message for years now – this matter is urgent, Iran must demonstrate its commitment to a diplomatic solution by taking concrete steps to address the international community’s concerns. The E3 wants to see a diplomatic solution. We welcome the ongoing efforts to achieve this. Through our engagement there is a clear, common message: Iran cannot be allowed to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. The E3 will spare no efforts to work towards a diplomatic solution to achieve this goal. Absent a satisfying deal, the E3 will consider triggering the snapback mechanism to address threats to international peace and security arising from Iran’s nuclear programme.

    We ask the Director General to keep the Board informed on all relevant activities and developments relating to Iran’s nuclear programme by regular and, if necessary, extraordinary reporting.

    Finally, we ask for this report to be made public.

    Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 11 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Philip R. Lane: The euro area bond market

    Source: European Central Bank

    Keynote speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Government Borrowers Forum 2025

    Dublin, 11 June 2025

    I am grateful for the invitation to contribute to the Government Borrowers Forum. I will use my time to cover three topics.[1] First, I will briefly discuss last week’s monetary policy decision.[2] Second, I will describe some current features of the euro area bond market.[3] Third, I will outline some innovations that might expand the scope for euro-denominated bonds to serve as safe assets in global portfolios.

    Monetary policy

    At last week’s meeting, the Governing Council decided to lower the deposit facility rate (DFR) to two per cent. The baseline of the latest Eurosystem staff projections foresees inflation at 2.0 per cent in 2025, 1.6 per cent in 2026 and 2.0 per cent in 2027; output growth is foreseen at 0.9 per cent for 2025, 1.2 per cent in 2026 and 1.3 per cent in 2027. The lower inflation path in the June projections compared to the March projections reflects the significant movements in energy prices and the exchange rate in recent months. These relative price movements both have a direct impact on inflation but also an indirect impact via the impact of lower input costs and a lower cost of living on the dynamics of core inflation and wage inflation.

    The June projections were conditioned on a rate path that included a quarter-point reduction of the DFR in June: model-based optimal policy simulations and an array of monetary policy feedback rules indicated a cut was appropriate under the baseline and also constituted a robust decision, remaining appropriate across a range of alternative future paths for inflation and the economy. By supporting the pricing pressure needed to generate target-consistent inflation in the medium-term, this cut helps ensure that the projected negative inflation deviation over the next eighteen months remains temporary and does not convert into a longer-term deviation of inflation from the target. This cut also guards against any uncertainty about our reaction function by demonstrating that we are determined to make sure that inflation returns to target in the medium term. This helps to underpin inflation expectations and avoid an unwarranted tightening in financial conditions.

    The robustness of the decision is also indicated by a set of model-based optimal policy simulations conducted on various combinations of the scenarios discussed in the Eurosystem staff projections report, even when also factoring in upside scenarios for fiscal expenditure. A cut is also indicated by a broad range of monetary policy feedback rules. By contrast, leaving the DFR on hold at 2.25 per cent could have triggered an adverse repricing of the forward curve and a revision in inflation expectations that would risk generating a more pronounced and longer-lasting undershoot of the inflation target. In turn, if this risk materialised, a stronger monetary reaction would ultimately be required.

    Especially under current conditions of high uncertainty, it is essential to remain data dependent and take a meeting-by-meeting approach in making monetary policy decisions. Accordingly, the Governing Council does not pre-commit to any particular future rate path.

    The euro area bond market

    Chart 1

    Ten-year nominal OIS rate and GDP-weighted sovereign yield for the euro area

    (percentages per annum)

    Sources: LSEG and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The latest observations are for 10 June 2025.

    Let me now turn to a longer-run perspective by inspecting developments in the bond market. In the first two decades of the euro, nominal long-term interest rates in the euro area were, by and large, on a declining trend from the start of the currency bloc until the outbreak of the pandemic (Chart 1). The ten-year overnight index swap (OIS) rate, considered as the ten-year risk-free rate in the euro area, declined from 6 percent in early 2000 to -50 basis points in 2020, a trend matched by the 10-year GDP-weighted sovereign bond yield.[4] The economic recovery from the pandemic and the soaring energy prices in response to the Russian invasion in Ukraine caused surges in inflation which led to an increase of interest rates. The recent stability of these long-term rates suggests that markets have seen the euro area economy gradually moving towards a new long-term equilibrium following the peak of annual headline inflation in October 2022, as past shocks have faded.

    Chart 2

    Decomposition of the ten-year spot euro area OIS rate into term premium and expected rates

    (percentages per annum)

    Sources: LSEG and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The decomposition of the OIS rate into expected rates and term premia is based on two affine term structure models, with and without survey information on rate expectations[5], and a lower bound term structure model[6] incorporating survey information on rate expectations. The latest observations are for 10 June 2025.

    A term structure model makes it possible to decompose OIS rates into a term premium component and an expectations component. For the ten-year OIS rate, the expectations component reflects the expected average ECB policy rate over the next ten years and is affected by ECB’s policy decisions on interest rates and communication about the future policy path (e.g., in the form of explicit or implicit forward guidance). The term premium is a measure of the estimated compensation investors demand for being exposed to interest rate risk: the risk that the realised policy rate can be different from the expected rate.

    Chart 3

    Ten-year euro area OIS rate expectations and term premium component

    (percentages per annum)

    Sources: LSEG and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The decomposition of the OIS rate into expected rates and term premia is based on two affine term structure models, with and without survey information on rate expectations4, and a lower bound term structure model5 incorporating survey information on rate expectations. The latest observations are for 10 June 2025.

    The decline of long-term rates in the first two decades of the euro and the rapid increase in 2022 were driven by both the expectations component and the term premium (Charts 2 and 3). The premium was estimated to be largely positive in the early 2000s, understood as a sign that the euro area economy was mostly confronted with supply-side shocks. Starting with the European sovereign debt crisis, the euro area was more and more characterised as a demand-shock dominated economy, in which nominal bonds act as a hedge against future crises and thus investors started requiring a lower or even negative term premium as compensation to hold these assets.[7] The large-scale asset purchases of the ECB under the APP reinforced the downward pressure on the term premium. By buying sovereign bonds (and other assets), the ECB reduced the overall amount of duration risk that had to be borne by private investors, reducing the compensation for risk.[8] With demand and supply shocks becoming more balanced again and central banks around the world normalising their balance sheet holdings of sovereign bonds in recent years, the term premium estimate turned positive again in early 2022 and continued to inch up through the first half of 2023. As it became clear in the second half of 2023 that upside risk scenarios for inflation were less likely, the term premium fell back to some extent and has been fairly stable since.

    Different to the ten-year maturity, very long-term sovereign spreads did not experience the same pronounced negative trend. From the inception of the euro until 2014, the thirty-year euro area GDP-weighted sovereign yield fluctuated around 3 percent. The decline to levels below 2 percent after 2014 and around 0.5 percent in 2020 reflect declining nominal risk-free rates more generally but also coincide with the announcements of large-scale asset purchases (PSPP and PEPP). Likewise, the upward shift back to above 3 percent during 2022 occurred on the back of rising policy rates and normalising central bank balance sheets.

    Chart 4

    Ten-year sovereign bond spreads vs Germany

    (percentages per annum)

    Sources: LSEG and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The spread is the difference between individual countries’ 10-year sovereign yields and the 10-year yield on German Bunds. The latest observations are for 10 June 2025.

    In the run-up to the global financial crisis, sovereign yields in the euro area were very much aligned between countries and also with risk-free rates (Chart 4). With the onset of the global financial crisis and later the European sovereign debt crisis, sovereign spreads for more vulnerable countries soared as investors started to discriminate between euro area countries according to their perceived creditworthiness.

    On top of the efforts of European sovereigns to consolidate their public finances, President Draghi’s 2012 “whatever it takes” speech and the subsequent announcement of Outright Monetary Transaction (OMTs) marked a turning point in the euro area sovereign debt crisis. Sovereign spreads came down from their peaks but have kept some variation across countries ever since.

    The large-scale asset purchases under the APP and PEPP further compressed sovereign spreads. During the pandemic and the subsequent monetary policy tightening, the flexibility in PEPP and the creation of the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) supported avoiding fragmentation risks in sovereign bond markets. The extraordinary demand for sovereign bonds as collateral at the beginning of the hiking cycle, at a time when central bank holdings of these bonds were still high, resulted in the yields of German bonds, which are the most-preferred assets when it comes to collateral, declining far below the risk-free OIS rate in the course of 2022. These tensions eased as collateral scarcity reversed.[9]

    This year, bond yields and bond spreads in the euro area have been relatively stable, despite significant movements in some other bond markets. This can be interpreted as reflecting a balancing between two opposing forces: in essence, the typical positive spillover across bond markets has been offset by an international portfolio preference shift towards the euro and euro-denominated securities. This international portfolio preference shift is likely not uniform and is some mix of a pull back by European investors towards the domestic market and some rebalancing by global investors away from the dollar and towards the euro. More deeply, the stability of the euro bond market reflects a high conviction that euro area inflation is strongly anchored at the two per cent target and that the euro area business cycle should be relatively stable, such that the likely scale of cyclical interest rate movements is contained. It also reflects growing confidence that the scope for the materialisation of national or area-wide fiscal risks is quite contained, in view of the shared commitment to fiscal stability among the member countries and the demonstrated capacity to react jointly to fiscal tail events.[10]

    Chart 5

    Holdings of “Big-4” euro area government debt

    (percentage of total amounts outstanding)

    Sources: ECB Securities Holding Statistics and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The chart is based on all general government plus public agency debt in nominal terms. The breakdown is shown for euro area holding sectors, while all non-euro area holders are aggregated in the orange category in lack of more detailed information. ICPF stands for insurance corporations and pension funds. The “Big-4” countries include DE, FR, IT, ES. 2014 Q4 reflects the holdings before the onset of quantitative easing. 2022 Q4 reflects the peak of Eurosystem holdings at the end of net asset purchases.

    Latest observation: Q1 2025

    In understanding the dynamics of the bond market, it is also useful to examine the distribution of bond holdings across sectors. The largest euro-area holder sectors are banks, insurance corporations and pension funds (ICPF) and investment funds, while non-euro area foreign investors also are significant holders (Chart 5). The relative importance of the sectors differs between countries. Domestic banks and insurance corporations play a relatively larger role in countries like Italy and Spain, while non-euro area international investors hold relatively larger shares of debt issued by France or Germany.

    Since the start of the APP in early 2015, the Eurosystem increased its market share in euro area sovereign bonds from about 5 per cent of total outstanding debt to a peak of 33 per cent in late 2022. Net asset purchases by the Eurosystem were stopped in July 2022, while the full reinvestment of redemptions ceased at the end of that year: by Q1 2025, the Eurosystem share had declined to 25 per cent. The increase in Eurosystem holdings during the QE period was mirrored by falling holdings of banks and non-euro area foreign investors. The holding share of banks declined from 22 per cent in 2014 to 14 per cent at the end of 2022, while the share held by foreign investors fell from 35 per cent to 25 per cent over the same period.

    ICPFs have consistently held a significant share of the outstanding debt, especially at the long-end of the yield curve. Since 2022, following the end of full reinvestments under the APP, more price-sensitive sectors, such as banks, investment funds and private foreign investors, have regained some market share. Holdings by households have also shown some noticeable growth in sovereign bond holdings, driven primarily by Italian households.[11] In summary, the holdings statistics show that the bond market has smoothly adjusted to the end of quantitative easing. In particular, the rise in bond yields in 2022 was sufficient to attract a wide range of domestic and global investors to expand their holdings of euro-denominated bonds.[12]

    To gain further insight into the recent dynamics of the euro area bond market, it is helpful to look at recent portfolio flow data and bond issuance data. Market data on portfolio flows[13] highlights a repatriation of investment funds in bonds by domestic investors during March, April, and May, contrasting sharply with 2024 trends, while foreign fund inflows into euro area bonds during the same period surpassed the 2024 average (Chart 6). Simultaneously, EUR-denominated bond issuance by non-euro area corporations has surged in 2025, reaching nearly EUR 100 billion year-to-date compared to an average of EUR 32 billion over the same period in the past five years (Chart 7).

    Expanding the pool of safe assets

    These developments (stable bond yields, increased foreign holdings of euro-denominated bonds) have naturally led to renewed interest in the international role of the euro.[14]

    The euro ranks as the second largest reserve currency after the dollar. However, the current design of the euro area financial architecture results in an under-supply of the safe assets that play a special role in investor portfolios.[15] In particular, a safe asset should rise in relative value during stress episodes, thereby providing essential hedging services.

    Since the bund is the highest-rated large-country national bond in the euro area, it serves as the main de facto safe asset but the stock of bunds is too small relative to the size of the euro area or the global financial system to satiate the demand for euro-denominated safe assets. Especially in the context of much smaller and less volatile spreads (as shown in Chart 4), other national bonds also directionally contribute to the stock of safe assets. However, the remaining scope for relative price movements across these bonds means that the overall stock of national bonds does not sufficiently provide safe asset services.

    In principle, common bonds backed by the combined fiscal capacity of the EU member states are capable of providing safe-asset services. However, the current stock of such bonds is simply too small to foster the necessary liquidity and risk management services (derivative markets; repo markets) that are part and parcel of serving as a safe asset.[16]

    There are several ways to expand the stock of common bonds. Just as the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme was financed by the issuance of common bonds jointly backed by the member states, the member countries could decide to finance investment European-wide public goods through more common debt.[17] From a public finance perspective, it is natural to match European-wide public goods with common debt, in order to align the financing with the area-wide benefits of such public goods. If a multi-year investment programme were announced, the global investor community would recognise that the stock of euro common bonds would climb incrementally over time.

    In addition, in order to meet more quickly and more decisively the rising global demand for euro-denominated safe assets, there are a number of options in generating a larger stock of safe assets from the current stock of national bonds. Recently, Olivier Blanchard and Ángel Ubide have proposed that the “blue bond/red bond” reform be re-examined.[18] Under this approach, each member country would ring fence a dedicated revenue stream (say a certain amount of indirect tax revenues) that could be used to service commonly-issued bonds. In turn, the proceeds of issuing blue bonds would be deployed to purchase a given amount of the national bonds of each participating member state. This mechanism would result in a larger stock of common bonds (blue bonds) and a lower stock of national bonds (red bonds).

    While this type of financial reform was originally proposed during the euro area sovereign debt crisis, the conditions today are far more favourable, especially if the scale of blue bond issuance were to be calibrated in a prudent manner in order to mitigate some of the identified concerns. In particular, the euro area financial architecture is now far more resilient, thanks to the significant institutional reforms that were introduced in the wake of the euro area crisis and the demonstrated track record of financial stability that has characterised Europe over the last decade. The list of reforms include: an increase in the capitalisation of the European banking system; the joint supervision of the banking system through the Single Supervisory Mechanism; the adoption of a comprehensive set of macroprudential measures at national and European levels; the implementation of the Single Resolution Mechanism; the narrowing of fiscal, financial and external imbalances; the fiscal backstops provided by the European Stability Mechanism; the common solidarity shown during the pandemic through the innovative NGEU programme; the demonstrated track record of the ECB in supplying liquidity in the event of market stress; and the expansion of the ECB policy toolkit (TPI, OMT) to address a range of liquidity tail risks. [19] In the context of the sovereign bond market, these reforms have contributed to less volatile and less dispersed bond returns.

    As emphasised in the Blanchard-Ubide proposal, there is an inherent trade off in the issuance of blue bonds. In one direction, a larger stock of blue bonds boosts liquidity and, if a critical mass is attained, also would trigger the fixed-cost investments need to build out ancillary financial products such as derivatives and repos. In the other direction, too-large a stock of blue bonds would require the ringfencing of national tax revenues at a scale that would be excessive in the context of the current European political configuration in which fiscal resources and political decision-making primarily remains at the national level. As emphasised in the Blanchard-Ubide proposal, this trade-off is best navigated by calibrating the stock of blue bonds at an appropriate level.

    In particular, the Blanchard-Ubide proposal gives the example of a stock of blue bonds corresponding to 25 per cent of GDP. Just to illustrate the scale of the required fiscal resources to back this level of issuance: if bond yields were on average in the range of two to four per cent, the servicing of blue bond debt would require ringfenced tax revenues in the range of a half per cent to one per cent of GDP. While this would constitute a significant shift in the current allocation of tax revenues between national and EU levels, this would still leave tax revenues predominantly at the national level (the ratio of tax revenues to GDP in the euro area ranges from around 20 to 40 per cent). The shared payoff would be the reduction in debt servicing costs generated by the safe asset services provided by an expanded stock of common debt.

    An alternative, possibly complementary, approach that could also deliver a larger stock of safe assets from the pool of national bonds is provided by the sovereign bond backed securities (SBBS) proposal.[20] The SBBS proposal envisages that financial intermediaries (whether public or private) could bundle a portfolio of national bonds and issue tranched securities, with the senior slice constituting a highly-safe asset. The SBBS proposal has been extensively studied (I chaired a 2017 ESRB report) and draft enabling legislation has been prepared by the European Commission.[21] Just as with the blue/red bond proposal, sufficient issuance scale would be needed in order to foster the market liquidity needed for the senior bonds to act as highly liquid safe assets.

    In summary, such structural changes in the design of the euro area bond market would foster stronger global demand for euro-denominated safe assets. A comprehensive strategy to expand the international role of the euro and underpin a European savings and investment union should include making progress on this front.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: New data release: ECB wage tracker indicates decline in negotiated wage growth over course of year

    Source: European Central Bank

    11 June 2025

    • ECB wage tracker updated with wage agreements signed up to mid-May 2025
    • Forward-looking information confirms negotiated wage growth set to ease over course of year, consistent with data published following April 2025 Governing Council meeting

    The European Central Bank (ECB) wage tracker, which only covers active collective bargaining agreements, indicates negotiated wage growth with smoothed one-off payments of 4.7% in 2024 (based on an average coverage of 48.8% of employees in participating countries), and 3.1% in 2025 (based on an average coverage of 47.4%). The ECB wage tracker with unsmoothed one-off payments indicates an average negotiated wage growth level of 4.9% in 2024 and 2.9% in 2025. The downward trend of the forward-looking wage tracker for the remainder of 2025 partly reflects the mechanical impact of large one-off payments (that were paid in 2024 but drop out in 2025) and the front-loaded nature of wage increases in some sectors in 2024. The wage tracker excluding one-off payments indicates growth of 4.2% in 2024 and 3.8% in 2025. See Chart 1 and Table 1 for further details.

    The ECB wage tracker may be subject to revisions, and the forward-looking part should not be interpreted as a forecast, as it only captures the information that is available for the active collective bargaining agreements. It should also be noted that the ECB wage tracker does not track the indicator of negotiated wage growth precisely and therefore deviations are to be expected over time.

    For a more comprehensive assessment of wage developments in the euro area, please refer to the June 2025 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which indicate a yearly growth rate of compensation per employee in the euro area of 3.2% in 2025, with a quarterly profile of 3.5% in the first quarter, 3.4% in the second quarter, 3.1% in Q3 in the third quarter, and of 2.8% in the fourth quarter.

    The ECB publishes four wage tracker indicators for the aggregate of seven participating euro area countries on the ECB Data Portal.

    Chart 1

    ECB wage tracker: forward-looking signals for negotiated wages and revisions to previous data release

    2023-25

    Revisions to previous data release

    (left-hand scale: yearly growth rates, percentages; right-hand scale: percentage share of employees)

    (percentage points)

    Sources: ECB calculations based on data on collective bargaining agreements signed up to mid-May 2025 provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Bank of Greece, the Banco de España, the Banque de France, the Banca d’Italia, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, the Dutch employers’ association AWVN and Eurostat. The indicator of negotiated wage growth is calculated using data from the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Statistik Austria, the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT), the Banque de France and Haver Analytics.

    Notes: Dashed lines denote forward-looking information up to December 2025.

    What do the four different indicators show?

    • The headline ECB wage tracker shows negotiated wage growth that includes collectively agreed one-off payments, such as those related to inflation compensation, bonuses or back-dated pay, which are smoothed over 12 months.
    • The ECB wage tracker excluding one-off payments reflects the extent of structural (or permanent) negotiated wage increases.
    • The ECB wage tracker with unsmoothed one-off payments is constructed using a methodology that, both in terms of data sources and statistical methodology, is conceptually similar to, but not necessarily the same as, that used for the ECB indicator of negotiated wage growth.
    • The share of employees covered is the percentage of employees across the participating countries that are directly covered by ECB wage tracker data. This indicator provides information on the representativeness of the underlying (negotiated) wage growth signals obtained from the set of wage tracker indicators for the aggregate of the participating countries. Employee coverage differs across countries and within each country over time (further details are provided in Table 2).

    Table 1

    ECB wage tracker summary

    (percentages)

    ECB wage tracker

    Coverage

    Headline indicator

    Excluding one-off payments

    With unsmoothed one-off payments

    Share of employees (%)

    2013-2023

    2.0

    1.9

    2.0

    49.1

    2024

    4.7

    4.2

    4.9

    48.8

    2025

    3.1

    3.8

    2.9

    47.4

    2024 Q1

    4.1

    3.7

    5.2

    49.0

    2024 Q2

    4.4

    3.9

    3.4

    49.0

    2024 Q3

    5.1

    4.5

    6.8

    48.7

    2024 Q4

    5.4

    4.7

    4.3

    48.4

    2025 Q1

    4.6

    4.5

    2.5

    49.6

    Apr-25

    4.1

    4.5

    4.2

    49.6

    May-25

    3.8

    4.2

    4.0

    49.5

    Jun-25

    3.9

    4.1

    3.9

    47.1

    Jul-25

    2.7

    3.7

    1.0

    46.5

    Aug-25

    2.1

    3.5

    2.1

    46.4

    Sep-25

    2.0

    3.4

    3.1

    46.2

    2025 Q4

    1.7

    3.1

    2.9

    44.7

    Sources: ECB calculations based on data provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Bank of Greece, the Banco de España, the Banque de France, the Banca d’Italia, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, the Dutch employers’ association AWVN and Eurostat.

    Notes: ECB wage tracker indicators reflect yearly growth in negotiated wages as a percentage. Coverage is defined as the share of employees in the participating countries as a percentage. Rows with values in italics and bold refer to the forward-looking aspect of the respective indicators.

    Table 2

    Employee coverage by country

    (share of employees in each country, percentages)

    Germany

    Greece

    Spain

    France

    Italy

    Netherlands

    Austria

    Euro area

    2013-2023

    41.7

    10.0

    61.1

    51.8

    48.7

    64.2

    56.7

    49.1

    2024 Q1

    43.4

    16.0

    57.1

    48.5

    48.2

    62.7

    78.6

    49.0

    2024 Q2

    43.7

    15.9

    56.5

    48.5

    48.1

    62.5

    77.8

    49.0

    2024 Q3

    43.9

    15.8

    54.9

    48.4

    47.9

    62.2

    77.8

    48.7

    2024 Q4

    43.5

    15.7

    53.7

    48.5

    47.8

    62.0

    77.8

    48.4

    2025 Q1

    44.0

    19.3

    53.4

    53.7

    47.8

    61.3

    76.2

    49.6

    2025 Q2

    44.8

    16.1

    52.4

    53.3

    43.5

    60.5

    73.1

    48.7

    2025 Q3

    43.9

    8.6

    51.1

    52.9

    35.6

    58.3

    71.4

    46.4

    2025 Q4

    43.2

    8.2

    50.7

    48.5

    35.5

    54.7

    66.5

    44.7

    Sources: ECB, the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Bank of Greece, the Banco de España, the Banque de France, the Banca d’Italia, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, the Dutch employers’ association AWVN and Eurostat.
    Notes: The euro area aggregate comprises the seven participating wage tracker countries. The coverage shows the relative strength of wage signals for each country and the euro area. The historical average is calculated from January 2016 to December 2023 for Greece and from February 2020 to December 2023 for Austria. For the other countries, it is calculated from January 2013 to December 2023. Rows with values in italics and bold refer to the forward-looking aspect of the respective indicators.

    For media queries, please contact Benoit Deeg, tel.: +491721683704

    Notes:

    • The ECB wage tracker is the result of a Eurosystem partnership currently comprising the European Central Bank and seven euro area national central banks: the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Bank of Greece, the Banco de España, the Banque de France, the Banca d’Italia, De Nederlandsche Bank, and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. It is based on a highly granular database of active collective bargaining agreements for Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Austria. The wage tracker is one of many sources that can help assess wage pressures in the euro area.
    • The wage tracker methodology uses a double aggregation approach. First, it aggregates the highly granular information on collective bargaining agreements and constructs the wage tracker indicators at the country-level using information on the employee coverage for each country. Second, it uses this information to construct the aggregate for the euro area using time-varying weights based on the total compensation of employees among the participating countries.
    • Given that the forward-looking nature of the tracker is dependent on the underlying collective bargaining agreements database, the wage signals should always be considered conditional on the information available at any given point in time and thus subject to revisions.
    • The results in this press release do not represent the views of the ECB’s decision-making bodies.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Human Rights Council to Hold its Fifty-Ninth Regular Session from 16 June to 9 July 2025

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The United Nations Human Rights Council will hold its fifty-ninth regular session from 16 June to 9 July 2025 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. 

    The session will open at 10 a.m. on Monday, 16 June under the presidency of Ambassador Jürg Lauber of Switzerland.  The opening will be addressed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, who will present his annual report.  The Council will be meeting in room XX of the Palais des Nations.

    Over almost four weeks, the Council will consider more than 60 reports presented by the Secretariat of the United Nations and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, human rights experts and other investigative bodies on numerous topics and relevant to the situation of human rights in more than 40 countries.  In total, the Council will hold 32 interactive dialogues. 

    During the session, the Council will hold interactive dialogues with the High Commissioner on his annual report under agenda item two; on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela under agenda item four; and on Ukraine and Colombia under agenda item 10. 

    The Council will hold enhanced interactive dialogues under agenda item two with  the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan and on the oral update of the Fact-Finding Mission on the human rights situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.  Under agenda item four, the Council will hold an enhanced interactive dialogue with the High Commissioner on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, with the participation of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.

    On climate change, the Council will hold its annual panel on the adverse impacts of climate change on human rights, followed by an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on climate change. The Council will also hold its annual panel on technical cooperation and capacity-building. 

    Under agenda item three, the Council will hold its annual panel discussion on women’s rights, and a panel on safe drinking water and sanitation.  It will also hold interactive dialogues on summary executions, freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, transnational corporations, education, health, leprosy (Hansen’s disease), sexual orientation and gender identity, migrants, internally displaced persons, prevention of genocide, trafficking, extreme poverty, discrimination against women and girls, violence against women and girls, judges and lawyers, and international solidarity.   

    The Council will also hear the presentation of the Secretary-General’s interim report on the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, under agenda item 10. Further, it will hold interactive dialogues with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea and the Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and in Israel, under agenda item two; and with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burundi under agenda item four. The Council will also hear oral updates from the Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan under agenda item two and from the Commission of Inquiry on Syria under agenda item four. 

    Additionally, the Council will hold interactive dialogues under agenda item seven with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, and under agenda item nine with the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.  Under agenda item 10, it will hold an interactive dialogue with the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Central African Republic. 

    The final outcomes of the Universal Periodic Review of 14 States will also be considered, namely those of Italy, El Salvador, Gambia, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Fiji, San Marino, Kazakhstan, Angola, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Madagascar, Iraq, Slovenia, Egypt, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    A detailed agenda and further information on the fifty-ninth session can be found on the session’s web page.  Reports to be presented are available here. All meetings of this session are broadcast on UN Web TV. 

    First Week of the Session

    The fifty-ninth regular session will open on Monday, 16 June under the presidency of Ambassador Jürg Lauber. After the opening, the Council will begin considerations under agenda item two, and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, will present his annual report.  Subsequently, the Council will hold an enhanced interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, and an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea. This will be followed by an enhanced interactive dialogue on the oral update of the Fact-Finding Mission on the human rights situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

    On Tuesday, 17 June, the Council will hold an interactive dialogue on the High Commissioner’s annual report, followed by an interactive dialogue with the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and in Israel.  At the end of the day, it will hear the presentation of an oral update by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan. 

    On Wednesday, 18 June, the Council will commence discussions under agenda item three on the promotion and protection of all human rights, holding interactive dialogues with the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, which will conclude on Thursday, 19 June. This will be followed by interactive dialogues with the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, and the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 

    On Friday, 20 June, the Council will hold interactive dialogues with the Special Rapporteur on the elimination of discrimination against persons affected by leprosy (Hansen’s disease) and their family members, the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, and the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons. 

    Second Week of the Session

    In its second week, the Council will conclude its interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons on Monday, 23 June.  It will then hold interactive dialogues with the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, and the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights.

    The Council will start Tuesday, 24 June, with the first part of its annual discussion on women’s rights, focusing on gender-based violence against women and girls in conflict, post-conflict and humanitarian settings.  This will be followed by an interactive dialogue with the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls.  In the afternoon, the second part of the annual discussion on women’s rights will be held, focusing on the commemoration of the International Day of Women in Diplomacy and on overcoming barriers to women’s leadership in peace processes.

    On Wednesday, 25 June, the Council will hold interactive dialogues with the Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls, its causes and consequences, the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, and the Independent Expert on human rights and international solidarity. 

    The Council will start Thursday, 26 June, with a panel discussion on the realisation of the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, followed by the presentation of reports under agenda item three.  In the afternoon, it will start its consideration of reports under agenda item four on human rights situations that require the Council’s attention, hearing the presentation of an oral update by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, followed by interactive dialogues with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, and on the oral update of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burundi. 

    On Friday, 27 June, the Council will hold an enhanced interactive dialogue on the report of the High Commissioner on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, and the oral update of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.  This will be followed by an interactive dialogue on the High Commissioner’s report on the situation of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and the presentation of the High Commissioner’s oral update on the situation of human rights in Nicaragua.

    Third Week of the Session

    The Council will begin its third week on Monday, 30 June, with its annual panel discussion on the adverse impacts of climate change on human rights, focusing on facilitating just transitions in the context of addressing the impacts of climate change on human rights.  This will be followed by an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change.  It will then hear the presentation of the report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises on the thirteenth session of the Forum on Business and Human Rights under agenda item five on human rights bodies and mechanisms.

    The Council will next start its consideration under item six of the outcomes of the Universal Periodic Review of Italy, El Salvador, Gambia, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Fiji, San Marino, Kazakhstan, Angola, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Madagascar, Iraq, Slovenia, Egypt, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will conclude at the end of the day on Wednesday, 2 July. 

    On Thursday, 3 July, the Council will hold an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, under agenda item seven on the human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories.  This will be followed by an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, under agenda item nine on racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related forms of intolerance. 

    In the afternoon, the Council will begin discussions under item 10 on technical assistance and capacity-building, with interactive dialogues on the oral presentation of the High Commissioner regarding his Office’s periodic report on the situation of human rights in Ukraine, and on the interim report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine.  This will be followed by an interactive dialogue on the High Commissioner’s report on the enhancement of technical assistance and capacity-building to assist Colombia in the implementation of the recommendations made by the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition. 

    On Friday, 4 July, the Council will hold its annual panel discussion on technical cooperation and capacity-building, focusing on the role of technical cooperation and capacity-building in strengthening national structures which play a role in promoting and safeguarding human rights, particularly national human rights institutions and national mechanisms for implementation, reporting and follow-up. 

    This will be followed by an interactive dialogue on the oral update of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Central African Republic.

    In the afternoon, the Council will hear the presentation of the report of the High Commissioner relating to cooperation with Georgia.  It will then start taking action on draft resolutions and decisions. 

    Fourth Week of the Session

    The final week of the Council will be devoted to taking action on draft resolutions and decisions and the appointment of a member of the Expert Mechanism on the Right to Development and a member of the Working Group on arbitrary detention.  The session will conclude on Wednesday, 9 July.

    The Human Rights Council

    The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the United Nations system, made up of 47 States, which is responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe.  The Council was created by the United Nations General Assembly on 15 March 2006 with the main purpose of addressing situations of human rights violations and making recommendations on them.

    The composition of the Human Rights Council at its fifty-ninth session is as follows: Albania (2026); Algeria (2025); Bangladesh (2025); Belgium (2025); Benin (2027); Bolivia (2027); Brazil (2026); Bulgaria (2026); Burundi (2026); Chile (2025); China (2026); Colombia (2027); Costa Rica (2025); Côte d’Ivoire (2026); Cuba (2026); Cyprus (2027); Czechia (2027); Democratic Republic of the Congo (2027); Dominican Republic (2026); Ethiopia (2027); France (2026); Gambia (2027); Georgia (2025); Germany (2025); Ghana (2026); Iceland (2027); Indonesia (2026); Japan (2026); Kenya (2027); Kuwait (2026); Kyrgyzstan (2025); Malawi (2026); Maldives (2025); Marshall Islands (2027); Mexico (2027); Morocco (2025); Netherlands (2026); North Macedonia (2027); Qatar (2027); Republic of Korea (2027); Romania (2025); South Africa (2025); Spain (2027); Sudan (2025); Switzerland (2027); Thailand (2027); and Viet Nam (2025).

    The term of membership of each State expires in the year indicated in parentheses.

    The President of the Human Rights Council in 2025 is Jürg Lauber (Switzerland).  The four Vice-Presidents are Tareq Md Ariful Islam (Bangladesh), Razvan Rusu (Romania), Claudia Puentes Julio (Chile), and Paul Empole Losoko Efambe (Democratic Republic of the Congo).  Mr. Efambe also serves as Rapporteur of the Geneva-based body. 

    The dates and venue of the fifty-ninth session are subject to change.

    Information on the fifty-ninth session can be found here, including the annotated agenda and the reports to be presented.

    For further information, please contact Pascal Sim (simp@un.org), Matthew Brown (matthew.brown@un.org) and David Díaz Martín (david.diazmartin@un.org)

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    HRC25.006E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB triples financing for banks to provide liquidity to SMEs in the supply chain of Europe’s defence industry, signs first deal with Deutsche Bank

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • EIB increases intermediated loans and guarantees available for key defence-industry segment to €3 billion from €1 billion.
    • Move to support small and medium-sized businesses that serve major European defence manufacturers in partnership with commercial banks across EU.
    • First agreement with Deutsche Bank to enable €1 billion financing for defence research, as well as military and police infrastructure.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) is tripling to €3 billion the intermediated financing available to Europe’s defence-industry suppliers in a fresh move to bolster security on the continent. The EIB is also triggering the new facility through an inaugural agreement with Deutsche Bank, providing long-term liquidity earmarked for security and defence investment projects.

    The EIB’s increase in intermediated financing targets small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that are a pillar of Europe’s defence industrial base. The EIB is providing a €500 million loan to Deutsche Bank, in a partnership that will enable €1 billion in financing and working capital for SMEs throughout the European Union security and defence supply chain, as well as military and police infrastructure such as training facilities for military personnel.

    The new partnership was unveiled at the European Defence and Security Summit in Brussels today by EIB Group President Nadia Calviño. It will support improved access to finance for security and defence projects, addressing the urgent need for investment in innovation, supply chain resilience, and strategic autonomy amid increased geopolitical uncertainty. 

    “Strengthening Europe’s security and defence is central to our mission,” said President Nadia Calviño. “We’re scaling up financing to record levels, and through intermediated lending and partnerships with banks across the EU, we ensure that SMEs in the defence supply chain have access to the financing they need.”

    “With this framework loan, Deutsche Bank will be able to deploy capital to clients at all stages of the supply chain throughout Europe, where it is most needed,” said Fabrizio Campelli, Deutsche Bank’s Head of Corporate Bank and Investment Bank and Member of the Management Board of Deutsche Bank AG. “It will support the comprehensive efforts our bank is deploying to advise and finance the sector at this crucial moment for Europe. Deutsche Bank is honoured to be the first European bank to partner with the EIB under its Pan-EU Security & Defence Lending scheme. The message is clear: we stand ready to reinforce the resilience of Europe’s security and defence.”

    The threefold increase in the EIB’s  €1 billion “Pan-European Security and Defence Lending Envelope” approved in December 2024 reflects exceptionally strong interest by commercial banks across Europe in leveraging the EIB’s resources, freeing up liquidity to support investments in the sector. The defence financing cooperation with Deutsche Bank is the first with a commercial bank under the EIB’s expanded lending scheme, with further partnerships currently due to follow shortly.

    It follows the agreement announced last week between the EIB and the national promotional institutions of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain on a pan-European approach to strengthening European security and defence. Ther EIB and the five long term investors – Caisse des Depôts, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK) and Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO) – agreed to work together on areas of investment and on potential joint financing in sectors such as research and development, industrial capacity, and infrastructure.

    The EU has more than 2,500 SMEs that are essential suppliers for major defence manufacturers such as Airbus, Thales, Rheinmetall and Leonardo. The SMEs provide key components, technologies and services, underpinning jobs, innovation and growth in the sector.

    The boost in potential EIB lending to defence SMEs is meant to help them counter traditional funding obstacles that larger companies in Europe are generally spared. The move also covers Mid-Caps, another segment of the EU defence industry that has faced financing hurdles on the market.  

    Background information

    About the EIB   

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. The EIB finances investments in eight core priorities that support EU policy objectives: climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and the bioeconomy, social infrastructure, the capital markets union and a stronger Europe in a more peaceful and prosperous world.  

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed nearly €89 billion in new financing for over 900 high-impact projects in 2024, boosting Europe’s competitiveness and security.    The EIB Group stepped up its support to Europe’s security and defence industry in 2024 by enlarging the scope of projects eligible for financing and setting up a one-stop shop to streamline processes, doubling investment to €1 billion. The EIB Group expects to multiply this amount in 2025 to new record.

    The Board of Directors in March approved a series of additional measures to further contribute to European peace and included peace and security as a cross-cutting Public Policy Goal to finance large-scale strategic projects in areas such as land-border protection, military mobility, critical infrastructure, military transport, space, cybersecurity, anti-jamming technologies, radar systems, military equipment and facilities, drones, bio-hazard and seabed infrastructure protection, critical raw materials and research. 

    In addition to financing, the EIB offers advisory services that help public and private partners develop and implement high-quality, investment-ready projects. In 2024 alone, EIB advisory teams helped mobilise over €200 billion of investment across Europe and beyond.

    High-quality, up-to-date photos of the organisation’s headquarters for media use are available here. 

    About Deutsche Bank

    Deutsche Bank provides retail and private banking, corporate and transaction banking, lending, asset and wealth management products and services as well as focused investment banking to private individuals, small and medium-sized companies, corporations, governments and institutional investors. Deutsche Bank is the leading bank in Germany with strong European roots and a global network.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI: OSS’s BRESSNER Receives the 2024 EMEA Growth Partner of the Year Award from Digi International

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ESCONDIDO, Calif., June 11, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — One Stop Systems, Inc. (OSS or the Company) (Nasdaq: OSS) today announced that its subsidiary, BRESSNER Technology GmbH, a leading specialized high-performance computing supplier in Europe, has been named Digi International’s 2024 EMEA Growth Partner of the Year.

    Digi International’s prestigious Global Channel Awards are given annually to Digi’s most impactful worldwide channel partners, celebrating their leadership, innovation, customer-first mindset, and outstanding contributions to the expansion of connected technologies.

    “Digi is a long-standing partner, and we are honored to be named their 2024 EMEA Growth Partner of the Year,” said Martin Stiborski, Managing Director of BRESSNER. “This award reflects our commitment to providing state-of-the-art hardware solutions for demanding applications.”

    “Our channel partners are at the heart of Digi’s global success,” said Ron Konezny, President and CEO of Digi International. “Each award recipient has demonstrated unmatched dedication to advancing IoT and infrastructure management, while delivering exceptional value to customers in every region we serve. Their commitment and results speak volumes — and together, we are empowering digital transformation across industries and geographies.”

    To learn more and view this year’s additional winners, visit:
    https://www.digi.com/company/press-releases/2025/digi-celebrates-2024-global-channel-awards   

    About BRESSNER Technology GmbH
    As a system integrator, manufacturer, value-added distributor, and system house for industrial hardware solutions, components, accessories, and built-to-order solutions, BRESSNER offers an extensive portfolio for various applications in the industrial environment. Tailored solutions for machine automation, logistics & transport, and production are part of the company’s range of services, as well as comprehensive support for topics such as AI applications, machine/deep learning, networks, intelligent retail, communication, and security. The company’s headquarters is located in Germany, with its parent company, One Stop Systems, based in the USA.

    About One Stop Systems
    One Stop Systems, Inc. (Nasdaq: OSS) is a leader in AI enabled solutions for the demanding ‘edge’. OSS designs and manufactures Enterprise Class compute and storage products that enable rugged AI, sensor fusion and autonomous capabilities without compromise. These hardware and software platforms bring the latest data center performance to harsh and challenging applications, whether they are on land, sea or in the air.

    OSS products include ruggedized servers, compute accelerators, flash storage arrays, and storage acceleration software. These specialized compact products are used across multiple industries and applications, including autonomous trucking and farming, as well as aircraft, drones, ships and vehicles within the defense industry.

    OSS solutions address the entire AI workflow, from high-speed data acquisition to deep learning, training and large-scale inference, and have delivered many industry firsts for industrial OEM and government customers.

    As the fastest growing segment of the multi-billion-dollar edge computing market, AI enabled solutions require-and OSS delivers-the highest level of performance in the most challenging environments without compromise.

    OSS products are available directly or through global distributors. For more information, go to www.onestopsystems.com. You can also follow OSS on X, YouTube, and LinkedIn.

    Forward-Looking Statements
    One Stop Systems cautions you that statements in this press release that are not a description of historical facts are forward-looking statements. These statements are based on the Company’s current beliefs and expectations. The inclusion of forward-looking statements should not be regarded as a representation by One Stop Systems or its partners that any of our plans or expectations will be achieved, including but not limited to the potential and/or the results participating in the ROTH Conference, any results relating to one-on-one meetings with management, and the expansion of the Company’s offerings and/or relationship with commercial customers and/or investors. Actual results may differ from those set forth in this press release due to the risk and uncertainties inherent in our business, including risks described in our prior press releases and in our filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), including under the heading “Risk Factors” in our latest Annual Report on Form 10-K and any subsequent filings with the SEC. You are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date hereof, and the company undertakes no obligation to revise or update this press release to reflect events or circumstances after the date hereof. All forward-looking statements are qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement, which is made under the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

    Media Contacts:
    Robert Kalebaugh
    One Stop Systems, Inc.
    Tel (858) 518-6154
    Email contact

    Investor Relations:
    Andrew Berger
    Managing Director
    SM Berger & Company, Inc.
    Tel (216) 464-6400
    Email contact

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Europe Builds AI Infrastructure With NVIDIA to Fuel Region’s Next Industrial Transformation

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    • France, Italy and the United Kingdom Support Regional Technology and Cloud Providers Domyn, Mistral AI, Nebius and Nscale to Deploy More Than 3,000 Exaflops of NVIDIA Blackwell Systems for Sovereign AI
    • NVIDIA to Build AI Factory in Germany to Accelerate Industrial Manufacturing Applications in Europe
    • European Telcos Fastweb, Orange, Swisscom, Telefónica and Telenor Build AI Infrastructure With NVIDIA, Enabling Enterprises to Adopt and Build Agentic AI Applications
    • European Enterprises, Startups and Public Sector to Harness Regional NVIDIA Infrastructure to Develop and Deploy Agentic and Physical AI
    • NVIDIA Establishes AI Technology Centers Across Continent to Advance Research, Upskill Workforces and Accelerate Scientific Breakthroughs

    PARIS, June 11, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — —NVIDIA GTC Paris at VivaTech—NVIDIA today announced it is working with European nations, and technology and industry leaders, to build NVIDIA Blackwell AI infrastructure that will strengthen digital sovereignty, support economic growth and position the continent as a leader in the AI industrial revolution.

    France, Italy, Spain and the U.K. are among the nations building domestic AI infrastructure with an ecosystem of technology and cloud providers, including Domyn, Mistral AI, Nebius and Nscale, and telecommunications providers, including Orange, Swisscom, Telefónica and Telenor.

    These deployments will deliver more than 3,000 exaflops of NVIDIA Blackwell compute resources for sovereign AI, enabling European enterprises, startups and public sector organizations to securely develop, train and deploy agentic and physical AI applications.

    NVIDIA is establishing and expanding AI technology centers in Germany, Sweden, Italy, Spain, the U.K. and Finland. These centers build on NVIDIA’s history of collaborating with academic institutions and industry through the NVIDIA AI Technology Center program and NVIDIA Deep Learning Institute to develop the AI workforce and scientific discovery throughout the regions.

    “Every industrial revolution begins with infrastructure. AI is the essential infrastructure of our time, just as electricity and the internet once were,” said Jensen Huang, founder and CEO of NVIDIA. “With bold leadership from Europe’s governments and industries, AI will drive transformative innovation and prosperity for generations to come.”

    “France is committed to investing in AI to strengthen our economy, benefit our citizens and uphold our values,” said Emmanuel Macron, president of the French Republic. “By working closely with our nation’s leading technology innovators and NVIDIA, we are equipping researchers, entrepreneurs and public institutions with the tools they need to explore new ideas, tackle complex challenges and help shape the future of AI for France.”

    “Just as coal and electricity once defined our past, AI is defining our future,” said U.K. Tech Secretary Peter Kyle. “NVIDIA’s expansion of its technology center here in the U.K. will be vital in helping us to deliver on our AI ambitions, and their partnership in building the capabilities that will transform our AI Growth Zones into engines of opportunity. This is our Plan for Change in action, bringing together leading innovators to build the compute infrastructure that will drive growth across every region and secure the U.K.’s place as a global AI leader in the age of AI.”

    “This agreement represents a strategic step toward strengthening Italy’s technological sovereignty and ensuring that our businesses have secure and competitive access to data management,” said Minister of Enterprise and Made in Italy Adolfo Urso. “The collaboration with top-tier partners such as NVIDIA and Domyn confirms the government’s commitment in supporting high-level alliances to foster innovation and the competitiveness of the national production system.”

    Building Europe’s Foundation for AI Infrastructure and Innovation
    Building AI infrastructure requires strategic investment in advanced systems, land and facilities, sustainable energy access, skilled experts and partnerships. To accelerate the development of these national resources, NVIDIA is working with leaders across France, the U.K., Germany and Italy.

    In France, Mistral AI is working with NVIDIA to build an end-to-end cloud platform powered by 18,000 NVIDIA Grace Blackwell systems in the first phase, with plans to expand across multiple sites in 2026. This infrastructure will enable organizations across Europe to quickly develop and deploy AI using optimized Mistral AI models and validated AI factory designs, accelerating the adoption of agentic AI applications.

    In the U.K., NVIDIA is collaborating with NVIDIA Cloud Partners Nebius and Nscale to unlock advanced AI capabilities for enterprises and businesses of all sizes. At London Tech Week, the cloud providers announced the first phase of their AI infrastructure development plans to deploy 14,000 NVIDIA Blackwell GPUs to power new data centers, making scalable, secure AI infrastructure widely accessible across the U.K.

    In Germany, NVIDIA and its partners are building the world’s first industrial AI cloud for European manufacturers. This AI factory will be powered by NVIDIA DGX™ B200 systems and NVIDIA RTX PRO™ Servers featuring 10,000 NVIDIA Blackwell GPUs to enable Europe’s industrial leaders to accelerate every manufacturing application, from design, engineering and simulation to factory digital twins and robotics.

    In Italy, NVIDIA is working with Domyn and the government to advance the nation’s sovereign AI capabilities. Domyn is developing its Domyn Large Colosseum reasoning model on its supercomputer, Colosseum, with NVIDIA Grace Blackwell Superchips, in alignment with its mission to support regulated industries in adopting AI.

    European Telcos Build AI Infrastructure With NVIDIA for Regional Enterprises
    NVIDIA is also working with leading European telecommunications providers — including Orange, Fastweb, Swisscom, Telefónica and Telenor — to develop secure, scalable sovereign AI infrastructure across the region.

    • Orange is accelerating the development of enterprise-grade AI, including agentic AI, large language models and personal AI assistants, using Orange Business’ Cloud Avenue, built on high-performance NVIDIA infrastructure.
    • Fastweb introduced MIIA — an Italian language model to support generative AI applications — trained and running on its NVIDIA DGX AI supercomputer.
    • Telenor is expanding its sovereign AI infrastructure in Norway with a new, renewable-powered data center, in addition to hosting a partner’s multilingual AI translation service, available in over 100 languages.
    • Swisscom is launching new AI services, including GenAI Studio and AI Workhub hosted on its sovereign AI NVIDIA DGX SuperPOD™-based infrastructure, empowering Swiss enterprises to rapidly build and scale AI applications.
    • Telefónica is piloting a distributed edge AI fabric across Spain with hundreds of NVIDIA GPUs to deliver low-latency, privacy-focused AI services.

    These collaborations enable enterprises to develop and deploy customized AI models and agentic applications at scale, tapping into telcos’ extensive networks and trusted role as critical infrastructure providers.

    NVIDIA AI Technology Centers Fuel Research, Upskilling and Scientific Progress
    NVIDIA is establishing and expanding technology centers in Germany, Sweden, Italy, Spain, the U.K. and Finland to accelerate AI skills development, research and infrastructure for the continent’s enterprises and startups.

    • The Bavarian AI center in Germany, intended to be established in collaboration with the Bayern KI consortium, will advance research in fields including digital medicine, stable diffusion AI and open-source robotics platforms to foster global collaboration.
    • The Sweden AI center will advance world-class AI research with support from NVIDIA experts and hands-on NVIDIA Deep Learning Institute training to help with upskilling.
    • The Italy AI center will expand to include new AI factory deployments with the CINECA consortium.
    • The Spain AI center will expand to include a new AI factory with the Barcelona Supercomputing Center.
    • The U.K. AI center will accelerate the U.K.’s most groundbreaking research in embodied AI, materials science and Earth systems modeling.
    • The Finland AI center enables researchers to accelerate AI research and applications for computer vision, machine learning and AI for science.

    These strategic initiatives across Europe build on NVIDIA investments in building AI infrastructure worldwide, including in Taiwan and the Middle East.

    Watch the NVIDIA GTC Paris keynote from Huang at VivaTech, and explore GTC Paris sessions.

    About NVIDIA
    NVIDIA (NASDAQ: NVDA) is the world leader in accelerated computing.

    For further information, contact:
    Corporate Communications
    NVIDIA Corporation
    press@nvidia.com

    Certain statements in this press release including, but not limited to, statements as to: with bold leadership from Europe’s governments and industries, AI driving transformative innovation and prosperity for generations to come; technology development in European nations; the benefits, impact, performance, and availability of NVIDIA’s products, services, and technologies; expectations with respect to NVIDIA’s third party arrangements, including with its collaborators and partners; expectations with respect to technology developments; and other statements that are not historical facts are forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, which are subject to the “safe harbor” created by those sections based on management’s beliefs and assumptions and on information currently available to management and are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause results to be materially different than expectations. Important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially include: global economic and political conditions; NVIDIA’s reliance on third parties to manufacture, assemble, package and test NVIDIA’s products; the impact of technological development and competition; development of new products and technologies or enhancements to NVIDIA’s existing product and technologies; market acceptance of NVIDIA’s products or NVIDIA’s partners’ products; design, manufacturing or software defects; changes in consumer preferences or demands; changes in industry standards and interfaces; unexpected loss of performance of NVIDIA’s products or technologies when integrated into systems; and changes in applicable laws and regulations, as well as other factors detailed from time to time in the most recent reports NVIDIA files with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC, including, but not limited to, its annual report on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q. Copies of reports filed with the SEC are posted on the company’s website and are available from NVIDIA without charge. These forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and speak only as of the date hereof, and, except as required by law, NVIDIA disclaims any obligation to update these forward-looking statements to reflect future events or circumstances.

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    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Philip R. Lane: The euro area bond market

    Source: European Central Bank

    Keynote speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Government Borrowers Forum 2025

    Dublin, 11 June 2025

    I am grateful for the invitation to contribute to the Government Borrowers Forum. I will use my time to cover three topics.[1] First, I will briefly discuss last week’s monetary policy decision.[2] Second, I will describe some current features of the euro area bond market.[3] Third, I will outline some innovations that might expand the scope for euro-denominated bonds to serve as safe assets in global portfolios.

    Monetary policy

    At last week’s meeting, the Governing Council decided to lower the deposit facility rate (DFR) to two per cent. The baseline of the latest Eurosystem staff projections foresees inflation at 2.0 per cent in 2025, 1.6 per cent in 2026 and 2.0 per cent in 2027; output growth is foreseen at 0.9 per cent for 2025, 1.2 per cent in 2026 and 1.3 per cent in 2027. The lower inflation path in the June projections compared to the March projections reflects the significant movements in energy prices and the exchange rate in recent months. These relative price movements both have a direct impact on inflation but also an indirect impact via the impact of lower input costs and a lower cost of living on the dynamics of core inflation and wage inflation.

    The June projections were conditioned on a rate path that included a quarter-point reduction of the DFR in June: model-based optimal policy simulations and an array of monetary policy feedback rules indicated a cut was appropriate under the baseline and also constituted a robust decision, remaining appropriate across a range of alternative future paths for inflation and the economy. By supporting the pricing pressure needed to generate target-consistent inflation in the medium-term, this cut helps ensure that the projected negative inflation deviation over the next eighteen months remains temporary and does not convert into a longer-term deviation of inflation from the target. This cut also guards against any uncertainty about our reaction function by demonstrating that we are determined to make sure that inflation returns to target in the medium term. This helps to underpin inflation expectations and avoid an unwarranted tightening in financial conditions.

    The robustness of the decision is also indicated by a set of model-based optimal policy simulations conducted on various combinations of the scenarios discussed in the Eurosystem staff projections report, even when also factoring in upside scenarios for fiscal expenditure. A cut is also indicated by a broad range of monetary policy feedback rules. By contrast, leaving the DFR on hold at 2.25 per cent could have triggered an adverse repricing of the forward curve and a revision in inflation expectations that would risk generating a more pronounced and longer-lasting undershoot of the inflation target. In turn, if this risk materialised, a stronger monetary reaction would ultimately be required.

    Especially under current conditions of high uncertainty, it is essential to remain data dependent and take a meeting-by-meeting approach in making monetary policy decisions. Accordingly, the Governing Council does not pre-commit to any particular future rate path.

    The euro area bond market

    Chart 1

    Ten-year nominal OIS rate and GDP-weighted sovereign yield for the euro area

    (percentages per annum)

    Sources: LSEG and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The latest observations are for 10 June 2025.

    Let me now turn to a longer-run perspective by inspecting developments in the bond market. In the first two decades of the euro, nominal long-term interest rates in the euro area were, by and large, on a declining trend from the start of the currency bloc until the outbreak of the pandemic (Chart 1). The ten-year overnight index swap (OIS) rate, considered as the ten-year risk-free rate in the euro area, declined from 6 percent in early 2000 to -50 basis points in 2020, a trend matched by the 10-year GDP-weighted sovereign bond yield.[4] The economic recovery from the pandemic and the soaring energy prices in response to the Russian invasion in Ukraine caused surges in inflation which led to an increase of interest rates. The recent stability of these long-term rates suggests that markets have seen the euro area economy gradually moving towards a new long-term equilibrium following the peak of annual headline inflation in October 2022, as past shocks have faded.

    Chart 2

    Decomposition of the ten-year spot euro area OIS rate into term premium and expected rates

    (percentages per annum)

    Sources: LSEG and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The decomposition of the OIS rate into expected rates and term premia is based on two affine term structure models, with and without survey information on rate expectations[5], and a lower bound term structure model[6] incorporating survey information on rate expectations. The latest observations are for 10 June 2025.

    A term structure model makes it possible to decompose OIS rates into a term premium component and an expectations component. For the ten-year OIS rate, the expectations component reflects the expected average ECB policy rate over the next ten years and is affected by ECB’s policy decisions on interest rates and communication about the future policy path (e.g., in the form of explicit or implicit forward guidance). The term premium is a measure of the estimated compensation investors demand for being exposed to interest rate risk: the risk that the realised policy rate can be different from the expected rate.

    Chart 3

    Ten-year euro area OIS rate expectations and term premium component

    (percentages per annum)

    Sources: LSEG and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The decomposition of the OIS rate into expected rates and term premia is based on two affine term structure models, with and without survey information on rate expectations4, and a lower bound term structure model5 incorporating survey information on rate expectations. The latest observations are for 10 June 2025.

    The decline of long-term rates in the first two decades of the euro and the rapid increase in 2022 were driven by both the expectations component and the term premium (Charts 2 and 3). The premium was estimated to be largely positive in the early 2000s, understood as a sign that the euro area economy was mostly confronted with supply-side shocks. Starting with the European sovereign debt crisis, the euro area was more and more characterised as a demand-shock dominated economy, in which nominal bonds act as a hedge against future crises and thus investors started requiring a lower or even negative term premium as compensation to hold these assets.[7] The large-scale asset purchases of the ECB under the APP reinforced the downward pressure on the term premium. By buying sovereign bonds (and other assets), the ECB reduced the overall amount of duration risk that had to be borne by private investors, reducing the compensation for risk.[8] With demand and supply shocks becoming more balanced again and central banks around the world normalising their balance sheet holdings of sovereign bonds in recent years, the term premium estimate turned positive again in early 2022 and continued to inch up through the first half of 2023. As it became clear in the second half of 2023 that upside risk scenarios for inflation were less likely, the term premium fell back to some extent and has been fairly stable since.

    Different to the ten-year maturity, very long-term sovereign spreads did not experience the same pronounced negative trend. From the inception of the euro until 2014, the thirty-year euro area GDP-weighted sovereign yield fluctuated around 3 percent. The decline to levels below 2 percent after 2014 and around 0.5 percent in 2020 reflect declining nominal risk-free rates more generally but also coincide with the announcements of large-scale asset purchases (PSPP and PEPP). Likewise, the upward shift back to above 3 percent during 2022 occurred on the back of rising policy rates and normalising central bank balance sheets.

    Chart 4

    Ten-year sovereign bond spreads vs Germany

    (percentages per annum)

    Sources: LSEG and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The spread is the difference between individual countries’ 10-year sovereign yields and the 10-year yield on German Bunds. The latest observations are for 10 June 2025.

    In the run-up to the global financial crisis, sovereign yields in the euro area were very much aligned between countries and also with risk-free rates (Chart 4). With the onset of the global financial crisis and later the European sovereign debt crisis, sovereign spreads for more vulnerable countries soared as investors started to discriminate between euro area countries according to their perceived creditworthiness.

    On top of the efforts of European sovereigns to consolidate their public finances, President Draghi’s 2012 “whatever it takes” speech and the subsequent announcement of Outright Monetary Transaction (OMTs) marked a turning point in the euro area sovereign debt crisis. Sovereign spreads came down from their peaks but have kept some variation across countries ever since.

    The large-scale asset purchases under the APP and PEPP further compressed sovereign spreads. During the pandemic and the subsequent monetary policy tightening, the flexibility in PEPP and the creation of the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) supported avoiding fragmentation risks in sovereign bond markets. The extraordinary demand for sovereign bonds as collateral at the beginning of the hiking cycle, at a time when central bank holdings of these bonds were still high, resulted in the yields of German bonds, which are the most-preferred assets when it comes to collateral, declining far below the risk-free OIS rate in the course of 2022. These tensions eased as collateral scarcity reversed.[9]

    This year, bond yields and bond spreads in the euro area have been relatively stable, despite significant movements in some other bond markets. This can be interpreted as reflecting a balancing between two opposing forces: in essence, the typical positive spillover across bond markets has been offset by an international portfolio preference shift towards the euro and euro-denominated securities. This international portfolio preference shift is likely not uniform and is some mix of a pull back by European investors towards the domestic market and some rebalancing by global investors away from the dollar and towards the euro. More deeply, the stability of the euro bond market reflects a high conviction that euro area inflation is strongly anchored at the two per cent target and that the euro area business cycle should be relatively stable, such that the likely scale of cyclical interest rate movements is contained. It also reflects growing confidence that the scope for the materialisation of national or area-wide fiscal risks is quite contained, in view of the shared commitment to fiscal stability among the member countries and the demonstrated capacity to react jointly to fiscal tail events.[10]

    Chart 5

    Holdings of “Big-4” euro area government debt

    (percentage of total amounts outstanding)

    Sources: ECB Securities Holding Statistics and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The chart is based on all general government plus public agency debt in nominal terms. The breakdown is shown for euro area holding sectors, while all non-euro area holders are aggregated in the orange category in lack of more detailed information. ICPF stands for insurance corporations and pension funds. The “Big-4” countries include DE, FR, IT, ES. 2014 Q4 reflects the holdings before the onset of quantitative easing. 2022 Q4 reflects the peak of Eurosystem holdings at the end of net asset purchases.

    Latest observation: Q1 2025

    In understanding the dynamics of the bond market, it is also useful to examine the distribution of bond holdings across sectors. The largest euro-area holder sectors are banks, insurance corporations and pension funds (ICPF) and investment funds, while non-euro area foreign investors also are significant holders (Chart 5). The relative importance of the sectors differs between countries. Domestic banks and insurance corporations play a relatively larger role in countries like Italy and Spain, while non-euro area international investors hold relatively larger shares of debt issued by France or Germany.

    Since the start of the APP in early 2015, the Eurosystem increased its market share in euro area sovereign bonds from about 5 per cent of total outstanding debt to a peak of 33 per cent in late 2022. Net asset purchases by the Eurosystem were stopped in July 2022, while the full reinvestment of redemptions ceased at the end of that year: by Q1 2025, the Eurosystem share had declined to 25 per cent. The increase in Eurosystem holdings during the QE period was mirrored by falling holdings of banks and non-euro area foreign investors. The holding share of banks declined from 22 per cent in 2014 to 14 per cent at the end of 2022, while the share held by foreign investors fell from 35 per cent to 25 per cent over the same period.

    ICPFs have consistently held a significant share of the outstanding debt, especially at the long-end of the yield curve. Since 2022, following the end of full reinvestments under the APP, more price-sensitive sectors, such as banks, investment funds and private foreign investors, have regained some market share. Holdings by households have also shown some noticeable growth in sovereign bond holdings, driven primarily by Italian households.[11] In summary, the holdings statistics show that the bond market has smoothly adjusted to the end of quantitative easing. In particular, the rise in bond yields in 2022 was sufficient to attract a wide range of domestic and global investors to expand their holdings of euro-denominated bonds.[12]

    To gain further insight into the recent dynamics of the euro area bond market, it is helpful to look at recent portfolio flow data and bond issuance data. Market data on portfolio flows[13] highlights a repatriation of investment funds in bonds by domestic investors during March, April, and May, contrasting sharply with 2024 trends, while foreign fund inflows into euro area bonds during the same period surpassed the 2024 average (Chart 6). Simultaneously, EUR-denominated bond issuance by non-euro area corporations has surged in 2025, reaching nearly EUR 100 billion year-to-date compared to an average of EUR 32 billion over the same period in the past five years (Chart 7).

    Expanding the pool of safe assets

    These developments (stable bond yields, increased foreign holdings of euro-denominated bonds) have naturally led to renewed interest in the international role of the euro.[14]

    The euro ranks as the second largest reserve currency after the dollar. However, the current design of the euro area financial architecture results in an under-supply of the safe assets that play a special role in investor portfolios.[15] In particular, a safe asset should rise in relative value during stress episodes, thereby providing essential hedging services.

    Since the bund is the highest-rated large-country national bond in the euro area, it serves as the main de facto safe asset but the stock of bunds is too small relative to the size of the euro area or the global financial system to satiate the demand for euro-denominated safe assets. Especially in the context of much smaller and less volatile spreads (as shown in Chart 4), other national bonds also directionally contribute to the stock of safe assets. However, the remaining scope for relative price movements across these bonds means that the overall stock of national bonds does not sufficiently provide safe asset services.

    In principle, common bonds backed by the combined fiscal capacity of the EU member states are capable of providing safe-asset services. However, the current stock of such bonds is simply too small to foster the necessary liquidity and risk management services (derivative markets; repo markets) that are part and parcel of serving as a safe asset.[16]

    There are several ways to expand the stock of common bonds. Just as the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme was financed by the issuance of common bonds jointly backed by the member states, the member countries could decide to finance investment European-wide public goods through more common debt.[17] From a public finance perspective, it is natural to match European-wide public goods with common debt, in order to align the financing with the area-wide benefits of such public goods. If a multi-year investment programme were announced, the global investor community would recognise that the stock of euro common bonds would climb incrementally over time.

    In addition, in order to meet more quickly and more decisively the rising global demand for euro-denominated safe assets, there are a number of options in generating a larger stock of safe assets from the current stock of national bonds. Recently, Olivier Blanchard and Ángel Ubide have proposed that the “blue bond/red bond” reform be re-examined.[18] Under this approach, each member country would ring fence a dedicated revenue stream (say a certain amount of indirect tax revenues) that could be used to service commonly-issued bonds. In turn, the proceeds of issuing blue bonds would be deployed to purchase a given amount of the national bonds of each participating member state. This mechanism would result in a larger stock of common bonds (blue bonds) and a lower stock of national bonds (red bonds).

    While this type of financial reform was originally proposed during the euro area sovereign debt crisis, the conditions today are far more favourable, especially if the scale of blue bond issuance were to be calibrated in a prudent manner in order to mitigate some of the identified concerns. In particular, the euro area financial architecture is now far more resilient, thanks to the significant institutional reforms that were introduced in the wake of the euro area crisis and the demonstrated track record of financial stability that has characterised Europe over the last decade. The list of reforms include: an increase in the capitalisation of the European banking system; the joint supervision of the banking system through the Single Supervisory Mechanism; the adoption of a comprehensive set of macroprudential measures at national and European levels; the implementation of the Single Resolution Mechanism; the narrowing of fiscal, financial and external imbalances; the fiscal backstops provided by the European Stability Mechanism; the common solidarity shown during the pandemic through the innovative NGEU programme; the demonstrated track record of the ECB in supplying liquidity in the event of market stress; and the expansion of the ECB policy toolkit (TPI, OMT) to address a range of liquidity tail risks. [19] In the context of the sovereign bond market, these reforms have contributed to less volatile and less dispersed bond returns.

    As emphasised in the Blanchard-Ubide proposal, there is an inherent trade off in the issuance of blue bonds. In one direction, a larger stock of blue bonds boosts liquidity and, if a critical mass is attained, also would trigger the fixed-cost investments need to build out ancillary financial products such as derivatives and repos. In the other direction, too-large a stock of blue bonds would require the ringfencing of national tax revenues at a scale that would be excessive in the context of the current European political configuration in which fiscal resources and political decision-making primarily remains at the national level. As emphasised in the Blanchard-Ubide proposal, this trade-off is best navigated by calibrating the stock of blue bonds at an appropriate level.

    In particular, the Blanchard-Ubide proposal gives the example of a stock of blue bonds corresponding to 25 per cent of GDP. Just to illustrate the scale of the required fiscal resources to back this level of issuance: if bond yields were on average in the range of two to four per cent, the servicing of blue bond debt would require ringfenced tax revenues in the range of a half per cent to one per cent of GDP. While this would constitute a significant shift in the current allocation of tax revenues between national and EU levels, this would still leave tax revenues predominantly at the national level (the ratio of tax revenues to GDP in the euro area ranges from around 20 to 40 per cent). The shared payoff would be the reduction in debt servicing costs generated by the safe asset services provided by an expanded stock of common debt.

    An alternative, possibly complementary, approach that could also deliver a larger stock of safe assets from the pool of national bonds is provided by the sovereign bond backed securities (SBBS) proposal.[20] The SBBS proposal envisages that financial intermediaries (whether public or private) could bundle a portfolio of national bonds and issue tranched securities, with the senior slice constituting a highly-safe asset. The SBBS proposal has been extensively studied (I chaired a 2017 ESRB report) and draft enabling legislation has been prepared by the European Commission.[21] Just as with the blue/red bond proposal, sufficient issuance scale would be needed in order to foster the market liquidity needed for the senior bonds to act as highly liquid safe assets.

    In summary, such structural changes in the design of the euro area bond market would foster stronger global demand for euro-denominated safe assets. A comprehensive strategy to expand the international role of the euro and underpin a European savings and investment union should include making progress on this front.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: New data release: ECB wage tracker indicates decline in negotiated wage growth over course of year

    Source: European Central Bank

    11 June 2025

    • ECB wage tracker updated with wage agreements signed up to mid-May 2025
    • Forward-looking information confirms negotiated wage growth set to ease over course of year, consistent with data published following April 2025 Governing Council meeting

    The European Central Bank (ECB) wage tracker, which only covers active collective bargaining agreements, indicates negotiated wage growth with smoothed one-off payments of 4.7% in 2024 (based on an average coverage of 48.8% of employees in participating countries), and 3.1% in 2025 (based on an average coverage of 47.4%). The ECB wage tracker with unsmoothed one-off payments indicates an average negotiated wage growth level of 4.9% in 2024 and 2.9% in 2025. The downward trend of the forward-looking wage tracker for the remainder of 2025 partly reflects the mechanical impact of large one-off payments (that were paid in 2024 but drop out in 2025) and the front-loaded nature of wage increases in some sectors in 2024. The wage tracker excluding one-off payments indicates growth of 4.2% in 2024 and 3.8% in 2025. See Chart 1 and Table 1 for further details.

    The ECB wage tracker may be subject to revisions, and the forward-looking part should not be interpreted as a forecast, as it only captures the information that is available for the active collective bargaining agreements. It should also be noted that the ECB wage tracker does not track the indicator of negotiated wage growth precisely and therefore deviations are to be expected over time.

    For a more comprehensive assessment of wage developments in the euro area, please refer to the June 2025 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which indicate a yearly growth rate of compensation per employee in the euro area of 3.2% in 2025, with a quarterly profile of 3.5% in the first quarter, 3.4% in the second quarter, 3.1% in Q3 in the third quarter, and of 2.8% in the fourth quarter.

    The ECB publishes four wage tracker indicators for the aggregate of seven participating euro area countries on the ECB Data Portal.

    Chart 1

    ECB wage tracker: forward-looking signals for negotiated wages and revisions to previous data release

    2023-25

    Revisions to previous data release

    (left-hand scale: yearly growth rates, percentages; right-hand scale: percentage share of employees)

    (percentage points)

    Sources: ECB calculations based on data on collective bargaining agreements signed up to mid-May 2025 provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Bank of Greece, the Banco de España, the Banque de France, the Banca d’Italia, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, the Dutch employers’ association AWVN and Eurostat. The indicator of negotiated wage growth is calculated using data from the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Statistik Austria, the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT), the Banque de France and Haver Analytics.

    Notes: Dashed lines denote forward-looking information up to December 2025.

    What do the four different indicators show?

    • The headline ECB wage tracker shows negotiated wage growth that includes collectively agreed one-off payments, such as those related to inflation compensation, bonuses or back-dated pay, which are smoothed over 12 months.
    • The ECB wage tracker excluding one-off payments reflects the extent of structural (or permanent) negotiated wage increases.
    • The ECB wage tracker with unsmoothed one-off payments is constructed using a methodology that, both in terms of data sources and statistical methodology, is conceptually similar to, but not necessarily the same as, that used for the ECB indicator of negotiated wage growth.
    • The share of employees covered is the percentage of employees across the participating countries that are directly covered by ECB wage tracker data. This indicator provides information on the representativeness of the underlying (negotiated) wage growth signals obtained from the set of wage tracker indicators for the aggregate of the participating countries. Employee coverage differs across countries and within each country over time (further details are provided in Table 2).

    Table 1

    ECB wage tracker summary

    (percentages)

    ECB wage tracker

    Coverage

    Headline indicator

    Excluding one-off payments

    With unsmoothed one-off payments

    Share of employees (%)

    2013-2023

    2.0

    1.9

    2.0

    49.1

    2024

    4.7

    4.2

    4.9

    48.8

    2025

    3.1

    3.8

    2.9

    47.4

    2024 Q1

    4.1

    3.7

    5.2

    49.0

    2024 Q2

    4.4

    3.9

    3.4

    49.0

    2024 Q3

    5.1

    4.5

    6.8

    48.7

    2024 Q4

    5.4

    4.7

    4.3

    48.4

    2025 Q1

    4.6

    4.5

    2.5

    49.6

    Apr-25

    4.1

    4.5

    4.2

    49.6

    May-25

    3.8

    4.2

    4.0

    49.5

    Jun-25

    3.9

    4.1

    3.9

    47.1

    Jul-25

    2.7

    3.7

    1.0

    46.5

    Aug-25

    2.1

    3.5

    2.1

    46.4

    Sep-25

    2.0

    3.4

    3.1

    46.2

    2025 Q4

    1.7

    3.1

    2.9

    44.7

    Sources: ECB calculations based on data provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Bank of Greece, the Banco de España, the Banque de France, the Banca d’Italia, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, the Dutch employers’ association AWVN and Eurostat.

    Notes: ECB wage tracker indicators reflect yearly growth in negotiated wages as a percentage. Coverage is defined as the share of employees in the participating countries as a percentage. Rows with values in italics and bold refer to the forward-looking aspect of the respective indicators.

    Table 2

    Employee coverage by country

    (share of employees in each country, percentages)

    Germany

    Greece

    Spain

    France

    Italy

    Netherlands

    Austria

    Euro area

    2013-2023

    41.7

    10.0

    61.1

    51.8

    48.7

    64.2

    56.7

    49.1

    2024 Q1

    43.4

    16.0

    57.1

    48.5

    48.2

    62.7

    78.6

    49.0

    2024 Q2

    43.7

    15.9

    56.5

    48.5

    48.1

    62.5

    77.8

    49.0

    2024 Q3

    43.9

    15.8

    54.9

    48.4

    47.9

    62.2

    77.8

    48.7

    2024 Q4

    43.5

    15.7

    53.7

    48.5

    47.8

    62.0

    77.8

    48.4

    2025 Q1

    44.0

    19.3

    53.4

    53.7

    47.8

    61.3

    76.2

    49.6

    2025 Q2

    44.8

    16.1

    52.4

    53.3

    43.5

    60.5

    73.1

    48.7

    2025 Q3

    43.9

    8.6

    51.1

    52.9

    35.6

    58.3

    71.4

    46.4

    2025 Q4

    43.2

    8.2

    50.7

    48.5

    35.5

    54.7

    66.5

    44.7

    Sources: ECB, the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Bank of Greece, the Banco de España, the Banque de France, the Banca d’Italia, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, the Dutch employers’ association AWVN and Eurostat.
    Notes: The euro area aggregate comprises the seven participating wage tracker countries. The coverage shows the relative strength of wage signals for each country and the euro area. The historical average is calculated from January 2016 to December 2023 for Greece and from February 2020 to December 2023 for Austria. For the other countries, it is calculated from January 2013 to December 2023. Rows with values in italics and bold refer to the forward-looking aspect of the respective indicators.

    For media queries, please contact Benoit Deeg, tel.: +491721683704

    Notes:

    • The ECB wage tracker is the result of a Eurosystem partnership currently comprising the European Central Bank and seven euro area national central banks: the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Bank of Greece, the Banco de España, the Banque de France, the Banca d’Italia, De Nederlandsche Bank, and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. It is based on a highly granular database of active collective bargaining agreements for Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Austria. The wage tracker is one of many sources that can help assess wage pressures in the euro area.
    • The wage tracker methodology uses a double aggregation approach. First, it aggregates the highly granular information on collective bargaining agreements and constructs the wage tracker indicators at the country-level using information on the employee coverage for each country. Second, it uses this information to construct the aggregate for the euro area using time-varying weights based on the total compensation of employees among the participating countries.
    • Given that the forward-looking nature of the tracker is dependent on the underlying collective bargaining agreements database, the wage signals should always be considered conditional on the information available at any given point in time and thus subject to revisions.
    • The results in this press release do not represent the views of the ECB’s decision-making bodies.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Wang Zifei, Hu Kai continue golden runs at ISSF World Cup

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    China’s Wang Zifei and Hu Kai extended their winning streaks in the women’s 10m air rifle and men’s 10m air pistol events respectively, each capturing their third individual gold medal of the season at the ISSF World Cup in Munich.

    At 18, world record holder Wang delivered a stunning qualification performance, breaking both the junior and overall qualification world records with a score of 637.9 to advance to the final.

    In the final, Wang stayed composed and consistent, delivering a series of high 10s. A decisive 10.9 shot near the end gave her a slim lead, allowing her to narrowly defeat South Korea’s Kwon Eun-ji by 0.1 point with a final score of 252.7. India’s Elavenil Valarivan claimed the bronze medal. Fellow Chinese shooter Han Jiayu secured sixth place.

    The win marked Wang’s third straight World Cup gold in the women’s 10m air rifle, keeping her unbeaten record in the event this season after victories in Buenos Aires and Lima. She currently holds all four individual women’s 10m air rifle records over senior and junior categories in this discipline.

    In the men’s 10m air pistol, 23-year-old Hu led qualification with 588 points, but faced stiff competition in the final from Kazakhstan’s Valeriy Rakhimzhan and Christian Reitz of Germany. Hu had a slow start in the final but regained momentum with a series of high-scoring shots, including several over 10.5, to move into medal contention.

    With two shots remaining, Hu responded with a 10.5 and a 10.4 to edge ahead. The Kazakh shooter, who had led most of the contest, closed with a 9.9 and had to settle for silver with 241.9. Reitz took bronze.

    The victory marked Hu’s third straight gold of the season in the event, keeping his unbeaten record in 2025. Another Chinese shooter, Olympic champion Xie Yu, finished fifth.

    With two gold medals on the first competition day, China leads the medal table in Munich, followed by Kazakhstan and South Korea.

    The ISSF World Cup will continue on Wednesday with the men’s 50m rifle 3 positions final and the women’s 25m pistol final. 

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Man City sign Cherki in time for Club World Cup

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Manchester City has announced the signing of Rayan Cherki from Lyon in deal worth 34 million pounds (46 million U.S. dollars).

    Pascal Gross (L) of Germany vies with Rayan Cherki of France during the UEFA Nations League A third-place match between Germany and France in Stuttgart, Germany, June 8, 2025. (Photo by Philippe Ruiz/Xinhua)

    “Manchester City has completed the signing of Rayan Cherki from Lyon. The 21-year-old attacking midfielder has put pen to paper on a five-year deal, which keeps him at the Etihad Stadium until the summer of 2030,” the club announced on its official website just moments before the transfer window allowing players to compete in the FIFA Club World Cup closed.

    Cherki made 20 appearances for Lyon last season, scoring 12 goals, and made his debut for the France national team in last week’s 5-4 UEFA Nations League defeat to Spain.

    “I would only leave Lyon for a project I really believe in and everything at City suggests I can develop my game and help the team be successful in the future. I can’t wait to show City fans what I can do,” Cherki was quoted as saying on the Manchester City website.

    “I have worked so hard for this all my life. I love this sport, and I can’t wait to develop further here in Manchester with [head coach] Pep [Guardiola] and his backroom staff.”

    City’s Director of Football, Hugo Viana, also expressed his satisfaction at the news.

    “He’s a player our scouts have watched for a long time, and we have all been impressed with his skill and creativity. I am convinced our fans will be excited to see him play,” commented Viana.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: ​More than 2,000 China-Europe express trains have made trips along the Eastern Corridor in the first five months of this year

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    According to China Railway Harbin Group, more than 2,000 trains have traveled along the Eastern Corridor in the first five months of 2025, accounting for 26.3% of the national total. The proportion of return trips is 31.9% of the national total. This is conducive to the further implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative.

    The Eastern Corridor includes the Manzhouli, Suifenhe and Tongjiang railway crossings. There are currently 27 routes in operation, connecting 14 countries including Poland, Germany and the Netherlands with more than 60 cities in China such as Changsha, Zhengzhou, Chengdu and Suzhou. It is an important element of connectivity and mutually beneficial cooperation between China and countries along the Belt and Road.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Why does the US still have a Level 1 travel advisory warning despite the chaos?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Samuel Cornell, PhD Candidate in Public Health & Community Medicine, School of Population Health, UNSW Sydney

    No travel can be considered completely safe. There are inherent risks from transportation, criminal activity, communicable diseases, injury and natural disasters.

    Still, global travel is booming — for those who can afford it.

    To reduce the chances of things going wrong, governments issue official travel advisories: public warnings meant to help people make informed travel decisions.

    Sometimes these advisories seem puzzling – why, for example, does the US still have the “safest” rating despite the ongoing volatility in Los Angeles?

    How do governments assess where is safe for Australians to travel?

    A brief history of travel advisories

    The United States pioneered travel advisories in 1978, with other countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom and Ireland following.

    Australia started providing travel advisories in 1996 and now runs its system under the Smart Traveller platform.

    To determine the risk level, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) draws on diplomatic reporting, assessments from Australian missions overseas about local security conditions, threat assessments from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and advice from Five Eyes intelligence sharing partners (Australia, the US, United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada).

    The goal is to create “smart, responsible informed travellers”, not to restrict tourism or damage foreign relationships.

    DFAT has stressed its system is not influenced by “commercial or political considerations”.

    Soft power and safety

    In theory, these advisories are meant to inform travellers, keep them safe and reduce the burden on consular services.

    However, they can also subtly reflect politics and alliances.

    While travel advisories are presented as neutral, fact-based risk assessments, they may not always be free from political bias.

    Research shows governments sometimes soften their warnings for countries they are close with and overstate risks in others.

    A detailed analysis of US State Department travel warnings from 2009 to 2016 found only a weak correlation between the number of American deaths in a country and the warnings issued.

    In some cases, destinations with no record of US fatalities received frequent warnings, while places with high death tolls had none.

    In early 2024, Australia issued a string of warnings about rising safety concerns in the US and extremely strict entry conditions even with an appropriate visa.

    Yet, the US kept its Level 1 rating – “exercise normal safety precautions” – the same advice given for places such as Japan or Denmark.

    Meanwhile, Australia’s warning for France was Level 2 — “exercise a high degree of caution” — due to the potential threat of terrorism.

    Experts have also criticised Australia’s travel warnings for being harsher toward developing countries.

    The UK, a country with lower crime rates than the US, also sits at Level 2 — putting it in the same risk level as Saudi Arabia, Nicaragua and South Africa.



    Read more:
    In Trump’s America, the shooting of a journalist is not a one-off. Press freedom itself is under attack

    Inconsistencies and grey areas

    The problem is, the advisory levels themselves are vague: a Level 2 warning can apply to countries with very different risk profiles.

    It’s used for places dealing with terrorism threats like France, or vastly different law and respect for human rights such as Saudi Arabia, or countries recovering from political unrest such as Sri Lanka.

    Until early June 2025, Sweden was also rated Level 2 due to localised gang violence, despite relatively low risks for tourists. Its rating has since been revised down to Level 1.

    Travel advisories often apply a blanket rating to an entire country, even when risks vary widely within its borders.

    For instance, Australia’s Level 1 rating for the US doesn’t distinguish between different regional threats.

    In June 2025, 15 people were injured in Boulder, Colorado after a man attacked a peaceful protest with Molotov cocktails.

    Earlier in 2025, a major measles outbreak in West Texas resulted in more than 700 cases reported in a single county.

    Despite this, Australia continues to classify the entire country as a low-risk destination.

    This can make it harder for travellers to make informed, location-specific decisions.

    Recent travel trends

    Recent data indicate a significant downturn in international travel to the US: in March 2025, overseas visits to the US fell by 11.6% compared to the previous year, with notable declines from Germany (28%), Spain (25%) and the UK (18%).

    Australian visitors to the US decreased by 7.8% compared to the same month in 2024, marking the steepest monthly drop since the COVID pandemic.

    This trend suggests travellers are reassessing risk on their own even when official advisories don’t reflect those concerns.

    The US case shows how politics can affect travel warnings: the country regularly experiences mass casualty incidents, violent protests and recently has been detaining and deporting people from many countries at the border including Australians, Germans and French nationals.

    Yet it remains at Level 1.

    What’s really going on has more to do with political alliances than safety: increasing the US travel risk level could create diplomatic friction.

    What travellers can do now

    If you’re a solo female traveller, identify as LGBTQIA+, are an academic, come from a visible minority or have spoken out online against the country you’re visiting, your experience might be very different from what the advice suggests.

    So, here are some tips to stay safe while travelling:

    • Check multiple sources: don’t rely solely on travel advisories – compare travel advice from other countries

    • Get on-the-ground updates: check local news for coverage of events. If possible, talk to people who’ve recently visited for their experiences

    • For broader safety trends, tools like the Global Peace Index offer data on crime, political stability and healthcare quality. If you’re concerned about how locals or police treat certain groups, consult Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, or country-specific reports from Freedom House

    • Consider identity-specific resources: there are travel guides and safety indexes for LGBTQIA+ travellers like Equaldex, women travellers (Solo Female Travelers Network) and others. These may highlight risks general advisories miss.

    Travel advisories often reflect whom your country trusts, not where you’re actually safe. If you’re relying on them, make sure you understand what they leave out.

    Samuel Cornell receives funding from an Australian Government Research Training Program
    Scholarship.

    Milad Haghani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Why does the US still have a Level 1 travel advisory warning despite the chaos? – https://theconversation.com/why-does-the-us-still-have-a-level-1-travel-advisory-warning-despite-the-chaos-258182

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Updating of designations of wine grape varieties with reference to origin – E-001573/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is aware that climate change can modify growing conditions and favour a geographical shift of certain varieties more adapted to forthcoming climatic conditions.

    According to Article 81 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013[1], it is for Member States to classify the wine grape varieties that may be used on their territories for wine production. Furthermore, grape varieties that can be used in each Geographical Indication (GI) are an element of the GI product specification.

    Product specifications can be modified and adapted to the specific production needs of each GI, in accordance to Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1143[2].

    A change of grape varieties is possible and can be made through a ‘standard amendment’ to the product specification, subject to a national procedure followed by notification to the Commission, as provided for in particular by Articles 24(4) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1143, 4 and 5 of Regulation (EU) 2025/27[3] and 12 of Regulation (EU) 2025/26[4].

    The Commission is not planning changes to Annex IV, Part B of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/33[5] considering the sensitivity of this labelling issue.

    This Annex was the result of a compromise reached after a long debate in the context of the recast of EU labelling rules resulting in Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/33.

    While Article 50 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/33 does not allow the use of the name of the varieties Barbera or Sangiovese on the label of wines with GI in Germany, it does not preclude the use of those varieties and others to produce wine, provided that those varieties are listed in the national classification of varieties and, in the case of GIs, are set out in the product specification of the relevant protected GI.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1308/oj/eng.
    • [2] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1143/oj.
    • [3] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2025/27/oj.
    • [4] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2025/26/oj.
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2019/33/oj/eng.
    Last updated: 10 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: Through Her Lens Photo Exhibition

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Through Her Lens: Women Rising for Peace premiered this June at New York’s Photoville Festival, spotlighting the leadership and impact of women driving peace in some of the world’s most fragile settings.

    Captured by local women photographers across 11 countries, the exhibition shares powerful stories of peacekeepers, activists, and allies working to build more just and secure futures.

    Presented in collaboration with the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, UN Women, and the Elsie Initiative Fund, the exhibit also marks 25 years of the #WomenPeaceSecurity agenda. We thank the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom for their generous support in making this global showcase possible.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z4pkD3aZBj4

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Azerbaijan signed a contract with the German company SEFE to increase gas supplies to Europe

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Baku, June 10 (Xinhua) — Azerbaijan’s state oil and gas company SOCAR and Germany’s state energy company SEFE (Securing Energy for Europe) have signed a 10-year contract on natural gas supplies, SOCAR said on Tuesday.

    According to the document, SOCAR will supply natural gas to Europe for SEFE. The volume of supplies will gradually increase to 15 terawatt-hours /TWh/ annually, which is about 1.5 billion cubic meters of gas.

    The agreement will support investment in production and infrastructure, including gas compressors, which will increase pipeline gas supplies to Europe and strengthen the region’s energy security.

    “This long-term contract underlines the strong partnership between Germany and Azerbaijan. It opens up a new route for significant volumes of gas to Europe, diversifying our portfolio and increasing security of supply for customers,” said SEFE CEO Egbert Lege.

    SOCAR President Rovshan Najaf, for his part, stressed: “The agreement is an important step in strengthening Europe’s energy security. The supply of significant volumes of SEFE gas strengthens cooperation between Azerbaijan and Germany, contributing to energy diversification and sustainable development in Europe.” –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why the salmon on your plate contains less omega-3 than it used to – and how the industry can address that

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Richard Newton, Lecturer in Aquaculture, University of Stirling

    Maria_Usp/Shutterstock

    Farmed Atlantic salmon has become one of the most highly traded food commodities in the world, enjoyed for its versatility as much as for its health benefits. It has long been known that eating oily fish such as salmon is the best way to consume long-chain omega-3 fatty acids. These are essential for brain development, mental health and cognition.

    In salmon, omega-3 fatty acids must come from the fish’s diet. For farmed fish, this means fishmeal and fish oil – so–called “marine ingredients” made from ground-up wild fish such as anchovy and fish by-products.

    But the global supply of omega-3s is severely limited, whether from farmed or wild seafood. Many of the key fisheries supplying marine ingredients reached full exploitation in the mid-1990s. Since the growth of salmon aquaculture, increasing volumes of the limited marine ingredients supply have been taken up by fish farming.

    This has raised concerns over sustainability and inflated the cost of these ingredients. The result has been a steady decline in the proportion of fish oil in farmed salmon diets, which has been replaced by plant oils. But these oils do not contain long-chain omega-3s.

    In turn, the amount of omega-3s in a portion of salmon halved between 2006 and 2015. However, the salmon industry increasingly uses omega-3 as a key selling point for its product – two portions of farmed Scottish salmon per week would meet the recommended intake for an adult at current levels.

    If the salmon industry is to continue to grow and maintain the omega-3 targets, it must be more efficient. And the seafood industry as a whole must do more to prevent omega-3 losses through its value chains. Part of the efficiency journey has been to produce more fish oil.

    This can be done by harnessing the value of fishery and aquaculture byproducts such as trimmings, skins and heads, so that more omega-3s are kept in the food (and feed) system.

    There is a growing incentive to use the whole fish – consequently there has been good progress in improving the use of byproducts. It is now estimated that around half of global fish oil supply is sourced from fishery, and particularly aquaculture, processing sources. However, there is still a lot of waste and logistical difficulties in storing and transporting seafood byproducts.

    Much of the industry incentive to use byproducts has been economic, as the global shortage of fish oil pushed prices above US$8,000 (£5,900) per tonne in 2024. Evidence from the past 20 years suggests that overall use of wild fish in the European salmon industry has dropped (replaced by plant ingredients), while production has grown several-fold.

    Despite improvements and reductions in the use of marine ingredients, the industry still comes under huge pressure from NGOs and conservation groups. They are concerned about the use of fish as feed, which may damage public perceptions of the aquaculture industry.

    To assess the use of fish as feed in aquaculture, the “fish in fish out” (Fifo) ratio was conceived, which measures the ratio of fish biomass included in fish feeds to the biomass of fish ultimately produced for consumption. The goal is for more fish to be produced for human consumption than is used as feed, and this would result in a Fifo of less than 1.

    New measure for nutrients

    Certification bodies such as the Aquaculture Stewardship Council and Best Aquaculture Practices have adopted different forms of the Fifo metric. However, until now, Fifo has not addressed one of the fundamental reasons for including marine ingredients in aquafeeds – providing omega-3s to consumers. It has neither considered the omega-3 content within feed fish, nor in the final product.

    Similarly, studies examining nutrient retention in salmon have only looked at that from feed to the farmed fish. The omega-3 lost in the process of turning the fish raw material in feed is not currently measured. By introducing our new measure, the nutrient Fifo (nFifo), nutrients can be followed from wild fish capture, its separation into meal and oil, and through to the final product sold to consumers.

    Certification bodies like the Aquaculture Stewardship Council could adopt the new metric for nutrition.
    T. Schneider/Shutterstock

    The method used in nFifo favours the use of byproduct resources over virgin raw materials, so that diets containing byproducts receive a lower nFifo. In theory, this should promote circular economy initiatives.

    This is crucial in the marine ingredients industry. Seafood is highly perishable and the byproducts especially so. But they are also some of the richest sources of omega-3s, such as from herring or mackerel.

    However, the cost of retaining, stabilising, storing and transporting byproducts is often prohibitive. This is especially true on board fishing boats, where space is at a premium and byproducts are often dumped at sea.

    Introducing metrics that prevent bioresources being wasted is essential for sustainable food production. Current salmon feed contains around 20% to 25% marine ingredients, but only around 5% is from byproducts. This results in a nFIFO of 2.17.

    Incorporating only marine ingredients sourced from byproducts reduces that nFifo to below 0.5. Crucially, this still provides the same level of omega-3s to the consumer.

    If the seafood industry is serious about sustainable production, it needs to become much more efficient with resources. The nFifo metric links the use of wild fish to omega-3s consumed in farmed salmon for the first time – but it could also be applied to other species and nutrients.

    The methodology is similar to that used for environmental impact indicators for climate change, land or water use. It makes it possible to assess the trade-offs of including and substituting marine ingredients in fish diets at different points of production.

    For example, while marine ingredients may raise concerns around their impact on fisheries, they have comparatively low carbon footprints and almost no land or water footprints compared to plant ingredients. This could potentially lead to more balanced and sustainable approaches to seafood production.

    It is hoped that the nFifo metric and an accessible tool for calculating it (there is one provided on the Blue Food Performance website) will be adopted by certifiers. It could also lead to more complex sustainability indicators becoming mainstream, letting consumers make informed choices about the nutritional and environmental credentials of the products they buy.

    Richard Newton is the Chair of the Climate Action Committe for Best Aquaculture Practice and the Stakeholder Advisory Group for Seafood Watch. He has previously received funding in 2019 and 2013 from the International Fishmeal Fishoil Organisation to map supplies of underutilised by-product resources.

    Dave Little has received funding from various organisations supporting sustainable aquaculture development and has been affiliated to various organisations working to to improve farmed seafood assurance

    – ref. Why the salmon on your plate contains less omega-3 than it used to – and how the industry can address that – https://theconversation.com/why-the-salmon-on-your-plate-contains-less-omega-3-than-it-used-to-and-how-the-industry-can-address-that-258228

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: President reaffirms commitment to global diplomacy 

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    President Cyril Ramaphosa has reaffirmed South Africa’s commitment to global diplomacy, describing the upcoming G7 Leaders’ Summit as a critical opportunity to strengthen international partnerships and promote the country’s leadership within the G20.

    Speaking to members of the media during a visit to Sefako Makgatho Primary School in Saulsville, Pretoria, the President confirmed that South Africa had been officially invited to attend the G7 by Canada, this year’s chair of the summit.

    “Yes, we are going to the G7. We’ve been invited by Canada, who are the conveners, who are the head of the G7 this time around. I’m hoping that when we meet the various leaders of the G7, we’ll be able to interact meaningfully with them,” President Ramaphosa said.

    The President outlined a number of key bilateral engagements scheduled on the sidelines of the summit, including meetings with the Chancellor of Germany, the Prime Minister of Canada, and the President of the United States, Donald Trump.

    “The G7 gives us an opportunity to go and propagate our message, the message about the presidency of South Africa’s G20 and how we want to see great outcomes of the G20. We’re going to use it as a platform to begin to consolidate what we want to have in November when the leaders’ summit takes place here,” the President said on Tuesday.

    President Ramaphosa is set to jet off to Canada, Kananaskis from 14-17 June to attend and participate in the G7 Leaders’ Summit. 

    READ | President Ramaphosa to attend G7 Leaders’ Summit in Canada

    Reflecting on the US working visit

    Reflecting on his recent visit to the White House in Washington DC, President Ramaphosa dismissed criticism of the trip, saying it was a strategic move to reset relations with one of South Africa’s key trading partners.

    “We do confirm that our visit to the White House in the United States was a moment where South Africa set out to reset the relationship with the United States, and I do believe that we have achieved that. 

    “Many people were very critical of our going there…and some were even suggesting that we were summoned. We were not summoned. In my telephone conversation with President Trump two weeks earlier, I said, I want to come and see you. And immediately conceded to that, and later they gave us a date. So that is not summoning, it is us taking the initiative that we want to go and see him,” the President said. 

    He said there was engagement that was taking place between the Department of Trade and Industry and Competition and the Department of International Relations. “So, we’ve opened the way for us to engage seriously with the United States. And on the other hand, we were also going to talk about trade matters, and that is now underway,” the President said. 

    He added that the White House meeting was also used to underscore the importance of President Trump attending the upcoming G20 Summit, which South Africa will host in November. 

    The President added that President Trump had “immediately conceded” that the G20 is not fully effective without the participation of the United States. 

    “For us, it’s important as a nation to reposition ourselves in the very turbulent geopolitical architecture or situation that we have, and that is why it was important to go to the United States, as we will go to many other countries, both on our own continent, in the Middle East and in Asia and in Europe as well. 

    “We are a country that is exposed and has relations with many countries around the world, and where the challenges and problems, we should immediately take action to correct those,” the President said. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI: Giftbit Expands Global Footprint, Emphasizes Ease

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SEATTLE and CALGARY, Alberta, June 10, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Giftbit, a digital payouts and gift card platform for businesses, has launched new features to improve reward management and expand its international offering. Highlights include one-click add-to-wallet functionality for prepaid Visa® cards, enhanced reporting, and a major expansion of its global gift card catalog.

    One-Click Add-to-Wallet Feature

    Recipients of prepaid Visa rewards can now instantly add their balance to Apple Pay, Google Pay, or Samsung Pay with a single click. No apps, logins, or manual data entry required.

    “Smooth activation matters,” said Leif Baradoy, Giftbit’s CEO and founder. “Other vendors make people jump through hoops which lead to frustration and user fatigue. We’re focused on a seamless cardholder experience.”

    The update also includes PIN support for spending at gas stations and convenience stores.

    Reward Management a Breeze With New Reporting Dashboard

    Giftbit is proud to launch one of its most highly requested features: an intuitive reward history dashboard. Customers can now easily view, sort, and filter sent rewards by date, status, brand, or campaign, all within the Giftbit web application. This update helps program managers track unclaimed rewards, resend with ease, and monitor contact list health, making it easy to find key details and take action across multiple orders all in one place.

    “The new Rewards History view has made it so much easier for us to stay on top of undeliverable rewards,” said Giftbit customer Hunter Lisenby of United Communications. “We can quickly spot bad contact email addresses and fix the issue without digging through individual orders.” 

    Expanded Global Reach

    Giftbit believes incentive programs should have the ability to reach entire audiences no matter where they reside. That’s why it’s proud to support local currency rewards in over 30 countries, enabling businesses to send payouts in the recipient’s currency for a more personal and seamless experience.

    Supported regions now include:

    Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United States.
    (Prepaid Mastercard®available globally wherever Mastercard is accepted)

    Strategic Partnerships Expand Catalog Offering

    New partnerships make Giftbit’s gift card catalog more reliable and diverse. Built-in backups prevent outages and strengthen a smooth end-to-end reward experience.

    “A strong catalog is key,” said Nat Salvione, Giftbit’s Chief Commercial Officer. “These partnerships help us deliver stable rewards anytime, anywhere.”

    In addition, Giftbit has upgraded their funding and payment processes to allow customers to fund their accounts in their preferred currency for easier operational control.

    Simplifying Global Rewards, Now and Ahead

    Giftbit continues to invest in the future of global digital rewards. The platform now supports:

    • 1,000+ payout products
    • 30+ local currencies
    • 25 funding currencies
    • Regional brand support in 40+ countries
    • Global prepaid card options in 100+ countries

    These enhancements make it easier than ever for businesses to scale their reward programs across borders with built-in flexibility, choice, and regional support.

    About Giftbit

    Giftbit helps companies send digital payouts and rewards at scale. Its platform offers branded gift cards, prepaid cards, and global payout options, making it easy to incentivize and reward employees, customers, and partners anytime, anywhere.

    Learn more at: www.giftbit.com.

    Media Contact: Zoe North — pr@giftbit.com

    The MIL Network –