Category: Intelligence

MIL-OSI: Castellum, Inc. Announces Pricing of $3.6 Million Registered Direct Offering

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

VIENNA, Va., Dec. 23, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Castellum, Inc. (the “Company”) (NYSE-American: CTM), a cybersecurity, electronic warfare, and software services company focused on the federal government, today announced that it has entered into a securities purchase agreement with several institutional investors to purchase 9,473,700 shares of common stock in a registered direct offering. The shares of common stock are being sold at an offering price of $0.38 per share.

The gross proceeds to the Company from the registered direct offering are estimated to be approximately $3.6 million before deducting the placement agent’s fees and other estimated offering expenses payable by the Company. The offering is expected to close on or about December 24, 2024, subject to the satisfaction of customary closing conditions.

Maxim Group LLC is acting as the sole placement agent in connection with the offering.

The shares of common stock are being offered pursuant to a shelf registration statement on Form S-3 (File No. 333-275840), which was declared effective by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on December 12, 2023. The offering of shares of common stock will be made only by means of a prospectus supplement that forms a part of such registration statement.

This press release does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy, nor will there be any sales of these securities in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of such jurisdiction. A prospectus supplement relating to the shares of common stock will be filed by the Company with the SEC. When available, copies of the prospectus supplement relating to the registered direct offering, together with the accompanying prospectus, can be obtained at the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov or from Maxim Group LLC, 300 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10022, Attention: Syndicate Department, or via email at syndicate@maximgrp.com or telephone at (212) 895-3500.

About Castellum, Inc.

Castellum, Inc. (NYSE-American: CTM) is a defense-oriented technology company that is executing strategic acquisitions in the cybersecurity, MBSE, and information warfare areas – http://castellumus.com/.

Forward-Looking Statements:

This release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. All forward-looking statements are inherently uncertain, based on current expectations and assumptions concerning future events or future performance of the company. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which are only predictions and speak only as of the date hereof. Words such as “will,” “would,” “believe,” and “expects,” and similar language or phrasing are indicative of forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks, uncertainties, and other factors, many of which are outside of the Company’s control, that could cause actual results to differ (sometimes materially) from the results expressed or implied in the forward-looking statements, including, among others: the Company’s ability to close the described debt financing; its ability to effectively integrate and grow its acquired companies; its ability to identify additional acquisition targets and close additional acquisitions; the impact on the Company’s revenue due to a delay in the U.S. Congress approving a federal budget; and the Company’s ability to maintain the listing of its common stock on the NYSE American LLC. In evaluating such statements, prospective investors should review carefully various risks and uncertainties identified in Item 1A. “Risk Factors” section of the Company’s recently filed Form 10-Q, Item 1A. “Risk Factors” in the Company’s most recent Form 10-K, and other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission which can be viewed at www.sec.gov. These risks and uncertainties, or not closing the described potential debt financing in this press release, could cause the Company’s actual results to differ materially from those indicated in the forward-looking statements. Except to the extent required by law, we undertake no obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, a change in events, conditions, circumstances or assumptions underlying such statements, or otherwise.

Contact:

Glen Ives, President and Chief Executive Officer
Phone: (703) 752-6157
Contact: Info@castellumus.com

A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/f3d9cecc-6bab-4be4-a011-1a1ac2c9d09a

The MIL Network –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: United States Charges Dual Russian and Israeli National as Developer of LockBit Ransomware Group
Source: United States Attorneys General

Defendant Rostislav Panev in Custody Pending Extradition from Israel to the United States
Note: A copy of the superseding criminal complaint can be found here.

A superseding criminal complaint filed in the District of New Jersey was unsealed today charging a dual Russian and Israeli national for being a developer of the LockBit ransomware group.

In August, Rostislav Panev, 51, a dual Russian and Israeli national, was arrested in Israel pursuant to a U.S. provisional arrest request with a view towards extradition to the United States. Panev is currently in custody in Israel pending extradition on the charges in the superseding complaint.

“The Justice Department’s work going after the world’s most dangerous ransomware schemes includes not only dismantling networks, but also finding and bringing to justice the individuals responsible for building and running them,” said Attorney General Merrick B. Garland. “Three of the individuals who we allege are responsible for LockBit’s cyberattacks against thousands of victims are now in custody, and we will continue to work alongside our partners to hold accountable all those who lead and enable ransomware attacks.”

“The arrest of Mr. Panev reflects the Department’s commitment to using all its tools to combat the ransomware threat,” said Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco. “We started this year with a coordinated international disruption of LockBit — the most damaging ransomware group in the world. Fast forward to today and three LockBit actors are in custody thanks to the diligence of our investigators and our strong partnerships around the world. This case is a model for ransomware investigations in the years to come.”

“The arrest of alleged developer Ratislav Panev is part of the FBI’s ongoing efforts to disrupt and dismantle the LockBit ransomware group, one of the most prolific ransomware variants across the globe,” said FBI Director Christopher Wray. “The LockBit group has targeted both public and private sector victims around the world, including schools, hospitals, and critical infrastructure, as well as small businesses and multi-national corporations. No matter how hidden or advanced the threat, the FBI remains committed to working with our interagency partners to safeguard the cyber ecosystem and hold accountable those who are responsible for these criminal activities.”

“The criminal complaint alleges that Rotislav Panev developed malware and maintained the infrastructure for LockBit, which was once the world’s most destructive ransomware group and attacked thousands of victims, causing billions of dollars in damage,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Nicole M. Argentieri, head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “Along with our domestic and international law enforcement partner actions to dismantle LockBit’s infrastructure, the Criminal Division has disrupted LockBit’s operations by charging seven of its key members (including affiliates, developers, and its administrator) and arresting three of these defendants — including Panev. We are especially grateful for our partnerships with authorities in Europol, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel, which show that, when likeminded countries work together, cybercriminals will find it harder to escape justice.”

“As alleged by the complaint, Rostislav Panev for years built and maintained the digital weapons that enabled his LockBit coconspirators to wreak havoc and cause billions of dollars in damage around the world,” said U.S. Attorney Philip R. Sellinger for the District of New Jersey. “But just like the six other LockBit members previously identified and charged by this office and our FBI and Criminal Division partners, Panev could not remain anonymous and avoid justice indefinitely. He must now answer for his crimes. Today’s announcement represents another blow struck by the United States and our international partners against the LockBit organization, and our efforts will continue relentlessly until the group is fully dismantled and its members brought to justice.”

According to the superseding complaint, documents filed in this and related cases, and statements made in court, Panev acted as a developer of the LockBit ransomware group from its inception in or around 2019 through at least February 2024. During that time, Panev and his LockBit coconspirators grew LockBit into what was, at times, the most active and destructive ransomware group in the world. The LockBit group attacked more than 2,500 victims in at least 120 countries around the world, including 1,800 in the United States. Their victims ranged from individuals and small businesses to multinational corporations, including hospitals, schools, nonprofit organizations, critical infrastructure, and government and law-enforcement agencies. LockBit’s members extracted at least $500 million in ransom payments from their victims and caused billions of dollars in other losses, including lost revenue and costs from incident response and recovery.

LockBit’s members comprised “developers,” like Panev, who designed the LockBit malware code and maintained the infrastructure on which LockBit operated. LockBit’s other members, called “affiliates,” carried out LockBit attacks and extorted ransom payments from LockBit victims. LockBit’s developers and affiliates would then split ransom payments extorted from victims.

As alleged in the superseding complaint, at the time of Panev’s arrest in Israel in August, law enforcement discovered on Panev’s computer administrator credentials for an online repository that was hosted on the dark web and stored source code for multiple versions of the LockBit builder, which allowed LockBit’s affiliates to generate custom builds of the LockBit ransomware malware for particular victims. On that repository, law enforcement also discovered source code for LockBit’s StealBit tool, which helped LockBit affiliates exfiltrate data stolen through LockBit attacks. Law enforcement also discovered access credentials for the LockBit control panel, an online dashboard maintained by LockBit developers for LockBit’s affiliates and hosted by those developers on the dark web.

The superseding complaint also alleges that Panev exchanged direct messages through a cybercriminal forum with LockBit’s primary administrator, who, in an indictment unsealed in the District of New Jersey in May, the United States alleged to be Dimitry Yuryevich Khoroshev (Дмитрий Юрьевич Хорошев), also known as LockBitSupp, LockBit, and putinkrab. In those messages, Panev and the LockBit primary administrator discussed work that needed to be done on the LockBit builder and control panel.

Court documents further indicate that, between June 2022 and February 2024, the primary LockBit administrator made a series of transfers of cryptocurrency, laundered through one or more illicit cryptocurrency mixing services, of approximately $10,000 per month to a cryptocurrency wallet owned by Panev. Those transfers amounted to over $230,000 during that period.

In interviews with Israeli authorities following his arrest in August, Panev admitted to having performed coding, development, and consulting work for the LockBit group and to having received regular payments in cryptocurrency for that work, consistent with the transfers identified by U.S. authorities. Among the work that Panev admitted to having completed for the LockBit group was the development of code to disable antivirus software; to deploy malware to multiple computers connected to a victim network; and to print the LockBit ransom note to all printers connected to a victim network. Panev also admitted to having written and maintained LockBit malware code and to having provided technical guidance to the LockBit group.

The LockBit Investigation

The superseding complaint against, and apprehension of, Panev follows a disruption of LockBit ransomware in February by the United Kingdom (U.K.)’s National Crime Agency (NCA)’s Cyber Division, which worked in cooperation with the Justice Department, FBI, and other international law enforcement partners. As previously announced by the Department, authorities disrupted LockBit by seizing numerous public-facing websites used by LockBit to connect to the organization’s infrastructure and by seizing control of servers used by LockBit administrators, thereby disrupting the ability of LockBit actors to attack and encrypt networks and extort victims by threatening to publish stolen data. That disruption succeeded in greatly diminishing LockBit’s reputation and its ability to attack further victims, as alleged by documents filed in this case.

The superseding complaint against Panev also follows charges brought in the District of New Jersey against other LockBit members, including its alleged primary creator, developer, and administrator, Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev. An indictment against Khoroshev unsealed in May alleges that Khoroshev began developing LockBit as early as September 2019, continued acting as the group’s administrator through 2024, a role in which Khoroshev recruited new affiliate members, spoke for the group publicly under the alias “LockBitSupp,” and developed and maintained the infrastructure used by affiliates to deploy LockBit attacks. Khoroshev is currently the subject of a reward of up to $10 million through the U.S. Department of State’s Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) Rewards Program, with information accepted through the FBI tip website at www.tips.fbi.gov/.

A total of seven LockBit members have now been charged in the District of New Jersey. Beyond Panev and Khoroshev, other previously charged LockBit defendants include:
- In July, two LockBit affiliate members, Mikhail Vasiliev, also known as Ghostrider, Free, Digitalocean90, Digitalocean99, Digitalwaters99, and Newwave110, and Ruslan Astamirov, also known as BETTERPAY, offtitan, and Eastfarmer, pleaded guilty in the District of New Jersey for their participation in the LockBit ransomware group and admitted deploying multiple LockBit attacks against U.S. and foreign victims. Vasiliev and Astamirov are presently in custody awaiting sentencing.
- In February, in parallel with the disruption operation described above, an indictment was unsealed in the District of New Jersey charging Russian nationals Artur Sungatov and Ivan Kondratyev, also known as Bassterlord, with deploying LockBit against numerous victims throughout the United States, including businesses nationwide in the manufacturing and other industries, as well as victims around the world in the semiconductor and other industries. Sungatov and Kondratyev remain at large.
- In May 2023, two indictments were unsealed in Washington, D.C., and the District of New Jersey charging Mikhail Matveev, also known as Wazawaka, m1x, Boriselcin, and Uhodiransomwar, with using different ransomware variants, including LockBit, to attack numerous victims throughout the United States, including the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department. Matveev remains at large and is currently the subject of a reward of up to $10 million through the U.S. Department of State’s TOC Rewards Program, with information accepted through the FBI tip website at www.tips.fbi.gov/.
The U.S. Department of State’s TOC Rewards Program is offering rewards of:

Information is accepted through the FBI tip website at tips.fbi.gov.

Khoroshev, Matveev, Sungatov, and Kondratyev have also been designated for sanctions by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control for their roles in launching cyberattacks.

Victim Assistance

LockBit victims are encouraged to contact the FBI and submit information at www.ic3.gov/. As announced by the Department in February, law enforcement, through its disruption efforts, has developed decryption capabilities that may enable hundreds of victims around the world to restore systems encrypted using the LockBit ransomware variant. Submitting information at the IC3 site will enable law enforcement to determine whether affected systems can be successfully decrypted.

LockBit victims are also encouraged to visit www.justice.gov/usao-nj/lockbit for case updates and information regarding their rights under U.S. law, including the right to submit victim impact statements and request restitution, in the criminal litigation against Panev, Astamirov, and Vasiliev.

The FBI Newark Field Office, under the supervision of Acting Special Agent in Charge Nelson I. Delgado, is investigating the LockBit ransomware variant. Israel’s Office of the State Attorney, Department of International Affairs, and Israel National Police; France’s Gendarmerie Nationale Cyberspace Command, Paris Prosecution Office — Cyber Division, and judicial authorities at the Tribunal Judiciare of Paris; Europol; Eurojust; the U.K.’s NCA; Germany’s Landeskriminalamt Schleswig-Holstein, Bundeskriminalamt, and the Central Cybercrime Department North Rhine-Westphalia; Switzerland’s Federal Office of Justice, Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Canton of Zurich, and Zurich Cantonal Police; Spain’s Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil; Japan’s National Police Agency; Australian Federal Police; Sweden’s Polismyndighetens; Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police; Politie Dienst Regionale Recherche Oost-Brabant of the Netherlands; and Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation have provided significant assistance and coordination in these matters and in the LockBit investigation generally.

Trial Attorneys Debra Ireland and Jorge Gonzalez of the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Andrew M. Trombly, David E. Malagold, and Vinay Limbachia for the District of New Jersey are prosecuting the charges against Panev and the other previously charged LockBit defendants in the District of New Jersey.

The Justice Department’s Cybercrime Liaison Prosecutor to Eurojust, Office of International Affairs, and National Security Division also provided significant assistance.

Additional details on protecting networks against LockBit ransomware are available at StopRansomware.gov. These include Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Advisories AA23-325A, AA23-165A, and AA23-075A.

A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
MIL Security OSI –
January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Lawson Sex Offender Sentenced to 17 Years for Child Pornography

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

KANSAS CITY, Mo. – A Lawson, Mo., man who is a registered sex offender has been sentenced in federal court for distributing child pornography over the internet.

Lance M. Berry, 37, was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Howard F. Sachs on Thursday, Dec. 19, to 17 years in federal prison without parole. The court also sentenced Berry to 10 years of supervised release following incarceration and ordered him to pay $33,000 in restitution to his victims.

On Aug. 7, 2024, Berry pleaded guilty to one count of distributing child pornography over the internet.

Berry has a prior Ray County, Mo., conviction for the deviate sexual assault of a child under the age of 13, which requires him to register as a sex offender.

Berry admitted that he utilized a peer-to-peer file-sharing program on June 1, 2022, to make images and videos of child pornography available to other users over the internet. On that day, an undercover officer with the Missouri State Highway Patrol was able to directly connect to Berry’s cell phone and download 14 videos of child pornography.

According to court documents, Berry’s cell phone contained 944 unique images of child pornography, including 19 images of sadistic or masochistic violence against a minor, and 168 images featuring infants or toddlers. There were an additional 40 videos of child pornography, which also included depictions of sadistic or masochistic violence and/or infants and toddlers.

This case was prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Kenneth W. Borgnino. It was investigated by the Missouri State Highway Patrol and the FBI.

Project Safe Childhood

This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse. Led by the United States Attorneys’ Offices and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to locate, apprehend, and prosecute individuals who sexually exploit children, and to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.usdoj.gov/psc . For more information about Internet safety education, please visit www.usdoj.gov/psc and click on the tab “resources.”

MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Charges Dual Russian And Israeli National As Developer Of Lockbit Ransomware Group
Source: Office of United States Attorneys

Defendant Rostislav Panev in Custody Pending Extradition from Israel to the United States

NEWARK, N.J. – A superseding criminal complaint filed in the District of New Jersey was unsealed today charging a dual Russian and Israeli national for being a developer of the LockBit ransomware group, U.S. Attorney Philip R. Sellinger announced.

In August, Rostislav Panev, 51, a dual Russian and Israeli national, was arrested in Israel pursuant to a U.S. provisional arrest request with a view towards extradition to the United States. Panev is currently in custody in Israel pending extradition on the charges lodged in the superseding complaint.

“As alleged by the complaint, Rostislav Panev for years built and maintained the digital weapons that enabled his LockBit coconspirators to wreak havoc and cause billions of dollars in damage around the world. But just like the six other LockBit members previously identified and charged by this office and our FBI and Criminal Division partners, Panev could not remain anonymous and avoid justice indefinitely. He must now answer for his crimes. Today’s announcement represents another blow struck by the United States and our international partners against the LockBit organization, and our efforts will continue relentlessly until the group is fully dismantled and its members brought to justice.”

U.S. Attorney Philip R. Sellinger

“The Justice Department’s work going after the world’s most dangerous ransomware schemes includes not only dismantling networks, but also finding and bringing to justice the individuals responsible for building and running them,” said Attorney General Merrick B. Garland. “Three of the individuals who we allege are responsible for LockBit’s cyberattacks against thousands of victims are now in custody, and we will continue to work alongside our partners to hold accountable all those who lead and enable ransomware attacks.”

“The arrest of Mr. Panev reflects the Department’s commitment to using all its tools to combat the ransomware threat,” said Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco. “We started this year with a coordinated international disruption of LockBit — the most damaging ransomware group in the world. Fast forward to today and three LockBit actors are in custody thanks to the diligence of our investigators and our strong partnerships around the world. This case is a model for ransomware investigations in the years to come.”

“The arrest of alleged developer Rostislav Panev is part of the FBI’s ongoing efforts to disrupt and dismantle the LockBit ransomware group, one of the most prolific ransomware variants across the globe,” said FBI Director Christopher Wray. “The LockBit group has targeted both public and private sector victims around the world, including schools, hospitals, and critical infrastructure, as well as small businesses and multi-national corporations. No matter how hidden or advanced the threat, the FBI remains committed to working with our interagency partners to safeguard the cyber ecosystem and hold accountable those who are responsible for these criminal activities.”

“The criminal complaint alleges that Rotislav Panev developed malware and maintained the infrastructure for LockBit, which was once the world’s most destructive ransomware group and attacked thousands of victims, causing billions of dollars in damage,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Nicole M. Argentieri, head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “Along with our domestic and international law enforcement partner actions to dismantle LockBit’s infrastructure, the Criminal Division has disrupted LockBit’s operations by charging seven of its key members (including affiliates, developers, and its administrator) and arresting three of these defendants — including Panev. We are especially grateful for our partnerships with authorities in Europol, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel, which show that, when likeminded countries work together, cybercriminals will find it harder to escape justice.”

“For five years, Panev helped to grow LockBit into a ransomware machine of deception and extortion,” said Acting Special Agent in Charge Nelson I. Delgado of the FBI Newark Field Office. “His reach was far and wide but FBI Newark and our international law enforcement partners were able to disrupt his reign. Panev’s arrest marks a victory against these conspirators, and is a step towards upholding justice and neutralizing these criminals.”

According to the superseding complaint, documents filed in this and related cases, and statements made in court, Panev acted as a developer of the LockBit ransomware group from its inception in or around 2019 through at least February 2024. During that time, Panev and his LockBit coconspirators grew LockBit into what was, at times, the most active and destructive ransomware group in the world. The LockBit group attacked more than 2,500 victims in at least 120 countries around the world, including 1,800 in the United States. Their victims ranged from individuals and small businesses to multinational corporations, including hospitals, schools, nonprofit organizations, critical infrastructure, and government and law-enforcement agencies. LockBit’s members extracted at least $500 million in ransom payments from their victims and caused billions of dollars in other losses, including lost revenue and costs from incident response and recovery.

LockBit’s members comprised “developers,” like Panev, who designed the LockBit malware code and maintained the infrastructure on which LockBit operated. LockBit’s other members, called “affiliates,” carried out LockBit attacks and extorted ransom payments from LockBit victims. LockBit’s developers and affiliates would then split ransom payments extorted from victims.

As alleged in the superseding complaint, at the time of Panev’s arrest in Israel in August, law enforcement discovered on Panev’s computer administrator credentials for an online repository that was hosted on the dark web and stored source code for multiple versions of the LockBit builder, which allowed LockBit’s affiliates to generate custom builds of the LockBit ransomware malware for particular victims. On that repository, law enforcement also discovered source code for LockBit’s StealBit tool, which helped LockBit affiliates exfiltrate data stolen through LockBit attacks. Law enforcement also discovered access credentials for the LockBit control panel, an online dashboard maintained by LockBit developers for LockBit’s affiliates and hosted by those developers on the dark web.

The superseding complaint also alleges that Panev exchanged direct messages through a cybercriminal forum with LockBit’s primary administrator, who, in an indictment unsealed in the District of New Jersey in May, the United States alleged to be Dimitry Yuryevich Khoroshev (Дмитрий Юрьевич Хорошев), also known as LockBitSupp, LockBit, and putinkrab. In those messages, Panev and the LockBit primary administrator discussed work that needed to be done on the LockBit builder and control panel.

Court documents further indicate that, between June 2022 and February 2024, the primary LockBit administrator made a series of transfers of cryptocurrency, laundered through one or more illicit cryptocurrency mixing services, of approximately $10,000 per month to a cryptocurrency wallet owned by Panev. Those transfers amounted to over $230,000 during that period.

In interviews with Israeli authorities following his arrest in August, Panev admitted to having performed coding, development, and consulting work for the LockBit group and to having received regular payments in cryptocurrency for that work, consistent with the transfers identified by U.S. authorities. Among the work that Panev admitted to having completed for the LockBit group was the development of code to disable antivirus software; to deploy malware to multiple computers connected to a victim network; and to print the LockBit ransom note to all printers connected to a victim network. Panev also admitted to having written and maintained LockBit malware code and to having provided technical guidance to the LockBit group.

The LockBit Investigation

The superseding complaint against, and apprehension of, Panev follows a disruption of LockBit ransomware in February by the U.K. National Crime Agency (NCA)’s Cyber Division, which worked in cooperation with the Justice Department, FBI, and other international law enforcement partners. As previously announced by the Department, authorities disrupted LockBit by seizing numerous public-facing websites used by LockBit to connect to the organization’s infrastructure and by seizing control of servers used by LockBit administrators, thereby disrupting the ability of LockBit actors to attack and encrypt networks and extort victims by threatening to publish stolen data. That disruption succeeded in greatly diminishing LockBit’s reputation and its ability to attack further victims, as alleged by documents filed in this case.

The superseding complaint against Panev also follows charges brought in the District of New Jersey against other LockBit members, including its alleged primary creator, developer, and administrator, Dmitry Yuryevich Khoroshev. An indictment against Khoroshev unsealed in May alleges that Khoroshev began developing LockBit as early as September 2019, continued acting as the group’s administrator through 2024, a role in which Khoroshev recruited new affiliate members, spoke for the group publicly under the alias “LockBitSupp,” and developed and maintained the infrastructure used by affiliates to deploy LockBit attacks. Khoroshev is currently the subject of a reward of up to $10 million through the U.S. Department of State’s Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) Rewards Program, with information accepted through the FBI tip website at www.tips.fbi.gov/.

A total of seven LockBit members have now been charged in the District of New Jersey. Beyond Panev and Khoroshev, other previously charged LockBit defendants include:
- In July, two LockBit affiliate members, Mikhail Vasiliev, also known as Ghostrider, Free, Digitalocean90, Digitalocean99, Digitalwaters99, and Newwave110, and Ruslan Astamirov, also known as BETTERPAY, offtitan, and Eastfarmer, pleaded guilty in the District of New Jersey for their participation in the LockBit ransomware group and admitted deploying multiple LockBit attacks against U.S. and foreign victims. Vasiliev and Astamirov are presently in custody awaiting sentencing.
- In February, in parallel with the disruption operation described above, an indictment was unsealed in the District of New Jersey charging Russian nationals Artur Sungatov and Ivan Kondratyev, also known as Bassterlord, with deploying LockBit against numerous victims throughout the United States, including businesses nationwide in the manufacturing and other industries, as well as victims around the world in the semiconductor and other industries. Sungatov and Kondratyev remain at large.
- In May 2023, two indictments were unsealed in Washington, D.C., and the District of New Jersey charging Mikhail Matveev, also known as Wazawaka, m1x, Boriselcin, and Uhodiransomwar, with using different ransomware variants, including LockBit, to attack numerous victims throughout the United States, including the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department. Matveev remains at large and is currently the subject of a reward of up to $10 million through the U.S. Department of State’s TOC Rewards Program, with information accepted through the FBI tip website at www.tips.fbi.gov/.
The U.S. Department of State’s Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) Rewards Program is offering rewards of:

Information is accepted through the FBI tip website at tips.fbi.gov.

Khoroshev, Matveev, Sungatov, and Kondratyev have also been designated for sanctions by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control for their roles in launching cyberattacks.

Victim Assistance

LockBit victims are encouraged to contact the FBI and submit information at www.ic3.gov. As announced by the Department in February, law enforcement, through its disruption efforts, has developed decryption capabilities that may enable hundreds of victims around the world to restore systems encrypted using the LockBit ransomware variant. Submitting information at the IC3 site will enable law enforcement to determine whether affected systems can be successfully decrypted.

LockBit victims are also encouraged to visit www.justice.gov/usao-nj/lockbit for case updates and information regarding their rights under U.S. law, including the right to submit victim impact statements and request restitution, in the criminal litigation against Panev, Astamirov, and Vasiliev.

The FBI Newark Field Office, under the supervision of Acting Special Agent in Charge Nelson I. Delgado, is investigating the LockBit ransomware variant. Israel’s Office of the State Attorney, Department of International Affairs, and Israel National Police; France’s Gendarmerie Nationale Cyberspace Command, Paris Prosecution Office — Cyber Division, and judicial authorities at the Tribunal Judiciare of Paris; Europol; Eurojust; the United Kingdom’s National Crime Agency; Germany’s Landeskriminalamt Schleswig-Holstein, Bundeskriminalamt, and the Central Cybercrime Department North Rhine-Westphalia; Switzerland’s Federal Office of Justice, Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Canton of Zurich, and Zurich Cantonal Police; Spain’s Policia Nacional and Guardia Civil; Japan’s National Police Agency; Australian Federal Police; Sweden’s Polismyndighetens; Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police; Politie Dienst Regionale Recherche Oost-Brabant of the Netherlands; and Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation have provided significant assistance and coordination in these matters and in the LockBit investigation generally.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Andrew M. Trombly, David E. Malagold, and Vinay Limbachia for the District of New Jersey and Trial Attorneys Debra Ireland and Jorge Gonzalez of the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) are prosecuting the charges against Panev and the other previously charged LockBit defendants in the District of New Jersey.

The Justice Department’s Cybercrime Liaison Prosecutor to Eurojust, Office of International Affairs, and National Security Division also provided significant assistance.

Additional details on protecting networks against LockBit ransomware are available at StopRansomware.gov. These include Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Advisories AA23-325A, AA23-165A, and AA23-075A.

The charges and allegations contained in the superseding complaint are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

Defense counsel: Frank Arleo, Esq.

MIL Security OSI –
January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: United States Attorney Christopher R. Kavanaugh Steps Down

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

CHARLOTTESVILLE, Va. – Christopher R. Kavanaugh announced today that he will step down as the United States Attorney for the Western District of Virginia, resigning from the Department of Justice, effective Friday, December 20, 2024 at 11:59 p.m. after serving more than three years in office.

“Four years ago, Chris Kavanaugh was one of the first people I brought in to join the Office of the Deputy Attorney General because of his experience within the Department and his leadership on national security issues,” said Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco. “Throughout his distinguished career – at Main Justice, as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the District of Columbia and the Western District of Virginia, and as United States Attorney – Chris has served the Department and his fellow Virginians with integrity and tenacity. I am grateful for his service.”

Mr. Kavanaugh was sworn in by Deputy Attorney General Monaco on October 7, 2021, after having been unanimously confirmed by the United States Senate. Mr. Kavanaugh was later appointed to be a member of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, a group that advises the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General on emerging policy issues facing the Department and the United States Attorney community. Mr. Kavanaugh also chaired the AGAC’s National Security Subcommittee, which supported the Department’s enhanced focus on investigations and prosecutions of malign foreign influence and nation state threats.

“Chris Kavanaugh has been an incredible partner for ATF and a national leader in the fight against violent crime. He has worked side-by-side with law enforcement to bring impactful cases, prosecute dangerous criminals, and lead in the innovative use of Crime Gun Intelligence to make Virginia, and this Nation, safer,” said Steven M. Dettelbach, Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

During his tenure, Mr. Kavanaugh led the U.S. Attorney’s Office through a transitional period, expanding its footprint, hiring a record number of federal prosecutors and staff, and spearheading ground-breaking criminal and affirmative civil enforcements.

“Every day, the public servants of United States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Virginia work to make the District – and our Nation – a safer and better place for us all,” United States Attorney Kavanaugh said today. “It has been the honor of my life to lead this team of selfless individuals who are so dedicated to fairness, the rule of law, and doing what is right. I know that WDVA will continue to make an outsized impact as citizens of the Justice Department, and I look forward to its future.

I thank President Biden for nominating me, Senators Mark Warner and Tim Kaine for their recommendation, and Attorney General Garland and Deputy Attorney General Monaco for leading the Department and supporting the United States Attorney community during my tenure. It has been an honor to serve the American people.”

Under Mr. Kavanaugh’s leadership, the Western District of Virginia has achieved notable successes in numerous complex criminal and civil cases. For example:

United States v. McKinsey & Company

For the first time ever, a management consulting firm was held criminally responsible for advice resulting in the commission of a crime by a client, Purdue Pharma, the makers of OxyContin. McKinsey & Company agreed to pay $650 million to resolve criminal and civil investigations into the firm’s consulting work, including a 2013 engagement with Purdue Pharma which McKinsey advised on steps to ‘turbocharge’ sales of OxyContin. A former senior partner at McKinsey & Company also agreed to plead guilty to one felony count of obstruction of justice for deleting Purdue related documents in an attempt to obstruct future investigations.

United States v. Envigo

In 2024, the Western District of Virginia obtained criminal convictions of Envigo, a biotechnology company dedicated to breeding animals for medical research with locations throughout North America. WDVA’s investigation revealed that Envigo was mistreating animals in violation of the Animal Welfare Act and polluting waterways in violation of the Clean Water Act. After a federal search warrant was executed, the Justice Department secured the surrender of over 4,000 beagles from an Envigo facility in Cumberland, Virginia. Envigo pled guilty to violating the Animal Welfare Act and the Clean Water Act, agreeing to pay more than $35 million in criminal penalties and fines – a record for any prosecution under the Animal Welfare Act.

The Killing of Big Stone Gap Police Officer Michael Chandler

Tragedy struck the small town of Big Stone Gap, Virginia in the early morning hours of November 13, 2021, when Big Stone Gap Police Officer Michael Chandler was murdered while responding to a disturbance call. The United States Attorney’s Office for WDVA brought federal charges against not only the person who shot and killed Chandler, Michael Donivan White, but also 18 other defendants who were a part of a methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy. Over the last few years, every single defendant has been convicted. White is scheduled to be sentenced in February 2025 and faces between 40- and 100-years’ incarceration.

The Bribery Trial of Sheriff Scott Jenkins

This week, a federal jury in the Charlottesville Division of WDVA returned guilty verdicts on all counts against former Culpeper County Sheriff Scott Jenkins. Jenkins had accepted numerous cash bribes and bribes in the form of campaign contributions from at least eight different people – one of whom he believed to be a felon – in exchange for appointing them as Auxiliary Deputy Sheriffs. A jury found Jenkins guilty of bribery, honest services fraud, and conspiracy after a trial and he will be sentenced in March 2025.

District Transformation

In addition to the case work victories, under Mr. Kavanaugh’s leadership, the U.S Attorney’s Office itself has transformed. Offices in Abingdon and Charlottesville have expanded, and the Office was awarded a nearly 20% increase in Assistant United States Attorneys, expanding the level of federal prosecutors to their highest levels in history. In a challenging budget climate, Mr. Kavanaugh has also made strides to modernize the Office’s capabilities to process voluminous amounts of documents for its more sophisticated prosecutions.

“On behalf of FBI Richmond, I sincerely thank Chris Kavanaugh for his service as U.S. Attorney. His unwavering commitment to justice and his exceptional partnership have been instrumental in advancing our shared mission of keeping Virginia safe. Chris’ leadership and collaboration have made a profound impact, and we deeply appreciate his dedication to ensuring the rule of law prevails,” said Stanley M. Meador, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Richmond Division.

“U.S. Attorney Kavanaugh’s leadership and vision have been instrumental in our initiatives to safeguard the health and safety of the citizens of Western Virginia. His determination in developing effective judicial strategies have contributed to the dismantling of many drug-trafficking networks and significantly mitigating this threat to our communities. We extend our best wishes to him in his future endeavors,” said Jarod Forget, Special Agent in Charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Washington Division.

Prior to his time as United States Attorney, Mr. Kavanaugh was an Assistant United States Attorney for 14 years, having served in United States Attorney’s Offices for both the Western District of Virginia and the District of Columbia. During his career, Mr. Kavanaugh directed numerous multi-agency investigations and prosecutions, with a focus on national security, white-collar crime, civil rights, and violent crimes involving racketeering and homicides. In WDVA, he served as the District’s chief national security prosecutor and Senior Litigation Counsel. Among other matters, he led the Department’s investigations and prosecutions into the Unite the Right riots of August 2017 in Charlottesville, Virginia. Just prior to his confirmation, Mr. Kavanaugh was Senior Counsel to Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco at the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C.

MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Captain in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Charged with Murder and Terrorism Offenses

Source: United States Attorneys General 6

Defendant Allegedly Orchestrated the Nov. 7, 2022, Murder of Stephen Troell, a U.S. Citizen Living in Iraq, in Retaliation for the January 2020 Death of Qasem Soleimani

Note: View the unsealed complaint here.

A complaint was unsealed today charging Mohammad Reza Nouri, 36, of Iran, also known as Muhammad Rida Husayn, Ali Asghar Nuri, and Abu Abbas, an Iranian national and officer in the IRGC, in connection with Nouri’s alleged role in orchestrating the Nov. 7, 2022, murder of American Stephen Troell in Baghdad, Iraq. Nouri was arrested in Iraq in March 2023.

“The Department of Justice will not tolerate terrorists and authoritarian regimes targeting and murdering Americans anywhere in the world,” said Attorney General Merrick B. Garland. “We allege that Mohammad Reza Nouri, an officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, orchestrated the murder of Stephen Troell, an American citizen living in Iraq, carrying out the Iranian Regime’s efforts to take vengeance for the death of Qasim Soleimani. Stephen should still be alive today, and the Justice Department will work relentlessly to ensure accountability for his murder.”

“The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains determined to target U.S. citizens, and orchestrated a cold-blooded plot to brutally murder Stephen Troell, a Tennessee native working at an English language institute in Iraq,” said FBI Director Christopher Wray. “According to the allegations, Mohammad Reza Nouri, an IRGC captain, played a key role in planning the attack in which Troell was ambushed as he drove home from work with his wife. Today’s announcement makes clear that the FBI and our partners will not tolerate the IRGC’s ruthless attacks on Americans, here in the United States or overseas, and will hold accountable any who seek to harm our citizens.”

“As alleged, Mohammad Reza Nouri, a Captain in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, orchestrated the murder of American Steven Troell in Iraq,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Edward Kim for the Southern District of New York. “Nouri is alleged to have gathered intelligence on Troell’s daily routine and whereabouts, procured weapons and vehicles, and provided safe harbor to the operatives who carried out the sinister plot to brutally attack Troell in front of his wife. As alleged, the Iranian regime is actively targeting U.S. citizens, such as Troell, living in countries around the world for kidnapping and execution both to repress and silence dissidents critical of the regime and to take vengeance for the death of Qasem Soleimani. This office will not stand by when an American is attacked and murdered in cold blood, and we will continue working with our law enforcement partners to bring Nouri to justice.”

“As alleged in the complaint, Nouri facilitated Troell’s murder. He gathered information and coordinated with a co-conspirator to procure supplies that operatives relied on during their attack on Troell,” said Assistant Director in Charge David Sundberg of the FBI Washington Field Office. “The FBI will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to bring IRGC operatives, including Nouri’s co-conspirator, to justice for harming Americans.”

According to court documents, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) is actively targeting nationals of the United States and its allies living in countries around the world for kidnapping and/or execution both to repress and silence dissidents critical of the Iranian regime and to take vengeance for the January 2020 death of then-Commander of the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), Qasem Soleimani, who was killed by a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad. The IRGC is an Iranian military and counterintelligence agency under the authority of Iran’s Supreme Leader, comprised of components including an external operations force, the IRGC-QF, and has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Secretary of State since April 15, 2019. The IRGC has publicly stated its desire to avenge the death of Soleimani, and, among its activities, the IRGC plots and conducts attack operations outside Iran targeting U.S. citizens residing in the United States and abroad. In November 2022, the Iranian regime struck in Iraq: a group of operatives working on behalf of the IRGC brutally murdered Stephen Troell, a 45-year-old American living in Baghdad, where he worked at an English language institute, as Troell was driving home with his wife after work.

Nouri is an IRGC Captain who works for the IRGC in Iraq and is involved in the IRGC’s external attack plotting against U.S. citizens and others. Nouri played a key role in the IRGC’s targeting and ultimate murder of Troell, whom Nouri appears to have believed was working as an American or Israeli intelligence officer. Nouri, on behalf of the IRGC, collected critical, highly personal information about Troell to facilitate stalking, attacking, and ultimately killing Troell. Nouri, with the assistance of co-conspirators, developed a source with access to details of Troell’s life and daily routine. With this information, Nouri created intelligence documents for his IRGC associates and a group of operatives recruited to execute the attack, which included Troell’s date of birth, coordinates of his residence, occupation, work schedule, telephone number, wife’s name, and children’s names, among other information. In the weeks leading up to the murder, Nouri coordinated with one of his co-conspirators (CC-1) in the plot targeting Troell to procure some of the means for attacking Troell, including firearms as well as a vehicle for use in the lethal attack on Troell. On the evening of Nov. 7, 2022, the group of recruited operatives carried out the attack. Troell was driving home from work with his wife when heavily armed gunmen in two cars forced the Troells to stop shortly before they reached their residence, blocked any possible escape route, approached Troell on the driver’s side, and, using an assault weapon, shot and killed Troell as his wife witnessed the attack in the passenger seat.

On the day of the murder, Nouri coordinated with CC-1 shortly before and immediately after the attack. Nouri and CC-1 spoke repeatedly in the hours leading up to the attack. Less than a half hour after the attack, Nouri sent CC-1 encrypted messages inquiring about the wellbeing of the operatives tasked with carrying out the hit on Troell, asking, “The guys are fine?” and “They are doing well?” to which CC-1 responded, “One is injured.” As the night went on, CC-1 continued to update Nouri, noting that “two so far” of the operatives on the hit squad — whom Nouri referred to as “our guys” — had gathered safely since the murder, that “the rest are on the way,” and that the injury sustained by one of their confederates was “slight.” In the course of these encrypted messages, Nouri and CC-1 celebrated the events of the day and their success. That night, after the murder, Nouri left Iraq for Iran. Shortly before departing Baghdad, Nouri visited a religious site associated with mourning for Soleimani’s death.

Following the murder, approximately nine of the operatives on the hit squad also left Iraq and entered Iran, where they joined Nouri. In Iran, Nouri arranged housing for the operatives, providing them safe harbor in the aftermath of the murder. Nouri and another IRGC official addressed the operatives during their stay in Iran, offered their blessings to the hit squad, and told them that Troell was purportedly a spy on behalf of America and Israel, that Troell threatened Islam by attracting Iraqi youths to the Jewish religion and spreading it in Iraq, and that Troell therefore deserved to be murdered.

In March 2023, Iraqi authorities arrested Nouri, and he was subsequently convicted by an Iraqi court for his role in Troell’s murder. Nouri remains in custody in Iraq.

Nouri has been charged with conspiring to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization resulting in death, and faces a maximum penalty of life in prison; providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization resulting in death, and faces a maximum penalty of life in prison; conspiring to provide material support for acts of terrorism resulting in death, and faces a maximum penalty of life in prison; providing material support for acts of terrorism resulting in death, and faces a maximum penalty of life in prison; conspiring to take hostages, and faces a maximum penalty of life in prison; conspiring to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States, and faces a maximum penalty of life in prison; murdering a U.S. national outside the United States, and faces a maximum penalty of death or life in prison; and causing death through the use of a firearm, and faces a maximum penalty of death or life in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The FBI Washington Field Office’s Counterterrorism Division is investigating the case. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs; Justice Department’s Attaché in Iraq; FBI Legal Attaché office in Iraq; Iraqi authorities; and U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia provided valuable assistance.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jacob H. Gutwillig, Matthew J.C. Hellman, and Kyle A. Wirshba for the Southern District of New York and Trial Attorneys Joshua Champagne and Timothy J. Reardon III of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

A complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Givinostat conditionally approved to treat patients with Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD)
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) has today (20 December 2024) granted a conditional marketing authorisation for the medicine givinostat (Duvyzat) to treat Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD).
Givinostat is a nonsteroidal drug indicated for the treatment of patients aged 6 years of age and older with all genetic variants of DMD.

DMD is a muscle wasting condition that causes progressive muscle weakness. It usually only affects boys and those assigned male at birth.

It’s caused by alterations in a protein called dystrophin. This causes muscle fibres to break down. They’re replaced by fibrous or fatty tissues that cause the muscle to gradually weaken.

Around 100 boys are born with DMD each year, and there are about 2,500 people living with the condition in the UK at any one time.

Julian Beach, MHRA Interim Executive Director, Healthcare Quality and Access, said:

Keeping patients safe and enabling their access to high quality, safe and effective medical products are key priorities for us.

We’re assured that the appropriate regulatory standards for the approval of this medicine have been met.

As with all products, we will keep its safety under close review.

Givinostat comes as an oral suspension to be taken twice daily.

It is a drug from a family of molecules called HDAC inhibitors (histone deacetylase) which reduce inflammation and fibrosis in muscle tissues. HDAC inhibitors also promote muscle regeneration and slow down the progression of DMD.

This approval is supported by evidence from a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled 18-month study involving 179 ambulatory patients with DMD who were given a placebo or givinostat for 18 months. Further data is required for the efficacy in non-ambulatory patients and will be subject to review following completion of additional clinical trials, as detailed in the condition associated with approval.

The study found that participants treated with givinostat over an 18-month period took significantly less time to climb four stairs compared to those given placebo.

A secondary efficacy endpoint was the change from baseline to month 18 in physical function as assessed by the North Star Ambulatory Assessment (NSAA) — a scale commonly used to rate the motor function in boys with DMD who are capable of walking. Compared to placebo, patients treated with givinostat saw less worsening in their NSAA score after 18 months.

The most common side effects of the medicine (which may affect more than 1 in 10 people) include abdominal pain, decrease in blood platelet count (which can increase risk of bleeding), diarrhea, elevated levels of triglycerides (a type of blood fats), fever, nausea and vomiting. The prescribing information for givinostat advises healthcare providers to assess patients’ platelet counts and triglyceride levels prior to initiating treatment. During treatment, regular monitoring of platelet counts and triglycerides is recommended to determine whether dosage adjustments are necessary. Additionally, givinostat may lead to QTc prolongation, a condition where the heart takes longer than normal to recharge between beats, which can elevate the risk of irregular heart rhythms. Patients with certain heart conditions or those taking other medications that prolong QTc intervals should avoid using givinostat.

As with any medicine, the MHRA will keep the safety and effectiveness of givinostat under close review. Anyone who suspects they are having a side effect from this medicine are encouraged to talk to their doctor, pharmacist or nurse and report it directly to the Yellow Card scheme, either through the website (https://yellowcard.mhra.gov.uk/) or by searching the Google Play or Apple App stores for MHRA Yellow Card.

ENDS

Notes to editors

The new conditional marketing authorisation was granted on 20 December 2024 to Italfarmaco S.p.A. More information can be found in the Summary of Product Characteristics and Patient Information leaflets which will be published on the MHRA Products website within 7 days of approval.

Giovinostat has been conditionally approved through the International Recognition Procedure (IRP). A conditional marketing authorisation is an early temporary license in which we may accept less completed clinical studies than would be necessary to issue a full marketing authorisation, provided the manufacturer clearly indicates when complete clinical data will be available. However, CMA post-approval conditions are determined on a case-by-case basis, and don’t have to be limited to providing further clinical data. A CMA lasts for one year and can be renewed annually.

For more information about Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD), visit: https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/muscular-dystrophy/

The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) is responsible for regulating all medicines and medical devices in the UK by ensuring they work and are acceptably safe. All our work is underpinned by robust and fact-based judgements to ensure that the benefits justify any risks.

The MHRA is an executive agency of the Department of Health and Social Care.

For media enquiries, please contact the newscentre@mhra.gov.uk, or call on 020 3080 7651.

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Published 20 December 2024
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Captain in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Charged with Murder and Terrorism Offenses

Source: US State of California

Defendant Allegedly Orchestrated the Nov. 7, 2022, Murder of Stephen Troell, a U.S. Citizen Living in Iraq, in Retaliation for the January 2020 Death of Qasem Soleimani

Note: View the unsealed complaint here.

A complaint was unsealed today charging Mohammad Reza Nouri, 36, of Iran, also known as Muhammad Rida Husayn, Ali Asghar Nuri, and Abu Abbas, an Iranian national and officer in the IRGC, in connection with Nouri’s alleged role in orchestrating the Nov. 7, 2022, murder of American Stephen Troell in Baghdad, Iraq. Nouri was arrested in Iraq in March 2023.

“The Department of Justice will not tolerate terrorists and authoritarian regimes targeting and murdering Americans anywhere in the world,” said Attorney General Merrick B. Garland. “We allege that Mohammad Reza Nouri, an officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, orchestrated the murder of Stephen Troell, an American citizen living in Iraq, carrying out the Iranian Regime’s efforts to take vengeance for the death of Qasim Soleimani. Stephen should still be alive today, and the Justice Department will work relentlessly to ensure accountability for his murder.”

“The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains determined to target U.S. citizens, and orchestrated a cold-blooded plot to brutally murder Stephen Troell, a Tennessee native working at an English language institute in Iraq,” said FBI Director Christopher Wray. “According to the allegations, Mohammad Reza Nouri, an IRGC captain, played a key role in planning the attack in which Troell was ambushed as he drove home from work with his wife. Today’s announcement makes clear that the FBI and our partners will not tolerate the IRGC’s ruthless attacks on Americans, here in the United States or overseas, and will hold accountable any who seek to harm our citizens.”

“As alleged, Mohammad Reza Nouri, a Captain in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, orchestrated the murder of American Steven Troell in Iraq,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Edward Kim for the Southern District of New York. “Nouri is alleged to have gathered intelligence on Troell’s daily routine and whereabouts, procured weapons and vehicles, and provided safe harbor to the operatives who carried out the sinister plot to brutally attack Troell in front of his wife. As alleged, the Iranian regime is actively targeting U.S. citizens, such as Troell, living in countries around the world for kidnapping and execution both to repress and silence dissidents critical of the regime and to take vengeance for the death of Qasem Soleimani. This office will not stand by when an American is attacked and murdered in cold blood, and we will continue working with our law enforcement partners to bring Nouri to justice.”

“As alleged in the complaint, Nouri facilitated Troell’s murder. He gathered information and coordinated with a co-conspirator to procure supplies that operatives relied on during their attack on Troell,” said Assistant Director in Charge David Sundberg of the FBI Washington Field Office. “The FBI will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to bring IRGC operatives, including Nouri’s co-conspirator, to justice for harming Americans.”

According to court documents, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) is actively targeting nationals of the United States and its allies living in countries around the world for kidnapping and/or execution both to repress and silence dissidents critical of the Iranian regime and to take vengeance for the January 2020 death of then-Commander of the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), Qasem Soleimani, who was killed by a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad. The IRGC is an Iranian military and counterintelligence agency under the authority of Iran’s Supreme Leader, comprised of components including an external operations force, the IRGC-QF, and has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Secretary of State since April 15, 2019. The IRGC has publicly stated its desire to avenge the death of Soleimani, and, among its activities, the IRGC plots and conducts attack operations outside Iran targeting U.S. citizens residing in the United States and abroad. In November 2022, the Iranian regime struck in Iraq: a group of operatives working on behalf of the IRGC brutally murdered Stephen Troell, a 45-year-old American living in Baghdad, where he worked at an English language institute, as Troell was driving home with his wife after work.

Nouri is an IRGC Captain who works for the IRGC in Iraq and is involved in the IRGC’s external attack plotting against U.S. citizens and others. Nouri played a key role in the IRGC’s targeting and ultimate murder of Troell, whom Nouri appears to have believed was working as an American or Israeli intelligence officer. Nouri, on behalf of the IRGC, collected critical, highly personal information about Troell to facilitate stalking, attacking, and ultimately killing Troell. Nouri, with the assistance of co-conspirators, developed a source with access to details of Troell’s life and daily routine. With this information, Nouri created intelligence documents for his IRGC associates and a group of operatives recruited to execute the attack, which included Troell’s date of birth, coordinates of his residence, occupation, work schedule, telephone number, wife’s name, and children’s names, among other information. In the weeks leading up to the murder, Nouri coordinated with one of his co-conspirators (CC-1) in the plot targeting Troell to procure some of the means for attacking Troell, including firearms as well as a vehicle for use in the lethal attack on Troell. On the evening of Nov. 7, 2022, the group of recruited operatives carried out the attack. Troell was driving home from work with his wife when heavily armed gunmen in two cars forced the Troells to stop shortly before they reached their residence, blocked any possible escape route, approached Troell on the driver’s side, and, using an assault weapon, shot and killed Troell as his wife witnessed the attack in the passenger seat.

On the day of the murder, Nouri coordinated with CC-1 shortly before and immediately after the attack. Nouri and CC-1 spoke repeatedly in the hours leading up to the attack. Less than a half hour after the attack, Nouri sent CC-1 encrypted messages inquiring about the wellbeing of the operatives tasked with carrying out the hit on Troell, asking, “The guys are fine?” and “They are doing well?” to which CC-1 responded, “One is injured.” As the night went on, CC-1 continued to update Nouri, noting that “two so far” of the operatives on the hit squad — whom Nouri referred to as “our guys” — had gathered safely since the murder, that “the rest are on the way,” and that the injury sustained by one of their confederates was “slight.” In the course of these encrypted messages, Nouri and CC-1 celebrated the events of the day and their success. That night, after the murder, Nouri left Iraq for Iran. Shortly before departing Baghdad, Nouri visited a religious site associated with mourning for Soleimani’s death.

Following the murder, approximately nine of the operatives on the hit squad also left Iraq and entered Iran, where they joined Nouri. In Iran, Nouri arranged housing for the operatives, providing them safe harbor in the aftermath of the murder. Nouri and another IRGC official addressed the operatives during their stay in Iran, offered their blessings to the hit squad, and told them that Troell was purportedly a spy on behalf of America and Israel, that Troell threatened Islam by attracting Iraqi youths to the Jewish religion and spreading it in Iraq, and that Troell therefore deserved to be murdered.

In March 2023, Iraqi authorities arrested Nouri, and he was subsequently convicted by an Iraqi court for his role in Troell’s murder. Nouri remains in custody in Iraq.

Nouri has been charged with conspiring to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization resulting in death, and faces a maximum penalty of life in prison; providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization resulting in death, and faces a maximum penalty of life in prison; conspiring to provide material support for acts of terrorism resulting in death, and faces a maximum penalty of life in prison; providing material support for acts of terrorism resulting in death, and faces a maximum penalty of life in prison; conspiring to take hostages, and faces a maximum penalty of life in prison; conspiring to murder U.S. nationals outside the United States, and faces a maximum penalty of life in prison; murdering a U.S. national outside the United States, and faces a maximum penalty of death or life in prison; and causing death through the use of a firearm, and faces a maximum penalty of death or life in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The FBI Washington Field Office’s Counterterrorism Division is investigating the case. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs; Justice Department’s Attaché in Iraq; FBI Legal Attaché office in Iraq; Iraqi authorities; and U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia provided valuable assistance.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jacob H. Gutwillig, Matthew J.C. Hellman, and Kyle A. Wirshba for the Southern District of New York and Trial Attorneys Joshua Champagne and Timothy J. Reardon III of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

A complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL OSI USA News –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Miami Duo Found Guilty of Kidnapping and Murder

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

MIAMI – On Dec. 17., James Edward Daniels, 59, and Frederick Eugene Rudolph, 69, of Miami, Fla., were found guilty of conspiracy to commit kidnapping resulting in death, multiple counts of kidnapping resulting in death, and kidnapping, at trial before U.S. District Court Judge Roy K. Altman.

On Dec. 5, 2020, Daniels, Rudolph, and other co-conspirators kidnapped three victims from a truck yard in Opa Locka, Fla. They bound and tortured the victims, duct-taped their eyes, and threw them into the back of a rented van after stealing the victims’ drugs. They drove around the city for hours before taking the victims to an abandoned house in Opa-Locka and attempting to execute them by shooting the three victims. Two of the victims died, while one miraculously survived.

Daniels stole jewelry from one of the murdered victims, and all the defendants benefitted by receiving drugs, money, or both, in exchange for their participation in the conspiracy.

A third defendant, Herbert Barr, 56, pled guilty to kidnapping on Nov. 26.

U.S. Attorney Markenzy Lapointe for the Southern District of Florida, Special Agent in Charge Jeffrey B. Veltri of the FBI, Miami Field Office, Director Stephanie V. Daniels of the Miami-Dade Police Department, and Special Agent in Charge Deanne L. Reuter of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Miami Field Division, made the announcement.

FBI Miami Division Homestead Resident Agency, Miami-Dade Police Department Homicide Bureau, and DEA Homestead Office investigated the case. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Yara Dodin, Nardia Haye, and Katie Guthrie are prosecuting the case.

Sentencing is scheduled for March 10, 2025, before Judge Altman. Daniels and Rudolph face up to life in prison, criminal fines of up to $250,000 as to each count, and up to a lifetime on supervised release.

This investigation was carried out by members of the South Florida High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Task Force. The South Florida HIDTA, established in 1990, is made up of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies who, cooperatively, target the region’s drug-trafficking and money laundering organizations. The South Florida HIDTA is funded by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, which sponsors a variety of initiatives focused the nation’s illicit drug trafficking threats. For more information regarding HIDTA visit https://www.dea.gov/operations/hidta.

You may find a copy of this press release (and any updates) on the website of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida at www.usdoj.gov/usao/fls.

Related court documents and information may be found on the website of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida at www.flsd.uscourts.gov or at http://pacer.flsd.uscourts.gov, under case number 23-cr-20431.

###

MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Denver Man Sentenced for Operating Illegal Gambling Parlor

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (b)

DENVER – The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado announces that Jonathan Arvay, 38, of Denver, was sentenced to one year and one day in prison after being found guilty by a federal jury on one count of conducting an illegal gambling business and one count of conspiracy to conduct an illegal gambling business.

According to the facts established at trial, Arvay operated Player One Arcade in Denver, part of a network of gambling parlors extending from Greeley to Pueblo. These parlors offered several electronic forms of gambling through games made to resemble arcade games, as well as virtual slot machines in which customers attempted to earn credits. Upon completing their game of choice, customers would exchange any credits won for a purported cryptocurrency, Obsidian Digital Asset Coin (ODAC), whose only function was to be exchanged for cash at an ATM-like “cryptocurrency teller machine” next door to or within the gambling parlor. Customers were required to pay a transaction fee to exchange the ODAC for U.S. currency.

“This was a modern version of old-fashioned illegal gambling,” said Acting United States Attorney Matt Kirsch. “I am grateful for our local and federal partners who helped put this criminal in prison.”

“This sentence reflects an appropriate resolution to a complicated case: When you launder money and commit fraud against the government, the FBI and our partners will track you down across jurisdictions,” said FBI Denver Special Agent in Charge Mark Michalek.

“IRS-CI remains on the cutting edge of cybercrime investigations as financial crimes continue to become more sophisticated,” said Tom Demeo Acting Special Agent in Charge, IRS Criminal Investigation Denver Field Office. “We are committed to staying one step ahead of criminals and leveraging our partnerships with federal and local law enforcement agencies to protect the U.S. tax system.”

United States District Judge Gordon P. Gallagher presided over the trial. The FBI Denver Field Division, the IRS Criminal Investigation Denver Field Office, and the Pueblo Police Department conducted the investigation. Assistant United States Attorneys Cyrus Y. Chung, Alison Connaughty, and Jena Neuscheler handled the prosecution.

Case Number: 23-cr-00222-GPG

MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: FBI and Cincinnati Police Announce $15,000 Reward in Death of Five-Year-Old Arty Stanford

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Crime News (b)

The FBI and the Cincinnati Police Department today announced a reward of up to $15,000 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the individual(s) responsible for the death of Artagist “Arty” Stanford III.

“Arty’s family has suffered greatly since this shooting and anyone responsible for his death should be held accountable,” stated FBI Cincinnati Special Agent in Charge Elena Iatarola. “Someone in our community knows what happened that night and who was involved. We need anyone with information to do the right thing and contact law enforcement.”

“Silence protects the wrong people,” said Cincinnati Police Chief Teresa Theetge. “Someone knows what happened. Someone holds the key to bringing closure to Arty’s family. Please speak up and help us bring justice for Arty.”

On October 24, 2024, at approximately 5:48 a.m., the Cincinnati Emergency Communications Center received a report of a drive-by shooting at a house on Holland Drive. Initially, residents believed there were no injuries and the house only received damage from the gunfire. When police arrived, family members found five-year-old Artagist “Arty” Stanford III suffering from a gunshot wound to the head in an upstairs bedroom. There were at least seven bullet impact marks or bullet holes in the front of the house. One of the bullets passed through the front exterior wall into a second-floor bedroom and struck Arty in the head.

Arty was taken to the hospital for treatment which included multiple surgeries. On October 26, 2024, Arty succumbed to his injuries and his death was ruled a homicide.

Anyone with information regarding this incident is asked to call the FBI at 1-800-Call-FBI or Crime Stoppers at 513-352-3040.

MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Des Moines Individuals Charged in Joint State and Federal Investigation of Fentanyl Trafficking Organization
Source: Office of United States Attorneys

DES MOINES, Iowa – A federal grand jury in Des Moines returned a three-count indictment charging five Des Moines individuals with offenses related to fentanyl trafficking.

The following individuals are charged in the Indictment:
- Devonte Darnell Hassell, also known as “Domo”, “Dom”, and “Rose”, 28, is charged with conspiracy to distribute and distribution of fentanyl. He faces a mandatory minimum 10-year prison sentence and a maximum sentence of life in prison.
- Ryan Redmond, also known as “Chiefy”, 31, is charged with conspiracy to distribute and distribution of fentanyl. He faces a mandatory minimum 5‑year prison sentence and a maximum sentence of 40 years in prison.
- Kevin Stanley Harris, Jr., also known as “Rylo” and “Big Hands”, 42, is charged with conspiracy to distribute and distribution of fentanyl. He faces a mandatory minimum 10-year prison sentence and a maximum sentence of life in prison, as he is alleged to have a prior serious drug felony conviction.
- Adonis Angel Devora, 43, is charged with conspiracy to distribute fentanyl. She faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison.
- Ricky Jamall Ellis, 30, is charged with conspiracy to distribute fentanyl. He faces a maximum sentence of 30 years in prison.
These individuals were all arrested on December 18, 2024: four in Des Moines, and one in Houston, Texas. The same day, thirteen federal search warrants were executed, which resulted in the seizure of approximately 610 grams of heroin/fentanyl mixture, approximately 135 grams of methamphetamine, approximately 260 grams of marijuana, as well as 19 firearms and more than $13,000 in U.S. currency.

The charges stem from a months’ long investigation into fentanyl distribution within the Des Moines area.

United States Attorney Richard D. Westphal of the Southern District of Iowa made the announcement. The Des Moines Police Department, the United States Postal Inspection Service, and FBI Des Moines Central Iowa Gang Task Force (CIGTF) are investigating the case, with assistance from the Iowa Department of Public Safety-Division of Narcotics Enforcement (DNE), Iowa Department of Public Safety-Division of Intelligence and Fusion Center, Iowa State Patrol, Iowa State Patrol SWAT, United States Marshals Service, Ames Police Department, West Des Moines Police Department, Mid-Iowa Narcotics Enforcement Task Force (MINE), Polk County Sheriff’s Office, Story County Sheriff’s Office, Mid-Iowa Drug Task Force (MIDTF), Central Iowa Drug Task Force (CIDTF), Suburban Emergency Response Team (SERT), Metro Special Tactics and Response (STAR), the Chicago, Illinois Police Department, and the Houston, Texas Police Department.

This investigation is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) investigation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level drug traffickers, money launderers, gangs, and transnational criminal organizations that threaten the United States by using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach that leverages the strengths of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies against criminal networks.

An indictment is merely an allegation, and all defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL Security OSI –
January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Attorney’s Office Secures Guilty Plea from Albuquerque Man for Production of Child Sexual Abuse Material

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

ALBUQUERQUE – An Albuquerque man pleaded guilty to federal charges of production of child sexual abuse materials, admitting to creating illicit content and using social media to lure minors for sexual exploitation.

According to court documents, Kevin Vallo, 40, used the social media messaging app Telegram to communicate with a 13-year-old victim. Vallo created multiple profiles on Telegram under different names and personas, misrepresenting his age as 16 when he was actually 39 years old.

Vallo admitted to engaging in sexually explicit chats with the victim and repeatedly inviting her to his residence. On or about February 19, 2024, Vallo persuaded the victim and two other minors to come to his home in Albuquerque for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity.

Vallo further admitted to recording four separate videos of himself engaging in sexual activity with the victim using his cellular phone, which he then sent to the victim. These videos constitute child pornography under federal law.

Vallo will remain in custody pending sentencing, which has not yet been scheduled. At sentencing, Vallo faces 15 to 25 years in prison. Upon his release from prison, Vallo will be subject to a minimum of 5 years and up to life of supervised release and must register as a sex offender.

U.S. Attorney Alexander M.M. Uballez, and Raul Bujanda, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Albuquerque Field Office, made the announcement today.

The FBI Albuquerque Field Office investigated this case with assistance from the Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Office. Assistant United States Attorney Jesse Pecoraro is prosecuting the case as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice. Led by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and CEOS, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to better locate, apprehend and prosecute individuals who exploit children via the Internet, as well as to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit Justice.gov/PSC.

If you have reason to believe you or your child may be a victim of Vallo, or if you have information about this ongoing investigation, please call the FBI at (505) 889-1300 or submit their tips online at tips.fbi.gov.

# # #

MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Former Miami-Dade Correctional Officer Indicted for Service in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

MIAMI – On Dec. 18, Vernell Syrethia Lawson, 33, a former Miami-Dade Correctional Officer, and Gabrielle Nicole Bess-Mills, 35, made their initial appearance in court on a previously sealed indictment containing charges related to a continuing criminal enterprise led by co-defendant Terrance Carter, 31.

According to the indictment, Carter led a drug trafficking organization which relied on the corruption of Lawson and other Miami-Dade Correctional Officers, along with drug trafficking associates, to introduce narcotics and other contraband for sale into Miami-Dade County jail facilities.

Lawson and Bess-Mills are charged with possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute, participating in a conspiracy to possess controlled substances with intent to distribute, and racketeering promotion through bribery and drug trafficking. Lawson is also charged with Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right conspiracy. The indictment also charges Carter with operating the continuing criminal enterprise and use of interstate facilities to commit violence in furtherance of racketeering.

The defendants are residents of Miami-Dade County.

U.S. Attorney Markenzy Lapointe for the Southern District of Florida, Stephanie Daniels, Director of the Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD), Sherea Green, Director of the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department, Special Agent in Charge Jefferey B. Veltri of the FBI Miami Division, Deanne L. Reuter, Special Agent in Charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Miami Field Division, and Dr. Judith Bernier, Chair of the Miami-Dade Commission on Ethics and Public Trust made the announcement.

This case was investigated by a Task Force formed by the Miami-Dade Police and Corrections Departments, with the support of federal, state, and local partners, to combat drug trafficking organizations operating in the Miami-Dade correctional facilities with the assistance of corrupt public officials. The Miami-Dade State Attorney’s Office and the Florida Department of Corrections provided significant assistance.

Special Assistant U.S. Attorney Ignacio J. Vázquez, Jr. and Trial Attorney Melanie G. Wegner are prosecuting this case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Annika Miranda is handling asset forfeiture.

This investigation was part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/ocdetf.

An indictment contains mere allegations, and all defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty in a court of law.

Individuals with information about corruption should contact the FBI Miami Area’s Task Force at https://tips.fbi.gov/. Anyone with information related to possible ethics violations is asked to contact the Miami-Dade County Commission on Ethics and Public Trust at 786-314-9560 or ethics@miamidade.gov.

Related court documents and information may be found on the website of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida at www.flsd.uscourts.gov or at http://pacer.flsd.uscourts.gov under case number 24-cr-20543.

###

MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Attempted Robber Who Shot Elderly Man on the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation Sentenced To More Than 13 Years In Prison

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

DURANGO – The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado announces that Lovell Cassius Benallie, age 27, of Kirtland, New Mexico, was sentenced to a total of 166 months in prison for assault with a dangerous weapon and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence on the Ute Mountain Ute Indian Reservation. The prison sentence will be followed by three years of supervised release.

According to the plea agreement and information presented at sentencing, on August 24, 2023, Benallie and an associate traveled from New Mexico to the Ute Mountain Ute Casino. After gambling, Benallie went to the nearby Ute Mountain Ute Travel Center and approached an elderly Navajo man preparing to use the laundry facility. In an interaction that lasted about eighteen seconds, Benallie said, “give me all your money” and pointed a 9mm gun at the man. When the man replied, “what money” Benallie aimed and fired the gun at the man’s leg. Benallie fled the scene. The victim was airlifted to Grand Junction for medical treatment and suffered serious and enduring injuries.

Benallie had several prior felony convictions, including a conviction for aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon in Farmington, New Mexico.

“The defendant acted callously and purposelessly,” said Acting United States Attorney for the District of Colorado Matt Kirsch. “Gun violence will not be tolerated on the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation and our office reaffirms our intention to vigorously violent crimes on our reservations.”

“This defendant coldly and callously shot a total stranger during an attempted robbery. Any such act of violence on the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation gets the full attention of FBI Denver,” said Special Agent in Charge Mark Michalek. “In this case we were assisted by the Farmington, New Mexico, Police Department. We will continue to support the Bureau of Indian Affairs and those who live on the reservation by investigating criminal acts and removing the perpetrators from the community.”

United States District Court Judge Gordon P. Gallagher sentenced the defendant on December 16, 2024.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation office in Durango conducted the investigation in conjunction with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Assistant United States Attorney Jeffrey K. Graves handled the prosecution.

Case Number: 1:23-cr-00383-GPG-JMC-1

MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Prince Andrew and the British establishment’s ‘target-rich environment’ for spies

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Philip Murphy, Director of History & Policy at the Institute of Historical Research and Professor of British and Commonwealth History, School of Advanced Study, University of London

A ruling by the UK’s Special Immigration Appeals Commission has revealed that a Chinese businessman with links to King Charles’ younger brother, Prince Andrew, has been banned from Britain. The commission was upholding a decision originally taken in 2023 by the then home secretary, Suella Braverman, to exclude a man subsequently named as Yang Tengbo.

Britain’s Security Service, MI5, had advised the commission that Yang posed “a risk to UK national security”. Reports have noted Yang’s visits to royal events at the request of the prince and his communications with one of Andrew’s senior advisers, Dominic Hampshire.

That Andrew might have been cultivated by an agent of the Chinese government will come as no surprise to anyone who has studied the work of intelligence agencies. Their ideal target will not necessarily be someone who sympathises with the regime they serve. Indeed with the collapse of the ideological certainties of the cold war, this has become increasingly unlikely.

Rather, a target will probably be someone who has particular weaknesses that can be exploited, often revolving around money or sex. They are seldom at the very pinnacle of power. But that, in itself, can leave them resentful and hungry for affirmation.

An exaggerated sense of self-importance can render them even more pliable. This can make for a complex relationship between intelligence predator and their prey.

In Andrew’s case, there are indications that members of his circle actually talked up the prince’s importance as a political contact. The commission’s ruling quoted a message from Hampshire to Yang in March 2020 after the latter had been invited to attend the Prince’s 60th birthday party.

Hampshire told Yang: “I also hope that it is clear to you where you sit with my principal and indeed his family. You should never underestimate the strength of that relationship. …outside of his closest internal confidants, you sit at the very top of a tree that many, many people would like to be on.”

Those more familiar with the workings of the British government might be sceptical about the height of the branches Yang had reached. King Charles is, after all, a constitutional monarch with few formal powers. And Andrew has become an increasingly marginalised figure within the royal family.

A steady stream of revelations about his relationship with sex-trafficker and paedophile Jeffrey Epstein has left him increasingly out in the cold. He was stripped of his role as UK trade envoy in 2011 and was then forced to step down from public duties in 2019. So why bother trying to court him?

Clues are provided in an important survey of the links between the royal family and the intelligence community published by international history specialists Richard Aldrich and Rory Cormac in 2021. As they note, before 2011, Andrew had enjoyed a long career in the royal navy and then as a British trade envoy, becoming closely involved in the sensitive and secretive world of UK arms sales.

In 2010, the Wikileaks revelations suggested Andrew had been fiercely critical of the Serious Fraud Office for almost derailing a deal with Saudi Arabia and that his inside knowledge might have extended to some dark corners of the arms trade and its methods. There were also reports that the UK’s foreign intelligence service, MI6, was concerned that a former US deputy police chief close to the investigation into the Epstein affair might have leaked details to Russia, leaving Andrew open to blackmail.

So Andrew probably was a tempting target, combining personal vulnerability with knowledge that could, at the very least, be embarrassing to the UK. But then, to borrow former US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s vivid phrase about Iraq, the British establishment has long provided foreign intelligence agencies with “a target-rich environment”. And the waters tend to be muddied by the ease with which legitimate contacts based on cultural and trade diplomacy can morph into something more sinister.

Broader concerns

The ruling of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission quoted from a statement by the director-general of MI5 from July 2022 which distinguished between legitimate diplomacy and “what we call interference activity – influencing that is clandestine, coercive or corruptive”. Yet, in practice, the distinction is often opaque.

When darker forces are at work, it often only becomes apparent as a result of prolonged surveillance of those involved. And that, in turn, assumes Britain’s spies are actually doing their job. Various bodies have questioned whether they are.

In a July 2020 report, the parliamentary intelligence and security committee criticised the intelligence community for not being more curious about certain aspects of Russian activity. The possibility of Kremlin interference in the 2016 Brexit referendum was a significant concern.

The implication – that intelligence officials had been nervous about getting involved in such a sensitive political issue – was rather borne out by the fate of the committee’s report itself. It was delivered to then prime minister Boris Johnson in October 2019 but was not released to the public until well after his pro-Brexit government had won the general election of December that year.

Nor is the Labour party without questions to answer. At the same time as the Prince Andrew scandal was unfolding, Christine Lee, who donated £584,177 to the office of the Labour MP Barry Gardiner, lost a claim against MI5 which had accused her of engaging in political interference on behalf of China. Gardiner has said in response that none of the donations “according to MI5, came from an illegal source” and that he has “ceased all contact” with Lee following the MI5 warning.

Prince Andrew’s behaviour is part of a wider picture and speaks to the general need for higher standards in British public life. Stricter rules on political donations to prevent foreign interference in British politics are long overdue. And people of political influence, including members of both houses of parliament, should be far more closely scrutinised over their relationships with foreign officials and business people. National security, as the term implies, very much begins at home.

Philip Murphy has received funding from the AHRC. He is a member of the European Movement UK.

– ref. Prince Andrew and the British establishment’s ‘target-rich environment’ for spies – https://theconversation.com/prince-andrew-and-the-british-establishments-target-rich-environment-for-spies-246383

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

January 27, 2025

MIL-OSI: Unaudited Half-Yearly Financial Report

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

FORESIGHT VENTURES VCT PLC
(FORMERLY THAMES VENTURES VCT 1 PLC)

Unaudited Half-Yearly Financial Report
30 September 2024

FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS

£72.7m
Total net assets
as at 30 September 2024

1.1p
Dividend paid
26 July 2024

42.1p
NAV per share
as at 30 September 2024

CHAIR’S STATEMENT

“I present the Company’s unaudited Half-Yearly Financial Report for the six months ended 30 September 2024.”

Post-period activity
Before discussing the period to 30 September 2024, I would like to welcome our new Shareholders who have been issued shares in the Company as part of the merger with Thames Ventures VCT 2 plc (“TV2”). The merger completed on 15 November following a General Meeting held on 8 November. As part of the merger, the Company has been renamed Foresight Ventures VCT plc, and TV2 has been placed into members’ voluntary liquidation. I am also pleased to welcome Andrew Mackintosh, previously a director of TV2, who has now been appointed to the Board of the Company following completion of the merger.

The Company’s Net Asset Value (“NAV”) per share has been reset to 100.0p and the merger has resulted in an enlarged company with net assets of £110 million. The Board believes this will bring a number of benefits to the Company, such as greater scale to raise and deploy capital into new and existing portfolio companies, as well as improved liquidity for dividends and buybacks.

On 15 November, the Company launched an offer for subscription to raise £5 million (with an over-allotment facility of a further £5 million). The promoter’s fee will be waived for applications made by existing shareholders of any Foresight VCT. New investors, who do not benefit as existing investors but who make an application by 20 December 2024, will, however, benefit from the offer costs being reduced by 1.0% of the amount subscribed.

Net Asset Value and dividends
As at 30 September 2024, the Company’s NAV per share stood at 42.1p, a decrease of 4.0p (or 8.7%) over the period. After adding back the dividend paid in the period of 1.1p per share, the decrease was 6.3%.

The Company’s policy is to seek to pay annual dividends of at least 4% of net assets per annum. During the period, on 26 July 2024, the Company paid an interim dividend of 1.1p, taking total dividends paid in respect of the year ended 31 March 2024 up to 2.1p per share, equivalent to 4.1% of the opening net assets of the previous financial year. This took the total dividends paid since the merger with Downing Absolute Income VCT 1 plc, Downing Absolute Income VCT 2 plc, Downing Income VCT plc, Downing Income VCT 3 plc and Downing Income VCT 4 plc in November 2013 to 47.6p per share.

The Company offers its Shareholders the opportunity to participate in a Dividend Reinvestment Scheme, whereby they may elect to receive shares, credited as fully paid, instead of receiving dividends in cash. If you wish to participate, please contact the registrar, City Partnership, at the details provided on page 30 of the Unaudited Half-Yearly Financial Report.

Investment performance and portfolio activity
A detailed analysis of the investment portfolio performance over the period is given in the Investment Adviser’s Review.

In brief, during the six months under review, the whole portfolio showed investment valuation losses of £9.4 million. Despite this disappointing overall performance, there were some highlights; a total of £2.9 million of proceeds were received from the sale of Data Centre Response Limited, as well as deferred consideration totalling £0.6 million, producing realised gains of £2.2 million. The Investment Adviser also completed two follow-on investments totalling £1.1 million.

Responsible investing
The Board notes the commitment of the Investment Adviser, Foresight Group, to being a “Responsible Investor”. Foresight places environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) criteria at the forefront of its business and investment activities in line with best practice and in order to enhance returns for their investors.

Further detail can be found on page 17 of the Unaudited Half-Yearly Financial Report.

Special administration of the Company’s custodian of quoted assets
As previously reported, since September 2020 the Company has used IBP Capital Markets Limited (“IBP”) as custodian for its quoted investments. Appointing a custodian is a requirement of the FCA, and IBP is an FCA authorised and regulated wholesale broker, providing custody services and access to equity and fixed income securities for non-retail clients (which includes the Company).

On 13 October 2023, the FCA published a supervisory notice under section 55L(3)(a) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, imposing certain restrictions on IBP. On the same date, IBP applied to the High Court and special administrators were appointed.

As noted in the Annual Report, on 19 July 2024, around 80% of the quoted investment portfolio was returned to the Company, meaning normal management and trading of these positions was resumed. The remaining 20% will be returned following the conclusion of court proceedings, the timing of which is currently anticipated to take place in the second half of 2025, unless additional claims are submitted or the outcome of the court proceedings in terms of a final distribution is any different. The Company will communicate with Shareholders if there is any new information which materially impacts the numbers presented in this report.

Share buybacks
The Company continues to operate a policy of buying in its own shares that become available in the market at a 5% discount to NAV (subject to liquidity and regulatory restrictions). Subsequent to the merger, the Board intends to reduce this target discount to 2.5% in future.

During the period the Company purchased 5,522,581 shares for cancellation at an average discount of 5.0%, which represented 3.1% of shares in issue at the date of the last Annual Report.

Share buybacks are timed to avoid the Company’s closed periods. Buybacks will generally take place, subject to demand, during the following times of the year:

August, after the Annual Report has been published
September, prior to the Half-Yearly reporting date of 30 September
January, after the Half-Yearly Report has been published
March, prior to the end of the financial year

The Company retains Panmure Liberum as its corporate broker to assist in operating the share buyback process and ensuring that the quoted spread on the Company’s shares remains at a reasonable level. Contact details for Panmure Liberum are on page 30 of the Unaudited Half-Yearly Financial Report.

Management charges and performance incentive
The annual management fee is an amount equal to 2.0% of net assets. There is no change to the management fee or secretarial fee post-merger. From 1 October 2024, the Investment Adviser took over responsibility for management of the Quoted Growth portfolio from Downing LLP. The team at Downing LLP continues to advise the Company on the Yield Focused portfolio under a subcontract agreement with Foresight Group LLP.

A new performance incentive scheme was formally approved by Shareholders as part of the merger on 15 November 2024. This scheme, in brief, means a performance fee would be payable to the Investment Adviser at the end of each performance period, subject to a total return hurdle. The fee would be equal to the lesser of: (i) 20% of distributions attributable to the relevant performance period; or (ii) 20% of the increase in the total return which is higher than the hurdle. The Board believes this new scheme will provide additional motivation for the Investment Adviser to drive enhanced shareholder value.

Board composition
As noted in the Annual Report, Chris Kay resigned as a Director of the Company on 6 June 2024. Post period end, Andrew Mackintosh has joined the Board from TV2 subsequent to the merger. Andrew is chair of UKI2S, a government-backed venture capital fund supporting companies from the UK’s scientific research base. He is a Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering and was awarded a CBE in the 2024 New Year Honours for services to Science and Technology, and to Enterprise Development, and we are delighted to have him on board.

The Board now comprises four Non-Executive Directors, which the Board considers to be an appropriate number for the current size of the VCT. All of the Directors are independent of the Investment Adviser, with the exception of Chris Allner who is considered non-independent by virtue of being a partner at Downing LLP, the previous investment adviser to the Company, which still provides some services to our new Investment Adviser.

VCT sunset clause
I am pleased to report that new regulations have been made to extend the UK’s VCT scheme by ten years to April 2035, following the European Commission’s confirmation that they would not oppose the continuation of the scheme. This now removes any recent uncertainty and will help support further investment by the VCT sector in early-stage companies.

Outlook
At the date of the merger the Company’s NAV per share had increased to 42.6p, as a result of valuation uplifts in the Quoted Growth portfolio, as well as favourable exchange rates on our US investments. With an offer for subscription now out to raise further funds, in addition to the cash boost on acquiring the assets of TV2, and a refreshed performance incentive scheme to greater motivate the Investment Adviser, we look forward to seeing an increase in deployment to enhance the portfolio and returns to Shareholders. Whilst the macroeconomic environment has been challenging for the last two years, the Investment Adviser is cautiously optimistic that 2025 will provide more positive conditions for our portfolio companies. The downward trajectory of inflation and interest rates should lead to increasing confidence and encourage investors to return to the market.

Atul Devani
Chair

20 December 2024

INVESTMENT ADVISER’S REVIEW

“We present our Investment Adviser’s Review for the six‑month period ended 30 September 2024.”

Unquoted Growth
Portfolio summary
At 30 September 2024, the Company held total unquoted investments of £44.4 million, split £34.5 million Unquoted Growth and £9.9 million Unquoted Yield Focused. Details of the Unquoted Yield Focused portfolio performance are set out on page 8 of the Unaudited Half-Yearly Financial Report.

The Unquoted Growth portfolio comprises 29 companies, across a range of sectors. Following a challenging period for the year ended 31 March 2024, with the portfolio unfavourably impacted by the downturn of the UK economy, the six months ended 30 September 2024 has been similarly disappointing, resulting in an overall unrealised investment valuation loss of £2.2 million in the portfolio.

Investment activity
There were no new investments made during the period ended 30 September 2024. The Company made follow-on investments in two Unquoted Growth companies during the period, totalling £1.1 million:

FundingXchange Limited (£750,000), a fintech platform delivering SME lenders insights into their portfolios. This investment was made concurrently with a £5.0 million investment from Barclays as part of a £6.0 million round. This transformational investment will allow the company to build on early commercial success and deepen the strategic and commercial relationship with Barclays.

Rated People Limited (£375,000), an online marketplace connecting homeowners and local tradespeople. This investment allows the strengthened management team to implement the necessary product and operational changes to enable a return to growth and a cash-generative business model.

There was one realisation during the period ended 30 September 2024:

DSTBTD Limited (trading as Distributed) was sold for £1 to ILX Group. No proceeds were returned to the Company, which was a disappointing result for the team, but a favourable outcome to an administration process, which was a real possibility after a proposed funding failed to come together.

Key portfolio developments
There were some material write downs in the Unquoted Growth portfolio during the period, and some companies have continued to struggle in the challenging macroeconomic environment. However, there have also been some positive movements in valuation. This has resulted in a net total realised and unrealised investment valuation loss of £3.0 million in the period, including £0.7 million in unrealised foreign exchange losses.

Of the total investment loss, total losses of £6.5 million were offset by gains of £3.5 million. The most significant movements are noted below.

The largest gain in value was in Ayar Labs, Inc, a silicon photonic chiplet developer used in next-generation AI data centers of the major hyperscalers and cloud-service providers. The valuation increased by £1.9 million, including foreign exchange losses, as a result of a new funding round.

Other unrealised valuation gains included:

Rated People Limited, an online marketplace connecting homeowners and local tradespeople, increased in value by £596,000. This was due to a follow-on funding round enhancing the Company’s share of proceeds on any liquidity event. It is also worth noting that the company is now trading profitably and under new leadership.

Carbice Corporation, Inc has developed a suite of products based on its carbon material, used primarily as thermal management solutions to enable greater thermal conductivity. The valuation increased by £401,000, including foreign exchange losses, as a result of the recent closure of a funding round that increases the prospect of growth and, ultimately, a positive realisation for investors.

Four other companies in the Unquoted Growth portfolio made up investment valuation gains of £603,000.

There were also a number of valuation losses reported in the period. The greatest loss was in Cambridge Touch Technologies Ltd, a company developing pressure sensitive multi-touch technology, which reduced in value by £1.9 million as a result of a challenging funding environment for deep tech companies. As noted above, DSTBTD Limited (trading as Distributed) was sold for £1 to ILX Group during the period. No proceeds were returned to the Company, resulting in a realised loss of £775,000.

Other investment valuation losses included:

Vivacity Labs Limited, a provider of Artificial Intelligence sensors to monitor and control traffic flows, was written down to nil value in the period, a decrease in value of £960,000, following a new funding round. The investment round (that we chose not to participate in) generated penal terms for shareholders not participating in the funding round and resulted in the write down.

Masters of Pie Limited, developer of “Radical”, a software solution that enables remote sharing and collaboration on large data sets, was reduced by £700,000 as a result of a challenging period for the company from a trading perspective. It is hoped that this situation will improve in Q4 2024, albeit the position remains challenging.

Virtual Class Ltd (trading as Third Space Learning), a platform offering personalised online lessons from specialist tutors, decreased in carrying value by £466,000, driven by significant budgetary pressure experienced by UK schools, a key customer group. It is hoped that early international sales (in the US) will somewhat offset challenges in the UK market.

Parsable, Inc., a provider of software to improve operational efficiencies in the industrial and manufacturing sectors, has seen a valuation decrease of £460,000, including foreign exchange losses. During the period, an offer to acquire Parsable was received that, whilst at a valuation lower than we expected, was accepted by the Board, and the valuation has been aligned with anticipated proceeds.

Bulbshare Limited, a company that enables brands to build communities from their existing customers to gather consumer insights, was exited post period end. The valuation was reduced by £371,000 in line with the exit proceeds received.

Trinny London Limited, a multi-channel female beauty and skincare brand, was reduced in value by £354,000 due to a decline in comparable market valuation multiples. Despite this, the business increased revenue during the period and remains profitable.

CommerceIQ, Inc., the pioneer in helping brands win on retail e-commerce channels, decreased by £221,000 in the period, including foreign exchange losses. Whilst CommerceIQ’s revenues increased during the period, market valuations for similar businesses declined and, consequently, the valuation fall is a reflection of wider market conditions.

Four other companies in the Unquoted Growth portfolio made up valuation losses of £340,000. Aside from Vivacity Labs Limited, no other investments were written down to nil during the period.

Post period end activity
After the period end, the Company completed two new investments totalling £1.6 million into Dragonfly Technology Solutions Ltd (£600,000), a predictive analytics business, and Alison Technologies Ltd (£978,000), a developer of an innovative AI marketing insights tool. The Company also completed two follow-on investments totalling £1.1 million into Maestro Media Limited (£750,000) and Virtual Class Ltd (£300,000). The Company received £1.1 million in proceeds from the exit of Bulbshare Limited in October.

At the date of the merger, the Unquoted Growth portfolio had seen positive foreign exchange movements totalling £421,000.

Outlook
Whilst the macroeconomic environment has been challenging for the last two years, we are cautiously optimistic that 2025 will provide more positive conditions for our portfolio companies. The downward trajectory of inflation and interest rates should lead to increasing confidence and encourage investors to return to the market. From an exit perspective, the IPO market is unlikely to open up in the short term, but we are seeing signs that PE and trade buyers will be more active in 2025, offering potential liquidity opportunities for portfolio companies.

In addition to the anticipated improved macro environment, we believe the merger with Thames Ventures VCT 2 plc has created a company well placed for success, with a very clear investment mandate (exclusively investing in private technology businesses) and benefiting from more streamlined company reporting and administration.

Foresight Group LLP
20 December 2024

Yield Focused portfolio
Downing LLP continues to advise the Company on the Unquoted Yield Focused portfolio under a subcontract from Foresight Group LLP.

Downing presents a review of the Yield Focused portfolio for the six months ended 30 September 2024. At the period end, the Yield Focused portfolio consisted of seven active investments, all of which are unquoted, with a total value of £9.9 million.

Divestment activity
During the period, the focus was on investment realisations from the Yield Focused portfolio, which resulted in proceeds of £2.9 million from the exit of Data Centre Response Limited, a provider of power solutions and maintenance services to data centres. There were no new or follow-on investments.

Realisations in the period ended 30 September 2024

		Total	Cost at date	Exit	Total
		invested	of disposal	proceeds	return
Company	Detail	(£)	(£)	(£)	(£)
Data Centre Response Limited	Full disposal	557,441	557,441	2,916,694	2,916,694

Key portfolio developments
The Yield Focused portfolio reduced in value by £113,000 during the period, with one company, Data Centre Response Limited, recognising a gain of £494,000 on exit, as noted above, and four companies recognising unrealised losses of £607,000:

Pilgrim Trading Limited, an operator and owner of two children’s nurseries in West London, decreased in value by £437,000 after two periods of unsuccessful marketing proved the last independent valuation of the business to be unachievable in current market conditions. Consequently, the independent valuation has now been heavily discounted.

Kimbolton Lodge Limited, a nursing and care home in Bedfordshire, decreased in value by £67,000 to bring the valuation in line with the anticipated proceeds from a sale process that is currently underway.

Doneloans Limited, which holds a portfolio of secured loans, decreased in value by £67,000 driven by the cost of its own funding marginally exceeding interest receivable from its borrowers.

SF Renewables (Solar) Limited, which built and operates a solar plant in India, was reduced by £36,000 in line with the exit proceeds received post period end.

Outlook
With one exit during the period and another shortly after period end, there were six investments remaining in the Yield Focused portfolio at the time of writing. Downing is actively seeking to progress exits from both Kimbolton Lodge and Pilgrim Trading, though the latter is currently looking less likely to materialise. Given current market conditions, sales of the higher value, hotel-related investments, Baron House Developments and Cadbury House Holdings, are expected to take some time to complete. The recovery of value from Doneloans is linked largely to the sale of Pilgrim Trading, which is the lender’s largest loan, but additional recoveries are anticipated from other borrowers over the next 12 months.

Downing LLP and Foresight Group LLP
20 December 2024

Quoted Growth portfolio
For the six months to 30 September 2024, Downing LLP continued to advise the Company on the Quoted Growth portfolio under a subcontract from Foresight Group LLP. From 1 October 2024, Foresight Group LLP took on full responsibility for management of the Quoted Growth portfolio.

Investment activity
Markets continued to be volatile through the reporting period. The impending Budget dominated market behaviours, particularly the FTSE AIM Index, where fears over an abolition of IHT reliefs on AIM shares adversely affected the market. In the end, this fear was overcooked, and the FTSE AIM All Share rallied 4% on the day of the Budget, as it was announced that reliefs on AIM shares would remain, albeit at half the relief previously enjoyed. Since the Budget, the new concern has been focused on the impact of National Insurance increases, which have weighed heavily on UK Small and Mid-Cap companies. There is a general acceptance that inflation will still be a looming threat and hence interest rates will remain higher for longer.

There were no investments or realisations made during the six months to 30 September 2024.

Key portfolio developments
At 30 September 2024, the Quoted Growth portfolio was valued at £13.4 million, comprising 36 active investments. Over the six-month period, the portfolio produced net valuation losses of £4.7 million, offset by £3.8 million received in dividends from the portfolio. Two companies, valued at £78,000 at year end, have been written down to nil during the period.

The most significant loss was incurred in Tracsis plc, a provider of transport technology, which saw valuation losses of £2.4 million during the period due to a profit warning, citing delays on rail infrastructure spend incurred due to the early election. This was exacerbated by contract delays in their US business.

This was offset by valuation gains elsewhere in the portfolio, where Anpario plc, a specialist manufacturer and distributor of natural sustainable feed additives for animal health, nutrition and biosecurity, increased by £680,000 net of £46,000 dividends received, reflecting an improvement in trading post supply chain issues experienced during the inflationary period post covid.

A net gain of £615,000 was made in Downing Strategic Micro‑Cap Investment Trust plc, where special dividends of £3.7 million were made during the period, as part of the managed wind-down of the Trust. Since the period end, a further special dividend of 2.2p, equating to £133,000, has been received by the Company.

Meanwhile Cohort plc, the parent company of six businesses providing a wide range of services and products for British, Portuguese and other international customers in defence and security markets, booked an unrealised gain of £558,000. This mirrored profit upgrades, contract renewals and strong financial results. This momentum has continued post period end.

As at 17 December 2024, the valuation of the Quoted Growth portfolio had decreased by £226,000 (-1.7%).

IBP Capital Markets Limited
As noted in the Annual Report, the Company recovered c.80% of its total Quoted Growth portfolio on 19 July 2024, with the remaining c.20% to be recovered following court proceedings, currently anticipated to take place in the second half of 2025. Up until July, the ability to trade the portfolio continued to be restricted and hence there has been limited ability to manage exposures within the portfolio. The Company is now able to trade its positions, having been unable to do so since October 2023.

Post-period end activity
Post period end, ahead of the Budget, shares were sold in 14 of the Company’s Quoted Growth portfolio holdings. Notably, holdings in Anpario plc and Craneware plc were reduced, as well as in Impact Healthcare REIT plc, a non-qualifying holding. As previously communicated to Shareholders, the strategy going forward is to realise the Quoted Growth portfolio over time, which will free up funds to be redeployed into Unquoted Growth holdings.

Outlook
A number of the Quoted Growth companies in the portfolio have been consistently overoptimistic about hitting milestones for product development, revenues and ultimately profits. Given competition for capital amongst the wider portfolio of venture capital holdings, Foresight took the difficult decision to reduce a number of these positions. Achieving a total sale of individual holdings has not been possible, given that 20% of the Company’s Quoted Growth assets are still tied up in the custodian IBP Capital Markets Limited (“IBP”), which remains in special measures. While this is frustrating, as it does not allow portfolio management to be conducted across the entire portfolio should changes need to be made, we are able to make them to substantially all of the holdings.

The Quoted Growth holdings have reduced as a percentage of the Company’s total assets, but we firmly believe that by making these changes we have increased the overall quality and see an encouraging future, despite an uncertain macroeconomic background.

Downing LLP and Foresight Group LLP
20 December 2024

UNAUDITED HALF-YEARLY RESULTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES STATEMENTS

Principal risks and uncertainties
The principal risks faced by the Company are as follows:

Investment performance
Regulatory
Operational
Economic, political and other external factors

The Board reported on the principal and emerging risks and uncertainties faced by the Company in the Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 2024. A detailed explanation can be found on pages 26 to 28 of the Annual Report and Accounts, which is available on the Investment Adviser’s website www.foresightgroup.eu/products/foresight-ventures-vct-plc or by writing to Foresight Group at The Shard, 32 London Bridge Street, London SE1 9SG.

In the view of the Board, there have been no changes to the fundamental nature of these risks since the previous report and these principal risks and uncertainties are equally applicable to the remaining six months of the financial year as they were to the six months under review.

Directors’ responsibility statement
The Disclosure and Transparency Rules (“DTR”) of the UK Listing Authority require the Directors to confirm their responsibilities in relation to the preparation and publication of the Half-Yearly Financial Report.

The Directors confirm to the best of their knowledge that:

   a)   The summarised set of financial statements has been prepared in accordance with FRS 104
   b)   The interim management report includes a fair review of the information required by DTR 4.2.7R (indication of important events during the first six months and description of principal risks and uncertainties for the remaining six months of the year)
   c)   The summarised set of financial statements gives a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss of the Company as required by DTR 4.2.4R
   d)   The interim management report includes a fair review of the information required by DTR 4.2.8R (disclosure of related parties’ transactions and changes therein)

Going concern
The Company’s business activities, together with the factors likely to affect its future development, performance and position, are set out in the Strategic Report of the Annual Report. The financial position of the Company, its cash flows, liquidity position and borrowing facilities are described in the Chair’s Statement, Strategic Report and Notes to the Accounts of the 31 March 2024 Annual Report. In addition, the Annual Report includes the Company’s objectives, policies and processes for managing its capital; its financial risk management objectives; details of its financial instruments; and its exposures to credit risk and liquidity risk.

The Company has adequate financial resources at the period end and holds a diversified portfolio of investments. As a consequence, the Directors believe that the Company is well placed to manage its business risks successfully.

The Directors have reasonable expectation that the Company has adequate resources to continue in operational existence for the foreseeable future. Thus they continue to adopt the going concern basis of accounting in preparing the half-yearly financial statements.

The Half-Yearly Financial Report has not been audited nor reviewed by the auditors.

On behalf of the Board

Atul Devani
Chair

20 December 2024

UNAUDITED INCOME STATEMENT
For the six months ended 30 September 2024

	Six months ended 30 September 2024 (Unaudited)			Six months ended 30 September 2023 (Unaudited)			Year ended 31 March 2024 (Audited)


	Revenue	Capital	Total	Revenue	Capital	Total	Revenue	Capital	Total
	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000
Realised gains/(losses) on investments	—	2,202	2,202	—	(5,203)	(5,203)	—	(8,015)	(8,015)
Investment holding (losses)/gains	—	(10,311)	(10,311)	—	1,028	1,028	—	3,465	3,465
Income	4,187	—	4,187	1,065	—	1,065	906	—	906
Investment management fees	(404)	(404)	(808)	(449)	(449)	(898)	(863)	(863)	(1,726)
Other expenses	(482)	—	(482)	(376)	—	(376)	(1,346)	—	(1,346)
Return/(loss) on ordinary activities before taxation	3,301	(8,513)	(5,212)	240	(4,624)	(4,384)	(1,303)	(5,413)	(6,716)
Taxation	—	—	—	(24)	24	—	—	—	—
Return/(loss) on ordinary activities after taxation	3,301	(8,513)	(5,212)	216	(4,600)	(4,384)	(1,303)	(5,413)	(6,716)
Return/(loss) per share	1.9p	(4.8)p	(2.9)p	0.1p	(2.5)p	(2.4)p	(0.7)p	(3.1)p	(3.8)p

The total columns of this statement are the profit and loss account of the Company and the revenue and capital columns represent supplementary information.

All revenue and capital items in the above Income Statement are derived from continuing operations. No operations were acquired or discontinued in the period.

The Company has no recognised gains or losses other than those shown above, therefore no separate statement of total recognised gains and losses has been presented.

The Company has only one class of business and one reportable segment, the results of which are set out in the Income Statement and Balance Sheet.

There are no potentially dilutive capital instruments in issue and, therefore, no diluted earnings per share figures are relevant. The basic and diluted earnings per share are, therefore, identical.

UNAUDITED RECONCILIATION OF MOVEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDERS’ FUNDS
For the six months ended 30 September 2024

	Called-up	Share premium	Capital redemption	Special	Capital	Revaluation	Revenue
	share capital	account	reserve	reserve	reserve	reserve	reserve	Total
	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000	£’000
As at 1 April 2024	1,775	2,522	71	86,901	(10,791)	6,057	(4,619)	81,916
Share issues in the period	7	301	—	—	—	—	—	308
Expenses in relation to share issues	—	(46)	—	—	—	—	—	(46)
Repurchase of shares	(55)	—	55	(2,340)	—	—	—	(2,340)
Realised gains on disposal of investments	—	—	—	—	2,202	—	—	2,202
Investment holding losses	—	—	—	—	—	(10,311)	—	(10,311)
Dividends paid	—	—	—	—	(1,953)	—	—	(1,953)
Management fees charged to capital	—	—	—	—	(404)	—	—	(404)
Revenue return before taxation for the period	—	—	—	—	—	—	3,301	3,301
Taxation for the period	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
As at 30 September 2024	1,727	2,777	126	84,561	(10,946)	(4,254)	(1,318)	72,673

Distributable reserves at 30 September 2024 total £51,490,000 (31 March 2024: £58,151,000).

UNAUDITED BALANCE SHEET
As at 30 September 2024

Registered number: 03150868

	As at	As at	As at
	30 September	30 September	31 March
	2024	2023	2024
	(Unaudited)	(Unaudited)	(Audited)
	£’000	£’000	£’000
Fixed assets
Investments held at fair value through profit or loss	57,746	65,871	67,393
Current assets
Debtors	8,467	7,393	7,570
Cash and cash equivalents	7,097	13,580	7,559
Total current assets	15,564	20,973	15,129
Creditors
Amounts falling due within one year	(637)	(1,077)	(606)
Net current assets	14,927	19,896	14,523
Net assets	72,673	85,767	81,916
Capital and reserves
Called-up share capital	1,727	1,770	1,775
Share premium account	2,777	2,252	2,522
Capital redemption reserve	126	71	71
Special reserve	84,561	85,122	86,901
Capital reserve	(10,946)	(5,627)	(10,791)
Revaluation reserve	(4,254)	3,619	6,057
Revenue reserve	(1,318)	(1,440)	(4,619)
Equity shareholders’ funds	72,673	85,767	81,916
Net Asset Value per share	42.1p	48.5p	46.1p

UNAUDITED CASH FLOW STATEMENT
For the six months ended 30 September 2024

	Six months ended	Six months ended	Year ended
	30 September	30 September	31 March
	2024	2023	2024
	(Unaudited)	(Unaudited)	(Audited)
	£’000	£’000	£’000
Cash flow from operating activities
Loss on ordinary activities after taxation	(5,212)	(4,384)	(6,716)
Loss on investments	8,109	4,175	4,550
Increase in debtors	(1,768)	(891)	(1,134)
Increase in creditors	59	82	304
Net cash inflow/(outflow) from operating activities	1,188	(1,018)	(2,996)
Cash flow from investing activities
Purchase of investments	(1,125)	(2,209)	(4,394)
Net proceeds on sale of investments	2,917	3,295	3,433
Net proceeds on deferred consideration	543	419	637
Net cash inflow/(outflow) from investing activities	2,335	1,505	(324)
Cash flows from financing activities
Proceeds of fundraising	—	1,586	1,585
Expenses of fundraising	—	(7)	(7)
Repurchase of own shares	(2,340)	(2,270)	(2,964)
Equity dividends paid	(1,645)	(1,498)	(3,017)
Net cash outflow from financing activities	(3,985)	(2,189)	(4,403)
Net outflow of cash in the period	(462)	(1,702)	(7,723)
Reconciliation of net cash flow to movement in net funds
Decrease in cash and cash equivalents for the period	(462)	(1,702)	(7,723)
Net cash and cash equivalents at start of period	7,559	15,282	15,282
Net cash and cash equivalents at end of period	7,097	13,580	7,559

Analysis of changes in net debt

	As at 1 April 2024 £’000	Cash flow £’000	At 30 September 2024 £’000


Cash and cash equivalents	7,559	(462)	7,097

NOTES TO THE UNAUDITED HALF-YEARLY RESULTS
For the six months ended 30 September 2024

1
The Unaudited Half-Yearly Financial Report has been prepared on the basis of the accounting policies set out in the statutory accounts of the Company for the year ended 31 March 2024. Unquoted investments have been valued in accordance with IPEV Valuation Guidelines.

2
These are not statutory accounts in accordance with s436 of the Companies Act 2006 and the financial information for the six months ended 30 September 2024 and 30 September 2023 has been neither audited nor formally reviewed. Statutory accounts in respect of the year ended 31 March 2024 have been audited and reported on by the Company’s auditor and delivered to the Registrar of Companies and included the report of the auditor which was unqualified and did not contain a statement under s498(2) or s498(3) of the Companies Act 2006. No statutory accounts in respect of any period after 31 March 2024 have been reported on by the Company’s auditor or delivered to the Registrar of Companies.

3
Copies of the Unaudited Half-Yearly Financial Report will be sent to Shareholders via their chosen method and will be available for inspection at the Registered Office of the Company at The Shard, 32 London Bridge Street, London SE1 9SG.

4 Net Asset Value per share
The Net Asset Value per share is based on net assets at the end of the period and on the number of shares in issue at the date.

		Number of shares
	Net assets	in issue
30 September 2024	£72,673,000	172,715,260
30 September 2023	£85,767,000	176,968,887
31 March 2024	£81,916,000	177,546,529

5 Return per share
The weighted average number of shares used to calculate the respective returns are shown in the table below.

	Number of shares
Six months ended 30 September 2024	176,320,908
Six months ended 30 September 2023	179,310,912
Year ended 31 March 2024	178,234,061

Earnings for the period should not be taken as a guide to the results for the full year.

6 Income

	Six months ended	Six months ended	Year ended
	30 September	30 September	31 March
	2024	2023	2024
	£’000	£’000	£’000
Income from investments
Loan stock interest	240	920	424
Dividend income	3,827	145	415
	4,067	1,065	839
Other income	120	—	67
	4,187	1,065	906

7 Investments held at fair value through profit or loss

	Unquoted Growth investments £’000	Unquoted Yield Focused investments £’000	Quoted Growth investments £’000	Total £’000



Book cost at 1 April 2024	39,760	13,651	23,241	76,652
Investment holding losses at 1 April 2024	(3,374)	(751)	(5,134)	(9,259)
Valuation at 1 April 2024	36,386	12,900	18,107	67,393
Movements in the period:
Purchases	1,125	—	—	1,125
Disposal proceeds	—	(2,917)	—	(2,917)
Realised (losses)/gains on disposals¹	(775)	2,360	—	1,585
Foreign exchange losses	(669)	—	—	(669)
Investment holding losses²	(1,554)	(2,473)	(4,744)	(8,771)
Valuation at 30 September 2024	34,513	9,870	13,363	57,746
Book cost at 30 September 2024	40,110	13,094	23,241	76,445
Investment holding losses at 30 September 2024	(5,597)	(3,224)	(9,878)	(18,699)
Valuation at 30 September 2024	34,513	9,870	13,363	57,746

Realised gains on investments in the Income Statement include realised gains relating to deferred consideration receipts totalling £617,000 from StorageOS Inc (£419,000), Efundamentals Group Limited (£96,000), Firefly Learning Limited (£74,000), DIA Imaging Analysis Limited (£14,000) and Imagen Limited (£14,000).
Investment holding losses in the Income Statement include unrealised losses which are a result of the deferred consideration debtor decrease of £871,000. The debtor movement reflects the recognition of amounts receivable in respect of DIA Imaging Analysis Limited (£45,000) and Firefly Learning Limited (£8,000), offset by receipts in respect of StorageOS Inc (£419,000), Efundamentals Group Limited (£96,000), Firefly Learning Limited (£74,000), Imagen Limited (£14,000) and DIA Imaging Analysis Limited (£14,000). Amounts were previously recognised as receivable but written down at 30 September 2024 in respect of Efundamentals Group Limited (£295,000), JRNI Limited (£8,000) and Imagen Limited (£4,000).

8 Contingencies, guarantees and financial commitments
As outlined in note 17 to the Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 2024, the Company has used IBP Capital Markets Limited (“IBP”) as custodian for its quoted investments since September 2020. Appointing a custodian is a requirement of the FCA; IBP is an FCA authorised and regulated wholesale broker, providing custody services and access to equity and fixed income securities for non-retail clients (which includes the Company). On 13 October 2023, the FCA published a supervisory notice under section 55L(3)(a) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, imposing certain restrictions on IBP. On the same date, IBP applied to the High Court and special administrators were appointed.

During the period since, the Investment Adviser has been actively collaborating with the special administrators to reach a resolution, which has involved reconciling quoted stocks held with IBP (“Custody Assets”) and cash held with IBP (“Client Money”). As at 13 October 2023, the Company held Client Money of £1.1 million (1.2% of indicative NAV on the same date), and Custody Assets of £16.9 million (19.5% of indicative NAV on the same date).

With regard to Custody Assets, whilst the final outcome remains subject to change, particularly as additional claims may be made, there have so far been two differences of value identified, together totalling a variance of £0.28 million, which was provided for at 31 March 2024. It was announced on 17 May 2024 that the special administrators would be making an interim distribution of 80% of eligible Custody Assets, and the transfer of these to the new custodian completed on 19 July 2024. The Company is now able to trade these assets on the quoted market. The remaining 20% withheld will be distributed as part of a Final Court Approved Distribution Plan, unless additional claims are made resulting in a break.

With regard to Client Money, a progress report was released on 12 April 2024 which identified a potential 44% cash shortfall equating to £0.46 million of Client Money held by the Company which was provided for at 31 March 2024. Any further deduction for fees relating to the special administration process is unknown at this point, but from the information available these are anticipated to be in the region of £0.14 million payable by the Company. These fees were accrued for as at 31 March 2024 and there has been no further adjustment to this estimate. The total potential exposure based on information available to date is therefore currently estimated to be £0.88 million, representing 1.2% of NAV at 30 September 2024.

As noted, the outcome remains subject to change with the final distribution plan being shared following the court proceedings. Timing of this is currently anticipated to take place in the second half of 2025. The Company will communicate with Shareholders if there is any new information which materially impacts the numbers presented in this report.

9 Related party transactions
No Director has an interest in any contract to which the Company is a party other than their appointment and payment as Directors.

10 Transactions with the Investment Adviser
Details of arrangements with Foresight Group LLP are given in the Annual Report and Accounts for the year ended 31 March 2024, in the Directors’ Report and notes 4 and 5. All arrangements and transactions were on an arm’s length basis.

Foresight Group LLP was appointed as Investment Adviser on 4 July 2022 and earned fees of £808,000 during the period to 30 September 2024 (30 September 2023: £898,000; 31 March 2024: £1,726,000).

Foresight Group LLP is the Company Secretary (appointed on 1 September 2023) and received, for accounting and company secretarial services, fees of £75,000 during the period to 30 September 2024 (30 September 2023: £80,000; 31 March 2024: £156,000).

At the balance sheet date there was £nil due to Foresight Group LLP (30 September 2023: £nil; 31 March 2024: £nil).

11 Post-balance sheet events
On 5 November 2024, the Company purchased for cancellation 2,197,967 ordinary shares of 1p at a gross price of 42.37p per share.

On 15 November 2024, the Company merged with Thames Ventures VCT 2 plc (“TV2”). A total of 86,637,164 shares in the Company were issued to TV2 shareholders at the price of 42.629237024071200p per share. Following this allotment, the Company redesignated 147,531,473 of its issued ordinary shares as deferred shares, which were immediately repurchased and cancelled in order to re-base the NAV per share of each of ordinary share to 100.0p.

A copy of the Unaudited Half-Yearly Financial Report will be submitted to the National Storage Mechanism in accordance with UK Listing Rules (“UKLR”)11.4.1 / UKLR 6.4.1 and UKLR 6.4.3.

END

For further information, please contact:

Company Secretary
Foresight Group LLP
Contact: Stephen Thayer Tel: 0203 667 8100

Investor Relations
Foresight Group LLP
Contact: Andrew James Tel: 0203 667 8181

The MIL Network –

January 27, 2025

MIL-OSI Security: Extradited Canadian National Sentenced To Life In Federal Prison

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

Tampa, Florida – U.S. District Judge Virginia Hernandez Covington has sentenced Paul Creighton (67, Ontario, Canada) to life in federal prison for producing child sexual abuse material and enticement of a minor. Creighton entered a guilty plea on August 19, 2024.

According to the plea agreement and evidence presented at sentencing, between 2012 and 2017, Creighton coerced and enticed minor children throughout the United States, including Florida, Virginia, Georgia, and California to create images and videos of themselves performing sexual acts.

One such victim, a 14-year-old girl living in Osceola County, was coerced by Creighton via social media applications. In April 2017, the victim confided in a friend about the relationship she engaged in with Creighton. The friend notified a high school guidance counselor, who notified the victim’s parents, who then immediately called law enforcement. After being discovered, Creighton advised the victim on what to say to her parents, to reset her phone, reformat her hard drive, and delete messages between them. Creighton later threatened the victim, and told her he would share her images and videos if the victim did not continue to speak to him.

In October 2017, FBI agents seized various electronic devices from Creighton. Agents obtained search warrants and conducted forensic reviews of those devices, which revealed photographs of the minor victim, online searches for the victim and their family, as well as numerous searches for other minor children throughout the United States.

On or about October 24, 2017—at the same time that Creighton was flying to

Washington, DC from Toronto—detectives with the Niagara Regional Police in coordination with the FBI, executed a Canadian search warrant at Creighton’s residence in Ontario. In his home, agents recovered hundreds of images of minor children, including images of child sexual abuse of the minor victims.

Creighton was indicted in 2018 and was taken into custody by Canadian authorities on November 12, 2020. On February 8, 2024, Creighton was extradited to the United States, and has been in custody since that date.

“The life sentence will guarantee no other child falls victim to this man’s horrific abuse,” said FBI Tampa Division Special Agent in Charge Matthew Fodor. “Our special agents and analysts work these tough investigations with compassion and commitment to ensure justice is served and the innocent are protected from predators.”

This investigation was led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tampa Field Office. Significant assistance was provided by the United States Marshals Service and the Niagara Regional Police. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided substantial assistance in securing the arrest and extradition of Creighton to the United States. It was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Diego F. Novaes.

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January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Attorney’s Office and FBI Announce Second Superseding Indictment, Bringing Additional Kidnapping and Assault Charges Against Serial Murderer, Kidnapper, and Sexual Abuser Labar Tsethlikai
Source: Office of United States Attorneys

ALBUQUERQUE – Federal prosecutors have filed six additional charges against Labar Tsethlikai for kidnapping and assault with a dangerous weapon. The additional charges are part of a larger series of violent crimes committed by Tsethlikai against Native American men across New Mexico between 2022 and 2024. The added charges correspond to 5 additional victims.

Labar Tsethlikai, 51, an enrolled Member of Zuni Pueblo, now faces a 17-count second superseding indictment charging him with five additional counts of kidnapping and one count of assault with a dangerous weapon as follows:
- Count 5: Kidnapping of John Doe 3 on or about May 19, 2023, in Indian Country, McKinley County, New Mexico
- Count 11: Kidnapping of John Doe 6 on or about August 24, 2023, in Indian Country, McKinley County, New Mexico
- Count 12: Assault with a dangerous weapon (baseball bat) against John Doe 6 on or about August 24, 2023, in Indian Country, McKinley County, New Mexico
- Count 13: Kidnapping of John Doe 7 on or about September 7, 2023, in Indian Country, McKinley County, New Mexico
- Count 14: Kidnapping of John Doe 8 on or about September 15, 2023, in Indian Country, McKinley County, New Mexico
- Count 16: Kidnapping of John Doe 10 on or about April 5, 2024, in Bernalillo County, New Mexico
In total, the second superseding indictment identifies 11 victims of Tsethlikai. The investigation is ongoing.

Tsethlikai was initially charged with second degree murder on April 25, 2024. On July 31, 2024, a federal grand jury charged Tsethlikai in an 11-count superseding indictment with two counts of kidnapping resulting in death, one count of first-degree murder, one count of first-degree felony murder, four counts of kidnapping, one count assault with intent to commit murder, one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, and one count of aggravated sexual abuse:
- Count 1: On October 22, 2022, Tsethlikai allegedly kidnapped and murdered John Doe 1.
- Count 2: On January 18, 2024, Tsethlikai allegedly murdered John Doe 2 willfully, deliberately, maliciously, and with premeditation.
- Count 3: On January 18, 2024, Tsethlikai allegedly killed John Doe 2 during the commission of a kidnapping and sexual abuse.
- Count 4: On January 18, 2024, Tsethlikai allegedly kidnapped John Doe 2 and death resulted.
- Count 6: On June 15, 2023, Tsethlikai allegedly kidnapped John Doe 4.
- Count 7: On June 15, 2023, Tsethlikai allegedly assaulted John Doe 4 with the specific intent to commit murder.
- Count 8: On June 15, 2023, Tsethlikai allegedly assaulted John Doe 4, and the assault resulted in serious bodily injury.
- Count 9: On July 13, 2023, Tsethlikai kidnapped John Doe 5.
- Count 10: On July 13, 2023, Tsethlikai allegedly sexually abused John Doe 5 by force and threats, and the sexual act consisted of contact between the penis of Tsethlikai and the mouth of John Doe 5.
- Count 15: On February 16, 2024, Tsethlikai allegedly kidnapped John Doe 9 using interstate facilities and instrumentalities.
- Count 17: On April 11, 2024, Tsethlikai allegedly kidnapped John Doe 11 using interstate facilities and instrumentalities.
If convicted, Tsethlikai faces a mandatory life sentence or death for the kidnapping resulting in death and first-degree murder charges, up to twenty years imprisonment on the assault with intent to murder charge, up to ten years imprisonment on the assault resulting in serious bodily injury charge, and any number of years up to life for the kidnapping and aggravated sexual abuse charges.

U.S. Attorney Alexander M.M. Uballez, and Raul Bujanda, Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Albuquerque Field Office, made the announcement today.

The Gallup Resident Agency of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Albuquerque Field Office, led by Special Agent Mark Stephenson, is investigating this case with assistance from the Albuquerque Police Department’s Homicide Unit, Sex Crimes Unit, and Air Support Unit. Assistant United States Attorneys Matthew J. McGinley and Mark A. Probasco are prosecuting the case, with victim support provided by the FBI’s Victim Services Division, the United States Attorney’s Office Victim Witness Unit, and Utah Navajo Health Systems, Inc., Victim Services.

The FBI continues to investigate Tsethlikai’s involvement in crimes against other victims. If you have reason to believe you or someone you know may be a victim, or have information about Tsethlikai, please call the FBI at (505) 889-1300 or submit tips online at tips.fbi.gov.

Labar Tsethlikai is approximately 5’7” and weighs 180 pounds. He is heavyset, has short brown hair, brown eyes, and wears glasses. He sometimes wears a gold bracelet. He is from Zuni, but travels extensively around New Mexico, including Gallup, Albuquerque, and Santa Fe. He is believed to work in the Native American jewelry industry and may be a Zuni jewely artist.

This case is part of the Department of Justice’s Missing or Murdered Indigenous Persons (MMIP) Regional Outreach Program, which aims to aid in the prevention and response to missing or murdered Indigenous people through the resolution of MMIP cases and communication, coordination, and collaboration with federal, Tribal, state, and local partners. The Department views this work as a priority for its law enforcement components. Through the MMIP Regional Outreach Program, a broad spectrum of stakeholders work together to identify MMIP cases and issues in Tribal communities and develop comprehensive solutions to address them. This prosecution upholds the Department’s mission to the unwavering pursuit of justice on behalf of Indigenous victims and their families.

# # #

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January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Lee’s Summit Teacher Charged with Child Pornography

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

KANSAS CITY, Mo. – A Lee’s Summit West High School teacher has been charged in federal court on charges related to child pornography.

Seth Brummond, 37, of Greenwood, Mo., was charged in a two-count criminal complaint filed in the U.S. District Court in Kansas City, Mo., on Thursday, Dec. 19. Brummond will have his initial court appearance this afternoon.

The federal criminal complaint charges Brummond with one count of distributing child pornography over the internet and one count of possessing child pornography from September 1 to December 18, 2024.

According to an affidavit filed in support of the criminal complaint, Lee’s Summit police officers received a Cyber Tip on Sept. 8, 2024, that a user (later identified as Brummond) had uploaded 12 videos of child pornography via the Kik Messenger application.

On Thursday, Dec. 19, Lee’s Summit law enforcement officers placed Brummond’s residence under surveillance for the purpose of serving federal search warrants. Officers followed Brummond when he left his house and at about 6 a.m. officers conducted a traffic stop and placed Brummond under arrest. Officers seized his iPhone as well as a computer tower that was in the trunk of his car.

The charges contained in this complaint are simply accusations, and not evidence of guilt. Evidence supporting the charges must be presented to a federal trial jury, whose duty is to determine guilt or innocence.

This case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney David Luna. It was investigated by the Lee’s Summit, Mo., Police Department.

Project Safe Childhood

This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse. Led by the United States Attorneys’ Offices and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to locate, apprehend, and prosecute individuals who sexually exploit children, and to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.usdoj.gov/psc . For more information about Internet safety education, please visit www.usdoj.gov/psc and click on the tab “resources.”

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January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Federal Jury Convicts Wagoner County Resident of Eight Counts of Child Sexual Abuse

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)

MUSKOGEE, OKLAHOMA – The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Oklahoma announced today that Richard Leroy Osborn III, age 47, of Wagoner County, Oklahoma, was found guilty by a federal jury of eight counts of child sexual abuse, including five counts of Aggravated Sexual Abuse and three counts of Abusive Sexual Contact. Two of the counts of conviction carry a mandatory sentence of life in prison.

The jury trial began with testimony on December 9, 2024, and concluded on December 11, 2024, with the guilty verdicts.

During the trial, the United States presented evidence that Osborn sexually assaulted three children starting in 2011 and continuing until May of 2022, when one of the children first disclosed the sexual abuse. Additionally, the United States presented evidence that Osborn, already a registered sex offender at the time of the crimes, had previously sexually abused three other victims when they were minors.

The guilty verdicts were the result of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The crimes occurred in Wagoner County, within the boundaries of the Cherokee and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservations, in the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

The Honorable Kea W. Riggs, U.S. District Judge in the United States District Court of New Mexico, sitting by assignment, presided over the trial in Muskogee, Oklahoma, and ordered the completion of a presentence report. Sentencing will be scheduled following completion of the report. Osborn will remain in the custody of the United States Marshals Service until sentencing.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Morgan Muzljakovich and Nicole Paladino represented the United States.

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January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Wagoner Resident Pleads Guilty to Child Neglect

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)

MUSKOGEE, OKLAHOMA – The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Oklahoma announced that Salasha Fae Bosley, age 25, of Wagoner, Oklahoma, entered a guilty plea to two counts of Child Neglect in Indian Country.

The Indictment alleged that between September 2023 and June 16, 2024, Bosley failed to provide two children with adequate nurturance, affection, food, shelter, sanitation, hygiene, medical care, supervision, and sanitary living conditions while responsible for the health, safety, and welfare of the children.

The crimes occurred in Wagoner County, within the boundaries of the Cherokee Nation Reservation, in the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

The charges arose from an investigation by the Wagoner County Sheriff’s Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Honorable D. Edward Snow, U.S. Magistrate Judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, accepted the plea and ordered the completion of a presentence investigation report.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jessica Bove and Caila M. Cleary represented the United States.

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January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Moore Resident Pleads Guilty to Federal Drug and Firearm Charges

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)

MUSKOGEE, OKLAHOMA – The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Oklahoma announced that Charles Daniel Tow, age 34, of Moore, Oklahoma, entered a guilty plea to one count of Possession with Intent to Distribute Fentanyl and one count of Felon in Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.

The Indictment alleged that on June 6, 2024, Tow knowingly and intentionally possessed 40 or more grams of a mixture and substance containing fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled substance, for the purpose of distribution. The Indictment also alleged that on that same date, Tow knowingly possessed a .380ACP caliber semi-automatic pistol and eight rounds of .380ACP caliber ammunition after having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, despite knowing of that conviction.

The charges arose from an investigation by the District 27 Drug Task Force and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Honorable Jason A. Robertson, U.S. Magistrate Judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, accepted the plea and ordered the completion of a presentence investigation report. Tow will remain in the custody of the U. S. Marshals Service pending sentencing.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard Lorenz represented the United States.

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January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Rantoul Man Convicted of Bank Robbery

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

Urbana, Ill. – A federal jury returned a guilty verdict on December 11, 2024, against Troy Burke, 40, of Rantoul, Illinois, for bank robbery. Sentencing for Burke has been scheduled for May 2, 2025, at 2:30 p.m. at the U.S. Courthouse in Urbana, Illinois

During the two-day trial, the government presented evidence that on June 20, 2024, Burke walked into the Community Plus Federal Credit Union in Rantoul, Illinois indicating to the teller that he had a gun. He proceeded to remove the plastic partition separating the teller from the customer and threatened to hit her with it. Burke left the bank with more than $9,000 in cash and a GPS device the teller had secured in the stack of currency. Burke was stopped by Rantoul police a few blocks from the Credit Union and was found to be in possession of more than $9,000 cash and the GPS device from the bank.

Burke was arrested on June 20, 2024, and remains in the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service pending sentencing.

Statutory penalties for bank robbery are up to twenty years imprisonment, up to 3 years of supervised release, and a fine of up to $250,000.

The case investigation was conducted by the Rantoul Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Springfield Field Office. Timothy Sullivan and Bryan Freres represented the government at trial.

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January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Nationwide Lawsuit Filed in Rhode Island Alleging CVS Knowingly Dispensed Controlled Substances in Violation of the Controlled Substances Act and the False Claims Act

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

PROVIDENCE, RI – In a civil complaint unsealed today in federal court in Providence, Rhode Island, the Justice Department alleges that CVS Pharmacy, Inc., and various subsidiaries (collectively, CVS) filled unlawful prescriptions in violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and sought reimbursement from federal healthcare programs for some of the unlawful prescriptions in violation of the False Claims Act (FCA). CVS is the country’s largest pharmacy chain, with more than 9,000 pharmacies across the United States.

The government’s complaint alleges that, from October 17, 2013, to the present, CVS knowingly filled prescriptions for controlled substances that lacked a legitimate medical purpose, were not valid, and/or were not issued in the usual course of professional practice. Among the large quantities of unlawful prescriptions that CVS allegedly filled were prescriptions for dangerous and excessive quantities of opioids, early fills of opioids, and “trinity” prescriptions, an especially dangerous and abused combination of drugs made up of an opioid, a benzodiazepine, and a muscle relaxant. CVS also allegedly filled large quantities of prescriptions for controlled substances written by prescribers it knew to be engaged in “pill mill practices” – that is, prescribers who issue large numbers of controlled substance prescriptions without any medical purpose. According to the complaint, CVS ignored substantial evidence from multiple sources, including its own pharmacists and internal data, indicating that its stores were dispensing unlawful prescriptions.

The complaint alleges that CVS’s violations resulted from corporate-mandated performance metrics, incentive compensation, and staffing policies that prioritized corporate profits over patient safety. CVS set staffing levels far too low for pharmacists to both meet their performance metrics and comply with their legal obligations. CVS also allegedly deprived its pharmacists of crucial information (including by, for example, preventing pharmacists from warning one another about certain prescribers) that could have reduced the number of unlawful prescriptions filled. The complaint alleges that CVS’s actions helped to fuel the prescription opioid crisis and that, in some particularly tragic instances, patients died after overdosing on opioids shortly after filling unlawful prescriptions at CVS.

“Opioid deaths remain a scourge on communities across Rhode Island and the nation, robbing families of loved ones and leaving a path of devastation in their wake,” said Zachary A. Cunha, U.S. Attorney for the District of Rhode Island. “This lawsuit alleges that CVS failed to exercise its critical role as gatekeeper of dangerous prescription opioids and, instead, facilitated the illegal distribution of these highly addictive drugs, including by pill mill prescribers. When corporations such as CVS prize profits over patient safety and overburden their pharmacy staff so that they cannot carry out the basic responsibility of ensuring that prescriptions are legitimate, we will use every tool at our disposal to see that they answer for it.”

“Our complaint alleges that CVS repeatedly filled controlled substance prescriptions that were unlawful and pressured its pharmacists to fill such prescriptions without taking the time needed to confirm their validity,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Brian M. Boynton, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “The practices alleged contributed to the opioid crisis and opioid-related deaths, and today’s complaint seeks to hold CVS accountable for its misconduct.”

The government alleges that by knowingly filling unlawful prescriptions for controlled substances, CVS violated the CSA and, where CVS sought reimbursement from federal healthcare programs, also violated the FCA. The complaint alleges that CVS’s actions helped to fuel the prescription opioid crisis. If CVS is found liable, it could face civil penalties for each unlawful prescription filled in violation of the CSA and treble damages and applicable penalties for each prescription reimbursed by federal healthcare programs in violation of the FCA. The court also may award injunctive relief to prevent CVS from committing further CSA violations, including ordering appropriate changes to corporate compliance programs and policies.

“When lives are destroyed or lost to opioid abuse, it doesn’t matter if the supplier is a street-level dealer, a pill mill, or a nationwide corporation,” said Jessica D. Aber, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia. “Our laws regarding the distribution of opioids and other controlled substances are clear and apply to everyone. We will pursue whatever legal action is necessary to stop any enterprise, regardless of size, that places profit over the safety of our citizens.”

“CVS is alleged to have dispensed large amounts of highly addictive opioid medications to persons they knew had no medical need for them. Simply put, they put profits over their obligation to keep their customers safe,” said DEA Administrator Anne Milgram. “A pharmacy is the final step in the pharmaceutical distribution process that is in place to keep customers safe. In the fight against the opioid epidemic, DEA will continue to be relentless in holding those accountable who violate our drug laws and place our communities in danger whether they are a criminal cartel or large pharmacy chain.”

“Pharmacies and pharmacists are critical partners to ensure controlled substances are dispensed lawfully and safely to the public,” said Deputy Inspector General Christian J. Schrank of the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG). “HHS-OIG is committed to holding individuals and entities that dispense these controlled substances improperly and without legitimate medical purpose accountable.”

“Protecting TRICARE, the healthcare system for military members and their dependents, is a top priority for the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS),” stated Special Agent in Charge Patrick J. Hegarty, DCIS Northeast Field Office. “Today’s filing demonstrates DCIS’ ongoing commitment to partner with the Department of Justice and our law enforcement partners to investigate health care providers that submit false claims to TRICARE and put its beneficiaries at risk.”

Whistleblower Hillary Estright, who previously worked for CVS, filed an action on October 17, 2019, under the qui tam provisions of the FCA. Those provisions authorize private parties to sue on behalf of the United States for false claims and share in any recovery. The Act permits the United States to intervene and take over such lawsuits, as it has done here.

The case is captioned United States ex rel. Estright v. Health Corporation, et al., No. 1:22-cv-222 (D.R.I.).

The United States’ intervention in this matter underscores the government’s commitment to combating health care fraud. One of the most powerful tools in this effort is the False Claims Act. Tips and complaints from all sources about potential fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement can be reported to HHS, at 800-HHS-TIPS (800-447-8477).

The United States’ enforcement action is being litigated by attorneys from the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for the District of Rhode Island (First Assistant U.S. Attorney Sara M. Bloom and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kevin Love Hubbard and Rachna Vyas), the Justice Department Civil Division’s Consumer Protection Branch (Assistant Directors Amy L. DeLine and C.B. Buente, Senior Litigation Counsel Donald Lorenzen, and Trial Attorneys Benjamin Cornfeld and Amanda K. Kelly) and Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section (Trial Attorneys Claire L. Norsetter, Joshua Barron, and Megan F. Engel), as well as the Eastern District of Virginia (Assistant U.S. Attorneys Clare Wuerker and John Beerbower), the District of Hawaii (Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sydney Spector and Tracy Weinstein), and the Eastern District of Texas (Assistant U.S. Attorneys James Gillingham and Adrian Garcia).

The DEA’s Office of Diversion Control, Washington, D.C. Field Division, HHS-OIG, and DCIS conducted the investigation. Several other offices provided substantial assistance in the investigation, including the United States Attorneys’ Offices for the Southern District of California, the Northern District of Ohio, DEA’s Office of Chief Counsel, DEA’s Office of Diversion Control, Los Angeles Field Division, the Office of Personnel Management, the Department of Labor Office of Inspector General, United States Postal Service Office of Inspector General, and the FBI.

The claims asserted against the defendants are allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability.

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MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Russian National Assisted Sanctioned Oligarch in Schemes to Employ an American Citizen to Launch and Operate Russian Television Network

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

Defendant Also Helped Oligarch Illegally Transfer a $10 Million U.S. Investment to Business Associate

Damian Williams, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Menno Goedman, the Co-Director of Task Force KleptoCapture, and James E. Dennehy, the Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), announced today the unsealing of a Superseding Indictment charging ALEXEY KOMOV with conspiracy and violations of U.S. sanctions arising from his assistance to sanctioned Russian oligarch KONSTANTIN MALOFEYEV, who was previously charged in April 2022. As alleged, KOMOV conspired with MALOFEYEV to recruit and employ an American citizen, Jack Hanick, who worked for MALOFEYEV in launching and operating a television network in Russia. KOMOV also conspired with MALOFEYEV, Hanick, and others to illegally transfer a $10 million investment that MALOFEYEV had made in a U.S. bank to a business associate in Greece, in violation of the sanctions blocking MALOFEYEV’s assets from being transferred.

U.S. Attorney Damian Williams said: “As alleged, Alexey Komov facilitated the efforts of Konstantin Malofeyev – an oligarch closely tied to Russian aggression in Ukraine who has been determined by OFAC to have been one of the main sources of financing for the promotion of Russia-aligned separatist groups operating in the sovereign nation of Ukraine – to flout U.S. sanctions. The unsealing today of the Indictment against Komov is yet another reminder that this Office will continue to hold those accountable that seek to undermine the United States’ national security goals.”

KleptoCapture Co-Director Menno Goedman said: “The indictment alleges Alexey Komov played an essential role in a multi-faceted scheme to violate and evade U.S. sanctions imposed on a significant financier of Russian aggression in Ukraine. Task Force KleptoCapture will continue to disrupt schemes perpetrated by Komov and other sanction evaders, whenever and wherever they may hide.”

FBI Assistant Director in Charge James E. Dennehy said: “Alexey Komov, a Russian national, allegedly conspired with an American citizen and a sanctioned Russian oligarch to develop a Russian cable network to promote anti-Western propaganda. This alleged conspiracy violated laws designed to protect the national security of the United States and our allies. The FBI remains committed to apprehending foreign nationals who employ our citizens to satisfy their odious agenda.”

According to the Indictment unsealed today in Manhattan federal court:[1]

In 2014, the President issued Executive Order 13660, which declared a national emergency with respect to the situation in Ukraine. To address this national emergency, the President blocked all property and interest in property that came within the U.S. or the possession or control of any U.S. person, of individuals determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be responsible for or complicit in, or who engaged in, actions or policies that threatened the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine, or who materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or goods and services to, individuals or entities engaging in such activities. Executive Order 13660, along with certain regulations issued pursuant to it (the “Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations”) prohibits, among other things, making or receiving any funds, goods, or services by, to, from, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked.

On December 19, 2014, the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) designated MALOFEYEV as a Specially Designated National (“SDN”) pursuant to Executive Order 13660. OFAC’s designation of MALOFEYEV explained that he was one of the main sources of financing for Russians promoting separatism in Crimea, and has materially assisted, sponsored, and provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods and services to or in support of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic, a separatist organization in the Ukrainian region of Donetsk.

As alleged in the Indictment, beginning in at least 2012, KOMOV assisted MALOFEYEV in recruiting and hiring a U.S. citizen named Jack Hanick to work on a new Russian cable television news network (the “Russian TV Network”) that MALOFEYEV was creating. As part of KOMOV’s recruitment of Hanick, KOMOV travelled to Manhattan to meet with Hanick and subsequently introduced Hanick to MALOFEYEV in Russia. With KOMOV’s knowledge, MALOFEYEV negotiated directly with Hanick regarding Hanick’s salary, payment for Hanick’s housing in Moscow, and Hanick’s Russian work visa. MALOFEYEV paid Hanick through two separate Russian entities through the end of 2018.

After OFAC designated MALOFEYEV as a SDN in December 2014, MALOFEYEV continued to employ Hanick on the Russian TV Network, with KOMOV’s assistance and input, and in violation of the Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations. For example, prior to the launch of the Russian TV Network on the air in Russia in April 2015, KOMOV wrote an e-mail to MALOFEYEV, Hanick, and another employee, referencing their prior discussion with MALOFEYEV earlier that day and instructing Hanick to create two types of programs and allocate staff. KOMOV further wrote, “Hopefully Konstantin will be providing general direction and guidance for both projects. Looking forward to our long-term co-operation on those exciting endeavors!” In turn, Hanick requested KOMOV to serve as a moderator for the first broadcast, writing “KM [i.e. MALOFEYEV] and I agree that we need you on this the first show on [the Russian TV Network]!!!”

With KOMOV’s participation, MALOFEYEV also employed Hanick to assist MALOFEYEV in transferring a shell company that MALOFEYEV owned to a Greek associate of MALOFEYEV (the “Greek Business Associate”). In 2014, MALOFEYEV, assisted by KOMOV, had used the shell company to make a $10 million investment in a Texas-based bank holding company (the “Texas Bank”). KOMOV helped set up the deal, emailing a Texas-based attorney (“Individiual-1”), “I plan to come to the US with two of my close friends Konstantin Malofeev [sic] and [another individual] on Feb 4-9, 2014 . . . I’d like the three of us to meet with you to discuss our cooperation, and also joint investment projects (please propose attractive investment opportunities with reliable partners for $50-100 mln participation from our side)”. On or about March 25, 2014, KOMOV wrote to Individual-I, “Konstantin has confirmed today that he goes ahead with the 10 mln investment in the bank project.”

Beginning in or about March 2015, with KOMOV’s assistance, MALOFEYEV began making plans to transfer ownership of the shell company to the Greek Business Associate, in violation of the Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations. On or about March 4, 2015, KOMOV wrote to Individual-1, “I need to discuss with you several things: previous investment in the bank project (we want to consider selling it)”. On or about March 17, 2015, KOMOV wrote to Individual-I about the Texas Bank interest, in part, “We want to keep it where it is now, only the owner from our side changes.” Consistent with that plan, in or about May 2015, MALOFEYEV’s attorney drafted a Sale and Purchase Agreement that purported to transfer the shell company to the Greek Business Associate in exchange for one U.S. dollar. In June 2015 MALOFEYEV had Hanick physically transport a copy of MALOFEYEV’s certificate of shares in the Texas Bank from Moscow to Athens to be given to the Greek Business Associate. MALOFEYEV signed the Sale and Purchase Agreement in June 2015, but the agreement was fraudulently backdated to July 2014 to make it appear that the transfer had taken place prior to the imposition of U.S. sanctions. MALOFEYEV’s attorney then falsely represented to the Texas Bank that the transfer had taken place in July 2014, even though MALOFEYEV and his attorney well knew that the transfer of the shell company was executed in June 2015.

The U.S. seized and forfeited approximately $5.4 million in the property traceable to MALOFEYEV’s Texas Bank investment, which had been converted by the Texas Bank in 2016 to cash held in a blocked U.S. bank account. In February 2023, the U.S. Attorney General authorized a transfer of these forfeited funds to the State Department to support Ukrainian veterans.

MALOFEYEV, of Russia, is believed to be in Russia and remains at large.

* * *

KOMOV, 53, a Russian national, is charged with conspiracy to violate and substantive violation of International Emergency Economic Powers Act, each of which carry a maximum potential sentence of 20 years in prison.

The maximum potential sentences in this case are prescribed by Congress and provided here for informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the judge.

Mr. Williams praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI and thanked the support and expertise of the Department of Justice’s National Security Division and Office of International Affairs in the conduct of this matter.

The prosecution is being handled by the Office’s Illicit Finance and Money Laundering Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Vladislav Vainberg, Thane Rehn, Jessica Greenwood, and Trial Attorney Scott Claffee of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Section are in charge of the prosecution.

[1] The entirety of the text of the Indictment, and the description of the Indictment set forth herein, constitute only allegations, and every fact described should be treated as an allegation.

MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Five Men From Grand Strand and Pee Dee Region Sentenced for Fentanyl Trafficking and Related Gun Crimes
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime News

FLORENCE, S.C. — Five men from across the Pee Dee and Grand Strand were sentenced to multi-year terms in federal prison after pleading guilty to a fentanyl trafficking conspiracy operating in and around Horry County and related firearms crimes.
- Joshua Rodriguez, 33, of Myrtle Beach, was sentenced to 151 months in federal prison after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute fentanyl;
- Derrick Adrien Hooks, Jr., 27, of Chesterfield, was sentenced to 96 months in federal prison after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute fentanyl;
- Christopher Brown, 32, of Pawleys Island, was sentenced to 84 months in federal prison after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute fentanyl;
- Jonathan Thien Ta, 32, of Myrtle Beach, was sentenced to 50 months in federal prison after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of firearm and ammunition; Ta’s federal sentence will run consecutive to a state sentence he is serving on separate firearms-related conduct; and
- Neil Alexander Torres, 32, of Myrtle Beach, was sentenced to 18 months in federal prison after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of firearm and ammunition.
Rodriguez and Brown’s terms of imprisonment will be followed by a five-year term of court-ordered supervision. Hook’s term of imprisonment will be followed by a four-year term of court-ordered supervision. Ta and Torres’s terms of imprisonment will be followed by three-year terms of court-ordered supervision. There is no parole in the federal system.

As to Ta and Torres, evidence presented to the court showed that on Nov. 26, 2020, officers with Myrtle Beach Police Department arrived at a restaurant in Myrtle Beach with a warrant to arrest Ta. Officers tried to take Ta into custody, but Ta disobeyed law enforcement commands, reaching into his waistband and pulling out a loaded 9mm handgun, which he passed to Torres before Ta attempted to flee on foot. At the time of the incident, both Ta and Torres were convicted felons who could not legally possess either the firearm or the ammunition with which it was loaded.

Additional evidence presented to the court showed that from 2018 to 2023, Rodriguez, Hooks, and Brown were involved in trafficking pressed pills containing fentanyl in and around Horry County. Fentanyl is potentially lethal in very small doses.

Rodriguez, who was a high-level distributor, was accountable for distributing some 14 kilograms of fentanyl over the course of the conspiracy. He frequently possessed firearms in connection with his drug trafficking and threatened to use violence against others.

On July 1, 2021, law enforcement in Horry County attempted to conduct a traffic stop on a car driven and solely occupied by Hooks. Hooks fled from officers and threw pills and suspected marijuana out of the car during the ensuing chase. Law enforcement then obtained a search warrant for the home in Little River Hooks had come from just prior to the traffic stop. In Hooks’ room at the house, law enforcement found approximately 3.5 kilogram of pills, multiple kilograms of suspected marijuana, a 5.56 caliber firearm, assorted magazines, and ammunition and more than $10,000 in cash. Further investigation revealed that over the course of his involvement in the conspiracy, Hooks was accountable for trafficking 1.6 kilograms of fentanyl.

Investigation showed Brown was involved as a lower-level distributor within the conspiracy. In approximately five years, Brown was accountable for trafficking 2.7 kilograms of fentanyl. Like Hooks, Brown had a history of fleeing from law enforcement. In 2023, Georgetown County Sheriff’s Office attempted to stop a vehicle driven by Brown in Pawleys Island. Brown fled, reaching speeds of 91 miles per hour while trying to evade law enforcement.

United States District Judge Joseph Dawson, III, sentenced all five men.

This prosecution is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) investigation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level drug traffickers, money launderers, gangs, and transnational criminal organizations that threaten the United States by using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach that leverages the strengths of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies against criminal networks. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.

This case was investigated by the FBI Columbia Field Office, Myrtle Beach Police Department, Horry County Police Department, Horry County Sheriff’s Office, and the 15^th Circuit Drug Enforcement Unit. Assistant U.S. Attorney Katherine Flynn is prosecuting the case.

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MIL Security OSI –
January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Louisville Man Sentenced to 27 Years in Federal Prison for Drug Trafficking Conspiracy and Firearms Offense

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

Louisville, KY – A Louisville man was sentenced yesterday to a total of 27 years in federal prison for numerous felony offenses, including conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute controlled substances, possession with the intent to distribute fentanyl, heroin, and cocaine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and escape.

U.S. Attorney Michael A. Bennett of the Western District of Kentucky, Special Agent in Charge R. Shawn Morrow of the ATF Louisville Field Division, and Chief Paul Humphreys of the Louisville Metro Police Department made the announcement.

“This case demonstrates the positive impact that flows from collaborative law enforcement efforts,” said U.S. Attorney Bennett. Our federal, state, and local law enforcement partnerships in Louisville are key to making the community safer. I commend the work ATF and LMPD, as well as the federal, state, and local agencies from across the country who assisted them. The result in this case – the removal of two violent individuals from the streets for a lengthy period – makes the city safer for all who live, work, and visit here.”

According to court documents, Chicoby Summers, 29, was sentenced to 25 years in prison, followed by 5 years supervised release, for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute over one kilogram of fentanyl, over 250 grams of heroin, and a mixture of cocaine base, commonly referred to as “crack cocaine,” possession with the intent to distribute fentanyl, heroin, and cocaine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and escape. Summers was sentenced to an additional 2 years in prison, to run consecutively with the 25-year sentence for a total of 27 years, for violation of his supervised release.

Summers and his co-defendant, Jerlen Horton, were convicted following a seven-day jury trial in July of this year.

In November of this year, Horton was sentenced to serve 29 years and a 6 months, followed by 5 years of supervised release, for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute over one kilogram of fentanyl, over 250 grams of heroin, and a mixture of cocaine base, commonly referred to as “crack cocaine,” possession with the intent to distribute fentanyl, heroin, and cocaine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.

There is no parole in the federal system.

The ATF and LMPD investigated the case, with assistance from the FBI, DEA, United States Postal Inspection Service, Kentucky State Police, Franklin County Sheriff’s Office, Long Beach California Police Department, Verdigris Oklahoma Police Department, and the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Frank Dahl and Josh Porter prosecuted the case, with assistance from paralegal Adela Alic.

This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.

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MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Texas title company employee admits to orchestrating $350,000 real estate wire fraud scheme

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

McALLEN, Texas – A 55-year-old McAllen resident has pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, announced U.S. Attorney Alamdar S. Hamdani.

Mayela Saby Cantu admitted she knowingly participated in a scheme that used falsified lien payoff statements, fraudulent warranty deeds and deceptive emails to mislead lenders, title companies and property buyers.

From November 2020 until her arrest, Cantu defrauded buyers and lenders in multiple property transactions while working at Sierra Title in McAllen. Using her position of trust, she facilitated closings backed by falsified documents. In one notable case, she directed others to create a fraudulent email address resembling that of a legitimate lienholder. Cantu then used the fake account to send false payoff amounts via interstate wires, leading a title company to improperly disburse more than $350,000.

Cantu facilitated additional fraudulent property transactions, including arranging closing on properties that had already been sold and accepting undisclosed cash payments. By concealing the true nature of these deals, she caused significant financial harm to the affected parties.

Chief U.S. District Judge Randy Crane will impose sentencing March 3, 2025. At that time, Cantu faces up to 20 years in federal prison and a possible $250,000 maximum fine.

She was permitted to remain on bond pending that hearing.

The FBI, McAllen Police Department and Texas Department of Insurance conducted the investigation. Assistant U.S. Attorney Eric D. Flores is prosecuting the case.

MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Jacksonville Technology Architect Sentenced To More Than 12 Years For Attempting To Entice And Meet An 11-Year-Old To Engage In Sexual Activity

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

Jacksonville, Florida – Senior United States District Judge Timothy J. Corrigan has sentenced Amol Chandrashekhar Khedkar (59, Jacksonville) to 12 years and 6 months in federal prison for using his cellphone and the internet to attempt to entice an 11-year-old child to engage in sexual activity. Khedkar was also ordered to serve a 10-year term of supervised release and to register as a sex offender. Khedkar was working as an information technology architect for a financial institution when he was arrested on November 29, 2023, in St. Johns County. He has been detained since that time. Khedkar pleaded guilty on August 13, 2024.

According to court documents and evidence discussed in open court, on November 28, 2023, an undercover FBI agent (UC) in the Jacksonville area was conducting an online undercover operation to identify adults seeking to meet and engage in sexual activity with children. Posing as the parent of an 11-year-old child, the UC posted a notice in a public chat room of a particular online social messaging application (app). Minutes later, an individual using the app name “drbrownee,” who was subsequently identified as Khedkar, contacted the UC online by private message on the app. After being advised of the “child’s” age, Khedkar confirmed that he would “love to see [the ‘child’].” He asked the UC specific questions about access to the “child” and the “child’s” sexual experience, including “[d]oes she suck,” “[d]o you allow fondling?,” and “[w]hat do you charge?” Khedkar and the UC discussed meeting in person the next day at the “child’s” residence. Khedkar stated, “I’ll show up, … [t]hen you can invite me inside.”

On November 29, 2023, Khedkar and the UC exchanged text messages and arranged to meet at a location in St. Johns County. When Khedkar arrived at the location, he was arrested by FBI agents. During an interview with agents, Khedkar stated that his username was “drbrownee,” that he used his online account to communicate with the UC, and he had asked the UC about sexually abusing the “child.” Khedkar’s cellphone was seized incident to his arrest and a search of its contents revealed at least 25 online conversations between Khedkar and other individuals on the app discussing the sexual exploitation of children, as well as several photos depicting young children being sexually abused.

This case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the St. Johns County Sheriff’s Office. It was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney D. Rodney Brown.

It is another case brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative launched in 2006 by the Department of Justice to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse. Led by the United States Attorneys’ Offices and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to locate, apprehend, and prosecute individuals who sexually exploit children, and to identify and rescue child victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.justice.gov/psc.

MIL Security OSI –

January 27, 2025

Category: Intelligence

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