NewzIntel.com

Category: Intelligence

  • MIL-OSI Security: Nine Members of 36th and Penn “Big Sip” Drug Trafficking Organization Indicted on Fentanyl Conspiracy and Firearms Charges

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    MINNEAPOLIS – Nine defendants have been indicted on federal fentanyl and firearms charges for their involvement in the “Big Sip Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO)” — a violent drug trafficking organization that that sold out of at least five apartment buildings near the intersection of 36th Avenue North and North Penn Avenue in Minneapolis, announced Acting U.S. Attorney Joseph H. Thompson.

    “Today marks the federal takedown of yet another dangerous criminal organization. And we will not stop,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Joseph H. Thompson. “The Big Sip drug trafficking organization wreaked havoc at 36th and Penn, bringing guns, violence, and deadly fentanyl to neighborhood apartment buildings. The law abiding people of Minneapolis deserve better. I am proud of the federal, state, and local team that came together to protect the neighborhood from this fentanyl trafficking organization.”

    According to court documents,Larry McGee, 42, Danielle Robberstad, 35, Maurice Montgomery, 31, Dameon Collins, 24, Marcus Lucious, 53, Romell Vann, 22, Bobby Nolan, 43, and Jeremy Lucious, 35, all are members of a drug trafficking organization (“DTO”) known as the “Big Sip DTO,” a high-volume fentanyl sales operation that sold out of at least five apartment buildings near the intersection of 36th Avenue North and North Penn Avenue in Minneapolis. The Big Sip DTO’s operation contributed to crime in the area, including shootings, homicides, and drug use, from August 2023 through June 2025. The defendants were indicted for a Conspiracy to Distribute Fentanyl in violation of Title 21 United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1) and 846. Three defendants, Montgomery, Collins, and Vann, were also indicted for Possessing Firearms in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c).  Seven defendants made their initial appearnces today and are all detained pending further proceedings.  An eighth defendant will make his initial appearance tomorrow. A ninth defendant remains under seal.  The defendants all face up to life in prison.

    According to court documents, the Big Sip DTO originated in the summer of 2023, led and operated by defendants McGee and Robberstad, who are husband and wife. The Big Sip DTO was an efficient sales operation with defined roles. At the top, McGee led the organization. He obtained and stored the fentanyl product, collected proceeds, and managed other members of the organization. Robberstad was a co-leader of the organization. Robberstad maintained the apartments used for fentanyl storage and sales, interacted with customers, provided vehicles for use by the organization members, and managed other members’ sales.

    Defendants Montgomery, Collins, M. Lucious, Vann, Nolan, and J. Lucious were also members of the Big Sip DTO. These defendants all sold fentanyl on behalf of the organization to users at the apartments controlled by the Big Sip DTO. Montgomery was responsible for collecting and transporting the profits of the fentanyl sales to McGee. Montgomery, as well as Collins and Vann, all possessed firearms to protect their product and sale activities.

    “Time and again, violent drug trafficking rings try to take root in our communities, bringing with them illegal guns, violence, and fear,” said ATF Special Agent in Charge Travis Riddle, of the St. Paul Field Division. “As soon as these organizations surface, ATF, along with our law enforcement partners, will be there to dismantle their operations and hold them accountable. We will not allow armed criminal groups to threaten the safety and future of the Twin Cities.”

    “This operation disrupted a violent drug trafficking network that was funneling narcotics, including deadly fentanyl, to the streets,” said Special Agent in Charge Alvin M. Winston Sr. of FBI Minneapolis. “These drugs and the criminals who traffic them, bring death, sorrow, and fear to our communities.  As this coordinated operation demonstrates, those who poison and terrorize the public will face justice. The FBI and our partners will stop at nothing to pursue and apprehend these dangerous offenders and protect our communities.”

    “For too long, 36th and Penn has been a hotspot for violent crime,” said Chief O’Hara. “In 2024, there were four times as many shooting victims within a one block radius of 36th and Penn than the previous three-year average. Overall violent crime more than doubled within a one-block radius of 36th and Penn. We’ve seen the spike in violent crime and heard the concerns loud and clear from the community. Inspector Charlie Adams and the officers of the Fourth Precinct have been working closely with residents to address those concerns, while our investigators have pursued long-term strategies to bring relief. I’m incredibly grateful to the dedicated MPD personnel and to our local and federal partners who supported this investigation. I’m hopeful these arrests and charges will deliver an immediate impact and help restore a sense of safety for everyone who lives and works near 36th and Penn.”

    “These defendants are suspected of some of the worst crimes wreaking havoc on our community. I want to thank all law enforcement agencies for their work on this case including the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office Criminal Intelligence Division and Violent Offender Task Force. These units provided intelligence throughout the case, carried out search warrants, targeted traffic stops, K9 operations, and much more to bring down these defendants and damage the criminal organization. We must stop those harming our neighbors, friends, and family and part of that work includes stopping the source,” said Dawanna Witt, Sheriff of Hennepin County.

    This case is the result of an investigation conducted by the ATF, FBI, Minneapolis Police Department, and the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney William C. Mattessich is prosecuting the case.

    An indictment is merely an allegation, and the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law. 

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Las Vegas Jury Convicts Woman for Threats Against Two Federal Judges and Her Probation Officer; San Diego Trial Team Prosecuted the Case in the District of Nevada

    Source: US FBI

    LAS VEGAS – A federal jury has convicted Latonia Smith of cyberstalking and threatening two district court judges and a probation officer, all of whom were involved in her previous federal conviction for death threats she made against lawyers in yet another case.

    In the current case, after a six-day trial and less than one day of deliberation, a jury found that Smith threatened U.S. District Judge Richard Franklin Boulware, who presided over Smith’s 2021 trial and sentenced her to 36 months in prison for that offense. The jury also found that Smith targeted U.S. District Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey, who presided over the defendant’s supervised release, and Shawn Mummey, her probation officer.

    At the time of the grand jury’s indictment in the current matter, Smith was on supervised release from that previous federal 2021 conviction. In that case, Smith targeted corporate lawyers involved in defending the 2017 firing of her mother from her job as a guest room attendant at the Planet Hollywood Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas after she allegedly took a small amount of money from a guest’s room.

    “All of these victims felt threatened and emotionally distressed. They then took steps to protect themselves and their families,” said U.S. Attorney Adam Gordon for the Southern District of California. “Threats directed at members of the judiciary are not only criminal acts, but direct attacks on the rule of law. Intimidation of judges and court personnel erodes public trust and threatens the fair administration of justice for all.”

    “The FBI takes threats of violence very seriously and works diligently to protect the communities we serve,” said Rafik Mattar, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the FBI in Las Vegas, “We will not tolerate threats of violence to any member of our community, particularly those dedicated to safeguarding our democratic process. The defendant’s actions were dangerous and unacceptable. We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to disrupt and investigate those who engage in violent rhetoric—ensuring accountability for anyone who threatens to harass, intimidate, or harm others.”

    When Smith was released from federal prison in the first case against her, she was sent to Washoe County jail to face allegations related to an October 31, 2019, armed home-invasion in Reno she allegedly committed against another lawyer involved in the Planet Hollywood case.

    Smith was granted bail in early June 2022. Upon her return to Las Vegas, Smith immediately began searching Google for information about Judge Boulware along with his wife, Las Vegas City Councilwoman Nancy Brune, and their family. At the same time, she googled “judges should die.”

    Over the next several weeks, the defendant became increasingly frustrated with judges and anyone involved with her prior federal case. On June 23, 2022, the defendant emailed her probation officer and explained, “Some good advice: Life is short, society should be careful who they piss off.” Below the warning, the defendant sent a link to a YouTube video showing a six-minute compilation of cell phone videos from the October 1 mass shooting at the Mandalay Bay Hotel.

    Over the next few days, Smith sent a series of emails. Some threatened a mass casualty event: “LET THE SHOW BEGIN. NEVADA IS GOING TO LOVE THIS!!!!”  Some were designed to let victims know their loved ones were in jeopardy: “LETS KEEP [YOUR KIDS] IN FOCUS”.

    Throughout many of the emails, the defendant made it clear that she had deeply researched the recipients of her threats, accurately identifying where they could be found, either during hobby activities, or in their actual homes. For example, to Judge Jennifer Dorsey the defendant wrote: “Tell Jennifer, Henderson is nice I see why she chose that area. Lots of shops nearby. Smart.” At trial, Judge Dorsey testified that the defendant’s identification of her personal residence inspired her to immediately sell her home and move.

    The victims of Smith’s threats testified at trial they were frightened and believed Smith was capable of violently acting on her threats as she had allegedly done in the pending case regarding the armed home invasion targeting the lawyer in Reno.

    U.S. District Judge Gloria Navarro reported Smith’s threats to U.S. Marshals, who protect the federal judiciary. Judge Navarro testified at the trial, telling the jury that she recognized the danger posed by the defendant and immediately took action.  “I emailed the chief of probation; anybody I could get a hold of to prevent a tragedy…I didn’t want to die. I didn’t want my family to die.  I didn’t want my coworkers to die.” The Marshals then contacted the FBI.

    After two special agents from the FBI interviewed the Smith on June 27, 2022, she was immediately taken into custody, where she has remained. During the interview, when asked what she was thinking about when she was researching mass shooters, Smith responded: “I think what they were thinking.”

    The investigation found that Smith, who has a biochemistry degree from the University of Nevada Las Vegas, Googled phrases like “judges die,” “how to become a bomb maker,” “how to be a mass shooter,” “buying a gun,” and “ar 15 for sale.” She also watched the compilation of videos from the October 1 mass shooting 13 times over a three-week period.  At the same time, the defendant repeatedly searched the names of her targets, some of their children, and some of their home addresses. The jury deliberated for less than a day before returning a guilty verdict on three counts of cyberstalking for the emails sent to Judges Dorsey and Boulware, along with her probation officer. The jury acquitted the defendant on the other two counts of cyberstalking.

    The defendant will remain in custody pending sentencing, on a date yet to be determined.

    The trial took place in the federal courthouse in Las Vegas. The presiding judge was Senior District Court Judge Michael W. Mosman, from the District of Oregon. Judge Mosman was appointed to preside over the case by special designation of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

    Smith’s prosecution was initiated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Nevada, out of their office in Reno.  In March 2024, the Department of Justice recused the entire U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Nevada and had the prosecution reassigned.

    This case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Andrew Haden and Francisco Nagel for the Southern District of California, both of whom were named Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys in Las Vegas after the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Nevada was recused.

    DEFENDANT                                                Case Number 22CR051-MWM                              

    Latonia Dyshawna Smith                               Age: 31                       Las Vegas, NV

    SUMMARY OF CHARGES

    Three Counts of Cyberstalking – Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 2261A

    Maximum penalty: Five years in prison, as to each count of conviction

    INVESTIGATING AGENCIES

    Federal Bureau of Investigation

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: The quest for cheaper and faster cross-border payments: regional and global solutions

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

    Basel, 27 June 2025

    Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.

    First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.

    Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.

    This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).

    Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.

    The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

    Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.

    Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]

    Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]

    Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]

    Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

    This raises three pressing issues.

    First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.

    Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.

    Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]

    Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.

    Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

    To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.

    At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.

    Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

    At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.

    Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.

    The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.

    The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.

    We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.

    A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]

    Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.

    Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

    This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.

    Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.

    This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.

    Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]

    We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

    In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.

    One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]

    We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].

    Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.

    However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.

    In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.

    In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]

    Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.

    I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?

    First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.

    Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.

    Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.

    Thank you for your attention.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: The quest for cheaper and faster cross-border payments: regional and global solutions

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

    Basel, 27 June 2025

    Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.

    First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.

    Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.

    This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).

    Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.

    The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

    Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.

    Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]

    Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]

    Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]

    Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

    This raises three pressing issues.

    First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.

    Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.

    Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]

    Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.

    Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

    To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.

    At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.

    Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

    At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.

    Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.

    The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.

    The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.

    We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.

    A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]

    Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.

    Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

    This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.

    Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.

    This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.

    Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]

    We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

    In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.

    One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]

    We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].

    Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.

    However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.

    In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.

    In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]

    Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.

    I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?

    First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.

    Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.

    Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.

    Thank you for your attention.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: The quest for cheaper and faster cross-border payments: regional and global solutions

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

    Basel, 27 June 2025

    Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.

    First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.

    Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.

    This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).

    Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.

    The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

    Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.

    Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]

    Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]

    Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]

    Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

    This raises three pressing issues.

    First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.

    Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.

    Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]

    Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.

    Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

    To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.

    At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.

    Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

    At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.

    Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.

    The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.

    The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.

    We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.

    A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]

    Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.

    Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

    This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.

    Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.

    This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.

    Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]

    We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

    In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.

    One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]

    We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].

    Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.

    However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.

    In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.

    In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]

    Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.

    I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?

    First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.

    Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.

    Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.

    Thank you for your attention.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: The quest for cheaper and faster cross-border payments: regional and global solutions

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

    Basel, 27 June 2025

    Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.

    First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.

    Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.

    This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).

    Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.

    The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

    Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.

    Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]

    Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]

    Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]

    Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

    This raises three pressing issues.

    First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.

    Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.

    Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]

    Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.

    Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

    To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.

    At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.

    Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

    At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.

    Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.

    The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.

    The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.

    We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.

    A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]

    Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.

    Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

    This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.

    Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.

    This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.

    Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]

    We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

    In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.

    One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]

    We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].

    Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.

    However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.

    In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.

    In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]

    Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.

    I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?

    First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.

    Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.

    Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.

    Thank you for your attention.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Attorney General Bonta Joins Law Enforcement Partners Announcing Results of Operation Targeting Organized Criminal Activity in the Central Valley

    Source: US State of California Department of Justice

    FRESNO – California Attorney General Rob Bonta today announced the results of a collaborative multiagency effort targeting criminal street gangs in the Central Valley. As part of the operation yesterday, federal, state, and local law enforcement served 54 search warrants in locations throughout the Central Valley. As part of the operation, investigators prevented nine violent crimes, made 89 felony arrests, seized firearms, ammunition, and illicit methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine. 

    “Today, we are sending a strong message that organized criminal enterprises cannot stand up to the power of good law enforcement work,” said Attorney General Rob Bonta. “Together with our federal, state, and local partners, we’ve made our communities safer by taking dangerous drugs and weapons off our streets and holding bad actors accountable. I thank our DOJ agents and our law enforcement partners for their dedication and tireless work to make California safer. Their efforts here not only held accountable members of organized criminal organizations, but also prevented violent crimes from occurring. Central Valley families can live and sleep with greater peace of mind as a result of this operation.”

    “Today’s announcement reflects our Office’s commitment to using every available resource in close coordination with our law enforcement partners to address the root causes of crime and hold gang members and their associates accountable,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Michele Beckwith. “Criminal street gangs inflict real harm on our communities by trafficking deadly drugs and firearms that destroy lives and neighborhoods. I commend the outstanding work of our agents and law enforcement partners in disrupting these criminal networks and safeguarding our communities.”

    “The charges reflect the brazen violence and drug trafficking that have threatened the safety and stability of the greater Fresno area, particularly in rural communities like Huron and Coalinga,” said Special Agent in Charge Sid Patel of the FBI Sacramento Field Office. “Yesterday’s operation was the culmination of months of collaborative work to disrupt gang-driven violence and the flow of drugs and firearms into Central Valley neighborhoods. This case highlights the power of strong partnerships at every level of law enforcement, all united in the mission to dismantle violent gangs and protect the communities we serve.”

    “The collective work done by all law enforcement agencies in this operation will undoubtedly improve the safety and overall quality of life for residents in Fresno County, particularly those living in our smaller rural communities,” said Fresno County Sheriff John Zanoni.

    This investigation was a cooperative effort between the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Fresno County Multi-Agency Gang Enforcement Consortium (MAGEC), California Department of Justice (CA DOJ) Special Operations Unit, U.S Attorney’s Office, and the Fresno County District Attorney’s Office.

    In February 2024, law enforcement agencies began an investigation into a criminal street gang operating in Fresno County with a specific focus on the ongoing criminal activities of criminal street gangs in the cities of Huron, Coalinga, and San Joaquin. The investigation found, and the unsealed federal criminal complaint alleges, an extensive criminal conspiracy in which gang members and associates — some of whom were inmates in California prisons and the Fresno County Jail — orchestrated various crimes, including drug and firearms trafficking. On several occasions, members of the drug trafficking conspiracy attempted to smuggle drugs into jails on their persons or through holes they punctured in the walls. Thirty-eight suspects have been charged in a federal criminal complaint on various drug and firearms trafficking charges. 

    Assistance was provided by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Homeland Security Investigations, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Marshals Service, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, California Highway Patrol, Fresno County Sheriff’s Office, Kings County Sheriff’s Office, Madera County Regional SWAT, and the Fresno, Clovis, Kingsburg, Coalinga, Kerman, Firebaugh, Lemoore, and Parlier police departments.

    CA DOJ’s Special Operations Unit is a collaborative investigative effort between CA DOJ and the California Highway Patrol that provides statewide enforcement for combating violent career criminals, gangs, and organized crime groups. These unique and essential teams use advanced investigative techniques and work alongside local law enforcement to enhance investigations into violent criminals and organized crime throughout the state.

    It is important to note that criminal charges must be proven in a court of law. Every defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Maryland Man Convicted of Two Convenience Store Robberies and Money Laundering

    Source: US FBI

    A man who was previously convicted of robbing the Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust on Council Street in Cedar Rapids on January 3, 2024, pled guilty to additional charges today in federal court in Cedar Rapids.

    Andrew Philip Derr, age 22, from Fredrick, Maryland, was convicted of Two Convenience Store Robberies and Money Laundering.

    In a plea agreement, Derr admitted that after being discharged from the military for misconduct in 2023, he moved to Iowa City and conducted a series of robberies in the Cedar Rapids, Iowa, area.  Derr admitted that on December 27, 2023, he robbed the Casey’s General Store in Robins, Iowa, and obtained over $7,000 in cash. Derr admitted that on January 1, 2024, he robbed the Kum & Go store on Four Oaks Drive in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.  Derr was previously convicted and sentenced for robbing the Cedar Rapids Bank and Trust branch on Council Street in Cedar Rapids on January 3, 2024, in which he obtained over $16,000 in cash.  Derr admitted that after each robbery he laundered the stolen funds by making multiple deposits into his Maryland Bank account to disguise the nature, source of ownership of the funds.  Ultimately on January 3, 2024, Derr flew to Maryland, and subsequently made two deposits of robbery proceeds totaling more than $4,800.  When the United States Marshals Service tried to arrest Derr at his Iowa City, Iowa, apartment, they found a note stating, “Catch me if you can.” On January 12, 2024, Derr turned himself into Orleans Parish, Louisiana, Sheriff’s Office.  

    Sentencing before United States District Court Chief Judge C.J. Williams will be set after a presentence report is prepared.  Derr remains in custody of the United States Marshal pending sentencing.  Derr faces a possible maximum sentence of 60 years’ imprisonment, a $1,000,000 fine, and 3 years of supervised release following any imprisonment.  Additionally, Derr must forfeit the stolen funds from the convenience store robberies and the money that he laundered and will be required to pay restitution to the victims of his crimes.

    The case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Patrick J. Reinert and was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, the United States Marshals Service’s Northern Iowa Fugitive Task Force, the Cedar Rapids Police Department, Robins Police Department, Linn County Attorney’s Office, the University of Iowa Police Department and the Orleans Parish, Louisiana, Sheriff’s Office.  

    Court file information at https://ecf.iand.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl.

    The case file number is 24-CR-00105

    Follow us on X @USAO_NDIA.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Smuggling Leader and Top Coordinator Will Spend Remainder of Their Lives in Prison Following Their Sentencing on Third Anniversary of Deadly Tractor-Trailer Smuggling Conspiracy

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    Two convicted human smugglers were sentenced in a federal court in San Antonio today for their prominent roles in the 2022 mass casualty human smuggling conspiracy that resulted in the deaths of 47 adults and six children.

    U.S. District Judge Orlando Garcia for the Western District of Texas sentenced Orduna-Torres to life in prison and a $250,000 fine, and Gonzales-Ortega to 83 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. Both defendants were found guilty by a federal jury in March for three counts related to the transportation of aliens within the United States resulting in death, causing serious bodily injury, and placing lives in jeopardy. Following the jury’s verdict at the trial, Judge Garcia set the sentencing date, noting that it would be three years to the day from when the 53 migrants perished as a result of the defendants’ smuggling scheme.

    “These criminals will spend the rest of their lives in prison because of their cruel choice to profit off of human suffering,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “Today’s sentences are a powerful message to human smugglers everywhere: we will not rest until you are behind bars.”

    “Three years to the day after these two smugglers and their co-conspirators left dozens of men, women, and children locked in a sweltering tractor-trailer to die in the Texas summer heat, they learned that they will spend the rest of their lives locked away in a federal prison,” said U.S. Attorney Justin R. Simmons for the Western District of Texas. “We recognize the justice handed down by Judge Garcia and thank our law enforcement partners for their great work that led to today’s outcome. At the same time, we reinforce the message that these criminal organizations will not place the lives of the desperate and vulnerable above their own financial enrichment. My office remains focused on prosecuting smugglers and their networks, and ultimately eradicating transnational criminal organizations.”

    “Today’s sentences are the result of a far-reaching investigation and a tireless commitment by HSI and our law enforcement partners to dismantle the deadliest human smuggling operation in U.S. history,” said Special Agent in Charge Craig Larrabee for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) San Antonio. “This case serves as a stark reminder: human smuggling is not a service — it is a deadly criminal enterprise. HSI will pursue smugglers relentlessly, wherever they operate. No one, who participates in the smuggling of human beings, will escape the reach of justice.”

    According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, Felipe Orduna-Torres, also known as Cholo, Chuequito/Chuekito, and Negro, 30, was a leader and organizer, and Armando Gonzales-Ortega, also known as El Don and Don Gon, 55, was a coordinator in the human smuggling organization (HSO) which illegally brought adults and children from Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico into the United States between December 2021 and June 2022.

    Court documents and evidence presented at the trial revealed that Orduna-Torres and Gonzales-Ortega worked in concert to transport and facilitate the transportation of the migrants, sharing routes, guides, stash houses, trucks, trailers, and transporters in order to consolidate costs, minimize risks, and maximize profit. The HSO maintained a variety of tractors and trailers for their smuggling operations, some of which were stored at a private parking lot in San Antonio.

    In the days leading up to June 27, 2022, Orduna-Torres and others exchanged the names of illegal aliens who would be smuggled in an upcoming tractor-trailer load. Gonzales-Ortega traveled to Laredo to meet the tractor-trailer, where at least 64 undocumented individuals, including eight children and one pregnant woman, were loaded for smuggling.

    Some of the defendants, including Orduna-Torres, were aware that the trailer’s reefer unit was malfunctioning and was not blowing any cool air to the migrants inside. When members of the organization met the tractor-trailer at the end of its approximately three-hour journey to San Antonio, they opened the doors to find 48 of the migrants were either already dead or had died on site, including the pregnant woman. Sixteen of the undocumented individuals were transported to hospitals — five of whom died.

    In addition to their sentences described above, the court also ordered Orduna-Torres to pay a $96,000 money judgment and ordered the forfeiture of the following assets: one 2008 Volvo semi-tractor; one 1995 Phoenix trailer; one 2015 Cadillac Escalade; one 2017 Ford F-350 Super Duty Truck; and $59,445.50.

    Five other defendants in this case have pleaded guilty for their involvement in the smuggling event. Riley Covarrubias-Ponce, also known as Rrili and Rilay, 32, is scheduled to be sentenced Nov. 6; Luis Alberto Rivera-Leal, 39, is scheduled to be sentenced on Nov. 13; Christian Martinez, 31, is scheduled to be sentenced on Nov. 20; and Homero Zamorano Jr., 48, is scheduled to be sentenced Dec. 4. Juan Francisco D’Luna Bilbao, 51, is indicted separately and is also scheduled to be sentenced Dec. 4.

    In a related case, Rigoberto Ramon Miranda-Orozco, 48, allegedly worked with the HSO to smuggle aliens into the United States on the same fatal journey orchestrated by Orduna-Torres and his co-conspirators. He made his initial appearance in San Antonio on March 17, seven months after he was arrested in Guatemala, and is currently scheduled for a jury trial Sept. 29.

    HSI investigated the case with the assistance of the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and has received tremendous support from Customs and Border Protection; Border Patrol; ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations; the San Antonio Police Department; the Bexar County Sheriff’s Office; the San Antonio Fire Department; the Marshall Police Department; and the Palestine Police Department.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eric Fuchs, Sarah Spears and Ray Gattinella for the Western District of Texas are prosecuting the case.

    These convictions are the result of the coordinated efforts of Joint Task Force Alpha (JTFA). JTFA, a partnership with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has been elevated and expanded by the Attorney General with a mandate to target cartels and other transnational criminal organizations to eliminate human smuggling and trafficking networks operating in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, and Colombia that impact public safety and the security of our borders. JTFA currently comprises detailees from U.S. Attorneys’ Offices along the southwest border. Dedicated support is provided by numerous components of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, led by the Human Rights and Special Prosecutions Section and supported by the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section; Office of Enforcement Operations; and the Office of International Affairs, among others. JTFA also relies on substantial law enforcement investment from DHS, FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and other partners. To date, JTFA’s work has resulted in more than 385 domestic and international arrests of leaders, organizers, and significant facilitators of alien smuggling; more than 345 U.S. convictions; more than 300 significant jail sentences imposed; and forfeitures of substantial assets.

    This case is part of Operation Take Back America, a nationwide initiative that marshals the full resources of the Department of Justice to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve the total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations, and protect our communities from the perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN).

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Pipe Bomber Found Guilty of Blowing Up ATM

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    ATLANTA – Abdurrahim Jalal has been convicted of blowing up a bank automated teller machine and possessing illegal explosive devices.

    “Criminals who use dangerous explosives to commit crimes will face federal prosecution to the fullest extent of the law,” said U.S. Attorney Theodore S. Hertzberg. “We will not tolerate conduct that puts innocent lives at risk or threatens the safety and stability of our communities.”

    “Jalal put his own greed ahead of the safety of our community. The FBI will use every resource available to find anyone who would go to the extreme use of a bomb to illegally obtain money,” said FBI Atlanta Special Agent in Charge Paul Brown.

    “The use of explosives in criminal activities poses an immense threat to public safety, and we will continue to work diligently to ensure that those who engage in such acts are brought to justice,” said ATF Assistant Special Agent in Charge Beau Kolodka.

    According to U.S. Attorney Hertzberg, the charges, and other information presented in court: Abdurrahim Jalal was convicted of bank theft, use of an explosive to commit a felony, arson, and two counts of possession of an unregistered destructive device following a bench trial on June 23, 2025. The evidence at trial revealed that on March 29, 2023, Jalal used a pipe bomb to blow up an ATM in Decatur, Georgia. Jalal took approximately $88,000 from the vault of the machine after the explosion. Investigators identified Jalal and obtained a warrant to search his home, during which they recovered additional pipe bombs. 

    Sentencing for Abdurrahim Jalal, 54, of DeKalb County, Georgia, is scheduled for September 22, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. before U.S. District Judge Michael L. Brown.  Jalal faces a mandatory minimum of 15 years and up to 60 years of imprisonment followed by up to three years of supervised release. In determining Jalal’s actual sentence, the court will consider the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which are not binding but provide appropriate sentencing ranges for most offenders.

    This case is being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, DeKalb County Police Department, and DeKalb County Fire Rescue Department.

    Assistant United States Attorney Dash A. Cooper is prosecuting the case.

    For further information please contact the U.S. Attorney’s Public Affairs Office at USAGAN.PressEmails@usdoj.gov or (404) 581-6185. The Internet address for the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Georgia is http://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Stockton Man Charged with Attempting to Provide Material Support to the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham

    Source: US FBI

    SACRAMENTO, Calif. — Ammaad Akhtar, 33, of Stockton, was arrested today and charged by complaint with attempting to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, Acting U.S. Attorney Michele Beckwith announced.

    According to court documents, since February 2025, Akhtar has been communicating online with a law enforcement-controlled individual, whom Akhtar believed was a member of ISIS. In these conversations, Akhtar voiced his support for ISIS and jihad, expressed a desire to travel overseas to join and fight with ISIS, and stated a desire to send guns and money to ISIS.

    In April 2025, during this investigation, Akhtar demonstrated a desire to provide support of ISIS and did so by providing financial funding on multiple occasions. After a few payments, the law enforcement-controlled individual indicated that ISIS had procured several guns with the money Akhtar had sent. In his response, Akhtar said, “may Allah destroy our enemies” and affirmed that he will send more money that same day.

    Akhtar also talked about planning acts of violence, including conducting an attack against a specific individual and an attack utilizing homemade explosives. He said he “want[s] to die in the cause of Allah fighting the kuffar [infidels]” and asked for instructions on how to make a homemade explosive device in order “to make a boom” at a populated event.

    Then, on June 23, 2025, Akhtar met with an individual he believed was an ISIS associate, but who was actually an undercover employee. Akhtar provided clothing, binoculars, $400 cash, two loaded guns, and six additional magazines. Akhtar then swore bayat (a pledge of loyalty) to ISIS.

    This case is the product of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation Field Offices in New York and Sacramento and the New York City Police Department. Assistant U.S. Attorney Elliot Wong and Trial Attorney Ryan D. White of the National Security Division are prosecuting the case.

    If convicted, Akhtar faces a maximum statutory penalty of 20 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. Any sentence, however, would be determined at the discretion of the court after consideration of any applicable statutory factors and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which take into account a number of variables. The charges are only allegations; the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Airline Employee Sentenced to More Than 12 Years for Attempted Coercion, Enticement of a Minor, and Possession of Child Sexual Abuse Material

    Source: US FBI

    Tampa, Florida – U.S. District Judge Mary S. Scriven has sentenced Brian Walker (52, Bradenton) to 12 years and 7 months in federal prison, followed by 20 years of supervised release, for attempted coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity and possession of child sexual abuse material. Walker pled guilty on March 25, 2025.

    According to court documents, Walker contacted a 12-year-old female living in his community over a social media application. The FBI took over the minor’s social media account and engaged in chats with Walker in an undercover capacity. Walker engaged in sexual conversations with the undercover agent, whom he believed to be the 12-year-old female, and attempted to coerce and entice her to engage in sexual activity. Within the conversations, Walker shared his attraction to 12-year-old females and expressed his desire to meet in person.

    On June 24, 2024, Walker travelled to meet the minor in person at the community pool and was arrested at the scene. Law enforcement seized a cell phone from Walker and located hundreds of images and videos of minors, including those under the age of 12 years, engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

    This case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Courtney Derry.

    This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse. Led by United States Attorneys’ Offices and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS), Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to locate, apprehend, and prosecute individuals who sexually exploit children, and to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.projectsafechildhood.gov.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Newcomb Man Charged with Assault for Violent Attack

    Source: US FBI

    ALBUQUERQUE – A Newcomb man is facing federal charges after a violent altercation left a victim with serious injuries.

    According to court documents, on June 14, 2025, Vincent Torrez, 35, an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation, assaulted John Doe at a residence on the Navajo Nation. During the incident, Torrez entered John Doe’s bedroom, repeatedly struck him, slammed him to the floor, and used a ceramic cup as a weapon to inflict a deep laceration to John Doe’s leg. John Doe sustained multiple injuries, including lacerations to the head and leg, abrasions, and an arterial wound, and was transported to Northern Navajo Medical Center for treatment.

    Torrez is charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury and will remain on conditions of release pending trial, which has not yet been scheduled. If convicted of the current charges, Torrez faces up to 10 years in prison.

    U.S. Attorney Ryan Ellison and Philip Russell, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Albuquerque Field Office made the announcement today.

    The Farmington Resident Agency of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Albuquerque Field Office investigated this case with assistance from the Navajo Nation Police Department and Navajo Department of Criminal Investigations. Assistant U.S. Attorney Meg Tomlinson is prosecuting the case.

    A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Terra Amarilla Man Faces Federal Charges for Illegal Firearm Possession

    Source: US FBI

    ALBUQUERQUE – A Terra Amarilla man has been federally charged for unlawful possession of a firearm despite prior felony convictions.

    According to court documents, on May 31, 2025, the Jicarilla Apache Police Department responded to a domestic disturbance involving Ronnie Martinez, 49, at a residence in Dulce, New Mexico. According to the investigation, Martinez became agitated after a dispute with Jane Doe and subsequently sent her threatening messages, including a photograph of a rifle.

    Officers located Martinez at the residence, where he was found carrying multiple knives. During questioning, Martinez admitted to possessing a rifle, which he claimed belonged to his father. Martinez consented to a search, and officers recovered a rifle from the home.

    Court records confirm Martinez has prior felony convictions, including first-degree assault with a deadly weapon and second-degree assault, both punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. As a previously convicted felon, Martinez is prohibited from possessing firearms or ammunition.

    Martinez will remain on conditions of release pending trial, which has not yet been scheduled. If convicted of the current charges, Martinez faces up to 15 years in prison.

    U.S. Attorney Ryan Ellison and Philip Russell, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Albuquerque Field Office made the announcement today.

    The Farmington Resident Agency of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Albuquerque Field Office investigated this case with assistance from the Jicarilla Apache Police Department. Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Pahl is prosecuting the case.

    A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Jury Convicts Taos Man in 2019 Double Homicide

    Source: US FBI

    ALBUQUERQUE – A federal jury convicted a Taos man of two counts of second-degree murder in connection with the June 2019 killings of two members of the Taos Pueblo. The verdict came after an eight-day trial and approximately six hours of deliberation.

    According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, on June 1, 2019, John Doe 1 and John Doe 2, both enrolled members of the Taos Pueblo, were reported missing after their last known contact on May 30, 2019. Taos Pueblo Department of Public Safety officers responded to John Doe 1’s residence, where they discovered John Doe 2’s pickup truck crashed into trees near the home. Officers entered the residence and found the bodies of both men, stacked and partially concealed under wire fencing. Forensic experts confirmed both victims died from extensive blunt force trauma. Investigators documented evidence from both inside and outside the residence, including large amounts of blood spatter, vehicle tracks, and property damage.

    The investigation tied Joshua Gonzales, 38, a non-Indian, to the murders. After the murders, Gonzales confessed to a witness, providing a detailed account of the killings, including that he used a wooden table leg as the murder weapon and describing the injuries he inflicted, details that matched the forensic findings. The victim’s niece testified that he was the last person seen with John Doe 1 and recounted how he attempted to manufacture a false alibi and threatened her to remain silent. She also testified that Gonzales had a key to the residence, which could only be locked from the outside.

    Additional evidence included bloody footprints at the scene, DNA analysis, surveillance video and cell phone records.  Investigators established a timeline placing Gonzales at the scene and showed that he possessed one of the victim’s cell phones the morning after the murders. Further, Gonzales fled the scene in John Doe 2’s truck, which he crashed while attempting to leave the area.

    Following the verdict, the Court ordered that Gonzales remain in custody pending sentencing, which has not been scheduled. At sentencing, Gonzales faces up to life in prison.

    There is no parole in the federal system.

    U.S. Attorney Ryan Ellison and Philip Russell, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Albuquerque Field Office, made the announcement today.

    The Santa Fe Resident Agency of the FBI Albuquerque Field Office investigated this case with assistance from the Taos Pueblo Department of Public Safety, Bureau of Indian Affairs, New Mexico State Police, Espanola Police Department, Taos Police Department, Taos County Sheriff’s Department, and the Albuquerque Police Department. Assistant United States Attorneys Mark Probasco and Samuel Hurtado are prosecuting the case.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Waterbury Drug Trafficker Sentenced to More Than 17 Years in Federal Prison

    Source: US FBI

    David X. Sullivan, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, announced that DANIEL DIAZ-RIVERA, also known as “Danny,” “Lupin,” “Lupito,” and “L,” 33, of Waterbury, was sentenced today by U.S. District Judge Michael P. Shea in Hartford to 210 months of imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release, for heading a Waterbury drug trafficking organization.

    According to court documents and statements made in court, the FBI’s Waterbury Safe Streets Gang Task Force and other law enforcement agencies investigated two drug trafficking organizations based in the city of Waterbury.  One organization was headed by Angel Quiros, also known as “Papa John,” and operated in the area of William Street, and the other was headed by Diaz-Rivera and operated in the area of Maple Avenue.  The investigation, which included court-authorized wiretaps on multiple phones, video surveillance, GPS tracking of vehicles, and numerous controlled purchases of narcotics, revealed that the two organizations distributed cocaine, crack, and fentanyl through a network of sellers.  The organizations shared sources of supply and worked together to further their operations.

    The Diaz-Rivera organization sold crack and fentanyl all hours of the day and night outside of a bodega on Maple Avenue in Waterbury.  Diaz-Rivera oversaw several shift bosses who, in turn, oversaw street-level distributors.  During the investigation, investigators made two controlled purchases of crack directly from Diaz-Rivera.  Diaz-Rivera used violence and threats to control others in connection with his drug distribution network.

    Quiros, Diaz-Rivera, and 15 other individuals were charged with federal offenses as a result of the investigation.  Diaz-Rivera and several codefendants were arrested on November 29, 2023.  In association with the arrests, investigators executed multiple search warrants and seized approximately 700 grams of crack cocaine, more than 900 vials (“caps”) of crack, approximately 200 grams of loose fentanyl, more than 1,600 dose bags of fentanyl/heroin, two stolen firearms, numerous rounds of ammunition, and more than $39,000 in cash, including more than $13,000 that was found in Diaz-Rivera’s vehicle.

    On January 24, 2025, Diaz-Rivera pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine.  He has been detained since his arrest.

    Quiros pleaded guilty to the same charge on February 11, 2025, and awaits sentencing.

    The FBI’s Waterbury Safe Streets Gang Task includes members from the FBI, the Waterbury Police Department, the Naugatuck Police Department, and the Connecticut Department of Correction.  The DEA, U.S. Marshals Service, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Connecticut State Police, Wolcott Police Department, and Meriden Police Department have assisted the investigation.

    This case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Natasha Freismuth and Shan Patel through the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) Program.  Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.

    U.S. Attorney Sullivan thanked the Waterbury State Attorney’s Office for its cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of this case.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Waterbury Drug Trafficker Sentenced to More Than 17 Years in Federal Prison

    Source: US FBI

    David X. Sullivan, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, announced that DANIEL DIAZ-RIVERA, also known as “Danny,” “Lupin,” “Lupito,” and “L,” 33, of Waterbury, was sentenced today by U.S. District Judge Michael P. Shea in Hartford to 210 months of imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release, for heading a Waterbury drug trafficking organization.

    According to court documents and statements made in court, the FBI’s Waterbury Safe Streets Gang Task Force and other law enforcement agencies investigated two drug trafficking organizations based in the city of Waterbury.  One organization was headed by Angel Quiros, also known as “Papa John,” and operated in the area of William Street, and the other was headed by Diaz-Rivera and operated in the area of Maple Avenue.  The investigation, which included court-authorized wiretaps on multiple phones, video surveillance, GPS tracking of vehicles, and numerous controlled purchases of narcotics, revealed that the two organizations distributed cocaine, crack, and fentanyl through a network of sellers.  The organizations shared sources of supply and worked together to further their operations.

    The Diaz-Rivera organization sold crack and fentanyl all hours of the day and night outside of a bodega on Maple Avenue in Waterbury.  Diaz-Rivera oversaw several shift bosses who, in turn, oversaw street-level distributors.  During the investigation, investigators made two controlled purchases of crack directly from Diaz-Rivera.  Diaz-Rivera used violence and threats to control others in connection with his drug distribution network.

    Quiros, Diaz-Rivera, and 15 other individuals were charged with federal offenses as a result of the investigation.  Diaz-Rivera and several codefendants were arrested on November 29, 2023.  In association with the arrests, investigators executed multiple search warrants and seized approximately 700 grams of crack cocaine, more than 900 vials (“caps”) of crack, approximately 200 grams of loose fentanyl, more than 1,600 dose bags of fentanyl/heroin, two stolen firearms, numerous rounds of ammunition, and more than $39,000 in cash, including more than $13,000 that was found in Diaz-Rivera’s vehicle.

    On January 24, 2025, Diaz-Rivera pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine.  He has been detained since his arrest.

    Quiros pleaded guilty to the same charge on February 11, 2025, and awaits sentencing.

    The FBI’s Waterbury Safe Streets Gang Task includes members from the FBI, the Waterbury Police Department, the Naugatuck Police Department, and the Connecticut Department of Correction.  The DEA, U.S. Marshals Service, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Connecticut State Police, Wolcott Police Department, and Meriden Police Department have assisted the investigation.

    This case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Natasha Freismuth and Shan Patel through the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) Program.  Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.

    U.S. Attorney Sullivan thanked the Waterbury State Attorney’s Office for its cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of this case.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Kansas City Man Pleads Guilty for Computer Hacking

    Source: US FBI

    KANSAS CITY, Mo. – A Kansas City, Mo., man has pleaded guilty for hacking into the computer system at an area nonprofit.

    Nicholas Michael Kloster, 32, admitted during his plea that he caused reckless damage to a protected computer owned by an area nonprofit during unauthorized access. Kloster admitted that he entered the premises of a nonprofit corporation on May 20, 2024. Kloster entered an area that is not available to the public and accessed a computer with access to the company’s network.

    Kloster specifically admitted that he utilized a boot disk to access the computer through multiple user accounts. By accessing the computer in this manner, Kloster was able to circumvent the password requirements by changing the password assigned to one or more users. Kloster was then able to install a virtual private network on this computer. Since Kloster’s intrusion into its computer and its network, the company has sustained significant losses in an attempt to remediate the effects from this intrusion.

    Under federal statutes, Kloster is subject to a sentence of up to five years’ imprisonment in federal prison without parole, a fine of up to $250,000, up to three years of supervised release, and an order of restitution. The maximum statutory sentence is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for informational purposes, as the sentencing of the defendant will be determined by the court based on the advisory sentencing guidelines and other statutory factors. A sentencing hearing will be scheduled after the completion of a presentence investigation by the United States Probation Office.

    This case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Nicholas Heberle and Patrick D. Daly. It was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Missouri Man Admits Trying to Meet Teen for Sex

    Source: US FBI

    ST. LOUIS – A man from Jefferson County, Missouri on Tuesday admitted trying to meet a 16-year-old to engage in sexual activity.

    Anthony Justin Snelson, 39, of Arnold, Missouri, pleaded guilty to one count of attempted receipt of child pornography. He admitted engaging in an inappropriate conversation via TikTok with a teen. After the victim’s mother discovered the conversation, she took it over and began impersonating the victim. She later had her daughter call Snelson, who requested a nude photo and asked if the victim wanted to meet and “mess around,” Snelson’s plea says. The mother called the St. Louis County Police Department on Aug. 12, 2024, after a meeting had been arranged, and officers arrested Snelson when he arrived. He admitted in an interview with police that the reason he met with the teen was “to maybe mess around,” his plea says.

    Snelson is scheduled to be sentenced on September 30. The charge carries a mandatory minimum prison term of five years, and a maximum of 20 years.

    The St. Louis County Police Department and the FBI investigated the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Colleen Lang is prosecuting the case.

    This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice. Led by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and the Department of Justice Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state and local resources to better locate, apprehend and prosecute individuals who exploit children via the Internet, as well as to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.justice.gov/psc.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Missouri Man Admits Trying to Meet Teen for Sex

    Source: US FBI

    ST. LOUIS – A man from Jefferson County, Missouri on Tuesday admitted trying to meet a 16-year-old to engage in sexual activity.

    Anthony Justin Snelson, 39, of Arnold, Missouri, pleaded guilty to one count of attempted receipt of child pornography. He admitted engaging in an inappropriate conversation via TikTok with a teen. After the victim’s mother discovered the conversation, she took it over and began impersonating the victim. She later had her daughter call Snelson, who requested a nude photo and asked if the victim wanted to meet and “mess around,” Snelson’s plea says. The mother called the St. Louis County Police Department on Aug. 12, 2024, after a meeting had been arranged, and officers arrested Snelson when he arrived. He admitted in an interview with police that the reason he met with the teen was “to maybe mess around,” his plea says.

    Snelson is scheduled to be sentenced on September 30. The charge carries a mandatory minimum prison term of five years, and a maximum of 20 years.

    The St. Louis County Police Department and the FBI investigated the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Colleen Lang is prosecuting the case.

    This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice. Led by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and the Department of Justice Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state and local resources to better locate, apprehend and prosecute individuals who exploit children via the Internet, as well as to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.justice.gov/psc.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Kelly to hold telephone town hall to help Pennsylvanians fight fraud, stop scams

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Mike Kelly (R-PA)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. — On Tuesday, July 8, U.S. Rep. Mike Kelly (R-PA) will hold a telephone town hall to help Pennsylvanians fight fraud, stop scams, and offer ways to protect your personal information. Officials from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will join the call to offer insight and answer questions.

    In April, the FBI released its annual Internet Crime Report, which revealed scammers stole more than $16 billion from Americans in 2024, a 33% increase in losses from 2023.

    “My office often received numerous calls from constituents who remain incredibly concerned about, or have even fallen victim to, scams and fraud,” said Rep. Kelly. “Our goal with this live telephone town hall is to give Pennsylvanians the tools necessary to fight back and to protect their personal information at a time when scams and fraud are on the rise. We hope you can join us!”

    DETAILS

    Who: Rep. Mike Kelly & Experts from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and FBI.
    What: Live Telephone Town Hall  — “Fight Fraud, Stop Scams, & How to Protect Your Personal Information”
    When: Tuesday, July 8, 2025 at 6:30p.m. ET
    Pinless Participant Dial-In: 855-531-1063
    Livestream:Facebook.com/MikeKellyPA

    BACKGROUND

    According to the FBI’s Internet Crime Report, the top three cybercrimes, by number of complaints reported by victims in 2024, were phishing/spoofing, extortion, and personal data breaches. Victims of investment fraud, specifically those involving cryptocurrency, reported the most losses—totaling over $6.5 billion.

    In April, Pennsylvania State Police investigated cybertheft after a Crawford County couple was reportedly scammed out of more than $2,000.

    Just this week, state officials warned Pennsylvanians to watch for an ongoing fake inheritance scam.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Remarks by Acting Chairman Caroline D. Pham, 100 Impact Leaders Dinner and Annual Awards, Digital Assets Global Forum, UK House of Lords

    Source: US Commodity Futures Trading Commission

    Good evening, my lords, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to express my gratitude to Lord Taylor of Warwick and Dr. Lisa Cameron, as well as the Financial Club and the UK US Crypto Alliance, for this recognition at the Digital Assets Global Forum 100 Impact Leaders Dinner and Annual Awards and inviting me to provide remarks. Thank you also to Baroness Uddin and Lord Ranger, and especially to all the event staff at the House of Lords.
    It is a great honor to receive this year’s Legacy Award, and a great privilege to share my views regarding innovation and market structure in financial services. Tonight’s event is a testament to the strength and longevity of the close relationships among UK and U.S. institutions, and the special relationship between our two great Nations.
    Crypto and Digital Assets
    In April, Treasury Secretary Bessent and Chancellor Reeves discussed digital asset regulation and laid the groundwork for our governments to explore ways “to support the use and responsible growth of digital assets.”
    In the context of that discussion, I was pleased to learn that Chancellor Reeves acknowledged the importance of the UK-U.S. Financial Regulatory Working Group (FRWG), which I will discuss in a few minutes. Both the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) are members, and our agencies have partnered closely for decades.
    The UK Government has moved quickly on cryptoasset regulatory proposals, including the FCA’s public consultation on various papers and publication of an FCA Crypto Roadmap.
    So, I would like to highlight for you the CFTC’s swift progress on President Trump’s executive orders and policy agenda for digital assets.
    For both our Nations, this is the light at the end of a very long tunnel, the dawn of a new golden age for market innovation, and the culmination of years of hard work by both the public and private sectors.
    Responsible innovation and fair competition
    While UK regulators have recently gained a secondary mandate on competition, the CFTC has long had a dual mandate to promote responsible innovation and fair competition in our markets.
    Our dual mandate enshrines the simple truth that derivatives are financial instruments that are at the cutting edge of market innovation, and therefore our regulatory framework must be principles-based and flexible to adapt to new markets and new products.
    Let me tell you about my personal journey towards ensuring that the CFTC remains not only the first, but also at the forefront, of leadership on digital asset markets.
    The U.S. regulation of spot digital assets is a high priority for the CFTC because the largest digital asset markets are commodities.
    It is also a high priority for me because I have worked on crypto and digital assets initiatives for over 10 years—since 2013, when I was staff at the CFTC and the Bitcoin Foundation came to Washington, DC to engage with regulators on responsible innovation.
    That’s right—the crypto industry did not run away from regulation, they ran towards it, even in those early years, in hopes of finding a clear regulatory roadmap.
    At that time, we at the CFTC thought that Bitcoin was a commodity. Two years later, in 2015, the CFTC made this view known publicly, and has maintained this view ever since as this novel asset class has expanded to include more tokens.
    After my initial experience with crypto at the CFTC, I engaged on crypto again in the private sector.
    I worked on Citi’s digital asset strategy, including product development and strategic equity and venture capital investments, and I worked on transactions, partnerships, vendors, and new clients.
    I led digital assets global regulatory strategy and policy advocacy and initiatives to implement governance, risk, and control frameworks and compliance policies and procedures. That included leading global engagement in supervisory examinations of distributed ledger technology (DLT or blockchain) and digital assets by both U.S. and non-U.S. regulators—including the FCA.
    Based on my hands-on experience, when I became a CFTC Commissioner, I knew providing regulatory clarity for digital assets had to be a priority.
    I first proposed 10 fundamentals for responsible digital asset markets, which could be universally applied in any jurisdiction, in 2022. Then, I proposed a CFTC digital asset markets pilot program as a U.S. regulatory sandbox in 2023. I was gratified to be named to CoinDesk’s Most Influential 2023 list for these efforts.
    Last year, in 2024, the Digital Asset Markets Subcommittee of the CFTC’s Global Markets Advisory Committee (GMAC), which I sponsor, developed and made two recommendations to the Commission: (1) a U.S. digital asset taxonomy and (2) regulatory treatment of tokenized non-cash collateral.
    I want to thank the firms—many in this audience—from the largest banks and asset managers, to exchanges and clearinghouses, to crypto native startups, who have contributed to the GMAC’s efforts and graciously provided their time and resources to create a consensus view across both traditional and digital asset markets.
    These recommendations for industry standards reflect years of thoughtful, disciplined work from the actual builders in this space who are the industry leaders.
    It’s a common global solution that works for everyone, and also includes input from both international standard setters and non-U.S. regulatory authorities.
    A golden age for market innovation
    This year, in the Trump Administration’s first 100 days, the CFTC has taken decisive action to implement these prior proposals and promote a pro-innovation, pro-growth approach for digital assets.
    The CFTC is a member of the President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, which is expected to release a report next month that will be the Administration’s crypto roadmap. We have been working closely with the U.S. Treasury Department, the SEC, and other agencies on this productive and fruitful effort.
    In February, I hosted a first-ever Crypto CEO Forum and participated in the groundbreaking White House Digital Assets Summit.
    The CFTC has withdrawn outdated staff advisories and released new guidance to improve regulatory clarity for American and other innovators and entrepreneurs in crypto and digital assets.
    We have had discussions on a digital asset markets pilot program and will soon participate as an observer in industry tokenization initiatives.
    And, the CFTC recently completed a public comment period on 24/7 trading and perpetual derivatives, two crypto market innovations that may have implications for other asset classes with sufficient liquidity. Perpetual derivatives have been trading live on CFTC-registered designated contract markets (DCMs) since April, and 24/7 trading has been live since May.
    The CFTC has provided technical assistance to Congress on various digital asset legislative proposals, including the CLARITY Act, and stands ready to carry out our mission if our jurisdiction is expanded. The future is bright.
    Looking ahead, the U.S. must have a durable and flexible approach to regulation that will keep up with continuing innovation and stand the test of time.
    Lessons learned
    I appreciate Lord Taylor’s remarks about learning from the past. I will share some lessons learned from my experience at the CFTC and in the private sector with implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, the last time the U.S. enacted legislation that dramatically reshaped market structure.
    The CFTC’s implementation of Dodd-Frank with our swaps regulations had far-reaching unintended consequences. Fifteen years later, the CFTC is still working to eliminate unworkable, overly burdensome requirements and resolve regulatory overreach that have significantly increased costs for all market participants with no meaningful benefits.
    There are two key lessons learned, and we must not repeat the mistakes of the past.
    Regulatory moat
    First, Dodd-Frank’s duplicative, costly, and unnecessary regulatory requirements that cost billions of dollars annually for registration, compliance, and reporting—in addition to enforcement penalties that have become a tax on doing business—have resulted in a regulatory moat that is a barrier to entry for smaller firms, startups, and entrepreneurs.
    This has led to anti-competitive effects and consolidation and concentration of market participants, because only the biggest firms can afford the overhead.
    Any mandate or issuance of new regulations by the CFTC should leverage our existing registration categories and compliance requirements to avoid piling on with another layer of overregulation that has no benefit to market integrity or customer protection.
    Market fragmentation
    Second, Dodd-Frank’s jurisdictional overreach and the CFTC’s initial approach to cross-border activity resulted in swaps market fragmentation. These effects were especially profound in London and New York, the most important trading hubs.
    A lack of harmonization based on principles of international comity, mutual recognition, and regulatory coherence led to fractured market liquidity that is less resilient to market shock or dislocation, increasing both market volatility and systemic risk.
    Market fragmentation also resulted in increased complexity and costs for international financial institutions and other market participants’ legal entity strategy, booking models, and other operational processes. Increasing complexity increases both financial and non-financial risks.
    Again, fifteen years later, the CFTC still has not completed implementing a substituted compliance regime across all CFTC swaps regulation.
    Most of the CFTC’s over 20 staff letters, advisories, or other guidance issued since January under my leadership as acting Chairman have been to fix remaining Dodd-Frank issues based on my experience as an operating executive.
    Because crypto and digital asset markets are borderless by design, it is imperative that the CFTC’s policy approach ensures that substituted compliance will be available from the start for entities that are properly registered in their home country jurisdictions that have comparable regulatory schemes, and that reciprocal mutual recognition for CFTC-registered entities is available as well.
    The close partnership between UK and U.S. authorities can help to achieve this regulatory coherence. By leveraging existing registration categories and cross-border substituted compliance or mutual recognition, the CFTC and our non-U.S. regulatory counterparts would not have to reinvent the wheel and further delay growth and progress for digital asset markets.
    Our current CFTC regulated entities could begin trading crypto on day one, and bring previously offshore activity back onshore to the U.S. with no negative impact to depth of market liquidity.
    Simplicity is the solution
    I have encouraged technology-neutral regulations that do not have to be continually rewritten to keep up with innovation, and activity-based regulations that do not require burdensome and costly entity-registration requirements that stifle competition by raising the gate to new entrants with less capital (namely, start-ups and entrepreneurs).
    It is critical that once further regulatory clarity is provided, including through interpretations and exemptions, that the CFTC is prepared to move quickly rather than waiting to complete the 4 to 5 year process to develop and adopt additional digital asset regulations, for the crypto and financial sector to then spend even more years to implement.
    The regulatory burn rate and the costs of missing out on market share are real.
    A simple approach that can be completed in 12 to 18 months is the fastest way to ensure that the U.S. is no longer left behind when it comes to promoting innovation and welcoming American entrepreneurs and companies to come back home.
    This is how we ensure U.S. competitiveness and that the U.S. leads the way in harnessing the potential of this new technology to create economic opportunities for all Americans.  This is how the U.S. becomes the crypto capital of the world.
    UK and U.S. Relationship
    In the FinTech and digital-assets space, the CFTC’s coordination with our UK counterparts has enabled us to navigate the rapidly changing landscape, mitigate risks, and advance responsible innovation. I especially want to recognize our close cooperation with the FCA in this regard.
    In 2018, the CFTC and the FCA signed a FinTech Innovation Arrangement wherein we each committed to collaborate and support innovative firms through our respective financial technology initiatives.
    CFTC staff members have also benefitted from participating with their UK peers and other regulatory partners in the Financial Innovation Partnership, which is a dialogue like the FRWG, designed to focus on facilitating our mutual engagement in financial innovation.
    In other areas of financial services oversight, we have a long and deep history of collaboration.
    These long-standing examples serve as a formidable blueprint for successful collaboration going forward regarding digital-assets, decentralized finance, and artificial intelligence (AI):

    In 1986, the CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) signed a memorandum of understanding with the UK Department of Trade and Industry, now succeeded by the FCA.

    In 1989, the CFTC included the UK among the first exemptions issued under Rule 30.10 (allowing UK firms to serve as futures brokers for U.S. customers on UK exchanges without having to register as brokers in the U.S.).   Many UK firms still avail themselves of this 30.10 relief.

    In 1991, we signed a memorandum of understanding amongst the CFTC, SEC, the then Department of Trade and Industry, and the Securities and Investments Board (the latter two succeeded by the FCA, the Prudential Regulation Authority, and the Bank of England) on mutual assistance and the exchange of information.

    In 2009, the CFTC and the Bank of England executed a memorandum of understanding on Central Counterparty Clearing House (CCP) supervision.

    In 2020, the CFTC revised that clearing memorandum of understanding with the Bank of England to reflect the cooperation and exchange of information in the supervision and oversight of CCPs that operate on a cross-border basis in the U.S. and UK.

    In the Spring of 2023, the CFTC and Bank of England announced a further strengthening of our commitment to close cooperation and mutual understandings on the supervision of CCPs.

    Later in 2023, the UK Parliament published its CCP equivalence decision for the CFTC. This was an important milestone in our mutual deferential approach to supervision because it highlights our strong cooperation and allows greater cross-border access for our regulated entities.

    Each of these achievements have been possible because we have a relationship based on trust and mutual respect.
    Since the financial crisis and global derivatives regulatory reform, the CFTC directly regulates the largest UK banks as swap dealers, and much hard work has gone into establishing a substituted compliance and mutual recognition regime. I’m pleased to have furthered these efforts under my chairmanship as well.
    The UK-U.S. Financial Regulatory Working Group
    During the most recent FRWG meeting, representatives of our finance ministries, markets regulators, and prudential authorities discussed the strong current of innovation evident in our jurisdictions as well as the means to collaborate on a foundational framework in the areas of digital-assets and AI.
    Our respective delegations provided updates on proposed legislation to regulate digital assets, including stablecoin. UK participants also noted that you have updated your Digital Securities Sandbox and are building on recent discussions between the Chancellor and the U.S. Treasury Secretary.
    Importantly, the FRWG also discussed exploring potential opportunities to support cross-border innovation. Participants emphasized the importance of effective regulation in promoting economic growth while also addressing risks and continued bilateral and international engagement within the sector and amongst authorities.
    In that regard, FRWG representatives also exchanged views on their respective approaches to AI and both current and future AI use cases within financial services. U.S. and UK authorities discussed means to work together, including as appropriate through international standard-setting and coordination institutions, to realize the potential of this technology and address the risks of AI in financial services.
    Conclusion
    During my chairmanship and as a commissioner, I have tirelessly advocated for a level playing field for global businesses and access to markets. Relationships—especially special ones like ours, the UK and the U.S.—make this possible.
    Through my work with the CFTC’s GMAC and engagement with international standard-setters like the Financial Stability Board (FSB), Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and my bilateral relationships with nearly two dozen of the CFTC’s regulatory counterparts around the world, I believe that we can achieve shared prosperity through economic growth and the engine of capital markets.
    As our Nations continue to forge ahead with our pro-innovation agendas through our multiple regulatory initiatives, our markets will be well-served by our continued cooperation.
    Thank you.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Remarks by Acting Chairman Caroline D. Pham, 100 Impact Leaders Dinner and Annual Awards, Digital Assets Global Forum, UK House of Lords

    Source: US Commodity Futures Trading Commission

    Good evening, my lords, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to express my gratitude to Lord Taylor of Warwick and Dr. Lisa Cameron, as well as the Financial Club and the UK US Crypto Alliance, for this recognition at the Digital Assets Global Forum 100 Impact Leaders Dinner and Annual Awards and inviting me to provide remarks. Thank you also to Baroness Uddin and Lord Ranger, and especially to all the event staff at the House of Lords.
    It is a great honor to receive this year’s Legacy Award, and a great privilege to share my views regarding innovation and market structure in financial services. Tonight’s event is a testament to the strength and longevity of the close relationships among UK and U.S. institutions, and the special relationship between our two great Nations.
    Crypto and Digital Assets
    In April, Treasury Secretary Bessent and Chancellor Reeves discussed digital asset regulation and laid the groundwork for our governments to explore ways “to support the use and responsible growth of digital assets.”
    In the context of that discussion, I was pleased to learn that Chancellor Reeves acknowledged the importance of the UK-U.S. Financial Regulatory Working Group (FRWG), which I will discuss in a few minutes. Both the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) are members, and our agencies have partnered closely for decades.
    The UK Government has moved quickly on cryptoasset regulatory proposals, including the FCA’s public consultation on various papers and publication of an FCA Crypto Roadmap.
    So, I would like to highlight for you the CFTC’s swift progress on President Trump’s executive orders and policy agenda for digital assets.
    For both our Nations, this is the light at the end of a very long tunnel, the dawn of a new golden age for market innovation, and the culmination of years of hard work by both the public and private sectors.
    Responsible innovation and fair competition
    While UK regulators have recently gained a secondary mandate on competition, the CFTC has long had a dual mandate to promote responsible innovation and fair competition in our markets.
    Our dual mandate enshrines the simple truth that derivatives are financial instruments that are at the cutting edge of market innovation, and therefore our regulatory framework must be principles-based and flexible to adapt to new markets and new products.
    Let me tell you about my personal journey towards ensuring that the CFTC remains not only the first, but also at the forefront, of leadership on digital asset markets.
    The U.S. regulation of spot digital assets is a high priority for the CFTC because the largest digital asset markets are commodities.
    It is also a high priority for me because I have worked on crypto and digital assets initiatives for over 10 years—since 2013, when I was staff at the CFTC and the Bitcoin Foundation came to Washington, DC to engage with regulators on responsible innovation.
    That’s right—the crypto industry did not run away from regulation, they ran towards it, even in those early years, in hopes of finding a clear regulatory roadmap.
    At that time, we at the CFTC thought that Bitcoin was a commodity. Two years later, in 2015, the CFTC made this view known publicly, and has maintained this view ever since as this novel asset class has expanded to include more tokens.
    After my initial experience with crypto at the CFTC, I engaged on crypto again in the private sector.
    I worked on Citi’s digital asset strategy, including product development and strategic equity and venture capital investments, and I worked on transactions, partnerships, vendors, and new clients.
    I led digital assets global regulatory strategy and policy advocacy and initiatives to implement governance, risk, and control frameworks and compliance policies and procedures. That included leading global engagement in supervisory examinations of distributed ledger technology (DLT or blockchain) and digital assets by both U.S. and non-U.S. regulators—including the FCA.
    Based on my hands-on experience, when I became a CFTC Commissioner, I knew providing regulatory clarity for digital assets had to be a priority.
    I first proposed 10 fundamentals for responsible digital asset markets, which could be universally applied in any jurisdiction, in 2022. Then, I proposed a CFTC digital asset markets pilot program as a U.S. regulatory sandbox in 2023. I was gratified to be named to CoinDesk’s Most Influential 2023 list for these efforts.
    Last year, in 2024, the Digital Asset Markets Subcommittee of the CFTC’s Global Markets Advisory Committee (GMAC), which I sponsor, developed and made two recommendations to the Commission: (1) a U.S. digital asset taxonomy and (2) regulatory treatment of tokenized non-cash collateral.
    I want to thank the firms—many in this audience—from the largest banks and asset managers, to exchanges and clearinghouses, to crypto native startups, who have contributed to the GMAC’s efforts and graciously provided their time and resources to create a consensus view across both traditional and digital asset markets.
    These recommendations for industry standards reflect years of thoughtful, disciplined work from the actual builders in this space who are the industry leaders.
    It’s a common global solution that works for everyone, and also includes input from both international standard setters and non-U.S. regulatory authorities.
    A golden age for market innovation
    This year, in the Trump Administration’s first 100 days, the CFTC has taken decisive action to implement these prior proposals and promote a pro-innovation, pro-growth approach for digital assets.
    The CFTC is a member of the President’s Working Group on Digital Asset Markets, which is expected to release a report next month that will be the Administration’s crypto roadmap. We have been working closely with the U.S. Treasury Department, the SEC, and other agencies on this productive and fruitful effort.
    In February, I hosted a first-ever Crypto CEO Forum and participated in the groundbreaking White House Digital Assets Summit.
    The CFTC has withdrawn outdated staff advisories and released new guidance to improve regulatory clarity for American and other innovators and entrepreneurs in crypto and digital assets.
    We have had discussions on a digital asset markets pilot program and will soon participate as an observer in industry tokenization initiatives.
    And, the CFTC recently completed a public comment period on 24/7 trading and perpetual derivatives, two crypto market innovations that may have implications for other asset classes with sufficient liquidity. Perpetual derivatives have been trading live on CFTC-registered designated contract markets (DCMs) since April, and 24/7 trading has been live since May.
    The CFTC has provided technical assistance to Congress on various digital asset legislative proposals, including the CLARITY Act, and stands ready to carry out our mission if our jurisdiction is expanded. The future is bright.
    Looking ahead, the U.S. must have a durable and flexible approach to regulation that will keep up with continuing innovation and stand the test of time.
    Lessons learned
    I appreciate Lord Taylor’s remarks about learning from the past. I will share some lessons learned from my experience at the CFTC and in the private sector with implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, the last time the U.S. enacted legislation that dramatically reshaped market structure.
    The CFTC’s implementation of Dodd-Frank with our swaps regulations had far-reaching unintended consequences. Fifteen years later, the CFTC is still working to eliminate unworkable, overly burdensome requirements and resolve regulatory overreach that have significantly increased costs for all market participants with no meaningful benefits.
    There are two key lessons learned, and we must not repeat the mistakes of the past.
    Regulatory moat
    First, Dodd-Frank’s duplicative, costly, and unnecessary regulatory requirements that cost billions of dollars annually for registration, compliance, and reporting—in addition to enforcement penalties that have become a tax on doing business—have resulted in a regulatory moat that is a barrier to entry for smaller firms, startups, and entrepreneurs.
    This has led to anti-competitive effects and consolidation and concentration of market participants, because only the biggest firms can afford the overhead.
    Any mandate or issuance of new regulations by the CFTC should leverage our existing registration categories and compliance requirements to avoid piling on with another layer of overregulation that has no benefit to market integrity or customer protection.
    Market fragmentation
    Second, Dodd-Frank’s jurisdictional overreach and the CFTC’s initial approach to cross-border activity resulted in swaps market fragmentation. These effects were especially profound in London and New York, the most important trading hubs.
    A lack of harmonization based on principles of international comity, mutual recognition, and regulatory coherence led to fractured market liquidity that is less resilient to market shock or dislocation, increasing both market volatility and systemic risk.
    Market fragmentation also resulted in increased complexity and costs for international financial institutions and other market participants’ legal entity strategy, booking models, and other operational processes. Increasing complexity increases both financial and non-financial risks.
    Again, fifteen years later, the CFTC still has not completed implementing a substituted compliance regime across all CFTC swaps regulation.
    Most of the CFTC’s over 20 staff letters, advisories, or other guidance issued since January under my leadership as acting Chairman have been to fix remaining Dodd-Frank issues based on my experience as an operating executive.
    Because crypto and digital asset markets are borderless by design, it is imperative that the CFTC’s policy approach ensures that substituted compliance will be available from the start for entities that are properly registered in their home country jurisdictions that have comparable regulatory schemes, and that reciprocal mutual recognition for CFTC-registered entities is available as well.
    The close partnership between UK and U.S. authorities can help to achieve this regulatory coherence. By leveraging existing registration categories and cross-border substituted compliance or mutual recognition, the CFTC and our non-U.S. regulatory counterparts would not have to reinvent the wheel and further delay growth and progress for digital asset markets.
    Our current CFTC regulated entities could begin trading crypto on day one, and bring previously offshore activity back onshore to the U.S. with no negative impact to depth of market liquidity.
    Simplicity is the solution
    I have encouraged technology-neutral regulations that do not have to be continually rewritten to keep up with innovation, and activity-based regulations that do not require burdensome and costly entity-registration requirements that stifle competition by raising the gate to new entrants with less capital (namely, start-ups and entrepreneurs).
    It is critical that once further regulatory clarity is provided, including through interpretations and exemptions, that the CFTC is prepared to move quickly rather than waiting to complete the 4 to 5 year process to develop and adopt additional digital asset regulations, for the crypto and financial sector to then spend even more years to implement.
    The regulatory burn rate and the costs of missing out on market share are real.
    A simple approach that can be completed in 12 to 18 months is the fastest way to ensure that the U.S. is no longer left behind when it comes to promoting innovation and welcoming American entrepreneurs and companies to come back home.
    This is how we ensure U.S. competitiveness and that the U.S. leads the way in harnessing the potential of this new technology to create economic opportunities for all Americans.  This is how the U.S. becomes the crypto capital of the world.
    UK and U.S. Relationship
    In the FinTech and digital-assets space, the CFTC’s coordination with our UK counterparts has enabled us to navigate the rapidly changing landscape, mitigate risks, and advance responsible innovation. I especially want to recognize our close cooperation with the FCA in this regard.
    In 2018, the CFTC and the FCA signed a FinTech Innovation Arrangement wherein we each committed to collaborate and support innovative firms through our respective financial technology initiatives.
    CFTC staff members have also benefitted from participating with their UK peers and other regulatory partners in the Financial Innovation Partnership, which is a dialogue like the FRWG, designed to focus on facilitating our mutual engagement in financial innovation.
    In other areas of financial services oversight, we have a long and deep history of collaboration.
    These long-standing examples serve as a formidable blueprint for successful collaboration going forward regarding digital-assets, decentralized finance, and artificial intelligence (AI):

    In 1986, the CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) signed a memorandum of understanding with the UK Department of Trade and Industry, now succeeded by the FCA.

    In 1989, the CFTC included the UK among the first exemptions issued under Rule 30.10 (allowing UK firms to serve as futures brokers for U.S. customers on UK exchanges without having to register as brokers in the U.S.).   Many UK firms still avail themselves of this 30.10 relief.

    In 1991, we signed a memorandum of understanding amongst the CFTC, SEC, the then Department of Trade and Industry, and the Securities and Investments Board (the latter two succeeded by the FCA, the Prudential Regulation Authority, and the Bank of England) on mutual assistance and the exchange of information.

    In 2009, the CFTC and the Bank of England executed a memorandum of understanding on Central Counterparty Clearing House (CCP) supervision.

    In 2020, the CFTC revised that clearing memorandum of understanding with the Bank of England to reflect the cooperation and exchange of information in the supervision and oversight of CCPs that operate on a cross-border basis in the U.S. and UK.

    In the Spring of 2023, the CFTC and Bank of England announced a further strengthening of our commitment to close cooperation and mutual understandings on the supervision of CCPs.

    Later in 2023, the UK Parliament published its CCP equivalence decision for the CFTC. This was an important milestone in our mutual deferential approach to supervision because it highlights our strong cooperation and allows greater cross-border access for our regulated entities.

    Each of these achievements have been possible because we have a relationship based on trust and mutual respect.
    Since the financial crisis and global derivatives regulatory reform, the CFTC directly regulates the largest UK banks as swap dealers, and much hard work has gone into establishing a substituted compliance and mutual recognition regime. I’m pleased to have furthered these efforts under my chairmanship as well.
    The UK-U.S. Financial Regulatory Working Group
    During the most recent FRWG meeting, representatives of our finance ministries, markets regulators, and prudential authorities discussed the strong current of innovation evident in our jurisdictions as well as the means to collaborate on a foundational framework in the areas of digital-assets and AI.
    Our respective delegations provided updates on proposed legislation to regulate digital assets, including stablecoin. UK participants also noted that you have updated your Digital Securities Sandbox and are building on recent discussions between the Chancellor and the U.S. Treasury Secretary.
    Importantly, the FRWG also discussed exploring potential opportunities to support cross-border innovation. Participants emphasized the importance of effective regulation in promoting economic growth while also addressing risks and continued bilateral and international engagement within the sector and amongst authorities.
    In that regard, FRWG representatives also exchanged views on their respective approaches to AI and both current and future AI use cases within financial services. U.S. and UK authorities discussed means to work together, including as appropriate through international standard-setting and coordination institutions, to realize the potential of this technology and address the risks of AI in financial services.
    Conclusion
    During my chairmanship and as a commissioner, I have tirelessly advocated for a level playing field for global businesses and access to markets. Relationships—especially special ones like ours, the UK and the U.S.—make this possible.
    Through my work with the CFTC’s GMAC and engagement with international standard-setters like the Financial Stability Board (FSB), Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and my bilateral relationships with nearly two dozen of the CFTC’s regulatory counterparts around the world, I believe that we can achieve shared prosperity through economic growth and the engine of capital markets.
    As our Nations continue to forge ahead with our pro-innovation agendas through our multiple regulatory initiatives, our markets will be well-served by our continued cooperation.
    Thank you.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Cotton to Introduce Bill to Reform, Improve, and Streamline ODNI

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Arkansas Tom Cotton
    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEContact: Caroline Tabler or Patrick McCann (202) 224-2353June 27, 2025
    Chairman Cotton to Introduce Bill to Reform, Improve, and Streamline ODNI 
    Washington, D.C. — Senator Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today will introduce the Intelligence Community Efficiency and Effectiveness Act, legislation that would realign resources to intelligence missions, eliminate duplicative efforts and inefficient, non-functioning bureaucracies across the intelligence community (IC) and return the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to its original size, scope, and mission.
    Senators Jim Risch (R-Idaho), Mike Rounds (R-South Dakota), Ted Budd (R-North Carolina), and James Lankford (R-Oklahoma) are cosponsoring the legislation.
    “Created after the September 11th attacks, ODNI was intended to be a lean organization to align America’s intelligence resources and authorities, not the overstaffed and bureaucratic behemoth that it is today, where coordinators coordinate with other coordinators. These reforms will be vital to keeping our country safe from the wide range of threats that we continue to face,” said Senator Cotton. 
    Text of the Intelligence Community Efficiency and Effectiveness Act may be found here.
    The Intelligence Community Efficiency and Effectiveness Act would:
    Cap ODNI full-time staff at 650.
    Eliminate certain reporting requirements and the transfer of personnel authorities.
    Modify the National Intelligence Council’s duties and terminate the National Intelligence Managers’ positions.
    Terminate the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) at ODNI and transfer its responsibilities to the FBI.
    Redesignate the National Counterterrorism Center as the National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center, and limit its mission to foreign intelligence authorities. 
    Terminate the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center (NCBC) at ODNI, transfer NCBC’s responsibilities to the CIA, and redesignate it as the National Counterproliferation Center.
    Repeal various positions (including the Director of the NCSC, the Director of the NCBC, and the Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer), and seven units, centers, councils, offices, and programs (including obsolete bureaucratic entities that have failed to function, such as the Joint Intelligence Community Council).  
    Prohibit National Intelligence Program funds from being used to outsource IC analytic efforts to organizations that take funds from foreign governments.  
    Require the DNI to wind down and terminate the National Intelligence University within 180 days.
    Prohibit use of National Intelligence Program funds to implement any diversity, equity, or inclusion practice in the intelligence community.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Cotton to Introduce Bill to Reform, Improve, and Streamline ODNI

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Arkansas Tom Cotton
    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEContact: Caroline Tabler or Patrick McCann (202) 224-2353June 27, 2025
    Chairman Cotton to Introduce Bill to Reform, Improve, and Streamline ODNI 
    Washington, D.C. — Senator Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today will introduce the Intelligence Community Efficiency and Effectiveness Act, legislation that would realign resources to intelligence missions, eliminate duplicative efforts and inefficient, non-functioning bureaucracies across the intelligence community (IC) and return the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to its original size, scope, and mission.
    Senators Jim Risch (R-Idaho), Mike Rounds (R-South Dakota), Ted Budd (R-North Carolina), and James Lankford (R-Oklahoma) are cosponsoring the legislation.
    “Created after the September 11th attacks, ODNI was intended to be a lean organization to align America’s intelligence resources and authorities, not the overstaffed and bureaucratic behemoth that it is today, where coordinators coordinate with other coordinators. These reforms will be vital to keeping our country safe from the wide range of threats that we continue to face,” said Senator Cotton. 
    Text of the Intelligence Community Efficiency and Effectiveness Act may be found here.
    The Intelligence Community Efficiency and Effectiveness Act would:
    Cap ODNI full-time staff at 650.
    Eliminate certain reporting requirements and the transfer of personnel authorities.
    Modify the National Intelligence Council’s duties and terminate the National Intelligence Managers’ positions.
    Terminate the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) at ODNI and transfer its responsibilities to the FBI.
    Redesignate the National Counterterrorism Center as the National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center, and limit its mission to foreign intelligence authorities. 
    Terminate the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center (NCBC) at ODNI, transfer NCBC’s responsibilities to the CIA, and redesignate it as the National Counterproliferation Center.
    Repeal various positions (including the Director of the NCSC, the Director of the NCBC, and the Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer), and seven units, centers, councils, offices, and programs (including obsolete bureaucratic entities that have failed to function, such as the Joint Intelligence Community Council).  
    Prohibit National Intelligence Program funds from being used to outsource IC analytic efforts to organizations that take funds from foreign governments.  
    Require the DNI to wind down and terminate the National Intelligence University within 180 days.
    Prohibit use of National Intelligence Program funds to implement any diversity, equity, or inclusion practice in the intelligence community.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Cotton to Introduce Bill to Reform, Improve, and Streamline ODNI

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Arkansas Tom Cotton
    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEContact: Caroline Tabler or Patrick McCann (202) 224-2353June 27, 2025
    Chairman Cotton to Introduce Bill to Reform, Improve, and Streamline ODNI 
    Washington, D.C. — Senator Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, today will introduce the Intelligence Community Efficiency and Effectiveness Act, legislation that would realign resources to intelligence missions, eliminate duplicative efforts and inefficient, non-functioning bureaucracies across the intelligence community (IC) and return the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to its original size, scope, and mission.
    Senators Jim Risch (R-Idaho), Mike Rounds (R-South Dakota), Ted Budd (R-North Carolina), and James Lankford (R-Oklahoma) are cosponsoring the legislation.
    “Created after the September 11th attacks, ODNI was intended to be a lean organization to align America’s intelligence resources and authorities, not the overstaffed and bureaucratic behemoth that it is today, where coordinators coordinate with other coordinators. These reforms will be vital to keeping our country safe from the wide range of threats that we continue to face,” said Senator Cotton. 
    Text of the Intelligence Community Efficiency and Effectiveness Act may be found here.
    The Intelligence Community Efficiency and Effectiveness Act would:
    Cap ODNI full-time staff at 650.
    Eliminate certain reporting requirements and the transfer of personnel authorities.
    Modify the National Intelligence Council’s duties and terminate the National Intelligence Managers’ positions.
    Terminate the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) at ODNI and transfer its responsibilities to the FBI.
    Redesignate the National Counterterrorism Center as the National Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Center, and limit its mission to foreign intelligence authorities. 
    Terminate the National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center (NCBC) at ODNI, transfer NCBC’s responsibilities to the CIA, and redesignate it as the National Counterproliferation Center.
    Repeal various positions (including the Director of the NCSC, the Director of the NCBC, and the Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer), and seven units, centers, councils, offices, and programs (including obsolete bureaucratic entities that have failed to function, such as the Joint Intelligence Community Council).  
    Prohibit National Intelligence Program funds from being used to outsource IC analytic efforts to organizations that take funds from foreign governments.  
    Require the DNI to wind down and terminate the National Intelligence University within 180 days.
    Prohibit use of National Intelligence Program funds to implement any diversity, equity, or inclusion practice in the intelligence community.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Piero Cipollone: The quest for cheaper and faster cross-border payments: regional and global solutions

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

    Basel, 27 June 2025

    Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.

    First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.

    Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.

    This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).

    Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.

    The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

    Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.

    Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]

    Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]

    Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]

    Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

    This raises three pressing issues.

    First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.

    Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.

    Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]

    Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.

    Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

    To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.

    At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.

    Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

    At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.

    Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.

    The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.

    The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.

    We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.

    A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]

    Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.

    Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

    This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.

    Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.

    This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.

    Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]

    We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

    In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.

    One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]

    We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].

    Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.

    However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.

    In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.

    In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]

    Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.

    I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?

    First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.

    Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.

    Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.

    Thank you for your attention.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Piero Cipollone: The quest for cheaper and faster cross-border payments: regional and global solutions

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the BIS Annual General Meeting

    Basel, 27 June 2025

    Cross-border retail payments are the subject of increasing attention. This is for two main reasons.

    First, they play a growing role in the world economy, as international transaction volumes have been increasing at a faster pace than GDP growth. However, despite some improvements in recent years, many payment corridors remain poorly served, which results in slow transaction times and high costs and ultimately hinders economic growth and social cohesion. Moreover, this inefficiency undermines the benefits of globalisation, as the economic gains from lower trade barriers are diverted into rents within cross-border payment markets, rather than benefiting the businesses and households that make use of them.

    Second, new risks are emerging. Geopolitical tensions, for instance, could lead to further fragmentation of global payment systems. Moreover, the expansion of stablecoins could introduce several additional challenges, including currency substitution risks and over-reliance on a limited number of dominant private issuers.

    This is not a situation we can accept passively. We need continuous efforts to enhance cross-border payments, in line with the G20 Roadmap.[1] And central banks, given their role in ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, have a major role to play. Significant work has already been undertaken at international level, notably by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB).

    Today, I would like to share our experience with cross-border payments from a regional perspective, emphasising how regional payment infrastructures can be part of the solution. I will then discuss our vision for advancing cross-border payments at the global level.

    The case for enhancing cross-border retail payments

    Let me begin by underscoring the costs and risks of inaction.

    Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed a surge in cross-border payments, driven by the globalisation of trade, capital and migration flows. According to some estimates, the value of cross-border retail payments could grow from close to USD 200 trillion last year to USD 320 trillion by 2032.[2]

    Yet, the average cost of international retail payments remains high. For nearly one-quarter of global payment corridors, costs exceed 3%. And in too many cases, they are slow – one-third of retail cross-border payments took more than one business day to be settled in 2024.[3]

    Worryingly, there are signs that progress is stalling. The FSB’s 2024 progress report revealed no improvements in costs and noted a deterioration in both costs and speed compared with 2023.[4]

    Geopolitical tensions further compound these challenges, as they risk fragmenting global payment systems and undermining the rules-based international order. This could challenge established correspondent banking networks and lead to greater complexity, higher costs and, in a worst-case scenario, the splintering of the global payment system into multiple, non-communicating blocs.

    This raises three pressing issues.

    First, high costs and slow transaction times are hampering economic integration and growth, with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) bearing the brunt. For SMEs operating on tight margins, exorbitant fees discourage them from participating in cross-border trade.

    Second, the world’s most vulnerable groups – such as migrant workers sending remittances home – shoulder a disproportionate share of these costs. In many regions, sending money internationally remains prohibitively expensive. For example, the average costs of remittances to sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia stand at 7.7% and 6.2% respectively.[5] As it stands, the global Sustainable Development Goal target of lowering remittance costs to 3% remains a distant goal. The impact that reducing these fees would have on financial inclusion and well-being cannot be overstated.

    Third, inefficiencies in cross-border payments have created a gap that alternative players, particularly in the crypto-asset space, are eager to fill. However, many of these solutions come with significant risks. Unbacked crypto-assets, for instance, are highly volatile and speculative in nature, creating risks for unsuspecting households and businesses and lending themselves to illicit activities.[6]

    Furthermore, stablecoins come with their own set of challenges, which the BIS described in detail in a special chapter of its Annual Economic Report published this week.[7] Stablecoins carry credit risk, making them susceptible to runs, and pose fragmentation risks due to the multitude of stablecoins being issued. Some of these could end up trading at a discount, undermining the singleness of money.[8] Moreover, because a small number of issuers currently dominate the market, this could also give rise to concentration risks. Lastly, a key concern is the prevalence of US dollar stablecoins, which currently account for 99% of the global stablecoin market.[9] These stablecoins provide an easy way to store value in dollars, considerably increasing the risk of currency substitution in the form of “digital dollarisation”.[10] This phenomenon could have destabilising effects, particularly on emerging markets and less developed economies by impairing the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. It may also increase the risk of capital flight in response to adverse economic shocks.

    Enhancing cross-border retail payments at the regional and global level

    To address inefficiencies in cross-border payments, we must offer an alternative that connects various parts of the global payments system and delivers tangible benefits in terms of speed and cost. At the same time, this solution must respect the integrity, sovereignty and stability of all countries involved.

    At the ECB, we are pursuing this on two levels – regional and global.

    Regional cross-border payments: the European experience

    At the regional level, Europe serves as a compelling example of what an interconnected payments landscape might look like.

    Of course, this has been facilitated by the creation of a single European market and the establishment of a monetary union. One of the key reasons for creating the euro was to support trade and investment by facilitating cross-border transactions. And the launch of our single currency offered a first solution to pay throughout the euro area – in the form of euro cash.

    The logical next step was to develop European instruments for electronic euro payments. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) emerged from close cooperation between the public and private sector to harmonise electronic euro transactions. As a result, individuals and businesses can make payments across the euro area at very low costs using credit transfers or direct debit.

    The success of SEPA led to its expansion beyond the euro area and even beyond the European Union. Today, customers in 41 European countries can make euro payments quickly, safely and efficiently via credit transfer and direct debit, just as they would for domestic transactions.

    We have also developed the TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) service, which enables the settlement of instant payments across the euro area. Instant payments are further supported by a payment scheme – the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme – that provides harmonised rules, standards and protocols. Moreover, EU legislation has made it mandatory for banks to allow their customers to send and receive instant payment at low cost.

    A key feature of TIPS is that it’s a multi-currency platform. Taking advantage of this, Sweden and Denmark are using TIPS to facilitate fast payments in their respective currencies.[11] Norway will do the same as of 2028.[12] Furthermore, we are implementing a cross-currency settlement service that will allow instant payments initiated in one TIPS currency to be settled in another. Initially, this service will support cross-currency payments between the euro area, Sweden and Denmark.[13]

    Within Europe, we are also supporting the Western Balkans in developing a regional fast payment system.[14] As a service provider for TIPS, the Banca d’Italia is collaborating with the central banks of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro to develop an instant, multi-currency payment system based on TIPS software. North Macedonia may join the initiative at a later stage.[15] The new platform will facilitate instant payments both within each participating country and across borders.

    Going global: interlinking fast payment systems

    This shows the potential for strengthening regional integration in payments. However, let me be clear: regional integration must not come at the expense of global connectivity. It should not be used as a means to sever ties with global payment networks.

    Our approach is that regional and global integration can go hand in hand through the interlinking of fast payment systems across regions and countries. Today, over 100 jurisdictions worldwide have implemented their own fast payment systems.[16] Interlinking these systems has the potential to address inefficiencies and build lasting connections that are rooted in trade openness and balanced relationships between partners.

    This approach offers several advantages. It would reduce costs, increase the speed and transparency of cross-border payments and shorten transaction chains. It would also enable payment service providers to conduct transactions without having to use multiple payment systems or a long chain of correspondent banks. Moreover, it would ensure that the platform for connecting and converting currencies is managed as a public good, thus avoiding closed loops and discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments has identified interlinking as a key strategy for enhancing cross-border payments.[17] In this respect, the excellent work the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) is carrying out on payee verification could make a significant difference.

    Last October, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to take concrete steps towards interlinking TIPS with other fast payment systems to improve cross-border payments globally.[18]

    We will implement a cross-currency settlement service for the exchange of cross-border payments between TIPS and other fast payment systems worldwide.[19] This will allow us to explore interlinking TIPS with fast payment systems that have a compatible scheme, are interested in being involved and fully comply with the standards set by the Financial Action Task Force for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

    In addition, we are exploring the possibility of creating bilateral and multilateral links with other fast payment systems.

    One possibility under consideration is connecting TIPS to a multilateral network of instant payment systems through Project Nexus, led by the BIS.[20] By joining Nexus, TIPS could serve as a hub for processing instant cross-border payments to and from the euro area and other countries that use TIPS.[21]

    We are also currently assessing the feasibility of creating a bilateral link between TIPS and India’s Unified Payments Interface[22], which handles the highest volume of instant payment transactions in the world[23].

    Interlinking fast payment systems has the potential to solve the shortcomings related to the messaging leg of cross-border transactions, by facilitating the message that the payer’s bank in country A sends to the payee’s bank in country B about the incoming transfer of funds. This would already go a long way towards improving the efficiency of cross-border payments.

    However, what interlinking does not fully resolve is the settlement leg, through which money moves from the payer’s to the payee’s account. This still requires a bank that has access to both payment systems that are interlinked, or a credit relationship between a bank in country A and a bank in country B. This is particularly challenging, given the increasing retrenchment of the correspondent banking model.

    In this context, we need to collectively exercise our creativity. I do not envisage a solution that could cover all possible corridors and use cases: there may be scope for tokenised forms of money, as well as a revival of the correspondent banking model, especially if we can reduce the associated risks.

    In the realm of sovereign money, jurisdictions could agree to use their respective central bank digital currencies as settlement assets. In this respect, the current draft legislation on the digital euro provides for an approach that respects the sovereignty of non-euro area countries and mitigates potential risks for them. It does so by opening the possibility for residents of a partner country to use the digital euro, subject to an agreement with that country, complemented by an arrangement between the ECB and the respective central bank.[24]

    Appropriate safeguards – such as individual holding limits for users – would ensure that the digital euro is used primarily as a means of payment and does not fuel currency substitution. Furthermore, the digital euro’s design would include multi-currency functionality, similar to that of TIPS. In practice, this means that non-euro area countries could use the digital euro infrastructure to offer their own digital currencies, thereby facilitating transactions across these currencies.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    We find ourselves at a pivotal moment for cross-border payments. If we want to make decisive progress and increase their efficiency, we need to work together to develop new solutions. We must, however, be aware of the risks that some of the alternatives on offer may pose.

    I would like to thank the BIS – and in particular the CPMI – for the active role they play in this area, not least by bringing us all together today, with representatives from A (Angola) to Z (Zambia). Each of us brings different needs and circumstances to the table. This raises two fundamental questions. What do we have in common? And what principles can guide our collective efforts?

    First, we must harness responsible innovation to solve persistent challenges while mitigating the risks I have noted today. Central banks – by ensuring the safety and integrity of payment systems – play an important role in this regard. And by interlinking fast payment systems and exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, we can address settlement inefficiencies while safeguarding monetary sovereignty and financial stability.

    Second, regional solutions can serve as a foundation for global progress. I have argued that regional payment integration can be an important part of the solution – provided it remains open to, and actively facilitates, interlinking at a global level. We firmly believe that this open, multi-currency interlinking approach can lay the groundwork for cheaper, faster and more transparent cross-border payments – without compromising the integrity, stability or sovereignty of the countries involved. By designing payment systems that are open, interoperable and multi-currency ready, we can ensure that regional initiatives contribute to global integration rather than fragmentation.

    Finally, collaboration is central to our collective success. Forums such as the CPMI community of practice, as well as today’s workshop, provide valuable opportunities for sharing knowledge and experiences. We will continue to find ways to work together to build resilient, inclusive and interconnected payment infrastructures that meet the needs of our people and economies. And we at the ECB remain committed to sharing our expertise and collaborating wherever we can add value.

    Thank you for your attention.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Boston Man Sentenced to More Than Five Years in Prison for Fentanyl Distribution

    Source: US FBI

    BOSTON – A Boston man was sentenced today in federal court in Boston for a drug distribution offense involving fentanyl. The defendant is currently awaiting trial on murder charges in Massachusetts state court.

    Csean Skerritt, a/k/a “Shizz Grimmy,” a/k/a “Black,” 36, was sentenced by U.S. District Court Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton to 68 months federal prison, to be followed by four years of supervised release. In March 2025, Skerritt pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of 40 grams or more of fentanyl. In March 2025, Skerritt was indicted by a federal grand jury.

    As part of a drug trafficking investigation, on Feb. 1, 2023, Skerritt agreed to sell 50 grams of fentanyl to an individual in exchange for $1,500. Following a series of communications, Skerritt met the individual at a pre-arranged location. There, Skerritt entered the individual’s car and provided approximately 52.3 grams of fentanyl in exchange for the agreed-upon amount.

    On March 9, 2023, Skerritt was indicted for murder in the Massachusetts Superior Court and is awaiting trial.

    United States Attorney Leah B. Foley; Ted E. Docks, Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Division; Boston Police Commissioner Michael Cox; and Suffolk County District Attorney Kevin Hayden made the announcement today. Assistant U.S. Attorney John T. Dawley of the Organized Crime & Gang Unit prosecuted the case.

    This case is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.
     

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Boston Man Sentenced to More Than Five Years in Prison for Fentanyl Distribution

    Source: US FBI

    BOSTON – A Boston man was sentenced today in federal court in Boston for a drug distribution offense involving fentanyl. The defendant is currently awaiting trial on murder charges in Massachusetts state court.

    Csean Skerritt, a/k/a “Shizz Grimmy,” a/k/a “Black,” 36, was sentenced by U.S. District Court Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton to 68 months federal prison, to be followed by four years of supervised release. In March 2025, Skerritt pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of 40 grams or more of fentanyl. In March 2025, Skerritt was indicted by a federal grand jury.

    As part of a drug trafficking investigation, on Feb. 1, 2023, Skerritt agreed to sell 50 grams of fentanyl to an individual in exchange for $1,500. Following a series of communications, Skerritt met the individual at a pre-arranged location. There, Skerritt entered the individual’s car and provided approximately 52.3 grams of fentanyl in exchange for the agreed-upon amount.

    On March 9, 2023, Skerritt was indicted for murder in the Massachusetts Superior Court and is awaiting trial.

    United States Attorney Leah B. Foley; Ted E. Docks, Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Division; Boston Police Commissioner Michael Cox; and Suffolk County District Attorney Kevin Hayden made the announcement today. Assistant U.S. Attorney John T. Dawley of the Organized Crime & Gang Unit prosecuted the case.

    This case is part of an Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) operation. OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. Additional information about the OCDETF Program can be found at https://www.justice.gov/OCDETF.
     

    MIL Security OSI –