Category: Intelligence

MIL-OSI: YieldMax® Introduces Option Income Strategy ETF on Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (BRK.B)

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

CHICAGO and MILWAUKEE and NEW YORK, June 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — YieldMax® announced the launch today of the following ETF:

YieldMax® BRK.B Option Income Strategy ETF (NYSE Arca: BRKC)

BRKC seeks to generate current income by pursuing options-based strategies on Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (“BRK.B”). BRKC is managed by Tidal Financial Group. BRKC does not invest directly in BRK.B.

BRKC is the newest member of the YieldMax® ETF family and like all YieldMax® ETFs, aims to deliver current income to investors. With respect to distributions, BRKC will be a Group A ETF, and its first distribution is expected to be announced on July 9^th, 2025.

Please see the table below for distribution information for all outstanding YieldMax® ETFs.

ETF Ticker¹	ETF Name	Distribution Frequency	Distribution Rate^2,4	30-Day SEC Yield³	ROC⁵
CHPY	YieldMax® Semiconductor Portfolio Option Income ETF	*Weekly*	34.19%	0.38%	100.00%
GPTY	YieldMax® AI & Tech Portfolio Option Income ETF	*Weekly*	33.22%	0.00%	100.00%
LFGY	YieldMax® Crypto Industry & Tech Portfolio Option Income ETF	*Weekly*	60.72%	0.00%	100.00%
QDTY	YieldMax® Nasdaq 100 0DTE Covered Call Strategy ETF	*Weekly*	28.07%	0.00%	100.00%
RDTY	YieldMax® R2000 0DTE Covered Call Strategy ETF	*Weekly*	24.42%	0.89%	95.29%
SDTY	YieldMax® S&P 500 0DTE Covered Call Strategy ETF	*Weekly*	25.88%	0.00%	100.00%
ULTY	YieldMax® Ultra Option Income Strategy ETF	*Weekly*	78.61%	0.00%	100.00%
YMAG	YieldMax® Magnificent 7 Fund of Option Income ETFs	*Weekly*	70.31%	66.50%	97.56%
YMAX	YieldMax® Universe Fund of Option Income ETFs	*Weekly*	65.04%	88.53%	92.64%
BIGY	YieldMax® Target 12™ Big 50 Option Income ETF	Monthly	12.02%	0.20%	94.52%
RNTY	YieldMax® Target 12™ Real Estate Option Income ETF	Monthly	12.13%	2.21%	93.65%
SOXY	YieldMax® Target 12™ Semiconductor Option Income ETF	Monthly	11.78%	0.17%	100.00%
ABNY	YieldMax® ABNB Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	42.01%	2.97%	93.60%
AIYY	YieldMax® AI Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	88.81%	2.97%	96.86%
AMDY	YieldMax® AMD Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	72.55%	3.09%	96.48%
AMZY	YieldMax® AMZN Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	48.28%	3.09%	94.01%
APLY	YieldMax® AAPL Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	30.96%	3.42%	89.96%
BABO	YieldMax® BABA Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	81.51%	3.32%	96.22%
CONY	YieldMax® COIN Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	119.22%	3.53%	80.80%
CRSH	YieldMax® Short TSLA Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	84.22%	3.08%	97.39%
CVNY	YieldMax® CVNA Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	129.09%	2.81%	99.33%
DIPS	YieldMax® Short NVDA Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	54.18%	2.78%	0.00%
DISO	YieldMax® DIS Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	50.22%	3.16%	94.89%
FBY	YieldMax® META Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	49.79%	3.21%	93.73%
FEAT	YieldMax® Dorsey Wright Featured 5 Income ETF	Every 4 weeks	51.42%	52.99%	0.00%
FIAT	YieldMax® Short COIN Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	67.85%	2.93%	96.24%
FIVY	YieldMax® Dorsey Wright Hybrid 5 Income ETF	Every 4 weeks	32.36%	35.26%	0.00%
GDXY	YieldMax® Gold Miners Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	30.60%	3.38%	0.00%
GOOY	YieldMax® GOOGL Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	36.93%	3.29%	81.91%
HOOY	YieldMax® HOOD Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	70.41%	–	99.33%
JPMO	YieldMax® JPM Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	31.52%	3.02%	91.70%
MARO	YieldMax® MARA Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	111.50%	3.30%	98.09%
MRNY	YieldMax® MRNA Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	63.98%	3.20%	0.00%
MSFO	YieldMax® MSFT Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	41.10%	3.13%	92.68%
MSTY	YieldMax® MSTR Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	85.27%	1.76%	97.45%
NFLY	YieldMax® NFLX Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	47.73%	2.98%	94.49%
NVDY	YieldMax® NVDA Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	131.88%	2.98%	97.93%
OARK	YieldMax® Innovation Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	50.47%	2.88%	94.42%
PLTY	YieldMax® PLTR Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	140.91%	2.76%	98.54%
PYPY	YieldMax® PYPL Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	55.03%	3.41%	95.28%
SMCY	YieldMax® SMCI Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	99.93%	3.05%	97.21%
SNOY	YieldMax® SNOW Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	96.99%	2.27%	97.27%
TSLY	YieldMax® TSLA Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	110.41%	2.76%	97.90%
TSMY	YieldMax® TSM Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	64.34%	2.87%	95.70%
WNTR	YieldMax® Short MSTR Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	104.26%	2.89%	97.57%
XOMO	YieldMax® XOM Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	42.05%	3.62%	85.39%
XYZY	YieldMax® XYZ Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	109.59%	2.93%	98.01%
YBIT	YieldMax® Bitcoin Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	106.79%	1.54%	99.08%
YQQQ	YieldMax® Short N100 Option Income Strategy ETF	Every 4 weeks	23.18%	3.35%	86.54%

Standardized Performance & Fund details can be obtained by clicking the ETF Ticker in the table above or by visiting us at www.yieldmaxetfs.com

Performance data quoted represents past performance and is no guarantee of future results. Investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when sold or redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost and current performance may be lower or higher than the performance quoted above. Performance current to the most recent month-end can be obtained by calling (833) 378-0717.

Note: DIPS, FIAT, CRSH, YQQQ and WNTR are hereinafter referred to as the “Short ETFs.”

Distributions are not guaranteed. The Distribution Rate and 30-Day SEC Yield are not indicative of future distributions, if any, on the ETFs. In particular, future distributions on any ETF may differ significantly from its Distribution Rate or 30-Day SEC Yield. You are not guaranteed a distribution under the ETFs. Distributions for the ETFs (if any) are variable and may vary significantly from period to period and may be zero. Accordingly, the Distribution Rate and 30-Day SEC Yield will change over time, and such change may be significant.

Investors in the Funds will not have rights to receive dividends or other distributions with respect to the underlying reference asset(s).

¹All YieldMax® ETFs shown in the table above (except YMAX, YMAG, FEAT, FIVY and ULTY) have a gross expense ratio of 0.99%. YMAX and FEAT have a Management Fee of 0.29% and Acquired Fund Fees and Expenses of 0.99% for a gross expense ratio of 1.28%. YMAG has a management fee of 0.29% and Acquired Fund Fees and Expenses of 0.83% for a gross expense ratio of 1.12%. FIVY has a Management Fee of 0.29% and Acquired Fund Fees and Expenses of 0.59% for a gross expense ratio of 0.88%. “Acquired Fund Fees and Expenses” are indirect fees and expenses that the Fund incurs from investing in the shares of other investment companies, namely other YieldMax® ETFs. ULTY has a gross expense ratio of 1.40%, and a net expense ratio after the fee waiver of 1.30%. The Advisor has agreed to a fee waiver of 0.10% through at least February 28, 2026.

²The Distribution Rate shown is as of close on June 4th, 2025. The Distribution Rate is the annual distribution rate an investor would receive if the most recent distribution, which includes option income, remained the same going forward. The Distribution Rate is calculated by annualizing an ETF’s Distribution per Share and dividing such annualized amount by the ETF’s most recent NAV. The Distribution Rate represents a single distribution from the ETF and does not represent its total return. Distributions may also include a combination of ordinary dividends, capital gain, and return of investor capital, which may decrease an ETF’s NAV and trading price over time. As a result, an investor may suffer significant losses to their investment. These Distribution Rates may be caused by unusually favorable market conditions and may not be sustainable. Such conditions may not continue to exist and there should be no expectation that this performance may be repeated in the future.

³ The 30-Day SEC Yield represents net investment income, which excludes option income, earned by such ETF over the 30-Day period ended May 31^st, 2025, expressed as an annual percentage rate based on such ETF’s share price at the end of the 30-Day period.

⁴ Each ETF’s strategy (except those of the Short ETFs) will cap potential gains if its reference asset’s shares increase in value, yet subjects an investor to all potential losses if the reference asset’s shares decrease in value. Such potential losses may not be offset by income received by the ETF. Each Short ETF’s strategy will cap potential gains if its reference asset decreases in value, yet subjects an investor to all potential losses if the reference asset increases in value. Such potential losses may not be offset by income received by the ETF.

⁵ROC refers to Return of Capital. The ROC percentage indicates how much the distribution reflects an investor’s initial investment. The figures shown for each Fund in the table above are estimates and may later be determined to be taxable net investment income, short-term gains, long-term gains (to the extent permitted by law), or return of capital. Actual amounts and sources for tax reporting will depend upon the Fund’s investment activities during the remainder of the fiscal year and may be subject to changes based on tax regulations. Your broker will send you a Form 1099-DIV for the calendar year to tell you how to report these distributions for federal income tax purposes.

Each Fund has a limited operating history and while each Fund’s objective is to provide current income, there is no guarantee the Fund will make a distribution. Distributions are likely to vary greatly in amount.

Important Information

This material must be preceded or accompanied by the prospectus. For all prospectuses, click here.

Tidal Financial Group is the adviser for all YieldMax® ETFs.

THE FUND, TRUST, AND ADVISER ARE NOT AFFILIATED WITH ANY UNDERLYING REFERENCE ASSET.

Risk Disclosures

Investing involves risk. Principal loss is possible.

Referenced Index Risk. The Fund invests in options contracts that are based on the value of the Index (or the Index ETFs). This subjects the Fund to certain of the same risks as if it owned shares of companies that comprised the Index or an ETF that tracks the Index, even though it does not.

Indirect Investment Risk. The Index is not affiliated with the Trust, the Fund, the Adviser, or their respective affiliates and is not involved with this offering in any way. Investors in the Fund will not have the right to receive dividends or other distributions or any other rights with respect to the companies that comprise the Index but will be subject to declines in the performance of the Index.

Russell 2000 Index Risks. The Index, which consists of small-cap U.S. companies, is particularly susceptible to economic changes, as these firms often have less financial resilience than larger companies. Market volatility can disproportionately affect these smaller businesses, leading to significant price swings. Additionally, these companies are often more exposed to specific industry risks and have less diverse revenue streams. They can also be more vulnerable to changes in domestic regulatory or policy environments.

Call Writing Strategy Risk. The path dependency (i.e., the continued use) of the Fund’s call writing strategy will impact the extent that the Fund participates in the positive price returns of the underlying reference asset and, in turn, the Fund’s returns, both during the term of the sold call options and over longer periods.

Counterparty Risk. The Fund is subject to counterparty risk by virtue of its investments in options contracts. Transactions in some types of derivatives, including options, are required to be centrally cleared (“cleared derivatives”). In a transaction involving cleared derivatives, the Fund’s counterparty is a clearing house rather than a bank or broker. Since the Fund is not a member of clearing houses and only members of a clearing house (“clearing members”) can participate directly in the clearing house, the Fund will hold cleared derivatives through accounts at clearing members.

Derivatives Risk. Derivatives are financial instruments that derive value from the underlying reference asset or assets, such as stocks, bonds, or funds (including ETFs), interest rates or indexes. The Fund’s investments in derivatives may pose risks in addition to, and greater than, those associated with directly investing in securities or other ordinary investments, including risk related to the market, imperfect correlation with underlying investments or the Fund’s other Index (or ETFs that track the Index’s performance)holdings, higher price volatility, lack of availability, counterparty risk, liquidity, valuation and legal restrictions.

Options Contracts. The use of options contracts involves investment strategies and risks different from those associated with ordinary Index (or ETFs that track the Index’s performance) securities transactions. The prices of options are volatile and are influenced by, among other things, actual and anticipated changes in the value of the underlying instrument, including the anticipated volatility, which are affected by fiscal and monetary policies and by national and international political, changes in the actual or implied volatility or the reference asset, the time remaining until the expiration of the option contract and economic events.

Distribution Risk. As part of the Fund’s investment objective, the Fund seeks to provide current income. There is no assurance that the Fund will make a distribution in any given period. If the Fund does make distributions, the amounts of such distributions will likely vary greatly from one distribution to the next. Additionally, monthly distributions, if any, may consist of returns of capital, which would decrease the Fund’s NAV and trading price over time.

High Index (or Index ETF) Turnover Risk. The Fund may actively and frequently trade all or a significant portion of the Fund’s holdings. A high Index (or Index ETF) turnover rate increases transaction costs, which may increase the Fund’s expenses.

Liquidity Risk. Some securities held by the Fund, including options contracts, may be difficult to sell or be illiquid, particularly during times of market turmoil.

Non-Diversification Risk. Because the Fund is “non-diversified,” it may invest a greater percentage of its assets in the securities of a single issuer or a smaller number of issuers than if it was a diversified fund.

New Fund Risk. The Fund is a recently organized management investment company with no operating history. As a result, prospective investors do not have a track record or history on which to base their investment decisions.

Price Participation Risk. The Fund employs an investment strategy that includes the sale of call option contracts, which limits the degree to which the Fund will participate in increases in value experienced by the underlying reference asset over the Call Period.

Inflation Risk. Inflation risk is the risk that the value of assets or income from investments will be less in the future as inflation decreases the value of money. As inflation increases, the present value of the Fund’s assets and distributions, if any, may decline.

Single Issuer Risk. Issuer-specific attributes may cause an investment in the Fund to be more volatile than a traditional pooled investment which diversifies risk or the market generally. The value of the Fund, which focuses on an individual security (ARKK, TSLA, AAPL, NVDA, AMZN, META, GOOGL, NFLX, COIN, MSFT, DIS, XOM, JPM, AMD, PYPL, SQ, MRNA, AI, MSTR, Bitcoin ETP, GDX®, SNOW, ABNB, BABA, TSM, SMCI, PLTR, MARA, CVNA, HOOD, BRK.B), may be more volatile than a traditional pooled investment or the market as a whole and may perform differently from the value of a traditional pooled investment or the market as a whole.

Risk Disclosures (applicable only to GPTY)

Artificial Intelligence Risk. Issuers engaged in artificial intelligence typically have high research and capital expenditures and, as a result, their profitability can vary widely, if they are profitable at all. The space in which they are engaged is highly competitive and issuers’ products and services may become obsolete very quickly. These companies are heavily dependent on intellectual property rights and may be adversely affected by loss or impairment of those rights. The issuers are also subject to legal, regulatory and political changes that may have a large impact on their profitability. A failure in an issuer’s product or even questions about the safety of the product could be devastating to the issuer, especially if it is the marquee product of the issuer. It can be difficult to accurately capture what qualifies as an artificial intelligence company.

Technology Sector Risk. The Fund will invest substantially in companies in the information technology sector, and therefore the performance of the Fund could be negatively impacted by events affecting this sector. Market or economic factors impacting technology companies and companies that rely heavily on technological advances could have a significant effect on the value of the Fund’s investments. The value of stocks of information technology companies and companies that rely heavily on technology is particularly vulnerable to rapid changes in technology product cycles, rapid product obsolescence, government regulation and competition, both domestically and internationally, including competition from foreign competitors with lower production costs. Stocks of information technology companies and companies that rely heavily on technology, especially those of smaller, less-seasoned companies, tend to be more volatile than the overall market. Information technology companies are heavily dependent on patent and intellectual property rights, the loss or impairment of which may adversely affect profitability.

Risk Disclosure (applicable only to MARO)

Digital Assets Risk: The Fund does not invest directly in Bitcoin or any other digital assets. The Fund does not invest directly in derivatives that track the performance of Bitcoin or any other digital assets. The Fund does not invest in or seek direct exposure to the current “spot” or cash price of Bitcoin. Investors seeking direct exposure to the price of Bitcoin should consider an investment other than the Fund. Digital assets like Bitcoin, designed as mediums of exchange, are still an emerging asset class. They operate independently of any central authority or government backing and are subject to regulatory changes and extreme price volatility.

Risk Disclosures (applicable only to BABO and TSMY)

Currency Risk: Indirect exposure to foreign currencies subjects the Fund to the risk that currencies will decline in value relative to the U.S. dollar. Currency rates in foreign countries may fluctuate significantly over short periods of time for a number of reasons, including changes in interest rates and the imposition of currency controls or other political developments in the U.S. or abroad.

Depositary Receipts Risk: The securities underlying BABO and TSMY are American Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”). Investment in ADRs may be less liquid than the underlying shares in their primary trading market.

Foreign Market and Trading Risk: The trading markets for many foreign securities are not as active as U.S. markets and may have less governmental regulation and oversight.

Foreign Securities Risk: Investments in securities of non-U.S. issuers involve certain risks that may not be present with investments in securities of U.S. issuers, such as risk of loss due to foreign currency fluctuations or to political or economic instability, as well as varying regulatory requirements applicable to investments in non-U.S. issuers. There may be less information publicly available about a non-U.S. issuer than a U.S. issuer. Non-U.S. issuers may also be subject to different regulatory, accounting, auditing, financial reporting and investor protection standards than U.S. issuers.

Risk Disclosures (applicable only to GDXY)

Risk of Investing in Foreign Securities. The Fund is exposed indirectly to the securities of foreign issuers selected by GDX®’s investment adviser, which subjects the Fund to the risks associated with such companies. Investments in the securities of foreign issuers involve risks beyond those associated with investments in U.S. securities.

Risk of Investing in Gold and Silver Mining Companies. The Fund is exposed indirectly to gold and silver mining companies selected by GDX®’s investment adviser, which subjects the Fund to the risks associated with such companies.

The Fund invests in options contracts based on the value of the VanEck Gold Miners ETF (GDX®), which subjects the Fund to some of the same risks as if it owned GDX®, as well as the risks associated with Canadian, Australian and Emerging Market Issuers, and Small-and Medium-Capitalization companies.

Risk Disclosures (applicable only to YBIT)

YBIT does not invest directly in Bitcoin or any other digital assets. YBIT does not invest directly in derivatives that track the performance of Bitcoin or any other digital assets. YBIT does not invest in or seek direct exposure to the current “spot” or cash price of Bitcoin. Investors seeking direct exposure to the price of Bitcoin should consider an investment other than YBIT.

Bitcoin Investment Risk: The Fund’s indirect investment in Bitcoin, through holdings in one or more Underlying ETPs, exposes it to the unique risks of this emerging innovation. Bitcoin’s price is highly volatile, and its market is influenced by the changing Bitcoin network, fluctuating acceptance levels, and unpredictable usage trends.

Digital Assets Risk: Digital assets like Bitcoin, designed as mediums of exchange, are still an emerging asset class. They operate independently of any central authority or government backing and are subject to regulatory changes and extreme price volatility. Potentially No 1940 Act Protections. As of the date of this Prospectus, there is only a single eligible Underlying ETP, and it is an investment company subject to the 1940 Act.

Bitcoin ETP Risk: The Fund invests in options contracts that are based on the value of the Bitcoin ETP. This subjects the Fund to certain of the same risks as if it owned shares of the Bitcoin ETP, even though it does not. Bitcoin ETPs are subject, but not limited, to significant risk and heightened volatility. An investor in a Bitcoin ETP may lose their entire investment. Bitcoin ETPs are not suitable for all investors. In addition, not all Bitcoin ETPs are registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Those Bitcoin ETPs that are not registered under such statute are therefore not subject to the same regulations as exchange traded products that are so registered.

Risk Disclosures (applicable only to the Short ETFs)

Investing involves risk. Principal loss is possible.

Price Appreciation Risk. As part of the Fund’s synthetic covered put strategy, the Fund purchases and sells call and put option contracts that are based on the value of the underlying reference asset. This strategy subjects the Fund to certain of the same risks as if it shorted the underlying reference asset, even though it does not. By virtue of the Fund’s indirect inverse exposure to changes in the value of the underlying reference asset, the Fund is subject to the risk that the value of the underlying reference asset increases. If the value of the underlying reference asset increases, the Fund will likely lose value and, as a result, the Fund may suffer significant losses.

Put Writing Strategy Risk. The path dependency (i.e., the continued use) of the Fund’s put writing (selling) strategy will impact the extent that the Fund participates in decreases in the value of the underlying reference asset and, in turn, the Fund’s returns, both during the term of the sold put options and over longer periods.

Purchased OTM Call Options Risk. The Fund’s strategy is subject to potential losses if the underlying reference asset increases in value, which may not be offset by the purchase of out-of-the-money (OTM) call options. The Fund purchases OTM calls to seek to manage (cap) the Fund’s potential losses from the Fund’s short exposure to the underlying reference asset if it appreciates significantly in value. However, the OTM call options will cap the Fund’s losses only to the extent that the value of the underlying reference asset increases to a level that is at or above the strike level of the purchased OTM call options. Any increase in the value of the underlying reference asset to a level that is below the strike level of the purchased OTM call options will result in a corresponding loss for the Fund. For example, if the OTM call options have a strike level that is approximately 100% above the then-current value of the underlying reference asset at the time of the call option purchase, and the value of the underlying reference asset increases by at least 100% during the term of the purchased OTM call options, the Fund will lose all its value. Since the Fund bears the costs of purchasing the OTM calls, such costs will decrease the Fund’s value and/or any income otherwise generated by the Fund’s investment strategy.

Derivatives Risk. Derivatives are financial instruments that derive value from the underlying reference asset or assets, such as stocks, bonds, or funds (including ETFs), interest rates or indexes. The Fund’s investments in derivatives may pose risks in addition to, and greater than, those associated with directly investing in securities or other ordinary investments, including risk related to the market, imperfect correlation with underlying investments or the Fund’s other portfolio holdings, higher price volatility, lack of availability, counterparty risk, liquidity, valuation and legal restrictions.

Options Contracts. The use of options contracts involves investment strategies and risks different from those associated with ordinary portfolio securities transactions. The prices of options are volatile and are influenced by, among other things, actual and anticipated changes in the value of the underlying reference asset, including the anticipated volatility, which are affected by fiscal and monetary policies and by national and international political, changes in the actual or implied volatility or the reference asset, the time remaining until the expiration of the option contract and economic events.

High Portfolio Turnover Risk. The Fund may actively and frequently trade all or a significant portion of the Fund’s holdings.

Liquidity Risk. Some securities held by the Fund, including options contracts, may be difficult to sell or be illiquid, particularly during times of market turmoil.

Price Participation Risk. The Fund employs an investment strategy that includes the sale of put option contracts, which limits the degree to which the Fund will participate in decreases in value experienced by the underlying reference asset over the Put Period.

Single Issuer Risk. Issuer-specific attributes may cause an investment in the Fund to be more volatile than a traditional pooled investment which diversifies risk or the market generally. The value of the Fund, for any Fund that focuses on an individual security (e.g., TSLA, COIN, NVDA, MSTR), may be more volatile than a traditional pooled investment or the market as a whole and may perform differently from the value of a traditional pooled investment or the market as a whole.

Risk Disclosures (applicable only to CHPY)

Semiconductor Industry Risk. Semiconductor companies may face intense competition, both domestically and internationally, and such competition may have an adverse effect on their profit margins. Semiconductor companies may have limited product lines, markets, financial resources or personnel. Semiconductor companies’ supply chain and operations are dependent on the availability of materials that meet exacting standards and the use of third parties to provide components and services.

The products of semiconductor companies may face obsolescence due to rapid technological developments and frequent new product introduction, unpredictable changes in growth rates and competition for the services of qualified personnel. Capital equipment expenditures could be substantial, and equipment generally suffers from rapid obsolescence. Companies in the semiconductor industry are heavily dependent on patent and intellectual property rights. The loss or impairment of these rights would adversely affect the profitability of these companies.

Risk Disclosures (applicable only to YQQQ)

Index Overview. The Nasdaq 100 Index is a benchmark index that includes 100 of the largest non-financial companies listed on the Nasdaq Stock Market, based on market capitalization.

Index Level Appreciation Risk. As part of the Fund’s synthetic covered put strategy, the Fund purchases and sells call and put option contracts that are based on the Index level. This strategy subjects the Fund to certain of the same risks as if it shorted the Index, even though it does not. By virtue of the Fund’s indirect inverse exposure to changes in the Index level, the Fund is subject to the risk that the Index level increases. If the Index level increases, the Fund will likely lose value and, as a result, the Fund may suffer significant losses. The Fund may also be subject to the following risks: innovation and technological advancement; strong market presence of Index constituent companies; adaptability to global market trends; and resilience and recovery potential.

Index Level Participation Risk. The Fund employs an investment strategy that includes the sale of put option contracts, which limits the degree to which the Fund will benefit from decreases in the Index level experienced over the Put Period. This means that if the Index level experiences a decrease in value below the strike level of the sold put options during a Put Period, the Fund will likely not experience that increase to the same extent and any Fund gains may significantly differ from the level of the Index losses over the Put Period. Additionally, because the Fund is limited in the degree to which it will participate in decreases in value experienced by the Index level over each Put Period, but has significant negative exposure to any increases in value experienced by the Index level over the Put Period, the NAV of the Fund may decrease over any given period. The Fund’s NAV is dependent on the value of each options portfolio, which is based principally upon the inverse of the performance of the Index level. The Fund’s ability to benefit from the Index level decreases will depend on prevailing market conditions, especially market volatility, at the time the Fund enters into the sold put option contracts and will vary from Put Period to Put Period. The value of the options contracts is affected by changes in the value and dividend rates of component companies that comprise the Index, changes in interest rates, changes in the actual or perceived volatility of the Index and the remaining time to the options’ expiration, as well as trading conditions in the options market. As the Index level changes and time moves towards the expiration of each Put Period, the value of the options contracts, and therefore the Fund’s NAV, will change. However, it is not expected for the Fund’s NAV to directly inversely correlate on a day-to-day basis with the returns of the Index level. The amount of time remaining until the options contract’s expiration date affects the impact that the value of the options contracts has on the Fund’s NAV, which may not be in full effect until the expiration date of the Fund’s options contracts. Therefore, while changes in the Index level will result in changes to the Fund’s NAV, the Fund generally anticipates that the rate of change in the Fund’s NAV will be different than the inverse of the changes experienced by the Index level.

YieldMax® ETFs are distributed by Foreside Fund Services, LLC. Foreside is not affiliated with Tidal Financial Group, or YieldMax® ETFs.

The MIL Network –

June 5, 2025

MIL-OSI: LyondellBasell enters into an agreement and exclusive negotiations with AEQUITA for the sale of four European Strategic Assessment assets

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

ROTTERDAM, The Netherlands, June 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — LyondellBasell (LYB) today announced that it has entered into an agreement and exclusive negotiations with AEQUITA for the sale of select olefins & polyolefins assets and the associated business in Europe. The sites to be sold have been part of the previously announced European strategic assessment and are located in Berre (France), Münchsmünster (Germany), Carrington (UK), and Tarragona (Spain).

“This contemplated transaction is a significant step in LYB’s transformation to Grow and Upgrade our Core. We are committed to operate our assets safely and reliably throughout this process and will continue to support our customers, employees and other key stakeholders,” said Peter Vanacker, LyondellBasell chief executive officer. “Europe remains a core market for LYB and one we will continue to participate in following this transaction with more of a focus on value creation through establishing profitable leadership in circular and renewable solutions.”

The assets and business to be acquired by AEQUITA include integrated and non-integrated sites within LYB’s European olefins and polyolefins business, as well as supporting central functions based at the Company’s Rotterdam headquarters and various locations. The sites together represent a scaled olefins and polyolefins platform strategically located in proximity to a longstanding customer base and with access and connectivity to key infrastructure.

“The acquisition of these assets from LYB marks another important step in expanding our industrial footprint,” said Christoph Himmel, Managing Partner at AEQUITA. “Each site brings a strong operational foundation and a highly experienced, committed employee base. We are confident in our ability to accelerate their development under AEQUITA’s ownership approach. We look forward to welcoming the teams into our Group and to working collaboratively with all stakeholders to ensure a smooth transition and establish a strong platform for long-term success.”

The agreement entered into between LyondellBasell and AEQUITA is a put option deed under which AEQUITA has committed to enter into an agreed form purchase agreement if LyondellBasell exercises its put option, after conclusion of certain works council consultation processes.

Closing of the proposed transaction is currently expected in the first half of 2026, subject to the completion of the information and consultation processes with the relevant employee representative bodies in accordance with applicable laws, as well as regulatory and other customary closing conditions. Citi and J.P. Morgan Securities LLC acted as financial advisors and Linklaters LLP acted as legal counsel to LyondellBasell.

Investor conference call

LYB will host a conference call June 5 at 8 a.m. EDT. Participants on the call will include Chief Executive Officer Peter Vanacker, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer Agustin Izquierdo, Executive Vice President of Global Olefins and Polyolefins Kim Foley and Head of Investor Relations Dave Kinney. For event access, the toll-free dial-in number is 1-877-407-8029, international dial-in number is 201-689-8029 or click the CallMe link. The slides and webcast that accompany the call will be available at investors.lyondellbasell.com/events-and-presentations/. A replay of the call will be available from 1 p.m. EDT June 5 until July 5, 2025. The replay toll-free dial-in numbers are 1-877-660-6853 and 201-612-7415. The access ID for each is 13754240.

About LyondellBasell
We are LyondellBasell (NYSE: LYB) ― a leader in the global chemical industry creating solutions for everyday sustainable living. Through advanced technology and focused investments, we are enabling a circular and low carbon economy. Across all we do, we aim to unlock value for our customers, investors, and society. As one of the world’s largest producers of polymers and a leader in polyolefin technologies, we develop, manufacture and market high-quality and innovative products for applications ranging from sustainable transportation and food safety to clean water and quality healthcare. For more information, please visit www.lyondellbasell.com or follow @LyondellBasell on LinkedIn.

About AEQUITA
AEQUITA is a Munich-based industrial group investing in special situations, including corporate carve-outs, successions, and transformational situations across Europe. Its current portfolio generates more than EUR 3.5 billion in revenues. With a strong capital base, entrepreneurial expertise, and a partnership approach, AEQUITA focuses on the acquisition and long-term value enhancement of companies that can benefit from its operational engagement. For more information, please visit www.aequita.com.

Media Inquiries LYB Global
LyondellBasell Media Relations
Phone: +1-713-309-7575
Email: mediarelations@lyondellbasell.com

Or:

Media Inquiries LYB Europe
Robert Kleissen, External Affairs Europe
Phone: +31-6-273-573-98
Email: robert.kleissen@lyondellbasell.com

Media Inquiries AEQUITA
Simon Schulz, Partner
Phone: +49-89-2620-4840-0
Email: contact@aequita.com

Forward-Looking Statements LYB
The statements in this release relating to matters that are not historical facts are forward-looking statements. Actual results could differ materially based on factors including, but not limited to, our ability to align our asset base with our strategic goals; our ability to successfully complete the transactions contemplated by the put option and related agreements; completion of information and consultation processes of the relevant employee representative bodies; and the satisfaction of regulatory and other customary closing conditions. Additional factors that could cause results to differ materially from those described in the forward-looking statements can be found in the “Risk Factors” section of our Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024, which can be found at www.LyondellBasell.com on the Investor Relations page and on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s website at www.sec.gov. There is no assurance that any of the actions, events or results of the forward-looking statements will occur, or if any of them do, what impact they will have on our results of operations or financial condition. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they were made and are based on the estimates and opinions of management of LyondellBasell at the time the statements are made. LyondellBasell does not assume any obligation to update forward-looking statements should circumstances or management’s estimates or opinions change, except as required by law.

The MIL Network –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI: Richemont publishes FY25 Annual Report and Non-Financial Report

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

5 JUNE 2025

RICHEMONT PUBLISHES FY25 ANNUAL REPORT
AND NON-FINANCIAL REPORT

Richemont has today published its combined Annual Report and Accounts with the Business review, the Compensation Report and the Corporate Governance Report, along with its Non-Financial Report, for the year ended 31 March 2025.

The Annual Report and Accounts, which includes the Chairman’s review to shareholders, the annual consolidated and statutory financial statements, and the corresponding audit reports was already published on 16 May 2025.

The Non-Financial Report 2025, prepared in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Standards (2021), provides Richemont’s disclosures on non-financial matters. The report complies with the reporting disclosure required by Articles 964a-c of the Swiss Code of Obligations, including the Swiss Ordinance on Climate Disclosures. Selected disclosures and indicators have been independently assured (limited assurance) by PricewaterhouseCoopers SA (PwC).

Both reports are available for download on the Company’s website at https://www.richemont.com/media/ue1bjrjv/richemont-fy25-annual-report-en.pdf and https://www.richemont.com/media/3vwfatyf/richemont-non-financial-report-2025.pdf. Hard copies will be mailed to parties who have requested it and may also be obtained from the Company’s registered office at the address below or by contacting the Company via the website at www.richemont.com/about-us/contact-us.

In South Africa, the Annual Report and Non-Financial Report may be obtained directly from the Depository Agent at the following address: Computershare Investor Services Proprietary Limited, Rosebank Towers, 15 Biermann Avenue, Rosebank, Johannesburg, 2196, South Africa.

About Richemont

At Richemont, we craft the future. Our unique portfolio includes prestigious Maisons distinguished by their craftsmanship and creativity. Richemont’s ambition is to nurture its Maisons and businesses and enable them to grow and prosper in a responsible, sustainable manner over the long term.

Richemont operates in three business areas: Jewellery Maisons with Buccellati, Cartier, Van Cleef & Arpels and Vhernier; Specialist Watchmakers with A. Lange & Söhne, Baume & Mercier, IWC Schaffhausen, Jaeger-LeCoultre, Panerai, Piaget, Roger Dubuis and Vacheron Constantin; and Other, primarily Fashion & Accessories Maisons with Alaïa, Chloé, Delvaux, dunhill, G/FORE, Gianvito Rossi, Montblanc, Peter Millar, Purdey, Serapian as well as Watchfinder & Co. Find out more at https://www.richemont.com/.

Richemont A shares are listed on the SIX Swiss Exchange, Richemont’s primary listing, and are included in the Swiss Market Index (‘SMI’) of leading stocks. Richemont A shares are listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Richemont’s secondary listing.

Investor/analyst and media enquiries
+41 22 721 3003 (investor relations)
Investor.relations@cfrinfo.net
+41 22 721 3507 (media)
pressoffice@cfrinfo.net
richemont@teneo.com

Click here for a printer-friendly version in English (PDF)

The MIL Network –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Boston Man Indicted for Receipt and Possession of Child Pornography

Source: US FBI

BOSTON – A Boston man has been indicted by a federal grand jury for receiving and possessing child sexual abuse material (CSAM).

Cess Frazier, 32, was charged with one count of receipt of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography. Frazier was arrested and charged by complaint on April 29, 2025. The defendant was subsequently released on conditions following a detention hearing and will be arraigned in federal court in Boston at a later date.

According to the charging documents, on or about Feb. 20, 2025 through April 29, 2025, Frazier knowingly received and possessed files that depicted CSAM from unknown users on Telegram. It is alleged that the CSAM files depicted the sexual abuse of minor victims who appeared to be between approximately three and 10 years old.

The charge of receipt of child pornography provides for a sentence of at least five years and up to 20 years in prison, at least five years and up to a lifetime of supervised release and a fine of up to $250,000. The charge of possession of child pornography provides for a sentence of up to 20 years in prison, at least five years and up to a lifetime of supervised release and a fine of up to $250,000. Sentences are imposed by a federal district court judge based upon the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and statutes which govern the determination of a sentence in a criminal case.

United States Attorney Leah B. Foley and Kimberly Milka, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Division made the announcement today. Valuable assistance was provided by the Boston Police Department. Assistant U.S. Attorney Allegra Flamm of the Major Crimes Unit is prosecuting the case.

The details contained in the charging documents are allegations. The defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Grassley Oversight Unveils Disturbing Extent of FBI’s Anti-Catholic Bias

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Iowa Chuck Grassley
WASHINGTON – Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) today released Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) records revealing the Biden FBI’s anti-Catholic Richmond Memo was widely distributed to over 1,000 FBI employees across the country before it was publicly disclosed by a whistleblower in 2023.
Per the Grassley-obtained records, the Biden FBI’s targeting of Catholics based on biased sources was more widespread than previously known. In fact, Grassley found the FBI produced at least 13 additional documents and five attachments that used anti-Catholic terminology and relied on information from the radical far-left Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC). One FBI agent admitted over email, “[O]ur overreliance on the SPLC for hate designation [of traditional Catholics] is … problematic.”
A second FBI memo, released by Grassley, was drafted by the FBI Richmond field office for Bureau-wide distribution. The draft memo repeated the unfounded link between traditional Catholicism and violent extremism, but was never published due to backlash following the Richmond Memo’s public disclosure. The existence of this second memo contradicts former-FBI Director Christopher Wray’s testimony that the Richmond field office only produced “a single product.”
Grassley is urging FBI Director Kash Patel to continue producing records related to the Richmond Memo’s origins, as well as former-FBI Director Christopher Wray’s misleading and obstructive response to Grassley’s oversight of the memo.
“I’m determined to get to the bottom of the Richmond memo, and of the FBI’s contempt for oversight in the last administration,” Grassley wrote. “I look forward to continuing to work with you to restore the FBI to excellence and prove once again that justice can and must be fairly and evenly administered, blind to whether we are Democrats or Republicans, believers or nonbelievers.”
Find Grassley’s letter and the released FBI documents HERE.
Related:
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MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Restricting The Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats

US Senate News:

Source: US Whitehouse
class=”has-text-align-center”>BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A PROCLAMATION
During my first Administration, I restricted the entry of foreign nationals into the United States, which successfully prevented national security threats from reaching our borders and which the Supreme Court upheld. In Executive Order 14161 of January 20, 2025 (Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats), I stated that it is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from aliens who intend to commit terrorist attacks, threaten our national security, espouse hateful ideology, or otherwise exploit the immigration laws for malevolent purposes.
I also stated that the United States must be vigilant during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those aliens approved for admission into the United States do not intend to harm Americans or our national interests. More importantly, the United States must identify such aliens before their admission or entry into the United States. The United States must ensure that admitted aliens and aliens otherwise already present in the United States do not bear hostile attitudes toward its citizens, culture, government, institutions, or founding principles, and do not advocate for, aid, or support designated foreign terrorists or other threats to our national security.
I directed the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, to identify countries throughout the world for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full or partial suspension on the admission of nationals from those countries pursuant to section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(f). After completing that process, the Secretary of State determined that a number of countries remain deficient with regards to screening and vetting. Many of these countries have also taken advantage of the United States in their exploitation of our visa system and their historic failure to accept back their removable nationals.
As President, I must act to protect the national security and national interest of the United States and its people. I remain committed to engaging with those countries willing to cooperate to improve information-sharing and identity-management procedures, and to address both terrorism-related and public-safety risks. Nationals of some countries also pose significant risks of overstaying their visas in the United States, which increases burdens on immigration and law enforcement components of the United States, and often exacerbates other risks related to national security and public safety.
Some of the countries with inadequacies face significant challenges to reform efforts. Others have made important improvements to their protocols and procedures, and I commend them for these efforts. But until countries with identified inadequacies address them, members of my Cabinet have recommended certain conditional restrictions and limitations. I have considered and largely accepted those recommendations and impose the limitations set forth below on the entry into the United States by the classes of foreign nationals identified in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, hereby find that, absent the measures set forth in this proclamation, the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of persons described in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions. I therefore hereby proclaim the following:
Section 1. Policy and Purpose. (a) It is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks and other national security or public-safety threats. Screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with visa adjudications and other immigration processes play a critical role in implementing that policy. These protocols enhance our ability to detect foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism, or otherwise pose a safety threat, and they aid our efforts to prevent such individuals from entering the United States.
(b) Information-sharing and identity-management protocols and practices of foreign governments are important for the effectiveness of the screening and vetting protocols and procedures of the United States. Governments manage the identity and travel documents of their nationals and residents. They also control the circumstances under which they provide information about their nationals to other governments, including information about known or suspected terrorists and criminal-history information. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to take all necessary and appropriate steps to encourage foreign governments to improve their information-sharing and identity-management protocols and practices and to regularly share their identity and threat information with the immigration screening and vetting systems of the United States.
(c) Section 2(b) of Executive Order 14161 directed the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, within 60 days of the date of that order, to jointly submit to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, a report identifying countries throughout the world for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full or partial suspension on the entry or admission of nationals from those countries pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)).
(d) On April 9, 2025, the Secretary of State, with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, presented the report described in subsection (c) of this section, recommending that entry restrictions and limitations be placed on foreign nationals of several countries. The report identified countries for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full suspension of admissions and countries that warrant a partial suspension of admission.
(e) In evaluating the recommendations from the Secretary of State and in determining what restrictions to impose for each country, I consulted with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, appropriate Assistants to the President, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I considered foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism goals. And I further considered various factors, including each country’s screening and vetting capabilities, information sharing policies, and country-specific risk factors — including whether each country has a significant terrorist presence within its territory, its visa-overstay rate, and its cooperation with accepting back its removable nationals.
I also considered the different risks posed by aliens admitted on immigrant visas and those admitted on nonimmigrant visas. Persons admitted on immigrant visas become lawful permanent residents of the United States. Such persons may present national security or public-safety concerns that may be distinct from those admitted as nonimmigrants. The United States affords lawful permanent residents more enduring rights than it does to nonimmigrants. Lawful permanent residents are more difficult to remove than nonimmigrants, even after national security concerns arise, which increases the costs and aggravates the dangers of errors associated with admitting such individuals. And although immigrants are generally subject to more extensive vetting than nonimmigrants, such vetting is far less reliable when the country from which someone seeks to emigrate maintains inadequate identity-management or information-sharing policies or otherwise poses risks to the national security of the United States.
I reviewed these factors and assessed these goals, with a particular focus on crafting country-specific restrictions. This approach was designed to encourage cooperation with the subject countries in recognition of each country’s unique circumstances. The restrictions and limitations imposed by this proclamation are, in my judgment, necessary to prevent the entry or admission of foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the United States. The restrictions and limitations imposed by this proclamation are necessary to garner cooperation from foreign governments, enforce our immigration laws, and advance other important foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives.
(f) After reviewing the report described in subsection (d) of this section, and after accounting for the foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives of the United States, I have determined to fully restrict and limit the entry of nationals of the following 12 countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. These restrictions distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants.
(g) I have determined to partially restrict and limit the entry of nationals of the following 7 countries: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela. These restrictions distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants.
(h) Sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation describe some of the identity-management or information-sharing inadequacies that led me to impose restrictions. These inadequacies are sufficient to justify my finding that unrestricted entry of nationals from the named countries would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. Publicly disclosing additional details on which I relied in making these determinations, however, would cause serious damage to the national security of the United States, and many such details are classified.
Sec. 2. Full Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern. The entry into the United States of nationals of the following countries is hereby suspended and limited, as follows, subject to the categorical exceptions and case-by-case waivers described in section 5 of this proclamation:
(a) Afghanistan
(i)   The Taliban, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group, controls Afghanistan. Afghanistan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. According to the Fiscal Year 2023 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Entry/Exit Overstay Report (“Overstay Report”), Afghanistan had a business/tourist (B-1/B-2) visa overstay rate of 9.70 percent and a student (F), vocational (M), and exchange visitor (J) visa overstay rate of 29.30 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Afghanistan as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(b) Burma
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Burma had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 27.07 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 42.17 percent. Additionally, Burma has historically not cooperated with the United States to accept back their removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Burma as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(c) Chad
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Chad had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 49.54 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.64 percent. According to the Fiscal Year 2022 Overstay Report, Chad had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 37.12 percent. The high visa overstay rate for 2022 and 2023 is unacceptable and indicates a blatant disregard for United States immigration laws.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Chad as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(d) Republic of the Congo
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, the Republic of the Congo had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 29.63 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.14 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of the Republic of the Congo as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(e) Equatorial Guinea
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Equatorial Guinea had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 21.98 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 70.18 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Equatorial Guinea as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(f) Eritrea
(i)   The United States questions the competence of the central authority for issuance of passports or civil documents in Eritrea. Criminal records are not available to the United States for Eritrean nationals. Eritrea has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Eritrea had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 20.09 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.43 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Eritrea as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(g) Haiti
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Haiti had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 31.38 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 25.05 percent. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of illegal Haitian aliens flooded into the United States during the Biden Administration. This influx harms American communities by creating acute risks of increased overstay rates, establishment of criminal networks, and other national security threats. As is widely known, Haiti lacks a central authority with sufficient availability and dissemination of law enforcement information necessary to ensure its nationals do not undermine the national security of the United States.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Haiti as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(h) Iran
(i)   Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. Iran regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks, is the source of significant terrorism around the world, and has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Iran as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby suspended.
(i) Libya
(i) There is no competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents in Libya. The historical terrorist presence within Libya’s territory amplifies the risks posed by the entry into the United States of its nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Libya as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(j) Somalia
(i)   Somalia lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. Somalia stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory, which greatly limits the effectiveness of its national capabilities in a variety of respects. A persistent terrorist threat also emanates from Somalia’s territory. The United States Government has identified Somalia as a terrorist safe haven. Terrorists use regions of Somalia as safe havens from which they plan, facilitate, and conduct their operations. Somalia also remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups that threaten the national security of the United States. The Government of Somalia struggles to provide governance needed to limit terrorists’ freedom of movement. Additionally, Somalia has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Somalia as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(k) Sudan
(i)   Sudan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. According to the Overstay Report, Sudan had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 26.30 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 28.40 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Sudan as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(l) Yemen
(i)   Yemen lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. The government does not have physical control over its own territory. Since January 20, 2025, Yemen has been the site of active United States military operations.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Yemen as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
Sec. 3. Partial Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern.
(a) Burundi
(i)    According to the Overstay Report, Burundi had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 17.52 percent.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Burundi as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Burundi to the extent permitted by law.
(b) Cuba
(i)    Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism. The Government of Cuba does not cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the United States. Cuba has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Cuba had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 7.69 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 18.75 percent.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Cuba as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Cuba to the extent permitted by law.
(c) Laos
(i)    According to the Overstay Report, Laos had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 34.77 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 6.49 percent. Laos has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Laos as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Laos to the extent permitted by law.
(d) Sierra Leone
(i)    According to the Overstay Report, Sierra Leone had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.43 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.83 percent. Sierra Leone has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Sierra Leone as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Sierra Leone to the extent permitted by law.
(e) Togo
(i)    According to the Overstay Report, Togo had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 19.03 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.05 percent.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Togo as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Togo to the extent permitted by law.
(f) Turkmenistan
(i)   According to the Overstay Report, Turkmenistan had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 21.74 percent.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Turkmenistan as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Turkmenistan to the extent permitted by law.
(g) Venezuela
(i)   Venezuela lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. Venezuela has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Venezuela had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 9.83 percent.
(ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Venezuela as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B‑1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Venezuela to the extent permitted by law.
Sec. 4. Scope and Implementation of Suspensions and Limitations. (a) Scope. Subject to the exceptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section and any exceptions made pursuant to subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the suspensions of and limitations on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation shall apply only to foreign nationals of the designated countries who:
(i)   are outside the United States on the applicable effective date of this proclamation; and
(ii) do not have a valid visa on the applicable effective date of this proclamation.
(b) Exceptions. The suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation shall not apply to:
(i)     any lawful permanent resident of the United States;
(ii)    any dual national of a country designated under sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation when the individual is traveling on a passport issued by a country not so designated;
(iii)   any foreign national traveling with a valid nonimmigrant visa in the following classifications: A-1, A-2, C-2, C-3, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, NATO-1, NATO‑2, NATO-3, NATO-4, NATO-5, or NATO-6;
(iv)    any athlete or member of an athletic team, including coaches, persons performing a necessary support role, and immediate relatives, traveling for the World Cup, Olympics, or other major sporting event as determined by the Secretary of State;
(v)     immediate family immigrant visas (IR-1/CR-1, IR-2/CR-2, IR-5) with clear and convincing evidence of identity and family relationship (e.g., DNA);
(vi)    adoptions (IR-3, IR-4, IH-3, IH-4);
(vii)   Afghan Special Immigrant Visas;
(viii) Special Immigrant Visas for United States Government employees; and
(ix)    immigrant visas for ethnic and religious minorities facing persecution in Iran.
(c) Exceptions to the suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation may be made for certain individuals for whom the Attorney General finds, in her discretion, that the travel by the individual would advance a critical United States national interest involving the Department of Justice, including when individuals must be present to participate in criminal proceedings as witnesses. These exceptions shall be made only by the Attorney General, or her designee, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(d) Exceptions to the suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation may be made case-by-case for individuals for whom the Secretary of State finds, in his discretion, that the travel by the individual would serve a United States national interest. These exceptions shall be made by only the Secretary of State or his designee, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security or her designee.
Sec. 5. Adjustments to and Removal of Suspensions and Limitations. (a) The Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director for National Intelligence, devise a process to assess whether any suspensions and limitations imposed by sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation should be continued, terminated, modified, or supplemented. Within 90 days of the date of this proclamation, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, describing his assessment and recommending whether any suspensions and limitations imposed by sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation should be continued, terminated, modified, or supplemented.
(b) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall immediately engage each of the countries identified in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation on measures that must be taken to comply with United States screening, vetting, immigration, and security requirements.
(c) Additionally, and in light of recent events, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide me an update to the review of the practices and procedures of Egypt to confirm the adequacy of its current screening and vetting capabilities.
Sec. 6. Enforcement. (a) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with appropriate domestic and international partners, including countries and organizations, to ensure efficient, effective, and appropriate implementation of this proclamation.
(b) In implementing this proclamation, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations.
(c) No immigrant or nonimmigrant visa issued before the applicable effective date of this proclamation shall be revoked pursuant to this proclamation.
(d) This proclamation shall not apply to an individual who has been granted asylum by the United States, to a refugee who has already been admitted to the United States, or to an individual granted withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT). Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to limit the ability of an individual to seek asylum, refugee status, withholding of removal, or protection under the CAT, consistent with the laws of the United States.
Sec. 7. Severability. It is the policy of the United States to enforce this proclamation to the maximum extent possible to advance the national security, foreign policy, and counterterrorism interests of the United States. Accordingly:
(a) if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision of this proclamation to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this proclamation and the application of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby; and
(b) if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision of this proclamation to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid because of the lack of certain procedural requirements, the relevant executive branch officials shall implement those procedural requirements to conform with existing law and with any applicable court orders.
Sec. 8. Effective Date. This proclamation is effective at 12:01 am eastern daylight time on June 9, 2025.
Sec. 9. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This proclamation shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This proclamation is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourth day of June, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty‑five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.
                             DONALD J. TRUMP

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI: James Altucher: “America Just Hit the AI Reset Button”

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

BALTIMORE, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — In a new briefing, tech entrepreneur and bestselling author James Altucher reveals a development he says will “change America forever.”

At the center of it is Project Colossus — a classified supercomputer initiative led by Elon Musk’s xAI — and backed by sweeping support from President Donald Trump.

A Presidential Reversal with Massive Implications

Altucher says the shift began with one of Trump’s first presidential actions in 2025.

“In one of his FIRST acts as President… Donald Trump overturned Executive Order #14110.”

This decision reversed Biden-era restrictions on AI research, which Altucher claims had “prevented us from unleashing its true power.”

“Trump also announced the LARGEST AI investment in history… Stargate… a massive, AI data center and infrastructure project.”

Hidden Inside a Warehouse in Memphis

Altucher’s report reveals a facility in Tennessee that, until now, has gone largely unnoticed.

“Right here, inside this warehouse in Memphis, Tennessee… lies a massive supercomputer Musk calls ‘Project Colossus.’”

“It contains not just one or two… but 200,000 units of Nvidia’s all-powerful AI chips… making it the most advanced AI facility known to man.”

“The fastest supercomputer on the planet.” — Jensen Huang, Nvidia CEO

July 1: “When It All Changes”

According to Altucher, time is short. A critical update to Colossus is imminent.

“That’s when I predict Elon could announce a major update to this new AI project. One that some say will essentially 10X its power – overnight.”

Altucher refers to this moment as a “second wave” of AI — what he calls:

“Artificial Superintelligence.”

“This second wave… will rival all of the great innovations of the past. Electricity… the wheel… even the discovery of fire.”

A Warning… and a Milestone

Altucher closes his briefing with a quote from Vladimir Putin to stress the stakes:

“Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” — Vladimir Putin

He believes Project Colossus may determine whether America leads — or falls behind — in the AI race.

About James Altucher

James Altucher is a computer scientist, entrepreneur, and bestselling author. A pioneer in AI since the 1980s, he previously worked on IBM’s Deep Blue supercomputer and developed early AI trading systems on Wall Street. His latest research uncovers critical breakthroughs in AI infrastructure and the political forces accelerating its rise.

Media Contact:
Derek Warren
Public Relations Manager
Paradigm Press Group
Email: dwarren@paradigmpressgroup.com

The MIL Network –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Restricts Foreign Student Visas at Harvard University

US Senate News:

Source: US Whitehouse
RESTRICTING FOREIGN STUDENT VISAS AT HARVARD: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a Proclamation to safeguard national security by suspending the entry of foreign nationals seeking to study or participate in exchange programs at Harvard University.
The Proclamation suspends the entry into the United States of any new Harvard student as a nonimmigrant under F, M, or J visas.
It directs the Secretary of State to consider revoking existing F, M, or J visas for current Harvard students who meet the Proclamation’s criteria.
The Proclamation does not apply to aliens attending other U.S. universities through the Student Exchange Visa Program (SEVP) and exempts aliens whose entry is deemed in the national interest.
HARVARD HAS A DEMONSTRATED HISTORY OF CONCERNING FOREIGN TIES AND RADICALISM:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has long warned that foreign adversaries take advantage of easy access to American higher education to steal information, exploit research and development, and spread false information.
The University has seen a drastic rise in crime in recent years, while failing to discipline at least some categories of conduct violations on campus.
Harvard has failed to provide sufficient information to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) about foreign students’ known illegal or dangerous activities, reporting deficient data on only three students.
Harvard is either not fully reporting its disciplinary records for foreign students or is not seriously policing its foreign students.
Harvard has also developed extensive entanglements with foreign adversaries, receiving more than $150 million from China alone. In exchange, Harvard has, among other things, hosted Chinese Communist Party paramilitary members and partnered with China-based individuals on research that could advance China’s military modernization.
The Chinese Communist Party has sent thousands of mid-career and senior bureaucrats to study at U.S. institutions, with Harvard University considered the top “party school” outside the country. Xi Jinping’s own daughter attended Harvard as an undergraduate in the early 2010s.

Harvard has failed to adequately address violent anti-Semitic incidents on campus, with many of these agitators found to be foreign students.
Harvard has persisted in prioritizing diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) in its admissions, denying hardworking Americans equal opportunities by favoring certain groups, despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2023 ruling against its race-based practices.
These concerns have compelled the Federal government to conclude that Harvard University is no longer a trustworthy steward of international student and exchange visitor programs.
HOLDING HARVARD ACCOUNTABLE: President Trump wants our institutions to have foreign students, but believes that the foreign students should be people that can love our country.
President Trump: “The students? Well, we want to have great students here. We just don’t want students that are causing trouble. We want to have students. I want to have foreign students.”
President Trump: “We have people who want to go to Harvard and other schools, they can’t get in because we have foreign students there. But I want to make sure that the foreign students are people that can love our country.”
President Trump: “We are still waiting for the Foreign Student Lists from Harvard so that we can determine, after a ridiculous expenditure of BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, how many radicalized lunatics, troublemakers all, should not be let back into our Country. Harvard is very slow in the presentation of these documents, and probably for good reason!”

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Enhancing National Security by Addressing Risks at Harvard University

US Senate News:

Source: US Whitehouse
class=”has-text-align-center”>BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A PROCLAMATION
Admission into the United States to attend, conduct research, or teach at our Nation’s institutions of higher education is a privilege granted by our Government, not a guarantee. That privilege is necessarily tied to the host institution’s compliance and commitment to following Federal law. Harvard University has failed in this respect, among many others.
The Student Exchange Visa Program (SEVP) depends fundamentally on academic institutions’ good faith, transparency, and full adherence to the relevant regulatory frameworks. This is for crucial national-security reasons. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has long warned that foreign adversaries and competitors take advantage of easy access to American higher education to, among other things, steal technical information and products, exploit expensive research and development to advance their own ambitions, and spread false information for political or other reasons. Our adversaries, including the People’s Republic of China, try to take advantage of American higher education by exploiting the student visa program for improper purposes and by using visiting students to collect information at elite universities in the United States.
Protecting our national security requires host institutions of foreign students to provide sufficient information, when asked, to enable the Federal Government to identify and address misconduct by those foreign students. In my judgment, it presents an unacceptable risk to our Nation’s security for an academic institution to refuse to provide sufficient information, when asked, about known instances of misconduct and criminality committed by its foreign students. This principle is one reason why SEVP regulations require foreign students to obey Federal and State criminal laws and require universities to keep records about foreign students’ studies in the United States — including records relating to criminal activity by foreign students and resulting disciplinary proceedings — and furnish them to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on request.
Crime rates at Harvard University — including violent crime rates — have drastically risen in recent years. Harvard has failed to discipline at least some categories of conduct violations on campus. Given these facts, it is imperative, in my judgment, that the Federal Government be able to assess and, if necessary, address misconduct and crimes committed by foreign students at Harvard.
Despite the risks described above, Harvard University has refused the recent requests of the DHS for information about foreign students’ “known illegal activity,” “known dangerous and violent activity,” “known threats to other students or university personnel,” “known deprivation of rights of other classmates or university personnel,” and whether those activities “occurred on campus,” and other related data. Harvard provided data on misconduct by only three students, and the data it provided was so deficient that the DHS could not evaluate whether it should take further actions. Harvard’s actions show that it either is not fully reporting its disciplinary records for foreign students or is not seriously policing its foreign students. In my judgment, these actions and failures directly undermine the Federal Government’s ability to ensure that foreign nationals admitted on student or exchange visitor visas remain in compliance with Federal law.
These concerns have compelled the Federal Government to conclude that Harvard University is no longer a trustworthy steward of international student and exchange visitor programs. When a university refuses to uphold its legal obligations, including its recordkeeping and reporting obligations, the consequences ripple far beyond the campus. They jeopardize the integrity of the entire United States student and exchange visitor visa system, compromise national security, and embolden other institutions to similarly disregard the rule of law.
Harvard University has also developed extensive entanglements with foreign countries, including our adversaries. According to The Harvard Crimson, Harvard has received more than $150 million in total contributions from foreign governments over the last 5 years, and over $1 billion from foreign sources. Over the last 10 years, Harvard has received more than $150 million from China alone. In exchange, Harvard has, among other things, “repeatedly hosted and trained members of a Chinese Communist Party paramilitary organization,” according to a probe by the House of Representatives Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Harvard researchers have also partnered with China-based individuals on research that could advance China’s military modernization, according to the same probe.
Finally, Harvard University continues to flout the civil rights of its students and faculty, triggering multiple Federal investigations. Harvard’s discrimination against disfavored races in admissions was so blatant that the Supreme Court decision ending the practice nationwide bears Harvard’s name. Yet even after that Supreme Court decision, Harvard and its affiliated organizations on campus continue to deny hardworking Americans equal opportunities. Instead of those Americans, Harvard admits students from non-egalitarian nations, including nations that seek the destruction of the United States and its allies, or the extermination of entire peoples. It is not in the interest of the United States to further compound Harvard’s discrimination against non-preferred races, national origins, shared ancestries, or religions by further reducing opportunities for American students through excessive foreign student enrollment.
Considering these facts, I have determined that it is necessary to restrict the entry of foreign nationals who seek to enter the United States solely or principally to participate in a course of study at Harvard University or in an exchange visitor program hosted by Harvard University. Such restrictions are authorized under sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), which authorize the President to suspend entry of any class of aliens whose entry would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. I have determined that the entry of the class of foreign nationals described above is detrimental to the interests of the United States because, in my judgment, Harvard’s conduct has rendered it an unsuitable destination for foreign students and researchers. Until such time as the university shares the information that the Federal Government requires to safeguard national security and the American public, it is in the national interest to deny foreign nationals access to Harvard under the auspices of educational exchange.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, hereby find that, absent the measures set forth in this proclamation, the entry into the United States of persons described in section 1 of this proclamation would, except as provided for in section 2 of this proclamation, be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions. I hereby proclaim as follows:
Section 1. Suspension of Entry. The entry of any alien into the United States as a nonimmigrant to pursue a course of study at Harvard University under section 101(a)(15)(F) or section 101(a)(15)(M) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F) or 1101(a)(15)(M), or to participate in an exchange visitor program hosted by Harvard University under section 101(a)(15)(J) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(J), is suspended and limited, subject to section 2 of this proclamation. That suspension and limitation shall expire, absent extension, 6 months after the date of this proclamation.
Sec. 2. Scope and Implementation of Suspension and Limitation on Entry. (a) The suspension and limitation on entry pursuant to section 1 of this proclamation shall apply to aliens who enter or attempt to enter the United States to begin attending Harvard University through the SEVP after the date of this proclamation.
(b) The Secretary of State shall consider, in the Secretary’s discretion, whether foreign nationals who currently attend Harvard University and are in the United States pursuant to F, M, or J visas and who otherwise meet the criteria described in section 1 of this proclamation should have their visas revoked pursuant to section 221(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1201(i).
(c) The suspension and limitation on entry pursuant to section 1 of this proclamation shall not apply to any alien who enters the United States to attend other universities through the SEVP.
(d) The suspension and limitation on entry pursuant to section 1 of this proclamation shall not apply to any alien whose entry would be in the national interest, as determined by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or their respective designees.
(e) No later than 90 days after the date of this proclamation, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly submit to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, a recommendation on whether an extension or renewal of the suspension and limitation on entry in section 1 of this proclamation is in the interests of the United States.
Sec. 3. Operational Action to Implement this Order. The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate to take all necessary and appropriate action to implement this proclamation. The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall also consider using their respective authorities under the INA to impose limitations on Harvard University’s ability to participate in the SEVP and the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System. Any such actions should include an exception for any alien whose entry would be in the national interest, as determined by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or their respective designees.
Sec. 4. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This proclamation shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This proclamation is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourth day of June, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.
DONALD J. TRUMP

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Pfluger, Green Request DHS Documents on Suspect in Boulder Terror Attack

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman August Pfluger (TX-11)

WASHINGTON, DC — In the wake of the antisemitic terrorist attack in Boulder, Colorado, House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Chairman August Pfluger (R-TX) and Full Committee Chairman Mark E. Green, MD (R-TN) sent a letter to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Kristi Noem requesting the alien file for the suspect, an Egyptian national named Mohamed Sabry Soliman, which will include information on his expired visa, work authorization, and asylum application.

In the letter, the Chairmen wrote, in part, “the Committee on Homeland Security is conducting an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the immigration history of Mohamed Sabry Soliman, an Egyptian national now facing felony charges after he carried out a terrorist attack in Boulder, Colorado. The charges include attempted murder, use of incendiary devices, and federal hate crimes.”

The Chairmen concluded that, “This tragedy is indicative of a heightened terrorism threat on U.S. soil, signaling an urgent need for increased homeland security measures, particularly with respect to foreign nationals who are unlawfully present in the United States, as Soliman reportedly overstayed a nonimmigrant visa. Our nation has now faced several major acts of antisemitic terror this year alone, including the recent assassination of two Israeli embassy staffers in our nation’s capital.”

Read more about this letter in the Washington Examiner HERE

Read the letter in its entirety HERE

BACKGROUND:

Soliman is part of a broader pattern. Last May, Chairman Pfluger, Chairman Green, along with other Committee leaders, sent a letter to then-DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas, then-Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray, and then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, requesting information on the alleged attempted breach of Marine Corps Base Quantico (MCB). Reports indicate the two individuals involved were Jordanian nationals, one of whom, Mohammad Khair Dabous, had overstayed his student visa. Dabous remains at large, while the other individual involved was recently arrested again for a different crime and is at an ICE detention facility.

In March, a pro-Hamas Palestinian protester was arrested at Columbia University after overstaying her student visa. Her visa was suspended in 2022 due to her poor attendance record. She had previously been arrested in connection with her involvement in pro-Hamas protests at Columbia.

In April, a Palestinian student was arrested at Columbia University after overstaying her student visa and “participating in anti-American, pro-terrorist activities on campus,” according to DHS. Her visa was suspended in 2022 due to a lack of attendance.

In February, a foreign national from Hungary was arrested for two counts of murder. He had overstayed his visa waiver and was previously charged with theft and robbery but had been released with an ankle monitor under the Alternatives to Detention Program in 2024. He managed to disable the monitor and remained a fugitive for months, during which he committed the two murders.

In 2022, a foreign national from Mexico murdered four people, including his three daughters, after overstaying his visa. The man’s non-immigrant visitor visa had expired in 2018. He had previously been arrested for assaulting a California Highway Patrol officer. ICE was not informed of his release from jail for the assault due to California’s 2017 “sanctuary state law.”

In October 2024, an illegal alien who had been released into the country under the Biden-Harris administration shot a Jewish man on his way to a Chicago Synagogue.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Public Servants Sentenced for COVID-19 Relief Fraud

Source: United States Department of Justice (National Center for Disaster Fraud)

MIAMI – Angelo Stephen, 33, a former Federal Bureau of Prisons Correctional Officer, and George Arestuche, 47, a former Miami-Dade County Aviation Department employee, were sentenced in separate cases after pleading guilty to defrauding COVID-19 relief programs.

Angelo Stephen

On May 22, Stephen was sentenced to four months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release and ordered to pay $75,513 in restitution by Chief U.S. District Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga. Chief Judge Altonaga also entered a forfeiture money judgment against Stephen in the additional amount of $71,166. The sentence follows Stephen’s conviction for wire fraud in connection with his fraudulent applications for two Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans and one Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL), as well as his participation in two bank account takeover schemes.

During his change of plea hearing, Stephen admitted that on August 4, 2020, he submitted a false and fraudulent EIDL application in his own name to the Small Business Administration (SBA), claiming to be an independent contractor and the sole owner of a business that provided event planning and entertainment services with 10 employees. The EIDL application falsely certified that for the applicable 12-month period, the business had approximately $62,018 in gross revenue and a cost of goods sold of $0. Based on his false and fraudulent application, Stephen received $20,000 in EIDL proceeds from the SBA.

Stephen additionally admitted to fraudulently obtaining two PPP loans. On April 24, 2021, Stephen submitted a first-draw PPP loan application, claiming to be the sole proprietor of a non-existent business with $106,554 in gross income in 2020. In support of the application, Stephen submitted a fraudulent IRS Form 1040 Schedule C. Based on his false and fraudulent application, Stephen received $20,833 in PPP loan proceeds from an SBA-approved lender. On May 11, 2021, Stephen submitted a second-draw PPP loan application, making the same false claims about his nonexistent business that was supported by submission of the identical false Schedule C. Based on his false and fraudulent application, Stephen obtained $20,833 in PPP loan proceeds from a different SBA-approved lender.

Stephen also admitted to taking part in two bank account takeover schemes. On March 30, 2023, Stephen received a $20,000 wire transfer from the account of an unsuspecting victim in Virginia. Stephen quickly withdrew all illegally obtained money through a series of cash withdrawals and Zelle transfers to others. In the second takeover scheme, Stephen and his accomplices obtained new checks from the credit union account of a different unsuspecting victim. Stephen subsequently used one of those checks to obtain $8,500 in cash that he was not entitled to.

George Arestuche

On May 28, Arestuche was sentenced by Senior U.S. District Judge Paul C. Huck to five years of probation to include 210 days in home detention and ordered to pay $114,679 in restitution, plus community service. The sentence follows Arestuche’s conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud in connection with his fraudulent application for an EIDL.

According to the facts admitted at the change of plea hearing, Arestuche and a co-conspirator devised a scheme to defraud the SBA by submitting a false and fraudulent application for Arestuche to obtain an EIDL and EIDL advance. As part of the conspiracy, Arestuche agreed to pay the co-conspirator a large fee.

On July 9, 2020, Arestuche’s co-conspirator submitted a false and fraudulent EIDL application to the SBA on behalf of Arestuche, claiming that Arestuche was an independent contractor and the sole owner of an automotive repair business with 10 employees. The EIDL application falsely certified that for the applicable 12-month period, the business had $600,000 in gross revenue and a cost of goods sold of $184,000. In reality, Arestuche was not an independent contractor and did not own any type of business. The EIDL application was supported by a fraudulent IRS Form 1040 Schedule C. As a result of this false and fraudulent EIDL application, Arestuche obtained $149,900 in EIDL proceeds and a $10,000 EIDL advance from the SBA. Arestuche subsequently paid his co-conspirator $17,275 for helping him fraudulently obtain the money from the SBA. Since pleading guilty, Arestuche has paid $50,000 in advance restitution payments.

U.S. Attorney Hayden P. O’Byrne for the Southern District of Florida; acting Special Agent in Charge Amber Howell of the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General’s Fraud Detection Office (DOJ-OIG); Special Agent in Charge Amaleka McCall-Brathwaite, U.S. Small Business Administration Office of Inspector General (SBA OIG), Eastern Region; acting Special Agent in Charge Brett D. Skiles of FBI Miami; and Inspector General Felix Jimenez of the Miami-Dade County Office of Inspector General (MDC-OIG) made the announcement.

DOJ-OIG and SBA-OIG investigated the Stephen case. SBA-OIG and the FBI’s Miami Area Corruption Task Force, which includes task force officers from the MDC-OIG, investigated the Arestuche case.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Edward N. Stamm prosecuted both cases.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Annika Miranda is handling forfeiture matters in the Stephen case.

In March 2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act was enacted. It was designed to provide emergency financial assistance to the millions of Americans suffering the economic effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Among other sources of relief, the CARES Act authorized and provided funding to the SBA to provide EIDLs to eligible small businesses, including sole proprietorships and independent contractors, experiencing substantial financial disruptions due to the COVID-19 pandemic to allow them to meet financial obligations and operating expenses that could otherwise have been met had the disaster not occurred. EIDL applications were submitted directly to the SBA via the SBA’s on-line application website, and the applications were processed and the loans funded for qualifying applicants directly by the SBA.

On May 17, 2021, the Attorney General established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force to marshal the resources of the Department of Justice in partnership with agencies across government to enhance efforts to combat and prevent pandemic-related fraud. The Task Force bolsters efforts to investigate and prosecute the most culpable domestic and international criminal actors and assists agencies tasked with administering relief programs to prevent fraud by, among other methods, augmenting and incorporating existing coordination mechanisms, identifying resources and techniques to uncover fraudulent actors and their schemes, and sharing and harnessing information and insights gained from prior enforcement efforts. For more information on the Department’s response to the pandemic, please visit https://www.justice.gov/coronavirus.

On September 15, 2022, the Attorney General selected the Southern District of Florida’s U.S. Attorney’s Office to head one of three national COVID-19 Fraud Strike Force Teams. The Department of Justice established the Strike Force to enhance existing efforts to combat and prevent COVID-19 related financial fraud. For more information on the department’s response to the pandemic, please click here.

Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can report it by calling the Department of Justice’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at: https://www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

Related court documents and information may be found on the website of the District Court for the Southern District of Florida at www.flsd.uscourts.gov or at http://pacer.flsd.uscourts.gov, under case numbers 25-cr-20014 (Stephen) and 25-cr-20001 (Arestuche).

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MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Meets With Three Federal Judges To Discuss Judicial Security

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin

June 04, 2025

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, released the following statement after discussing judicial security with Judge Beth Bloom of the Southern District of Florida, Judge Mark Norris of the Western District of Tennessee, and Judge Esther Salas of the District of New Jersey, whose son was murdered at the family’s home by a former litigant who posed as a deliveryman:

“President Trump is openly threatening judges with over-the-top rhetoric and even calling for their impeachment for ruling against him. Just as bad: Republicans seem to be keeping quiet about—or even enabling—his threats. If President Obama or President Biden had said these things, Republicans would’ve thrown a fit.

“Americans are welcome to disagree with judicial decisions on the merits, but we must all agree that we cannot undermine our Constitution by allowing threats to the officers of our judicial branch in an attempt to weaken it.

“Judges Salas, Bloom, and Norris are helping to shed light on the threats faced by our judges in a heightened political environment, and I thank them for having the courage to speak about their experiences and carry on the legacy of Judge Salas’s son Daniel.”

New reporting found that USMS has seen a spike in threats against federal judges, including 197 federal judges threatened between March 1 and May 27 of this year. One report identified more than 600 posts on social media and right-leaning message boards since February targeting family members of judges who ruled against the Trump Administration—with the posts viewed more than 200 million times. Another report described federal judges and their family members receiving anonymous deliveries to their homes intended to show that those seeking to intimidate the targeted judge know the judge’s address or their family members’ addresses. Some of these deliveries were made using the name of Judge Salas’s son.

The spike in threats coincides with escalating, threatening language by President Trump and his allies, including calls for impeaching judges who don’t rule in the President’s favor.

Durbin has urged Attorney General Bondi and FBI Director Patel to investigate the ongoing and increasing threats against federal judges. Durbin asked for a response by May 20, but has yet to receive one.

In 2023, the Daniel Anderl Judicial Security and Privacy Act was signed into law as part of the National Defense Authorization Act. The legislation provided additional intelligence analysts and deputy Marshals to the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) and allowed judges to remove sensitive personal information from government websites and private publications.

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MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Sterling Heights Man Pleads Guilty to Aggravated Assaults on Federal Officers While Resisting Arrest

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

DETROIT – Carl Emerson Travis, 52, of Sterling Heights, Michigan, pleaded guilty today to aggravated assaults on federal officers, announced United States Attorney Jerome F. Gorgon, Jr.

Gorgon was joined in the announcement by Cheyvoryea Gibson, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI in Michigan.

According to court documents, on March 29, 2024, members of the U.S. Marshals Fugitive Apprehension Team tried to arrest Travis, who was wanted in multiple jurisdictions. Travis resisted and attempted to escape with a moving car, endangering the surrounding officers. At the end of the struggle, Travis sped his car in reverse, dragging two officers and nearly running over another with his car. The officers sustained injuries during the assault. Travis only stopped resisting when his car slammed into a parked vehicle, pushing it through the wall of an occupied hotel room.

Sentencing is scheduled for October 15, 2025. A conviction for assault on a federal officer carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison, a $250,000 fine, or both.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation investigated the case with assistance from Michigan State Police. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Nhan Ho and Eaton Brown are prosecuting the case on behalf of the United States.

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Georgia Resident Sentenced for Leading Bank Fraud and ID Theft Scheme

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

Defendant Created Fake Recruiting Website to Steal Identifications; 14 Others Convicted

ALBANY, Ga. – The final defendant and ringleader of a bank fraud and aggravated identity theft scheme involving stolen checks and a fake online recruiting website was sentenced to federal prison today.

Jalen Tylee Hill, aka “Roscoe Hill,” 26, of Americus, was sentenced to serve 81 months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release. The Court will determine restitution at a later date. Hill previously pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud, one count of aggravated identity theft and one count of conspiracy to possess stolen mail on May 14, 2024. A codefendant, Victoria Lynn Carter, 25, of Americus, was sentenced to serve one year of supervised release after she previously pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud. The sentences were handed down by Chief U.S. District Judge Leslie Abrams Gardner on June 4. There is no parole in the federal system.

“Schemes to defraud and steal from citizens will not be tolerated in the Middle District of Georgia,” said Acting U.S. Attorney C. Shanelle Booker. “This case serves as a reminder for all of us to be as vigilant as possible with what we share online and monitor our financial accounts. I commend the good investigative work of our local and federal law enforcement partners for helping to prevent any more people and businesses from falling victim to this fraud.”

“The sentencing of this defendant and co-defendants exemplifies the dedication of the investigative efforts which sends a strong message to individuals to consider the consequences of stealing mail and committing financial fraud,” said Rodney M. Hopkins, Inspector in Charge of the Atlanta Division. “I commend the hard work and countless hours put forth by all of the law enforcement agencies involved, which resulted in the dismantling of this criminal network.”

According to court documents and statements made in court, the Sumter County Sheriff’s Office received a complaint from a local church in December 2021 about mail theft and forged checks. During the investigation, law enforcement discovered that numerous checks had been stolen out of mailboxes at residential and commercial locations in Georgia. The checks were then forged and deposited into other bank accounts. Specifically, the checks were often altered by having the “Pay To” designation changed to an individual involved in the fraud. That individual would then

make a deposit into their banking account. Other times, the checks would be altered by computer software.

Investigators discovered that Hill directed the scheme and would recruit people via Facebook. Hill would often offer to deposit stolen, forged or duplicated checks into the bank accounts of the recruits on condition that they would split half the funds. Investigators were able to determine that in six months, Hill stole hundreds of pieces of mail, participated in at least 68 incidents of bank fraud, and unlawfully used debit cards belonging to other individuals at least 14 occasions. Hill then deposited, or attempted to deposit, the numerous stolen, forged or otherwise fraudulent checks of more than ten financial institutions into other bank accounts, resulting in an intended loss of approximately $165,743.68. As part of another scheme discovered by investigators, Hill created a fake solar panel installation company recruiting page online from which he stole the identities of 28 individuals, including their driver’s licenses, social security cards, birth certificates, instructional permits and other documents depicting personally identifiable information.

The following codefendants have been convicted for their participation in the crime:

Quontavius Markeese Hill, 34, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and after serving more than eight months in custody was sentenced to time served plus three years of supervised release and to pay $10,815.89 restitution on Nov. 8, 2023;

Accacia Renae Gordon, 24, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve four months in prison to be followed by four years of supervised release and to pay $14,970.35 restitution on Jan. 15, 2025;

Shaneria Sharae Murray, 33, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve 45 days in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release and to pay $2,000 restitution on Dec. 2, 2024;

Chelsea Ja’Nay Tullis, 29, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve one month in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release on March 15, 2024;

LaQuashia Nichole French, 24, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve 15 days in prison to be followed by four years of supervised release and to pay $2,227.91 restitution on Oct. 23, 2024;

Jazmon Lace Whitehead, 31, of Oglethorpe, Georgia, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve three years of supervised release and to pay $7,658.59 restitution on March 17, 2025;

Chasity LaCole Wellons, 31, of Cordele, Georgia, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve three years of supervised release and to pay $2,000 restitution on Jan. 22, 2025;

DeKeyvia Moasha Blackshear, 26, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve three years of supervised release on Aug. 16, 2024;

Janita Bre’Shaye Terry, 24, of Columbus, Georgia, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve three years of supervised release on Dec. 2, 2024;

Kelbresha Danielle Thomas, 30, of Oglethorpe, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve three years of supervised release on Dec. 2, 2024;

Jenetta Small, 29, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve two years of supervised release on March 14, 2025;

Tyavia Deashia Richardson, 24, of Americus, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to one year of supervised release and to pay $4,740 restitution on Aug. 14, 2024; and

Kimbreyanna Andranique Peeples, 23, of Butler, Georgia, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud and was sentenced to serve one year of supervised release on Dec. 2, 2024.

The case was investigated by the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) and the Sumter County Sheriff’s Office with assistance from the FBI and the U.S Secret Service (USSS).

Assistant U.S. Attorney Matthew Redavid prosecuted the case for the Government.

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Box Elder man sentenced to over 5 years in prison for child sexual abuse

Source: Office of United States Attorneys

GREAT FALLS – A Box Elder man who sexually abused a child was sentenced today to 68 months in prison to be followed by 10 years of supervised release, U.S. Attorney Kurt Alme said.

Brian Lee Bigbow, 48, pleaded guilty in January 2025 to one count of abusive sexual contact by force and of a child.

Chief U.S. District Judge Brian M. Morris presided.

The government alleged in court documents that in April 2021, a Montana DPHHS centralized intake report came in on an abuse of Jane Doe, who disclosed she was sexually abused by Brian Bigbow. During interviews, Doe provided details of the abuse. Doe said Bigbow hurt her and said the sexual abuse occurred when she was in Bigbow’s bed, and they were watching TV. He turned off the TV and the lights and “raped her” – which she described as sex when you don’t want it. Bigbow took off his pants and clothes and took off her clothes. Doe tried to push him away but could not. His private parts touched her private parts and it, “hurt really bad.” He was laying on her, touching her leg with his hand, and he tried to hold her hand. Bigbow told her not to tell anyone or he would hurt her. Doe did not remember how many times it happened – she just knew it was multiple times.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office prosecuted the case. The investigation was conducted by the FBI and Chippewa Cree Law Enforcement Services

This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results. For more information about Project Safe Neighborhoods, please visit Justice.gov/PSN.

XXX

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Attorney’s Office Announces Expansion of Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago
Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

CHICAGO — Andrew S. Boutros, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, today announced an expansion of Project Safe Neighborhoods (“PSN”)—a key component of the Department of Justice’s violent crime reduction strategy—to include the economic centers in downtown Chicago and the entire rail system operated by the Chicago Transit Authority, including all train lines operating in every neighborhood from every part of the city.

The PSN program is a federally funded, nationwide initiative that brings together federal, state, and local law enforcement and other stakeholders to identify the most pressing violent crime problems and develop comprehensive solutions to address them. Until today, the PSN program was deployed in seven Chicago neighborhoods on the West and South sides of the city. The expansion announced today will implement the program in parts of three police districts in downtown financial zones that represent the economic engines of the city and region, as well as on the CTA trains that bring residents and visitors to those areas from every neighborhood of Chicago and from the city’s two international airports. Today’s announcement represents the first time anywhere in the country that the program will be deployed on mass transit.

The PSN expansion was announced by U.S. Attorney Boutros and members of the PSN Chicago Task Force, including the Chicago Police Department. Substantial assistance to the PSN program is provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Cook County Sheriff’s Office.

“Downtown Chicago is the capital of the region’s economy and the cultural and civic heart of the Midwest, where interstate commerce runs strong,” said U.S. Attorney Boutros, who was sworn in as the United States Attorney on April 7, 2025. “Many billions of dollars of revenue, taxes, and investments are anchored in our city’s financial districts, and when violence and criminal activity cause our residents, businesses, and tourists not to feel safe to live, invest, and shop in Chicago, everyone suffers, whether at the federal, state, or local level. By investing PSN resources in our urban economic centers and the public transit system that feeds into them, we will help foster a downtown that is both safe and friendly to economic vitality for everyone. This initiative could not happen without a deep collaboration and shared commitment between the Department of Justice and our PSN partners to dedicate the resources necessary to support the downtown economic zones and the many millions of people who annually visit them, as well as the scores of businesses both large and small who serve them.”

“Partnership and collaboration with our law enforcement and prosecutorial partners are vital in reducing violence and making Chicago safer for all,” said Chicago Police Department Superintendent Larry Snelling. “Project Safe Neighborhoods reflects this spirit of collaboration and serves as an important tool in addressing crime in one of the busiest areas of our city. The expansion of this program builds on the progress CPD is making in combating crime citywide.”

“This new investment of federal resources is critically needed to address the threat that crime—including organized retail theft, carjacking, and armed robberies—pose to the heart of Chicago’s economy and to the transportation systems that tens of thousands of Chicagoans use to travel to and from the downtown,” said Cook County Sheriff Thomas J. Dart. “For years, my office has devoted significant resources to aggressively combat crime throughout downtown Chicago, the Magnificent Mile, and the surrounding areas, and we welcome the much-needed expansion of Project Safe Neighborhoods to these areas.”

“ATF is proud to work with our federal, state, and local partners on the expansion of Project Safe Neighborhoods,” said ATF Chicago Special Agent-in-Charge Christopher Amon. “By combining resources and expertise, we are proactively taking steps to disrupt violent crime in key transit and economic areas to ensure the safety of our residents and visitors.”

“The FBI remains steadfast in our dogged pursuit of eliminating violent crime,” said FBI Chicago Special Agent-in-Charge Douglas S. DePodesta. “We continue to be thankful for the powerful collaboration between our many law enforcement and prosecutorial partners in this fight. Our combined efforts reflect our unwavering commitment to ensure that anyone who seeks to endanger our community will be held accountable.”

Originally launched in 2001, PSN is an evidence-based program that focuses enforcement efforts on the most violent offenders, and partners with local prevention and reentry programs to pursue lasting reductions in crime. PSN follows four key design elements: focused and strategic enforcement; prevention and intervention; accountability; and community engagement.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office works closely with its Chicago PSN Task Force partners to assist with applying for and obtaining federal PSN grants to support anti-violence strategies in Chicago. By designating the downtown economic centers and CTA trains as PSN Enforcement Zones, PSN funds can now be deployed in various ways to help reduce violent crime in those areas, including:
- Aggressively prosecuting violent offenders.
- Hiring law enforcement personnel.
- Paying certain overtime costs for law enforcement officers and others working downtown and aboard CTA trains.
- Purchasing equipment to assist with violent crime reduction efforts.
- Supporting multi-jurisdictional task forces.
- Providing training and technical assistance under the national PSN program.
- Expanding messaging to deter violence, including signage aboard CTA trains.
The enforcement efforts in the newly designated PSN Enforcement Zones will focus on the investigation and prosecution of individuals and organized groups who engage in illegal firearm possession, drug trafficking, robberies, carjackings, and other violent offenses. For violent offenders arrested downtown or aboard CTA trains, criminal prosecutors will bring appropriate charges to achieve maximum deterrence and will seek pretrial detention and substantial prison sentences for defendants who pose a danger to the community.

In addition to all of the CTA rail lines in every neighborhood in Chicago, the newly designated PSN Enforcement Zone, depicted on this map (reproduced below), extends from Division Street on the Near North Side, between Lake Michigan and La Salle Drive (e.g., Magnificent Mile and Oak Street shopping corridors, Navy Pier, Loop, and Millennium Park), to I-55 between Clark Street and Lake Michigan on the Near South Side (e.g., Museum Campus and McCormick Place), and extends west to Ogden and Ashland Avenues, between Grand Avenue and I-290 (e.g., Fulton Market and West Loop business corridors).

MIL Security OSI –
June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI—Hagerty Joins Varney & Co. on Fox Business to Discuss Budget Reconciliation, Chinese Nationals’ Arrests

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Tennessee Bill Hagerty

WASHINGTON—Today, United States Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN), a member of the Senate Banking and Foreign Relations Committees, joined Varney & Co. on Fox Business to discuss the budget reconciliation package, along with two Chinese nationals charged with smuggling and potential agroterrorism.

*Click the photo above or here to watch*

Partial Transcript

Hagerty on the need to pass the budget reconciliation package: “We certainly do respect the effort that Elon undertook with respect to government efficiency. We all want to see cost reductions, but I tell you: my number one goal is to avoid what would otherwise be a greater than $4 trillion tax increase on Americans. I talked with Kevin Hassett yesterday, the National Economic Advisor at the White House. Were that to happen, were we not to pass this, we’d have over $4.2 trillion tax increase on America that would cut GDP growth negative six percent. Certainly, the nation, the world, doesn’t need to see that happen. One of the overarching aims here is to create certainty in our tax code to stimulate more capital investment. That’s exactly what will happen if we pass this. And Leader [John] Thune is right, the Congressional Budget Office essentially conducted malpractice last time in 2017 when they tried to estimate the impact of that Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. They missed it by a trillion dollars of revenue. I’m very optimistic; this will help reduce the deficit.”

Hagerty on the prospective positive financial impacts of the budget reconciliation package: “As I talk to CEOs around the country, they want to make investments here in America, but they need certainty in terms of the rule set. We can deliver that through this bill. We need to do it quickly. And if we do it quickly, we’ll be able to see a 2026 that’s going to be an incredible move forward, lots more capital investment. That capital investment begets more employment. That employment and jobs begets more economic activity. It’s a positive feedback loop that will make America grow at a great degree, much higher than the 1.8 percent that the Congressional Budget Office predicts. And if we’re at three percent or better, we’re going to see that deficit begin to close much more rapidly.”

Hagerty on the arrest of two Chinese nationals for smuggling and potential agroterrorism: “We need to be extremely careful, particularly when you think about the movement that we’ve had with Chinese nationals, particularly those affiliated with the [People’s Liberation Army], moving into our university system. That was precisely the case here. And we need to be very, very careful about who comes in, what they’re bringing with them. And make no mistake, and I’m so pleased that [FBI Director] Kash Patel [is] in the position he’s in, because he’s seeing right through all of this. Make no mistake: the Chinese Communist Party is not our friend. This sort of infiltration, this act of agroterrorism is the last thing we need to see on American soil. And the only way to prevent it is by waking up and realizing that we’ve got to be extraordinarily careful as we allow anybody to come into this country.”

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Washington State Man Arrested on Federal Charges Alleging He Provided Material Support to Palm Springs Fertility Clinic Bomber

Source: United States Attorneys General

A Washington state man was arrested on a federal criminal complaint alleging he provided material support to the Palm Springs fertility clinic bomber by shipping and paying for significant quantities of ammonium nitrate – an explosive precursor – prior to the suicidal terror attack last month.

Daniel Jongyon Park, 32, of Kent, was arrested last night shortly after his flight from Poland arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Park is charged with providing and attempting to provide material support to terrorists and made his initial court appearance today in the Eastern District of New York.

“This defendant is charged with facilitating the horrific attack on a fertility center in California. Bringing chaos and violence to a facility that exists to help women and mothers is a particularly cruel, disgusting crime that strikes at the very heart of our shared humanity,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “We are grateful to our partners in Poland who helped get this man back to America and we will prosecute him to the fullest extent of the law.”

“Park allegedly sent large amounts of explosive precursors to the man who drove a car bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs, an attack that potentially could have killed innocent people,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “The FBI and our partners work together to find and hold accountable those who engage in domestic terrorism and other illegal activity. I also want to express my thanks to authorities in Poland for their vital assistance in this case.”

“This defendant is charged with shipping large quantities of explosive precursors to the man whose suicide bombing last month destroyed a fertility clinic in Palm Springs,” said U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli for the Central District of California. “Domestic terrorism is evil and unacceptable. Those who aid terrorists can expect to feel the cold wrath of justice.”

According to an affidavit filed with the complaint, Guy Edward Bartkus, 25, of Twentynine Palms, California, drove a car containing a bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs on May 17. Bartkus detonated the bomb, killing himself, injuring numerous victims, destroying the fertility clinic’s building, and damaging surrounding buildings and areas. Bartkus’s attack was motivated by his pro-mortalism, anti-natalism, and anti-pro-life ideology, which is the belief that individuals should not be born without their consent and that non-existence is best.

Park – who shares Bartkus’s extremist views – shipped large quantities of explosive precursor materials to Bartkus, including approximately 180 pounds of ammonium nitrate. Days before the Palm Springs bombing, Park paid for an additional 90 pounds (40.8 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate that was shipped to Bartkus.

Park sent the first shipments of approximately 180 pounds (81.7 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate to Bartkus shortly before traveling to Bartkus’s residence, where he stayed with Bartkus from Jan. 25 to Feb. 8. Three days before Park arrived at Bartkus’s house, records from an AI chat application show that Bartkus researched how to make powerful explosions using ammonium nitrate and fuel.

During his stay at Bartkus’s residence, Park and Bartkus spent time in Bartkus’s room as well as in a detached garage “running experiments,” according to the affidavit. This was the same garage where law enforcement, during a search after the May 17 bombing, located significant amounts of chemicals commonly used in the construction of homemade bombs.

Four days after Bartkus conducted the suicide bombing, Park flew to Europe. On May 30, Park was detained in Poland and later was ordered deported to the United States.

If convicted, Park would face a statutory maximum penalty of 15 years in federal prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The FBI’s Inland Empire Joint Terrorism Task Force is investigating this matter. Considerable assistance was provided by the Palm Springs Police Department, the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department; the FBI’s legal attaché in Warsaw, Polish authorities, and FBI field offices in Seattle, New York, San Diego, Las Vegas, and Portland.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sarah E. Gerdes and Anna P. Boylan for the Central District of California, and Trial Attorney Patrick J. Cashman of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: New Jersey Man Pleads Guilty to Tax Evasion

Source: United States Attorneys General

A New Jersey man pleaded guilty today to tax evasion.

The following is according to court documents and statements made in court: for tax years 2015 and 2016, Matthew Tucci, of West Long Branch, filed tax returns that stated he owed more than $2 million in taxes for both years. Despite admitting that he owed those taxes, Tucci did not fully pay them when they were due. Instead, Tucci purchased real estate and engaged in a series of transactions designed to conceal his interest in those properties.

In 2017, the IRS sent notices to Tucci that he owed taxes, interest, and penalties for 2015 and 2016. After receiving these notices, Tucci transferred multiple properties to an entity owned by another individual, but he continued to exert control over at least two of them. Of the two properties Tucci continued to control, he sold one and refinanced the other. Tucci used the proceeds from these transactions to pay his personal expenses rather than his tax debts. In 2019, Tucci submitted documents to the IRS that falsely claimed that he had no connection to the entity that owned the 12 properties.

Tucci is scheduled to be sentenced on Oct. 9. He faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison as well as a period of supervised release, restitution, and monetary penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney Karen E. Kelly of the Justice Department’s Tax Division and Acting U.S. Attorney Alina Habba for the District of New Jersey made the announcement.

IRS Criminal Investigation and the FBI are investigating the case.

Trial Attorney Catriona Coppler of the Tax Division and Assistant U.S. Attorney Matthew Belgiovine for the District of New Jersey are prosecuting the case.

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI: “The AI Mothership Has Landed”: Legendary Tech Investor Reveals Musk’s Most Powerful Project Yet

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

NEW YORK, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — In a new briefing from bestselling author and tech entrepreneur James Altucher, startling revelations are emerging about Musk’s most ambitious AI undertaking yet — a project known as “Project Colossus.”

According to Altucher, this facility — now operational in Memphis — will soon power what he calls Artificial Superintelligence, ushering in a second wave of AI unlike anything we’ve seen before. And it’s happening alongside the return of Donald Trump, who Altucher says has already “cleared the path” for AI developers like Musk to move forward at full speed.

Musk’s “AI Mothership” Quietly Built in Memphis

Altucher opens his briefing with a bold claim: Elon Musk has already surpassed all major tech competitors — including OpenAI, Meta, and Microsoft — with a covert project few have even heard of.

“Elon Musk has created the AI mothership… an innovation of such enormous proportion… that he has already surpassed all the leading AI developers.”

“Right here, inside this warehouse in Memphis, Tennessee… lies a massive supercomputer Musk calls ‘Project Colossus.’”

According to Altucher, this isn’t speculation — it’s already functional and has been acknowledged by Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, who reportedly called it:

“The fastest supercomputer on the planet.” — Jensen Huang

AI 2.0: The Rise of Artificial Superintelligence

Altucher claims the world is on the verge of an entirely new technological era — one that goes beyond ChatGPT and the public’s current understanding of AI.

“This will lead to the rise of AI 2.0… Or what I call ‘Artificial Superintelligence.’”

“AI 1.0 gives us all the world’s knowledge at our fingertips. AI 2.0… gives that knowledge to intelligent machines that I believe will solve our problems for us.”

A Presidential Greenlight

In the same briefing, Altucher highlights Donald Trump’s early move to eliminate restrictions that were previously in place under President Biden.

“In one of his FIRST acts as President… Donald Trump overturned Executive Order #14110.”

“That’s why Donald Trump REPEALED Biden’s AI executive safety order on Day 1… Clearing the path for leading AI developers like Musk.”

Trump has also unveiled a $500 billion AI infrastructure plan, which Altucher says reflects the seriousness of the new administration’s approach.

“Trump also announced the LARGEST AI investment in history… Stargate… a massive, AI data center and infrastructure project with an estimated $500 billion price tag.”

What Comes Next: A 10X Expansion?

Altucher warns that the biggest developments are yet to come — and soon.

“In a matter of weeks, Elon plans to unveil a critical new update to Project Colossus that is expected to increase its power by 10-fold.”

“That’s when I predict Elon could announce a major update to this new AI project. One that some say will essentially 10X its power – overnight.”

He adds, “This second wave of ARTIFICIAL SUPERINTELLIGENCE… Will rival all of the great innovations of the past. Electricity… the wheel… even the discovery of fire.”

A Life’s Work Converging

Altucher isn’t just reporting from the sidelines — he claims to have been immersed in AI for more than 40 years.

“I’ve been working in the artificial intelligence field for the better part of the last four decades.”

“I helped pioneer AI trading on Wall Street.”

“At one point, I was recruited by IBM to help them develop their Deep Blue AI supercomputer… the one that beat the world chess champion, Gary Kasprov, in 1997.”

What’s at Stake

Altucher closes his report by pointing to a quote from Russian President Vladimir Putin as a sobering reminder of what this technology represents on the world stage.

“Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” — Vladimir Putin

With Trump clearing regulatory barriers and Musk ramping up development, Altucher believes the United States is poised to enter a defining moment in global technology leadership.

About James Altucher

James Altucher is a former hedge fund manager, computer scientist, and the author of over 20 books on finance, technology, and personal growth. A longtime pioneer in digital innovation, Altucher has advised startups, traded for top funds, and interviewed some of the most influential figures in business and tech. His latest work focuses on exposing the hidden infrastructure behind emerging AI technologies and preparing readers for the changes ahead.

Media Contact:
Derek Warren
Public Relations Manager
Paradigm Press Group
Email: dwarren@paradigmpressgroup.com

The MIL Network –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Washington State Man Arrested on Federal Charges Alleging He Provided Material Support to Palm Springs Fertility Clinic Bomber

Source: US State of California

A Washington state man was arrested on a federal criminal complaint alleging he provided material support to the Palm Springs fertility clinic bomber by shipping and paying for significant quantities of ammonium nitrate – an explosive precursor – prior to the suicidal terror attack last month.

Daniel Jongyon Park, 32, of Kent, was arrested last night shortly after his flight from Poland arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Park is charged with providing and attempting to provide material support to terrorists and made his initial court appearance today in the Eastern District of New York.

“This defendant is charged with facilitating the horrific attack on a fertility center in California. Bringing chaos and violence to a facility that exists to help women and mothers is a particularly cruel, disgusting crime that strikes at the very heart of our shared humanity,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “We are grateful to our partners in Poland who helped get this man back to America and we will prosecute him to the fullest extent of the law.”

“Park allegedly sent large amounts of explosive precursors to the man who drove a car bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs, an attack that potentially could have killed innocent people,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “The FBI and our partners work together to find and hold accountable those who engage in domestic terrorism and other illegal activity. I also want to express my thanks to authorities in Poland for their vital assistance in this case.”

“This defendant is charged with shipping large quantities of explosive precursors to the man whose suicide bombing last month destroyed a fertility clinic in Palm Springs,” said U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli for the Central District of California. “Domestic terrorism is evil and unacceptable. Those who aid terrorists can expect to feel the cold wrath of justice.”

According to an affidavit filed with the complaint, Guy Edward Bartkus, 25, of Twentynine Palms, California, drove a car containing a bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs on May 17. Bartkus detonated the bomb, killing himself, injuring numerous victims, destroying the fertility clinic’s building, and damaging surrounding buildings and areas. Bartkus’s attack was motivated by his pro-mortalism, anti-natalism, and anti-pro-life ideology, which is the belief that individuals should not be born without their consent and that non-existence is best.

Park – who shares Bartkus’s extremist views – shipped large quantities of explosive precursor materials to Bartkus, including approximately 180 pounds of ammonium nitrate. Days before the Palm Springs bombing, Park paid for an additional 90 pounds (40.8 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate that was shipped to Bartkus.

Park sent the first shipments of approximately 180 pounds (81.7 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate to Bartkus shortly before traveling to Bartkus’s residence, where he stayed with Bartkus from Jan. 25 to Feb. 8. Three days before Park arrived at Bartkus’s house, records from an AI chat application show that Bartkus researched how to make powerful explosions using ammonium nitrate and fuel.

During his stay at Bartkus’s residence, Park and Bartkus spent time in Bartkus’s room as well as in a detached garage “running experiments,” according to the affidavit. This was the same garage where law enforcement, during a search after the May 17 bombing, located significant amounts of chemicals commonly used in the construction of homemade bombs.

Four days after Bartkus conducted the suicide bombing, Park flew to Europe. On May 30, Park was detained in Poland and later was ordered deported to the United States.

If convicted, Park would face a statutory maximum penalty of 15 years in federal prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The FBI’s Inland Empire Joint Terrorism Task Force is investigating this matter. Considerable assistance was provided by the Palm Springs Police Department, the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department; the FBI’s legal attaché in Warsaw, Polish authorities, and FBI field offices in Seattle, New York, San Diego, Las Vegas, and Portland.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sarah E. Gerdes and Anna P. Boylan for the Central District of California, and Trial Attorney Patrick J. Cashman of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: New Jersey Man Pleads Guilty to Tax Evasion

Source: US State of California

A New Jersey man pleaded guilty today to tax evasion.

The following is according to court documents and statements made in court: for tax years 2015 and 2016, Matthew Tucci, of West Long Branch, filed tax returns that stated he owed more than $2 million in taxes for both years. Despite admitting that he owed those taxes, Tucci did not fully pay them when they were due. Instead, Tucci purchased real estate and engaged in a series of transactions designed to conceal his interest in those properties.

In 2017, the IRS sent notices to Tucci that he owed taxes, interest, and penalties for 2015 and 2016. After receiving these notices, Tucci transferred multiple properties to an entity owned by another individual, but he continued to exert control over at least two of them. Of the two properties Tucci continued to control, he sold one and refinanced the other. Tucci used the proceeds from these transactions to pay his personal expenses rather than his tax debts. In 2019, Tucci submitted documents to the IRS that falsely claimed that he had no connection to the entity that owned the 12 properties.

Tucci is scheduled to be sentenced on Oct. 9. He faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison as well as a period of supervised release, restitution, and monetary penalties. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney Karen E. Kelly of the Justice Department’s Tax Division and Acting U.S. Attorney Alina Habba for the District of New Jersey made the announcement.

IRS Criminal Investigation and the FBI are investigating the case.

Trial Attorney Catriona Coppler of the Tax Division and Assistant U.S. Attorney Matthew Belgiovine for the District of New Jersey are prosecuting the case.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Albuquerque Man Sentenced to Federal Prison for Cyberstalking Multiple Women

Source: US FBI

Phillip Gonzales of Albuquerque has been sentenced to 33 months in federal prison after a pattern of persistent digital harassment targeting multiple women over a nine-month period.

MIL Security OSI –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Up to $2 Million Reward Offers Each for Information Leading to Arrests and/or Convictions of Malicious Cyber Actors from China

Source: United States Department of State (3)

Office of the Spokesperson

Up to $2 Million Reward Offers Each for Information Leading to Arrests and/or Convictions of Malicious Cyber Actors from China

Media Note

March 5, 2025

Today, the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is announcing two reward offers under the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program (TOCRP) of up to $2 million each for information leading to the arrests and/or convictions, in any country, of malicious cyber actors Yin KeCheng and Zhou Shuai, both Chinese nationals residing in China.

Yin and Zhou were identified as associated with an advanced persistent threat group (APT27), who are also known to private sector security researchers as “Threat Group 3390,” “Bronze Union,” “Emissary Panda,” “Lucky Mouse,” “Iron Tiger,” “UTA0178,” “UNC 5221,” and “Silk Typhoon.”  Yin and Zhou are longtime members of the eco-system China uses to perpetuate its malicious cyber activity. They enrich themselves financially as hackers for hire for a myriad of Chinese entities.

An FBI investigation of APT27, which began in approximately 2014, resulted in two separate indictments, announced today by the Department of Justice. Yin is charged individually for cybercrime activity occurring from roughly 2013 to 2015, while Yin and Zhou are charged together in a separate conspiracy related to computer network intrusion activity occurring from roughly 2018 to 2020.  Yin and Zhou are each charged with wire fraud, money laundering, aggravated identity theft, and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

Today’s reward offers are authorized by the Secretary under the TOCRP, which supports law enforcement efforts to disrupt transnational crime globally. The reward offers also complement the announcement today of a Treasury sanctions action by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) against Zhou and his company Shanghai Heiying Information Technology. The combined actions represent a whole of government effort to combat malicious cyber actors.

If you have information, please contact the FBI by email at yin_zhou_info@fbi.gov. If you are located outside of the United States, you can also visit the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate. If you are in the United States, you can also contact your local FBI field office.

ALL IDENTITIES ARE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.  Government officials and employees are not eligible for rewards.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Public Schedule – May 28, 2025

Source: United States Department of State (4)

Office of the Spokesperson

Public Schedule – May 28, 2025

Public Schedule

May 27, 2025

***THE DAILY PUBLIC SCHEDULE IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE***

SECRETARY MARCO RUBIO

11:15 a.m. Secretary Rubio meets with German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul at the Department of State
(CAMERA SPRAY AT THE TOP)

Call time for video cameras, still cameras and writers is 10:45 a.m. from the 23rd Street entrance.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER LANDAU

12:00 p.m. Deputy Secretary Landau meets with Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri at the Department of State.
(CLOSED PRESS COVERAGE)

SENIOR OFFICIAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS LISA KENNA

11:15 a.m. Senior Official Kenna joins Secretary Rubio’s meeting with German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul at the Department of State
(CAMERA SPRAY AT THE TOP)

SENIOR BUREAU OFFICIAL FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS BRENDAN P. HANRAHAN

11:15 a.m. Senior Bureau Official Hanrahan joins Secretary Rubio’s meeting with German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul at the Department of State.
(CAMERA SPRAY AT THE TOP)

BRIEFING SCHEDULE

No Department Press Briefing.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: $5 Million Reward Offer for Information Leading to Arrest and/or Conviction of Leader of Foreign Terrorist Organization MS-13

Source: United States Department of State (3)

Tammy Bruce, Department Spokesperson

$5 Million Reward Offer for Information Leading to Arrest and/or Conviction of Leader of Foreign Terrorist Organization MS-13

Press Statement

April 21, 2025

With the designation of Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) on February 20, 2025, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), the U.S. government is working towards building a safer, stronger, and more prosperous hemisphere in the Americas by providing all available means to eliminate the threats of violent crime by MS-13 throughout the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. government is offering a reward under the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program (TOCRP) of up to $5 million, which was announced in 2023, for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction in any country of Yulan Adonay Archaga Carías, aka “Porky” and “Alexander Mendoza”, the leader of MS-13 in Honduras.

Archaga Carías is the highest-ranking member of MS-13 in Honduras and is responsible for directing the gang’s criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, murder, kidnappings, and other violent crimes involving machine guns. He is also responsible for the gang’s importation of large amounts of cocaine into the United States. Archaga Carías remains at large.

Archaga Carías is one of the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted Fugitives, as well as one of the DEA’s and Homeland Security Investigations’ most wanted fugitives.

If you have information, please contact the FBI by email at archaga-carias_tips@fbi.gov or via text at +1 832-267-1688 (text/WhatsApp) for this reward. If you are located outside of the United States, you may also contact the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate. If you are in the United States, you may also contact the local FBI, DEA, or HSI offices in your city.

Today’s announcement reinforces the importance of public awareness for rewards targets who are members of, or associated with, the eight cartels and transnational criminal organizations designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations on February 20, 2025. Bringing these individuals to justice is a priority for the Trump Administration.

ALL IDENTITIES ARE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Government officials and employees are not eligible for rewards.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Public Schedule – May 29, 2025

Source: United States Department of State (4)

Office of the Spokesperson

HomePublic Schedule – May 29, 2025

Public Schedule – May 29, 2025

Public Schedule

May 28, 2025

***THE DAILY PUBLIC SCHEDULE IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE***

SECRETARY MARCO RUBIO

9:30 a.m. Secretary Rubio meets with North Macedonia Foreign Minister Timčo Mucunski at the Department of State.
(CAMERA SPRAY AT THE TOP)
Call time for video cameras, still cameras and writers is 9:00 a.m. from the 23rd Street entrance.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER LANDAU

Deputy Secretary Landau attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES MICHAEL J. RIGAS

Deputy Secretary Rigas attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

SENIOR OFFICIAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS LISA KENNA

Senior Official Kenna attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

BRIEFING SCHEDULE

1:45 p.m. Department Press Briefing with Spokesperson Tammy Bruce.
(OPEN PRESS COVERAGE)
The Department Press Briefing will be streamed live on the Department homepage and YouTube Channel.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Public Schedule – May 30, 2025

Source: United States Department of State (4)

Office of the Spokesperson

HomePublic Schedule – May 30, 2025

Public Schedule – May 30, 2025

Public Schedule

May 29, 2025

***THE DAILY PUBLIC SCHEDULE IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE***

SECRETARY MARCO RUBIO

Secretary Rubio attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER LANDAU

11:15 a.m. Deputy Secretary Landau meets with Liberian Foreign Minister Sara Beysolow Nyanti at the Department of State.
(CLOSED PRESS COVERAGE)

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES MICHAEL J. RIGAS

Deputy Secretary Rigas attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

SENIOR OFFICIAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS LISA KENNA

Senior Official Kenna attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

BRIEFING SCHEDULE

No Department Press Briefing.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Public Schedule – June 2, 2025

Source: United States Department of State (4)

HomePublic Schedule – June 2, 2025

***THE DAILY PUBLIC SCHEDULE IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE***

SECRETARY MARCO RUBIO

Secretary Rubio attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER LANDAU

Deputy Secretary Landau attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES MICHAEL J. RIGAS

Deputy Secretary Rigas attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

SENIOR OFFICIAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS LISA KENNA

Senior Official Kenna attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

BRIEFING SCHEDULE

No Department Press Briefing.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Public Schedule – June 4, 2025

Source: United States Department of State (4)

Office of the Spokesperson

HomePublic Schedule – June 4, 2025

Public Schedule – June 4, 2025

Public Schedule

June 4, 2025

***THE DAILY PUBLIC SCHEDULE IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE***

SECRETARY MARCO RUBIO

1:00 p.m. Secretary Rubio meets with Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan at the Department of State.
(OPEN PRESS COVERAGE)
Call time for video cameras, still cameras, and writers is 12:30 p.m. from the 23rd Street entrance.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER LANDAU

11:15 a.m. Deputy Secretary Landau meets with Ukrainian Presidential Administration Head Andriy Yermak and Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko at the Department of State.
(CLOSED PRESS COVERAGE)

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES MICHAEL J. RIGAS

Deputy Secretary Rigas attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

SENIOR OFFICIAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS LISA KENNA

Senior Official Kenna attends meetings and briefings at the Department of State.

SENIOR BUREAU OFFICIAL FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS BRENDAN P. HANRAHAN

11:15 a.m. Senior Bureau Official Hanrahan joins Deputy Secretary Landau’s meeting with Ukrainian Presidential Administration Head Andriy Yermak and Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko at the Department of State.
(OPEN PRESS COVERAGE)

1:00 p.m. Senior Bureau Official Hanrahan meets with European Union Political and Security Committee Ambassadors at the Department of State.
(CLOSED PRESS COVERAGE)

3:30 p.m. Senior Bureau Official Hanrahan meets with Danish Ambassador to the United States Møller Sørensen at the Department of State.
(CLOSED PRESS COVERAGE)

BRIEFING SCHEDULE

No Department Press Briefing.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 5, 2025