Source: Reserve Bank of India
The expression ‘Banking System’ or ‘Banks’ means the banks and any other financial institution referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (vi) of clause (d) of the explanation below Section 42(1) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. No. of Scheduled Commercial Banks as on Current Fortnight:135 Ajit Prasad Press Release: 2025-2026/440 |
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Translation. Region: Russian Federal
Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.
Order of May 28, 2025 No. 1350-r
From June 4, 2025, Russia will begin implementing a pilot project for the operational interaction of government agencies, banks and telecom operators to combat cyber fraud. An order to this effect has been signed.
The goal of the pilot is to create an effective mechanism for interaction between various state and non-state structures and to establish an exchange of information between them to prevent crimes using information and communication technologies.
The platform for such interaction will be the state information system being created to combat violations in this area. During the implementation of the pilot project, the operation of this system will be tested. Thus, it is planned to determine the categories of data necessary for effective counteraction to cybercrimes, develop unified formats for providing data on offenses, and achieve automation of operational interaction. In addition, within the framework of the pilot project, it is necessary to develop preventive measures to combat fraudsters using digital communication channels.
The participants of the pilot project from the state side will be the Ministry of Digital Development, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB, Roskomnadzor, Rosfinmonitoring, FSTEC, the Bank of Russia, the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Investigative Committee. The participants will also include the largest Russian banks and telecom operators and JSC National Payment Card System.
The pilot project is scheduled to be completed in March 2026. Its implementation will provide new opportunities to protect citizens from fraudulent activities and enhance their security on the Internet.
At the end of 2024, the Government approved the Concept of the state system for combating crimes committed using information and communication technologies. This document, among other things, defined the creation of a specialized digital platform for the prompt exchange of information between law enforcement agencies, credit institutions and communications operators as a priority area of activity.
Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
SINGAPORE, May 30, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — UP Fintech Holding Limited (NASDAQ: TIGR) (“UP Fintech” or the “Company”), a leading online brokerage firm focusing on global investors, today announced its unaudited financial results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2025.
Mr. Wu Tianhua, Chairman and CEO of UP Fintech stated: “The macro environment remained dynamic in the first quarter, our total revenues reached US$122.6 million, representing an increase of 55.3% year-over-year. Benefiting from our brand strength and continued investment in R&D, both our GAAP and non-GAAP net income saw impressive growth. Net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech was US$30.4 million, up 8.4% quarter over quarter and 146.7% year over year. Non-GAAP net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech reached US$36.0 million, an increase of 18.3% sequentially and 145.0% from the same period last year.
In the first quarter, we added 60,900 new customers with deposits, already achieving 40% of our yearly guidance of 150,000 new customers with deposits for 2025, and bringing our total number of customers with deposits at the end of the first quarter to 1,152,900, a 23.5% increase compared to the same quarter last year. Asset inflow remained strong, we saw net asset inflow of US$3.4 billion in the first quarter, of which the majority comes from retail users, combining with a US$776 million mark to market gain, led total account balance rose by 9.9% quarter over quarter and 39.5% year over year to US$45.9 billion, setting another historic high. We also achieved notable growth in Hong Kong, the average net asset inflows of new funded clients in Hong Kong during the first quarter were above US$30,000.
In the first quarter, we continued to roll out new features aimed at enhancing the user experience across our platform. In Hong Kong, we introduced additional functionality on top of its existing virtual asset trading service. Retail investors can now deposit and withdraw cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, while professional investors are also able to deposit and withdraw USDT. Additionally, Tiger Brokers Hong Kong recently launched Delivery Versus Payment (DVP) functionality, which strengthens our ability to serve institutional and high-net-worth clients. We also introduced equity repo services to further enhance our securities lending and treasury management capabilities. In addition, we remain committed to improving our Tiger AI offering based on user feedback. It now supports portfolio and watchlist analysis, allowing users to more effectively identify investment opportunities, receive risk alerts on their holdings, and access actionable strategy suggestions.
In our Corporate business, we underwrote 4 Hong Kong IPOs in the first quarter, including “Chifeng Gold” and “Nanshan Aluminum”, and acted as distributor for “Mixue Group”, the largest Hong Kong IPO in the first quarter. In our ESOP business, we added 20 new clients in the first quarter, bringing the total number of ESOP clients served to 633 as of March 31, 2025.”
Financial Highlights for First Quarter 2025
Operating Highlights for First Quarter 2025
Selected Operating Data for First Quarter 2025
| As of and for the three months ended | |||||||||||
| March 31, | December 31, | March 31, | |||||||||
| 2024 | 2024 | 2025 | |||||||||
| In 000’s | |||||||||||
| Number of customer accounts | 2,247.4 | 2,449.3 | 2,526.7 | ||||||||
| Number of customers with deposits | 933.4 | 1,092.0 | 1,152.9 | ||||||||
| Number of options and futures contracts traded | 10,850.3 | 18,926.3 | 20,400.7 | ||||||||
| In USD millions | |||||||||||
| Trading volume | 85,410.6 | 198,016.9 | 217,453.6 | ||||||||
| Trading volume of stocks | 28,606.3 | 55,502.6 | 59,453.4 | ||||||||
| Total account balance | 32,872.1 | 41,725.2 | 45,861.9 | ||||||||
First Quarter 2025 Financial Results
REVENUES
Total revenues were US$122.6 million, an increase of 55.3% from US$78.9 million in the same quarter of last year.
Commissions were US$58.3 million, an increase of 109.8% from US$27.8 million in the same quarter of last year, due to an increase in trading volume.
Financing service fees were US$2.6 million, a decrease of 9.6% from US$2.8 million in the same quarter of last year, primarily due to a decrease of the account balance of our fully disclosed account customers.
Interest income was US$53.8 million, an increase of 22.7% from US$43.8 million in the same quarter of last year, primarily due to the increase in margin financing and securities lending activities of our consolidated account customers.
Other revenues were US$7.9 million, an increase of 76.8% from US$4.5 million in the same quarter of last year, primarily due to an increase in currency exchange income and wealth management income.
Interest expense was US$15.0 million, an increase of 1.7% from US$14.8 million in the same quarter of last year, primarily due to the increase in funding for margin financing activities.
OPERATING COSTS AND EXPENSES
Total operating costs and expenses were US$67.1 million, an increase of 32.1% from US$50.8 million in the same quarter of last year.
Execution and clearing expenses were US$5.3 million, an increase of 139.3% from US$2.2 million in the same quarter of last year due to an increase in our trading volume.
Employee compensation and benefits expenses were US$33.8 million, an increase of 21.7% from US$27.8 million in the same quarter of last year, primarily due to an increase of global headcount to support our global expansion.
Occupancy, depreciation and amortization expenses were US$2.1 million, a slight increase of 0.2% from US$2.1 million in the same quarter of last year.
Communication and market data expenses were US$9.8 million, an increase of 14.4% from US$8.6 million in the same quarter of last year due to increased IT-related service fees.
Marketing and branding expenses were US$10.9 million, an increase of 147.5% from US$4.4 million in the same quarter of last year, primarily due to higher marketing spending this quarter.
General and administrative expenses were US$5.1 million, a decrease of 9.4% from US$5.7 million in the same quarter of last year due to a decrease in professional service fees.
NET INCOME attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech
Net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech was US$30.4 million, as compared to a net income of US$12.3 million in the same quarter of last year. Net income per ADS – diluted was US$0.166, as compared to a net income per ADS – diluted of US$0.077 in the same quarter of last year.
Non-GAAP net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech, which excludes share-based compensation, was US$36.0 million, as compared to a US$14.7 million non-GAAP net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech in the same quarter of last year. Non-GAAP net income per ADS – diluted was US$0.198 as compared to a non-GAAP net income per ADS – diluted of US$0.092 in the same quarter of last year.
For the first quarter of 2025, the Company’s weighted average number of ADSs used in calculating non-GAAP net income per ADS – diluted was 184,472,928. As of March 31, 2025, the Company had a total of 2,649,914,037 Class A and B ordinary shares outstanding, or the equivalent of 176,660,936 ADSs.
CERTAIN OTHER FINANCIAL ITEMS
As of March 31, 2025, the Company’s cash and cash equivalents, term deposits and long-term deposits were US$406.4 million, compared to US$396 million as of December 31, 2024.
As of March 31, 2025, the allowance for doubtful accounts on receivables from customers was US$14.8 million compared to US$15.3 million as of December 31, 2024.
In December 2023, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) issued Accounting Standards Update No. 2023-08, Intangibles—Goodwill and Other—Crypto Assets (Subtopic 350-60): Accounting for and Disclosure of Crypto Assets (“ASU 2023-08”). ASU 2023-08 requires certain crypto assets to be measured at fair value separately on the balance sheet with changes reported in the statement of operations each reporting period.
The Company adopted this guidance from January 1, 2025, and the Company recorded such crypto asset balance in Crypto assets held as of March 31, 2025, with a cumulative-effect adjustment of US$2.3 million to the opening balance of Retained earnings.
Updates to Management and Directors
Mr. Ming Liao departed from the position of Independent Director at the Company due to personal reasons, effective May 28, 2025. Mr. Liao’s departure was not the result from any disagreement with the Company.
Conference Call Information:
UP Fintech’s management will hold an earnings conference call at 8:00 AM on May 30, 2025, U.S. Eastern Time (8:00 PM on May 30, 2025, Singapore/Hong Kong Time).
All participants wishing to attend the call must preregister online before receiving the dial-in number. Preregistration may take a few minutes to complete.
Preregistration Information:
Please note that all participants will need to pre-register for the conference call, using the link:
https://register-conf.media-server.com/register/BId8a2d4cd09e14653b3533b8d3745dfa0
It will automatically lead to the registration page of “UP Fintech Holding Limited First Quarter 2025 Earnings Conference Call”, where details for RSVP are needed.
Upon registering, all participants will be provided a confirmation email with a participant dial-in number and personal PIN to access the conference call. Please dial in 10 minutes prior to the call start time using the conference access information.
Additionally, a live and archived webcast of the conference call will be available at https://ir.itigerup.com
Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures
In evaluating our business, we consider and use non-GAAP net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech and non-GAAP net income per ADS – diluted as supplemental measures to review and assess our operating performance. The presentation of the non-GAAP financial measures is not intended to be considered in isolation or as a substitute for the financial information prepared and presented in accordance with the United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“U.S. GAAP”). We define non-GAAP net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech as net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech excluding share-based compensation. Non-GAAP net income per ADS – diluted is non-GAAP net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech divided by the weighted average number of diluted ADSs.
We present these non-GAAP financial measures because they are used by our management to evaluate our operating performance and formulate business plans. Non-GAAP net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech enables our management to assess our operating results without considering the impact of share-based compensation. We also believe that the use of these non-GAAP financial measures facilitates investors’ assessment of our operating performance.
These non-GAAP financial measures are not defined under U.S. GAAP and are not presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP. These non-GAAP financial measures have limitations as an analytical tool. One of the key limitations of using these non-GAAP financial measures is that they do not reflect all items of income and expenses that affect our operations. Share-based compensation has been and may continue to be incurred in our business and are not reflected in the presentation of non-GAAP net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech. Further, these non-GAAP financial measures may differ from the non-GAAP financial information used by other companies, including peer companies, and therefore their comparability may be limited.
These non-GAAP financial measures should not be considered in isolation or construed as alternatives to total operating costs and expenses, net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech or any other measure of performance or as an indicator of our operating performance. Investors are encouraged to review these historical non-GAAP financial measures in light of the most directly comparable GAAP measures. These non-GAAP financial measures presented here may not be comparable to similarly titled measures presented by other companies. Other companies may calculate similarly titled measures differently, limiting the usefulness of such measures when analyzing our data comparatively. We encourage investors and others to review our financial information in its entirety and not rely on a single financial measure.
About UP Fintech Holding Limited
UP Fintech Holding Limited is a leading online brokerage firm focusing on global investors. The Company’s proprietary mobile and online trading platform enables investors to trade in equities and other financial instruments on multiple exchanges around the world. The Company offers innovative products and services as well as a superior user experience to customers through its “mobile first” strategy, which enables it to better serve and retain current customers as well as attract new ones. The Company offers customers comprehensive brokerage and value-added services, including trade order placement and execution, margin financing, IPO subscription, ESOP management, investor education, community discussion and customer support. The Company’s proprietary infrastructure and advanced technology are able to support trades across multiple currencies, multiple markets, multiple products, multiple execution venues and multiple clearinghouses.
For more information on the Company, please visit: https://ir.itigerup.com.
Safe Harbor Statement
This announcement contains forward−looking statements. These statements are made under the “safe harbor” provisions of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forward−looking statements can be identified by terminology such as “may,” “might,” “aim,” “likely to,” “will,” “expects,” “anticipates,” “future,” “intends,” “plans,” “believes,” “estimates” and similar statements or expressions. Among other statements, the business outlook and quotations from management in this announcement, the Company’s strategic and operational plans and expectations regarding growth and expansion of its business lines, and the Company’s plans for future financing of its business contain forward-looking statements. The Company may also make written or oral forward-looking statements in its periodic reports to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on Forms 20−F and 6−K, in its annual report to shareholders, in press releases and other written materials and in oral statements made by its officers, directors or employees to third parties, including the earnings conference call. Statements that are not historical facts, including statements about the Company’s beliefs and expectations, are forward−looking statements. Forward−looking statements involve inherent risks and uncertainties. A number of factors could cause actual results to differ materially from those contained in any forward-looking statement, including but not limited to the following: the Company’s ability to effectively implement its growth strategies; trends and competition in global financial markets; changes in the Company’s revenues and certain cost or expense accounting policies; the cooperation relationships with our business partners and shareholders such as Interactive Brokers LLC and Xiaomi Corporation and its affiliates; and governmental policies and regulations affecting the Company’s industry and general economic conditions in China, Singapore and other countries. Further information regarding these and other risks is included in the Company’s filings with the SEC, including the Company’s annual report on Form 20-F filed with the SEC on April 23, 2025. All information provided in this press release and in the attachments is as of the date of this press release, and the Company undertakes no obligation to update any forward-looking statement, except as required under applicable law. Further information regarding these and other risks is included in the Company’s filings with the SEC.
For investor and media inquiries please contact:
Investor Relations Contact
UP Fintech Holding Limited
Email: ir@itiger.com
| UP FINTECH HOLDING LIMITED UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS (All amounts in U.S. dollars (“US$”)) |
||||||||
| As of December 31, |
As of March 31, |
|||||||
| 2024 | 2025 | |||||||
| US$ | US$ | |||||||
| Assets: | ||||||||
| Cash and cash equivalents | 393,576,874 | 403,891,218 | ||||||
| Cash-segregated for regulatory purpose | 2,464,683,625 | 2,849,477,420 | ||||||
| Term deposits | 1,075,260 | 1,101,083 | ||||||
| Receivables from customers (net of allowance of US$15,284,002 and US$14,790,668 as of December 31, 2024 and March 31, 2025) | 1,052,972,649 | 1,221,616,295 | ||||||
| Receivables from brokers, dealers, and clearing organizations | 2,305,740,507 | 2,556,498,087 | ||||||
| Financial instruments held, at fair value | 75,547,082 | 177,479,943 | ||||||
| Prepaid expenses and other current assets | 17,629,819 | 19,529,054 | ||||||
| Amounts due from related parties | 16,720,671 | 13,821,867 | ||||||
| Total current assets | 6,327,946,487 | 7,243,414,967 | ||||||
| Non-current assets: | ||||||||
| Long-term deposits | 1,369,994 | 1,378,037 | ||||||
| Right-of-use assets | 10,880,673 | 12,736,333 | ||||||
| Property, equipment and intangible assets, net | 15,358,528 | 15,750,823 | ||||||
| Crypto assets held | — | 3,410,986 | ||||||
| Goodwill | 2,492,668 | 2,492,668 | ||||||
| Long-term investments | 7,658,809 | 7,473,531 | ||||||
| Equity method investment | 10,203,622 | 10,305,433 | ||||||
| Other non-current assets | 6,828,553 | 8,623,671 | ||||||
| Deferred tax assets | 8,573,135 | 9,931,234 | ||||||
| Total non-current assets | 63,365,982 | 72,102,716 | ||||||
| Total assets | 6,391,312,469 | 7,315,517,683 | ||||||
| Current liabilities: | ||||||||
| Payables to customers | 3,574,651,125 | 4,333,279,026 | ||||||
| Payables to brokers, dealers and clearing organizations: | 1,914,769,701 | 1,975,967,952 | ||||||
| Accrued expenses and other current liabilities | 67,263,254 | 75,891,783 | ||||||
| Lease liabilities-current | 4,153,928 | 4,845,376 | ||||||
| Amounts due to related parties | 874,331 | 53,588,763 | ||||||
| Total current liabilities | 5,561,712,339 | 6,443,572,900 | ||||||
| Convertible bonds | 159,505,397 | 160,158,584 | ||||||
| Lease liabilities- non-current | 5,902,323 | 6,992,755 | ||||||
| Deferred tax liabilities | 2,068,661 | 2,161,995 | ||||||
| Total liabilities | 5,729,188,720 | 6,612,886,234 | ||||||
| Mezzanine equity | ||||||||
| Redeemable non-controlling interest | 7,177,668 | 5,518,571 | ||||||
| Total Mezzanine equity | 7,177,668 | 5,518,571 | ||||||
| Shareholders’ equity: | ||||||||
| Class A ordinary shares | 25,427 | 25,523 | ||||||
| Class B ordinary shares | 976 | 976 | ||||||
| Additional paid-in capital | 619,030,730 | 624,497,561 | ||||||
| Statutory reserve | 12,425,463 | 12,425,463 | ||||||
| Retained earnings | 37,843,547 | 70,712,884 | ||||||
| Treasury stock | (2,172,819 | ) | (2,172,819 | ) | ||||
| Accumulated other comprehensive loss | (11,919,310 | ) | (8,090,989 | ) | ||||
| Total UP Fintech shareholders’ equity | 655,234,014 | 697,398,599 | ||||||
| Non-controlling interests | (287,933 | ) | (285,721 | ) | ||||
| Total equity | 654,946,081 | 697,112,878 | ||||||
| Total liabilities, mezzanine equity and equity | 6,391,312,469 | 7,315,517,683 | ||||||
| UP FINTECH HOLDING LIMITED | ||||||||||||
| UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF COMPREHENSIVE INCOME | ||||||||||||
| (All amounts in U.S. dollars (“US$”), except for number of shares (or ADSs) and per share (or ADS) data) | ||||||||||||
| For the three months ended | ||||||||||||
| March 31, | December 31, | March 31, | ||||||||||
| 2024 | 2024 | 2025 | ||||||||||
| US$ | US$ | US$ | ||||||||||
| Revenues: | ||||||||||||
| Commissions | 27,786,218 | 55,964,174 | 58,307,151 | |||||||||
| Interest related income | ||||||||||||
| Financing service fees | 2,832,065 | 2,770,419 | 2,560,432 | |||||||||
| Interest income | 43,841,220 | 55,762,091 | 53,805,393 | |||||||||
| Other revenues | 4,488,989 | 9,605,165 | 7,936,987 | |||||||||
| Total revenues | 78,948,492 | 124,101,849 | 122,609,963 | |||||||||
| Interest expense | (14,789,835 | ) | (16,731,341 | ) | (15,041,810 | ) | ||||||
| Total Net revenues | 64,158,657 | 107,370,508 | 107,568,153 | |||||||||
| Operating costs and expenses: | ||||||||||||
| Execution and clearing | (2,230,863 | ) | (6,095,132 | ) | (5,338,917 | ) | ||||||
| Employee compensation and benefits | (27,787,218 | ) | (37,163,110 | ) | (33,805,808 | ) | ||||||
| Occupancy, depreciation and amortization | (2,144,337 | ) | (2,137,586 | ) | (2,149,308 | ) | ||||||
| Communication and market data | (8,561,482 | ) | (11,787,814 | ) | (9,794,869 | ) | ||||||
| Marketing and branding | (4,390,987 | ) | (9,507,918 | ) | (10,867,048 | ) | ||||||
| General and administrative | (5,667,137 | ) | (6,432,737 | ) | (5,136,346 | ) | ||||||
| Total operating costs and expenses | (50,782,024 | ) | (73,124,297 | ) | (67,092,296 | ) | ||||||
| Other income (expense): | ||||||||||||
| Others, net | 3,615,219 | 3,469,021 | (1,340,064 | ) | ||||||||
| Income before income tax | 16,991,852 | 37,715,232 | 39,135,793 | |||||||||
| Income tax expenses | (4,528,297 | ) | (9,488,084 | ) | (8,549,158 | ) | ||||||
| Net income | 12,463,555 | 28,227,148 | 30,586,635 | |||||||||
| Less: net (loss) income attributable to non-controlling interests | (17,914 | ) | 12,563 | 11,527 | ||||||||
| Accretion of redeemable non-controlling interests to redemption value | (151,322 | ) | (164,328 | ) | (155,983 | ) | ||||||
| Net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech | 12,330,147 | 28,050,257 | 30,419,125 | |||||||||
| Other comprehensive income (loss), net of tax: | ||||||||||||
| Unrealized gain on available-for-sale investments | — | 343,892 | — | |||||||||
| Changes in cumulative foreign currency translation adjustment | (4,791,040 | ) | (17,440,809 | ) | 3,826,640 | |||||||
| Total Comprehensive income | 7,672,515 | 11,130,231 | 34,413,275 | |||||||||
| Less: comprehensive (loss) income attributable to non-controlling interests | (13,454 | ) | 24,226 | 9,845 | ||||||||
| Accretion of redeemable non-controlling interests to redemption value | (151,322 | ) | (164,328 | ) | (155,983 | ) | ||||||
| Total Comprehensive income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech | 7,534,647 | 10,941,677 | 34,247,447 | |||||||||
| Net income per ordinary share: | ||||||||||||
| Basic | 0.005 | 0.011 | 0.012 | |||||||||
| Diluted | 0.005 | 0.011 | 0.011 | |||||||||
| Net income per ADS (1 ADS represents 15 Class A ordinary shares): | ||||||||||||
| Basic | 0.079 | 0.164 | 0.173 | |||||||||
| Diluted | 0.077 | 0.158 | 0.166 | |||||||||
| Weighted average number of ordinary shares used in calculating net income per ordinary share: | ||||||||||||
| Basic | 2,342,468,897 | 2,557,911,677 | 2,634,972,699 | |||||||||
| Diluted | 2,452,022,959 | 2,687,607,158 | 2,767,093,920 | |||||||||
| Reconciliations of Unaudited Non-GAAP Results of Operations Measures to the Nearest Comparable GAAP Measures (All amounts in U.S. dollars (“US$”), except for number of ADSs and per ADS data) |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| For the three months ended March 31,2024 | For the three months ended December 31,2024 | For the three months ended March 31,2025 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| non-GAAP | non-GAAP | non-GAAP | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| GAAP | Adjustment | non-GAAP | GAAP | Adjustment | non-GAAP | GAAP | Adjustment | non-GAAP | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| US$ | US$ | US$ | US$ | US$ | US$ | US$ | US$ | US$ | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Unaudited | Unaudited | Unaudited | Unaudited | Unaudited | Unaudited | Unaudited | Unaudited | Unaudited | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2,380,637 | (1 | ) | 2,421,342 | (1 | ) | 5,621,791 | (1 | ) | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Net income attributable to ordinary shareholders of UP Fintech |
12,330,147 | 2,380,637 | 14,710,784 | 28,050,257 | 2,421,342 | 30,471,599 | 30,419,125 | 5,621,791 | 36,040,916 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Net income per ADS – diluted | 0.077 | 0.092 | 0.158 | 0.172 | 0.166 | 0.198 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Weighted average number of ADSs used in calculating diluted net income per ADS | 163,468,197 | 163,468,197 | 179,173,811 | 179,173,811 | 184,472,928 | 184,472,928 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
(1) Share-based compensation.
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
OMA SAVINGS BANK PLC, STOCK EXCHANGE RELEASE 21 MAY 2025 AT 15.00. P.M. EET, MANAGERS’ TRANSACTIONS
Oma Savings Bank Plc – Managers’ transactions – Pykäri
____________________________________________
Person subject to the notification requirement
Name: Pykäri, Pekka
Position: Other senior manager
Issuer: Oma Savings Bank Plc
LEI: 743700LE1ECAPXC5UT18
Notification type: INITIAL NOTIFICATION
Reference number: 743700LE1ECAPXC5UT18_20250527134104_53
____________________________________________
Transaction date: 2025-05-28
Venue not applicable
Instrument type: SHARE
ISIN: FI4000306733
Nature of the transaction: SUBSCRIPTION
Transaction details
(1): Volume: 179 Unit price: 7.5129 EUR
Aggregated transactions
(1): Volume: 179 Volume weighted average price: 7.5129 EUR
Oma Savings Bank Plc
Additional information:
Karri Alameri, CEO, tel. +358 45 656 5250, karri.alameri@omasp.fi
DISTRIBUTION:
Nasdaq Helsinki Ltd
Major media
www.omasp.fi
OmaSp is a solvent and profitable Finnish bank. About 600 professionals provide nationwide services through OmaSp’s 48 branch offices and digital service channels to over 200,000 private and corporate customers. OmaSp focuses primarily on retail banking operations and provides its clients with a broad range of banking services both through its own balance sheet as well as by acting as an intermediary for its partners’ products. The intermediated products include credit, investment and loan insurance products. OmaSp is also engaged in mortgage banking operations.
OmaSp core idea is to provide personal service and to be local and close to its customers, both in digital and traditional channels. OmaSp strives to offer premium level customer experience through personal service and easy accessibility. In addition, the development of the operations and services is customer-oriented. The personnel is committed and OmaSp seeks to support their career development with versatile tasks and continuous development. A substantial part of the personnel also own shares in OmaSp.
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION TO U.S. NEWSWIRE SERVICES OR FOR DISSEMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES. ANY FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS RESTRICTION MAY CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW
CALGARY, Alberta, May 30, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — High Arctic Overseas Holdings Corp. (TSXV: HOH) (“High Arctic Overseas” or the “Corporation”) has released its first quarter 2025 financial and operating results. The unaudited condensed interim consolidated financial statements (the “Financial Statements”) and management’s discussion & analysis (“MD&A”) for the quarter ended March 31, 2025, will be available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca. All amounts are denominated in United States dollars (“USD”), unless otherwise indicated.
The common shares of the Corporation began trading on the TSXV on August 16, 2024 under the trading symbol HOH.
Mike Maguire, Chief Executive Officer commented on the Corporation’s first quarter 2025 financial and operating results:
“Having established High Arctic Overseas Holdings Corp. with dedicated Management and a resilient core business, this Corporation is well placed to participate meaningfully in anticipated future major project developments.
Our experience combined with ideal drilling equipment for the challenging PNG environment positions us well.
I remain excited about our prospects to play a strategic role servicing the major projects anticipated in PNG over the second half of the decade.”
2025 FIRST QUARTER HIGHLIGHTS
Business strategy
Our business strategy focused on Papua New Guinea is underpinned by the following cornerstones:
2025 Strategic Objectives
Since the Corporation and HAES-Cyprus were both wholly-owned by HWO, the transfer of all of the outstanding ordinary shares of HAES-Cyprus to the Corporation was deemed a common control transaction. The Corporation’s Financial Statements are presented under the continuity of interests basis. Financial and operational results contained within this Press Release present the historic financial position, results of operations and cash flows of HAES-Cyprus for all prior periods up to August 12, 2024, under HWO’s control. The financial position, results of operations and cash flows from April 1, 2024 (the date of incorporation of the Corporation) to August 12, 2024, include both HAES-Cyprus and the Corporation on a combined basis and from August 12, 2024, forward include the results of the Corporation on a consolidated basis upon completion of the Arrangement.
For reporting purposes in the Financial Statements, the MD&A and this Press Release, it is assumed that the Corporation held the PNG business prior to August 12, 2024, and as such, information provided includes the financial and operating results for the three months ended March 31, 2025, including all comparative periods.
In the above results discussion, the three months ended March 31, 2025 may be referred to as the “quarter” or “Q1 2025” and the comparative three months ended March 31, 2024 may be referred to as “Q1 2024”. References to other quarters may be presented as “QX 20XX” with X/XX being the quarter/year to which the commentary relates.
FIRST QUARTER 2025 SELECT FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL RESULTS OVERVIEW
| Three months ended March 31, | ||||||||
| (thousands of USD except per share amounts) | 2025 | 2024 | ||||||
| Operating results: | ||||||||
| Revenue | 2,510 | 11,134 | ||||||
| Net income (loss) | (1,225) | 2,501 | ||||||
| Per share (basic and diluted) (1)(2) | ($0.10) | $0.20 | ||||||
| Operating margin (3) | 714 | 4,315 | ||||||
| Operating margin as a % of revenue (3) | 28.4% | 38.8% | ||||||
| EBITDA (3) | (286) | 3,588 | ||||||
| Per share (basic and diluted) (1)(2) | ($0.02) | $0.29 | ||||||
| Adjusted EBITDA (3) | (202) | 3,530 | ||||||
| Adjusted EBITDA as a % of revenue (3) | (8.0%) | 31.7% | ||||||
| Per share (basic and diluted) (1)(2) | ($0.02) | $0.28 | ||||||
| Operating income (loss) (3) | (998) | 2,720 | ||||||
| Per share (basic and diluted) (1)(2) | ($0.08) | $0.22 | ||||||
| Cash flow: | ||||||||
| Cash flow from operating activities | (825) | 5,348 | ||||||
| Per share (basic and diluted) (1)(2) | ($0.07) | $0.43 | ||||||
| Funds flow from operations (3) | (256) | 3,314 | ||||||
| Per share (basic and diluted) (1)(2) | ($0.02) | $0.27 | ||||||
| Capital expenditures | 74 | 550 | ||||||
| (thousands of USD except per share amounts and common shares outstanding) |
March 31, 2025 | December 31, 2024 | ||||||
| Financial position: | ||||||||
| Working capital (3) | 20,212 | 20,602 | ||||||
| Cash and cash equivalents | 13,902 | 14,930 | ||||||
| Total assets | 34,133 | 35,287 | ||||||
| Shareholder’s equity | 29,766 | 30,953 | ||||||
| Per share (4) | $2.39 | $2.49 | ||||||
| Common shares outstanding | 12,448,166 | 12,448,166 | ||||||
| (1) For periods when the Corporation incurred a net loss the shares outstanding under the Corporation’s equity incentive plans for the periods presented are excluded from the calculation of diluted weighted average number of common shares as the outstanding options were anti-dilutive. (2) For the purposes of computing per share amounts, the number of common shares outstanding for the periods prior to the Arrangement is deemed to be the number of shares issued by the Corporation to the shareholders of HWO upon completion of the Arrangement. See “2024 Corporate Reorganization” section of this Press Release and the Corporation’s Financial Statements for additional details. (3) Readers are cautioned that Operating margin, Operating margin as a % of revenue, EBITDA (Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization), Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA as a % of revenue, Operating income (loss), Funds flow from operations and Working capital do not have a standardized meanings prescribed by IFRS. See “Non IFRS Measures” in this Press Release for additional details on the calculations of these measures. (4) Shareholders’ equity per share calculated based on the number of common shares outstanding as at the relevant date. |
||||||||
Operating Results
| Three months ended March 31, | ||||||
| (thousands of USD, unless otherwise noted) | 2025 | 2024 | ||||
| Revenue | 2,510 | 11,134 | ||||
| Operating expenses | (1,796) | (6,819) | ||||
| Operating margin (1) | 714 | 4,315 | ||||
| Operating margin percentage (1) | 28.4% | 38.8% | ||||
| (1) See “Non-IFRS Measures” |
||||||
Customer-owned rig 103 has been suspended since the second half of 2024 compared to being operational in the first 5.5 months in 2024. As such, the majority of Q1 2025 revenue is from the provision of equipment rental and skilled personnel to key customers within PNG’s oil and gas industry. While minor, the Corporation is seeing increased equipment rental revenues from other industries within PNG. As noted above, revenues for Q1 2024, were inclusive of rig 103 drilling activities plus revenue from the provision of equipment rental and skilled personnel into PNG’s oil and gas industry.
The Corporation owns two heli-portable drilling rigs (Rigs 115 and 116) which remain preserved and maintained ready for deployment.
Liquidity and Capital Resources
| Three months ended March 31, | ||||||
| (thousands of USD) | 2025 | 2024 | ||||
| Cash provided by (used in) operations: | ||||||
| Operating activities | (825) | 5,348 | ||||
| Investing activities | (74) | (550) | ||||
| Financing activities | (117) | (124) | ||||
| Effect of foreign exchange rate changes | (12) | – | ||||
| Increase (decrease) in cash | (1,028) | 4,674 | ||||
| (thousands of USD, unless otherwise noted) | As at March 31, 2025 |
As at Dec 31, 2024 |
||||
| Current assets | 24,230 | 24,706 | ||||
| Working capital(1) | 20,212 | 20,602 | ||||
| Working capital ratio(1) | 6.0:1 | 6.0:1 | ||||
| Cash and cash equivalents | 13,902 | 14,930 | ||||
| (1) See “Non-IFRS Measures” | ||||||
Liquidity and Capital Resources
Cashflows from Operating Activities
For the three months ended March 31, 2025, cash used in operating activities was $825 (Q1 2024 – cash generated was $5,348). The change in operating cash flow was driven by reduced revenue generating activities and changes in non-cash working capital. Changes in non-cash working capital are listed in Note 13 of the Financial Statements and represent temporary differences as inventory is purchased in support of anticipated sales, deferred revenue is earned and related party balances post the Arrangement.
Cashflows from Investing Activities
For the three months ended March 31, 2025, cash used in investing activities was $74 (Q1 2024 – $550). Cash outflows associated with investing activities were directed towards capital expenditures for additional rental assets. The Corporation continues to seek opportunities to invest in additional capital assets, in particular where it can do so with support of customer take-or-pay agreements.
Cash flows from Financing Activities
For the three months ended March 31, 2025, cash used in financing activities was $117 (Q1 2024 – $124). Cash outflows associated with finance activities were directed towards lease obligation payments.
Outlook
Consistent with the outlook provided by the Corporation in Q4 2024 the outlook for the Corporation’s core business in PNG for the remainder of 2025 remains subdued. Current quarter operating results were largely driven by manpower and rental services delivered to its key customers in PNG’s oil and gas industry. With no near-term drilling activity currently contracted, the Corporation expects equipment rental and manpower to continue as the primary revenue generating activity for 2025. The second half of 2025 is expected to see a decline in these activities as certain projects supported by the Corporation are expected to conclude, and customers have deferred non-essential work as they realize low and volatile near-term commodity prices.
The Corporation is buoyed by an increase in recent enquiries for services and requests for pricing which may lead to a future upswing in revenue generating activity. The Corporation remains engaged with its principal customer on planning for future drilling activity and continues to focus on enhancing and optimizing its existing rental fleet deployment and manpower solutions offerings. The Corporation also continues to pursue business expansion opportunities in PNG, participating in requests for tender and actively engaging with potential customers for its services in PNG and the wider region while also taking actions to protect its capability to realize the future potential of the business.
Our rationale for a business strategy focussed on PNG is unchanged. Papua New Guinea possesses substantial deposits of natural resources including significant reserves of oil and natural gas and has emerged as a reliable low-cost energy exporter to Asian markets, particularly for liquefied natural gas (“LNG”). A significant investment in the country’s oil and gas industry was evidenced by the successful construction of the PNG-LNG project in 2014, with the primary partners in the venture being customers of the Corporation. In the period following, the Corporation’s predecessor company committed to the purchase and upgrade of drilling rigs 115 and 116 and expansion of the Corporation’s fleet of rentable equipment including camps, material handling equipment and worksite matting. These investments contributed to a substantive lift in revenues and earnings as PNG enjoyed its highest period of exploration and development activity.
Since the onset of COVID-19 in early 2020, there has been a substantive reduction in drilling services in PNG. This follows some consolidation among the active exploration and production companies and evolving political and economic influences. In the longer term, High Arctic believes PNG is on the precipice of a new round of large-scale projects in the natural resources sector. The next significant LNG project currently being planned is Papua-LNG, a project lead by the French oil and gas super-major TotalEnergies, with a final investment decision anticipated in late 2025. There is an expectation for increased drilling activity through the latter half of this decade, not only to develop wells for the supply of gas to the Papua-LNG export facility, but also to explore for and appraise other discoveries. The signing of a fiscal stability agreement between the P’nyang gas field joint venture and the government of PNG is another positive signal for that expansionary project to follow Papua-LNG.
The Corporation is strategically positioned to support these developments, given its dominant position for drilling and associated services in PNG, existing work relationships with the operating companies, and proximity to the proposed sites of operation. The Corporation’s drilling rigs 115 and 116 are portable by helicopter and have been maintained and preserved for future use.
There are a number of other petroleum projects and substantive nation-building projects including infrastructure, electrification, telecommunications and defense projects planned for the development of PNG. These projects will require access to transport and material handling machinery, quality worksite and temporary road mats and a substantive amount of labour including skilled equipment operators, qualified tradespeople and engineers, geoscientists and other professionals. High Arctic’s business continues to position itself to be a meaningful supplier of services, equipment and manpower for this market.
NON-IFRS MEASURES
This Press Release contains references to certain financial measures that do not have a standardized meaning prescribed by International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) and may not be comparable to the same or similar measures used by other companies. High Arctic Overseas uses these financial measures to assess performance and believes these measures provide useful supplemental information to shareholders and investors. These financial measures are computed on a consistent basis for each reporting period and include Oilfield services operating margin, EBITDA (Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization), Adjusted EBITDA, Operating loss, Funds flow from operating activities, Working capital and Net cash. These do not have standardized meanings.
These financial measures should not be considered as an alternative to, or more meaningful than, net income (loss), cash from operating activities, current assets or current liabilities, cash and/or other measures of financial performance as determined in accordance with IFRS.
For additional information regarding non-IFRS measures, including their use to management and investors and reconciliations to measures recognized by IFRS, please refer to the Corporation’s Q1 2025 MD&A, which is available online at www.sedarplus.ca.
About High Arctic Overseas Holdings Corp.
High Arctic Overseas is a market leader in Papua New Guinea providing drilling and specialized well completion services, manpower solutions and supplies rental equipment including rig matting, camps, material handling and drilling support equipment.
For further information, please contact:
Mike Maguire
Chief Executive Officer
1.587.320.1301
High Arctic Overseas Holdings Corp.
Suite 2350, 330–5th Avenue SW
Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2P 0L4
www.higharctic.com
Email: info@higharctic.com
Forward-Looking Statements
This Press Release contains forward-looking statements. When used in this document, the words “may”, “would”, “could”, “will”, “intend”, “plan”, “anticipate”, “believe”, “seek”, “propose”, “estimate”, “expect”, and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. Such statements reflect the Corporation’s current views with respect to future events and are subject to certain risks, uncertainties, and assumptions. Many factors could cause the Corporation’s actual results, performance, or achievements to vary from those described in this Press Release.
Should one or more of these risks or uncertainties materialize, or should assumptions underlying forward-looking statements prove incorrect, actual results may vary materially from those described in this Press Release as intended, planned, anticipated, believed, estimated or expected. Specific forward-looking statements in this Press Release include, among others, statements pertaining to the following: general economic and business conditions; the role of the energy services industry in future phases of the energy industry; the outlook for energy services both globally and within PNG; the impact of conflict in the Middle East and Ukraine; the timing and impact on the Corporation’s business related to potential new large-scale natural resources projects and increased drilling activity in PNG; the impact, if any, related to existing or future changes to government regulations by the government of PNG; the impact, if any, on the Corporation’s future financial and operational results related to non-resource development opportunities in PNG; market fluctuations in commodity prices, and foreign currency exchange rates; restrictions on repatriation of funds held in PNG; expectations regarding the Corporation’s ability to manage its liquidity risk; raise capital and manage its debt finance agreements; projections of market prices and costs; factors upon which the Corporation will decide whether or not to undertake a specific course of operational action or expansion; the Corporation’s ongoing relationship with its major customers; customers’ drilling intentions; the Corporation’s ability to position itself to be a significant supplier of services, equipment and manpower for other resource and non-resources based projects in PNG; the Corporation’s expectations related to financial and operational results in 2025, including the expectation that the equipment rental and manpower services portion of the Corporation’s business will be the primary revenue generating activity for fiscal 2025; the timing and ability of the Corporation to put its own administrative infrastructure in place; the Corporation’s ability to invest in additional capital assets, including the impact on the Corporation’s future financial and operational results; the impact, if any, of geo-political events, changes in government, changes to tariff’s or related trade policies and the potential impact on the Corporation’s ability to execute on its 2025 business plan and strategic objectives; the ability of the Corporation to expand its geographic customer base outside of PNG, and the deploying idle heli-portable drilling rigs 115 and 116 and securing future work with other exploration companies in PNG.
With respect to forward-looking statements contained in this Press Release, the Corporation has made assumptions regarding, among other things, its ability to: maintain its ongoing relationship with major customers; successfully market its services to current and new customers; devise methods for, and achieve its primary objectives; source and obtain equipment from suppliers; successfully manage, operate, and thrive in an environment which is facing much uncertainty; remain competitive in all its operations; attract and retain skilled employees; and obtain equity and debt financing on satisfactory terms and manage liquidity related risks.
The Corporation’s actual results could differ materially from those anticipated in these forward-looking statements as a result of the risk factors set forth in this Press Release and in the Corporation’s annual 2024 MD&A, which is available on SEDAR+.
The forward-looking statements contained in this Press Release are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement. These statements are given only as of the date of this Press Release. The Corporation does not assume any obligation to update these forward-looking statements to reflect new information, subsequent events or otherwise, except as required by law.
Neither the TSX Venture Exchange nor its Regulation Services Provider (as that term is defined in the policies of the TSX Venture Exchange) accepts responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of this release.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
China successfully launched its first asteroid sample-return mission, Tianwen-2, in the early hours of Thursday, an endeavour designed to shed light on the formation and evolution of asteroids and the early solar system.
The mission marks the 578th launch of the Long March series of carrier rockets. The Long March-3B rocket, which serves as the primary vehicle for China’s high-orbit launches, holds the record for the highest number of launches in the country, having completed 108 missions, according to the China National Space Administration (CNSA).
It has previously been involved in lunar exploration projects such as the Chang’e-3 and Chang’e-4 missions.
China Aerospace Science and Technology Cooperation (CASC), the rocket developer, noted that the Tianwen-2 mission, however, marks the first time the Long March-3B rocket series has been used for a launch to escape Earth’s orbit.
In previous missions sending payloads into the Earth’s orbit, a rocket is required to achieve a separation velocity equal to the first cosmic velocity, or approximately 7.9 kilometers per second.
However, this mission requires a separation speed exceeding 11.2 kilometers per second, known as the second cosmic velocity, to escape the Earth’s gravitational influence, necessitating high speed and energy, said the agency.
Moreover, asteroids are characterized by their small size, low mass, and weak gravity, making them challenging to capture and requiring exceptional precision in the rocket’s trajectory.
During this launch, the rocket reached a speed of 11.2 kilometers per second, with a permitted speed deviation of no more than one meter per second, which could otherwise lead to a positional error of up to one million kilometers.
“Achieving such trajectory precision is akin to shooting a basketball from Shanghai to hit a hoop in Beijing, while ensuring the ball’s angle and speed upon entering the hoop are correct,” said the CASC.
After evaluating the rocket’s payload capacity, performance capability, and reliability, Long March-3B was chosen as the dedicated vehicle for the Tianwen-2 mission, it said.
The rocket design team has spent two years completing multiple design iterations so as to achieve seamless “handoff” between the rocket and the probe.
Source: Office of United States Attorneys
PORTLAND, Ore.—A Salem, Oregon man was sentenced to federal prison Friday for possessing and trafficking more than 40 pounds of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and heroin.
Rico Anthony Russell Rigutto, 46, was sentenced to 108 months in federal prison and five years’ supervised release.
According to court documents, on December 14, 2021, as part of a drug trafficking investigation, investigators arranged a controlled buy of counterfeit oxycodone pills from Rigutto. Investigators observed him arrive and depart the meeting location, after which they conducted a traffic stop on Rigutto.
Investigators searched Rigutto’s vehicle and seized approximately 3,000 counterfeit pills containing fentanyl and a firearm with a machine gun conversion switch. Machine gun switches, sometimes referred to as “Glock switches,” are small attachments used to convert firearms from semi-automatic to fully-automatic.
Later the same day, investigators obtained and executed a search warrant on Rigutto’s residence. During the search, investigators located and seized 20,000 counterfeit pills containing fentanyl, 28 pounds of methamphetamine, six pounds of heroin, approximately $100,000 in cash, and fifteen firearms, including an AR-15 rifle and another handgun with a conversion switch.
On January 19, 2022, a federal grand jury in Portland returned a four-count indictment charging Rigutto with possessing fentanyl, methamphetamine, and heroin with the intent to distribute and possessing a machinegun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.
On April 18, 2023, Rigutto pleaded guilty to possessing fentanyl with the intent to distribute. However, on March 5, 2024, Rigutto failed to appear for his sentencing and an arrest warrant was issued.
On August 2, 2024, the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) located and arrested Rigutto for failing to appear. USMS also found a firearm during the arrest.
This case was investigated by the FBI and the Salem Police Department. It was prosecuted by Scott M. Kerin, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Oregon.
Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid 80 to 100 times more powerful than morphine and 30 to 50 times more powerful than heroin. A 2-milligram dose of fentanyl—a few grains of the substance—is enough to kill an average adult male. The wide availability of illicit fentanyl in Oregon has caused a dramatic increase in overdose deaths throughout the state.
If you are in immediate danger, please call 911.
If you or someone you know suffers from addiction, please call the Lines for Life substance abuse helpline at 1-800-923-4357 or visit www.linesforlife.org. Phone support is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. You can also text “RecoveryNow” to 839863 between 2pm and 6pm Pacific Time daily.
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
NEW YORK, May 29, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) —
Class Action Attorney Juan Monteverde with Monteverde & Associates PC (the “M&A Class Action Firm”), has recovered millions of dollars for shareholders and is recognized as a Top 50 Firm in the 2024 ISS Securities Class Action Services Report. The firm is headquartered at the Empire State Building in New York City and is investigating A SPAC III Acquisition Corp. (NASDAQ: ASPCU) relating to the proposed Merger with Bioserica International Limited 禾素國際有限公司. Pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, relating to the proposed merger with Under pursuant to the terms of the Merger Agreement, the aggregate consideration to be paid to existing shareholders and holders of equity awards of Bioserica is $200,000,000, which will be paid entirely in stock, comprised of newly issued Class B Ordinary Shares of the Purchaser at a price of $10.00 per share.
Click here for more info https://monteverdelaw.com/case/a-spac-iii-acquisition-corp/. It is free and there is no cost or obligation to you.
NOT ALL LAW FIRMS ARE EQUAL. Before you hire a law firm, you should talk to a lawyer and ask:
About Monteverde & Associates PC
Our firm litigates and has recovered money for shareholders…and we do it from our offices in the Empire State Building. We are a national class action securities firm with a successful track record in trial and appellate courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court.
No one is above the law. If you own common stock in the above listed company and have concerns or wish to obtain additional information free of charge, please visit our website or contact Juan Monteverde, Esq. either via e-mail at jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com or by telephone at (212) 971-1341.
Contact:
Juan Monteverde, Esq.
MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
The Empire State Building
350 Fifth Ave. Suite 4740
New York, NY 10118
United States of America
jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com
Tel: (212) 971-1341
Attorney Advertising. (C) 2025 Monteverde & Associates PC. The law firm responsible for this advertisement is Monteverde & Associates PC (www.monteverdelaw.com). Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome with respect to any future matter.
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
NEW YORK, May 29, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) —
Class Action Attorney Juan Monteverde with Monteverde & Associates PC (the “M&A Class Action Firm”), has recovered millions of dollars for shareholders and is recognized as a Top 50 Firm in the 2024 ISS Securities Class Action Services Report. The firm is headquartered at the Empire State Building in New York City and is investigating Informatica Inc. (NYSE INFA) (“Informatica”) related to Informatica’s agreement to be acquired by Salesforce. Under the terms of the agreement, Informatica shareholders will receive $25.00 per share in cash.
Click here for more info https://monteverdelaw.com/case/informatica-inc/. It is free and there is no cost or obligation to you.
NOT ALL LAW FIRMS ARE EQUAL. Before you hire a law firm, you should talk to a lawyer and ask:
About Monteverde & Associates PC
Our firm litigates and has recovered money for shareholders…and we do it from our offices in the Empire State Building. We are a national class action securities firm with a successful track record in trial and appellate courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court.
No one is above the law. If you own common stock in the above listed company and have concerns or wish to obtain additional information free of charge, please visit our website or contact Juan Monteverde, Esq. either via e-mail at jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com or by telephone at (212) 971-1341.
Contact:
Juan Monteverde, Esq.
MONTEVERDE & ASSOCIATES PC
The Empire State Building
350 Fifth Ave. Suite 4740
New York, NY 10118
United States of America
jmonteverde@monteverdelaw.com
Tel: (212) 971-1341
Attorney Advertising. (C) 2025 Monteverde & Associates PC. The law firm responsible for this advertisement is Monteverde & Associates PC (www.monteverdelaw.com). Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome with respect to any future matter.
Source: Office of United States Attorneys
SALT LAKE CITY, Utah – Kyle Eugene Duncan-Carle, 41, of Las Vegas, Nevada, was sentenced to 72 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release after he admitted to bank fraud in 2023.
In addition to his term of imprisonment, Duncan-Carle, was ordered to pay $3,490,634.75 in restitution.
According to court documents and statements made at Duncan-Carle’s change of plea and sentencing hearings, from January 2023 through September 2023 in the District of Utah. Duncan-Carle stole U.S. Treasury checks made out to individuals and companies, assumed the identity of the individuals whose names were on the checks, opened credit union accounts under the assumed identities, and then deposited the checks and withdrew the funds. Duncan-Carle admitted the scheme resulted in at least eight stolen treasury checks that totaled $7,975,621.22. As a result, Duncan-Carle cost the United States government, financial institutions, and a financial institution’s insurance provider $3,490,634.75.
Acting U.S. Attorney Felice John Viti of the District of Utah made the announcement.
The case was investigated jointly by the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigations (IRS-CI); the Internal Revenue Service Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA); and the FBI Salt Lake City Field Office.
Assistant United States Attorneys Stephen P. Dent and Luisa Gough of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Utah prosecuted the case.
Release No. 25-71
Source: Office of United States Attorneys
SANTA ANA, California – The founder and former CEO of the now-defunct Sovereign Health Group addiction treatment provider was arrested today on an eight-count federal grand jury indictment alleging he submitted more than $149 million in fraudulent claims to health insurers – including for fraudulent urinalysis claims – and, in addition, paid more than $21 million in illegal kickbacks for patient referrals.
Tonmoy Sharma, 61, of Tustin, was arrested this afternoon at Los Angeles International Airport and is expected to make his initial appearance and be arraigned tomorrow in United States District Court in downtown Los Angeles.
Sharma is charged with four counts of wire fraud, one count of conspiracy, and three counts of illegal remunerations for referrals to clinical treatment facilities.
Also arrested today was co-defendant Paul Jin Sen Khor, 45, of Irvine, who worked as Sovereign’s cash management and accounts payable supervisor. Khor is charged with one count of conspiracy and one count of illegal remunerations for referrals to clinical treatment facilities. Khor was arraigned this afternoon in United States District Court in Santa Ana. He pleaded not guilty and a July 29 trial date was scheduled. A federal magistrate judge ordered him released on $20,000 bond.
According to the indictment, the San Clemente-based Sovereign once was a prominent addiction treatment provider throughout Southern California and several other states. From 2014 to 2020, Sovereign billed private insurance companies for drug addicted and mentally ill patients often at high, out-of-network rates.
At Sharma’s direction, Sovereign employees aggressively pursued patients through various forms of marketing, directing the patients to contact the company at its toll-free phone number. Once patients called in to Sovereign’s call center, employees used various tactics to enroll patients into the company’s treatment facilities, including misrepresentations. One such misrepresentation was that a patient’s treatment would be paid for by a foundation funded by donations from former Sovereign patients.
In fact, the foundation was a sham organization and a ruse for Sovereign employees – at Sharma’s direction – to obtain patients’ names, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers for use in surreptitiously obtaining health insurance coverage on their behalf. In order to obtain these private health insurance plans, Sovereign employees, at Sharma’s direction, made false representations on insurance applications, claiming qualifying life events that had not happened in order to obtain new insurance outside the enrollment period and inflating or underreporting their income so the patients would qualify for Affordable Care Act government-subsidized private insurance instead of Medicaid, whose reimbursement rates were significantly lower than private insurers.
Patients generally did not know that Sovereign would enroll them into these policies or authorize Sovereign to do so. Sovereign employees at times even pretended to be the patients when calling into those insurance companies. Those insurance companies would not have covered any services under plans obtained by these fraudulent means.
Sovereign also fraudulently billed insurers more than $29 million for urinalysis tests not authorized by the purported ordering health providers. At Sharma’s direction, Sovereign submitted fraudulent claims for comprehensive urinalysis screening, including through its laboratory, Vedanta Laboratories Inc. Sovereign patients were frequently drug tested through both cup testing and comprehensive panel testing. The cup testing returned results within minutes, while the panel testing was much more comprehensive, with results taking several days to return. The comprehensive panel testing screened for dozens of different substances and, accordingly, was billed at a significantly higher rate than cup testing.
Sharma directed Sovereign employees to frequently administer cup testing and comprehensive panel testing on patients, including comprehensive panel testing up to three times a week. Sovereign submitted thousands of claims to insurance companies, including for comprehensive panel tests that purportedly were authorized by physicians when, in reality, the physicians did not authorize the tests. Sovereign also submitted numerous claims to the insurance companies, including urinalysis tests, after physicians were no longer working at Sovereign.
Finally, in addition to the patients obtained through the call center above, Sharma and Khor also procured patients for Sovereign by paying illegal kickbacks to patient brokers. To conceal the nature of these transactions, Sharma and Khor caused Sovereign to enter sham contracts that referred to the brokers’ services as “marketing hours,” a term the brokers used when sending invoices to Sovereign for payment. Sovereign paid more than $21 million in illegal kickbacks for patient referrals.
An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
If convicted, Sharma would face a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years in federal prison for each wire fraud count. Both defendants would face up to five years in federal prison for the conspiracy count, and up to 10 years in federal prison for each illegal remunerations count.
The FBI, the United States Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, and the California Department of Health Care Services are investigating this matter.
Assistant United States Attorney Solomon Kim of the Major Frauds Section is prosecuting this case.
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
CALGARY, Alberta, May 29, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Reconnaissance Energy Africa Ltd. (the “Company” or “ReconAfrica”) (TSXV: RECO) (OTCQX: RECAF) (Frankfurt: 0XD) (NSX: REC) announces the filing of its fiscal first quarter disclosure documents for the three-month period ended March 31, 2025, including the unaudited consolidated financial statements and Management’s Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”), which are available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca .
Brian Reinsborough, President and CEO of the Company commented: “ReconAfrica continues to move Prospect I toward spud and management remains excited about this exploration target, which is our largest prospect to be drilled to date. On trend with the Naingopo and Prospect I locations, the Company recently gained access to over five million acres in Angola, and we look forward to working with our partner, ANPG to explore this acreage. Management recognizes its responsibility to all stakeholders to steward the evaluation and exploration process of this vast portfolio with the utmost care. We are keen to continue our work with shareholders, local government, joint venture and community partners.”
Selected Highlights
For the first quarter ended March 31, 2025, and subsequent period, we announced:
Operational Update
Prospect I, located onshore Namibia in Petroleum Exploration License 073 (“PEL 73”), will be the Company’s largest exploration prospect drilled to date. Prioritizing Prospect I as the next drillable prospect was significantly influenced by the drilling results of the Naingopo prospect, which has confirmed the presence of carbonate reservoir, indications of oil observed from the Damara Fold Belt and oil being recovered at surface in the drilling mud system.
The Company has conducted extensive stakeholder and community engagement activities and obtained local consents. The Company is completing permitting requirements and obtaining all regulatory approvals. Pre-construction activities are currently underway, including, de-brushing, de-mining, access road infrastructure development and drill site preparation. ReconAfrica is committed to continuing to work collaboratively with communities, governments and regulators.
Management remains encouraged that the sequence of completing the necessary pre-drill activities on Prospect I is progressing toward spudding the well. Permitting for road and pad construction is proceeding and we expect the rig to move in late June with spud shortly thereafter. Any adjustments to the spud date of Prospect I are logistical in nature with management’s view regarding the prospectivity of the target remaining positive and unchanged from earlier communications.
About ReconAfrica
ReconAfrica is a Canadian oil and gas company engaged in the exploration of the Damara Fold Belt and Kavango Rift Basin in the Kalahari Desert of northeastern Namibia, southeastern Angola and northwestern Botswana, where the Company holds petroleum licences comprising ~13 million contiguous acres. In all aspects of its operations, ReconAfrica is committed to minimal disturbance of habitat in line with international standards and implementing environmental and social best practices in its project areas.
Neither the TSXV nor its Regulation Services Provider (as that term is defined in policies of the TSXV) accepts responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of this release.
For further information contact:
Brian Reinsborough, President and Chief Executive Officer
Mark Friesen, Managing Director, Investor Relations & Capital Markets
IR Inquiries Email: investors@reconafrica.com
Media Inquiries Email: media@reconafrica.com
Telephone: 1-877-631-1160
Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements:
Certain statements contained in this press release constitute forward-looking information under applicable Canadian, United States and other applicable securities laws, rules and regulations, including, without limitation, the timing of permits, timing and sequencing of the next well, actual well results, future drilling activity, resource potential, the updated NSAI Report, the Company’s commitment to minimal disturbance of habitat, in line with best international standards and its implementation of environmental and social best practices in all of its project areas. These statements relate to future events or future performance. The use of any of the words “could”, “intend”, “expect”, “believe”, “will”, “projected”, “estimated” and similar expressions and statements relating to matters that are not historical facts are intended to identify forward-looking information and are based on ReconAfrica’s current belief or assumptions as to the outcome and timing of such future events. There can be no assurance that such statements will prove to be accurate, as the Company’s actual results and future events could differ materially from those anticipated in these forward-looking statements as a result of the factors discussed in the “Risk Factors” section in the Company’s annual information form dated April 29, 2025, available under the Company’s profile at www.sedarplus.ca. Actual future results may differ materially. Various assumptions or factors are typically applied in drawing conclusions or making the forecasts or projections set out in forward-looking information. Those assumptions and factors are based on information currently available to ReconAfrica. The forward-looking information contained in this release is made as of the date hereof and ReconAfrica undertakes no obligation to update or revise any forward-looking information, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by applicable securities laws. Because of the risks, uncertainties and assumptions contained herein, investors should not place undue reliance on forward-looking information. The foregoing statements expressly qualify any forward-looking information contained herein.
Source: US State of Vermont
An IT specialist employed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was arrested today for attempting to transmit national defense information to an officer or agent of a foreign government.
Nathan Vilas Laatsch, 28, of Alexandria, Virginia, was arrested today in northern Virginia, and will make his initial court appearance in the Eastern District of Virginia tomorrow.
According to court documents, Laatsch became a civilian employee of the DIA in 2019, where he works with the Insider Threat Division and holds a Top Secret security clearance. In March 2025, the FBI commenced an operation after receiving a tip that an individual — now known to be Laatsch — offered to provide classified information to a friendly foreign government. In that email, the sender wrote that he did not “agree or align with the values of this administration” and was therefore “willing to share classified information” that he had access to, including “completed intelligence products, some unprocessed intelligence, and other assorted classified documentation.”
After multiple communications with an FBI agent — who Laatsch allegedly believed to be an official of the foreign government — Laatsch began transcribing classified information to a notepad at his desk and, over the course of approximately three days, repeatedly exfiltrated the information from his workspace. Laatsch subsequently confirmed to the FBI agent that he was prepared to transmit the information.
Thereafter, the FBI implemented an operation at a public park in northern Virginia, where Laatsch believed he would deposit the classified information for the foreign government to retrieve. On or about May 1, 2025, FBI surveillance observed Laatsch proceed to the specified location and deposit an item. Following Laatsch’s departure, the FBI retrieved the item, which was a thumb drive later found to contain a message from Laatsch and multiple typed documents, each containing information that was portion-marked up to the Secret or Top Secret levels. The message from Laatsch indicated that he had chosen to include “a decent sample size” of classified information to “decently demonstrate the range of types of products” to which he had access.
After receiving confirmation that the thumb drive had been received, on May 7, Laatsch allegedly sent a message to the FBI agent, which indicated Laatsch was seeking something from the foreign government in return for continuing to provide classified information. The next day, Laatsch specified that he was interested in “citizenship for your country” because he did not “expect[] things here to improve in the long term.” Although he said he was “not opposed to other compensation,” he was not in a position where he needed to seek “material compensation.”
On May 14, the FBI agent advised Laatsch that it was prepared to receive additional classified information. Between May 15 and May 27, Laatsch again repeatedly transcribed multiple pages of notes while logged into his classified workstation, folded the notes, and exfiltrated the classified information in his clothing.
On May 29, Laatsch arrived at a prearranged location in northern Virginia, where Laatsch again allegedly attempted to transmit multiple classified documents to the foreign country. Laatsch was arrested upon the FBI’s receipt of the documents.
Sue J. Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, U.S. Attorney Erik S. Siebert for the Eastern District of Virginia, Assistant Director Roman Rozhavsky of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, and Executive Director Lee M. Russ of Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) Office of Special Projects made the announcement.
The FBI Washington Field Office is investigating the case, with valuable assistance provided by the U.S. Air Force OSI and with thanks to the Defense Intelligence Agency for its cooperation.
Trial Attorneys Christina Clark and Mark Murphy of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Gordon Kromberg for the Eastern District of Virginia are prosecuting the case.
A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
Source: United States Attorneys General
An IT specialist employed by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was arrested today for attempting to transmit national defense information to an officer or agent of a foreign government.
Nathan Vilas Laatsch, 28, of Alexandria, Virginia, was arrested today in northern Virginia, and will make his initial court appearance in the Eastern District of Virginia tomorrow.
According to court documents, Laatsch became a civilian employee of the DIA in 2019, where he works with the Insider Threat Division and holds a Top Secret security clearance. In March 2025, the FBI commenced an operation after receiving a tip that an individual — now known to be Laatsch — offered to provide classified information to a friendly foreign government. In that email, the sender wrote that he did not “agree or align with the values of this administration” and was therefore “willing to share classified information” that he had access to, including “completed intelligence products, some unprocessed intelligence, and other assorted classified documentation.”
After multiple communications with an FBI agent — who Laatsch allegedly believed to be an official of the foreign government — Laatsch began transcribing classified information to a notepad at his desk and, over the course of approximately three days, repeatedly exfiltrated the information from his workspace. Laatsch subsequently confirmed to the FBI agent that he was prepared to transmit the information.
Thereafter, the FBI implemented an operation at a public park in northern Virginia, where Laatsch believed he would deposit the classified information for the foreign government to retrieve. On or about May 1, 2025, FBI surveillance observed Laatsch proceed to the specified location and deposit an item. Following Laatsch’s departure, the FBI retrieved the item, which was a thumb drive later found to contain a message from Laatsch and multiple typed documents, each containing information that was portion-marked up to the Secret or Top Secret levels. The message from Laatsch indicated that he had chosen to include “a decent sample size” of classified information to “decently demonstrate the range of types of products” to which he had access.
After receiving confirmation that the thumb drive had been received, on May 7, Laatsch allegedly sent a message to the FBI agent, which indicated Laatsch was seeking something from the foreign government in return for continuing to provide classified information. The next day, Laatsch specified that he was interested in “citizenship for your country” because he did not “expect[] things here to improve in the long term.” Although he said he was “not opposed to other compensation,” he was not in a position where he needed to seek “material compensation.”
On May 14, the FBI agent advised Laatsch that it was prepared to receive additional classified information. Between May 15 and May 27, Laatsch again repeatedly transcribed multiple pages of notes while logged into his classified workstation, folded the notes, and exfiltrated the classified information in his clothing.
On May 29, Laatsch arrived at a prearranged location in northern Virginia, where Laatsch again allegedly attempted to transmit multiple classified documents to the foreign country. Laatsch was arrested upon the FBI’s receipt of the documents.
Sue J. Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, U.S. Attorney Erik S. Siebert for the Eastern District of Virginia, Assistant Director Roman Rozhavsky of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, and Executive Director Lee M. Russ of Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) Office of Special Projects made the announcement.
The FBI Washington Field Office is investigating the case, with valuable assistance provided by the U.S. Air Force OSI and with thanks to the Defense Intelligence Agency for its cooperation.
Trial Attorneys Christina Clark and Mark Murphy of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Gordon Kromberg for the Eastern District of Virginia are prosecuting the case.
A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement
TALLAHASSEE — U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement arrested more than 100 illegal aliens during a targeted enforcement operation at construction sites in the in Tallahassee during a joint agency operation May 29.
The multiagency operation, directed by ICE Homeland Security Investigations Tallahassee, with significant assistance from ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations, Florida Highway Patrol, FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, U.S. Marshals Service, Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigations, led to the arrest of illegal aliens from Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Venezuelans, Colombia, and Honduras to name a few.
One was taken into state custody for resisting arrest and is being charged with four counts of assault on law enforcement officers. Another attempted to pull a weapon on officers.
“These types of enforcement actions aim to eliminate illegal employment, holding employers accountable and protecting employment opportunities for America’s lawful workforce,” said ICE HSI Tallahassee Assistant Special Agent in Charge Nicholas Ingegno. “HSI Tallahassee, working alongside our state, local, and federal partners, will continue protecting public safety by enforcing the immigration laws of our nation.”
ICE officials have continually emphasized the agency’s continued focus to identifying public safety and national security threats. Individuals unlawfully present in the United States who are encountered during enforcement operations may be taken into custody and processed for removal in accordance with federal law.
Members of the public with information about suspected immigration violations or related criminal activity are encouraged to contact the ICE Tip Line at 866-DHS-2-ICE (866-347-2423) or submit information online via the ICE Tip Form.
For more information about ICE HSI Tallahassee and its efforts to enhance public safety in Florida, follow us on X at @HSITampa.
Source: Office of United States Attorneys
GREAT FALLS – A Browning man who assaulted a woman on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation was found guilty today, U.S. Attorney Kurt Alme said.
Following a one-and-a-half-day trial, a federal jury found William Alvin Potts, 62, guilty of attempted strangulation and assault by striking, beating, or wounding. Potts faces 10 years in prison, a $250,000 fine and 3 years of supervised release.
Chief U.S. District Judge Brian M. Morris presided and will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors. Sentencing was set for October 8, 2025. Potts will remain released on conditions pending further proceedings.
The government alleged in court documents that on June 28, 2024, Potts physically assaulted Jane Doe. That morning a verbal argument escalated to name-calling. Potts then threw a chair to the side and grabbed Jane Doe by the neck. He pushed her backward while applying pressure to her throat and neck. Eventually he pushed her into the corner of the entry wall to the living room. Potts pushed her backward for approximately ten feet, at which point, their legs tangled, and Doe fell to the ground. Potts landed on top of Jane Doe and proceeded to physically strike her with his fists. A witness stopped the assault and physically pulled Potts off Jane Doe. Jane Doe experienced significant pain after the assault and sought treatment at the Browning Community Hospital. Doe suffered a spinal fracture and continues to experience pain.
Potts was interviewed by law enforcement and admitted to pushing Doe. He said he pushed her to make her go down the hall and they then both fell. He denied striking her.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Kalah Paisley prosecuted the case. The investigation was conducted by the FBI and Blackfeet Law Enforcement Services.
This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results. For more information about Project Safe Neighborhoods, please visit Justice.gov/PSN.
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Source: US Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Good afternoon. Thank you to President Lorie Logan, Senior Vice President and Senior Advisor to the President Sam Schulhofer-Wohl, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas for hosting us. Consistent with the title selected for the Symposium, today’s discussion will explore AI Risks and Opportunities Across the Digital and Cyber Landscape, including a broad range of topics focused on fostering responsible innovation, as well as topics focused on proactively addressing potential risks. As always allow me to share a standard disclaimer. My views are my own and not necessarily the views of the Commission, Commission staff or my fellow Commissioners.
This morning, I gave a livestream interview from my hotel with Reunion Tower standing tall behind me, offering an impressive landmark as background for the interview. For those of you who are not familiar, Reunion Tower is an iconic symbol in the Dallas skyline. Like Reunion Tower and the breathtaking 360-degree view it provides, our smart approach to supervision of financial markets has enabled us to create and boast the deepest and most liquid capital and derivatives markets in the world while still maintaining the ability to see the market from any angle. How have we achieved these goals? We have harnessed lessons from the customs and traditions that built successful market and prudential supervision and oversight for over one hundred years under federal legislation and for over two hundred and fifty years since the founding of our nation. At the same time, we are forward-looking, appreciating the innovative design and potential for technology to shape enduring, healthy, competitive financial markets that foster market integrity and stability and promote customer and investor protection.
It is an honor to be here and to see so many familiar faces, including market and prudential regulators, industry representatives from traditional financial services firms and emerging technologies, academics, and public interest advocates. Any successful convening on the issues that we will tackle today requires a multi-stakeholder dialogue drawing on all corners to help us ensure that supervision and oversight are best-in-class and fit-for-purpose.
As I intimated, today’s Symposium will explore topics that are at the core of our markets and reflect the future of finance. In my time as a Commissioner, and for decades prior to my public service, I have worked to ensure first-best outcomes for our economy, customer protection, and industry initiatives in these areas.
AI: Generating New Buzz
Over the last few decades, we have witnessed the evolution of a number of technologies. While thoughts of artificial intelligence, automation, and robotics have long populated sci-fi novels and films, it was only during the last half-century that sentient technology became an increasing feature in financial markets. The advent and advances in computer technology and computing capabilities have significantly accelerated the adoption of various forms of AI in financial markets and enhanced the efficiency and execution of various back-office and compliance functions that were sources of consternation and crises forty or fifty years ago.
Three distinct phases of AI have marked the most recent chapter of financial markets development and evolution – the creation of supervised and unsupervised machine learning algorithms, the creation of generative AI (GenAI), and most recently, the launch of agentic AI. As we transverse the most recent stages of these innovative developments, I think that expert, industry, and customer protection driven dialogues are essential to the creation of any potential regulation or simply effective oversight and supervision of financial markets. I am looking forward to hearing from panelists today regarding the potential and possible limitations of the most cutting-edge aspects of this most recent phase AI of developments.
GenAI
A Treasury report focused on AI-based cybersecurity risks in the financial services sector notes that:
The term “Generative AI” means the class of AI models that emulate the structure and characteristics of input data in order to generate derived synthetic content. This can include images, videos, audio, text, and other digital content.[1]
In general, a user inputs a specific prompt into an interface to produce synthetic content. Tools like ChatGPT and Claude apply this model to produce text, audio, and images based on the input. As we all quickly noticed, GenAI has real limitations. For example, non-determinism, or the potential for different outputs to result from the same input, and hallucinations – that is, notwithstanding reliance on incredibly large amounts of data gathered from the internet, GenAI models may generate false information that is highly persuasive.[2]
Notwithstanding a general propensity to be accurate, current GenAI models may not comprehend certain real-world roadblocks because these models rely heavily on user input and training data to predict patterns.
For example, a GenAI model trained on a LLM similar to the LLMs that enable GPT-4 can successfully offer highly accurate driving directions in New York City. However, when adding street closures or detours (both of which are common in many cities) the models struggled to achieve the same performance level and the accuracy of the models’ predictions were drastically reduced.[3]
There is tremendous potential for GenAI to facilitate execution of regulatory reporting and compliance obligations. Regulators supervising markets may use GenAI for supervisory technology (SupTech) to better enable oversight of know-your-customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering (AML) compliance, to expedite routine reporting and to enable efficient review of responses and comment letters issued in connection with requests for information or comment on important, timely issues emerging in financial markets.
Agentic AI
More recent efforts of technologists have generated a next-level AI model that does more than generate synthetic content. Agentic AI endeavors to make decisions, take actions, and adapt to changing inputs. So, for example, an agentic AI model would not be thumped by the road closures and detours that crop up on a map of busy New York City streets. An agentic AI model can tackle these new obstacles, adapting as the information inputs regarding routing change.
Agentic AI introduces AI agents designed to complete tasks in an autonomous manner. According to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab (CSAIL), Agentic AI is “designed to pursue complex goals with autonomy and predictability” by “taking goal-directed actions, making contextual decisions, and adjusting plans based on changing conditions with minimal human oversight” to enhance productivity.[4] What does this mean for those of us who do not have an advanced degree in computer science and artificial intelligence from MIT? Agentic AI focuses on the creation and utilization of autonomous, task-based agents to showcase AI’s ability to do, rather than to just create.
Potential applications of this technology are widespread and include healthcare (identifying, mapping, monitoring, and predicting disease prognosis), global logistics (rerouting to optimize shipped commodities due to weather, geopolitical events, or other exogenous events in a supply chain), and even simply, creature comfort energy optimization (adjusting heating, air conditioning, and lighting for maximum efficiency). In the financial services industry, and broadly our markets, the potential found in agentic AI presents an array of cost savings and efficiencies to be had with the proper implementation of this technology. For example, manual transaction reviews typically conducted in different types of auditing can be completed by AI agents who autonomously scan financial statements and flag those transactions which do not comply with their respective regulations. Credit scoring models, which typically rely on static data, now have the potential to rely on real-time transaction data, behavior trends and economic indicators and can continuously monitor credit instead of providing credit snap shots.[5] Agentic AI can also be used to create processes to improve efficiencies in customer interactions through automation in financial planning and optimization of client communications, and in market intelligence by monitoring the vast data produced by the markets each day and analyzing the data for notable shifts to alert analysts for opportunities and risks.[6] More importantly, from a regulator’s perspective, at least, properly architected agentic AI systems can produce robust compliance and fraud prevention systems, including those that can monitor for AML risks by flagging and dynamically intervening in high-risk transactions, automating claims triaging and refining risk assessments in claims and underwriting, tracking real-time market threats and making risk mitigation recommendations with robust data sets, end and even identifying bugs, deploying automatic updates, and ensuring compliance with software compliance testing in real time.[7]
In the context of producing systems that can complete tasks without human oversight, like creating robust compliance and reporting systems that can create tangible operational efficiencies and increase compliance with applicable regulations, agentic AI builds upon GenAI in every discernable way. It does so by being distinct from GenAI in four ways: a focus on action and decision-making rather than creating synthetic data and content; removal of the necessity to continuously input prompts; an ability to act independently to carry out activities and tasks within its parameters; and, compared to GenAI whose programs are static once trained, the ability to continuously change and remain dynamic by adjusting to data and learning from its own mistakes.[8]
But with every great opportunity comes risk. Agentic AI suffers from a vulnerability in that outputs are only as good as inputs – meaning, if the training model data is biased, incomplete, or otherwise compromised, agentic AI outputs may be similarly inadequate.
Perhaps more immediately concerning for regulators who are cops on the financial markets beat, as the potential for positive, efficient, market-enhancing use cases AI grow, so too does the potential for misuse of the same technology by bad actors. The increasing power of GenAI to create synthetic data, which might be inaccurately produced due to purposeful prompting by a bad actor or produced due to its own vulnerabilities and insufficient data sets, has created the ability to insert misleading or malicious data which might lead to hallucinations in output from the AI agents. Because they work autonomously, if improperly architected, this has the potential to create a continuous loop of improper data and feedback, effectively poisoning the model’s own data. Further, agentic AI suffers some of the same vulnerabilities and risks to that of GenAI, including privacy concerns over the vast amounts of data used to fuel the algorithms and data learning sets, risks associated with fairness and bias due to incomplete or over representative data, and to data leakages and model inference attacks which can leak sensitive data.[9]
Other risks that should be carefully considered as agentic AI models are integrated into our markets include the limitations of synthetic data, data leakages, data integrity, data security, data privacy, ethical concerns, the absence of a human in the loop, security vulnerabilities (hijacking or exploitation), and accountability among others.
Cyber Threats: The AI Problem and Solution
Over the course of my service, discussions of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence have become increasingly intertwined. I have closely followed these topics and the increasing volume and severity of cyberattacks in part due to the rise in AI used by bad actors to perpetrate these attacks. Over the last year in particular, several reports highlight the rise in cyberthreats across financial markets and discuss potential risks that cyber threats pose.[10] I have continuously advocated for the Commission to take a leading role among domestic and international regulators in addressing these issues to ensure that our market participants are prepared, and in turn, that our overall markets remain resilient.
In April, my remarks at an AI summit highlighted findings from the Treasury report on AI-fueled cyber and fraud threats that pose significant risks to our markets, including AI-driven fraud, vulnerabilities of technology, and synthetic identities and impersonation. In the speech, I called for regulators to collaborate and coordinate efforts to identify a responsible path for introducing responsible innovation in our markets.[11]
A recent FSOC Report notes gaps in financial institutions’ cybersecurity preparedness, risk management, and business continuity practices with respect to AI. The report notes, “AI’s data intensity and higher complexity, as well as increased reliance on third-party vendors of AI technology can complicate the ability to fend off attacks.”[12]
The FSOC Report explains that “[c]yberthreat actors may also be able to use AI tools, such as generative AI, to enable attacks on the financial services sector, particularly through the use of social engineering, malware generation, vulnerability discovery, and disinformation. While these cyber attacks are neither new nor unique to AI, AI tools may make these attacks much easier for a less sophisticated adversary.”[13] In December 2024, the Treasury Department released an additional report on AI in financial services highlighting uses of AI by financial services firms. That report notes that “AI is widely used for cybersecurity risk management…including analyzing large sets of data, detecting anomalies, flagging suspicious activities, and verifying customer identities under Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) obligations” and goes on to note that “Generative AI has been deployed to complement an investigation platform in collating and summarizing data and automating report creation and filing. AI is also being used in compliance with risk management guidelines, including managing operational risks, meeting capital and liquidity standards, improving stress test scenarios, and enhancing forecasting accuracy.”[14]
As agentic AI comes into focus, it may present new opportunities to build upon the systems that financial services firms may already be working on and enable these tools to be more tailored to their specific organizations.
As I continue to study these issues and engage with market participants, AI has increasingly been discussed as a potential mitigant to the very risks that the technology creates in other contexts. In fact, AI is being discussed not just as a potential benefit, but possibly a necessary element to fighting AI-driven cyberthreats. I am reminded of a saying I heard at a prior event on this topic, that firms need to be able to “fight fire with fire.” In my remarks in April, I encouraged regulators to focus on how we may be able to use AI to combat cybersecurity and fraud threats. In other words, AI may offer useful SupTech solutions to detect fraud and market manipulation.
Market participants have already been using AI for compliance and supervision functions, and we may expect that number to increase. For example, the FSB Report notes that financial institutions are using AI for compliance with fraud and AML/CFT requirements in more and more varied use cases. The report notes that “[a]lthough the use of AI models to comply with AML/CFT requirements and to perform fraud detection were already identified in the 2017 report, they have been more widely deployed since then to facilitate investigations into sanctions evasion, to identify misuse of legal persons and legal arrangements, to uncover trade fraud and trade-based money laundering, and to detect tax evasion, fraud/scams, and money mules.”[15] The report discusses some enhanced benefits of generative AI, and our discussion today may show why agentic AI can even go a step further. Similarly, a recent consultation report published by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) on AI in capital markets reports from a survey of IOSCO members and self-regulatory organizations that market participants are not only using AI “to enhance the effectiveness of AML and CFT measures,” but in addition to other compliance uses, specifically using AI for cybersecurity, including “for vulnerability, threat, phishing, and anomaly detection; for automated response and authentication; in risk management and compliance surveillance activities; and to assist with the detection and prevention of frauds and scams.”[16]
On the regulators’ side, there are also opportunities to use AI to enhance our ability to carry out our missions. The FSB Report notes that “Supervisory authorities’ use of SupTech has increased, with 59% of authorities surveyed using various applications in 2023, a 5- percentage point increase from 2022.”[17] With the data that it collects and its responsibilities for market oversight, it is easy to imagine how the CFTC could start to explore how SupTech could facilitate the agency in advancing many aspects of its mission.
TPRM: Market Risks and Beyond
As we hear from a truly impressive group of experts today about how some of these new technologies are being integrated into their organizations, and how at a micro and macro level these innovations may be capable of (and in some cases already have) changing how we operate or interact with different players in our markets, I would ask you to consider not just the big picture of what the technology or the outcome may be but what goes into making that happen. And in many cases, we will see that critical third-party vendors are an integral part of that – in some cases, the technology itself will come from a vendor, and in others, it may be an important input, such as data centers or cloud storage. It is important to highlight a number of potential risks that may relate to third-party risk management, such as concentration risk among a limited number of providers.[18]
As I have discussed previously, MRAC has been at the forefront of the Commission’s efforts to address the importance of cyber resilience for market participants, central counterparties and the broader market and economy. In March 2023, MRAC held a “first-of-its-kind” public meeting to discuss the cybersecurity event at ION Cleared Derivatives that led to a ripple effect across our markets. This was the first chance for experts across our industry to come together to evaluate the event as well as begin to map out next steps to ensure cyber preparedness among market participants, service providers, and other sources that have the potential to impact our markets.
After the March 2023 meeting, both the Commission and the MRAC got to work on addressing the cyber resilience of market participants. The Commission developed a proposed rule that would implement an operational resilience framework for futures commission merchants, swap dealers, and major swap participants, but did not focus on similar cyber risk in other areas, such as DCOs. The CCP Risk & Governance Committee took up the mantel where the Commission left off and developed recommendations that highlight the importance of cyber resilience in DCOs and the need for a more robust regulatory framework. These recommendations, which the MRAC voted to advance to the Commission, would expand upon the existing framework and require DCOs establish, implement and maintain a third-party relationship management program.
CFTC Rule 39.18, establishing system safeguard standards for DCOs, addresses outsourcing but does not expressly discuss third-party relationships; the CCP Risk and Governance recommendations would build upon the framework of Rule 39.18 by adding a third-party risk management program to (b)(2). The proposed language notes that “[a] robust TPRM program should identify, assess, mitigate and monitor the full scope of risks that the use of third party arrangements through implementation” at a minimum of certain enumerated principes, including, among other things, written policies and procedures that over the entire lifecycle of the third-party relationship, personnel with expertise to monitor the third-party service provider, onboarding and diligence before onboarding and exit strategies and alternatives before termination, risk-based monitoring, and more.[19]
The recommendations build upon the principle-based approach of the Core Principles as well as lessons learned and best practices from voices across the industry as well as international standard setting bodies. As noted in the report
“These principles are intended to reflect lessons learned from industry efforts and best practices in derivatives, the guidance notes in Form DCO, the NFA interpretive guidance, lessons learned from the wider context of third-party relationship management, as well as the principles enunciated in the PFMIs. Incorporating these principles in Commission regulations would enable the Commission to update its regulatory framework with respect to critical third party service providers and to bring its regulations in line with internationally accepted standards, while maintaining a principles based approach to regulation.”[20]
Cyber resilience is a critical gateway issue for protecting market integrity. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, I urge everyone to be thoughtful about these issues and what steps we can take to strengthen market participants and our broader derivatives and global financial markets. Effectively combatting cyber threats will require a coordinated effort among regulators and industry, and I believe there is a lot we can accomplish across a number of different areas, ranging from considering best practices for governance and effective risk management to leveraging technology through SupTech or RegTech innovations.
Conclusion
Reunion Tower stands tall and strong in Dallas largely because it is built on a solid foundation. As we think about integrating innovative technologies into our markets and as we focus on cyber resilience and third-party risk management, as well as the benefits and threats of AI-enhanced cybersecurity, I look forward to collaborating with different regulators, industry experts, and academics at roundtables and events like this one to continue to study these issues. My hope is that we can continue to advance a shared understanding of the risks and opportunities to develop best practices or to use these technologies to monitor and fight back against cyber threats.
[10] See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Managing Artificial Intelligence-Specific Cybersecurity Risks in the Financial Services Sector (Mar. 2024), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Managing-Artificial-Intelligence-Specific-Cybersecurity-Risks-In-The-Financial-Services-Sector.pdf (Treasury Report); Financial Stability Oversight Council, Annual Report (Dec. 6, 2024), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC2024AnnualReport.pdf (FSOC Report); Financial Stability Board, The Financial Stability Implications of Artificial Intelligence (Nov. 14, 2024), https://www.fsb.org/uploads/P14112024.pdf (FSB Report).
[12] FSOC Report at 86 (citation omitted).
[15] FSB Report at 12 (citation omitted).
[17] FSB Report at 13 (citing Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (2023), Cambridge SupTech Lab: State of SupTech Report 2023).
Source: US FBI
SAN FRANCISCO – Fernando Aguilera was sentenced yesterday to 45 months in federal prison for being a felon in possession of ammunition. Senior U.S. District Judge William Alsup handed down the sentence.
Aguilera, 37, a national of Honduras, was indicted by a federal grand jury on July 18, 2023. On Feb. 12, 2025, Judge Alsup found Aguilera guilty of being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after a bench trial. According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, Aguilera took a gun out of his waistband on two occasions at a crowded bar in San Francisco. He then left the bar and fired into the air two separate times with people and cars nearby. When law enforcement arrived, Aguilera fled from the police before being apprehended in the garden area of a nearby residence. Law enforcement found a firearm with the wrong caliber bullet stuck in the chamber next to Aguilera and ammunition in his bag. At the time of his arrest, Aguilera had four prior felony convictions for being an accessory, being a prohibited person with ammunition, and second-degree burglary.
United States Attorney Craig H. Missakian and FBI Special Agent in Charge Sanjay Virmani made the announcement.
In addition to the prison term, Judge Alsup also sentenced the defendant to a three-year period of supervised release. The defendant has been in custody since the offense.
Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kelsey Davidson and Sophia Cooper prosecuted the case with the assistance of Kevin Costello and Marina Ponomarchuk. The prosecution is the result of an investigation by the FBI and San Francisco Police Department.
Source: US FBI
SAN FRANCISCO – Lafayette Davenport was sentenced today to 90 months in federal prison for carjacking a San Francisco AIDS Foundation vehicle in the Tenderloin in August 2023, unlawfully possessing a firearm, and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Senior U.S. District Judge William Alsup handed down the sentence.
Davenport, 30, of San Francisco, was indicted by a federal grand jury on July 17, 2024, on charges of carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1), brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Davenport pleaded guilty on Feb. 11, 2025, to all three counts.
According to the plea agreement and court documents, on the morning of Aug. 24, 2023, Davenport saw an employee of the San Francisco AIDS Foundation driving in the Tenderloin neighborhood in a vehicle marked with the nonprofit organization’s logos. As the victim driver completed a pickup of discarded needles and returned to the car, Davenport, wearing a ski mask, ran up to the victim and pointed a pistol at him, saying “Don’t make me shoot you” and “I swear I’ll shoot you right here.” Davenport stole the victim’s watch and car keys and drove the San Francisco AIDS Foundation vehicle several feet before fleeing on foot to a nearby apartment building.
On Feb. 22, 2024, San Francisco Police Department officers arrested Davenport in the Tenderloin neighborhood. Officers found Davenport with the ski mask and the loaded pistol that he had used during the carjacking. At the time of his arrest, Davenport was on probation and had been convicted of prior felonies, including second-degree burglary of automobiles while on parole.
In addition to the prison term, Judge Alsup also sentenced the defendant to a five-year period of supervised release and ordered $500 in restitution.
United States Attorney Craig H. Missakian and FBI Special Agent in Charge Sanjay Virmani made the announcement.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Sara E. Henderson prosecuted the case with the assistance of Claudia Hyslop, Alycee Lane, and Janice Pagsanjan. The prosecution is the result of an investigation by the FBI and San Francisco Police Department.
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
NEW PORT RICHEY, Fla., May 29, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Zeo Energy Corp. (Nasdaq: ZEO) “Zeo Energy” or the “Company”), announced today that, as expected, it received a notice (the “Notice”) from Nasdaq on May 22, 2025, notifying the Company that it is not in compliance with the periodic filing requirements for continued listing set forth in Nasdaq Listing Rule 5250(c)(1) because the Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the for the three months ended March 31, 2025 (the “10-Q”) was not filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) by the required due date of May 15, 2025.
As previously reported in the Current Report on Form 8-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) on April 18, 2025, the Company received a deficiency notice from Nasdaq that the Company was not in compliance with Nasdaq’s Listing Rules as set forth in Listing Rule 5250(c)(1) given the Company’s failure to timely file its Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2024 (the “10-K”). The Company subsequently filed the 10-K on May 28, 2025.
This Notice received from Nasdaq has no immediate effect on the listing or trading of the Company’s shares. Nasdaq has provided the Company until Monday, June 16, 2025, to submit a plan to regain compliance. If Nasdaq accepts the Company’s plan, then Nasdaq may grant the Company an exception until October 13, 2025 to regain compliance with the Nasdaq Listing Rules.
The Company continues to work diligently to complete the 10-Q, after which the Company anticipates maintaining compliance with its SEC reporting obligations.
This announcement is made in compliance with Nasdaq Listing Rule 5810(b), which requires prompt disclosure of receipt of a deficiency notification.
About Zeo Energy Corp.
Zeo Energy Corp. is a Florida-based regional provider of residential solar, distributed energy, and energy efficiency solutions. Zeo Energy focuses on high-growth markets with limited competitive saturation. With its differentiated sales approach and vertically integrated offerings, Zeo Energy, through its Sunergy business, serves customers who desire to reduce high energy bills and contribute to a more sustainable future. For more information on Zeo Energy Corp., please visit www.zeoenergy.com.
Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements
This news release contains certain forward-looking statements within the meaning of section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and Section 21E of the Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, that are based on beliefs and assumptions and on information currently available to the Company. Such statements may include, but are not limited to, statements that refer to projections, forecasts, or other characterizations of future events or circumstances, including any underlying assumptions. The words “anticipate,” “intend,” “plan,” “goal,” “seek,” “believe,” “project,” “estimate,” “expect,” “strategy,” “future,” “likely,” “may,” “should,” “will,” and similar references to future periods may identify forward-looking statements, but the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. Forward-looking statements may include, for example, statements about the filing of the 10-Q, maintaining compliance with SEC reporting obligations and regaining compliance with Nasdaq listing rules. These forward-looking statements are based on information available as of the date of this news release, and current expectations, forecasts, and assumptions, and involve a number of judgments, risks, and uncertainties. Accordingly, forward-looking statements should not be relied upon as representing the Company’s views as of any subsequent date, and the Company does not undertake any obligation to update such forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances after the date they were made, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise, except as may be required under applicable securities laws. You should not place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements. As a result of a number of known and unknown risks and uncertainties, the Company’s actual results or performance may be materially different from those expressed or implied by these forward-looking statements. Some factors that could cause actual results to differ include: (i) the outcome of any legal proceedings that may be instituted against the Company or others; (ii) the Company’s success in retaining or recruiting, or changes required in, its officers, key employees, or directors; (iii) the Company’s ability to maintain the listing of its common stock and warrants on Nasdaq; (iv) limited liquidity and trading of the Company’s securities; (v) geopolitical risk and changes in applicable laws or regulations; (vi) the possibility that the Company may be adversely affected by other economic, business, and/or competitive factors; (vii) operational risk; (viii) litigation and regulatory enforcement risks, including the diversion of management time and attention and the additional costs and demands on the Company’s resources; and (ix) other risks and uncertainties, including those included under the heading “Risk Factors” in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC for the year ended December 31, 2024 and in its subsequent periodic reports and other filings with the SEC.
In light of the significant uncertainties in these forward-looking statements, you should not regard these statements as a representation or warranty by the Company, its respective directors, officers or employees or any other person that the Company will achieve its objectives and plans in any specified time frame, or at all. The forward-looking statements in this news release represent the views of the Company as of the date of this news release. Subsequent events and developments may cause that view to change. However, while the Company may elect to update these forward-looking statements at some point in the future, there is no current intention to do so, except to the extent required by applicable law. You should, therefore, not rely on these forward-looking statements as representing the views of the Company as of any date subsequent to the date of this news release.
Zeo Energy Corp. Contacts
For Investors:
Tom Colton and Greg Bradbury
Gateway Group
ZEO@gateway-grp.com
For Media:
Zach Kadletz
Gateway Group
ZEO@gateway-grp.com
Source: Office of United States Attorneys
Ocala, Florida – United States District Judge Thomas P. Barber has sentenced a federal inmate, Jessie Wooden (36, Miami), to 10 years in federal prison for possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. A co-defendant, Janai Chanel Stephens (38, Opa Locka), also was sentenced to 18 months’ probation for her role in introducing contraband into a federal prison and making false statements to a federal agent. A federal grand jury indicted Wooden and Stephens on May 28, 2024. Both defendants entered guilty pleas to the charges in January 2025.
According to the court records, on March 10, 2024, Wooden was an inmate at the Coleman Federal Correctional Complex (FCC Coleman) in Sumter County, Florida. On that date, Stephens visited Wooden at the prison. She entered FCC Coleman with a bag containing contraband 78 grams of methamphetamine and tobacco cigarettes that she intended to give to Wooden. Federal inmates are prohibited from possessing such items because they threaten the order, discipline, and security of the prison.
Prior to the visitation, Stephens falsely represented to a corrections officer on a written form that she did not have any contraband in her possession. When she subsequently met with Wooden in a visitation room, however, she threw him the bag containing the contraband. After being confronted by law enforcement, Stephens confessed to bringing in the contraband for Wooden, though she claimed only to know about the tobacco products. Wooden admitted that he had planned to distribute the methamphetamine and other items to inmates inside FCC Coleman.
“Individuals who smuggle contraband into federal prisons put lives at risk,” said Eric Fehlman, Special Agent in Charge of the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Southeast Region. “The Department of Justice Office of Inspector General will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to keep federal prisons safe and hold those who would exploit our correctional system for personal gain accountable.”
This case was prosecuted as part of a United States Department of Justice (DOJ) task force aimed at rooting out contraband and misconduct in the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The task force was led by the BOP and the DOJ – Office of the Inspector General (DOJ-OIG), with support from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida. It was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Hannah Nowalk Watson.
Source: Office of United States Attorneys
COLUMBIA, S.C. — A federal grand jury in Florence has returned a 13-count indictment charging Stephen Todd Greene, 55, of West Columbia, with conspiracy to produce child sexual abuse material, two counts of production of child sexual abuse material, four counts of distribution of child sexual abuse material, three counts of receipt of child sexual abuse material, possession of child sexual abuse material, and two counts of coercion and enticement of a minor into illegal sexual conduct.
The indictment alleges that from June 2023 through September 2024, Greene worked with a woman in Brazil, referred to in the indictment as C0-Conspirator 1, to sexually exploit her nieces, who are 3 years old and 9 years old as of the date of the indictment. Co-Conspirator 1 abused the children in person and Greene abused the children virtually, including by livestreaming their sex abuse to his home in West Columbia and by directing Co-Conspirator 1 to engage in certain abuse over livestream, according to the indictment.
Greene and Co-Conspirator 1 used Instagram, WhatsApp, Telegram, and FaceTime to facilitate the scheme, as well as a series of cameras installed in Greene’s home and in Co-Conspirator 1’s home in Brazil, which allowed a livestream from both locations. According to the indictment, Greene produced, received, distributed, and possessed child sexual abuse material, and he engaged in sexually explicit conduct on video and caused the minor victims to watch. During the scheme, Greene travelled twice to Brazil, where he gained direct access to the children, and he transferred money during the scheme to Co-Conspirator 1 through a wire service, according to the indictment.
Agents with the FBI Columbia field office arrested Greene and he was arraigned in federal court earlier this afternoon. He was ordered detained pending a bond hearing.
Greene faces a maximum penalty of life in prison. He also faces a mandatory minimum of 15 years on the conspiracy to produce child sexual abuse material and the production of child sexual abuse material charges, a mandatory minimum of 10 years on the coercion and enticement charges, and a mandatory minimum of five years on the receipt and distribution of child sexual abuse material charges. Greene also faces up to a $250,000 fine, restitution payable to the minor victims for damages incurred as a result of the conduct, a special assessment of $5,000, lifetime supervision by the U.S. Probation Office following any term of incarceration, and potential sex offender registry requirements.
The case was investigated by the FBI Columbia field office and the Brazilian Federal Police. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Elliott B. Daniels and Elle E. Klein are prosecuting the case.
The FBI’s Columbia field office is seeking any information regarding additional potential victims in this investigation. Tips can be provided at 1-800-CALL-FBI or tips.fbi.gov.
U.S. Attorney Bryan P. Stirling stated that all charges in the indictment are merely accusations and that defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
###
* The term “pornography” is currently used in federal statutes and is defined as any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a person less than 18 years old. While this phrase still appears in federal law, “child sexual abuse material” is preferred, as it better reflects the abuse that is depicted in the images and videos and the resulting trauma to the child. The Associated Press Stylebook also discourages the use of the phrase “child pornography.”
Source: Office of United States Attorneys
ALEXANDRIA, Va. – A Maryland woman was sentenced yesterday to four years in prison for bank fraud, aggravated identity theft, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
According to court documents, on Nov. 23, 2022, Loryn Michelle Dorsey, 36, of Elkridge, Maryland, fraudulently obtained the personal identifying information (PII) of two victims, identified as K.R. and Z.B, due to their high credit scores, which she needed to fraudulently obtain a loan from a bank to purchase a vehicle. Dorsey also assumed the fake identity of “Julia Ball,” who is not a real person.
On December 6, 2022, Dorsey used K.R.’s PII to apply online for financing to purchase a vehicle from a car dealership in Fairfax, falsely presenting herself as K.R., a female. The dealership then submitted the information to financial institutions to provide the requested credit. Ally Bank, among others, received but rejected the application, but no loan was awarded, and no vehicle was purchased.
Later that day, Dorsey again attempted to obtain approval for financing to purchase a vehicle from the same dealership, this time applying with Z.B. as the co-purchaser and “Julia Ball” as the co-owner. Through the dealership’s website, Dorsey was granted conditional approval of a loan from Ally Bank based on Z.B.’s good credit rating. Because Z.B. had to be present to complete the purchase, and because Z.B. is a man, Dorsey asked a coconspirator to accompany her to the dealership and fraudulently present himself as Z.B. Dorsey also arranged for someone to create a fraudulent identification document with Z.B.’s information and the co-conspirator’s photograph.
Dorsey and the co-conspirator, at Dorsey’s direction, completed paperwork to purchase a 2015 Cadillac Escalade for $48,629.20, with $1,000 cash downpayment provided by Dorsey and the remaining sum of $47,629.20 to be financed by Ally Bank. Fairfax County Police (FCPD) arrived at the dealership after the paperwork was completed. When Dorsey was arrested, she was in possession of a firearm. In 2016, Dorsey was convicted of possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance in Maryland. As a previously convicted felon, Dorsey cannot legally possess a firearm or ammunition.
Erik S. Siebert, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; and Emily Odom, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Washington Field Office’s Criminal and Cyber Division, and Kevin Davis, Fairfax County Chief of Police, made the announcement after sentencing by Senior U.S. District Judge Anthony J. Trenga.
FCPD Auto Crimes Enforcement and the FBI WFO TOC-E/Major Theft Task Force investigated this case.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Nicholas A. Durham prosecuted the case.
This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.
A copy of this press release is located on the website of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Related court documents and information are located on the website of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia or on PACER by searching for Case No. 1:24-cr-7.
Source: US FBI
LOS ANGELES – A federal grand jury indictment unsealed today charges a Russian national with leading a group of cyber criminals that developed and deployed the Qakbot malware that infected thousands of computers worldwide, installing ransomware and demanding payment from victims.
Rustam Rafailevich Gallyamov, 48, of Moscow, Russia, is charged with one count of conspiracy to commit computer fraud and abuse, and one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. He is believed to be in Russia and is not in custody.
In connection with the charges, the Justice Department filed today a civil forfeiture complaint against more than $24 million in cryptocurrency seized from Gallyamov over the course of the investigation. These actions are the latest step in an ongoing multinational effort by the United States, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Canada to combat cybercrime.
“The criminal charges and forfeiture case announced today are part of an ongoing effort with our domestic and international law enforcement partners to identify, disrupt, and hold accountable cybercriminals,” said United States Attorney Bill Essayli for the Central District of California. “The forfeiture action against more than $24 million in virtual assets also demonstrates the Justice Department’s commitment to seizing ill-gotten assets from criminals in order to ultimately compensate victims.”
“Today’s announcement of the Justice Department’s latest actions to counter the Qakbot malware scheme sends a clear message to the cybercrime community,” said Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “We will not stop holding cybercriminals accountable, even over a course of years, and we will use every legal tool at our disposal to identify you, charge you, forfeit your ill-gotten gains, and disrupt your criminal activity.”
“Mr. Gallyamov’s bot network was crippled by the talented men and women of the FBI and our international partners in 2023, but he brazenly continued to deploy alternative methods to make his malware available to criminal cyber gangs conducting ransomware attacks against innocent victims globally,” said Akil Davis, the Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office. “The charges announced today exemplify the FBI’s commitment to relentlessly hold accountable individuals who target Americans and demand ransom, even when they live halfway across the world.”
According to the indictment, Gallyamov developed, deployed, and controlled the Qakbot malware beginning in 2008. From 2019 onward, Gallyamov allegedly used the Qakbot botnet to infect thousands of victim computers around the world to establish a network or “botnet” of infected computers. Once Gallyamov gained access to victim computers, he provided access to co-conspirators who infected the computers with ransomware, including Prolock, Dopplepaymer, Egregor, REvil, Conti, Name Locker, Black Basta, and Cactus. Gallyamov was paid a portion of the ransoms received from ransomware victims.
The announcement of charges today is the latest step taken by the Justice Department against the Qakbot conspiracy. In August 2023, a U.S.-led multinational operation disrupted the Qakbot botnet and malware. At that time, the Justice Department announced the seizure of illicit proceeds from Gallyamov, including more than 170 bitcoin and more than $4 million of USDT and USDC tokens.
According to the indictment, after the disruption and takedown of the Qakbot botnet, Gallyamov and his co-conspirators continued their criminal activities. Instead of a botnet, they allegedly used different tactics, including “spam bomb” attacks on victim companies, where co-conspirators would trick employees at those victim companies into granting access to computer systems. The indictment alleges that Gallyamov orchestrated spam bomb attacks against victims in the United States as recently as January 2025. It also alleges that Gallyamov and his co-conspirators deployed Black Basta and Cactus ransomware on victim computers.
On April 25, pursuant to a seizure warrant, the FBI seized additional illicit proceeds from Gallyamov, including more than 30 bitcoin and more than $700,000 of USDT tokens. Today, the Department filed a civil forfeiture complaint in the Central District of California against all the illicit proceeds seized from Gallyamov – worth more than $24 million as of today – to forfeit and ultimately return those funds to victims.
An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
If convicted, Gallyamov would face a statutory maximum sentence of 25 years in federal prison.
The investigation of Gallyamov was led by the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office, which worked closely with investigators from Germany’s Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), the Netherlands National Police, the French Police Cybercrime Central Bureau, and Europol. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs and the FBI Milwaukee Field Office provided significant assistance.
The case against Gallyamov is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Khaldoun Shobaki and Lauren Restrepo of the Cyber and Intellectual Property Crimes Section, and the Criminal Division’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) Senior Counsel Jessica Peck. Assistant United States Attorney James Dochterman of the Asset Forfeiture and Recovery Section is prosecuting the forfeiture case.
These law enforcement actions were taken in conjunction with Operation Endgame, an ongoing, coordinated effort among international law enforcement agencies aimed at dismantling and prosecuting cybercriminal organizations around the world.
Resources for victims can be found on the following website, which will be updated as additional information becomes available: Qakbot Resources.
Source: US FBI
SANTA ANA, California – A former executive at a Newport Beach company that specializes in the purchase of classic cars – who also happens to be an illegal alien from Mexico – was arrested today on a federal complaint alleging he embezzled approximately $7 million from his employer.
Alexander G. Ramos, 62, of Newport Beach, is charged with wire fraud, a felony that carries a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years in federal prison.
A federal magistrate judge ordered Ramos jailed without bond and scheduled an arraignment for June 30.
According to an affidavit filed with the complaint, Ramos was employed at the victim company since 2017 until his termination in September 2024 in the company’s Risk Management Department. Through his positions, he knew his employer’s loans and held relationships with title agents or other partners nationwide. He also oversaw requests by the company’s Title and Risk Department to its Accounting Department for payment to title agents, sometimes submitting the requests himself.
Ramos allegedly caused checks to be issued from the victim company to certain parties, including a Las Vegas DMV services business. The checks were supposed to cover expenses for tax, titling, and licensing associated with car purchases.
However, Ramos purposely caused his employer to send too much money to the outside entities. He then directed those entities on how to dispose of the extra money, including by sending the funds to bank accounts that he controlled.
A law enforcement review of financial records revealed that approximately $7 million in checks and wires were deposited into Ramos-controlled bank accounts from the outside entities in the car industry. The origin of some of the funds deposited into Ramos’s bank accounts showed the checks and wires were made out to the victim company and were intended as refunds to that company’s clients who had overpaid for vehicle registration fees.
Instead of being returned directly to the Ramos’s employer, Ramos allegedly moved the funds to other accounts he controlled for his personal use, including buying a home in Irvine. The illegal transfers date back to at least January 2020, according to the complaint.
Ramos is an illegal alien from Mexico who was removed from the United States in 2017 but later returned.
A complaint contains allegations that a defendant has committed a crime. Every defendant is presumed to be innocent until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in court.
The FBI and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Office of Inspector General are investigating this matter.
Assistant United States Attorney Kevin Fu of the Orange County Office is prosecuting this case.
Source: US FBI
LOS ANGELES – A federal grand jury indictment and criminal complaint unsealed today charge 16 defendants who allegedly developed and deployed the DanaBot malware which a Russia-based cybercrime organization controlled and deployed, infecting more than 300,000 victim computers around the world, facilitated fraud and ransomware, and caused at least $50 million in damage.
The defendants include Aleksandr Stepanov, 39, a.k.a. “JimmBee,” and Artem Aleksandrovich Kalinkin, 34, a.k.a. “Onix”, both of Novosibirsk, Russia. Stepanov was charged with conspiracy, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, aggravated identity theft, unauthorized access to a protected computer to obtain information, unauthorized impairment of a protected computer, wiretapping, and use of an intercepted communication.
Kalinkin was charged with conspiracy to gain unauthorized access to a computer to obtain information, to gain unauthorized access to a computer to defraud, and to commit unauthorized impairment of a protected computer. Both defendants are believed to be in Russia and are not in custody.
According to the indictment and complaint, DanaBot malware used a variety of methods to infect victim computers, including spam email messages containing malicious attachments or hyperlinks. Victim computers infected with DanaBot malware became part of a botnet (a network of compromised computers), enabling the operators and users of the botnet to remotely control the infected computers in a coordinated manner. The owners and operators of the victim computers are typically unaware of the infection.
The DanaBot malware allegedly operated on a malware-as-a-service model, with the administrators leasing access to the botnet and support tools to client coconspirators for a fee that was typically several thousand dollars a month. The DanaBot malware was multi-featured and had extensive capabilities to exploit victim computers. It could be used to steal data from victim computers, and to hijack banking sessions, steal device information, user browsing histories, stored account credentials, and virtual currency wallet information.
DanaBot also had the capability to provide full remote access to victim computers, to record keystrokes, and record videos showing the activity of users on victim computers. DanaBot has further been used as an initial means of infection for other forms of malware, including ransomware. The DanaBot malware has infected over 300,000 computers around the world, and caused damage estimated to exceed $50 million.
DanaBot administrators operated a second version of the botnet that was used to target victim computers in military, diplomatic, government, and related entities. This version of the botnet recorded all interactions with the computer and sent stolen data to a different server than the fraud-oriented version of DanaBot. This variant was allegedly used to target diplomats, law enforcement personnel, and members of the military in North America, and Europe.
“Pervasive malware like DanaBot harms hundreds of thousands of victims around the world, including sensitive military, diplomatic, and government entities, and causes many millions of dollars in losses,” said United States Attorney Bill Essayli for the Central District of California. “The charges and actions announced today demonstrate our commitment to eradicating the largest threats to global cybersecurity and pursuing the most malicious cyber actors, wherever they are located.”
“The enforcement actions announced today, made possible by enduring law enforcement and industry partnerships across the globe, disrupted a significant cyber threat group, who were profiting from the theft of victim data and the targeting of sensitive networks,” said Special Agent in Charge Kenneth DeChellis of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), Cyber Field Office. “The DanaBot malware was a clear threat to the Department of Defense and our partners. DCIS will vigorously defend our infrastructure, personnel, and intellectual property.”
“Today’s announcement represents a significant step forward in the FBI’s ongoing efforts to disrupt and dismantle the cyber-criminal ecosystem that wreaks havoc on global digital security,” said Special Agent in Charge Rebecca Day of the FBI Anchorage Field Office. “We are grateful for the coordinated efforts of our domestic and international law enforcement partners in holding cyber criminals accountable, no matter where they operate.”
An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
If convicted, Kalinkin would face a statutory maximum sentence of 72 years in federal prison, and Stepanov would face a statutory maximum sentence of five years in federal prison.
As part of today’s operation, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) agents effected seizures and takedowns of DanaBot command and control servers, including dozens of virtual servers hosted in the United States. The U.S. government is now working with partners including the Shadowserver Foundation to notify DanaBot victims and help remediate infections.
These law enforcement actions were taken in conjunction with Operation Endgame, an ongoing, coordinated effort among international law enforcement agencies aimed at dismantling and prosecuting cybercriminal organizations around the world.
Amazon, Crowdstrike, ESET, Flashpoint, Google, Intel 471, Lumen, PayPal, Proofpoint, Spycloud, Team CYMRU, and ZScaler provided valuable assistance.
The investigation into DanaBot was led by the FBI’s Anchorage Field Office and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, working closely with Germany’s Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), the Netherlands National Police, and the Australian Federal Police. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs provided significant assistance.
Assistant United States Attorney Aaron Frumkin of the Cyber and Intellectual Property Crimes Section is prosecuting these cases. Assistant United States Attorney James E. Dochterman of the Asset Forfeiture and Recovery Section is handling the forfeiture case.
Source: US FBI
LOS ANGELES – An insurance brokerage executive was charged today with breaking federal campaign laws by making so-called “conduit” campaign contributions –contributions illegally made in the name of another person – to a joint fundraising committee that included a U.S. Senator’s principal campaign committee.
Teena Maria Hostovich, 66, of La Cañada Flintridge, is charged in a single-count information with making contributions in the name of another aggregating to more than $10,000 in a year, a felony that carries a statutory maximum sentence of two years in federal prison.
In a related filing today, Hostovich has agreed to plead guilty to the federal criminal charge and agreed to pay a fine of $43,500.
Hostovich is expected to make her initial appearance in United States District Court in downtown Los Angeles in the coming weeks.
According to her plea agreement, from May 2020 through 2023, Hostovich knowingly and willfully made a total of $75,700 in contributions to federal candidates’ principal campaign committees and federal joint fundraising committees in the names of other people. For the calendar years 2021 through 2023, Hostovich’s conduit contributions aggregated to more than $10,000 during each of those years.
To make these illegal campaign contributions, Hostovich used 11 different people – including employees at the insurance brokerage that employed her, family members of those employees, and individuals who performed personal services for Hostovich and her family.
As part of the scheme, Hostovich contacted one of these individuals or their family members and asked them to contribute individually or have one of their family members contribute to a particular candidate’s campaign or fundraising committee. Hostovich then paid the person the funds via PayPal either before the contribution was made or reimbursed them afterward.
To execute these conduit contributions, Hostovich sometimes explicitly stated that she would advance the money for the contribution or pay the person back for that contribution. Other times, the person had an implicit understanding that Hostovich would advance the money or reimburse them based on her history of advancements and reimbursements of political contributions. Hostovich generally advanced or reimbursed these individuals in amounts that exceeded the exact contribution amount but often the amounts were very close to the contribution amount.
Hostovich admitted in her plea agreement that one of the reasons she engaged in conduit contributions was to secure an appointment to the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees in Washington, D.C. She did not obtain this position.
The recipients of the illegal contributions included a joint fundraising committee that included a United States senator’s principal campaign committee, a principal campaign committee for a U.S. senatorial candidate, principal campaign committees for two members of the U.S. House of Representatives, and a joint fundraising committee that included the principal campaign for a presidential candidate.
At no time did Hostovich reveal to any of these candidate committees or joint fundraising committees that she was the true source of the funds donated by the 11 individuals. Hostovich further admitted that she knew it was unlawful to make conduit contributions and that, before executing this scheme, she made numerous political contributions to federal candidates and served as a host for political fundraisers.
The FBI investigated this matter.
Assistant United States Attorney Thomas F. Rybarczyk of the Public Corruption and Civil Rights Section is prosecuting this case.
Source: US FBI
Paul Hughes, 42, of Colfax, was sentenced today to 24 years and four months in prison for sexual exploitation of a child, Acting U.S. Attorney Michele Beckwith announced.
According to court documents, between September 2018 and June 2019, on three separate occasions Hughes created visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Hughes used a cellphone to surreptitiously record at least three videos containing child sexual abuse material and saved them on an external hard drive. In addition to these videos, agents recovered more than 3,000 images and videos of child sexual abuse material on Hughes’s external hard drive and Google account.
Further, agents located on Hughes’ devices hundreds of videos and photographs that were taken by Hughes of females between the ages of five to 55 in various public venues in Colfax. In each image, Hughes was attempting to obtain images of the female’s private parts by angling the camera in an upwards direction towards her groin.
“This defendant preyed on the most innocent and vulnerable members of our society—children,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Beckwith. “Keeping children safe from sexual exploitation is a top priority for the U.S. Attorney’s Office. We will continue to use every tool at our disposal to investigate the perpetrators of these heinous crimes and bring them to justice.”
“Paul Hughes exploited children, forever damaging the memories of their childhood,” said FBI Sacramento Special Agent in Charge Sid Patel. “The FBI has no tolerance for any adult who preys upon the innocence of children and anyone who exploits a child faces severe consequences for their actions.”
This case was the product of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with assistance by the Placer County Sheriff’s Office. Assistant U.S. Attorney Denise N. Yasinow is prosecuting the case.
This case was brought as part of Project Safe Childhood, a nationwide initiative launched in May 2006 by the Department of Justice to combat the growing epidemic of child sexual exploitation and abuse. Led by the United States Attorneys’ Offices and the Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Project Safe Childhood marshals federal, state, and local resources to locate, apprehend, and prosecute those who sexually exploit children, and to identify and rescue victims. For more information about Project Safe Childhood, please visit www.usdoj.gov/psc. Click on the “resources” tab for information about internet-safety education.
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)
TORONTO, May 29, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Ninepoint Partners LP (“Ninepoint Partners”) today announced the final May 2025 cash distribution for the Ninepoint Cash Management Fund – ETF Series. The record date for the distribution is May 30, 2025. This distribution is payable on June 6, 2025.
The per-unit final May 2025 distribution is detailed below:
| Ninepoint ETF Series | Ticker | Cash Distribution per unit |
Notional Distribution per unit |
CUSIP |
| Ninepoint Cash Management Fund |
NSAV | $0.12203 | $0.00000 | 65443X105 |
About Ninepoint Partners
Based in Toronto, Ninepoint Partners LP is one of Canada’s leading alternative investment management firms overseeing approximately $7 billion in assets under management and institutional contracts. Committed to helping investors explore innovative investment solutions that have the potential to enhance returns and manage portfolio risk, Ninepoint offers a diverse set of alternative strategies spanning Equities, Fixed Income, Alternative Income, Real Assets, F/X and Digital Assets
For more information on Ninepoint Partners LP, please visit www.ninepoint.com or for inquiries regarding the offering, please contact us at (416) 943-6707 or (866) 299-9906 or invest@ninepoint.com.
Ninepoint Partners LP is the investment manager to the Ninepoint Funds (collectively, the “Funds”). Commissions, trailing commissions, management fees, performance fees (if any), and other expenses all may be associated with investing in the Funds. Please read the prospectus carefully before investing. The information contained herein does not constitute an offer or solicitation by anyone in the United States or in any other jurisdiction in which such an offer or solicitation is not authorized or to any person to whom it is unlawful to make such an offer or solicitation. Prospective investors who are not resident in Canada should contact their financial advisor to determine whether securities of the Fund may be lawfully sold in their jurisdiction.
Please note that distribution factors (breakdown between income, capital gains and return of capital) can only be calculated when a fund has reached its year-end. Distribution information should not be relied upon for income tax reporting purposes as this is only a component of total distributions for the year. For accurate distribution amounts for the purpose of filing an income tax return, please refer to the appropriate T3/T5 slips for that particular taxation year. Please refer to the prospectus or offering memorandum of each Fund for details of the Fund’s distribution policy.
The payment of distributions and distribution breakdown, if applicable, is not guaranteed and may fluctuate. The payment of distributions should not be confused with a Fund’s performance, rate of return, or yield. If distributions paid by the Fund are greater than the performance of the Fund, then an investor’s original investment will shrink. Distributions paid as a result of capital gains realized by a Fund and income and dividends earned by a Fund are taxable in the year they are paid. An investor’s adjusted cost base will be reduced by the amount of any returns of capital. If an investor’s adjusted cost base goes below zero, then capital gains tax will have to be paid on the amount below zero.
Sales Inquiries:
Ninepoint Partners LP
Neil Ross
416-945-6227
nross@ninepoint.com
Source: US FBI
BIRMINGHAM, Ala. – A Birmingham man has been sentenced for his role in the robbery of a Hibbett Sports Distribution Center, announced U.S. Attorney Prim F. Escalona.
U.S. District Court Judge Madeline H. Haikala sentenced Mario Autwun Scott, 42, to 45 months in prison. In November 2024, Scott pleaded guilty to conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery and interference with commerce by threats or violence.
Michael Anthony Pippens, 42, of Birmingham, Scott’s co-conspirator in the robbery, was previously sentenced to 30 months in prison. In January 2025, Pippens pleaded guilty to conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery.
According to court documents, in October 2022, Scott robbed the Hibbett Sports Distribution Center in Shelby County, stealing two trailers full of sporting goods merchandise worth over $84,000. Prior to the robbery, Pippens provided a box truck to Scott so that he could transport the stolen goods.
The FBI investigated the case along with the Alabaster Police Department. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Darius C. Greene and Lloyd C. Peeples prosecuted the case.