Category: KB

MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – AFET Interparliamentary Committee Meeting on Foreign Policy Issues – Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source: European Parliament

AFET Interparliamentary Committee Meeting – 19 February 2025 © Image used under the license from Adobe Stock

On 19 February, Committee on Foreign Affairs will host its first Interparliamentary Committee Meeting of the new legislative term. Over 40 members of national parliaments will be present to exchange views with AFET members. There will be two sessions, focusing on transatlantic relations in challenging times and the role of the European Union in an increasingly multipolar world. Rosa Balfour (Carnegie Europe) and Jim Cloos (TEPSA) will be the keynote speakers in the respective sessions.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Discharge 2023 (Commission and EU Agencies): Consideration of Draft Reports – Committee on Budgetary Control

Source: European Parliament

European Parliament © Image used under the license from Adobe Stock

On 17-18 February 2025, CONT Members will consider the draft reports on the financial year 2023 discharge to the European Commission and EU Agencies. The draft reports will be presented by the respective Rapporteurs, emphasising what they consider to be the main points for the 2023 discharge cycle.

The discharge procedure is the Parliament’s final approval of how the EU budget for a specific year has been implemented. In the draft reports presented during the meeting, the CONT Committee scrutinises how the Commission and EU Agencies are implementing the EU budget and prepares the Parliament’s discharge decisions. Parliament considers the reports prepared by the Budgetary Control Committee, taking into account the Council’s recommendations, and decides to grant, postpone or refuse a discharge.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU-Israel Association Council meeting 2025 – P-000539/2025
Source: European Parliament
Priority question for written answer P-000539/2025
to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Rule 144
Marc Botenga (The Left), Pernando Barrena Arza (The Left), Ilaria Salis (The Left), Lynn Boylan (The Left), Özlem Demirel (The Left), Giorgos Georgiou (The Left), Jonas Sjöstedt (The Left), Danilo Della Valle (The Left), Merja Kyllönen (The Left), Irene Montero (The Left)

The EU plans to hold an Association Council meeting with Israel in February 2025. Due to Israel’s disregard for human rights and international law, including through illegal settlement expansion in the West Bank, no such meetings took place between 2012 and 2022. Similar concerns impeded the meetings in 2023 and 2024.

Indeed, Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which constitutes the framework for these meetings, states that ‘relations between the Parties … shall be based on respect for human rights’, underscoring that this ‘constitutes an essential element of this Agreement’.

Since the 2022 meeting of the Association Council, the International Court of Justice has confirmed the illegal character of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. The International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for the Israeli prime minister for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

1.Does the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy recognise that war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide violate Article 2?

2.Will the meeting of the Association Council be made conditional upon Israel’s compliance with Article 2? If not, why not?

3.If the meeting does take place, what measures will the European side put on the table to make Israel comply with Article 2?

Submitted: 5.2.2025
Last updated: 11 February 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Consideration of draft opinion on the revamped EU Budget – Committee on Budgetary Control

Source: European Parliament

A revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world © Image used under the license from Adobe Stock

On 17 February 2025, CONT Members will consider the draft opinion for BUDG on a revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world.

The draft opinion amends the draft Report of the BUDG Rapporteurs by putting more emphasis on the need for increased transparency, improved performance and the importance of protection of the financial interests of the Union.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Presentation of study on performance-based instruments – Committee on Budgetary Control

Source: European Parliament

Study on performance-based instruments © Image used under the license from Adobe Stock

On 18 February 2025, the study “Performance-based instruments – possible improvements in their design” will be presented to CONT Members by the authors. It will be followed by an exchange of views.

With the adoption and implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the first large-scale performance based instrument (PBI) was established. PBIs require a different way of working from the Commission, and a different way of exercising scrutiny by the Parliament. The study provides an overview of experience so far and draws lessons for the future.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Two new fish species discovered in Swiss waters

Source: Switzerland – Department of Foreign Affairs in English

The public can take part in a survey to decide on the names of two fish species discovered by researchers from the University of Bern, the Natural History Museum of Bern and the Aquatic Research Institute Eawag. In this interview, biologist Bárbara Calegari explains where they live and how to make the diversity of our waters visible.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia – B10-0106/2025

Source: European Parliament

Reinier Van Lanschot, Mārtiņš Staķis, Maria Ohisalo, Sergey Lagodinsky, Markéta Gregorová, Ville Niinistö, Erik Marquardt, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Villy Søvndal
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

B10‑0106/2025

European Parliament resolution on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia

(2025/2522(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

– having regard to the statement of 1 December 2024 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas and Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos on Georgia,

– having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024,

– having regard to the Association Agreement of July 2016 between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part, and its establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas mass grass-roots protests have been taking place in Georgia since the October 2024 parliamentary election; whereas civil society, opposition parties and international and local observers did not accept the reported election results and continue to demand a new election; whereas the protests have been marred by the police’s use of excessive and disproportionate violence, countless arrests and the ill treatment of detainees while in custody;

B. whereas local and international human rights organisations have documented a worrying trend of police brutality, stating that hundreds of protesters, dispersed and arrested by police, have faced violence that, in some cases, amounts to torture; whereas Georgia’s police forces are operating under a veil of apparent impunity, using sporadic acts of violence by protesters, often provoked by their own actions, as a pretext for repression; whereas no officials responsible for abuses have been held accountable;

C. whereas hundreds of anti-government protesters and activists are still being detained, of whom more than 300 are alleging that they suffer beatings, torture and other ill treatment in detention; whereas detainees face swift court hearings resulting in fines or detention for alleged administrative offences, while dozens of people have been arrested on criminal charges in the context of the ongoing anti-government protests;

D. whereas UN experts have condemned the pattern of repression and human rights violations in Georgia, while the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has called this suppression a serious breach of the right of freedom of assembly;

E. whereas prominent journalist Mzia Amaghlobeli, founder of Georgian independent news outlets Batumelebi and Netgazeti, was detained in Batumi on 12 January 2025 for posting a protest poster and then detained again after she suffered ill treatment while in detention, which allegedly resulted in her slapping a Batumi police officer who had insulted her; whereas the Georgian Prosecutor’s Office then charged her with ‘attacking a police officer,’ a criminal offence that carries a prison sentence of four to seven years; whereas on 20 January, it became known that Amaghlobeli had begun a hunger strike; whereas international and local human rights organisations, foreign and Georgian politicians, 14 embassies and more than 300 Georgian journalists, editors and media managers have expressed deep concern about her medical condition and called for her immediate release;

F. whereas the ruling Georgian Dream party convened the new parliament in violation of the country’s constitution, resulting in a boycott of parliament by the opposition; whereas on 5 February 2025, Georgian Dream members of parliament (MPs) voted to strip 49 opposition MPs of their mandates; whereas Georgian authorities have arrested several opposition figures, including politicians Nika Melia and Gigi Ugulava;

G. whereas Georgian Dream has adopted new legislation that came into effect on 30 December 2024, which imposes further arbitrary restrictions on the rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, along with hefty fines for the use of protest slogans or posters, and enables preventive detentions of anyone suspected of planning to violate these rules governing public assembly or other laws, for up to 48 hours; whereas the authorities are routinely abusing administrative and criminal proceedings by the Georgian authorities as part of the worsening crackdown on protest and peaceful dissent;

H. whereas the Georgian authorities continue to ignore the numerous local and international calls to repeal the law ‘on transparency of foreign influence’ and the law ‘on family values and protection of minors’; whereas Georgian Dream has, however, announced plans to replace the so-called foreign agent legislation with a tougher law it describes as a ‘direct copy of the current US Foreign Agents Registration Act’; whereas Georgian Dream has also announced plans for a new draft law on media control which would reportedly restrict media funding from foreign sources, establish ‘standards for media objectivity and journalistic ethics’ and define institutional mechanisms for monitoring and safeguarding these standards;

I. whereas a growing number of civil servants have been dismissed after speaking out against the halting of Georgia’s EU membership process, with Prime Minster Kobakhidze stating that the country’s civil service was going through a ‘process of self-cleansing’;

J. whereas Giorgi Gakharia, leader of the For Georgia party and former prime minister, and Zviad Koridze, a journalist and a member of Transparency International Georgia, were physically assaulted in two separate incidents on 15 January;

K. whereas Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution states that the constitutional bodies must take all measures within the scope of their competences to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union;

L. whereas the EU has firmly halted Georgia’s EU accession process, redirected EU funding from Georgia’s government to civil society and suspended visa-free travel to the EU for Georgian diplomats and officials; whereas, at the December 2024 Foreign Affairs Council, Hungary and Slovakia blocked broadly demanded targeted sanctions against leading Georgian officials, including Bidzina Ivanishvili;

M. whereas Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have bilaterally imposed targeted sanctions against Ivanishvili and 10 government officials, including Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and Interior Minister Vakhtang Gomelauri; whereas, in December 2024, the US imposed individual sanctions against Ivanishvili, while the UK imposed individual sanctions against Mr Gomelauri, Deputy Interior Minister Aleksandre Darakhvelidze, Tbilisi Police Department Director Sulkhan Tamazashvili, Chief of the Special Tasks Department Zviad Kharazishvili, and Deputy Head of the Special Tasks Department Mileri Lagazauri; whereas on 13 January 2025, UK MP James MacCleary put forward a motion to sanction Ivanishvili in the House of Commons;

N. whereas Ivanishvili and his family members have reportedly begun transferring their business assets, worth dozens of millions of euros, from offshore entities to Georgia-registered companies following the imposition of the US targeted sanctions;

O. whereas a significant incentive for Georgian Dream and Ivanishvili in particular to remain on their confrontational path with democracy at home and against European integration is their confidence in cultivating alternative economic development opportunities with Russia, and the continued and growing geo-economic leverage of Georgia in respect of the West; whereas Georgia is a key partner country of the ‘Middle Corridor’ in terms of connectivity, energy and trade relations;

1. Stands in solidarity with all people in Georgia who, for over three months, have been protesting for their country’s democracy and constitution, human rights and EU values; reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, free from corruption, that fully respects fundamental freedoms, protects human rights and guarantees an open society, independent media and free and fair elections;

2. Reconfirms its position that the reported extensive electoral fraud during the October 2024 parliamentary election undermined the integrity of the election process, the legitimacy of the results and the public’s trust in any new government, and that the results therefore do not serve as a reliable representation of the will of the Georgian people; calls for a new election within a year, and for the process to be conducted in an improved electoral environment by an independent and impartial election administration, under diligent international observation, in order to ensure a genuinely fair and transparent electoral process;

3. Considers that the actions of the Georgian Dream party, both in parliament and on the streets against its own citizens, are rapidly steering the country towards authoritarianism, in a seemingly deliberate attempt to demonstrate that the will of the Georgian people no longer determines the country’s future;

4. Condemns all violence against protesters and the ill treatment of detainees by Georgia’s police forces, especially the growing reports of torture; strongly urges the Georgian authorities to guarantee the right of citizens to assemble and to refrain from using unwarranted force against them; demands that all officials responsible for unlawful use of force, including acts of torture and other ill treatment, must be held fully accountable;

5. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of political prisoners and those detained during the anti-government protests; expresses its deep concern about the medical condition of Mzia Amaghlobeli and denounces Georgian Dream for her unlawful detention and criminal prosecution, which was intended to instil fear among independent media representatives, activists and civil society at large;

6. Condemns the termination of the mandates of 49 opposition MPs by Georgian Dream; considers this the latest step in Georgian Dream’s attack on political pluralism in the country; warns the Georgian authorities that any attempts to turn its threats of a ban on established political parties into a reality would alienate Georgia from the EU and make any move towards EU accession impossible;

7. Condemns the attacks on Giorgi Gakharia and Zviad Korids; demands an independent investigation into the incidents and for those responsible to be held accountable;

8. Reiterates its call on the Georgian authorities to repeal the law ‘on transparency of foreign influence’ and the law ‘on family values and protection of minors’; expresses concern about recently announced and introduced laws limiting freedom of expression and assembly, increasing state control of the media and further tightening of the so-called foreign agent legislation; underlines that the law and policies implemented by Georgian Dream are unconstitutional and incompatible with Georgia’s EU integration;

9. Condemns the broader campaign of attacks by the Georgian authorities vilifying civil society organisations and reputable international donors that support democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights in Georgia; notes in this regard attempts by Georgian Dream officials to align themselves on these issues with US President Donald Trump and Elon Musk;

10. Deplores efforts by Hungary and Slovakia to block EU targeted sanctions against Georgian Dream officials at the December 2024 Foreign Affairs Council; reiterates its call on the Council to impose, without delay, individual sanctions on the officials and political leaders in Georgia who are responsible for the democratic backsliding, violations of electoral laws and standards, brutality by police and their proxies and the ill treatment of detainees, administrative abuses and misuse of state institutions, such as Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, Mayor of Tbilisi and Secretary General of the ruling Georgian Dream party Kakha Kaladze, Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Shalva Papuashvili, and Chairman of the Georgian Dream party Irakli Garibashvili, and to extend these sanctions to judges passing politically motivated sentences; reiterates its call on the Council and the EU’s democratic partners, in particular the UK, to impose immediate and targeted personal sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili and to freeze all his assets for his role in the deterioration of the political process in Georgia and for acting against the country’s constitutionally declared interests, including efforts to restore Russia’s sphere of influence over the country;

11. Welcomes in this regard the sanctions imposed bilaterally by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; encourages other Member States, especially those hosting relevant assets, to similarly impose targeted sanctions against Georgian Dream officials, in particular Mr Ivanishvili, in a coordinated fashion, if EU level sanctions fail to be adopted in the Council; calls on France to revoke Ivanishvili’s Légion d’honneur;

12. Reiterates its call for the EU and the Member States to adjust and accelerate the EU funding mechanisms for Georgian civil society and independent media to help make them resilient against efforts by the Georgian Government to cut off their financial lifeline; calls for the focus of that funding to reflect adjusted project needs in the context of a more hostile and anti-democratic environment; stresses that both fresh EU funding for Georgian civil society and the effective allocation of funding is more important than ever now that President Trump has frozen all such funding from the US; stresses that in Georgia’s increasingly repressive climate there is a rapidly growing need for EU and Member State emergency support for Georgian civil society and media, including core operational support, as well as support in countering disinformation;

13. Calls for targeted sanctions on the financial sector of Georgia, as well as political and financial divestment away from planned connectivity projects, in order to disincentive Georgian Dream’s efforts to become a thriving hub for (illicit) Russian financial markets, and a key ‘partner of necessity’ for the West in the Caucasus in the Middle Corridor; stresses that there can be no deep political and economic relations between Georgia and the EU without Georgia upholding fundamental rights and the Georgian Constitution;

14. Calls on VP/HR Kallas and Commissioner Kos, along with Magdalena Grono as the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, to travel to Georgia at their earliest convenience in order to meet with civil society and democratic/pro-European opposition leaders, express support for political prisoners, and more broadly show that the EU has not forgotten those in Georgia protesting for democracy and human rights; expresses its continued support for the efforts of Georgia’s fifth President, Salome Zourabichvili, who continues to represent Georgia’s democratic ambitions;

15. Calls for an immediate and comprehensive audit of EU policy towards Georgia in the context of the halt in the country’s EU accession process; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to conduct a review of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, in particular Georgia’s adherence to the requirements of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and its general principles;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Prime Minister and Parliament of Georgia.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0129/2025

Source: European Parliament

Sara Matthieu, Marie Toussaint, Mounir Satouri, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Saskia Bricmont, Majdouline Sbai, David Cormand, Ville Niinistö, Catarina Vieira, Erik Marquardt, Ignazio Roberto Marino
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

B10‑0129/2025

European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

(2025/2553(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

– having regard to the UN Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, of August 2010,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas (Conflict Minerals Regulation)[1],

– having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the EU and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part (the Samoa Agreement),

– having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986,

– having regard to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, adopted on 18 February 2006,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

– having regard to the UN Charter,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group captured the towns of Minova on 21 January 2025, Sake on 23 January 2025 and Goma, the capital of the North Kivu region in the DRC, on 27 January 2025; whereas this constitutes a brutal violation of the territorial integrity of the DRC; whereas indiscriminate attacks with explosive weapons have increased in recent weeks in densely populated areas of North Kivu, including displacement camps and other highly populated areas near Goma; whereas unlawful killings, rapes and other apparent war crimes, as well as forced labour, forced recruitment and other abusive practices have reportedly been committed by M23 with the support of the Rwandan military;

B. whereas the UN Group of Experts on the DRC established estimates, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004), that between 3 000 and 4 000 Rwandan army troops are on the ground in the DRC, and considers that the deployment of the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, and that Rwanda’s de facto control and direction of M23 operations also renders Rwanda liable for the actions of M23;

C. whereas the UN Group of Experts on the DRC concluded that M23 and other armed groups are involved in illegal mineral exploitation and smuggling in the eastern DRC, and that ‘at least 150 tons of coltan’ have been fraudulently exported to Rwanda and mixed with Rwandan production, leading to the largest contamination of mineral supply chains in the Great Lakes region recorded to date;

D. whereas the resurgence of M23 relates to the deterioration of the security situation in the eastern DRC over the past year, with other armed groups, and at times government soldiers, committing widespread violence, unlawful killings and other grave abuses, putting civilians at greater risk;

E. whereas the DRC has one of the highest rates of internal displacement in the world; whereas many women and children live in precarious conditions and are being exposed to the risk of harassment, assault or sexual exploitation; whereas displaced populations often receive no basic life-saving services and are at risk of malnutrition and disease; whereas cities that host internally displaced people in precarious circumstances, such as Bunia, are also targets of attack by different militias, causing great distress to the displaced communities and to the local population; whereas there is a reported high risk of the spread of Mpox in Goma, due to the dire humanitarian situation;

F. whereas the deputy head of the UN peacekeeping force based in Goma has reported on the widespread rape and killing of women inmates in Goma’s Munzenze prison, and the DRC’s Minister for Human Rights Chantal Chambu Mwavit estimates that 163 women were burned alive in the prison; whereas the UN Human Rights Office reported that only between 9 and 13 female inmates, ‘all of whom had also been raped’, survived the blaze;

G. whereas the security situation in the eastern DRC has dramatically deteriorated in recent weeks and humanitarian access is blocked in the territories illegally occupied since January 2025 by M23;

H. whereas the Luanda Process, which was relaunched in July 2024 and is being facilitated by Angola, aims to mediate between the DRC and Rwanda regarding the conflict in the eastern DRC;

I. whereas the UN and the DRC agreed on the withdrawal of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in mid-2024, leading to a degradation of the security situation and affecting civilians, who were left exposed to human rights abuses by state security forces and armed actors;

J. whereas the M23 and Rwandan forces have obligations to civilians under international humanitarian law, including protecting and facilitating access to humanitarian assistance, and permitting freedom of movement;

K. whereas the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigations into the DRC have focused on alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed mainly in the eastern DRC, in the Ituri region and the North Kivu and South Kivu Provinces, since 1 July 2002; whereas the DRC made a second referral to the ICC in May 2023 concerning allegations of crimes committed in North Kivu since 1 January 2022;

L. whereas the coltan extraction zone in Rubaya in the DRC, controlled by M23, accounts for 15 % of the global supply of tantalum and, as a result, Rwanda recorded a 50 % increase in its coltan exports in 2023, becoming the world’s leading exporter – far exceeding its national production capacity;

M. whereas the Commission and the Rwandan Government signed on 19 February 2024 a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on sustainable raw materials value chains, which anticipates the adoption of an implementation roadmap, opening the door to the EU financing of strategic projects;

N. whereas this MoU clearly anticipates the risk of importing conflict minerals from the DRC into the EU market by requiring Rwanda to enforce ‘measures to intercept smuggled minerals entering the country and to repatriate them to the country of origin’;

O. whereas the EU has not made its cooperation with Rwanda on sustainable raw materials value chains conditional on the country joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), while the DRC is a member of the initiative, thereby creating disparities between transparency requirements on minerals from both countries;

P. whereas Parliament, unlike the Council, was not given the opportunity by the Commission to share its political assessment of the decision to negotiate an MoU with Rwanda, or to provide technical feedback on the draft MoU;

Q. whereas on 18 December 2024, the DRC filed criminal complaints against Apple subsidiaries in France and Belgium, accusing the tech firm of using conflict minerals in its supply chain;

R. whereas the DRC Foreign Affairs Minister Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner and Nobel Prize laureate Denis Mukwege briefed Parliament on 5 February 2025 on the occupation of the eastern DRC and the dire humanitarian impact on the local population and internally displaced people; whereas women are particularly at risk, in these circumstances, of being victims of sexual abuse and rape; whereas the hospitals in Goma lack sufficient sanitary equipment and hundreds of patients are waiting to undergo life-saving surgery;

S. whereas a joint summit of the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community took place on 8 February 2025 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, calling for the disengagement of Rwanda’s forces from the DRC and for the urgent provision of humanitarian assistance to the eastern DRC; whereas the Foreign Affairs Council of the Council of the EU is expected to exchange views on the situation in the DRC on 24 February 2025;

1. Is concerned by findings in the recent reports of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the DRC, and fully supports their recommendations;

2. Condemns the fact that the RDF has deployed troops to the eastern DRC and has provided direct military support to M23, helping it to expand control in the eastern DRC; condemns the fact that Congolese army units have supported armed groups implicated in serious abuses in the fighting with M23;

3. Calls for a quick resumption of negotiations within the Luanda Process in order to find a lasting, peaceful and political solution, and urges all sides to fully honour their engagements within the Luanda Process, specifically the ceasefire agreed on 30 July 2024, the neutralisation of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and the M23 rebel groups, as well as the withdrawal of the RDF from the territory of the DRC; calls for the EU to have an active role in the diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the conflict, advocating for an immediate ceasefire and a renewed commitment to dialogue, with the protection of civilians at the core of negotiations, in particular women and children;

4. Deplores the fact that fighting and the shelling of medical infrastructure in and around Goma has severely limited the delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need; calls on all neighbouring countries, particularly Rwanda, to facilitate access of humanitarian equipment and personnel to all areas occupied by the rebel groups in the eastern DRC, including through the reopening of Goma airport and of borders; highlights the precarious situation that women and girls face and calls on M23 to lift all restrictions on humanitarian interventions aimed at addressing and preventing gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence;

5. Calls on the UN Human Rights Council to create an independent mandate to investigate abuses by all parties to the current conflict as soon as possible;

6. Commends the Prosecutor of the ICC’s announcement that the ICC will continue to investigate alleged crimes committed by any person, irrespective of affiliation or nationality; is highly concerned about the fragile situation of the ICC, which is already undermining its crucial work in bringing justice to victims of the most serious crimes worldwide; reiterates the EU’s unwavering support for the ICC and calls on the Council and the Commission to fulfil their obligations to ensure the functioning and effectiveness of the ICC;

7. Calls on the Commission to continue supporting anti-corruption efforts and the strengthening of governance in the DRC;

8. Calls on the Commission and the Council to impose targeted sanctions against relevant senior M23 and other armed group commanders, army leaders and senior officials, particularly the individuals identified by the recent reports of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC as responsible for, or complicit in, recent serious human rights abuses by their forces, or those for which they have command responsibility, such as Rwanda’s major generals Eugene Nkubito, Ruki Karusisi and Emmy Ruvusha;

9. Exhorts the Commission and the Member States to take measures to ensure that support through the European Peace Facility for the deployment of Rwandan troops in northern Mozambique remains exclusively dedicated to the fight against terrorism in Mozambique and does not, directly or indirectly, support the abusive military operations in the eastern DRC;

10. Expresses regret that the Commission did not present the draft or seek feedback from Parliament in the preparation process of the MoU with Rwanda on sustainable raw materials value chains; regrets that the Council and Parliament were not treated equally in the drafting process of the MoU; highlights the importance of improving the early engagement of the Commission with Parliament in the drafting process of future MoUs;

11. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to suspend the application of the MoU between the Commission and Rwanda on sustainable raw materials value chains, and freeze any decision to select any project in Rwanda as a strategic project under the Critical Raw Materials Act [2], and to temporarily halt cooperation with Rwanda in the context of the EU’s Global Gateway initiative; calls on the Commission to render the future re-activation of cooperation on sustainable raw materials value chains conditional upon Rwanda joining the EITI, which the DRC is already part of;

12. Calls for the EU, Rwanda’s neighbouring countries and Rwanda’s main trading partners to put in place a trade embargo for all minerals, including processed minerals, exported from Rwanda, until a definitive withdrawal of the RDF and rebel group supported by Rwanda from the territory of the DRC;

13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to swiftly adopt an export ban of weapons from the EU to Rwanda and for the immediate suspension of any further military and security assistance to Rwanda until the territorial integrity of the DRC is restored;

14. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure a strong enforcement of the current Conflict Minerals Regulation, and for the Commission to swiftly propose a revision to the EU rules, with the aim of ensuring that the highest standards of traceability and transparency are met for each and every mineral imported into the EU, in particular from the DRC and Rwanda, to review accordingly the current import thresholds currently anticipated in the Regulation, and to enhance anti-circumvention and enforcement provisions regarding sanctions;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of Rwanda.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0105/2025

Source: European Parliament

Thierry Mariani, Jordan Bardella, Pierre‑Romain Thionnet, Matthieu Valet, Nikola Bartůšek
on behalf of the PfE Group

B10‑0105/2025

European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

(2025/2553(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), notably those of 18 January 2018 [1] and 24 November 2022 [2], which address ongoing conflicts and humanitarian concerns in the region,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2008 on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo and rape as a war crime [3] and to its previous resolutions on human rights abuses in the DRC,

– having regard to the declaration of 25 January 2025 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), Kaja Kallas, on behalf of the EU on the security situation in the Kivu,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 9 December 2019 on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which outline the EU’s strategic approach to the DRC,

– having regard to UN Security Council resolutions on the DRC, notably Resolution 2765 (2024) adopted on 20 December 2024, which extended the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) until 20 December 2025, and Resolution 2688 (2023) of 27 June 2023, which renewed the DRC sanctions regime until 1 July 2024,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017, laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum, tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas [4],

– having regard to the Partnership Agreement between the EU and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part [5] (the Samoa Agreement),

– having regard to the Addis Ababa Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, signed on 24 February 2013 under the auspices of the African Union and the United Nations, which aimed to address the root causes of instability in the DRC by promoting regional cooperation, respecting state sovereignty and ending external support to armed groups,

– having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, which was adopted unanimously on 31 October 2000,

– having regard to the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, adopted on 18 February 2006,

– having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations,

– having regard to Report S/2024/432 by the Group of Experts on the DRC to the President of the UN Security Council,

– having regard to Report S/2024/969 by the Group of Experts on the DRC to the President of the UN Security Council,

– having regard to the UN Security Council press statement of 26 January 2025 on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, reaffirming the international community’s commitment to the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,

– having regard to the memorandum of understanding signed on 19 February 2024 between the European Union and Rwanda concerning sustainable and resilient value chains for critical raw materials,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the DRC has faced decades of ongoing armed conflicts, particularly in the eastern regions of North and South Kivu, fuelled by local, regional and international actors;

B. whereas since 1998, the conflict in the DRC has resulted in the deaths of more than 5.4 million people, predominantly civilians, making it the most protracted and deadly conflict since World War II;

C. whereas a significant proportion of these fatalities have been children, who have endured violence and suffered from malnutrition and preventable diseases exacerbated by the ongoing instability;

D. whereas to this day, the DRC continues to suffer violence, attacks, killings and widespread human rights violations perpetrated by domestic and foreign armed groups, notably in the east of the country;

E. whereas the Congo River Alliance and its principal member, the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group, with documented support from Rwanda, has recently escalated hostilities in North Kivu, culminating in the recent seizure of Goma, the capital city of North Kivu, in direct violation of the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;

F. whereas numerous UN reports, including findings from the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, have repeatedly documented Rwanda’s military, logistical and financial support to M23, despite official denials from the Rwandan Government;

G. whereas the ongoing conflict has resulted in widespread human rights violations, including mass killings, sexual violence, forced displacement and the forced recruitment of soldiers, creating one of Africa’s worst protracted humanitarian crises;

H. whereas rape and sexual violence are systematically used as a weapon of war by the M23 rebel group, as documented by numerous human rights organisations and UN reports;

I. whereas over 700 000 people have been forcibly displaced as a result of the escalating violence in the Kivu regions, exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation in refugee camps and informal settlements;

J. whereas the recent escalation of violence in the eastern DRC has resulted in the tragic deaths of over 3 000 civilians and the loss of 13 MONUSCO peacekeepers;

K. whereas armed groups, including M23, continue to illegally exploit the DRC’s vast mineral resources, including coltan, cobalt and gold, fuelling conflict financing and depriving the Congolese people of their national wealth;

L. whereas the EU signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Rwanda in February 2024 regarding sustainable value chains for critical raw materials, despite growing concerns over Rwanda’s role in the illicit exploitation of DRC minerals; whereas this MoU cannot ensure supply chain due diligence as it relies solely on the seller’s self-declarations, providing no verifiable proof of traceability;

M. whereas Rwanda’s President, Paul Kagame, was re-elected on 15 July 2024 with 99.18 % of the vote, extending his 24-year rule by another five years, amid widespread concerns over the absence of political freedom in Rwanda;

N. whereas MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, has been in the country for over two decades, yet continues to struggle to prevent large-scale violence and human rights violations;

O. whereas the African Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have the potential to play a greater role in peacekeeping and regional stabilisation, complementing MONUSCO and other diplomatic efforts, provided that such initiatives align with the sovereignty and wishes of the DRC;

P. whereas regional efforts, including the Luanda Process led by Angolan President João Lourenço, have sought to mediate between the DRC and Rwanda, though continued hostilities have undermined diplomatic progress;

Q. whereas the Great Lakes region remains highly fragile, and a full-scale war between the DRC and Rwanda would not only inflict immense suffering on Congolese civilians, but also destabilise the broader east and central African region;

R. whereas, at the initiative of Kenyan President William Ruto, a joint SADC-EAC summit was held on 7 and 8 February 2025, providing an opportunity for political dialogue between the DRC and Rwanda;

1. Unequivocally condemns the seizure of Goma by the M23 rebel group, backed by Rwanda, as a grave violation of the DRC’s sovereignty and a threat to regional stability; denounces Rwanda’s documented support for M23 and demands its immediate cessation;

2. Reaffirms its unwavering support for the stability of the region and calls for full respect for the territorial integrity of the DRC; emphasises the importance of respecting international borders and the sovereignty of nations; condemns any actions that seek to undermine these principles;

3. Strongly condemns the grave human rights violations committed in Kivu, including pillaging, mass rapes and forced displacement, which have triggered a severe humanitarian crisis, displacing over 230 000 more people; notes that the North and South Kivu provinces are already home to over 4.6 million internally displaced people, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees;

4. Expresses its deepest condolences to the families of the 13 MONUSCO soldiers who lost their lives while carrying out their peacekeeping mission, and to the families of the 3 000 civilians killed in the ongoing violence;

5. Denounces the systematic exploitation and illegal extraction of the DRC’s natural resources, particularly ores and critical raw materials, by armed groups; notes that this plundering not only deprives the Congolese people of their national wealth, but also fuels the conflict, as revenues from these resources are used to finance rebel activities;

6. Condemns the perpetuation of modern slavery within the mining sectors of the region, especially in artisanal mines; notes that miners, including children, are subjected to inhumane working conditions, forced labour and severe exploitation;

7. Expresses deep concern over M23’s recent offensive in South Kivu and the inflammatory rhetoric propagated by the Rwanda-backed rebel alliance; worries about the potential for such actions to further destabilise the region, incite ethnic tensions and undermine efforts toward peace;

8. Notes the unilateral ceasefire declared by M23; points out that while this development may offer a temporary respite from active hostilities, the Congolese Government has described this ceasefire as a ‘false communication’ amid reports of ongoing violence;

9. Expresses profound concern over Rwanda’s escalating militarisation and the potential escalation of the conflict into a full-scale war, which could destabilise the entire Great Lakes region; underscores the importance of diplomacy and calls on all regional actors to engage constructively to avert spillover effects that could lead to a broader crisis;

10. Highlights the opaque roles of some neighbouring countries in the conflict, particularly Uganda; calls for transparency and accountability from all external parties involved;

11. Takes note of the Commission’s announcement of humanitarian support for the DRC, with an initial amount of EUR 60 million for 2025; calls for further improvements in humanitarian aid, including food, clean water, medical assistance and shelter, with a focus on protecting women and children;

12. Notes that humanitarian assistance must be delivered in full respect of humanitarian principles; calls on the Commission to ensure that EU funding is effectively implemented, directly benefiting local communities and delivering real value to them;

13. Emphasises the severe environmental threats posed by the conflict, particularly to the Virunga National Park, a UNESCO world heritage site; recalls that its unique wildlife has been historically plagued by poaching, deforestation and habitat destruction, exacerbated by local instability; calls for immediate measures to safeguard these natural treasures by all parties on the ground;

14. Urges the Commission to immediately suspend and review the EU-Rwanda MoU on critical raw materials in a transparent manner, given Rwanda’s role in destabilising the DRC; notes that the MoU, signed in February 2024, is under scrutiny amid allegations that Rwanda is exploiting DRC resources to fuel the conflict; highlights that Pillar 3 of the MoU, which claims to strengthen due diligence and traceability through Rwanda’s engagement with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, mine-level data publication and scientific verification of mineral origins, lacks credibility as it relies solely on the seller’s self-declarations, providing no verifiable proof of traceability;

15. Urges the Commission to immediately freeze and review financial assistance, development and security cooperation programmes with Rwanda in response to its ongoing destabilisation of the DRC; underlines that, according to Article 101(7) of the Samoa Agreement, funding from the EU could be resumed and modulated based on the conclusions of the Commission’s review;

16. Expresses its dismay at the Commission’s passivity towards ongoing atrocities in Kivu, which have persisted for years; calls for a thorough investigation into Rwanda’s mineral supply chains to ensure that the EU’s prerogatives in the region – as per the obligations of each party in the agreements signed thus far – are respected;

17. Demands the establishment of a common security and defence policy training mission for the DRC’s army to enhance its capacity to protect civilians, counter armed groups and stabilise the conflict zone, tailored to its actual operational needs on the ground;

18. Acknowledges the need to reassess MONUSCO’s effectiveness, given its prolonged presence and limited impact in preventing large-scale atrocities despite its mandate and resources; calls on the UN to evaluate its strategy and peacekeeping capacity;

19. Welcomes the regional efforts towards reconciliation, such as the Luanda Process, chaired by Angolan President João Lourenço, and the joint SADC-EAC summit in Tanzania; encourages the DRC and Rwanda to engage in political dialogue and promote reconciliation in this context;

20. Welcomes the recent efforts of the AU, the EAC and the SADC and invites them to play a greater role in stabilisation through African-led initiatives that complement MONUSCO, while respecting the DRC’s wishes and sovereignty;

21. Renews its endorsement of an African-led peace process to resolve the conflict in the eastern DRC; calls for the return of all parties to the negotiating table; urges all parties to engage constructively in dialogue to achieve a sustainable and peaceful resolution to the war, in line with the communiqué adopted by the Peace and Security Council of the AU at its 1256th Emergency Ministerial meeting;

22. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the UN Security Council, the Presidents, Prime Ministers and Parliaments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, and the African Union and its institutions.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: EU launches InvestAI initiative to mobilise €200 billion of investment in artificial intelligence

Source: European Commission

European Commission Press release Paris, 11 Feb 2025 Today, at the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Action Summit in Paris, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has launched InvestAI, an initiative to mobilise €200 billion for investment in AI, including a new European fund of €20 billion for AI gigafactories.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI: Bitget Wallet Simplifies BNB Memecoin Trading with MemeX and Zero-Fee On-Ramp

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

VICTORIA, Seychelles, Feb. 11, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Bitget Wallet, a leading Web3 non-custodial wallet, has launched the BNB Chain Meme Token List, providing real-time tracking and one-click trading for the most popular meme tokens. As meme tokens surge in popularity on BNB Chain, this feature — alongside the powerful MemeX discovery tool, limit orders, and a zero-fee BNB on-ramp event — ensures users have the right tools to stay ahead of the market and discover early-stage tokens.

The Meme Token List is a real-time leaderboard that shows the top-performing and emerging meme tokens on BNB Chain. It’s designed to make trading simple by helping users easily find trending tokens and understand market movements. By offering quick and easy access to token insights, Bitget Wallet helps users discover new opportunities without missing key moments.

To further boost the memecoin trading experience, Bitget Wallet includes MemeX and limit order support for BNB Chain. MemeX is an exclusive discovery tool that finds new, high-potential tokens within seconds of their creation. It also filters out high-risk tokens, giving users added safety when trading. The limit order feature allows users to set a target price for buying or selling, and trades will automatically execute when the market hits their set price. This helps users stay in control, especially when the market is moving fast.

To make it easier and cheaper to trade meme tokens, users can buy BNB directly within Bitget Wallet with zero on-ramp fees. Bitget Wallet has partnered with Simplex and OnMeta for a special BNB on-ramp event running from February 12, 20:00 to February 19, 20:00 (UTC+8). During this period, users benefit from zero-fee BNB purchases and the chance to win a share of the $5,000 $BGB prize pool. This streamlined, cost-effective on-ramp removes fees and delays, giving users a head start in the fast-moving meme token market.

“Meme tokens are entering a new era where virality and fun will continue, but the big wins will come from smart strategies and early moves,” said Alvin Kan, COO of Bitget Wallet. “We expect trends like cross-vertical memes, AI-driven tokenomics, and sustainable community models to define the next wave of memecoin trading. Our goal is to give users the best tools to capture these opportunities and stay ahead of the next big trend.”

About Bitget Wallet
Bitget Wallet is the home of Web3, uniting endless possibilities in one non-custodial wallet. With over 60 million users, it offers comprehensive onchain services, including asset management, instant swaps, rewards, staking, trading tools, live market data, a DApp browser, an NFT marketplace and crypto payment. Supporting over 100 blockchains, 20,000+ DApps, and 500,000+ tokens, Bitget Wallet enables seamless multi-chain trading across hundreds of DEXs and cross-chain bridges, along with a $300+ million protection fund to ensure safety of users’ assets. Experience Bitget Wallet Lite to start a Web3 journey.
For more information, visit: X | Telegram | Instagram | YouTube | LinkedIn | TikTok | Discord | Facebook
For media inquiries, please contact media.web3@bitget.com

A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/715e20ac-07d0-4a57-ab07-7e15ac959754

The MIL Network –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Meetings with National Parliaments – AFET Interparliamentary Committee Meeting on Foreign Policy Issues – 19-02-2025 – Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source: European Parliament

AFET Interparliamentary Committee Meeting – 19 February 2025 © Image used under the license from Adobe Stock

On 19 February, Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) will host its first inter-parliamentary committee meeting of the new legislative term. Over 40 members of national parliaments will be present to exchange views with AFET members. There will be two sessions, focusing on transatlantic relations in challenging times and the role of the European Union in an increasingly multipolar world. Rosa Balfour (Carnegie Europe) and Jim Cloos (TEPSA) will be the keynote speakers in the respective sessions.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025

MIL-OSI: Form 8.3 – [ALLIANCE PHARMA PLC – 10 02 2025] – (CGWL)

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

FORM 8.3

PUBLIC OPENING POSITION DISCLOSURE/DEALING DISCLOSURE BY
A PERSON WITH INTERESTS IN RELEVANT SECURITIES REPRESENTING 1% OR MORE
Rule 8.3 of the Takeover Code (the “Code”)

1. KEY INFORMATION

(a) Full name of discloser:	CANACCORD GENUITY WEALTH LIMITED (for Discretionary clients)
(b) Owner or controller of interests and short positions disclosed, if different from 1(a): The naming of nominee or vehicle companies is insufficient. For a trust, the trustee(s), settlor and beneficiaries must be named.	N/A
(c) Name of offeror/offeree in relation to whose relevant securities this form relates: Use a separate form for each offeror/offeree	ALLIANCE PHARMA PLC
(d) If an exempt fund manager connected with an offeror/offeree, state this and specify identity of offeror/offeree:	N/A
(e) Date position held/dealing undertaken: For an opening position disclosure, state the latest practicable date prior to the disclosure	10 FEBRUARY 2025
(f) In addition to the company in 1(c) above, is the discloser making disclosures in respect of any other party to the offer? If it is a cash offer or possible cash offer, state “N/A”	N/A

2. POSITIONS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE DISCLOSURE

If there are positions or rights to subscribe to disclose in more than one class of relevant securities of the offeror or offeree named in 1(c), copy table 2(a) or (b) (as appropriate) for each additional class of relevant security.

(a) Interests and short positions in the relevant securities of the offeror or offeree to which the disclosure relates following the dealing (if any)

Class of relevant security:	1p ORDINARY
	Interests		Short positions
	Number	%	Number	%
(1) Relevant securities owned and/or controlled:	12,255,282	2.2671
(2) Cash-settled derivatives:
(3) Stock-settled derivatives (including options) and agreements to purchase/sell:
TOTAL:	12,255,282	2.2671

All interests and all short positions should be disclosed.

Details of any open stock-settled derivative positions (including traded options), or agreements to purchase or sell relevant securities, should be given on a Supplemental Form 8 (Open Positions).

(b) Rights to subscribe for new securities (including directors’ and other employee options)

Class of relevant security in relation to which subscription right exists:
Details, including nature of the rights concerned and relevant percentages:

3. DEALINGS (IF ANY) BY THE PERSON MAKING THE DISCLOSURE

Where there have been dealings in more than one class of relevant securities of the offeror or offeree named in 1(c), copy table 3(a), (b), (c) or (d) (as appropriate) for each additional class of relevant security dealt in.

The currency of all prices and other monetary amounts should be stated.

(a) Purchases and sales

Class of relevant security	Purchase/sale	Number of securities	Price per unit
1p ORDINARY	SALE	5,625	61.406p

(b) Cash-settled derivative transactions

Class of relevant security	Product description e.g. CFD	Nature of dealing e.g. opening/closing a long/short position, increasing/reducing a long/short position	Number of reference securities	Price per unit
NONE

(c) Stock-settled derivative transactions (including options)

(i) Writing, selling, purchasing or varying

Class of relevant security	Product description e.g. call option	Writing, purchasing, selling, varying etc.	Number of securities to which option relates	Exercise price per unit	Type e.g. American, European etc.	Expiry date	Option money paid/ received per unit
NONE

(ii) Exercise

Class of relevant security

Product description
e.g. call option

Exercising/ exercised against

Number of securities

Exercise price per unit

(d) Other dealings (including subscribing for new securities)

Class of relevant security	Nature of dealing e.g. subscription, conversion	Details	Price per unit (if applicable)
NONE

4. OTHER INFORMATION

(a) Indemnity and other dealing arrangements

Details of any indemnity or option arrangement, or any agreement or understanding, formal or informal, relating to relevant securities which may be an inducement to deal or refrain from dealing entered into by the person making the disclosure and any party to the offer or any person acting in concert with a party to the offer:
Irrevocable commitments and letters of intent should not be included. If there are no such agreements, arrangements or understandings, state “none”

NONE

(b) Agreements, arrangements or understandings relating to options or derivatives

Details of any agreement, arrangement or understanding, formal or informal, between the person making the disclosure and any other person relating to:
(i) the voting rights of any relevant securities under any option; or
(ii) the voting rights or future acquisition or disposal of any relevant securities to which any derivative is referenced:
If there are no such agreements, arrangements or understandings, state “none”

NONE

(c) Attachments

Is a Supplemental Form 8 (Open Positions) attached?

Date of disclosure:	11 FEBRUARY 2025
Contact name:	MARK ELLIOTT
Telephone number:	01253 376539

Public disclosures under Rule 8 of the Code must be made to a Regulatory Information Service.

The Panel’s Market Surveillance Unit is available for consultation in relation to the Code’s disclosure requirements on +44 (0)20 7638 0129.

The Code can be viewed on the Panel’s website at www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk.

The MIL Network –

February 12, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia – B10-0107/2025

Source: European Parliament

B10‑0107/2025

European Parliament resolution on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia

(2025/2522(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia, in particular that of 28 November 2024 on Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud [1],

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023 and of 27 June 2024,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Commission staff working document of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘Georgia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0697),

– having regard to the joint statement of 8 November 2023 by the Chair of the Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus and the European Parliament’s Standing Rapporteur on Georgia on the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 on the EU membership application of Georgia,

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part [2], which entered into force on 1 July 2016,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in particular Article 215(2) thereof, and to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Article 29 thereof,

– having regard to the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia and to its September 2009 report,

– having regard to the final conclusions of the international election observation mission relating to the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the exercise of freedom of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly is a fundamental right enshrined in the Georgian constitution;

B. whereas Georgia, as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights and a member of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), has committed itself to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights;

C. whereas Russia has illegally occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia since the August 2008 conflict that followed Georgia’s attack on Tskhinvali on the night of 7 to 8 August 2008;

D. whereas in June 2014, the EU and Georgia signed an Association Agreement that entered into force on 1 July 2016;

E. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia the status of EU candidate country;

F. whereas in March 2017, the EU visa facilitation agreement with Georgia came into effect, following Georgia’s successful implementation of all the benchmarks set in its visa liberalisation action plan;

G. whereas on 27 January 2025, the Council decided to suspend parts of the EU-Georgia visa facilitation agreement, specifically affecting diplomats and officials, who may now be required to apply for a visa when travelling to the EU;

H. whereas on 28 November 2024, in response to the European Parliament’s November 2024 resolution on Georgia, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would suspend accession talks until the end of 2028 and refuse all EU budget support; whereas he also stated that by 2028, Georgia would be ‘more prepared than any other candidate country to open accession talks with Brussels and become a Member State in 2030’;

I. whereas the parliamentary elections held on 26 October 2024 were the first to take place in Georgia under a fully proportional electoral system and were also the first elections to be held since Georgia was granted the status of EU candidate country in December 2023;

J. whereas the legal framework in Georgia provides an adequate basis for conducting democratic elections, but several long-standing recommendations of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Venice Commission remain unaddressed, despite numerous reforms;

K. whereas on 16 November 2024, the Georgian electoral authority announced the official results of the country’s parliamentary elections, confirming that the ruling Georgian Dream party had won 89 seats in the 150-seat parliament after receiving 53.93 % of the vote, while four opposition parties had passed the 5 % threshold and had received a combined 37.44 % share of the vote;

L. whereas the international election observation mission on the parliamentary elections in Georgia comprised 529 observers from 42 countries, including 380 expert observers deployed by the ODIHR, 60 parliamentarians and staff from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 39 from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 38 from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and 12 from the European Parliament;

M. whereas the election campaign in Georgia was competitive and generally allowed contestants to campaign freely, but was marred by the use of highly divisive rhetoric and imagery, as well as isolated incidents of violence, event disruptions, verbal abuse and the destruction of campaign materials, as reported by both ruling and opposition parties;

N. whereas the administration of the elections was generally orderly, but they took place in a tense environment, with overcrowding in many polling stations and several incidents of physical altercations and intimidation;

O. whereas President Salome Zourabichvili publicly accused the Georgian Government of electoral fraud and irregularities in the recent parliamentary elections; whereas President Zourabichvili subsequently refused to testify before the Georgian Prosecutor’s Office regarding these allegations;

P. whereas Mikheil Kavelashvili was sworn in as President of Georgia on 29 December 2024; whereas the outgoing President, Salome Zourabichvili, refused to step down despite the official end of her term of office; whereas opposition parties boycotted the Georgian Parliament in protest;

Q. whereas Georgia has over 26 000 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – 1 for every 142 citizens, which is greater than the EU average;

R. whereas following the 2020 parliamentary elections, the NGO International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, which received external funding, challenged the official election results and questioned their legitimacy, but later admitted that it had made a significant error in its calculations;

S. whereas the Parliament of Georgia adopted the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ law, which was signed into law on 3 June 2024 despite the President’s veto; whereas the law was met with protest from parts of Georgian civil society; whereas the law requires organisations receiving more than 20 % of their funding from overseas to register as ‘agents of foreign influence’;

T. whereas on 17 September 2024, the Parliament of Georgia adopted the ‘family values and the protection of minors’ law, which bans gender transition, prohibits adoption by gay and transgender people, nullifies, on Georgian territory, same-sex marriages performed abroad, and provides a legal basis for the authorities to outlaw Pride events and public displays of the LGBTQI+ rainbow flag and to impose the censorship of films and books;

U. whereas the Venice Commission stresses that, in accordance with international standards, the state has a positive obligation to ensure gender equality; whereas on 4 April 2024, the Parliament of Georgia repealed the 2020 amendments introducing gender quotas for candidate lists in parliamentary and local elections, and abolished the associated financial incentives for political parties;

V. whereas the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has been operating in Georgia since 1992; whereas Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze claimed that USAID funding was not directed toward genuine humanitarian objectives but was instead being used to ‘stage revolutions, sow disorder and destabilise countries, including Georgia’; whereas US President Donald Trump implemented a 90-day freeze on US foreign assistance to reassess its alignment with national interests;

1. Recalls that the EU accession process is based on objective criteria; regrets the European Council’s decision to suspend financial assistance to Georgia; underlines the benefits of the visa facilitation agreement and the need to maintain it; emphasises the need for a constructive dialogue between the Government of Georgia and the EU; calls on the Government of Georgia to uphold its commitments to reform and continue implementing the necessary measures for its EU accession process;

2. Stresses that Georgia’s future must be determined by the will of its people, free from external pressure or interference; emphasises that Georgia’s sovereignty and political trajectory should reflect the aspirations of its citizens; condemns any attempts, whether foreign or domestic, to undermine Georgia’s democratic institutions;

3. Takes note of the final report of the international election observation mission, which stated that the overall legal framework in Georgia provides an adequate basis for conducting democratic elections, that voters were offered a wide choice of 18 candidate lists, that contestants could generally campaign freely and that the administration of the elections was generally orderly; is alarmed that these elections took place in a polarised environment and on an uneven playing field, and that there were reports of pressure on voters and cases where ballot secrecy was potentially compromised;

4. Takes note of the results of the parliamentary elections that took place in Georgia on 26 October 2024; calls on all sides to work together constructively and peacefully and observe the rule of law, and to address the long-standing recommendations of the ODIHR and the Venice Commission with regard to elections and the increasing polarisation of Georgian society; calls for the EU to enter into a holistic and purposeful dialogue with the new Government of Georgia; calls on all foreign actors to respect the outcome of the elections;

5. Rejects, with deep concern, the adoption of the ‘family values and the protection of minors’ law, and considers it an attack on the LGBTQI+ community and a threat to civil liberties as a whole; rejects, furthermore, the law’s implications for the media, given that it imposes censorship by banning broadcasters from reporting freely on LGBTQI+ issues; reiterates that media freedom and tolerance towards sexual minorities are key features of a functioning democracy;

6. Notes that the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ law entails the risk that NGOs, civil society organisations, opposition media outlets and other organisations that receive funds from other countries will be labelled ‘foreign agents’;

7. Emphasises that the rights to freedom of expression and assembly and to peaceful protest are fundamental freedoms and must be respected in all circumstances; expresses concern over reports of the unnecessary and disproportionate use of force against demonstrators; highlights the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, that ‘[a]ny restrictions to these rights must abide by principles of legality, necessity and proportionality’ and that ‘[t]he use of force during protests should always be exceptional and a measure of last resort when facing an imminent threat’;

8. Emphasises that foreign assistance for humanitarian and development purposes must be allocated on the basis of need and human dignity, not geopolitical interests; stresses that such aid should remain impartial, transparent and focused on social and economic well-being, rather than serving as a tool for political leverage or interference;

9. Regrets the Georgian Parliament’s decision to abolish mandatory gender quotas; reiterates the need for balanced gender representation in political participation; regrets the under-representation of women in the electoral process; calls on the Government of Georgia to undertake initiatives in this regard;

10. Takes note of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statements at a press conference at the UN General Assembly in New York and the corresponding willingness of Georgian officials to resolve outstanding issues in a peaceful, diplomatic way; encourages both sides to undertake solid initiatives to this end;

11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Georgia.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025

MIL-OSI: Royalty Pharma Reports Q4 and Full Year 2024 Results

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Portfolio Receipts of $742 million in Q4 2024 and $2,801 million for FY 2024
Royalty Receipts growth of 12% in Q4 2024 and 13% for FY 2024
Net cash provided by operating activities of $743 million in Q4 2024 and $2,769 million for FY 2024
Full year 2025 guidance: Portfolio Receipts expected to be $2,900 to $3,050 million excluding future transactions

NEW YORK, Feb. 11, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Royalty Pharma plc (Nasdaq: RPRX) today reported financial results for the fourth quarter and full year 2024 and introduced full year 2025 guidance for Portfolio Receipts.

“We had an incredibly successful 2024, delivering double-digit growth in Royalty Receipts, which was significantly above our initial guidance, and deploying $2.8 billion of capital on value-enhancing royalties” said Pablo Legorreta, Royalty Pharma’s founder and Chief Executive Officer. “We are very excited for the opportunities ahead as the fundamentals of our business have never been stronger. Additionally, we have already taken two major steps at the start of 2025 to enhance shareholder value, announcing the acquisition of our external manager, which is expected to result in multiple financial and strategic benefits, and a new $3 billion share repurchase program, which highlights the confidence we have in our business and the attractive value we see in our shares. With a robust transaction pipeline and significant financial flexibility, I am confident that Royalty Pharma is well positioned to deliver attractive, compounding growth over the long term.”

Strong Royalty Receipts growth; Portfolio Receipts growth impacted by a high base of comparison

Royalty Receipts grew 12% to $729 million in the fourth quarter and 13% to $2,771 million for full year 2024, driven by strong performance from Evrysdi, the CF franchise, Trelegy, Tremfya and new royalty acquisitions.
Portfolio Receipts increased 1% to $742 million in the fourth quarter of 2024; Portfolio Receipts decreased 8% from $3,049 million to $2,801 million for full year 2024, largely reflecting $525 million in Biohaven-related milestone payments received in 2023.

Capital Deployment of $2.8 billion in 2024 with royalties on eight new therapies added to the portfolio

Record year for synthetic royalty transactions for Royalty Pharma with $925 million announced in 2024.
Significantly expanded development-stage portfolio by acquiring royalties on four potential new therapies.

Exciting new product launches expected across the royalty portfolio in 2025

Royalty Pharma to benefit in 2025 from new product launches, including Servier’s Voranigo, Bristol Myers Squibb’s Cobenfy, Ascendis’ Yorvipath, Syndax and Incyte’s Niktimvo and Geron’s Rytelo.

Financial guidance for full year 2025 (excludes contribution from future transactions)

Royalty Pharma expects 2025 Portfolio Receipts to be between $2,900 million and $3,050 million, representing expected growth of 4% to 9%.

Financial & Liquidity Summary

	Three Months Ended December 31,			Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	(unaudited)
*($ and shares in millions)*	2024	2023	Change	2024	2023	Change
Portfolio Receipts	742	736	1%	2,801	3,049	(8)%
Net cash provided by operating activities	743	773	(4)%	2,769	2,988	(7)%
Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP)*	669	682	(2)%	2,565	2,806	(9)%
Portfolio Cash Flow (non-GAAP)*	678	687	(1)%	2,452	2,708	(9)%
Weighted average Class A ordinary shares outstanding – diluted	589	598	(1)%	594	603	(1)%

*See “Liquidity and Capital Resources” section. Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow are non-GAAP liquidity measures calculated in accordance with the credit agreement.

Portfolio Receipts Highlights

			Three Months Ended December 31,
			(unaudited)
*($ in millions)*			2024	2023	Change
Products:	Marketers:	Therapeutic Area:
Cystic fibrosis franchise	Vertex	Rare disease	237	207	14%
Trelegy	GSK	Respiratory	74	60	23%
Tysabri	Biogen	Neuroscience	61	68	(11)%
Evrysdi	Roche	Rare disease	56	20	182%
Xtandi	Pfizer, Astellas	Cancer	46	38	20%
Imbruvica	AbbVie, J&J	Cancer	46	50	(10)%
Promacta	Novartis	Hematology	44	44	(1)%
Tremfya	Johnson & Johnson	Immunology	39	35	11%
Cabometyx/Cometriq	Exelixis, Ipsen, Takeda	Cancer	20	18	11%
Spinraza	Biogen	Rare disease	15	17	(13)%
Orladeyo	BioCryst	Rare disease	11	8	36%
Trodelvy	Gilead	Cancer	11	10	10%
Erleada	Johnson & Johnson	Cancer	11	9	25%
Nurtec ODT/Zavzpret	Pfizer	Neuroscience	7	5	49%
Other products⁽⁵⁾			54	63	(14)%
Royalty Receipts			729	651	12%
Milestones and other contractual receipts			13	84	(85)%
Portfolio Receipts			742	736	1%

Results for full year 2024 and 2023 are shown in Table 5. Amounts shown in the table may not add due to rounding.

Royalty Receipts was $729 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, an increase of 12% as compared to $651 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. The increase was primarily driven by strong growth from Evrysdi, the cystic fibrosis franchise, Trelegy, Xtandi and Tremfya. Royalty receipts from Evrysdi included the benefit of the additional royalties acquired in October 2023 and June 2024.

Portfolio Receipts was $742 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, an increase of 1% as compared to $736 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. The increase was primarily driven by the same Royalty Receipts increases noted above, offset by a decrease in milestones and other contractual receipts, which reflected a $50 million payment related to the oral formulation of zavegepant in the prior period.

Liquidity and Capital Resources

Royalty Pharma’s liquidity and capital resources are summarized below:

As of December 31, 2024, Royalty Pharma had cash and cash equivalents of $929 million and total debt with principal value of $7.8 billion.

During the fourth quarter of 2024, Royalty Pharma repurchased approximately two million Class A ordinary shares for $50 million. For full year 2024, Royalty Pharma repurchased approximately eight million Class A ordinary shares for $230 million. The weighted-average number of diluted Class A ordinary shares outstanding for the fourth quarter of 2024 was 589 million as compared to 598 million for the fourth quarter of 2023. The weighted-average number of diluted Class A ordinary shares outstanding for full year 2024 was 594 million as compared to 603 million for full year 2023.

In January 2025, Royalty Pharma’s Board of Directors authorized a new share repurchase program under which Royalty Pharma may repurchase up to $3.0 billion of its Class A ordinary shares. Royalty Pharma intends to repurchase $2.0 billion of its shares in 2025, subject to market conditions. The total value of shares repurchased will depend on the discount to the intrinsic value at which its Class A ordinary shares are trading. This new share repurchase program replaces the unused $465 million of the company’s original $1.0 billion share repurchase program that was announced in March 2023.

Liquidity Summary

	Three Months Ended December 31,		Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	(unaudited)
*($ in millions)*	2024	2023	2024	2023
Portfolio Receipts	742	736	2,801	3,049
Payments for operating and professional costs	(72)	(54)	(236)	(243)
Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP)	669	682	2,565	2,806
Interest received/(paid), net	8	5	(113)	(98)
Portfolio Cash Flow (non-GAAP)	678	687	2,452	2,708

Amounts may not add due to rounding.

Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP) was $669 million in the fourth quarter of 2024. Adjusted EBITDA is calculated as Portfolio Receipts minus payments for operating and professional costs.
Portfolio Cash Flow (non-GAAP) was $678 million in the fourth quarter of 2024. Portfolio Cash Flow is calculated as Adjusted EBITDA minus interest paid or received, net. This measure reflects the cash generated by Royalty Pharma’s business that can be redeployed into value-enhancing royalty acquisitions, used to repay debt, returned to shareholders through dividends or share purchases, or utilized for other discretionary investments.

Refer to Table 4 for Royalty Pharma’s reconciliation of each non-GAAP measure to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure, net cash provided by operating activities.

Capital Deployment was $522 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, consisting primarily of the acquisitions of royalties on Niktimvo and Rytelo. Capital Deployment reflects cash payments during the period for new and previously announced transactions. Capital Deployment was $2.8 billion for full year 2024.

The table below details Capital Deployment by category:

Capital Deployment

	Three Months Ended December 31,		Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	(unaudited)
*($ in millions)*	2024	2023	2024	2023
Acquisitions of financial royalty assets	(496)	(1,002)	(2,506)	(2,116)
Development-stage funding payments – upfront and milestone	—	—	—	(50)
Development-stage funding payments – ongoing	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)
Purchases of available for sale debt securities	—	—	(150)	—
Milestone payments	(25)	—	(75)	(12)
Investments in equity method investees	—	(2)	(11)	(13)
Acquisitions of other financial assets	—	—	(18)	—
Contributions from legacy non-controlling interests – R&D	0	0	1	1
Capital Deployment	(522)	(1,005)	(2,761)	(2,192)

Amounts may not add due to rounding.

In January 2025, Royalty Pharma announced the sale of the MorphoSys Development Funding Bonds for $511 million in upfront cash (press release). This payment, combined with payments previously received, results in total cash proceeds of $530 million on the $300 million investment that was made in September 2022. The proceeds strengthen Royalty Pharma’s balance sheet and provide added flexibility to pursue its disciplined capital allocation strategy.

Royalty Transactions

For full year 2024, Royalty Pharma announced new transactions of up to approximately $2.8 billion. The announced transactions amount reflects the entire amount of capital committed for new transactions during the year, including potential future milestones.

Recent transactions include:

In November 2024, Royalty Pharma acquired a synthetic royalty on Rytelo from Geron Corporation for an upfront payment of $125 million (press release). Rytelo is approved for the treatment of certain adult patients with low- to intermediate-1 risk myelodysplastic syndromes with transfusion-dependent anemia. Following the acquisition, Royalty Pharma is entitled to receive tiered royalties on U.S. net sales on Rytelo.
In November 2024, Royalty Pharma acquired a synthetic royalty on Niktimvo from Syndax Pharmaceuticals, Inc. for an upfront payment of $350 million (press release). Niktimvo is approved for the treatment of chronic graft-versus-host disease and will be co-commercialized by Incyte. Following the acquisition, Royalty Pharma is entitled to receive royalties on U.S. net sales on Niktimvo.

The information in this section should be read together with Royalty Pharma’s reports and documents filed with the SEC at www.sec.gov and the reader is also encouraged to review all other press releases and information available in the Investors section of Royalty Pharma’s website at www.royaltypharma.com.

Internalization Transaction

In January 2025, Royalty Pharma agreed to acquire its external manager, RP Management, LLC (the “Manager”) (press release). This transaction to simplify Royalty Pharma’s corporate structure is expected to result in multiple benefits for shareholders. On a financial basis, the acquisition is expected to reduce costs and enhance economic returns on investments. Specifically, the acquisition will generate cash savings of greater than $100 million in 2026, rising to greater than $175 million in 2030 and driving cumulative savings of greater than $1.6 billion over ten years. The acquisition also increases shareholder alignment, enhances corporate governance, ensures management continuity and simplifies Royalty Pharma’s corporate structure.

The total transaction value of approximately $1.1 billion⁽⁷⁾ consists of approximately 24.5 million shares of Royalty Pharma equity that will vest over five to nine years, approximately $100 million in cash⁽⁸⁾, and the assumption of $380 million of the Manager’s existing debt.

The closing of the internalization transaction is subject to shareholders’ approval of the issuance of the share consideration and other customary closing conditions, including required regulatory approvals. The transaction is estimated to close during the second quarter of 2025.

Key Developments Relating to the Portfolio

The key developments related to Royalty Pharma’s royalty interests are discussed below based on disclosures from the marketers of the products.

TEV-‘749	In January 2025, Teva announced that TEV-‘749 (olanzapine LAI) achieved Phase 3 targeted injections without PDSS (post-injection delirium/sedation syndrome), and the full safety presentation is expected in the second quarter of 2025.
Cystic fibrosis franchise	In December 2024, Vertex announced the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of the new triple-combination modulator Alyftrek (vanzacaftor triple) for the treatment of cystic fibrosis in people ages 6 and older with at least one responsive mutation. In November 2024, Vertex announced that it had completed regulatory submissions for the vanzacaftor triple in the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Switzerland, and reviews are underway.
Skytrofa	In December 2024, Ascendis announced the U.S. FDA accepted for review its supplemental Biologics License Application (sBLA) in adult growth hormone deficiency for Skytrofa. The FDA set a Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) goal date of July 27, 2025.
aficamten	In December 2024, Cytokinetics announced that the FDA accepted its New Drug Application (NDA) for aficamten for the treatment of Obstructive Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy. The FDA has assigned the NDA a Prescription Drug User Fee Act date of September 26, 2025. Additionally, the European Medicines Agency validated the Marketing Authorization Application for aficamten, and it will now be reviewed by the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP).
Trodelvy	In November 2024, Gilead announced plans to voluntarily withdraw the U.S. accelerated approval of Trodelvy for use in pre-treated adult patients with locally advanced or metastatic urothelial cancer, following the results of the Phase 3 TROPiCS-04 trial.
Airsupra	In October 2024, AstraZeneca announced that positive high-level results from the BATURA Phase 3b trial showed Airsupra met the primary endpoint, demonstrating a statistically significant and clinically meaningful reduction in the risk of a severe exacerbation when used as an as-needed rescue medication in response to symptoms compared to as-needed albuterol. These positive results triggered a milestone payment from AstraZeneca, of which Royalty Pharma received its pro rata portion of $27 million in January 2025.
MK-8189	In October 2024, Merck updated its public disclosures to remove MK-8189 from its pipeline chart and Royalty Pharma does not anticipate making a further investment in this program.
pelabresib	In October 2024, Novartis announced that based on its review of 48-week data from the Phase 3 MANIFEST-2 study, longer follow-up time is needed to determine the regulatory path for pelabresib in myelofibrosis. Novartis will continue to follow patients in MANIFEST-2 and evaluate the potential for additional studies to support registration.
trontinemab	In October 2024, Roche presented its latest Phase 1b/2a interim results for trontinemab at the Clinical Trials on Alzheimer’s Disease (CTAD) conference, which demonstrated rapid and robust amyloid plaque depletion after 12 to 28 weeks of treatment and an overall favorable safety profile with very limited amyloid related imaging abnormalities (ARIA-E) observed.

2025 Financial Outlook

Royalty Pharma has provided guidance for full-year 2025, excluding new transactions and borrowings announced after the date of this release, as follows:

	Provided February 11, 2025
Portfolio Receipts	$2,900 million to $3,050 million (Growth of ~+4% to 9% year/year)
Payments for operating and professional costs	Approximately 10% of Portfolio Receipts⁽¹⁾
Interest paid	$260 million

The above Portfolio Receipts guidance represents expected growth of 4% to 9% in 2025. Royalty Pharma’s full-year 2025 guidance reflects a negligible estimated foreign exchange impact to Portfolio Receipts, assuming current foreign exchange rates prevail for the rest of 2025.

2025 guidance for payments for operating and professional costs and interest paid does not reflect the impact of the internalization transaction announced on January 10, 2025 and will be updated following the closing of the internalization transaction, which is expected to be in the second quarter of 2025.

Total interest paid is based on the semi-annual interest payment schedule of Royalty Pharma’s existing notes and is anticipated to be approximately $260 million in 2025. Interest paid is anticipated to be approximately $138 million in the first quarter of 2025, which includes the first interest payment on the $1.5 billion notes issued in June 2024. Interest paid in the third quarter of 2025 is anticipated to be $119 million. De minimis amounts are anticipated in the second and fourth quarter of 2025. These projections assume no additional debt financing in 2025, including no drawdown on the revolving credit facility. In 2024, Royalty Pharma collected interest of $46 million on its cash and cash equivalents.

Royalty Pharma today provides this guidance based on its most up-to-date view of its prospects. This guidance assumes no major unforeseen adverse events or changes in foreign exchange rates and excludes the contributions from transactions announced subsequent to the date of this press release.

Financial Results Call

Royalty Pharma will host a conference call and simultaneous webcast to discuss its fourth quarter and full year 2024 results today at 8:30 a.m., Eastern Time. Please visit the “Investors” page of the company’s website at https://www.royaltypharma.com/investors/events to obtain conference call information and to view the live webcast. A replay of the conference call and webcast will be archived on the company’s website for at least 30 days.

About Royalty Pharma plc

Founded in 1996, Royalty Pharma is the largest buyer of biopharmaceutical royalties and a leading funder of innovation across the biopharmaceutical industry, collaborating with innovators from academic institutions, research hospitals and non-profits through small and mid-cap biotechnology companies to leading global pharmaceutical companies. Royalty Pharma has assembled a portfolio of royalties which entitles it to payments based directly on the top-line sales of many of the industry’s leading therapies. Royalty Pharma funds innovation in the biopharmaceutical industry both directly and indirectly – directly when it partners with companies to co-fund late-stage clinical trials and new product launches in exchange for future royalties, and indirectly when it acquires existing royalties from the original innovators. Royalty Pharma’s current portfolio includes royalties on more than 35 commercial products, including Vertex’s Trikafta, GSK’s Trelegy, Roche’s Evrysdi, Johnson & Johnson’s Tremfya, Biogen’s Tysabri and Spinraza, AbbVie and Johnson & Johnson’s Imbruvica, Astellas and Pfizer’s Xtandi, Novartis’ Promacta, Pfizer’s Nurtec ODT and Gilead’s Trodelvy, and 14 development-stage product candidates.

Forward-Looking Statements

The information set forth herein does not purport to be complete or to contain all of the information you may desire. Statements contained herein are made as of the date of this document unless stated otherwise, and neither the delivery of this document at any time, nor any sale of securities, shall under any circumstances create an implication that the information contained herein is correct as of any time after such date or that information will be updated or revised to reflect information that subsequently becomes available or changes occurring after the date hereof.

This document contains statements that constitute “forward-looking statements” as that term is defined in the United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, including statements that express the company’s opinions, expectations, beliefs, plans, objectives, assumptions or projections regarding future events or future results, in contrast with statements that reflect historical facts. Examples include discussion of Royalty Pharma’s strategies, financing plans, growth opportunities, market growth and plans for capital deployment, plus the benefits of the benefits of the internalization transaction, including expected accretion, enhanced alignment with shareholders, increased investment returns, expectations regarding management continuity, transparency and governance, and the benefits of simplification to its structure. In some cases, you can identify such forward-looking statements by terminology such as “anticipate,” “intend,” “believe,” “estimate,” “plan,” “seek,” “project,” “expect,” “may,” “will,” “would,” “could” or “should,” the negative of these terms or similar expressions. Forward-looking statements are based on management’s current beliefs and assumptions and on information currently available to the company. However, these forward-looking statements are not a guarantee of Royalty Pharma’s performance, and you should not place undue reliance on such statements. Forward-looking statements are subject to many risks, uncertainties and other variable circumstances, and other factors. Such risks and uncertainties may cause the statements to be inaccurate and readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on such statements. Many of these risks are outside of the company’s control and could cause its actual results to differ materially from those it thought would occur. The forward-looking statements included in this document are made only as of the date hereof. The company does not undertake, and specifically declines, any obligation to update any such statements or to publicly announce the results of any revisions to any such statements to reflect future events or developments, except as required by law.

Certain information contained in this document relates to or is based on studies, publications, surveys and other data obtained from third-party sources and the company’s own internal estimates and research. While the company believes these third-party sources to be reliable as of the date of this document, it has not independently verified, and makes no representation as to the adequacy, fairness, accuracy or completeness of, any information obtained from third-party sources. In addition, all of the market data included in this document involves a number of assumptions and limitations, and there can be no guarantee as to the accuracy or reliability of such assumptions. Finally, while the company believes its own internal research is reliable, such research has not been verified by any independent source.

For further information, please reference Royalty Pharma’s reports and documents filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) by visiting EDGAR on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov.

Portfolio Receipts

Portfolio Receipts is a key performance metric that represents Royalty Pharma’s ability to generate cash from Royalty Pharma’s portfolio investments, the primary source of capital that is deployed to make new portfolio investments. Portfolio Receipts is defined as the sum of Royalty Receipts and Milestones and other contractual receipts. Royalty Receipts includes variable payments based on sales of products, net of contractual payments to the legacy non-controlling interests, that are attributed to Royalty Pharma.

Milestones and other contractual receipts include sales-based or regulatory milestone payments and other fixed contractual receipts, net of contractual payments to legacy non-controlling interests, that are attributed to Royalty Pharma. Portfolio Receipts does not include proceeds from equity securities or proceeds from purchases and sales of marketable securities, both of which are not central to Royalty Pharma’s fundamental business strategy.

Portfolio Receipts is calculated as the sum of the following line items from Royalty Pharma’s GAAP statements of cash flows: Cash collections from financial royalty assets, Cash collections from intangible royalty assets, Other royalty cash collections, Proceeds from available for sale debt securities and Distributions from equity method investees less Distributions to legacy non-controlling interests – Portfolio Receipts, which represent contractual distributions of Royalty Receipts, milestones and other contractual receipts to RPSFT and the Legacy Investors Partnerships. Distributions to RPSFT substantially ended in December 2023 when Royalty Pharma acquired the remaining interest in RPCT held by RPSFT.

Use of Non-GAAP Measures

Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow are non-GAAP liquidity measures that exclude the impact of certain items and therefore have not been calculated in accordance with GAAP.

Management believes that Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow are important non-GAAP measures used to analyze liquidity because they are key components of certain material covenants contained within Royalty Pharma’s credit agreement. Royalty Pharma cautions readers that amounts presented in accordance with the definitions of Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow may not be the same as similar measures used by other companies or analysts. These non-GAAP liquidity measures have limitations as analytical tools, and you should not consider them in isolation or as a substitute for the analysis of Royalty Pharma’s results as reported under GAAP.

The definitions of Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow used by Royalty Pharma are the same as the definitions in the credit agreement. Noncompliance with the interest coverage ratio, leverage ratio and Portfolio Cash Flow ratio covenants under the credit agreement could result in lenders requiring the company to immediately repay all amounts borrowed. If Royalty Pharma cannot satisfy these covenants, it would be prohibited under the credit agreement from engaging in certain activities, such as incurring additional indebtedness, paying dividends, making certain payments, and acquiring and disposing of assets. Consequently, Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow are critical to the assessment of Royalty Pharma’s liquidity.

Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow are used by management as key liquidity measures in the evaluation of the company’s ability to generate cash from operations. Management uses Adjusted EBITDA and Portfolio Cash Flow when considering available cash, including for decision-making purposes related to funding of acquisitions, debt repayments, dividends and other discretionary investments. Further, these non-GAAP liquidity measures help management, the audit committee and investors evaluate the company’s ability to generate liquidity from operating activities.

The company has provided reconciliations of these non-GAAP liquidity measures to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measure, being net cash provided by operating activities in Table 4.

Royalty Pharma Investor Relations and Communications

+1 (212) 883-6772
ir@royaltypharma.com


Royalty Pharma plc Condensed Consolidated Operations (unaudited) Table 1

	Three Months Ended December 31,		Twelve Months Ended December 31,
*($ in millions)*	2024	2023	2024	2023
Income and other revenues
Income from financial royalty assets	562	523	2,149	2,198
Other royalty income and revenues	32	73	114	157
Total income and other revenues	594	596	2,264	2,355
Operating expense/(income)
Provision for changes in expected cash flows from financial royalty assets	164	(77)	732	561
Research and development funding expense	1	1	2	52
General and administrative expenses	68	59	237	250
Total operating expense/(income), net	232	(17)	971	862
Operating income	362	613	1,292	1,492
Other (income)/expense
Equity in earnings of equity method investees	(32)	(0)	(30)	(29)
Interest expense	66	47	226	187
Other income, net	(7)	(152)	(234)	(366)
Total other expense/(income), net	27	(105)	(38)	(208)
Consolidated net income before tax	334	718	1,331	1,700
Income tax expense	—	—	—	—
Consolidated net income	334	718	1,331	1,700
Net income attributable to non-controlling interests	126	223	472	565
Net income attributable to Royalty Pharma plc	208	494	859	1,135

Amounts may not add due to rounding.


Royalty Pharma plc Selected Balance Sheet Data (unaudited) Table 2

*($ in millions)*	As of December 31, 2024	As of December 31, 2023
Cash and cash equivalents	929	477
Total current and non-current financial royalty assets, net	15,911	14,827
Total assets	18,223	16,382
Current portion of long-term debt	998	—
Long-term debt, net of current portion	6,615	6,135
Total liabilities	7,880	6,298
Total shareholders’ equity	10,342	10,084


Royalty Pharma plc Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (unaudited) Table 3

	Three Months Ended December 31,		Twelve Months Ended December 31,
*($ in millions)*	2024	2023	2024	2023
Cash flows from operating activities:
Cash collections from financial royalty assets	777	747	2,983	3,201
Cash collections from intangible royalty assets	0	0	15	1
Other royalty cash collections	30	75	109	159
Distributions from equity method investees	—	—	13	19
Interest received	9	8	46	72
Development-stage funding payments – ongoing	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)
Development-stage funding payments – upfront and milestone	—	—	—	(50)
Payments for operating and professional costs	(72)	(54)	(236)	(243)
Interest paid	(1)	(3)	(160)	(169)
Net cash provided by operating activities	743	773	2,769	2,988
Cash flows from investing activities:
Distributions from equity method investees	3	5	24	44
Investments in equity method investees	—	(2)	(11)	(13)
Purchases of equity securities	—	—	(63)	—
Proceeds from equity securities	—	—	99	—
Purchases of available for sale debt securities	—	—	(150)	—
Proceeds from available for sale debt securities	13	1	20	1
Proceeds from sales and maturities of marketable securities	—	—	—	24
Acquisitions of financial royalty assets	(496)	(1,002)	(2,506)	(2,116)
Acquisitions of other financial assets	—	—	(18)	—
Milestone payments	(25)	—	(75)	(12)
Other	—	(2)	2	(2)
Net cash used in investing activities	(506)	(1,000)	(2,678)	(2,073)
Cash flows from financing activities:
Distributions to legacy non-controlling interests – Portfolio Receipts	(81)	(92)	(362)	(377)
Distributions to continuing non-controlling interests	(31)	(24)	(125)	(120)
Dividends to shareholders	(94)	(89)	(376)	(358)
Repurchases of Class A ordinary shares	(53)	(30)	(230)	(305)
Contributions from legacy non-controlling interests – R&D	0	0	1	1
Contributions from non-controlling interests – other	1	1	4	7
Cash acquired in connection with purchase of non-controlling interest	—	5	—	5
Proceeds from revolving credit facility	—	350	—	350
Repayment of revolving credit facility	—	(350)	—	(350)
Repayment of long-term debt	—	—	—	(1,000)
Proceeds from issuance of long-term debt, net of discount	—	—	1,471	—
Debt issuance costs and other	0	(2)	(13)	(2)
Other	0	—	(9)	—
Net cash (used in)/provided by financing activities	(258)	(232)	361	(2,149)
Net change in cash and cash equivalents	(21)	(459)	452	(1,234)
Cash and cash equivalents, beginning of period	950	936	477	1,711
Cash and cash equivalents, end of period	929	477	929	477

Amounts may not add due to rounding.


Royalty Pharma plc GAAP to Non-GAAP Reconciliation (unaudited) Table 4

	Three Months Ended December 31,		Twelve Months Ended December 31,
*($ in millions)*	2024	2023	2024	2023
Net cash provided by operating activities (GAAP)	743	773	2,769	2,988
Adjustments:
Proceeds from available for sale debt securities⁽⁶⁾	13	1	20	1
Distributions from equity method investees⁽⁶⁾	3	5	24	44
Interest (received)/paid, net⁽⁶⁾	(8)	(5)	113	98
Development-stage funding payments – ongoing	1	1	2	2
Development-stage funding payments – upfront and milestone	—	—	—	50
Distributions to legacy non-controlling interests – Portfolio Receipts⁽⁶⁾	(81)	(92)	(362)	(377)
Adjusted EBITDA (non-GAAP)	669	682	2,565	2,806
Interest received/(paid), net⁽⁶⁾	8	5	(113)	(98)
Portfolio Cash Flow (non-GAAP)	678	687	2,452	2,708

Amounts may not add due to rounding.


Royalty Pharma plc Fourth Quarter and Full Year Portfolio Receipts Highlights (unaudited) Table 5

	Three Months Ended December 31,			Twelve Months Ended December 31,
*($ in millions)*	2024	2023	Change	2024	2023	Change
Products:
Cystic fibrosis franchise	237	207	14%	857	771	11%
Trelegy	74	60	23%	284	203	40%
Tysabri	61	68	(11)%	262	279	(6)%
Imbruvica	46	50	(10)%	191	210	(9)%
Evrysdi	56	20	182%	174	66	163%
Xtandi	46	38	20%	169	146	15%
Promacta	44	44	(1)%	158	161	(2)%
Tremfya	39	35	11%	140	116	20%
Cabometyx/Cometriq	20	18	11%	73	66	10%
Spinraza	15	17	(13)%	45	45	1%
Trodelvy	11	10	10%	43	33	30%
Erleada	11	9	25%	39	27	42%
Orladeyo	11	8	36%	39	29	32%
Nurtec ODT/Zavzpret	7	5	49%	26	18	39%
Other products⁽⁵⁾	54	63	(14)%	273	277	(1)%
Royalty Receipts	729	651	12%	2,771	2,449	13%
Milestones and other contractual receipts	13	84	(85)%	31	599	(95)%
Portfolio Receipts	742	736	1%	2,801	3,049	(8)%

Amounts may not add due to rounding.

Royalty Pharma plc
Description of Approved Indications for Select Portfolio Therapies
Table 6

Cystic fibrosis franchise	Cystic fibrosis
Trelegy	Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and asthma
Tysabri	Relapsing forms of multiple sclerosis
Evrysdi	Spinal muscular atrophy
Xtandi	Prostate cancer
Imbruvica	Hematological malignancies and chronic graft versus host disease
Promacta	Chronic immune thrombocytopenia purpura and aplastic anemia
Tremfya	Plaque psoriasis, psoriatic arthritis and ulcerative colitis
Cabometyx / Cometriq	Kidney, liver and thyroid cancer
Spinraza	Spinal muscular atrophy
Orladeyo	Hereditary angioedema
Trodelvy	Breast and bladder cancer
Erleada	Prostate cancer
Nurtec ODT/Zavzpret	Acute and preventative treatment of migraine

Notes

⁽¹⁾Portfolio Receipts is a key performance metric that represents Royalty Pharma’s ability to generate cash from Royalty Pharma’s portfolio investments, the primary source of capital that Royalty Pharma can deploy to make new portfolio investments. Portfolio Receipts is defined as the sum of Royalty Receipts and Milestones and other contractual receipts. Royalty Receipts include variable payments based on sales of products, net of contractual payments to the legacy non-controlling interests, that are attributed to Royalty Pharma (“Royalty Receipts”). Milestones and other contractual receipts include sales-based or regulatory milestone payments and other fixed contractual receipts, net of contractual payments to the legacy non-controlling interests, that are attributed to Royalty Pharma. Portfolio Receipts does not include proceeds from equity securities or proceeds from purchases and sales of marketable securities, both of which are not central to Royalty Pharma’s fundamental business strategy.

Portfolio Receipts is calculated as the sum of the following line items from Royalty Pharma’s GAAP statements of cash flows: Cash collections from financial royalty assets, Cash collections from intangible royalty assets, Other royalty cash collections, Proceeds from available for sale debt securities and Distributions from equity method investees less Distributions to legacy non-controlling interests – Portfolio Receipts, which represent contractual distributions of Royalty Receipts and milestones and other contractual receipts to RPSFT and the Legacy Investors Partnerships. Distributions to RPSFT substantially ended in December 2023 when Royalty Pharma acquired the remaining interest in RPCT held by RPSFT.

⁽²⁾Adjusted EBITDA is defined under the credit agreement as Portfolio Receipts minus payments for operating and professional costs. Operating and professional costs reflect Payments for operating and professional costs from the GAAP statements of cash flows. See GAAP to Non-GAAP reconciliation in Table 4.

⁽³⁾Portfolio Cash Flow is defined under the credit agreement as Adjusted EBITDA minus interest paid or received, net. See GAAP to Non-GAAP reconciliation in Table 4. Portfolio Cash Flow reflects the cash generated by Royalty Pharma’s business that can be redeployed into value-enhancing royalty acquisitions, used to repay debt, returned to shareholders through dividends or share purchases or utilized for other discretionary investments.

⁽⁴⁾Capital Deployment is calculated as the summation of the following line items from Royalty Pharma’s GAAP statements of cash flows: Investments in equity method investees, Purchases of available for sale debt securities, Acquisitions of financial royalty assets, Acquisitions of other financial assets, Milestone payments, Development-stage funding payments – ongoing, Development-stage funding payments – upfront and milestone less Contributions from legacy non-controlling interests – R&D.

⁽⁵⁾Other products primarily include Royalty Receipts on the following products: Cimzia, Crysvita, Emgality, Entyvio, Farxiga/Onglyza, IDHIFA, Lexiscan, Nesina, Prevymis, Soliqua and distributions from the Legacy SLP Interest, which is presented as Distributions from equity method investees on the GAAP statements of cash flows.

⁽⁶⁾The table below shows the line item for each adjustment and the direct location for such line item on the GAAP statements of cash flows.

Reconciling Adjustment	Statements of Cash Flows Classification
Interest received/paid, net	Operating activities (Interest paid less Interest received)
Distributions from equity method investees	Investing activities
Proceeds from available for sale debt securities	Investing activities
Distributions to legacy non-controlling interests – Portfolio Receipts	Financing activities

⁽⁷⁾ The total transaction value of approximately $1.1 billion is based on the closing price of Royalty Pharma plc common stock of $26.20 on January 8, 2025.

⁽⁸⁾ Consists of $200 million in cash less the amount of the management fees paid to the Manager from January 1, 2025 through the closing of the transaction.

The MIL Network –

February 12, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0133/2025

Source: European Parliament

Adam Bielan, Carlo Fidanza, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Cristian Terheş, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Bogdan Rzońca, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Małgorzata Gosiewska
on behalf of the ECR Group

B10‑0133/2025

European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

(2025/2553(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the security situation, including the human rights situation, is deteriorating even further in the DRC, especially in the eastern parts of the country and specifically in the provinces of North and South Kivu; whereas North and South Kivu have endured long-lasting conflicts for over two decades; whereas severe human rights violations have been committed in the region;

B. whereas the Rwandan-backed Tutsi rebel group M23 launched a military operation on 18 January 2025 to expand its territory in North and South Kivu; whereas this attack violates a ceasefire agreement concluded between Rwanda and the DRC as part of the Luanda Peace Process; whereas on 21 January 2025, M23 claimed to have captured several towns, including the strategically important trading town Minova;

C. whereas on 24 January 2025, intense fighting occurred near Sake, where the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), supported by the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), UN forces (MONUSCO) and a coalition of militia groups, attempted to prevent M23 from advancing towards and capturing Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu; whereas FARDC Major General Peter Cirimwami, who was also the military governor of North Kivu, was fatally shot on the same day; whereas several South African and Malawian soldiers have reportedly been killed in the recent conflict while serving with SAMIDRC; whereas numerous UN peacekeepers have been killed in the DRC and many more have been injured;

D. whereas on 30 January 2025, Goma fell under M23 control after several days of fighting in the city; whereas M23 has vowed to ‘march all the way to Kinshasa’; whereas M23 is advancing towards Bukavu in South Kivu; whereas on 3 February 2025, M23 declared a ceasefire for ‘humanitarian reasons’; whereas Goma Airport remains closed, leaving no entry point for humanitarian aid; whereas Goma is experiencing a total blackout, with no access to running water, electricity or the internet; whereas M23 is illegally occupying Goma; whereas M23 is deliberately destroying vital infrastructure;

E. whereas M23’s occupation of Goma will have severe humanitarian consequences for civilians; whereas the Congolese authorities have reported a high risk of a cholera outbreak; whereas bombs and artillery are being used in densely populated areas; whereas statements by Congolese officials indicate that the streets of Goma are filled with rotting bodies; whereas doctors in Goma are overwhelmed and unable to provide adequate care; whereas M23 has already carried out multiple summary executions, used forced labour and forcibly recruited civilians to join it and commit atrocities on its behalf; whereas both M23 and the FARDC have used rape as a weapon of war; whereas the UN reports that more than 100 female prisoners were raped and burned alive during a jailbreak in Goma; whereas this conflict has significantly increased gender-based violence; whereas M23 is deliberately targeting refugee camps full of displaced civilians, including women and children, which constitutes a war crime; whereas the exact number of displaced people in North Kivu is unconfirmed, but is estimated to be at least 2.4 million;

F. whereas it is widely known that M23 is backed by Rwanda and its forces; whereas this conflict has its roots in the Rwandan civil war; whereas medical staff can only access Goma through Rwanda; whereas Rwanda has never sent medical experts to Goma; whereas Rwanda is benefiting from this conflict, particularly economically;

G. whereas the DRC is rich in various minerals and other natural resources; whereas M23 is illegally mining these resources and exporting them to Rwanda; whereas M23 is exploiting forced and child labour in the process; whereas this conflict can also be viewed as an economic war driven by these resources; whereas, in the current geopolitical climate, a number of actors are seeking access to resources in other countries; whereas the potential escalation of the conflict in the DRC could pose a serious threat to the entire African continent, given the current geopolitical situation in the region;

H. whereas in February 2024, the EU and Rwanda signed a memorandum of understanding on sustainable raw materials value chains; whereas critics say that the deal facilitates the smuggling of conflict minerals from the DRC, further fuels the conflict and helps to finance armed groups in the eastern DRC;

1. Expresses deep concern about the escalation of violence and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the DRC, caused by the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group; strongly condemns the brutal atrocities committed by M23 in the DRC and Rwanda’s support for the group; demands that Rwanda and all other potential state actors in the region cease their support for M23; demands that M23 withdraw from the territories it has unlawfully gained and return them to the DRC; reminds all parties that territorial integrity must be upheld; demands that M23 immediately stop illegally mining Congolese minerals and resources and sending them to Rwanda; demands the disarmament and dismantling of M23; urges all state parties involved to ensure that any political settlement does not include pardons for individuals who are responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity;

2. Deplores the fact that millions of civilians have been affected by this conflict, leaving them displaced and in need of humanitarian aid; expresses deep concern over the number of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the DRC;

3. Demands that the safety of civilians be ensured; demands that medical staff be granted full access to Goma; emphasises the need for a thorough investigation into the crimes committed by M23 and its supporters;

4. Underlines its support for the DRC in its legitimate fight against M23 and other armed groups, and calls on the international community to increase pressure on Rwanda and M23;

5. Insists that all EU-funded humanitarian aid must be directed towards helping the most vulnerable people in the eastern DRC, such as women and children, who have suffered the most; stresses that North and South Kivu should be given higher priority for the allocation of EU-funded development aid;

6. Urges the EU and its Member States to adopt sanctions under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against all the Rwandan officials and authorities responsible for supporting M23; calls for the sanctions against M23 commanders to be maintained and extended further to include those newly found responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity;

7. Calls for the EU, its Member States and other democratic Western countries to increase their diplomatic visibility and strengthen their economic and strategic influence in the region, which has large quantities of crucial minerals and other vital resources, to ensure that other authoritarian actors cannot further destabilise the area; calls for the EU to guarantee the traceability of minerals imported from Rwanda and to ensure that there is no trade in conflict minerals from the eastern DRC;

8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European External Action Service, the African Union, the Joint Council of Ministers and Joint Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the EU, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the governments and parliaments of Rwanda, the DRC and the other countries of the East African Community.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia – B10-0114/2025

Source: European Parliament

Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell, Petr Bystron, Tomasz Froelich, Petar Volgin, Stanislav Stoyanov
on behalf of the ESN Group

B10‑0114/2025

European Parliament resolution on the further deterioration of the political situation in Georgia

(2025/2522(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its resolution of 25 April 2024 on attempts to reintroduce a foreign agent law in Georgia and its restrictions on civil society [1],

– having regard to the statement by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell with the European Commission of 15 May 2024 on the adoption of the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ in Georgia,

– having regard to its resolution of 9 October 2024 on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia [2],

– having regard to the final report of 20 December 2024 of the international election observation mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights on the Georgian parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024,

– having regard to the statement by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and the European Commission of 27 October 2024 on the parliamentary elections,

– having regard to the statement by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell of 29 October 2024 on the latest developments following the parliamentary elections,

– having regard to Georgia’s sovereignty as recognised in international law,

– having regard to the Charter of the United Nations and to the principles of non-interference in domestic affairs,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Georgia is a sovereign state under international law, with full authority to determine its political system, conduct elections and govern itself without interference from foreign actors or international organisations;

B. whereas the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 were conducted in broad compliance with national and international legal standards and the Georgian people have made a clear and democratic choice regarding the composition of their new government;

C. whereas the new Georgian Government remains committed to European integration, continuing its aspiration for EU membership while ensuring respect for national sovereignty and democratic processes;

D. whereas according to Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), a Sweden-based political science research institute, Georgia is among the top performers across Europe and worldwide in the field of freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom from governmental attacks on judicial justice, and equal protection across societal groups; notes that Georgia has attained a historic high ranking in the Index of Public Integrity of the European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building;

E. whereas the Georgian Parliament has signalled its willingness to engage in dialogue with the EU on legislative matters and to negotiate solutions to contested legal provisions in a constructive manner;

F. whereas Georgia is of significant strategic value to the EU, particularly in areas such as energy cooperation, logistics, security and economic development, which should be recognised and supported rather than undermined by political disputes;

G. whereas the EU’s continued interference in Georgia’s internal affairs – including its refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the Georgian elections and its continued support for opposition movements – risks damaging trust and weakening the EU’s credibility in the region;

H. whereas the principle of non-intervention in sovereign states’ affairs is enshrined in Articles 2(1) and 2(7) of the UN Charter, and the EU’s failure to respect Georgia’s democratic choices constitutes a breach of international law;

I. whereas the Georgian Government has expressed its readiness to engage in constructive negotiations with the EU, yet certain EU institutions have refused to acknowledge this openness, preferring instead to impose unilateral demands on the country;

J. whereas the EU’s insistence on disregarding regional and cultural considerations – such as the Georgian Parliament’s decision on laws related to foreign influence and public morality – ignores the will of the majority of Georgian citizens and undermines political pluralism;

K. whereas continued EU pressure on Georgia, including threats of sanctions and the potential suspension of financial aid, constitutes an unjustified punitive approach that alienates a key strategic partner in the region;

1. Deplores the EU’s refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the parliamentary elections in Georgia and its ongoing interference in Georgia’s domestic political affairs;

2. Reaffirms that the choice of political leadership and governance in Georgia is solely a matter for the Georgian people, and should be made free from external coercion or pressure;

3. Calls for the EU institutions to respect the Georgian Parliament’s willingness to engage in open dialogue, rather than imposing unilateral demands that disregard Georgia’s political realities;

4. Urges the EU to engage in constructive dialogue with the new Georgian Government and to recognise that continued political pressure will only serve to push Georgia away from European cooperation rather than fostering integration;

5. Calls for the EU to take a pragmatic and strategic approach towards Georgia, emphasising mutual benefits in key sectors such as energy security, trade and regional stability rather than focusing on ideological disagreements;

6. Warns that the EU’s policy of intervention and political pressure in Georgia risks weakening the EU’s standing in the wider Caucasus region, harming its ability to build sustainable partnerships based on mutual respect;

7. Warns that the EU’s constant interference in Georgia’s internal affairs could fuel strong anti-EU sentiment within Georgian society;

8. Demands that the EU stop supporting opposition movements that do not represent the will of the majority of Georgian citizens, and instead focus on fostering institutional dialogue with the legitimately elected government;

9. Reiterates that sovereignty and democracy cannot be applied selectively, and that international law requires all states and organisations – including the EU – to respect the principles of self-determination and non-intervention;

10. Calls for the EU to adopt a forward-looking policy towards Georgia, recognising the country’s strategic importance and its legitimate democratic processes rather than pursuing a confrontational approach;

11. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and the President, Government, and Parliament of Georgia.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – EP Conference of Presidents’ statement on EU support for Ukraine

Source: European Parliament

Statement of the Conference of Presidents on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression.

Three years have passed since the Russian Federation launched its unprovoked, unjustified and illegal full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, violating international law, the United Nations Charter, and undermining European and global security. The European Parliament Conference of Presidents again strongly condemns Russia’s ongoing war of aggression with deliberate targeting of civilian and critical infrastructure, and the atrocities committed against the Ukrainian population, all serious violations of international law and international humanitarian law.

We reaffirm our steadfast solidarity with the people of Ukraine, who continue to demonstrate extraordinary resilience and courage in defending their sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.

The European Union must remain united in its commitment to support Ukraine that includes political, military, economic, humanitarian and financial assistance. We commend the efforts of Member States, institutions, civil society organisations, companies and citizens who have mobilised resources and provided refuge to millions of displaced Ukrainians. At the same time, we call on the EU and its Member States to increase and speed up the delivery of its support, in particular of its military support and establish a legal regime allowing for the confiscation of Russian-owned assets frozen by the EU.

We continue to call for accountability for all war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during this war of aggression. We welcome the recent steps made towards the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.

We call for continued and enhanced military support to Ukraine, including the provision of defence equipment, training, and strategic assistance necessary to uphold Ukraine’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

We reaffirm the EU’s commitment to sustainable and long-term financial and economic support to Ukraine, including macro-financial assistance, support for reconstruction and economic and social recovery, and measures to ensure the resilience of Ukraine’s economy and critical infrastructure.

We call for the full implementation and a significant expansion of sanctions, including effective measures to prevent circumvention, against Russia and its accomplices, aimed at definitively undermining its capacity to wage war and holding accountable those responsible for aggression and human rights violations.

We express full support for Ukraine’s European integration aspirations. The European Parliament remains committed to advancing Ukraine’s path towards EU membership, recognising its significant progress in reforms under the most challenging circumstances.

In a challenging international and geopolitical environment, we stress the importance of maintaining transatlantic and global solidarity with Ukraine and countering Russian disinformation. We also highlight the need to ensure the international community’s continued focus on the consequences of this war and on supporting Ukraine in achieving a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace based on the Ukrainian peace formula

As we mark three years of this brutal aggression, the European Parliament Conference of Presidents honours the resilience of the Ukrainian people and pays tribute to all those who have sacrificed their lives for freedom and democracy. We stand firm with Ukraine, reaffirming that peace, security, and justice will prevail.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the escalation of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo – B10-0109/2025

Source: European Parliament

B10‑0109/2025

European Parliament resolution on the escalation of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

(2025/2553(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

– having regard to the statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the EU of 25 January 2025 on the latest escalation in eastern DRC,

– having regard to the statement by G7 foreign ministers of 2 February 2025 on the escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,

– having regard to the press statement of the UN Security Council of 26 January 2025 on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

– having regard to the special session of the UN Human Rights Council of 7 February 2025 on the human rights situation in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

– having regard to the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 28 January 2025 on the recent developments in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,

– having regard to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) of 18 December 1979,

– having regard to the Partnership Agreement of 15 November 2023 between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Members of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, of the other part [1],

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas in January 2025, the armed rebel group M23, backed by Rwandan forces, further advanced in the eastern DRC and seized the regional capital city of Goma; whereas violence between rebel groups and the Congolese army increased sharply, causing a high number of civilian casualties; whereas an estimated 3 000 deaths occurred during the offensive on Goma;

B. whereas M23 announced a unilateral ceasefire to begin on 4 February 2025; whereas fighting has continued nonetheless; whereas there are reports that the mining town of Nyabibwe in South Kivu has been captured by M23; whereas M23 leaders have declared their intention to continue advancing in the DRC;

C. whereas the latest advances of M23 mark an alarming escalation of the devastating conflict in the eastern DRC and have further destabilised the country; whereas the region has been plagued by decades of cyclical violence, causing a security and humanitarian crisis; whereas a ceasefire brokered in 2024 did not hold;

D. whereas there are estimated to be around 100 separate armed groups operating in eastern DRC; whereas the largest of the foreign armed groups is the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR);

E. whereas the seizing of Goma has led to significant displacement of civilians; whereas an estimated 700 000 people have been displaced since early January 2025; whereas thousands of Congolese people had previously fled to the city to escape violence and have been further driven from camps for internally displaced people into makeshift tents or forced to sleep out in the open; whereas the safety of internally displaced people is now seriously threatened, with women and girls suffering disproportionately;

F. whereas eastern DRC was already the centre of one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world; whereas thousands of people are facing shortages of food, medicine and drinking water; whereas hospitals are overwhelmed and there is limited electricity and running water in Goma; whereas there are rapidly growing levels of malnutrition, particularly among children; whereas access for humanitarian assistance is restricted and Goma airport remains closed;

G. whereas sanitary conditions, notably in camps for internally displaced people, are extremely concerning; whereas experts are warning of the risks of widespread outbreaks of diseases, including cholera and mpox; whereas in January 2025 the Commission announced an increase of EUR 60 million in EU humanitarian assistance to the DRC;

H. whereas instances of gender-based and sexual violence, including the use of rape as a weapon of war, are staggeringly high; whereas the UN reported that more than 165 women were raped and that most were later burned alive during a jailbreak in Goma following the M23 advance on the city; whereas the current spike in rape and assault in eastern DRC follows decades of widespread sexual violence perpetuated against generations of Congolese women;

I. whereas the seizure of Goma triggered violent protests in Kinshasa, with dozens of protesters attacking embassies and calling on the international community to halt the advancement of M23;

J. whereas the UN mission Monusco has been deployed in the DRC since 2010; whereas President Tshisekedi announced a deadline of December 2024 for all Monusco peacekeeping troops to leave the DRC; whereas this withdrawal was put on hold and the mandate of the mission extended to December 2025;

K. whereas the conflict in the DRC is at risk of regional spillover; whereas a peacekeeping deployment from the East African Community Regional Forces (EACRF) withdrew in 2023; whereas the Southern African Development Community deployed a peacekeeping mission to the DRC in December 2023 with troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi; whereas at least 20 peacekeepers were killed during the M23 advance on Goma; whereas on 6 February 2025, Malawi announced the withdrawal of its troops from this mission;

L. whereas it is widely acknowledged that Rwanda is active in the conflict in eastern DRC, including through its de-facto control of M23, to which it supplies weapons, logistical support and troops; whereas UN experts estimate there are between 3 000 and 4 000 Rwandan troops operating with M23;

M. whereas North Kivu is a resource-rich region, with vast supplies of critical raw materials including cobalt, gold and tin, which are necessary for the global digital and energy transition; whereas Goma is a major transport and trading hub for the export of minerals; whereas the UN estimates that around 120 tonnes of coltan is being moved by M23 to Rwanda each month; whereas UN experts further estimate that M23 is financed by around EUR 288 000 per month generated through its control of the mineral trade in the DRC;

N. whereas the EU has formed raw materials partnerships with several countries, including the DRC and Rwanda; whereas the EU signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on sustainable raw materials value chains with Rwanda on 19 February 2024 to promote sustainable and responsible production of critical minerals; whereas the MoU is underpinned with a roadmap for joint action; whereas the Rwanda-EU roadmap has not yet been developed, and roadmaps are not made public; whereas parliamentary scrutiny of the development and implementation of the MoU is lacking;

O. whereas the MoU commits Rwanda to aligning with international standards by joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative; whereas Rwanda has not done so to date; whereas under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, the Commission is currently assessing applications for strategic projects with partner countries to increase EU capacity and supply;

1. Expresses deep concern at the alarming escalation of violence and the seizure of Goma; deplores the loss of life and the sexual violence perpetrated against women and girls; expresses its sympathy with the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

2. Underlines the urgent need for the stabilisation of the country and the implementation of an immediate ceasefire; calls on M23 to halt its territorial advances, notably to refrain from any further advancement into South Kivu and to withdraw from the territory of the DRC, and for all parties to observe a cessation of violence;

3. Calls on all state actors, including the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, to cease any cooperation with armed groups, including M23 and FDLR;

4. Is extremely concerned by the critical humanitarian situation in the country; calls for the creation of a humanitarian corridor and for all parties, including armed groups operating in eastern DRC, to allow and facilitate humanitarian access; emphasises that humanitarian workers must be able to operate safely to deliver life-saving assistance to Congolese civilians; stresses that this is a central obligation under international humanitarian law, and that perpetrators violating these obligations should be held to account;

5. Welcomes the increased humanitarian support pledged by the EU, but notes that this still falls far short of satisfying the basic needs for food, water, medical assistance and shelter in eastern DRC, especially in the light of the recent termination of support from the United States Agency for International Development; calls on the Commission and the international community to significantly step up financial support for urgent and life-saving assistance;

6. Urges the Government of the DRC to work with the international community to address the displacement crisis and provide shelter, sanitation and support for internally displaced people, including increased protection for the safety of all displaced people, notably women and girls;

7. Deplores the endemic sexual and gender-based violence committed against women and girls in the region; underlines that abuse of women and girls escalates into conflict, and that sexual violence is used as a weapon of war; reiterates that sexual violence is a war crime, and those responsible must be held accountable; urges the European External Action Service (EEAS), Member States and the Government of the DRC to take immediate action to prevent sexual violence and improve care for survivors, including by adapting the national legal framework to guarantee access to medical abortion care;

8. Draws attention to the health needs of pregnant women, notably those who are displaced and out of reach of medical support; calls on the EEAS and Member States to further prioritise the disbursement of humanitarian support for women and girls in the region;

9. Calls on M23 to allow the immediate reopening of Goma International Airport; underlines that this is essential for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the evacuation of injured people;

10. Recognises the contribution made by peacekeeping forces from Monusco and the Southern African Development Community mission, as well as the past contribution by the EACRF; offers its condolences for the peacekeepers who have lost their lives; reiterates its support for the continuation of Monusco’s mandate;

11. Underlines that a lasting peace must be found through a return to political processes and cooperation; calls on the Government of the DRC and all armed groups to commit to the Nairobi Process for resumed national dialogue;

12. Regrets that there has long been a lack of accountability for human rights violations in eastern DRC; urges the UN Human Rights Council to create an independent mandate for the investigation of human rights abuses in the region; considers that this should contribute to efforts to hold perpetrators of human rights violations to account;

13. Calls on the President and Government of Rwanda to respond to calls from the international community to withdraw their support for M23 and prevent any further destabilisation in the DRC; urges Rwanda to ensure that the advance of M23 is halted and that all M23 and Rwandan troops are withdrawn from eastern DRC; underlines that the territorial integrity of the DRC must be respected; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the governments of the Member States to raise these urgent concerns with Rwanda at the highest levels;

14. Calls on the Commission to suspend the MoU on sustainable raw materials and value chains; further calls on the Commission to undertake an immediate assessment of the feasibility of implementing the MoU in the light of the widespread evidence of illegal mineral smuggling and financing of M23; calls for the conclusions of such an assessment to be presented to Parliament as soon as possible; notes that parliamentary oversight and civil society involvement in the signing and implementation of raw material MoUs and roadmaps is essential for an inclusive process with adequate scrutiny, and must become part of the MoU;

15. Stresses that effective implementation of the MoU with Rwanda can only be made in good faith if both parties commit to increasing due diligence and traceability, and tackling illegal trafficking; stresses that this is currently not the case; urges Rwanda to join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as an essential first step towards implementing the commitments outlined in the MoU;

16. Calls on the Commission to suspend any proposals for strategic projects with Rwanda that are currently under consideration in the framework of the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Global Gateway initiative; notes that strategic projects must be implemented sustainably and in compliance with human rights and due diligence standards, something which cannot be guaranteed currently;

17. Stresses the importance of a return to regional dialogue to deescalate the conflict; urges the authorities of the DRC and Rwanda to resume the Luanda peace process;

18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the African Union, the Southern African Development Community, the East African Community, the President, Government and Parliament of Rwanda, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – European Parliamentary Week 2025 – 17-18.02.25 – Committee on Budgets

Source: European Parliament

On the occasion of the European Parliamentary Week 2025, organised by the European Parliament and the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of Poland, the Committee on Budgets will hold an Inter-Committee Meeting on Monday 17 February at 16.20-19.20.

The first session will focus on EU competitiveness and a debate on how to increase the synergies between the EU and national financial support. Piotr Serafin, Commissioner for budget, anti-fraud and public administration will give a keynote speech.

The second session will focus on European public goods in particular how to identify and finance them. On this matter, the audience will have the opportunity to hear from Professor Armin Steinbach, Jean Monnet Professor of Law and Economics at HEC Paris, non-resident fellow at Bruegel and Research Affiliate at the Max Planck Institute for Research and Collective Goods.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: EIB and Banco Santander join forces to boost Europe’s wind energy manufacturers
Source: European Investment Bank
- The EIB provides a €500 million counter-guarantee enabling Santander to create a portfolio of bank guarantees of up to €1 billion, expected to unlock €8 billion of investment to support wind energy manufacturers in Europe.
- The agreement is part of the EIB’s €5 billion wind power package to boost Europe’s wind power manufacturing sector and accelerate the energy transition.
- The operation is backed by InvestEU, the EU programme aiming to mobilise investment of more than €372 billion by 2027.
The European Investment Bank (EIB) and Santander have signed a €500 million counter-guarantee agreement that Santander will use to create a portfolio of bank guarantees of up to €1 billion, expected to unlock €8 billion of investment to support wind energy equipment manufacturing companies in Europe.

The guarantees will back investment by companies manufacturing wind energy and grid interconnection equipment, as well as key components for the wind sector. This will enable the manufacturers to receive advance payments as well as to provide performance guarantees when taking on new wind projects. The guarantees scheme also enables manufacturers to pay their suppliers in advance for the supply of wind farms and the related wind value chain components, which include turbines, grid connection infrastructure, cables and transformer stations.

The leverage effect of the EIB counter-guarantee is expected to mobilise additional funding from other investors to support increasing production and accelerate wind energy development, helping to stimulate investment in the real economy.

The deal forms part of the EIB’s €5 billion wind power package launched in 2023, a dedicated package of counter-guarantees to improve access to finance for wind power sector and support increasing newly installed wind energy generation capacity by 32GW. This EIB financing scheme is being activated through agreements with the sector’s main lenders like Santander. It is a key component of the European Wind Power Package launched by the European Commission, and is designed to further accelerate a just and swift transition to net zero, while boosting home-grown industrial innovation.

“Wind energy will play a significant role in achieving the EU’s renewable-energy target. To unveil its full potential, the EIB together with Santander is putting in place de-risking instruments that will allow manufacturers to overcome some of the challenges impacting the sector such as supply chain disruptions, high costs or intense international competition,” said EIB Director of Financial Institutions Gemma Feliciani. “This new framework sponsored by the EIB wind package will accelerate the energy transition in Europe while strengthening its industrial competitiveness and strategic autonomy.”

Ricardo Gamazo, Santander Global Trade Finance team added: “The program has been very welcome by our clients in the wind equipment industry which face a large backlog of orders to meet the energy transition demand. This in turn creates large guarantee issuance requirements and this extra capacity goes a long way in securing credit lines in the market. We believe this agreement is another decisive step in buttressing energy security for the EU in a sustainable fashion”

Background information

About the EIB

The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union owned by its Member States. It finances investments that contribute towards EU policy goals. EIB projects bolster competitiveness, drive innovation, promote sustainable development, enhance social and territorial cohesion, and support a just and swift transition to climate neutrality.

About Banco Santander

Banco Santander (SAN SM) is a leading commercial bank, founded in 1857 and headquartered in Spain and one of the largest banks in the world by market capitalization. The group’s activities are consolidated into five global businesses: Retail & Commercial Banking, Digital Consumer Bank, Corporate & Investment Banking (CIB), Wealth Management & Insurance and Payments (PagoNxt and Cards). This operating model allows the bank to better leverage its unique combination of global scale and local leadership. Santander aims to be the best open financial services platform providing services to individuals, SMEs, corporates, financial institutions and governments. The bank’s purpose is to help people and businesses prosper in a simple, personal and fair way. Santander is building a more responsible bank and has made a number of commitments to support this objective, including raising €220 billion in green financing between 2019 and 2030. At the end of 2024, Banco Santander had €1.3 trillion in total funds, 173 million customers, 8,000 branches and 207,000 employees.
MIL OSI Europe News –
February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland files indictment on charges of insider dealing involving millions of francs

Source: Switzerland – Department of Foreign Affairs in English

The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland (OAG) has indicted a Swiss citizen in the Federal Criminal Court on charges of insider dealing in transactions worth millions of francs. The indictment alleges that in five cases in the period from 2018 to 2020, the accused exploited confidential and price sensitive information about ongoing or planned takeovers. By doing so, he is believed to have made an unlawful profit of around CHF 10.6 million. He is alleged to have obtained the confidential information from an acquaintance of many years standing who worked for an investment bank.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: DPG Media signs new loan agreement with EIB

Source: European Investment Bank

DPG Media Group has signed a new lending agreement with the European Investment Bank (EIB). Built around financing eight core priorities, the EIB finances investments that support EU policy goals, including digitalisation. After a first loan signed in 2022 to support the Group’s digitalisation of media platforms, DPG has now signed a further €120 million in the framework of further digitalisation and innovation of its media.

DPG Media plans to spend a total of €392 million in this regard over the period 2024-2026, of which 30% will be financed with an EIB loan. This financing will allow DPG Media to accelerate its digital transformation and continue to play a leading role in digital innovation as a local player. As part of the project, DPG Media expects to increase its knowledge and expertise in artificial intelligence and content distribution, in alignment with the objectives of the Digital Europe Programme.

EIB vice-president Robert de Groot: “Digitalisation and the development of advanced technologies play a key role in Europe’s competitiveness. These technologies must be an intrinsic part of the broad support for European entrepreneurs and companies. DPG’s investments to digitise its offering and services are in line with European ambitions. EIB loans are meant to foster this type of development.”

Erik Roddenhof, CEO of DPG Media: “We are delighted with this new long-term loan from the European Investment Bank for our investments in our further digital transformation. We deem this necessary to be able to successfully offer independent and strong media as a local media player in a rapidly changing market that is increasingly dominated by global players. With this loan, the group diversifies its debt financing, both in terms of creditors and tenors. We regard the support of the European Investment Bank primarily as a quality stamp, not only for the creditworthiness of DPG Media, but especially for our digital efforts.”

Looking ahead, DPG will invest to further develop its digital platform for end-users and advertisers, including with AI and text-to-speech applications.

In recent years the investments in DPG’s advertising platform ‘Trusted Web’ marked a crucial and unique step to reduce dependence on big tech: advertisers no longer need to use third-party big tech purchasing platforms and tools to buy advertising campaigns at DPG Media.

Furthermore, DPG invested heavily in audio technology, the digitalisation of its magazines and improvement of its streaming platforms on smart TVs, and the platform now also serves multiple users (besides VTM GO, Streamz and RTL Play also use the same platform). DPG Media has also implemented a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy to ensure its platforms remain resistant to emerging threats.

Background information

The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. Built around eight core priorities, it finances investments that contribute to EU policy objectives by bolstering climate action and the environment, digitalisation and technological innovation, security and defence, cohesion, agriculture and bioeconomy, social infrastructure, high-impact investments outside the EU, and the Capital Markets Union.  

All projects financed by the EIB Group are in line with the Paris Climate Agreement, as pledged in our Climate Bank Roadmap. Almost 60% of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment.  

DPG Media Group’s mission is to inform, entertain and inspire people. The headquarters of the international media group, which is active in the Belgian, Dutch and Danish markets, are in Antwerp. DPG Media Group has a workforce of 5,396 employees and a portfolio of 90 strong publishing, broadcasting and services brands. Every day, the DPG Media Group brands reach a total of 15 million media users, both online and offline.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: International Day of Women and Girls in Science: A seat at the table for women scientists

Source: Switzerland – Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research

Research thrives on diversity of thought, new perspectives, talent and creativity. By involving and supporting female researchers, today’s greatest challenges can be addressed and solved. To mark the International Day of Women and Girls in Science, four Empa researchers whose contributions have shaped science at the national and international level share their stories and motivations.

MIL OSI Europe News –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI NGOs: Egypt: Military trials of fishermen an affront to justice

Source: Amnesty International –

gyptian authorities must stop trying civilians in military courts, said Amnesty International and the Sinai Foundation for Human Rights, ahead of an expected verdict on 12 February in the military trials of five civilians in relation to fishing in a lake in North Sinai controlled by a development agency operating under the ministry of defence.

On 6 and 7 January, a military police unit from the Egypt’s Future Sustainable Development Agency (EFSDA) arrested five fishermen at Lake Bardawil. Military prosecutors investigated the men on charges of fishing during “prohibited periods” as well as being in a military area without permission. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi had placed the lake, a fishing spot for around 3,500 fishermen, under military jurisdiction in 2019, according to presidential Decree No. 294 of 2019.

“It is a travesty that a group of fishermen have found themselves facing military trial for fishing in a lake without authorization. Trying civilians in military courts is a flagrant violation of Egypt’s international human rights obligations. Military authorities must immediately drop the charges against the five men and release them. They must be tried by independent and impartial civilian courts in proceedings meeting international standards of due process and fair trial,” said Ahmed Salem, Executive Director of the Sinai Foundation for Human Rights (SFHR).

It is a travesty that a group of fishermen have found themselves facing military trial for fishing in a lake without authorization.

Ahmed Salem, Executive Director of the Sinai Foundation for Human Rights

“Egypt’s military courts have a notorious history of handing down unjust convictions and sentences, including death sentences, following grossly unfair trials. The authorities must overhaul legislation to ensure that military courts have no jurisdiction over civilians in any case,” said Sara Hashash, Deputy Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa at Amnesty International.

The fishermen, who are in their twenties, are facing two separate military trials. Amnesty International and the SFHR reviewed copies of the arrest reports, prosecution reports, and charge sheets for both trials. The organizations also spoke with a lawyer who attended the hearings, two employees of an official body responsible for lake management, and relatives of detainees.

The trials were marred by violations of fair trial guarantees. According to a lawyer who attended hearings for both cases on 28 January the defendants’ lawyers made a request to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, but the court ignored their request. The court also held two hearings on 5 and 6 February without any of the defendants present.

All five detainees are currently held by Central Security Forces, operating under the ministry of interior, in Ismailia Security Forces Camp, which is not officially recognized as a detention facility.

The five defendants are tried under Law No. 146 of 2021 on the Protection and Development of Lakes and Fisheries, which stipulates that Lake Protection and Fish Wealth Development Authority (LPFWDA), affiliated with the cabinet, is responsible for determining areas in or periods during which fishing is banned. According to the law, fishing during prohibited periods or in banned areas is a crime punishable by six months to two years imprisonment and/or a fine between 10,000 EGP to 100,000 EGP.

In 2022, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi established the EFSDA by a decree No. 591 of 2022, which was never made public. Since then, the government has assigned several large projects to the agency including development projects in South Egypt and North Sinai, according to local media.

On 31 October 2024, the spokesman of the government announced that the EFSDA will begin development works in Lake Bardawil aiming at achieving

“the economic development of the lake”, according to an official statement by the Council of Ministers. The lake was previously under the supervision of LPFWDA, which by law supervises lakes across the country. Two employees at the LPFWDA told Amnesty International and SFHR that, since the government’s announcement EFSDA has taken full control of the lake supervision.

Military trials of civilians in Egypt are inherently unfair because all personnel in military courts, from judges to prosecutors, are serving members of the military who report to the Minister of Defence and do not have the necessary training on rule of law or fair trial standards. Verdicts by military courts are subject to appeal before higher military courts as well, and ratification by the President.

On 28 January 2024, the Egyptian parliament approved new amendments to Law No. 25 of 1966 on the Military Code of Justice that further expand the jurisdiction of military courts to prosecute civilians. The new amendments added to the military jurisdiction include “crimes committed against public and vital facilities and public properties, and other comparable things, that are protected by the armed forces”. Presidential ratification of the amendments was never published in the official gazette.

These amendments coincided with the enactment of Law No. 3 of 2024, ratified by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on 5 February 2024, which expanded military jurisdiction over civilians for even more crimes than in the parliament’s previously mentioned amendments to the Military Code of Justice. The law authorizes the military to assist the police in safeguarding public and vital facilities and “services,” as well as addressing crimes committed against them, including crimes that “undermine the basic needs of society, including food commodities and essential products.”

Background

Egypt has a long track record of trying civilians before military courts. Most recently, in December 2024 a military court sentenced 62 residents of North Sinai governorate to prison terms ranging from three to 10 years on charges of damaging military vehicles and using force against public officials.

The trial followed a sit-in in October 2023 by residents of Sheikh Zuwayed city, who had been forcibly evicted by the authorities demanding to return to their homes. The sit-in was forcibly dispersed by the military. On 24 December 2024, President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi issued a presidential pardon for 54 of them.

For over a decade, Egyptian armed and security forces have engaged in military operations against armed groups in North Sinai. In April 2023, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi declared the end of ongoing military operations in North Sinai. However, the region remains as a de facto military zone, with the Egyptian authorities continuing to maintain a strict media blackout on the security situation in North Sinai. They have for years prevented media, human rights organizations and independent observers from accessing the region. Several presidential decrees, including Decree No. 444 of 2014 and Decree No. 420 of 2021, have placed large areas of North Sinai under military jurisdiction, further militarizing the region and hampering independent reporting.

MIL OSI NGO –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI NGOs: India: Authorities must uphold human rights and end violence in Manipur following Biren Singh’s resignation

Source: Amnesty International –

Responding to the resignation of N Biren Singh as the Chief Minister of the state of Manipur in India yesterday, Aakar Patel, chair of the board at Amnesty International India, said:

“Biren Singh’s resignation presents in Manipur the opportunity for the authorities to uphold and ensure human rights for everyone, break with the violence and impunity of the past and work towards ending the ethnic violence in the state which has claimed the lives of more than 250 people in the last two years. The (BJP)-led governments at both state and central level have utterly failed to end the violence in Manipur, impunity of vigilante groups, and the divisive rhetoric that has flamed the ethnic violence. Their actions have led to repression of dissenting voices and an abject humanitarian crisis in the state.

“By the continued failure to hold to account those suspected to be responsible for serious human rights violations, the government risks sending the message that the impunity for these violations will continue. This in turn will fuel further violations. Unlike the emblematic cases taken over by the Central Bureau of Investigation, like the case of the gang-rape of two Kuki women in May 2023 that found the Manipur police complicit – many lesser-known ones continue to struggle for attention of the state and central governments. This must change.”

Biren Singh’s resignation presents in Manipur the opportunity for the authorities to uphold and ensure human rights for everyone, break with the violence and impunity of the past…

Aakar Patel, chair of the board at Amnesty International India

Background:

Since May 2023, more than 60,000 people have been displaced in Manipur due to the ongoing violence between the dominant ethnic community, the Meities and the other minority ethnic communities including the Kukis. Homes, business, villages and places of worship have been burnt down, attacked, looted and vandalised.

The resignation of Biren Singh comes after the Supreme Court of India earlier this month ordered for a sealed-cover report from the Central Forensic Sciences Laboratory into audio tapes that allegedly had him saying that the ethnic violence in the state had been instigated at his insistence.

In July 2024, Amnesty International documented the ongoing violence and impunity in Manipur state.

MIL OSI NGO –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Response to the Smart Machines Strategy 2035: letter from Lord Patrick Vallance

Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

Letter from Lord Patrick Vallance to David Lane and Paul Clarke, Co-Chairs of the Robotics Growth Partnership regarding the Smart Machines Strategy 2035.

Documents

Response to the Smart Machines Strategy 2035: letter from Lord Patrick Vallance

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Lord Patrick Vallance, Minister of State for Science, Research and Innovation wrote to David Lane and Paul Clarke, Co-Chairs of the Robotics Growth Partnership, welcoming the Smart Machines 2035 Strategy.

The Smart Machines 2035 Strategy provides a roadmap to position the UK as a global leader in robotics and Smart Machines. It highlights their transformative potential to address pressing societal challenges, enhance economic productivity, and establish national leadership in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

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Published 11 February 2025

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MIL OSI United Kingdom –

February 12, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Opening Address by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi at the AI Action Summit, Paris

Source: Government of India

Posted On: 11 FEB 2025 3:41PM by PIB Delhi

Excellencies,

Friends,

Let me begin with a simple experiment.

If you upload your medical report to an AI app, it can explain in simple language, free of any jargon, what it means for your health. But, if you ask the same app to draw an image of someone writing with their Left hand, the app will most likely draw someone writing with their Right hand. Because that is what the training data is dominated by.

It shows that while the positive potential of AI is absolutely amazing, there are many biases that we need to think carefully about. That is why I am grateful to my friend, President Macron, for hosting this summit. And for inviting me to co-chair it.

Friends,

AI is already re-shaping our polity, our economy, our security and even our society. AI is writing the code for humanity in this century. But, it is very different from other technology milestones in human history.

AI is developing at an unprecedented scale and speed. And being adopted and deployed even faster. There is also a deep inter-dependence across borders. Therefore, there is a need for collective global efforts to establish governance and standards, that uphold our shared values, address risks, and build trust.

But, Governance is not just about managing risks and rivalries. It is also about promoting innovation, and deploying it for the global good. So, we must think deeply and discuss openly about innovation and governance.

Governance is also about ensuring access to all, especially in the Global South. It is where the capacities are most lacking – be it compute power, talent, data, or the financial resources.

Friends,

AI can help transform millions of lives by improving health, education, agriculture and so much more. It can help create a world in which the journey to Sustainable Development Goals becomes easier and faster.

To do this, we must pool together resources and talent. We must develop open-source systems that enhance trust and transparency. We must build quality data sets, free from biases. We must democratise technology and create people-centric applications. We must address concerns related to cyber security, disinformation, and deep fakes. And, we must also ensure that technology is rooted in local ecosystems for it to be effective and useful.

Friends,

Loss of jobs is AI’s most feared disruption. But, history has shown that work does not disappear due to technology. Its nature changes and new types of jobs are created. We need to invest in skilling and re-skilling our people for an AI-driven future.

Friends,

There is no doubt that the high energy intensity of AI needs to be looked into. This will require green power to fuel its future.

India and France have worked together for years through initiatives like the International Solar Alliance to harness the power of the sun. As we advance our partnership to AI, it is a natural progression from sustainability to innovation to shape a smarter and responsible future.

At the same time, Sustainable AI does not only mean using clean energy. AI models must also be efficient and sustainable in size, data needs and resource requirements. After all, the human brain manages to compose poetry and design space ships using less power than most lightbulbs.

Friends,

India has successfully built a Digital Public Infrastructure for over 1.4 billion people at a very low cost. It is built around an open and accessible network. It has regulations, and a wide range of applications to modernize our economy, reform governance and transform the lives of our people.

We have unlocked the power of data through our Data Empowerment and Protection Architecture. And, we have made digital commerce democratic and accessible to all. This vision is the foundation of India’s National AI Mission.

That is why, during our G20 Presidency, we built a consensus on Harnessing AI Responsibly, for Good, and for All. Today, India leads in AI adoption, and techno-legal solutions on data privacy.

We are developing AI applications for public good. We have one of the world’s largest AI talent pools. India is building its own Large Language Model considering our diversity. We also have a unique public-private partnership model for pooling resources like compute power. It is made available to our start-ups and researchers at an affordable cost. And, India is ready to share its experience and expertise to ensure that the AI future is for Good, and for All.

Friends,

We are at the dawn of the AI age that will shape the course of humanity. Some people worry about machines becoming superior in intelligence to humans. But, no one holds the key to our collective future and shared destiny other than us humans.

That sense of responsibility must guide us.

Thank you.

***

MJPS/SR

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MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 12, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Measures taken by the government to stop food adulteration

Source: Government of India

Measures taken by the government to stop food adulteration

Regular surveillance, monitoring, inspection, and random sampling of food products are conducted by FSSAI through its regional offices and State/ UTs; penal action taken against defaulting Food Business Operators

Mobile food testing labs “Food Safety on Wheels” (FSWs) provided to extend the reach of basic testing facilities in remote areas

Pan-India Surveillance of food products conducted by FSSAI, especially on staple foods and commodities prone to adulteration

Mechanisms for receiving and addressing food adulteration complaints by consumers in place through the FSSAI helpline or Food Safety Connect mobile app

Mandatory registration certification and licensing by FSSAI for food businesses; regular reviews of the certification process and improvement based on the stakeholder feedback in place

Various campaigns launched by FSSAI to raise consumer awareness about food adulteration

Posted On: 11 FEB 2025 3:38PM by PIB Delhi

Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) through its regional offices and State/ Union Territories conducts regular surveillance, monitoring, inspection, and random sampling of food products. In cases where food samples are found to be non-conforming, penal action is taken against the defaulting Food Business Operators as per the provisions of the Food Safety and Standards Act, Rules and Regulations.

To extend the reach of basic testing facilities even in remote areas, FSSAI has provided mobile food testing labs called Food Safety on Wheels (FSWs). FSSAI also conducts periodic Pan-India Surveillance of food products especially on staple foods and commodities that are prone to adulteration.

FSSAI has also established mechanisms for receiving and addressing complaints related to food adulteration. Consumers can lodge complaints through the FSSAI helpline or Food Safety Connect mobile app, which are promptly investigated and acted upon as per FSS Act, Rules and Regulations. Further, FSSAI has launched various campaigns to raise consumer awareness about food adulteration.

Details of samples analysed, found non-conforming and penal action taken during last 4 years are as below:

Year	No. of Samples Analysed	No. of Samples found non-conforming	No. of Civil Cases launched	No. of Criminal Cases launched
2020-21	1,07,829	28,347	24,195	3,869
2021-22	1,44,345	32,934	28,906	4,946
2022-23	1,77,511	44,626	38,053	4,817
2023-24	1,70,513	33,808	33,750	4,737

As per the FSS Act 2006, no person can commence a food business without holding a license under the Act. Accordingly, petty food businesses such as petty retailers, hawkers, itinerant vendors or temporary stall holders, etc with a turnover of less than 12 lakhs per annum have to take a registration certificate before starting any food business whereas food businesses having an annual turnover of more than 12 lakh need FSSAI license.

A Food Business Operator (FBO) submits an online application through the Food Safety Compliance System (FoSCoS) portal, providing necessary documents, undergoing an inspection by FSSAI officials at their premises, and upon approval, receiving a registration certificate or license depending on their business type and turnover.

FSSAI regularly reviews the certification process and improves it based on stakeholder feedback.

The Union Minister of State for Health and Family Welfare, Shri Prataprao Jadhav stated this in a written reply in the Rajya Sabha today.

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MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 12, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Update on the implementation of Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission (ABDM)

Source: Government of India

Update on the implementation of Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission (ABDM)

As of 6th February 2025, more than 73.98 Crore Ayushman Bharat Health Account (ABHA) created; over 49.06 Crore health records linked with ABHA

Over 3.63 Lakh health facilities registered on health facility registry (HFR)

More than 5.64 Lakh healthcare professionals are registered on the healthcare professional registry (HPR)

Over 1.59 Lakh health facilities use ABDM-enabled software

Posted On: 11 FEB 2025 3:36PM by PIB Delhi

Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission (ABDM) has been launched with the aim to enable interoperability of health data within the health ecosystem and creating longitudinal electronic health records of every citizen. ABDM comprises key registries such as the Ayushman Bharat Health Account (ABHA), healthcare professional registry (HPR), health facility registry (HFR), and drug registry.

As of 6^thFebruary 2025, a total of 73,98,09,607 ABHA have been created, 3,63,520 health facilities have registered on HFR, 5,64,851 healthcare professionals have registered on HPR, 1,59,020 health facilities are using an ABDM-enabled software and 49,06,02,540 (~49.06 Cr) health records have been linked with ABHA.

The total 73,98,09,607 ABHA correspond to 36 States/UTs spanning 786 districts across the country meaning that the entire country is being covered, including rural areas. Similarly, the 1.59 lakh health facilities that use an ABDM-enabled software correspond to 36 States/UTs and 786 districts.

Inclusion is one of the key principles of ABDM. The digital health ecosystem created by ABDM supports continuity of care across primary, secondary, and tertiary healthcare in a seamless manner. It aids the availability of health care services, particularly in remote and rural areas through various technology interventions like telemedicine etc.

Various steps have been taken to ensure that the benefits of the Mission reach every citizen. The ABHA portal [abha.abdm.gov.in] and the government PHR (personal health record) applications such as the ABHA app and Aarogya Setu app have been made multi-lingual and intuitive to use, with a view to address the lack of digital literacy. The mission provides for assisted and offline mode for the creation of ABHA for areas with limited internet connectivity or hardware or both.

The Union Minister of State for Health and Family Welfare, Shri Prataprao Jadhav stated this in a written reply in the Rajya Sabha today.

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MV

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MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

February 12, 2025

Category: KB

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Updates to this page

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Measures taken by the government to stop food adulterationRegular surveillance, monitoring, inspection, and random sampling of food products are conducted by FSSAI through its regional offices and State/ UTs; penal action taken against defaulting Food Business Operators

Update on the implementation of Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission (ABDM) As of 6th February 2025, more than 73.98 Crore Ayushman Bharat Health Account (ABHA) created; over 49.06 Crore health records linked with ABHA

Measures taken by the government to stop food adulteration

Regular surveillance, monitoring, inspection, and random sampling of food products are conducted by FSSAI through its regional offices and State/ UTs; penal action taken against defaulting Food Business Operators

Update on the implementation of Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission (ABDM)

As of 6th February 2025, more than 73.98 Crore Ayushman Bharat Health Account (ABHA) created; over 49.06 Crore health records linked with ABHA