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  • MIL-OSI USA: Sullivan Statement on Anniversary of October 7th Terrorist Attacks

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Alaska Dan Sullivan
    10.07.24
    “One year ago today, on October 7th, the people of Israel suffered the worst terrorist attack in their history, a horrendous massacre that took the lives of 1,200 people—many of them innocent civilians in their homes or attending a music festival. Nearly 100 innocent hostages are still being held by Hamas terrorists, including several American citizens, and I reiterate our call for their immediate, unconditional release.
    “America mourns with the Israeli people on this difficult anniversary and remains steadfast in support of Israel’s right to exist in peace and security, free from the existential threat posed by the terrorist regime in Tehran and its proxies.”
    Sen. Sullivan, Sen. Joni Ernst (R-Iowa), and all 47 of their Senate Republican colleagues introduced a resolution demonstrating America’s solidarity with the people of Israel on the anniversary of October 7.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: New NREL Tool Estimates Lifetime Greenhouse Gas Emissions of the Most Well-Established Grid-Scale Energy Storage Technology

    Source: US National Renewable Energy Laboratory

    Hydropower Developers and Operators Can Use the Tool To Select Sites, Components, and Specifications That Minimize Emissions

    This digital mock-up showcases a pumped storage hydropower plant in action. This form of renewable energy not only stores electricity efficiently but also boasts the lowest greenhouse gas emissions among grid-storage technologies. Image from IKM 3D

    The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has developed a first-of-its-kind tool that enables hydropower operators and developers to estimate the greenhouse gas emissions associated with building and operating closed-loop pumped storage hydropower (PSH) facilities.

    Closed-loop PSH generates and stores electricity by moving water between an upper and lower reservoir. It is an established technology that accounts for most of today’s grid-scale energy storage.

    As part of the clean energy transition, low-carbon renewable energy sources such as solar and wind are being rapidly deployed on the electric grid. However, because these generation sources are variable, grid-scale energy storage is needed to help balance energy supply and demand.

    It is also important for the construction and operation of the storage technology to be low carbon. With PSH, for example, there can be greenhouse gas emissions due to diesel-powered construction equipment, the use of concrete and steel, and the local grid electricity mix powering the pump to move water to the upper reservoir.

    In 2023, an NREL research team published a study showing that PSH is the smallest emitter of greenhouse gases compared to four other grid-storage technologies—compressed-air energy storage, utility-scale lithium-ion batteries, utility-scale lead-acid batteries, and vanadium redox flow batteries. The finding suggests that PSH could offer substantial climate benefits by playing a key role in accommodating wind and solar generation.

    Recognizing this potential, the NREL team used the data and methods from the 2023 study to create the Pumped Storage Hydropower Life Cycle Assessment tool. PSH developers and anyone interested in PSH deployment can use this web-based, interactive application to determine the greenhouse gas emissions of a PSH facility over its lifetime. Lifetime emissions vary depending on numerous site-specific factors, such as construction materials, components, and especially the grid electricity mix used to operate the facility.

    Users can input specifications for PSH facilities at varying levels of detail. Examples of specifications include the reservoir volume, dam material and dimensions, number and capacity of turbines, and length of the transmission line that connects the PSH system to the grid. Users can compare different PSH scenarios side-by-side and view the emissions by component, material, and life-cycle phase. The idea is to help users determine the sites, specifications, and configurations that minimize emissions.

    “The tool’s ultimate goal is to show how PSH can contribute to overall greenhouse gas emissions reductions and make the clean energy transition as clean as possible,” Stuart Cohen said.

    The U.S. Department of Energy Water Power Technologies Office supported the development of the tool.

    Access the Pumped Storage Hydropower Life Cycle Assessment tool and learn how to use it. Have questions about the tool or want to collaborate with NREL on PSH project development? Contact Stuart Cohen.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA, Smithsonian Open New Exhibit to Showcase Our Dynamic Earth

    Source: NASA

    NASA Administrator Bill Nelson joined the director of the Smithsonian’s National Museum of Natural History in Washington and agency leadership to unveil the new Earth Information Center exhibit during an early preview on Monday.
    “NASA has studied Earth and our changing climate for more than 60 years. The Earth Information Center at the Smithsonian Museum of Natural History will expand access to NASA’s data and our decades of Earth observation to even more people,” said Nelson. “Together with the Smithsonian, we are providing detailed, usable, and scalable information to enable the public to better understand the climate crisis and take action in their community.”
    The exhibit includes a 32-foot-long, 12-foot-high video wall displaying Earth science data visualizations and videos, interpretive panels showing Earth’s connected systems, information on our changing world, and an overview of how NASA and the Smithsonian study our home planet. It opens to the public Tuesday, Oct. 8. 
    “The new Earth Information Center at the National Museum of Natural History will bring Smithsonian and NASA data on the Earth’s environment and climate to thousands of museum visitors every year,” said Kirk Johnson, the museum’s Sant director. “It is an honor to partner with NASA to bring this dynamic view of Earth to museumgoers and connect people more deeply with their home planet.”
    Visitors also can explore Earth observing missions, changes in Earth’s landscape over time, and how climate is expected to change regionally through multiple interactive experiences. The exhibit will remain on display through 2028.
    “The Earth Information Center allows people to see our planet as we at NASA see it – an awe-inspiring and complex system of oceans, land, ice, atmosphere, and the life they support,” said Karen St. Germain, division director, Earth Sciences Division at NASA Headquarters in Washington. “We are thrilled that this collaboration puts NASA’s Earth science at the fingertips of Smithsonian visitors for the benefit of all.”
    With more than two dozen missions in orbit, NASA observes our planet’s oceans, land, ice, and atmosphere, and measure how a change in one drives change in others. NASA develops new ways to build long-term data records of how our planet evolves. The agency freely shares this unique knowledge and works with institutions around the world.
    As part of NASA’s ongoing mission to better understand our home planet, NASA created the Earth Information Center which draws insights from across all NASA centers and its federal partners – the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Agency for International Development, Environmental Protection Agency, and Federal Emergency Management Administration. It allows viewers to see how our home planet is changing and gives decision makers information to develop the tools they need to mitigate, adapt, and respond to those changes.
    NASA’s Earth Information Center is a virtual and physical space designed to aid people to make informed decisions on Earth’s environment and climate. It provides easily accessible Earth information, enabling global understanding of our changing planet.
    The expansion of the physical Earth Information Center at the Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History makes it the second location in the Washington area. The first is located at NASA Headquarters in Washington at 300 E St., SW.
    To learn more about the Earth Information Center, visit:
    https://earth.gov
    -end-
    Meira Bernstein / Elizabeth VlockHeadquarters, Washington202-358-1600meira.b.bernstein@nasa.gov / elizabeth.a.vlock@nasa.gov

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: GLOBE Eclipse and Civil Air Patrol: An Astronomical Collaboration

    Source: NASA

    3 min read

    The Civil Air Patrol (CAP) is a volunteer organization that serves as the official civilian auxiliary of the United States Air Force. The organization has an award-winning aerospace education program that promotes Science, Technology Engineering, & Mathematics (STEM)-related careers and activities. The total solar eclipse on 8 April 2024 was a unique opportunity to design a mission for cadets, senior members, and educators to collect atmospheric data in contribution the Global Learning and Observations to Benefit the Environment (GLOBE) Program’s GLOBE Eclipse protocol, for which a temporary tool in the GLOBE Observer app made it possible for volunteer observers to document and submit air temperature and cloud data during the eclipse.

    For the first time ever, the CAP had cadets and senior members participating in a mission from every wing (US state), in addition to two US territories and 2 Canadian provinces. Over 400 teams with over 3,000 cadets and over 1,000 senior members collected air temperature, clouds, wind, and precipitation for a total of 4 hours before, during, and after the eclipse. This work was led by Capt. Shannon Babb who organized the mission with the aerospace education team led from the Rocky Mountain Region.

    The collaboration between GLOBE Eclipse and CAP gave cadets the opportunity to do real, hands-on Earth science and be part of a mission alongside senior members. It also brought in over 40,000 students and more than 600 educators through the Civil Air Patrol’s education sites involving K-12 formal and informal educators at schools, youth organizations, museums and libraries. This unique collaboration was so successful, the CAP wants to continue doing missions alongside citizen science programs at NASA and the GLOBE Program. A 2025 mission is being formulated, focused on contrail formation using the strengths of the CAP in aeronautics and unique cloud observations made using the GLOBE Observer app. Results and announcements of 2025 mission plans were presented at the Civil Air Patrol National Conference on 16-17 August 2024 in San Antonio, Texas, USA.

    GLOBE Observer is part of the NASA Earth Science Education Collaborative (NESEC), which is led by the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) and supported by NASA under cooperative agreement award number NNX16AE28A. NESEC is part of NASA’s Science Activation Portfolio. Learn more about how Science Activation connects NASA science experts, real content, and experiences with community leaders to do science in ways that activate minds and promote deeper understanding of our world and beyond: https://science.nasa.gov/learn

    https://www.gocivilairpatrol.com/programs/aerospace-education/curriculum/2024-solar-eclipse

    Civil Air Patrol Cadet observing the 8 April 2024 total solar eclipse.
    Civil Air Patrol

    Civil Air Patrol Cadets making atmospheric measurements during the 8 April 2024 total solar eclipse.
    Civil Air Patrol

    Civil Air Patrol Cadets making atmospheric measurements during the 8 April 2024 total solar eclipse.
    Civil Air Patrol

    Civil Air Patrol Cadet observing the 8 April 2024 total solar eclipse.
    Civil Air Patrol

    Civil Air Patrol Cadet observing the 8 April 2024 total solar eclipse.
    Civil Air Patrol

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: How CBO Uses Discount Rates to Estimate the Present Value of Future Costs or Savings

    Source: US Congressional Budget Office

    Many activities of the federal government have budgetary and other effects that can last far into the future. To produce estimates of those budgetary effects—and to help lawmakers compare different policies—the Congressional Budget Office often has to translate a flow of future income or payments into an equivalent lump-sum value today. This report describes such present-value estimates, particularly how CBO selects and uses discount rates to calculate the value of future cash flows in its analyses.

    • Discount Rates and Present Values. The present value of future cash flows depends on the rate used to convert those flows into a single equivalent value at a specific time, generally the present. Discount rates account for the time value of money: the fact that an amount received or paid today is more valuable than the same amount received or paid in the future. Discount rates can also incorporate factors such as risk, inflation, and other considerations that can affect the value of an asset to a person or business.
    • Types of Estimates That Use Present Values. CBO uses discount rates for a wide variety of estimates. They include estimates of the budgetary cost of federal programs that make or guarantee loans, the financial position of the Social Security trust funds, and the long-term effects of spending for infrastructure or children’s health on federal spending and revenues. CBO also uses discount rates to estimate household wealth, the value of future retirement benefits, the lifetime costs of weapon systems, the likelihood that people will invest in energy-saving technologies, and the cost of future damage from flooding, among other topics.
    • CBO’s Methods and Data for Choosing Discount Rates. The choice of discount rates can have large effects on estimates, especially for cash flows far in the future. To estimate discount rates that are consistent with market prices and rates of return, CBO uses data from an array of sources, including financial markets, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Federal Reserve, and academic studies. CBO’s discount rates may differ from those used by the Administration for various reasons, such as differences in economic assumptions, assessments of risk, and decisions about what factors discount rates should reflect.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: House Republicans Will Always Stand With Our Ally Israel In Their Fight For Survival

    Source: US House of Representatives Republicans

    The following text contains opinion that is not, or not necessarily, that of MIL-OSI –

    Categories24/7 OSI, MIL-OSI, US House of Representatives Republicans, US Politics, US Republicans

    House Republicans Will Always Stand With Our Ally Israel In Their Fight For Survival

    Washington, October 7, 2024

    Today marks the one-year anniversary of the October 7th Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel, the bloodiest day for the Jewish people since the Holocaust, when barbaric terrorists brutally kidnapped, raped, and murdered innocent civilians. As we mourn the lives lost and pray for the safe return of the 97 hostages still being held, including 4 Americans, the United States must show its unwavering support and unequivocally stand with our most precious ally, as they fight for their very existence. 
     
    As Iran and its proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq surround Israel, hellbent on its extermination, the Biden-Harris Administration’s failed foreign policy of appeasement has abandoned Israel and emboldened Iran by softening sanctions and slow-walking critical military aid passed by House Republicans. House Republicans know the only way to restore order in the world is by reimplementing a successful peace through strength foreign policy agenda. 
     
    MAKE NO MISTAKE: House Republicans will always stand with our most precious ally Israel and remain committed to ensuring it has the resources necessary to defend itself and bring the hostages home. 
     
    HOUSE REPUBLICANS’ SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL:

    • House Republicans passed the Antisemitism Awareness Act of 2023, which codifies President Trump’s Executive Order that discrimination against Jewish students may violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and requires the Department of Education to take into account the 2016 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s definition of antisemitism and its contemporary examples as part of its assessment of whether antisemitic discrimination transpired.
    • House Republicans passed the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, which fully funds the U.S.-Israeli cooperative missile defense programs and holds the United Nations (U.N.) accountable for its blatant bias against our most precious ally Israel by prohibiting any taxpayer dollars from going to the United Nations Commission of Inquiry against Israel and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.
    • House Republicans passed H.R. 6126, the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024, with overwhelming support.
    • House Republicans passed H.Res. 771, Standing with Israel as it defends itself against the barbaric war launched by Hamas and other terrorists. 
    • House Republicans passed H. Res. 798, Condemning the support of Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations at institutions of higher education, which may lead to the creation of a hostile environment for Jewish students, faculty, and staff.
    • In February 2023, in a strong show of support for our ally, House Republican leadership sent a letter to President Biden encouraging the Administration to oppose and veto any anti-Israel resolution put before the U.N. Security Council.
    • In April 2023, House Republicans voted to support the expansion of the Abraham Accords to encourage nations to normalize relations with Israel and express continued support for bilateral cooperation across economic, security, and civilian issues.
    • In May 2023, House Republicans voted to condemn the rise of antisemitism and call on elected officials to identify and educate others on the contributions of the Jewish American community.
    • In June 2023, House Republicans voted to establish a Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords at the Department of State to strengthen and expand the Abraham Accords.
    • In July 2023, House Republicans passed the FY24 National Defense Authorization Act with key priorities to support the U.S./Israeli partnership and enhance Israel’s security.   

    THE BIDEN-HARRIS ADMINISTRATION’S HISTORY OF TURNING THEIR BACK ON ISRAEL:

    • In February 2021, the Biden-Harris Administration reversed President Trump’s move, ensuring that sanctions on Iran’s drones and missiles will expire in October 2023.
    • In September 2023, the Biden-Harris Administration waived sanctions to allow $6 billion in Iranian funds in South Korean banks to be transferred to banks in Qatar in exchange for the release of five American hostages.
    • Authorizing the transfer of $6 billion for Iran sets a dangerous precedent that will incentivize more hostage-taking by the number one state sponsor of terror and other bad actors.
    • In November 2023, House Republicans passed the No Funds For Iranian Terrorism Act, which would effectively prevent Iran from accessing these funds. 
    • In November 2023, the Biden-Harris Administration reissued a sanctions waiver that gave Iran access to more than $10 billion.
    • In March 2024, the Biden-Harris Administration supported Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer’s unprecedented calls for new elections in Israel. 
    • In April 2024, the Biden-Harris Administration demanded that our most precious ally Israel surrender to the Iranian backed terrorist organization Hamas.   

    FAR LEFT HOUSE DEMOCRATS’ OPPOSITION TO ISRAEL IN THE 118TH CONGRESS:

    KAMALA HARRIS’ FAILED FOREIGN POLICY OF APPEASEMENT HAS TURNED THE WORLD TO CHAOS:

    • The Biden-Harris Administration has failed to stand up to our adversaries in Beijing, Tehran, and Moscow. 
    • The Biden-Harris Administration’s strategy of appeasement toward Iran has resulted in the deadliest attack against the Jewish people since the Holocaust, hundreds of Iranian-backed terrorist attacks on American service members, and plunged the Middle East into chaos. 
    • On October 7, 2023, the world witnessed Iranian-backed Hamas terrorists perpetrate the deadliest attack against the Jewish people since the Holocaust. 
    • To appease his pro-Hamas base, the Biden-Harris Administration withheld aid from Israel. 
    • In May, Biden told CNN that he would withhold military aid to Israel if Israel continues their campaign against Hamas terrorists.
      • Biden-Harris’ decision greenlights Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran to escalate attacks following his failed foreign policy of appeasement. 
    • Biden-Harris went into hiding for nine days as antisemitic, pro-terrorist mobs overran colleges and universities, endangering Jewish students.
      • When Biden finally addressed the country for the first time in days, he did NOT condemn the antisemitic, pro-terrorist, mobs that have overrun colleges and universities, and he did NOT say how he would protect Jewish students.
    • In April, Biden was blasted for equivocating on antisemitic protests happening across the country.
    • To appease Iran, the Biden-Harris Administration removed the Houthis from the U.S. list of foreign terror organizations. 
    • In 2023, the Biden-Harris Administration gave Iran, the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world, $6 billion as a ransom payment for five American prisoners, jeopardizing Americans’ safety around the world. 
    • While American service members were under attack by Iranian-backed terrorists, the Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin was MIA, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks was on vacation in Puerto Rico.
    • The Biden-Harris Administration allowed a Communist Chinese surveillance balloon to traverse the entire continental U.S. over the course of 7 days, gathering intelligence and flying over sensitive military sites, before taking action. 
    • Biden and Harris’ disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan resulted in:
      • The deadliest attack on Americans in Afghanistan since 2011, killing 13 of our brave service members and wounding many others. 
      • OVER 1,000 Americans were abandoned behind enemy lines for months at the mercy of the Taliban, and $7 billion in U.S. military equipment was left behind. 
      • Biden has been “privately defiant” that he made the right calls during his Administration’s catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. 
      • In June, Biden FALSELY claimed no U.S. service members have died during his Administration. 
    • Under Biden and Harris, the U.S. Army fell 15,000 soldiers short of their recruitment goal for FY22, missing by 25%.  

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI: Abraxas Power Announces the Submission of the Environmental Assessment Registration for its Exploits Valley Renewable Energy Corporation Green Hydrogen Project in Central Newfoundland

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TORONTO, Oct. 07, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Abraxas Power Corp. (“Abraxas”), a leading energy transition developer, and its subsidiary Exploits Valley Renewable Energy Corporation (“EVREC”), are pleased to announce that EVREC has submitted the Environmental Assessment Registration (“EAR”) with the Department of Environment and Climate Change of the Government of Newfoundland & Labrador for its Green Energy Hub project in the Botwood area.

    EVREC is a P2X project that was awarded access to over 300 square kilometres of crown lands by the province of Newfoundland and Labrador in 2023 for EVREC’s use in the development of its project in Central Newfoundland. EVREC will include a 3.5 GW onshore wind project with its associated energy and molecular storage powering behind-the-meter hydrogen (H2) and ammonia (NH3) production. The project expects to generate up to 200,000 tons of green H2 and up to 1,000,000 tons of green NH3 annually that will be exported to global markets.

    Since the above-mentioned land access award, EVREC has significantly advanced the project through pre-construction activities which include environmental data collection, resource measurement, and public consultations. The final project design is subject to these ongoing assessments and activities.

    “Today marks a pivotal milestone for EVREC as we register the Project with the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador,” said Colter Eadie, CEO of Abraxas Power. “This project is not just about harnessing the power of natural resources; it’s about developing a strong partnership with our local communities as we transform the future of energy. This initiative will boost Newfoundland’s economy by creating substantial high-skilled job opportunities and fostering economic stability and vibrant, thriving communities.”

    EVREC’s total capital investment is expected to be CAD$12 billion. According to an Economic Impact Assessment published by Jupia Consulting, when combining both CAPEX and OPEX economic activity, the project is expected to:

    • Boost provincial GDP by $7.8 billion over the 34-year life of the project (in $2024), excluding the GDP impacts arising from spending the tax/royalty revenue
    • Contribute $3.1 billion employment income in Newfoundland and Labrador
    • Support 10,900 person years of employment during the four years of construction and over 21,600 over the 34-year operating period
    • Boost annual household spending in NL by over $2.2 billion
    • Contribute $220 million in tax revenue to municipal governments over the 38-year period (CAPEX and OPEX phases). The provincial government will receive an estimated $8 billion and the federal government another $1.6 billion just from the in-province activity.

    EVREC’S EAR Document can be found at:

    Botwood and Area EVREC Green Energy Project – Environment and Climate Change (gov.nl.ca)

    About Abraxas Power:

    Abraxas Power is a pioneering energy transition developer focused on decarbonizing hard-to-abate sectors and creating value by solving the current and future challenges of the energy transition. Abraxas Power’s broad mandate allows it to see opportunities across technologies and geographies to transform the global energy industry. Our team has extensive experience in leading, financing, and solving the challenges associated with energy transition, and a proven track record of delivering complex, large-scale development projects across various disciplines, including renewable power and storage, hydrogen and ammonia production, industrial and precious metals, large-scale project construction, and operations at scale. The team possesses strong project finance and capital markets experience and has a history of creating value for shareholders, stakeholders, and the communities they live in. Abraxas has signed strategic partnerships with various global strategics and technology providers.

    Abraxas has secured over US$9 billion in capital projects through competitive government awards over the past year in furtherance of the energy transition, including our marquis Exploits Valley Renewable Energy Corporation (“EVREC”) project.
    To learn more, visit http://www.abraxaspower.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Univest Financial Corporation to Hold Third Quarter 2024 Earnings Call

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SOUDERTON, Pa., Oct. 07, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Univest Financial Corporation (Nasdaq: UVSP), parent company of Univest Bank and Trust Co. and its insurance, investment and equipment finance subsidiaries, announced it will host a conference call to discuss its third quarter 2024 earnings on Thursday, October 24, 2024 at 9:00 a.m. Earnings are scheduled to be released after the close of the market on Wednesday, October 23, 2024.

    Pre-registration
    Telephone participants may avoid any delays by pre-registering for the call using the following link.

    Conference Call registration link: https://www.netroadshow.com/events/login?show=27c257f2&confId=71976

    Audio
    Dial in number: 1-833-470-1428
    Access Code: 752766
    Note: Participants who are unable to pre-register should dial in a few minutes prior to the start time.

    Replay
    Dial in number: 1-866-813-9403
    Replay Code: 807549
    Available until: December 24, 2024

    About Univest Financial Corporation
    Univest Financial Corporation (UVSP), including its wholly-owned subsidiary Univest Bank and Trust Co., Member FDIC, has approximately $7.9 billion in assets and $5.0 billion in assets under management and supervision through its Wealth Management lines of business at June 30, 2024. Headquartered in Souderton, Pa. and founded in 1876, the Corporation and its subsidiaries provide a full range of financial solutions for individuals, businesses, municipalities and nonprofit organizations primarily in the Mid-Atlantic Region. Univest delivers these services through a network of more than 50 offices and online at http://www.univest.net.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Alexander Novak: Russia is preparing to present its climate strategy at the international conference COP29 in Baku

    MILES AXLE Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Alexander Novak, Alexey Overchuk and Maxim Reshetnikov took part in a meeting on the use of the results of the first stage of the most important innovative project of national importance “Russian Climate Monitoring System” in the formation of state climate policy measures

    October 7, 2024

    Alexander Novak took part in a meeting on the use of the results of the first stage of the most important innovative project of national importance “Russian Climate Monitoring System” in the formation of state climate policy measures

    October 7, 2024

    Alexander Novak, Alexey Overchuk and Maxim Reshetnikov took part in a meeting on the use of the results of the first stage of the most important innovative project of national importance “Russian Climate Monitoring System” in the formation of state climate policy measures

    October 7, 2024

    Alexander Novak, Alexey Overchuk and Maxim Reshetnikov took part in a meeting on the use of the results of the first stage of the most important innovative project of national importance “Russian Climate Monitoring System” in the formation of state climate policy measures

    October 7, 2024

    Alexander Novak, Alexey Overchuk took part in a meeting on the issue of using the results of the first stage of the most important innovative project of national importance “Russian Climate Monitoring System” in the formation of state climate policy measures

    October 7, 2024

    Previous news Next news

    Alexander Novak, Alexey Overchuk and Maxim Reshetnikov took part in a meeting on the use of the results of the first stage of the most important innovative project of national importance “Russian Climate Monitoring System” in the formation of state climate policy measures

    Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak took part in a meeting on the use of the results of the first stage of the most important innovative project of national importance (IIP GN) “Russian Climate Monitoring System” in the formation of state climate policy measures. The event took place at the Government Coordination Center.

    The meeting was also attended by Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk, Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov, Presidential Aide on Climate Issues Ruslan Edelgeriev, representatives of the Government, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Roshydromet, Roscosmos, business, the scientific community, fuel and energy companies, etc.

    The parties discussed the results of the work of the Federal State Budgetary Institution “Yu. A. Izrael Institute of Global Climate and Ecology” on adjusting the coefficients for greenhouse gas emissions in various industrial sectors – from agriculture to energy, petrochemistry and municipal solid waste management as part of the preparation of the draft National Inventory of Anthropogenic Emissions from Sources and Absorption by Sinks of Greenhouse Gases for 1990-2022. Data from Rosleskhoz, Earth remote sensing systems, etc. were used to adjust the coefficients. The second stage of the VIP GZ was instructed to be finalized.

    The monitoring system will ensure the formation of reliable and internationally recognized scientific data for assessing anthropogenic and natural flows of climate-active substances on the territory of the Russian Federation, and will also allow for the implementation of further measures to achieve the national goals set by the President, including in the field of ecology and climate.

    The Director of the Institute of Public Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences reported on forecasts of greenhouse gas emissions and absorption for the implementation of the goals of the Strategy for Socioeconomic Development with Low Greenhouse Gas Emissions until 2050.

    Alexander Novak thanked the scientists for their work and instructed them to coordinate the new data with industry plans for investment in emission reduction projects and environmental programs. The Ministry of Economic Development will have to finalize and coordinate with federal executive authorities the draft presidential decree on establishing a target indicator for greenhouse gas emissions for 2035 and the draft operational plan.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    http://government.ru/nevs/52927/

    EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and or sentence structure not be perfect.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Dartmouth — RCMP charges three drivers with stunting

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    The Nova Scotia RCMP has charged three drivers with stunting.

    On September 26, at approximately 2 a.m., an officer from RCMP Halifax Regional Detachment was doing radar on Portland St., in Dartmouth, and saw a Dodge Charger travelling at 116 km/h in a 50 km/h zone. The vehicle was pulled over and the driver, a 20-year-old Halifax man, was charged with Stunting. The vehicle was towed.

    On October 4, at approximately 10:25 a.m., RCMP Southwest Traffic Services was conducting traffic enforcement on Hwy. 1, in Weymouth, when a Ford Mustang was seen on radar travelling at 109 km/h in a 30 km/h school zone. A traffic stop was completed and the driver, a 28-year-old New Germany woman, was charged with Stunting and her vehicle was towed.

    Later that day, at approximately 8:40 p.m., an officer from RCMP Southeast Traffic Services (Metro) completed a traffic stop on a Honda Civic that was observed on radar travelling at 109 km/h in a 50 km/h zone of St Margarets Bay Rd., in Timberlea. The driver, a 19-year-old Hubley man, was charged with Stunting and his vehicle was towed.

    Stunting in Nova Scotia carries a fine of $2,422.50 for first time offenders, six licence demerit points and an immediate seven-day driver’s licence suspension.

    File # 24-132069, 2024-1463532, 24-136618

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Security: North Sydney — RCMP investigates fatal vehicle-pedestrian collision

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    RCMP Northeast Traffic Services (NETS) is investigating a fatal vehicle-pedestrian collision that occurred in North Sydney.

    On October 4, at approximately 7:55 p.m., RCMP NETS, Cape Breton Regional Police (CBRP), fire services, and EHS responded to a report of a crash on Hwy. 125. RCMP officers learned that a pedestrian was on the roadway when they were struck by a Nissan Murano travelling eastbound.

    The pedestrian, a 65-year-old Sydney Mines man, was transported to hospital and pronounced deceased.

    The driver and passenger of the Nissan did not report physical injuries.

    An RCMP collision reconstructionist attended the scene and the investigation is ongoing.

    Hwy. 125 was closed for several hours but has since reopened.

    Our thoughts are with the victim’s loved ones at this difficult time.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia – B10-0070/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Bernard Guetta, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    B10‑0070/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia

    (2024/2822(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

    – having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[1],

    – having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023 and to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), which outline the steps for Georgia’s candidacy status, particularly step 9, concerning the freedom of civil society,

    – having regard to the statement by the spokesperson for the European External Action Service of 4 September 2024 on the legislative package on ‘family values and protection of minors’ in Georgia,

    – having regard to the statement of 18 September 2024 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the laws, adopted by the Georgian Parliament, on ‘family values and protection of minors’,

    – having regard to the opinions adopted or endorsed by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) on various pieces of Georgian legislation at its 139th session (21-22 June 2024),

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the Constitution of Georgia protects the exercise of the freedoms of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly, and the right to universal, equal and free elections, as fundamental rights; whereas the Constitution of Georgia also guarantees the equality of all persons and protects them from discrimination; whereas, according to Article 78 of the Constitution of Georgia, ‘the constitutional bodies shall take all measures within the scope of their competences to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’;

    B. whereas, despite widespread public protests and calls from the EU and Georgia’s other Western partners, the ruling Georgian Dream party has adopted a Russian-inspired bill on the ‘transparency of foreign influence’, which requires civil society and media organisations that accept funds from abroad to register as ‘organisations pursuing the interest of a foreign power’ or face fines;

    C. whereas this legislation limits the capacity of civil society and media organisations to operate freely, curtails freedom of expression and unfairly stigmatises organisations that deliver clear benefits to the citizens of Georgia;

    D. whereas in March 2023, a proposal for similar legislation sparked widespread protests in Georgia, leading to its withdrawal; whereas since the proposal’s withdrawal in 2023, the ruling party and pro-government media have continued to escalate rhetoric against civil society and journalists;

    E. whereas on 20 February 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream party adopted amendments to the electoral legislation, endangering the independence and impartiality of the Central Election Commission and undermining public trust in this institution;

    F. whereas in late August 2024, oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili urged voters to help the Georgian Dream party retain a supermajority in the Georgian Parliament in order to initiate the process of outlawing several opposition parties; whereas this was supported by Georgia’s Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, who announced that the government would seek to ban more than half a dozen parties following the parliamentary elections;

    G. whereas on 17 September 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream party passed a law on ‘family values and protection of minors’, which strips LGBTIQ+ people of their rights;

    H. whereas two days after the introduction of the law on ‘family values and protection of minors’, Kesaria Abramidze, a transgender model and prominent public figure, was killed in her apartment;

    I. whereas previously, on 4 April 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream party abolished the mandatory gender quotas for political parties’ electoral lists contained in Georgia’s election code and overturned the gender-related funding rule laid down in the law on political associations of citizens, thereby undoing the progress achieved on the promotion of women’s political participation and representation;

    J. whereas the Georgian authorities have not acted on a single recommendation of the Venice Commission regarding the annulment or modification of the above-mentioned legislation on the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and on ‘family values and protection of minors’, the abolition of gender quotas in local and parliamentary elections, and the formation of the Central Election Commission;

    K. whereas the ruling Georgian Dream party and pro-government media are spreading anti-EU and anti-democratic propaganda, as well as conspiracy theories;

    L. whereas the ruling Georgian Dream party and its leadership continue to escalate divisive, distorted and violent rhetoric against political opponents and international partners, including Ukraine; whereas the ruling party uses despicable political banners depicting Ukrainian cities destroyed by Russia, thus capitalising on the suffering of brave Ukrainians;

    M. whereas Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s statement expressing his readiness to help Georgia normalise its relations with ‘the neighbouring … states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’ was praised by the leaders of the ruling party, demonstrating the Georgian Government’s departure from its policy of non-recognition of the occupied regions of Georgia;

    N. whereas in the Commission communication entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’, the Commission recommended granting candidate status to Georgia on the understanding that Georgia takes nine steps, which include combating disinformation and interference against the EU and its values, engaging opposition parties and civil society in governance, and ensuring freedom of assembly and expression, as well as consulting civil society and involving it meaningfully in legislative and policymaking processes and ensuring that civil society can operate freely;

    O. whereas on 14 December 2023, Georgia was granted EU candidate status by the European Council on the understanding that the nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation are taken;

    P. whereas Georgia’s Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has stated that Georgia will not impose sanctions on Russia, but only prevent their circumvention from happening on its territory;

    Q. whereas trade and business cooperation between Georgia and Russia has increased over the past two years, with more than 100 000 Russians having moved to Georgia, opened more than 26 000 businesses, purchased real estate and engaged in activities that create risks of money laundering; whereas this situation jeopardises Georgia’s national security and increases its dependence on Russia;

    R. whereas in recent months, the United States has imposed financial sanctions on Georgian security officials and the leaders of a far-right party for undermining and suppressing the freedom of peaceful assembly in Georgia, and has imposed travel sanctions on 60 other individuals, including senior government officials; whereas the National Bank of Georgia has refused to comply with these sanctions;

    S. whereas parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held in Georgia on 26 October 2024;

    1. Strongly condemns the adoption of the so-called ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and ‘family values and protection of minors’ legislation, as well as the abolition of gender quotas in local and parliamentary elections and the changes in formation of the Central Election Commission by the Georgian Dream majority; underlines that this legislation is incompatible with EU norms and values, damages Georgia’s reputation and jeopardises its efforts towards EU accession;

    2. Urges the Georgian Dream majority to immediately withdraw the legislation on the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and ‘family values and protection of minors’, to reintroduce gender quotas in local and parliamentary elections, and to ensure a consensus-based political process, which is crucial for the independence and impartiality of the Central Election Commission and for public trust in that institution; urges the Georgian Dream majority to implement the other recommendations of the Venice Commission; reiterates its call to cease all attacks on civil society, independent media, gender equality and the LGBTIQ+ community and to ensure a genuine enabling environment for civil society and media in the country;

    3. Stresses that the withdrawal of the legislation on the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and ‘family values and protection of minors’ will be necessary steps in improving the relationship between the EU and Georgia;

    4. Stands in solidarity with the courageous Georgian people fighting for their democratic rights and the European future of their country; reiterates its unwavering support for all those who advocate for and defend human rights and work for a peaceful country and society committed to equality and human dignity for all;

    5. Calls for the EU funding provided to the Georgian Government to be frozen until these illiberal pieces of legislation are repealed, and for strict conditions to be placed on the disbursement of any future funding to the Georgian Government;

    6. Reiterates its calls on the Commission to promptly assess how Georgia’s legislation on the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and ‘family values and protection of minors’, as well as the abolition of gender quotas and other changes in its electoral legislation, and the implementation of the Venice Commission’s recommendations in general, affect Georgia’s continuous fulfilment of the visa liberalisation benchmarks, in particular the fundamental rights benchmark, which is a crucial component of the EU visa liberalisation policy;

    7. Calls for the EU and its Member States to impose sanctions on Georgian officials who are involved in human rights violations against Georgian citizens or in the country’s democratic backsliding; reiterates its call on the Council to consider imposing personal sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili for his role in the deterioration of the political process and the human rights situation in Georgia; urges Georgian commercial banks to implement international sanctions;

    8. Reminds the Georgian Government that the EU granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the steps set out in the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 would be taken; underscores that the recently adopted pieces of legislation clearly go against this goal and put Georgia’s EU integration on hold;

    9. Reiterates its call on the Georgian Government to uphold its commitment to the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and encourages it to adopt and implement reforms that are in line with its stated objective of joining the EU, as demanded by a large majority of Georgia’s citizens;

    10. Strongly urges Georgia, as an EU candidate country, to impose sanctions on Russia in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and to effectively enforce measures to prevent the circumvention of EU sanctions, as it has committed to doing; is deeply concerned by the alignment of the Georgian Government with Russian policies and the increasing dependence of Georgia on Russia, and by the Georgian Dream party’s use of violent images of the war in Ukraine as a means of manipulating public opinion and spreading disinformation in its campaign ahead of the October 2024 elections; calls on Georgia to fully align with the EU’s foreign policy and the EU’s strategy towards Russia;

    11. Calls for the EU and its Member States to guarantee their full support to Georgian civil society organisations in this difficult period, including on issues linked to fines and other burdens imposed on them by the new legislation;

    12. Urges the Georgian authorities to ensure that the October 2024 parliamentary elections adhere to the highest international standards, guaranteeing a transparent, free and fair process that reflects the democratic will of the people; urges the abolition of the ingrained practice of misusing public resources and administrative capacity for the benefit of the ruling party; insists that the presence of both domestic and international observers should be ensured in order to safeguard the integrity of the elections and calls for an expanded EU election observation mission;

    13. Is deeply concerned by reports that the Georgian Government is creating obstacles for the coalition of 30 NGOs and Transparency International Georgia in their efforts to conduct the ‘Go Out and Vote’ campaign; considers these obstacles an attempt to undermine democracy in the country;

    14. Is extremely concerned about the police brutality that occurred during the protests of March-June 2024 in Tbilisi, and calls on the Georgian authorities to conduct timely and thorough investigations into that police brutality;

    15. Reiterates its call for an impartial and independent long-term international election observation mission by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, in order to monitor Georgia’s upcoming parliamentary elections;

    16. Reiterates its call on the Georgian authorities to immediately release former President Mikheil Saakashvili and to allow him to receive proper medical treatment abroad;

    17. Calls for the EU and its Member States to continue to pay close attention to these matters and to closely monitor developments in Georgia ahead of and after the country’s October 2024 parliamentary elections;

    18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Georgia.

     

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Oral question – Irreplaceability of vehicles powered by internal combustion engines in emergency situations – O-000012/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for oral answer  O-000012/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 142
    Christine Anderson, Ivan David, Ewa Zajączkowska-Hernik, Marcin Sypniewski, Stanisław Tyszka, René Aust
    on behalf of the ESN Group

    It would be extremely challenging to replace internal combustion engines in rescue vehicles, especially during crises like the recent floods in eastern Europe. Internal combustion engines provide high power and reliability, both of which are crucial for coping with extreme conditions such as deep water, debris and unpredictable terrain. Electric or alternative-fuel vehicles often face limitations in range, refueling infrastructure and battery life. During emergencies, vehicles must be able to deploy rapidly and refuel quickly in remote or damaged areas, and current electric-vehicle technology struggles to meet these demands. Moreover, rescue operations often involve heavy-duty equipment, which requires sustained power output – something for which internal combustion engines are well suited. The current technological level of electric vehicles is not sufficient: further advances in battery technology, faster recharging, and guaranteed resilience in harsh environments are required.

    Hence the question:

    Catastrophic floods have shown that rescue work cannot be carried out without vehicles with internal combustion engines. Is the Commission aware that banning the sale of cars with internal combustion engines will paralyse the fire, ambulance and police services, as well as the military, and that it would no longer be possible to deploy these emergency services to save the lives, health and property of citizens and the public sector in the event of natural disasters?

    Submitted: 4.10.2024

    Lapses: 5.1.2025

    Last updated: 7 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections – B10-0073/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

    Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Cristian Terheş, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Jaak Madison, Rihards Kols, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Carlo Fidanza, Michał Dworczyk, Roberts Zīle, Alberico Gambino, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ivaylo Valchev, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Tobiasz Bocheński, Assita Kanko, Alexandr Vondra
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    B10‑0073/2024

    European Parliament resolution on strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections

    (2024/2821(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on the Republic of Moldova and on Eastern Partnership countries,

    – having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part[1], which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and which fully entered into force on 1 July 2016,

    – having regard to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union,

    – having regard to the Republic of Moldova’s application for European Union (EU) membership, submitted on 3 March 2022,

    – having regard to the Versailles Declaration of 10 and 11 March 2022,

    – having regard to the EU statement of 21 March 2024 at the OSCE Permanent Council No 1466 in Vienna on the recent security incidents in the Transnistrian region,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas a presidential election is scheduled to be held in Moldova on 20 October 2024; whereas a referendum on Moldova’s accession to the EU is set to take place on the same day as the presidential election;

    B. whereas Russia has persistently sought to influence, subvert and undermine free, fair and independent elections in Moldova, as well as in various EU countries, by using disinformation, covert activities, corruption and many other hybrid warfare tactics aimed at destabilising the West; whereas, despite recent legislative improvements, concerns regarding campaign financing and the use of illicit Russian funds to influence electoral outcomes remain among the most sensitive issues within Moldova’s electoral landscape; whereas Russia’s efforts to exert influence are expected to increase in the run-up to Moldova’s presidential election;

    C. whereas there has been a noticeable shift in Russian interference tactics, with Russia expanding its support beyond traditional hard-line pro-Russian parties to a broader spectrum of political actors; whereas this spectrum now includes not only moderately pro-Russian and pro-Moldovan groups but also groups presenting themselves as ‘pro-European’; whereas this strategy appears, deceptively, to offer disillusioned voters a range of alternatives to the Party of Action and Solidarity, seeking to fragment the political landscape and dilute genuine support for the current government; whereas this shift reflects the Kremlin’s evolving approach to influence operations, prioritising the creation of multiple fronts to undermine democratic processes and foment internal discord;

    D. whereas Moldova’s local elections on 5 November 2023 reportedly saw unprecedented levels of Russian interference, including disinformation campaigns, voter bribery and financial support for pro-Russian parties, which pose a serious threat to Moldova’s democratic process ahead of the presidential election in October 2024; whereas recent reports by Moldovan investigators unveil the possibility that more than USD 15 million of Russian funds have allegedly been transferred to bribe voters in the upcoming elections;

    E. whereas Moldova has taken steps to combat Russian interference, including by banning pro-Russian parties, sanctioning oligarchs, suspending media outlets that spread disinformation, and increasing customs controls; whereas these efforts require further support from the international community and the EU in particular;

    F. whereas on 3 March 2022 the Republic of Moldova applied for EU membership and, on 17 June 2022, the European Commission presented its opinions on the applications submitted by Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova; whereas Moldova was granted the status of candidate country on 23 June 2022 by unanimous agreement of the 27 Member States; whereas the Commission outlined nine steps for Moldova to address in its 2023 Enlargement Package report, which was presented on 8 November 2023, recommending the opening of accession negotiations, provided that remaining reforms in justice, anti-corruption and deoligarchisation were accomplished; whereas the Council decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023, and the first intergovernmental conference formally launching these negotiations was held on 25 June 2024;

    G. whereas the EU has imposed sanctions on key Moldovan oligarchs and pro-Russian actors, and the United States (US) has repeatedly warned Moldova of Russian plans to destabilise and overthrow its government;

    H. whereas Russian actors, including sanctioned individuals like fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, have been directly involved in those destabilisation efforts, using state-funded Russian media outlets located in Russian territory and criminal networks to influence Moldovan politics;

    I. whereas Russian interference, combined with Moldova’s vulnerable economic situation, political divisions and geostrategic importance, risks undermining Moldova’s future in the EU, despite its significant progress towards EU accession; whereas oligarch-backed media and corrupt financial networks continue to destabilise Moldova’s political landscape, posing a threat to its sovereignty and democratic institutions;

    J. whereas Russia Today (RT) and its employees, including editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan, have directly coordinated with the Kremlin to support Russian Government efforts to influence the October 2024 Moldovan election; whereas Simonyan leverages the state-funded platforms in which she holds leadership positions – namely RT, Sputnik, and their parent company, the international information agency Rossiya Segodnya, a federal state unitary enterprise – to attempt to foment unrest in Moldova, likely with the specific aim of causing protests to turn violent;

    K. whereas Russia is escalating its years of ‘grey zone’ assaults on Moldova through disinformation, cyberattacks, bomb threats and other manipulations; whereas this campaign is part of what experts and government officials discuss as Russia’s steadily evolving hybrid war from the Baltic to the Black Sea: its invasion of Ukraine and destabilisation efforts against Georgia, Estonia and other neighbours; whereas Putin’s primary instruments for destabilising Moldova are propaganda and the corruption exercised by billionaire allies such as Ilan Shor and former ruling party leader Vladimir Plahotniuc, as well as Russia’s influence over two regions: Gagauzia, a stronghold of Ilan Shor in the south, and Transnistria, located on Moldova’s eastern border and controlled by Russian troops;

    L. whereas in 2023, the Russian government expanded the operational scope of RT by embedding within it a cyber-unit with direct ties to the Russian state; whereas this unit has been involved in intelligence and influence operations globally, including in Moldova; whereas the information gathered by this entity, operating under RT’s cover, is reportedly funnelled to Russian intelligence agencies, state-controlled media, mercenary groups and other actors aligned with the Russian Government; whereas RT is also engaged in disinformation campaigns, covert influence operations and military procurement efforts in support of Russia’s war in Ukraine;

    M. whereas the Intelligence and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova published a report in 2023 highlighting the unprecedented intensity of the actions carried out by the Russian Federation aimed at anchoring the Republic of Moldova within its sphere of influence; whereas the mechanism used to carry out this threat is of a hybrid nature, aiming operationally at attacking democratic processes and undermining Moldova’s path towards European integration by amplifying radical, separatist tendencies in the southern region of Moldova, particularly in Gagauzia, spreading propaganda and altering the information space, interfering in Moldova’s electoral process and conducting subversive operations;

    N. whereas on 18 September 2024 two close allies of Ilan Shor – Marina Tauber, member of the Parliament of Moldova, and Governor (Bashkan) of Gagauzia Evghenia Guțul – met the spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, and subsequently released false information about the EU and Moldova’s future in it, thus manipulating Moldovan citizens and trying to influence the upcoming election;

    O. whereas Moldova faces growing economic and security challenges, including the risk of political backsliding if Russia-backed candidates succeed in the upcoming presidential election;

    P. whereas Ukraine’s decision to close its border with Transnistria, which hosts 1 500 Russian troops, significantly curtailed trade between Kyiv and Tiraspol, cutting off critical revenue streams and reducing Transnistria’s trade volumes with Russia by 22 % in 2022; whereas Moldova now controls most of Transnistria’s access to external trade, representing an unprecedented opportunity to influence the separatist region; whereas Moldova has implemented a pressure strategy that includes criminalising separatism, tightening customs checks and stripping Transnistrian businesses of customs privileges, thus creating significant economic strain; whereas, despite receiving free Russian gas, Transnistria remains vulnerable to the potential cutting off of the Russian gas transit through Ukraine by December 2024, which could leave the region without energy;

    Q. whereas Russia has a substantial military presence in the Black Sea, including through undisclosed numbers and capabilities of its submarines, and considerable potential to dominate adjacent maritime transport routes; whereas the volatile situation in Transnistria poses a strategic risk, as Russia could seize control of the region and escalate the conflict, owing to Ukraine’s likely military response;

    R. whereas, according to journalistic investigations, dozens of priests from the Metropolis of Moldova travel to Russia, where they receive cards through which they later withdraw funds; whereas these trips are reportedly organised by Ilan Shor in close collaboration with the Russian Orthodox Church, which is closely aligned with the Kremlin regime, with the intention of using the clergy for electoral purposes;

    S. whereas in response to Russia’s continued efforts to undermine Moldovan democracy and interfere in Moldova’s electoral processes, the US State Department is imposing additional sanctions on a critical aspect of Russia’s malign influence in Moldova;

    1. Stands in solidarity with the people of the Republic of Moldova and reiterates its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders; in particular, commends Moldova for its 2022 electoral code reforms, which addressed long-standing recommendations and set a stronger framework for the upcoming election and for an increase in the number of polling stations abroad and a new partial postal voting initiative; stresses also the important role being played by the Republic of Moldova in the safety and stability of the EU’s eastern border in the context of the humanitarian crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    2. Strongly condemns Russia’s repeated attempts to destabilise the Republic of Moldova, its institutions and society; calls on the Russian authorities to respect the Republic of Moldova’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, to cease its provocations and attempts to destabilise the country, and to immediately and unconditionally withdraw its military forces from the occupied territories of Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Ukraine;

    3. Reaffirms its full commitment to the Republic of Moldova’s membership of the EU; welcomes the Moldovan authorities’ considerable efforts to advance the reform agenda and their determination to fulfil the nine steps identified in the Commission’s opinion of 17 June 2022 in order to progress towards EU membership, despite Russia’s pressure on Moldova and the crises triggered by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    4. Stresses that, based on the experience of the 2023 local elections, the Russian Federation is likely to employ the tactic of using ‘filler’ parties in the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2025, creating a smokescreen to facilitate the entry of at least one Ilan Shor-controlled party into Parliament;

    5. Congratulates Moldova for the first intergovernmental conference on the opening of accession negotiations, which occurred in June 2024, only two years after the granting of candidate status, and thus serves as evidence of Moldova’s determination to fulfil the EU’s reform agenda; acknowledges the significant progress made by Moldova in the EU accession process and calls for the intergovernmental conference to conclude cluster 1 of the negotiations in the coming year;

    6. Calls on NATO and its members to consider enhancing NATO’s naval presence and readiness in the Black Sea region;

    7. Calls for the EU to support Moldova’s efforts toward the peaceful reintegration of Transnistria by providing financial and technical assistance for economic stabilisation, social cohesion measures and the diversification of Transnistria’s energy through neighbouring Member States, ensuring that Moldova’s progress toward EU accession is not undermined by the unresolved status of Transnistria;

    8. Encourages the Government of Moldova, as the country advances on its path to EU accession, to repair the injustices done by the oppressive Soviet occupation to all religious denominations;

    9. Recognises the Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia as a victim of Soviet oppression; notes in this regard that the Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia, after it was abusively abolished by the Soviet authorities, was not officially recognised until 2002, after a decision of the European Court of Human Rights;

    10. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service and the Member States to urgently provide funding and expertise to support the training of short-term election observers in Moldova for the October 2024 elections, in collaboration with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and its dedicated services and offices;

    11. Calls on the Commission to consider enhanced cooperation to provide Moldova with specific counter-interference technical assistance and to improve Moldova’s election infrastructure, including assisting with the implementation of secure voting technologies and measures to ensure the integrity of the transmission of vote count results;

    12. Urges the Commission to develop and present a comprehensive growth plan for Moldova that would aim to facilitate foreign investment and foster economic development within the country; calls for the continued provision of robust financial support to Moldova to ensure its sustainable growth and stability; further calls for the permanent abolition of import duties and quotas on Moldovan exports to the EU;

    13. Welcomes the assistance provided under the European Peace Facility in support of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova, aimed at modernising the country’s air defence capabilities, and calls for the continued provision of such support; notes that every sovereign state has the inherent right to invest in its defence capabilities, and affirms that such actions are fully consistent with the Republic of Moldova’s status of neutrality;

    14. Commends the launch of the EU Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova under the common security and defence policy, aimed at strengthening the resilience of Moldova’s security sector; strongly supports the mission’s activities and its role in providing crucial assistance and expertise to enhance the country’s security and stability;

    15. Commends the signing of the security and defence partnership, which will strengthen Moldova’s resilience and enable the EU and Moldova to jointly address common security challenges; emphasises that Moldova is the first country to sign such a partnership with the EU, demonstrating the strong commitment of both parties to enhanced cooperation in the field of security and defence;

    16. Calls for the EU, the US, Canada and the United Kingdom to continue to apply and expand sanctions against individuals, media outlets and entities involved in Kremlin-sponsored activities to subvert the democratic processes and electoral integrity of Moldova and all EU countries and partners;

    17. Urges the Moldovan Government to increase vigilance over potential electoral irregularities, enhance public communication on election security, and prepare to address Russian attempts to incite protests following the election results;

    18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations and the Council of Europe.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – October: Breast Cancer Awareness Month – Subcommittee on Public Health

    Source: European Parliament

    Breast cancer affects globally 2.3 million new women every year.

    Known best for its pink theme colour, the Breast Cancer Awareness Month aims at promoting screening and prevention of the disease.

    Actions such as early detection, timely diagnosis, comprehensive treatment and providing support for persons with lived experience, are crucial for tackling the disease and to address the existing disparities and challenges in access to breast cancer care.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia – B10-0079/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

    Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Nicolás Pascual De La Parte, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Wouter Beke, Daniel Caspary, Sandra Kalniete, Ondřej Kolář, Andrey Kovatchev, Andrius Kubilius, Miriam Lexmann, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Milan Zver
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    B10‑0079/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia

    (2024/2822(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

    – having regard to the statement by the High Representative and the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement of 17 April 2024 on the adoption of the ‘transparency of foreign influence’ law,

    – having regard to the statement by the High Representative of 18 September 2024 on the Georgian law on ‘family values and protection of minors’,

    – having regard to the statement by the European External Action Service Spokesperson of 4 April 2024 on the draft law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’,

    – having regard to the European Council conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2023,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690),

    – having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[1],

    – having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

    – having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

    – having regard to the joint statement by the Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Chair of the Delegation for relations with the South Caucasus and the European Parliament’s Standing Rapporteur on Georgia of 18 April 2024 on the reintroduction of the draft law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ in Georgia,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the exercise of freedom of opinion, expression, association and peaceful assembly is a fundamental rights enshrined in the Georgian Constitution;

    B. whereas Georgia, as a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as a member of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, has committed itself to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights;

    C. whereas Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution provides that ‘the constitutional bodies shall take all measures within the scope of their competence to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’;

    D. whereas the EU expects Georgia, a candidate country for EU accession, to abide fully by the Association Agreement and other international commitments it has made and, in particular, to fulfil the conditions and take the steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 8 November 2023; whereas the European Council decided to grant candidate status to Georgia solely on the understanding that these steps would be taken, including combating disinformation and interference against the EU and its values, engaging opposition parties and civil society in governance, and ensuring freedom of assembly and expression, as well as meaningfully consulting civil society and involving it in legislative and policymaking processes and ensuring that it can operate freely;

    E. whereas on 20 February 2024 the Parliament of Georgia passed amendments to the electoral code, changing the procedure for the election of chairman and so-called professional members of the Central Election Commission and abolishing the post of deputy chairman, which is filled by an opposition representative;

    F. whereas on 4 April 2024 the Georgian Parliament adopted amendments to the country’s electoral code, abolishing mandatory parliamentary quotas for women, which required that at least one in four candidates on a party list be of a different gender than the majority;

    G. whereas on 28 May 2024, the Georgian Parliament adopted the so-called transparency of foreign influence law, which requires organisations receiving over 20 % of their funding from abroad to register within two months as ‘organisations pursuing the interests of a foreign power’ and label themselves as such; whereas these organisations are subjected to additional scrutiny, reporting requirements and possibly sanctions, including administrative penalties of up to GEL 25 000; whereas this law seriously restricts media and civil society organisations’ ability to operate freely; whereas adopting this law has led to the suspension of EU financial assistance for Georgia;

    H. whereas on 6 June 2024 the US imposed visa restrictions on dozens of Georgian officials over the adoption of the ‘foreign agents law’;

    I. whereas on 11 July 2024 the US Congress Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted Georgia sanctions legislation known as the Megobari Act, which imposes sanctions against Georgian officials responsible for undermining the country’s democratic system;

    J. whereas on 17 September 2024 the Georgian Parliament passed a law on ‘family values and the protection of minors’, which strips the LGBTI community of its rights and bans Pride events and public displays of the rainbow flag;

    K. whereas a parliamentary election will take place in Georgia on 26 October 2024; whereas there is growing anti-Western and hostile rhetoric from the Georgian Dream party against Georgia’s democratic partners, as well as promotion of Russian disinformation and manipulation; whereas the Georgian Dream party is pursuing a narrative of the West as a ‘global war party’ trying to push Georgia back into a war with Russia;

    L. whereas on 28 August 2024, the leader of Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili, at the inauguration of his party’s electoral campaign, spoke of his desire to ban democratic opposition parties; whereas he was seconded by the Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, who stated that if their party achieved a majority in the Georgian Parliament, it would ban certain opposition parties;

    1. Strongly condemns the adoption of the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ and the law on ‘family values and protection of minors’, as well as the changes to the electoral code; considers that the foregoing are incompatible with EU values and democratic principles, run against Georgia’s ambitions for EU membership, damage Georgia’s international reputation and endanger the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; strongly underlines that unless the abovementioned legislation is rescinded, progress cannot be made in Georgia’s relations with the EU; regrets that Georgia, once a champion of democratic progress with Euro-Atlantic aspirations, has been in a democratic backsliding free fall for a considerable period;

    2. Expects Georgian Dream to respect the will and free choice of the Georgian people in the upcoming parliamentary election and to relinquish power peacefully if defeated; demands that Georgian Dream and its leaders immediately stop the violence, intimidation, hate speech, persecution and repression that it is committing against the opposition, civil society and independent media;

    3. Strongly believes that the EU should consider temporarily suspending its visa-free regime with Georgia if the conduct of the election is not in line with accepted international standards and base its decision to do so also on Georgia’s fulfilment of the visa liberalisation benchmarks, in particular the fundamental rights benchmark;

    4. Strongly believes that the upcoming election will be decisive in determining Georgia’s future democratic development and geopolitical choice, as well its ability to make progress with its EU member state candidacy; considers that the result of the Georgian election should allow the country to return to its pro-Western democratic agenda, implement the necessary reforms and launch accession negotiations with the EU;

    5. Reiterates its unwavering support for the Georgian people’s legitimate European aspirations and their wish to live in a prosperous country, free from corruption, that fully respects fundamental freedoms, protects human rights and guarantees an open society and independent media; underlines that the decision to grant Georgia EU candidate country status was motivated by the wish to acknowledge the achievements and democratic efforts of Georgia’s civil society, as well as the overwhelming support for EU accession among its citizens; appreciates the efforts made by Georgia’s President Salome Zourabishvili to return Georgia to the democratic and pro-European path of development;

    6. Deplores the personal role played by Georgia’s sole oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, who returned to active politics on 30 December 2023 when he became ‘honorary chairman’ of the Georgian Dream party, in the current political crisis and in yet another attempt to undermine the country’s Western-oriented course in favour of pivoting towards Russia; reiterates its call on the Council and the EU’s democratic partners to consider imposing personal sanctions on Ivanishvili for his role in bringing about the deterioration of the political process in Georgia and in working against the interests of its people;

    7. Calls for the EU and its Member States to hold to account and impose personal sanctions on all those responsible for undermining democracy in Georgia, who are complicit in the violence committed against political opponents and peaceful protesters and who spread anti-Western disinformation; welcomes the personal sanctions imposed by the US on Georgian Dream officials;

    8. Highlights the worrying fact that many recent legislative decisions of Georgian Dream betray the aspirations of the large majority of the Georgian people to live in a democratic society, continue democratic and rule of law reforms, pursue close cooperation with Euro-Atlantic partners and commit to a path towards EU membership;

    9. Emphasises that the rights to freedom of expression and assembly and to peaceful protest are fundamental freedoms and must be respected under all circumstances, particularly in a country aspiring to join the EU;

    10. Recalls that the European Council of 14 and 15 December 2023 granted Georgia candidate country status on the understanding that the relevant steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 would be taken; stresses that recently adopted legislation clearly goes against this ambition and has effectively put on hold Georgia’s integration into the EU;

    11. Urges the Georgian Government to return to its European path, uphold its commitment to respect, strengthen and promote democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and genuinely engage in the full implementation of the steps required to fulfil the conditions for candidate country status and EU membership, in a spirit of engagement and cooperation with Georgia’s civil society and political opposition;

    12. Reiterates the tangible opportunities that Georgia would take advantage of once the accession negotiations begin, such as pre-accession assistance that would improve the standard of living of Georgian citizens, as well as support the institutions, infrastructure and social services;

    13. Expresses deep concern about the increased influence of Russia in Georgia, the increased number of Russian citizens residing in Georgia, increased trade ties with Russia, and Georgia’s willingness to pursue reconciliation with Russia despite Russia’s war in Ukraine and its occupation of a fifth of Georgian sovereign territory; calls on the Government of Georgia to impose sanctions against Russia in response to its war of aggression against Ukraine;

    14. Reiterates its call on the Georgian authorities to release former President Mikheil Saakashvili from prison;

    15. Calls on the Georgian Bureau of Investigation to conduct a thorough investigation of police brutality during the spring protests against the law on ‘transparency of foreign influence’ in Georgia;

    16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the President, Government and Parliament of Georgia.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – European Democracy Shield – intended mechanisms and envisaged roll-out – E-001903/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001903/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová (Renew)

    In the light of President von der Leyen’s commitment to establishing a ‘European Democracy Shield’ aimed at tackling deceitful online content, I would like to request further clarification on the role envisaged for digital platforms, which are often conduits for the dissemination of disinformation, including content generated by AI.

    • 1.Could the Commission describe what new mechanisms could be introduced to ensure that these platforms contribute effectively to the prevention and prebunking of disinformation?
    • 2.Could the Commission provide details of the anticipated timeline and scope for the roll-out of this initiative?

    Submitted: 1.10.2024

    Last updated: 7 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Boosting the Greek defence industry – E-001385/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Precise, detailed and official data on the proportion of the defence budget of each Member State that is spent on domestic production and imports from Member States or third countries is currently not available.

    There are, however, strong indications of persistent fragmentation in the European defence equipment market and an increasing reliance on imports from third countries.

    More details can be found for instance in the European Defence Industrial Strategy[1] and in the Staff Working Document accompanying the proposal for a regulation establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP)[2].

    The EU programmes that can be used to support the capacity of the Greek defence industry include in particular: the European Defence Fund[3], which supports collaborative defence research and development projects with a budget of over EUR 7 billion over 2021-2027; the regulation on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[4], which was adopted as an emergency response following Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and supported the ramp-up of ammunition and missiles production capacity across Europe; the EDIP[5] proposal, through which the Commission foresees in particular the extension of the ASAP support logic in time (over 2025-2027) and in scope (beyond the field of ammunition and missiles only).

    Also, Member States may use the Cohesion Policy Funds[6] for the modernisation and building of industrial capacities, including defence industry capacities, as far as the investments contribute to the objectives of the respective funds[7].

    Last updated: 7 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Türkiye’s provocative bid to join the BRICS countries and inclusion of the ‘Blue Homeland’ doctrine in the school curriculum – E-001895/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001895/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Vangelis Meimarakis (PPE)

    There have recently been two worrying developments concerning Türkiye:

    its application to join the BRICS countries and the inclusion and teaching of the revisionist narrative about the ‘Blue Homeland’ in school textbooks.

    Türkiye is an EU candidate country that has an Association Agreement and is in a customs union with the EU. It is also a member of NATO. How is this compatible with BRICS membership given these countries’ conflicting interests with the EU and NATO?

    Meanwhile, the ‘Blue Homeland’ narrative violates the sovereign rights of Greece and Cyprus under the Convention on the Law of the Sea and has led to the illegal Memorandum of Understanding between Türkiye and Lebanon. This narrative undermines the EU’s work in the field of energy in the Eastern Mediterranean and can become a source of conflict. It will also instil in Türkiye’s young generations a false understanding of the country’s history and obligations.

    In view of this:

    • 1.How will the Commission address these two issues in the context of the EU-Türkiye high-level dialogue?
    • 2.How will it address the digital diplomacy Türkiye has built through social media, which is reinforcing the ‘Blue Homeland’ narrative beyond Turkish borders?

    Submitted: 1.10.2024

    Last updated: 7 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU Centre on Child Sexual Abuse (EUCSA) – E-001904/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001904/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová (Renew)

    In light of the ongoing negotiations between institutions regarding the legislation to combat online child sexual abuse, which envisages the establishment of an independent EU Centre on Child Sexual Abuse (EUCSA) as a hub of expertise:

    Could the Commission provide comprehensive details on the current status of preparations, any progress made, and specific developments concerning the potential creation and operational framework of the EUCSA?

    Submitted: 1.10.2024

    Last updated: 7 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Possible initiation of a State aid procedure in relation to the planned sale of shares in Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG – E-001899/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001899/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Fabio De Masi (NI)

    What is the Commission’s assessment of the sale of shares in Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG (HHLA) to the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), and does it intend to initiate a formal State aid procedure owing, for example, to the suspected sale of undervalued shares[1]?

    Submitted: 1.10.2024

    Last updated: 7 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Supporting borrowers and protecting first homes in Greece and the EU as a whole – E-001918/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001918/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Afroditi Latinopoulou (PfE)

    The transfer of loans to servicers and funds has created a new, stressful environment for debtors. Many risk losing their first home due to aggressive debt collection practices. Vulnerable groups such as low-income earners and people with disabilities, in particular, find themselves in deep water. Meanwhile, the lack of transparency over how management companies and funds operate makes it difficult to protect borrowers’ rights. This problem is especially felt in Greece where the economic crisis has left deep scars in society and many citizens are having serious trouble paying back their loans.

    In view of this:

    • 1.Can the Commission adopt legislation allowing borrowers who are having proven difficulties in meeting their loan obligations to be given priority in repurchasing their loans at a discounted rate or to be offered more favourable repayment terms instead of these loans being sold to funds at very low prices?
    • 2.Is it feasible to establish a mechanism that will allow borrowers to buy their loans from funds, paying a set penalty, thus preventing profiteering?
    • 3.What ways are there to guarantee the EU-wide protection of people’s first homes and of vulnerable borrowers who are trying to meet their obligations?

    Submitted: 1.10.2024

    Last updated: 7 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Deteriorating situation in eastern Congo – E-001902/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001902/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Hilde Vautmans (Renew)

    According to a recently published report by Human Rights Watch, Rwandan troops and M23 rebels have committed large-scale violence against civilians, including women and children, in eastern Congo, especially in camps for displaced persons. The European Union has pledged EUR 20 million to Rwandan troops through the European Peace Facility, which gives rise to the following questions about the potential impact of our financial aid:

    • 1.How does the Commission intend to ensure that the EUR 20 million provided to Rwandan troops through the European Peace Facility do not further add to the violence in eastern Congo? Are specific mechanisms in place to monitor the use of these funds?
    • 2.What does the Commission intend to do if it is ascertained that these funds do in fact further add to to the conflict or to human rights violations?

    Submitted: 1.10.2024

    Last updated: 7 October 2024

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: At a Glance – Fisheries management measures in the Mediterranean: Transposition into EU law – 07-10-2024

    Source: European Parliament

    All Member States bordering the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, together with the European Union, participate in the management of fisheries in this area, in cooperation with several third countries, in the framework of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM). As a contracting party to the GFCM, the EU is bound to adopt its decisions. The European Commission has therefore proposed to transpose a number of recently adopted GFCM measures into EU law.

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU finance ministers welcome proposals for new EIB Group initiatives to deepen Europe’s capital markets, channel savings into productive investments and boost competitiveness

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • Plans discussed with European Finance ministers in Luxembourg will broaden financing options and tools available to scale up European innovative companies and unicorns.
    • The instruments to be deployed by the EIB Group include expanding the successful European Tech Champions Initiative Fund-of-Funds, equity and venture capital investments for scale-ups, and a new Exit platform to facilitate purchases and listing of tech start-ups.

    European Union Finance ministers have welcomed an Action Plan to be deployed by the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group, to support the development of the Capital Markets Union. The Plan includes measures to untap private savings and channel them into productive investment, to boost innovation, competitiveness, strategic autonomy, and productivity growth in Europe.

    The Action Plan was discussed at the meeting of EIB Group President Nadia Calviño with finance ministers at the Eurogroup in Luxembourg today. It was developed after months of intensive engagement with member states and financial markets partners, and received broad support by the Boards of Directors of the EIB and of the European Investment Fund (EIF) last week.

    EIB Group President Nadia Calviño, said “The EIB Group is itself already a Capital Markets Union instrument. The Action Plan discussed with ministers will help European innovators scale up their business and contribute to channel savings into productive investments, boost innovation, create jobs and lead Europe toward a more robust growth model, ensuring that European companies born in Europe, stay in Europe”.

    The Action Plan covers three main areas:

    • Improving market integration for green and digital bonds: The EIB Group will continue to play a leading role in the European green bond market, through issuance and also scaling up bond acquisition.
    • Closing the funding gap throughout the company and innovation cycle: The EIB Group plans to scale up support for the EU venture capital and private equity markets to help close the financing gap and to retain the most innovative scale-ups in Europe.
    • Mobilizing large-scale investments for EU policy priorities: For instance, working with the Commission on a financing platform for housing.

    Today’s meeting has focused on the second area, with proposals to finance the scale-up of European unicorns, including through an extension of the successful European Tech Champions Initiative, scaling up equity and venture debt investments and  a new dedicated fund, an “exit platform”, for financing acquisitions and listing of tech start-ups by European companies.

    These proposals will be further discussed and finalised by the EIB’s Board of Directors, in partnership with the Commission. Today’s discussion follows up on the Eurogroup’s mandate in March for the EIB Group to support the integration of European capital markets with new instruments that will further facilitate access to financing for small and medium-sized businesses and innovators.

    EU leaders committed, in April 2024, to advancing work without delay toward integrating the Union’s capital markets, while a Savings and Investment Union, including banking and capital markets, is among the flagship goals included in the political guidelines of European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen for the new institutional cycle. Helping develop well-functioning cross border capital markets is among the EIB Group’s core priorities, included in the Strategic Roadmap for 2024-2027, which was unanimously endorsed by EU finance ministers in June.

    Capital markets fragmentation has been singled out as a key impediment to European competitiveness by both Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi in their flagship reports. The European Central Bank has repeatedly emphasized that deep and integrated single market for capital is essential for financial stability and for achieving some of the EU’s flagship policy goals, from financing the green and digital transitions to enabling savers to earn higher returns.

    The EIB Group is uniquely positioned to support the development of a European Savings and Investments Union, as it is the only truly pan-European financial institution, with operations in every member state and every region of the EU. It has an unparalleled record and expertise in introducing and shaping innovative financing instruments and tools.

    The EIB Group has just reached the €100bn milestone of green bond issuance, since pioneering this market back in 2007, and is the largest provider of venture debt in Europe. It offers a full range of products and services, from debt and equity to advisory, to clients ranging from public sector and large corporates to SMEs and innovative startups. The EIB Group has a stellar AAA credit rating, and outstanding Environmental, Social and Governance credentials.

    Background information

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union owned by its Member States. It makes long-term finance available for sound investment contributing toward EU policy goals. The EIB Group is the largest provider of venture debt in Europe and the largest public investor in European venture capital funds. It is also a major financier of climate investment, with over €100 in cumulative green bond issuances, and is well on track to support €1 trillion in green investment in the critical decade to 2030.

    The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed a total of €88 billion in new financing for over 900 projects last year. These commitments are expected to mobilise around €320 billion in investment, supporting 400 000 companies and 5.4 million jobs. Over half of the EIB Group’s annual financing supports projects directly contributing to climate change mitigation, adaptation, and a healthier environment. Approximately half of the EIB’s financing within the European Union is directed towards cohesion regions, where per capita income is lower. This underscores the Bank’s commitment to fostering inclusive growth and the convergence of living standards.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Easing of visa requirements for Russians and Belarusians by the Hungarian Government – E-001472/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    As explained in the Commission’s answer to the Written Question E-0001438/2024 on the same issue, on 1 August 2024, a letter has been sent to the Hungarian Minister of the Interior in which the Commission’s concerns about the extension of the ‘National Card’ scheme to citizens of Russia and Belarus were expressed.

    Hungary was reminded of the importance of upholding enhanced standards of scrutiny and vigilance with regards to the entry of Russian nationals into the Schengen area.

    The dialogue with the Hungarian authorities is ongoing to assess the implications of the ‘National Card’ extension for the security of the Schengen area.

    Hungary remains bound by the obligation to thoroughly check whether all entry conditions of Article 6 of the Schengen Borders Code[1] (SBC) applicable to third-country nationals have been met.

    This includes, amongst others, the absence of alerts issued in the Schengen Information System or other indications that an individual poses a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of any of the Member States. A third-country national who does not fulfil the entry conditions must be refused entry (Article 14 SBC).

    On 30 September 2022, the Commission issued updated guidelines on controls of Russian citizens at the external borders in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine[2].

    According to these guidelines, border guards should exercise intensive individual scrutiny in assessing the potential heightened security risk posed by Russian nationals.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, 23.3.2016.
    • [2] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-09/Communication%20from%20the%20Commission%20on%20updating%20guidelines%20on%20general%20visa%20issuance%20in%20relation%20to%20Russian%20applicants%20and%20on%20providing%20guidelines%20on%20controls%20of%20Russian%20citizens%20at%20the%20external%20borders_en.pdf
    Last updated: 7 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Financial support for tourism businesses in disaster-stricken Magnesia – E-001908/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001908/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Yannis Maniatis (S&D)

    After storm Daniel hit in September 2023, extensive parts of the Region of Thessaly were ravaged by floods, which caused severe damage to infrastructure and businesses. On top of this, towards the end of August this year, thousands of dead fish washed up on the shores of the Pagasetic Gulf causing a major environmental disaster, which brought the area to its knees and drove tourists away. The tourism sector, a mainstay of the local economy, in particular Magnesia’s economy, now finds itself in a critical situation as businesses are unable to return to business as usual without direct financial support.

    Given how serious and urgent a matter this is, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.Will it deploy available financial instruments to provide direct support to tourism businesses in Magnesia that have been affected by Storm Daniel and the dead fish in the Pagasetic Gulf?
    • 2.Is it considering the possibility of giving priority funding from European programmes to activities focused on rebuilding and strengthening the tourism sector in the regional unit of Magnesia?
    • 3.What steps will it take to ensure the viability of tourism businesses in areas such as Magnesia that are affected by environmental disasters, bearing in mind the increasing risk posed by climate change?

    Submitted: 1.10.2024

    Last updated: 7 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Agenda – Monday, 7 October 2024 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    1     Resumption of session and order of business
    44   One year after the 7 October terrorist attacks by Hamas
    Commission statement
    [2024/2864(RSP)]
    27   The reintroduction of internal border controls in a number of Member States and its impact on the Schengen Area
    Commission statement
    [2024/2819(RSP)]
    28   Need to fight the systemic problem of gender-based violence in Europe
    Commission statement
    [2024/2847(RSP)]
    29   Facing fake news, populism and disinformation in the EU – the importance of public broadcasting, media pluralism and independent journalism
    Commission statement
    [2024/2848(RSP)]
    43   The extreme wildfires in Southern Europe, in particular Portugal and Greece and the need for further EU climate action on adaptation and mitigation
    Commission statement
    [2024/2861(RSP)]
        Short presentation of the following report:
    18   – Mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund: assistance to Italy, Slovenia, Austria, Greece and France further to natural disasters occurred in 2023
    Report:  Georgios Aftias (A10-0002/2024)
    Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Italy, Slovenia, Austria, Greece and France relating to six natural disasters occurred in 2023
    [COM(2024)0325 – C10-0088/2024 – 2024/0212(BUD)]
    Committee on Budgets
    2     One-minute speeches (Rule 179)

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Agenda – Tuesday, 8 October 2024 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    26 The crisis facing the EU’s automotive industry, potential plant closures and the need to enhance competitiveness and maintain jobs in Europe 25 Strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration     – Motion for a resolution Friday, 4 October 2024, 13:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 8 October 2024, 12:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 8 October 2024, 13:00     – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Tuesday, 8 October 2024, 19:00 24 The democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia     – Motion for a resolution Friday, 4 October 2024, 13:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 8 October 2024, 12:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 8 October 2024, 13:00     – Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Tuesday, 8 October 2024, 19:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 4 October 2024, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 7 October 2024, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 8 October 2024, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 October 2024, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Agenda – Thursday, 10 October 2024 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    39 The case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 7 October 2024, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 October 2024, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 October 2024, 14:00 38 The cases of unjustly imprisoned Uyghurs in China, notably Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 7 October 2024, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 October 2024, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 October 2024, 14:00 40 Iraq, notably the situation of women’s rights and the recent proposal to amend the Personal Status Law     – Motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Monday, 7 October 2024, 20:00     – Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 October 2024, 13:00     – Amendments to joint motions for resolutions (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 October 2024, 14:00 Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 4 October 2024, 12:00 Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 7 October 2024, 19:00 Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 8 October 2024, 19:00 Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 9 October 2024, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News –