Category: Law

MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s bid to end birthright citizenship heads to the Supreme Court

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Jean Lantz Reisz, Clinical Associate Professor of Law, Co-Director, USC Immigration Clinic, University of Southern California

President Donald Trump’s executive order on birthright citizenship resurrects a dissenting argument in an 1898 case that went before the Supreme Court. iStock/Getty Images Plus

For more than 150 years, people who were born within U.S. territory automatically received citizenship – regardless of their parents’ immigration status.

President Donald Trump’s January 2025 executive order on birthright citizenship – stating that children born in the U.S. to parents who are not in the country legally, or who are not permanent residents, cannot receive citizenship – threatens to upend this precedent.

The Supreme Court is set to hear arguments on the case on May 14, 2025.

This comes after federal judges in three cases that took place in Maryland, Massachusetts and Washington banned Trump’s order from going into effect, determining that the president cannot change or limit the Constitution by executive order.

The Trump administration has argued that courts previously did not interpret the 14th Amendment’s citizenship clause correctly. But the administration’s argument in its emergency appeal to the Supreme Court is different. The administration is asking the Supreme Court to narrow the federal judges’ bans on implementing the order so their rulings apply only to the noncitizen plaintiffs named in those specific cases. If the Supreme Court justices agree, that could mean Trump’s executive order could apply to all of the other noncitizens not named in the cases at hand.

The president has broad powers when enforcing immigration laws and has the most discretion to use this authority when immigration is a national security issue.

At the same time, as an immigration law scholar, I understand that the president’s immigration power is limited by federal laws and the Constitution. American citizenship is a right that is spelled out in the Constitution – and the Constitution does not give the president the power to change how someone gets citizenship in the country.

Washington state Attorney General Nick Brown speaks to the media after a federal judge blocked President Donald Trump’s executive order on birthright citizenship on Feb. 6, 2025.
Jason Redmond/AFP via Getty Images

What the Constitution says about birthright citizenship

Ratified in 1868, the 14th Amendment citizenship clause states, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. …”

There are currently two exceptions to who can receive birthright citizenship: children of war enemies who are occupying the U.S. and children of noncitizens working as foreign diplomats in the U.S.

Trump’s executive order states there is now a third exception – the child of a mother who is living in the country without legal authorization, or has a temporary visa, if the father is also not a lawful permanent resident or U.S. citizen.

Since Trump’s Jan. 20 executive order, multiple states, cities, immigration rights organizations and private individuals, including pregnant mothers, have sued Trump. They have also sued the government agencies he instructed to deny citizenship to children born in the U.S. to noncitizens.

If the president’s executive order were to fully take effect, hundreds of thousands of babies born in the U.S. would be living in the country illegally. They could be deported by the U.S. government and would potentially be stateless, meaning without citizenship in any country.

If these babies stayed in the U.S., they would also be denied basic rights and privileges given to U.S. citizens, such as government-provided health care insurance and legal identification documents.

Once these children became adolescents and then adults, they could not receive federal financial aid for education, may not be eligible to legally work and could not vote.

This would create a vast and indefinitely growing population of noncitizens who are born and raised in the U.S. but do not have the legal right to stay there.

What led to the 14th Amendment

In 1868, the required 28 of the then 37 U.S. states ratified the 14th Amendment. This ensured that certain states did not deny citizenship to freed former slaves, who were of African descent and forcibly sent to the U.S., as well as their children.

About 30 years later, a U.S.-born man of Chinese descent named Wong Kim Ark was returning home to San Francisco after visiting his parents in China. U.S. authorities would not let him leave a steamship docked in the San Francisco harbor and enter the U.S.

Government officials prevented his entry under the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, a discriminatory law that barred Chinese nationals from entering the U.S. and becoming naturalized citizens, among other restrictions.

Wong argued that he was a U.S. citizen at birth and not barred by the exclusion laws.

The Supreme Court, albeit not unanimously, decided in 1898 that Wong was a citizen, since he was born in a U.S. territory.

The Supreme Court noted that the framers of the 14th Amendment relied on the British legal principle of “jus soli,” a Latin term meaning right of soil, to give automatic citizenship to anyone born on U.S. soil. Under jus soli, any person born within the kingdom of the British king was a citizen of that kingdom.

U.S. courts and lawmakers have similarly interpreted the 14th Amendment to automatically give citizenship to all children born in the U.S., even if their parents are immigrants.

In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act, which incorporated language from the 14th Amendment into immigration law. This included the phrase that “any person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” is a “citizen of the United States at birth.”

The 1952 statute did not exclude children born to immigrants living in the U.S. without legal authorization or immigrants with a temporary visa.

In 1995, the Office of Legal Counsel for the Department of Justice evaluated proposed federal legislation that would deny birthright citizenship to certain children, based on their parents’ immigration status. The Department of Justice determined the legislation would be “unquestionably unconstitutional” and it did not become law.

Less than 10 years later, the Supreme Court recognized in 2004 that accused Taliban fighter Yasser Hamdi had certain rights as a U.S. citizen. Hamdi was born in Louisiana to Saudi Arabian parents who had temporary visas.

Wong Kim Ark was born in the U.S. but denied reentry in 1895 in a case that went to the Supreme Court.
National Archives/Interim Archives/Getty Images

Trump’s 14th Amendment claims

Whether Trump’s executive order ultimately survives depends on how the Supreme Court interprets the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the 14th Amendment.

The Trump administration argues that this phrase was never meant to include the children of immigrants who were living in the U.S. without legal authorization or with temporary visas. The administration also says the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” means more than just being born in U.S. territory. It means having undivided sovereign allegiance to the U.S. government.

The Trump administration argues that U.S.-born children of noncitizens owe allegiance to a different country.

This is an old argument, based on the dissenting opinion in the Wong Kim Ark case in 1898. The Supreme Court already rejected this argument in that case.

The courts are following historical precedent

Three federal judges in the cases before the Supreme Court all determined in 2025 that Trump’s executive order is likely unconstitutional.

The Washington judge, for example, said in February that the administration was rehashing a century-old losing argument.

The appellate courts have also denied the government’s requests to change the preliminary injunctions.

For over a century, the federal government has recognized that nearly every child born in the U.S., regardless of who their parents are, automatically becomes a U.S. citizen.

Now, the Supreme Court will decide whether there is merit to the Trump administration’s technical argument that the federal judges’ block on its executive order should apply to plaintiffs in the three cases – an option that could permit the executive order to apply to all other noncitizens, even if it is unconstitutional.

Whether the executive order itself is constitutional would be a question left for a later date. However, that date may come after the executive order causes irreversible damage to U.S. citizens.

Jean Lantz Reisz does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Trump’s bid to end birthright citizenship heads to the Supreme Court – https://theconversation.com/trumps-bid-to-end-birthright-citizenship-heads-to-the-supreme-court-248819

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: Committee on the Rights of the Child Opens Ninety-Ninth Session, Adopts New Bureau with Sopio Kiladze as Chairperson

Source: United Nations – Geneva

The Committee on the Rights of the Child this morning opened its ninety-ninth session, which is being held in Geneva from 12 to 30 May, during which the Committee will review reports on the efforts to adhere to the Convention on the Rights of the Child of Brazil, Indonesia, Iraq, Norway, Qatar and Romania, as well as on Brazil’s efforts to implement the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.

In an opening statement, Andrea Ori, Chief, Groups in Focus Section, Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Representative of the Secretary-General, said the Committee’s work was more crucial than ever. Significant progress in children’s rights, which seemed secure until recently, was now severely disrupted. Children worldwide were increasingly affected by a convergence of crises, including economic downturns, climate change, public health emergencies, and armed conflicts.

Mr. Ori warned that the recent global funding crisis exacerbated the situation of children, with a daunting forecast ahead. The United Nations Children’s Fund had projected that in 2025, at least 14 million children would experience interruptions in vital nutrition support and services due to current and anticipated funding cuts, putting them at increased risk of severe malnutrition and death. The capacity to vaccinate over 15 million vulnerable children against measles in fragile and conflict-affected countries would also be drastically reduced.

Considering the troubling outlook for children, Mr. Ori said, there was an urgent need for coordinated global efforts to safeguard children’s rights and ensure their well-being. Now, more than ever, it was crucial for governments to fulfil their commitments under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Mr. Ori concluded by wishing the Committee all the best for a productive session.

During the meeting, the Committee elected a new Chair and Bureau. Sopio Kiladze (Georgia) was elected as Chair, and Cephas Lumina (Zambia), Thuwayba Al Barwani (Oman), Philip D. Jaffe (Switzerland), and Mary Beloff (Argentina) were elected as Vice-Chairs.

The Committee also welcomed four new members – Timothy. P.T. Ekesa (Kenya), Mariana Ianachevici (Republic of Moldova), Juliana Scerri Ferrante (Malta), and Zeinebou Taleb Moussa (Mauritania) – and welcomed back Mr. Lumina, who previously served as a member from 2017 to 2021. They made their solemn declaration.

Ms. Kiladze said it was a pleasure and honour to be elected as Chair of the Committee. She said her election came at a difficult time in which many children around the world were affected by violations of their rights. She said it was vital that the Committee continued to work for the protection of the rights of children everywhere.

Before adopting the session’s agenda, the Committee also heard statements from representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Children’s Fund, Child Rights Connect, and the Secretary of the Committee.

Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here. The programme of work of the Committee’s ninety-ninth session and other documents related to the session can be found here.

The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. this afternoon to consider the seventh periodic report of Norway (CRC/C/NOR/7).

Statements

ANDREA ORI, Chief, Groups in Focus Section, Human Rights Council and Treaty Mechanisms Division, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Representative of the Secretary-General, welcomed the four new members of the Committee: Timothy Ekesa (Kenya), Mariana Ianachevici (Republic of Moldova), Juliana Scerri Ferrante (Malta), and Zeinebou Taleb Moussa (Mauritania), and the returning member Cephas Lumina (Zambia). Each member brought valuable and diverse experiences that would greatly enhance the Committee’s work. Additionally, he congratulated the members who had been re-elected for another term: Rinchen Chophel (Bhutan); Sopio Kiladze (Georgia); Benyam Dawit Mezmur (Ethiopia); and Benoit Van Keirsbilck (Belgium).

The Committee’s work was more crucial than ever. Significant progress in children’s rights, particularly in health and education, which seemed secure until recently, was now severely disrupted. Children worldwide were increasingly affected by a convergence of crises, including economic downturns, climate change, public health emergencies, and armed conflicts. The recent global funding crisis exacerbated their situation, with a daunting forecast ahead.

The United Nations Children’s Fund had projected that in 2025, at least 14 million children would experience interruptions in vital nutrition support and services due to current and anticipated funding cuts, putting them at increased risk of severe malnutrition and death. The capacity to vaccinate over 15 million vulnerable children against measles in fragile and conflict-affected countries would be drastically reduced. Immunisation services, disease surveillance, and outbreak responses in nearly 50 countries were already facing disruptions.

Mr. Ori said, quoting the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “human rights are like air: we need them to live— but we only notice them when we are suffocating.” Today, countless children worldwide were suffocating as their rights were denied and overlooked. Considering the troubling outlook for children, there was an urgent need for coordinated global efforts to safeguard their rights and ensure their well-being. Now, more than ever, it was crucial for governments to fulfil their commitments under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The global funding crisis was also affecting the Committee’s work directly. Its pre-sessional working group, scheduled to be held after this session, was cancelled as funding was not available. Altogether, 15 sessions across 10 treaty bodies were at stake, and it was highly likely that, for those treaty bodies with three sessions, the Office of the High Commissioner would not be able to secure the funding to hold the third session. The lack of predictability and the piecemeal approach with last-minute confirmation created huge uncertainty, led to wasted time and effort, and higher costs.

The Office of the High Commissioner had received only 73 per cent of its approved regular budget in 2025, and 87 per cent of its approved regular budget in 2024. As a result, the United Nations Secretariat was implementing a hiring freeze until August 2025. This would impact on regular budget posts approved to support the treaty body system, which currently could not be filled. The Secretariat was in a similar situation last year, and this had led to increased backlogs in reviewing State party reports and backlogs in registering and analysing individual communications.

The United Nations Office at Geneva’s conference services had also adopted cash conservation measures, which would impact on the conference support provided to the United Nations human rights treaty bodies, particularly in terms of documentation, meeting time, and interpretation, with an overall reduction of 10 per cent. This meant treaty bodies’ mandated activities would be even more affected in 2025 than in 2024, impacting their ability to have dialogues with States parties and to make decisions on individual communications, resulting in further delays and backlogs. The Office was also forced to significantly reduce treaty body capacity building activities, which provided support for States to report to, and interact with, treaty bodies.

All this caused real damage to predictability, which was so important for States, civil society organizations and rights-holders to engage with treaty bodies. Given the overall reduction in funds and availability of support services, “business as usual” would no longer be possible and the treaty bodies needed to plan on doing less with less.

On a more positive note, the annual meeting of Chairpersons of human rights treaty bodies would be held in Geneva from 2 to 6 June. The Chairs would dedicate the meeting to the liquidity crisis, which was affecting the very existence of treaty bodies if they could no longer fulfil their mandates, and to discuss what could be done to increase predictability within the current financial and human constraints, including reviewing the decisions and recommendations from their last meeting and their working methods.

The 2025 full-day meeting on the rights of the child at the Human Rights Council on 13 March, which focused on early childhood development, featured speeches by children and an informal dialogue on the topic between a group of young people, Member States and the High Commissioner.

The first session of the Open Ended Inter-Governmental Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the Convention on education would be held from 1 to 5 September in Geneva. The Office was working closely with the sponsors of the resolution to establish the modalities for the process leading up to the first session of the Inter-Governmental Working Group and its programme of work. A call for submissions was issued in March for the attention of States, civil society, United Nations agencies and children, for whom a toolkit for consultations had been prepared.

In conclusion, Mr. Ori wished the Committee all the best for a productive session, saying that he looked forward to working with the new Chair and Bureau of the Committee for the next two years.

SOPIO KILADZE, newly elected Committee Chair, said it was a pleasure and honour to be elected as Chair of the Committee. She said her election came at a difficult time in which many children around the world were affected by violations of their rights. It was vital that the Committee continued to work for the protection of the rights of children everywhere.

Regarding the session’s agenda, Ms. Kiladze said that the Committee would hold dialogues to consider the reports of six States parties: Brazil, Indonesia, Iraq, Norway, Qatar and Romania. The scheduled review of Pakistan was postponed to a later session at the request of the State party.

During the session, the Committee would continue its discussions on how its cooperation with various relevant bodies could be further strengthened to enhance the promotion and protection of the rights of the child. It would also discuss the organisation of its future work and consideration of States parties’ reports, focusing on issues related to its methods of work and follow-up to the treaty body strengthening process.

In addition, the Committee would consider any communication and information it had received through its communication procedure and would continue to consider how to integrate days of general discussion into the process of developing general comments. The Committee would also continue its work on its new general comment on children’s right to access to justice and to an effective remedy.

ALLEGRA FRANCHETTI, Secretary of the Committee, said that no reports had been received under the Convention since the last session, with the total number of reports pending consideration remaining at 62. The total number of ratifications of the Convention remained at 196, while 64 periodic reports were overdue, of which 10 for more than five years and five for more than 10 years.

There had been one new accession to an Optional Protocol to the Convention since the last session, with Estonia acceding to the Optional Protocol on a communications procedure. The total number of ratifications of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the involvement of children in armed conflict remained at 173, while ratifications of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography remained at 178, and ratifications of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on a communications procedure was now at 53.

No new reports had been received under any of the Optional Protocols. There were 37 initial reports overdue under the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict; and 47 overdue under the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.

Statements by United Nations Bodies and Civil Society Representatives

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights said the current global political and financial environment was difficult and complex.

The Office introduced reports to be presented at the upcoming June session of the Human Rights Council related to children’s rights, including the second report of the High Commissioner on child rights mainstreaming, a report on the use of digital technologies to achieve universal birth registration, and a report on ensuring quality education for children.

The Office was also preparing a report on the rights of the child and violations of the human rights of children in armed conflicts, which would be presented at the September session of the Human Rights Council, and a report on the safety of the child in the digital environment, which would be presented at the Council in 2026.

In addition, the Office had held a capacity-building roundtable with Member States on 5 June on strengthening child participation at the Human Rights Council, and it continued to contribute to the civil society and academia-led process to develop global guidelines on child participation in global events, helping to convene two participatory surveys that had reached over 200 children worldwide.

The Office encouraged Committee members and other parties to participate in the Fifth World Conference on Justice for Children, to be held in Spain for 2 to 4 June. The Office would work with the Committee to protect children’s rights in this difficult time.

United Nations Children’s Fund commended the work of the Committee’s outgoing bureau and expressed its desire to work with the new Bureau and all Committee Experts. Perhaps more than ever, the Committee was meeting at a time of great constraint for the international human rights system. It was regrettable that the pre-sessional working group was cancelled. The Fund was discussing with the Committee regarding alternative means of engaging with children and civil society from the countries concerned in preparation for the next session.

Armed conflicts, climate change, poverty, violence and inequalities, among other trends, continued to deprive millions of children of their rights, and the mere recognition that children had rights continued to be challenged in all parts of the world. There was a normative pushback against children’s rights at the last Human Rights Council. Most statements focused exclusively on children’s vulnerability and their right to protection, and did not highlight children’s agency, empowerment and participation. In negotiations on a resolution on child rights defenders, there was much resistance to attempts to recognise their contributions.

The Fund had held consultations with more than 7,000 children related to the Committee’s general comment 27 on children’s right to access to justice and to an effective remedy and had worked to develop a child-friendly version of the draft general comment.

The Fund had also worked on a child rights training course for its staff and had updated its handbook on the jurisprudence of the Committee. Later in the year, the Fund would start to develop guidance on general measures of implementation, following the online guidance on children’s rights legislative reform launched last year.

Child Rights Connect expressed its renewed commitment to supporting the Committee. It welcomed the holding of the session, despite uncertainty due to the United Nations’ liquidity crisis, and requested the Committee to discuss the organisation of its future work, including how and when it would engage with children and civil society.

Child Rights Connect raised deep concern about the impact on children of the funding crisis affecting the child rights sector. Despite these circumstances, it continued to collaborate with stakeholders and carry out its mandate. It welcomed the development of general comment 27, and had mobilised children and civil society around it, producing a methodology for consulting with children along with supporting child-friendly materials. It had also recently launched a global survey on the digital protection of child human rights defenders, which collected the opinions and experiences of children who had stood up to protect human rights in the digital space.

At a time when manifold crises affected children of the world, all persons holding mandates for children needed to strengthen joint efforts and find new ways of working with creativity to better serve children.

___________

Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media;
not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

CRC25.009E

MIL OSI United Nations News –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Upper Nappan — Cumberland County Integrated Street Crime Enforcement Unit seizes fentanyl, charges woman
Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

The Cumberland County Integrated Street Crime Enforcement Unit (SCEU) seized quantities of illicit drugs and charged a woman as part of an ongoing drug trafficking investigation.

On May 5, the Cumberland County Integrated SCEU, with assistance of Cumberland County District RCMP, executed a search warrant at a property on Hwy. 2 in Upper Nappan as part of an ongoing drug trafficking investigation.

Officers safely arrested a woman and seized quantities of fentanyl, methamphetamine (crystal and tablets), oxycodone, cocaine, prescription drugs, unstamped cannabis and cash. Officers also seized a conducted energy weapon and drug paraphernalia.

Toni Cree Loppie, 51, of Upper Nappan, has been charged with:
- Possession for the Purpose of Trafficking (seven counts)
- Possession of Unstamped Cannabis
- Possession of Weapon for Dangerous Purpose
- Possession of Prohibited Weapon
- Possession of Prohibited Weapon knowing Possession Unauthorized
- Possession of Property Obtained by Crime
Loppie was released from custody by the court and is scheduled to appear in Amherst Provincial Court on July 7 at 9:30 a.m.

Nova Scotians are encouraged to contact their nearest RCMP detachment or local police to report crime, including the illegal sale of drugs, in their communities. Anonymous tips can be made by calling Nova Scotia Crime Stoppers, toll-free, at 1-800-222-TIPS (8477), submitting a secure web tip at www.crimestoppers.ns.ca, or using the P3 Tips app.

Notes:
- The Cumberland County Integrated Street Crime Enforcement Unit includes members of the Cumberland County District RCMP and the Amherst Police Department.
- A photo of the items seized is attached.
File: 2024-1802880

MIL Security OSI –
May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The Crete-Cyprus electricity interconnection is an important project for the EU and has received significant EU funding – E-000454/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Great Sea Interconnector (formerly known as ‘EuroAsia Interconnector’) is recognised as a project of common interest (PCI) of the EU in the field of energy, notably under the fifth EU list of projects of common and mutual interest adopted in 2021[1]. The project has been received a EUR 657 million EU grant under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and has also been awarded a EUR 100 million grant from the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility[2].

The EU has repeatedly expressed its expectation by Türkiye to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean[3].

In particular, the Commission has underlined in the 2024 enlargement report on Türkiye[4] that, as stemming from obligations under the Negotiating Framework, Türkiye is expected to make an unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations, international agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes including through the International Court of Justice. Türkiye must avoid threats and actions that damage good neighbourly relations and respect the sovereignty of all Member States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including inter alia the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

This is essential to ensure a stable and secure environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between the EU and Türkiye[5].

[1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R0564&qid=1663087079030.

[2] https://commission.europa.eu/news/commission-participates-launch-euroasia-electricity-interconnector-2022-10-14_en.

[3] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/57442/2022-06-2324-euco-conclusions-en.pdf.

[4] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/8010c4db-6ef8-4c85-aa06-814408921c89_en?filename=T%C3%BCrkiye%20Report%202024.pdf.

[5] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6157.
Last updated: 12 May 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
May 13, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: European Public Prosecutor’s Office (the ‘EPPO’) – P10_TA(2025)0087 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office for the financial year 2023,

– having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0051/2025),

A. whereas the EPPO is the independent public prosecution office of the Union, responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes against the financial interests of the Union, for significantly enhancing the Union’s capacity to safeguard taxpayer funds, and for bringing to judgment the perpetrators of, and accomplices to, criminal offences provided for in Directive (EU) 2017/1371(1) and indicated by Regulation (EU) 2017/1939(2);

B. whereas the competence of the EPPO encompasses several types of fraud, and includes cross-border VAT fraud with a total damage of at least EUR 10 million, money laundering, corruption, organised crime and other offences for which the EPPO performs prosecutorial functions before the competent courts of the participating Member States;

C. whereas the EPPO is one of the component of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture and, as such, its actions are coordinated with and complementary to those of the other components of the architecture, to achieve streamlined, efficient coordination that enhances the overall effectiveness of the architecture;

D. whereas the EPPO intervenes when national authorities could investigate and prosecute crimes but where the prerogatives of national authorities stop at the borders of their country, and other organisations like Eurojust, OLAF and Europol do not have the necessary powers to carry out the relevant criminal investigations and prosecutions;

E. whereas the procedural acts of the EPPO are subject to judicial review by the national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’) has, by way of preliminary rulings or judicial reviews of those acts, residual power to ensure a consistent application of Union law;

F. whereas the EPPO is composed of a central level, with its headquarters in Luxembourg, consisting of the European Chief Prosecutor, 22 European Prosecutors (one per participating Member State), the Administrative Director, and a decentralised, national- level consisting of the European delegated prosecutors (EDPs) in the 22 participating Member States;

G. whereas at the central level the European Chief Prosecutor and the 22 European Prosecutors compose the College of the EPPO (the ‘College’) and supervise the investigations and prosecutions carried out by the EDPs at the national level, who operate with complete independence from their national authorities;

H. whereas, under Article 93 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, the EPPO Administrative Director, acting as the authorising officer of the EPPO, is to implement its budget under its own responsibility and within the limits authorised in the budget and shall send each year to the budgetary authority all information relevant to the findings of any evaluation procedures;

I. whereas, in accordance with Article 50(2) of the EPPO’s Financial Rules, the Accounting Officer of the Commission is also to act as Accounting Officer of the EPPO and is responsible for the preparation of the annual accounts, which are consolidated with those of the Union;

J. whereas, under the current framework, the final annual accounts are scrutinised by the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’) and it is with the Council to recommend and to the European Parliament to decide whether to grant discharge to EPPO’s Administrative Director in respect of the implementation of the budget for a given financial year;

K. whereas the scrutiny over the management of the EPPO resources and related expenditure cannot ignore the examination of operational activities, their consequences and impact and the methods of their execution;

L. whereas the EPPO has been operating autonomously in the implementation of its budget only since 24 June 2021 and it has started its operational activities, necessitating continuous evaluation to ensure resources align with operational effectiveness, on 1 June 2021, which is also the dies a quo for the five-year term indicated in Article 119 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 upon reaching which the Commission will have to submit to the European Parliament and to the Council and to national parliaments an evaluation report on the implementation and impact of such Regulation, and on the effectiveness and efficiency of the EPPO and its working practices, together with its conclusions;

M. whereas, in accordance with Article 119(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, the Commission is to submit legislative proposals to the European Parliament and to the Council if it concludes that it is necessary to have additional or more detailed rules on the setting up of the EPPO, its functions or the procedure applicable to its activities, including its cross-border investigations;

1. Welcomes the positive opinion of the Court on the reliability of the EPPO’s accounts for the year ended 31 December 2023 and on the legality and regularity of the underlying revenue and payments;

2. Recalls the Parliament’s strong support for the establishment of the EPPO; acknowledges the EPPO as an independent Union body; stresses the EPPO’s important role in the protection of the Union’s financial interests and as an essential component of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture and of a wider Union system based on integrity, accountability, transparency and the sound financial management of resources; commends the EPPO for its work in investigating, prosecuting, and ensuring justice for crimes affecting the Union budget, such as fraud, corruption, and cross-border VAT fraud;

3. Highlights the critical necessity of promptly dedicating necessary resources to ensure the timely conclusion of the ongoing investigation into the acquisition of the COVID-19 vaccine in the Union, especially considering the substantial public interest in this matter, coupled with the fact that the investigation already commenced in 2022 and to this date no decision has been publicly announced;

4. Notes that it is possible to compare only the two most recent budgetary and operational performances of the EPPO, for the period 2022 to 2023, following the EPPO’s financial autonomy in June 2021; observes that, in that context, the budgetary increases related to the EPPO’s activities remain very difficult to estimate because of the EPPO’s recent establishment, the unique characteristics of the EPPO and its main activities, the unpredictable level of fraud detection, the wide variety of its cases, its lack of discretion with regard to pursuing prosecutions coupled with its reliance on the resources and procedural constraints of national judicial systems, the lack of a fixed correlation between the number and the costs of investigations, and the magnitude of the Union’s financial interests that are to be protected; also observes that it is difficult to estimate the expenditure for the caseload related to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) because of its unprecedented manner of implementation and high volume of resources;

Budgetary and financial management

5. Notes that the overall final budget allocated to the EPPO for 2023 was EUR 65,9 million, substantially increased (by 14,7 %) from the EUR 51,2 million that was allocated in 2022, while the 2021 budget (EUR 26,2 million) related to a period prior to the EPPO’s financial autonomy; observes that the EPPO’s budget includes the reinforcement, granted by the budgetary authority at the request of the EPPO in June 2023, by EUR 500 000 (the request also included human resources related to the essential enhancement of the EPPO’s security capacity, leading to the grant of eight additional establishment plan posts); appreciates that no budget was returned in 2023, compared to 10 % (EUR 5,9 million) of the initial budget in 2022 and 21 % (EUR 9,5 million) in 2021; re-iterates the need for the EPPO to be provided with sufficient resources to adequately fulfil its mandate;

6. Welcomes the increasing level of budget implementation, which was 99,6 % in 2023 (compared to 98,1 % in 2022 and 97,4 % in 2021); appreciates that the overall execution rate for payments progressed in 2023 reaching 85,3 % (compared to 76,6 % and 71 % in 2022 and 2021) and the average payment time decreased to 17 days compared to 23,8 in 2022 and 21,0 in 2021); observes that the electronic invoicing module (e-invoicing) was rolled out in June 2023 and it will contribute to further reducing administrative burdens, time-to-payment and the overall processing costs; encourages a further refinement of operational processes to maximise efficiency;

7. Understands that, because the budget endowment requests were only partially met, the EPPO focused its financial resources on the intake of additional EDPs, which has an impact on the EPPO’s capacity to lead the increasing number of investigations and prosecutions, on the need to improve the security standing of the organisation and on the maintenance of its case-management System (CMS), which could have negatively affected the management of cross-border investigations; underlines the importance of additional funding and strengthening its staffing to enable the EPPO to effectively combat organised crime, protect the Union’s financial interests, and uphold the rule of law, which are key Union priorities; calls for a dedicated increase in funding within the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to ensure it can continue to meet its objectives and obligations;

8. Is aware that, following the achievement of its financial autonomy, in June 2021, the EPPO prioritised the operational expenditure related to investigation, prosecution and security measures, and that this has resulted in limiting the non-operational expenditure to essential level support services; remarks that, in this context, a total of EUR 28 312 075 was allocated on operational expenditure lines (Title 3), representing 43 % of the EPPO’s final budget 2023 (compared to EUR 21 047 346, which was 41 % in 2022); observes that the main cost drivers for these activities were the EDPs’ remuneration (51 % of the operational activities compared to 42 % in 2022), followed by operational ICT activities like maintenance and development of the EPPO’s CMS (19 % compared to 28 % in 2022), and the linguistic services (translation and interpretation related activities) (14 %, the same as in 2022);

9. Notes that the remuneration of the EDPs reached EUR 14,5 million (compared to EUR 8,7 million in 2022), which represents the main operational expenditure because of the increased number of EDPs in place over 2023; welcomes the accession of Poland and Sweden to the EPPO, which was announced in 2024; notes that it did not affect the 2023 expenditure and concerns the 2024 budget only marginally, due to the late and gradual intake of two European Prosecutors and a number of EDPs; understands that a more solid cost estimation will not be possible until 2025; welcomes the inclusion in the programme of the objective of the new Irish Government to join the EPPO; calls on the Hungarian government, as the sole remaining Member State that has not yet joined the EPPO, despite the absence of any legal or constitutional impediment, to join the EPPO without further delay;

10. Observes that costs for missions and operational meetings increased further in 2023 (mission costs were EUR 1 175 000 in 2023 and EUR 980 000 in 2022; operational meeting in 2023 were EUR 659 752 compared to EUR 170 000 in 2022), in line with the increasing level of intensity of investigations;

11. Is aware that the costs for translation services are expected to further increase, in line with the EPPO’s increasing caseload, and recognises the need for additional resources for translation; welcomes both the internal guidance developed on the use of translation services, with a view to reinforcing control over costs and including the recommendation to use machine translation services whenever possible, and the use of national service providers of the limit allowed by the current Regulation to address the problem; observes, in that regard, that while Article 107 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 provides for translation services required for the administrative functioning of the EPPO at the central level to be provided by the Union’s Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union, it also provides for different handling of operational and urgent matters and empowers EDPs to decide on the arrangements for translations for the purpose of investigations in accordance with applicable national law;

12. Notes that in 2023 the EPPO signed 234 specific contracts under existing framework contracts, for a total of more than EUR 11 million, with a significant increase in the use of EPPO framework contracts (82 specific contracts for a value of more than EUR 6,5 million) due, to a great extent, to the use of the EPPO’s framework contract for the Provision of Services in the Field of Information Systems; observes that only one contract, concerning the EPPO’s CMS, was awarded via a negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice for reasons of extreme urgency;

13. Observes that carry-over of appropriations from the previous exercise in 2022 amounted to EUR 10 969 680 (24,4 % of the EPPO’s 2022 final budget), of which 84,8 % was consumed (EUR 9 307 392) and 15,2 % was cancelled (compared to 21,4 % in 2022) and notes that forecasts indicate another carry-over in 2024, pending completion of the deliverables, for payment appropriations (the carry-over from 2023 to 2024 amounted to EUR 9 392 989); understands that partial cancellation is a consequence of the progressive establishment of the EPPO’s administrative practices following the financial autonomy it achieved in 2021; notes that carry-over appropriations cancelled for approved budgets of 2022 and 2023 could be neither used with existing or new contracts nor synchronised with the principle of annuality, while the planning of the corresponding expenses, mainly related to translation, meetings, missions and external contractors, could not be accurate due to a lack of any historical data and figures and the rapid evolving of the organisation; appreciates that the continuous strengthening of the EPPO’s administrative capacity is progressively addressing those issues and that, while a fully estimation cannot be made in advance because of the nature of the EPPO’s operational activity, the expected level of cancelled appropriations will diminish in 2024;

14. Notes that in 2023 two budget transfers were adopted by the European Chief Prosecutor, on a proposal drawn up by the Administrative Director, and that they were notified to the College for information, for a total transferred between titles of EUR 1,2 million;

15. Acknowledges the need for adequate budget flexibility, to address unexpected operational needs such as, in 2023, the war in Ukraine, inflationary pressures, or other global challenges and understands that the EPPO made use of its Financial Rules by timely reallocation of appropriations via budget amendments (one in June and one in November) and via budget transfers (one in September and one in December);

16. Reiterates its observation on the obsolete 2017 Legislative Financial Statement which is deemed to be no longer fit-for-purpose due to a significantly underestimated workload; recalls its previous resolution, underlining that the absence of a mid-term budgetary review obliges the EPPO to wait until the very end of the budgetary adoption process to have clarity on what resource level it can implement in the subsequent year, and it limits the EPPO’s capacity to anticipate budget implementation preparatory activities as well as the options that should be made available to achieve maximum flexibility in the development of an organisational infrastructure for a project as innovative as the EPPO; notes that this, in particular, affects the early launch of recruitment, delaying the progress towards full occupancy among others and the overall absorption capacity of the EPPO;

17. Maintains that the budgetary and human resources allocated to the EPPO are expected to be adequate to allow the efficient and successful carrying out of its mandate and the normal handling of the related administrative procedures; reiterates its call on the Commission to review the EPPO budgetary framework in close cooperation with the EPPO to find adequate ways to support it in its work; calls on the Commission to allocate additional resources, justified by the growing number of complex cases, and emphasises that these should not be dependent on the revision of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 or of the EPPO mandate, but rather on the importance of the fight against organised crime and the protection of the Union’s financial interests in the next MFF;

18. Emphasises that the activities of the EPPO contribute to the protection of the Union’s financial interests and are also expected to recover amounts from the Union’s budget that were not used for its intended purpose due to criminal activities; believes that the amounts resulting from seizing and confiscating measures adopted by the EDPs in the Member States could, after the deduction of costs incurred by the Member States’ authorities to implement those measures, flow back into the Union Budget in accordance with Article 38 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939; considers that the potential revenue resulting from seizing and confiscating measures should be accounted for in the Union Budget as non-assigned revenue; calls on the Commission to make the necessary arrangements with the relevant national authorities to allow those amounts to enter into the Union Budget;

19. Acknowledges that the EPPO clearly contributes to European added value in terms of coordination and cooperation with the Member States in investigating and prosecuting crimes against the financial interests of the Union and that the EPPO has been achieving the goals set out in Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 in that regard; expects Member States to comply with legal obligations and to report all relevant cases to the EPPO; notes with concern that in several instances Member States have been declaring criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union as national cases, which are within the competence of the EPPO; notes that questions of competence between the national authorities and the EDPs have come up in several cases across several countries; is aware that, according to Article 25(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, cases of disagreement about the EPPO’s competences are to be decided by the same national judicial authority who is responsible for determining the competent body for prosecution at national level; regrets that in many participating Member States the procedures in force and the national authorities entrusted with the decisions on such cases regarding conflicts of competence are not set in compliance with Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, stresses that in cases of conflicts of competence between the EPPO and a national prosecution authority, the national authority competent to decide on the attribution of competence could come to a conclusion without requesting a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice and could, instead adopt a decision that is binding on the EPPO and points out that this is against the spirit of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, which provides that, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provision on conflicts of competence between the EPPO and national authorities; believes that the current situation lacks legal clarity; encourages all Member States to work more closely with the EPPO; emphasises that the competence of the EPPO is clearly outlined in Article 22(1) and (2), and in Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, and that all Member States are to comply with that Regulation; notes that when Member States have doubts about the competence of the EPPO in a particular case, there is the possibility of submitting a preliminary question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 267 TFEU and Article 42(2), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 ; urges the Commission, where there is a breach of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, to submit the case to the Court of Justice; notes with concern that the question of competence can cause a halt to the investigation; is concerned about potential loss of evidence when cases are paused; calls on the Commission to collect information regarding cases regarding conflicts of competence for the evaluation report that will be submitted in 2026;

20. Reiterates that Article 91(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 is to be implemented properly and underlines that the peculiar characteristics of prosecution and investigation expenditure, including the exceptional cases of the EPPO’s operational expenditure governed by that provision, have to be taken into account; understands that, in 2023, a first financing agreement was signed in the framework of a pilot for the reimbursement of claims made under Article 91(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, to cover exceptionally costly investigation measures carried out at national level on behalf of the EPPO; appreciates that the corresponding payment was audited by the Court during the 2023 audit and was deemed legal and regular;

Internal management, performance and internal control

21. Welcomes that, during 2023, the College met 22 times and adopted 73 decisions, among which are the anti-fraud strategy 2023-2025, the anti-harassment policy for staff and for members of the College or the EDPs;

22. Acknowledges that the EPPO continued its efforts to set in place a system to monitor efficiency gains and cost savings, and notes that in 2023 it launched a review of the budget and activities’ strategic and operational planning and monitoring processes and of the recruitment processes, to make gains in speed and acquired competences; points out that, overall, the internal control systems in force are effective;

23. Notes that, to further develop the EPPO’s assurance framework, the internal auditor of the EPPO for non-operational matters (IAS) initiated, in 2023, a limited review of the EPPO’s building blocks of assurance; believes that this engagement, scheduled to be finalised during the course of 2024, will provide recommendations to build a stronger capacity for the Authorising Officer to issue a credible declaration of assurance;

24. Welcomes the benchmarking exercise carried out by the Internal Audit Capability (IAC) by comparing the deployed human resources of the EPPO with a set of other Union entities and national prosecution offices, against a standardised set of pillars which includes administrative support and operational activities; observes that, in 2023, the IAC tested the internal oversight environment and ran the first internal audit as an analysis of the working environment and internal controls of the EPPO’s decentralised office in Sofia, Bulgaria;

25. Reiterates its view that the IAS and the IAC should coordinate their actions with a view to advising and assisting the EPPO in the establishment of its main core processes and the achievement of its objectives;

26. Notes that the EPPO has developed its own purchase capacity, resulting from its own specifically run procurement processes launched in 2023, and manages its own specific contracts and order forms with regard to the implementation of existing framework contracts that were signed in 2023; observes that the EPPO continues, in parallel, to operate its purchase capacity through service level agreements with other Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by joining inter-institutional contracts with various market operators;

27. Is aware that in 2023 the Administrative Director established the minimum standards (assessment criteria) for each of the 17 internal control principles based on the COSO 2013 Control-Integrated Framework and established by the EPPO Internal Control Framework (ICF) as building blocks of the EPPO internal control system; observes that out of 72 compliance criteria, 51 are observed as fulfilled, 20 have some elements in place but further development is desirable and only in the case of one criterion has no significant implementation has been noted; appreciates that, since its adoption by the College on March 2021, 71 % of the adopted ICF assessment have been successfully implemented whereas additional effort needs to be made for the full implementation of the remaining 29 %;

28. Welcomes that, on 1 March 2023, an updated version of the EPPO Anti-Fraud Strategy 2023-2025 was adopted setting the objectives to counter fraud at all levels of the organisation in connection with a dedicated action plan which is part of the EPPO internal control environment and is monitored on a regular basis; appreciates the annual review of the Anti-Fraud Strategy action plan by the EPPO Internal Control Officer, reporting the results of that review to the Administrative Director;

29. Is aware that, in line with the EPPO’s financial rules, the EPPO ensures an adequate level of financial transactions and procurement procedures via ex post controls on financial transactions (payments, commitments and recovery orders) and on procurement procedures for the period 1 January to 31 December 2023;

30. Observes the increase in crime reports submitted to the EPPO (4 187 in 2023 compared to 3 318 in 2022 and 2 832 in 2021) and, as a result, the increase in open investigations (1 371 in 2023 compared to 865 in 2022 and 567 in 2021) and in the estimation of damage (EUR 19,27 billion in 2023 compared to 14,1 billion in 2022 and 5,4 billion in 2021); remarks that reports from private parties (2 494, which is 29 % more than in 2022) and from national authorities (1 562, which is 24 % more than in 2022) represent the biggest share of operational input received, while regrets that reports from other Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies remained very low (108), suggesting that no significant improvement in terms of detection and reporting was achieved from their side; notes that the number of indictments (139 in 2023 compared to 87 in 2022 and 5 in 2021) together with the freezing orders obtained by the EPPO (EUR 1,5 billion compared to EUR 359,1 million in 2022 and EUR 147 million in 2021) are indicative of the growing performance level of the EPPO;

31. Notes that, compared with 2022, the caseload of the EPPO almost doubled in 2023, reaching up to 1 927 active investigations; commends the fruitful activities of the EPPO in 2023, which included 139 indictments, 339 VAT-related cases and over 200 investigations on the implementation of NextGenerationEU; further notes that the EPPO started to bring more perpetrators of Union fraud to justice in front of national courts;

32. Notes that, in 2023, 48 cases concluded with a court conviction (compared to 20 cases in 2022) and that EUR 60 million was the amount confiscated (compared to EUR 2 million in 2021); underlines the importance of a systematic reporting on the follow-up to these cases in terms of the financial measures adopted (confiscation and recovery) to get a clearer understanding of the impact of the EPPO’s actions; welcomes the actions undertaken by the EPPO and the Commission to streamline their communications and make them adequate in relation to the needs of possible administrative procedures for the adoption of measures to restore the Union’s budget affected by financial crimes; reiterates its call on the Commission to assist the EPPO in monitoring and follow-up activities, in such a way that the EPPO’s limited resources are not diverted from their investigative and prosecutorial tasks; encourages the EPPO, where possible and appropriate, to engage in better cooperation with other components of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture, such as Eurojust and Europol, or using – via OLAF- the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services established in the Member States to monitor the results of its investigations;

33. Underlines the essential role of asset recovery in the creation of a credible deterrent to organised crime; welcomes the EPPO’s participation in international networks to advance its asset recovery operations further; stresses the need for the Commission to invite the EPPO to participate in the newly created cooperation network on asset recovery and confiscation; notes that the timely and effective investigation and prosecution of fraud-related crimes can generate significant savings for the budget of the Union and the budgets of the Member States;

34. Is concerned about the increasing number of EPPO investigations regarding the implementation of Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) (there were 233 investigations at the end of 2023, compared to 15 investigations at the end of 2022) and their relevant estimated financial damage (EUR 1,86 billion); is particularly concerned that, despite the high number of investigations, there is currently no obligation on Member States to report RRF cases to the Commission through the Irregularity Management System (IMS); recalls the obligation to report all the cases of fraud affecting RRF to the EPPO and stresses that such cases are also relevant for EDES-related measures; stresses that the EPPO’s workload, initially underestimated, has significantly increased and is expected to continue growing particularly due to the rising number of RRF-related cases and that relevant analyses suggest a possible exponential grow in the number of cases of fraud, corruption, double funding and conflicts of interest in the coming years; calls on the EPPO to systematically analyse and identify fraud patterns in Member States where multiple RRF cases have been detected, and to communicate these patterns to Member States, the Commission and the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, with the objective of enhancing preventative measures to mitigate the risk of fraud; calls on the EPPO, the Commission and OLAF to cooperate closely with the aim of minimising, as much as possible, the impact of such fraudulent misbehaviours on the Union’s budget and safeguarding the achievements of the RRF’s goals; recalls the call on the Commission to provide adequate guidance to the EPPO on how to support and foster the adoption of the remedial measures which follow the EPPO’s independent investigation and prosecution of fraud affecting the RRF and to keep the budgetary authority informed regarding the available options;

35. Understands that the EPPO reacted to Parliament’s call for a better monitoring system and enhanced follow-up of investigations and prosecutions by launching a project on digital statistical tools which would allow better use of the data that it processes, and the development of a strategic analysis capacity to identify the patterns of fraud; shares the EPPO’s view that the success of those efforts are directly linked to the available resources and calls on the Commission to take these activities and the related costs into consideration for the future proposals on Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 and on budgetary endowments;

36. Appreciates the EPPO’s efforts in the setting up key performance indicators (KPIs) for both operational and administrative activities with specific targets due to its peculiar business model; maintains its remark on the need for operational activities to include reference to the amounts seized, confiscated and eventually recovered to the Union’s budget, the safeguard of which is ultimately the raison d’être of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture of which the EPPO is an important component; understands that monitoring and follow-up action, including reporting on the recovery results, are not in the EPPO’s remit and require resources and specific prerogatives that are not part of the EPPO’s mission; asks the Commission to support the EPPO in identifying indicators linked to the achievement of that essential task, stressing that a better monitoring system, and more data of good granularity and aggregated in cluster per typology of misconduct, sector of interest or geographical area, could allow making more tangible the impact of the EPPO’s investigations and allow the identification of patterns of fraud;

Human resources, equality and staff well-being

37. Observes the upward trend in the number of staff, increasing from 58 in 2020, to 122 in 2021, 217 by the end of 2022 and 238 by the end of 2023; is aware that, for 2023, the EPPO requested from the budgetary authority the suppression of 20 contract agent posts and the creation of 20 temporary agent posts, which was granted and implemented by the EPPO in the same year, resulting in the total number of staff remaining unchanged (248, out of with 171 TAs, 48 CAs and 29 SNEs), with a different allocation of posts (191 TAs, 28 CAs and 29 SNEs); points out, however, that following certain security weaknesses identified, the EPPO requested in May 2023 an amending budget and additional posts to enhance the physical, information and cyber security at central and decentralised levels and that out of 21 security posts identified, only eight posts (1 AD 9, 4 AD 6 and 3 AST 3) were granted in November 2023 for further security implementations which was finalised in 2024;

38. Points out that, in 2023, the occupancy rate at the central office was 92,97 %, of which 238 were members of staff compared to 256 budgeted posts; notes that out of 140 posts for the EDPs, 130 were on the post at the end of 2023 and another 10 started at the beginning of 2024, reaching 100 % of occupancy rate; observes that the EPPO reinforced its capacity to run timely and transparent recruitment procedures by concluding 24 selection procedures in 2023, on-boarding 45 statutory staff members and 8 new European Prosecutors while 35 new EDPs were appointed;

39. Notes that, by December 2023, staff turnover (TAs and CAs) was at 4,62 %(3), recording a total of 11 resignations throughout the year, mainly justified by leaving to another institution (four cases) and for more senior positions offered in other Union institutions (seven cases); observes that the main underlying cause for this turnover is the specificity of the Luxembourg labour market, which has a very limited talent pool and small offer of specialised skills;

40. Acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to satisfy the EPPO’s requests for additional posts; believes that the workload perspectives indicates that further resources are needed, especially considering the backlog and additional RRF-related cases and far-reaching VAT fraud and also considering that the administrative and central support functions are expected to grow, in line with the larger operational population; points out the risk of underestimating needs and capacities; remarks that the cost of interim staff and external service providers working intra-muros in 2023 reached EUR 4 235 242; encourages the Commission and the EPPO to find a sustainable long-term solution which allows for continuity, preserves confidentiality and retains built-in competences; appreciates that the EPPO’s additional operational needs are exhaustively integrated in the EPPO Single Programming Document 2024-2026 and in EPPO budget requests;

41. Notes with concern that the Luxembourg labour market is very competitive, that the financial conditions offered by the Union administration are not attractive compared to the local market (subject to diverse salary indexations throughout the year), and do not take due account of the high cost of living in Luxembourg, which has become even more difficult because of the inflation rate and the increased cost of housing; notes that the EPPO cannot offer a career path for its members of staff to become Union Officials and that its posts are therefore even less attractive than those in the four other Union institutions operating from Luxembourg; emphasises that this results either in a very limited number of applications for vacant posts or in the rejection by the selected candidates of the employment offer once received, due to the high cost of living; calls on the EPPO and the Commission to implement measures that enhance the EPPO’s attractiveness for highly skilled professionals with international experience, such as the housing allowance for lower-grade staff approved by the budgetary authority for 2025, as recommended by the High-Level Interinstitutional Group; notes the overrepresentation of certain nationalities among staff;

42. Notes that, at the end of 2023, geographical and gender balance was adequately pursued overall across the 238 members of staff (with 137 men and 101 women); maintains that the nationality breakdown of the EPPO population is constantly monitored by those hiring new members of staff, in seeking to ensure balance, especially, in light of the uneven distribution of applicants, and with Italy (34), Romania (33), Greece (26) and Belgium (24) being more represented across the 26 different nationalities; encourages the EPPO to adopt proactive measures to ensure a balanced representation of nationalities among its staff, reflecting the diversity of the participating Member States; expresses concerns over the gender distribution among senior management positions (four men to one woman) and calls for this issue to be addressed in the framework of the overall diversity strategy; calls for the publication of an annual report, disaggregated by gender, nationality, and employment category, including concrete measures to close gaps in recruitment and career advancement and to monitor and address imbalances;

43. Is aware that the decision to implement a strategy on Diversity and Inclusion was made in 2023, with the development of the strategy to be executed in the course of 2024; encourages the EPPO to progress with its adoption and to periodically launch surveys among its staff, by promoting peer-review with other components of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture, such as Eurojust, OLAF and Europol; understands that the EPPO’s policy on Diversity & Inclusion will be based on the EU Agencies Network Charter on Diversity & Inclusion, adopted in March 2023, and believes that it will in general encourage diversity to make the workplace more attractive to candidates with specific needs; reiterates its request to the EPPO to adopt its Charter on Diversity and Inclusion without delay, in light of the increase in staff during 2023;

44. Remarks that, including TAs, CAs, SNEs and EDPs, 341 out of 396 staff (compared to 275 out of 332 in 2022) were deployed in investigative activities by the end of 2023 (that is 86,10 % compared to 82,83 % in 2022 and 86 % in 2021) while 55 members of staff (compared to 57 in 2022) were engaged in administrative support and control functions;

45. Welcomes the appointment of 8 new European Prosecutors and 35 new EDP’s to the EPPO in 2023; reiterates that the EPPO can fulfil its role only if it enjoys full judicial independence, which flows from a merit-based and objective appointment procedure; encourages Member States to contribute to the full independence of the EPPO in that regard;

46. Maintains that the appointment of EDPs is a shared responsibility of the EPPO and the Member States; stresses that the appointment procedure must always comply with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 and the principle of national procedural autonomy;

47. Underlines the need for greater career development opportunities for EDPs to attract and retain experienced professionals; calls for improved employment conditions, including a clear career progression path and the standardisation of social security and pension arrangements across participating Member States, ensuring that national salary discrepancies do not deter qualified candidates from applying;

48. Appreciates that, in the course of 2023 and beginning 2024, the number of EDPs reached the initially foreseen number of 140; welcomes the decision to align the remuneration of EDPs with that of EU Officials of equivalent level of responsibility, rather than 80 % of the salary of EU Officials, as originally provided for; takes the view that this decision increases the attractiveness of the EDP’s function, paving the way to the recruitment of more experienced national prosecutors whose national salary was higher than the remuneration offered by the EPPO, and in the meantime reduces the administrative burden on the EPPO for the implementation of Article 16(1) of the Conditions of Employment of the EDPs, which provides that, in the case of total net remuneration lower than the national salary, a top-up amount is provided to ensure that the remuneration matches the previous level;

49. Underlines that the selection process for European Prosecutors and EDPs is not managed autonomously by the EPPO, because European Prosecutors are nominated by the Member States and then appointed by the European Council, whereas EDPs are nominated by the Member States and appointed by the College; maintains that the application of qualified candidates to the EDP positions could increase and the process could become more selective by adopting a clear career perspective and more favourable administrative discipline on social security and health insurance coverage; reiterates that the creation of a specific status for EDPs would be consistent with the nature of their judicial function and contribute on making those posts more appealing; calls on the Commission to propose adequate solutions in the event of amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1939;

50. Understands that each Member State is obliged (under Article 96(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939) to put in place arrangements of legislative or administrative nature to maintain the affiliation and coverage of the EDPs, including any contributions to the relevant national social security, pension and insurance schemes, but a number of Member States have not yet fully complied with this obligation; therefore calls on the Commission to propose an effective solution to the social security and health insurance coverage gap of the EDPs at the revision of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939;

51. Notes that five complaints about the appointment of EDPs were introduced before the Court of Justice until 2023, of which three were closed (either dismissed or withdrawn) and one was dismissed, but an appeal is currently pending before the Court of Justice, and the last action for annulment of the decision of the College rejecting the nomination as EDP of a person nominated by a Member State was admitted in July 2024 on the grounds of a lack of sufficient reasoning in the College’s decision and an analysis is on-going on the manner in which the annulment is to be implemented; observes that there are no new complaints before the General Court concerning appointments to the EPPO;

52. Notes that the EPPO’s learning and development strategy was launched in 2023, aiming to promote a culture of continuous learning and facilitate the continuous assessment and adaptation of the staff’s evolving learning needs, together with the pilot learning needs analysis;

53. Notes, as regards measures and policies in place to safeguard the physical and mental well-being of staff, that in 2023 all measures were subject to revision and consultation by all involved stakeholders (the staff committee, members of staff in general, and management), seeking to find a balance between expectations and reality of the EPPO as a growing and rapidly changing organisation; observes that there the EPPO operates a flexitime scheme and a work-from-home standard scheme, which provides for one day of telework per week as a basis and a maximum of three days per week, plus extensions accepted in light of serious health or family constraints; remarks that current framework also includes 10 days’ work from outside the place of employment in a given year, to be used without link to other days of leave; believes that the EPPO’s current working conditions allow staff to take advantage of digital solutions by integrating a good level of autonomy in the management of working patterns, facilitating the conciliation of private and work life and promoting team morale and spirit; welcomes the on-going development of a policy on well-being which shall contain a section on well-being for staff benefiting from telework;

54. Highlights that, as suggested by Parliament, in the second semester of 2023 an open consultation on flexible working arrangements took place, and the decisions adopted in 2021 and 2022 underwent an ex post revision; notes that in consideration of the input of all stakeholders, on December 2023 the Administrative Director incorporated updates to the provisions; notes that changes included the enlargement of the notion of ‘place of telework’ (from 2 to 2,5 hours’ time/distance radius around the EPPO’s central office), and the introduction of hybrid working arrangements for interim agency staff; observes that no further change was adopted by College decisions, taking into account that the Administrative Director decisions had already enacted the conclusions of the staff consultations;

55. Notes that, following Parliament’s calls, a staff satisfaction (engagement) survey is planned in the first quarter of 2025; understands that the EPPO’s staff committee has also run a staff priorities survey, and encourages a more intensive dialogue to enhance the work-life conditions;

56. Welcomes that no case of burnout or harassment have been reported and that the number of long-term sick leave is very limited; welcomes the EPPO’s awareness of its duty to ensure promotion and preservation of health and wellbeing across staff, as well as the monitoring practices to earn such understanding which take into account untaken annual leave, the carry-over of annual leave and absences, the number of staff on long-term sick leave and the length of the absences; recalls the importance of establishing a clear and structured procedure for reporting cases of harassment by the European Chief Prosecutor and by the European Prosecutors, as well as its divulgation to all the staff;

57. Observes that, in early 2023, the EPPO’s central office carried out a traineeship pilot and the EPPO legal service sector hosted two trainees followed by two more in March and September 2023 for remunerated, in-person, five-month traineeships; notes that, based on the positive conclusions of the pilot, a traineeship policy was drafted and has been approved in 2024, followed by a first cycle of effective trainees the same year; welcomes the initiative to launch an experimental relationship-building with the local university and if successful, calls for its expansion to additional universities across the EU, which could offer interesting perspectives to further develop the early talent programmes for diversity; stresses that the high cost of living in Luxembourg poses a considerable obstacle for potential trainees; emphasizes that traineeships should be remunerated in compliance with the European Parliament’s resolution of 14 June 2023 with recommendations to the Commission on quality traineeships in the Union (2020/2005(INL)), which calls for all internships in the Union to be paid;

58. Welcomes the intense activity of the staff committee, the final adoption of its internal rules of procedure, the launch of the first staff committee open day, the launch of the first EPPO-wide staff survey, the participation of its representatives in the selection procedures, the retroactive revision of all general implementing provisions adopted by the EPPO before the establishment of the staff committee, the submission of input on internal reorganisation, working time and hybrid working, implementing rules and the improvement of working conditions;

59. Understands that the EPPO is progressing towards the finalisation of a business continuity plan, which is included in the Union’s administration management standards, and urges the EPPO to adopt it without further delay;

Ethical framework and transparency

60. Understands that the EPPO’s ethical framework is being gradually built up; observes that the core values of that ethical framework are clearly set out in codes of conduct, which outline the standards of behaviour expected of employees at all levels; also observes that the ethical framework depends on the EPPO’s code of good administrative behaviour, its anti-fraud strategy and a training programme on ethics, which encompasses harassment, whistleblowing, the prevention of conflicts of interest and other ethical issues; regrets that members of staff of the EPPO are not required to attend that training programme, which would ensure a consistent understanding and application of the EPPO’s codes of conduct; calls on the EPPO to remedy the situation;

61. Notes the EPPO’s engagement in awareness-raising actions among staff about ethical framework and related matters; encourages the EPPO to make mandatory the attendance of such sessions by European Prosecutors and EDPs at their taking over of duties; believes that internal dialogue needs to be intensified;

62. Notes that no effective cases of conflict of interest were detected in 2023; is aware that dedicated conflict of interest declaration forms have been established and conflict of interest rules are in force for the members of College, the EDPs, the members of staff of the operational units, and other sensitive posts; welcomes the ongoing development of a structured conflict of interest policy and calls on the EPPO to finalise its adoption; calls for the implementation of a mandatory annual refreshment of an ethics and integrity training course for all EPPO personnel;

63. Urges the EPPO to enhance its internal integrity framework by mandating public disclosure of all financial interests and external activities of senior officials, including members of the College; calls for a periodic audit of these disclosures to identify and mitigate potential risks of undue influence;

64. Understands that the EPPO seeks to prevent revolving doors in particular by endorsing the strict application of the provisions of the Staff Regulations, which are set out in all contracts of the EPPO, including ad hoc exit forms that indicate the obligations that apply after termination of engagement; welcomes in this regard the adoption, in 2023, of the Guidelines for the EPPO Staff on Outside Activities and Assignments, which apply to activities that are not considered to relate to hobbies of leisure activities outside the remit of the EPPO;

65. Calls for the introduction of a more robust revolving door policy, including an extended cooling-off period of at least two years for senior EPPO officials before they can engage in private-sector employment related to EPPO investigations; requests that the EPPO conducts an annual review of compliance with these post-employment restrictions;

66. Calls the EPPO to adopt a dedicated whistleblowing and anti-retaliation procedure to integrate the implementing rules to the Staff Regulations adopted by the College (College Decision 2021/077 laying down guidelines on whistleblowing applicable within the EPPO) and to accompany Article 45.12 of the EPPO Financial Rules (establishing the actions to be undertaken in the circumstances) in order to ensure a safe and protected workplace; welcomes the initiative of intensifying internal communication on the first network of confidential counsellors and on the anti-harassment provisions and to all National European Delegated Prosecutors’ Assistants (NEDPAs) on whistleblowing mechanism for breaches against the EPPO mandate;

Digitalisation, Cybersecurity and data protection

67. Deplores the situation of the EPPO in the area of its IT autonomy, which is adversely affected by the decision of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Digital Services (‘DG Digital Services’, formerly DIGIT) to discontinue the provision of digital workplace services; points out that EPPO IT autonomy requires additional human and financial resources which so far have not been granted because of the limitation imposed by the overall available budgetary resources in the concerned lines; regrets that, on grounds of the risks to its operational activities, the EPPO had to establish its own digital service capacity to accommodate the additional human resources that it was granted in light of the participation of Poland and Sweden;

68. Notes that the EPPO’s initial approach was to prioritise resources on the setting and working of essential digital services linked to its operational activities, such as its case-management system, while acknowledging that the EPPO’s digital services, which, at least in part, diverge from those of the Commission, would have needed, in the mid-term, a tailored approach; observes that the interruption of service by the Commission occurs in the crucial phase of the consolidation of the EPPO’s establishment;

69. Understands that, in 2023, the EPPO’s IT, Security and Corporate Services unit continued the implementation of two major programmes: the IT Autonomy Programme, to offer a complete catalogue of administrative IT services fully managed internally, and the EPPO’s CMS programme, to further develop the digitalisation of the organisation in its core business area; acknowledges that in 2023 the EPPO continued to prepare to gradually transition from a digital workplace provided by DG Digital Services to an EPPO-owned and operated solution; is aware that the resources needed to implement this change, although were included in the EPPO’s budget request for 2023, were not granted by the budgetary authority; notes that following DG Digital Service’s announcement, the EPPO started negotiation to seek a solution which has not yet been achieved;

70. Appreciates that Commission has temporarily extended the provision of IT services until June 2025 but maintains that the outsourcing of those services is a suboptimal solution in the current situation; understands that not only security and confidentiality-related arguments, but also purely financial aspects, suggest to reconsider the decision, because the outsourcing would appear much more costly than the in-house solution, and the adoption of the latter, after DG Digital Services cease providing their services, would be managed by the EPPO; stresses that, to implement the preferable in-house solution, the complex administrative aspects, the EPPO lack of experience and the de-centralised configuration of the EPPO with EDPs and NEDPAs in several locations across the Union, will require a more relevant budget and a lengthy transition period;

71. Reiterates its call on DG Digital Services to not interrupt its support to the EPPO until such a time as the EPPO has its own reliable IT system; deems it to be essential to avoid loss of data and to keep the EPPO fully operational in the transition between IT services providers; maintains that clear communication and operational coordination on the transition is to be ensured involving the highest decision-making levels of the Commission and the EPPO; asks the Commission and the EPPO to agree upon a gradual passage of competences for a smooth and continuous transition in the period after the extension, which could be extended beyond June 2025;

72. Observes that EPPO’s requests for permanent additional posts to fill the gap stemming from the discontinuation of DG Digital Services were refused, in January 2023, when EPPO requested 45 establishment plan, and at the end of February 2024, when a request for an amending budget 2024 for EUR 2,98 million and 37 established plan posts was also rejected; notes that the solution of recruiting intra-muros contractors could be a part of an interim solution to address DG Digital Service’s discontinuation, but while that approach would offer immediate operational continuity, it should not be conceived as a definitive solution for the EPPO, taking into account the extremely sensitive nature of its activities and the need to ensure continuity and reliability of its digital services, as well as the highest level of security of its IT infrastructure, systems and equipment; shares the view that the rejection of the EPPO’s budgetary requests is indicative of differences in the assessment of the problem, which has an adverse impact on the EPPO’s operational activities and represents a potential reputational risk for the Union in the case it results in weakening the EPPO’s operational capacity;

73. Understands that each EDP has to use any national and the EPPO’s CMS, which are different data bases governed by different access rights; believes that this situation increases the daily complexity in the data management; is also aware that to make it possible the processing and exchange of information between the central services of the EDPs and the EPPO, all the casefiles need to be digitalised by the EDPs using national digital tools and in compliance with national law; appreciates, in this regard, the formal creation of the NEDPA status in the official organisation chart which allows granting access to NEDPAs (staff of the national office) directly to the EPPO’s CMS, like that unburdening the EDPs of administrative tasks and creating the basis for more accuracy and consistency of case data between the two case-management systems; takes the view that the way towards integration between the EPPO’s CMS and national case-management systems would be facilitated by appropriate revision of regulation and that these steps would increase the effectiveness of EPPO investigations; notes, however, that such integration could be primarily a matter of compatible technological solutions used in the different Member States and linked to the actual level of digitalisation of judiciary proceedings in those Member States; observes that the burden of the inherent costs is currently shared, with the national budget covering the costs of the equipment needed for interaction with the national case-management systems, and the EPPO budget covering hardware and the setting of a digital working environment that is secured to the same standard as EPPO central office staff and which is considered part of the operational communication costs provided for by Regulation (EU) 2017/1939;

74. Understands that interoperability is material to achieving efficient data exchange and cooperation and that in order to adopt minimum common data exchange agreements and the implementation of judicial interoperability tools, an e-CODEX EPPO Use Case Project, initiated in 2023, involved several workshops with the e-CODEX Consortium to align on technical and functional requirements; regrets that, after several workshops with e-CODEX Consortium, the project was paused to allow the transition to the new e-CODEX programme manager, eu-LISA, and due to lack of EPPO resources with expertise in this area; calls on the Commission to act as a facilitator for further progressing in the project and to factor also those actions in the EPPO’s budgetary needs estimate;

75. Is aware of the increased threat to the EPPO’s IT structural integrity stemming from the aggressiveness of organised crime, combatted by the EPPO, and resulting in the need to step up physical and digital security; notes that in 2023 the EPPO focused on enhancing its security governance; appreciates the EPPO decision to create a dedicated unit to address cyber and physical security; observes that the EPPO prepared a framework including new processes, roles and responsibilities and policies to increase the security of the digital systems used for the handling of operational and administrative data; understands that several risk assessments were carried out to assess the security framework of the digital systems which suggested the implementation of additional technical and governance measures to enhance the EPPO’s security environment; remarks that the policy framework was improved in the circumstance, with a security strategy and global information security policy proposed in 2023 and formally approved and adopted in 2024;

76. Observes that the EPPO completed, in 2023, the set-up of security contact points in all participating Member States to enhance cooperation on security matters for staff and EPPO offices located in those Member States; welcomes the service level agreement is in place with CERT-EU that provides support and monitoring for specific services for incident response-related matters; underlines that the deployed system to assess risk and to report incidents is well structured and training is provided effectively; appreciates the external assessment performed for physical security whose findings translated in a roadmap for improvement by the host country;

77. Praises the significant progress made in 2023 towards the implementation of a backup data centre and the deployment of an associated disaster recovery scenario; appreciates, in that regard, the EPPO’s development of its own case-management ecosystem the components of which are all hosted in the EPPO data centre and managed by the EPPO’s staff, guaranteeing the EPPO control, retention and ownership of systems and data processed;

78. Acknowledges the EPPO’s need for up-to-date equipment and IT systems to deal with increasingly complicated crimes frequently involving digital elements and digital methodologies; stresses as well the urgency of developing a strong cybersecurity framework, given the growing risks posed by highly tech-savvy criminal networks and potential foreign interferences, through cyberattacks; supports the EPPO in its request for resources to be allocated to protecting its cybersecurity and calls for the swift implementation of a robust cybersecurity strategy to safeguard EPPO’s operations and data integrity;

79. Stresses that the nature of the EPPO’s activities entails the need for specific oversight and dedicated attention to the protection of personal data; takes the view that the EPPO and the EDPS should engage in continuous dialogue to ensure the usability of the data for the investigation and prosecution and, at the same time, ensure respect for the protection of personal data; understands that the requirements relating to data protection handling stems from Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 and from Regulation (EU) 2018/1725(4) and that those requirements are complemented and implemented by College decisions, adopted after consulting the EDPS; appreciates the decision to provide mandatory training for all members of staff, including dedicated data protection training essential to the access to the EPPO’s CMS;

Buildings and security

80. Observes that, thanks to the lease agreement by which Luxembourg authorities provide the building currently hosting the EPPO’s headquarters (the TOB building) on a rent-free basis, the costs are limited to a service charge fee of EUR 716 724 per year; notes that, in 2023, EUR 248 103 was paid to the same Luxembourg authorities for security installations in the two additional floors (9 and 10) delivered to the EPPO in Q1 2023;

81. Welcomes, having regard to physical security, the allocation – with amending budget 2023 and the budget 2024 – of the resources needed to have a proportionate capacity to deliver enhanced security services (21 additional posts to enhance its security capability) and the EPPO’s efforts towards the continuous improvement and efficiency alignment of the physical security processes; maintains the proper functioning of the EPPO implies that prosecutors and staff have to be protected to be able to pursue their mission to its full extent, without threats, influence or pressure;

Environment and sustainability

82. Believes that the Luxembourg authorities providing the EPPO’s headquarters should consider their sustainability and energetic performance; calls on the EPPO to engage in discussions with the Luxembourg authorities to explore specific actions for improving the environmental footprint of its premises, including the installation of renewable energy sources such as solar panels, the introduction of CO2 offsetting measures and implementation of the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme to evaluate, report, enhance organisations’ environmental performance and to save energy; calls on the Commission to facilitate dialogue between the EPPO and the local host authorities to ensure the optimal use of resources and the alignment of EPPO’s operations with the Union’s sustainability;

83. Notes that the EPPO’s central office is integrated in the Luxembourg network of free public transport making it easily reachable through low environmental impact means, at no cost for staff and visitors and that the central office underground car park provides a dedicated zone for bike parking; understands that exchanges are ongoing concerning the installation of charging stations for e-vehicles in the same underground car park;

Interinstitutional cooperation

84. Maintains that the EPPO’s role as a major operational component of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture can be effectively pursued only with intense cooperation with and support from its partners and stakeholders; reiterates that the EPPO can fulfil its role only if it enjoys full judicial independence; encourages Member States to contribute to the full independence of the EPPO in that regard and encourages the EPPO to continue its communication and coordination efforts with the several partners whose action has been designed to be reciprocal and complementary;

85. Welcomes the initiatives launched by OLAF and the EPPO to intensify and streamline their operational cooperation and share knowledge amongst the involved actors; appreciates the first international conference allowing exchange of views between EPPO prosecutors and OLAF investigators, hosted by Parliament in 2024; emphasises that the revision of the regulatory frameworks of OLAF and EPPO provides the opportunity to reconsider many aspects of their working together in the light of the experiences earned in those first years of EPPO operational activity, having specific regard to the opening of complementary OLAF investigations and administrative investigations in support of the EPPO, as well as OLAF’s increased role in detecting and reporting fraud to the EPPO in support of the recovery of the damage to the Union budget; believes that the dialogue and cooperation within the antifraud architecture could be made more effective by the setting of a regular inter-institutional forum with a view to optimising the efficiency and efficacy of the available resources in action;

86. Welcomes the initiatives launched by OLAF and the EPPO to intensify operational dialogue and improve coordination; underlines the importance of full and effective data-sharing between the EPPO, OLAF, Eurojust, and Europol to ensure seamless cooperation in the fight against cross-border fraud; calls for the establishment of a joint working group to oversee data integration and case management efficiency among these bodies;

87. Encourages continued and enhanced cooperation between the EPPO and OLAF, in line with their respective regulations, and the obligation on OLAF to report, without undue delay, suspicions of criminal contact to the EPPO, in order to enable it to tackle fraud, corruption and financial crime affecting the Union’s financial interests; supports the further development of joint initiatives, information sharing and coordinated actions between the EPPO and OLAF, as such cooperation is vital in strengthening the protection of the Union’s financial interests and the Union’s fight against financial crime and to ensuring the effective and efficient use of Union resources;

88. Commends the close cooperation in 2023 between the EPPO and the Court of Auditors, resulting in the timely transmission of information on suspicions of criminal offences falling within the EPPO’s competences;

89. Expects that the working group established with the Commission, and the meetings on the implementation of the Commission-EPPO Working Arrangement, will ensure that EPPO notifications for the purpose of administrative recovery, as provided for by Article 103(2), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 will duly and effectively enable the Commission to maximise recovery to the Union budget, while complying with the confidentiality and proper conduct of the investigative actions; stresses that, in this specific regard, no feedback has been yet provided by either party, preventing the legislators from earning a comprehensive understanding of the underlying issues, including the specific amounts recovered annually by the Commission from Member States in cases of damage to the Union budget; highlights that the recovery of funds by national authorities remains under the Commission’s responsibility, as mentioned in the Mission Letter to the Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration, while the EPPO does not hold a mandate to follow up on the recovery process; calls on the Member States to strengthen cooperation and inform both the Commission and the EPPO of final confiscations; urges a revision of the relevant Regulations to clarify the EPPO’s role in the recovery process; and urges the EPPO and the Commission to adopt an agreed upon form of reporting to Parliament; understands that this could require appropriate development of the EPPO’s CMS, and asks the Commission to prioritise the allocation of resources to the EPPO to meet that need;

90. Welcomes the strengthened cooperation with Europol; observes that the ODIN (Operational Digital Infrastructure Network) programme would enable the full exploitation of the amount of data collected by the EPPO in its investigations (more than 1000 terabytes and growing); notes that, in that framework, the EPPO has identified possible crimes outside its competences, including organised crime, drug trafficking, illicit cigarette production, investment fraud, illegal gambling and prostitution (non-PIF offences), and others which have resulted in the transmission of several files as key evidence to ongoing national investigations and that 28 new cases have been initiated by national prosecution offices to further investigate those non-PIF offences, which are outside the EPPO’s remit; understands that for this and other analyses, however, cooperation with Europol suffers from limitations stemming from national procedural criminal law and accessibility of the EPPO data owned; underlines that the EPPO’s existing competence to investigate organised crime and money laundering linked to fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests should be supported through adequate resources and efficient cooperation with Europol; considers that while cooperation with Europol needs to be even further enhanced, it cannot fully substitute the development of the EPPO’s internal analytical platform, which remains vital to a fast interpretation of the data collected during its investigations and the setting of operational strategies in cross-border cases requiring access to the EPPO’s entire CMS; recalls that, in its upcoming evaluation report, the Commission should carefully analyse to which categories of crimes the EPPO’s mandate needs to be extended, in order to take full advantage of its potential; welcomes the EPPO’s call for enhanced cooperation with Union institutions;

91. Is concerned about the increasing number of cases concerning the RRF; appreciates the timely information provided to the Commission and to the relevant Parliament Committees on this matter; believes that the large number of active cases involving RRF funds justifies an intensification of the exchanges held with, in particular, the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, with the aim of identifying possible oversight or control gaps or fraud patterns and to allow the Commission to keep up to date its performance monitoring mechanisms and to enforce the reduction and recovery measures recently designed; reiterates that RRF funds are Union and not national funds and are under the jurisdiction of the EPPO and encourages the Commission and other Union’s bodies and authorities to increase the detection efforts and report to the EPPO every relevant situation;

92. Welcomes that the EPPO signed Working Arrangement with Parliament in November 2024, establishing clear modalities of cooperation for the purpose of protecting the Union’s financial interests;

93. Notes that, in 2023, the EPPO continued to rely on inter-institutional contracts and bilateral agreements (SLAs) to purchase goods and services at a lower cost; observes that, at the end of 2023, the EPPO had 80 active membership in inter-institutional framework contracts and 22 service-level agreement or other bilateral agreements with other Union’s entities with the aim of maximising budgetary savings from the contractual instruments in place, in line with the principles of sound financial management;

94. Strongly welcomes the participation of Poland and Sweden in the EPPO; is aware that this will have an impact on the EPPO’s budgetary needs, and supports the EPPO’s request which aims to equip the EPPO with the necessary resources to take advantage of the participation of Poland and Sweden to its operational activities; notes that while Ireland and Denmark continue to exercise their opt-out from the EPPO under Protocols No 21 and 22 TFEU, Hungary is the sole remaining Member State that has not yet joined the EPPO; calls on the Hungarian government to join the EPPO without further delay; recalls the collection of 680 000 signatures in favour of joining the EPPO, underscoring a strong societal demand for enhanced legal safeguards against fraud and corruption affecting the Union’s financial interests;

95. Observes that, in 2023, no major improvement towards participation into the EPPO has occurred with the Irish authorities; reminds that their refusal to cooperate with the EPPO in executing several requests for mutual legal assistance sent by the EDPs had resulted in the EPPO reporting the situation to the Commission in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(5); appreciated the following decision of the Irish authorities to amend their domestic legislation providing the legal framework for mutual legal assistance to the EPPO and underlines that from 1 November 2023 it provides mutual legal assistance to the EPPO based on this unilateral recognition; notes that no exchanges occurred with the Irish inter-agency working group established to examine Ireland’s potential future participation in the EPPO; urges the Commission, the EPPO and the Irish authorities to engage in a constructive dialogue to find an effective way of cooperation;

96. Maintains that any lack of cooperation with the EPPO by any of the Member States, whether they are participating in the enhanced cooperation that established the EPPO, creates niches of immunity and privilege that make the defence of the financial interests of the Union uneven and inefficient at best; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States concerned to make any possible effort to integrate the current scenario with the few but still very important missing components, promoting the extension of the participation in the EPPO by the other still non-participating Member States in such a way that strengthens the effectiveness of the protection of the Union and national budgets; calls on the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO and urges the Commission to initiate infringement proceedings against any Member State that systematically obstructs EPPO-led investigations; takes the view that membership of the EPPO should be a precondition for receiving Union funds;

97. Condemns the recently reported systematic espionage organized by the Hungarian government against OLAF staff during an investigative mission into the potential misuse of Union funds by ELIOS, a company linked to the Hungarian Prime Minister’s son-in-law; emphasizes that OLAF and the EPPO, as cornerstone institutions of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture, are regrettably exposed to such threats not only from third countries but also within EU Member States; stresses that such actions gravely undermine the rule of law and the integrity of Union institutions; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard Union’s institutional staff on mission in Member States and to prevent such unacceptable violations in the future;

Communication

98. Observes that the EPPO engages in continuous efforts to enhance internal and external communication; appreciates the actions carried out via social network platforms and encourages the EPPO to maintain its proactive and transparent approach;

99. Believes that explanations about the EPPO’s interventions and operations and about their background, when reported in the media and posted on social networks, would contribute to reinforcing the reputation of the institutions amongst citizens and raise awareness in taxpayers about the complexity of the protection of the Union’s financial interests;

100. Maintains that proper and accurate communication from the EPPO would also increase the involvement of civil society and increase submission of potential investigative input; understands that the EPPO asks to have the reporting option included in every standard presentation for external audiences or at conferences and seminars, when possible and appropriate; notes that, in 2023, the EPPO’s corporate website underwent a complete redesign, with the primary focus on enhancing accessibility and user-friendliness, and that the option to report a crime is now prominently displayed at the top of every webpage together with a banner highlighting this feature in the homepage;

101. Observes that the level of the EPPO’s resources that are devoted to communication are limited, and that, in view of the need to establish the EPPO’s digital autonomy, management of the EPPO website will have to be brought in-house, requiring additional resources, after DG Digital Services cease providing that service; underlines that the increasing volume and the sensitivity of EPPO investigations calls for attention in exchanges with the media, journalists, citizens and academia; reiterates its call on the EPPO to clearly strike the best possible balance between transparency and public interest on the one hand and confidentiality and proper conduct of the investigation on the other, and to ensure the neutrality of its communications about its activities;

102. Recalls the importance of transparency in the EPPO’s interactions with external actors; calls for the establishment of a mandatory public register of all meetings between EPPO officials and representatives of third parties, including lobbyists and national government representatives, in order to prevent undue influence and reinforce public trust in the EPPO’s independence;

Effect of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

103. Recalls that EPPO competences extend to Union funds even when used in third countries; believes that the working arrangements with the Ukrainian competent authorities could effectively enhance the level of protection of the Union’s financial interests following the relevant commitments undertaken to support Ukraine and its population; welcomes the efforts undertaken by the Ukrainian authorities on anti-corruption measures, but recalls that the country is still subject to high rate of corruption and fraud, demanding extra precaution to be taken and further anti-corruption measure in order to successfully reach transparency goals; is aware that transmission of evidence has occurred in execution of mutual legal assistance requests and welcomes the perspective of activating a joint task force with the Ukrainian authorities to coordinate investigations; reminds the Commission and other Union institutions bodies, offices and agencies of the importance of detection and timely submission of investigative input to the EPPO.

(1)	Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj).
(2)	Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017, implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).
(3)	According to the Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2023, the turnover rate was 5,9 % for temporary and contract agents.
(4)	Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/1725/oj).
(5)	Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 13, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – European Council and Council – P10_TA(2025)0079 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section II – European Council and Council,

–  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0052/2025),

A.  whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

B.  whereas, under Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Parliament has the sole responsibility of granting discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the Union, and whereas the budget of the European Council and of the Council is a section of the Union budget;

C.  whereas, pursuant to Article 15(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the European Council is not to exercise legislative functions;

D.  whereas, under Article 317 TFEU, the Commission is to implement the Union budget on its own responsibility, having regard to the principles of sound financial management, and whereas, under the framework in place, the Commission is to confer on the other Union institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

E.  whereas, under Articles 235(4) and 240(2) TFEU, the European Council and the Council (the ‘Council’) are assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council (the ‘Secretariat’), and whereas the Secretary-General of the Council is wholly responsible for the sound management of the appropriations entered in Section II of the Union budget;

F.  whereas, over the course of more than twenty years, Parliament has been implementing the well-established and respected practice of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and whereas the Commission supports that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution, body, office and agency for its administrative expenditure should continue to be pursued;

G.  whereas, according to Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation, the Commission shall confer on the other Union Institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them;

H.  whereas, since the 2009 budget discharge, the Council’s lack of cooperation in the discharge procedure has compelled Parliament to refuse to grant discharge to the Secretary-General of the Council;

I.  whereas the European Council and the Council, as Union institutions and as recipients of the general budget of the Union, should be transparent and democratically accountable to the citizens of the Union and subject to democratic scrutiny of the spending of public funds;

J.  whereas Article 15(3) TFEU requires the EU institutions to ensure in their Rules of Procedure that their proceedings are transparent, while in several of its inquiries and decisions Ombudsman has criticised the Council for its lack of transparency suggesting that the Council has failed fully to grasp the critical link between democracy and the transparency of decision-making;

K.  whereas the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union confirms the right of taxpayers and of the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenue and that the General Court in in its judgment of 25 January 2023 in Case T-163/21(1), De Capitani v Council, stated on transparency within the Union legislative process that documents produced by the Council in its working groups are not of technical nature but legislative and are therefore subject to access to documents requests;

1.  Notes that the budget of the Council falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 12,3 billion in 2023 (representing 6,4% of the total Union budget); notes that the Council’s budget of approximately EUR 0,6 billion represents approximately 5,2% of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

2.  Welcomes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023 examined a sample of 70 transactions under Administration, 10 more than were examined in 2022; further notes that the Court writes that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources, including expenditure on pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology, and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

3.  Notes that 21 (30 %) of the 70 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the five errors which were quantified, estimates the level of error to be below the materiality threshold;

4.  Notes that the Court, in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023, made an observation on the duration of a building maintenance framework contract awarded by the Council; notes that the Court did not identify any quantifiable errors in the four payments examined concerning the Council;

State of play of the discharge procedure

5.  Deeply regrets that, since 2009, and again for the financial year 2022, Parliament has had to refuse discharge to the Council because the Council continues to refuse to cooperate with Parliament on the discharge procedure, preventing Parliament from taking an informed decision based on a serious and thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council’s budget;

6.  Notes that, on 20 September 2024, the relevant Parliament services, on behalf of the rapporteur for the discharge procedure, forwarded a questionnaire to the Secretariat of the Council containing 90 important questions for Parliament in order to enable a thorough scrutiny of the implementation of the Council budget and of the management of the Council; further notes that similar questionnaires were sent to all other institutions, all of which have provided Parliament with detailed answers to all the questions;

7.  Regrets that, on 23 September 2024, the Secretariat informed Parliament once again that it would not be answering Parliament’s questionnaire and that the Council would not be participating in the hearing organised on 12 November 2024 as part of the discharge process and in which all other invited institutions participated;

8.  Reiterates Parliament’s prerogative to grant discharge pursuant to Article 319 TFEU as well as the applicable provisions of the Financial Regulation and Parliament’s Rules of Procedure in line with current interpretation and practice, namely the power to grant discharge in order to maintain transparency and to ensure democratic accountability towards Union taxpayers;

9.  Underlines that Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation states that the Commission shall confer on the other Union Institutions the requisite powers for the implementation of the sections of the budget relating to them and, therefore, finds it incomprehensible that the Council believes it appropriate that discharge should be granted to the Commission for the implementation of the Council budget;

10.  Stresses the well-established and respected practice followed by Parliament over the course of more than twenty years of granting discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, including the European Council and Council; recalls that the Commission has declared its inability to oversee the implementation of the budgets of the other Union institutions; stresses the reiterated view of the Commission that the practice of giving discharge to each Union institution for their administrative expenditure and implementation of the EU budget should continue to be pursued directly by Parliament to preserve the compliance of the principle of sound financial management;

11.  Stresses that the current situation implies that Parliament can only check the reports of the Court and of the Ombudsman as well as the publicly available information on the Council’s website due to the Council’s persistent lack of cooperation with Parliament; underlines that this lack of cooperation undermines Parliament’s ability to effectively fulfil its oversight role and to make an informed decision on granting discharge;

12.  Deplores that the Council, for more than a decade, has shown that it does not have any political willingness to collaborate with Parliament in the context of the annual discharge procedure; underlines that this attitude has had a lasting negative effect on both institutions, has discredited the management and democratic scrutiny of the Union budget and has damaged the trust of citizens in the Union as a transparent entity; underlines that the Council must adhere to the same standards of accountability it expects from other Union institutions;

13.  Reiterates that the Council’s continued refusal to engage in the discharge procedure is an unacceptable breach of democratic accountability. Calls for legal and procedural amendments to withhold budgetary appropriations to any Union institution that fails to comply with transparency obligations;

14.  Recalls that the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union supports the right of taxpayers and the public to be kept informed about the use of public revenue; demands, therefore, full respect for Parliament’s prerogative and role as guarantor of the democratic accountability principle; calls on the Council to duly follow up on the recommendations adopted by Parliament in the context of the discharge procedure and insists on the full application of Article 14(1) TEU;

15.  Calls on the Council to resume negotiations with Parliament without undue delay and to actively engage with Parliament at the highest level as soon as possible involving the Secretaries-General and the Presidents of both institutions, in order to break the deadlock and resolve the long-standing discharge impasse, while respecting the respective roles of Parliament and the Council in the discharge procedure and ensuring transparency, credibility and proper democratic control of budget implementation; requests that Commission and the Council legal services provide an opinion on potential Treaty-based solutions to enforce Council’s accountability in the discharge procedure;

16.  Stresses that, while the current situation needs to be improved through better inter-institutional cooperation within the framework of the Treaties, a revision of the Treaties could make the discharge procedure clearer and more transparent by giving Parliament the explicit competence to grant discharge to all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies individually; stresses, however, that pending such a review, the current situation must be improved through enhanced inter-institutional cooperation; urges in this sense the Council to actively engage with the Parliament;

17.  Notes that despite the Council being unwilling to cooperate in the discharge procedure, Parliament, nevertheless, stresses some political priorities and sets out some observations concerning the budgetary and financial management of the Council and other observations relevant for the discharge procedure in this report;

18.  Notes that, given the Council’s lack of cooperation with Parliament, observations in the following sections primarily rely on aggregated information publicly available, which provides limited detail;

Political priorities

19.  Regrets that the Council exerts its prerogative in the nomination and appointment procedures for many Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies without taking into account the views of the interested parties or the recommendations of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF);

20.  Notes the Council’s tradition of not questioning the appointments of individual Member States for most positions;

21.  Recalls that, pursuant to Article 286(2) TFEU, the Council appoints the members of the Court of Auditors, in accordance with proposals made by each Member State, after consultation with Parliament; recalls that, on the basis of this prerequisite, Parliament delivers an opinion on the candidates; regrets that the Council has repeatedly disregarded Parliament’s recommendations in its consultative role regarding the appointment of the members of the Court; recalls that although Parliament’s opinion is non-binding on the Council, candidates who received an unfavourable opinion withdrew their candidatures by accepting Parliament’s decision, thereby recognising the role of Parliament as the democratic supervisory authority linked to the safeguarding of the Union budget; calls on the Council to recognise Parliament’s role by cooperating in the discharge procedure;

22.  Recalls that the judges and advocates-general of the Court of Justice of the European Union are appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member states after consultation of a panel responsible for giving an opinion on prospective candidates’ suitability to perform the duties concerned;

23.  Calls on the rotating Council Presidencies to stop using corporate sponsorship to contribute to covering their expenses as this runs the risk of creating conflicts of interest, in line with the conclusions of the workshop held by Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control on 27 June 2023; notes that, in her decision of 9 September 2024 on the strategic initiative on sponsorship of the presidency of the Council of the European Union, the European Ombudsman encouraged the Council to take stock of how the non-binding rules adopted by the Council for the use of sponsorship by its presidency (the Guidance) have been implemented and to explore other possible measures that could help mitigate the risks associated with the use of sponsorship; reiterates its call on the Council to provide a budget for the Council Presidencies to ensure adequate and uniform standards of efficiency and effectiveness in the work in the Council in general;

24.  Expresses deep concern over the Hungarian government’s misuse of its role in the EU Presidency to pursue bilateral engagements that contradict the Union’s core values, such as Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin, despite Union sanctions and the International Criminal Court arrest warrant against the latter for war crimes; notes with alarm similar engagements with other authoritarian leaders, undermining the EU’s credibility; calls on the Council to firmly condemn such actions and to take all necessary measures to ensure that Member States holding the Presidency act in alignment with EU principles, safeguarding the Union’s integrity and values;

Budgetary and financial management

25.  Regrets that the budget of the European Council and the Council has not been divided into two clearly separated budgets as recommended by Parliament in previous discharge resolutions in order to improve transparency and accountability, not least concerning the European Council, given that it is currently impossible to get reliable information regarding its costs; stresses the importance of reliable data for objective control; calls on the compliance with the recommendation of the discharge authority;

26.  Notes that the Council’s budget was EUR 647 908 757 for 2023, representing an increase of 6 % compared to 2022, which is higher than the increase of 2,3 % between 2021 and 2022; notes that this increase is mainly related to the revision of salary update parameters due to inflation;

27.  Notes that the overall implementation rate of the Council’s budget in 2023 was 97,0 %; notes that almost EUR 20 million in appropriations were cancelled at the end of 2023, half of which originated from the staff expenditure budget line;

28.  Notes that, in accordance with Article 29 of the Financial Regulation, the Council carried out 41 budgetary transfers in 2023 for a cumulated amount of EUR 6,5 million; notes further that three of those transfers required that the budgetary authority be informed in accordance with Article 29(2), for the purpose of reinforcing various budget lines including “Fitting-out and installation work”, “Water, gas, electricity and heating”, “Acquisition of equipment and software” and “Cost of renting, maintenance and repair of service cars”;

29.   Calls on the Council to publish an annual breakdown of travel and representation expenses of senior officials, including the President of the European Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the Secretariat, in a user-friendly format accessible to the public;

30.  Notes that appropriations carried over from 2023 to 2024 totalled EUR 85,5 million covering mainly computer systems, cost of interpretation provided in 2023, for which invoices have not been yet agreed with the European Commission services at the time of the closure, buildings, information and communication, audio-visual and conference equipment, other staff expenditure: and transport;

31.   Expresses concern over insufficient control mechanisms regarding the Council’s use of consultancy services and external contractors; calls for full disclosure of all contracts exceeding EUR 50 000, detailing the scope, deliverables, and awarded entities, to prevent potential misuse of public funds;

32.  Notes that the average time for payments of invoices decreased from 18 to 13 days from 2022 to 2023, well below the maximum time-limit of 30 days, thus avoiding interest on late payments;

33.  Notes that mission expenses, comprising both mission expenses from the Secretariat and mission expenses of staff related to the European Council, increased by 25 % between 2022 and 2023, and that travel expenses of delegations incurred by Presidencies and national delegations increased by 36,6 % during the same period; calls on the Council to assess this significant increase in mission expenditure; in the absence of access to detailed information, encourages the Council to use these resources in the spirit of sound financial management;

Internal management, performance and internal control

34.  Notes that the Council laid down objectives for the performance of its budget in 2023, namely to ensure ongoing decision-making in the European Council and the Council; to ensure continuous support for the European Council and the Council through the effective and efficient use of financial resources, particularly in view of the persistent pressure of inflation and the resulting price increases due to contract indexation and to further proceed with the process of administrative digital modernisation with the objective of enhancing the quality of the Secretariat’s organisation and the appropriate use of resources;

35.  Notes that, in order to ensure the efficient use of its budget in 2023, the Secretariat continued to improve its financial management processes, notably based on the recommendations of a number of internal task forces; welcomes, in particular, the new performance tools, such as the inclusion of human resources and skills elements in the integrated management planning exercise, the full digitalisation of the financial workflows and the introduction of the electronic signature;

36.  Welcomes the greater use of data in decision-making, notably based on the monthly financial dashboard, showing key performance indicators across the Secretariat services and the Managers’ dashboard with key insights from HR data in order to facilitate daily management and decisions in the area of human resources;

37.  Notes that the Secretariat organised 4 429 meetings in 2023, which was relatively stable compared to 2022; notes further that the number of physical meetings increased by 11 % compared to 2022, while the number of meetings held by videoconference or in hybrid mode decreased substantially, by more than 60 %;

38.  Notes the Secretariat launched 17 open procurement procedures, 12 new negotiated procedures, as well as 21 inter-institutional procedures (any value) with the Council not in the lead; notes that, by the end of 2023, 41 contracts were signed, compared to 42 in 2022, and 47 Lots (any category) were being worked on; notes that contracts were awarded for a total amount of EUR 124,1 million in 2023, which corresponds to 19,15 % of the Council’s annual budget; notes, that out of the total contracted amount, 0,5 % was committed in low and middle value contracts, 58 % in specific contracts under framework contracts where Council is the sole contracting authority and 69,5 % in specific contracts awarded under inter-institutional framework contracts;

39.  Notes that the Council transmitted its annual report on internal audits carried out in 2023 to the discharge authority, in accordance with Article 118 of the Financial Regulation; notes that, at the end of 2023, 81 % of the recommendations issued during the years 2020-2022 had been implemented, 18 % were still open and for 1 %, risk had been accepted by management or the recommendations were no longer applicable; notes that four internal audits planned in the 2023 work programme were concluded during the year and two were still ongoing at the end of 2023; notes that the internal auditor issued high priority recommendations in three audits of the 2023 work programme related to transport services, IOLAN servers and core services and IOLAN endpoint systems;

Human resources, equality and staff well-being

40.  Notes that, out of 3 116 members of staff at the end of 2023, 79 % were permanent staff, 12,8% were temporary staff, 7,2% were contractual agents and 1% were seconded national experts; notes that the repartition of permanent and temporary staff between job categories remained stable with 1 474,25 administrators (AD), 1 159 assistants (AST) and 230 secretaries (AST-SC) in 2023, compared to 1 519, 1 284 and 190 in 2022; notes that the occupation rate of the establishment plan was 97,4 % at the end of 2023;

41.   Notes that, given the Council’s lack of cooperation with Parliament, observations in this section primarily rely on aggregated information published on the Council’s website which provides limited detail;

42.  Notes the other initiatives taken by the Secretariat to become a more diverse and inclusive workplace; welcomes that the Council received the 2023 Ombudsman’s award for Good Administration in the category ‘Excellence in diversity and inclusion’ for its Positive Action Programme for Trainees with Disabilities which meant that 6 trainees with disabilities were hosted in the Secretariat in 2023;

43.  Regrets the lack of publicly available information concerning the gender and geographical distribution of staff in the Secretariat; calls on the Council to provide information to Parliament on gender balance, geographical distribution and disabilities of its members of staff and on the related internal policies; encourages the Council to promote geographical balance of its staff by offering a wider pool of candidates from underrepresented Member States;

44.  Welcomes the Secretariat’s efforts in 2023 to attract and retain a qualified and younger workforce through various initiatives such as the recruitment of eight junior policy administrators under the new Junior Policy Team programme, the revision of the internal mobility rules and the participation of 41 of the Secretariat’s members of staff in an Interinstitutional Job Shadowing Exercise; emphasizes that traineeships should be remunerated in compliance with the European Parliament’s resolution of 14 June 2023 on Quality Traineeships in the Union (2020/2005(INL)), which calls for all internships in Europe to be paid; regrets the lack of information on the implementation of the Council’s Employer Branding Action Plan prepared in 2023;

45.  Notes that, in 2023, the 2020-2023 Psychosocial Risk Prevention plan was the subject of a review, the results of which have been taken into account in preparing a new Risk Prevention plan and updating the Psychosocial Intervention Plan as part of the Council’s initiatives to promote staff wellbeing, both individually and as teams or units; notes that several forms of support and courses were offered to members of staff and managers of the Secretariat, such as a dedicated management training session on psychological safety, Guidance for Managers on mental health, specific workshops on psychosocial risk prevention organised on demand and stress management workshops for the Spanish and Belgian Council Presidencies;

46.  Notes that the Secretariat completed the New Ways of Working (NWOW) pilot project, which was launched in 2018, and conducted an evaluation providing valuable insights especially in terms of change communication, user involvement and staff engagement in change processes; notes that the Council shared the results of the pilot project with other organisations conducting similar programmes; calls on the Council to also share the lessons learned with the discharge authority;

Ethical framework and transparency

47.  Regrets that two key components of the ethical framework of the Council, the ‘Guide to Ethics and Conduct’ for Secretariat staff and the ‘Code of Conduct for the President of the European Council’, are available on the Council’s website without further guidance or date of publication; criticises that, despite several requests by Parliament, the code of conduct for the President of the European Council has not been brought in line with those of Parliament and the Commission, in particular in terms of post term-of-office activities; calls on forthwith rectification of foregoing deficiencies;

48.   Reiterates that ethical conduct contributes to sound financial management and increases public trust and that, as stressed by the Court in its Special Report No 13/2019, there is scope for improvement in the ethical frameworks of the Union institutions; recalls in particular the recommendation issued by the Court with regard to improving the Council’s ethical framework; expresses concern about the lack of a common Union ethical framework governing the work of the representatives of Member States in the Council as identified by the Court;

49.  Notes that, as part of the implementation of the Secretary-General’s Decision 23/2021 concerning psychological and sexual harassment at work, several actions were taken in 2023 such as the publication on the Secretariat’s intranet of the Guide to preventing harassment in the workplace, awareness-raising activities for newcomers regarding the zero tolerance approach of the Council and the organisation of compulsory trainings on anti-harassment and inappropriate behaviour for new managers and staff with management responsibilities;

50.  Notes that the Secretariat publishes an annual report with information regarding the occupational activities of former senior officials of the Secretariat after leaving the service in accordance with Article 16, third and fourth paragraphs, of the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Union; notes that, according to the report concerning 2023, one former senior official declared their intention to engage in occupational activities less than 12 months after they left and was granted permission from the Appointing Authority to engage in one activity subject to a certain condition which was aimed at respecting the mitigation period of the second paragraph of Article 16 of the Staff Regulations;

51.   Urges the Council to establish stricter post-term employment rules for senior officials, including an extended cooling-off period and mandatory public disclosure of private-sector affiliations; calls on the Council to make the participation of Member States’ Permanent Representations in the EU Transparency Register mandatory;

52.  Regrets the fact that the participation of the Member States’ Permanent Representatives in the mandatory transparency register, set up by the interinstitutional agreement of 20 May 2021 between Parliament, the Council and the Commission, is completely voluntary as the application of the conditionality principle is left to the discretion of each Member State’s Permanent Representation; notes that only eight Member States and the Union institutions abide by the best practice of applying a mandatory broad-scope definition of lobbyist in their regulatory framework and insists that all Permanent Representations should take an active part in the mandatory transparency register before, during and after their Member State’s presidency of the Council; calls for stronger and harmonized ethics rules on conflicts of interest, revolving doors, and lobbying transparency; recalls Parliament’s position that Member State representatives who benefit directly from Union subsidies through the businesses they own should not be allowed to participate in policy or budgetary discussions and votes related to those subsidies; regrets that the Council does not fully use the mandatory transparency register or accept proposals to improve it; reiterates its call on the Council to refrain from engaging with unregistered lobbyists;

53.   Regrets that the Council does not fully utilise the mandatory transparency register beyond its current limitations, rejecting any recommendation for improvements; reiterates its call on the Council to refuse to meet with unregistered lobbyists;

54.   Urges the Council to mandate that all high-ranking officials, including Permanent Representatives and Heads of Delegation, publicly disclose their meetings with interest groups and lobbyists in a standardised transparency register, similar to the obligations imposed on Members of the European Parliament and the European Commission;

55.  Strongly regrets that the Council continues to systematically withhold or delay access to legislative documents and the decision-making process in the Council is still far from fully transparent, thereby hindering public scrutiny of its decision-making, negatively affecting citizens’ trust in the Union as a transparent entity and jeopardising the reputation of the Union as a whole; recalls and supports the recommendations of the European Ombudsman regarding the transparency of the Council legislative process in strategic inquiry OI/2/2017/TE; urges the Council to take all the measures necessary to implement the recommendations of the Ombudsman and the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union without undue delay; recalls that the Court of Justice of the European Union, in its judgement in Case T-163/21, De Capitani v Council, underlined that clearer legislative transparency is needed from the Council in order to ensure access to legislative documents, corresponding to the Council’s obligation in terms of public scrutiny and accountability of the co-legislators as the basis of any democratic legitimacy;

56.  Is concerned that, in 2023, the European Ombudsman once again called on the Council to make legislative documents available at a time that would allow the public to participate effectively in the discussions; notes that the European Ombudsman also called on the Council to continue its efforts with regard to informing the public adequately about the restrictive measures adopted against Russia, to the greatest extent possible; welcomes the strategic enquiry launched by the European Ombudsman in 2023 on how the institutions handle requests for public access to legislative documents, based in particular on six recent complaints to the Ombudsman concerning public access to Union legislative documents handled by the Council;

57.  Notes that the Access to Documents team reported that they received and replied to an unusually high number of requests for public access to documents in 2023, 3 732 initial requests for access to documents and 40 confirmatory applications, which required the analysis of 13 912 documents; notes that, among the initial requests for access, full access was granted to 10 908 documents (78,4 %) and partial access to 1 600 documents (11,5 %) while access was refused to 1 404 documents (10,1 %); notes that for the confirmatory applications, full access was granted to 53 documents and partial access to 45 documents, while access was refused to 48 documents; notes that initial requests were processed, on average, in 16 working days and confirmatory applications in 32 working days;

58.  Welcomes that, according to the publicly available annual reports, no cases of fraud or irregularity were brought to the attention of the responsible authorising officers by delegation during 2023, nor were such cases subject to the competence of the panel (Article 143 of the Financial Regulation) or OLAF;

Digitalisation

59.  Notes that, in 2023, the Secretariat continued to pursue its goal of digital transformation, in line with its Digital Strategy priorities for 2022-2025; notes, that out of 113 digitalisation projects in the annual work plan, concerning, in particular, the areas of shared services, policy, legal and IT, 37 % were completed at the end of the year while 8 % were cancelled or merged and 38% were still ongoing; notes that more diversified training courses were organised, including specific courses for the electronic signature of contracts and to promote FIORI, the new user experience of SAP;

60.   Urges the Council to accelerate the implementation of secure digital voting and document-sharing systems to enhance efficiency, accountability, and reduce unnecessary paper-based processes;

61.  Welcomes that, in 2023, 97 % of invoices were submitted electronically, the same as in 2022; acknowledges that, with between 30 and 40 % of purchase orders and contracts being signed electronically each month in 2023, significant progress was made towards the full digitalisation of the financial workflow, from launching procurement procedures to paying invoices electronically;

62.  Notes that, in 2023, the Council took steps in favour of greater digital accessibility, in particular through the publication of a Digital Accessibility Guide;

Cybersecurity and data protection

63.  Notes that, in 2023, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) issued a Supervisory Opinion in accordance with Article 57(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 relating to the need to conduct a data protection impact assessment concerning the project of the Secretariat regarding the use of centralised human resource analytics and reporting services and the establishment a data warehouse; notes that the EDPS did not report any investigation or complaint concerning the Council in 2023;

64.   Expresses concern over the lack of robust safeguards against surveillance and data collection by third parties; calls for enhanced security measures, including mandatory data encryption and regular security audits of all digital communication systems used by the Council;

65.  Notes that, in order to improve the cybersecurity awareness and preparedness of its staff, the Secretariat designed and launched several new training courses related to information security, counterespionage, and cybersecurity in 2023; notes further that awareness-raising events about cybersecurity and information security were organised during Cybersecurity Month in October 2023;

Buildings

66.  Notes that budget line 2011 for “Water, gas, electricity and heating” was reinforced by 33 % through a budgetary transfer in 2023; notes that the Secretariat continued to reduce its energy consumption, through methods such as reducing the building heating and replacing the boilers in the Justus Lipsius building;

67.  Notes that key building projects were executed in 2023, such as the renovation of some meeting rooms in the LEX and Justus Lipsius buildings, the continuous renovation of office corridors in the Justus Lipsius building, improvements of facilities and infrastructure for bikes in the Council’s premises and the modernisation of the Justus Lipsius reception desks;

68.  Regrets that the Council has still not implemented a simplified accreditation procedure to facilitate the access of the other Union institutions’ staff to Council’s premises; calls on the Council to implement this measure;

Environment and sustainability

69.  Notes that, further to an external audit performed in 2023, the EcoManagement and Audit Scheme was maintained and that Energy Performance of Buildings certificates were renewed;

70.  Notes that, as part of the continuing priority efforts for sustainable mobility, facilities and infrastructures for bikes in the Secretariat premises were improved and tailored and videoconferencing facilities in the form of “meet anywhere rooms” were renovated or put in place; notes further that efforts to on-board staff and managers in the green transformation were deployed through training and awareness-raising actions;

Interinstitutional cooperation

71.  Stresses the need for Article 319 TFEU to be revised in order to explicitly stipulate that Parliament, besides granting discharge to the Commission, also grants discharge to other Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in respect of the implementation of their sections of the budget or of their budgets; invites the Council to overcome the inter-institutional conflict and to resume talks with the European Parliament in order to reach a common agreement for a smooth resumption of the discharge procedure;

Communication

72.  Notes that, in 2023, the overall budget for communication implemented in the course of the year, taking transfers into account, was EUR 11 871 300, i.e. 3,54 % higher than the 2022 budget;

73.  Notes that the Secretariat provides communication services to the President of the European Council, whose web presence was fundamentally revamped in 2022, the President of the Eurogroup, the rotating presidency, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Member States and the Secretariat; notes that 2023 saw a marked increase in collaboration between the Secretariat’s digital team and the presidencies, in particular, close editorial coordination led to increased synergies in terms of content reuse and better complementarity, which maximised the overall communication impact;

74.  Notes that, according to an online survey conducted in the last quarter of 2023, 67 % of users were satisfied with their overall experience with the Council’s website, which had over 23 million visits in 2023, a 1 % increase compared to 2022, and 57 900 subscribers, compared to 51 600 in 2022.

(1) Judgment of the General Court of 25 January 2023, De Capitani v Council, T-163/21, CLI:EU:T:2023:15.

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Request for clarification on the interpretation of Article 4(2) of Directive 2013/29/EU – E-001796/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-001796/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Nikos Pappas (The Left)

Greece’s current regulatory framework governing pyrotechnic articles, grounded in legislation dating back to Law 456/1976 and Presidential Decree 293/1977, is increasingly at odds with the harmonised provisions of Directive 2013/29/EU. While the directive clearly classifies categories F2 and F3 as suitable for the general public and F4 as exclusively for professionals, Greek enforcement authorities appear to conflate these distinctions, erroneously treating all three categories as restricted-use fireworks. This misinterpretation has led to a blanket prohibition on the use of pyrotechnics at private events – despite the fact that Article 4(2) of the directive permits Member States to impose restrictions solely on articles intended for the general public.

To ensure the correct application of Union law, safeguard the internal market’s integrity and enable certified, licensed professionals in Greece to operate in line with EU norms, I ask the Commission to clarify the following:

1.Does Article 4(2) permit Member States to impose restrictions exclusively on the general public, or may these extend to certified professionals operating under national and EU authorisations?

2.Does the omission of Category F4 from Article 4(2) reflect the legislator’s intention to exempt professional-use-only pyrotechnics from national restrictions?

3.Should the phrase ‘to the general public’ in Article 4(2) be interpreted as applying to possession, use and sale, or solely to the sale of pyrotechnic articles?

Submitted: 2.5.2025
Last updated: 12 May 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
May 13, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Banking Union – annual report 2024 – P10_TA(2025)0105 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023(1),

– having regard to the Commission’s follow-up to Parliament’s resolution of 16 January 2024 on Banking Union – annual report 2023,

– having regard to document published by the European Central Bank (ECB) on 25 March 2024, entitled ‘Feedback on the input provided by the European Parliament as part of its resolution on Banking Union 2023’,

– having regard to the ECB’s 2023 Annual Report on supervisory activities, published in March 2024,

– having regard to the 2023 Annual Report of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), published on 28 June 2024,

– having regard to the adoption of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD)(2) and the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR)(3), and to the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA)(4),

– having regard to the implementation of the Basel III standards, namely to the adoption of amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive(5) and to the Capital Requirements Regulation(6),

– having regard to the adoption of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/2795 of 24 July 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk(7),

– having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and funding of resolution action(8),

– having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU as regards early intervention measures, conditions for resolution and financing of resolution action(9),

– having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/49/EU as regards the scope of deposit protection, use of deposit guarantee schemes funds, cross-border cooperation, and transparency(10),

– having regard to the report of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of 23 April 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 March 2018 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral (COM(2018)0135),

– having regard to the Five Presidents’ Report of 22 June 2015 entitled ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’,

– having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 10 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market – Speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’,

– having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to the Eurogroup statement of 11 March 2024 on the future of Capital Markets Union, and to the Eurogroup statement of 16 June 2022 on the future of the Banking Union and the Eurogroup follow-up thereto of 28 April 2023,

– having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s disclosure framework for banks’ cryptoasset exposures and to the targeted amendments to its prudential standard on banks’ exposures to cryptoassets, both published on 17 July 2024,

– having regard to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s core principles for effective banking supervision, published on 25 April 2024,

– having regard to the ECB’s Financial Stability Review of May 2024,

– having regard to the ECB Occasional Paper No 328 of 2023 entitled ‘The Road to Paris: stress testing the transition towards a net-zero economy’,

– having regard to the Financial Stability Board publication of 9 November 2015 entitled ‘Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution’,

– having regard to the Financial Stability Board report of 10 October 2023 entitled ‘2023 Bank Failures – Preliminary lessons learnt for resolution’,

– having regard to Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No 24-15 of 25 June 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s banking union at ten: unfinished yet transformative’(11),

– having regard to the Single Supervisory Mechanism supervisory priorities for 2024-2026, published in December 2023,

– having regard to the SRB’s biannual reporting note to the Eurogroup of 13 May 2024,

– having regard to the outcome of the 2023 EU-wide transparency exercise of the European Banking Authority, published on 28 July 2023,

– having regard to Special Report 12/2023 of the European Court of Auditors of 12 May 2023 entitled ‘EU supervision of banks’ credit risk – The ECB stepped up its efforts but more is needed to increase assurance that credit risk is properly managed and covered’,

– having regard to the statements by Claudia Buch, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 2 September 2024,

– having regard to the statements by Dominique Laboureix, Chair of the SRB, at the hearings conducted by Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 21 March 2024 and 23 September 2024,

– having regard to the European Banking Authority’s risk assessment reports of July 2024 and December 2024,

– having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2019 on gender balance in EU economic and monetary affairs nominations(12),

– having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on strengthening the international role of the euro(13),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0044/2025),

A. whereas the Banking Union (BU) encompasses the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution Mechanism and a European deposit insurance that is still missing;

B. whereas the main objective of the BU is to safeguard the stability of the banking sector in Europe and prevent the need to bail out banks at risk of failure with taxpayers’ money;

C. whereas a completed BU would be a positive development for citizens and the EU economy, as it would improve the competitiveness and stability of the banking sector, reduce systemic risk, improve supply and consumer choice and offer increased opportunities for cross-border banking that enhances access to financing for households and businesses, thereby reducing costs for banks’ customers, while ensuring that public funds are not used to bail out the banking sector; whereas the ‘too big to fail’ risk has not yet been fully addressed;

D. whereas concluding the reform of the EU frameworks for bank crisis management and deposit insurance, focusing particularly on small and medium-sized banks, is fundamental in order to provide Europe’s banking sector with security, stability and resilience; whereas a complete BU with a true European deposit insurance scheme is a basic condition for ensuring that citizens trust European banks;

E. whereas fragmentation and the lack of cross-border consolidation of the EU banking sector is affecting its global competitiveness; whereas the profitability gap between EU and US banks has widened;

F. whereas a strong and diversified banking sector is key to delivering economic growth, increasing the possibility of home ownership, fostering investment and job creation, financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-ups and ensuring the transition to a green and digital economy;

G. whereas around 80 % of external financing for EU companies comes from banks, while only 20 % comes from the capital markets; whereas only 30 % of credit for US firms comes from banks, while 70 % is funded via capital markets, including corporate bond holdings and shares;

H. whereas the EUR 356,1 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 110 supervised institutions in 2024, compared with EUR 988,9 billion in non-performing loans recorded at the 102 supervised institutions in the second quarter of 2015, reflects a significant downward trajectory, leaving the total non-performing loan stock at 36 % of its 2015 level; whereas further efforts are required;

I. whereas in April 2024, it adopted its position on the review of the crisis management and deposit insurance framework;

J. whereas in April 2024, its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs adopted a report on the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme;

K. whereas financial institutions rely increasingly on the use of information and communications technology (ICT); whereas the digitalisation of finance provides key opportunities for the banking sector and has brought about significant technological advances in the EU banking sector through increased efficiency in the provision of banking services and a greater appetite for innovation; whereas it also poses challenges, including with regard to data protection, reputational risks, anti-money laundering and consumer protection concerns; whereas the EU banking sector must increase its cyber resilience to ensure that ICT systems can withstand various types of cyber security threats; whereas the ECB is currently studying the establishment of a digital euro;

L. whereas EU banks have withstood the impact of Russian aggression; whereas they play a pivotal role in ensuring the ongoing implementation of and compliance with the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in response to the invasion; whereas further coordination is needed to avoid circumvention of sanctions;

M. whereas climate change, environmental degradation and the transition to a low-carbon economy are factors to be taken into account when assessing the risks on banks’ balance sheets, as a source of risk potentially impacting investments across regions and sectors;

General considerations

1. Acknowledges the progress made over the last 10 years through the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM); notes that the BU will not be completed without the establishment of its third pillar, the European deposit insurance scheme;

2. Asks the Commission to ensure that the completion of the BU and the Capital Markets Union remains a key priority; highlights that these projects offer households and SMEs access to broader funding, reduce the high reliance on bank credit to foster investments and job creation, increase financial stability, reduce the impact of economic downturns, support competitiveness, give additional investment opportunities, fund the transition to a green and digital economy and unlock the EU’s growth potential; notes that the Commission is requested to take into consideration the specificities of the different banking models, while preserving a level playing field;

3. Notes the need to be prepared for episodes of banking stress that could potentially lead to bank runs such as those witnessed in some jurisdictions outside the EU in March 2023, and the need to ensure the stability of deposits;

4. Points out that cyber resilience is a key element for the competitiveness of the EU banking sector, in particular taking into account the geopolitical situation and the need to preserve financial stability;

5. Notes that a more integrated BU would help to make the EU banking sector more resilient, improve access to credit and reduce costs; notes that better cross-border integration of banking business would increase the potential for private risk sharing and ensure diversification in the EU banking market; points out that a more integrated BU is not necessarily the same as a more consolidated banking market and that there are benefits for competition in a diversified banking market; stresses that a fully developed BU would allow EU banks to grow and put them in a better position to compete in the international arena;

6. Regrets that EU banks’ ability to finance major investments is constrained by lower profitability that is not sufficient to ensure their competitiveness; notes that the profitability gap as compared with other jurisdictions is due to both structural and regulatory factors and calls for a review to streamline the regulatory framework; notes that the specific character of the EU banking system, with its large number of smaller banks, calls for proportionate solutions that take this into account and are tailored to its characteristics, without undermining financial stability; remains mindful of the ‘too big to fail’ risk;

7. Calls on the Commission to assess the need to develop targeted frameworks within the BU to enhance access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, recognising their role as the backbone of the EU economy;

8. Regrets that EU banks’ cross-border activity is still rather limited, particularly with regard to granting loans; takes the view, therefore, that it is important to complete the BU in order to uphold the free movement of capital in a fully integrated internal market;

9. Calls on the EU banks still operating in Russia to exit the Russian market as soon as possible; calls on supervisory institutions to ensure that those banks push ahead with exiting the Russian market swiftly;

10. Invites the Commission to further explore whether the creation of a separate jurisdiction for EU banks with substantial cross-border operations(14) could help to complete the BU or whether this would increase banking sector fragmentation;

11. Notes that a review of the securitisation framework to strengthen European markets and the introduction of European Secured Notes as a dual-recourse funding instrument for SMEs for long-term financing could be explored, taking due account of financial stability risks;

12. Underlines that financial literacy is essential in modern economies, contributing to the resilience of the banking systems across Member States and encouraging cross-border financial activity;

13. Underlines that a high level of consumer protection will make the BU more resilient;

14. Takes the view that the Commission should focus on aspects that contribute to achieving the goals of digitalisation, modernisation, simplification, streamlining and increased competitiveness; maintains that legal certainty, security, predictability and stability are essential for EU banks to be able to operate under favourable conditions;

15. Notes that, in addition to traditional loans, diverse sources of financing can be beneficial for EU growth and EU competitiveness, and recognises the low-risk nature of asset-backed financing solutions;

16. Notes the ECB’s progress on the digital euro and the parliamentary dialogue being held with the ECB on the topic; understands existing reservations, such as with regard to its offline functionality, given that offline transactions reduce visibility and impair financial crime prevention; recalls that the digital euro should complement, not replace, cash; considers that the decision on whether or not to introduce a digital euro is ultimately a political decision that has to be taken by the EU’s co-legislators, given the profound potential impact of this decision on a wide range of EU domains, including privacy, consumer protection, financial stability, financial policy and other areas that go beyond the strict remit of monetary policy;

17. Regrets the failure of some financial institutions to ensure gender balance, especially in their management bodies; stresses that gender balance on boards and in the workforce brings both societal and economic returns; calls on financial institutions to regularly update their diversity and inclusion policies and help to foster healthy working cultures that prioritise inclusivity; calls on private and public entities to address the lack of diversity and gender balance in the management bodies of financial institutions;

Supervision

18. Welcomes the adoption by the co-legislators of the new banking package implementing Basel III standards in the EU; notes the current lack of clarity concerning the implementation of the Basel III standards in some other jurisdictions and the potential risk for an international level playing field; stresses that the Commission should evaluate whether targeted changes could help to maintain the international competitiveness of EU banks without weakening their resilience; recalls that the delegated act on the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk postponed the date of application of the new market risk framework by one year to 1 January 2026; calls on the Commission to assess whether the equivalence decisions taken with the jurisdictions not implementing the Basel III standards need to be reviewed in order to preserve the financial stability of the EU financial sector;

19. Acknowledges the growing phenomenon of bank branch closures, which contributes to the risk of ‘bank desertification’ in certain regions, with a particularly negative impact on vulnerable citizens without digital access; emphasises the critical role smaller banks play in ensuring access to essential banking services, especially in rural and remote areas, thereby supporting households, SMEs and local economies; notes that the high supervisory costs and regulatory burdens can pose significant challenges for smaller banks; underscores the need to apply the principle of proportionality in banking supervision, ensuring that the intensity of regulation is tailored to the size, risk profile and business model of institutions, while taking into account the essential territorial role of smaller banks and their specific characteristics;

20. Recalls that the Banking Package contains a high number of mandates to the European Banking Authority; calls on the European Banking Authority to respect these mandates;

21. Notes that even within the existing regulatory framework the banking sector has shown its resilience during the market events of recent years, and that the average Common Equity Tier 1 ratio has remained at high levels, at 15,81 %;

22. Notes that the non-performing loans ratio has remained stable at 2,30 % and the liquidity coverage ratio at 159,39 %;

23. Notes the varying levels of exposure to non-performing loans and recalls that there are Member States which have exposure levels in the order of 1 % or even lower, while other Member States have exposure levels exceeding 4 %; considers that efforts to reduce European banks’ exposure to this type of loan should continue as good risk management practice;

24. Highlights the fact that adverse macroeconomic conditions, geopolitical headwinds and the rapid development of deferred payment services may lead to a deterioration in asset quality and affect the level of non-performing loans in the future; highlights, therefore, the importance of prudent risk management and appropriate provisioning;

25. Notes that the current levels of banking sector profitability may provide an opportunity for an increase in macroprudential buffers and help to preserve banking sector resilience; invites the Commission to further explore this option and carefully evaluate how to revise the macroprudential framework, taking into consideration the potential impact on capital requirements and bearing in mind a level playing field with other jurisdictions;

26. Notes that the banking sector plays a role in supporting the transition to a digitalised and carbon neutral economy, in channelling funds to renewable energy sources and in supporting the achievement of the objectives of the EU Green Deal and the EU Climate Law;

27. Notes that the ECB takes account of climate- and nature-related financial risks in its supervisory practices and monitors growing physical and transition risks closely;

28. Welcomes the idea of increasing venture capital and unlocking capital to finance fast-growing companies in the EU; notes Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s commitment to put forward risk-absorbing measures to make it easier for commercial banks, investors and venture capital to finance fast-growing companies(15); notes that this must be done in a way that does not pose a systemic risk or moral hazard;

29. Welcomes the creation of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, which will allow more effective ways to combat money laundering and terrorist financing via direct supervision of certain financial entities and better cooperation, a better flow of information between national authorities and better coordination among sanctions enforcement authorities in Members States to help close gaps in the implementation of targeted sanctions;

30. Stresses the need to enhance the resilience of non-bank financial intermediaries, including by designing specific regulatory and supervisory tools; points out that such measures must guarantee the security of the financial system and be in the best interests of the customer; welcomes the Commission consultation on macroprudential policies for non-bank financial intermediaries; supports the Eurosystem’s recommendation to introduce system-wide stress tests to identify and quantify risks to the resilience of core markets; invites the Commission to investigate whether there are any gaps in the supervisory toolkit, including in relation to potential liquidity crunches and implications for systemic risk;

31. Notes that crypto-assets create new challenges and opportunities for the financial system but also pose risks to it, and that these require attention from the national supervisors, the SSM and the European Systemic Risk Board;

Resolution

32. Recalls that the position adopted by Parliament in April 2024 on the crisis management and deposit insurance framework ensures a more consistent approach across all Member States to the application of resolution tools and deposit protection to enhance financial stability, taxpayer protection and depositor confidence; notes that small banks have some specificities that may warrant a proportionate approach; stresses that European and national competent authorities should have at their disposal appropriate and sufficient tools to respond effectively to bank failures and safeguard financial stability, and that banks need to operate in an effective regulatory environment that fosters their development;

33. Highlights the importance of preserving shareholders’ and creditors’ primary responsibility for bearing losses in the event of a bank’s failure; stresses that resorting to using taxpayers’ money must be avoided, which is still a key lesson learned from the global financial crisis; stresses that the bail-in of shareholders and creditors must remain the main source for resolution financing before any recourse is made to industry-funded sources;

34. Recalls that a sufficient minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) is crucial for a credible resolution framework and for ensuring that resolution authorities have sufficient flexibility to effectively apply the resolution strategies needed in a specific crisis situation; underlines that this minimum requirement should be sufficient to effectively implement any of the resolution strategies included in a bank’s resolution plan; recalls that the resolution framework should avoid undue increases in MREL calibration and disproportionate contributions to the Single Resolution Fund;

35. Stresses that if a bank’s eligible liabilities are issued to non-EU investors, the write-down or conversion of these liabilities should be enforceable with full certainty to safeguard the effective application of resolution tools;

36. Notes that any reliance on taxpayer money for the resolution of banks, including for liquidity support, should be avoided, in keeping with the principles of fiscal and social responsibility and market discipline;

37. Recalls that banks need to continue to meet their obligations and perform their key functions after the implementation of a resolution decision;

38. Recalls the importance of clarifying the role of the ECB as liquidity provider in resolution, paying due attention to appropriate guarantees and the ECB’s mandate;

39. Underlines the SRB’s announcement that it will enhance its capabilities for launching enforcement action to remove substantive impediments to resolvability; calls for the publication, at the end of each resolution planning cycle, of an anonymised list of identified impediments to resolvability and the actions adopted to address them;

40. Welcomes the ‘SRM Vision 2028’ strategic review initiated by the SRB to set its long-term goals, address new challenges and further strengthen collaboration with the national resolution authorities and other stakeholders; notes, in particular, the SRB’s intention to identify areas where sustainability can be embedded further in its daily operations and core business; highlights the need to ensure efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the implementation of the new strategy;

41. Welcomes the SRB plan to streamline the annual resolution planning cycle to ensure that it is increasingly efficient and has a greater focus on testing banks’ resolvability and the operationalisation of resolution strategies;

42. Welcomes the fact that the Single Resolution Fund has now been built up; calls for the full ratification of the Amending Agreement to the ESM Treaty by all Member States, including the establishment of a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund;

43. Highlights the need for additional efforts to ensure full resolvability for all banks falling under the scope of resolution; recalls that achieving resolvability cannot be considered a ‘moving target’ and therefore calls for more standardisation and harmonisation of the resolvability assessment; recalls, nonetheless, the important role played by national resolution authorities in the assessment of resolvability;

Deposit insurance

44. Underlines the fact that the Commission’s proposal to establish a European deposit insurance scheme was published back in 2015 and that the landscape has changed significantly since then;

45. Recalls that the position of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on a European deposit insurance scheme was adopted in April 2024; notes that that position deviates from the Commission’s 2015 proposal and adopts a new approach; is waiting for, and encourages the Council to move forward with, the negotiations on a European deposit insurance scheme;

46. Notes that national deposit guarantee schemes were introduced successfully and have proved their functionality in a number of cases; underlines the need to take specific national characteristics into account and to preserve the well-functioning systems for smaller banks that are already in place in some Member States, such as institutional protection schemes, in a way that ensures a level playing field across the BU;

o
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47. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the Single Resolution Board and the European Banking Authority.

(1)	OJ C, C/2024/5706, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5706/oj.
(2)	Directive (EU) 2024/1640 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the mechanisms to be put in place by Member States for the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Directive(EU) 2019/1937, and amending and repealing Directive (EU) 2015/849 (OJ L, 2024/1640, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1640/oj).
(3)	Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (OJ L, 2024/1624, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1624/oj).
(4)	Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 establishing the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (OJ L, 2024/1620, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1620/oj).
(5)	Directive (EU) 2024/1619 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards supervisory powers, sanctions, third-country branches, and environmental, social and governance risks (OJ L, 2024/1619, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1619/oj).
(6)	Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards requirements for credit risk, credit valuation adjustment risk, operational risk, market risk and the output floor (OJ L, 2024/1623, 19.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1623/oj).
(7)	OJ L 2024/2795, 31.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2024/2795/oj.
(8)	Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0326.
(9)	Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0327.
(10)	Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0328.
(11)	Véron, N., ‘Europe’s banking union at ten: unfinished yet transformative’, Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper No 24-15, June 2024.
(12)	OJ C 23, 21.1.2021, p. 105.
(13)	OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 118.
(14)	Draghi report, p. 61.
(15)	Von der Leyen, Ursula, Europe’s Choice: Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, p. 11.

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 13, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Old challenges and new commercial practices in the internal market – P10_TA(2025)0107 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2023 on the 30th anniversary of the single market: celebrating achievements and looking towards future developments(1),

– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a Market’ (the Letta report),

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘the 2025 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report’ (COM(2025)0026),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘A simpler and faster Europe: Communication on implementation and simplification (COM(2025)0047),

– having regard to the question to the Commission on the old challenges and new commercial practices in the internal market (O-000012/2025 – B10‑0264/2025),

– having regard to Rules 142(5) and 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the European Union’s ability to compete and prosper in the global economy is vital, especially amid the current geopolitical challenges and climate and other environmental crises; whereas its current, medium and long-term competitiveness relies on a fully integrated and efficient single market that allows European businesses to innovate and prosper and prioritises the reduction of administrative burdens;

B. whereas the single market, comprising nearly 450 million citizens and 23 million businesses, generates a gross domestic product (GDP) of EUR 17 trillion, positioning the EU among the world’s three largest economies and contributing approximately one-sixth of global economic output;

C. whereas the Draghi report demonstrated that compliance costs resulting from various pieces of legislation remain very high for European companies, therefore hindering European innovation capacity;

D. whereas it remains crucial to improve the functioning of the single market by addressing persisting fragmentation through common, harmonised EU policies, more efficient implementation and enforcement, and the simplification of EU rules; whereas reducing administrative burdens and costs, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), can help foster innovation and support European businesses; whereas unlocking the full potential of the single market requires overcoming persistent barriers to the free movement of goods and services;

E. whereas the rapid expansion of digital platforms and e-commerce has introduced new market dynamics and whereas evolving trends in global e-commerce are exerting additional pressure on customs controls, market surveillance and consumer protection authorities;

F. whereas geopolitical shifts and global economic transformations are reshaping supply chains, requiring the EU to adapt its single market policies; whereas the EU has set the highest standards for product safety and consumer protection, both offline and online;

G. whereas attention has been drawn to a growing number of cases reported across the EU in which goods and services offer reduced quantity or quality, despite stable or rising prices;

Old and enduring challenges

1. Reaffirms that the single market has been a cornerstone of European economic integration, enabling the free movement of goods, services, capital and people; stresses, however, that there are long-standing and emerging challenges that necessitate ambitious reforms without harming European competitiveness or imposing unnecessary administrative burdens on companies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to accelerate efforts towards implementing these reforms and to eliminate remaining unjustified obstacles to the free movement of goods and services, while ensuring a high level of consumer protection;

2. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to maintain strong consumer protection while also providing for competition rules that are innovation-friendly, future-proof and proportionate; emphasises the need to ensure legal certainty and consistency and minimise regulatory complexity and fragmentation, which could disproportionately affect SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups;

3. Highlights that ongoing barriers and regulations have constrained the development of the single market, as noted in the Draghi report; calls for a shift towards a regulatory approach that empowers companies to grow, innovate and lead internationally, thereby restoring the single market as a true engine of growth and competitiveness;

4. Calls on the Commission to ensure that future legislative initiatives are consistently guided by the strategic priorities outlined in its communications and competitiveness strategy;

5. Underscores that, as demonstrated by the Letta and Draghi reports, there is still untapped potential in the services sector; calls for further action in this sector to address the significant obstacles that persist, starting from setting ambitious targets in the upcoming single market strategy; notes that services account for three quarters of EU GDP, represent two thirds of employment and create 9 out of 10 new jobs in the EU economy; notes also, however, that services are still the least developed segment of the EU single market;

6. Welcomes the proposal for a regulation on a public interface connected to the Internal Market Information System for the declaration of posting of workers and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 (COM(2024)0531), which should lead to simplification and strengthened enforcement; notes also that digitalisation could significantly reduce administrative burdens for cross-border services and ensure better access for businesses and consumers; calls, in this regard, for a single declaration portal and the digitalisation of A1 forms for cross-border services;

7. Stresses the importance of the effective recognition of professional qualifications and the removal of unjustified barriers to the free movement of professionals in order to make EU professional services globally competitive in future decades; encourages the Commission to remain vigilant in pursuing infringement procedures where Member States do not comply with EU legislation on the recognition of qualifications;

8. Stresses that single market rules should safeguard access to public services and preserve consumer rights as well as other overriding reasons of public interest; adds that any assessment to evaluate restrictions in the single market for services should include qualitative criteria;

9. Notes the role that EU public procurement can play in overcoming barriers to market entry, supporting sustainable and resilient industrial ecosystems, high quality jobs and value creation in the EU;

10. Acknowledges that the new legislative framework (NLF) has contributed to consistency in EU product legislation and that since its adoption, the industry sector, supply chains and products have experienced important transformations in the light of the digital and green transition, but also changes in market dynamics; notes that the 2022 evaluation of the NLF identified critical challenges, such as potential foreign influence, illegal practices, inadequacies in addressing digitalisation and the circular economy, and potential updates to obligations and definitions for certain economic operators to reflect new market realities;

11. Stresses that addressing these issues and making the NLF future-proof is essential to ensure coherence, reduce costs and ensure free movement of goods; calls, therefore, for an update to the NLF in order to streamline product rules, promote digitalisation and simplify compliance and market surveillance procedures; considers that the NLF should promote the use of Digital Product Passports as a means of demonstrating product conformity and complying with information requirements;

12. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to simplify EU rules and make them easier to implement, and to significantly reduce administrative burdens, in particular for SMEs, which play a vital role in sustaining local communities and economies; stresses the importance of ensuring legal certainty and consistency for businesses, as well as predictability for long-term investments, which are essential to boost competitiveness, innovation and resilience and to deliver fast and meaningful improvements for consumers and businesses; calls, furthermore, on the Member States to prevent actions that could compromise the level playing field in the internal market;

13. Calls on the Commission to facilitate the activities of SMEs and small mid-caps within the single market, notably with a dedicated simplification omnibus;

14. Recognises that inconsistent and fragmented enforcement of EU laws across the Member States continues to distort competition and undermine the single market’s integrity; adds that primary responsibility for enforcement of EU rules lies with the Member States; invites the Commission to make full use of its enforcement powers; calls for improved monitoring and enforcement mechanisms at EU level, such as harmonised rules on minimum levels of checks, harmonised methodologies to conduct these checks and joint inspections, in order to ensure the uniform application of EU law and, where applicable, swift redress for consumers;

15. Stresses the importance of maintaining a competitive and dynamic economic environment by safeguarding consumers’ rights and enforcing digital competition rules to address unfair business practices that distort market conditions; calls, furthermore, on the Member States to increase the capacity of market surveillance authorities and customs authorities to ensure effective enforcement of single market rules, particularly in respect of e-commerce and imports from non-EU countries;

16. Recalls that territorial supply constraints in the retail and wholesale segments fragment the single market, limit consumer choice and contribute to significant price disparities across the Union, particularly affecting the prices of basic consumer goods; highlights that while competition law penalises some of these practices effectively, many fall outside its scope; calls, therefore, on the Commission to propose measures to address the issue, including stronger enforcement against anti-competitive distribution agreements, in order to safeguard fair competition, thereby ensuring the integrity of the single market;

17. Calls on the Commission to investigate the causes for the differentiated levels of the inflation of basic goods and consumer price increases observed in some EU Member States;

18. Considers that the single market is a key tool in times of crisis if the Member States can act in a coordinated way; considers that the recently adopted Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act(2) will be crucial to ensure coordination in order to prevent shortages and ensure the smooth functioning of the single market, including the free movement of essential goods and services throughout the EU;

19. Calls on the Commission to empower consumers to easily exercise their passenger rights by establishing national enforcement bodies, which should be granted harmonised investigation and enforcement powers and which should be able to efficiently process individual complaints and related fines;

20. Highlights that e-commerce measures targeting geo-blocking, notably the Geoblocking Regulation(3), have been successful in creating a framework for a less fragmented single market and enhancing consumer choice for online shopping; notes with concern that the implementation of the regulation has been inadequate;

21. Notes that the European Accessibility Act(4) will become applicable across all EU Member States as of 28 June 2025; stresses the importance of its full and effective implementation by the Member States in order to ensure the harmonisation of accessibility requirements for products and services, thereby guaranteeing their accessibility to persons with disabilities across the EU internal market;

Emerging commercial practices

22. Highlights that the rapid expansion of digital platforms and e-commerce has introduced new market dynamics and has created advanced opportunities and challenges and risks for users; acknowledges that the Digital Markets Act(5) (DMA) and the Digital Services Act(6) (DSA) constitute key legislative instruments ensuring fair competition, contestability and fairness in digital platforms, while also fostering consumer protection and a safer, more trustworthy and more transparent digital environment in the digital economy; calls for proper enforcement of the EU’s new technology legislation to ensure genuine, autonomous and informed consumer choice, protection and fair competition;

23. Considers it essential to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of these two legislative acts and urges the Commission to conclude its ongoing investigations in the framework of the DSA and the DMA;

24. Stresses that the implementation of the DSA must fully respect freedom of expression; underlines that actions against illegal content must not restrict lawful speech and calls for transparent enforcement to protect an open and democratic digital space;

25. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act(7) maintains a risk-based, innovation-friendly approach, ensuring that compliance requirements are proportionate to the actual risks posed by AI applications while respecting the need to ensure a high level of protection of health, safety and fundamental rights;

26. Welcomes the Commission’s ‘digital fairness’ fitness check of consumer law and the upcoming public consultation; underlines that some issues remain unaddressed concerning the protection of consumers online, leading to an imbalance between consumers and traders within the digital economy; calls on the Commission to address these issues in the upcoming Digital Fairness Act; believes that digital addiction, online gambling, protection of minors online and persuasive technologies used by online actors, such as targeted advertising, influencer advertising and dark patterns, should fall under the Digital Fairness Act, which should close legal loopholes and be consistent with current legal instruments in order to better protect consumers online, taking into account the need to avoid unnecessary regulatory burdens;

27. Notes that evolving trends in global e-commerce and supply chain restructuring are placing greater pressure on customs controls, market surveillance and consumer protection authorities; highlights that the volume of unsafe and illicit products sold on e-commerce platforms, in particular from non-EU countries, has been increasing in recent years; highlights the significance of Digital Product Passports in these processes; calls, therefore, for a reinforced market surveillance framework and a revision of the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation(8) and calls on the Council to swiftly adopt its position in order to enable the adoption of the revised Union Customs Code and the establishment of an EU customs authority in 2026;

28. Calls on the Member States to allocate sufficient technical, human and financial resources to national authorities; calls on the Member States and the Commission to ensure sufficient funds and expertise to strengthen customs authorities and market surveillance across the Union and to intensify joint activities and EU testing;

29. Emphasises the need to strengthen consumer protection in both online and offline markets, ensuring transparency in advertising and pricing, especially concerning dynamic pricing, ensuring fair business practices and stronger safeguards against fraud to foster consumer trust in cross-border commerce and the highest level of protection;

30. Stresses that attention has increasingly been drawn to instances where goods and services offer less in terms of quantity or quality while prices remain the same or increase; calls on the Commission to assess the scale and underlying causes of such practices and to explore appropriate measures to enhance transparency and consumer awareness;

31. Underlines that environmental sustainability and fair-trade considerations are increasingly shaping commercial practices by playing an important role in consumers’ purchasing decisions and consequently driving businesses towards sustainability; adds that transparency and information for consumers on environmental aspects as well as on socially-responsible and ethical production processes allow consumers to adopt sustainable consumption patterns;

32. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to maintain their level of ambition in this regard and work further on EU-wide labelling schemes; recalls that the objective of the Green Claims Directive is to establish a tool to protect consumers against greenwashing by establishing requirements for substantiation and verification;

33. Highlights the need to further combat misleading advertising and greenwashing and to strengthen the second-hand market; notes, however, that restrictive sustainability rules may have a negative impact on European competitiveness;

34. Highlights that some growing trends in e-commerce raise concerns with regard to goods from non-EU countries not fulfilling EU safety and sustainability requirements, thus negatively impacting SMEs in the EU; welcomes the Commission communication on ‘A comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable e-commerce’ and asks the Commission to swiftly implement the recommendations contained therein;

35. Emphasises that harmonised technical standards are essential for the free movement of goods within the single market, ensuring product safety, quality and performance across the Member States; highlights that standards must reflect the interests, policy objectives and values of the Union by taking into account the views of all stakeholders; adds that the recent Court of Justice of the European Union ruling(9) acknowledges the added value of harmonised standards that form part of EU law because of their legal effects and establishes that they should be made freely accessible; underlines the need to improve the agility of the standardisation framework, particularly for emerging green and digital value chains, and to help industry to maintain competitive positions in key technology markets;

36. Considers that the EU must increase its efforts to set up a new mechanism with the Member States and national standardisation bodies to share information, coordinate and strengthen the European approach to international standardisation activities; calls for swift action to update the EU standardisation framework in order to speed up the standardisation process to ensure the rapid publication of harmonised standards that grant presumption of conformity and are aligned with international standards to support global trade while encouraging greater industry participation, particularly from SMEs;

37. Stresses the need to reinforce the external dimension of the single market to safeguard the EU’s strategic autonomy and global influence and welcomes the gradual integration of EU candidate countries to the single market with a view to their future EU membership; emphasises that the EU’s high regulatory standards can serve as a global benchmark and must be effectively enforced to ensure a level playing field for European businesses; calls on the Commission to intensify regulatory dialogues and political cooperation with other relevant non-EU countries in order to identify common challenges and try to build joint actions, especially concerning e-commerce, digital rules and consumers;

38. Reiterates its call for innovative, complementary and flexible interaction between the ongoing work on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement currently in force and the accession negotiation process, thus allowing for Ukraine’s gradual integration into the EU single market and sectoral programmes;

Conclusions

39. Recognises that geopolitical tensions, climate change, challenges to EU competitiveness and economic disparities pose significant risks to the integrity of the single market; calls for a robust, coordinated and strategic policy response to strengthen the single market;

40. Calls for the continued evolution of the single market to address both remaining unjustified barriers and emerging commercial challenges; takes the view that eliminating regulatory fragmentation, promoting simplification, significantly reducing administrative burdens, enhancing enforcement and ensuring resilient supply chains are critical to maintaining the EU’s competitive edge and fair market conditions and enhancing the single market; underlines the importance of consulting all relevant stakeholders in these processes;

41. Emphasises the importance of digital transformation, the circular economy and adaptability to global economic shifts in securing the EU’s long-term economic dynamism;

42. Reiterates that strengthening the internal and external dimensions of the single market is essential for preserving the EU’s strategic autonomy and competitiveness;

43. Urges the Commission, therefore, to reflect the foregoing in the forthcoming new single market strategy, scheduled for June 2025, in the 2030 consumer agenda, scheduled for the end of 2025, and in the Digital Fairness Act, scheduled for 2026;

o
o o

44. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1)	OJ C 214, 16.6.2023, p. 8.
(2)	Regulation (EU) 2024/2747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2024 establishing a framework of measures related to an internal market emergency and to the resilience of the internal market and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 (OJ L, 2024/2747, 8.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2747/oj).
(3)	Regulation (EU) 2018/302 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2018 on addressing unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the internal market and amending Regulations (EC) No 2006/2004 and (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC (OJ L 60I, 2.3.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/302/oj).
(4)	Directive (EU) 2019/882 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the accessibility requirements for products and services (OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 70, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/882/oj).
(5)	Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).
(6)	Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
(7)	Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
(8)	Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (OJ L 345, 27.12.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2394/oj).
(9)	Judgment of 5 March 2024, Public.Resource.Org Inc. v Right to Know CLG, C‑588/21 P, EU:C:2024:201.

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 13, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The European Water Resilience Strategy – P10_TA(2025)0091 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Article 191 thereof,

– having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

– having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with particular emphasis on the SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation,

– having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted in December 2022,

– having regard to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants of 22 May 2001,

– having regard to the precautionary principle and the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should, as a priority, be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay, as enshrined in Article 191(2) TFEU,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law)(1),

– having regard to Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy(2) (Water Framework Directive),

– having regard to Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration(3) (Groundwater Directive),

– having regard to Directive 2008/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directives 82/176/EEC, 83/513/EEC, 84/156/EEC, 84/491/EEC, 86/280/EEC and amending Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(4) (Environmental Quality Standards Directive),

– having regard to Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks(5),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption(6) (Drinking Water Directive),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/741 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 2020 on minimum requirements for water reuse(7) (Water Reuse Regulation),

– having regard to Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive)(8),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/3019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 concerning urban wastewater treatment(9) (revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 amending Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste(10),

– having regard to Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources(11),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869(12),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC(13) (Critical Entities Resilience Directive),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)(14),

– having regard to Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides(15),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013(16),

– having regard to Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190 of 19 December 2024 on the use of bisphenol A (BPA) and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives with harmonised classification for specific hazardous properties in certain materials and articles intended to come into contact with food, amending Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/213(17),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2021 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ (COM(2025)0075),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 May 2021 entitled ‘Pathway to a Healthy Planet for All – EU Action Plan: ‘Towards Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil’’ (COM(2021)0400),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change’ (COM(2021)0082),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 18 July 2007 on addressing the challenge of water scarcity and droughts in the European Union (COM(2007)0414),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 entitled ‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan: For a cleaner and more competitive Europe’ (COM(2020)0098),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 14 November 2012 entitled ‘A Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s Water Resources’ (COM(2012)0673),

– having regard to the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030,

– having regard to the COP29 Declaration on Water for Climate Action, endorsed by the European Union,

– having regard to the European Oceans Pact announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

– having regard to the European climate adaptation plan and the European water resilience strategy announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

– having regard to the EU’s 8th environment action programme,

– having regards to its resolution of 5 October 2022 entitled ‘Access to water as a human right – the external dimension’(18),

– having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2024 on the devastating floods in central and eastern Europe, the loss of lives and the EU’s preparedness to act on such disasters exacerbated by climate change(19),

– having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2022 on momentum for the ocean: strengthening ocean governance and biodiversity(20),

– having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency(21),

– having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN climate change conference in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29)(22),

– having regard to the Commission report of 4 February 2025 on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) entitled ‘Third river basin management plans – Second flood risk management plans’ (COM(2025)0002),

– having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 15/2024 of 16 October 2024 entitled ‘Climate adaptation in the EU – action not keeping up with ambition’,

– having regard to former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö’s report of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness’,

– having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the implementation of the EU water legislation(23),

– having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 33/2018 of 18 December 2018 entitled ‘Combating desertification in the EU: a growing threat in need of more action,

– having regard to the European citizens’ initiative (ECI) on the right to water,

– having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on the follow-up to the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water(24),

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/292 of 28 July 2010, which recognises the human right to water and sanitation,

– having regard to the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture,

– having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 20/2024 of 30 September 2024 entitled ‘Common Agricultural Policy Plans – Greener, but not matching the EU’s ambitions for the climate and the environment’,

– having regard to European Environment Agency report 07/2024 of 15 October 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s state of water 2024: the need for improved water resilience’ (EEA Report 07/2024),

– having regard to the Environment Council conclusions of 17 June 2024 on the 8th environment action programme,

– having regard to European Court of Auditors special report 20/2021 of 28 September 2021 entitled ‘Sustainable water use in agriculture: CAP funds more likely to promote greater rather than more efficient water use’,

– having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee declaration of 26 October 2023 for an EU Blue Deal,

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 5 July 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Soil Monitoring and Resilience (Soil Monitoring Law) (COM(2023)0416),

– having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration and Directive 2008/105/EC on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy(25),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (A10-0073/2025),

A. whereas water is essential for life and humanity; whereas the EU has to manage current and future water resources efficiently and respond effectively to the current water challenges, as they directly affect human health, the environment and its ecosystems, strategic socio-economic activities such as energy production, agriculture and food security, and the EU’s competitiveness;

B. whereas water is a scarce and limited resource and, while 70 % of the earth’s surface is water-covered, available and usable fresh water accounts for only 0,5 % of water on earth(26); whereas mountains are real water towers and important freshwater reservoirs in Europe, the Alps alone providing 40 % of Europe’s fresh water(27);

C. whereas groundwater supplies two thirds of the EU’s drinking water and supports many ecosystems(28); whereas the services provided by freshwater ecosystems are worth over EUR 11 trillion in Europe, and provide considerable health and recreational benefits, such as from angling(29);

D. whereas water stress is already occurring in Europe, affecting approximately 20 % of Europe’s territory and 30 % of the population on average every year, figures that are likely to increase in the future on account of climate change(30), despite the fact that total water abstraction at the EU-27 level appeared to decrease by 15 % between 2000 and 2019; whereas the increase in the number and recurrence of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods, and the fact that they are expected to become yet more frequent in the near future, poses a risk to human life and the EU’s food sovereignty and could lead to regions in Europe becoming uninhabitable;

E. whereas 78 % of Europeans consider that the EU should propose additional measures to address water-related issues in Europe and 21 % of Europeans consider pollution to be the main threat linked to water in their country(31);

F. whereas the human right to water and sanitation was recognised as a human right in a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 28 July 2010;

G. whereas the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water was the first ever to gather the required number of signatories, calling for the EU to ensure the right to water for all;

H. whereas the provisions of Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No 26 thereto on Services of General Interest are key elements to be prominently taken into account in all aspects of the design and implementation of the European water resilience strategy (EWRS), thus safeguarding the status of Europe’s water services as essential public services, and ensuring accessibility, equity, affordability and the maintenance of high quality standards;

I. whereas the Member States should follow up on the recommendations of the Commission report of November 2023(32) in order to improve water balances as the knowledge basis for making decisions about water allocation;

J. whereas substantive corporate value may be at risk owing to worsening water insecurity, with a decrease in the capacity of production or its complete halt as a consequence; whereas assets in water-stressed regions could become stranded, temporarily or permanently, if assumptions made about water availability and access prove inaccurate, if regulatory responses are unanticipated or if risk mitigation and stewardship plans are not put in place(33);

K. whereas the deadline set by the Water Framework Directive (WFD) for European rivers, lakes, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwaters to achieve ‘good’ status was 2015, with a possible postponement to 2027 under certain conditions; whereas the objective of achieving good chemical status for all EU water bodies by 2027 remains far from being achieved, primarily due to substances such as mercury, brominated flame retardants and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons(34);

L. whereas the 2025 report on the implementation of the WFD shows that delays in meeting the WFD’s targets are not due to a deficiency in the legislation but to a lack of funding, slow implementation and insufficient integration of environmental objectives into sectoral policies; whereas analysis has shown that the Member States are not meeting the annual investment needs, which are estimated to be EUR 77 billion, with a financing gap currently estimated at around EUR 25 billion a year; whereas the report also shows the clear need for the Member States to increase their level of ambition and accelerate action to reduce the compliance gap as much as possible before 2027, to increase investment and ensure adequate financing, including via EU funds, to achieve the objectives of their programmes of measures, as well as to put in place additional measures to reduce current persistent environmental challenges to and improve transboundary cooperation;

M. whereas the water legislation has been evaluated as fit for purpose; whereas it establishes a framework for the protection of inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater; whereas, at the same time, it allows for less stringent environmental objectives to be achieved if socio-economic needs served by such human activity cannot be achieved by other means and it allows for a failure to achieve the objectives for water bodies if the reason for the failure is overriding public interest; whereas the legislation is proportionate and mandates the authorities of the Member States, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, to decide on the overriding public interest; whereas in some cases this may be the protection of the environment and in others a socio-economic activity;

N. whereas industry accounts for approximately 40 % of total water abstraction in Europe; whereas the largest categories of the annual water abstraction in the EU-27, according to the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE), are abstraction for cooling in electricity generation (34 %), followed by abstraction for agriculture (29 %), public water supply (21 %) and manufacturing (15 %)(35); whereas data on water abstraction and use in the EU is historical and poor(36);

O. whereas electricity production is the largest water-abstracting sector, but most of the water is returned to the environment after cooling or turbine propulsion; whereas overall, agriculture is the highest net water-consuming sector at the EU level, as most of the water is consumed by the crop or evaporates; whereas other uses, such as industry and water utilities, abstract and consume comparatively less water, but they can represent significant pressures at a local level, especially on groundwater(37);

P. whereas all industrial activity requires water to produce its end products or to support production activities; whereas businesses depend on water for their daily operations, and as water scarcity increases, it can disrupt operations, raise costs and create regulatory and reputational risks;

Q. whereas the energy sector relies heavily on water resources; whereas this dependency poses a serious risk as water scarcity can impact energy production processes and supply security, especially where water is used as feedstock or for cooling; whereas the transition to renewable energy, particularly wind and solar energy, offers sustainable and water-efficient decarbonisation pathways and the opportunity to halt or reverse the trend of increasing water consumption;

R. whereas water is an essential resource for agriculture in the production of high-quality food, feed and renewable raw materials; whereas agriculture depends on water availability and irrigation helps to shield farmers from irregular rainfall and to increase the viability, yield and quality of the crops, but is a significant drain on water resources; whereas in view of climate change, changing weather patterns and increased frequency of floods and droughts, the importance of water as a resource for the production of high-quality agricultural products and of the need for water to be used efficiently will therefore be fundamental to the security of food supply and to the solutions to address water scarcity; whereas reducing pressure on surface water and groundwater from agriculture must go hand in hand with investment aimed at the use of reclaimed water and innovative desalination technologies, thereby achieving a better water balance as well as promoting clean alternative energies such as green hydrogen;

S. whereas global population growth requires increased food production, and the EU must guarantee food sovereignty, as laid down in Article 39 TFEU;

T. whereas reliable data on water accounting, that is, the systematic study of the current status and trends in water supply, demand, accessibility and use in domains that have been specified(38), is crucial for an assessment of the current situation in the EU and for European competitiveness;

U. whereas the potential of wastewater as an alternative water supply is underestimated, given that 60-70 % of the potential value of wastewater across the EU is currently unexploited(39) and less than 3 % of treated wastewater is reused in the EU(40); whereas there is significant potential for circular approaches to water in households, as only a small amount of the water in households is used for drinking and eating and therefore requires the highest quality standards;

V. whereas a very large quantity of water is lost due to obsolete or ageing water networks and the lack of necessary maintenance; whereas investment in the maintenance, improvement and development of resilient innovative irrigation infrastructures is essential for reducing and improving the efficiency of water consumption in agriculture; whereas such improvements in efficiency enable the water saved to be used for other purposes or enable the natural flow rates of watercourses to be maintained;

W. whereas clean and sufficient water is an essential element in implementing and achieving a real sustainable circular economy in the EU;

X. whereas water leakage is an underestimated global issue, which significantly exacerbates water scarcity, with an average of 23 % of treated water lost during distribution in the EU due to leaky pipes, outdated treatment facilities and insufficient reservoirs(41); whereas the revised Drinking Water Directive included measures to reduce water leakages, as well as risk assessment and management of the catchment areas for drinking water abstraction;

Y. whereas in 2021, 91 % of Europe’s groundwater bodies were reported as having achieved ‘good quantitative status’, while 77 % were reported as having ‘good chemical status’(42);

Z. whereas in 2021, only 37 % of Europe’s surface water bodies were reported as being in ‘good’ or ‘high’ ecological status, while 29 % achieved ‘good chemical status’(43);

AA. whereas the European Environment Agency emphasises that the proportion of surface waters failing to achieve good ecological status is uneven across Europe, and that these are more prevalent in parts of central and western Europe, and stresses that differences in water status between the Member States may be caused by different pressures, but that those differences may also result from varying approaches to monitoring and assessment(44);

AB. whereas the quality of surface waters across the continent reflects continuing and combined pressures, in particular diffuse pollution and the degradation of their natural flow and physical features; whereas pollution by nutrients and persistent priority substances, as well as by substances newly emerging as pollutants, continues; whereas groundwaters are affected by diffuse pollution and also suffer from intensive abstraction(45);

AC. whereas groundwater supplies 65 % of water for drinking and 25 % of water for agricultural irrigation in the EU(46); whereas it is a finite resource that needs to be protected from pollution and over-exploitation(47);

AD. whereas monitoring data from the European Environment Agency indicates widespread pollution by per- and polyfluoralkyl substances (PFAS), commonly referred to as ‘forever chemicals’, in European waters, posing significant risks to aquatic ecosystems and human health; whereas short-chain PFAS trifluoroacetic acid (TFA) has been detected in drinking water all over Europe; whereas PFAS persist in the environment, bioaccumulate in living organisms and cause adverse (eco)toxicological effects; whereas from a group of 6 000 to 10 000 individual substances, only a few have been extensively studied and their impact on human health and environment is known; whereas 99 % of PFAS remain undetected in the environment as a result of limits in monitoring;

AE. whereas the lack of EU-wide quality standards for PFAS in groundwater and insufficient monitoring of less-studied PFAS compounds exacerbate the challenge of achieving good chemical status for EU waters in line with the WFD and pose a substantial technical and financial burden on health systems and on water service providers while jeopardising applications of water and sewage sludge reuse;

AF. whereas hazardous chemicals, including heavy metals and other pollutants, released into water bodies by industrial activities, significantly impact water quality and aquatic ecosystems(48);

AG. whereas pharmaceutical substances are increasingly identified in surface water and groundwater; whereas pollution caused by pharmaceutical residues necessitates advanced water treatment technologies, including membrane filtration, activated carbon treatment, advanced oxidation processes and other innovative purification techniques;

AH. whereas Directive 2010/75/EU(49) mandates that the potential aggravation of the impact of industrial discharges on the state of water bodies due to variations of water flow dynamics should be explicitly taken into account in the granting and reviewing of permits; whereas the best available techniques will newly incorporate notions of environmental performance levels related to water and permits, which translate the use of these techniques into environmental performance limit values; whereas this is a welcome change with a potential improvement to the industry’s resilience, as EU installations may already face a lower production capacity seasonally due to water scarcity;

AI. whereas urban wastewater is one of the main sources of water pollution, if not properly collected and treated; whereas the objectives of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive should not be lowered, and its scope should be extended to other sectors and substances that contribute to water pollution;

AJ. whereas nutrient pollution in EU water bodies leads to eutrophication, loss of biodiversity, and degradation of aquatic ecosystems(50); whereas pesticide run-off contaminates surface water and groundwater, threatening water quality and human health;

AK. whereas research indicates that exposure in Europe to the synthetic chemical bisphenol A (BPA), which is used in products ranging from plastic and metal food containers to reusable water bottles, is well above acceptable health safety levels(51);

AL. whereas soil and nutrient management lies at the basis of improving water quality and availability; whereas the EWRS should focus on improving nutrient management, with the aim of closing nutrient loops to reduce nutrient emissions to waterways; whereas the safe use of sewage sludge in agriculture will also reduce the EU’s very high dependency on the import of phosphorus mineral fertiliser, for example, from Russia; whereas the safe use of sludge should therefore also be considered as contributing to European resilience and strategic autonomy;

AM. whereas climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; whereas many impacts of climate change are felt through water, such as more intense and frequent droughts, more extreme flooding and more erratic seasonal rainfall; whereas floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security, and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion, economic prosperity and stability, as well as jeopardising the long-term availability of this valuable resource;

AN. whereas the European climate risk assessment recognised that Europe’s policies and adaptation actions are not keeping pace with the rapidly growing risks that threaten ecosystems, infrastructure, food and water supply and people’s health, as well as the economy and finance(52);

AO. whereas assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show that the sea level rise due to climate change is leading to an increase in the salinity of soils and freshwaters, compromising ecosystem health and water quality, as well as affecting 80 million Europeans living in low elevation coastal zones and flood plains; whereas freshwater and marine ecosystems are interconnected as riverine pollution, disruption to sediment flows and water shortages all have a very strong impact on the health of marine ecosystems, particularly the coastal ones, as well as on the viability of social and economic activities that depend on them, such as transport, fisheries, agriculture, aquaculture and tourism;

AP. whereas prolonged drought, extreme heat and large-scale flooding events, caused by changing weather patterns, will intensify and become more frequent throughout the continent, damaging ecosystems and human health and leading to major disruption to economic activities and decreasing the overall quantity and quality of available water; whereas preserving water resources and the natural functions of rivers, while supplying sufficient water of good quality, is becoming a major challenge that will require increased climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, effective management and innovative measures to increase water availability; whereas managing water scarcity and flood risks affordably and sustainably will increasingly become important across the EU;

AQ. whereas in 2022, Europe experienced its hottest summer and the second warmest year on record, leading to drought impacting over 15 % of EU territory; whereas the average annual economic loss caused by droughts in the EU between1981 and 2010 was estimated at around EUR 9 billion per year; whereas with no adaptation measures, it is estimated that annual drought losses in Europe and the UK could increase to EUR 45 billion per year up to 2100 with warming of 3°C(53); whereas in the period of 1998-2020, floods comprised 43 % of all disaster events in Europe; whereas climate change impacts and socio-economic developments are leading to more frequent flooding, affecting an increasing number of people and causing increasing damage; whereas 12 % of Europe’s population lives in floodplains(54);

AR. whereas the cost of inaction in addressing water-related challenges is extremely high, given that 90 % of disasters are related to water(55); whereas without policy action, the cost of economic losses from coastal floods alone could exceed EUR 1 trillion per year by the end of the century in the EU(56) and the economic cost of droughts in Europe could exceed EUR 65 billion a year by 2100(57);

AS. whereas significant differences exist between the Member States in water availability, management strategies and usage patterns, and vulnerability to climate change impacts can vary considerably; whereas a tailored approach is required to enhance water resilience and ensure sustainable water management;

AT. whereas droughts constitute one of the chief catastrophic consequences of climate change; whereas around 23 % of the EU’s territory is moderately susceptible to desertification and 8 % is highly susceptible to it; whereas Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain and Italy are among the countries most affected, and 74 % of Spain’s surface area is at risk of desertification; whereas the EWRS should look beyond prolonged droughts, but rather address the reality that the semi-arid line is moving north, resulting in increasing areas in the EU that will face chronic long-term unavailability of sufficient freshwater resources;

AU. whereas policies related to desertification, water consumption and climate change are closely interconnected; whereas as part of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the EU reaffirmed in 2015 and later re-confirmed in 2024(58) its commitment to achieving land degradation neutrality by 2030, which, according to the European Court of Auditors special report on desertification, is unlikely to be achieved;

AV. whereas water infrastructure can help maintain a constant and predictable flow and supply of water; whereas in 2022, the annual average river discharge across Europe was the second lowest since records began in 1991(59);

AW. whereas downstream areas are particularly dependent on upstream water management and abstraction; whereas the Member States should refrain from implementing measures that significantly increase flood risks upstream or downstream of other countries in the same river basin, in accordance with the WFD;

AX. whereas nature-based solutions are pertinent interventions that, when tailored to specific ecosystems and needs, can increase resilience in the water cycle and provide multiple benefits in terms of biodiversity protection, carbon sequestration, improved water quality, nutrient retention, supply of drinking water, wildfire prevention and flood risk mitigation; whereas nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and the operable life of water infrastructure, therefore ensuring, in many cases, complementarity of both solutions;

AY. whereas natural water retention measures are nature-based solutions that aim to store water in natural, agricultural, forested and urban landscapes;

AZ. whereas water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such; whereas, under Directive (EU) 2024/1203 on the protection of the environment through criminal law(60), abstraction of surface water or groundwater within the meaning of the WFD constitutes a criminal offence where such conduct is unlawful and intentional, and causes, or is likely to cause, substantial damage to the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or to the quantitative status of groundwater bodies;

BA. whereas soil biodiversity and soil organic carbon affect water retention capacity; whereas soil erosion, compaction and certain soil management practices that cause soil degradation lead to a steady decrease in the water retention capacity of soil, which as a consequence exacerbates drought and flood events with a direct negative impact on farming; whereas healthy soil is therefore one of the drivers of water resilience, which itself should be approached and managed at river basin level; whereas better land management is key to preventing disasters;

BB. whereas the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) includes an ambitious but non-binding target of dedicating at least 7,5 % of annual EU spending to the biodiversity objectives in 2024 and 10 % in both 2026 and 2027; whereas the new financial framework should incorporate a water perspective with a view to allocating sufficient resources to the future EWRS in order to ensure resilient water ecosystems and infrastructure, and security of water supply, and to facilitate investments in innovative solutions;

BC. whereas cohesion funding has played a crucial role in improving water and sanitation services across the Member States; whereas continued support is required to ensure their long-term resilience and compliance with increasingly stringent quality standards;

BD. whereas pricing policies can improve the efficiency of water use; whereas such policies are a national competence and account for the regional differences in water availability and the source of water supply; whereas pricing can play a significant role in prompting households and other economic sectors to optimise consumption, as well as in ensuring that water users effectively participate in recovering the costs of water services; whereas pricing policies should also consider affordability for households and small businesses;

BE. whereas digitalisation and innovation can effectively assist the Member States, regional bodies and the Commission in collecting data on and monitoring water management; whereas the EU is at the forefront of new technological developments in the water sector, accounting for 40 % of all international patent families in this sector between 1992 and 2021(61), a position that needs to be fostered and nurtured, and the potential of the internal market fully exploited; whereas hurdles for the introduction and scaling-up of new water technologies need to be examined and a just European level playing field guaranteed; whereas continued support for research in water technology innovation is needed to secure and to create jobs and boost European competitiveness;

BF. whereas innovation is a crucial tool to help the water sector meet the challenges of the United Nation’s SDGs, adapt to climate change and become more water-efficient;

BG. whereas deployment of monitoring and modelling technologies is still lagging behind in many Member States, and the digitalisation of the sector is too slow; whereas provisions on the river basin management plans in the WFD do not explicitly include concrete measures to digitise the water sector; whereas common shortcomings for the current policies harnessing the potential digital solutions are related to the lack of technology guidance, monitoring standards, policy integration, standardisation and public involvement;

BH. whereas the water sector is vulnerable to various threats, including physical attacks, cyberattacks and contamination with harmful agents; whereas such incidents could result in widespread illness, casualties and service disruptions, significantly impacting public health, the environment and economic stability; whereas the digitalisation of water management might introduce further security risks in a context of increasing hostile attacks on critical infrastructure; whereas the implementation of the NIS2 Directive and Critical Entities Resilience Directive can contribute to mitigating security risks to vital (drinking) water systems and (drinking) water infrastructure, arising from geopolitical tensions;

BI. whereas advances in sensor technology, computing, artificial intelligence (AI) and big data management can help monitor water quantity and quality and inform the operational decisions of the policymakers and water management companies; whereas innovations in nature-based systems to manage water are available and can contribute to resilient water management;

BJ. whereas water is a vital component in the life cycle of AI, both in the operation of data centres and the manufacture of hardware; whereas the rapid expansion of AI could result in an exponential increase in water demand; whereas that dependency on an increasingly scarce resource poses significant challenges in terms of sustainability; whereas strategic technologies, such as semiconductors, hydrogen, electric vehicle batteries and data centres, play a key role in achieving a competitive and autonomous EU;

BK. whereas chiller and cooling tower systems, based on innovative cooling technologies such as evaporative and closed-loop cooling, are already available and can contribute to reducing water consumption in industrial, heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems applications;

BL. whereas research must be promoted with a view to producing alternative active ingredients to combat pests, to ensure greater plant health and reduce the use of inputs and phytosanitary products;

BM. whereas water resilience is crucial in education and teaching, and in raising awareness and giving information about the functioning of the water cycle;

BN. whereas limited access to water and related infrastructure has a negative impact, especially on women, as it undermines the realisation of other human rights, such as self-determination, economic independence and education;

BO. whereas 60 % of European river basin districts are transnational, which makes effective transboundary cooperation crucial; whereas 20 European countries depend on other countries for more than 10 % of their water resources, with five countries relying on more than 75 % of their resources coming from abroad via rivers(62); whereas this cooperation should be strengthened to account for current and future climate challenges such as droughts and floods;

BP. whereas United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres appointed a Special Envoy on Water, aiming to enhance international cooperation and synergies among international water processes;

BQ. whereas clean water access and sustainable and resilient sanitation infrastructure are key components of the One Health approach, recognising the interconnection between the health of humans and water pollution;

BR. whereas water cooperation across borders and sectors generates many benefits, including enhancing food security, sustaining healthy livelihoods and ecosystems, helping address resilience to climate change, contributing to disaster risk reduction, providing renewable energy, supporting cities and industry, and fostering regional integration and peace;

BS. whereas geopolitical developments demonstrate that the EU should be ready to withstand the challenges that go beyond the environmental sphere; whereas non-environmental threats, such as recent accidents related to the damaged cable in the Baltic Sea, send the EU a strong message that strengthening transboundary cooperation is key in addressing both the environmental and security-related objectives;

BT. whereas about 41 000 kilometres of inland waterways flow through 25 of the Member States; whereas inland waterways, which rely on the availability of water resources, perform a crucial role in optimising water supply and mitigating the impact of droughts and floods, as well as supporting the economic activities and the development of regions;

BU. whereas the increasing water scarcity, inequalities in access to water, and external shocks to the water sector have heightened interdependencies, increasing competition for water and leading to complex economic repercussions;

General remarks

1. Welcomes and supports President von der Leyen’s announcement in the political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on putting forward a European Water Resilience Strategy (EWRS) addressing water efficiency, scarcity, pollution and water-related risks, as well as the recognition that water is an indispensable resource that is increasingly under stress from climate change and increasing demands;

2. Believes that while implementing legislation, economic competitiveness should be taken into account in line with the Competitiveness Compass; calls for the implementation of EU environmental legislation in order to build a resilient and competitive Europe, mitigate and adapt to climate change, halt biodiversity loss, prevent pollution, ensure food security, limit resource use and waste, and strive towards efficient use of resources, including water, while taking into account the precautionary principle, the control-at-source principle and the polluter-pays principle; highlights the fact that water availability impacts the quantity, quality, variety and seasonal availability of foods that can be produced;

3. Calls for the EU to integrate its commitments to the COP29 Baku Dialogue on Water for Climate Action and the UN 2023 Water Conference into the international dimension of the strategy;

4. Stresses the urgent need to enhance water resilience and management to ensure sustainable freshwater supplies for people, the economy and the environment; emphasises that the EWRS should be developed in coordination with the European Oceans Pact, ensuring a cohesive and integrated approach to managing freshwater and ocean resources, addressing interconnected challenges, enhancing competitiveness and promoting sustainable water management across inland and marine environments, while ensuring a holistic ‘source-to-sea’ approach;

5. Insists on the need for a comprehensive and holistic EWRS that integrates water quality, quantity, security, infrastructure, technology and management aspects and includes the restoration of the water cycle as a key element, as it underpins economic activities, ensures resource availability and contributes to climate regulation;

6. Stresses the importance of water supply, in particular drinking water, as well as water security of supply; points out that all environmental restoration projects should take into account the water security aspects, prioritising solutions that not only provide environmental benefits, but also guarantee the supply and efficient management of water; emphasises, furthermore, that ecological restoration measures should be carried out in synergy with the development of the EU’s renewable energy potential and not impact the overall energy resilience;

7. Recommends that lakes and other freshwater-dependent habitats be included in the strategy, alongside rivers, transitional waters and groundwater, as essential components of the EU’s water resilience efforts;

8. Stresses the urgent need to improve crisis-warning systems with regard to heavy water incidents, as well as to improve preventive measures;

9. Calls on the Commission to present a European climate adaptation plan, including concrete legislative proposals and actions, particularly regarding infrastructure resilience, water management and nature-based solutions, while prioritising the protection of vulnerable communities, to make the EU more resilient and to lead by example;

10. Reiterates that access to clean and safe drinking water and sanitation is a human right; emphasises that this right must be unequivocally ensured, with everyone having access to affordable and good quality water services, including the inhabitants of islands and outermost regions;

11. Stresses that no one, whether in public places or private establishments, should be denied access to water supplied from a distribution network intended for human consumption, where available;

12. Notes that industrial activities and agricultural production require water to produce their end products or to support production activities, with the amount of water used varying depending on the type of activity; highlights the fact that ensuring Europe’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy requires a water-smart society where technology and data enhance a circular economy, fostering sustainable and water-efficient practices; calls on all relevant actors to accelerate the transition towards water-efficient, circular industry and agriculture by promoting and investing in innovative solutions, including digital tools and technologies, resource recovery, water reuse, renewable energy production, infrastructure, nature-based solutions and inclusive governance mechanisms;

13. Urges the Commission to integrate and mainstream the water dimension into internal and external EU policies through a cross-sectoral approach in order to ensure that water resilience, sustainability and security is woven into the fabric of European policies; calls on the Commission, in particular, to carry out a water-related assessment of any regulatory measure, including related to energy, as part of the socio-economic and environmental impact assessment; emphasises that assessing how each EU policy, and EU-funded projects and infrastructure, can impact water resources in terms of quantity, quality and accessibility would ensure that water resilience is a cornerstone of policy formulation and implementation, thus shifting the paradigm from treating water as an infinite resource to recognising its intrinsic value for humanity and for the EU’s ecological and socio-economic landscape and its competitiveness;

Water efficiency

14. Stresses that efficient water use is essential for preserving the EU’s water resources and that water efficiency should be a key objective of the EU; calls, in this regard, for a consequential reduction in water demand, including by addressing excessive leakage levels, investing in research and innovative solutions, modernising industrial and production processes, upgrading water infrastructure, managing water resources and peak demands sustainably, prioritising uses and ensuring that higher water efficiency results in a reduction in overall freshwater consumption as well as in an increase in water availability in water-stressed areas at the local and regional levels; believes that areas affected by prolonged drought and desertification should be given priority;

15. Calls for a legislative framework setting sectoral water efficiency and water abstraction targets at basin level, based on up-to-date assessments of water availability and climate risks, including a water valuation approach that accounts for ecosystem services and long-term sustainability, and covering all water uses, including industry, energy, agriculture, public institutions and households; underlines the fact that these targets should be ambitious yet adaptable, taking into account the specific circumstances and progress already achieved by each Member State to ensure continued efforts towards efficiency gains across all regions; stresses the importance of efficient and uniform data collection practices across the Member States and all sectors, including through the use of innovative technologies, as well as real-time data collection points for more transparency on water consumption; emphasises the need to carry out an appropriate assessment of the environmental and socio-economic impacts of water use; stresses that the strategic importance of food production must not be compromised; emphasises that science, research and technology are important for water efficiency and water use as well as for the circular economy in this regard; calls for the creation and promotion of new smart and high-performance irrigation systems, rainwater retention and water from reuse, as well as water-efficient irrigation systems;

16. Reiterates the need to develop a common EU methodology for setting water efficiency and water abstraction targets to ensure the sustainable use of available renewable water resources within an integrated water resources management framework which gives due consideration to linkages beyond the water sector through the water-energy-food-ecosystems nexus, thus enabling decision-makers and economic actors to plan the necessary investment to ensure water supply security in an increasingly sustainable manner, while giving due consideration to the characteristics of the water bodies concerned;

17. Calls for close collaboration on integrated energy and water resource planning and related technologies across all sectors at national, regional and local levels, including between all stakeholders, in order to establish mechanisms for ensuring coherence across water and energy policies;

18. Calls on the Commission to put forward a comprehensive policy on sustainable water management for industry based on reducing, recovering, reusing and recycling, including a focus on the use of water-efficient and circular technologies, water recycling, pollutant reduction strategies and the promotion of closed-loop systems;

19. Recalls that the growing threat of water scarcity is jeopardising industries and projects that are key to Europe’s competitiveness drive, including semiconductors, data centres, renewable hydrogen and electric vehicle battery production; notes that these industries will increasingly face pressure to reduce their environmental impact and improve water resource efficiency, including both direct and indirect water usage; calls on the Member States to support water-intensive industries in setting up water-efficiency plans aimed at saving, reusing and recycling water, preventing water pollution and implementing water-efficient technologies; calls on the Commission to incorporate comprehensive water management strategies into relevant EU industrial policies and sector-specific transition pathways, with a particular focus on strategic water-intensive sectors;

20. Stresses that knowledge, data, research and technology are key for efficient water use; calls for adequate financial and technical support to be given to the Member States to implement efficient water management measures, including by means of innovative and modern technologies;

21. Welcomes the recommendations of the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture underlining that sustainable farming practices and new business models need to be scaled up to promote more efficient use of natural resources, especially water;

22. Calls for the transition to a more sustainable and competitive farming model, assisted by the implementation of sustainable practices and innovative solutions that promote biodiversity, reduce chemical inputs and enable water resources to be managed efficiently, including nature-based solutions, regenerative management, smart precision irrigation technologies, digital monitoring systems, advanced treatment methods and smart water distribution networks, optimising consumption and preventing water resource depletion, and that help ensure continued productivity while enabling agriculture to reduce pollution, use pesticides and fertilisers efficiently, improve the hydrological cycle, enhance groundwater recharge and adapt to lower water use; considers that technological solutions can also include measures that can increase water absorption, infiltration and retention in agricultural systems, which are important amid increasing occurrences of both drought and heavy rains;

23. Points out that innovative irrigation solutions and practices can enhance water efficiency in agriculture, gaining an economic advantage while also reducing environmental burdens; notes that farmers generally lack sufficient means and incentives to know about water use by crops, actual irrigation applications, the yield responses of crops to different water management practices, and thus current on-farm water-efficiency levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to incentivise the uptake and support the maintenance of innovative irrigation solutions such as drip irrigation to allow for an active management of water levels and efficient use of water resources, as well as to promote continuous knowledge exchange, so that all relevant stakeholders can share greater responsibility across the entire water supply chain;

24. Recalls that the use of nutrients such as nitrate and phosphate is essential for food production, as this activity would not be possible without their use; recommends better consideration of the nutrient cycle in agricultural production and the exploitation of the value in urban wastewater; calls for more research into the effective use of nutrients and the development of nutrient recovery technologies, in order to decrease the Union’s dependence on imported raw materials; recognises the high potential for nutrient recovery from water and calls on the Member States to support the agricultural sector to optimise their nutrient consumption including by using resources (nitrate and phosphorus) recovered from wastewater treatment plants; calls on the Commission to propose an integrated nutrient management action plan to effectively address loss of valuable agricultural inputs, recycling of nutrients, nutrient pollution and inefficiencies in the nutrient cycle; calls for the proper and safe recovery of phosphorus from organic sources and for incentivising investments in its recovery and circular nutrient management in accordance with the Commission’s JRC publication(63);

25. Stresses that the current Nitrates Directive is due for revision, as outdated provisions promote the use of artificial fertilisers rather than organic manure; calls for an urgent review of the Nitrates Directive before the end of this year, and its revision to promote circular nutrient management;

26. Emphasises, in line with the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture, the need to support the transition to regionally adapted crop and seed varieties and the switch to different crops, with reduced water requirements and greater drought resistance, as well as the need to support the adoption of appropriate soil management practices; considers the need for stronger support for scientific research and technological development related to the breeding of new species, to enable the production and supply of foodstuffs to be diversified and their quality enhanced, while raising the level of protection for human health and the environment; notes the potential of plant varieties that are more resistant to water stress and pests and could play a role in reducing water use and could reduce the environmental footprint of crops;

27. Calls for financial and technical support for farmers and rural communities, particularly in water-stressed areas, to help them adopt sustainable land management practices that improve soil and water quality, contribute to biodiversity and mitigate climate change; emphasises the need for special attention to be given to regions that are particularly vulnerable to soil degradation and water scarcity;

28. Acknowledges the significant efforts made by farmers to enhance water quality and emphasises the need for an appropriate timeframe to allow the effects of these measures to be accurately assessed;

29. Points to the success of the agricultural European Innovation Partnership EIP‑AGRI and calls for the continuation of knowledge exchange, expertise and peer-to-peer learning via the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Network;

30. Notes the links between carbon sinking and water availability, and calls for coherence between the water resilience strategy and carbon farming schemes;

31. Reiterates that the Water Reuse Regulation aims at reducing the pressure on water bodies by setting out provisions on reusing water after appropriate treatment extends its life cycle, thereby preserving water resources; emphasises, however, that regulatory, financial and technological barriers, including the economic competitiveness of reclaimed wastewater, risk management planning and the sharing of responsibilities, contribute to the slow uptake of reuse of reclaimed water for agriculture; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to adopt supportive policies, at both the EU and the local level, that incentivise water reuse practices, taking into account the importance of adapting wastewater treatment and quality requirements to the intended water use; notes that treated wastewater also finds valuable applications in various industrial processes and urban contexts, contributing to reducing the pressure on freshwater resources and the conservation of drinking water; calls therefore on the Commission to assess a possible extension of the scope of the Water Reuse Regulation in order to establish, at EU level, minimum water quality standards for safe water reuse for industrial and urban purposes;

32. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to specify systems of regulatory and financial incentives for the reuse of treated wastewater in water-intensive sectors and to provide specific funding for the construction of infrastructure connecting wastewater treatment plants and refined water distribution networks; urges a streamlined approach in EU legislation to remove administrative barriers and promote safe and efficient water recycling across the Member States; calls on the Member States to set up national water reuse and saving plans to incentivise cross-sectoral cooperation in water management;

33. Reiterates that reused water could alleviate abstraction from rivers, lakes and groundwater for irrigated agriculture; underlines the fact that reused water can contribute to maintaining base flows and minimum water levels during dry periods;

34. Highlights the potential of the building sector to save water, for example, with the help of smart sub-metering systems, efficient greywater systems, reuse of domestic wastewater or rainwater harvesting; stresses that the energy performance of buildings can be enhanced by water efficiency, reducing greenhouse gas emissions; calls on the Member States and local authorities to incentivise water-saving features in new buildings; stresses, in this regard, that water-efficient practices should be factored into urban planning; highlights the fact that harvesting rain water as well as using and reusing water efficiently can improve climate adaptation in cities;

35. Calls for the transition, in industry and in the energy and digital sectors, to optimised cooling efficiency and alternative cooling methods that are less water-dependent, in order to ensure significant water savings in these sectors;

36. Points out that, while households represent 10 % of the overall water consumption in the EU, action on improving domestic water efficiency is also necessary; notes that water-saving technological solutions are readily available and can reduce water consumption in households without compromising comfort or requiring high investment; calls on the Member States to support consumers in transitioning towards such technologies and to strengthen consumer awareness of water consumption and potential efficiency gains by anchoring domestic water efficiency in water, building and consumer policies across the EU;

37. Notes that the leakage rates from pipes are high in some Member States, which increases the total share of domestic water consumption; welcomes the provisions of the new Drinking Water Directive on leakage rates and the ongoing work of the Commission to evaluate those rates and set threshold values that will trigger action in the Member States concerned; calls on the Member States to urgently tackle leakage in water supply networks and to fully implement the monitoring and reporting requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, so that the Commission can set a threshold value for leakage by January 2028; emphasises the need for sustainable urban irrigation networks to be modernised, to curb leakages and reduce their water footprint; calls on the Member States to regularly inform the public about the efficiency and effectiveness of their water supplies;

38. Points out that public sector organisations provide significant untapped potential for saving water by virtue of their size or their nature as public organisations; believes that the public sector should act as a role model for other sectors;

39. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote easily accessible and free information, training, advisory programmes and information campaigns aimed at raising public awareness of sustainable water resource management;

40. Recommends that water-efficiency aspects, such as reductions in water loss and reuse of water, be integrated in the upcoming revision of the public procurement framework;

Water pollution

41. Underlines the fact that the existing EU water policy framework is designed to address the effective management of water resources and the protection and restoration of freshwater and marine ecosystems, but that its poor implementation and enforcement, insufficient funding and lack of proper cost-benefit analyses of the implementation measures undermine its effectiveness;

42. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement and enforce the current legislation, in particular the WFD and its ‘daughter’ directives (the Groundwater Directive and the Environmental Quality Standards Directive), with a particular focus on strengthening the monitoring and reporting mechanisms to ensure that all Member States consistently implement the required water protection measures; recalls the need for sufficient funding to implement these acts;

43. Stresses that the chemical pollution of surface water and groundwater poses a threat to the aquatic environment, with effects such as acute and chronic toxicity in aquatic organisms, accumulation of pollutants in the ecosystem and loss of habitats and biodiversity, as well as to human health;

44. Calls for the establishment of comprehensive EU-wide quality standards for PFAS in groundwater and surface water; stresses that respective updates of the relevant directives are essential for safeguarding water quality and achieving good chemical status for water bodies as mandated under the WFD;

45. Insists that essential uses of PFAS in critical sectors, such as medical devices, pharmaceuticals and products necessary for the twin transition to a climate neutral and digital economy, are not endangered in the context of upcoming legislative and non-legislative proposals; calls on the Commission to propose to phase out forever chemicals (PFAS) – starting with consumer goods – linked to harmful effects on human health and the environment, based on scientific evidence, allowing their use where there are no safe alternatives; underlines the need to scale up investments and accelerate the research and development of equivalent and safe alternatives;

46. Calls on the Commission to propose updated limits on PFAS in drinking water, taking into account the latest scientific knowledge;

47. Emphasises the urgency of addressing, primarily at the source, and effectively monitoring pollution from pharmaceuticals, bisphenols, antimicrobial resistance genes, persistent organic pollutants and other existing and emerging pollutants, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition and the goal of achieving good chemical status for all water bodies;

48. Calls on the Commission to close the gaps with enhanced funding and the enforcement of current laws, and the integration of circular economy principles to mitigate pollution at its source and safeguard water ecosystems for future generations; underscores the fact that antibiotic-resistant bacteria and certain emerging pollutants remain insufficiently addressed, necessitating further innovation and investment; emphasises the need for all sectors to apply sustainable production processes and circular practices, proactively preventing pollutants from entering water systems;

49. Recalls that microplastics may enter drinking water sources in a number of ways: from surface run-off (for example, after a rain event) to wastewater effluent (both treated and untreated), combined sewer overflows, industrial effluent, degraded plastic waste and atmospheric deposition; calls on the Commission to put forward, in line with the requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, a full risk assessment of microplastics in drinking water, while continuously working on reliable and robust sampling and analytical methods in order to appropriately address the potential threat of this emerging pollutant to sources of water intended for human consumption;

50. Emphasises the need to improve the monitoring and regulation of plastic pollution in freshwater and marine environments, with particular attention to microplastics and single-use plastics; encourages the Commission to assess current enforcement mechanisms and consider further measures to protect water quality;

51. Calls on the stakeholders to develop safe water contact materials, to substitute BPA and other bisphenols and ensure compliance with Regulation (EU) 1935/2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food(64) and the recently adopted provisions as regards the use of BPA and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives (Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190);

52. Recalls that the revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive, in effect since 1 January 2025, imposes new obligations regarding water purification, requiring pharmaceutical and cosmetic producers to cover at least 80 % of the costs of removing micropollutants from wastewater, with the aim of reducing harmful substances in the environment; notes the existence of differing figures and assessments regarding the impact this would have on the pharmaceutical sector and, consequently, on the availability and affordability of medicines, and therefore calls on the Commission to conduct a new and comprehensive assessment of the impact on this sector;

53. Calls for increased EU support for local authorities for the modernisation of wastewater treatment plants and the promotion of water reuse, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition, ensuring that municipal wastewater management contributes effectively to good chemical and ecological water status;

54. Calls for increased monitoring of pesticide residues in water bodies and enforcement of pesticide application regulations to mitigate their impact on water quality; stresses the need for increased funding to support farmers in the adoption of low-input and organic farming practices that reduce reliance on chemical pesticides and fertilisers, as well as to provide appropriate training and independent advisory services to farmers and other operators on the use, effectiveness and toxicity of pesticides, as well as best practice;

55. Insists on the integration of circular economy principles to reduce hazardous chemical use in industrial processes; stresses the need for additional funding to support industries in transitioning to clean technologies that minimise water pollution(65);

56. Recognises the role of treated sludge as a local and circular source of fertiliser, contributing to soil health, nutrient recycling and reduced dependency on synthetic fertilisers; emphasises the importance of preventing PFAS, heavy metals, microplastics and other harmful substances from entering sewer networks in order to enable the safe and sustainable use of high-quality sewage sludge in agriculture;

57. Calls on the Commission to include an overview of measures in an annex to the EWRS, with a timeline for achieving the objectives in question;

Adaptation to climate change: floods, droughts, stress areas, disaster preparedness

58. Calls for the climate adaptation proofing of all new EU legislative and non-legislative acts in order to ensure the integration of climate adaptation into sectoral plans and policy measures affecting water and land use; highlights, in this regard, the need for increased climate ambition as part of the fight against climate change, while urging the Member States to ensure that all climate adaptation measures affecting water use contribute to long-term, improved water resilience; calls on the Commission to take fully into account the geographical and environmental conditions in the Member States, as well as the specific situation of islands, outermost regions and other areas of high vulnerability, such as areas affected by desertification, when adopting new legislative and non-legislative proposals; asks the Commission to present a roadmap for current and ongoing legislative and non-legislative policy measures, including targets and monitoring requirements affecting water and land use;

59. Emphasises the need for tailored climate adaptation measures for the Mediterranean region, which faces unique challenges such as prolonged droughts and saline intrusion into freshwater resources;

60. Stresses the specific challenges faced by island areas due to the scarcity of drinking water and calls for targeted measures to protect island water resources, including improving rainwater collection and storage infrastructure, and implementing alternative water sources, while enhancing water resource monitoring and management systems; calls, further, on the Member States to take better account of mountainous regions in national adaptation plans in order to meet the specific challenges of water management in mountainous areas;

61. Reiterates that climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should not come at the cost of ecosystem degradation, and should avoid increasing the demand for water- and energy-intensive activities, and should instead prioritise energy- and water-efficient innovation and technologies as part of moving towards a more resource-efficient economy, without undermining its productivity, while ensuring equitable access to water for all; points out that, in order to be effective, climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should be tailored to national circumstances, while enhancing competitiveness and productivity in the short and long term; points out the possibilities of synergies, in this regard, with innovative energy production such as photovoltaics and biogas, as it can also contribute to an increase in agricultural income;

62. Recognises the importance of reserving water for nature and the need to maintain healthy freshwater ecosystems, for the good functioning of the water cycle, for human activities and for mitigating the impacts of droughts and water scarcity; underlines, in the context of restoring freshwater ecosystems and the natural functions of rivers, the importance of removing ‘obsolete barriers’, namely artificial barriers that no longer fulfil their original purpose or are no longer needed, wherever such opportunities exist, on the basis of current knowledge and experience; calls for the establishment of specific programmes for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring minimum flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

63. Insists that, with climate change impact becoming more persistent, flood and drought management must fully integrate the arising risks, including changing weather patterns, such as increased rain patterns leading to excess of water; is convinced that a combination of monitoring and data collection, preparedness, emergency and recovery responses taking into account the principle of ‘building back better’(66)on the one hand, and adapting societal and economic activities on the other, is essential to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience, especially in the light of the quantitative aspect of water becoming more prominent; stresses, in this regard, the need for climate-resilient nature-based solutions and infrastructure that take into account the impact of extreme climate events in their development to ensure their viability in the face of extreme climate events;

64. Recalls that in 2007, the WFD was supplemented by Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks, which aims to establish a framework to reduce the adverse consequences of flooding on human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity; notes that making the two directives mutually compatible is achieved through risk management plans and river basin flood management plans as the components of an integrated water management system in which coordination is crucial; recalls that flood prevention is closely connected to urban green spaces, soil protection strategies and investment in drainage networks;

65. Stresses that preparedness for water scarcity and drought can be significantly improved in the EU, considering that no drought management plans are in place in several Member States(67); calls on the Member States and, where applicable, competent regional and local authorities, to develop drought management plans, particularly with a view to ensuring the provision of drinking water, ensuring food production and integrating digitalised monitoring, control and early warning systems in order to support effective and data-based decisions on protection, response and communication measures with clearly defined areas of responsibility; points out the need to introduce EU-level provisions as regards drought management plans, similar to the ones on flood management plans;

66. Insists, in view of the numerous climatic events, such as floods, droughts and cyclones, which have affected Europe, on the importance of the EU having a robust mechanism for responding to such crises, including systems for warning and providing assistance to the civilian population; points out that digital monitoring, adequate public display of relevant data and early warning systems are key to developing effective drought and flood management plans at the level of the Member States; emphasises, further, the importance of fully using the available EU tools, such as the flood forecasts of the European Flood Awareness System and the Global Flood Awareness System, and the Global Flood Monitoring tool, as part of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service;

67. Stresses the importance of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) in helping countries hit by water-related disasters such as flood and droughts; calls for increased funding to provide the UCPM with sufficient and upgraded resources in order to increase preparedness and improve capacity building;

68. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance citizen preparedness in the event of water-related disasters or crisis; stresses the importance of information campaigns and demonstration exercises in education facilities, public administration and businesses in order to build a ‘preparedness culture’ for citizens;

69. Calls on the Member States to systematically renew and upgrade their water infrastructure, including drinking water and sanitation infrastructure, as well as infrastructure regulating river flows, and to invest in innovative solutions based on good practice, making water systems more resilient to climate change, ensuring stable drinking water supply, enabling the early detection of losses and reducing water leakages and waste, while optimising water transport and storage systems; highlights the fact that funding for innovative water infrastructure is insufficient compared to the investment needs across the EU; calls, in this regard, for dedicated funding, on national, regional or EU level, to ensure adequate financing for the development, maintenance and modernisation of water-resilient infrastructure, to foster innovative solutions and technologies and ensure long-term sustainability of that water infrastructure;

70. Regrets that, despite the threat that desertification poses to water quality and availability, soil fertility and food production, and despite the fact that 13 Member States have declared themselves to be affected by desertification in the context of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the Commission is not addressing desertification effectively and efficiently; urges the Commission, therefore, in line with the Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on desertification, land degradation and drought, to present an integrated EU-wide action plan to combat desertification, land degradation and drought, aiming at building resilience to drought and achieving land degradation neutrality in the EU by 2030, based on a full impact assessment;

71. Insists that the agricultural sector be further supported in implementing new technologies to reduce the demand for water, while at the same time increasing access to water, including by supporting water retention and groundwater recharge; calls for research results, for example on seawater desalination, to be made accessible and to facilitate the deployment of innovative desalination solutions; calls on the Member States to create natural water reserves based on up-to-date assessments of climate risks to protect critical water supplies and their catchments, and taking into consideration the environmental and socio-economic impact of developing such reserves; points out that such natural water reserves would complement the WFD’s requirement for Member States to identify water bodies used for drinking water abstraction, making sure they meet the objectives set out in Article 4 WFD and in the Drinking Water Directive, and would ensure their necessary protection; notes that such natural water reserves already exist under different forms in various Member States; stresses that assistance should be given to Member States or local and regional governments to help them develop natural water reserves;

72. Notes the potential of retention infrastructure as an example of water generation systems created using the best available, cost-effective techniques that have the lowest environmental impact, including by means of wastewater reuse or rainwater collection, in order to reduce the risks of droughts and floods, increase water security and foster circularity, water reclamation and reuse; believes that water retention facilities may be useful tools provided that they are authorised by local or national authorities under clear conditions, including the capacity of local groundwater to sustain such activities and the need for farmers accessing the water resource to adapt their practices to more sustainable practices, in particular in terms of water needs and water quality; calls on the Commission to use its available tools, including financial support, to streamline this approach among the Member States;

73. Deplores the unlawful or intentional abstraction of water, which is likely to cause substantial damage to water bodies; calls for strong dissuasive measures to be applied, including through the criminal law, to protect the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or of the quantitative status of groundwater bodies; notes that additional support for training and knowledge transfer for national enforcement capacities is needed;

74. Notes the important cross-cutting role of nature-based solutions in addressing the challenges of the triple planetary crisis and restoring the natural water cycle; calls on the Commission and the Member States to prioritise, taking into account the environmental and socio-economic impacts, the deployment of nature-based solutions for water resilience in their policy actions and recommendations, such as the re-wetting of wetlands and peatlands to increase ground water availability and surrounding soil moisture, the restoration and protection of floodplains, natural water retention measures, revegetation as a barrier against floods, and rainwater conservation, in order to strengthen water availability, mitigate climate change risks and support long-term resilience for communities, businesses and food production; underlines that, in addition to nature-based solutions, complementary investment in engineering solutions remains necessary to ensure successful climate adaptation and water resilience in the long term;

Funding and pricing

75. Notes that nature-based solutions and natural water retention measures have the potential to restore groundwater levels and support ecological flows while reducing water-related risks from water scarcity, floods and droughts; notes that in flood management, nature-based solutions cannot usually replace existing solutions and may not be effective for the most extreme events; points out, however, that nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and operable life of grey infrastructure by increasing water absorption capacity, reducing water velocity and regulating peak flows; reiterates, in this regard, that the effectiveness of nature-based solutions is context-specific and must be adapted to the local situation; emphasises in this regard that a ‘one solution that fits all’ does not exist;

76. Stresses the need to provide financial support for sustainable innovative methods and solutions, while having due regard to public-private partnerships;

77. Stresses, in the context of climate adaptation, the importance of healthy soils in ensuring water security and circularity; emphasises that the natural water retention of soils must be improved through measures to enhance soil health, minimising carbon losses, as well as actions at the level of the water body, such as the stabilisation of riverbanks, including through re-naturalisation, and the restoration of the retention capacities of aquifers;

78. Notes that thoroughly designed forest management measures can improve watershed health, regulate water flow and reduce drought and flood stress, given the essential role of trees and forests in water cycle regulation, through their ability to purify water, increase the availability of water resources and improve soil moisture retention; proposes that this be duly considered when the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, develops Union disaster resilience goals and that it be considered in the development and refinement of disaster risk management and contingency planning; highlights the need, in this regard, for more research, data collection, innovation and funding to support land managers in preventing the impact of environmental stressors such as drought floods and diminishing watershed function;

79. Recognises that urban areas are increasingly vulnerable to water-related climate risks such as flooding, water shortages and heat stress; calls for the integration of urban water resilience planning into climate adaptation strategies, including investment in green roofs, permeable infrastructure, rainwater harvesting and storm water retention systems, as well as measures aimed at increasing green and blue spaces in urban areas, in order to mitigate extreme weather impacts and to reduce the risks to human life and property; calls further for the maintenance of, and regained access to, urban waterways in cities;

80. Emphasises that the EWRS should ensure adequate funding from public and private sources in order to support the modernisation, upgrading, adaptation and maintenance of resilient water infrastructure, sustainable water management, data collection, research, effective monitoring, digitalisation, upskilling, nature-based solutions, the development and the uptake of innovative water-efficient technologies, as well as to ensure environmental and socio-economic sustainability in line with the goals set by the new European Competitiveness Compass;

81. Calls on the Commission to create a separate and dedicated fund for water resilience within the upcoming MFF; believes that specific financial mechanisms should also be established within the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund to support water-smart technologies and water investment; strongly believes that, in the interim, water should be prioritised in existing funding frameworks, including the Cohesion Fund; stresses that EU funding mechanisms must incorporate considerations of social equity and affordability, in particular in the context of providing water services to the population, ensuring support for Member States and citizens with greater financial constraints and specific realities, while meeting water management obligations; highlights the importance of adjusting existing funding, subsidies and financing streams related to water management and other related land uses, moving away from outdated engineering solutions to innovative ones, as well as nature-based solutions or a combination thereof;

82. Calls for targeted funding, via Horizon Europe and the EIP-AGRI, for field trials on the water relations of different cropping systems; calls for the recognition of the role of women in water policies and for specific funding to be identified to promote their access to agriculture;

83. Recalls that the lack of dedicated funding for water or binding funding targets within the current MFF limits the EU’s capacity to direct targeted investment towards essential water resilience measures, including infrastructure modernisation, innovation, climate adaptation measures and the implementation of nature-based solutions, and thus its competitive capacity, as the absence of a water balance creates an additional burden for the economy of the regions; notes that outermost and mountainous regions and islands in the EU are particularly struggling to access funding or public-private partnerships to support local and regional investment in water management and infrastructure;

84. Stresses the important role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in water financing; highlights the fact that the EIB is actively investing in and supporting the water sector; stresses that the EU should collaborate with the EIB to share best practice and calls, further, on the EIB and other financial institutions to strengthen their role in the funding of innovative and resilient water infrastructure, improved sanitation and drinking water infrastructure, digitalisation, as well as to support projects aimed at flood risk reduction, erosion prevention and the revitalization of watercourses, by facilitating favourable conditions for water investment;

85. Urges the Commission to explore and promote innovative financing mechanisms, including payments for ecosystem services and green bonds, while ensuring regulatory clarity and safeguards to prevent market distortions; calls on the EIB and other financial institutions to prioritise low-interest loans and credits for Member States and regional and local authorities undertaking large-scale restoration projects, with specific provisions to support economically disadvantaged regions;

86. Highlights the importance of public-private partnerships as a source of funding for water investment; calls on the Commission to incentivise private investment in the water sector by creating a supportive regulatory framework that may include co-financing opportunities and public-private partnerships in order to drive innovation, improve infrastructure and ensure sustainable water management solutions across the Member States; underlines, nevertheless, that the involvement of private investment in the EU water sector must not undermine the status of water as a public good and a public service, and that the long-term resilience of the sector, as well as the principles of accessibility, affordability and sustainability must be ensured;

87. Calls on the Member States to adopt governance frameworks that clearly define the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in planning, financing and implementing nature-based solutions; believes that these frameworks should integrate funding from diverse sources, including philanthropic contributions and private-sector partnerships, while ensuring equitable access to resources for small-scale projects, particularly managed at local or regional levels;

88. Urges the Commission and the Member States to address water aspects in their budgets and to improve governance within the regions in the use of EU funds;

89. Underlines the need to provide targeted financial and technical assistance to municipalities to facilitate compliance with water-related legislation;

90. Encourages the Member States to accelerate the granting of authorisations for sustainable and innovative resilient water infrastructure projects to enable their rapid implementation in the face of the urgent challenges;

91. Notes that the application of the cost recovery principle on water services, which provides that all water users effectively and proportionately participate financially in the recovery of the costs of water services, remains low to non-existent in several Member States; calls on the Member States and their regional authorities to implement adequate water pricing policies and apply the cost recovery principle for both environmental and resource costs in line with the WFD; calls on the Member States to take into account the long investment cycles when implementing the cost recovery principle and to ensure sufficient funding is available for needed (re)investment;

92. Stresses the importance of ensuring that water pricing supports long-term water security by reflecting the economic, environmental and resource costs of water use; encourages the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to ensure that water pricing is economically sustainable, socially fair and promotes efficient water use, and that it reflects the availability of water across different Member States and regions, particularly in water-stressed regions, while safeguarding affordability for households and small businesses; calls on the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to insure transparent water prices and to raise awareness of the value of water services;

93. Points out that competent national water authorities will play a central role in implementing new water management and conservation plans at the level of the Member States; calls, therefore, on the Members States to financially and technically increase the capacity of those competent authorities to play a more significant enabling and advisory role in sustainable and future-proof water management and storage infrastructure; believes that EU funds, such as the Just Transition Fund, should be used to further assist Member States and water agencies in implementation;

Digitalisation, security and technological innovation

94. Stresses the potential and the necessity for digitalisation and AI in improving the management and monitoring of bodies of water and water infrastructure, as well as in reporting and ensuring the comparability of data reflecting different geographical flow conditions;

95. Calls on the Commission, the Member States and water providers to mainstream transparency and digitalisation as fundamental principles in water management and to enhance the use of management and metering data, with the aim of strengthening monitoring, assessment, accountability and decision-making, while optimising and simplifying reporting obligations; calls for digitally enabled water technologies to facilitate real-time, sample-based and distance monitoring and reporting on water quality, leakages, usage and resources; calls for improved efficiency in the use of public funds and public spending in this area; recognises that widespread deployment of innovative digital technologies needs to be accompanied by digital skills training;

96. Emphasises the need to promote digitalisation and data-centric solutions in building a water-smart society; stresses the need to develop digital solutions for monitoring water consumption and optimising the use of water resources across all sectors; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, to provide financial support for the implementation of smart water management systems, focusing on the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);

97. Points out that water systems, including water treatment and distribution systems, are considered one of the nation’s critical infrastructures and security pillars, and hence key for the EU’s strategic autonomy, and require increased protection and the ability of utilities to detect, respond to, and recover from physical and cyberthreats and cyberattacks; notes that a higher level of digitalisation comes with new vulnerabilities; points out that, in the event of a threat or an attack, water system operators can lose their ability to control the flow and quality of the water or lose the ability to track the true status of the water system; insists that vulnerability assessments and an emergency response plan should be an integral part of the water management system in every Member State; encourages the promotion of information sharing about threats to cybersecurity and procedures to exchange best practice among operators, as well as to establish a cybersecurity culture through technical security measures, competence building and awareness creation and communication; draws attention to the measures and provisions in the NIS2 Directive and the Critical Entities Resilience Directive which could help mitigate the arising security risks; calls on the Commission to take the lead in reinforcing the EU-level coordination formats and to propose effective tools in the upcoming Preparedness Union Strategy with the aim of ensuring timely preparedness to tackle environmental and non-environmental risks to the water bodies that are threatening the EU’s overall security;

98. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase the involvement of women in decisions regarding water resilience; calls for the adoption of a methodological approach that effectively considers gender-related needs in the implementation of water supply projects, by implementing monitoring, reporting and tracking that use tools and indicators disaggregated by gender;

99. Notes that better data and data analysis are key to evidence-based decision-making and the swift identification of small changes in water quality that could present a threat to bodies of water, together with the evaluation of best practice and identification of the most cost-effective and impactful measures;

100. Stresses that improved, reliable and interoperable data on water supply, demand, distribution, accessibility and use are needed and that data points need to be established; urges the Commission and the Member States to enhance data collection and improve data interoperability across all levels to support the implementation of current water legislation, as well as to facilitate circular economy and water-smart industrial symbiosis strategies; highlights the fact that data and AI could be used in modelling water and energy consumption as well as reuse and recycling capacities;

101. Calls on the Commission to better recognise the fundamental role of the water sector in bolstering EU competiveness by fostering research and innovation and promoting entrepreneurship and talent; emphasises, in this regard, the importance of ramping up innovation in the water sector; points out that the European Innovation Centre for Industrial Transformation and Emissions, created as part of Directive 2010/75/EU, could play a role in this regard, as it evaluates the environmental performance of industrial technologies and gathers information on innovative industrial environmental techniques; points, further, to existing partnerships like the Water4All Partnership, a funding programme for scientific research;

102. Believes that there is a need to build and nurture multi-stakeholder platforms to promote innovation uptake at all levels, local and national; recommends that these platforms involve a wide range of participants – the public and private sectors, and civil society associations – to build a coalition of partners to bring about change; supports the promotion of knowledge sharing on how digital water technologies can support the implementation of existing EU water legislation, as well as capacity building at local, regional and national levels; calls on the Commission and the Members States to expand digital skills, and research and development (R&D) programmes targeting water, including through collaboration with universities, research centres and SMEs;

103. Acknowledges the critical role of data centres in the digital economy; notes with concern that the rapid expansion of the technology could lead to a substantial increase in AI’s demand for water resources associated with their operations, which could undermine the environmental benefits that AI promises to deliver, such as resource optimisation and carbon emission reductions, and stresses the need to integrate water efficiency measures in their design and operation; urges the Commission to address the use of water resources by information and communications technologies (ICT) and, in particular, by AI and data centres in its EWRS, in particular by encouraging data centres to reuse treated water and to promote the design of more efficient chips and components to reduce the need for cooling; recommends that the Member States prioritise water resilience strategies that address the specific challenges posed by data centres to ensure the sustainability of both the digital and the environmental agendas;

104. Recalls that seawater desalination is the process of removing salt from sea or brackish water to make it useable for a range of ‘fit for use’ purposes, including drinking, and that it is thus an important technological solution for people’s livelihoods; notes that, at the same time, desalination is an energy-intensive process and should ideally be done using renewable energy, whenever possible, in order to minimise environmental impacts; reiterates that desalination produces a by-product, brine (a concentrated salt solution), that must be properly disposed of to avoid adverse impacts on the marine environment; considers, therefore, that desalination based on reverse osmosis or thermal technologies should be applied, if other more environmentally sustainable options are not available or cannot be implemented, particularly in remote areas and islands; highlights, in this regard, the ongoing work on new technological solutions, such as microbial desalination cells, offering an environmentally sustainable and innovative alternative to traditional desalination methods, particularly to provide clean water and wastewater treatment to small, isolated locations without electricity;

105. Stresses the need for increased funding and R&D into technologies such as innovative desalination techniques in order to increase the efficiency, sustainability and the scaling up of such technologies; calls for research into the possibilities of using such technologies in agriculture to diversify the water supply points and therefore decrease the vulnerability of the sector to water stress;

106. Notes that in the last decade, there have been many scientific breakthroughs for making water treatment smarter and more circular, with these solutions offering opportunities for using digital solutions, AI and remote sensing to use water more efficiently and by reusing treated wastewater for irrigation and recovering energy and nutrients from wastewater;

107. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the regulatory obstacles within the single market to facilitate the development, scaling-up, and placing on the market of innovative biotechnology and biomanufacturing solutions and the promotion of cleaner manufacturing and circularity;

108. Calls for the funding, development and authorisation of innovative solutions for crop protection and fertilisation, including biological control agents and active substances with lower impact on the environment, which are needed for a just transition to more sustainable agricultural systems;

109. Calls for specific programmes to be established for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring adequate flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

Cross-border and international cooperation

110. Stresses the need for a comprehensive EWRS that fosters cross-border cooperation, more uniform data collection and reporting, sharing best practice between local, regional and national actors, ensuring sustainable water management and equitable resource distribution among the Member States, preventing water challenges such as scarcity and flood risk from being passed on to other Member States;

111. Emphasises that climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; notes that floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion and stability; recognises that water resilience is crucial for preventing and addressing current and future health, food, energy and security crises; emphasises that water resilience promotes transboundary water cooperation, serving as a catalyst for peace and security, as countries are interconnected through shared rivers and groundwater resources;

112. Calls for increased cross-border cooperation between the Member States in the management of shared river basins and groundwater aquifers and in the effective collection and sharing of data on water quality, pollution levels and water levels; recommends the establishment of regional cooperation centres to coordinate the implementation of joint water resilience strategies, taking into account the climate, social and economic challenges of each territory;

113. Calls for enhanced international cooperation, including at the level of river basins, to address the growing water crisis, ensure clean and high-quality water, promote sustainable water management and implement various innovative water technologies, including nature-based solutions; calls for the anchoring of cooperation across borders at operational, tactical and strategic levels;

114. Calls for the establishment of cross-border projects under Interreg and other EU funds to improve regional cooperation in the management of water resources, with a particular focus on ensuring the fair distribution of water between sectors and Member States;

115. Stresses the need to strengthen EU monitoring capacities through digitalisation and modern technologies, including satellite surveillance and real-time pollution tracking, which are essential for preventing and combating cross-border pollution;

116. Urges the Commission to implement a specific diplomatic role dedicated to resolving water-related conflicts, promoting water cooperation and protecting water sources and systems, particularly during armed conflicts and in transboundary contexts;

117. Urges the EU to lead international efforts to protect and restore water ecosystems in line with the SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation;

o
o o

118. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1)	OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj.
(2)	OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/60/oj.
(3)	OJ L 372, 27.12.2006, p. 19, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/118/oj.
(4)	OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 84, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/105/oj.
(5)	OJ L 288, 6.11.2007, p. 27, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2007/60/oj.
(6)	OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2020/2184/oj.
(7)	OJ L 177, 5.6.2020, p. 32, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/741/oj.
(8)	OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/56/oj.
(9)	OJ L, 2024/3019, 12.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/3019/oj.
(10)	OJ L, 2024/1785, 15.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1785/oj.
(11)	OJ L 375, 31.12.1991, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1991/676/oj.
(12)	OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1991/oj.
(13)	OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 164, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj.
(14)	OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj.
(15)	OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 71, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/128/oj.
(16)	OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj.
(17)	OJ L, 2024/3190, 31.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3190/oj.
(18)	OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 54.
(19)	OJ C, C/2024/7216, 10.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7216/oj.
(20)	OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 106.
(21)	OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 28.
(22)	OJ C, C/2025/808, 11.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/808/oj.
(23)	OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 126.
(24)	OJ C 316, 22.9.2017, p. 99.
(25)	Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0358.
(26)	World Meteorological Organization, 2021 State of Climate Services – Water, WMO-No 1278, WMO, Geneva, 2021.
(27)	European Environment Agency, Water resources across Europe – confronting water scarcity and drought, EEA Report 2/2009.
(28)	EEA Report 07/2024.
(29)	WWF, High Cost of Cheap Water, WWF, Gland, 2021.
(30)	EEA Report 07/2024.
(31)	European Commission, Attitudes of Europeans towards the environment, Special Eurobarometer 550, May 2024.
(32)	European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, et al., Implementation of water balances in the EU – Final report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
(33)	Disclosure Insight Action (CDP) and Planet Tracker, High and Dry. How Water Issues Are Stranding Assets, 2022.
(34)	EEA Report 07/2024.
(35)	European Environment Agency, ‘Water abstraction by economic sector in the 27 EU Member States, 2000-2022’, European Environment Agency website, 5 December 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/water-abstraction-by-source-and/water-abstraction-by-economic?activeTab=8a280073-bf94-4717-b3e2-1374b57ca99d.
(36)	Eurostat, ‘Archive: Water use in industry’, Eurostat website, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:Water_use_in_industry&oldid=196132#Further_Eurostat_information.
(37)	EEA Report 07/2024.
(38)	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Water accounting and auditing, A sourcebook, FAO Water Reports 43, FAO, Rome, 2016.
(39)	European Investment Bank, Wastewater as a resource, EIB, 2022.
(40)	European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, ‘Water reuse: New EU rules to improve access to safe irrigation’, European Commission website, 26 June 2023, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/water-reuse-new-eu-rules-improve-access-safe-irrigation-2023-06-26_en.
(41)	European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, ‘Zero pollution: Improved quality and access to drinking water’, European Commission website, 12 January 2023, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/improved-quality-and-access-drinking-water-all-europeans-2023-01-12_en.
(42)	EEA Report 07/2024.
(43)	Ibid.
(44)	Ibid.
(45)	Ibid.
(46)	Ibid.
(47)	Ibid.
(48)	European Environment Agency, ‘Industrial pollutant releases to water in Europe’, European Environment Agency website, 30 May 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/industrial-pollutant-releases-to-water.
(49)	Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (OJ L 334, 17.12.2010, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/75/oj).
(50)	European Commission ‘Nitrates’, European Commission website, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/water/nitrates_en#implementation.
(51)	European Environment Agency, ‘Public exposure to widely used Bisphenol A exceeds acceptable health safety levels’, European Environment Agency website, 14 September 2023, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/newsroom/news/public-exposure-to-bisphenol-a.
(52)	European Environment Agency, European Climate Risk Assessment, EEA Report 01/2024.
(53)	Cammalleri, C. et al., Global warming and drought impacts in the EU, JRC Technical Report , Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
(54)	EEA Report 07/2024.
(55)	Feyen, L. et al., Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe, JRC PESETA IV final report, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
(56)	European Environment AgencyEuropean Climate Risk Assessment, EEA Report 01/2024.
(57)	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, GAR Special Report on Drought 2021, Geneva, UNDRR, 2021.
(58)	Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought.
(59)	EEA Report 07/2024.
(60)	Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and 2009/123/EC (OJ L, 2024/1203, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1203/oj).
(61)	European Patent Office, Innovation in water-related technologies, EPO, Munich 2024.
(62)	EEA Report 07/2024.
(63)	European Commission JRC Science for Policy Report, ‘Technical proposals for the safe use of processed manure above the threshold established for Nitrate Vulnerable Zones by the Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC)’, 2020.
(64)	Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food and repealing Directives 80/590/EEC and 89/109/EEC (OJ L 338, 13.11.2004, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/1935/oj).
(65)	European Environment Agency,‘Industrial pollutant releases to water in Europe, European Environment Agency website, 30 May 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/industrial-pollutant-releases-to-water.
(66)	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Build Back Better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, UNISDR, Geneva, 2019.
(67)	European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment et al. Stock-taking analysis and outlook of drought policies, planning and management in EU Member States – Final Report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023.

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 13, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – A revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world – P10_TA(2025)0090 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Articles 311, 312, 323 and 324 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(1) and to the joint declarations agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context and the related unilateral declarations,

– having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom(2),

– having regard to the amended Commission proposal of 23 June 2023 for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2023)0331),

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(3) (the IIA),

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)(4) (the Financial Regulation),

– having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(5) (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

– having regard to its position of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(6),

– having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 on own resources: a new start for EU finances, a new start for Europe(7),

– having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges(8),

– having regard to its position of 16 December 2020 on the draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(9),

– having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights of 13 December 2017(10) and to the Commission Action Plan of 4 March 2021 on the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (COM(2021)0102),

– having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP 15) in Montreal on 19 December 2022 (Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework),

– having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

– having regard to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals,

– having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer together – strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness’ (the Niinistö report),

– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),

– having regard to the report of 4 September 2024 of the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture entitled ‘A shared prospect for farming and food in Europe’,

– having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market – speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’ (the Letta report),

– having regard to the report of 20 February 2024 of the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’,

– having regard to the Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal,

– having regard to the joint communication of 26 March 2025 entitled ‘European Preparedness Union Strategy’ (JOIN(2025)0130),

– having regard to the joint white paper of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 7 March 2025 entitled ‘A Roadmap for Women’s Rights’ (COM(2025)0097),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: a joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ (COM(2025)0075),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 9 December 2021 entitled ‘Building an economy that works for people: an action plan for the social economy’ (COM(2021)0778),

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 March 2025, 6 March 2025 and 19 December 2024,

– having regard to the political guidelines of 18 July 2024 for the next European Commission 2024-2029,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘EU budget and place-based policies: proposals for new design and delivery mechanisms in the MFF post-2027’(11),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0076/2025),

A. whereas, under Article 311 TFEU, the Union is required to provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies;

B. whereas the Union budget is primarily an investment tool that can achieve economies of scale unattainable at Member State level and support European public goods, in particular through cross-border projects; whereas all spending through the Union budget must provide European added value and deliver discernible net benefits compared to spending at national or sub-national level, leading to real and lasting results;

C. whereas spending through the Union budget, if effectively targeted, aligned with the Union’s political priorities and better coordinated with spending at national level, helps to avoid fragmentation in the single market, promote upwards convergence, decrease inequalities and boost the overall impact of public investment; whereas public investment is essential as a catalyst for private investment in sectors where the market alone cannot drive the required investment;

D. whereas the NextGenerationEU recovery instrument (NGEU) established in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic enabled significant additional investment capacity of EUR 750 billion in 2018 prices – beyond the Union budget, which amounts to 1,1 % of the EU-27’s gross national income (GNI) – prompting a swift recovery and return to growth and supporting the green and digital transitions; whereas NGEU will not be in place post-2027;

E. whereas in 2022 Member States spent an average of 1,4 % of gross domestic product (GDP) on State aid – significantly more than their contribution to the Union budget – with over half of the State aid unrelated to crises;

F. whereas the Union budget, bolstered by NGEU and loans through the SURE scheme, has been instrumental in alleviating the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 crisis and in responding to the effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Union budget remains ill-equipped, in terms of size, structure and rules, to fully play its role in adjusting to evolving spending needs, addressing shocks and responding to crises and giving practical effect to the principle of solidarity, and to enable the Union to fulfil its objectives as established under the Treaties;

G. whereas people rightly expect more from the Union and its budget, including the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to evolving needs and to provide them with the necessary support, especially in times of crisis;

H. whereas, since the adoption of the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), the political, economic and social context has changed beyond recognition, compounding underlying structural challenges for the Union and leading to a substantial revision of the MFF in 2024;

I. whereas the context in which the Commission will prepare its proposals for the post-2027 MFF is every bit as challenging, with the established global and geopolitical order changing quickly and radically, the return of large-scale warfare in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood, a highly challenging economic and social backdrop and the worsening climate and biodiversity crisis; whereas, as the Commission has made clear, the status quo is not an option and the Union budget will need to change accordingly;

J. whereas the US administration has decided to retreat from the country’s post-war global role in guaranteeing peace and security, in leading on global governance in the rules-based, multilateral international order and in providing essential development and humanitarian aid to those most in need around the world; whereas the Union will therefore have to step up to fill part of the void the US appears set to leave, placing additional demands on the budget;

K. whereas the Union has committed to take all the steps needed to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest and to protect nature and reverse biodiversity loss; whereas delivering on the policy framework put in place to achieve this objective will require substantial investment; whereas the Union budget will have to play a key role in providing and incentivising that investment;

L. whereas, in order to compensate for the budget’s shortcomings, there have been numerous workaround solutions that make the budget more opaque, leaving the public in the dark about the real volume of Union spending, undermining the longer-term predictability of investment the budget is designed to provide and undercutting not only the principle of budget unity, but also Parliament’s role as a legislator and budgetary and discharge authority and in holding the executive to account;

M. whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities; whereas breaches of those values undermine the cohesion of the Union, erode the rights of Union citizens and weaken mutual trust among Member States;

1. Insists that, in a fast changing world where people rightly expect more from the Union and its budget and where the Union is confronted with a growing number of crises, the next MFF must be endowed with increased resources compared to the 2021-2027 period, moving away from the historically restrictive, self-imposed level of 1 % of GNI;

2. Underscores that the next MFF must focus on financing European public goods with discernible added value compared to national spending; highlights the need for enhanced synergies and better coordination between Union and national spending; emphasises that spending will have to address major challenges, such as the return of large-scale warfare in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood, a highly challenging economic and social backdrop, a competitiveness gap and the worsening climate and biodiversity crisis;

3. Considers that the ‘one national plan per Member State’ approach as envisaged by the Commission, with the Recovery and Resilience Facility model as a blueprint, cannot be the basis for shared management spending post-2027; underlines that the design of shared management spending under the next MFF must fully safeguard Parliament’s roles as legislator and budgetary and discharge authority and be designed and implemented through close collaboration with regional and local authorities and all relevant stakeholders;

4. Calls for the next MFF to continue support for economic, social and territorial cohesion in order to help bind the Union together, deepen the single market, promote convergence and reduce inequality, poverty and social exclusion;

5. Considers that the idea of an umbrella Competitiveness Fund merging existing programmes as envisaged by the Commission is not fit for purpose; stresses that the fund should instead be a new instrument taking advantage of a toolbox of funding based on lessons learned from InvestEU and the Innovation Fund and complementing existing, highly successful programmes;

6. Stresses that, in particular in the light of the US’s retreat from its role as a global guarantor of peace and security, there is a clear need to progress towards a genuine Defence Union, with the next MFF supporting a comprehensive security approach through an increase in investment; stresses that defence spending cannot come at the expense of nor lead to a reduction in long-term investment in the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the Union;

7. Calls for genuine simplification for final beneficiaries by avoiding programmes with overlapping objectives, diverging eligibility criteria and different rules governing horizontal provisions; underlines that simplification cannot mean more leeway for the Commission without the necessary checks and balances and must therefore be achieved with full respect for the institutional balance provided for in the Treaties;

8. Insists on enhanced in-built crisis response capacity in the next MFF and sufficient margins under each heading; stresses that, alongside predictability for investment, spending programmes should retain a substantial in-built flexibility reserve, with allocation to specific policy objectives to be decided by the budgetary authority; underlines that flexibility for humanitarian aid should be ring-fenced; considers that the post-2027 MFF should include two special instruments – one dedicated to ensuring solidarity in the event of natural disasters and one for general-purpose crisis response;

9. Underlines that compliance with Union values and fundamental rights is an essential pre-requisite to access EU funds; insists that the Union budget be protected against misuse, fraud and breaches of the principle of the rule of law and calls for a stronger link between the rule of law and the Union budget post-2027;

10. Underlines that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must not endanger the financing of EU policies and priorities; stresses, therefore, that all costs related to borrowing backed by the Union budget or the budgetary headroom be treated distinctly from appropriations for EU programmes within the future MFF architecture;

11. Calls on the Council to adopt new own resources as a matter of urgency in order to enable sustainable repayment of NGEU borrowing; stresses that new genuine own resources, beyond the IIA, are essential for the Union’s higher spending needs; considers that all instruments and tools should be explored in order to provide the Union with the necessary resources, and considers, in this respect, that joint borrowing presents a viable option to ensure that the Union has sufficient resources to respond to acute Union-wide crises, such as the ongoing crisis in the area of security and defence;

12. Stands ready to work constructively with the Council and Commission to deliver a long-term budget that addresses the Union’s needs; highlights that the post-2027 MFF is being constructed in a far from ‘business as usual’ context and takes seriously its institutional role as enshrined in the Treaties; insists that it will only approve a long-term budget that is fit for purpose for the Union in a changing world and calls for swift adoption of the MFF to enable timely implementation of spending programmes from 1 January 2028;

A long-term budget with a renewed spending focus

13. Considers that, in view of the structural challenges facing the Union, the post-2027 MFF should adjust its spending focus to ensure that the Union can meet its strategic policy aims as detailed below;

Competitiveness, strategic autonomy, social, economic and territorial cohesion and resilience

14. Is convinced that boosting competitiveness, decarbonising the economy and enhancing the Union’s innovation capacity are central priorities for the post-2027 MFF and are vital to ensure long-term, sustainable and inclusive growth and a thriving, more resilient economy and society;

15. Considers that the Union must develop a competitiveness framework in line with its own values and political aims and that competitiveness must foster not only economic growth, but also social, economic and territorial cohesion and environmental sustainability as underlined in both the Draghi and Letta reports;

16. Underlines that, as spelt out in the Letta and Draghi reports, the European economy and social model are under intense strain, with the productivity, competitiveness and skills gap having knock-on effects on the quality of jobs and on living standards for Europeans already grappling with high housing, energy and food prices; is concerned that a lack of job opportunities and high costs of living increase the risk of a brain drain away from Europe;

17. Points out that Draghi puts the annual investment gap with respect to innovation and infrastructure at EUR 750-800 billion per year between 2025 and 2030; underlines that the Union budget must play a vital role but it cannot cover that shortfall alone, and that the bulk of the effort will have to come from the private sector – points to the need to exploit synergies between public and private investment, in particular by simplifying and harmonising the EU investment architecture;

18. Stresses that the Union budget must be carefully coordinated with national spending, so as to ensure complementarity, and must be designed such that it can de-risk, mobilise and leverage private investment effectively, enabling start-ups and SMEs to access funds more readily; calls, therefore, for programmes such as InvestEU, which ensures additionality and follows a market-based, demand-driven approach, to be significantly reinforced in the next MFF; considers that financial instruments and budgetary guarantees are an effective use of resources to achieve critical Union policy goals and calls for them to be further simplified;

19. Insists that more must be done to maximise the potential of the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group – together with other international and national financial institutions – in lending and de-risking in strategic policy areas, such as climate and, latterly, security and defence projects; calls for an increased risk appetite and ambition from the EIB Group to crowd in investment, based on a strong capital position, and for a reinforced investment partnership to ensure that every euro spent at Union level is used in the most effective manner;

20. Emphasises that funding for research and innovation, including support for basic research, should be significantly increased, should be focused on the Union’s strategic priorities, should continue to be determined by the principle of excellence and should remain merit-based; considers that there should be sufficient resources across the MFF and at national level to fund all high-quality projects throughout the innovation cycle and to achieve the 3 % GDP target for research and development spending by 2030;

21. Stresses that the next MFF, building on the current Connecting Europe Facility, should include much greater, directly managed funding for energy, transport and digital infrastructure, with priority given to cross-border connections and national links with European added value; considers that such infrastructure is an absolute precondition for a successful deepening of the single market and for increasing the Union’s resilience in a changing geopolitical order;

22. Points out that a secure and robust space sector is critical for the Union’s autonomy and sovereignty and therefore needs sustained investment;

23. Underlines that a more competitive, productive and socially inclusive economy helps to generate high-quality, well-paid jobs, thus enhancing people’s standard of living; emphasises that, through programmes such as the European Social Fund+ and Erasmus+, the Union budget can play an important role in supporting education and training systems, enhancing social inclusion, boosting workforce adaptability through reskilling and upskilling, and thus preparing people for employment in a modern economy;

24. Insists that the Union budget should continue to support important economic and job-creating sectors where the Union is already a world leader, such as tourism and the cultural and creative sectors; underscores the need for dedicated funding for tourism, including to implement the EU Strategy for Sustainable Tourism, in the Union budget post-2027; points to the importance of Creative Europe in contributing to Europe’s diversity and competitiveness and in supporting vibrant societies;

25. Stresses that, in order to compete with other major global players, the European economy must also become more competitive and resilient on the supply side by investing more in the Union’s open strategic autonomy through enhanced industrial policy and a focus on strategic sectors, resource-efficiency and critical technologies to reduce dependence on third countries;

26. Considers that, in light of the above, the idea of an umbrella Competitiveness Fund merging existing programmes as envisaged by the Commission is not fit for purpose; stresses that the fund should instead be a new instrument taking advantage of a toolbox of funding based on lessons learned from InvestEU and the Innovation Fund; recalls that, under Article 182 TFEU, the Union is required to adopt a framework programme for research;

27. Notes that, in the Commission communication on the competitiveness compass, the Commission argues that a new competitiveness coordination tool should be established in order to better align industrial and research policies and investment between EU and national level; notes that the proposed new tool is envisaged as part of a ‘new, lean steering mechanism’ designed ‘to reinforce the link between overall policy coordination and the EU budget’; insists that Parliament must play a full decision-making role in both mechanisms;

28. Emphasises that food security is a vital component of strategic autonomy and that the next MFF must continue to support the competitiveness and resilience of the Union’s farming and fisheries sectors, including small-scale and young farmers and fishers, and help the sectors to better protect the climate and biodiversity, as well as the seas and oceans; highlights that a modern and simplified common agricultural policy is crucial for increasing productivity through technical progress, ensuring a fair standard of living for farmers, guaranteeing food security and the production of safe, high-quality and affordable food for Europeans, fostering generational renewal and ensuring the viability of rural areas;

29. Points out that the farming sector is particularly vulnerable to inflationary shocks which affect farmers’ purchasing power; calls for an increased and dedicated budget for the CAP in the next MFF, safeguarding it from possible cuts, in order to maintain its integrity and commonality, as well as the coherence and interconnection between its first and second pillar, and therefore opposes the idea of integrating the CAP into a single fund for each Member State; calls for additional dedicated funding sources to be explored where appropriate, including outside of the CAP, in order to cope with natural disasters and provide incentives to farmers and foresters to contribute to climate change mitigation, biodiversity recovery and nature protection, without measures causing a regression in EU agricultural production;

30. Stresses that the new global challenges facing EU farmers, including the present geopolitical situation, climate change and rising input prices, require sound financial allocation in the next CAP; emphasises that, in order to address these challenges, taking into account the lessons learned from the COVID-19 crisis, and to avoid reductions to farmers’ support, the CAP urgently needs an increased budget in the next MFF that is indexed to inflation through annual re-evaluation; underlines, in that respect, that direct payments in the current form generate clear EU added value and should continue to strengthen income security, production and protection against price volatility, better targeting persons actively engaged in agricultural production and the provision of public goods, while respecting realistic and balanced EU environmental and social standards; calls for a fair and efficient distribution of CAP support within and among the Member States; calls for the continuation and reinforcement of measures that maintain production in vulnerable areas and guarantee the viability of rural communities and the adequacy of public infrastructure, specifically regarding digitalisation and particularly through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and the renewed involvement of local and regional authorities in the management of such measures; stresses the need to increase and reform the agricultural reserve in order to respond effectively and rapidly to future crises that the European agricultural sector will have to deal with, and to establish new tools for managing natural, market and sanitary risks, such as an EU reinsurance scheme to better mitigate the effects of future crises and provide greater stability for farmers; emphasises that specific solutions must be found for the farmers in eastern Europe who are most affected by the cascade effects of Russia’s war against Ukraine, such as high input prices, inflation and market disturbances; urges the Commission to continue to set up the necessary financial and legal framework for the food supply chain in order to strengthen the position of farmers and better combat unfair trading practices; calls on the Commission to support EU farmers by promoting agri-food products inside and outside the Union through a dynamic and stronger EU promotion policy; regrets the funding cuts made to the programme on the promotion of agricultural products during the review of the current MFF; emphasises that the next MFF must include dedicated funds for agri-tourism, female entrepreneurship, vocational training and technological innovation in agriculture;

31. Recalls that social, economic and territorial cohesion is a cornerstone of European integration and is vital in binding the Union together and deepening the single market; reaffirms, in that respect, the importance of the convergence process; underlines that a modernised cohesion policy must follow a decentralised, place-based, multilevel governance approach and be built around the shared management and partnership principle, fully involving local and regional authorities and relevant stakeholders, ensuring that resources are directed where they are most needed to reduce regional disparities;

32. Stresses that cohesion policy funding must tackle the key challenges the Union faces, such as demographic change and depopulation, and target the regions and people most in need; calls, furthermore, for enhanced access to EU funding for cities, regions and urban authorities; recalls that, under Article 349 TFEU, the Union is required to put in place specific measures for the outermost regions and stresses, therefore, the need for continued, targeted support for these regions in the next MFF, including via a reinforced programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI);

33. Recalls the importance of the social dimension of the European Union and of promoting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, its Action Plan and headline targets; emphasises that the Union budget should, therefore, play a pivotal role in reducing inequality, poverty and social exclusion, including by supporting children, families and vulnerable groups; recalls that around 20 million children in the Union are at risk of poverty and social exclusion; stresses that addressing child poverty across the Union requires appropriately funded, comprehensive and integrated measures, together with the efficient implementation of the European Child Guarantee at national level; emphasises that Parliament has consistently requested a dedicated budget within the ESF+ to support the Child Guarantee as a central pillar of the EU anti-poverty strategy;

34. Highlights, in this regard, the EU-wide housing crisis affecting millions of families and young people; stresses the need for enhanced support for housing through the Union budget, in particular via cohesion policy, and through other funding sources, such as the EIB Group and national promotional banks; acknowledges that, while Union financing cannot solve the housing crisis alone, it can play a crucial role in financing urgent measures and complementing broader Union and national efforts to improve housing affordability and enhance energy efficiency of the housing stock;

35. Points out that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has had substantial economic and social consequences, in particular in Member States bordering Russia and Belarus; insists that the next MFF provide support to these regions;

The green and digital transitions

36. Highlights that the green and digital transitions are inextricably linked to competitiveness, the modernisation of the economy and the resilience of society and act as catalysts for a future-oriented and resource-efficient economy; insists therefore, that the post-2027 MFF must continue to support and to further accelerate the twin transitions;

37. Recalls that the Union budget is an essential contributor to achieving climate neutrality by 2050, including through support for the 2030 and 2040 targets; underlines that the transition will require a decarbonisation of the economy, in particular through the deployment of clean technologies, improved energy and transport infrastructure and more energy-efficient housing; notes that the Commission estimates additional investment needs to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at 1,5 % of GDP per year compared to the decade 2011-2020 and that, while the Union budget alone cannot cover the gap, it must remain a vital contributor; calls, therefore, for increased directly managed support for environment and biodiversity protection and climate action building on the current LIFE programme;

38. Underlines that industry will be central in the transition to net zero and the establishment of the Energy Union, and that support will be needed in helping some industrial sectors and their workers to adapt; stresses the importance of a just transition that must leave no one behind, requiring, inter alia, investment in regions that are heavily fossil-fuel dependent and increased support for vulnerable households, in particular through the Just Transition Mechanism and the Social Climate Fund;

39. Points to the profound technological shift under way, with technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum both creating opportunities, in terms of the Union’s economic potential and global leadership and improvements to citizens’ lives, and posing reliability, ethical and sovereignty challenges; stresses that the next MFF must support research into, and the development and safe application of digital technologies and help people to hone the knowledge and skills they need to work with and use them;

Security, defence and preparedness

40. Recalls that peace and security are the foundation for the Union’s prosperity, social model and competitiveness, and a vital pillar of the Union’s geopolitical standing; stresses that the next MFF must support a comprehensive security approach by investing significantly more in safeguarding the Union against the myriad threats it faces;

41. Underlines that, as the Niinistö report makes clear, multiple threats are combining to heighten instability and increase the Union’s vulnerability, chief among them the fragmenting global order, the security threat posed by Russia and Belarus, growing tensions globally, hostile international actors, the globalisation of criminal networks, hybrid campaigns – which include cyberattacks, foreign information manipulation, disinformation and interference and the instrumentalisation of migration – increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events as a result of climate change, and health threats;

42. Points out that the Union has played a vital role in achieving lasting peace on its territory and must continue to do so by adjusting to the reality of war on its doorstep and the need to vastly boost defence infrastructure, capabilities and readiness, including through the Union budget, going far beyond the current allocation of less than 2 % of the MFF;

43. Notes that European defence capabilities suffer from decades of under-investment and that, according to the Commission, the defence spending gap currently stands at EUR 500 billion for the next decade; underlines that the Union budget alone cannot fill the gap, but has an important role to play, in conjunction with national budgets and with a focus on clear EU added value; considers that the Union budget and lending through the EIB Group can help incentivise investment in defence; stresses that defence spending must not come at the expense of social and environmental spending, nor must it lead to a reduction in funding for long-standing Union policies that have proved their worth over time;

44. Underlines the merits of the defence programmes and instruments put in place during the current MFF, which have enhanced joint research, production and procurement in the field of defence, providing a valuable foundation on which to build further Union policy and investment;

45. Emphasises that, given the geopolitical situation, there is a clear need to act and to progress towards a genuine Defence Union, in coordination with NATO and in full alignment with the neutrality commitments of individual Member States; concurs, in that regard, with the Commission’s analysis that the next MFF must provide a comprehensive and robust framework in support of EU defence;

46. Underscores the importance of a competitive and resilient European defence technological and industrial base; considers that enhanced joint EU-level investment in defence in the next MFF backed up by a clear and transparent governance structure can help to avoid duplication, generate economies of scale, and thus significant savings for Member States, reduce fragmentation and ensure the interoperability of equipment and systems; underscores the importance of technology in modern defence systems and therefore of investing in research, cyber-defence and cybersecurity and in dual-use products; points to the need to direct support towards the defence industry within the Union, thus strengthening strategic autonomy, creating quality high-skilled jobs, driving innovation and creating cross-border opportunities for EU businesses, including SMEs;

47. Points to the importance of increasing support in the budget for military mobility, which upgrades infrastructure for dual-use military and civilian purposes, enabling the large-scale movement of military equipment and personnel at short notice and thus contributing to the Union’s defence capabilities and collective security; highlights, in that regard, the importance of financing for the trans-European transport networks to enable their adaptation for dual-use purposes;

48. Emphasises that the Union needs to ramp up funding for preparedness across the board; is alarmed by the growing impact of natural disasters, which are often the result of climate change and are therefore likely to occur with greater frequency and intensity in the future; points out that, according to the 2024 European Climate Risk Assessment Report, cumulated economic losses from natural disasters could reach about 1,4 % of Union GDP;

49. Underlines, therefore, that, in addition to efforts to mitigate climate change through the green transition, significant investment is required to adapt to climate change, in particular to prevent and reduce the impact of natural disasters and severe weather events; considers that support for this purpose, such as through the current Union Civil Protection Mechanism, must be significantly increased in the next MFF and made available quickly to local and regional authorities, which are often on the frontline;

50. Emphasises that reconstruction and recovery measures after natural disasters must be based on the ‘build back better’ approach and prioritise nature-based solutions; stresses the importance of sustainable water management and security and hydric resilience as part of the Union’s overall preparedness strategy;

51. Recalls that the COVID-19 pandemic wreaked economic and social havoc globally and that a key lesson from the experience is that there is a need to prioritise investment in prevention of, preparedness for and response to health threats, in medical research and disease prevention, in access to critical medicines, in healthcare infrastructure, in physical and mental health and in the resilience and accessibility of public health systems in the Union; recalls that strategic autonomy in health is key to ensuring the Union’s preparedness in this area;

52. Considers that the next MFF must build on the work done in the current programming period by ensuring that the necessary investment is in place to build a genuine European Health Union that delivers for all citizens;

53. Underlines that, with technological developments, it has become easier for malicious and opportunistic foreign actors to spread disinformation, encourage online hate speech, interfere in elections and mount cyberattacks against the Union’s interests; insists that the next MFF must invest in enhanced cybersecurity capabilities and equip the Union to counter hybrid warfare in its various guises;

54. Stresses that a free, independent and pluralistic media is a fundamental component of Europe’s resilience, safeguarding not only the free flow of information but also a democratic mindset, critical thinking and informed decision-making; points to the importance of investment in independent and investigative journalism, fact-checking initiatives, digital and media literacy and critical thinking to safeguard against disinformation, foreign information manipulation and electoral interference as part of the European Democracy Shield initiative and therefore to guarantee democratic resilience; underscores the need for continued Union budget support for initiatives in these areas;

55. Underscores the importance of continued funding, in the next MFF, for effective protection of the EU’s external borders; underlines the need to counter transnational criminal networks and better protect victims of trafficking networks, and to strengthen resilience and response capabilities to address hybrid attacks and the instrumentalisation of migration, by third countries or hostile non-state actors; highlights, in particular, the need for support to frontline Member States for the purposes of securing the external borders of the EU;

56. Underlines that the EU’s resilience and preparedness are inextricably linked to those of its regional and global partners; emphasises that strengthening partners’ capacity to prevent, withstand and effectively respond to extreme weather events, health crises, hybrid campaigns, cyberattacks or armed conflict also lowers the risk of spill-over effects for Europe;

External action and enlargement

57. Insists that, in a context of heightened global instability, the Union must continue to engage constructively with third countries and support peace, and conflict prevention, stability, prosperity, security, human rights, the rule of law, equality, democracy and sustainable development globally, in line with its global responsibility values and international commitments;

58. Regrets the fact that external action in the current MFF has been underfunded, leading to significant recourse to special instruments and substantial reinforcements in the mid-term revision; notes, in particular, that humanitarian aid funding has been woefully inadequate, prompting routine use of the Emergency Aid Reserve;

59. Underlines that the US’s retreat from its post-war global role in guaranteeing peace, security and democracy, in leading on global governance in the rules-based, multilateral international order and in providing essential development and humanitarian aid to those most in need around the world will leave an enormous gap and that the Union has a responsibility and overwhelming strategic interest in helping to fill that gap; calls on the Commission to address the consequences of the US’s retreat at the latest in its proposal for the post-2027 MFF;

60. Stresses that the next MFF must continue to tackle the most pressing global challenges, from fighting climate change, to providing relief in the event of natural disasters, preventing and addressing violent conflict and guaranteeing global security, ensuring global food security, improving healthcare and education systems, reducing poverty and inequality, promoting democracy, human rights, the rule of law and social justice and boosting competitiveness and the security of global supply chains, in full compliance with the principle of policy coherence for development; emphasises, in particular, the need for support for the Union’s Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods;

61. Underlines that, in particular in light of the drastic cuts to the USAID budget, the budget must uphold the Union’s role as the world’s leading provider of development aid and climate finance in line with the Union’s global obligations and commitments; recalls, in that regard, that the Union and its Member States have collectively committed to allocating 0,7 % of their GNI to official development assistance and that poverty alleviation must remain its primary objective; insists that the budget must continue to support the Union in its efforts to defend the rules-based international order, democracy, multilateralism, human rights and fundamental values;

62. Insists that, given the unprecedented scale of humanitarian crises, mounting global challenges and uncertainty of US assistance under the current administration, humanitarian aid funding must be significantly enhanced and that its use must remain solely needs-based and respect the principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality; emphasises that the needs-based nature of humanitarian aid requires ring-fenced funding delivered through a stand-alone spending programme, distinct from other external action financing; underscores, furthermore, that effective humanitarian aid provision is contingent on predictability through a sufficient annual baseline allocation;

63. Emphasises that humanitarian aid, by its very nature, requires substantial flexibility and response capacity; considers, therefore, that, in addition to an adequate baseline figure, humanitarian aid will require significant ring-fenced flexibility in its design to enable an effective response to the growing crises;

64. Emphasises that, in a context in which global actors are increasingly using trade interdependence as a means of economic coercion, the Union must bolster its capacity to protect and advance its own strategic interests, develop more robust tools to counter coercion and ensure genuine reciprocity in its partnerships; stresses that such an approach requires the strategic allocation of external financing so as to support, for example, economic, security and energy partnerships that align with the Union’s values and strategic interests;

65. Considers that enlargement represents an opportunity to strengthen the Union as a geopolitical power and that the next MFF is pivotal for preparing the Union for enlargement and the candidate countries for accession; recalls that the stability, security and democratic resilience of the candidate countries are inextricably connected to those of the EU and require sustained strategic investment, linked to reforms, to support their convergence with Union standards; underlines the important role that citizens and civil society organisations play in the process of enlargement;

66. Points to the need for strategically targeted support for pre-accession and for growth and investment; is of the view that post-2027 pre-accession assistance should be provided in the form of both grants and loans; believes, in that context, that the future framework should allow for innovative financing mechanisms, as well as lending to candidate countries backed by the budgetary headroom (the difference between the own resources and the MFF ceilings);

67. Stresses that financial support must be conditional on the implementation of reforms aligned with the Union acquis and policies and adherence to Union values; emphasises, in this regard, the need for a strong governance model that ensures parliamentary accountability, oversight and control and a strong, effective anti-fraud architecture;

68. Reiterates its full support for Ukrainians in their fight for freedom and democracy and deplores the terrible suffering and impact resulting from Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression; welcomes the decision to grant Ukraine and the neighbouring Republic of Moldova candidate country status and insists on the need to deploy the necessary funds to support their accession processes;

69. Underlines that pre-accession support to Ukraine has to be distinct from and additional to financial assistance for macroeconomic stability, reconstruction and post-war recovery, where needs are far more substantial and require a concerted international effort, of which support through the Union budget should be an important part;

70. Is convinced that the existing mandatory revision clause in the event of enlargement should be maintained in the next framework and that national envelopes should not be affected; underlines that the next MFF will also have to put in place appropriate transitional and phasing-in measures for key spending areas, such as cohesion and agriculture, based on a careful assessment of the impacts on different sectors;

Fundamental rights, Union values and the rule of law

71. Emphasises the importance of the Union budget and programmes like Erasmus+ and Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values in promoting and protecting democracy and the Union’s values, fostering the Union’s common cultural heritage and European integration, enhancing citizen engagement, civic education and youth participation, safeguarding and promoting fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rule of law; calls, in this regard, for increased funding for Erasmus+ in the next MFF; points to the importance of the independence of the justice system, the sound functioning of national institutions, de-oligarchisation, robust support for and, in line with article 11(2) TEU, an active dialogue with civil society, which is vital for fostering an active civic space, ensuring accountability and transparency and informing policymakers about best practices from the ground;

72. Highlights, in that connection, that the recast of the Financial Regulation requires the Commission and the Member States, in the implementation of the budget, to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and to respect the values on which the Union is founded, which are enshrined in Article 2 TEU; expects the Commission to ensure that the proposals for the next MFF, including for the spending programmes, are aligned with the Financial Regulation recast;

73. Stresses that instability in neighbouring regions and beyond, poverty, underlying trends in economic development, demographic changes and climate change, continue to generate migration flows towards the Union, placing significant pressure on asylum and migration systems; underlines that the post-2027 MFF must support the full and swift implementation of the Union’s Asylum and Migration Pact and effective return and readmission policies, in line with fundamental rights and EU values, including the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility; underlines, moreover, that, in line with the Pact, the EU must pursue enhanced cooperation and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries on migration, with adequate parliamentary scrutiny, and that such cooperation must abide by EU and international law;

74. Underlines that compliance with Union values and fundamental rights is an essential pre-requisite to access EU funds; highlights the importance of strong links between respect for the rule of law and access to EU funds under the current MFF; believes that the protection of the Union’s financial interests depends on respect for the rule of law at national level; welcomes, in particular, the positive impact of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in protecting the Union’s financial interests in cases of systemic and persistent breaches of the rule of law; calls on the Commission and the Council to apply the regulation strictly, consistently and without undue delay wherever necessary; emphasises that decisions to suspend or reduce Union funding over breaches of the rule of law must be based on objective criteria and not be guided by other considerations, nor be the outcome of negotiations;

75. Points to the need for a stronger link between the rule of law and the Union budget post-2027 and welcomes the Commission’s commitment to bolster links between the recommendations in the annual rule of law report and access to funds through the budget; calls on the Commission to outline, in the annual rule of law report from 2025 onwards, the extent to which identified weaknesses in rule of law regimes potentially pose a risk to the Union budget; welcomes, furthermore, the link between respect for Union values and the implementation of the budget and calls on the Commission to actively monitor Member States’ compliance with this principle in a unified manner and to take swift action in the event of non-compliance;

76. Calls for the consolidation of a robust rule of law toolbox, building on the current conditionality provisions under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the horizontal enabling conditions in the Common Provisions Regulation and the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulation and insists that the toolbox should cover the entire Union budget; underlines the need for far greater transparency and consistency with regard to the application of tools to protect the rule of law and for Parliament’s role to be strengthened in the application and scrutiny of such measures; insists, furthermore, on the need for consistency across instruments when assessing breaches of the rule of law in Member States;

77. Recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation provides that final recipients should not be deprived of the benefits of EU funds in the event of sanctions being applied to their government; believes that, to date, this provision has not been effective and stresses the importance of applying a smart conditionality approach so that beneficiaries are not penalised because of their government’s actions; calls on the Commission, in line with its stated intention in the political guidelines, to propose specific measures to ensure that local and regional authorities, civil society and other beneficiaries can continue to benefit from Union funding in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without weakening the application of the regulation and maintaining the Member State’s obligation to pay under Union law;

A long-term budget that mainstreams the Union’s policy objectives

78. Stresses that a long-term budget that is fully aligned with the Union’s strategic aims requires that key objectives be mainstreamed across the budget through a set of horizontal principles, building on the lessons from the current MFF and RRF;

79. Recalls that the implementation of horizontal principles should not lead to an excessive administrative burden on beneficiaries and be in line with the principle of proportionality; calls for innovative solutions and the use of automated reporting tools, including artificial intelligence, to achieve more efficient data collection;

80. Underlines, therefore, that the next MFF must ensure that, across the board, spending programmes pursue climate and biodiversity objectives, promote and protect rights and equal opportunities for all, including gender equality, support competitiveness and bolster the Union’s preparedness against threats;

81. Points out that effective mainstreaming is best achieved through a toolbox of measures, primarily through policy, project and regulatory design, thorough impact assessments and solid tracking of spending and, in specific cases, spending targets based on relevant and available data; welcomes the significant improvements in performance reporting in the current MFF, which allow for much better scrutiny of the impact of EU spending and calls for this to be further developed in the next programing period;

82. Welcomes the development of a methodology to track gender-based spending and considers that the lessons learnt, in particular as regards the collection of gender-disaggregated data, the monitoring of implementation and impact and administrative burden, should be applied in the next MFF in order to improve the methodology; calls on the Commission to explore the feasibility of gender budgeting in the next MFF; stresses, in the same vein, the need for a significant improvement in climate and biodiversity mainstreaming methodologies to move towards the measurement of impact;

83. Regrets that the Commission has not systematically conducted thorough impact assessments, including gender impact assessments, for all legislation involving spending through the budget and insists that this change;

84. Is pleased that the climate mainstreaming target of 30 % is projected to be exceeded in the current MFF; regrets, however, that the Union is not on track to meet the 10 % target for 2026 for biodiversity-related expenditure; insists that the targets in the IIA have nevertheless been a major factor in driving climate and biodiversity spending; calls on the Commission to adapt the spending targets contributing positively to climate and biodiversity in line with the Union policy ambitions in this regard, taking into account the investment needs for these policy ambitions;

85. Stresses, furthermore, that the Union budget should be implemented in line with Article 33(2) of the Financial Regulation, therefore without doing significant harm(12) to the specified objectives, respecting applicable working and employment conditions and taking into account the principle of gender equality;

86. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to phase out all fossil fuel subsidies and environmentally harmful subsidies in the next MFF; expects the Commission to come forward with its planned roadmap in this regard as part of its proposal for the next MFF;

A long-term budget with an effective administration at the service of Europeans

87. Underlines the need for Union policies to be underpinned by a well-functioning administration; insists that, post-2027, sufficient financial and staff resources be allocated from the outset so that Union institutions, bodies, decentralised agencies and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office can ensure effective and efficient policy design, high-quality delivery and enforcement, provide technical assistance, continue to attract the best people from all Member States, thus ensuring geographical balance, and have leeway to adjust to changing circumstances;

88. Regrets that the Union’s ability to implement policy effectively and protect its financial interests within the current MFF has been undermined by stretched administrative resources and a dogmatic application of a policy of stable staffing, despite increasing demands and responsibilities; points, for example, to the failure to provide sufficient staff to properly implement and enforce the Digital Services(13) and Digital Markets Acts(14), thus undercutting the legislation’s effectiveness and to the repeated redeployments from programmes to decentralised agencies to cover staffing needs; insists that staffing levels be determined by an objective needs assessment when legislation is proposed and definitively adopted, and factored into planning for administrative expenditure from the outset;

89. Emphasises that the Commission has sought, to some degree, to circumvent its own stable staffing policy by increasing staff attached to programmes and facilities and thus not covered by the administrative spending ceiling; underscores, however, that such an approach merely masks the problem and may ultimately undermine the operational capacity of programmes; insists, therefore, that additional responsibilities require administrative expenditure and must not erode programme envelopes;

90. Stresses that up-front investment in secure and interoperable IT infrastructure and data mining capabilities can also generate longer-term cost savings and hugely enhance policy delivery and tracking of spending;

91. Acknowledges that, in the absence of any correction mechanism in the current MFF, high inflation has significantly driven up statutory costs, requiring extensive use of special instruments to cover the shortfall; regrets that the Council elected not to take up the Commission’s proposal to raise the ceiling for administrative expenditure in the MFF revision, thus further eroding special instruments;

A long-term budget that is simpler and more transparent

92. Stresses that the next MFF must be designed so as to simplify the lives of all beneficiaries by cutting unnecessary red tape; underlines that simplification will require harmonising rules and reporting requirements wherever possible, including, as relevant, ensuring consistency between the applicable rules at European, national and regional levels; underlines, in that respect, the need for a genuine, user-friendly single entry point for EU funding and a simplified application procedure designed in consultation with relevant stakeholders; points out, furthermore, that the next MFF must be implemented as close to people as possible;

93. Calls for genuine simplification where there are overlapping objectives, diverging eligibility criteria and different rules governing horizontal provisions that should be uniform across programmes; considers that an assessment of which spending programmes should be included in the next MFF must be based on the above aspects, on the need to focus spending on clearly identified policy objectives with clear European added value and on the policy intervention logic of each programme; stresses that reducing the number of programmes is not an end in itself;

94. Underlines that simplification cannot mean more leeway for the Commission without the necessary checks and balances and must therefore be achieved with full respect for the institutional balance provided for in the Treaties;

95. Insists that simplification cannot come at the expense of the quality of programme design and implementation and that, therefore, a simpler budget must also be a more transparent budget, enabling better accountability, scrutiny, control of spending and reducing the risks of double funding, misuse and fraud; underlines that any reduction in programmes must be offset by a far more detailed breakdown of the budget by budget line, in contrast to some programme mergers in the current MFF, such as the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe), which is an example not to follow; calls, therefore, for a sufficiently detailed breakdown by budget line to enable the budgetary authority to exercise proper accountability and ensure that decision-making in the annual budgetary procedure and in the course of budget implementation is meaningful;

96. Recalls that transparency is essential to retain citizens’ trust, and that fraud and misuse of funds are extremely detrimental to that trust; underlines, therefore, the need for Parliament to be able to control spending and assess whether discharge can be granted; insists that proper accountability requires robust auditing for all budgetary expenditure based on the application of a single audit trail; calls on the Commission to put in place harmonised and effective anti-fraud mechanisms across funding instruments for the post-2027 MFF that ensure the protection of the Union’s budget;

97. Reiterates its long-standing position that all EU-level spending should be brought within the purview of the budgetary authority, thereby ensuring transparency, democratic control and protection of the Union’s financial interests; calls, therefore, for the full budgetisation of (partially) off-budget instruments such as the Social Climate Fund, the Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund, or their successors;

A long-term budget that is more flexible and more responsive to crises and shocks

98. Points out that, traditionally, the MFF has not been conceived with a crisis response or flexibility logic, but rather has been designed primarily to ensure medium-term investment predictability; underlines that, in a rapidly changing political, security, economic and social context, such an approach is no longer tenable; insists on sufficient in-built crisis response capacity in the next MFF;

99. Underscores that the current MFF has been beset by a lack of flexibility and an inability to adjust to evolving spending priorities; considers that the next MFF needs to strike a better balance between investment predictability and flexibility to adjust spending focus; highlights that spending in certain areas requires greater stability than in others where flexibility is more valuable; stresses that recurrent redeployments are not a viable way to finance the Union’s priorities as they damage investments and jeopardise the delivery of agreed policy objectives;

100. Believes that, while allocating a significant portion of funding to objectives up-front, spending programmes should retain a substantial in-built flexibility reserve, with allocation to specific policy objectives to be decided by the budgetary authority; notes that the NDICI – Global Europe’s emerging challenges and priorities cushion provides a model for such a flexibility reserve, but that the decision-making process for its mobilisation must not be replicated in the future MFF; points to the need for stronger, more effective scrutiny powers of the co-legislators over the setting of policy priorities and objectives and a detailed budgetary breakdown to ensure that the budgetary authority is equipped to make meaningful and informed decisions;

101. Underlines that the MFF must have sufficient margins under each heading to ensure that new instruments or spending objectives agreed over the programming period can be accommodated without eroding funding for other policy and long-term strategic objectives or eating into crisis response capacity;

102. Underlines that the possibility for budgetary transfers under the Financial Regulation already provides for flexibility to adjust to evolving spending needs in the course of budget implementation; stresses that, under the current rules, the Commission has significant freedom to transfer considerable amounts between policy areas without budgetary authority approval, which limits scrutiny and control; calls, therefore, for the rules to be changed so as to introduce a maximum amount, in addition to a maximum percentage per budget line, for transfers without approval; considers that for transfers from Union institutions other than the Commission that are subject to a possible duly justified objection by Parliament or the Council, a threshold below which they would be exempt from that procedure could be a useful measure of simplification;

103. Recalls that the current MFF has been placed under further strain due to high levels of inflation in a context where an annual 2 % deflator is applied to 2018 prices, reducing the budget’s real-terms value and squeezing its operational and administrative capacity; considers, therefore, that the future budget should be endowed with sufficient response capacity to enable the budget to adapt to inflationary shocks;

104. Calls for a root-and-branch reform of the existing special instruments to bolster crisis response capacity and ensure an effective and swift reaction through more rapid mobilisation; underlines that the current instruments are both inadequate in size and constrained by excessive rigidity, with several effectively ring-fenced according to crisis type; points out that enhanced crisis response capacity will ensure that cohesion policy funds are not called upon for that purpose and can therefore be used for their intended investment objectives;

105. Considers that the post-2027 MFF should include only two special instruments – one dedicated to ensuring solidarity in the event of natural disasters (the successor to the existing European Solidarity Reserve) and one for general-purpose crisis response and for responding to any unforeseen needs and emerging priorities, including where amounts in the special instrument for natural disasters are insufficient (the successor to the Flexibility Instrument); insists that both special instruments should be adequately funded from the outset and able to carry over unspent amounts indefinitely over the MFF period; believes that all other special instruments can either be wound up or subsumed into the two special instruments or into existing programmes;

106. Calls for the future Flexibility Instrument to be heavily front-loaded and subsequently to be fed through a number of additional sources of financing: unspent margins from previous years (as with the current Single Margin Instrument), the annual surplus from the previous year, a fines-based mechanism modelled on the existing Article 5 of the MFF Regulation, reflows from financial instruments and decommitted appropriations; underlines that the next MFF should be designed such that the future special instruments are not required to cover debt repayment;

107. Underlines that re-use of the surplus, of reflows from financial instruments and surplus provisioning and of decommitments would require amendments to the Financial Regulation;

108. Points out that, with sufficient up-front resources and such arrangements for re-using unused funds, the budget would have far greater response capacity without impinging on the predictability of national GNI-based contributions; insists that an MFF endowed with greater flexibility and response capacity is less likely to require a substantial mid-term revision;

A long-term budget that is more results-focused

109. Emphasises that, in order to maximise impact, it is imperative that spending under the next MFF be much more rigorously aligned with the Union’s strategic policy aims and better coordinated with spending at national level; underlines that, in turn, consultation with regional and local authorities is vital to facilitate access to funding and ensure that Union support meets the real needs of final recipients and delivers tangible benefits for people; underscores the importance of technical assistance to implementing authorities to help ensure timely implementation, additionality of investments and therefore maximum impact;

110. Underlines that, in order to support effective coordination between Union and national spending, the Commission envisages a ‘new, lean steering mechanism’ designed ‘to reinforce the link between overall policy coordination and the EU budget’; insists that Parliament play a full decision-making role in any coordination or steering mechanism;

111. Considers that the RRF, with its focus on performance and links between reforms and investments and budgetary support, has helped to drive national investments and reforms that would not otherwise have taken place;

112. Underlines that the RRF can help to inform the delivery of Union spending under shared management; recalls, however, that the RRF was agreed in the very specific context of the COVID-19 pandemic and cannot, therefore, be replicated wholesale for future investment programmes;

113. Points out that spending under shared management in the next MFF must involve regional and local authorities and all relevant stakeholders from design to delivery through a place-based and multilevel governance approach and in line with an improved partnership principle, ensure the cross-border European dimension of investment projects, and focus on results and impact rather than outputs by setting measurable performance indicators, ensuring availability of relevant data and feeding into programme design and adjustment;

114. Underlines that the design of shared management spending under the next MFF must safeguard Parliament’s role as legislator, budgetary and discharge authority and in holding the executive to account, putting in place strict accountability mechanisms and guaranteeing full transparency in relation to final recipients or groups of recipients of Union spending funds through an interoperable system enabling effective tracking of cash flows and project progress;

115. Considers that the ‘one national plan per Member State’ approach envisaged by the Commission is not in line with the principles set out above and cannot be the basis for shared management spending post-2027; recalls that, in this regard, the Union is required, under Article 175 TFEU, to provide support through instruments for agricultural, regional and social spending;

A long-term budget that manages liabilities sustainably

116. Recalls Parliament’s very firm opposition to subjecting the repayment of NGEU borrowing costs to a cap within an MFF heading given that these costs are subject to market conditions, influenced by external factors and thus inherently volatile, and that the repayment of borrowing costs is a non-discretionary legal obligation; stresses that introducing new own resources is also necessary to prevent future generations from bearing the burden of past debts;

117. Deplores the fact that, under the existing architecture and despite the joint declaration by the three institutions as part of the 2020 MFF agreement whereby expenditure to cover NGEU financing costs ‘shall aim at not reducing programmes and funds’, financing for key Union programmes and resources available for special instruments, even after the MFF revision, have de facto been competing with the repayment of NGEU borrowing costs in a context of steep inflation and rising interest rates; recalls that pressure on the budget driven by NGEU borrowing costs was a key factor in cuts to flagship programmes in the MFF revision;

118. Underlines that, to date, the Union budget has been required only to repay interest related to NGEU and that, from 2028 onwards, the budget will also have to repay the capital; underscores that, according to the Commission, the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25-30 billion a year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of payment appropriations in the 2025 budget;

119. Acknowledges that, while NGEU borrowing costs will be more stable in the next MFF period as bonds will already have been issued, the precise repayment profile will have an impact on the level of interest and thus on the degree of volatility; insists, therefore, that all costs related to borrowing backed by the Union budget or the budgetary headroom be treated distinctly from appropriations for EU programmes within the MFF architecture;

120. Points, in that regard, to the increasing demand for the Union budget to serve as a guarantee for the Union’s vital support through macro-financial assistance and the associated risks; underlines that, in the event of default or the withdrawal of national guarantees, the Union budget ultimately underwrites all macro-financial assistance loans and therefore bears significant and inherently unpredictable contingent liabilities, notably in relation to Ukraine;

121. Calls, therefore, on the Commission to design a sound and durable architecture that enables sustainable management of all non-discretionary costs and liabilities, fully preserving Union programmes and the budget’s flexibility and response capacity;

A long-term budget that is properly resourced and sustainably financed

122. Underlines that, as described above, the budgetary needs post-2027 will be significantly higher than the amounts allocated to the 2021-2027 MFF and, in addition, will need to cover borrowing costs and debt repayment; insists, therefore, that the next MFF be endowed with significantly increased resources compared to the 2021-2027 period, moving away from the historically restrictive, self-imposed level of 1 % of GNI, which has prevented the Union from delivering on its ambitions and deprived it of the ability to respond to crises and adapt to emerging needs;

123. Considers that all instruments and tools should be explored in order to provide the Union with those resources, in line with its priorities and identified needs; considers, in this respect, that joint borrowing through the issuance of EU bonds presents a viable option to ensure that the Union has sufficient resources to respond to acute Union-wide crises such as the ongoing crisis in the area of security and defence;

124. Reiterates the need for sustainable and resilient revenue for the Union budget; points to the legally binding roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources in the IIA, in which Parliament, the Council and the Commission undertook to introduce sufficient new own resources to at least cover the repayment of NGEU debt; underlines that, overall, the basket of new own resources should be fair, linked to broader Union policy aims and agreed on time and with sufficient volume to meet the heightened budgetary needs;

125. Recalls its support for the amended Commission proposal on the system of own resources; is deeply concerned by the complete absence of progress on the system of own resources in the Council; calls on the Council to adopt this proposal as a matter of urgency; and urges the Commission to spare no effort in supporting the adoption process;

126. Calls furthermore, on the Commission to continue efforts to identify additional innovative and genuine new own resources and other revenue sources beyond those specified in the IIA; stresses that new own resources are essential not only to enable repayment of NGEU borrowing, but to ensure that the Union is equipped to cover its the higher spending needs;

127. Calls on the Commission to design a modernised budget with a renewed spending focus, driven by the need for fairness, greater simplification, a reduced administrative burden and more transparency, including on the revenue side; underlines that existing rebates and corrections automatically expire at the end of the current MFF;

128. Welcomes the decision, in the recast of the Financial Regulation, to treat as negative revenue any interest or other charge due to a third party relating to amounts of fines, other penalties or sanctions that are cancelled or reduced by the Court of Justice; recalls that this solution comes to an end on 31 December 2027; invites the Commission to propose a definitive solution for the next MFF that achieves the same objective of avoiding any impact on the expenditure side of the budget;

A long-term budget grounded in close interinstitutional cooperation

129. Underlines that Parliament intends to fully exercise its prerogatives as legislator, budgetary authority and discharge authority under the Treaties;

130. Recalls that the requirement for close interinstitutional cooperation between the Commission, the Council and Parliament from the early design stages to the final adoption of the MFF is enshrined in the Treaties and further detailed in the IIA;

131. Emphasises Parliament’s commitment to play its role fully throughout the process; believes that the design of the MFF should be bottom-up and based on the extensive involvement of stakeholders; underlines, furthermore, the need for a strategic dialogue among the three institutions in the run-up to the MFF proposals;

132. Calls on the Commission to put forward practical arrangements for cooperation and genuine negotiations from the outset; points, in particular, to the importance of convening meetings of the three Presidents, as per Article 324 TFEU, wherever they can aid progress, and insists that the Commission follow up when Parliament requests such meetings; reminds the Commission of its obligation to provide information to Parliament on an equal footing with the Council as the two arms of the budgetary authority and as co-legislators on MFF-related basic acts;

133. Recalls that the IIA specifically provides for Parliament, the Council and the Commission to ‘seek to determine specific arrangements for cooperation and dialogue’; stresses that the cooperation provisions set out in the IIA, including regular meetings between Parliament and the Council, are a bare minimum and that much more is needed to give effect to the principle in Article 312(5) TFEU of taking ‘any measure necessary to facilitate the adoption of a new MFF’; calls, therefore, on the successive Council presidencies to respect not only the letter, but also the spirit of the Treaties;

134. Recalls that the late adoption of the MFF regulation and related legislation for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods led to significant delays, which hindered the proper implementation of EU programmes; insists, therefore, that every effort be made to ensure timely adoption of the upcoming MFF package;

135. Expects the Commission, as part of the package of MFF proposals, to put forward a new IIA in line with the realities of the new budget, including with respect to the management of contingent liabilities; stresses that the changes to the Financial Regulation necessary for alignment with the new MFF should enter into force at the same time as the MFF Regulation;

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136. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1)	OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj.
(2)	OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2020/2053/oj.
(3)	OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 28, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2020/1222/oj.
(4)	OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
(5)	OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
(6)	OJ C, C/2024/6751, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6751/oj.
(7)	OJ C, C/2023/1067, 15.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1067/oj.
(8)	OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 115.
(9)	OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 240.
(10)	OJ C 428, 13.12.2017, p. 10.
(11)	OJ C, C/2025/279, 24.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/279/oj.
(12)	Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 (OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/852/oj).
(13)	Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
(14)	Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 13, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Competition policy – annual report 2024 – P10_TA(2025)0104 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to Articles 101 to 109 thereof,

– having regard to the publication of 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen entitled ‘Europe’s choice – political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024–2029’,

– having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to the report of 18 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

– having regard to the European Court of Auditors Special Report21/2024 of 23 October 2024 entitled ‘State aid in times of crisis – Swift reaction but shortcomings in the Commission’s monitoring and inconsistencies in the framework to support the EU’s industrial policy objectives’,

– having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation)(1),

– having regard to Article 11 TFEU, which mandates the integration of environmental protection requirements into the definition and implementation of all EU policies and activities, with a view to promoting sustainable development,

– having regard to Article 3 of Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030(2), which provides that environmentally harmful subsidies, in particular fossil fuel subsidies, should be phased out without delay,

– having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 3 September 2024 in Case C‑611/22 P, Illumina v Commission(3), of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑465/20 P, European Commission v Ireland and Others(4), and of 10 September 2024 in Case C‑48/22 P (Google and Alphabet v Commission)(5),

– having regard to the Commission’s report of June 2024 entitled ‘Protecting competition in a changing world – Evidence on the evolution of competition in the EU during the past 25 years’,

– having regard to the study entitled ‘The role of commodity traders in shaping agricultural markets’, published by its Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in November 2024,

– having regard to the report of 20 December 2023 by the European Securities and Markets Authority entitled ‘CRA Market Share Report: 2023 edition’,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0071/2025),

A. whereas the current challenging economic, climate and geopolitical contexts, marked by uncertainty and unpredictability, require a renewed approach to European competitiveness and concrete strategies to boost economic growth;

B. whereas the proper enforcement of the EU competition policy framework leads to lower prices, higher quality, greater choice for consumers, faster innovation and a fairer and more resilient economy, and protects entry conditions for operators in the internal market, tackling abuses of dominant position, monopolies and practices distortive to the internal market;

C. whereas the Draghi report underlines that the EU has a broad and diversified industrial innovation base, with a strong comparative advantage in green technologies, but that sustained efforts are needed in order to retain that advantage; whereas the integration of climate and environmental considerations into competition policy is essential, in that regard; whereas the Letta report maintains that the lack of EU integration in the financial, energy and electronic communications sectors is a primary reason for Europe’s declining competitiveness;

D. whereas the EU’s competition policy could contribute to bolstering the resilience of the internal market, as well as achieving the goals of the European Green Deal, the 2030 Digital Compass and the Competitiveness Compass, for which international exchange and cooperation are essential;

E. whereas the Commission and the national competition authorities need to act in an impartial and objective way in order to preserve the credibility of the EU’s competition policy; whereas the political independence of national competition authorities is of utmost importance to ensure the impartiality and credibility of competition policy;

General considerations

1. Considers that EU competition law seeks to shield against excessive levels of concentration and accumulation of market power, and reaffirms the role of competition policy in encouraging efficiency, innovation and growth, creating a level playing field and protecting consumers, by assuring that markets remain competitive, efficient, dynamic and innovative, delivering high-quality products and services at fair prices and with a wider range of choice;

2. Reiterates that competition policy should contribute to all of the EU’s policies, notably in the fields of sustainability, energy, defence and digitalisation; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to a new State aid framework to accompany the Clean Industrial Deal, so as to ensure competitiveness through mobilising the necessary public support for the energy transition to decarbonise EU industry, while ensuring that this does not hinder innovation, increase prices or reduce competition in the internal market; reiterates that State aid should not distort fair and effective competition;

3. Emphasises that the global strength and importance of the EU single market derives not only from its internal and external competitiveness but also from its ability to set common standards and guarantee territorial cohesion; notes that at the same time, policymakers should take due account of international regulatory and market developments and calls on the Commission to strive for continued dialogue and cooperation at international level, including via second-generation cooperation agreements that allow for more effective information exchange between competition authorities, and the development of influence on competition policy, globally; highlights the importance of the European Competition Network (ECN) and calls on the Commission to prioritise sustained constructive dialogue and cooperation, in this regard, at international level; calls for the coordination between national competition authorities to ensure the uniform application of competition rules and underlines the necessity of increasing collaboration between antitrust and other sectoral regulators;

A competitive Union

4. Supports the Commission’s commitment to investing in sustainable competitiveness; welcomes the Draghi report’s emphasis on innovation, investments, market integration, decarbonisation and resilience, and the Letta report’s focus on integration, autonomy and solidarity; encourages policies that promote innovation, competitiveness and sustainable and inclusive growth;

5. Underlines the need for coordinated, targeted and truly European industrial policy to boost competitiveness; notes that this must not result in market dominance or abuse thereof, price distortion or economic inefficiencies, and points to the need for effective merger control procedures;

6. Considers that any State aid granted should be consistent with EU policy objectives; notes the Commission’s intention to provide guidance on the compatibility of State aid with innovation, climate and economic security considerations, as well as its actions to scale down and phase out fossil fuel subsidies under the Clean Industrial Deal, and encourages the Member States to consider the introduction of further conditions for the receipt of State aid; calls for companies structured through non-EU tax havens to be barred from receiving State aid; invites the Commission to investigate the lack of harmonisation of clawback mechanisms;

7. Takes note of the Commission’s report asserting that market concentration, markups and profits have increased over the past 25 years, while industry dynamism has decreased, despite the active enforcement of competition law; also takes note that this increase in markups was found to be driven by market share reallocation towards the largest firms; further notes that weak levels of competition have had significant negative impacts on consumers, purchasing power, and on the competitiveness of EU firms and overall economic growth; recalls that the application of competition law should focus on ensuring open, competitive markets free from anti-competitive practices;

8. Points out that State aid is increasingly used to support industrial policy objectives; recalls that such aid, as permitted under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, must not adversely affect trading conditions or the common interest; notes the divergent fiscal capabilities of the Member States and warns that fragmented State aid creates an uneven playing field; calls on the Commission to monitor these effects and to ensure the integrity of the single market, which can be done through a common financing instrument for a European industrial policy, such as a European Competitiveness Fund, as proposed by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines; calls on the Commission and the Member States not to engage in subsidy competition, which only exacerbates market distortions, notably when financing undertakings that are not efficient; concludes that temporary State aid frameworks have failed to prevent further market fragmentation and notes that only two of the Member States accounted for 77 % of State aid notified; calls for stricter State aid notification monitoring and enhanced State aid reporting and transparency, in line with the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors;

9. Underlines the importance of the important projects of common European interest (IPCEIs) for financing projects within the EU with a cross-border dimension; stresses that IPCEIs should have genuine EU added value, which means that they should have a positive impact on more than one Member State; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any such State aid notification is completed within six months at the latest;

10. Takes note of the Draghi report’s estimate that, in order to protect our EU competitiveness, an additional EUR 800 billion per year is needed; acknowledges the importance of public and private investment in this context; underlines that the EU budget needs to be properly equipped to that end; regards the completion of the Savings and Investments Union as important for mobilising private investment, addressing the fragmentation of the internal market and supporting the EU’s industrial strategy; acknowledges the urgent need for reforms alongside the effective implementation of the three action areas outlined in the Draghi report: (i) closing the innovation gap with the US and China; (ii) a common plan for decarbonisation and competitiveness to accelerate the energy transition and reduce energy costs; and (iii) enhancing security and reducing dependencies;

11. Welcomes the protection of the level playing field of European markets and European companies and their workers granted by anti-dumping measures that correct for distortive foreign State aid; calls on the Commission to make swift use of available trade instruments on procurement and foreign subsidies to prevent unfair competition in the internal market;

Enforcement priorities

12. Observes changes in business practices, highlighting a decline in cartel cases; cautions, however, against new forms of harmful conduct like tacit collusion and algorithmic collusion, and emphasises the need to align enforcement priorities with this evolving landscape;

13. Notes the Draghi report’s proposal for a ‘new competition tool’ as a flexible market investigation tool designed to address structural competition problems that do not result from anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominance, and to impose market-wide, forward-looking structural or behavioural remedies, including by lowering entry barriers for competitors, with the aim of increasing competitiveness, incentivising innovation and protecting vulnerable consumers; invites the Commission to analyse how this tool would complement the existing framework for sector investigations;

14. Recalls that under the Treaty, the Commission is empowered to address exploitative abuses;

15. Acknowledges the existence of a legal base for structural remedies against the abuse of market dominance; is aware that EU competition rules stipulate that structural remedies should only be used as a last resort if behavioural remedies have proven ineffective, but nonetheless regrets the reluctance of the Commission to address market dominance through structural remedies; reiterates its invitation to make better use of structural remedies and end the primacy given to behavioural remedies, and encourages further efforts to strengthen their application when necessary; calls on the Commission to make better use of the interim measures instrument to stop any practice that would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;

16. Welcomes the priority given to housing by the 2024-2029 Commission; calls on the Commission to assess how EU competition principles affect the supply of services of general economic interest (SGEI); calls on the Commission to assess the position of social services of general interest and an SGEI exemption for affordable housing;

17. Stresses the importance of State aid as a tool for closing the economic gap between more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, outermost regions and economically depressed areas; recalls that allowing State aid in the context of SGEIs remains essential for the survival of these areas, especially in the context of State support dedicated to connectivity and other basic provisions of services for communities residing in isolated, remote or peripheral regions of the EU; calls on the Commission to investigate possibilities of further flexibility in providing funding to these regions;

18. Takes note of the recent Court of Justice of the European Union ruling which found that one of the Member States has failed to transpose the ECN+ Directive into national legislation; underlines the importance of transposing the ECN+ Directive fully; calls on all of the Member States to ensure a proper implementation of this Directive;

Merger and antitrust

19. Notes with concern the Court of Justice of the European Union’s interpretation of Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation in Case C-611/22 P (Illumina v Commission), rescinding the Commission’s approach of accepting referrals of non-notifiable deals; acknowledges that the EC Merger Regulation does not provide the Commission with sufficient tools for dealing with killer acquisitions; strongly believes that the impact of merger decisions on the internal market justifies the inclusion of an internal market legal base in the EC Merger Regulation, so as to fully involve co-legislators, in a manner similar to that of the Digital Markets Act (DMA); calls on the Commission to require Member States that have or can claim the relevant competence to examine potential killer acquisitions in the light of their national merger control laws, and to continue to refer those deals in accordance with Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of reviewing the EC Merger Regulation to be able to examine mergers that fall below EU or national thresholds, regardless of the sectors involved;

20. Notes that since the 2004 entry into force of the EC Merger Regulation, 0,7 % of notified mergers have been either blocked by the Commission or withdrawn following an investigation;

21. Notes that the turnover thresholds in the EC Merger Regulation alone might not be suitable for detecting all cases that should be reviewed by the competition authorities; highlights practices used by dominant firms to avoid formal investigations, such as the growing use of ‘partnerships’ in the AI sector, which further suggests that a review of the EU Merger Regulation is necessary;

22. Welcomes the Draghi report’s proposal for an ‘innovation defence’ in cases where a merger increases the ability and incentive to innovate, and invites the Commission to analyse and further develop this concept; furthermore calls for matters of public interest, such as the impact on workers, to be taken into account;

23. Asks the Commission to identify the national barriers that may prevent it from considering the EU market as the relevant one in its analyses of mergers; calls on the Commission to present a legislative proposal to remove these impediments; notes that the international environment needs to be carefully analysed when deciding on the definition of the relevant market in competition and merger control cases; calls on the Commission to adopt a forward-looking approach to consolidation in the EU where appropriate, as also proposed by the Draghi and Letta reports, taking into account the strategic importance and pro-competitive impact of scale and favourable investment conditions in certain sectors for driving innovation and long-term competition;

24. Calls for merger assessment frameworks to be updated to reflect the realities of the digital economy, where market power can be manifested in ways beyond traditional market share in clearly delineated markets; supports the development of advanced methodologies for analysing data-driven dominance and network effects, emphasising the critical role of consumer choice in selecting digital services and devices; encourages the Commission to enhance mechanisms enabling interoperability across services and devices, fostering innovation and competition in the digital ecosystem; urges the Commission to progress swiftly on the implementation of the existing interoperability obligations for messaging services under the DMA, the existing interoperability obligations for cloud providers under the Data Act and to start work on the review of the DMA for May 2026; urges the Commission to implement existing interoperability obligations under the DMA and look into extending interoperability obligations to online social networking services; supports the Commission in taking more account of the potential harm to competition when assessing mergers where expansion into adjacent markets would have the effect of further strengthening market dominance in the acquiring company’s core market;

25. Calls on the Commission to address excessively long antitrust investigations during which companies continue to benefit from their anticompetitive practices; calls on the Commission to set appropriate time limits for antitrust cases and ensure an effective follow-through of decisions taken; calls on the Commission to adopt further interim measures to stop any practice which would seriously harm competition, particularly in relation to dynamic and rapidly developing markets such as digital markets;

Sectoral policies

26. Welcomes the two September 2024 landmark judgments by the Court of Justice confirming the Commission’s assertion that the Irish tax deal with Apple constitutes illegal State aid and that Google abused its dominant position in contravention of the Treaties; acknowledges that the legal framework in Ireland has since changed; encourages the Commission to continue the clamp down on State aid abuses involving the selective granting of tax breaks to companies;

27. Notes the detrimental effect of international tax competition; recalls its support for the implementation of Pillar Two of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); deeply regrets the US presidential Executive Order of 20 January 2025 which asserts that the OECD global tax agreement has ‘no force or effect within the United States’; stresses the importance of multilateralism in ensuring that multinationals pay their fair share of taxation where value is created; takes the view that the EU should fully stand by the OECD’s Pillar Two Directive;

28. Emphasises the worrying market concentrations in various digital markets, such as social media, search engines, AI, cloud services, e-commerce, microchips and online advertising; underlines the actual and potential negative impact on EU competitiveness, the resilience of supply chains, media freedom, privacy and data protection, society and democracy; urges the Commission to address issues that are specific to the tech market, including infrastructural power in hardware and cloud computing layers, vertical concentration, algorithmic manipulation of the digital public sphere and market leveraging in digital markets, as demonstrated by the progress made under the DMA; additionally calls for the opening of new investigations into the cloud services sector to further ensure fair competition and innovation, taking into account the degree of market concentration in this sector and anticompetitive practices related to complex and non-transparent licensing terms or forced bundling; furthermore, urges the Commission to address the increasing vertical concentration of dominant players across the advertising value chain, which puts the EU online advertising sector at risk;

29. Notes the rapid development of AI services, which has the potential to result in market concentration; calls on the Commission to take an ecosystemic approach towards this sector, including by developing and applying new theories of harm to address the further entrenchment of the dominant players in this sector; highlights that the DMA contains several provisions that must be used to prevent gatekeepers from restricting emerging AI developers, and asks the Commission to act swiftly to address the risk of consumers being forced into using pre-determined AI services on their mobile devices, ensuring that AI systems remain user-selectable and transparent, thereby safeguarding competition and consumer choice; calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of adding generative AI as a new core platform service under the DMA;

30. Notes that large digital players use their market power, power over consumers, financial resources and data concentration in one market to leverage their position in another; stresses that small players cannot compete with the aforementioned factors, which makes EU citizens even more dependent on the same small number of non-EU companies and endangers strategic autonomy; calls for increased scrutiny of the leveraging of position by dominant digital sector players into other sectors and the EU’s strategic autonomy, through a revision of the merger guidelines to ensure that market leveraging can be scrutinised more effectively;

31. Notes the importance of data and data analytics tools as one of the deterring factors for digital market concentrations and acquisitions in the digital sector; calls for an opinion of the European Data Protection Board in cases of concentrations involving one or more operators in digital sectors on the relevance of datasets for the intended concentration, the personal data the target acquisition processes and the potential impact on the rights to privacy and data protection the intended concentration has;

32. Expresses concern regarding the growing use of dynamic pricing mechanisms across the EU; calls on the Commission to explore regulatory measures against highly adaptive and opaque pricing methods;

33. Calls on the Commission to vigorously enforce all competition rules, including the Foreign Subsidies Regulation and the DMA, in order to address gatekeeper practices and foster contestable markets and fair competition; stresses that the Commission must have sufficient staff for enforcement, while noting that new tools, as well as scientists and economists stemming from divergent disciplines, can work to improve competition law enforcement; underlines in particular that the DMA should be applied rigorously and independently, without any undermining by external pressures; stresses that the DMA and potential fines must not be used as a bargaining chip in relation to discussions on tariffs, but as a cornerstone of the EU’s efforts to ensure fair and competitive digital markets; notes the six non-compliance procedures launched against some designated gatekeepers; is deeply concerned about potential delays in critical investigations and the capacity of the Commission to respect their ‘best effort’ obligations and to make a decision on non-compliance procedures without undue delay;

34. Notes with concern the fragmentation in numerous consumer markets, including financial services, telecoms and household energy, and calls for faster and greater market integration where there are benefits for consumers, and for recognition that this market integration can drive investment and innovation;

35. Expresses alarm at the high concentration in the retail, agricultural and automotive sectors in overseas territories whereby excessive prices set by dominant undertakings on essential products and services amplify inequalities, precariousness and territorial disparities; calls on the Commission to launch an investigation into potential abuses of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU;

36. Notes with concern the high degree of market concentration in the European financial sector, as well as its sustained over-reliance on a limited number of non-EU service providers; notes that the three largest credit rating agencies still hold a market share of over 90 %; expresses concern about the continued high concentration in the public interest entities (PIE) audit market, with four firms mainly holding the vast majority of EU revenues for PIE audits, limiting choice and risking supervisory capture; invites the Commission to present an impact assessment on options to address these concerns; urges the Commission to carefully assess public tenders for expertise from audit market participants so that potential conflicts of interest are avoided;

37. Expresses concern about the food price crisis and notes, in this regard, the high levels of market concentration in food supply chains; reiterates its call for the Commission to urgently conduct a thorough analysis of the extent and effect of buying alliances, thereby devoting special attention to guaranteeing fair competition and greater transparency in supermarket and hypermarket chains’ commercial practices, particularly where such practices affect brand value and product choice or limit innovation or price comparability; recalls, in this light, the market concentration in agri-commodity trading wherein four companies account for the vast majority of the global crop trade; regrets that the Commission nonetheless conditionally approved the 2024 Bunge-Viterra merger (M.11204) despite competition concerns; asks the Commission to address excessive power accumulation in the hands of a few large players in this market, in order to strengthen the bargaining position of farmers and consumers alike; highlights the implementation of the New Competition Tool in this context;

38. Notes the high-net profits of EU banks during this inflationary period, mostly driven by the delayed pass-through of the rapid monetary policy tightening to deposit rates;

39. Notes with particular concern the dominant position of two international card schemes in the EU payments market, and their engagement in practices that reinforce and extend their dominance of this market, potentially further increasing barriers to entry and hampering long-term innovation(6), as well as leading to higher costs for EU businesses and ultimately consumers; calls on the Commission to take decisive actions, emphasising the need for a review of the Interchange Fee Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2015/751) to tackle the significant increase in card scheme fees charged by international card schemes and to ensure a fair, competitive and transparent market environment;

Parliamentary involvement

40. Stresses that Parliament should be sufficiently involved in shaping competition policy; cautions against the over-reliance on soft-law instruments, such as guidance and temporary frameworks, in which Parliament’s involvement is limited; calls on the Commission to enter into negotiation for an interinstitutional agreement on competition policy to formalise its enforcement priorities to Parliament; calls on the European Council to adopt a decision under Article 48(7) TEU allowing for the adoption of legislative acts in the area of competition policy in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure; stresses that Parliament should be more involved in the activity of working parties and expert groups in the International Competition Network and the OECD as an observer, and also in the High-Level Group on the DMA;

41. Calls on the responsible Executive Vice-President, also Commissioner in charge of competition policy to maintain close contact with Parliament’s competent committee and its working group on competition issues;

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42. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1)	OJ L 024, 29.1.2004, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/139/oj.
(2)	OJ L 114, 12.4.2022, p. 22, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2022/591/oj.
(3)	Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3 September 2024, Illumina v Commission, C-611/22 P, ECLI:EU:C:2024:677.
(4)	Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 September 2024, European Commission v Ireland and Others, C-465/20 P, ECLI:EU:C:2024:724.
(5)	Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 September 2024, Google and Alphabet v Commission, C-48/22 P, CLI:EU:C:2024:726.
(6)	European Court of Auditors, Special Report: ‘Digital payments in the EU – Progress towards making them safer, faster, and less expensive, despite remaining gaps’, 9 January 2025, https://www.eca.europa.eu/ECAPublications/SR-2025-01/SR-2025-01_EN.pdf.

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 13, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Kosovo – P10_TA(2025)0094 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and Kosovo, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 April 2016,

– having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2022,

– having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe of 12 May 2022,

– having regard to the framework agreement between the European Union and Kosovo on the general principles for the participation of Kosovo in Union programmes(2), in force since 1 August 2017,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(3),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(4),

– having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans Summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia, of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb, of 6 October 2021 in Brdo pri Kranju, of 6 December 2022 in Tirana, of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

– having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0692),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0692),

– having regard to the general summary and the country assessments by the Commission, dated 31 May 2023 and 13 June 2024, on Kosovo’s economic reform programme,

– having regard to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye, adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion of 22 July 2010 on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, and to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298 of 9 September 2010, which acknowledged the content of the ICJ opinion and welcomed the EU’s readiness to facilitate dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo,

– having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

– having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and to the implementation annex thereto,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1095 of 5 June 2023 amending Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)(5), which extended the mission’s mandate until 14 June 2025,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (Kosovo)(6),

– having regard to the final report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2021 municipal elections in Kosovo,

– having regard to the preliminary report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2025 parliamentary elections in Kosovo,

– having regard to the fourth meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Council between the European Union and Kosovo held in Brussels on 7 December 2021,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Kosovo,

– having regard to the joint recommendations adopted at the 12th meeting of the EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 9 December 2024,

– having regard to the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International,

– having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders,

– having regard to the Democracy Report 2024 of March 2024 by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0075/2025),

A. whereas enlargement policy is one of the most effective EU foreign policy instruments and one of the most successful policies to incentivise and encourage fundamental reforms, and is a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

B. whereas democracy, human rights and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

C. whereas the EU enlargement process is a strategic tool for strengthening stability, democracy and economic development in Europe, and each enlargement country is judged on its own merits and whereas it is the implementation of the necessary reforms and compliance with the set of criteria and common European values that determines the timetable and progress of accession; whereas Kosovo’s path towards EU membership also depends on the normalisation of relations with Serbia;

D. whereas the EU is the largest provider of financial support to Kosovo;

E. whereas Kosovo has been subjected to foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, particularly from Russia, especially through Serbian nationalist outlets, and China, through soft power, aiming to destabilise its democratic institutions, jeopardise societal cohesion, and incite ethnic violence; whereas the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023 was followed by a massive spread of disinformation that further exacerbated tensions; whereas Kosovo authorities adopted the Law on the Independent Media Commission (IMC) in July 2024; whereas, in May 2024, the Council of Europe published a legal opinion on the draft law on the IMC expressing concerns related to certain aspects of the at-that-time draft law, and providing recommendations on how to address these concerns; whereas the final text of the Law on the IMC did not reflect most of the recommendations made;

F. whereas the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, also known as EULEX, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the common security and defence policy of the European Union;

G. whereas in 2018 and 2023, petitions were signed by over 500 people who historically self-identify as Bulgarian;

Commitment to EU accession

1. Commends Kosovo’s commitment to EU accession, which reflects a clear strategic geopolitical choice, and the continued strong support of its citizens for Kosovo’s European path; reiterates that Kosovo has been consistent in its efforts to integrate into the European Union;

2. Reiterates its firm belief that Kosovo’s future lies in the EU and that all efforts to bring Kosovo out of the ‘grey zone’ are in the interest of the people of both Kosovo and the EU, especially in the context of the current geopolitical dynamics in the region, rapid major shifts in world politics and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

3. Supports Kosovo’s application for EU membership, which reflects the overwhelming cross-party consensus on EU integration and a clear geopolitical strategic choice; reiterates its call on the Member States in the Council to mandate the Commission to present its questionnaire and to submit its opinion on the merits of the country’s application; calls on the five non-recognising Member States that have not yet recognised Kosovo’s independence to do so without delay and thus allow Kosovo to progress on its EU path on an equal footing with the other candidate countries; recalls the advisory opinion of the ICJ dated 22 July 2010, which states that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence does not violate general international law;

4. Recalls that membership of the European Union is based on a merit-based process, conditional on the rigorous implementation of reforms aligned with the highest European standards, in particular compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and the rule of law, and ensures the effective application of laws in practice; encourages Kosovo to continue its efforts in this regard, by further strengthening its commitment to the values and standards of the Union; stresses that enlargement also implies thorough preparation of potential new members, while respecting the economic stability of the internal market, social and environmental standards and the proper functioning of the European institutions;

5. Welcomes the visa liberalisation, adopted in April 2023 and in place since 1 January 2024, as a tangible result of Kosovo’s ever-closer relations with the EU and as evidence of Kosovo’s efforts on the path of European integration; welcomes Kosovo’s decision to unilaterally abolish visa requirements for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina; welcomes the decision of Spain to recognise ordinary passports issued by Kosovo as valid travel documents as of January 2024;

6. Notes the tangible progress in the areas of justice, freedom and security, the fight against organised crime and a functioning market economy; regrets the limited progress and calls for an acceleration of reforms in the area of rule of law; welcomes Kosovo’s ambition to advance the implementation of reforms, which remains the country’s priority; regrets the lack of a decision-making quorum in the Kosovo National Assembly, caused by the boycott of the Assembly work by political parties ahead of parliamentary elections;

7. Regrets the politicisation of institutions such as the Central Election Commission and the IMC;

8. Commends Kosovo’s ongoing alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, in particular its firm condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its implementation of the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus, aligning with the Union’s foreign policy, and its support through humanitarian aid and military assistance packages to Ukraine, which confirm that Kosovo is a reliable and valuable partner committed to EU integration and confirms its clear geopolitical orientation, firmly anchored in the European and transatlantic alliance;

9. Calls for the immediate lifting of the EU measures against Kosovo, which are no longer justified as Kosovo has fulfilled the EU requirements and as the measures also stand in gross contradiction to Kosovo’s demonstrated commitment to European values and alignment with EU policies, limiting the impact of the EU’s partnership with Kosovo and hindering the resumption of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in good faith;

10. Reiterates its full support for Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe and for the country’s strategic orientation plan to join the NATO Partnership for Peace programme and its bids to join other international organisations; calls on the relevant organisations and the Member States to proactively support Kosovo’s respective bids; calls on the Commission and the EU Office in Kosovo to step up their efforts in enhancing visibility and promoting the role, efforts and benefits of the closer partnership between the EU and Kosovo;

11. Welcomes the fact that Kosovo reduced administrative burden by simplifying procedures through the implementation of the related program for 2022-2027; notes that the strategic framework for public administration is in place, but not efficiently implemented; regrets the fact that delays in public administration reform have left EU funding management weak and that accountability in the public sector is insufficient; calls on Kosovo to improve public administration and the merit-based civil service system by amending and adopting the Law on public officials and the Law on the independent oversight board of civil service;

12. Regrets that the Kosovo Constitutional Court ruling on the Law on salaries, which unifies the current system of remuneration for public officials, is not yet functional; calls on the Kosovo Government to revise its legislation on public financial management to meet international standards and to incorporate the public investment methodology into the revised legislation;

Democracy and the rule of law

13. Welcomes the important and positive progress on addressing many of the EU Election Observation Mission’s (EU EOM) long-standing recommendations and on presenting a consensual law on general elections; notes that this provides an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections, in line with international and regional standards; notes that in response to an invitation by the president of Kosovo, the European Union deployed an EU EOM, including an observer delegation of Members of the European Parliament, to observe the parliamentary elections in Kosovo on 9 February 2025; welcomes the conclusions of the EU EOM confirming the conduct of peaceful, free and fair elections on 9 February 2025 with the participation of all communities in Kosovo; regrets the harsh rhetoric of the political parties during the campaign; takes note of the technical problems encountered during the counting process and encourages the Kosovo authorities to increase their efforts to improve the organisation of the next elections; notes the lack of genuine political pluralism within the Kosovo Serb community at the parliamentary elections, despite multiple Kosovo Serb electoral lists; is concerned by reports of continuous pressure on voters from the Serbian community exercised by Belgrade; condemns the repeated interference in the electoral campaign by US Special Envoy Richard Grenell;

14. Notes with concern the political deadlock caused by the fragmented political landscape and failure so far to elect a speaker of the Parliament, hindering the formation of a government following the legislative elections of 9 February 2025 and delaying the parliamentary reading of several budgetary texts; encourages the political parties to work together to overcome this stalemate as soon as possible;

15. Notes with concern that the Law on Local Elections and the Law on General Elections are still not implemented and harmonised with the Law on Gender Equality, which mandates 50 % equal representation of women and men; regrets that women continue to be underrepresented;

16. Welcomes the adoption of the law on the Special Prosecution Office and the progress in adjudicating corruption cases; commends the active work of the Special Prosecution Office for solving seven war crime cases; calls for further clarification of the division of jurisdiction between the Special Prosecution Office and the Basic Prosecution in handling investigations and prosecutions; calls on Kosovo to continue strengthening the Special Prosecution Office by enhancing its capacity to investigate and prosecute high-profile organised crime cases; calls on the police and Special Prosecution Office to work closely together to develop strategies for conducting investigations more effectively, with a clear division of responsibility;

17. Takes note of the progress in Kosovo’s ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index, as it has moved upward 10 places since last year, considering it to be a positive development while acknowledging that this is attributable both to decreases in other countries’ scores and, more significantly, to the adoption of qualitative legislation, but that it still remains largely unsatisfactory; emphasises that gaining people’s trust requires not only legislative reforms but also visible results in investigating, prosecuting and convicting cases of corruption at all levels; regrets that Kosovo has lacked an anti-corruption strategy since 2019 and urges for more efforts to finalise it as a matter of priority; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption;

18. Expresses serious concern about systemic vulnerabilities in Kosovo’s judiciary, particularly regarding the independence of the justice system and respect for separation of powers; reiterates its concern about delays to trials and continued criticism by government officials of judicial decisions in individual cases; welcomes the fact that in December 2024, the government submitted its draft legislation on judicial reforms to the Venice Commission and that the first opinion was issued by the latter on 18 March 2025; calls on Kosovo to ensure that legislation governing the integrity and accountability of the judiciary is consistent with European standards and Venice Commission recommendations; calls on the Government of Kosovo to allocate adequate budget for the judicial system; welcomes the establishment of the Commercial Court, progress in the recruitment of new judges and prosecutors in a merit-based and transparent process, and an overall increase of transparency;

19. Welcomes the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the parliamentary elections and encourages their elected representatives to play an active role within the Kosovo legislative framework, in support of Kosovo’s European future; regrets, however, the boycott of parties representing Kosovo Serbs during the local elections in April 2023 and the withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions; expresses concern over Serbia’s interference in the parliamentary elections through Srpska Lista (SL);

20. Welcomes the implementation of the 2016 judgement of the Constitutional Court on the Visoki Dečani/Deçani Monastery land ownership by registering the monastery as the owner, in March 2024;

21. Welcomes the steady increase in organised crime sentences and the fact that the legal framework on the fight against organised crime is aligned with the EU acquis; emphasises the need for prosecution services and police to strengthen their joint action against criminal groups and networks; expresses concern about the security challenges in the north of Kosovo, particularly following the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023, which demanded significant police resources; emphasises the need to deepen cooperation in the field of combating drug trafficking; calls for further alignment regarding the fight against terrorism;

22. Welcomes the adoption of the strategy and action plan on control of small arms light weapons and explosives, as well as the high level of compliance with the rules of the UN Firearms Protocol;

23. Remains concerned over the slow implementation of the rule of law strategy and action plan;

24. Reaffirms its commitment to maintaining and strengthening its cooperation with the Kosovo Assembly and its members in support of democratic processes related to Kosovo’s European path by using Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives; believes that this partnership can be revitalised and further reinforced following the democratic elections held on 9 February 2025; encourages the active involvement and collaboration of all elected members of the newly formed Kosovo Assembly;

25. Condemns the serious security incidents in the north of Kosovo in late November 2024, the gravest act occurring near the village of Vragë in Zubin Potok, where explosive devices damaged critical infrastructure by targeting the main channel of the Ibër Lepenc system; expresses its support for Kosovo’s institutions in conducting a full investigation of these criminal actions so that the perpetrators will be brought to justice;

26. Commends the work of EULEX, which has been assisting Kosovo authorities in establishing sustainable and independent rule of law institutions;

Fundamental freedoms and human rights

27. Notes that Kosovo has the necessary institutional set-up for the promotion and protection of human rights; welcomes the adoption of the strategy for the protection and promotion of the rights of communities; emphasises, however, that human rights protection remains weak owing to the lack of legislative implementation, political will and limited human and financial resources and calls for strengthened enforcement and accountability mechanisms;

28. Acknowledges that Kosovo’s constitution is very progressive in terms of protection of minority rights; notes with regret that the petition signed by nearly 500 people who have historically self-identified as Bulgarian, which was registered at the Assembly of Kosovo in January 2023, has still not been considered and recommends that those rights be enshrined in law and ensured in practice; calls on Kosovo to ensure that all minorities recognised under the Law on protection of minority rights and members of their communities, are fully incorporated into the country’s constitution; calls on the Kosovo authorities to step up efforts to protect the rights of all minorities, including national communities, in particular vulnerable national communities, and to provide them equal opportunities and adequate representation in political and cultural life, public media, the administration and the judiciary, as well as prevent their assimilation and promote their integration into Kosovo’s society and strengthen activities to eliminate social and economic challenges of these national minorities;

29. Welcomes the increase in funding to shelters for victims of domestic violence and trafficking; notes that domestic violence remains the most common form of gender-based violence; expresses concerns that the system continues to fail in ensuring the effective prevention of domestic violence;

30. Regrets that the adoption of the draft Civil Code of Kosovo remains pending; highlights that the draft Civil Code addresses several important issues related to gender equality as a fundamental EU value, including enabling an equal share of joint marital property among women and men spouses; stresses the importance of ensuring rights for all people in Kosovo in the Civil Code to safeguard respect for constitutional rights and opportunities for the LGBTIQ community; expresses concern that women remain under-represented in senior political positions, specifically related to security and the dialogue, and emphasises the urgent need for their involvement in peacemaking and reconciliation processes, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; calls for more efforts to be made to improve the place of women in society;

31. Notes that the prison system broadly follows UN Standard Minimum Rules and calls for the better protection of the rights of prisoners, particularly female, minority and mentally ill prisoners; remains concerned that discriminatory language against women and LGBTIQ people persists, and calls on the authorities to create and implement a national gender strategy for research fields, such as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics; commends the participation of women in high-quality business and management training programmes, as well as in ICT related domains, facilitated by the instrument for pre-accession assistance funds; regrets that women from minority groups, particularly the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, face numerous forms of discrimination, particularly in education, employment and access to healthcare; expresses concerns that the central administration does not adequately represent minority communities, and the number of women in senior positions is low;

32. Regrets that the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has not yet been adopted; expresses concerns that there is insufficient alignment between Kosovo’s legislation and the EU acquis on the rights of people with disabilities, who face discrimination and barriers to accessing social services;

33. Welcomes Kosovo’s consistent improvement in its position in the 2024 Liberal Democracy Index and Electoral Democracy Index, as prepared by the Varieties of Democracy Institute, which measures the rule of law, checks and balances, civil liberties, and free and fair elections;

34. Takes note of Kosovo’s pluralistic media environment while awaiting the decision of the Constitutional Court on the main media law and underlines the role of the IMC, whose independence in decision-making needs to be strictly ensured and full functioning restored; regrets, however, the decline in Kosovo’s media freedom, as evidenced by its drop from the 56th to the 75th place in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; reaffirms that media pluralism and transparency are prerequisites for EU accession; calls for greater transparency on media ownership and financing with a view to enhancing media independence and pluralism; emphasises the need for robust measures to protect journalists from harassment and intimidation, and to ensure the independence of media regulatory bodies; notes the concerns raised by civil society about the allegedly politically motivated election of the Chair of the IMC; urges the Kosovo authorities to further revise the Law on the IMC in order to include the recommendations made by the Council of Europe, thus aligning the national law with EU standards and practices; recommends increased support for independent media outlets and fact-checking organisations in Kosovo, recognising their crucial role in countering disinformation and providing accurate information to the public; encourages the EU to provide technical and financial assistance to these entities; encourages the Kosovo authorities to request tailor-made Technical Assistance and Information Exchange expert missions bodies; calls for the adoption of the law on Radio Television of Kosovo and the law on the protection of journalists’ sources;

35. Expresses concern over the recent cyberattack targeting Kosovo’s digital infrastructure; urges the Kosovo Government to reinforce its capacities to combat foreign interference and disinformation, particularly those originating from Serbian nationalist outlets and Russia, aimed at destabilising the region and undermining the European integration of the Western Balkans, by developing comprehensive strategies that include public awareness campaigns also combating disinformation undermining women’s participation in public life, strengthening cybersecurity and related infrastructure, fostering collaboration with international partners, most notably the European Union, to protect its digital economy, public services and national security, and addressing disinformation campaigns and hybrid threats that aim to destabilise the country and undermine its European perspective; encourages the integration of media literacy programs into Kosovo’s educational curriculum to equip citizens with the skills necessary to identify and counteract disinformation;

36. Commends the fact that Kosovo provided shelter and asylum to journalists from Ukraine and Afghanistan;

37. Expresses serious concern about the significant increase in attacks against journalists and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP cases), including by government officials; calls on the authorities to advance their work on anti-SLAPP legislation in line with the new EU Directive 2024/1069(7); calls on Kosovo to work actively to secure the ability of journalists to carry out their work and to ensure full freedom for the media to operate independently; underlines the need to stop all forms of violence;

38. Welcomes Kosovo’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a very crucial and positive role in the reform process; encourages the Kosovo Government to enhance its cooperation with civil society, in particular with women’s rights organisations, on decision-making and to make more use of the Government Council for Cooperation with Civil Society for building collaborative relationships and genuinely implicating civil society in a transparent legislative process from an early stage onwards; stresses the importance of increasing accountability and transparency in relation to public funding for civil society organisations; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress;

39. Regrets the lack of a clear plan for engaging Kosovo Serbs in the north and that initiatives to involve the Serb community in Kosovo’s political, social and economic structures remain very limited; reiterates its call to improve the internal dialogue and genuinely and directly engage with the independent civil society organisations of Kosovo Serbs, in particular in the north, with the aim of building trust, facilitating the daily life of Kosovo Serbs and successfully integrating them;

Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

40. Commends Kosovo’s engagement in a number of regional cooperation initiatives and encourages it to enhance its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes; commends Kosovo on its constructive approach and active engagement in regional cooperation and trade facilitation that led to the unblocking of the Central European Free Trade Agreement;

41. Calls on Serbia to open all wartime archives and grant access to the former Yugoslav Secret Service (UDBA) and Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service (KOS) files, ensuring their return to respective governments upon request; emphasises the need to open these archives region-wide to investigate communist-era crimes and strengthen democracy, accountability and institutions in the Western Balkans;

42. Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

43. Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Kosovo and Serbia in order to achieve a comprehensive legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

44. Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

45. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

46. Condemns all actions that endanger stability and jeopardise the reconciliation process, including the tensions in the north of Kosovo and provocations by Serbian state-sponsored groups and illegal armed formations, and urges the European Union to take a stronger stance against external interference in Kosovo’s internal affairs; emphasises that both sides must fully implement all agreements reached and avoid unilateral actions that could escalate tensions; calls on the Kosovo police to ensure that they fully abide by all rule of law and human rights requirements, and to guarantee that a multi-ethnic and inclusive police force, fully in line with legal requirements, is deployed in the north of Kosovo; recalls the shared responsibility of all political representatives and all communities in Kosovo for upholding peace, security and the rule of law;

47. Welcomes the establishment of the Joint Commission on Missing Persons in December 2024 and calls for swift progress in implementing the May 2023 Political Declaration on Missing Persons; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to refrain from politicising this humanitarian issue and to step up their efforts in implementing the declaration as part of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and to establish cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia;

48. Welcomes the recent agreements in the framework of the Berlin Process;

49. Welcomes Kosovo’s decision to remove restrictions on the entry of Serbian finished products at the Merdare border crossing;

50. Welcomes the presence of the Kosovo Force and its role in building and maintaining a safe and secure environment and in developing a stable and peaceful Kosovo on the path towards Euro-Atlantic integration; recalls the importance of the mission for the ongoing development of the Kosovo Security Force through the provision of advice, training and capacity building;

Socio-economic reforms

51. Welcomes Kosovo’s active engagement in the implementation of the new growth plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to deepen EU-related reforms and reduce the socio-economic gap between EU Member States and the Western Balkan countries; welcomes the adoption of Kosovo’s Reform Agenda and recalls that Kosovo (as well as Serbia) needs to show improved commitment to the EU-facilitated Dialogue in order to access the resources;

52. Welcomes the progress achieved by Kosovo in developing a functioning market economy and encourages Kosovo to implement the necessary structural reforms to address fiscal challenges, while ensuring adequate labour protection, fair wages, and improved working conditions in line with EU legislation;

53. Reiterates its calls on the Commission to develop a regional strategy to address the persistent youth unemployment and brain drain by tackling the skills mismatch between the education system and the labour market, improving the quality of teaching, and ensuring adequate funding for active labour market measures and vocational training schemes, along with adequate childcare and pre-school education facilities;

54. Welcomes the fact that Kosovo’s cybercrime legislation is broadly aligned with the EU acquis; notes Kosovo’s limited progress in the digital transformation of public services; emphasises the need for it to align with EU digital legislation as well as with the needs of its people, specifically with the European Electronic Communications Code, the EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2)(8), the EU toolbox for 5G security, and the Digital Services Act(9) and the Digital Markets Act(10); notes that Kosovo’s economy remains highly dependent on imports and stresses the need for economic diversification to enhance competitiveness and sustainability, particularly in the context of deeper integration into EU markets;

55. Regrets that the draft law on textbooks, presented in 2022, is still pending final adoption in the Kosovo Assembly; calls on Kosovo to finalise the implementation of the new curricular framework for basic education, complete the revision of current textbooks, provide sustainable training to teachers, and systematically apply quality assurance mechanisms at all education levels;

56. Urges Kosovo to ensure better access to quality healthcare services; notes that healthcare expenditure remains the second lowest in the region, and calls for a comprehensive healthcare reform to address the needs of all citizens, especially in rural and underserved areas;

57. Notes with concern that access to social services, particularly for vulnerable groups, worsened with the government’s closure of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, which was done without transparent consultation with civil society and other stakeholders and contributed to significant confusion; calls for better, evidence-based budgeting to improve social services, particularly for survivors of gender-based violence in accordance with the new legal framework;

58. Calls on Kosovo to provide equal and non-discriminatory state education in minority languages;

59. Reiterates the need to reach out to young people from the Serb majority municipalities and to integrate them in the socio-economic structures of the country;

Energy, environment, sustainable development and connectivity

60. Notes that Kosovo has made some progress on the security of energy supply but remains heavily reliant on outdated, highly polluting power plants, posing serious health and environmental risks; notes that Kosovo needs to ensure the time-efficient implementation of its energy programme for 2022-2025 to meet its ambitious targets and reduce its dependence on fossil fuels; calls for the EU to step up and prioritise its efforts to help Kosovo overcome its air pollution problems; notes that Kosovo’s new energy strategy does not promote the construction of hydropower plants due to their harmful environmental impact, in particular because of the water scarcity in the country;

61. Highlights the need for comprehensive infrastructure development in Kosovo to facilitate the reduction of emissions from public transport and the expansion of electrified transport; stresses that improving accessibility and ensuring compatibility with the EU transport network must remain a priority;

62. Welcomes the agreement at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of data roaming charges and further reductions leading to prices close to domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entrance into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

63. Urges Kosovo to enhance compliance with emission ceilings, improve the integration of environmental considerations into sectoral policies and adopt necessary measures for pollution, soil and water contamination control and waste management, in line with EU and international standards and commitments; urges Kosovo to improve comprehensive environmental impact assessments and to integrate sustainability measures into infrastructure planning; calls on Kosovo to increase the protected areas in the country and to improve instruments and measures for their protection with a view to safeguarding biodiversity, including key habitats of the critically endangered Balkan lynx; encourages Kosovo to intensify and speed up collaborative efforts with its neighbouring countries to designate transboundary protected areas and establish coherent transboundary management plans;

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64. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Kosovo.

(1)	OJ L 71, 16.3.2016, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2016/342/oj.
(2)	OJ L 195, 27.7.2017, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2017/1388/oj.
(3)	OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
(4)	OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
(5)	OJ L 146, 6.6.2023, p.22, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2023/1095/oj.
(6)	OJ L 110, 25.4.2023, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/850/oj.
(7)	Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj).
(8)	Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj).
(9)	Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
(10)	Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 13, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Serbia – P10_TA(2025)0093 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

Source: European Parliament

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

– having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

– having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

– having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and the Implementation Annex thereto,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)(2),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

– having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

– having regard to its resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

– having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

– having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

– having regard to the agreement on free movement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, and to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

– having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

– having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001 and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 and 27 October 2023 on Kosovo and Serbia,

– having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

– having regard to the European Court of Human Rights order to Serbia of 29 April 2025 to refrain from using sonic devices for crowd control,

– having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

– having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

– having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, signed on 19 July 2024,

– having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(4),

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 19 October 2023 on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo(5), and that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections(6),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0072/2025),

A. whereas enlargement is one of the most successful EU foreign policy instruments and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

B. whereas according to the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must adhere to the values of the Union in order to be able to join it;

C. whereas democracy and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

D. whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations;

E. whereas the Fourth Opinion on Serbia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, adopted on 26 June 2019, criticised Serbia’s delays in fully implementing education rights for minorities;

F. whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right and Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

G. whereas in line with Chapter 23 of the acquis, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

H. whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits, including their respect for and unwavering commitment to shared European rights and values and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy;

I. whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has clearly condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and voted alongside the EU in the UN, even though it has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024 while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – achieved 100 % alignment;

J. whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create an anti-Western rhetoric; whereas the final report of the OSCE/ODHIR on the early parliamentary elections held on 17 December 2023 pointed out several procedural deficiencies, as well as the use of harsh rhetoric and the presence of consistent bias in the media that gave an unbalanced advantage to the ruling party; whereas the issues identified in that report need to be assessed thoroughly and promptly; whereas as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Combating Cybercrime 2019-2023 and the relevant action plans in September 2018; whereas the strategy and the relevant action plans were not renewed after December 2023; whereas Serbia did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures in reaction to cyberattacks in 2023 and 2024;

K. whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

L. whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Union;

M. whereas Serbia recognises the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimean peninsula and the Donbas region;

N. whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59,7 % of Serbia’s total trade;

O. whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere in and threaten neighbouring sovereign states and undermine Serbia’s European future; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives; whereas disinformation often originates from a false or misleading statement by a political figure, which is then reported by state-owned media and subsequently amplified on social media, often with an intention to undermine political opponents and democratic principles;

P. whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of political leaders from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’;

Commitment to EU accession

1. Notes Serbia’s stated commitment to EU membership as its strategic goal and its ambition to align fully with the EU acquis by the end of 2026; urges Serbia to deliver quickly and decisively on essential reforms, especially in cluster 1, for this very ambitious commitment to be perceived as realistic, genuine and meaningful; stresses the need for Serbia to seriously and categorically demonstrate that it is strategically oriented towards the EU, by showing strong political will and consistency in the implementation of EU-related reforms and by communicating objectively and unambiguously with its citizens about the EU, Serbia’s European path and the required reforms;

2. Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the current geopolitical context and for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; outlines that, owing to its geopolitical position, the country has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempts to establish a sphere of influence undermining the sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

3. Acknowledges Serbia’s good level of preparation with regard to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline and the Commission’s assessment that cluster 3 is technically ready for opening but notes with concern that there has been limited or no overall progress in meeting the benchmarks for EU membership across negotiating chapters, with particular shortcomings in critical areas such as the rule of law, media freedom, public administration reform, and alignment with EU policies, particularly the EU’s foreign policy;

4. Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31, as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly due to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding CFSP alignment; calls on Serbia to reverse this trend and to demonstrate positive steps towards full alignment; notes that Serbia’s rate of compliance with EU statements and declarations is increasing but remains at only 61 %; welcomes Serbia’s continued active participation in and positive contribution to EU military crisis management missions and operations;

5. Welcomes Serbia’s humanitarian support for Ukraine and takes note of the sale of ammunition to the value of EUR 800 million for use by Ukraine in a mutually beneficial agreement; notes that Serbia has aligned with some of the EU’s positions regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; regrets, however, that Serbia still does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the EU to reconsider the extent of the financial assistance provided by the EU to Serbia in the event of continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures and the CFSP; calls on Serbia to swiftly align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia and Belarus, systematically and without delay;

6. Stresses the importance of implementing sanctions against Russia for the security of Europe as a whole; deplores Serbia’s continued close relations with Russia, raising concerns about its strategic orientation; reiterates its calls on the Serbian authorities to enhance transparency regarding the role and activities of the so-called Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis and to immediately terminate all military cooperation with Russia; notes Serbia’s decision to support the UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine three years after the full-scale invasion; regrets President Vučić’s immediate verbal retraction of Serbia’s UN vote, calling it a ‘mistake’; considers that maintaining privileged relations with the Kremlin regime undermines not only Serbia’s credibility as a candidate country but also the trust of its European partners and the future of EU-Serbia relations;

7. Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of a long-standing anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric from the government-controlled media as well as some government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

8. Deplores the continued spread of disinformation, including about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the spillover effects of these actions in other countries in the region; calls on the Serbian authorities to combat disinformation and calls for the EU to enhance cooperation with Serbia to strengthen democratic resilience and counter hybrid threats;

9. Notes Serbia’s progress on aligning with EU visa policy and calls for full alignment, in particular with regard to those non-EU countries presenting a security threat to the EU, including the threat of cyberattacks; welcomes the agreement signed on 25 June 2024 between the EU and Serbia on operational cooperation on border management with Frontex, highlighting the need to act in line with fundamental rights and international standards;

10. Reiterates that the overall pace of the accession negotiations should depend on tangible progress on the fundamentals, the rule of law and a commitment to the shared European rights and values as well as to the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is to be conducted in good faith so that it results in a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, as well as alignment with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the fundamentals;

11. Repeats its concern regarding the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia against the backdrop of the country’s year-long rollback on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission to use clearer language, including on the highest level, towards Serbia, consistently addressing significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values;

12. Calls on the Serbian Government to promote the role and benefits of EU accession and EU-funded projects and reforms among the Serbian population;

Democracy and the rule of law

13. Notes the ongoing challenges in ensuring judicial independence, including undue influence and political pressure on the judiciary; expresses concern about the failure to implement safeguards preventing political interference in judicial appointments and disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors; calls on Serbia to ensure that the High Judicial Council, the High Prosecutorial Council and the Government and Parliament of Serbia effectively and proactively defend judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy;

14. Stresses the importance of adopting the Law on the Judicial Academy and the Venice Commission opinion and making necessary judicial appointments to reduce existing vacancies and improve the overall effectiveness of the judicial system; notes that the delay in adopting this law has stalled key judicial reforms necessary for alignment with EU standards; calls for the draft law to be amended following transparent consultation with all relevant stakeholders, with a view to ensuring the independence and control mechanisms of the institution in order to contribute to overall judicial independence;

15. Notes that limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption despite the adoption of a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; calls on Serbia to adopt and begin implementing the accompanying anti-corruption action plan and to establish an effective monitoring and coordination mechanism to track progress, in line with international standards; expresses concern that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’, and that strong political will is required to effectively address corruption as well as to mount a robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption; notes that Serbia ranks 105th in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, well below the EU average; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that results have still not been delivered in cases of high public interest, after several years, such as in the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica, Savamala and Belivuk; calls on Serbia to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and protected from political interference; calls on the Government of Serbia to sign the Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and to fully align its legal framework on police cooperation and organised crime with that of the EU;

16. Welcomes the more pluralistic composition of the new parliament, with a broader representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities; notes that the early election and the corresponding break in the functioning of the government and parliament have impeded progress on reforms; notes the frequent pattern of early elections, a permanent campaign mode and long delays in forming governments, as well as the disrupted work of the national parliament, including the absence of government question-time sessions, the lack of discussion on the reports of independent institutions, and the more frequent use of urgent procedures, which lead to a lack of parliamentary legislative oversight and legitimacy and do not contribute to the effective democratic governance of the country;

17. Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025, and of the subsequent election of the new government led by Đuro Macut, appointed on 16 April 2025; takes note of the resumption of the work of the National Assembly on 4 March 2025, after a pause of three months, and condemns all the acts of violence that occurred on this occasion;

18. Reiterates its readiness to support the National Assembly and the members thereof in the democratic processes related to Serbia’s European path, including the proper functioning of the parliament in accordance with its rules of procedure, by using the European Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives and by supporting increased parliamentary oversight of the EU accession process and reforms;

19. Takes note, with deep concern, of the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the December 2023 elections; notes that in April 2024, the National Assembly formed a working group for the improvement of the election process but that, by the end of the year, it had not agreed on any legal measures to improve the election process; notes that two out of three representatives of civil society left the working group in February 2025; notes that steps were taken in the first months of 2025 on amending the Law on Unified Voter Registry but that there is no consensus among political and civil society actors on the content; calls on all parliamentary groups in the National Assembly to decide on the implementation of ODIHR recommendations, with the agreement of all groups; calls for equal treatment of all members of parliament in the work of the National Assembly, consistent and effective implementation of the parliamentary Code of Conduct and the impartial sanctioning of breaches of parliamentary integrity;

20. Is concerned about the increasing role of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and foreign cyber operations and interference in Serbia’s democratic election processes;

21. Stresses the critical importance of ensuring the independence of key institutions, including media regulators such as the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM); regrets the delay in the election of the new members; regrets the irregularities in the nomination process; notes the withdrawal of several candidates from the selection in February 2025, who justified their decision on the basis of these irregularities; deeply regrets the fact that the REM neglected its legal obligations to scrutinise the conduct of the 2023 election campaign in the media in a timely manner, to report on its findings and to sanction media outlets that breached the law, spread hate speech or violated journalistic standards; notes, with concern, the absence of pluralistic political views in the nationwide media; notes that the REM should actively promote media pluralism and transparency regarding the ownership structures of media outlets and independence from foreign actors;

22. Notes that the REM awarded four national frequencies to channels that have a history of violating journalistic standards, including using hate speech and misleading the public, not complying with warnings issued by the REM, spreading disinformation and supporting the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war in Ukraine; deeply regrets the fact that REM has not issued the fifth national licence and calls for it to be awarded through a transparent and impartial process without unnecessary delay and in compliance with international media freedom standards as soon as a new REM council is elected; calls for the Serbian Government to scrap and re-start the process of electing new members, in line with Serbian law and international media freedom standards;

Fundamental freedoms and human rights

23. Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 16 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024; calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities, to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

24. Regrets the delayed response and accountability of the Serbian authorities, the slow investigation process and the lack of transparency in the aftermath of the tragedy, which were partially addressed in the face of escalating public pressure;

25. Expresses deep concern about the systemic issues highlighted by the student protests and various other protests in Serbia, such as issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, corruption, environmental protection, institutional and financial transparency, especially in relation to infrastructure projects, and accountability; regrets the fact that the government missed the opportunity to meet the demands of the students and of the citizens who support the students in good faith; affirms that the students’ demands align with reforms that Serbia is expected to implement on its European path;

26. Underlines the importance of freedom of speech and assembly; calls on the authorities of Serbia to ensure the protection of those participating in the peaceful protests; takes note of the mass protests on 15 March 2025, the largest in the modern history of Serbia; calls for an impartial investigation of the claims that unlawful technology of crowd control was used against the protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;

27. Deplores the continuing violence against students, including the recent incident at the Faculty of Sports and Physical Education building in Novi Sad, in which at least five people were injured as a result of the police storming the building accompanied by the Dean, Patrik Drid;

28. Condemns, in the strongest terms, the misuse of personal data from public registries to retaliate against peaceful protesters; calls on the prosecution office in Serbia to file charges against all persons who physically attacked and incited violence against the participants of the demonstrations; is deeply concerned about any act of violence; is carefully following developments as regards arrests of protesters and legal proceedings that have been opened against them; is concerned about the reports that the security services were involved in intimidation and surveillance of the protesters; condemns the language used by the Serbian authorities inciting violence against students and other protesters; notes that student activists have faced legal harassment, intimidation and excessive use of force by the authorities; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into allegations of violence used against demonstrators and police misconduct during protests; urges the diplomatic missions of the EU and the Member States to continue to monitor closely the ongoing legal cases relating to the protests;

29. Is deeply concerned about the increasing political and financial pressure on primary and secondary school teachers, as well as university professors, who were deprived of their salaries for taking part in the collective action to support students’ demands; deplores in this context the unacceptable legal proceedings and media smear campaign against the Rector of the University of Belgrade;

30. Is deeply alarmed that the Serbian authorities have engaged in widespread illegal surveillance practices using spyware against activists, journalists and members of civil society, as indicated in the recent reports by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation; urges the Government of Serbia to immediately cease the use of advanced surveillance technology against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and calls on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible; calls on the European Commission, in the light of this, to follow up on these incidents, address these issues with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation into these matters;

31. Deplores the alleged illegal wiretapping and detention of five activists from the opposition Movement of Free Citizens (PSG) and a student from the STAV organisation in March 2025, and the arrest warrants issued for other STAV activists; condemns the use of the case by the propaganda media and the unfounded extension of the detention; calls on the Serbian authorities to release Marija Vasić, Lazar Dinić, Mladen Cvijetić, Lado Jovović, Srđan Đurić and Davor Stefanović from detention;

32. Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in that context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s border; notes that anti-EU narratives are being manifested in decreasing support for EU integration in Serbian society and in a strengthening of the presence of foreign autocratic actors in the country;

33. Calls on the Serbian authorities to restore citizens’ confidence in state institutions by granting transparency and accountability; encourages all political and social actors to engage in an inclusive, substantive dialogue aimed at fulfilling EU-related reforms;

34. Notes that media freedom in Serbia has deteriorated further, as evidenced by Serbia’s drop to 98th place in the 2024 Reporter Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; urges Serbia to improve and protect media professionalism, diversity and media pluralism, and to promote quality investigative journalism, the highest ethical journalistic standards, through respecting journalistic codes of conduct, and media literacy; recalls the importance of the plurality and transparency of the media, including on aspects related to ownership and state financing, most notably through better involvement of the REM; recalls that the concentration of media ownership can have adverse effects on the freedom of the media and the professionalism of reporting; reaffirms that, as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia needs to align with the EU in matters of strategic importance, such as countering FIMI; calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the provisions included in the Digital Services Act(7) and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising(8); encourages cooperation between Serbia, the European External Action Service and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in tackling disinformation; expects the authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists;

35. Expresses its deep concerns about reported cases of abusive attacks, digital surveillance and harassment against journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations, most recently a police raid on 25 February 2025 on four leading civil society organisations, ostensibly regarding their misuse of US Agency for International Development funds; strongly condemns persistent smear campaigns and intimidation against civil society in Serbia, including false allegations about plots to overthrow the government with foreign support;

36. Expresses concern that civil society organisations in Serbia face increasing challenges, including restrictive conditions, funding constraints, police raids and other forms of intimidation from state authorities; underlines the importance of a framework that enables local, vibrant civil society organisations to operate freely and participate in policymaking, including EU integration processes, in inclusive and meaningful ways; regrets that Serbia currently does not provide a framework that enables its lively and pluralistic civil society organisations, particularly those engaged in democracy support and electoral observation, to operate freely and participate in policymaking in inclusive and meaningful ways; expresses concern about recent raids of the offices of civil society organisations; calls for investigations into all attacks and smear campaigns against civil society organisations and for the improved transparency of public funding;

37. Condemns the political pressure exerted on universities and other research institutions through a hasty government decree that interferes with the academic freedom of researchers and cuts their salaries; condemns the vilification of professors, researchers and other academic staff in pro-government media; deplores the increasing use of temporary contracts for teachers and other civil servants as a political tool to exert pressure and control;

38. Urges the Serbian authorities to expand the availability of public broadcasting services in all minority languages across the country, ensuring equal access to media for all communities, while drawing on the best practice of the region of Vojvodina;

39. Expresses its deep concern about the draft law submitted to the Serbian Parliament on 29 November 2024, which proposes the establishment of a Russian-style foreign agents law; reminds Serbian legislators that civil society organisations and journalists play a key role in a healthy democratic society; reiterates that such legislation is incompatible with the values of the EU; notes that multiple civil society organisations suspended their cooperation with the legislative and executive branches of the government in February 2025;

40. Expresses grave concern about the increasing political interference in heritage protection in Serbia, including the removal of protected status from cultural monuments and the disregard for legal procedures governing their preservation, as in the case of the Generalštab Modernist Complex;

41. Calls on Serbia to fight disinformation, including manipulative anti-EU narratives and, in particular, to end its own state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; condemns the opening of an RT office in Belgrade, the launch of RT’s online news service in Serbian and the continued operation of the Russian online news service Sputnik Srbija, which is used to propagate pro-Russian narratives and misinformation across the Western Balkans region; urges the Serbian authorities to counter hybrid threats and fully align with the Council’s decision on the suspension of the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT; is deeply concerned about the spread of disinformation about the Russian aggression against Ukraine; calls on Serbia and the Commission to bolster infrastructure to fight disinformation and other hybrid threats; condemns the increasing influence of Russian and Chinese state-sponsored disinformation in Serbia, including the dissemination of anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives;

42. Takes note of the adoption of the national strategy for equality and the strategy for prevention of and protection against discrimination, and calls for their full implementation and for further alignment with European standards; urges the Serbian authorities to address the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), with a view to improving compliance with the Istanbul Convention ratified by Serbia; notes with concern the temporary suspension of the implementation of the Law on Gender Equality by the Constitutional Court; expresses concern about the persistent lack of adequate support for organisations promoting women’s rights and gender equality;

43. Deeply deplores the demographic decline in Serbia, which is being exacerbated by negative net migration due to economic hardship and political persecution; stresses that it is mainly young, educated and productive people who are being forced to leave the country, as well as those pressured and threatened on account of their political views, including Dijana Hrka, the mother of one of the victims of the Novi Sad railway station tragedy, who fears for her safety after being put under pressure by SNS supporters;

44. Stresses that the Serbian authorities must take concrete measures to uphold and strengthen the respect for the rights of the child in the country, including by ratifying the third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopting a national action plan for the rights of the child, adopting a new strategy on violence against children, given the expiry of the previous framework, and establishing a national framework to protect children from abuse and neglect;

45. Welcomes the fact that Belgrade Pride 2024 parade, the biggest in Serbia so far, passed off peacefully, though being protected by a high-profile police presence;

46. Highlights the need for strong commitment to safeguarding the rights of national minorities, ensuring their full representation at all levels of government, preserving their cultural identity through the use of their respective languages and by meeting their educational needs, freedom of expression and access to information, and to actively pursuing investigations into hate-motivated crimes as an irreplaceable part of common European values; regrets the fact that almost all national minorities are protected only formally; expresses concerns about the practice of pro forma representation of national minorities who are under government control; calls on Serbia to protect and promote the cultural heritage and traditions of its national minorities, in particular to create a positive atmosphere for education in minority languages, including by providing sufficient numbers of teachers, textbooks and additional materials, and deplores the violation of minority rights in this area; calls on Serbia to refrain from exploiting the national identities of national minorities that create division within these communities, and strongly condemns recorded cases of hate speech against some of them; notes the considerable delay in drafting a new action plan for the realisation of national minority rights and stresses the urgent need for Serbia to finalise and implement it promptly; highlights the need for the new action plan to fully incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

47. Expresses concerns about the significant decline in the population of certain minority groups, including the Bulgarian minority; calls on Serbia to ensure the right to use names and language specific to minority groups, including women within the Bulgarian community; notes with concern that not all school textbooks have been translated into Bulgarian; calls on the Serbian Government to ensure reciprocal equal rights for the Croatian minority in Serbia as the Serbian minority enjoys in Croatia, in particular with regard to ensuring their reciprocal representation at all levels of government, including regional and local levels; reiterates its concern regarding the restrictive and arbitrary enforcement of the Law on Permanent and Temporary Residence related to the passivation of address of thousands of Albanians in the south of Serbia; emphasises the situation of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia, which is not officially recognised by the state as a traditional church;

48. Regrets the attempts by the Serbian authorities to undermine the national identity of communities within the country; expresses concern, in this context, about the promotion of narratives such as that of the ‘Shopi nation’, which seek to erase the existence of the Bulgarian community and deny its historical roots and cultural heritage; regrets the searches carried out by the Serbian authorities at the Bosilegrad Cultural Centre and the initiation of pre-trial proceedings for ‘ethnic hatred’ against activists from non-governmental organisations;

49. Calls on Serbia to refrain from distorting historical events, such as the narrative surrounding the so-called Surdulica massacre, which only serve to spread division and hatred against minorities and neighbouring countries, which is incompatible with EU membership;

Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

50. Reiterates that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process; calls on Serbia to stop restrictions on entry for regional civil society activists and artists as such practices undermine regional dialogue and cooperation; reaffirms, furthermore, the importance of the stability of south-eastern European countries and their resilience against foreign interference in internal democratic processes; stresses the importance of Serbia developing good neighbourly relations, implementing bilateral agreements and resolving outstanding bilateral issues with its neighbours; notes Serbia’s participation in regional initiatives and its active involvement in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Common Regional Market; underlines the fact that respect for national minority rights is an essential condition of Serbia’s advancement along its European path;

51. Calls for historical reconciliation and the overcoming of discrimination and prejudices from the past; deplores the recent inflammatory rhetoric by the government, targeting neighbouring states that did not support the opening of cluster 3 for Serbia;

52. Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from influencing the domestic politics of its neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including regarding the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and questioning Bosnia and Herzegovina’s court decisions;

53. Urges Serbia to step up its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes, in particular when it comes to missing persons, who account for 1 782 people in Croatia, 7 608 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 595 people in Kosovo; calls on the Serbian authorities to achieve justice for victims by recognising and respecting court verdicts on war crimes, fighting against impunity for wartime crimes, investigating cases of missing persons, investigating grave sites, and supporting domestic prosecutors in bringing perpetrators to justice, which requires the cooperation of other parties too; strongly condemns the widespread public denials of international verdicts for war crimes, including the denial of the Srebrenica genocide;

54. Calls on the judicial authorities in Serbia to ensure compliance with the standards of fair trial and satisfaction of justice for victims in all war crime cases; calls for the denial of war crimes and the glorification of war criminals to be included in the Criminal Code, with a view to prosecuting any form of denial of war crimes determined by the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice;

55. Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish a regional commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

56. Reiterates its position on the importance of opening and publishing wartime archives, and reiterates its call for the former Yugoslav archives to be opened and, in particular, for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav secret service (UDBA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army Counterintelligence Service (KOS), and for the files to be returned to the respective governments if they so request;

57. Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

58. Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo in order to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

59. Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

60. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

Socio-economic reforms

61. Welcomes Serbia’s steady progress towards developing a functioning market economy with positive GDP growth and increased foreign investment in some sectors; takes note of that fact that Serbia received its first-ever investment-grade credit rating; underlines the fact that the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, the largest source of foreign direct investment and by far the largest donor; reiterates that the financial assistance, which is of great benefit to Serbia, is conditional on the strengthening of democratic principles and alignment with the CFSP and other EU policies; reiterates the need for more substantial reforms in the labour market, education and public administration, including to address social inequalities; expresses concern about the scale and scope of intergovernmental contracts awarded that are exempt from the current legislative framework on public procurement; regrets, however, the fact that public debt as a percentage of GDP remains well above the eastern European average;

62. Is concerned about the investment in Serbia by Russia and China and their growing influence on the political and economic processes in the region;

63. Calls on Serbia to intensify efforts and increase investment in the socio-economic development of its border regions to address depopulation and ensure that the residents have access to essential services, including professional opportunities, healthcare and education; underlines the potential of the IPA III cross-border cooperation programmes as a key tool to promote long-term sustainable regional growth;

64. Welcomes Serbia’s active engagement in the implementation of the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans; takes note of the fact that Serbia adopted its Reform Agenda on 3 October 2024; believes that embracing the opportunities of the growth plan would further enhance the Serbian economy, which over the past three years benefited from more than EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance under IPA III; believes that the EU funding should better support the democratic reforms of the country; calls, in that context, for the relevant EU funding, including from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures, as well as towards independent media and civil society organisations, in order to support their critical work, in particular in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US donors; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and its Western Balkan counterparts in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its power on IPA III and Western Balkan Facility funds in the recipient countries; urges the Serbian authorities to step up efforts to communicate clearly to citizens the benefits of the EU funds and to improve their visibility;

65. Regrets the lack of public consultation during the adoption of the Serbian Reform Agenda; calls for more effective oversight of the EU funding programmes and projects;

66. Advocates increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; emphasises the role of the EU in facilitating such collaborative efforts; calls for the continuation and further reinforcement of the IPA regional cybersecurity programme;

67. Recognises the important role of Serbia’s business community in advancing economic convergence with the EU, including through the opportunities offered by and in the implementation of the growth plan as a sustainable alternative to Russian and Chinese investment in the country; welcomes the business community’s contribution to advancing socio-economic relations in the Western Balkans;

68. Takes note of Serbia’s business community’s efforts in advocating for the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU’s single market as a concrete step towards full EU membership; calls for clear, measurable actions and well-defined roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the Common Regional Market action plan, as a key driver for the region’s successful accession to the EU’s single market;

Energy, the environment, sustainable development and connectivity

69. Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the transposition of relevant environmental and climate acquis and to ensure the proper application of environmental protection standards, including by significantly enhancing its administrative and technical capacities at all levels of government, notably on waste management legislation and the adoption of the Climate Change Adaptation Programme and the National Energy and Climate Plan; urges the Serbian authorities to improve the transparency and environmental impact assessment of all investment, including from China and Russia;

70. Reiterates its regret regarding the lack of action on the pollution of the Dragovishtitsa river by mines operating in the region and the detrimental effect on the health of the local people and the environment;

71. Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the decarbonisation of its energy system and to enable effective enforcement of pollution reduction regulations related to thermal power plants;

72. Emphasises the need for further progress in transboundary cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially with regard to transboundary road infrastructure; urges Serbia to begin implementing the activities outlined in the memorandum of understanding on environmental protection cooperation with Bulgaria;

73. Takes note of the EU-Serbia memorandum of understanding launching a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, in view of the European energy transition and in line with the highest environmental standards; recalls that dialogue with the affected populations, the scientific community and civil society should be at the centre of any such strategic partnership;

74. Welcomes the agreement reached at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of roaming charges for data and further reductions leading to prices close to the domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entering into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

75. Reiterates that it is important for Serbia to continue diversifying its energy supply, to be able to break away from its dependency on Russia; takes note of the sanctions announced by the United States against Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), a subsidiary of the Russian Gazprom; welcomes the completion of the gas interconnector between Serbia and Bulgaria (IBS) in December 2023; regrets the postponement of the launching of the IBS’s commercial operation; calls for the swift finalisation of the permitting process to ensure its full operability in compliance with the energy community acquis; notes that Serbia is taking steps to introduce a carbon tax by 2027 as a step towards aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

76. Notes that all chapters in cluster 4 on the green agenda and sustainable connectivity have been opened; notes the adoption of the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment as a positive step towards environmental protection in Serbia, while expressing its regret that the new law fails to align fully with the relevant EU Directive 2014/52/EU(9), since it still leaves the opportunity for significant projects to advance without comprehensive environmental scrutiny; reiterates the need to designate and rigorously manage protected areas, particularly those identified as Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas (IBAs); calls for special attention to be given to critical sites where enforcement against poaching needs to be improved;

o
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77. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.

(1)	OJ L 278, 18.10.2013, p. 16, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2013/490/oj.
(2)	OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
(3)	OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
(4)	OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
(5)	OJ C, C/2024/2654, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2654/oj.
(6)	OJ C, C/2024/6339, 7.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6339/oj.
(7)	Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
(8)	Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).
(9)	Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/52/oj).

MIL OSI Europe News –

May 13, 2025

MIL-OSI Security: Bay Roberts — Bay Roberts RCMP investigates theft of vehicle, seeks public’s assistance

Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Bay Roberts RCMP is investigating the theft of a vehicle that occurred in Bay Roberts sometime between May 9 and May 11, 2025.

The vehicle, a 2016 silver Hyundai Tucson with NL licence plate JEF 737, was stolen from a parking lot near L.T. Stick Drive. A stock image of the vehicle is attached.

The investigation is continuing.

Anyone having information about this crime or the current location of the vehicle is asked to contact Bay Roberts RCMP at 709-786-2118. To remain anonymous, contact Crime Stoppers: #SayItHere 1-800-222-TIPS (8477), visit www.nlcrimestoppers.com or use the P3Tips app.

MIL Security OSI –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Senators Marshall, Hoeven, and Boozman Lead Effort to Bolster Crop Insurance and Reduce Costs for Farmers

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Kansas Roger Marshall
Washington – U.S. Senator Roger Marshall, M.D. (R-Kansas) joined U.S. Senators John Hoeven (R-North Dakota), a senior member of the Senate Agriculture Committee and Chairman of the Senate Agriculture Appropriations Committee, and Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman John Boozman (R-Arkansas) in reintroducing the Federal Agriculture Risk Management Enhancement and Resilience (FARMER) Act – legislation that strengthens crop insurance and makes increased levels of coverage more affordable for producers.
“The FARMER Act is a major step toward ensuring the farm safety net stays intact and up to date for those who work tirelessly to provide us with food and fuel. I hear repeatedly from farmers in Kansas that crop insurance is the top priority in the Farm Bill because it provides a critically needed rapid response when disaster strikes,” said Senator Marshall.“Investing in crop insurance means protecting rural economies and securing our nation’s food supply.”
“Crop insurance remains the number one risk management tool for our farmers, but it doesn’t provide the kind of affordable coverage options that all producers need. The result has been the repeated need for ad-hoc disaster assistance. Ultimately, producers buying higher levels of coverage will lessen the need for ad-hoc disaster assistance in the future,” said Senator Hoeven. “That means less emergency spending by the federal government, greater certainty for farmers and a more resilient ag economy. Those are wins across the board.”
“Farmers must have the risk management tools they need to plan for the future. The Farmer Act would make critical improvements to the farm safety net and deliver support to producers across the country who rely on these programs. I appreciate Senator Hoeven for continuing to lead on this issue as we work provide certainty to America’s farm families,” said Senator Boozman.
The legislation is also cosponsored by Senators Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky), Joni Ernst (R-Iowa), Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-Mississippi), Jim Justice (R-West Virginia), Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), Deb Fischer (R-Nebraska), and Jerry Moran (R-Kansas).
Specifically, the Federal Agriculture Risk Management Enhancement and Resilience (FARMER) Act would:
Increase premium support for higher levels of crop insurance coverage, which will enhance affordability and reduce the need for future ad-hoc disaster assistance.
Improve the Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) by increasing premium support and expanding the coverage level, providing producers with an additional level of protection.
Direct the Risk Management Agency (RMA) to conduct a study to improve the effectiveness of SCO in large counties.
Not require producers to choose between purchasing enhanced crop insurance coverage or participating in Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programs, giving them flexibility to make decisions that work best for their operations.
This legislation is supported by the American Farm Bureau Federation, American Soybean Association, American Sugarbeet Growers Association, Crop Insurance and Reinsurance Bureau, Crop Insurance Professionals Association, Farm Credit Council, Midwest Council on Agriculture, National Association of Wheat Growers, National Barley Growers Association, National Corn Growers Association, National Cotton Council, National Sunflower Association, USA Dry Pea and Lentil Council, U.S. Beet Sugar Association, U.S. Canola Association, U.S. Durum Growers Association, and Western Peanut Growers Association.
The full text of the legislation can be found here.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Sorensen Leads Bipartisan Bill to Increase Resources for Disabled Veterans

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Eric Sorensen (IL-17)

Congressman Eric Sorensen (IL-17), Congresswoman Nicole Malliotakis (NY-11), and House Veterans Affairs Committee Ranking Member Mark Takano (CA-39) reintroduced the Autonomy for All Disabled Veterans Act, which will provide veterans with additional federal funding to make accessibility improvements to their homes.

Senators John Boozman (R-AR) and Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV) introduced similar companion legislation in the Senate.

“The last thing a veteran should worry about is red tape that prevents them from living the life they deserve,” said Congressman Eric Sorensen. “It’s time to finally increase the federal funding available to help disabled veterans make accessibility improvements to their homes with this bipartisan legislation.”

“Every veteran deserves to live in a home that works for them. But right now, VA’s HISA program is not meeting the needs of disabled veterans struggling with higher costs,” said Ranking Member Mark Takano. “That’s why Congressman Sorensen and I are reintroducing the Autonomy for All Disabled Veterans Act—to raise the amount of help veterans can get and make sure more of them can live safely and independently. If we ask people to serve our country, we owe it to them to take care of them when they come home.”

“I’m proud to join my colleagues in introducing this bipartisan legislation to increase the funding available for veterans through the VA’s Home Improvements and Structural Alterations (HISA) program,” said Congresswoman Nicole Malliotakis. “This critical program helps disabled veterans make essential home modifications such as ramps, widened doorways, and accessible bathrooms and by raising the grant cap to $10,000, we’re ensuring that more veterans can live safely and independently in their homes after having served our nation.”

“Arkansas veterans have sacrificed tremendously in service to our nation,” said Senator John Boozman. “One of the most important ways we can support our former servicemembers is to ensure those living with a disability feel safer in an accessible home with a greater sense of independence and quality of life. I am pleased to champion commonsense improvements that will better serve those who have worn our nation’s uniform.”

“After making countless sacrifices in service to our country, disabled veterans deserve to live in their own home with more freedom and dignity,” said Senator Catherine Cortez Masto. “That’s why I’m proud to work alongside my colleagues to provide them the resources they need to make improvements to their homes for accessibility and safety. I will continue working across the aisle to stand up for Nevada veterans and their families.”

“VA’s Home Improvements and Structural Alterations grant program provides medically necessary improvements and structural changes to a veteran or service member’s home,” said Heather Ansley, Chief Policy Officer of Paralyzed Veterans of America. “Unfortunately, grant rates haven’t been increased since 2010, despite rising construction costs, minimizing the purchase power of this important program. We are grateful to Representative Sorensen, Representative Takano, and Representative Malliotakis for introducing this important legislation which will not only increase the grant amount but also tie the grant to an inflation formula to allow it to keep up with rising costs.”

“The quality and self-governing of one’s life means having the freedom to make one’s own decisions and act independently,” said Gary Hall, Service Officer at American Legion Post #2. “This is what every veteran wants in life and when you have a condition that limits an individual’s ability to perform physical tasks or functions, impacting mobility, dexterity or stamina. Veterans with physical disabilities resulting from their military service should be thanked for their service by helping them cope with the physical and emotional challenges that come with living with what has happen to them because of serving their country.”

“The Home Improvement and Structural Alterations (HISA) Grant is one of the most important grant programs for veterans with disabilities that the Veterans Health Administration administers,” said Dan Smith, Veterans Service Office at the Peoria County Veterans Assistance Commission. “It allows disabled veterans to make improvements to their homes in areas that present obstacles to their ability to live independently. The Autonomy for All Disabled Veterans Act is vital to offsetting the overwhelming cost increases in the construction industry over the past years, which directly reduce the necessary improvements these Disabled Veterans can make to their homes.”

“During my tenure of being a member of a couple of Military Veteran Organizations I have come across several veteran comrades that have physical disabilities,” said Gary Holmes, Col. Thomas G. Lawler VFW Post 342 Commander. “Some of these veterans mention that they have issues in their current living quarters that don’t meet their needs or provide a better quality of life. With the passage of this bill, it will help them reside in their homes and improve their current home situation.”

“There is no bad time to increase the grant ceiling to help veterans improve their homes and implement structural alterations. The best time, however, is to do so when the demand for needed support is at its highest. That time is now,” said Eric Willard, Secretary/Treasurer of Chapter 984 of Vietnam Veterans of America. “For the past several years our team of veterans has been helping disabled and other veterans with home improvements that accommodate their needs for adaptive and assistive living in their own homes and apartments. I see the greatest needs of the past decade happening today. Our volunteers and non-profits continue to provide free labor, but we have no funds to purchase the items and supplies to help our disabled peers. The proposed House bill will provide the funds needed by veterans to pay for the ramps, grab bars, and dozens of other accommodations that will make them more independent than otherwise possible. We stand ready to do the work, but our veterans need the money to make it happen.”

The Department of Veteran Affairs Home Improvements and Structural Alterations program (HISA) offers funds to help eligible disabled veterans alter their homes to better accommodate their needs. This bipartisan bill will increase the amount available under this program to up to $10,000 for veterans with both service-connected and non-service-connected conditions. This raises the current ceiling offered from $6,800 for those with service-connected conditions and $2,000 to those with non-service-connected conditions.

The Autonomy for All Disabled Veterans Act is supported by the Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA), the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), and AMVETS.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Attorney General Bonta: Trump Administration Continues to Put Communities at Risk and Threaten Public Safety by Slashing Community Violence Intervention Program Funding
Source: US State of California

SACRAMENTO – In response to devastating public safety funding cuts by the Trump Administration, California Attorney General Rob Bonta, GIFFORDS Center for Violence Intervention, Assemblymember Mike Gipson, and Senator Jesse Arreguín today came together to urge the Administration to reverse course and honor federal funding commitments to community violence intervention programs. President Trump and the U.S. Department of Justice, under the direction of U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi, have terminated $811 million in essential federal grants for victim services and crime prevention across the country. This reduction in funding has severely impacted Community Violence Intervention (CVI) programs, hindering initiatives to address gun violence, stopping the vital support of at-risk youth, and preventing victims from obtaining necessary recovery support.

“The Trump Administration is recklessly disregarding the safety of the people it is sworn to serve with the termination of programs that heal and protect survivors of violence,” said Attorney General Rob Bonta. “The Trump Administration’s cuts threaten California’s—and the nation’s—progress against violent crime and make all of us less safe. If the Administration truly cared about public safety, it wouldn’t cut programs that are saving lives today. The cancellation of CVI funding is a profound setback for violence prevention efforts nationwide. We urge the Administration to reinstate these vital grants and for lawmakers to continue to invest in lifesaving violence prevention and victim care.”

“The Trump Administration is pulling the plug on lifesaving programs across the country, including so many here in California,” said Mike McLively, Policy Director at GIFFORDS Center for Violence Intervention. “These cuts dismantle years of strategic, bipartisan investment in public safety and will cost people their lives. We are incredibly grateful for the leadership of Attorney General Bonta and California legislators who have been at the forefront of the fight to fund community violence intervention work at the state level, but the federal government cannot go back on its promises. These were grants that were already awarded to critical live-saving programs.”

“The Trump Administration’s Department of Justice decision to cut millions in Community Violence Intervention and Prevention Initiative funding is a reckless and dangerous step backward,” said Assemblymember Mike A. Gipson (D-Carson). “At a time when our communities are working tirelessly to reduce gun violence through proven, community-led strategies, this move undermines years of progress and puts lives at risk. California CVI organizations, which were relying on these funds, are now forced to scale back efforts or shut down programs that save lives every day. Cutting millions for California alone sends a clear message: that community safety is not a priority for this administration. If we are serious about stopping gun violence and healing our neighborhoods, we must invest in—not abandon—the people doing the hardest work on the ground. I stand with California Attorney General Rob Bonta, GIFFORDS, and other longstanding leaders in this space, against this blatantly irresponsible are careless decision by the federal government.”

CVI programs work to break cycles of violence by employing specialists trained to engage, protect, and heal gunshot victims and others at highest risk. They provide lifesaving services designed to keep victims safe and alive, promote trauma recovery, and support pathways away from retaliatory violence and gang activity. Last year, Attorney General Bonta hosted a series of gun violence prevention roundtables around the state with hundreds of CVI leaders to recognize and uplift these programs’ enormous successes in reducing gun violence in communities across our state. Their work is incredibly important. And at every single roundtable it was expressed that what these programs need most from our leaders is meaningful, stable investment to expand their lifesaving work.

Multiple community violence intervention service providers in California have had their federal grants terminated mid-grant cycle and without any warning. Some organizations impacted are:
- Advance Peace in Fresno which is a program lauded by the city’s former police commissioner, had a $2 million grant revoked, causing reduced staff
- Youth ALIVE! In Oakland lost its $2 million grant to support the nation’s first hospital-based violence intervention program
- Urban Peace Institute in Los Angeles lost its $1.5 million grant to support the training and certification of street outreach workers
- Centro Cha Inc in Los Angeles lost $1.5 million in funding
- Fresno County Economic Opportunities Commission lost $2 million in funding
- The Reverence Project in Los Angeles lost $2 million in funding
- Providence Health System in Southern California lost nearly $2 million in funding
MIL OSI USA News –
May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI: Funded Ventures Launches Terrace Wealth in Partnership with Industry Veteran Ryan Bowman to Offer Tailored Wealth Management Solutions

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Clayton, Missouri, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Funded Ventures, in partnership with industry veteran Ryan Bowman, is proud to announce the launch of Terrace Wealth, a new wealth management firm focused on delivering personalized, fee-only financial solutions. Led by Ryan, Terrace Wealth will provide individuals, families, and institutions with customized strategies for investment management and wealth building.

Ryan is a seasoned CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER™ with over a decade of experience as a wealth advisor. Ryan was previously a partner at a Denver-based wealth management firm, where he spearheaded the successful transition from Raymond James to an independent, fee-only Registered Investment Advisor (RIA). Ryan has an MBA from Washington University in St. Louis and previously served four years in the United States Army as a combat Infantryman, earning the rank of Sergeant and was awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge. Ryan joined Funded Ventures in 2024 as an Operating Partner to launch Terrace Wealth, bringing his passion for transparent, client-focused financial strategies to the Midwest.

Brian Wolfe founded Funded Ventures in 2017 to buy and build small businesses. Funded Ventures previously co-led the acquisition of three businesses in the SEO SaaS vertical with sale to private equity. Brian is a retired partner at Kirkland & Ellis, where he practiced for 17 years, and teaches courses on entrepreneurship through acquisition and private equity at Washington University in St. Louis, UNC Kenan-Flagler Business School and Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. Brian also serves on the board of many civic organizations including the Skandalaris Center at Washington University in St. Louis and is a member of the Young Presidents’ Organization.

“We are excited to launch Terrace Wealth,” said Ryan. “Our goal is to provide a client-focused, holistic approach to wealth management free of conflicts of interest, combining years of experience with a deep understanding of each client’s financial needs.”

Brian added, “Trust and transparency are essential in building long-term financial relationships. We’re committed to working closely with our clients to create tailored strategies that align with their personal and institutional goals. We’re excited to bring cutting-edge wealth management solutions to the Midwest.”

Terrace Wealth will offer a range of services, including retirement and goal planning, cash and money management, tax optimization, estate planning, and risk management. The firm is dedicated to serving individuals, families, and institutional clients across the Midwest, providing personalized, forward-thinking financial strategies that align with their long-term objectives.

The firm plans to grow organically and via strategic acquisition partnerships, positioning itself for long-term success in the wealth management industry. The ideal acquisition partners are fee-only planning-focused firms offering investment management. Terrace also welcomes partnerships with single-owner practices where the advisor wants (or needs) to pull back from the practice to some degree or to realize a gradual exit that retains value, income, and a more ideal day-to-day.

For more information about Terrace Wealth and services offered, please visit www.terracewealth.com or contact Ryan Bowman at ryan@terracewealth.com or (314) 810-4012.

About Terrace Wealth

Terrace Wealth is a fee-only wealth management firm based in Clayton, Missouri, that provides personalized financial strategies, offering services such as retirement and goal planning, cash and money management and estate planning. Terrace Wealth aims to help clients build and manage wealth by tailoring solutions to meet their unique financial goals.

About Funded Ventures

Funded Ventures was founded in 2017 to acquire and grow small businesses. The firm previously co-led the acquisition of three companies in the SEO SaaS sector, culminating in a successful sale to private equity. Funded Ventures is currently building in the home services, legal services, and home health industries. Visit www.fundedventures.com to learn more.

Press inquiries

Terrace Wealth
https://www.terracewealth.com
Brian Wolfe
wolfebd@gmail.com

The MIL Network –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Lawler and Chairman Hill Applaud the Release of American-Israeli Hostage Edan Alexander

Source: US Congressman Mike Lawler (R, NY-17)

Pearl River, NY – 5/12/2025… Today, Congressman Mike Lawler (NY-17), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, and Congressman French Hill (AR-2), Chairman of the House Hostage Task Force, praised the return of Edan Alexander, an American-Israeli hostage held by Hamas since the October 7th terrorist attack.

On Friday, Reps. Lawler and Hill led a letter with a bipartisan coalition of lawmakers urging the Trump Administration to exert maximum diplomatic pressure in order to return all of the hostages still being held in Gaza.

“I’m thrilled by the news that Edan Alexander has returned home. I applaud President Trump for his tireless diplomatic work in securing the release of these hostages. As we continue forward in securing the release of Americans being held hostage abroad, I remain steadfast in my commitment to bring them all home. God be with the families who are still awaiting the release of their loved ones. I stand with you and will not relent until every American abroad is returned home,” stated Chairman Lawler.

“I am overjoyed to hear that Edan Alexander is finally coming home after enduring nearly 600 days of unimaginable hardship and suffering. His release is a moment of great relief and joy for his family and for all Americans who have kept him in their prayers. We are deeply grateful to all those whose tireless efforts made this homecoming possible. As Co-Chair of the Hostage Task Force in the House, I know that while we celebrate Edan’s release, we must continue our work to secure the freedom of every American held abroad and to bring home the remains of every American who died at the hands of Hamas,” concluded Chairman Hill.

Congressman Lawler is one of the most bipartisan members of Congress and represents New York’s 17th Congressional District, which is just north of New York City and contains all or parts of Rockland, Putnam, Dutchess, and Westchester Counties. He was rated the most effective freshman lawmaker in the 118th Congress, 8th overall, surpassing dozens of committee chairs.

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MIL OSI USA News –

May 13, 2025

MIL-OSI USA: SCHUMER – WITH CAPITAL REGION RELIGIOUS LEADERS, FOOD BANKS & FARMERS – SOUNDS ALARM THAT UNDER GOP PLAN TO CUT SNAP – AMERICA’S LARGEST ANTI-HUNGER PROGRAM – THOUSANDS OF KIDS, SENIORS, & FAMILIES…

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for New York Charles E Schumer

Already 27 Tractor Trailers, Nearly 1 Million Pounds Of Food, For The Regional Food Bank Of Northeastern NY Has Been Canceled Due To Trump’s Cruel USDA Cuts – Now GOP Wants To Steal Up To $230 Billion From SNAP To Fund Trump’s Tax Breaks For Corporations & Billionaires

Schumer, With Church Leaders & Advocates, Say This Double Whammy Could Hurtle Families To A Hunger Crisis, Impacting 112,000+ In Capital Region, Millions Nationwide; Demands GOP Block Cruel Cut To SNAP And Protect Anti-Hunger Programs

Schumer: No Child Should Go To Bed Hungry. This Is Not A Partisan Issue; This Is A Moral Issue

As Congressional Republicans look to advance the largest potential cut to the anti-hunger program SNAP in American history this week, U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer stood with Capital Region religious leaders, food banks, & farmers to issue a stark warning and demand action against the devastating proposed $230 billion SNAP cut to fund Trump’s tax cuts for corporations & billionaires, that would leave thousands of seniors, families and children hungry. The senator joined with church leaders and hunger advocates to say how this is a moral issue that we should all unite to stop, and Schumer called on the administration to reverse its hunger program cuts and for the NY House Republicans to stand against stealing from SNAP, which over 112,000 in the Capital Region rely on for food.

“No child should ever go to bed hungry. But Trump’s slashing of anti-hunger programs at the USDA has already cancelled 27 tractor trailers, nearly 1 million pounds of food, for the Regional Food Bank of Northeastern NY. Now, House Republicans are trying to rush through the budget process and make the largest cut to SNAP in history. With food insecurity on the rise, this is a double whammy that could hurtle families to a hunger crisis,” said Senator Schumer. “Stealing from SNAP to pay for Trump’s tax breaks for corporations & billionaires is as backwards as it gets, and will result in thousands of kids, seniors, and families going hungry. It is not a partisan issue, it is a moral issue. That is why I am here to show what these cuts mean for the nuns, priests, and food banks on the frontlines of fighting against hunger. Together we are demanding a stop to this all-out assault on our federal anti-hunger programs and to protect SNAP for our children, veterans, seniors, and families.”

Sister Betsy Van Deusen, CEO of Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany said, “SNAP is a lifeline for so many people in our communities and across the country. Working people who are trying to feed their families depend on this critical resource. The vast and draconian cuts that have been discussed will send children to bed hungry, our elders without basic nutrition and our veterans without dignity. the lives of wealthiest people in our country will not be substantially changed by another tax cut, but the millions on whose backs those cuts come, will be devastated.”

Schumer added, “It only takes a few NY House Republicans to join us to stop this cruel cut to SNAP. We need NY Republicans to show us which side they are on with their actions. For feeding corporate & billionaires’ greed or for feeding hungry families here in the Capital Region. We need them to join us in demanding the USDA reverse all of Trump’s cuts to our farmers, food banks, and anti-hunger programs and keep their hands off SNAP to fund Trump’s tax breaks.”

Schumer explained how Trump’s USDA has already cruelly canceled $1 billion in food assistance, hurting the Capital Region’s Food Bank of Northeastern NY, and if these SNAP cuts move forward it would be a double whammy, hurtling us to a hunger crisis. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is a lifeline for nearly 3 million NY seniors, veterans and families who rely on the critical funding to purchase groceries. Schumer said that we should be investing more not less in anti-hunger programs, but under the Republican proposal, the average family would be reduced to just $5.00 per day per person. A breakdown of SNAP recipients in the Capital Region from the Center for American Progress can be found below:

County	SNAP Recipients	% of County on SNAP	SNAP Retailers
Albany	34,556	10.9%	281
Columbia	5,546	9.1%	82
Greene	4,504	9.5%	54
Rensselaer	15,022	9.4%	148
Saratoga	13,847	5.8%	163
Schenectady	22,196	13.9%	166
Schoharie	3,671	12.2%	34
Warren	6,726	10.3%	75
Washington	6,556	10.8%	61
TOTAL	112,624		1,064

Schumer explained the Republican proposal to cut up to $230 billion from SNAP would inevitably mean costs of feeding families shift to states, who simply do not have the capacity to absorb this massive increase in expenses, risking families going hungry. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, mandating New York State to cover even a modest share of SNAP benefits would shift astronomical costs to the state with even just 5% increasing New York State’s costs by nearly $3.5 billion from FY2026 to FY2034. The senator said it is impossible to cut this much from federal SNAP funding without ripping food away from hungry children, seniors, veterans, people with disabilities, and more.

These agonizing decisions would be amplified even further at the local level, with non-profits, many of whom have already had their funding cut, unable to fill in the gap. Counties could even be forced to shoulder the burden of increased costs in SNAP, using more local dollars to provide coverage because less federal funding will be coming in.

According to New York’s Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, in New York’s 20^th Congressional District – which represents all of Albany, Saratoga, and Schenectady counties, and portions of Montgomery and Rensselaer counties – nearly 45,000 households receive an estimated $185 million in annual benefits. 34% of SNAP recipients are children, 15% are elderly, and 12% are people with disabilities. In New York’s 21^st Congressional District – which represents all of Clinton, Franklin, St. Lawrence, Lewis, Hamilton, Essex, Warren, Washington, Fulton, Herkimer, Montgomery, and Schoharie counties, and portions of Jefferson, Oneida, and Saratoga counties – more than 52,000 households receive as estimated$194 million in annual benefits. 30% of SNAP recipients are children, 18% are elderly, and 14% are people with disabilities.

Schumer said, “SNAP is a lifeline that helps uplift everyone, from the NY farms who get direct assistance from the program to the Capital Region families’ kitchen tables. NY Republicans are tying themselves in knots to try to justify these SNAP cuts, but the math shows you cannot make the massive cuts the House’s tax bill proposes without risking the food security for thousands of families. I’m all for reducing any waste or fraud to make the program more efficient, but rushing to pass these massive damaging cuts with no plan while they slash our food banks is a recipe for disaster.”

The proposed SNAP cuts would be a blow to Capital Region food banks which have already been hit hard by Trump’s funding freezes and canceled payments. Earlier this year, the USDA canceled $1 billion in food assistance for organizations to purchase locally grown food. USDA programs provide food banks, schools, and other organizations with federal support to purchase local food products from NY farms.

The Regional Food Bank of Northeastern New York has already had 27 tractor-trailers of food canceled, which is nearly 1 million pounds meant to feed Capital Region families. That’s nearly 800,000 meals, and the food bank expects to lose over 200 tractor-trailers over the next year. 80% of this food goes to pantries and soup kitchens like CONSERNS-U in Rensselaer. The food bank also works with religious leaders like Catholic Charities to distribute food to those who need it most.

Schumer said these proposed cuts will limit food banks’ ability to keep shelves stocked as more people have been forced to rely on food banks to feed their families. Food bank workers and religious leaders across Upstate New York are concerned about the impact of potential cuts to SNAP on the people they serve, and farmers are worried there will be nowhere to sell their food if SNAP funding levels drop.

“No matter which way you slice it, this Congressional Republican plan will screw Capital Region families, food banks and farmers from farm to table. We need everyone to stand up to these cuts that would take away food from our neighbors in need,” added Schumer.

“When federal nutrition programs are cut, it’s not just a single plate that goes empty — it’s millions,” said Tom Nardacci, CEO of the Regional Food Bank. “Without federal support, community organizations simply can’t fill the growing gap. Slashing SNAP or canceling USDA food deliveries doesn’t just reduce access — it clears the table entirely for seniors, children, veterans, and families in every community in this country. We appreciate Senator Schumer fighting to save these important programs.”

“Cutting or reducing budgets for food safety net programs is the exact opposite of what is needed to ensure New Yorkers don’t go hungry,” said Natasha Pernicka, Executive Director for The Food Pantries for the Capital District. “Any reductions to current SNAP will continue to exacerbate the growing strain on our food pantry system. We should be doing much more to help our food-insecure communities, not less.”

Proposed rollbacks to the country’s most widely utilized nutrition assistance program would strain budgets for Capital Region families. Schumer said decimating funding for SNAP right as costs at grocery stores across the country are skyrocketing will hit the Capital Region hard. According to the New York State Community Action Association, more than 12% of people in Rensselaer County live in poverty, including nearly 20% of children. According to No Kid Hungry, over half of New Yorkers reported going into debt in the past year due to rising food costs, with over 60% of families with children.

SNAP not only supplements families’ food budgets, it has also generated great economic benefits for New York State and NY-20 specifically. According to the National Grocers Association, grocery stores across New York State sold over $2.1 billion in groceries to people using SNAP benefits, including $99.3 million in NY-20. This created more than 18,500 New York jobs in the grocery industry, including 876 in NY-20, and generated more than $820.8 million in grocery industry wages, including $38.7 million in NY-20.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 13, 2025

MIL-OSI Canada: New lien rules support B.C. service providers

Source: Government of Canada regional news

New rules will make it easier for businesses to collect debts for services they provide to repair, store or transport goods.

The new Commercial Liens Act comes into force on June 30, 2025, creating one clear set of lien rules for anyone who repairs, stores or transports goods. It replaces a patchwork of outdated laws, which created different rules for different services.

The change reduces risks and costs, meaning service providers will be less likely to lose their liens and the payment that liens secure. Updated rules and processes that are easier to understand benefit businesses and their customers.

Once in force, the act gives service providers flexibility by allowing them to keep possession of goods or to register the lien in B.C.’s Personal Property Registry. This allows owners to keep using their vehicle or equipment to make money and pay off the debt. It means that liens can be registered on big items that cannot be easily moved or stored.

The Personal Property Registry, an online system that tracks legal claims on personal property, will be updated on June 30 to so that commercial liens can be registered.

The changes will also make it easier to enforce liens without going to court, which helps businesses get paid and cuts legal costs.

The act replaces the Repairers Lien Act, Warehouse Lien Act and Livestock Lien Act. Any existing liens under those acts will continue as commercial liens.

The changes respond to the B.C. Law Institute’s recommendation to follow Saskatchewan’s lead in adopting the Uniform Liens Act. It uses similar rules used by secured lenders across Canada to collect on loans against personal property.

This brings B.C. closer to the goal of having one set of lien rules across Canada so businesses that provide services in different provinces do not have to keep track of different rules.

Learn More:

For more information about B.C.’s Personal Property Registry, visit: https://www.bcregistry.gov.bc.ca/en-CA/ppr-marketing

MIL OSI Canada News –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Warren, Booker, Nadler Press Pepsi on Potentially Illegal Price Discrimination Against Small, Independently-Owned Grocery Stores

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren
May 12, 2025
“Charging discriminatory, high prices to smaller, independent retailers harms those retailers’ ability to compete, and often forces consumers to endure unfair price increases.”
“American families across the country continue to struggle to afford groceries, and enforcement of the [Robinson-Patman Act] is part of the solution to help promote competition throughout the food supply chain and ease their financial burden.”
Text of Letter (PDF)
Washington, D.C. — U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Cory Booker (D-N.J.), along with Representative Jerry Nadler (D-N.Y.) wrote to Ramon Laguarta, CEO of PepsiCo, Inc. (Pepsi) demanding an explanation for the company’s potentially illegal price discrimination against small and independent grocery stores. The lawmakers are the top Democrats on the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, and House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Administrate State, Regulatory Reform, and Antitrust, respectively.
Representatives Becca Balint (D-Vt.), Andre Carson (D-Ind.), Maggie Goodlander (D-N.H.), Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.), Summer Lee (D-Pa.), Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.), and Nikema Williams (D-Ga.) joined in signing the letter.
In recent months, Pepsi has faced legal action from convenience stores and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a regulator charged with enforcing federal consumer protection laws and antitrust laws. In January 2025, the FTC sued Pepsi, accusing it of violating the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), which prohibits sellers from engaging in anticompetitive price discrimination. The FTC claimed that for years, Pepsi has disadvantaged retailers – including local convenience stores – by consistently giving benefits and advantages, such as promotional payments, to a big-box store, while denying those same benefits to the store’s competitors.
In February 2025, two small, family-owned convenience stores accused Pepsi and its subsidiary Frito-Lay of violating the RPA, claiming the corporation charged independent retailers more “for identical bags of snack chips” compared to what it charged chain stores. The plaintiffs claimed they were charged as much as 50 percent more for those goods, and that the “discriminatory pricing” forced them to pass on the higher costs to consumers.
“The Robinson-Patman Act is an important tool for the FTC to combat illegal price discrimination and concentration, and to provide a level playing field to all businesses…Charging discriminatory, high prices to smaller, independent retailers harms those retailers’ ability to compete, and often forces consumers to endure unfair price increases,” wrote the lawmakers.
The RPA forbids sellers from charging competing buyers different prices for the same goods when the price discrimination may lessen or harm competition. The law also prohibits special promotional payments, discounts, rebates, allowances, or services to one buyer unless they are made available to all competing buyers.
“As food prices remain sky-high, the FTC should continue to enforce the RPA to promote fair competition in the food industry,” urged the lawmakers.
The bicameral coalition asked Pepsi to explain, by May 25, 2025, its pricing strategies, any discrepancies between what it charges chain retailers and small, independent retailers, how these price discrepancies affect shopping options for consumers, and the company’s lobbying efforts to refute price discrimination allegations.
As a champion for American consumers and a secure and healthy economy, Senator Warren has engaged in oversight of corporations for unfairly increasing prices for consumers. She has also been calling for more competition and stronger enforcement of antitrust laws to bring down prices for families:
In May 2025, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Jim Banks (R-Ind.) applauded the Department of Justice’s ongoing investigation into potential anticompetitive practices by major egg producers and urged the agency to continue its thorough investigation as egg prices continue to rise.
In January 2025, Senator Elizabeth Warren and Representative Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) led 19 of their colleagues, writing to President Donald Trump, pushing him to take meaningful steps to lower the prices of eggs and other groceries—a problem he largely ignored during his entire first week in office.
In November 2024, Senator Elizabeth Warren and Congressman Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) led their colleagues in writing to Chair of the Federal Trade Commission, Lina Khan, and Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Thomas Vilsack, urging them to investigate Albertsons and other major grocery chains for predatory practices that could have violated federal laws.
In October 2024, Senators Elizabeth Warren led a letter to President and Chief Executive Officer of McDonald’s, Chris Kempczinski, pushing for more information on McDonald’s pricing decisions as fast food prices continue to increase, outpacing inflation and squeezing customers.
In October 2024, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Ed Markey, along with Representatives Jim McGovern and Ayanna Pressley, sent a letter to Frans Muller, CEO of Ahold Delhaize—parent company of Stop & Shop—demanding an explanation for its potential use of pricing algorithms is leading to price gouging, resulting in higher prices in minority and working class communities in Massachusetts.
On May 3, 2024, during a hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, Senator Warren called out food industry price gouging and urged action to combat unfair pricing practices.
On March 28, 2024, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Representative Mary Gay Scanlon (D-Penn.) led a group of 14 lawmakers in a letter to FTC Chair Lina Khan urging the agency to revive enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), a critical tool to promote fair competition in the food industry.
On February 28, 2024, Senator Warren joined Senator Bob Casey (D-Pa.) in introducing the Shrinkflation Prevention Act to crack down on corporations that deceive consumers by selling smaller sizes of their products without lowering prices.
On February 15, 2024, Senators Warren, Baldwin, Casey, and U.S. Representative Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.) reintroduced the Price Gouging Prevention Act of 2024, which would protect consumers and prohibit corporate price gouging by authorizing the FTC and state attorneys general to enforce a federal ban against grossly excessive price increases.
In December 2023, Senator Warren urged the FTC to block the Kroger-Albertsons merger, which would give the five largest food retail companies control of 55 percent of all grocery sales, allowing them to further control and ultimately raise consumer prices, while also reducing job competition, decreasing wages, and decreasing the bargaining power of organized labor.
In November 2023, Senator Warren called out TransDigm for its refusal to provide cost and pricing information needed to prevent price gouging of taxpayers and the Department of Defense.
Senator Warren repeatedly urged the Biden administration to closely scrutinize other potentially anticompetitive mergers that could lead to higher prices for consumers and accelerate industry consolidation. She has led letters about the proposed mergers of Frontier and Spirit airlines, JetBlue and Spirit Airlines, Sanderson-Wayne, WarnerMedia-Discovery, and Amazon-MGM.
In March 2022, Senator Warren introduced the Prohibiting Anticompetitive Mergers Act to help stomp out rampant industry consolidation that allows companies to raise consumer prices and mistreat workers. The bill would ban the biggest, most anticompetitive mergers and give the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission the teeth to reject deals in the first instance without court orders and to break up harmful mergers.
In February 2022, at a hearing, Senator Warren called out corporations for abusing their market power to raise consumer prices and boost profits.
That same month, Senator Warren requested the Department of Justice to take aggressive action against corporations violating antitrust laws to hike prices for consumers.
In January 2022, Senator Warren questioned Federal Reserve nominee Lael Brainard about market concentration and price gouging driving inflation.
At a January 2022 hearing, Senator Warren pressed Fed Chair Jerome Powell on the role of corporate concentration in driving up prices for consumers during his renomination hearing to be Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
In a New York Times op-ed published in April 2020, Senator Warren urged Congress to focus on cracking down on price gouging in its ongoing effort to address the impact of the coronavirus pandemic.
In March 2020, Senator Warren joined her colleagues in urging the FTC to use its full authority to prevent abusive price gouging on consumer health products during the COVID-19 pandemic.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Falmouth — Update: RCMP seeking information about fatal collision in Falmouth

Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

On May 10, RCMP officers, fire services, and EHS responded to a fatal two-vehicle collision on Highway 101 between Hantsport and Falmouth.

At this time, based on physical evidence gathered at the scene, investigators believe that the Honda Civic was travelling in the opposite direction of traffic in the eastbound lanes when it collided with the Nissan Sentra approximately 1.5 kms from Exit 7 in Falmouth.

Through the investigation, it’s been determined that Kings District RCMP responded to a possible impaired driver involving the same Civic at 7:20 p.m. The vehicle was last seen at a restaurant on Hwy. 1 near the 11600 block in Grand Pre. An extensive search for the vehicle, led by multiple officers in Kings and West Hants counties, was unsuccessful.

Investigators are seeking information from the public to establish the whereabouts of the blue 2014 Honda Civic prior to 7:20 p.m. and prior to the collision, which occurred at approximately 11:12 p.m. The vehicle was bearing Nova Scotia licence plate HLF590.

The investigation is ongoing.

Anyone with information about this incident or dashcam footage of the area prior to the collision is asked to call West Hants District RCMP at 902-798-2207. To remain anonymous, contact Nova Scotia Crime Stoppers, toll-free, at 1-800-222-TIPS (8477), submit a secure web tip at www.crimestoppers.ns.ca, or use the P3 Tips app.

Our thoughts continue to be with the victims’ loved ones at this difficult time.

File #: 2025-632421, 2025-631333

MIL Security OSI –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Syria faces renewed sectarian violence as government fails to deliver inclusivity

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Katya Alkhateeb, Senior Researcher in International Human Rights Law & Humanitarian Law at Essex Law School and Human Rights Centre, University of Essex

A recent surge in violence against Syria’s Druze religious community has reportedly seen over 100 people killed since the start of May. This is a grim extension of sectarian targeting that began with the massacre of Alawite civilians in March.

Both crises are grounded in the same religious justifications, revealing problems in Syria’s transition following the end of the Assad family’s 53-year rule.

Specifically these atrocities are linked by the misuse of nafir aam – a general call to arms or mass mobilisation. It is an Arabic term rooted in classical Islamic jurisprudence, especially in discussions about jihad and collective defence.

It is declared only when the Muslim community faces an existential threat, such as an invasion or overwhelming danger from an enemy.

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Recently though, it has been used by extremist groups such as Islamic State and al-Qaeda to summon Muslims to fight supposed enemies of the faith. These enemies have, in most cases, been innocent civilians.

In March, when gunmen loyal to Syria’s former leader Bashar al-Assad (who is an Alawite) clashed with security forces, the transitional government issued a nafir aam. Loudspeakers in mosques across northern Syria broadcast mobilisation calls, tribal groups pledged support, and recruitment links flooded social media.

The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that close to 1,400 Alawite civilians were subsequently murdered, with the final death toll likely to be much higher.

A post on the Telegram channel of Syria’s ruling Hayat Tahrir al-Sham organisation reading: ‘General mobilisation now being announced via loudspeakers in Idlib and Aleppo toward the coast. Listen to the important and urgent announcement directly.’
Telegram

The same sectarian machinery has now been turned against the Druze. This latest wave of violence was triggered by the unproven allegation that a Druze cleric was responsible for an audio recording containing anti-Islamic remarks. Despite the cleric’s immediate denial, armed groups launched assaults on Druze areas near Syria’s capital, Damascus.

Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, vowed to protect the Druze and the Israeli military subsequently carried out a series of airstrikes across Syria. These included strikes near the presidential palace. While Netanyahu has positioned these actions as protecting a vulnerable minority, they risk further destabilising Syria’s fragile transition.

Deeply entrenched sectarianism

Syria’s transitional government is led by the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Following its campaign against Assad, HTS has been implementing a new policy of tolerance towards minority groups. The Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has vowed to protect minorities and pursue more inclusive policies.

But HTS is arguably failing to deliver the inclusive governance it promised when seizing control of the country in December 2024. The seven-member committee for the national dialogue conference, which began in February to discuss a new path for the nation, lacked Alawite, Kurdish and Druze representation.

The resulting constitutional declaration offered no explicit protections for Syria’s religious diversity. It also centralises power in ways that undermine pluralism.

Article 3 of the constitutional declaration states that the “religion of the president of the republic is Islam” and “Islamic jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation”. Officials have clarified that any future parliament would remain subordinate to Islamic law.

The ideological basis and policy for sectarian violence in Syria remains deeply entrenched. A 14th-century fatwa (a religious edict) by Sunni Muslim scholar Ibn Taymiyyah branded Alawites as “infidels”. This fatwa continues to circulate in areas under government control.

At the Brussels donors’ conference on Syria in March, Syrian foreign minister Asaad al-Shibani blamed “54 years of minority rule” for mass displacement and deaths – raising concerns about sectarian narratives. And the integrity of the investigation into the recent massacres have been questioned, notably by the Syrians for Truth and Justice human rights group.

Criticisms have also been made over the inclusion of controversial figures to the newly formed Civil Peace Committee, which is tasked with healing the sectarian wounds left by Assad family rule. One of these figures, Sheikh Anas Ayrout, was reported 12 years ago to have made inciting comments against Alawites.

Civil society organisations, including the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, have called on the government to issue protective religious rulings for minority communities. But their appeals have gone unanswered. And violence, particularly against Alawites in Homs and Aleppo, has surged dramatically.

Five months after Assad’s fall, it seems that Syria is not witnessing the long hoped for fruition of its 2011 revolution, where pro-democracy protests swept through the country, but rather its continuing unravelling.

The groups now in power had little to do with the revolution’s early democratic hopes. They have emerged from transnational jihadist networks with a radically different vision for Syria’s future.

In the view of prominent Syrian intellectual Yassin al-Haj Saleh, Syria urgently needs a period of de-escalation and genuine political concessions. He argues for “taking two or three steps back … to move more firmly forward”. Political solutions must precede the creation of public institutions, not the other way around.

If the cycle of sectarian violence is not broken, Syria risks sliding deeper into communal bloodshed that could permanently fracture the nation’s social fabric.

The international community must act decisively. It has to apply concrete political pressure that makes the protection of all Syrians – regardless of sect – a non-negotiable foundation for Syria’s path forward.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Syria faces renewed sectarian violence as government fails to deliver inclusivity – https://theconversation.com/syria-faces-renewed-sectarian-violence-as-government-fails-to-deliver-inclusivity-255974

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Medetomidine: what you need to know about the animal sedative turning up in opioid deaths

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Paul Chazot, Professor of Pharmacology, Durham University

Michael O’Keene/Shutterstock.com

The opioid crisis, increasingly driven by synthetic opioids, continues to claim tens of thousands of lives annually in the US alone. Similar crises have arisen all over the western world.

The crisis has become more complex as powerful synthetic opioids like fentanyl, nitazenes and oxycodone are now being “cut” (mixed) with other drugs that slow brain activity, including animal tranquillisers.

The emergence of medetomidine as a new contaminant in the US illicit drug market signals a worrying development in this escalating crisis. When public health officials in Philadelphia first began testing for the drug in May last year, medetomidine was found in 29% of fentanyl samples analysed. Six months later, the drug was found in 87% of fentanyl samples.

Medetomidine, a drug approved only for veterinary use as a sedative and painkiller, has increasingly been implicated in illicit fentanyl-related overdoses.

Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences. Join The Conversation for free today.

Like xylazine – another veterinary tranquilliser recently detected in street drugs – it is believed that medetomidine is added to fentanyl to boost its euphoric effects and hence make it more appealing to users. However, medetomidine is even more potent and longer-lasting than xylazine.

An overdose of medetomidine can cause extreme sleepiness, very low blood pressure, slow heart rate, trouble breathing (respiratory failure), and even coma or death. This is because medetomidine rapidly depresses the central nervous system and slows the heart rate significantly.

When medetomidine is used with opioids, the risk is even greater because both drugs can slow breathing, and together they can make it much worse.

Overdose-reversing drugs

Police and paramedics use naloxone to reverse fentanyl overdoses. But if the drug is mixed with medetomidine, naloxone won’t work because medetomidine affects the body in a different way.

Naloxone won’t reverse the effects of animal tranquillisers.
oasisamuel / Shutterstock.com

Atipamezole can reverse the effects of medetomidine – such as sedation, slowed breathing and slowed heart rate – but it’s only been tested in dogs. The US Food and Drug Administration has not approved the drug for human use.

Overdoses from fentanyl and high-potency nitazenes are also common in the UK and across Europe. The spread of medetomidine in street drugs in other parts of the world needs urgent attention.

The first death in the UK involving xylazine was reported by the National Programme on Substance Abuse Deaths in December 2022. Between April 2023 and January 2024, 17 cases were reported in the UK, in a range of opioid tablets and powders, including codeine, tramadol and heroin.

So far, no confirmed cases involving medetomidine have been reported in the UK. If trends in the US are reliable indicators, the UK may face similar challenges soon.

Paul Chazot does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Medetomidine: what you need to know about the animal sedative turning up in opioid deaths – https://theconversation.com/medetomidine-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-animal-sedative-turning-up-in-opioid-deaths-256015

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: Victim Services Volunteers Recognized During Victims and Survivors of Crime Week

Source: Government of Canada regional news

Released on May 12, 2025

The Government of Saskatchewan has proclaimed May 11-17, 2025, as Victims and Survivors of Crime Week in the province.

The week is a chance to raise awareness about matters facing victims and survivors of crime and to highlight the services and supports available to aid them on their path to healing. It is also a chance to acknowledge the contributions of Saskatchewan’s volunteer victim support workers, staff and community board members.

Saskatchewan’s long-term volunteers, staff and board members were recognized at the Legislative Building today for their contributions to police-based victim services programs and the strength of their collaboration within the Saskatchewan justice system.

“The dedication and compassion of our Saskatchewan volunteer victim support workers is instrumental to creating and maintaining safe, healthy communities across our province,” Justice Minister and Attorney General Tim McLeod, K.C., said. “I would like to sincerely thank them for helping victims and survivors of crime overcome tragic situations, ensuring they are not alone and for the collaborative role they play in helping people navigate the criminal justice system.”

Currently, there are 150 volunteer victim support workers working with police-based victim services programs in Saskatchewan. In 2023-24, more than 13,000 victims of crime were supported through their efforts.

Fourteen police-based victim services programs operate throughout Saskatchewan. Of these, four are part of municipal police services, while the other 10 are overseen by a board of directors, including 80 volunteer community board members.

For more information on Victims and Survivors of Crime Week, volunteer victim support worker opportunities and services or supports that are available for victims and survivors, contact a police-based victim services program through your local RCMP detachment or municipal police service. You can also contact the Victims Services Branch at 306-787-3500 or visit:
www.saskatchewan.ca/victimsservices.

-30-

For more information, contact:

MIL OSI Canada News –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: LEADER JEFFRIES STATEMENT ON RELEASE OF EDAN ALEXANDER

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Hakeem Jeffries (8th District of New York)

Know Your Immigration Rights

If you or a loved one encounter immigration enforcement officials, it is essential that you know your rights and have prepared your household for all possible outcomes.

Ask for a warrant: The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects you from unreasonable search and seizure. You do not have to open your door until you see a valid warrant to enter your home or search your belongings.

Your right to remain silent: The Fifth Amendment protects your right to remain silent and not incriminate yourself. You are not required to share any personal information such as your place of birth, immigration status or criminal history.

Always consult an attorney: You have a right to speak with an attorney. You do not have to sign anything or hand officials any documents without speaking to an attorney. Try to identify and consult one in advance.

The New York City Office of Civil Justice and the Mayor’s Office of Immigrant Affairs (MOIA) support a variety of free immigration legal services through local nonprofit legal organizations. To access these resources, dial 311 and say “Action NYC,” call the MOIA Immigration Legal Support Hotline at 800-354-0365 Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. or visit MOIA’s website.

Learn more here: KNOW YOUR IMMIGRATION RIGHTS – Congressman Hakeem Jeffries

MIL OSI USA News –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Keir Starmer’s immigration plans: research shows you don’t beat the far right by becoming them

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Katy Brown, Research Fellow in Language and Social Justice, Manchester Metropolitan University

Keir Starmer gives press conference on migration Flickr/Number 10, CC BY-NC-ND

As British prime minister Keir Starmer vowed to “finally take back control of our borders” in a landmark speech on immigration on May 12, it felt a little like déjà vu.

Some nine years earlier, we had heard those exact words repeated over and over in the build-up to the Brexit referendum from former prime minister Boris Johnson and the Leave campaign. It was a refrain also used by Nigel Farage and UKIP.

Of course, this direct reference was the point. Starmer used it to claim that the Labour government’s white paper on immigration was finally going to deliver on what had been promised and desired for many years.

In these opening lines, the tone was set. And as the speech went on, there were echoes of far-right language and ideas reverberating throughout. Starmer lamented the “squalid” state of contemporary politics, the “forces” pulling the country apart, and the previous government’s so-called “experiment in open borders”.

This speech and the white paper that it unveiled are but the latest indication of the rightward direction of travel within UK politics, led by mainstream and far-right parties alike – as exemplified in recent months by the footage released of immigration raids and deportations.

Some will argue this is Labour’s response to the rising threat of Reform UK, with results in the recent local elections seen as evidence of the far right’s growing popularity. So the story goes, Labour is proving that they can be tough on immigration, showing would-be Reform defectors that they can be trusted after all.

This familiar narrative seems to follow a prevailing wisdom which is parroted in political, media and public debates – that appeasing the far right is the way to defeat it. Rather than beating the far right at their own game, however, research shows that these techniques simply legitimise their key talking points and further normalise exclusionary politics.

Starmer’s speech is a case in point. In using “take back control” from the outset, there was no hiding the intended audience or message. Starmer claimed that this project would “close the book on a squalid chapter for our politics, our economy, and our country”, implying that excessive immigration has directly caused these problems and that stopping it solves them. This chimes with classic far-right narratives where migration is framed as the root of all societal ills.

When these kinds of ideas are pushed by those in government, with great authority and influence, they are given greater credence and weight. A strikingly clear example of this came in the summer of 2024 when participants in racist riots waved posters containing the slogan “stop the boats” (a phrase popularised by the previous Tory government).

Another component of the speech that was reminiscent of far-right tropes was the idea that increased immigration was a deliberate tactic by the previous government. Starmer suggested that the Conservatives were actively pursuing a “one-nation experiment in open borders” while deceiving the British public of their intentions.

Far-right conspiracies are often premised on the idea that elites are deliberately encouraging mass immigration. It’s not hard to see how Starmer’s words could act as a dog whistle in this scenario.

These claims are especially damaging when we think about the draconian measures introduced under former Conservative governments, such as the Rwanda policy. Labour is now indicating that these proposals didn’t go far enough.

To justify bringing far stricter immigration rules, Starmer stated that “for the vast majority of people in this country, that is what they have long wanted to see”. As far-right parties so often do, Labour suggests that they are delivering on “people’s priorities”. Yet are they really a priority for people, or are we told that they are a priority which then makes them more of a priority?

Research by Aurelien Mondon, senior lecturer in politics at the University of Bath, illustrates how people’s personal and national priorities differ dramatically. When people in the UK were asked to name the two most important issues facing them personally, immigration didn’t even make it into the top ten.

However, when asked the same question about the issues facing their country, immigration topped the list. How can something that doesn’t affect you in your day-to-day life suddenly become a top priority for your country? We need to challenge the narrative that the government is simply acting on people’s wishes and acknowledge its own capacity to set the agenda.

Other priorities

Some will say that harsher anti-immigration policies are a necessary evil to defeat the far right. However, if people’s personal priorities are really the cost of living, housing and education, why is the government not focusing more of its energy on these things rather than scapegoating migrants?

What’s more, research shows that even based on these terms, these strategies are ineffective and can actually boost the success of the far right electorally. After all, its ideas are being repeatedly normalised.

In all this tactical talk, we lose sight of the fact that people are living the consequences of this rhetoric and policies right now. Rather than focus on Reform’s potential performance in a general election that is probably years away, we should recognise the immediate consequences of the rhetoric that has accompanied this white paper. Even if this did put a dent in Reform’s prospects, what is the meaning of defeating them if the policies they promote become part of the mainstream in the process?

The bottom line is that you do not beat the far right by becoming them. It doesn’t work electorally or ideologically, and even if it did, minoritised communities suffer the consequences regardless. The far right is not some threat lying waiting in the future – its normalisation is happening now.

Katy Brown has received funding from UK Research and Innovation and the Irish Research Council. She is affiliated with the Reactionary Politics Research Network and Manchester Centre for Research in Linguistics.

– ref. Keir Starmer’s immigration plans: research shows you don’t beat the far right by becoming them – https://theconversation.com/keir-starmers-immigration-plans-research-shows-you-dont-beat-the-far-right-by-becoming-them-256499

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

May 13, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Attorney General James Delivers Over $13,500 Worth of Baby Formula to Rochester Families

Source: US State of New York

EW YORK – New York Attorney General Letitia James today announced that her office secured more than $13,500 worth of baby formula from baby formula supplier Paragon USA & Co., LLC (Paragon) for families in Rochester. The donation is the result of an investigation conducted by the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) into Paragon for price gouging during the national baby formula shortage in 2022. As part of a settlement with OAG, Paragon has paid a $10,000 penalty and must pay an additional $35,000 in donated baby formula or cash. Today’s donation will be distributed to families in need across Rochester by Foodlink, a community organization that serves the Greater Rochester and Finger Lakes regions.

“During a nationwide baby formula shortage, Paragon took advantage of New York families, illegally raising the price on formula to squeeze extra profits,” said Attorney General James. “My office made sure Paragon was held responsible for their illegal action and guaranteed that hard-working families in New York received relief. I thank Foodlink and all its partner organizations for distributing this baby formula to help Rochester families in need.”

“We are thankful to Attorney General James for once again providing Foodlink and our new Health & Wellness initiative with additional baby formula,” said Julia Tedesco, President & CEO of Foodlink. “Our partners have highlighted a growing need for baby products and other essential items, especially as grocery prices remain historically high. This generous contribution will greatly benefit our members and their clients who are in urgent need of formula.”

In 2022, Abbott Laboratories closed one of its baby formula manufacturing plants and recalled formula produced there, creating significant hardship for families throughout New York and the nation as formula supplies dwindled and prices rose. Abbott produces over 40 percent of the infant formula sold in the United States, and the plant it closed was responsible for approximately one fifth of total U.S. production.

New York’s price gouging laws prohibit vendors from unconscionably increasing prices on goods that are vital to consumers’ health, safety, or welfare during market disruptions such as the 2022 formula shortage. In May 2022, Attorney General James issued warnings to more than 30 retailers across the state to stop overcharging for baby formula after consumers reported unreasonably high prices.

The OAG’s investigation found that Paragon, which supplies formula to retailers in New York, generated tens of thousands of dollars in additional revenue by raising prices more than 20 percent after Abbott announced its recall.

As a result of a settlement with OAG, Paragon must pay penalties and make formula donations with a combined value of $45,000. This includes a $10,000 penalty to the state that Paragon has already paid and an additional $35,000 that can be paid in the form of donated formula or cash that must be delivered by June 10, 2025.

Today’s donation is the third secured by Attorney General James as part of the settlement with Paragon. In February, Attorney General James secured the donation of $1,500 worth of baby formula to families in Westchester, and in March, $6,300 worth of baby formula to families in Brooklyn. To date, Attorney General James has donated more than $21,400 worth of baby formula as a result of the settlement with Paragon.

“No parent should be forced to choose between paying their bills or feeding their child,” said Senator Jeremy Cooney. “When businesses illegally jack up prices for goods like baby formula, they must be held accountable. I applaud Attorney General James for once again protecting consumers and ensuring Rochester families get the relief they deserve.”

“Families are struggling to make ends meet with inflation and an economy on the brink of a recession, so this donation goes such a long way for Rochester children, who are already amongst the neediest in the nation,” said Assemblymember Jen Lunsford. “I am grateful to Attorney General James for doggedly pursuing these bad corporate actors and holding them accountable for their opportunistic money grab.”

Attorney General James is a leader in the fight to protect New York consumers and guard against price gouging. As part of a $675,000 settlement with formula suppliers Marine Park and Formula Depot, Attorney General James secured the donation of over $344,000 worth of baby formula to families in the Bronx in March 2025 and $140,000 worth of formula to families in Rochester in December 2024. In October 2024, Attorney General James led a multistate coalition urging Congressional leaders to support a national ban on price gouging. In March and April 2024, Attorney General James distributed over 9,500 cans of baby formula in Buffalo and New York City from a settlement with Walgreens for price gouging during the formula shortage. In May 2023, Attorney General James secured a $100,000 settlement with Quality King Distributors, Inc. due to unconscionable price increases for Lysol products during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. In April 2021, Attorney General James delivered 1.2 million eggs to food pantries throughout the state which were secured as part of an agreement with the nation’s largest egg producers for price gouging in the early months of the pandemic.

New Yorkers should report potential concerns about price gouging to the OAG by filing a complaint online or calling 800-771-7755.

This matter was handled by Assistant Attorney General Benjamin C. Fishman, under the supervision of Bureau Chief Jane M. Azia and Deputy Bureau Chief Laura J. Levine, all of the Consumer Frauds and Protection Bureau. Former Data Scientist Jasmine McAllister also assisted in this matter, under the supervision of Director of Research and Analytics Victoria Khan, Deputy Director Gautam Sisodia, and former Director Megan Thorsfeldt. The Consumer Frauds and Protection Bureau is a part of the Division for Economic Justice, which is led by Chief Deputy Attorney General Chris D’Angelo and is overseen by First Deputy Attorney General Jennifer Levy.

MIL OSI USA News –

May 13, 2025

Category: Law

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Other priorities