Category: Middle East

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Israel, Iran travel alert raised to black

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    The Government today raised the outbound travel alert for Israel and Iran to black in view of the latest developments there.

    It advised Hong Kong residents to avoid all travel to Israel and Iran. Those already there should attend to their personal safety and leave or relocate to relatively safe regions immediately.

    The Security Bureau will continue to closely monitor the situation in Israel and Iran and issue updates through the media, the bureau’s mobile app and its outbound travel alert webpage.

    In addition to attending to their personal safety, the bureau advised Hong Kong residents in Israel and Iran to pay attention to announcements made by local authorities and the Chinese Embassy there.

    Hong Kong residents in Israel and Iran who need assistance can call the Immigration Department’s 24-hour hotline at (852) 1868, call the 1868 hotline using network data or use the 1868 Chatbot via the department’s mobile app.

    They can also send a message to the 1868 WhatsApp assistance hotline or 1868 WeChat assistance hotline or submit an online assistance request form.

    Alternatively, they may contact the local Chinese Embassy by calling the Embassy in Israel at (972) 35459520 or the Embassy in Iran at (98) 9122176035.

    Hong Kong residents are encouraged to use the online Registration of Outbound Travel Information service to register their contact details and itinerary when outside Hong Kong.

    The information provided allows the Immigration Department to disseminate practical information to them through appropriate means on a timely basis when necessary.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: TUI Hotels & Resorts contributes to growth in Africa with strong leisure hotel brands

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    • TUI Blue and TUI Suneo extend their portfolio in North Africa
    • New openings planned in The Gambia and Côte d’Ivoire
    • New luxury brand The Mora celebrates its first anniversary

    TUI Group (www.TUIGroup.com) continues to expand its hotel business worldwide and pursues ambitious plans to support the African hospitality industry. With its 12 leisure hotel brands, TUI offers unique experiences for holidaymakers and invites them to enjoy the respective region with its culinary delights, natural beauty and cultural heritage. A few weeks ago, the brands TUI Blue and TUI Suneo expanded their portfolio in Africa. In Egypt, TUI Blue Samaya with 143 rooms and an aqua park has been added to the premium brand’s portfolio. The hotel is located in the growing destination of Marsa Alam. For holidaymakers looking for value for money, TUI Suneo Palm Beach Skanes in Tunisia has also opened its doors. With 294 rooms and a large garden area, the hotel is offering an attractive all-inclusive package with a wide range of sports and entertainment options.

    “Together with our long-standing JV partners, we have more than 20 hotels in our pipeline that will open in Africa in the coming months and years”, says Artur Gerber, Managing Director TUI Hotels & Resorts, at the Future Hospitality Summit Africa. “We already have a strong presence in North Africa, the Cape Verde Islands and Zanzibar, but we are convinced that other destinations can also benefit from our strong leisure hotel brands.” For example, the lifestyle brand TUI Blue is planning its first hotel in The Gambia, which will open at the end of this year. The resort features 140 rooms and a unique location along Kotu Beach. “With our expertise, along with management and franchise agreements, we are also attracting hotel partners in entirely new destinations. One example is Côte d’Ivoire, where the construction of a new TUI Blue hotel has just started and is scheduled to open in 2027”, adds Wesam Okasha, Head of Global Development TUI Blue.

    Last year, TUI launched a new brand targeting the upscale market and selected Tanzania as its inaugural destination. The Mora Zanzibar has just celebrated its first anniversary, offering laid-back, contemporary luxury with highly personalized and flexible service. “Our guest reviews show that The Mora is resonating strongly with this new audience and delivering an exceptional experience. We are very proud of this achievement and look forward to introducing more carefully selected The Mora hotels across Africa,” says Artur Gerber.

    TUI Hotels & Resorts’ current portfolio in Africa comprises a total of 97 hotels with over 30,000 rooms across eight countries.

    – on behalf of TUI Blue Hotels.

    TUI Group – Group Corporate & External Affairs:
    Natascha Kreye
    Corporate Communications
    Phone: +49 (0) 511 566 6029
    natascha.kreye@tui.com

    group.communications@tui.com
    www.TUIGroup.com

    About TUI Group:
    The TUI Group is one of the world’s leading tourism groups and operates worldwide. The Group is headquartered in Germany. TUI shares are listed in the MDAX index of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and in the regulated market of the Lower Saxony Stock Exchange in Hanover. TUI Group offers its over 20 million customers integrated services from a single source and forms the entire tourism value chain under one roof. The Group owns over 400 hotels and resorts with premium brands such as RIU, TUI Blue and Robinson and 18 cruise ships, ranging from the MS Europa and MS Europa 2 in the luxury class and expedition ships in the HANSEATIC class to the Mein Schiff fleet of TUI Cruises and cruise ships operated by Marella Cruises in the UK. The Group also includes Europe’s leading tour operator brands and online marketing platforms, for example for hotel-only or flight-only offers, five airlines with 125 modern medium- and long-haul aircraft and around 1,200 travel agencies. In addition to expanding its core business with hotels and cruises via successful joint ventures and activities in vacation destinations, TUI is increasingly focusing on the expansion of digital platforms. The Group is transforming itself into a global tourism platform company.  

    Global responsibility for sustainable economic, environmental and social action is at the heart of our corporate culture. With projects in 25 countries, the TUI Care Foundation initiated by TUI focuses on the positive effects of tourism, on education and training and on strengthening environmental and social standards. In this way, it supports the development of vacation destinations. The globally active TUI Care Foundation initiates projects that create new opportunities for the next generation.  

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    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi says ceasefire an urgent priority in settling conflict in Middle East 2025-06-19 19:28:10 Chinese President Xi Jinping said on Thursday that ceasefire is an urgent priority in settling the conflict in the Middle East, and the use of force is not the right way to resolve international disputes.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – Ministry of National Defense

      BEIJING, June 19 (Xinhua) — Chinese President Xi Jinping said on Thursday that ceasefire is an urgent priority in settling the conflict in the Middle East, and the use of force is not the right way to resolve international disputes.

      During phone talks with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, over the situation in the Middle East, he urged the conflicting parties, especially Israel, to cease fire as soon as possible.

      The Chinese president said that protecting civilians’ safety is the top priority amid the Iran-Israel tensions, calling on the conflicting parties to strictly follow international law, and resolutely avoid harming innocent civilians.

      Dialogue and negotiation are the fundamental way out, he said, calling on the international community, particularly major countries that have a special influence on the parties to the conflict, to make efforts to cool down the situation.

      China stands ready to continue to strengthen communication and coordination with all parties, pool their efforts, and uphold justice, so as to play a constructive role in restoring peace in the Middle East, he said. 

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    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi says ceasefire an urgent priority in settling conflict in Middle East

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Chinese President Xi Jinping said on Thursday that ceasefire is an urgent priority in settling the conflict in the Middle East, and the use of force is not the right way to resolve international disputes.

    During phone talks with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, over the situation in the Middle East, he urged the conflicting parties, especially Israel, to cease fire as soon as possible.

    The Chinese president said that protecting civilians’ safety is the top priority amid the Iran-Israel tensions, calling on the conflicting parties to strictly follow international law, and resolutely avoid harming innocent civilians.

    Dialogue and negotiation are the fundamental way out, he said, calling on the international community, particularly major countries that have a special influence on the parties to the conflict, to make efforts to cool down the situation.

    China stands ready to continue to strengthen communication and coordination with all parties, pool their efforts, and uphold justice, so as to play a constructive role in restoring peace in the Middle East, he said.

    MIL OSI China News

  • Sensex, Nifty end marginally lower as geopolitical tensions, Fed decision weigh on sentiment

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (2)

    ata-start=”105″ data-end=”439″>Equity benchmarks ended marginally lower on Thursday as caution prevailed in global markets amid rising geopolitical tensions and the US Federal Reserve’s policy stance. The Sensex slipped by 82.79 points, or 0.10%, to close at 81,361.87, while the Nifty declined by 18.80 points, or 0.08%, to settle at 24,793.25.

    The market mood remained subdued as tensions between Iran and Israel escalated, crude oil prices stayed volatile, and global investors reacted to the Fed’s decision to hold interest rates steady between 4.25% and 4.5%.

    “The equity index witnessed rangebound trading with a negative bias due to global uncertainty, particularly over possible US involvement in the Middle-East conflict,” said Vinod Nair, Head of Research at Geojit Financial Services. He added that the Fed’s hawkish tone, pointing to persistent inflation and slower growth, also weighed on sentiment, especially for software exporters.

    On the Sensex, Bajaj Finance, Tech Mahindra, IndusInd Bank, and Nestle India were among the top losers, shedding between 1.28% and 2.50%. In contrast, Mahindra & Mahindra, Titan, Maruti Suzuki, Bharti Airtel, and Larsen & Toubro posted gains of up to 1.57%.

    The broader market bore the brunt of the selling pressure. The Nifty Midcap100 index dropped by 1.63%, and the Nifty Smallcap100 fell 1.99%, reflecting investor risk aversion toward mid- and small-cap segments.

    Among sectoral indices, Nifty Auto emerged as the lone gainer, closing up 0.52%. All other major indices ended in the red. Nifty PSU Bank led the decline, slipping 2.04%, followed by losses of over 1% in the Nifty Metal, Media, and Realty indices.

    The Indian rupee weakened for the third straight session, pressured by rising geopolitical uncertainty and the Fed’s stance. “The rupee’s downward trend may continue, with the USD/INR pair likely moving toward the 87–87.50 range,” said Dilip Parmar, Research Analyst at HDFC Securities.

    Gold prices moved in a volatile range. On Comex, gold traded between $3,347 and $3,375, while on the MCX, prices ranged from ₹98,650 to ₹99,450 per 10 grams.

    -IANS

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Global march to Gaza: MEPs worried about the treatment of activists in Egypt

    Source: European Parliament 3

    Concerned about reports of the deportation and maltreatment, leading MEPs call on the Egyptian authorities to ensure the respect for human rights.

    Tineke Strik (Greens, NL), standing rapporteur for Egypt and Mounir Satouri (Greens, FR), Chair of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, issued the following statement on Thursday, 19 June:

    “We are concerned about credible reports of the deportation and mistreatment of citizens, including from EU member states, by the Egyptian authorities over the past couple of days.

    “Thousands of activists from around the world travelled to Egypt to participate in the ‘Global March to Gaza’ and following their arrival reported about (incommunicado) detention, physical harassment, unjustified denials of entry, and the confiscation of passports and mobile phones.”

    “Under Article 2 of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement, the Egyptian authorities committed themselves to the respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights as set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. More recently, the EU and Egypt agreed to an upgraded partnership that reiterates cooperation grounded in mutual respect, trust, and shared human rights commitments.

    “We call on the Egyptian authorities to adhere to these commitments and ensure the respect for the human rights of all persons under its jurisdiction. Moreover, we call upon the authorities to provide clarification about these recent incidents as soon as possible. We have also conveyed this message to the Egyptian Ambassador to the EU.”

    For further information contact:

    Office of Tineke Strik, tel. +32 2 284 52 12, e-mail: tineke.strik@europarl.europa.eu

    Office of Mounir Satouri, tel. +32 2 284 55 21, e-mail: mounir.satouri@europarl.europa.eu

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Interview with Alexey Overchuk for the Vedomosti newspaper.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Alexey Overchuk: “A change in the technological order is taking place”

    Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk discusses the nature of the changes taking place in international trade, the struggle of countries for access to rare earth minerals, and the establishment of new trade relations for Russia in an interview with Vedomosti.

    Interview with Alexey Overchuk for the Vedomosti newspaper

    Question: Vedomosti, together with Roscongress and economists, prepared a report for the SPIEF on the topic of “Global Development Opportunities.” The main trend that experts are currently noting is the fragmentation of the global economy. In your opinion, what balance of power may be established in the near future?

    A. Overchuk: Indeed, fragmentation of the world economy, or deglobalization, is happening. This has an economic background.

    Globalization emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s as a response to the economic and social successes of the socialist economy. In the United States, it was seen as a threat to a way of life based on private property.

    In this global confrontation, the USSR and its allies were excluded from global supply chains, financial restrictions were imposed on them, export controls were applied, obstacles were created to obtaining export revenues, and conditions were created for the diversion of resources to unproductive expenditures, such as the arms race and peripheral military conflicts. The policy of containment put the USSR in a position where its revenue opportunities were narrowed and its expenditure obligations increased. The calculation was that at some point the country’s budget, formed on the basis of a strict planning system, would cross the break-even point and the state would not be able to fulfill its obligations to the Soviet people.

    At the same time, in exchange for participating in the containment policy, the United States created the most favorable conditions for the development of the countries that supported them. They were provided with access to cheap finance, technology, education, and security guarantees. Thus, these countries were freed up funds that could be used for development, and market conditions and freedom of capital movement made it possible to build the most effective international supply chains. Investments were placed where they gave the greatest return, which made it possible to better saturate the market with goods. An international trade system was formed that sought to ensure free access of goods to foreign markets, including the most capacious consumer market on the planet.

    The United States bore the burden of maintaining this system for decades, but also, thanks to the strength of its domestic market, it was able to turn a blind eye to tariff restrictions and barriers to American exports in the markets of friendly countries. Many of these countries took advantage of globalization, which demonstrated the advantages of a market economy. It was not emphasized that this success was financed by the largest economy in the world. The outcome of the confrontation between the two economic systems is known, and, obviously, the point of further bearing these costs has diminished. Today, countries that have enjoyed the benefits of globalization for 70 years are forced to pay their own bills, costs and their structure are changing, and this is pushing the world to find a new balance.

    Question: Why did fragmentation begin now?

    A. Overchuk: These processes are long and are now just becoming noticeable. Over the past 30 years, there has been a series of economic crises and regional conflicts that have diverted resources and influenced the growth of national debt. The United States allowed a trade imbalance and barriers to its exports. Trust in the dollar-based international financial system has been undermined. The freezing of Russian foreign assets and talk of their confiscation have called into question the security of property rights. New technologies have emerged. Internal problems have accumulated. Apparently, [US President Donald] Trump wondered: why continue to bear this global burden when solving the accumulated internal problems requires corresponding expenses? All this has a complex effect.

    In addition, the pandemic has highlighted the weaknesses of the global economy. China has gone into isolation, causing supply disruptions to global markets. The vulnerability of international commodity flows and dependence on foreign suppliers, for example, of the same chips, began to be perceived as a security threat. There has come an understanding that the global economy does not always work as we would like, it is necessary to reduce the transport shoulder, move production closer to consumers, and even better, especially when it comes to security issues, not to transfer technology and develop our own production.

    Question: How would you identify the potential fault lines of global economic fragmentation?

    A. Overchuk: The modern world is connected by complex economic threads, and if they begin to break, their recreation in other regions will require very large investments, the justification of which will often be questionable. At the same time, processes have already been launched that are throwing the global system out of balance and forcing the formation of new cooperation chains and the search for new balances. In this environment, countries will be attracted to the largest economies of their regions. Obviously, such factors as the presence of domestic consumer demand capable of ensuring the necessary level of sustainable independent development, the presence of science and a production base that supports technological sovereignty, own resources necessary to ensure food and energy security, as well as the development of a new economy will play a role here. Availability of water will be critical. The presence of a civilizational community and a common language for communication will play a role. Not many regions of the planet that, despite fragmentation, will continue to maintain ties with each other fall under this description.

    Question: The trade deficit has been the main reason for the double- and triple-digit tariffs in the US. What are the long-term consequences of the US tariffs?

    A. Overchuk: They will negotiate and look for a balance of interests. First, they announced an increase in tariffs and made it clear to their partners how everything could suddenly change and become bad, and then they rolled back and negotiations began. Tariffs are a double-edged sword. Their growth entails an increase in prices for imported consumer goods, which affects inflation, leads to a drop in real incomes, etc. It is unlikely that anyone wants to go this route completely, but some positions of American exports may improve. The main goal of these efforts is to create conditions for the relocation of production to North America. A self-sufficient macro-region with a huge consumer market and global export opportunities is being formed here. Such shifts do not happen quickly, so the coming years will be spent in a joint search for new equilibrium points, which will be very dynamic. Agreements will be reached and quickly revised.

    Question: We discussed with experts how difficult it will be for China to overcome this. They are focused on the domestic market, but the export economy still accounts for a significant part of the GDP. How will this hit China, even if they agree to reduce duties to reasonable levels?

    A. Overchuk: China is making a lot of efforts to improve people’s living standards and increase domestic consumption. Its progress in this area is obvious. On the other hand, it is, of course, an export-oriented economy that has extracted maximum benefits from globalization and has become one of the most technologically advanced on the planet. The international trade system has made the economies of the United States and China interdependent like no other. The state of relations between them determines the well-being of the entire world, and both countries understand the consequences of their abrupt rupture. At the same time, it is known that China’s growth is now perceived in the United States as a threat to its leadership. Hence the use of export control measures and the withdrawal of assets of American companies. In addition, recreating the international supply chains formed in and around China will require attracting an unbearable volume of investment. This will take time. So there will be agreements on some positions.

    At the same time, China is actively diversifying its export markets. As a country with a strategic vision, China has been working on implementing its Belt and Road Initiative for over 10 years, creating favorable conditions for promoting its goods, services, technologies, and knowledge to foreign markets. This is a global project. Geography does not allow us to talk about it as a macro-region, but rather as a global network structure with the center of economic gravity in China.

    Question: It used to be that the production process was distributed across different countries: raw materials were mined here, processing and assembly took place – design and software work took place there… If the value chains were to be broken, how would production and international trade take place?

    A. Overchuk: It will not come to a complete break. The world is very complex now. Hundreds and thousands of individual components and parts are produced in dozens of countries and cross state borders dozens of times before they are put together into a final product that is consumed on some completely different side of the world. The changes that are taking place lead to changes in the cost structure of production and delivery of goods and services to end consumers, which does not go unnoticed by investors and they react to it. In addition, the global economic system has shown its vulnerabilities. Some things will continue to be created as a product resulting from coordinated global efforts, while others will be localized within individual macro-regions and countries. Much of this is based on economic calculations, while others are dictated by the current global situation.

    Particular attention should be paid to new types of resources for the new economy. After all, countries with technologies do not always have a sufficient resource base. Therefore, international supply chains connecting different regions of the world are likely to receive new content. Countries with technologies will strive to develop their own production, and therefore the need for cross-border knowledge transfer will decrease. End consumers will have access to user devices connected to computing power located in countries that own technological solutions and intellectual property rights. The main flows of global income will also be directed there. Such technological dependence will be avoided by those who can independently develop the relevant competencies and protect their market. Potentially, there are three or four macro-regions on the planet that are already doing this or will be able to do so.

    Question: Is it economically feasible to do everything in one country?

    A. Overchuk: It is economically expedient to optimize costs, i.e. to distribute production in such a way that the best competitive conditions are achieved for each specific product on the consumer market. This is how it worked under globalization. On the other hand, there are factors of technological sovereignty, food and energy security. Some countries can afford greater dependence on external circumstances, some less. Their income level will also depend on this.

    Question: So this is a question of national security and sovereignty?

    A. Overchuk: This is at the intersection of interests, ambitions and opportunities.

    Question: If we resume trade relations with the US, is it possible to increase trade turnover? Last year it was a 30-year low – $3.5 billion. Compared to the economies these are, one could say there was simply no trade turnover.

    A. Overchuk: Our trade turnover with one of the two largest economies in the world (China. – Vedomosti) exceeds $244 billion. With Belarus we have $51 billion, with Armenia it exceeded $12 billion. Therefore, as they say, when there is practically nothing, Russian-American mutual trade has good potential. Taking into account the low base effect, trade turnover with the USA will grow rapidly if such decisions are made.

    The United States is currently attracting investors to its country and seeking to create new production facilities. Even taking into account the capacity of the North American market, the United States will be interested in increasing its exports. From this point of view, the EAEU is about 190 million consumers with good purchasing power living within the perimeter of the common customs contour. In other words, this is a promising market for the United States. As for the reverse flow of goods from the EAEU, we see interest in access to critical minerals and rare earths, which Central Asia, located between China, Afghanistan, Iran, the Caspian Sea and Russia, is rich in. Investing in the creation of modern high-tech production facilities in North America requires ensuring guaranteed supplies of raw materials, which makes the existence of secure supply chains critically necessary. The most cost-effective and secure route from Central Asia to North America lies north of Kazakhstan to the Baltic and the Barents Sea. There are other areas of mutual interest, so there is certainly potential.

    Question: This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Greater Eurasian Partnership idea. It was planned that the EAEU would be “coupled” with other associations that already exist on the continent. Which ones have more prospects?

    A. Overchuk: Various integration associations are being formed on the large Eurasian continent today. There is the EU, the EAEU, the CIS, and ASEAN. China is developing its Belt and Road project. The SCO has recently been paying increasing attention to issues of improving transport connectivity on the continent and creating common investment mechanisms for development. These are already mechanisms for linking participating economies.

    If we talk about the EAEU, work is underway to develop international transport corridors that will play a central role in the overall transport framework of Greater Eurasia, integration with the Chinese Belt and Road initiative is being carried out, industrial cooperation projects that build value chains are being supported, trade barriers are being reduced, and the free trade zone is being expanded. This is what is already being done.

    Of particular importance for the EAEU is the development of trade relations with the countries of the Global South and the formation of better conditions for promoting exports from our countries to this market, as well as saturating our common market with their products. These efforts contribute to the development of mutual trade with India, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and further – with Southeast Asia, with Africa. These are all rapidly developing markets with good demographics, and there is prospect there.

    Question: Since you mentioned Afghanistan… The Supreme Court lifted the terrorist status of the Taliban, the de facto authorities of the country. How do you think this could change the approaches to the implementation of international projects in the country and Russia’s participation in them?

    A. Overchuk: Russia has a varied history with this country, and many people have questions about the normalization of relations with the Taliban movement. What should be understood here? For the first time in many years, a situation has developed in Afghanistan where the central government controls the entire territory of the country and seeks to ensure peaceful conditions. Representatives of Afghanistan say that they are interested in living in peace with their neighbors and developing their own economy. The results of these efforts are already noticeable. Automobile transit from Russia, from Central Asia through Afghanistan to Pakistan has begun.

    The Afghans have proposed a list of projects: from the construction of residential buildings to power plants, from road construction to the production and processing of agricultural products. Any government interested in improving life in its country will take such actions. It is in our interests for Afghanistan to be a peaceful state, and for people to be engaged in peaceful life. We want to contribute to this. Especially since the leadership of this country demonstrates a positive attitude towards Russia.

    Question: On the issue of Eurasian transport corridors. There is North-South. Iraq has spoken about its intention to build a branch from Iran. There is Turkey’s “Development Road” project – from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Turkey and Europe. Can this also be connected somehow? Or are they competitors?

    A. Overchuk: There are many initiatives in the transport and logistics sector on the continent. Countries are striving to develop international transport corridors. As a result, a single transport framework of Greater Eurasia will be formed. The totality of these efforts, even competing with each other, will strengthen transport connectivity in the macro-region and promote the development of its economies. Everyone in Greater Eurasia will benefit from this. But peace is needed for this.

    Question: We have a free trade zone with Vietnam. Are there any similar agreements planned with India, with which our trade is growing?

    A. Overchuk: The purpose of such agreements is to simplify trade conditions, reduce costs for business by improving the accessibility of foreign markets, which leads to an increase in mutual trade, complementarity and growth of the economies of the participating countries. The EAEU member states view India as the largest and geographically closest market in Eurasia to our union, with which it is possible to conclude a free trade agreement. Together with our partners in the EAEU and the CIS, we are working to improve transport connectivity with India and create better conditions for the mutual movement of goods between our markets. Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan are also interested in developing such infrastructure. The free trade agreement with Iran entered into force in May this year. Preparations were underway with Pakistan to launch the first freight train between our countries. Our vision of Greater Eurasia, among other things, includes the formation of a continental transport framework, which, where possible, will be supported by free trade agreements. It is clear that what is now starting to happen between Iran and Israel is pushing this prospect back and slowing down the economic development of the countries in the region.

    Consultations are underway on the issue of the agreement with India. We see that India is also working in this direction, concluding agreements with other countries, for example with the UAE or, most recently, in May, with Britain, developing trade and economic ties with the USA. The totality of such efforts of many countries is forming a new network of mutually beneficial ties and relations between states and international integration associations.

    Question: What are the positions of the parties?

    A. Overchuk: The positions of the parties will be set out in the signed document.

    Question: You said that it is important to strengthen good-neighborly relations in order to counter external challenges that are growing every year. In this regard, what prospects do you see for the development of the EAEU? Is it possible to expand the number of its participants?

    A. Overchuk: The EAEU has already reached a very high level of economic integration. Five equal member states have access to a large common market, have put in place a mechanism to support industrial cooperation and are jointly expanding the free trade zone, providing better competitive conditions for their exports. In general, the EAEU has resolved the problems of food and energy security, and transport connectivity is being strengthened. Last year, the GDP growth rates of the EAEU member states exceeded the world average. All this does not go unnoticed, and an increasing number of countries are showing interest in closer cooperation with our integration association.

    As for the accession of new states to the EAEU, this is always their sovereign decision, taken based on an analysis of the pros and cons that the respective economies will receive. Countries comprehensively assess the impact of integration on individual sectors of their economy, investment attraction, the labor market, their foreign economic and foreign policy relations with other countries. For our part, we also consider these models, assess how the opening of our markets to potential member states will affect our economies, as well as how the structure of their economies will be transformed. We understand that for the economies of our closest neighbors, joining the EAEU will create new opportunities for growth and development.

    Question: We have observer countries in the EAEU. As if joining is the next step for them?

    A. Overchuk: Observer states in the EAEU are Uzbekistan, Iran, Cuba. This status gives the country the opportunity to gain access to materials, documents, have the opportunity to participate at the expert level in working meetings, can state their positions there, and also take part in regular meetings at the level of heads of government and heads of state. The EAEU is the largest economic integration association in our region, and, understanding its logic, they can make more informed decisions for interaction and development of their economies.

    The EAEU is a leading trading partner, for example, for Uzbekistan. At the same time, Uzbekistan is a member of the CIS, where there is also a free trade zone for goods and services. In addition, Uzbekistan has certain advantages in customs clearance of goods going to our markets. Russian business is actively investing in the economy of this country. Our countries have a flexible set of economic integration tools and have the choice to act as they see fit. If any country ever considers it promising to join the EAEU, it will make a corresponding request, and the EAEU member states will consider it.

    Question: There is also the issue of distribution of duties in the EAEU. Could this be a barrier for countries to join?

    A. Overchuk: The system of distribution of customs duties is designed in such a way that the accession of a new member state will require a revision of the existing shares due to each state. This is part of the accession process, during which all countries will agree on a new distribution formula, which directly affects the size of customs revenues of each participant in the integration association. However, even if we imagine that the country will incur losses, it will still ultimately benefit from access to a larger market, participation in cooperation chains, resources and the economic growth associated with all this. All this is taken into account, and the experience of the EAEU shows that agreements are always found. So there is no barrier here – there will be negotiations, and this is normal.

    Question: It seems that there is a threat of the opposite process – a reduction in the number of EAEU participants. Armenia recently adopted a law on striving to join the EU. At the end of 2024, you said that Yerevan’s trade with it was falling, while with the EAEU it was growing. The Armenian Foreign Ministry said in May that they had not submitted applications to the EU and intended to work in the EAEU. How do you assess such conflicting signals?

    A. Overchuk: In 2014, before joining the EAEU, Armenia’s per capita GDP was approximately $3,850. Thanks to barrier-free access to the EAEU market, this figure exceeded $8,500 in 2024. Mutual trade with the EAEU in 2024 reached $12.7 billion. For comparison: the volume of mutual trade between Armenia and the EU in 2024 was $2.3 billion. Providing the republic with food and energy on favorable terms also contributes to the sustainable and dynamic development of Armenia as our ally. Armenia’s economic success is a demonstration of the advantages of the interaction model within the EAEU. On the one hand, this is what shapes reality in Armenia, and on the other hand, there are people in Armenia who believe that developing relations with the EU opens up more prospects for their country than interaction with the EAEU. Ultimately, this will be the choice of the Armenian people, and we will always respect it.

    Currently, there is a discussion in Armenia and practical measures are being taken to get closer to the EU. This is already having a negative economic effect. Back in September of last year, I drew the attention of my colleagues to the fact that due to the rapprochement with the EU, Russian entrepreneurs are starting to be more cautious about doing business with Armenia. According to our estimates, our mutual trade turnover last year already lost about $2 billion. This year, we have already lost $3 billion, and the overall decline by the end of the year will obviously be $6 billion. For a country with a GDP of about $26 billion, these are very noticeable figures. And this is only the reaction of Russian business to the Armenian discussion about rapprochement with the EU.

    It is obvious that the EAEU and the EU are incompatible. It is impossible to be in two unions at the same time. Moreover, Brussels, despite the fact that many in Armenia do not want a break, will not allow Yerevan to have normal relations with Russia in the current conditions. Therefore, when the people of Armenia go to make their choice, they will need to imagine how this will affect the lives of ordinary people and what will happen next.

    For example, in 2022, Brussels closed the skies of Europe to Russian air carriers. The European perspective means that Yerevan will also have to stop air traffic with Russia, since decisions will be made elsewhere. Of course, people will adapt and start flying via Tbilisi, but this means that families will not be able to communicate with their loved ones in Russia as easily, or grandchildren from Russia cannot simply be put on a direct flight to Yerevan and sent to their relatives for the summer. Of course, the flow of tourists from Russia – and this is the main source of tourist income – will come to naught, which will affect the hotel and restaurant business, and this will also affect retail.

    Europe has closed for Russian hauliers and retaliatory measures have been introduced against European hauliers. Today, at the borders of the Union State of Russia and Belarus with the EU, cargo is being re-coupled, and then it is pulled by a vehicle with Russian or Belarusian license plates. The European perspective means that Armenian trucks will also come to Verkhniy Lars, re-coupled and return back to Armenia. There may be many such everyday examples in the future.

    This year, the dynamics of Armenia’s trade with the EU has shown growth, while Armenian exports to the EU are declining. Unfortunately, Armenia has already made a decision to simplify the procedure for processing documents on conformity assessment of food products imported to Armenia from non-EAEU member states. Because of this seemingly inconspicuous decision, in addition to the fact that foreign goods will begin to create competition within Armenia and displace Armenian producers, Russia will need to assess the threats to its market. The authors of this document expect that the EAEU will not be able to open its market to goods that do not meet its requirements, which means that Russia will need to strengthen control in Upper Lars, which will be felt by many bona fide Armenian producers selling their goods to Russia, and this will cause their dissatisfaction with the actions of Russia and the EAEU. We are being placed in such conditions, and the ultimate goal of these efforts, as the EU wants, is a complete break between Russia and Armenia. Whether the Armenians want this is a question they will have to answer. In today’s reality, given the state of relations between Russia and the EU, this is exactly how life looks, and people need to know about it.

    The law declaring the beginning of the process of joining the EU has already been adopted, and we have a tradition of taking the law seriously. It is a difficult situation: once again, it will be the choice of the people of Armenia, and we will respect it. We want to develop multifaceted ties with Armenia. Armenian employers and regions are also in favor of developing ties with Russia, they are talking about the urgent need to increase the number of checkpoints.

    Question: From the point of view of global development trends, can the EU somehow be part of the Greater Eurasian space?

    A. Overchuk: Someday, maybe. The main problem of the European Union is the lack of its own resources, and Europeans have long understood this well. Every time the world stood on the threshold of a new industrial revolution, the question of access to resources arose. If you recall the Treaty of Versailles, then significant attention was paid to coal, and if you recall the post-war agreements in the 20th century, then the discussion was about gas and oil. In the context of the transition to a new economic order, Europe is seeking to gain access to resources that it does not have, but which are necessary to maintain its position in the new world.

    The EU is the largest developed market with high purchasing power of the population. In the current conditions, the EU ceases to be a purely economic union, while it is losing its production base, in a number of important positions it depends on foreign technologies, and the most effective transport routes pass through the Union State. A more sober assessment of the situation would help Brussels peacefully fit into global trends, become part of Greater Eurasia and largely maintain its standard of living.

    Question: BRICS, which includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, the UAE, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia, has been expanding very rapidly in recent years – up to and including 2024. What opportunities does Russia have in BRICS? Is further expansion possible?

    A. Overchuk: BRICS is a unique platform: there are no big, small, senior or junior. It appeared relatively recently and, one might say, is still feeling out possible options for interaction, comparing the positions of the parties and, due to its global nature and respectful attitude to the opinions of all partners, is careful in forming institutional mechanisms for interaction. Discussions take place on an equal footing, without mentoring, moralizing or imposing someone else’s positions. Everyone has the opportunity to convey their point of view, and if others share it, it is reflected in the final documents, which, as a rule, reflect positions on issues on the global agenda, and also define a joint vision of development.

    BRICS does not oppose itself to the existing international institutions and does not seek to replace them, most likely, it develops a joint position for work within them. At the same time, without opposing itself to the existing international structures, BRICS does not exclude the creation of alternative structures. For example, the New Development Bank has been created. There is an exchange of experience, knowledge, approaches, and certain positions are being developed at the interdepartmental level. There is in-depth interaction along the lines of finance ministries, central banks, tax authorities, transport workers and other areas. This in itself is very valuable and, in the case of joint interest, can begin to acquire specifics.

    Other important points that are probably not paid much attention to: BRICS does not include countries whose relations were burdened by a colonial past, and there is no division into developed and developing countries. All this makes it attractive for many countries of the world.

    Question: The BRICS countries are very geographically divided by regions: there are integration associations that are geographically more compact – the EAEU, the EU, NAFTA. That is, this is not an integration process and organization, but rather a club, like the G20 or an alternative to the G7?

    A. Overchuk: The advantage of BRICS is that it is not really a regional association. Its wide geographical distribution ensures the presence of various points of view on this platform, reflecting regional characteristics and vision. Countries that play a leading role in their regions participate there. Many of them are centers of economic attraction in their regions, and in this sense BRICS can become a coordinating support for the interaction of future macro-regions. And this gives BRICS additional weight, not to mention the fact that BRICS is today economically larger than the G7.

    Question: What are Russia’s prospects with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)? Is a free trade zone possible with this association?

    A. Overchuk: Interaction in the EAEU-ASEAN format is developing. EAEU and ASEAN days are held at the ASEAN and EEC venues. Last year, a session on “Economic Integration and Connectivity of ASEAN and Northern Eurasia Macroregions” was held as part of the ASEAN Business Investment Summit, where the conjugation of their economic potentials was discussed. Over the past 10 years, mutual trade between Russia and ASEAN countries has grown by more than 80%. Cooperation will develop, but, of course, the relocation of production, changes in tariff policy, and the need to create conditions for development in the EAEU member states require a careful assessment of the consequences of concluding free trade agreements, which our five countries always do.

    And then there is APEC, which includes the USA, China, Japan, Mexico, Canada, Australia and other countries of the Pacific Ocean basin, where the idea of creating a free trade zone was also previously promoted. The world is trying out interaction in various formats, in which, in principle, everyone shares common points of view regarding a set of global challenges.

    Question: You have previously predicted that there will be a struggle between countries for access to rare earth minerals. The United States and Ukraine recently signed an agreement on access to them. Why have rare earth minerals become such an important resource?

    A. Overchuk: The fall in the cost of memory storage and the data streams continuously generated by the Internet of Things, along with the ability to work with unstructured data, have pushed the corporate world to create digital services based on algorithms and predictive analytics methods that allow us to predict the behavior of both various systems and individual users. In turn, all this has paved the way for the development of large language models and artificial intelligence, which requires a lot of energy. A little earlier, global concern about the growth of the average temperature on the planet and the need to switch to clean energy sources became more acute. The synergy of these changes leads to a point beyond which, as famous classics wrote, other production forces and production relations begin to operate. All this began to move actively about 15-17 years ago. So if you follow these processes, what is happening becomes clear.

    The technological order is changing, and this always requires new resources. When we depended – still depend, however – on the internal combustion engine, oil was the main resource. Today, the world is changing – and critical minerals and rare earths are becoming priority resources. But no serious investor will start investing until they have calculated all the risks and are completely confident in the control over the uninterrupted supply of raw materials.

    In the modern world, everyone strives to breathe fresh air, have access to clean water and prevent the planet’s temperature from rising. Achieving these noble goals requires restructuring the economy, closing old and organizing new production facilities, which creates a new demand and structure for the consumption of raw materials. For example, the transition to electric vehicles entails an increase in demand for lithium, copper, nickel and other so-called critical materials. Previously, these resources were not needed in such quantities, but today the situation has changed. Therefore, an assessment is made of global reserves, in which countries they are located, to what extent they will be able to meet the expected demand.

    There are studies that suggest that maintaining someone’s usual level of consumption, for example, two cars in each family, may raise the issue of a shortage of critical materials on the planet. It is clear that the economy of shared consumption has arrived and it is becoming more convenient to order a taxi or rent a car through an app than to buy one, but nevertheless, the issue of resource shortage is present. Therefore, those who have the appropriate technologies and an understanding of the development vector are striving to gain control over critical materials and rare earths. What happened in Ukraine with the signing of the well-known agreement is one illustration of the process. This is really very critical for the development of society, ensuring leadership positions in the global economy and maintaining the usual level of consumption. Those who do not yet fully understand this – enter into contracts with foreign companies to develop their reserves.

    Question: In addition to new types of resources, the issue of world hunger is also being discussed. It is believed that consumption will change, food preferences will change. For example, there is an opinion that there will not be enough meat for everyone, there will be plant food.

    A. Overchuk: At the recent Astana Forum, the FAO Director General said that Kazakhstan could theoretically feed 1 billion people. This is a very serious figure, given that the area under grain crops in Kazakhstan is about 15 million hectares, while in the world it is about 700 million hectares. This is only about Kazakhstan. Russia has more areas, better water supply, and higher yields. In addition, if we talk about the production and export of fertilizers to global markets, Russia and Belarus have strong positions here. Our macro-region is very well positioned in terms of ensuring its own food security and has unique export potential. If we are not hindered in receiving income from the sale of grain and food, then the problems of hunger in the world will be less acute.

    And of course, it is necessary to help needy countries develop food production, overcome poverty and increase incomes. This potential has not yet been exhausted either.

    Question: Another trend that is being talked about all over the world is the demographic problem: the aging population, the declining birth rate, even in India. This also directly affects the economy through labor resources, demand. How can we solve this problem here in Northern Eurasia? Attract labor from South Asia, ASEAN, Africa?

    A. Overchuk: A decrease in the supply of labor in the labor market leads to an increase in its cost and inflation. The import of cheap labor allows us to solve current problems, but in the longer term it reduces incentives to increase labor productivity, transition to new technologies and leads to economic backwardness. Given the advantages that Northern Eurasia has, it is already attracting migrants from South Asia and Africa.

    In some places, the demographic problem is considered to be population decline, while in others, on the contrary, it is population growth. Some places experience a labor shortage, while in others, there is an oversupply and pressure on social infrastructure. In general, Northern Eurasia looks rather balanced. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan are recording rapid growth: for example, in Uzbekistan in 2024, with a population of almost 38 million people, 962,000 children were born. So the problems are different everywhere.

    Northern Eurasia is a single civilizational space with a common language of communication and worldview. This unity is the greatest advantage of all the peoples inhabiting our region, and therefore it is very important to preserve and support it. It is these efforts, as well as technological development and increased labor productivity, that will allow us to preserve our uniqueness and provide what is necessary for the further development of our macro-region in the new world.

    Question: Now the status of the world’s factory belongs to China. There is the US, which is transferring production to itself with the help of a trade war. There is ASEAN, for example, where even China is transferring production because there is cheap labor there. There is Africa. What new future layouts for the global division of labor do you see?

    A. Overchuk: These processes are constantly happening in the world. 70 years ago, the main production facilities were located in the USA and Europe. Then they moved to Japan, then to South Korea and China. Now the ASEAN countries are growing, and Africa is starting to develop. Every time one of the countries reached a certain level of development and income, investors had a question about the advisability of moving assets to economies that require lower costs. The impetus for making such decisions, as a rule, is a change in the cost of labor and, for example, tariff measures. Access to water and energy, the environment for doing business are also important. China has now reached a point of development where it itself has begun to move its production, and not only to the ASEAN countries, but also to the North American free trade zone, and is actively working with Africa.

    This process has been repeated in one form or another in different countries at different times. Assessing the features of the current stage, it is necessary to pay attention to the reduction in the share of live labor in the cost structure, which is happening due to the widespread introduction of new technologies, including artificial intelligence. This is what makes it possible to return production to highly developed countries with traditionally high labor costs. The advantage will be with those who master the technology and access to resources, but this will also increase the income gap, which will pose very serious social issues for these countries, including the need for a wider distribution of private property and the income it creates.

    Question: What will this changing world be like in the medium and long term, and what will be Russia’s role in it?

    A. Overchuk: In terms of purchasing power parity, Russia is one of the four leading economies in the world, which makes it the center of economic gravity of Northern Eurasia. Russia and its allies in the EAEU and the CIS have everything they need for confident development in the world of the future. Together, we have a literate and relatively large population, we have technologies and all the necessary resources, including water, we do not have acute problems with food and energy security, and we are expanding the free trade zone. The CIS countries have everything they need for success, which will be possible if we complement each other, develop integration, and jointly build ties with other macro-regions of the emerging world.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-Evening Report: A war on diplomacy itself – Israel’s unprovoked attack on Iran

    ANALYSIS: By Joe Hendren

    Had Israel not launched its unprovoked attack on Iran on Friday night, in direct violation of the UN Charter, Iran would now be taking part in the sixth round of negotiations concerning the future of its nuclear programme, meeting with representatives from the United States in Muscat, the capital of Oman.

    Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu claimed he acted to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb, saying Iran had the capacity to build nine nuclear weapons. Israel provided no evidence to back up its claims.

    On 25 March 2025, Trump’s own National Director of Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard said: 

    “The IC [Intelligence Community] continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorised the nuclear weapons programme he suspended in 2003. The IC is monitoring if Tehran decides to reauthorise its nuclear weapons programme”

    Even if Iran had the capability to build a bomb, it is quite another thing to have the will to do so.

    Any such bomb would need to be tested first, and any such test would be quickly detected by a series of satellites on the lookout for nuclear detonations anywhere on the planet.

    It is more likely that Israel launched its attack to stop US and Iranian negotiators from meeting on Sunday.

    Only a month ago, Iran’s lead negotiator in the nuclear talks, Ali Shamkhani, told US television that Iran was ready to do a deal. NBC journalist Richard Engel reports:

    “Shamkhani said Iran is willing to commit to never having a nuclear weapon, to get rid of its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, to only enrich to a level needed for civilian use and to allow inspectors in to oversee it all, in exchange for lifting all sanctions immediately. He said Iran would accept that deal tonight.”

    Inside Iran as Trump presses for nuclear deal.   Video: NBC News

    Shamkhani died on Saturday, following injuries he suffered during Israel’s attack on Friday night. It appears that Israel not only opposed a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear impasse: Israel killed it directly.

    A spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Esmaeil Baghaei, told a news conference in Tehran the talks would be suspended until Israel halts its attacks:

    “It is obvious that in such circumstances and until the Zionist regime’s aggression against the Iranian nation stops, it would be meaningless to participate with the party that is the biggest supporter and accomplice of the aggressor.”

    On 1 April 2024, Israel launched an airstrike on Iran’s embassy in Syria, killing 16 people, including a woman and her son. The attack violated international norms regarding the protection of diplomatic premises under the Vienna Convention.

    Yet the UK, USA and France blocked a United Nations Security Council statement condemning Israel’s actions.

    It is worth noting how the The New York Times described the occupation of the US Embassy in November 1979:

    “But it is the Ayatollah himself who is doing the devil’s work by inciting and condoning the student invasion of the American and British Embassies in Tehran. This is not just a diplomatic affront; it is a declaration of war on diplomacy itself, on usages and traditions honoured by all nations, however old and new, whatever belief.

    “The immunities given a ruler’s emissaries were respected by the kings of Persia during wars with Greece and by the Ayatollah’s spiritual ancestors during the Crusades.”

    Now it is Israel conducting a “war on diplomacy itself”, first with the attack on the embassy, followed by Friday’s surprise attack on Iran. Scuppering a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue appears to be the aim. To make matters worse, Israel’s recklessness could yet cause a major war.

    Trump: Inconsistent and ineffective
    In an interview with Time magazine on 22 April 2025, Trump denied he had stopped Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear sites.

    “No, it’s not right. I didn’t stop them. But I didn’t make it comfortable for them, because I think we can make a deal without the attack. I hope we can. It’s possible we’ll have to attack because Iran will not have a nuclear weapon.

    “But I didn’t make it comfortable for them, but I didn’t say no. Ultimately I was going to leave that choice to them, but I said I would much prefer a deal than bombs being dropped.”

    — US President Donald Trump

    In the same interview Trump boasted “I think we’re going to make a deal with Iran. Nobody else could do that.” Except, someone else had already done that — only for Trump to abandon the deal in his first term as president.

    In July 2015 Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) alongside the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the European Union. Iran pledged to curb its nuclear programme for 10-15 years in exchange for the removal of some economic sanctions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also gained access and verification powers.

    Iran also agreed to limit uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent U-235, allowing it to maintain its nuclear power reactors.

    Despite clear signs the nuclear deal was working, Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and reinstated sanctions on Iran in November 2018. Despite the unilateral American action, Iran kept to the deal for a time, but in January 2020 Iran declared it would no longer abide by the limitations included in JCPOA but would continue to work with the IAEA.

    By pulling out of the deal and reinstating sanctions, the US and Israel effectively created a strong incentive for Iran to resume enriching uranium to higher levels, not for the sake of making a bomb, but as the most obvious means of creating leverage to remove the sanctions.

    As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Iran is allowed to enrich uranium for civilian fuel programmes.

    Iran’s nuclear programme began in the 1960s with US assistance. Prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran was ruled by the brutal dictatorship of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahavi.

    American corporations saw Iran as a potential market for expansion. During the 1970s the US suggested to the Shah he needed not one but several nuclear reactors to meet Iran’s future electricity needs. In June 1974, the Shah declared that Iran would have nuclear weapons, “without a doubt and sooner than one would think”.

    In 2007, I wrote an article for Peace Researcher where I examined US claims that Iran does not need nuclear power because it is sitting on one of the largest gas supplies in the world. One of the most interesting things I discovered while researching the article was the relevance of air pollution, a critical public health concern in Iran.

    In 2024, health officials estimated that air pollution is responsible for 40,000 deaths a year in Iran. Deputy Health Minister Alireza Raisi said the “majority of these deaths were due to cardiovascular diseases, strokes, respiratory issues, and cancers”.

    Sahimi describes levels of air pollution in Tehran and other major Iranian cities as “catastrophic”, with elementary schools having to close on some days as a result. There was little media coverage of the air pollution issue in relation to Iran’s energy mix then, and I have seen hardly any since.

    An energy research project, Advanced Energy Technologies provides a useful summary of electricity production in Iran as it stood in 2023.

    Iranian electricity production in 2023. Source: Advanced Energy Technologies

    With around 94.6 percent of electricity generation dependent on fossil fuels, there are serious environmental reasons why Iran should not be encouraged to depend on oil and gas for its electricity needs — not to mention the prospect of climate change.

    One could also question the safety of nuclear power in one of the most seismically active countries in the world, however it would be fair to ask the same question of countries like Japan, which aims to increase its use of nuclear power to about 20 percent of the country’s total electricity generation by 2040, despite the 2011 Fukushima disaster.

    Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran’s uranium enrichment programme “must continue”, but the “scope and level may change”. Prior to the talks in Oman, Araghchi highlighted the “constant change” in US positions as a problem.

    Trump’s rhetoric on uranium enrichment has shifted repeatedly.

    He told Meet the Press on May 4 that “total dismantlement” of the nuclear program is “all I would accept.” He suggested that Iran does not need nuclear energy because of its oil reserves. But on May 7, when asked specifically about allowing Iran to retain a limited enrichment program, Trump said “we haven’t made that decision yet.”

    Ali Shamkhani, an adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said in a May 14 interview with NBC that Iran is ready to sign a deal with the United States and reiterated that Iran is willing to limit uranium enrichment to low levels. He previously suggested in a May 7 post on X that any deal should include a “recognition of Iran’s right to industrial enrichment.”

    That recognition, plus the removal of U.S. and international sanctions, “can guarantee a deal,” Shamkhani said.

    So with Iran seemingly willing to accept reasonable conditions, why was a deal not reached last month? It appears the US changed its position, and demanded Iran cease all enrichment of uranium, including what Iran needs for its power stations.

    One wonders if Zionist lobby groups like AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) influenced this decision. One could recall what happened during Benjamin Netanyahu’s first stint as Israel’s Prime Minister (1996-1999) to illustrate the point.

    In April 1995 AIPAC published a report titled ‘Comprehensive US Sanctions Against Iran: A Plan for Action’. In 1997 Mohammad Khatami was elected as President of Iran. The following year Khatami expressed regret for the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979 and denounced terrorism against Israelis, while noting that “supporting peoples who fight for their liberation of their land is not, in my opinion, supporting terrorism”.

    The threat of improved relations between Iran and the US sent the Israeli government led by Netanyahu into a panic. The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reported that “Israel has expressed concern to Washington of an impending change of policy by the United States towards Iran” adding that Netanyahu “asked AIPAC . . . to act vigorously in Congress to prevent such a policy shift.”

    20 years ago the Israeli lobby were claiming an Iranian nuclear bomb was imminent. It didn’t happen.

    Netanyahu’s Iran nuclear warnings.   Video: Al Jazeera

    The misguided efforts of Israel and the United States to contain Iran’s use of nuclear technology are not only counterproductive — they risk being a catastrophic failure. If one was going to design a policy to convince Iran nuclear weapons may be needed for its own defence, it is hard to imagine a policy more effective than the one Israel has pursued for the past 30 years.My 2007 Peace Researcher article asked a simple question: ‘Why does Iran want nuclear weapons?’ My introduction could have been written yesterday.


    “With all the talk about Iran and the intentions of its nuclear programme it is a shame the West continues to undermine its own position with selective morality and obvious hypocrisy. It seems amazing there can be so much written about this issue, yet so little addresses the obvious question – ‘for what reasons could Iran want nuclear weapons?’.

    “As Simon Jenkins (2006) points out, the answer is as simple as looking at a map. ‘I would sleep happier if there were no Iranian bomb but a swamp of hypocrisy separates me from overly protesting it. Iran is a proud country that sits between nuclear Pakistan and India to its east, a nuclear Russia to its north and a nuclear Israel to its west. Adjacent Afghanistan and Iraq are occupied at will by a nuclear America, which backed Saddam Hussein in his 1980 invasion of Iran. How can we say such a country has no right’ to nuclear defence?’”

    This week the German Foreign Office reached new heights in hypocrisy with this absurd tweet.

    Iran has no nuclear weapons. Israel does. Iran is a signatory to the NPT. Israel is not. Iran allows IAEA inspections. Israel does not.

    Starting another war will not make us forget, nor forgive what Israel is doing in Gaza.

    From the river to the sea, credibility requires consistency.

    I write about New Zealand and international politics, with particular interests in political economy, history, philosophy, transport, and workers’ rights. I don’t like war very much.

    Joe Hendren writes about New Zealand and international politics, with particular interests in political economy, history, philosophy, transport, and workers’ rights. Republished with his permission. Read this original article on his Substack account with full references.

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: A war on diplomacy itself – Israel’s unprovoked attack on Iran

    ANALYSIS: By Joe Hendren

    Had Israel not launched its unprovoked attack on Iran on Friday night, in direct violation of the UN Charter, Iran would now be taking part in the sixth round of negotiations concerning the future of its nuclear programme, meeting with representatives from the United States in Muscat, the capital of Oman.

    Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu claimed he acted to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb, saying Iran had the capacity to build nine nuclear weapons. Israel provided no evidence to back up its claims.

    On 25 March 2025, Trump’s own National Director of Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard said: 

    “The IC [Intelligence Community] continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorised the nuclear weapons programme he suspended in 2003. The IC is monitoring if Tehran decides to reauthorise its nuclear weapons programme”

    Even if Iran had the capability to build a bomb, it is quite another thing to have the will to do so.

    Any such bomb would need to be tested first, and any such test would be quickly detected by a series of satellites on the lookout for nuclear detonations anywhere on the planet.

    It is more likely that Israel launched its attack to stop US and Iranian negotiators from meeting on Sunday.

    Only a month ago, Iran’s lead negotiator in the nuclear talks, Ali Shamkhani, told US television that Iran was ready to do a deal. NBC journalist Richard Engel reports:

    “Shamkhani said Iran is willing to commit to never having a nuclear weapon, to get rid of its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, to only enrich to a level needed for civilian use and to allow inspectors in to oversee it all, in exchange for lifting all sanctions immediately. He said Iran would accept that deal tonight.”

    Inside Iran as Trump presses for nuclear deal.   Video: NBC News

    Shamkhani died on Saturday, following injuries he suffered during Israel’s attack on Friday night. It appears that Israel not only opposed a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear impasse: Israel killed it directly.

    A spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Esmaeil Baghaei, told a news conference in Tehran the talks would be suspended until Israel halts its attacks:

    “It is obvious that in such circumstances and until the Zionist regime’s aggression against the Iranian nation stops, it would be meaningless to participate with the party that is the biggest supporter and accomplice of the aggressor.”

    On 1 April 2024, Israel launched an airstrike on Iran’s embassy in Syria, killing 16 people, including a woman and her son. The attack violated international norms regarding the protection of diplomatic premises under the Vienna Convention.

    Yet the UK, USA and France blocked a United Nations Security Council statement condemning Israel’s actions.

    It is worth noting how the The New York Times described the occupation of the US Embassy in November 1979:

    “But it is the Ayatollah himself who is doing the devil’s work by inciting and condoning the student invasion of the American and British Embassies in Tehran. This is not just a diplomatic affront; it is a declaration of war on diplomacy itself, on usages and traditions honoured by all nations, however old and new, whatever belief.

    “The immunities given a ruler’s emissaries were respected by the kings of Persia during wars with Greece and by the Ayatollah’s spiritual ancestors during the Crusades.”

    Now it is Israel conducting a “war on diplomacy itself”, first with the attack on the embassy, followed by Friday’s surprise attack on Iran. Scuppering a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue appears to be the aim. To make matters worse, Israel’s recklessness could yet cause a major war.

    Trump: Inconsistent and ineffective
    In an interview with Time magazine on 22 April 2025, Trump denied he had stopped Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear sites.

    “No, it’s not right. I didn’t stop them. But I didn’t make it comfortable for them, because I think we can make a deal without the attack. I hope we can. It’s possible we’ll have to attack because Iran will not have a nuclear weapon.

    “But I didn’t make it comfortable for them, but I didn’t say no. Ultimately I was going to leave that choice to them, but I said I would much prefer a deal than bombs being dropped.”

    — US President Donald Trump

    In the same interview Trump boasted “I think we’re going to make a deal with Iran. Nobody else could do that.” Except, someone else had already done that — only for Trump to abandon the deal in his first term as president.

    In July 2015 Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) alongside the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the European Union. Iran pledged to curb its nuclear programme for 10-15 years in exchange for the removal of some economic sanctions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also gained access and verification powers.

    Iran also agreed to limit uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent U-235, allowing it to maintain its nuclear power reactors.

    Despite clear signs the nuclear deal was working, Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and reinstated sanctions on Iran in November 2018. Despite the unilateral American action, Iran kept to the deal for a time, but in January 2020 Iran declared it would no longer abide by the limitations included in JCPOA but would continue to work with the IAEA.

    By pulling out of the deal and reinstating sanctions, the US and Israel effectively created a strong incentive for Iran to resume enriching uranium to higher levels, not for the sake of making a bomb, but as the most obvious means of creating leverage to remove the sanctions.

    As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Iran is allowed to enrich uranium for civilian fuel programmes.

    Iran’s nuclear programme began in the 1960s with US assistance. Prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran was ruled by the brutal dictatorship of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahavi.

    American corporations saw Iran as a potential market for expansion. During the 1970s the US suggested to the Shah he needed not one but several nuclear reactors to meet Iran’s future electricity needs. In June 1974, the Shah declared that Iran would have nuclear weapons, “without a doubt and sooner than one would think”.

    In 2007, I wrote an article for Peace Researcher where I examined US claims that Iran does not need nuclear power because it is sitting on one of the largest gas supplies in the world. One of the most interesting things I discovered while researching the article was the relevance of air pollution, a critical public health concern in Iran.

    In 2024, health officials estimated that air pollution is responsible for 40,000 deaths a year in Iran. Deputy Health Minister Alireza Raisi said the “majority of these deaths were due to cardiovascular diseases, strokes, respiratory issues, and cancers”.

    Sahimi describes levels of air pollution in Tehran and other major Iranian cities as “catastrophic”, with elementary schools having to close on some days as a result. There was little media coverage of the air pollution issue in relation to Iran’s energy mix then, and I have seen hardly any since.

    An energy research project, Advanced Energy Technologies provides a useful summary of electricity production in Iran as it stood in 2023.

    Iranian electricity production in 2023. Source: Advanced Energy Technologies

    With around 94.6 percent of electricity generation dependent on fossil fuels, there are serious environmental reasons why Iran should not be encouraged to depend on oil and gas for its electricity needs — not to mention the prospect of climate change.

    One could also question the safety of nuclear power in one of the most seismically active countries in the world, however it would be fair to ask the same question of countries like Japan, which aims to increase its use of nuclear power to about 20 percent of the country’s total electricity generation by 2040, despite the 2011 Fukushima disaster.

    Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran’s uranium enrichment programme “must continue”, but the “scope and level may change”. Prior to the talks in Oman, Araghchi highlighted the “constant change” in US positions as a problem.

    Trump’s rhetoric on uranium enrichment has shifted repeatedly.

    He told Meet the Press on May 4 that “total dismantlement” of the nuclear program is “all I would accept.” He suggested that Iran does not need nuclear energy because of its oil reserves. But on May 7, when asked specifically about allowing Iran to retain a limited enrichment program, Trump said “we haven’t made that decision yet.”

    Ali Shamkhani, an adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said in a May 14 interview with NBC that Iran is ready to sign a deal with the United States and reiterated that Iran is willing to limit uranium enrichment to low levels. He previously suggested in a May 7 post on X that any deal should include a “recognition of Iran’s right to industrial enrichment.”

    That recognition, plus the removal of U.S. and international sanctions, “can guarantee a deal,” Shamkhani said.

    So with Iran seemingly willing to accept reasonable conditions, why was a deal not reached last month? It appears the US changed its position, and demanded Iran cease all enrichment of uranium, including what Iran needs for its power stations.

    One wonders if Zionist lobby groups like AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) influenced this decision. One could recall what happened during Benjamin Netanyahu’s first stint as Israel’s Prime Minister (1996-1999) to illustrate the point.

    In April 1995 AIPAC published a report titled ‘Comprehensive US Sanctions Against Iran: A Plan for Action’. In 1997 Mohammad Khatami was elected as President of Iran. The following year Khatami expressed regret for the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979 and denounced terrorism against Israelis, while noting that “supporting peoples who fight for their liberation of their land is not, in my opinion, supporting terrorism”.

    The threat of improved relations between Iran and the US sent the Israeli government led by Netanyahu into a panic. The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reported that “Israel has expressed concern to Washington of an impending change of policy by the United States towards Iran” adding that Netanyahu “asked AIPAC . . . to act vigorously in Congress to prevent such a policy shift.”

    20 years ago the Israeli lobby were claiming an Iranian nuclear bomb was imminent. It didn’t happen.

    Netanyahu’s Iran nuclear warnings.   Video: Al Jazeera

    The misguided efforts of Israel and the United States to contain Iran’s use of nuclear technology are not only counterproductive — they risk being a catastrophic failure. If one was going to design a policy to convince Iran nuclear weapons may be needed for its own defence, it is hard to imagine a policy more effective than the one Israel has pursued for the past 30 years.My 2007 Peace Researcher article asked a simple question: ‘Why does Iran want nuclear weapons?’ My introduction could have been written yesterday.


    “With all the talk about Iran and the intentions of its nuclear programme it is a shame the West continues to undermine its own position with selective morality and obvious hypocrisy. It seems amazing there can be so much written about this issue, yet so little addresses the obvious question – ‘for what reasons could Iran want nuclear weapons?’.

    “As Simon Jenkins (2006) points out, the answer is as simple as looking at a map. ‘I would sleep happier if there were no Iranian bomb but a swamp of hypocrisy separates me from overly protesting it. Iran is a proud country that sits between nuclear Pakistan and India to its east, a nuclear Russia to its north and a nuclear Israel to its west. Adjacent Afghanistan and Iraq are occupied at will by a nuclear America, which backed Saddam Hussein in his 1980 invasion of Iran. How can we say such a country has no right’ to nuclear defence?’”

    This week the German Foreign Office reached new heights in hypocrisy with this absurd tweet.

    Iran has no nuclear weapons. Israel does. Iran is a signatory to the NPT. Israel is not. Iran allows IAEA inspections. Israel does not.

    Starting another war will not make us forget, nor forgive what Israel is doing in Gaza.

    From the river to the sea, credibility requires consistency.

    I write about New Zealand and international politics, with particular interests in political economy, history, philosophy, transport, and workers’ rights. I don’t like war very much.

    Joe Hendren writes about New Zealand and international politics, with particular interests in political economy, history, philosophy, transport, and workers’ rights. Republished with his permission. Read this original article on his Substack account with full references.

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Christine Lagarde: Strengthening economies in a stormy and fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the ninth Annual Research Conference “Economic and financial integration in a stormy and fragmenting world” organised by the National Bank of Ukraine and Narodowy Bank Polski in Kyiv, Ukraine

    Kyiv, 19 June 2025

    It is an honour to be here in Kyiv – a city that has come to symbolise resilience, dignity and the enduring spirit of freedom. Kyiv stands not only as the heart of Ukraine, but as a beacon of what it means to hold fast to democratic values in the face of immense challenge.

    As the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko once wrote, “In your own house – your own truth. Your own strength and freedom.” Ukraine’s fight today reminds all of Europe of this powerful truth: our security and prosperity rely on unity, on integration with our neighbours.

    In the face of Russia’s unjustified war of aggression, Ukrainians have demonstrated extraordinary courage and resilience in defence of their country.

    In my remarks today, and in keeping with the theme of this conference, I would like to reflect on the historical lessons we have learned about strengthening and integrating economies in an increasingly stormy and fragmented world.

    Experience shows that closer ties with the European neighbourhood can provide a strong foundation for Ukraine to rebuild and emerge stronger. And as geopolitical tensions rise and global supply chains fragment, the case for deeper regional cooperation has never been clearer.

    Europe’s own long history of integration offers valuable insights that can help guide Ukraine’s path forwards. Two key lessons stand out.

    First, while deeper integration increases the potential rewards, it also raises the risks if not managed wisely. Sound domestic policy frameworks are essential to maximise growth and safeguard stability.

    Second, the benefits of integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Maintaining them depends on continuous reform – but reforms must also deliver tangible improvements for people’s lives, and do so relatively quickly.

    The benefits of integration in a fragmenting world

    During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain fractured the European economy. Trade between East and West fell by half. This division was like imposing a 48% tariff – leading to immense welfare losses and isolating the Eastern bloc from global markets.[1]

    But the transformation since Europe’s eastern enlargement has been nothing short of remarkable. On average, countries that joined the EU in 2004 have nearly doubled their GDP per capita over the past two decades.

    Critically, this was not just about catching up from a low base. Between 2004 and 2019, the EU’s new Member States saw their GDP per capita grow 32% more than comparable non-EU countries.[2] The difference was deeper economic integration – and those that were already highly embedded in the regional economy gained the most.

    While all new members experienced gains, countries with stronger integration into regional value chains recorded nearly 10 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth compared with less integrated peers – regardless of geographic proximity.[3]

    This difference was driven mainly by technology and productivity spillovers. ECB research shows that a 10% increase in productivity among western EU firms translated into a 5% productivity gain for central and eastern European firms linked to their supply chains.[4]

    The case for regional integration is therefore clear – and in today’s increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape, it has become even more compelling.

    First, regional integration underpins growth.

    European economies are highly open, which means a world splintering into rival trading blocs poses clear risks to prosperity. Yet Europe’s most important trading partner is Europe itself: around 65% of euro area exports go to other European countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. For Ukraine too, Europe is the principal trading partner, accounting for over 50% of its goods trade in 2024.

    By deepening economic ties – more closely linking neighbouring economies – we can reduce our exposure to external shocks. Rising trade within our region can help offset losses in global markets.

    Second, regional integration strengthens resilience.

    One consequence of geopolitical fragmentation is the realignment of supply chains toward trusted partners. Nearly half of firms involved in external trade have already revised their strategies – or intend to do so – including relocating parts of their operations closer to home.[5] While this trend reduces strategic dependencies, it can also raise costs.

    Yet large integrated regions can mitigate these costs by replicating many of the benefits of globalisation at the regional level. Supply chains can be reorganised regionally, allowing each country to specialise based on its comparative advantage within regional value chains.

    Ukraine stands to benefit significantly from expanding these networks across the region – and the EU stands to benefit, too, from having Ukraine as a partner.[6]

    In the automotive sector, for example, Ukrainian firms already produce around 7% of all wire harnesses used in EU vehicles.[7] As the industry shifts towards electric vehicles, which require more complex wiring systems, Ukraine’s manufacturing base is well positioned to scale up and play a larger role in the EU value chain.

    Equally transformative is Ukraine’s drone industry, which has become one of the most advanced in the region. Drones are not only a critical component of modern warfare, but also a technology with substantial spillover effects and far-reaching dual-use applications.

    Indeed, the country’s ambitious goal of producing 4.5 million drones by 2025 has accelerated innovation in materials science, battery technology and 3D printing. These advances are already finding civilian applications in sectors such as logistics, agriculture and emergency response.

    In short, for both existing EU members and neighbouring countries like Ukraine, regional integration is both a path to prosperity and a strategic anchor in an increasingly fragmented world.

    Managing the risks of integration

    But examining the experience of countries that have used regional integration as a platform for growth and reform reveals two important lessons.

    The first is that if integration is not accompanied by appropriate reforms, it can create new vulnerabilities – especially in the financial sphere.

    Financial integration often brings volatile capital inflows, which can make it difficult to distinguish sustainable growth from unsustainable excesses in real time.

    One way this can happen is when productivity gains in tradable sectors, such as manufacturing, drive up wages in those sectors, which then spill over into higher wages in non-tradable sectors and push up overall inflation.[8]

    While this effect is a normal feature of catching-up, it can make it easy to mistake genuine convergence for economic overheating. If foreign capital is in fact driving financial imbalances – such as unsustainable real estate booms – countries may exhibit the same patterns of rising wages and inflation, masking underlying vulnerabilities.

    Another potential distortion is that capital inflows can significantly affect government fiscal positions by boosting tax revenues and creating the illusion of permanently greater fiscal space. This often leads to procyclical fiscal policies, with governments increasing spending or cutting taxes during boom periods – only to face fiscal stress when inflows reverse or growth slows.

    Both dynamics have been visible during Europe’s recent experience with regional integration.

    After the eastern enlargement, financial integration accelerated rapidly. Between 2003 and 2008, the new Member States experienced an extraordinary surge in capital inflows, averaging over 12% of GDP annually – twice the typical level for emerging markets globally.[9]

    Initially, this rapid financial integration brought clear benefits: it expanded access to credit, fuelled growth and enabled much-needed development. However, in many countries, foreign capital was disproportionately channelled into consumption and construction booms, while tax revenues rose sharply on the back of property transactions and buoyant domestic demand.[10] This led to widespread misallocation of private capital and inefficient public spending.

    Capital flows then reversed sharply when the global financial crisis struck, exposing these imbalances. Between December 2008 and May 2013, external bank liabilities in non-euro area central and eastern European countries declined by an average of 27% – with some countries experiencing drops of more than 50%.[11]

    Yet the risks associated with financial integration can be avoided. Not all countries in the region were affected equally. Those that performed better typically shared two key features.

    First, they had clear policies to channel foreign investment into productive sectors. Strong industrial strategies, a skilled workforce and integration into global supply chains helped direct capital towards manufacturing and tradable services – sectors that drive export growth and are less prone to unsustainable booms and asset bubbles.[12]

    Second, they maintained robust financial policy frameworks. Tighter capital requirements, active macroprudential measures and countercyclical buffers strengthened domestic banking sectors and curbed excessive mortgage lending. These tools enabled those countries to absorb large capital inflows without creating destabilising imbalances.[13]

    The lesson is clear: as countries integrate into the region, strong domestic policy frameworks are critical to ensuring that capital inflows support long-term growth rather than generating financial instability or inefficient allocation.

    This insight is especially relevant for Ukraine today as it charts its path towards recovery. If reconstruction proceeds as planned, the country could attract significant capital inflows over the next decade. But without the right safeguards, that capital risks being misallocated – undermining long-term productivity instead of strengthening it.

    There are encouraging signs. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area have already driven significant reforms in the financial sector. Ukraine’s banking regulation now aligns with more than 75% of EU standards, covering critical areas such as capital adequacy, governance and auditing.[14]

    The National Bank of Ukraine has adopted a risk-based supervisory model inspired by the Single Supervisory Mechanism – the system of banking supervision in Europe – markedly improving oversight. Despite extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine is also modernising its capital markets – consolidating exchanges, upgrading settlement systems and strengthening regulatory enforcement to attract long-term investors.

    These reforms are already delivering results: in 2023, Ukraine’s banking sector remained profitable and well capitalised despite the ongoing war – an outcome that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

    Still, further progress is essential, especially in fiscal governance. Strengthening public investment management will be critical to ensure that reconstruction funds are allocated transparently and efficiently.

    This is not just about meeting external standards. It is about ensuring that every euro, and every hryvnia, delivers real returns for the Ukrainian people.[15]

    Making integration sustainable

    However, reforms cannot be treated as a one-time effort.

    So, the second key lesson is that the benefits of regional integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Sustaining them requires continuous reform – and, just as importantly, it requires citizens to see visible, tangible improvements in their daily lives.

    In this context, there are two risks to watch out for.

    The first is that institutional reform momentum can fade if economic benefits do not follow quickly.

    Deeper regional integration typically begins with aligning framework conditions, such as legal systems, regulation and public administration. These areas often improve rapidly. But for the economic gains to materialise, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors must respond to the new incentives created – and this takes time.

    In the long run, evidence shows that countries with initially weaker institutions benefit the most from adopting higher standards.[16] But in the short run, if people only see the effort and not the payoff, public support for further reforms can weaken, putting long-term convergence at risk.

    The second risk is that structural shifts in the economy may weaken the link between integration and economic convergence over time.

    The integration of goods markets has traditionally driven convergence almost automatically, as foreign direct investment flows to countries with lower land and labour costs, supply chains relocate and lower-income countries benefit from technology transfers.

    As I mentioned earlier, this will remain an important mechanism even in an era of supply chain reshoring. But countries cannot rely on it as heavily as in the past. Future growth in intra-EU trade is expected to depend increasingly on services – particularly digital services.

    However, research shows that services sector activity tends to concentrate in larger, more affluent urban areas that exhibit the hallmarks of a knowledge economy: high tertiary education rates, strong technology and science sectors and robust digital infrastructure.[17]

    This means that deeper integration alone will not guarantee broad-based convergence across all regions. Over time, countries will need to invest more in education, skills and digitalisation to ensure they can build high levels of human capital.

    Maintaining the path of convergence is therefore not easy. But slowing down reform efforts is not the answer – especially in the shock-prone world we face today.

    There is a clear link between strong institutions and economic resilience. ECB research indicates that, during the pandemic, regions with lower institutional quality experienced – all else equal – an additional decline of around 4 percentage points in GDP per capita compared with the ten regions with the highest quality of government.[18]

    As our economies are increasingly buffeted by global turbulence, institutional backsliding therefore risks creating a vicious circle: repeated shocks can undermine economic convergence and further erode public confidence in the reform process.

    The best way for countries to sustain reform momentum is to recognise the importance of maintaining public support and, as far as possible, pair governance improvements with a focus on sectors where they have a clear competitive edge – and where deeper integration with the region can unlock significant and rapid growth opportunities.

    This way, the benefits of reforms will be felt more quickly and more widely.

    Ukraine is well positioned to put this into practice. Its IT sector is already relatively strong: IT services exports reached nearly USD 7 billion in 2023, making it one of the country’s leading export sectors despite the war.[19]

    Ukraine also produces around 130,000 STEM graduates each year – exceeding Germany and France[20] – and it ranks among the top five countries globally for certified IT professionals.[21] Successful IT clusters are active in several cities, and major foreign firms – including Apple, Microsoft, Boeing and Siemens – have established R&D operations in the country.

    A dynamic defence tech ecosystem is also taking shape[22], with Ukrainian start-ups attracting almost half a billion US dollars in funding in 2024 – surpassing many of their peers across central and eastern Europe.[23] Experience from countries like Israel suggests that such a foundation can enable the country to emerge as a broader technology hub in the years ahead.

    If Ukraine stays the course on institutional reform and continues to adapt its economy to new opportunities, despite the stormy environment, it can emerge as a vital engine of growth and a key contributor to the region’s future.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Ukraine stands at a pivotal moment – facing the hardships of war, the challenge of reconstruction and the opportunity of deeper regional integration.

    In a world marked by shifting geopolitical realities, such integration offers a clear path to recovery and lasting prosperity.

    The recent history of regional integration shows not only its immense benefits, but also the importance of managing transitional risks through robust policy frameworks. It also underlines the need to sustain reform over time by ensuring that people feel its benefits.

    I am confident that Ukraine will be able to fully realise its economic potential, turning the upheaval of today into the foundation for a dynamic future.

    As Ivan Franko, one of Ukraine’s greatest poets, once wrote: “even though life is but a moment and made up of moments, we carry eternity in our souls.”

    This enduring spirit captures the resilience and potential of Ukraine’s people and its economy – a spirit that will continue to drive advancement and renewal in the years ahead.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Africa: United Arab Emirates (UAE) Undersecretary for Energy and Petroleum Affairs Joins African Energy Week (AEW) 2025

    Sharif Salim Al-Olama, Undersecretary for Energy and Petroleum Affairs at the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has joined African Energy Week (AEW): Invest in African Energies to discuss collaborative opportunities in oil and gas. Taking place on September 29 to October 3 in Cape Town, the event is the premier platform for Africa’s energy industry. Al-Olama’s participation is expected to open new doors for multilateral deals and partnerships.  

    The UAE has emerged as Africa’s largest source of foreign direct investment, with investments from Emirati companies totaling $110 billion between 2019 and 2023. This reflects a broader trend by Emirati companies to expand their portfolios in Africa, with strengthened cooperation set to unlock a wealth of development opportunities for African nations. As African countries pursue new sources of finance to advance projects in oil, gas and logistics, UAE expertise and technology will prove invaluable. During AEW: Invest in African Energies 2025, Al-Olama is expected to share insights into opportunities for UAE-Africa collaboration.  

    AEW: Invest in African Energies is the platform of choice for project operators, financiers, technology providers and government, and has emerged as the official place to sign deals in African energy. Visit http://www.AECWeek.com for more information about this exciting event. 

    Looking to consolidate its position as a major player in Africa’s energy landscape, the UAE has strengthened ties with African nations in recent months. A deal signed with Morocco will see the UAE support the development of the Africa-Atlantic gas pipeline – transporting Nigerian gas to North Africa and then on to Europe. The UAE will help mobilize financing for the project through its Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund. As of May 2025, the feasibility and preliminary engineering studies for the pipeline were complete. Agreements have also been signed with Tanzania for the operation and modernization of port infrastructure while the UAE and Kenya signed a landmark comprehensive economic partnership agreement in 2025. The UAE also launched the UAE-Africa Gateway initiative in 2025, aimed at enhancing investment opportunities for Emirati companies in the sub-Saharan African region. The initiative seeks to mobilize private sector investment to advance African projects and strengthen UAE-Africa cooperation.  

    The UAE’s state-owned oil and gas companies are also expanding their presence in Africa. Notably, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) is deepening its footprint across the continent, with strategic investments in exploration and infrastructure development. Recent milestones include ADNOC’s international arm XRG acquiring a 10% stake in Mozambique’s offshore Rovuma Basin Area 4 concession. The acquisition includes stakes in the operational Coral South FLNG project, the planned Coral North FLNG project and the Rovuma LNG projects. Collectively, these projects have a target production capacity of 25 million tons per annum. In Egypt, ADNOC partnered with energy major bp to establish Arcius Energy – a natural gas platform to unlock the country’s upstream potential. The platform aligns with ADNOC’s international expansion plans.  

    Beyond oil and gas, UAE-based companies have played an instrumental role in strengthening Africa’s trade and logistics sector. Companies such as DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports have expanded their presence across the continent. DP World operates six African ports while Abu Dhabi Ports have recently extended operations into Guinea, Egypt and Angola. In the clean energy space, Emirati companies are leading projects in solar, green hydrogen and power. Notably, Masdar has committed $2 billion to renewable energy projects in Africa through 2030, unlocking significant opportunities for African countries. AMEA Power is investing in a series of renewable energy projects across the continent, including $620 million in a 300MW wind project in Ethiopia; a 120 million solar project in South Africa; a 1GW green hydrogen development in Mauritania; two battery storage projects in South Africa; a 150 MW solar plant in Angola; among others. Currently, the company has more than 2.6 GW of clean energy projects either in operation of under construction in Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Togo and Tunisia.  

    “The UAE has emerged as a strong partner for African countries seeking to advance the development of their oil, gas, clean energy and infrastructure industries. By expanding their presence across the market, partnering with African firms and mobilizing capital for impactful projects, Emirati companies are playing a major role in supporting Africa’s economic growth,” states Verner Ayukegba, Senior Vice President, African Energy Chamber.  

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Energy Chamber.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Rescue at sea by the aid vessel ‘Madleen’ – P-002408/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-002408/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Özlem Demirel (The Left)

    On 5 June 2025, the Gaza-bound aid vessel ‘Madleen’ received a distress signal via a Frontex drone. It provided a location update for a boat with 30-40 people on board. The ‘Madleen’ contacted Greek authorities and, as the boat was in Egypt’s search-and-rescue zone, Egyptian authorities too. The crew launched a rescue boat. Another vessel approached; it was initially assumed to be Egyptian, but turned out to be a Libyan coastguard vessel. It took the people on board, apparently against their will. Four of them jumped into the sea out of fear; they were rescued by the ‘Madleen’, with Frontex subsequently taking charge of them.

    • 1.When and by what means (aircraft, drones, satellite reconnaissance) did Frontex observe and/or contact the ‘Madleen’ or the vessel ‘Conscious’, which had been on a similar mission?
    • 2.What facts are known to Frontex about the maritime emergency on 5 June 2025 (position and time, actor making the sighting, distress signals sent and received, maritime emergency coordination centres that were competent and took action, vessels in the vicinity, order given to the ‘Madleen’ to carry out the rescue)?
    • 3.Who directed Frontex to take charge of the rescued persons from the ‘Madleen’, and to hand them over to another centre, and where are those persons and the people taken on board by the Libyan coastguard vessel ‘Tareq Bin Zayed’ now?

    Submitted: 16.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Unlawful use of Horizon Europe funds by Israeli entities – E-002355/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002355/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Thijs Reuten (S&D), Tineke Strik (Verts/ALE)

    Investigative research by the investigative journalism platform Follow the Money has brought to light that more than EUR 3 billion has been allocated to Horizon Europe projects involving Israeli institutions since 2007. The research also concluded that Dutch universities are involved in at least 28 ongoing Horizon Europe projects developing technologies and products that could potentially also be used for military purposes – so-called dual-use products.

    • 1.Can the Commission provide an overview of all Horizon Europe projects involving Israeli entities which are developing dual-use products and whether they fall within Article 1(2)(a), (b) or (c) of Regulation (EU) 2021/695?
    • 2.How does the Commission verify that Horizon Europe projects (Article 1(2)(a) and (b)) with Israeli involvement comply with Regulation (EU) 2021/695, and in particular Articles 5, 7 and 19 regarding exclusive use for civilian purposes, protection of human rights and ethical principles?
    • 3.Are there any known cases where the Commission or a research institution either suspected or concluded that technology or finished products were being used by Israel for military purposes, and specifically for military actions in violation of international law, and thus in breach of Regulations (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/697? What action has the Commission taken if such cases have indeed come to light?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – EU inaction in the face of the threat from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – E-000867/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU has listed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and persons and entities belonging to the IRGC under several EU restrictive measures regimes[1].

    The Council regularly reviews these restrictive measures in light of developments in Iran.

    The listing of a person, group or entity under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (CP 931)[2] must satisfy the conditions set out in Article 1(2) to 1(4) of that Common Position, which provides a definition of persons, groups and entities ‘involved in terrorist acts’ as well as a definition of ‘terrorist acts’ for this purpose, and specifies the requirements related to the adoption of a decision by a national competent authority in respect of the persons, groups and entities concerned.

    The addition of any new organisations to the list of persons, groups and entities covered by the measures in Articles 2 and 3 of CP 931 is subject to the adoption of a Council decision by unanimity.

    • [1] Iran human rights sanctions regime, Iran weapons of mass destruction sanctions regime, Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and to armed groups and entities in the Middle East and the Red Sea region regime, the territorial integrity of Ukraine sanctions regime, the regime in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine and the Syria sanctions regime.
    • [2] Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism 2001/931/CFSP (OJ L 344 28.12.2001, p.93).
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Situation surrounding the oldest Christian monastery in the world – E-002338/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002338/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Ioan-Rareş Bogdan (PPE)

    A court order issued on 28 May 2025 by the Egyptian High Court concerning St. Catherine’s Monastery on Mount Sinai has sparked significant reactions in the press and among the public.

    According to reports, the Egyptian authorities are to close down the 15-centuries-old site, confiscate the monastery’s assets and expel the monks.

    At the same time, the veracity of that information has been disputed, and news of the monastery’s closure has been claimed to be false.

    • 1.What information does the Commission have on this court order?
    • 2.What steps has the Commission taken, or does it plan to take, to protect the interests of Orthodox Christians in the face of the decision by the Egyptian High Court concerning St. Catherine’s Monastery on Mount Sinai?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Protocol AI Captures $16B AI Agent Market with Revolutionary Platform That Turns Anyone Into a Web3 Developer

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, June 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Protocol AI unveils a paradigm-shifting platform that eliminates traditional barriers between innovative ideas and functional Web3 applications. The company’s autonomous AI agents, known as “pAgents,” enable users to create sophisticated decentralized applications, mini-games, and smart contracts simply by describing their vision in plain language.

    This breakthrough arrives as the on-chain AI agent sector experiences unprecedented growth, with market capitalization exploding 300% from $4.8 billion to nearly $16 billion in Q4 2024, according to CoinGecko’s annual report.

    From Concept to Creation in Minutes

    Traditional Web3 development demands extensive coding expertise and months of development time. Protocol AI shatters these constraints by deploying intelligent agents that autonomously handle complex development tasks – from smart contract generation to user interface design and multi-chain deployment.

    “Instead of spending months learning Solidity, creators can now focus entirely on their innovative concepts while our pAgents handle the technical execution,” explains the Protocol AI team.

    Comprehensive Development Ecosystem

    Protocol AI comprehensive ecosystem delivers four core innovations that revolutionize Web3 development:

    • Instant AI dApps Builder: Transform natural language into dApps in seconds with no coding required
    • Fully Compatible with EVM: Seamless integration and deployment on EVM blockchains like Ethereum, Base, BSC, and more
    • AI Owned by DAO: Communities decide how AI Agents are managed by $PROAI token holders, ensuring true decentralization
    • Proof of Value: Accelerate growth with AI dApps that ensure fair and transparent rewards for valuable contributions

    The platform supports natural language input in multiple languages, automatically translating user intentions into production-ready code across Ethereum, Binance Smart Chain, Polygon, and Solana networks. Protocol AI’s AI-driven development assistants perform contract generation, debugging, security auditing, and performance optimization autonomously, while a built-in decentralized marketplace enables immediate monetization through the native $PROAI token.

    Security remains paramount through partnerships with leading auditing firms Coinsult and Solidproof, ensuring all generated smart contracts meet rigorous safety standards. Additional collaborations with Web3Toolkit and Web3Payments provide comprehensive vulnerability testing.

    Massive Market Opportunity Meets Strategic Presale

    The convergence of AI advancement and Web3 adoption creates unprecedented opportunity. While blockchain technology promises revolutionary applications, development complexity has created significant bottlenecks. Current Web3 development sees recycling of existing talent rather than new protocol creation.

    Protocol AI addresses this gap precisely as institutional and retail interest in AI agents reaches historic highs, potentially unlocking innovation from millions of creators previously excluded by technical barriers.

    Protocol AI is conducting an exclusive presale of $PROAI tokens, offering early investors access before public availability. This strategic timing allows participants to enter the AI-Web3 convergence at foundational valuations while supporting infrastructure development that could reshape Web3 accessibility.

    Join the Protocol AI presale and secure exclusive early access to a fast-paced AI ecosystem

    Revenue Model and Growth Strategy

    The ecosystem generates value through marketplace transactions using $PROAI tokens, creating consistent utility demand. Developers earn through direct sales, subscription services, and royalty systems on their AI-generated applications. Enterprise licensing provides custom AI agent development for institutional clients.

    Platform optimization and developer onboarding continue through Q3 2025, with major blockchain partnerships expanding cross-chain capabilities in Q4. The company plans centralized exchange listings and institutional adoption initiatives throughout 2026, positioning for global scaling and advanced AI capabilities.

    Market Impact

    Protocol AI represents infrastructure for Web3’s next evolutionary phase. By removing technical barriers, the platform enables innovation from diverse backgrounds previously excluded from blockchain development. This democratization could accelerate blockchain adoption across industries and use cases not yet imagined.

    “Protocol AI doesn’t just simplify Web3 development – it reimagines who can be a Web3 developer,” the team concludes. “We’re building the bridge between human creativity and blockchain possibility.”

    Protocol AI’s launch positions early investors and developers at the forefront of a technological shift that could fundamentally reshape how Web3 protocols are conceived, created, and deployed globally.

    About Protocol AI

    Protocol AI operates a decentralized ecosystem of autonomous AI agents designed to democratize Web3 protocol development across DeFi, GameFi, SocialFi, and emerging blockchain applications.

    For more information Visit:

    Website: https://protocolai.finance

    Community: https://t.me/ProtocolAIAgent

    X: https://x.com/ProtocolAIAgent

    Documentation: https://docs.protocolai.finance

    Contact:
    Alex Jury,
    contact@protocolai.finance

    Disclaimer: This content is provided by Protocol AI. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice. Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed. Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility. Globenewswire does not endorse any content on this page.

    Legal Disclaimer: This media platform provides the content of this article on an “as-is” basis, without any warranties or representations of any kind, express or implied. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies, errors, or omissions. We do not assume any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information presented herein. Any concerns, complaints, or copyright issues related to this article should be directed to the content provider mentioned above.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/2b0c10e1-5c82-4c50-aa11-9dfb996ecb5f

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Protocol AI Captures $16B AI Agent Market with Revolutionary Platform That Turns Anyone Into a Web3 Developer

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, June 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Protocol AI unveils a paradigm-shifting platform that eliminates traditional barriers between innovative ideas and functional Web3 applications. The company’s autonomous AI agents, known as “pAgents,” enable users to create sophisticated decentralized applications, mini-games, and smart contracts simply by describing their vision in plain language.

    This breakthrough arrives as the on-chain AI agent sector experiences unprecedented growth, with market capitalization exploding 300% from $4.8 billion to nearly $16 billion in Q4 2024, according to CoinGecko’s annual report.

    From Concept to Creation in Minutes

    Traditional Web3 development demands extensive coding expertise and months of development time. Protocol AI shatters these constraints by deploying intelligent agents that autonomously handle complex development tasks – from smart contract generation to user interface design and multi-chain deployment.

    “Instead of spending months learning Solidity, creators can now focus entirely on their innovative concepts while our pAgents handle the technical execution,” explains the Protocol AI team.

    Comprehensive Development Ecosystem

    Protocol AI comprehensive ecosystem delivers four core innovations that revolutionize Web3 development:

    • Instant AI dApps Builder: Transform natural language into dApps in seconds with no coding required
    • Fully Compatible with EVM: Seamless integration and deployment on EVM blockchains like Ethereum, Base, BSC, and more
    • AI Owned by DAO: Communities decide how AI Agents are managed by $PROAI token holders, ensuring true decentralization
    • Proof of Value: Accelerate growth with AI dApps that ensure fair and transparent rewards for valuable contributions

    The platform supports natural language input in multiple languages, automatically translating user intentions into production-ready code across Ethereum, Binance Smart Chain, Polygon, and Solana networks. Protocol AI’s AI-driven development assistants perform contract generation, debugging, security auditing, and performance optimization autonomously, while a built-in decentralized marketplace enables immediate monetization through the native $PROAI token.

    Security remains paramount through partnerships with leading auditing firms Coinsult and Solidproof, ensuring all generated smart contracts meet rigorous safety standards. Additional collaborations with Web3Toolkit and Web3Payments provide comprehensive vulnerability testing.

    Massive Market Opportunity Meets Strategic Presale

    The convergence of AI advancement and Web3 adoption creates unprecedented opportunity. While blockchain technology promises revolutionary applications, development complexity has created significant bottlenecks. Current Web3 development sees recycling of existing talent rather than new protocol creation.

    Protocol AI addresses this gap precisely as institutional and retail interest in AI agents reaches historic highs, potentially unlocking innovation from millions of creators previously excluded by technical barriers.

    Protocol AI is conducting an exclusive presale of $PROAI tokens, offering early investors access before public availability. This strategic timing allows participants to enter the AI-Web3 convergence at foundational valuations while supporting infrastructure development that could reshape Web3 accessibility.

    Join the Protocol AI presale and secure exclusive early access to a fast-paced AI ecosystem

    Revenue Model and Growth Strategy

    The ecosystem generates value through marketplace transactions using $PROAI tokens, creating consistent utility demand. Developers earn through direct sales, subscription services, and royalty systems on their AI-generated applications. Enterprise licensing provides custom AI agent development for institutional clients.

    Platform optimization and developer onboarding continue through Q3 2025, with major blockchain partnerships expanding cross-chain capabilities in Q4. The company plans centralized exchange listings and institutional adoption initiatives throughout 2026, positioning for global scaling and advanced AI capabilities.

    Market Impact

    Protocol AI represents infrastructure for Web3’s next evolutionary phase. By removing technical barriers, the platform enables innovation from diverse backgrounds previously excluded from blockchain development. This democratization could accelerate blockchain adoption across industries and use cases not yet imagined.

    “Protocol AI doesn’t just simplify Web3 development – it reimagines who can be a Web3 developer,” the team concludes. “We’re building the bridge between human creativity and blockchain possibility.”

    Protocol AI’s launch positions early investors and developers at the forefront of a technological shift that could fundamentally reshape how Web3 protocols are conceived, created, and deployed globally.

    About Protocol AI

    Protocol AI operates a decentralized ecosystem of autonomous AI agents designed to democratize Web3 protocol development across DeFi, GameFi, SocialFi, and emerging blockchain applications.

    For more information Visit:

    Website: https://protocolai.finance

    Community: https://t.me/ProtocolAIAgent

    X: https://x.com/ProtocolAIAgent

    Documentation: https://docs.protocolai.finance

    Contact:
    Alex Jury,
    contact@protocolai.finance

    Disclaimer: This content is provided by Protocol AI. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice. Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed. Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility. Globenewswire does not endorse any content on this page.

    Legal Disclaimer: This media platform provides the content of this article on an “as-is” basis, without any warranties or representations of any kind, express or implied. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies, errors, or omissions. We do not assume any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information presented herein. Any concerns, complaints, or copyright issues related to this article should be directed to the content provider mentioned above.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/2b0c10e1-5c82-4c50-aa11-9dfb996ecb5f

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Video: UK Conflict in the Middle East | Lords urgent question

    Source: United Kingdom UK House of Lords (video statements)

    Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon to ask the government what assessment they have made of the current hostilities between Israel and Iran.

    Catch-up on House of Lords business:

    Watch live events: https://parliamentlive.tv/Lords
    Read the latest news: https://www.parliament.uk/lords/

    Stay up to date with the House of Lords on social media:

    • X: https://twitter.com/UKHouseofLords
    • Bluesky: https://bsky.app/profile/houseoflords.parliament.uk
    • Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/UKHouseofLords/
    • Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/UKHouseofLords
    • Flickr: https://flickr.com/photos/ukhouseoflords/albums
    • LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/the-house-of-lords
    • Threads: https://www.threads.net/@UKHouseOfLords

    #HouseOfLords #UKParliament

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4JRJWT6Qzc

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Family reunification from countries where polygamy is practiced – E-002343/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002343/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mary Khan (ESN), Petra Steger (PfE)

    A current case in Austria[1], and similar cases in Germany, reveal conflicts between EU rules on family reunification and prohibitions of polygamous marriages enshrined in criminal law. A Syrian refugee applied for family reunification for his wife and eight children. However, DNA analyses showed that the children are from two different mothers. While the second wife was refused entry, all children were granted entry under family reunification. Under current law, it can be assumed that the four children of the second wife can successfully apply for family reunification for their mother. The applicable provisions of EU law, in particular Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, may, in their practical application, create situations which could be interpreted as indirect toleration of polygamous relationships. This raises significant questions as to the coherence of European legislation and national legal systems, such as the prohibition of bigamy enshrined in the national law of Austria (Section 44 of the Austrian Civil Code (ABGB) and Section 192 of the Austrian Criminal Code (StGB)) and of Germany (Section 1306 of the German Civil Code (BGB) and Section 172 of the German Criminal Code (StGB)).

    • 1.How does the Commission assess the compatibility of Directive 2003/86/EC and its implementation in practice with national prohibitions of polygamy in the context of family reunification in relation to polygamous marriages?
    • 2.What measures is the Commission considering in order to counteract the normalisation of polygamous relationships in the context of family reunification and to prevent the emergence of a right to protection under Union law for polygamous relationships?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    • [1] https://www.heute.at/s/familiennachzug-syrer-wollte-zweitfrau-ins-land-holen-120101639
    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The unacceptable seizure of the sailing boat ‘Madleen’ by the murderous state of Israel – E-002351/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002351/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos (NI)

    The sailing boat ‘Madleen’, which was heading towards the Gaza Strip carrying symbolic humanitarian aid, was seized by the Israeli army in international waters and the 12 people on board – including MEP Rima Hassan – were arrested.

    The EU, the US, NATO – and the Greek Government – bear heavy responsibilities. By continuing political, military and economic cooperation with the state of Israel while regurgitating Israeli pretexts about the ‘right to self-defence’ and the ‘proportionate use of force’, they are facilitating the occupying state of Israel to continue its genocide in Gaza.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.What is the position of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the fact that the EU’s stance encourages the occupying state of Israel in, inter alia, the unacceptable and reprehensible seizure of the vessel ‘Madleen’ in international waters by the Israeli army and the illegal arrest and deportation of passengers?
    • 2.What is the position of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the demand of the peoples of the EU for the immediate suspension and annulment of the EU-Israel Association Agreement?
    • 3.What is the position of the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the need to stop forthwith the massacre by Israel against the Palestinian people, end military operations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank immediately, open all crossings and allow the necessary humanitarian aid to reach the Gaza Strip, boost EU funds directed to the Palestinian people and strengthen UNRWA, which is the competent and internationally recognised agency for assisting Palestinian refugees?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Confiscation of the Monastery of St Catherine of Sinai by Egyptian authorities – E-002347/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002347/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Emmanouil Kefalogiannis (PPE)

    The Monastery of St Catherine on Mount Sinai, the oldest functioning Christian monastery in the world, is facing the risk of confiscation following a decision by an Egyptian court, provoking strong reactions at the international level.

    The decision essentially assigns the Monastery to the Egyptian state, depriving it of the ownership status that has been in force since the Monastery was founded, some 1 500 years ago, by the Byzantine emperor Justinian.

    In a statement, the Archbishop of Athens and All Greece Ieronymos condemned the specific decision ‘unequivocally’, expressing ‘immense sadness’ and ‘legitimate anger’ over the matter. At the same time, he has called for the mobilisation of every Greek and international authority, as ‘the property of the Monastery is being seized and confiscated, and this spiritual Beacon of Orthodoxy and Hellenism is now facing an existential threat’.

    What actions does the Commission intend to take so that the oldest Christian monastery can continue its uninterrupted spiritual function and its property is not confiscated?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran – RC-B10-0284/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0284/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0285/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0296/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0299/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0300/2025 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Michał Wawrykiewicz, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Loucas Fourlas, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Daniel Attard, Chloé Ridel
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Rihards Kols, Aurelijus Veryga, Diego Solier, Nora Junco García, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Charlie Weimers, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alexandr Vondra, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Bogdan Rzońca, Assita Kanko, Marlena Maląg, Marion Maréchal, Waldemar Tomaszewski
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Abir Al‑Sahlani, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Bart Groothuis, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Alice Kuhnke
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Jonas Sjöstedt

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0284/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0284/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran

    (2025/2753(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran,

     having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Swedish-Iranian national Dr Ahmad Reza Djalali, a specialist in emergency medicine and a scholar at Belgium’s Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Italy’s Università del Piemonte Orientale, was arrested on 24 April 2016 by the Iranian security forces;

    B. whereas Djalali was sentenced to death on spurious espionage charges in October 2017 following a grossly unfair trial based on a confession extracted under torture; whereas the sentence was upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court on 17 June 2018;

    C. whereas Djalali has been denied adequate medical care despite the severe deterioration in his physical health and the risk to his life, including a recent heart attack at Evin prison; whereas Iran has continued to threaten to implement his death sentence;

    D. whereas hundreds of individuals have already been executed in 2025 and at least 972 were executed in 2024, a 14 % increase on 2023;

    E. whereas the Iranian Government refuses to recognise Djalali’s Swedish citizenship;

    F. whereas this case is part of a systematic pattern of unlawful detentions and hostage diplomacy by the Iranian regime;

    1. Calls on Iran to immediately release Dr Djalali along with all political prisoners currently being detained; calls on Iran to put a moratorium on executions and to abolish the death penalty;

    2. Strongly condemns Djalali’s sham trial and the Iranian authorities’ brutal treatment of him, amounting to torture and ill treatment, as he was subjected to months of interrogation in solitary confinement, and then sentenced to death;

    3. Urges Iran to provide Djalali, whose health is deteriorating, with immediate and unrestricted access to necessary specialised medical care at an external hospital; urges Iran, furthermore, to provide Djalali with legal representation and legal defence, and allow him regular contact with his family;

    4. Calls on the relevant Member States and the European External Action Service to intensify diplomatic efforts and adopt targeted measures in response to Iran’s continued detention of EU nationals, including Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and others, as part of its hostage diplomacy and in violation of international law;

    5. Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for taking EU nationals hostage and for mass executions of opposition voices and other human rights violations;

    6. Demands that Iran grant full access to UN human rights mechanisms, including the Special Rapporteur, and the EU’s full support and increase support for civil society organisations;

    7. Emphasises that EU-Iran engagements must be founded on tangible progress on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the release of all political prisoners;

    8. Asks the VP/HR to raise Djalali’s case publicly and in all engagements with her Iranian counterparts;

    9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government of Iran, the VP/HR, the Commission, the Member States and the United Nations.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Northfield Academy Pupils Honour Fallen Hero

    Source: Scotland – City of Aberdeen

    Secondary Year Two pupils at Northfield Academy were so inspired by the courage and sacrifice of former pupil Lance Corporal Allan Douglas they decided there should be a memorial plaque and trophy created in his honour.

    Lance Corporal Allan Douglas, of The Highlanders (Seaforth, Gordons and Camerons), lost his life on 30 January 2006, while on patrol in Al Amarah, Iraq. 

    The Lord Provost of Aberdeen, Dr David Cameron, unveiled the memorial plaque at the main entrance of the school building yesterday (Wednesday 18 June). The pupils of Crew 2.5 wanted the plaque located there as they want everyone entering the building to be reminded of Allan’s legacy.   

    The unveiling ceremony, featured, a lone piper suggested by Allan’s mum who was delighted and moved to learn of the pupils’ tribute to her son. Rikki Evans, owner of Alba Bagpipes was a school friend of Allan and said it was an honour to play in Allan’s memory.  

    The ceremony also included a welcome from Craig McDermott, head teacher of Northfield Academy before the pupils from Crew 2.5 spoke about why they felt compelled to honour Allan.  Ann Lowson, a retired guidance teacher, spoke fondly of Allan as she shared memories of his time at the school with the audience that included members of Allan’s family, the school community and the wider Northfield community.

    Following the ceremony, the Lord Provost, said: “It was clear that the unveiling of the memorial plaque and creation of the Allan Douglas Trophy, means a great deal to the school community and the wider community of Northfield.

    “Lance Corporal Allan Douglas was a young man when he died, and his legacy continues with the commendable efforts and community spirit demonstrated by the pupils of Crew 2.5 at Northfield Academy. They are immensely proud of Allan, and I am sure he would be very proud of them too.”

    Former guidance teacher Ann Lowson, said: “Allan’s death was very tragic. He was a typical Northfield lad …..full of life and fun. He was very caring of others, a loyal friend and very respectful of staff.”

    The pupils from Crew 2.5 have worked with the school’s management team and technical department to create the permanent memorial plaque.

    In addition to the plaque, the pupils have also raised funds for the creation of the Allan Douglas Trophy.  This annual award, presented at the academy’s Celebration of Success ceremony, will recognise Northfield Academy pupils who display bravery, courage and sacrifice. 

    The first recipient of this special award is Adam Mitchell, Secondary Year One pupil, who was presented with the Allan Douglas Trophy at the academy’s Celebration of Success ceremony, on Wednesday 11 June.  The trophy was awarded for bravery, courage and sacrifice.

    Adam Mitchell, Secondary Year One (S1) pupil at Northfield Academy. “It’s been a real honour to win the first ever Allan Douglas Trophy. It has been overwhelming in a good way.  I was left absolutely speechless when winning the trophy and receiving the medal. It is good to remember a former pupil from this school who fought for his country and sadly got killed during the war. I am proud to have been chosen.”

    Paul Rorie, Executive Officer, TD SCOTS RHQ Aberdeen & Tayforth Officer Training Regiment and John McLeish, Chief Executive, The Gordon Highlanders Museum were also in attendance.  

    Photo: The Lord and Lady Provost of Aberdeen, Dr David Cameron and Hazel Cameron with pupils from Crew 2.5 Mason Sherriffs; John Eglitis; Ashton Duncan; and Kaiden Henderson at the unveiling of plaque in memory of Lance Corporal Allan Douglas.  

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI: AI Prop Announces Unrestricted Use of Automated AI Bots for Prop Traders

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, June 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — AI Prop, a prop trading firm based in Dubai, announces a major update allowing traders to use fully automated AI trading bots without restrictions, even during the evaluation phase. Unlike many firms in the industry, AI Prop permits any bot type, strategy, or holding period, including weekend positions.

    AI Prop Funding Traders Up to $5 Million USD

    This policy shift positions AI Prop as a top contender for the best prop firm for traders looking to leverage automation. The firm reports that this flexibility can increase trading efficiency by up to 40 percent and reduce emotional decision-making errors by over 60 percent.

    Through its partnership with TradeBot365, AI Prop provides a streamlined platform for traders to build, customize, and launch AI bots directly into their funded accounts. These bots use adaptive machine learning to respond to market changes in real time, optimizing performance and risk control.

    In addition to bot deployment, AI Prop offers two AI-powered tools:

    • AI Coach: Offers personalized coaching by analyzing trader behavior and market data, saving up to 20 hours a month in manual analysis.
    • AI Analytics: Delivers real-time insights to help reduce losses by up to 25 percent and improve trading decisions.

    Together, these AI tools support traders in reducing trial-and-error, accelerating skill development, and improving profitability by as much as 35 percent.

    AI Prop also emphasizes transparency through blockchain-based tracking of profit payouts and capital management. All transactions are publicly verifiable, ensuring secure and timely payments to funded traders.

    Additional benefits for traders include:

    • Up to 50 percent reduction in manual trading tasks
    • Up to 30 percent fewer errors and drawdowns
    • Simplified bot integration through TradeBot365
    • Funding up to $5 million across forex, crypto, stocks, metals, and indices

    “AI Prop’s unrestricted AI bots and AI Coach have transformed my trading, cutting analysis time in half and boosting profits by 28 percent,” said a funded trader from the AI Prop community.

    For more information, visit https://aiprop.com.

    Media Contact:

    Eddy Hoffmann
    AI Prop
    info@aiprop.com
    https://aiprop.com/

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: AI Prop Announces Unrestricted Use of Automated AI Bots for Prop Traders

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, June 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — AI Prop, a prop trading firm based in Dubai, announces a major update allowing traders to use fully automated AI trading bots without restrictions, even during the evaluation phase. Unlike many firms in the industry, AI Prop permits any bot type, strategy, or holding period, including weekend positions.

    AI Prop Funding Traders Up to $5 Million USD

    This policy shift positions AI Prop as a top contender for the best prop firm for traders looking to leverage automation. The firm reports that this flexibility can increase trading efficiency by up to 40 percent and reduce emotional decision-making errors by over 60 percent.

    Through its partnership with TradeBot365, AI Prop provides a streamlined platform for traders to build, customize, and launch AI bots directly into their funded accounts. These bots use adaptive machine learning to respond to market changes in real time, optimizing performance and risk control.

    In addition to bot deployment, AI Prop offers two AI-powered tools:

    • AI Coach: Offers personalized coaching by analyzing trader behavior and market data, saving up to 20 hours a month in manual analysis.
    • AI Analytics: Delivers real-time insights to help reduce losses by up to 25 percent and improve trading decisions.

    Together, these AI tools support traders in reducing trial-and-error, accelerating skill development, and improving profitability by as much as 35 percent.

    AI Prop also emphasizes transparency through blockchain-based tracking of profit payouts and capital management. All transactions are publicly verifiable, ensuring secure and timely payments to funded traders.

    Additional benefits for traders include:

    • Up to 50 percent reduction in manual trading tasks
    • Up to 30 percent fewer errors and drawdowns
    • Simplified bot integration through TradeBot365
    • Funding up to $5 million across forex, crypto, stocks, metals, and indices

    “AI Prop’s unrestricted AI bots and AI Coach have transformed my trading, cutting analysis time in half and boosting profits by 28 percent,” said a funded trader from the AI Prop community.

    For more information, visit https://aiprop.com.

    Media Contact:

    Eddy Hoffmann
    AI Prop
    info@aiprop.com
    https://aiprop.com/

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Minutes – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg – Final edition

    Source: European Parliament

    PV-10-2025-06-18

    EN

    EN

    iPlPv_Sit

    Minutes
    Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

     Abbreviations and symbols

    + adopted
    rejected
    lapsed
    W withdrawn
    RCV roll-call votes
    EV electronic vote
    SEC secret ballot
    split split vote
    sep separate vote
    am amendment
    CA compromise amendment
    CP corresponding part
    D deleting amendment
    = identical amendments
    § paragraph

    EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

    2025 – 2026 SESSION

    Sittings of 16 to 19 June 2025

    STRASBOURG

    MINUTES

    WEDNESDAY 18 JUNE 2025

    IN THE CHAIR: Roberta METSOLA
    President

    1. Opening of the sitting

    The sitting opened at 09:02.



    2. Negotiations ahead of Parliament’s first reading (Rule 72) (action taken)

    The decision of the LIBE Committee to enter into interinstitutional negotiations had been announced on 16 June 2025 (minutes of 16.6.2025, item 12).

    As no request for a vote pursuant to Rule 72(2) had been made, the committee responsible had been able to enter into negotiations upon expiry of the deadline.



    3. Upcoming NATO summit on 24-26 June 2025 (debate)

    Commission statement: Upcoming NATO summit on 24-26 June 2025 (2025/2748(RSP))

    The President provided some clarifications on the arrangements for the conduct of the debate, for which a test format was to be used.

    Kaja Kallas (Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, on behalf of the PPE Group, Yannis Maniatis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Harald Vilimsky, on behalf of the PfE Group, Alexandr Vondra, on behalf of the ECR Group, Valérie Hayer, on behalf of the Renew Group, Bas Eickhout, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Marc Botenga, on behalf of The Left Group, René Aust, on behalf of the ESN Group, Michael Gahler, Sven Mikser, Jean-Paul Garraud, Adam Bielan, Dan Barna, Mārtiņš Staķis, Özlem Demirel, Milan Uhrík, Ruth Firmenich, Ingeborg Ter Laak and Eero Heinäluoma.

    IN THE CHAIR: Sabine VERHEYEN
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Anna Bryłka, Rasa Juknevičienė, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Petras Auštrevičius, Sebastião Bugalho, Hannah Neumann, Merja Kyllönen, Pekka Toveri, Elio Di Rupo, Roberto Vannacci, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Wouter Beke, Dan Nica, Hans Neuhoff, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Branislav Ondruš, who also answered a blue-card question from Maria Grapini, Riho Terras, Tobias Cremer, Jaak Madison, Markéta Gregorová, Michał Szczerba, Marina Mesure, Sarah Knafo, Ondřej Dostál, Angelika Niebler, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Özlem Demirel, Tonino Picula, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Massimiliano Salini, Evin Incir, Lucia Yar, Mika Aaltola, Giorgos Georgiou, Davor Ivo Stier, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Georgiana Teodorescu, Reinier Van Lanschot, Željana Zovko, Rihards Kols, Irene Montero, Eszter Lakos, Petar Volgin and Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez.

    IN THE CHAIR: Javi LÓPEZ
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: José Cepeda, Petra Steger, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Marta Wcisło, Jüri Ratas, Loucas Fourlas, Niels Fuglsang, Engin Eroglu, Miriam Lexmann, Kathleen Funchion, Ana Miguel Pedro, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Francisco Assis, Matej Tonin, Johan Van Overtveldt, Anders Vistisen, Marta Wcisło, Ville Niinistö, Sandra Kalniete and Danilo Della Valle.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Hélder Sousa Silva, Maria Grapini, João Oliveira, Petras Gražulis, Lukas Sieper, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos and Juan Fernando López Aguilar.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas.

    The debate closed.

    (The sitting was suspended at 11:43.)



    IN THE CHAIR: Roberta METSOLA
    President

    4. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 12:00.



    5. Voting time

    For detailed results of the votes, see also ‘Results of votes’ and ‘Results of roll-call votes’.



    5.1. Macro-financial assistance to Egypt ***I (vote)

    Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt [COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)] – Committee on International Trade. Rapporteur: Céline Imart (A10-0037/2025)

    An initial vote had been held on 1 April 2025 and the matter had been referred back to the committee responsible for interinstitutional negotiations under Rule 60(4) (minutes of 1.4.2025, item 6.11).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    REQUEST FROM THE LEFT GROUP TO PROCEED WITH A VOTE ON THE AMENDMENTS (Rule 60(3))

    Rejected

    PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)125)

    Parliament’s first reading thus closed.

    Detailed voting results



    5.2. Adoption by the Union of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty ***I (vote)

    Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adoption by the Union of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty between the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States [COM(2024)0257 – C10-0058/2024 – 2024/0148(COD)] – Committee on International Trade – Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. Rapporteurs: Anna Cavazzini and Borys Budka (A10-0009/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    COMMISSION PROPOSAL and AMENDMENTS

    Approved (P10_TA(2025)126)

    Parliament’s first reading thus closed.

    Detailed voting results

    2

    The following had spoken:

    Anna Cavazzini (rapporteur), before the vote, to make a statement on the basis of Rule 165(4).



    5.3. EU/Euratom Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty: adoption by Euratom * (vote)

    Report on the Proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by the European Atomic Energy Community of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty between the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States [COM(2024)0256 – C10-0092/2024 – 2024/0146(NLE)] – Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. Rapporteur: Borys Budka (A10-0008/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    COMMISSION PROPOSAL TO THE COUNCIL

    Approved by single vote (P10_TA(2025)127)

    Detailed voting results



    5.4. Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (vote)

    Report on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility [2024/2085(INI)] – Committee on Budgets – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. Rapporteurs: Victor Negrescu and Siegfried Mureşan (A10-0098/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 10).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)128)

    Detailed voting results



    5.5. The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report (vote)

    Report on The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report [2024/2078(INI)] – Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Rapporteur: Ana Catarina Mendes (A10-0100/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 11).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)129)

    Detailed voting results



    5.6. 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro (vote)

    Report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro [2025/2020(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Marjan Šarec (A10-0093/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 12).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)130)

    Detailed voting results



    5.7. 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova (vote)

    Report on 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova [2025/2025(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Sven Mikser (A10-0096/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 13).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)131)

    Detailed voting results

    7

    (The sitting was suspended for a few moments.)



    IN THE CHAIR: Christel SCHALDEMOSE
    Vice-President

    6. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 12:35.



    7. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

    The minutes of the previous sitting were approved.



    8. Stopping the genocide in Gaza: time for EU sanctions (topical debate)

    The following spoke: Manon Aubry to open the debate proposed by the The Left Group.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas (Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy).

    The following spoke: Hildegard Bentele, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nacho Sánchez Amor, on behalf of the S&D Group, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, on behalf of the PfE Group (the President noted that some comments needed to be checked), Sebastian Tynkkynen, on behalf of the ECR Group, Hilde Vautmans, on behalf of the Renew Group, Tineke Strik, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Hanna Gedin, on behalf of The Left Group, Marc Jongen, on behalf of the ESN Group, Seán Kelly, Evin Incir, Beatrice Timgren, Barry Andrews, Jaume Asens Llodrà, Nikos Pappas, Kateřina Konečná, Matjaž Nemec, Christophe Bay, Kristoffer Storm, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Ana Miranda Paz, Isabel Serra Sánchez, Ruth Firmenich, Francisco Assis, Abir Al-Sahlani, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Per Clausen, Cecilia Strada, Irena Joveva, Ville Niinistö, Özlem Demirel, Alex Agius Saliba, Lucia Yar, Giorgos Georgiou, Elio Di Rupo, Billy Kelleher, Estrella Galán, Ciaran Mullooly, Mimmo Lucano, Pernando Barrena Arza and Jussi Saramo (once the checks had been carried out, the President provided some clarifications).

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas.

    The debate closed.



    9. Freedom of assembly in Hungary and the need for the Commission to act (debate)

    Commission statement: Freedom of assembly in Hungary and the need for the Commission to act (2025/2758(RSP))

    Michael McGrath (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Tomas Tobé, on behalf of the PPE Group, Iratxe García Pérez, on behalf of the S&D Group, Kinga Gál, on behalf of the PfE Group, Paolo Inselvini, on behalf of the ECR Group, Fabienne Keller, on behalf of the Renew Group, Terry Reintke, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Konstantinos Arvanitis, on behalf of The Left Group, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, on behalf of the ESN Group, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Klára Dobrev, Harald Vilimsky, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Nicolae Ştefănuță, Nicolas Bay, who also answered a blue-card question from Mélissa Camara, Dainius Žalimas, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper, Tineke Strik, Ilaria Salis, who also declined to take a blue-card question, Christine Anderson, who also declined to take a blue-card question, Judita Laššáková, Maria Walsh, Ana Catarina Mendes and Hermann Tertsch.

    IN THE CHAIR: Martin HOJSÍK
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Arkadiusz Mularczyk, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper, Moritz Körner, Mélissa Camara, who also answered a blue-card question from Jacek Ozdoba, Carolina Morace, Milan Mazurek, Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Arba Kokalari, Marc Angel, Paolo Borchia, Jacek Ozdoba, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Daniel Freund (the President reminded him of the rules on conduct), Li Andersson, Tomasz Froelich, Lukas Sieper, Mirosława Nykiel, Alessandro Zan, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Tobiasz Bocheński, who also answered a blue-card question from Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Kim Van Sparrentak, Lena Düpont, Krzysztof Śmiszek, András László, who also answered a blue-card question from Michał Wawrykiewicz, Rasmus Nordqvist, who also answered a blue-card question from Tomasz Froelich, Evin Incir, Juan Fernando López Aguilar and Chloé Ridel.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Sebastian Tynkkynen and Alexander Jungbluth.

    The following spoke: Michael McGrath.

    The debate closed.



    10. Safeguarding the rule of law in Spain, ensuring an independent and autonomous prosecutor’s office to fight crime and corruption (debate)

    Commission statement: Safeguarding the rule of law in Spain, ensuring an independent and autonomous prosecutor’s office to fight crime and corruption (2025/2759(RSP))

    Michael McGrath (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Tomas Tobé, on behalf of the PPE Group, Javier Moreno Sánchez, on behalf of the S&D Group, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, on behalf of the PfE Group, Diego Solier, on behalf of the ECR Group, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, on behalf of the Renew Group, Diana Riba i Giner, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Isabel Serra Sánchez, on behalf of The Left Group, Dolors Montserrat, Evelyn Regner, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Enikő Győri, Hermann Tertsch, Nora Junco García, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Jaume Asens Llodrà, Lena Düpont, Francisco Assis, Petra Steger, Siegfried Mureşan, who also answered a blue-card question from Maria Grapini, and Sandro Ruotolo.

    IN THE CHAIR: Younous OMARJEE
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Enikő Győri, who also answered a blue-card question from Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Michał Wawrykiewicz, who also answered a blue-card question from Nicolás González Casares, Evin Incir, who also declined to take a blue-card question from François-Xavier Bellamy, Csaba Dömötör, Sebastião Bugalho, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, who also declined to take a blue-card question from François-Xavier Bellamy, Fabrice Leggeri, François-Xavier Bellamy to raise a point of order (the President cut off the speaker as his remarks did not constitute a point of order), Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, who also accepted a blue-card question from François-Xavier Bellamy (the President cut him off and made some clarifications on the blue-card procedure), David Casa, Ana Miguel Pedro, Dirk Gotink, Andrey Kovatchev and Javier Zarzalejos.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: José Cepeda, András László, Sebastian Tynkkynen and Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Michael McGrath.

    The debate closed.



    11. Clean Industrial Deal (debate)

    Question for oral answer O-000020/2025 by Tom Berendsen, on behalf of the ITRE Committee to the Commission: Clean Industrial Deal (B10-0006/2025) (2025/2656(RSP))

    Tom Berendsen moved the question.

    Stéphane Séjourné (Executive Vice-President of the Commission) answered the question.

    The following spoke: Angelika Winzig, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nicolás González Casares, on behalf of the S&D Group, Paolo Borchia, on behalf of the PfE Group, Daniel Obajtek, on behalf of the ECR Group, Christophe Grudler, on behalf of the Renew Group, Sara Matthieu, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Per Clausen, on behalf of The Left Group, and Anja Arndt, on behalf of the ESN Group.

    The following spoke: Stéphane Séjourné.

    Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 142(5) to wind up the debate: minutes of 19.6.2025, item I.

    The debate closed.

    Vote: 19 June 2025.



    12. Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system (debate)

    Report on electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system [2025/2006(INI)] – Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. Rapporteur: Anna Stürgkh (A10-0091/2025)

    Anna Stürgkh introduced the report.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The following spoke: Seán Kelly, on behalf of the PPE Group, Bruno Tobback, on behalf of the S&D Group, András Gyürk, on behalf of the PfE Group, Ondřej Krutílek, on behalf of the ECR Group, Christophe Grudler, on behalf of the Renew Group, Kira Marie Peter-Hansen, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Dario Tamburrano, on behalf of The Left Group, Sarah Knafo, on behalf of the ESN Group, Angelika Winzig, Mohammed Chahim, Aleksandar Nikolic, Diego Solier, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Jutta Paulus, Markus Buchheit, who also answered a blue-card question from Jutta Paulus, Fernand Kartheiser, Paulo Cunha, Tsvetelina Penkova, Isabella Tovaglieri, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Dario Nardella, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Barry Andrews, Benedetta Scuderi, Marcin Sypniewski, who also answered a blue-card question from Stine Bosse, Fidias Panayiotou, Mirosława Nykiel, Yannis Maniatis and Julie Rechagneux.

    IN THE CHAIR: Antonella SBERNA
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Ivars Ijabs, Michael Bloss, Andrea Wechsler, Dario Nardella, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Marion Maréchal, Bart Groothuis, Virgil-Daniel Popescu, Jens Geier, Nikola Bartůšek, Beatrice Timgren, Wouter Beke, Nicolás González Casares, who also answered blue-card questions from João Oliveira and Mireia Borrás Pabón, Gilles Pennelle, Hildegard Bentele, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper, Sofie Eriksson, Niels Flemming Hansen, Jüri Ratas, Michał Szczerba, Dimitris Tsiodras, Krzysztof Hetman, Andreas Schwab, Regina Doherty and Tomislav Sokol.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Billy Kelleher, João Oliveira, Maria Zacharia and Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva and Anna Stürgkh.

    The debate closed.

    Vote: 19 June 2025.



    13. Composition of committees and delegations

    The ECR Group had notified the President of the following decision changing the composition of the committees and delegations:

    – ITRE Committee: Anna Zalewska

    The decision took effect as of that day.



    14. Rise in violence and the deepening humanitarian crisis in South Sudan (debate)

    Commission statement: Rise in violence and the deepening humanitarian crisis in South Sudan (2025/2751(RSP))

    Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Michael Gahler, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marit Maij, on behalf of the S&D Group, György Hölvényi, on behalf of the PfE Group, Adam Bielan, on behalf of the ECR Group, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, on behalf of the Renew Group, Erik Marquardt, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Özlem Demirel, on behalf of The Left Group, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Francisco Assis, Barry Andrews, Murielle Laurent and Leire Pajín.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Alessandra Moretti, Nikos Papandreou and Sebastian Tynkkynen.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva.

    IN THE CHAIR: Roberts ZĪLE
    Vice-President

    The debate closed.



    15. Debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (debate)

    (For the titles and authors of the motions for resolutions, see minutes of 18.6.2025, item I.)



    15.1. Media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli

    Motions for resolutions B10-0282/2025, B10-0283/2025, B10-0287/2025, B10-0288/2025, B10-0289/2025, B10-0290/2025 and B10-0295/2025 (2025/2752(RSP))

    Rasa Juknevičienė, Tobias Cremer, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Dainius Žalimas, Lena Schilling, Danilo Della Valle and Petr Bystron introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.

    The following spoke: Liudas Mažylis, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nacho Sánchez Amor, on behalf of the S&D Group, and Thierry Mariani, on behalf of the PfE Group.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The debate closed.

    Vote: minutes of 19.6.2025, item 5.1.



    15.2. Case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran

    Motions for resolutions B10-0280/2025, B10-0284/2025, B10-0285/2025, B10-0286/2025, B10-0296/2025, B10-0299/2025 and B10-0300/2025 (2025/2753(RSP))

    Michał Wawrykiewicz, Evin Incir, Veronika Vrecionová, Abir Al-Sahlani, Alice Kuhnke, Jonas Sjöstedt and Sebastiaan Stöteler introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.

    The following spoke: Alice Teodorescu Måwe, on behalf of the PPE Group, Francisco Assis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Gerolf Annemans, on behalf of the PfE Group, Hilde Vautmans, on behalf of the Renew Group, Wouter Beke, Daniel Attard and Danuše Nerudová.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The debate closed.

    Vote: minutes of 19.6.2025, item 5.2.



    15.3. Dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali

    Motions for resolutions B10-0281/2025, B10-0291/2025, B10-0292/2025, B10-0293/2025, B10-0294/2025, B10-0297/2025 and B10-0298/2025 (2025/2754(RSP))

    Christophe Gomart, Laura Ballarín Cereza and Catarina Vieira introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.

    The following spoke: Ingeborg Ter Laak, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marta Temido, on behalf of the S&D Group, and Reinhold Lopatka.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The debate closed.

    Vote: minutes of 19.6.2025, item 5.3.



    16. Digital Markets, Digital Euro, Digital Identities: economical stimuli or trends toward dystopia (topical debate)

    The following spoke: Rada Laykova to open the debate proposed by the ESN Group.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The following spoke: Fernando Navarrete Rojas, on behalf of the PPE Group, Aurore Lalucq, on behalf of the S&D Group, Piotr Müller, on behalf of the ECR Group, Billy Kelleher, on behalf of the Renew Group, Sergey Lagodinsky, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Jussi Saramo, on behalf of The Left Group, Siegbert Frank Droese, on behalf of the ESN Group, Lídia Pereira, Stefano Cavedagna, Katri Kulmuni, Damian Boeselager, Milan Mazurek, Fabio De Masi, Paulius Saudargas, Marlena Maląg, Diego Solier, Gheorghe Piperea, Dick Erixon and Claudiu-Richard Târziu.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva.

    The debate closed.



    17. Oral explanations of votes (Rule 201)

    No oral explanations of votes were made.



    18. Explanations of votes in writing (Rule 201)

    Explanations of votes given in writing would appear on the Members’ pages on Parliament’s website



    19. Agenda of the next sitting

    The next sitting would be held the following day, 19 June 2025, starting at 09:00. The agenda was available on Parliament’s website.



    20. Approval of the minutes of the sitting

    In accordance with Rule 208(3), the minutes of the sitting would be put to the House for approval at the beginning of the afternoon of the next sitting.



    21. Closure of the sitting

    The sitting closed at 21:10.



    LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVING AS A BASIS FOR THE DEBATES AND DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENT



    I. Motions for resolutions tabled

    Media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli

    The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0282/2025)
    Lena Schilling, Mélissa Camara, Mounir Satouri, Ville Niinistö, Maria Ohisalo, Mārtiņš Staķis, Nicolae
    Ştefănuță, Markéta Gregorová
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0283/2025)
    Danilo Della Valle
    on behalf of The Left Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0287/2025)
    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas, Olivier Chastel
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0288/2025)
    Petr Bystron, Tomasz Froelich, Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell
    on behalf of the ESN Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0289/2025)
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Tobias Cremer
    on behalf of the S&D Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0290/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere, Rasa Juknevičienė
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0295/2025)
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Reinis Pozņaks, Rihards Kols, Alexandr Vondra, Mariusz Kamiński, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Assita Kanko, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    Case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran

    The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0280/2025)
    Jonas Sjöstedt
    on behalf of The Left Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0284/2025)
    Alice Kuhnke, Maria Ohisalo, Mounir Satouri, Nicolae
    Ştefănuță, Mélissa Camara, Ville Niinistö, Hannah Neumann
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali’s illegal arrest and detention in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0285/2025)
    Abir Al-Sahlani, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Bart Groothuis, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0286/2025)
    Sebastiaan Stöteler, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa, Nikola Bartůšek, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Gerolf Annemans, Hermann Tertsch
    on behalf of the PfE Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0296/2025)
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Chloé Ridel
    on behalf of the S&D Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0299/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Željana Zovko, David McAllister, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Loucas Fourlas, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0300/2025)
    Adam Bielan, Reinis Pozņaks, Rihards Kols, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Mariusz Kamiński, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alberico Gambino, Carlo Fidanza, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Assita Kanko, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Cristian Terheş, Diego Solier, Nora Junco García, Michał Dworczyk, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Marion Maréchal
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    Dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali

    The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0281/2025)
    Merja Kyllönen
    on behalf of The Left Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0291/2025)
    Nathalie Loiseau, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Yvan Verougstraete, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0292/2025)
    Tomasz Froelich, Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell
    on behalf of the ESN Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0293/2025)
    Matthieu Valet, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Nikola Bartůšek
    on behalf of the PfE Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0294/2025)
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Laura Ballarín Cereza
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Catarina Vieira
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0297/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, Christophe Gomart, Željana Zovko, David McAllister, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0298/2025)
    Adam Bielan, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Assita Kanko, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Małgorzata Gosiewska
    on behalf of the ECR Group



    II. Delegated acts (Rule 114(2))

    Draft delegated acts forwarded to Parliament

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the identification of sub-categories within net-zero technologies and the list of specific components used for those technologies. (C(2025)02901 – 2025/2733(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 23 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ITRE
    opinion: ECON, EMPL, ENVI, IMCO, REGI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/125 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (C(2025)03066 – 2025/2727(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 21 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: INTA

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the addition of vehicle sub-groups for extra-heavy-combination lorries (C(2025)03071 – 2025/2726(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 20 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ENVI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards measures adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organisation for the monitoring, reporting and verification of aviation emissions for the purpose of implementing a global market-based measure and repealing Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/1603 (C(2025)03075 – 2025/2725(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 20 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ENVI
    opinion: ITRE

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 as regards the inclusion of the drug precursors 4-piperidone and 1-boc-4-piperidone in the list of scheduled substances (C(2025)03079 – 2025/2729(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 21 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: LIBE

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on the authorisation and organisational requirements for approved publication arrangements and approved reporting mechanisms, and on the authorisation requirements for consolidated tape providers, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/571 (C(2025)03100 – 2025/2765(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the input and output data of consolidated tapes, the synchronisation of business clocks and the revenue redistribution by the consolidated tape provider for shares and ETFs, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/574 (C(2025)03102 – 2025/2761(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on the obligation to make market data available to the public on a reasonable commercial basis (C(2025)03103 – 2025/2762(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council with detailed rules and procedures on the acceptance of air traffic controller licences and certificates issued by third countries. (C(2025)03114 – 2025/2732(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 23 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: TRAN

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council by specifying the rules on the identification of authorised oil and gas producers who are required to contribute to the objective of reaching the Union-target for available CO2 injection capacity by 2030, on the calculation of their respective contributions, and on their reporting obligations (C(2025)03218 – 2025/2730(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 21 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ITRE
    opinion: ECON, EMPL, ENVI, IMCO, REGI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the information in an application for authorisation to offer asset-referenced tokens to the public or to seek their admission to trading (C(2025)03221 – 2025/2737(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 5 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 as regards updating the references to the environmental protection requirements and correcting that Regulation (C(2025)03287 – 2025/2735(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 28 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: TRAN

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards geographic coordinates in Annexes VII and XIII thereto (C(2025)03293 – 2025/2734(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 28 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: PECH

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending the Annex to Regulation (EU) No 609/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council to allow the use of monosodium salt of L-5-methyltetrahydrofolic acid as a source of folate in infant formula and follow-on formula, processed cereal-based food and baby food, total diet replacement for weight control and in food for special medical purposes (C(2025)03411 – 2025/2736(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 4 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ENVI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards the assignment of Unique Device Identifiers for spectacle frames, spectacle lenses and ready-to-wear reading spectacles (C(2025)03484 – 2025/2763(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: SANT

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 of the European Parliament and of the Council to take into account regulatory developments concerning amendments to UN Regulations Nos 25, 34, 79, 100, 117, 127 and 152, and the new UN Regulations Nos 167, 169 and 171 adopted by the World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (C(2025)03502 – 2025/2738(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 5 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: IMCO

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) No 876/2013 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards changes to the functioning and management of colleges for central counterparties (C(2025)03626 – 2025/2755(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 11 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk (C(2025)03643 – 2025/2764(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation on the implementation of the Union’s international obligations, as referred to in Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part, as regards picked dogfish (C(2025)03715 – 2025/2768(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 13 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: PECH

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list (C(2025)03815 – 2025/2740(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 1 month from the date of receipt of 10 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON, LIBE

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/530 as regards its date of application (C(2025)03819 – 2025/2766(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: INTA



    ATTENDANCE REGISTER

    Present:

    Aaltola Mika, Abadía Jover Maravillas, Adamowicz Magdalena, Aftias Georgios, Agirregoitia Martínez Oihane, Agius Peter, Agius Saliba Alex, Alexandraki Galato, Allione Grégory, Al-Sahlani Abir, Anadiotis Nikolaos, Anderson Christine, Andersson Li, Andresen Rasmus, Andrews Barry, Andriukaitis Vytenis Povilas, Androuët Mathilde, Angel Marc, Annemans Gerolf, Annunziata Lucia, Antoci Giuseppe, Arias Echeverría Pablo, Arimont Pascal, Arłukowicz Bartosz, Arnaoutoglou Sakis, Arndt Anja, Arvanitis Konstantinos, Asens Llodrà Jaume, Assis Francisco, Attard Daniel, Aubry Manon, Auštrevičius Petras, Axinia Adrian-George, Azmani Malik, Bajada Thomas, Baljeu Jeannette, Ballarín Cereza Laura, Bardella Jordan, Barley Katarina, Barna Dan, Barrena Arza Pernando, Bartulica Stephen Nikola, Bartůšek Nikola, Bausemer Arno, Bay Nicolas, Bay Christophe, Beke Wouter, Bellamy François-Xavier, Benea Dragoş, Benjumea Benjumea Isabel, Beňová Monika, Bentele Hildegard, Berendsen Tom, Berg Sibylle, Berlato Sergio, Bernhuber Alexander, Biedroń Robert, Bielan Adam, Bischoff Gabriele, Blaha Ľuboš, Blinkevičiūtė Vilija, Blom Rachel, Bloss Michael, Bocheński Tobiasz, Boeselager Damian, Bogdan Ioan-Rareş, Bonaccini Stefano, Bonte Barbara, Borchia Paolo, Borrás Pabón Mireia, Borvendég Zsuzsanna, Borzan Biljana, Bosanac Gordan, Boßdorf Irmhild, Bosse Stine, Botenga Marc, Boyer Gilles, Brasier-Clain Marie-Luce, Braun Grzegorz, Brejza Krzysztof, Bricmont Saskia, Brnjac Nikolina, Bryłka Anna, Buchheit Markus, Buczek Tomasz, Buda Daniel, Buda Waldemar, Budka Borys, Bugalho Sebastião, Buła Andrzej, Buxadé Villalba Jorge, Bystron Petr, Bžoch Jaroslav, Camara Mélissa, Canfin Pascal, Carberry Nina, Cârciu Gheorghe, Carême Damien, Casa David, Caspary Daniel, Cassart Benoit, Castillo Laurent, del Castillo Vera Pilar, Cavazzini Anna, Cavedagna Stefano, Ceccardi Susanna, Cepeda José, Ceulemans Estelle, Chahim Mohammed, Chaibi Leila, Chastel Olivier, Christensen Asger, Ciccioli Carlo, Cifrová Ostrihoňová Veronika, Ciriani Alessandro, Cisint Anna Maria, Clausen Per, Clergeau Christophe, Cormand David, Corrado Annalisa, Costanzo Vivien, Cotrim De Figueiredo João, Cowen Barry, Cremer Tobias, Cristea Andi, Crosetto Giovanni, Cunha Paulo, Dahl Henrik, Danielsson Johan, Dauchy Marie, Dávid Dóra, David Ivan, Decaro Antonio, de la Hoz Quintano Raúl, Della Valle Danilo, Deloge Valérie, De Masi Fabio, Demirel Özlem, Deutsch Tamás, Devaux Valérie, Dibrani Adnan, Dieringer Elisabeth, Dîncu Vasile, Di Rupo Elio, Disdier Mélanie, Dobrev Klára, Doherty Regina, Doleschal Christian, Dömötör Csaba, Do Nascimento Cabral Paulo, Donazzan Elena, Dorfmann Herbert, Dostalova Klara, Dostál Ondřej, Droese Siegbert Frank, Düpont Lena, Dworczyk Michał, Ecke Matthias, Ehler Christian, Ehlers Marieke, Eriksson Sofie, Erixon Dick, Eroglu Engin, Estaràs Ferragut Rosa, Everding Sebastian, Falcă Gheorghe, Falcone Marco, Farreng Laurence, Farský Jan, Ferber Markus, Ferenc Viktória, Fernández Jonás, Fidanza Carlo, Fiocchi Pietro, Firmenich Ruth, Flanagan Luke Ming, Fourlas Loucas, Fourreau Emma, Fragkos Emmanouil, Freund Daniel, Fritzon Heléne, Froelich Tomasz, Fuglsang Niels, Funchion Kathleen, Furet Angéline, Furore Mario, Gahler Michael, Gál Kinga, Galán Estrella, Gálvez Lina, Gambino Alberico, García Hermida-Van Der Walle Raquel, Garraud Jean-Paul, Gasiuk-Pihowicz Kamila, Geadi Geadis, Gedin Hanna, Geese Alexandra, Geier Jens, Geisel Thomas, Gemma Chiara, Georgiou Giorgos, Gerbrandy Gerben-Jan, Gerzsenyi Gabriella, Geuking Niels, Gieseke Jens, Giménez Larraz Borja, Girauta Vidal Juan Carlos, Glavak Sunčana, Glucksmann Raphaël, Goerens Charles, Gomart Christophe, Gomes Isilda, Gómez López Sandra, Gonçalves Bruno, Gonçalves Sérgio, González Casares Nicolás, González Pons Esteban, Gori Giorgio, Gosiewska Małgorzata, Gotink Dirk, Gozi Sandro, Grapini Maria, Gražulis Petras, Gregorová Markéta, Grims Branko, Griset Catherine, Gronkiewicz-Waltz Hanna, Groothuis Bart, Grossmann Elisabeth, Grudler Christophe, Gualmini Elisabetta, Guarda Cristina, Guetta Bernard, Guzenina Maria, Győri Enikő, Gyürk András, Haider Roman, Halicki Andrzej, Hansen Niels Flemming, Hassan Rima, Hauser Gerald, Häusling Martin, Hava Mircea-Gheorghe, Heinäluoma Eero, Henriksson Anna-Maja, Herbst Niclas, Herranz García Esther, Hetman Krzysztof, Hojsík Martin, Holmgren Pär, Hölvényi György, Homs Ginel Alicia, Humberto Sérgio, Ijabs Ivars, Imart Céline, Incir Evin, Inselvini Paolo, Iovanovici Şoşoacă Diana, Jalloul Muro Hana, Jamet France, Jarubas Adam, Jerković Romana, Jongen Marc, Joński Dariusz, Joron Virginie, Jouvet Pierre, Joveva Irena, Juknevičienė Rasa, Junco García Nora, Jungbluth Alexander, Kabilov Taner, Kalfon François, Kaliňák Erik, Kaljurand Marina, Kalniete Sandra, Kamiński Mariusz, Kanev Radan, Kanko Assita, Karlsbro Karin, Kartheiser Fernand, Karvašová Ľubica, Katainen Elsi, Kefalogiannis Emmanouil, Kelleher Billy, Keller Fabienne, Kelly Seán, Kennes Rudi, Khan Mary, Kircher Sophia, Knafo Sarah, Knotek Ondřej, Kobosko Michał, Köhler Stefan, Kohut Łukasz, Kokalari Arba, Kolář Ondřej, Kollár Kinga, Kols Rihards, Konečná Kateřina, Kopacz Ewa, Körner Moritz, Kountoura Elena, Kovařík Ondřej, Kovatchev Andrey, Krištopans Vilis, Kruis Sebastian, Krutílek Ondřej, Kubín Tomáš, Kuhnke Alice, Kulmuni Katri, Kyllönen Merja, Kyuchyuk Ilhan, Lagodinsky Sergey, Lakos Eszter, Lalucq Aurore, Lange Bernd, Langensiepen Katrin, Laššáková Judita, László András, Latinopoulou Afroditi, Laurent Murielle, Laureti Camilla, Laykova Rada, Lazarov Ilia, Lazarus Luis-Vicențiu, Le Callennec Isabelle, Leggeri Fabrice, Lenaers Jeroen, Leonardelli Julien, Lewandowski Janusz, Lexmann Miriam, Liese Peter, Lins Norbert, Loiseau Nathalie, Løkkegaard Morten, Lopatka Reinhold, López Javi, López Aguilar Juan Fernando, López-Istúriz White Antonio, Lövin Isabella, Lucano Mimmo, Luena César, Łukacijewska Elżbieta Katarzyna, Lupo Giuseppe, McAllister David, Madison Jaak, Maestre Cristina, Magoni Lara, Magyar Péter, Maij Marit, Maląg Marlena, Mandl Lukas, Maniatis Yannis, Mantovani Mario, Maran Pierfrancesco, Marczułajtis-Walczak Jagna, Maréchal Marion, Mariani Thierry, Marino Ignazio Roberto, Marquardt Erik, Martín Frías Jorge, Martins Catarina, Martusciello Fulvio, Marzà Ibáñez Vicent, Mato Gabriel, Matthieu Sara, Mavrides Costas, Mayer Georg, Mazurek Milan, Mažylis Liudas, McNamara Michael, Mebarek Nora, Mehnert Alexandra, Meimarakis Vangelis, Meleti Eleonora, Mendes Ana Catarina, Mendia Idoia, Mertens Verena, Mesure Marina, Metsola Roberta, Metz Tilly, Mikser Sven, Milazzo Giuseppe, Millán Mon Francisco José, Minchev Nikola, Miranda Paz Ana, Molnár Csaba, Montero Irene, Montserrat Dolors, Morace Carolina, Morano Nadine, Moreira de Sá Tiago, Moreno Sánchez Javier, Moretti Alessandra, Motreanu Dan-Ştefan, Mularczyk Arkadiusz, Müller Piotr, Mullooly Ciaran, Mureşan Siegfried, Muşoiu Ştefan, Nagyová Jana, Nardella Dario, Navarrete Rojas Fernando, Negrescu Victor, Nemec Matjaž, Nerudová Danuše, Nesci Denis, Neuhoff Hans, Neumann Hannah, Nevado del Campo Elena, Nica Dan, Niebler Angelika, Niedermayer Luděk, Niinistö Ville, Nikolaou-Alavanos Lefteris, Nikolic Aleksandar, Ní Mhurchú Cynthia, Noichl Maria, Nordqvist Rasmus, Novakov Andrey, Nykiel Mirosława, Obajtek Daniel, Ódor Ľudovít, Oetjen Jan-Christoph, Oliveira João, Olivier Philippe, Omarjee Younous, Ondruš Branislav, Ó Ríordáin Aodhán, Orlando Leoluca, Ozdoba Jacek, Paet Urmas, Pajín Leire, Palmisano Valentina, Panayiotou Fidias, Papadakis Kostas, Papandreou Nikos, Pappas Nikos, Pascual de la Parte Nicolás, Paulus Jutta, Pedro Ana Miguel, Pedulla’ Gaetano, Pellerin-Carlin Thomas, Peltier Guillaume, Penkova Tsvetelina, Pennelle Gilles, Pereira Lídia, Peter-Hansen Kira Marie, Petrov Hristo, Picaro Michele, Picierno Pina, Picula Tonino, Piera Pascale, Pietikäinen Sirpa, Pimpie Pierre, Piperea Gheorghe, de la Pisa Carrión Margarita, Polato Daniele, Polfjärd Jessica, Popescu Virgil-Daniel, Pozņaks Reinis, Prebilič Vladimir, Princi Giusi, Protas Jacek, Pürner Friedrich, Rackete Carola, Radev Emil, Radtke Dennis, Rafowicz Emma, Ratas Jüri, Razza Ruggero, Rechagneux Julie, Regner Evelyn, Repasi René, Repp Sabrina, Ressler Karlo, Reuten Thijs, Riba i Giner Diana, Ricci Matteo, Ridel Chloé, Riehl Nela, Ripa Manuela, Rodrigues André, Roth Neveďalová Katarína, Rougé André, Ruissen Bert-Jan, Ruotolo Sandro, Rzońca Bogdan, Saeidi Arash, Salini Massimiliano, Salis Ilaria, Salla Aura, Sánchez Amor Nacho, Sanchez Julien, Sancho Murillo Elena, Saramo Jussi, Sardone Silvia, Šarec Marjan, Sargiacomo Eric, Satouri Mounir, Saudargas Paulius, Sbai Majdouline, Sberna Antonella, Schaldemose Christel, Schaller-Baross Ernő, Schenk Oliver, Scheuring-Wielgus Joanna, Schieder Andreas, Schilling Lena, Schneider Christine, Schnurrbusch Volker, Schwab Andreas, Scuderi Benedetta, Seekatz Ralf, Sell Alexander, Serrano Sierra Rosa, Serra Sánchez Isabel, Sidl Günther, Sienkiewicz Bartłomiej, Sieper Lukas, Singer Christine, Sinkevičius Virginijus, Sjöstedt Jonas, Śmiszek Krzysztof, Smith Anthony, Smit Sander, Sokol Tomislav, Solier Diego, Solís Pérez Susana, Sommen Liesbet, Sonneborn Martin, Sorel Malika, Sousa Silva Hélder, Søvndal Villy, Squarta Marco, Staķis Mārtiņš, Stancanelli Raffaele, Ștefănuță Nicolae, Steger Petra, Stier Davor Ivo, Storm Kristoffer, Stöteler Sebastiaan, Stoyanov Stanislav, Strada Cecilia, Streit Joachim, Strik Tineke, Strolenberg Anna, Sturdza Şerban Dimitrie, Stürgkh Anna, Sypniewski Marcin, Szczerba Michał, Szekeres Pál, Tamburrano Dario, Tânger Corrêa António, Tarquinio Marco, Tarr Zoltán, Târziu Claudiu-Richard, Tavares Carla, Tegethoff Kai, Temido Marta, Teodorescu Georgiana, Teodorescu Måwe Alice, Terheş Cristian, Ter Laak Ingeborg, Terras Riho, Tertsch Hermann, Thionnet Pierre-Romain, Timgren Beatrice, Tinagli Irene, Tobback Bruno, Tobé Tomas, Tolassy Rody, Tomac Eugen, Tomašič Zala, Tomaszewski Waldemar, Tomc Romana, Tonin Matej, Toom Jana, Topo Raffaele, Torselli Francesco, Tosi Flavio, Toussaint Marie, Tovaglieri Isabella, Toveri Pekka, Tridico Pasquale, Trochu Laurence, Tsiodras Dimitris, Tudose Mihai, Turek Filip, Tynkkynen Sebastian, Uhrík Milan, Ušakovs Nils, Vaidere Inese, Valchev Ivaylo, Vălean Adina, Valet Matthieu, Van Brempt Kathleen, Vandendriessche Tom, Van Dijck Kris, Van Lanschot Reinier, Van Leeuwen Jessika, Vannacci Roberto, Van Overtveldt Johan, Van Sparrentak Kim, Varaut Alexandre, Vasconcelos Ana, Vasile-Voiculescu Vlad, Vautmans Hilde, Vedrenne Marie-Pierre, Ventola Francesco, Verheyen Sabine, Verougstraete Yvan, Veryga Aurelijus, Vešligaj Marko, Vicsek Annamária, Vieira Catarina, Vigenin Kristian, Vilimsky Harald, Vind Marianne, Vistisen Anders, Vivaldini Mariateresa, Volgin Petar, von der Schulenburg Michael, Vondra Alexandr, Voss Axel, Vozemberg-Vrionidi Elissavet, Vrecionová Veronika, Vázquez Lázara Adrián, Waitz Thomas, Walsh Maria, Walsmann Marion, Warborn Jörgen, Warnke Jan-Peter, Wąsik Maciej, Wawrykiewicz Michał, Wcisło Marta, Wechsler Andrea, Weimers Charlie, Werbrouck Séverine, Wiezik Michal, Winkler Iuliu, Winzig Angelika, Wiseler-Lima Isabel, Wiśniewska Jadwiga, Wölken Tiemo, Wolters Lara, Yar Lucia, Yon-Courtin Stéphanie, Zacharia Maria, Zajączkowska-Hernik Ewa, Zalewska Anna, Žalimas Dainius, Zan Alessandro, Zarzalejos Javier, Zdechovský Tomáš, Zdrojewski Bogdan Andrzej, Zijlstra Auke, Zīle Roberts, Zingaretti Nicola, Złotowski Kosma, Zoido Álvarez Juan Ignacio, Zovko Željana

    Excused:

    Burkhardt Delara, Friis Sigrid, Hazekamp Anja, Kemp Martine

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Public hearing on the human rights dimension of the EU Memoranda of Understanding – Subcommittee on Human Rights

    Source: European Parliament

    On 25 June 2025, the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI) is organising a public hearing on “The Human Rights dimension of the EU memoranda of Understanding in its Southern Neighbourhood (Mauritania, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan)”. It will allow to reflect upon the EU cooperation policy in the region from a human rights perspective and discuss solutions for the monitoring of the informal agreements and related funding and improving the human rights conditionality in the EU policy tools.

    Civil society voices will share testimonies and analysis of situations on the ground after the conclusion of those informal agreements, which include but are not limited to migration and asylum-related measures. Representatives of the EU Commission, the European External Action Service and the European Court of Accounts will explain EU action in the field, also against the background of the upcoming EU Pact for the Mediterranean. Each panel will be followed by a Q&A session with MEPs.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Serious negligence in the protection of minors in France – E-002372/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002372/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Catherine Griset (PfE), Aleksandar Nikolic (PfE), Virginie Joron (PfE), Valérie Deloge (PfE), Marie-Luce Brasier-Clain (PfE), Mathilde Androuët (PfE), Julie Rechagneux (PfE), Jean-Paul Garraud (PfE)

    As reported in the press[1], the state of affairs in France’s juvenile detention centres in France is scandalous: girls are exposed to prostitution, boys to drug trafficking, and now Islamist networks, particularly those run by the Muslim Brotherhood, are infiltrating them:

    Despite repeated warnings, this criminal neglect of children and teenagers, who are among the most vulnerable members of society, has been completely ignored by successive French governments.

    Worse still, through their irresponsible migration policy, these governments have aggravated the security situation in juvenile detention centres, even going so far as to place children of Jihadists returning from Syria in these centres.

    Furthermore, the French authorities do not monitor the training of professionals in secularism, which allows religious rules to be imposed in the canteens of these establishments.

    • 1.Is the Commission aware of similar cases of negligence in the protection of minors in other Member States?
    • 2.Are any European agencies, such as Europol or Eurojust, monitoring Islamist or criminal tendencies in homes for minors in Europe?

    Submitted: 12.6.2025

    • [1] https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/les-islamistes-ont-infiltre-les-foyers-pour-mineurs-et-les-associations-de-protection-de-l-enfance-20250601
    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Scottish Government must choose human rights over war profiteers

    Source: Scottish Greens

    Scottish Greens call for update on Government funding of Israel’s arms dealers

    The SNP must urgently update parliament on what it is doing to end Scottish Government support for companies arming and supporting Israel, say the Scottish Greens.

    Yesterday in Holyrood, Scottish Greens co-leader and Economy spokesperson Lorna Slater MSP forced a vote to ensure the Scottish Government takes urgent action on Scottish Enterprise’s failing human rights due diligence checks.

    All other parties except the Scottish Greens refused to back Lorna’s call.

    Since 2019, the Scottish Government has reportedly given at least £8 million of Scottish Enterprise grants to companies involved in arms dealing and manufacturing. This includes a number of businesses who have directly supplied weapons and military equipment to Israel during its assault on Gaza, including Leonardo and Raytheon.

    Companies receiving funds through Scottish Enterprise are subject to a human rights due diligence check, but no company has ever failed these checks. Amnesty International has condemned the process as “inadequate”.

    Following a debate forced by the Greens in February this year, the Scottish Government committed to a review of these human rights checks to ensure that Scotland is meeting its international obligations.

    However, the Government has yet failed to update Parliament on the progress of the review.

    Lorna Slater spoke in the Conservatives party debate ‘Recognising the Economic Contribution of Scotland’s Defence Sector’.

    Speaking after the vote, Lorna said:

    “Not a penny of public money should be going to arms companies that are profiting from war crimes and genocide in Gaza. But four months on from the Scottish Government’s promised review of Scottish Enterprise human rights checks, we’ve had no update and seen no changes. Ten-thousand more people have been killed in Gaza while this review has been going on.

    “Yesterday, the Parliament could have forced the Government to report on this critical review and ensure they meet their own public commitments to upholding and promoting human rights internationally. But despite voting for the review in February, the SNP, Labour and the Lib Dems refused to back our call for an urgent update to Parliament.

    “The ongoing genocide of the Palestinian people in Gaza that is being live streamed on social media into our homes, is only possible because of the companies and governments arming the state of Israel to carry out the assaults.

    “Just this week, 51 starving Palestinians were killed while desperately trying to access food through a so-called ‘aid’ distribution point coordinated by the US and Israel. This is only one of several attacks at these sites, where the death toll has now reached into the hundreds, with thousands more severely injured.

    “We may not have the power to stop the UK’s active participation in Israel’s genocide, but we can control where our public money goes – and that should never be put into the pockets of companies who are profiting from some of the most horrific war crimes of our generation.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 18 June 2025 Departmental update Jordan’s new drink-driving law will save lives

    Source: World Health Organisation

    Jordan has taken a bold step to make its roads safer with the ratification of a new drink-driving law that meets World Health Organization (WHO) best practice criteria.

    With technical support from WHO, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan introduced legislation that lowers the legal blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit for drivers to 0.05 grams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood for the general population, bringing the country closer to global standards that are proven to save lives. 

    Drinking and driving significantly increases the risk and severity of road crashes. In low- and middle-income countries, where 92% of road deaths occur, between 33% and 69% of drivers killed in crashes have consumed alcohol.

    “Jordan’s landmark drink-driving law is a major step forward in efforts to reduce road deaths,” said Dr Iman Shankiti, WHO Representative to Jordan. “This builds on the commendable progress in reducing preventable road fatalities in recent years. Looking forward, WHO is here to help implement the new law and advance road safety however we can.”

    With an estimated 1514 annual road traffic fatalities and a fatality rate of 13.6 deaths per 100 000 population, Jordan is below the global average of 15 deaths per 100 000 population. Yet while road deaths are declining, the country faces challenges around legislation for speed limits, seatbelt use, child restraints, helmet use and impaired driving.

    The adoption of the new law follows extensive engagement with WHO, including through a series of consultations with countries across the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region that focused on developing laws on key road user behaviours.

    The WHO Global Status Report on Road Safety 2023 notes that 166 countries report having drink-driving laws, yet only 53 UN Member States meet all three WHO best practice criteria. This requires countries to have a drink-driving law in place, to set blood alcohol concentration at 0.05 grams or below per decilitre for the general population and at 0.02 grams per decilitre or below for novice drivers. Jordan’s new law meets two of the three criteria.

    With WHO support, efforts will focus on ensuring the law is effectively implemented, properly enforced and clearly communicated to enforcement authorities and the public. The WHO Drink-Driving Manual for Decision Makers notes that laws must be evidence-based, context-relevant and supported by robust enforcement and public awareness to save lives.

    “Jordan’s progress demonstrates what is possible when leadership, evidence and commitment come together. With the new drink-driving law in place, the country is taking meaningful action to protect lives and build a safer future on its roads,” said Dr Iman Shankiti, WHO Representative to Jordan.

    MIL OSI United Nations News