Category: Middle East

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Israel accepts US special envoy S. Witkoff’s proposal for ceasefire in Gaza – media

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    JERUSALEM, May 29 (Xinhua) — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Thursday said the Jewish state’s government has accepted the proposal of U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East Steven Witkoff for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the release of hostages, Israeli state broadcaster Kan reported.

    According to Kan, B. Netanyahu made the statement during a meeting with the families of the Israeli hostages who are presumed dead.

    The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office is not yet ready to comment.

    Earlier on Thursday, Hamas said in a statement that it had received Witkoff’s proposal and was currently studying it.

    As reported by Kan, citing a senior Israeli official, the proposal includes a 60-day ceasefire in the Gaza Strip in exchange for the release of 10 live hostages and the handover of 18 bodies of the dead in two stages. Israel, in turn, must free 1,236 Palestinian prisoners and hand over the bodies of 180 dead Palestinians.

    The proposal does not oblige Israel to end its 19-month offensive in Gaza, but it does require the Jewish state and Hamas to negotiate a long-term truce. The United States, Egypt and Qatar would act as guarantors of the ceasefire. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s military parade: A ‘big big celebration’ or an authoritarian ritual?

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Irene Gammel, Professor & Director, Modern Literature and Culture Research Centre and Gallery, Toronto Metropolitan University

    U.S. Army soldiers march along Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C. during U.S. President Donald Trump’s Inaugural Parade in January 2017. (Kalie Jones)

    Born on June 14, 1946, United States President Donald Trump turns 79 in 2025 — the same day that the U.S. Army, founded in 1775, marks its 250th anniversary. To mark the anniversary, Trump proclaimed that “we’re gonna have a big, big celebration.”

    Plans drawn up by the army call for 6,600 soldiers, 150 vehicles, 50 helicopters, seven military bands and thousands of civilians. The parade will also reportedly include 34 horses, two mules and a dog.

    Dismissed by many as a costly vanity project by some, the parade invites a deeper question: what kind of political work does a birthday celebration like this actually do?

    Far from trivial or benign, Trump’s spectacle draws on a long history of authoritarian leaders who use ritualized celebrations to bind personal power to national identity. The most notorious example, Adolf Hitler, turned his birthdays into massive national events with military parades, mass rallies and highly estheticized scenes of domestic cheer.

    These displays blurred dominance and intimacy, fatherliness and force — an approach revived today in the digital era, where curated imagery and social media entangle leadership with affective spectacle.

    Fascist birthday culture

    I was born and raised in Germany. I’m acutely aware that Hitler’s birthday still casts a shadow and that such dates continue to carry political weight, with the rituals involved doing long-term political work.

    During the Third Reich, the Führer’s birthday — modeLled on the Kaiser’s — became a mass propaganda event, blending public spectacle with personal attachment.

    As German philosopher Theodor Adorno noted, fascist rituals portrayed the authoritarian leader as both a “superman” and an ordinary, flawed “average person.” This duality encouraged intimate identification and awe, much like the dynamic between a patriarchal father and child.

    Trump echoes this dynamic through a mix of paternal posturing, hypermasculine bluster and expansive nationalism. Whereas Hitler relied on the latest photograph and film technology, today’s spectacles are amplified by digital media’s participatory culture.

    German leader Adolf Hitler reviewing a military parade held in celebration of his 47th birthday on April 20, 1936.
    (German Federal Archives), CC BY

    Neo-Nazi groups across North America and Europe still mark Hitler’s birthday with cakes, cookies, memes and tweets; often disarmingly “cute” images overlaid with disturbing swastikas and jokes. In his 2017 paper, sociologist Christian Fuchs shows that the most retweeted neo-Nazi post in his study was “Wake and bake #HitlersBirthday #420,” blending cannabis culture with fascist nostalgia to deflect horror through humour.

    The blurred boundaries between the national and the personal feed meme culture, where, as communications scholar Limor Shifman writes, “small units of culture” spread through imitation, often cloaked in play.

    Amid mounting pressure on various institutions in the U.S. — universities, courts and public discourse — the military/birthday parade is an extravaganza that fuses esthetics and propaganda to cement authority, suppress dissent and consolidate power.

    Power aesthetics of military pageantry

    By combining a military display with a personal celebration, Trump’s birthday parade stages a grand spectacle of power. Key here is the presence of thousands of soldiers in military uniform, which creates a “persona and a powerful collective presence,” as fashion scholar Jennifer Craik writes.

    Uniforms signal discipline and belonging, but also intimidate and threaten. Fashion writer Colin McDowell calls the uniform a “spectacle” steeped in associations with power and eroticism, a garment long linked to theatricality and role-playing.

    Nowhere was this more explicit than under European fascism and colonialism. Uniforms were engineered to seduce, often fetishized: streamlined silhouettes, tight jackets and black leather boots. As Craik notes, such imagery was not incidental; it was the visual grammar of domination. As sociologist Klaus Theweleit observes, fascist power had to be seen, desired and even fantasized.

    Trump’s parade is a show of force. Its sheer scale — bands, vehicles, helicopters — performs strength and legitimacy, marking who belongs and who does not. But the birthday celebration also turns attention back to the man himself, reminding us that authoritarianism is not only about intimidation but also about the persona of the autocrat.

    Parades staged for Adolf Hitler’s 50th birthday.

    Authoritarian scripts, then and now

    Autocratic regimes work hard to fashion the leader into a man of the people: familiar, relatable and someone to be admired. Think of Hitler in his motorcade, hands outstretched toward the crowd.

    My father, just 10 years old, was part of that spectacle at one of these parades on a mandatory school trip, lined up along the street. Yet as the motorcade neared, he was shoved aside in the crush. What stayed with him wasn’t Hitler — he never saw him — but the fanatical woman who pushed him to get closer.

    The point was the crowd itself, kept at a fever pitch with ever-new spectacles like Hitler’s 50th birthday on April 20, 1939, declared a national holiday. German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels staged it as what historian Ian Kershaw called “an astonishing extravaganza of the Führer cult;” a visual and military spectacle widely broadcast.

    One gift, a model of the FW 200 Condor, later became Hitler’s official plane. Trump’s new luxury Air Force One, “a gift” from Qatar, is also part of his visual narrative. The symbolism is eerie: once again, the personal cloaks itself in national power.

    The cult of MAGA

    In the end, Trump’s militarized birthday parade solicits not just admiration but political allegiance. Like past authoritarian rituals, it manipulates affect through military pageantry to elevate the leader as both a symbol and supreme commander.

    The spectacle demands emotional submission with the goal being identification with the leader. It exchanges democratic freedom for a vision of unity under a single figure. However wrapped in humour or patriotic kitsch, Trump’s parade rehearses an authoritarian script with disturbingly familiar cues.

    What appears as celebration is, in fact, a rehearsal. It signals a dangerous shift toward personal glorification and a political culture where pageantry replaces participation and adoration displaces dissent.

    As history warns, that is when democracy begins to give way.

    Irene Gammel receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

    ref. Trump’s military parade: A ‘big big celebration’ or an authoritarian ritual? – https://theconversation.com/trumps-military-parade-a-big-big-celebration-or-an-authoritarian-ritual-257536

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Breaking: Israel accepts US special envoy S. Witkoff’s proposal for ceasefire in Gaza – media

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    JERUSALEM, May 29 (Xinhua) — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Thursday that the Jewish state’s government has accepted the proposal of U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East Steven Witkoff for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the release of hostages, Israeli state television Kan TV reported.

    According to the TV channel, B. Netanyahu made the corresponding statement during a meeting with the families of the Israeli hostages, who are presumed dead. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Joint Declaration on Economic Cooperation Between the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

    Source: ASEAN – Association of SouthEast Asian Nations

    We, the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), gathered today for the 2nd ASEAN-GCC Summit;
     
    DESIRING to enhance economic cooperation between ASEAN and the GCC to deepening economic partnership and establishing linkages, especially in areas of mutual interest to diversify its supply chains.
     
    RECALLING the Joint Statement of the First ASEAN-GCC Summit, held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on 20 October 2023, where both sides declared to, among others, explore cooperation on key economic partnership priorities namely, strengthening regional market integration; sustainability and decarbonisation; digital transformation and inclusivity, including Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), public-private sector engagement, and people-to-people ties;
     
    Download the full declaration here.
    The post Joint Declaration on Economic Cooperation Between the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI USA: Hoyer Statement on the Trump Administration’s Acceptance of a Luxury Jet from Qatar

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Steny H Hoyer (MD-05)

    WASHINGTON, DC – Congressman Steny H. Hoyer (MD-05) released the following statement today after reports that the Trump Administration has formally accepted a Boeing 747 airliner from the government of Qatar:

    “It’s a sad day in America when, reportedly at the President’s request, a small but very rich Middle Eastern nation gives him a $400 million jet. Experts say that it will take two years and cost the government more than the value of the plane to bring the jet up to the standard necessary for Trump to use it.
     
    “This ‘gift’ is among the most flagrant abuses of power in American history – an act that violates our Constitution, defies our laws, and undermines our national security. The Founding Fathers are turning over in their graves.
     
    “Once again, Donald Trump shows us how he views the Office of the President of the United States of America. He sees it merely as a tool to enrich himself, his family, and his friends.
     
    “Nothing is ever free. This plane may not come with a price tag, but the person receiving it is making America and its reputation pay a deep cost. This is a sad day.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: 2025 Dickson Prize in Medicine Goes to Professor Sir Cato T. Laurencin of UConn

    Source: US State of Connecticut

    The Dickson Prize in Medicine is awarded annually to a leading American investigator engaged in innovative and paradigm-shifting biomedical research. It is an esteemed annual award presented by the University of Pittsburgh. Many recipients of the Dickson Prize have gone on to receive the Nobel Prize. Dr. Cato T. Laurencin is the founder and pioneer of the field of regenerative engineering.

    His lecture, “Regenerative Engineering: Breakthroughs in Medicine,” will be given at 2:30 p.m. on July 11 at the University of Pittsburgh, Alan Magee Scaife Hall West Wing Auditorium. It will be followed by a panel discussion and reception at 5 p.m.

    Laurencin is a University Professor (one of two at UConn) and professor of Chemical and Biomolecular Engineering, professor of Materials Science and Engineering, and professor of Biomedical Engineering. He is the chief executive officer of The Cato T. Laurencin Institute for Regenerative Engineering, a cross-university Institute created in his honor. At UConn School of Medicine he is the Albert and Wilda Van Dusen Distinguished Endowed Professor of Orthopaedic Surgery.

    He is the leading international figure in polymer science and engineering as applied to musculoskeletal biology. Renowned for his work in areas including biomaterials science and materials chemistry, his broad background and insight have allowed him to move research from fundamental science to applied research, to research translation and clinical treatment.

    Laurencin earned his B.S.E. in Chemical Engineering from Princeton University, his M.D., Magna Cum Laude, from the Harvard Medical School, and earned his Ph.D. in Biochemical Engineering/Biotechnology from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He completed an orthopaedic surgery residency at Harvard, where he was named Chief Resident at the Beth Israel Hospital, Harvard Medical School. A specialist in shoulder surgery and sports medicine, he completed fellowship training at the Hospital for Special Surgery in New York.

    Laurencin is a fellow of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, a fellow of the American Orthopaedic Association, a fellow of the American College of Surgeons, an elected member of the American Surgical Association and an elected member of the Association of Bone and Joint Surgeons. In orthopaedic surgery, he received the Nicolas Andry Lifetime Achievement Award, the highest honor of the Association of Bone and Joint Surgeons, the Kappa Delta Award, the highest research honor from the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, the Marshall R. Urist Award, honoring an investigator who has a sustained ongoing body of research in tissue regeneration as it relates to the musculoskeletal system, from the Orthopaedic Research Society, and the American Orthopaedic Association’s (AOA) Distinguished Contributions to Orthopaedics Award with induction into the AOA Awards Hall of Fame. He is the first individual to receive these four awards.

    He is the first surgeon in history elected to the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, the National Academy of Medicine, and the National Academy of Inventors.

    In 2025, he received Knighthood under the auspices of King Charles III of England by the Governor General of St. Lucia.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • India in touch with Iranian authorities to locate missing nationals: MEA on three Indians missing in Iran

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    India is in regular contact with Iranian authorities to trace three Indian nationals who have gone missing in Iran, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said on Thursday, adding that it is receiving “good cooperation” from the Iranian side.

    MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal, addressing a media briefing in New Delhi, said the government is also in constant communication with the families of the missing individuals and is providing them with all possible assistance.

    “The three Indian nationals who had landed there some time ago are missing, and we are in touch with the Iranian authorities to locate them for their safety, security, and eventual return home,” Jaiswal said. “We are in daily contact with the authorities there. We are also in touch with the families. Understandably, they are anxious, and we are doing our best to assist them.”

    Asked whether the MEA was aware of similar incidents reported in recent months, including ransom calls allegedly originating from Pakistan, Jaiswal clarified that the current case involves individuals who traveled to Iran earlier this month.

    “February was a different issue,” he said. “What we are discussing now pertains to three Indian nationals who recently traveled to Iran in May.”

    The Indian Embassy in Iran had earlier confirmed that it was aware of the case and had taken up the matter strongly with local authorities. In a statement posted on X, the embassy said, “Family members of three Indian citizens have informed the Embassy of India that their relatives are missing after having travelled to Iran. The Embassy has strongly taken up this matter with the Iranian authorities and requested that the missing Indians be urgently traced and their safety ensured.”

    The embassy also said it is keeping the families regularly updated on the status of its efforts.

    (ANI)

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why have so few atrocities ever been recognised as genocide?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By James Sweeney, Professor, Lancaster Law School, Lancaster University

    xiquinhosilva via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

    An intense argument is raging over whether what has been happening in Gaza since October 2023 is an act of genocide. It is the subject of a case being heard in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in which South Africa has accused Israel of committing acts of genocide. The case began in December 2023 but the ICJ has yet to reach a judgment.

    The reason the issue is so controversial is that the word “genocide” holds so much power. To be accused of it is to be accused of what is considered in international law to be the “crime of crimes”. International law holds that not only should states not commit genocide, they must also prevent and punish it in their own criminal law. Some commentators would even argue that the use of armed force to stop genocide is acceptable.

    Yet the legal definition of genocide is much narrower than is generally understood. That’s why so few events have ever been labelled as genocide as a matter of law. Looking at some of them might help to shed some light on the Gaza controversy.




    Read more:
    Gaza: why it’s difficult to reach a legal judgment of genocide against Israel


    Genocide is about attempting to destroy a group of people. The concept was first defined in 1944 by the Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin, in response to his horror at the mass killing of ethnic Armenians by the Ottoman Empire amid the first world war as well as – of course – at the atrocities of the Nazis before and during the second world war.


    Sign up to receive our weekly World Affairs Briefing newsletter from The Conversation UK. Every Thursday we’ll bring you expert analysis of the big stories in international relations.


    It was such a novel concept that it was not prosecuted in the post-war trials of the surviving leading Nazis in Nuremberg. Instead, for their role in the Holocaust, the defendants were charged with “crimes against humanity”. And to this day, in the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court, there is a close relationship between the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity. The Rome statute uses the definition of genocide agreed in the 1948 genocide convention, which was negotiated after the considerable efforts of Lemkin to bring attention to his new concept.

    Despite the crime of genocide being established in 1948, the first international conviction for genocide was not until 1998. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found Jean-Paul Akayesu, a local politician, guilty of genocide as part of the extreme violence by ethnic Hutu against (mostly) minority ethnic Tutsis in 1994. Over the course of around 100 days around 800,000 people were killed.

    The mass killing was instigated at the highest levels of the Rwandan government after Tutsis were accused of killing the president of Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana, by shooting down a plane that was carrying him and the president of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira. Both men were Hutus.

    The response to this was clearly a genocide, but surely there must have been other post-war genocides before this, you might think?

    Limitations of genocide

    Under the leadership of Joseph Stalin, millions of people died or were killed in famines, executions and prison camps across the Soviet Union. Yet, these deaths do not fall within the 1948 definition of genocide because they were generally not aimed at groups defined by nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion. Only those four groups are protected in the genocide convention.

    The same goes for murders committed by the Khmer Rouge – the radical communist regime of Pol Pot that ruled what is now Cambodia from 1975 to 1979. The regime was responsible for the deaths of between 1.5 and 3 million people. But the hybrid criminal tribunal set up in 1997 to judge these events has only been able to find that the killing of minority Vietnamese and Cham victims counted as genocide. The majority of those that the Khmer Rouge targeted for killing were fellow Cambodians selected for being “intellectuals” or were otherwise thought to oppose the regime.

    The choice of protected groups in the genocide convention was the result of political horse-trading between different factions, as the cold war was gaining in intensity. There was a tension between protecting enough groups, and agreeing a treaty that enough states would actually sign.




    Read more:
    How Canada committed genocide against Indigenous Peoples, explained by the lawyer central to the determination


    The atrocity of Srebrenica

    The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the ICJ have held that Bosnian Serbs committed genocide against Bosnian Muslims in the town of Srebrenica in what is now Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. The Bosnian Serb army killed around 8,000 men and boys, and secretly buried them. They detained, treated badly and then expelled the remaining women.

    The atrocity at Srebrenica in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where more than 8,000 Muslim men and boys were murdered, has been ruled as an act of genocide.
    Skrewt25 via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-NC-SA

    The ICTY has held, beyond reasonable doubt, that across Bosnia and Herzegovina there was a “strategic plan” to “link Serb-populated areas […] together, to gain control over these areas and to create a separate Bosnian Serb state, from which most non-Serbs would be permanently removed”. It also found that this plan “could only be implemented by the use of force and fear”. Yet, apart from at Srebrenica, genocide has not been proved in the former Yugoslavia.

    The issue here was not identifying a protected group, but a lack of evidence that the mass killings of non-Serbs were carried out as an end in themselves and not “just” to make them flee (something which is often called “ethnic cleansing”). This is because for a killing to be genocidal, it has not only to be carried out intentionally, but also to show the “special” intent to physically or biologically destroy a protected group.

    The problem is that – in the absence of an admission or a bundle of incriminating documents – then such special intent can only be inferred from the facts if it is the only reasonable inference that could be made.

    Why Gaza is controversial

    Should the definition of genocide be expanded to cover a greater range of protected groups, either by amending the genocide convention or by creative judicial interpretation? Should it be easier to infer the existence of genocidal intent from a pattern of facts? Both are important questions.

    Yet, until they are answered in the affirmative, it will remain difficult in law to apply the label of genocide even to the most egregious of mass killings. The labels of “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity” are more easily applied, but the “crime of crimes” remains elusive.

    James Sweeney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Why have so few atrocities ever been recognised as genocide? – https://theconversation.com/why-have-so-few-atrocities-ever-been-recognised-as-genocide-257753

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why are the US and Israel not on the same page over how to deal with Iran? Expert Q&A

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Scott Lucas, Professor of International Politics, Clinton Institute, University College Dublin

    The US president, Donald Trump, claimed on May 28 to have personally stopped Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. When asked if he’d intervened during a phone call with the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump replied: “Well, I’d like to be honest. Yes, I did … I said, I don’t think it’s appropriate right now”. The Trump administration is currently in talks with Iran over the future terms of its nuclear programme.

    Middle East expert Scott Lucas answered the Conversation’s questions about the disagreement over Iran and how it might affect US-Israel relations.

    The US wants a nuclear deal with Iran. Israel doesn’t. Why the disagreement?

    Israel has long been sceptical of diplomatic overtures to Tehran, saying Iran is committed to Israel’s destruction. This position has not changed.

    When Trump apparently told Netanyahu recently that he wanted a diplomatic solution with Iran and believed in his ability to “make a good deal”, the Israeli leader insisted that the only “good deal” would be one that dismantled Iran’s nuclear facilities.

    But Trump’s priority is not a “good deal”. He is more interested in a photo opportunity portraying him as a “dealmaker” even when there is no substantive agreement.

    Trump’s first term saw him embrace North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, whom he had previously threatened with “fire and fury” and denounced as “little rocket man”, to proclaim a breakthrough in stalled nuclear talks. There wasn’t anything beyond a meaningless one-page memorandum, but Trump became the first serving US president to step into North Korea and garnered international attention for doing so.

    Then, at the start of his second term, Trump claimed he could end Russia’s war in Ukraine within 24 hours. But, more than four months later, he is frustrated and embittered. He recently called Russia’s leader Vladimir Putin “absolutely crazy”.

    Trump also said he could resolve Israel’s assault on Gaza. He claimed the glory of a phase one ceasefire agreement in which Hamas freed some hostages in return for Israel releasing hundreds of Palestinians detained in its prisons. But he walked away when Netanyahu’s government refused to move to a second phase.

    So now his hope, as outlandish as it might seem, is to appear alongside Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, or even the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, making some kind of deal.

    What do the Gulf states hope for?

    Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are rivals of Iranian regional leadership, but they want to avoid Israeli military action against Tehran as this could spark a conflagration across the region.

    They are looking to extract themselves from a decade-long war in Yemen, where their intervention has not toppled the Iran-backed Houthi insurgency. And they would like space for Syria to develop after five decades of Assad family rule came to an end in December 2024 – with possible profits for Gulf companies involved in recovery and reconstruction.


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    Qatar, which Trump also visited in May, as well as Oman have long burnished their reputations as peace brokers. This has included facilitating talks between the US and Iran.

    What is Iran’s position and how close is it to building a nuclear weapon?

    When Iran agreed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) in 2015 with the UK and other world powers, it gave up any potential for a military nuclear programme. Enrichment of uranium was limited to 3.67%, and stocks of 20% grade were shipped out of the country. While uranium enriched to 20% is not weapons-grade, it shortens the time it will take to produce a nuclear weapon considerably.

    It was Trump who allowed Iran to restart its nuclear programme when he pulled the US out of the JCPoA in May 2018 and imposed comprehensive sanctions six months later. Iran not only resumed 20% enrichment but began production of 60% uranium, which can be further enriched to the 90% required for military use.

    Tehran is still stopping short of that 90% level. And it has said it will forego any potential for a military programme in a renewed agreement with the US, but is refusing US demands to end enrichment for civil purposes.

    What might Israel do to disrupt the talks?

    Netanyahu could defy Trump and order military strikes. But such action would further alienate Israel from the international community, unsettle relations with Washington, and risk regional conflicts that would overstretch the Israeli military.

    Israeli intelligence and military institutions have opposed Netanyahu’s plans to attack Iran in the past, notably in 2010 and 2011. When he tried to lay the foundations for military action, they raised political, diplomatic and logistical obstacles that put an attack on hold.

    And, despite Netanyahu’s attempts to replace intelligence heads and military commanders with his loyalists, the new appointees are still likely to take the same position.

    For more than 15 years, Israel has pursued covert operations to disrupt Iran’s nuclear programme. These include sabotage, cyber-attacks, assassinations and explosions set off by agents inside Iran. Those operations have appeared to diminish in recent months, but they might be renewed without raising Trump’s ire.

    How does the disagreement over Iran affect US-Israel relations, especially when it comes to Gaza?

    We are in a world where Trump can hold back Netanyahu over Iran, but give him a blank cheque for the assault and starvation of Gaza.

    Trump’s administration did nothing to oppose the Netanyahu government’s inevitable rejection of the phase two ceasefire in Gaza at the start of March. This subsequently saw renewed military operations and imposition of a blockade on humanitarian aid. Trump’s envoy, real estate developer Steve Witkoff, has been ineffectual in his purported mediation efforts.

    Netanyahu has not only tabled the plan for Israel’s long-term occupation of Gaza, with four military zones and Gazans penned into three areas with limited movement. He has publicly embraced Trump’s proposal for the displacement – some would call it “ethnic cleansing” – of hundreds of thousands of Gazans.

    In October 2024, Trump reportedly told Netanyahu to “do what you have to do” in the offensive against Hamas. Then, in mid-February, he said: “Bibi, you do whatever you want”.

    So, even as Trump does what he wants over Iran to Netanyahu’s chagrin, the Israeli prime minister is finding that Trump is not restricting what he does closer to home in Gaza.

    Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Why are the US and Israel not on the same page over how to deal with Iran? Expert Q&A – https://theconversation.com/why-are-the-us-and-israel-not-on-the-same-page-over-how-to-deal-with-iran-expert-qanda-257758

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Nato faces a make-or-break decision about how to protect Europe and its future in next few weeks

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Amelia Hadfield, Head of Department of Politics, University of Surrey

    Nato is facing a pivotal moment in its history.

    Ahead of its June 24-25 summit in The Hague, Nato is weighing up whether it can truly continue to count on US support (and membership), whether it will become a European-only organisation, or whether it has a future at all. This suggests a massive shift for the intergovernmental organisation that sits at the heart of defence and security for Europe, and beyond.

    The past year has changed everything. Trump’s anti-Nato rhetoric has become increasingly vociferous and disrespectful, undermining both the organisation itself, and the other 31 Nato member countries, which include Germany, France, Canada, Turkey, the UK, Sweden and Norway. Add to this the Trump administration’s embrace of international isolationism, and the potential, consequential loss of clear US backing for the alliance, all of which highlight the organisation’s historical dependence on the US.

    This is what makes the June 2025 summit so critical. It is a make-or-break opportunity to unveil a plan for Nato’s wholesale transformation, or an event conclusively marking its obsolescence. The plan itself is simple: build – or rebuild – Nato as a possible Europe-only endeavour.




    Read more:
    Why it matters for European security if an American no longer commands Nato troops – by a former Trident submarine commander


    If this plan becomes reality, historians of European security and defence may spot earlier parallels for Nato with the original Western European Union (WEU). The WEU was the European defence security structure established in 1954 under the Paris Accords, which helped to redefine relations with West Germany.

    Ultimately subsumed into both Nato and EU governance structures, the WEU’s prime goal at the time was to bolster the European content of the Atlantic alliance.

    US never wanted Europe to lead

    There is a deep irony in Trump’s bluster about Nato states paying more towards their defence. The US has, for decades, been sanguine at best, and hostile at worst on almost every form of European defence autonomy, from basic ops-based endeavours established by the EU to more ambitious strategies. Instead, the US has insisted almost exclusively on increased defence spending by other Nato members, improved interoperability between the various national forces, but all “in furtherance of a US-dominated alliance”, rather than a more authentically US-European approach to safeguarding both European and American interests according to Max Bergman, a former senior adviser to the US state department.

    What is the future of Nato?

    If the US is now reducing its involvement in Nato, or abdicating entirely, the only option for Nato is to reduce its dependence on the US, and in doing so, to focus more on Europe. A clear mandate is needed, to ensure that being US-less does not render Nato itself useless. Without a mandate, opportunistic space would quickly open up for an aggressive Russia.

    Trump made clear early in his first administration that he was no fan of Nato, and argued that its funding structure should no longer overburden the US. In his second administration, Trump has been even clearer, has variously threatened to pull US troops from Nato joint exercises, reduce US security commitments to Nato as a whole, remove some or all of the 80,000 US troops on permanent rotation in Europe and vastly reduce the US’s contribution to Nato’s central budget of US$5 billion (£3.6 billion).

    These threats are now repeated routinely by US defence secretary Pete Hegseth and others in the Trump administration. This has profoundly rattled Nato as an institution and its individual member states.

    As Nato’s own records show, from 2023 onward, there have been major increases in European defence spending. But the opportunity to keep spending commitments high, as well as overhaul the organisation to meet Ukraine’s demands and defence opportunities for the EU as a whole – which could have been nailed onto Nato’s 75th anniversary summit in 2024 – did not materialise.

    There are pros and cons of a new Europe-focused approach for Nato, and these will work themselves out in the final five-to-ten-year plan which is being prepared ahead of the June summit.

    For some, building a European defence mission within Nato is an opportunity to plot a new and more sustainable course for Nato, rather than trying to shore up an expanding US-shaped hole. Spending increases that reduce Nato’s perceived helplessness, or reliance on the US, may also be a benefit.

    For others, the removal of US command and control, hardware, software, intelligence and much more from Nato is a futile endeavour that will leave the organisation in pieces at best, and present Russia with a golden opportunity for continued eastern aggression at worst.

    The signals from Washington remain confusing. Trump’s suggestion of a sudden and total US withdrawal from European defence was tempered in April by US secretary of state Marco Rubio’s suggestion that Trump remained supportive of Nato but also demanding expanded spending commitments (these demands vary from 2.5% to 5% of GDP), and for other members to take on far greater responsibility for developing Nato’s capabilities.

    An emerging European coalition

    Many members now support the emerging “coalition of the willing”, led by France and Britain, to underwrite a force and secure a post-conflict deal for Ukraine. In figuring out the current provision of military force, including logistics and intelligence capacities in addition to air, land and sea forces, Nato members are aiming to remove the US’s presence and fill the vacuum with European assets over a decade.

    The task is colossal, and not without risks. Nato does not want an overnight abdication of the US, as it currently relies far too heavily upon US capabilities, such as long-range precision missiles, and crucially, heavy-lift aircraft which are vital in shifting armoured forces around the continent rapidly. Nato also wants a clear plan, which new member Finland has emphasised as crucial, to prevent an abrupt and disjointed transition that Russia could exploit.

    A new vision must be set out by the end of June in order to deal sensibly with ongoing defence spending commitments, reworked governance structures, and possible planned responses to the war in Ukraine.

    Scrapping Nato is unnecessary and lays Europe – and the US, if the White House could but see far enough ahead – open to innumerable threats and consequences. Even without the US, Nato provides a valuable structure for security cooperation in Europe. Strengthening European capabilities within Nato, rather than creating an entirely new defence structure, makes sense.

    Amelia Hadfield does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Nato faces a make-or-break decision about how to protect Europe and its future in next few weeks – https://theconversation.com/nato-faces-a-make-or-break-decision-about-how-to-protect-europe-and-its-future-in-next-few-weeks-256348

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Law Library Publishes New Report on Regulation of IVF and Related Issues

    Source: US Global Legal Monitor

    The staff of the Global Legal Research Directorate of the Law Library of Congress has recently completed a comparative report, Regulation of IVF and Related Issues. The report examines the rules regarding embryos created through artificial reproductive technology techniques, such as those involving in vitro fertilization (IVF), in the following countries: France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

    VITRO by Flickr user Tman. May 21, 2021. Used under NonCommercial-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic Deed CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

    Among issues addressed by the report are the legal limits on the number of embryos that can be created or transferred in a treatment cycle and the actions that can be taken with respect to the embryos created, apart from transfer to a person’s uterus as part of that cycle. Such actions include preimplantation genetic testing, sex selection for nonmedical purposes, cryopreservation and storage, donation to another person or couple, disposal or destruction, and allowing the embryos to be used for research purposes. The report further addresses countries’ requirements for facilities where IVF procedures are conducted, registries of procedures and donors, funding of procedures, and the existence of restrictions in access to IVF procedures for certain groups of patients and couples.

    The report consists of a comparative summary, individual country surveys, and a table providing information on the legal treatment of embryos created through IVF.

    We invite you to review the information provided in our report here.

    This report is an addition to the Law Library’s Legal Reports (Publications of the Law Library of Congress) collection, which includes over 4,000 historical and contemporary legal reports covering a variety of jurisdictions, researched and written by foreign law specialists with expertise in each area. A search for legal reports on human reproduction identifies a number of relevant entries.

    To receive alerts when new reports are published, you can subscribe to email updates and the RSS feed for Law Library Reports (click the “subscribe” button on the Law Library’s website).

    The Law Library also publishes articles related to assisted reproduction in the Global Legal Monitor.

    And finally, a search of our blog, In Custodia Legis, using the term “embryo” may lead you to posts on a variety of related topics.


    Subscribe to In Custodia Legis – it’s free! – to receive interesting posts drawn from the Law Library of Congress’s vast collections and our staff’s expertise in U.S., foreign, and international law.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Micropolis to Participate in Maxim Group’s 2025 Virtual Tech Conference on June 3-5, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, May 29, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Micropolis Holding Co. (“Micropolis” or the “Company”) (NYSE: MCRP), a pioneer in unmanned ground vehicles and AI-driven security solutions, today announced it will participate in a fireside chat at Maxim Group’s 2025 Virtual Tech Conference: Discover the Innovations Reshaping Tomorrow, to be held from June 3-5, 2025.

    Virtual Conference Fireside Chat
    Date & Time: Tuesday, June 3, 2025, 9:30 a.m. ET
    Speakers: Fareed Aljawhari, Founder & CEO and Dzmitry Kastahorau, CFO
    Registration Link: https://m-vest.com/events/tmt-06032025

    For more information or to schedule a meeting with Micropolis, please contact your Maxim representative or KCSA Strategic Communications at Micropolis@kcsa.com.

    About Micropolis Holding Co.
    Micropolis is a UAE-based company specializing in the design, development, and manufacturing of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), AI systems, and smart infrastructure for urban, security, and industrial applications. The Company’s vertically integrated capabilities cover everything from mechatronics and embedded systems to AI software and high-level autonomy.

    For more information please visit www.micropolis.ai.

    Investor Contact:
    KCSA Strategic Communications
    Valter Pinto, Managing Director
    PH: (212) 896-1254
    Valter@KCSA.com

    Media Contact:
    Jessica Starman
    media@elev8newmedia.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Op-Ed: UN Peacekeeping is both a lifesaving tool and a smart investment

    Source: United Nations – Peacekeeping

    U.N. Peacekeeping has a legacy of success, from Namibia to today’s volatile hotspots. But to remain effective, it needs investment and adaptation. 

    By Jean-Pierre Lacroix 

    This March, some 35 years after the United Nations closed a landmark chapter in peacekeeping, Namibia inaugurated President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, the country’s first democratically elected woman head of state. 

    In 1989, despite rising global instability and a liquidity crisis at the U.N., member states came together to launch the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, or UNTAG — a multidimensional peacekeeping mission that helped usher in Namibia’s independence. 

    UNTAG didn’t just monitor a ceasefire in Namibia. It helped organize and secure the country’s first free and fair elections, protected civilians, verified troop withdrawals, and supported democratic transition across a vast and remote territory. It pioneered approaches that are now cornerstones of modern peacekeeping, from U.N. policing and human rights monitoring to electoral support and a robust public information campaign. 

    Today, the United Nations Peacekeeping stands at a critical juncture. The global landscape is dangerous and complex. Crises erupt quickly and spread faster, magnified by international political polarization, transnational crime, terrorism, a rising sense of impunity, and the weakening of international law. 

    The globally recognized U.N. Peacekeeping blue helmets enjoy broad international support. Now more than ever, peacekeepers remain on the front lines — holding ground, protecting civilians, and creating the space necessary for diplomacy to work. But faced with increasing instability and mounting financial pressure, peacekeeping’s effectiveness depends on investment in its future. 

    Blue helmets on the front lines 

    The work of our U.N. peacekeepers — men and women serving far from their homes to help others live in peace — is demanding and complex, but it is also dangerous. Since January 2024, we have suffered 78 fatalities. Many more have been injured. Their sacrifice, and the service of more than 68,000 military, police, and civilian personnel deployed under the U.N. flag — including uniformed peacekeepers from 119 countries — represents a tangible commitment to peace and security. 

    Across 11 missions, big and small, peacekeepers operate in some of the world’s most volatile contexts. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, our peacekeeping mission MONUSCO is helping to shield civilians from violence while supporting dialogue and disarmament.  

    In Lebanon, UNIFIL remains a stabilizing presence along the Blue Line amid ongoing exchanges of fire. In South Sudan, UNMISS is working to prevent a relapse into civil war by enhancing security and promoting dialogue and negotiation at the local and national levels. In the Central African Republic, MINUSCA continues to protect the vulnerable all over the country and is supporting preparations for the country’s first local elections in decades. And in Cyprus, peacekeepers serving with UNFICYP continue to reduce tensions and maintain a buffer strip to promote security and build confidence between communities. 

    Many of these missions face challenges that reflect deeper complexities, with confusing or impractical mandates, ambiguous political support at local and international levels, a lack of a clearly defined end-state, and a widening gap between expectations and resources. 

    Investing in peacekeeping 

    2025 is a pivotal year. As we mark the U.N.’s 80th anniversary, Germany — a stalwart peacekeeping partner of long standing — hosted a U.N. Peacekeeping Ministerial meeting in Berlin earlier this month. Ministers of defense and foreign affairs from around the world united in pledging their unequivocal and tangible support for and to our blue helmets. More than half of the 130 member state delegations present made concrete pledges to make missions stronger, safer, and more effective. 

    They discussed the future of peace missions and ways to reform the instrument to ensure our operations remain adaptable, innovative, cost-effective, and resilient. As it did in Namibia in the early 90s, U.N. Peacekeeping has always adapted to and achieved results in ever-changing contexts. Going forward, we will need to build on this momentum to ensure peacekeeping is streamlined, economical, and fit for purpose. 

    And on this point, it is important to stress that peacekeeping is not only a lifesaving tool — it is a smart investment. It delivers value for money, reduces violence, and helps forge a durable peace. From Cambodia to Timor-Leste and El Salvador to Liberia, U.N. Peacekeeping has supported transitions from war to peace at a minuscule fraction of what military activities have cost worldwide. These achievements are not historical footnotes: they are the building blocks of regional stability. 

    And U.N. Peacekeeping must and will continue to evolve. Missions may be deployed jointly with or in support of regional partners, such as the African Union. They may be smaller, more technologically leveraged, and more specialized. But their core purpose will remain to support political solutions, protect the vulnerable, and pave the way for a sustainable peace. 

    If the past tells us anything, it is that peacekeeping can deliver when we invest in it and stay the course. Peacekeeping’s record is measured not only by what happens but by what doesn’t — violence that was averted, escalation that was prevented, space that was created for politics to work. 

    We ignore this hard-won truth at our peril — U.N. mission closures in Mali, Sudan, and Haiti, and the rise of violence in all of these countries, are cases in point. To avoid this trap, we must maintain readiness and the capabilities to deploy rapidly, if and when asked. 

    Thirty-five years ago, the world came together to launch UNTAG, a ground-breaking peace mission that helped Namibia chart its own course as an independent country. Today, that same spirit of unity, innovation, and determination is needed once again. If we fall short now, we risk undermining decades of progress and undermining the hopes of millions who depend on peacekeeping to help protect their future.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Champions League final 2025: a battle for glory against a backdrop of money and fashion

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Simon Chadwick, Professor of AfroEurasian Sport, EM Lyon Business School

    The 2025 men’s Champions League final will end in triumph for either Paris Saint-Germain or Inter Milan. And whichever side wins, Uefa will no doubt claim that the tournament’s new format, involving more teams, more games and more fans, has been a success.

    Not everyone will agree of course. But in commercial terms, there is no doubt that the Champions League continues to generate huge amounts of money for everyone involved.

    Thanks to lucrative broadcasting rights, sponsorship deals and ticket sales, the sums handed out to clubs following this season’s competition are eye-watering, with over £2 billion in prize money on offer (up from £1.7 billion last year).

    By reaching the final, Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) has already earned £116.96 million, and Inter Milan £115.86 million.

    The winner will receive an additional £5.45 million in prize money, while victory is also expected to generate around £30 million in future revenues through participation in tournaments like the European Super Cup.

    Qualifying for the final has also boosted the clubs’ brand value and fan engagement. In the latter stages of the tournament, Inter Milan saw huge growth in its number of followers on social media.

    But for all the big numbers on revenue statements and social media accounts, this year’s final has a cultural dimension which is hard to measure in numbers alone.

    Football and fashion

    Paris and Milan are both global fashion capitals, home to famous designers and globally coveted labels. PSG and Inter Milan are on a mission to emulate those brands, with attractive football which brings prestige and heritage.

    And some parallels can be drawn between the style of the teams and the cities they call home. PSG for example, with its focus on building a team packed with young local talent, has managed to mirror the sophistication and flamboyance of Paris.

    The side’s partnerships with Jordan and Dior position the club as a vessel for the city’s global image: one that is bold, luxurious, cosmopolitan.

    Inter meanwhile, though lacking big name players, embodies a classic disciplined and defensively minded Italian approach to football (historically referred to as “catenaccio” and translated as “locked door”). It’s a fitting match for the crisp, distinctive style of the fashion houses based in Milan.

    The side’s identity is rooted not in flamboyance, but in structure and refinement – like the precise tailoring of Prada and Armani. So perhaps while PSG is the billboard of global luxury, Inter is the blueprint of Italian design culture – less performative, more exacting.

    Together, PSG and Inter are brand ambassadors of urban identity for cities looking to exert influence far beyond Parisian and Milanese borders, projecting soft power not just through architecture or tourism, but through the aesthetic performance of sport.

    In this way, football becomes a stage for symbolic competition between cities, where civic identity is channelled through symbolic and material images such as kits, campaigns and international fandom. In this final, there will be a clash of urban ambition, a soft power play between two of Europe’s most image-conscious metropolises.

    Geopolitically, there is plenty at stake too. PSG’s second appearance in a Champions League final is of huge importance to the club’s Qatari owners who have spent years investing in star players from overseas to help build the Gulf state’s image. In recent seasons the club has switched strategy towards signing young, local talent.

    This has helped PSG position itself as a Parisian club whilst strengthening Qatari relations with the French government. This is particularly important right now as, from next season, PSG will have a local rival. Last year, French luxury goods business LVMH acquired Paris FC, which looks set to battle its local rival for the title of the capital’s most prominent club.

    For its part, Inter has been through a recent ownership change. Acquired by a Chinese company in 2016, the club struggled (notwithstanding another Champions League final in 2023) as China’s attempted football revolution faltered.

    Then in May 2024, the club was bought by a US investment fund. In recent years, this has been a trend across European football whereby American private equity has triumphed Chinese, state-backed investment.

    All of this sets up another classic football battle of our age, as 450 million people watch a Champions League final contested between American and Gulf money. The game will be a clash of ideologies as much as it is about stars, cities and fashion.

    Simon Chadwick teaches for UEFA’s Academy.

    Paul Widdop and Ronnie Das do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Champions League final 2025: a battle for glory against a backdrop of money and fashion – https://theconversation.com/champions-league-final-2025-a-battle-for-glory-against-a-backdrop-of-money-and-fashion-257377

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Two Lives, One Team

    Source: US State of Connecticut

    Halfway through her third pregnancy, Taylor Jordan-Blue received some scary news. She was at high risk for placenta accreta – a life-threatening condition. But the high-risk pregnancy team at UConn Health knew exactly what to do in order to make sure Taylor safely delivered a healthy baby.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: BOS Reports Record $15 Million in Revenues for the First Quarter of 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    RISHON LE ZION, Israel, May 29, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — BOS Better Online Solutions Ltd. (“BOS” or the “Company”) (NASDAQ: BOSC) reported its financial results for the first quarter of the year 2025.

    First Quarter 2025 Financial Highlights:

    • Revenues increased by 33.1% to $15.0 million from $11.3 million in the first quarter of the year 2024;
    • Gross profit margin improved to 23.9% compared to 22.7% in the first quarter of the year 2024;
    • EBITDA increased by 86.2% to $1.9 million compared to $1.0 million in the first quarter of the year 2024;
    • Operating expenses increased by only 7.7% compared to the 33.1% increase in revenues, demonstrating operating leverage;
    • Net income increased by 82.3% to $1.35 million or $0.23 per basic share compared to $741,000 or $0.13 per basic share in the first quarter of the year 2024;
    • Backlog was $22 million as of March 31, 2025 compared to $27 million as of December 31, 2024.

    Eyal Cohen, Chief Executive Officer at BOS, stated: “I am pleased to report record revenues and record net income in the first quarter, demonstrating the success of our strategic focus on the defense sector and diligent operating efficiency. We continue to capitalize on the growing opportunities in this rapidly changing sector by increasing contracting activity with existing customers and securing new customers.”

    “Based on our first quarter performance and contracted backlog, we are optimistic about surpassing our full-year outlook for 2025, which are revenues of $44 million and net income of $2.5 million,” Cohen concluded.

    “Our record results in the first quarter reflect BOS’s long-term investments in developing a diverse product offering and establishing a robust operational and financial framework, all of which are specifically designed to meet the evolving and distinct demands of the defense industry,” said Avidan Zelicovsky, BOS President.

    BOS will host a video conference meeting on May 29, 2024 at 8:30 a.m. EDT. A question-and-answer session will follow management’s presentation. To access the video conference meeting, please click on the following link: https://us06web.zoom.us/j/83920447982?pwd=nxng3dstyBqK9argz8YQSsH9Cx4VkE.1

    For those unable to participate in the video conference, a recording of the meeting will be available the next day on the BOS website: www.boscom.com

    About BOS

    BOS integrates cutting-edge technologies to streamline and enhance supply chain operations for global customers in the aerospace, defense, industrial and retail sectors. The Company integrates three specialized divisions:

    – Intelligent Robotics Division: Automates industrial and logistics inventory processes through advanced robotics technologies, improving efficiency and precision.

    – RFID Division: Optimizes inventory management with state-of-the-art solutions for marking and tracking, ensuring real-time visibility and control.

    – Supply Chain Division: Integrates franchised components directly into customer products, meeting their evolving needs for developing innovative solutions.

    For more information on BOS Better Online Solutions Ltd., visit www.boscom.com.

    For additional information, contact:

    Matt Kreps, Managing Director
    Darrow Associates
    +1-214-597-8200
    mkreps@darrowir.com

    Eyal Cohen, CEO
    +972-542525925
    eyalc@boscom.com

    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Information
    BOS reports financial results in accordance with US GAAP and herein provides some non-GAAP measures. These non-GAAP measures are not in accordance with, nor are they a substitute for, GAAP measures. These non-GAAP measures are intended to supplement the Company’s presentation of its financial results that are prepared in accordance with GAAP. The Company uses the non-GAAP measures presented to evaluate and manage the Company’s operations internally. The Company is also providing this information to assist investors in performing additional financial analysis that is consistent with financial models developed by research analysts who follow the Company. The reconciliation set forth below is provided in accordance with Regulation G and reconciles the non-GAAP financial measures with the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures.

    Safe Harbor Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    The forward-looking statements contained herein reflect management’s current views with respect to future events and financial performance. These forward-looking statements are subject to certain risks and uncertainties that could cause the actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statements, all of which are difficult to predict and many of which are beyond the control of BOS. These risk factors and uncertainties include, amongst others, the dependency of sales being generated from one or few major customers, the uncertainty of BOS being able to maintain current gross profit margins, inability to keep up or ahead of technology and to succeed in a highly competitive industry, inability to maintain marketing and distribution arrangements and to expand our overseas markets, uncertainty with respect to the prospects of legal claims against BOS, the effect of exchange rate fluctuations, general worldwide economic conditions, the effect of the war against the Hamas and other parties in the region, the continued availability of financing for working capital purposes and to refinance outstanding indebtedness; and additional risks and uncertainties detailed in BOS’ periodic reports and registration statements filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission. BOS undertakes no obligation to publicly update or revise any such forward-looking statements to reflect any change in its expectations or in events, conditions or circumstances on which any such statements may be based, or that may affect the likelihood that actual results will differ from those set forth in the forward-looking statements.

     
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    U.S. dollars in thousands
     
        Three months ended
    March 31,
          Year ended
    December 31, 
          2025       2024         2024  
          (Unaudited)         (Unaudited)           (Audited)  
               
    Revenues   $ 15,026     $ 11,287       $ 39,949  
    Cost of revenues     11,437       8,727         30,655  
    Gross profit     3,589       2,560         9,294  
    Operating costs and expenses:              
    Research and development     41       44         175  
    Sales and marketing     1,263       1,162         4,394  
    General and administrative     542       508         2,113  
    Impairment of intangible assets and Goodwill                   1,173  
    Total operating costs and expenses     1,846       1,714         7,855  
                   
    Operating income     1,743       846         1,439  
    Financial expenses, net     (272 )     (105 )       (139 )
    Income before taxes on income     1,471       741         1,300  
    Income taxes benefits (expenses)     (120 )             1,000  
    Net income   $ 1,351     $ 741       $ 2,300  
                   
    Basic net income per share   $ 0.23     $ 0.13       $ 0.40  
    Diluted net income per share   $ 0.22     $ 0.13       $ 0.39  
    Weighted average number of shares used in computing basic net income per share     5,900       5,748         5,756  
    Weighted average number of shares used in computing diluted net income per share     6,273       5,828         5,887  
                   
    Number of outstanding shares as of March 31, 2025 and 2024 and December 31, 2024     5,924       5,748         5,793  
     
    CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (U.S. dollars in thousands)
     
        March 31, 2025 
      December 31, 2024  
        (Unaudited)   (Audited)
     
    ASSETS              
                   
    CURRENT ASSETS:              
    Cash and cash equivalents   $ 3,844     $ 3,368  
    Restricted bank deposits     66       185  
    Trade receivables, net     15,839       11,787  
    Other accounts receivable and prepaid expenses     1,235       1,150  
    Inventories     7,505       7,870  
               
    Total current assets     28,489       24,360  
               
    LONG-TERM ASSETS     167       177  
               
    PROPERTY AND EQUIPMENT, NET     3,362       3,417  
               
    OPERATING LEASE RIGHT-OF-USE ASSETS, NET     727       779  
               
    DEFERRED TAX ASSETS     981       1,000  
               
    OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSETS, NET     407       422  
               
    GOODWILL     4,188       4,188  
               
    Total assets   $ 38,321     $ 34,343  
     
    CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (U.S. dollars in thousands)
     
        March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024
        (Unaudited)   (Audited)
             
    LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY        
             
    CURRENT LIABILITIES:        
    Current maturities of long-term loans   $ 342     $ 439  
    Operating lease liabilities, current     161       176  
    Trade payables     7, 769       6,362  
    Employees and payroll accruals     1,128       1,087  
    Deferred revenues     2,543       2,003  
    Accrued expenses and other liabilities     1,091       598  
             
    Total current liabilities     13,034       10,665  
             
    LONG-TERM LIABILITIES:        
    Long-term loans, net of current maturities     921       980  
    Operating lease liabilities, non-current     530       576  
    Long-term deferred revenues     273       293  
    Accrued severance pay, net     514       498  
             
    Total long-term liabilities     2,238       2,347  
             
             
    TOTAL SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY     23,049       21,331  
             
             
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity   $ 38, 321     $ 34,343  
     
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED EBITDA
    (U.S. dollars in thousands)
     
        Three months ended
    March 31,
      Year ended
    December 31,
          2025       2024       2024  
                 
    Operating income   $ 1,743     $ 846     $ 1,439  
    Add:            
    Impairment of Goodwill and other intangible assets               1,173  
    Amortization of intangible assets     15       47       190  
    Stock-based compensation     9       21       74  
    Depreciation     101       89       370  
    EBITDA   $ 1,868     $ 1,003     $ 3,246  
     
    SEGMENT INFORMATION
    (U.S. dollars in thousands)

     

     

    RFID

     

    Supply
    Chain Solutions

     

    Intelligent
    Robotics

     

    Intercompany

     

    Consolidated

     

     

     

     

         

    Three months ended March 31, 2025

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Revenues

     

    $

    3,259

     

    $

      11,390

     

     

    496

     

    (119

    )

     

    $

     15,026

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Gross profit  

     

     

    707

     

     

    2,756

     

     

    126

     

     –

     

     

     

    3,589

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Allocated operating expenses

     

     

     529

     

     

    1,048

     

     

    68

     

     –

     

     

     

    1,645

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Unallocated operating expenses*

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    201

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Income from operations

     

    $

         178

     

    $

        1,708

     

    $

            58

     

     

     

     

    1,743

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Financial expenses and tax on income

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    (392

    )

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Net income

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    $

             1,351

     

     

     

    RFID

     

    Supply
    Chain Solutions

     

    Intelligent
    Robotics

     

    Intercompany

     

    Consolidated

     

     

         

    Three months ended March 31, 2024

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Revenues

     

    $

    3,683

     

    $

        7,356

     

    250

     

     

    (2

    )

     

    $

          11,287

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Gross profit 

     

     

    992

     

     

    1,484

     

    84

     

     

                 –

     

     

    2,560

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Allocated operating expenses

     

     

     565

     

     

    909

     

            62

     

     

                 –

     

     

    1,536

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Unallocated operating expenses*

     

       

     

     

     

     

       

    178

     

    Income  from operations

     

    $

         427

     

    $

           575

    $

            22

     

     

     

       

    846

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Financial expenses and tax on income  

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    (105

    )

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Net income

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    $

               741

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    SEGMENT INFORMATION
    (U.S. dollars in thousands)
     
         

    RFID

     

    Supply Chain Solutions

     

    Intelligent
    Robotics

     

    Intercompany

     

    Consolidated

             

    Year ended December 31, 2024

     
                             
                             

    Revenues

       

    $

     12,877

     

    $

     25,829

       

    1,410

     

    (167

    )

     

    $

      39,949

     
                             

    Gross profit

         

     3,533

       

      5,430

       

                                 331

         

    9,294

     
                             
                             

    Allocated operating expenses

         

      2,273

       

     3,338

       

     274

         

      5,885

     
                             

    Impairment of goodwill and intangible assets

         

     984

       

    189

       

         

    1,173

     
                             

    Unallocated operating expenses*

         

       

       

           

     797

     
                             

    Income from operations

       

    $

      276

     

    $

     1,903

     

    $

      57

           

    1,439

     
                             

    Financial expenses and tax benefit

                         

    861

     
                             

    Net income

                       

    $

     2,300

     

    *Unallocated operating expenses include costs not specific to a particular segment but general to the entire group, such as expenses incurred for insurance of directors and officers, public company fees, legal fees, and other similar corporate costs.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Alarum Technologies Announces First Quarter 2025 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Q1 2025 highlighted the growing traction of the company’s data collection solutions with leading AI and eCommerce players worldwide

    Company strategically accelerated investments in scalable infrastructure and next-gen technologies to meet the rising demand for AI-ready data and to future-proof its position among top-tier global companies

    First quarter 2025 revenue reached $7.1 million, in line with guidance, net profit was at $0.4 million and adjusted EBITDA exceeded guidance, reaching $1.3 million Cash and debt investments balance at quarter-end amounted to $24 million

    TEL AVIV, Israel, May 29, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Alarum Technologies Ltd. (Nasdaq, TASE: ALAR) (“Alarum” or the “Company”), a global provider of web data collection solutions, today announced financial results for the three-month period ended March 31, 2025.

    “2025 began with strong momentum, as demand for scalable, high-quality data continues to accelerate, driven by the rapid growth of AI technologies and eCommerce platforms,” said Shachar Daniel, Chief Executive Officer of Alarum.

    “During the quarter, several of the world’s leading AI and eCommerce companies significantly expanded their usage of our platform, relying on our advanced proxy infrastructure, innovative data collector, and Website Unblocker, to power data collection, model training, and real-time access to public web data.”

    “In line with our long-term vision, we made a deliberate decision to increase investments in our infrastructure and products, aiming to meet the growing global demand for large-scale data solutions. While this impacted our gross margin, it reinforces our position as a foundational player in the AI data ecosystem,” Mr. Daniel added.

    “With discipline and vision, we are building the backbone of data access for the AI era. Our technology and collaborations with customers uniquely position us to deliver long-term value for our stakeholders as the market continues to evolve,” Mr. Daniel concluded.

    Market Trends, Recent Developments and Business Highlights

    • Expanded strategic partnerships with major AI and eCommerce players during the first quarter: Notable new collaborations include a top Asian marketplace, a global electronics brand, and a European AI firm, for large-scale data labeling and model fine-tuning with fresh public data.
    • Redefining industry trends and market dynamics: A new market is emerging around high-quality, scalable data infrastructure. As AI models require constant training and fine-tuning, Alarum is positioned to play a key role in shaping this space and powering the global AI transformation.
    • Advancing and investing in long-term strategy, supported by strong financials: Alarum continues to pursue its strategic decision to reinvest earnings into innovative products, scaling operations, expanding infrastructure, and strengthening its IP network. This positions the Company to meet rising demand from AI-driven customers and capture long-term value, while maintaining operational efficiency during this pivotal growth phase.
    • Powering data collection with Alarum’s enhanced offerings portfolio: Tech giants and startups rely on Alarum’s data collector, Website Unblocker, and proxy network to overcome data access barriers.
    • Entering 2025 with a strong momentum: NetNut Net Retention Rate (“NRR”)1 reached 1.13 as of March 31, 2025, in yet another consecutive quarter of achieving an NRR well above 1. With its data collection offering, the Company is well-positioned amid a shifting landscape, and early results from its strategic investments and pipeline visibility support the positive outlook for the second quarter of 2025.

    ______________________

    1 See definition under “Other Metrics”.

    Summary of Financial Results2
    (in millions of U.S. dollars, rounded, except per share amounts and margins)
        For the
    Three Months Ended
    March 31,
      For the
    Year Ended
    December 31,
        2025   2024   2024
        (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)   (Audited)
                 
    Total Revenue   7.1   8.4   31.8
    of which, Web Data Collection Revenue was   7.0   8.1   30.9
    Gross profit   4.8   6.6   23.9
    Gross margin (in percentage)   67.5%   78.5%   75.1%
    Non-IFRS gross margin (in percentage)   69.4%   80.4%   77.0%
    Total operating expenses   4.5   4.0   17.2
    Financial income (expense), net   0.2   (0.9)   0.3
    Tax expense   0.1   0.3   1.2
    Net profit   0.4   1.4   5.8
    Adjusted EBITDA   1.3   3.2   9.4
    Basic earnings per American Depository Share (“ADS”)
    (in U.S. dollars)
      $0.06   $0.23   $0.87
    Non-IFRS basic earnings per ADS (in U.S. dollars)   $0.16   $0.45   $1.26
    Cash, cash equivalents and debt investments
    (including accrued interest)3
      24.0   15.1   25.0
    Shareholders’ equity2   27.6   17.1   26.4
                 

    First Quarter 2025 Financial Analysis

    • Revenue in Q1 2025 totalled $7.1 million (Q1 2024: $8.4 million). The 15% year-over-year change reflects market dynamics that affected the demand from certain customers since mid-2024.  
    • Cost of revenue in Q1 2025 was $2.3 million (Q1 2024: $1.8 million). The increase is mainly due to the investment in the Company’s IP network, specifically in infrastructure and servers, aligning with its strategic decision to boost its expansion capabilities.
    • As a result, Gross profit in Q1 2025 amounted to $4.8 million (Q1 2024: $6.6 million).
    • Operating expenses in Q1 2025 totalled $4.5 million (Q1 2024: $4.0 million). The difference was driven mainly by the increase in research and development salaries and share based payments costs.
    • Financial income, net, in Q1 2025 was $0.2 million (Q1 2024: financial expense, net, of $0.9 million). This shift was mainly due to the fair value decrease of derivative financial instruments (warrants issued in 2019-2020), resulting from the share price changes during the measured periods.  
    • Net profit in Q1 2025 reached $0.4 (Q1 2024: $1.4 million).
    • As of March 31, 2025, shareholders’ equity increased to $27.6 million, up from $26.4 million as of December 31, 2024. The increase was driven by the quarterly net profit.
    • Outstanding ordinary share count as of March 31, 2025, was approximately 69.3 million shares, or 6.9 million in ADSs.

    ______________________

    1 See definition under “Other Metrics”.
    2 The table below contains certain non-IFRS financial measures. See “Use of Non-IFRS Financial Results” for additional information regarding these measures and reconciliations to the most comparable IFRS measures.
    3 As of the last day of the period.

    Financial Outlook

    “First quarter revenues were in line with guidance, whilst Adjusted EBITDA exceeded expectations, surpassing our outlook,” said Mr. Shai Avnit, Chief Financial Officer of Alarum.

    “Alarum has entered the second quarter of 2025 with solid momentum and demand. Accordingly, second quarter 2025 revenues are estimated at $7.9 million ±3%, and Adjusted EBITDA for the second quarter 2025 is expected to range from $0.5 million to $0.8 million. We remain attentive to market dynamics as the AI market reshapes and are actively optimizing our network infrastructure and product delivery, with a clear roadmap to drive efficiency, maintain high margins, and deliver long-term value to our stakeholders,” Mr. Avnit concluded.

    We are unable to present a reconciliation of our estimated Adjusted EBITDA to net profit as we are unable to predict with reasonable certainty, and without unreasonable effort, the impact and timing of certain expenses on our net profit. The financial impact of these expenses is uncertain and is dependent on various factors, including timing, and could be material to our consolidated statements of profit or loss and other comprehensive income (loss).

    First Quarter 2025 Financial Results Conference Call

    Mr. Shachar Daniel, Chief Executive Officer of Alarum, and Mr. Shai Avnit, Chief Financial Officer of Alarum, will host a conference call today, May 29, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. ET, 5:30 a.m. Pacific time, 3:30 p.m. Israel, to discuss the first quarter of 2025 results and the second quarter 2025 outlook, followed by a Q&A session.

    To attend, log in here or dial one of the following numbers, at least five minutes before the call starts: 1-877-407-0789 or 1-201-689-8562. If you are unable to connect using the toll-free number, please try the international dial-in number. An Israeli toll-free number is: 1 809 406 247. Participants will be required to state their name and company upon dialling in. 

    Replay: The conference call will be broadcast live and available for replay here, after 11:30 a.m. ET on May 29, 2025.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the “safe harbor” words such as “expects,” “anticipates,” “intends,” “plans,” “believes,” “seeks,” “estimates” and similar expressions or variations of such words are intended to identify forward-looking statements. For example, Alarum is using forward-looking statements in this press release when it discusses that the demand for scalable, high-quality data continues to accelerate, driven by the rapid growth of AI technologies and eCommerce platforms; the Company’s focus and strategic; that its technology and collaborations with customers uniquely position it to deliver long-term value for its stakeholders as the market continues to evolve; emergence of a new market around high-quality, scalable data infrastructure; that early results from its strategic investments; pipeline visibility support the positive outlook for the second quarter of 2025; and its estimates regarding second quarter 2025 revenues and Adjusted EBITDA. Because such statements deal with future events and are based on Alarum’s current expectations, they are subject to various risks and uncertainties and actual results, performance or achievements of Alarum could differ materially from those described in or implied by the statements in this press release. The forward-looking statements contained or implied in this press release are subject to other risks and uncertainties, including those discussed under the heading “Risk Factors” in Alarum’s annual report on Form 20-F filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on March 20, 2025, and in any subsequent filings with the SEC. Except as otherwise required by law, Alarum undertakes no obligation to publicly release any revisions to these forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances after the date hereof or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events. References and links to websites have been provided as a convenience, and the information contained on such websites is not incorporated by reference into this press release. Alarum is not responsible for the contents of third-party websites.

     Condensed Consolidated Statements of Financial Position
     (in thousands of U.S. dollars)

        March 31,   December 31,
        2025   2024     2024
        (Unaudited)   (Audited)
    Assets            
    Current assets:            
    Cash and cash equivalents   13,952     15,060     15,081  
    Trade receivables, net   3,789     2,945     3,231  
    Other receivables   698     1,449     503  
        18,439     19,454     18,815  
                 
    Non-current assets:            
    Long-term deposits   119     104     121  
    Other non-current assets   85     119     85  
    Property and equipment, net   134     110     130  
    Right-of-use assets   429     709     498  
    Deferred tax assets   497     244     422  
    Debt investments at fair value through other comprehensive income   9,331         9,256  
    Debt investments at fair value through profit or loss   564         555  
    Intangible assets, net   677     1,225     811  
    Goodwill   4,118     4,118     4,118  
    Total non-current assets   15,954     6,629     15,996  
    Total assets   34,393     26,083     34,811  
                 
    Liabilities and equity            
    Current liabilities:            
    Trade payables   373     416     251  
    Other payables   2,815     3,056     4,484  
    Current maturities of long-term loan   965     353     938  
    Contract liabilities   2,072     2,728     1,987  
    Derivative financial instruments   1     952     148  
    Short-term lease liabilities   362     365     359  
    Total current liabilities   6,588     7,870     8,167  
                 
    Non-current liabilities:            
    Long-term lease liabilities   186     462     261  
    Long-term loans, net of current maturities       691     32  
    Total non-current liabilities   186     1,153     293  
    Total liabilities   6,774     9,023     8,460  
                 
    Equity:            
    Ordinary shares            
    Share premium   112,059     104,097     111,892  
    Other equity reserves   11,705     13,856     11,012  
    Accumulated deficit   (96,145 )   (100,893 )   (96,553 )
    Total equity   27,619     17,060     26,351  
    Total liabilities and equity   34,393     26,083     34,811  
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income (Loss)
    (in thousands of U.S. dollars, except per share amounts)

      For the
    Three Months Ended
    March 31,
      For the
    Year Ended
    December 31,
      2025   2024   2024
      (Unaudited)   (Unaudited)   (Audited)
               
    Revenue 7,133   8,376   31,824
    Cost of revenue 2,318   1,803   7,915
    Gross profit 4,815   6,573   23,909
           
    Operating expenses:      
    Research and development 1,370   1,022   4,495
    Sales and marketing 1,827   1,725   7,033
    General and administrative 1,285   1,240   5,661
    Total operating expenses 4,482   3,987   17,189
           
    Operating profit 333   2,586   6,720
           
    Financial income (expense), net 212   (848)   281
    Profit from operations before income tax 545   1,738   7,001
    Tax expense (137)   (298)   (1,221)
    Net profit for the period 408   1,440   5,780
    Other comprehensive income (loss) for the period
    Change in fair value of debt investments
    72     (80)
    Total comprehensive income for the period 480   1,440   5,700
           
    Basic profit per share $0.01   $0.02   $0.09
    Diluted profit per share $0.01   $0.02   $0.08
    Basic profit per ADS $0.06   $0.23   $0.87
               

    Use of Non-IFRS Financial Results

    In addition to disclosing financial results calculated in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board, this press release contains non-IFRS financial measures of EBITDA (EBITDA loss), Adjusted EBITDA (Adjusted EBITDA loss), non-IFRS net profit (loss), non-IFRS gross profit, non-IFRS gross margin and non-IFRS basic earnings (loss) per share or ADS for the periods presented. The Company defines EBITDA (EBITDA loss) as net profit (loss) before depreciation, amortization and impairment of intangible assets (if any), financial income (expense) and income tax; defines Adjusted EBITDA (Adjusted EBITDA loss) as EBITDA (EBITDA loss) as further adjusted to remove the impact of (i) impairment of goodwill (if any); and (ii) share-based compensation; defines non-IFRS net profit (loss) as net profit (loss) before depreciation, amortization and impairment of intangible assets (if any), impairment of goodwill (if any), financial income (expense) effects primarily related to derivative financial instruments as well as long-term loans, deferred tax effects and share-based compensation; defines non-IFRS gross profit as gross profit adjusted to remove the impact of depreciation, amortization and impairment of intangible assets and share-based compensation recorded under cost of revenues; defines non-IFRS gross margin as the percentage of the non-IFRS gross profit out of revenues; and defines non-IFRS basic earnings (loss) per share or ADS as non-IFRS net profit (loss) divided by the weighted average number of ordinary shares or ADSs. The Company’s management believes the non-IFRS financial information provided in this press release is useful to investors’ understanding and assessment of the Company’s ongoing operations. Management also uses both IFRS and non-IFRS information in evaluating and operating its business internally, and as such deemed it important to provide this information to investors. The non-IFRS financial measures disclosed by the Company should not be considered in isolation, or as a substitute for, or superior to, financial measures calculated in accordance with IFRS, and the financial results calculated in accordance with IFRS and reconciliations to those financial statements should be carefully evaluated. Investors are encouraged to review the reconciliations of these non-IFRS measures to their most directly comparable IFRS financial measures provided in the financial statement tables herein.

    Other Metrics

    Net retention rate (NRR) is a key indicator of customer base health and revenue expansion. It is based on NRR point in time, which measures the revenue growth of current customers over the past four quarters, compared to the revenue generated from these customers during the same period a year earlier.
    NRR is calculated as an average of the NRR points in time for the end of the current period and the three preceding quarters.
    NRR > 1 (or 100%): Indicates revenue growth driven by existing customers, where upsells and cross-sells outweigh churn.
    NRR < 1 (or 100%): Shows revenue loss due to churn exceeding gains from upsells or cross-sells.

    Non-IFRS Financial Measures
    (in millions of U.S. dollars, rounded)

    The following tables present the reconciled effect of the above on the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA; non-IFRS net profit; and non-IFRS gross profit for the three months ended March 31, 2025 and 2024, and the year ended December 31, 2024:

        For the
    Three Months Ended
    March 31,
      For the
    Year Ended
    December 31,
        2025
      2024   2024
    Net profit   0.4   1.4   5.8
    Adjustments:            
    Depreciation and amortization   0.2   0.2   0.6
    Financial expense (income), net   (0.2)   0.9   (0.4)
    Tax expense   0.1   0.3   1.4
    EBITDA   0.5   2.8   7.4
    Adjustments:            
    Share-based compensation   0.8   0.4   2.0
    Adjusted EBITDA for the period   1.3   3.2   9.4
        For the
    Three Months Ended
    March 31,
      For the
    Year Ended
    December 31,
        2025   2024   2024
    Net profit   0.4   1.4   5.8
    Adjustments:            
    Depreciation and amortization   0.2   0.2   0.6
    Financial expense (income), net effects   (0.2)   0.9   0.1
    Deferred tax effects   (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.1)
    Share-based compensation   0.8   0.4   2.0
    Non-IFRS net profit for the period   1.1   2.8   8.4
        For the
    Three Months Ended
    March 31,
      For the
    Year Ended
    December 31,

        2025   2024   2024
    Gross profit   4.8   6.6   23.9
    Adjustments:            
    Depreciation and amortization   0.1   0.1   0.6
    Share-based compensation   *   *   *
    Non-IFRS gross profit for the period   4.9   6.7   24.5

    * Less than $0.1 million

    About Alarum Technologies Ltd.

    Alarum Technologies Ltd. (Nasdaq, TASE: ALAR) is a global provider of web data collection solutions, empowering organizations to gain a competitive edge by streamlining the collection, extraction, and analysis of large-scale structured data from public online sources. Our data collection solutions by NetNut, are based on our world’s fastest and most advanced and secured hybrid proxy network, which comprises both exit points based on our proprietary reflection technology and hundreds of servers located at our ISP partners around the world. Pushing the boundaries of innovation in data collection, we are building a robust platform, complemented by the Website Unblocker, Data Collector, Data Sets and AI data collector. As the impact of the AI revolution unfolds, Alarum, with its robust market-leading data collection offerings is preparing itself to play a meaningful role as the world reshapes in a new form.

    For more information about Alarum and its web data collection solutions, please visit www.alarum.io.

    Follow us on LinkedIn

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    Subscribe to our YouTube channel

    Investor Relations Contact:

    investors@alarum.io

    The MIL Network

  • Israel announces new West Bank settlements despite sanctions threat

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Israel’s government has approved 22 new Jewish settlements in the occupied-West Bank, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said on Thursday, a move that could deepen divisions with some allies, who have threatened sanctions over further expansion.

    Far-right Smotrich, an advocate for Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank, wrote on X that the new settlements would be located in the northern area of the West Bank, without specifying where.

    Israeli media cited the Defense Ministry as saying that among the new Jewish settlements, existing “outposts” would be legalised and new settlements would also be built.

    Around 700,000 Israeli settlers live among 2.7 million Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, territories Israel captured from Jordan in the 1967 war. Israel later annexed East Jerusalem, a move not recognized by most countries, but has not formally extended sovereignty over the West Bank.

    Palestinians see expansion of the settlements as a hindrance to their aspirations to establish an independent Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including occupied East Jerusalem.

    There is a growing list of European countries demanding that Israel end the war in Gaza, while Britain, France and Canada this month warned Israel it could impose targeted sanctions if Israel continued to expand settlements in the West Bank.

    Most of the international community considers the Jewish settlements illegal. The Israeli government deems settlements legal under its own laws, while some so-called “outposts” are illegal but often tolerated and sometimes later legalised.

    Settlement activity in the West Bank has accelerated sharply since the war in Gaza, now in its 20th month, adding to escalating Israeli military operations against Palestinian militants and increasing numbers of settler attacks targeting Palestinian residents.

    Nabil Abu Rudeineh, a spokesperson for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, called Israel’s decision a “dangerous escalation”, accusing the government of continuing to drag the region into a “cycle of violence and instability”.

    “This extremist Israeli government is trying by all means to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state,” he told Reuters, urging U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration to intervene.

    Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri condemned the announcement and called on the United States and the European Union to take action.

    “The announcement of the building of 22 new settlements in the West Bank is part of the war led by Netanyahu against the Palestinian people,” Abu Zuhri told Reuters.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI Russia: In 2025, more than 2,100 budget places will be available at NSU at all levels of training

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Novosibirsk State University – Novosibirsk State University –

    Today, TASS hosted a press conference dedicated to the specifics of the upcoming admissions campaign to universities in the Siberian Federal District. The event was attended by representatives of leading universities in Novosibirsk, Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk and Gorno-Altaisk. NSU was represented by Alexander Trusevich, Head of the Department for Work with Applicants.

    — Last year, more than 8,000 applicants showed interest in entering the university, in terms of the number of applications, this is, of course, several times more. We hope that this year the number will be even greater. As a rule, 2/3 of the total number of those enrolled are those who were enrolled in budget places, and the rest are paid admission. The interest and popularity of NSU is increasing among applicants based on the results of prestigious Olympiads — this is the All-Russian School Olympiad, these are the list Olympiads. Last year, the number of enrolled applicants with such results increased by almost 20%, — noted Alexander.

    In 2025, 2108 budget and 1363 fee-paying places will be available at NSU at all levels of training. In general, the number of places remains at the level of previous years.

    — This year, NSU will have a new category of places for the first time — places financed by industrial partners. Education in these places will be completely free for applicants, with the possibility of receiving a scholarship at the expense of industrial partners, — added Alexander.

    Among the main innovations that await applicants this year:

    — the most noticeable change compared to last year is the abolition of the requirement to provide the original educational document as a prerequisite for enrollment; instead of the original educational document, applicants must submit an application for consent to enrollment;

    — for the first time this year, applicants for master’s and postgraduate programs will be able to use the super service “Online University Admission” and submit documents using the “Gosuslugi” portal; this will expand the geography of applicants;

    — starting with this admissions campaign, universities must designate the maximum number of fee-paying places, which cannot be increased during the admissions campaign;

    — amendments were recently made to the Federal Law on Education, which will allow children of participants in military operations on the territory of the Russian Federation to enroll in places under a separate quota;

    — starting this year, a new type of individual achievements has been introduced for applicants to target quota places — targeted individual achievements; the maximum score that an applicant can receive is 5 points.

    This year, the university will introduce a number of new educational programs that train interdisciplinary specialists and cover promising areas. Among them are the specialty “Medical Cybernetics” and the master’s program “Industrial Pharmacy”. New educational programs are being implemented jointly with the MSU Engineering School, and large companies “Pharmstandard” and “Generium” are industrial partners. New educational programs will be developed on the basis of the infrastructure of the educational and scientific center of the Institute of Medicine and Medical Technologies, which is part of the modern NSU campus, built within the framework of the national project “Youth and Children”.

    Also starting this year, NSU is opening admission to the bachelor’s degree program “Applied Artificial Intelligence”. This program won the federal grant competition for training top specialists in the field of artificial intelligence. The pilot recruitment will consist of 150 students. The program will be implemented with the active participation of industrial partners – Rostelecom and Innotech (T1). Grant support will allow students to study for free and receive scholarships from industrial partners.

    On Faculty of Physics a new Master’s program “Applied Mathematics and Physics” will be implemented. Within its framework, training will be conducted in three profiles – “Space and Special Instrumentation”, “Medical Physics” and “Information Processes and Systems”.

    If we talk about the most popular areas, then the biggest competition is for those with a small number of budget places, for example: linguistics; business informatics; jurisprudence. The competition for them reaches 50 people per place.

    According to the results of the 2024 admissions campaign, the following can be distinguished among the most popular areas of natural science and engineering:

    — Applied Mathematics and Physics — 33.6 people per place (14 people enrolled on a budgetary basis);

    — Computer science and engineering — 27.3 people per place (185 people enrolled on a budgetary basis);

    — Physics. Physical informatics — 14.6 people per place (28 people enrolled on a budgetary basis);

    — Mechatronics and robotics — 13.8 people per place (70 people enrolled on a budgetary basis);

    — Chemistry — 9.9 people per place (65 people enrolled on a budget basis).

    — The interest in NSU from applicants coming from other regions is growing. Thus, last year, out of 2,000 people admitted to bachelor’s and specialist’s degree programs, almost 50% were not from the Novosibirsk Region. Moreover, applicants come not only from neighboring regions, but also from the central part of Russia: from Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ufa, Kaliningrad, Samara and other cities, — Alexander emphasized.

    The university is increasing the number of foreign students, primarily interested in medical, natural science and engineering research areas. Many applicants are from the CIS – Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Among the far abroad countries, the top countries include China, Turkey, Iran and Iraq. This year, a joint educational program for a bachelor’s degree in physics will open with Chongqing University, 60 Chinese students will be accepted.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Radical legal step towards ending impunity for Israel over killing Gaza journalists

    Pacific Media Watch

    Journalists have been targeted, detained and tortured by the Israeli military in Gaza — and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has now taken a new approach towards bringing justice these crimes.

    The Paris-based global media freedom NGO has submitted multiple formal requests to the International Criminal Court (ICC) asking that Palestinian journalists who are victims of Israeli war crimes in Gaza be allowed to participate as such in international judicial proceedings.

    If granted this status, these journalists would be able to present the ICC with the direct and personal harm they have suffered at the hands of Israeli forces, reports RSF.

    RSF has filed four complaints with the ICC concerning war crimes committed against journalists in Gaza and recently joined director Sepideh Farsi at the Cannes Film Festival to pay tribute to Fatma Hassoun, a photojournalist killed by the Israeli army after it was revealed she was featured in the documentary film Put Your Soul on Your Hand and Walk.

    After filing the four complaints with the ICC concerning war crimes committed against journalists in Gaza since October 2023, RSF is resolutely continuing its efforts to bring the issue before international justice.

    The NGO has submitted several victim participation forms to the ICC so that Gazan journalists can participate in the legal process as recognised victims, not just as witnesses.

    Being officially recognised as victims is a first step toward justice, truth, and reparations — and it is an essential step toward protecting press freedom and journalistic integrity in conflict zones.

    Nearly 200 journalists killed
    Since October 2023, Israeli armed forces have killed nearly 200 journalists in Gaza — the Gaza Media Office says more than 215 journalists have been killed — at least 44 of whom were targeted because of their work, according to RSF data.

    Not only are foreign journalists barred from entering the blockaded Palestinian territory, but local reporters have watched their homes and newsrooms be destroyed by Israeli airstrikes and have been constantly displaced amid a devastating humanitarian crisis.

    “The right of victims to participate in the ICC investigation is a crucial mechanism that will finally allow for the recognition of the immense harm suffered by Palestinian journalists working in Gaza, who are the target of an unprecedented and systematic crackdown,” said Clémence Witt, a lawyer at the Paris and Barcelona Bars, and Jeanne Sulzer, a lawyer at the Paris Bar and member of the ICC’s list of counsel.

    Jonathan Dagher, head of the RSF Middle East desk, said: “It is time for justice for Gaza’s journalists to be served. The Israeli army’s ongoing crimes against them must end.

    “RSF will tirelessly continue demanding justice and reparations. This new process in the ICC investigation is an integral part of this combat, and allowing journalists to participate as victims is essential to moving forward.

    “They should be able to testify to the extreme violence targeting Gaza’s press. This is a new step toward holding the Israeli military and its leaders accountable for the crimes committed with impunity on Palestinian territory.”

    Pacific Media Watch collaborates with RSF.

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: Grattan on Friday: Trump, tariffs and the Middle East are looming challenges for Albanese

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

    Australia these days receives invitations to big-league international conferences. And so Anthony Albanese will be off soon to the G7 meeting in Alberta, Canada, on June 15-17.

    For the prime minister, what’s most important about this trip is not so much the conference itself, but his expected first meeting with US President Donald Trump, either on the sidelines of the G7 or in a visit to Washington while he’s in North America.

    Nothing is locked in. But it’s impossible to think such a meeting won’t take place. The Australian PM certainly needs to have his first face-to-face talks with the US president sooner rather than later.

    During the election, there was much argument over whether Albanese or Peter Dutton would be better at dealing with the difficult and unpredictable Trump, in particular, in trying to extract some concessions on his tariffs

    Australia has been hit by Trump’s 25% tariff on aluminium and steel, as well as by his general 10% tariff.

    The Trump tariff regime has been a chaotic story of decisions, pauses and changes of mind. In the latest drama, the United States Court of International Trade on Wednesday blocked Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs (as far as Australia goes, this relates to the 10% general tariff but not that on aluminium and steel). The court found the president had exceeded his powers. The administration immediately appealed the decision.

    We can’t know how this imbroglio will play out. But assuming Australia will still be confronting some tariffs, Albanese’s pitch for special treatment will be made around what we can do for the Americans with our large deposits of critical minerals and rare earths. These are vital for the production of a huge range of items, including for defence purposes.

    Australia’s ambassador to the US, Kevin Rudd, speaking at a conference in Detroit this week, pointed out that the two countries already had a draft accord on these minerals.

    “What we need to work out […] is how do we collaborate both on the mining, the extraction, the transportation and the processing and the stockpiling to make our economies resilient, including what you’ll need for future battery manufacture,” Rudd said.

    When Albanese does get together with Trump, he will have the advantage of meeting him as the big winner of the recent election. Trump said of him post-election, “He’s been very, very nice to me, very respectful to me”.

    But that’s no iron-clad guarantee of success. With the US president, there are always multiple “known unknowns”.

    For Albanese, success on the tariff front would be important, but not, of course, as important politically as it would have been pre-election.

    A range of other issues will also be on the agenda when the two meet: including progress on AUKUS.

    The president would no doubt be pleased the government is in the process of booting the Chinese lessee out of the Port of Darwin (with American investment firm Cerberus expressing an interest in taking over, although the government’s preference is for the port to be in Australian hands).

    Trump might not think, however, that the government’s commitment to defence spending, due to reach 2.3% of gross domestic product by 2033-34, is enough. The Americans would prefer a level of 3% of GDP.

    No doubt the Middle East would also be canvassed in such talks. While Middle East policy is not a frontline issue in the Australian-American relationship, the Albanese government struggles at home to strike the right stance.

    Since the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, Australia has seen a deterioration in local social cohesion. Antisemitism spiked to a degree not anticipated; pro-Palestinian demonstrations became a regular and controversial feature. The government found itself under political fire from the Jewish community and pro-Palestinian critics alike.

    With the Israeli government disregarding international criticism, and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza growing more dire, Albanese this week toughened his rhetoric.

    On Monday he said: “It is outrageous that there be a blockade of food and supplies to people who are in need in Gaza. We have made that very clear by signing up to international statements”. He described Israel’s actions as “completely unacceptable”.

    Within Labor, the pressure to go further has been mounting. It is on two fronts. Some want sanctions against Israel (beyond the existing sanctions in relation to settlers on the West Bank). There is also the issue of whether Australia should recognise a Palestinian state ahead of a two-state solution.

    Ed Husic, a Muslim, was relatively outspoken even while he was in cabinet. Since being dumped from the ministry, he is much freer to put forth his view.

    This week, he was calling for imposing sanctions if other nations were to do so. “I think we should be actively considering […] drawing up a list of targeted sanctions where we can join with others”.

    Significantly, former Labor Foreign Minister Gareth Evans was another advocate, saying sanctions “would send a powerful message”.




    Read more:
    Gareth Evans: the case for recognising Palestine


    But when the question of sanctions was put to Albanese, he was dismissive, raising the issue of substantive outcomes.

    At the Labor party’s grassroots level, there is strong pressure for a more pro-Palestinian approach.

    It is not unreasonable to think that would strike a sympathetic chord with both Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong, but they are very cognisant of the politics – both international and local.

    Wong a year ago raised the possibility of recognising Palestine statehood as a step along a peace process, ahead of a two-state solution.

    Australia’s ambassador to the United Nations, James Larson, last week delivered an Australian statement to a preparatory meeting for a June conference in New York on “the question of Palestine and the implementation of the two-state solution”.

    Echoing Wong’s earlier position, he said: “A two-state solution – a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel – is the only hope of breaking the endless cycle of violence, and the only hope of a just and enduring peace, for Israelis and Palestinians alike.”

    “Like other partners, Australia no longer sees recognition of a Palestinian state as only occurring at the end of negotiations, but rather as a way of building momentum towards a two-state solution.”

    Evans, in an article for Pearls and Irritations this week, says the “strongest and most constructive contribution” Australia could make on the issue would be to announce at the conference “that we are immediately recognising Palestinian statehood: not just as the final outcome of a political settlement but as a way of kickstarting it”.

    The government is tight-lipped about what stand it will take for the June 17-20 conference, saying it doesn’t have details yet and is unable to say who will attend for Australia. It says it is not being framed as a conference where countries are expected to make pledges.

    Nevertheless, many within Labor will be watching closely whether the coming weeks will see any change in Australia’s Middle East policy. But that, in turn, would depend on whether others make any moves, because Australia wants to have company from like-minded countries.

    Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Grattan on Friday: Trump, tariffs and the Middle East are looming challenges for Albanese – https://theconversation.com/grattan-on-friday-trump-tariffs-and-the-middle-east-are-looming-challenges-for-albanese-257333

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: More than blue helmets: What you might not know about UN peacekeepers

    Source: United Nations – Peacekeeping

     

     

    Written by Lesley Myers, Digital Editor for UN Peacekeeping’s Strategic Communications Section. She specializes in political analysis, strategic planning and peacekeeping impact.

     

     

    They work in some of the world’s toughest environments to protect people and prevent conflict. But how much do you really know about UN “Blue Helmets”? As we celebrate the International Day of UN Peacekeepers, discover seven surprising facts about the people working for peace.

     

    1. UN Peacekeepers have won a Nobel Peace Prize.

    UN peacekeepers were awarded the prize in 1988 for peacekeepers’ role in promoting global peace and security. During the ceremony, the Nobel Committee honoured peacekeepers that have given their lives for peace: “They volunteered to the service, knowing that it could involve risk. It became their lot to pay the highest price a human being can pay.”

    2. UN Peacekeeping does not have its own army or police force.

    Instead, UN Member States voluntarily contribute their own troops and police officers to peacekeeping missions. To date, over 2 million peacekeepers have served from over 120 countries, making us a truly global force for peace. The top contributors of these personnel include Nepal, Rwanda, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan as of February 2025, as well as Security Council members like China and France. Countries like Côte d’Ivoire, Timor-Leste and Liberia — where peacekeeping missions used to be deployed — are now sending peacekeepers of their own to help others.

    3. Peacekeepers are not only soldiers.

    Peacekeepers include military, police and civilian staff taking on a wide range of roles to help us advance peace. Peacekeepers include a wide range of experts including in logistics, engineering, mediation, politics, civics, human rights, gender, strategic communications and rule of law. They provide advice and support on important issues from how build strong justice institutions to protecting civilians to holding free and fair elections. This cross-disciplinary mix is what lets us navigate the complex socioeconomic, political, environmental and security dynamics that drive conflict.

    4. Peacekeepers do more than patrol.

    We protect civilians, monitor ceasefires, support peace negotiations and help prevent relapses into civil war. We also assist in long-term peacebuilding by building trust between communities, strengthening national institutions, promoting justice, and supporting free and fair elections, laying the critical foundations that help peace take root. Our work is tailored to the conflict environments we work in so we can best meet the needs of the communities we serve.

    chinese_peacekeepers_build_up_infrastructure_in_south_sudan.jpg

    5. Peacekeepers are cost-effective.

    Missions cost significantly less than comparable operations led by individual countries. Peacekeeping’s current budget represents less than 0.5% of global military spending but supports 11 peacekeeping operations in places like South Sudan, Cyprus, and south Lebanon. It delivers value for money, reducing violence, preventing the escalation of conflicts that can destabilize countries and regions, and advancing the global community’s peace and security goals at a fraction of the cost of what military activities cost worldwide.

    6. Peacekeepers serve impartially on behalf of UN Member States.

    UN peacekeeping missions are established, tasked, and ended by the UN Security Council. We serve on behalf of all UN Member States and remain impartial, giving us credibility that can be difficult to achieve when a Member State acts alone.

    7. Peacekeepers are effective at advancing peace.

    Peacekeeping remains one of the global community’s most effective tools for advancing peace. The majority of missions succeed, stabilizing societies, ending war, and saving millions of lives. We are proven to help stop violence before it starts, reduce its impact during conflict, and prevent its return once peace is restored. We increase the likelihood that peace agreements will last once established and have helped countries like Cambodia, El Salvador and Sierra Leone transition from conflict to peace. UN Member States play a critical role in these efforts: we are most successful when we are backed by their are backed by the political will of UN Member States.

    Today, an increasingly divided global community is facing the highest number of conflicts since the second world war, and peacekeeping itself is becoming an increasingly dangerous endeavour. Peacekeeping continues to evolve in the face of these growing challenges, but our commitment remains constant: each day, peacekeepers step up to give peace a fighting chance.

     

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Silicon Cyprus

    Source: European Investment Bank

    Ioannis Kasinopoulos and his friend Yiannis Zambas set up Electryone AI in 2023 with a “strong belief and no outside financing.” The belief was in their software, which uses artificial intelligence to make batteries that store renewable energy more efficient and profitable. They also believed in the importance of the transition to a clean, green economy. Without external funding, however, belief could only get them so far.

    The two young Cypriots, who had previously been at Meta, McKinsey and Palantir, worked hard to find pre-seed financing and some angel investors from their bases in London and Spain, including Genesis Ventures, a Greek venture capital firm backed by the European Investment Fund. Then they got an unexpected surprise—venture capital financing from their home island, where support for startups has been limited. 33East Venture Capital, a Nicosia-based venture capital fund supported by the Cyprus Equity Fund, started making investments from its €26 million fund this year, and it backed Electryone AI with €400 000 in January.

    “We were very happy to have people from Cyprus being part of this,” says Kasinopoulos, who was born in Nicosia. “We had tried to raise money in Cyprus, but we didn’t really get anywhere. There are companies in the energy space, but they didn’t understand software or venture capital. They wouldn’t take that much risk.”

    For technology and innovation startups in Cyprus, 33East’s new fund could be a gamechanger, reversing a brain drain that has seen talented Cypriots leave, largely for London. Though the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor ranks Cyprus seventh in the European Union for early stage entrepreneurial activity, venture capital investment in Cyprus is scarce, according to a report by the University of Cyprus’s Centre for Entrepreneurship.

    “There has been no formal path for startups to follow, so either companies died or left Cyprus to seek financing,” says Yiannis Eftychiou, one of two 33East cofounders. “There has been a drain of quality talent from Cyprus. But we see a lot of opportunity in Cyprus.”

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU Fact Sheets – Gulf countries, Iran, Iraq and Yemen – 28-05-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU has cooperation agreements with the Gulf Cooperation Council (a regional organisation grouping Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and with Yemen, and a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Iraq. The EU has no formal agreement with Iran and there is no EU Delegation in Tehran. EU-Iran relations are currently based on the preservation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or Iran nuclear agreement), signed in Vienna in July 2015.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Is Sudan’s war the reason for South Sudan’s economic crisis? What’s really going on with oil revenue

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jan Pospisil, Associate Professor at the Centre for Peace and Security, Coventry University

    The civil war in Sudan between the Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, which began in April 2023, has had an impact on its neighbours. One of the most keenly affected countries is South Sudan, which became an independent state in 2011 and went on to endure its own civil war. This ended in 2018 with a tenuous peace agreement.

    The impact of the Sudanese war on South Sudan, however, isn’t a straightforward spillover catastrophe. The picture is more nuanced, and this is most clearly seen in South Sudan’s oil economy. Jan Pospisil, who has studied the dynamics in Sudan and South Sudan, explains.

    What is the current status of oil exports from South Sudan through Sudan?

    Landlocked South Sudan is reliant on its neighbour to the north to transport oil from its fields to the international market. Crude oil is transported via pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

    However, recent drone strikes on Port Sudan carried out by the Rapid Support Forces targeted power plants that supply electricity to pumping stations along Sudan’s critical oil pipelines.

    Soon after, the Sudanese army formally notified South Sudan that it would have to halt exports. Following hectic negotiations, the South Sudanese government released a statement that the stoppage could be prevented.

    This back and forth has reopened the pressing question of the impact of Sudan’s war on South Sudan’s economy and, in particular, the role of crude oil.

    Assessments of the impact of Sudan’s war on South Sudan suggest the worst: oil revenues would account for 80% of South Sudan’s budget and 90% of its fiscal revenue.

    This informs the International Monetary Fund’s warnings of looming economic collapse in case of a breakdown of oil exports. The predominant view is that a shutdown of the oil pipeline through Sudan would lead to a collapse of dollar inflows to South Sudan, triggering a severe economic crisis.

    However, South Sudan’s 2024-25 budget suggests a high reliance on non-oil revenue.

    In fact, government oil revenues for 2024-25 are based on a volume of only around 16,000 barrels per day. This is the share of total production of about 130,000 barrels per day controlled by South Sudan. Attempts to increase production to pre-war levels of up to 400,000 barrels failed. The substantial drop in production is explained by a decline in the quality of South Sudan’s oil wells, especially in Paloch in the north-east’s Upper Nile State, and Unity State in the north-central region.

    South Sudan additionally lacks the operational capacity to extract the oil it has in the ground.

    The 2024-25 budget projects a hefty fiscal deficit. The revenues projected will cover only about half of total planned state spending. Oil and non-oil revenues – which mainly include tax income from international NGOs and businesses – each account for about half of the revenue that’s expected to come in.

    Oil income has to account for debt (capital and interest) repayments on loans, as well as pipeline transport fees paid to Sudan. This means that even the optimistically assessed net contributions of oil revenue would only pay for 16% of planned government spending. South Sudan remains with a hefty deficit.

    What are the challenges South Sudan is facing in growing oil revenues?

    First, Petronas, a Malaysian multinational oil and gas company, withdrew from South Sudan in August 2024 after three decades.

    It left behind substantial challenges, including an arbitration process worth more US$1 billion. This followed the government preventing Petronas from selling its shares to the British-Nigerian group Savannah Energy.

    As a short-term solution, South Sudan de facto nationalised Petronas’ shares. It did this by transferring the shares to the state’s oil and gas company, Nile Petroleum Corporation (NilePet). This was perhaps in the hope of increasing revenue in the short term.

    However, NilePet hasn’t been able to replace Petronas’ production logistics. This has resulted in huge challenges in restoring production to levels before the 2024 pipeline disruptions.

    A second factor is the sale of oil forward. The then finance minister said in 2022 that most of the oil production had been sold in advance until 2027. He later retracted the statement, saying instead that some oil advances were merely “spread up to 2027”. While this walk-back attempted to soften the political fallout, it reinforced wider uncertainty about how much control NilePet actually retains over the revenues formally under its authority.

    Given the limited relevance of oil revenues for the official South Sudanese budget, why the major concern about disruptions?

    There are three reasons.

    First, NilePet plays a structural role in South Sudan’s informal and often dubious hard currency circulation, which international observers would call large-scale corruption. NilePet’s accounts rarely appear in any official financial accounts and are often channelled off-budget. NilePet functions as a black box within the public finance system where real money flows can only rarely be traced. Recent intentions by the president to structurally reform the company might implicitly confirm this.

    Second, there are indirect oil revenues that are important to the country’s security apparatus. This includes protection rents which come from protecting South Sudanese oil fields. This revenue never hits the budget. It pays the National Security Service either directly as salaries, or is reinvested in the considerable conglomerate of companies owned by the security service to multiply profits. Losing this revenue could destabilise the country because the funds are used to pay the salaries of the best-trained and best-equipped security service in the country.

    Third, South Sudan’s ability to attract new loans depends on the repayment of existing ones. These repayments largely depend on oil production. As the 2024-24 budget shows, South Sudan desperately needs new loans to keep even core state functions operational. Yet, funding from multilateral agencies has dwindled to small-scale loans from the African Development Bank. The International Monetary Fund has currently ended all its funding programmes.

    This is not a result of the war in Sudan. It is due to persistent concerns over insufficient financial governance in South Sudan and the state’s performance. Negotiations with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates for new loans appear to have stalled, not least because of a default in repayments to Qatar.

    These factors show that the flow of oil to Port Sudan is significant to the availability of hard currency in South Sudan’s economy. But this is in more indirect ways than the outdated claim of an 80% budgetary dependency would suggest.

    The war in Sudan has a significant yet multifaceted impact on South Sudan’s economic health. But Juba’s biggest challenges are internal.

    South Sudan’s economy over the last six years has been mainly dependent on international loans coming in – a flow which has now dried up, resulting in a severe economic crisis unprecedented in the young country’s history.

    – Is Sudan’s war the reason for South Sudan’s economic crisis? What’s really going on with oil revenue
    – https://theconversation.com/is-sudans-war-the-reason-for-south-sudans-economic-crisis-whats-really-going-on-with-oil-revenue-257375

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Global: Is Sudan’s war the reason for South Sudan’s economic crisis? What’s really going on with oil revenue

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jan Pospisil, Associate Professor at the Centre for Peace and Security, Coventry University

    The civil war in Sudan between the Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, which began in April 2023, has had an impact on its neighbours. One of the most keenly affected countries is South Sudan, which became an independent state in 2011 and went on to endure its own civil war. This ended in 2018 with a tenuous peace agreement.

    The impact of the Sudanese war on South Sudan, however, isn’t a straightforward spillover catastrophe. The picture is more nuanced, and this is most clearly seen in South Sudan’s oil economy. Jan Pospisil, who has studied the dynamics in Sudan and South Sudan, explains.

    What is the current status of oil exports from South Sudan through Sudan?

    Landlocked South Sudan is reliant on its neighbour to the north to transport oil from its fields to the international market. Crude oil is transported via pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

    However, recent drone strikes on Port Sudan carried out by the Rapid Support Forces targeted power plants that supply electricity to pumping stations along Sudan’s critical oil pipelines.

    Soon after, the Sudanese army formally notified South Sudan that it would have to halt exports. Following hectic negotiations, the South Sudanese government released a statement that the stoppage could be prevented.

    This back and forth has reopened the pressing question of the impact of Sudan’s war on South Sudan’s economy and, in particular, the role of crude oil.

    Assessments of the impact of Sudan’s war on South Sudan suggest the worst: oil revenues would account for 80% of South Sudan’s budget and 90% of its fiscal revenue.

    This informs the International Monetary Fund’s warnings of looming economic collapse in case of a breakdown of oil exports. The predominant view is that a shutdown of the oil pipeline through Sudan would lead to a collapse of dollar inflows to South Sudan, triggering a severe economic crisis.

    However, South Sudan’s 2024-25 budget suggests a high reliance on non-oil revenue.

    In fact, government oil revenues for 2024-25 are based on a volume of only around 16,000 barrels per day. This is the share of total production of about 130,000 barrels per day controlled by South Sudan. Attempts to increase production to pre-war levels of up to 400,000 barrels failed. The substantial drop in production is explained by a decline in the quality of South Sudan’s oil wells, especially in Paloch in the north-east’s Upper Nile State, and Unity State in the north-central region.

    South Sudan additionally lacks the operational capacity to extract the oil it has in the ground.

    The 2024-25 budget projects a hefty fiscal deficit. The revenues projected will cover only about half of total planned state spending. Oil and non-oil revenues – which mainly include tax income from international NGOs and businesses – each account for about half of the revenue that’s expected to come in.

    Oil income has to account for debt (capital and interest) repayments on loans, as well as pipeline transport fees paid to Sudan. This means that even the optimistically assessed net contributions of oil revenue would only pay for 16% of planned government spending. South Sudan remains with a hefty deficit.

    What are the challenges South Sudan is facing in growing oil revenues?

    First, Petronas, a Malaysian multinational oil and gas company, withdrew from South Sudan in August 2024 after three decades.

    It left behind substantial challenges, including an arbitration process worth more US$1 billion. This followed the government preventing Petronas from selling its shares to the British-Nigerian group Savannah Energy.

    As a short-term solution, South Sudan de facto nationalised Petronas’ shares. It did this by transferring the shares to the state’s oil and gas company, Nile Petroleum Corporation (NilePet). This was perhaps in the hope of increasing revenue in the short term.

    However, NilePet hasn’t been able to replace Petronas’ production logistics. This has resulted in huge challenges in restoring production to levels before the 2024 pipeline disruptions.

    A second factor is the sale of oil forward. The then finance minister said in 2022 that most of the oil production had been sold in advance until 2027. He later retracted the statement, saying instead that some oil advances were merely “spread up to 2027”. While this walk-back attempted to soften the political fallout, it reinforced wider uncertainty about how much control NilePet actually retains over the revenues formally under its authority.

    Given the limited relevance of oil revenues for the official South Sudanese budget, why the major concern about disruptions?

    There are three reasons.

    First, NilePet plays a structural role in South Sudan’s informal and often dubious hard currency circulation, which international observers would call large-scale corruption. NilePet’s accounts rarely appear in any official financial accounts and are often channelled off-budget. NilePet functions as a black box within the public finance system where real money flows can only rarely be traced. Recent intentions by the president to structurally reform the company might implicitly confirm this.

    Second, there are indirect oil revenues that are important to the country’s security apparatus. This includes protection rents which come from protecting South Sudanese oil fields. This revenue never hits the budget. It pays the National Security Service either directly as salaries, or is reinvested in the considerable conglomerate of companies owned by the security service to multiply profits. Losing this revenue could destabilise the country because the funds are used to pay the salaries of the best-trained and best-equipped security service in the country.

    Third, South Sudan’s ability to attract new loans depends on the repayment of existing ones. These repayments largely depend on oil production. As the 2024-24 budget shows, South Sudan desperately needs new loans to keep even core state functions operational. Yet, funding from multilateral agencies has dwindled to small-scale loans from the African Development Bank. The International Monetary Fund has currently ended all its funding programmes.

    This is not a result of the war in Sudan. It is due to persistent concerns over insufficient financial governance in South Sudan and the state’s performance. Negotiations with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates for new loans appear to have stalled, not least because of a default in repayments to Qatar.

    These factors show that the flow of oil to Port Sudan is significant to the availability of hard currency in South Sudan’s economy. But this is in more indirect ways than the outdated claim of an 80% budgetary dependency would suggest.

    The war in Sudan has a significant yet multifaceted impact on South Sudan’s economic health. But Juba’s biggest challenges are internal.

    South Sudan’s economy over the last six years has been mainly dependent on international loans coming in – a flow which has now dried up, resulting in a severe economic crisis unprecedented in the young country’s history.

    Jan Pospisil receives funding from the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform (PeaceRep), funded by UK International Development from the UK government. However, the views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies. Any use of this work should acknowledge the authors and the Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform.

    ref. Is Sudan’s war the reason for South Sudan’s economic crisis? What’s really going on with oil revenue – https://theconversation.com/is-sudans-war-the-reason-for-south-sudans-economic-crisis-whats-really-going-on-with-oil-revenue-257375

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Video: Middle East Peace at Risk: UN Calls for Bold Action & Two-State Solution | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Sigrid Kaag said, “Since the resumption of hostilities in Gaza, the already horrific existence of civilians has only sunk further into the abyss. This is manmade.”

    During a briefing to the Security Council today (28 May) Kaag confirmed that Israel had approved a limited resumption of aid entry on 18 May. But she stressed that deliveries remain woefully inadequate. “Since then, very limited numbers of goods have entered and have been distributed by the United Nations and its partners. But this is comparable to a lifeboat after the ship has sunk.”

    Emphasizing the need for a political solution, Kaag said, “There can however be no sustainable peace in the Middle East without a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There are no shortcuts. The two-State solution is on life support; reviving it requires collective action.”

    Feroze Sidhwa, a trauma surgeon, shared the anguish of health workers on the ground. “My Palestinian friends, mostly healthcare workers, no longer speak of resilience or even survival,” he said. “Parents memorize their children’s clothing in case they must identify their remains.”

    Sidhwa also said, “We strongly and explicitly reject the weaponization and politicization of aid embodied by the ‘Gaza Humanitarian Foundation,’” he said, citing the resignation of its executive director over alleged failures to uphold humanitarian principles.

    U.S. envoy John Kelley reaffirmed Washington’s support for Israel, “Every day Hamas demonstrates its lack of regard for the Palestinians it claims to represent.” He also said that Hamas is diverting aid and violently suppressing dissent, adding, “The United States fully stands behind Israel and its right to defend itself.”

    Riyad Mansour, Permanent Observer to the United Nations, Palestine said, “Israel wants to appear as allowing aid in, while continuing to make sure life cannot actually be sustained in Gaza.”

    Before the Security Council meeting Israel’s Ambassador Danny Danon spoke to members of press and pushed back against international criticism. “We are not bombing the people of Gaza. We are fighting a terrorist organization,” he said.

    “We have two goals in this war,” Danon added. “We will not finish the war leaving behind 58 people. Their families are waiting for them, and we are committed to finish this war by making sure the hostages are back, and Hamas is out of the game.”

    After the Security Council meeting, Sigrid Kaag said to reporters, “Privatization of aid and the weaponization of aid is a very dangerous precedent. It doesn’t only speak to the situation, potentially in Gaza, but worldwide. And we have to look at the things we allow, don’t allow or speak out against or discourage. It’s not only relevant to the here and the now, it is relevant to so many other conflict situations. So, I would say support the UN.”

    For all official languages, please visit: https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1h/k1h6akrxuo

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odLO9KVKVnc

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Video: International Day of Peacekeepers, Middle East & other topics- Daily Press Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    International Day Of UN Peacekeepers
    Middle East
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Unrwa
    Yemen
    Sudan
    Haiti
    Ukraine
    Global Climate Predictions
    Global Employment Growth

    INTERNATIONAL DAY OF UN PEACEKEEPERS
    Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, who be the guest on Thursday to brief reporters on the International Day of Peacekeepers.
    As part of that at 2:45pm tomorrow, the Secretary-General will lay a wreath to honour the more than 4,400 United Nations peacekeepers who have given their lives in the line of duty since 1948. He will also preside over a ceremony in the Trusteeship Council, during which the Dag Hammarskjöld Medals will be awarded posthumously to 57 military, police, and civilian peacekeepers, who lost their lives serving under the flag of the United Nations last year.
    At 3 p.m., the Secretary-General will present awards to the 2024 Military Gender Advocate of the Year. That is Squadron Leader Sharon Mwinsote Syme of Ghana and he will also present an award to the UN Woman Police Officer of the Year, and that is Superintendent Zainab Gbla of Sierra Leone.
    Both serve with the peacekeeping mission in Abyei.

    MIDDLE EAST
    Sigrid Kaag, the acting UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, briefed the Security Council this morning, telling Council members that the two-State solution is on life support and reviving it requires decisive action.
    She said the upcoming high-level international conference in June, co-chaired by France and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, must not be another rhetorical exercise and instead must launch a concrete path towards ending the occupation and realizing the two-State solution based on international law, UN resolutions and previous agreements.
    Ms. Kaag warned that the entire population of Gaza is facing the risk of famine. As the Secretary-General has said, families are being starved and denied the very basics.
    She added that while Gaza rightly captures the world’s attention, the West Bank is on a dangerous trajectory. Developments are best described as accelerating de facto annexation through settlement expansion, through land seizures, and through settler violence. If not reversed, Ms. Kaag said, these will make the two-State solution physically impossible.
    Ms. Kaag will also be speaking to you after the Council session has ended. We are advised that there will likely not be closed consultations afterwards and we will let you know when she is there.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=28%20May%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VpI-lzCyvrQ

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China’s UN envoy calls for long-term ceasefire in Gaza

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    UNITED NATIONS, May 29 (Xinhua) — China’s permanent representative to the United Nations Fu Cong on Wednesday called for a long-term ceasefire and an end to the humanitarian disaster in the Gaza Strip.

    According to him, since May 16, Israel has continued to intensify its military operation in Gaza, which in the last two weeks alone has resulted in the complete destruction of densely populated areas and the death of more than 1,000 people.

    Questions have been repeatedly asked about when this conflict will end, whether any means are allowed in it, and whether Palestinians will have to lose their homes again, Fu Cong noted. “In the face of such questions, China firmly states that a long-term ceasefire in Gaza is urgent, and Israel must immediately stop all military operations,” the diplomat emphasized.

    “Alleviating the humanitarian catastrophe is a top priority. Israel must lift the blockade, fully restore humanitarian access, and support the UN and other international humanitarian organizations in their relief efforts,” the Permanent Representative said.

    The Gaza Strip and the West Bank are integral parts of the State of Palestine, he stressed, adding that the international community must resolutely oppose any attempts to annex these territories and forcibly displace the population of Gaza.

    The United States, as a country with significant influence on the parties involved, should act fairly and responsibly and take effective and decisive steps, Fu Cong said. The UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, he noted, stressing that China supports the Security Council in taking effective measures to promote a lasting ceasefire and alleviate the humanitarian disaster.

    The implementation of the “two states for two peoples” plan is the only viable way to resolve the Palestinian issue, the diplomat said. The international community should step up efforts to advance the political settlement process based on the principle of coexistence of two states, he noted.

    Fu Cong said China will continue to work with the international community to end the fighting in Gaza, alleviate the humanitarian disaster, achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Palestinian issue, and restore peace and stability in the Middle East. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Iran condemns Israeli airstrikes on Sana’a International Airport

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    TEHRAN, May 29 (Xinhua) — Iran strongly condemns Israel’s airstrikes on Sana’a International Airport, the country’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement on Wednesday.

    The ministry’s spokesman, Esmail Baghaei, called the attacks another sign of Israel’s “cruelty and hostility toward the Muslim peoples of Yemen and the West Asian region.”

    According to the Houthi-controlled Al-Masirah TV channel, Israel carried out four strikes on the Sana’a airport runway and a Yemenia Airlines plane on Wednesday morning, destroying the last remaining commercial aircraft of the airline in Yemen.

    E. Bagai said that the Israeli strikes are aimed at “preventing the delivery of Yemeni pilgrims to the city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia for the upcoming Hajj, and are a major crime.” He called on the international community, especially the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), to immediately pay serious attention to the situation.

    The diplomat also condemned Israel’s “repeated aggressive actions” against Yemen’s economic infrastructure and civilian targets, including ports, airports and food warehouses. He called the attacks “clear examples of war crimes and crimes against humanity.”

    E. Bagai stressed that confronting Israel’s “violations and crimes” in the occupied Palestinian territories and in relation to other countries in the region is the legal and moral responsibility of all West Asian states. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News