Category: Middle East

  • MIL-OSI Economics: DG Okonjo-Iweala: MC14 must deliver outcomes on WTO reform

    Source: World Trade Organization

    Reporting to the meeting in her capacity as Chair of the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC), the Director-General said that in recent meetings she had with leaders and ministers in Japan and the Republic of Korea, the issue of WTO reform “was front and centre” of the discussions.

    “Prime Minister Ishiba (of Japan) and his ministers of trade, foreign affairs and finance, along with virtually every APEC minister that I met in Jeju, have bought into the idea that we must not waste a crisis, and that we need deep and thorough reform of the WTO if it is to remain relevant,” DG Okonjo-Iweala said.

    “For a successful MC14, we must act here in Geneva to deliver a package of reform proposals for ministers to consider and bless at MC14,” she added. “Nothing short of this can reposition this organization in the way and form needed.”

    The Director-General met with Prime Minister Ishiba and other senior Japanese government officials in Tokyo on 13 May and then attended a meeting of trade ministers from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Jeju, Republic of Korea, on 15-16 May.

    At their 12th Ministerial Conference in 2022, WTO members for the first time agreed to undertake a comprehensive review of the WTO’s functions in order to ensure the organization is capable of responding more effectively to both the challenges facing the multilateral trading system and the opportunities provided by contemporary developments in global trade.

    The Director-General said that while the ministers she met “made clear they value the system, they also admitted it cannot continue the way it is.”

    “Members keep sweeping things under the carpet and not solving problems,” she said. “I think what has brought us here is the inability to solve problems when they occur, and this has led to unilateral actions, instead of a cooperative approach to solve these problems.”

    “It has taken time for members to admit that things are not working as well as they should, and that they want solutions,” she continued.

    The Director-General said she was pleased work is continuing on possible deliverables for MC14, including further work on fisheries subsidies, agriculture, the Investment Facilitation for Development initiative, electronic commerce, and issues pertaining to least developed countries (LDCs).  Members will have a chance to assess progress on these issues at the next TNC meeting in July and decide later which packages are ready to take forward to MC14 for decision. 

    She welcomed the recent progress made on member acceptances of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies, noting that 99 members have now accepted the Agreement with only 12 more needed to bring it into force.

    Twenty-six delegations took the floor after the Director-General’s intervention, some of them speaking on behalf of groups of members.  Many members commented on a suggested road map for MC14 prepared by the WTO Secretariat and highlighted issues of interest, including WTO reform, new disciplines on fisheries subsidies, progress on agriculture, the e-commerce moratorium, and industrial policy, among others.

    General Council Chair to initiate MC14 consultations

    Under a separate agenda item, the General Council Chair, Ambassador Saqer Abdullah Almoqbel (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), noted that discussions he had with delegations over the past weeks revealed various calls to proceed with work in three key areas, namely: WTO reform; dispute settlement reform; and the process towards preparing a possible MC14 outcome document.

    With MC14 taking place in 10 months, “time is not on our side,” he told members.  “Accordingly, immediately after this General Council meeting, I intend to consult interested delegations on how to take forward work in each of these areas.” 

    Investment facilitation for development

    On the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) initiative, members were once again unable to reach consensus on the request supported by 126 members to incorporate the IFD Agreement under Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO. This marked the eighth time the proposal has been submitted to members for adoption.

    Speaking on behalf of the 126 co-sponsors, the Republic of Korea underlined the urgent need for incorporating the Agreement into the WTO framework in order to help members attract investment, in particular developing and least developed country members. IFD Agreement participants are also actively engaging with non-participating members to build understanding and highlight the Agreement’s benefit, the Republic of Korea said.

    Three members reiterated their objections to incorporating the IFD Agreement into the WTO multilateral framework.

    Current trade tensions

    On behalf of 47 members, Singapore and Switzerland introduced a statement in support of the rules-based multilateral trading system. The statement cites the value and achievements of the WTO since it was established in 1995, underlining how the organization has contributed to the economic development of both developed and developing members by promoting trade liberalization and facilitating economic integration, fostering stability, predictability and consumers’ trust while preserving incentives for innovation. The WTO’s support for developing economies, including LDCs, has lifted millions out of poverty, the co-sponsors said.

    China introduced its communication regarding heightened trade turbulence and responses from the WTO.  Faced with the current situation of heightened trade turbulence, China said, members should safeguard the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core. China proposed a “Stability, Development and Reform” (SDR) approach for the WTO and said it stands ready to work with all parties to safeguard the WTO rules system and inject more certainty and predictability into the global economy.

    The European Union introduced an item on fragmentation of global trade through tariffs and the global costs. The EU said the item was submitted in response to the economic and trade uncertainty created by recent tariff actions. The EU underlined its support for a rules-based multilateral trading system and highlighted the importance of ongoing dialogue on tariffs to assess impacts, monitor trade patterns, and consider systemic effects.

    WTO retreat on sustainable agriculture

    Brazil expressed its appreciation for the recent WTO retreat on sustainable agriculture and the broad engagement across regions and constituencies. It highlighted trends in agriculture production globally, including towards increased productivity and the search for greater resilience and sustainability.  Brazil said it saw value in further discussing this topic in a forward-looking manner as a conversational WTO exercise.

    Thirty-six delegations took the floor to comment.

    Electronic commerce

    Japan, on behalf of the co-sponsors of the Agreement on Electronic Commerce, informed members of the co-sponsors’ recent efforts to gather members’ support for incorporation of the Agreement into the WTO multilateral framework. Japan also reported that the co-sponsors are undertaking work to advance implementation of the Agreement, including a needs assessment survey to better understand priorities for implementation support.

    Several members reiterated their concerns about the Agreement and their objections to its incorporation into the WTO multilateral framework.

    Next meeting

    The next meeting of the General Council is tentatively scheduled for 22-23 July.

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    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Creative industry figures urge Starmer to act against Gaza genocide- ‘you know what is happening’

    Source: Amnesty International –

    116 leading UK and Irish creatives have urged Keir Starmer to act over Israel’s escalating atrocities in Gaza, criticising UK arms exports, settlement trade, and lack of ICC support – open letter 

    Riz Ahmed, Dame Harriet Walker, Maxine Peake, Nish Kumar, Paloma Faith and others condemn UK government inaction on Gaza 

    The Prime Minister must ‘stand up for justice and human rights’ and ‘words are no longer enough; we need to see action’ – Creatives 

    Artists gather outside Downing Street to hold placards urging the PM to act to stop the genocide and human rights abuses in Gaza 

    Over 100 leading voices from across the UK and Ireland’s film, television, and creative industries including Riz Ahmed, Dame Harriet Walker, Maxine Peake, Nish Kumar, Paloma Faith, Juliet Stevenson and many more have united to call on Prime Minister Keir Starmer to take urgent action in response to Israel’s escalating atrocities in Gaza and the wider Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT).   

    In a public letter, the group condemn “all attacks on civilians” but emphasise that as well as Israel’s decades-long military occupation, expansion of illegal settlements, and system of apartheid, Israel is committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza, as described by Amnesty International in its report “You feel Like You Are Subhuman”.  

    “We are deeply troubled by your lack of meaningful action to help deter Israel’s horrifying and calculated violations of Palestinian rights,” the letter states to the Prime Minister. 

    Since October 2023, more than 20,000 children have reportedly been killed in Gaza. The group point to the use of 2,000lb bombs dropped from F-35 fighter jets – supplied with UK-made components – as part of a devastating campaign that includes siege tactics blocking access to food, water, electricity, and medicine for over two million civilians. 

    “You know what is happening,” they write to the Prime Minister, and state “your Government is failing to fulfil its obligation to prevent the ongoing genocide in Gaza.” 

    The letter also highlights a stark double standard in UK policy: banning imports from Russian-occupied Crimea, while allowing trade with Israeli settlements in the illegally Occupied Palestinian Territory. The International Court of Justice has made clear that countries must not support illegal occupations – including through trade.

    In addition to arms and trade, the group call on the UK government to fully support the International Criminal Court’s investigation into alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in the region. 

    Their demands include: 

    • An immediate suspension of all UK arms exports to Israel 
    • A ban on trade with illegal Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
    • Compliance with international legal rulings, including those of the ICJ and ICC 

    The group implores the Prime Minister “to stand up for justice and human rights” and that “words are no longer enough; we need to see action”. 

    Artists gather outside Downing Street to deliver the letter and hold placards urging the PM to act to stop Israel’s genocide and human rights abuses in Gaza. 

    The artists held placards bearing messages from residents of Gaza that capture the urgency and human toll of the crisis: 

    • “I don’t want my child to die hungry” – Gaza Resident, Occupied Gaza 
    • “You may send your child to bring water only for him to return in a body bag” – Gaza Resident, Occupied Gaza 

    These statements are a stark reminder of the daily reality for civilians under Israel’s illegal blockade.  

    About the Signatories 

    This statement by Amnesty International has been endorsed by a coalition of UK-based professionals across the creative industries – filmmakers, actors, writers, artists and cultural leaders – who believe in the power of art, law, and collective voice in the face of injustice. 

    Ahmed Masoud; Aisling Bea; Aiysha Hart; Alan Moore; Alexander McKinnon; Alexei Sayle; Alice Roberts; Alisdair Beckett; King Amrita Acharia; Andrea Arnold Anjli; Mohindra Anneika; Rose Annie Mac; Sir Anish Kapoor CBE; Anoushka Shankar; Dr Ariel Caine; Bernadette O’Brien; Bertie Carvel; President of the Bianca Jagger Human Rights Foundation; Brian Eno; Briony Hannah; Brona C Titley; Charlotte Church; Chipo Chung; David Morrissey; Deborah Frances-White; Declan McKenna; Denise Gough; Emma D’Arcy; Esther Freud; Esther Manito; Fionn O’Loinsigh; Francesca Martinez; Frankie Boyle; Frederico Gaggio; Grace Petrie; Dame Harriet Walter; Himesh Patel; Ian Rickson; Imran Yusuf; Indeyarna Donaldson-Holness; Inua Ellams MBE; Ivor Graeme; Jackie Clune; James Acaster; Jan Pearson; Janie Dee; Jason Fleming; Jay Griffiths; Jen Brister; Jessica Fostekew; Jim Loach; John Higgs; Josie Long; Jolyon Rubinstein; Juliet Stevenson CBE; Kathy Lette; Kerry Godliman; Khalid Abdalla; Ken Loach; Lise Meyer; Lolly Adefope; Louisa Young; Love Ssegga; Mae Martin; Mahtab Hussain; Manjinder Virk; Mariam Haque; Marnie Dickens; Max Porter; Maxine Peake; Dr Michael Hrebeniak; Misan Harriman; Mystery Jets; Nadia Sawalha; Nicola Thorp; Nikesh Patel; Nikesh Shukla; Nikita Gill; Nimmi Harasgama; Nish Kumar; Paapa Essiedu; Paloma Faith; Paul Laverty; Penny Woolcock; Peter Wyer; Rebecca O’Brien; Rida Hamidou; Riz Ahmed; Robin Ince; Robin Morrissey; Roger Hartley; Roisin O’Loughlin; Ruth Lass; Salena Godden; Sam Spruell; Sara Masry; Sarah Agha; Sasha Behar; Selma Dabbagh; Shazia Mirza; Simon Rix; Sonali Bhattacharyya; Stewart Lee; Steve Coogan; Susan Lynch; Suzi Ruffell; Thomas Browne; Thomas Combes; Thusitha Jayasundera; Tobias Menzies; Dame Tracey Emin; Tracey Seaward; Vijay Mistry; Vivian Munn; Young Fathers (all members); Zainab Hassan 

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Rights of the Child Commend Romania on Deinstitutionalisation Process, Raise Questions on Corporal Punishment and Segregation in Education

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Rights of the Child today concluded its review of the combined sixth and seventh periodic reports of Romania, with Committee Experts commending the State on the deinstitutionalisation process of alternative care centres, while raising questions on the prevalence of corporal punishment and measures taken to combat segregation in education. 

    A Committee Expert said she was happy to hear about the programme for the deinstitutionalisation of alternative care centres; this was something Romania should be proud of, as well as all the foster arrangements being made, especially for children with disabilities. 

    Juliana Scerri Ferrante, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, said there seemed to be a lack of parental education programmes around corporal punishment. How could the views of the child be respected if violence was accepted as a disciplinary measure?  Could the Romanian Government take clear steps to train staff and promote child education?  Philip Jaffe, Committee Vice-Chair and Country Taskforce Member, also noted that corporal punishment appeared to remain quite widespread despite being banned in 2004.  What efforts were being made to lower the prevalence and change attitudes among parents and adults? 

    Mr. Jaffe asked what was being done to combat school segregation based on disability, special education needs, and family economic status?  What improvements were being made to increase the improvement of vocational training for older children who may be leaving the school system?  Were there any programmes which specifically targeted economically disadvantaged children?

    The delegation said Romanian legislation completely prohibited violence against children, regardless of the environment.  However, despite the legislation, which was fully aligned with United Nations Conventions, the State needed to fight against mentalities and traditions and to practically change the minds of parents and caregivers, who believed corporal punishment would discipline children better.  Awareness-raising campaigns were being conducted for parents, and mechanisms including hotlines had been developed to support children, including the helpline 119.  Authorities were obligated to launch investigations immediately concerning any allegations of violence against children. 

    The delegation said the Ministry of Education had taken steps to assist children with special educational needs, with the creation of frameworks offering them different kinds of support, based on the type of disability.  Adaptive measures had been taken for Roma children, including stimulating their participation in early education and in summer kindergartens, supporting education in their current language, and translating schoolbooks in their mother tongue, among others.  An increasing number of contracts between schools and the business sector had been recorded, including around 6,000 contracts in the school year 2023/2024. 

    Introducing the report, Helena Omna-Raicu, President of the National Authority for the Protection of Child Rights and Adoption of Romania and head of the delegation, said Romania’s path in recent years had been shaped by profound changes and emerging pressures, including the war in Ukraine and the arrival of thousands of children and families fleeing conflict.  As a neighbouring country, Romania had mobilised rapidly to provide emergency care, protection, psychosocial support, and schooling to children regardless of their nationality. 

    Ms. Omna-Raicu said Romania had made significant progress in certain areas, including in the deinstitutionalisation process.  Of the 167 residential placement centres operating in 2017, 149 had already been closed by the end of March 2025 and over 6,000 children were now benefiting from family-type alternative care.  The remaining 18 placement centres would be closed soon. 

    In closing remarks, Rinchen Chophel, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Coordinator, reiterated the Committee’s appreciation for the Government of Romania’s support to Ukrainian refugees, particularly children.  Significant progress had been made from the last reporting period to the current one, with many looking forward beyond the dialogue. 

    In her closing remarks, Ms. Omna-Raicu, expressed deep gratitude for the dialogue.  The Committee’s concerns regarding urban disparities were noted.  Romania would treat the Committee’s recommendations as an opportunity for deeper transformation. 

     

    The delegation of Romania was comprised of representatives from the National Authority for the Protection of Child Rights and Adoption; the Ministry of Education and Research; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Labour, Family, Youth and Social Security; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police; the General Inspectorate for Immigration; the National Administration of Penitentiaries; the Prosecutor’s Office; the National Health Insurance Authority; and the Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Nations Office at Geneva. 

    Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here. The programme of work of the Committee’s ninety-ninth session and other documents related to the session can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 21 May to begin its consideration of the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Qatar (CRC/C/QAT/5-6).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the combined sixth and seventh periodic reports of Romania (CRC/C/ROU/6-7).

    Presentation of Report

    HELENA OMNA-RAICU, President of the National Authority for the Protection of Child Rights and Adoption of Romania and head of the delegation, said Romania’s path in recent years had been shaped by profound changes and emerging pressures, including the war in Ukraine and the arrival of thousands of children and families fleeing conflict.  As a neighbouring country, Romania had mobilised rapidly to provide emergency care, protection, psychosocial support, and schooling to children regardless of their nationality.  The State was proud to have established the first Blue Dot in the region at the border crossing with Ukraine and launched the use of the Child Protection Information Management System Primero in only a couple of months after the onset of the refugee crisis, ensuring registration and case management for almost 40,000 refugee children.

    Several new national strategies had been developed for 2021-2027 which aimed to address child poverty and wellbeing, including the national strategy for the protection and promotion of children’s rights “protected children, safe Romania” 2023-2027, and the national strategy on social inclusion and poverty reduction 2022-2027, among others.   Romania had also adopted and begun the implementation of the child guarantee national action plan 2023-2030, which aimed to reduce the number of children at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 500,000 by 2030. Romania had seen a measurable decline in the proportion of children at risk of poverty and social exclusion from 41.5 per cent in 2022 to 33.8 per cent in 2024. 

    In April 2024, law 100/2024 was approved which included specific amendments to several laws relevant for social assistance.  The new emergency ordinance no. 96/2024, approved in June 2024 regarding the provision of humanitarian support and assistance by the Romanian State to foreign citizens or stateless persons in special situations coming from the area of the armed conflict in Ukraine, established the legal framework providing refugees with access to a wide range of key national statutory services. Another significant legislative change was enacted by amending law 272/2004 in December 2024, which now mandated the participation of children in public decision-making processes. 

    There had also been several significant programmes launched, including modernising the unique national number 119 for reporting cases of abuse, neglect, exploitation and any other form of violence against children; the development of community services for children and families to prevent separation and support the family reintegration of children from the special protection system; and the development of 200 integrated community centres and 150 daycare centres for children, among others.  Despite these advances, challenges remained, including disparities between rural and urban areas. 

    However, Romania had made significant progress in certain areas, including in the deinstitutionalisation process.  Of the 167 residential placement centres operating in 2017, 149 had already been closed by the end of March 2025 and over 6,000 children were now benefiting from family-type alternative care.  The remaining 18 placement centres would be closed soon.  The use of European Union structural funds had also supported the training of over 11,000 foster carers.  A new programme had also been introduced, aimed to scale-up integrated community-services in 2,000 marginalised rural communities, combining social assistance, health, education, and other types of social support.  Over 800 million euros of European Social Funds were planned for enhancing access to social services for the most vulnerable, including children and their families.

    The State had also expanded support for children at risk of early school leaving by using the early warning mechanism in education, of which around 50,000 participants from 6,950 institutions had completed the training programme.  Targeted policies had been developed that supported the reintegration of children who dropped out during the pandemic, and more resources were reaching schools in deprived communities.  In health, the role of community nurses and Roma health mediators had grown, and work continued to improve access to services for vulnerable groups. 

    Pilot projects on mental health for children had laid the groundwork for more systemic change, with mental health services for children and adolescents being expanded. However, challenges remained in ensuring equitable access to quality services in rural and marginalised areas, addressing shortages of specialised personnel, and improving early identification and intervention for children with developmental delays or disabilities.

    Romania was committed to reducing the number of children affected by poverty and social exclusion by at least 500,000.  The State would also pursue the complete closure of old-type residential centres, with every child in alternative care placed in family-based or community settings. Romania was committed to translating the pledges made during the first-ever global ministerial conference on ending violence against children held at the end of 2024 in Bogota, Columbia, into realities for children. 

    In education, the State aimed to increase the early childhood education enrolment rate by at least 22 per cent for children aged zero to three and at least 95 per cent for children aged four to six.  There would be a focus on improving mental health services for children and linking schools, families, and health providers more effectively, aiming to reduce preventable mortality by 20 per cent compared to 2021 levels for children of all ages.   Finally, Romania would ensure that children had a role in shaping systems through participatory budgeting, monitoring, and children and youth-led policy platforms. Romania remained committed to fully implementing the Convention and to contributing to the global effort to advance child rights everywhere.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    RINCHEN CHOPHEL, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Coordinator, said Romania had achieved a lot since the last report, which the Committee was happy about. Romania’s assistance to the Ukrainian refugees and children should be noted.  There had been significant legislative achievements, particularly the amendments to law 272.  What measures were in place to ensure effective implementation of the law?  The national strategy on social inclusion and poverty reduction 2022-2027, and the child guarantee national action plan 2023-2030 were very welcome developments.  How had these impacted on measures to promote and protect children? Had an assessment been undertaken to evaluate the impact of the national strategy. 

    While welcoming increased allocations to certain sectors, the Coordinator asked what measures were in place to develop a child-friendly budgeting process?  What was the current status of the complaints mechanism in the country for reporting all forms of abuse and violence for children? What had been done to inform children of their right to file a complaint?  Had professionals working with children been trained on receiving complaints concerning children and the Convention? 

    The establishment of the child Ombudsman in 2018 was a crucial step in the right direction, and the Government should be congratulated for that.  What was the current status of the institution?  How did it connect with children?  The Committee noted the State party’s awareness raising activities on the Convention with appreciation, including the translation of the Committee’s general comments into Romanian.  How did these efforts extend to rural children? 

    JULIANA SCERRI FERRANTE, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, asked if the national strategy for school de-segregation been adopted?  If not, then when would this occur?  What measures had been taken to address hate speech? Did the permanent committee set up in every education unit offer a complaints mechanism to children?  If not, how could children complain in schools? 

    What had been done to decrease discrimination against the Roma population?  What efforts had been made to promote the inclusion of Roma in mainstream schooling?  How was discrimination against children with disabilities tackled in education?  There was concern that Romanian law did not define valid reasons on which minor marriages could be authorised and this was left to the discretion of the authorities.  What training was provided to apply the best interests of the child? What approaches had been taken to reduce the preventable mortality of children under five years old?  What was the position of the Romanian Government on the proposed amendment to law 272 regarding lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex children?

    There seemed to be a lack of parental education programmes around corporal punishment. How could the views of the child be respected if violence was accepted as a disciplinary measure?  Could the Romanian Government take clear steps to train staff and promote child education?  How were child labour laws enforced?  How would the Romanian Government establish a child participation mechanism?  Were refugee and asylum-seeking children involved in decisions which affected them? Were children provided information on their rights? 

    What measures were being taken to strengthen the capacity of the social welfare services? How were children with disabilities prioritised in reform measures?  What was being done to combat the illicit transfer of children abroad?  Had bilateral agreements been conducted in this regard?  Was the Romanian Government carrying out measures to understand the impact of prison on children?  How were they supported when their parents were incarcerated?  What support was available for young people leaving institutional care? 

    SOPHIE KILADZE, Committee Chair and Country Taskforce Member, said the adoption of law 105/22 providing for automatic birth registration should be considered as positive.  Could more information be provided about how the law worked in practice?  Were there any plans to introduce a statelessness determination procedure?  Was data on statelessness which concerned children disaggregated?  What measures were in place to protect children from excessive screen use?  How did Romania deal with artificial intelligence as a European Union member? Romania had one of the lowest levels of digital skills in the European Union; what measures were being undertaken to promote digital literacy among children, as well as parents? 

    PHILIP JAFFE, Committee Vice-Chair and Country Taskforce Member, said it was wonderful that strong pledges had been made at the global ministerial conference on ending violence against children in Bogota.  How was Romania implementing its mission as a pathfinding global alliance country?  It seemed Romanian children were in need of protection against high levels of physical and sexual violence.  One of the pledges made in Bogota was to conduct a prevalence study on sexual abuse; had the State moved forward with this study?  Were there dedicated teams drawing up the comprehensive framework and strategy which had been promised?  One pledge had been to enhance children’s participation regarding issues of violence.  What efforts had the Government made to ensure that there was a clear public understanding that all forms of violence against children needed to be reported? 

    Corporal punishment appeared to remain quite widespread despite being banned in 2004. What efforts were made to lower the prevalence and change attitudes among parents and adults?  It was encouraging that Romania had been one of 40 countries to recently join a statement of the Human Rights Council, expressing children’s right to protection from corporal punishment.  How was bullying and cyber bullying being addressed at all levels of legislative policy?  Could more information about the child helplines be provided? 

    Was it true that around seven to eight per cent of girls in Romania were married before the age of 18, with that percentage rising to around 20 per cent in the Roma community? What was being done in response to this? Was it true that charges had been dropped against a 17-year-old boy who entered into a non-formal marriage with an 11-year-old girl?  What policy was in practice in the health sector regarding surgical interventions and intersex children?  What were the guidelines to protect their bodily integrity until these children were capable of providing consent? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the law on child protection now included clear provisions which made it compulsory for public administrative bodies to involve children in consultations regarding issues which concerned them.  The national strategy on children’s rights was recently adopted and another national action plan was elaborated; these plans were complimentary. This was a comprehensive package which would help the Government to better implement all necessary measures. An assessment of the national strategy had been undertaken.  The State was now piloting a system which would indicate how to establish a model of financing where children would be considered as a different group that would benefit from a different budget. 

    The national programme for schooling in Romania ensured children received food support at schools to increase the enrolment rate and participation.  School supplies were also provided for all school grades. Two hundred euros were provided for the purchase of technology, and remedial lessons were provided to students coming from disadvantaged communities.  Recently, the scholarship system had been extended to encompass more disadvantaged groups. 

    Funds allocated to primary medical care had registered a continuous annual increase.  Just last year, the fund allocated to primary care increased by 24 per cent.  The national observatory was a big achievement for Romania and aimed to identify the children most at risk of being separated from their families, based on indicators.  Training was being conducted on the use of the observatory to ensure the data provided was reliable.   

    The hearing of minors in justice proceedings took place in special rooms, and a psychologist was always required to be present.  The new national strategy for the development of the judicial system provided for another 10 hearing rooms across the country.  There were specially designated prosecutors to handle cases involving minors.  The child Ombudsman was fully operational and cooperated with all institutions.  It had a functioning complaints mechanism.  If an incident was notified to the Ombudsman, an investigation started, which concluded with a set of recommendations sent to the institution responsible to correct the situation.  

    Civil society representatives were part of the consultative groups established at the national level.  A methodology had been issued and piloted regarding identifying and banning segregation within the educational sector.  The measures focused on ensuring an inclusive education.  Any kind of discrimination on criteria such as ethnicity, religion or sex was completely forbidden within the educational system.  Specific places in high schools were allocated for Roma students and students with disabilities.  To ensure access to high quality education, educational services had been developed starting from early education to prevent early dropout and absenteeism.     

    A set of programmes had been introduced, including a monthly allowance for children up to the age of 18, as well as parental leave.  There was also a minimum income support which supported families with children. Emergency ordinance no.96 was developed specifically for children from Ukraine and their families. 

    There was a dedicated intergovernmental group which addressed the subject of forced marriage, with the aim of drafting legislative projects in this regard.  Concerning infant mortality and the number of deaths under one year of age, a regionalised system of care had been introduced to ensure each neonate was born in a medical unit which could provide the services necessary for their care, thereby reducing infant mortality.  An important national programme was in place which contained around 15 interventions, established in partnership with the United Nations Children’s Fund.  Another programme provided 900 neonatal incubators around the country. 

    A significant number of services had been established to help families in vulnerable situations. A special programme was launched last year on the minimum inclusion income, which focused on how to assist parents within the labour market.  The State was aware of a lack of social assistance in rural areas, which was where the most vulnerable communities lived.  Interventions were directed, including food packages, and local administrative capacities would be developed. 

    A programme had been developed which aimed to establish hearing rooms for children in courts, and 29 hearing rooms were completed in April 2024.  The rooms were used by the Prosecutors and police officers when they had victims who were minors.  The rooms were child-friendly and specially designed with toys.  The child did not see the other people participating in the hearing.  A new strategy adopted in 2025 provided for the need for an additional 10 hearing rooms in the near future. 

    All social services were functioning based on a set of minimum quality standards, which were verified by the national agency for social inspection.   With the United Nations Children’s Fund, Romania was piloting a project which would identify and train foster families to care specifically for children with disabilities.  A child entering the special protection system was prioritised to be reintegrated in a family environment.  Adoption was considered the best solution in this regard, and this could only be decided by a court.  Priority was offered to domestic adoption, but international adoption could be considered after one year. 

    Amendments had been made to allow special spaces for visits in prison with children.  Such spaces were now available in all prison facilities within the Romanian penitentiary system.  There were cooperation protocols in place with the United Nations Children’s Fund and Save the Children which supported parents to develop their parental skills and improve their relationship with their children. The State was aware of the need to develop programmes which addressed the needs of children and adults and improved the relationship within the family.

    The Ministry of Education aimed to develop digital competencies among students and parents. During the pandemic, all students were provided with laptops and digital devices to keep up with the educational process.  In a new initiative launched in partnership with Microsoft, the Ministry of Education had announced the development of a project concerning artificial intelligence for increasing the school performance of students.  A project was also being implemented aimed at improving the digital skills of civil servants. 

    Romania had a dedicated national child help line.  It was toll-free and operational 24/7.  Those operating the calls were specialised counsellors who could refer the cases to the relevant authorities.  Another helpline just referred cases to social services.  The 119 helpline was a recent development, operational from any place in Romania and accessible to children and adults.  After the first year, it had been well received and was being regularly used to inform on any situation concerning a child. 

    Rape of a minor and sexual assault against a minor had been introduced as acts within the Criminal Code.  Rape committed by an adult against a minor under the age of 18 was punished by a prison sentence of between seven to 12 years.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    PHILIP JAFFE, Committee Vice-Chair and Country Taskforce Member, said one in 20 people in Romania held a disability certificate, with around 80,000 being children. What were the difficulties faced by certain groups of children to receive this certificate, including rural children?  Were there any awareness-raising campaigns for rural minorities and poor families regarding their entitlement to services?  Could more information be provided about Romania’s strategy for persons with disabilities?  How were the number and expertise of professionals being scaled up?  To what degree had the State embraced a human-rights approach to disability, as opposed to a medical model of disability?  How many children were still left in institutions? When would such institutions all be closed? 

    There were two recent laws on pre-university education and higher education; could more information be provided about the implementation of these laws?  What was the level of gross domestic product dedicated to education in Romania?  Was there a direct pipeline to hear about the concerns of children within the education system and were these concerns taken seriously?  What was being done to combat school segregation based on disability, special education needs, and family economic status?  Figures suggested that 40 per cent of children with disabilities had limited access to education.  What steps were being made to improve education for children under the age of three? What improvements were being made to increase the improvement of vocational training for older children who may be leaving the school system?  Were there any programmes which specifically targeted economically disadvantaged children?  What was the mission of the Ministry of Youth? 

    SOPHIE KILADZE, Committee Chair and Country Taskforce Member, asked if sufficient resources were dedicated to the capacity building of medical personnel? Did all children have access to health care, including health insurance?  How were vaccinations promoted in the country?  How was breast feeding promoted?  Child obesity was an issue of concern; how was this combatted? Was there a hot meals programme? 

    Mental health was a very important issue.  Was data on mental health being disaggregated, including on suicide?  Was there a comprehensive strategy and action plan regarding the issue of mental health?  Were quality mental health services available in rural and remote areas? According to alarming information, the country had the highest number of adolescent mothers across the European Union. What steps would the State undertake to prevent adolescent pregnancies and subsequent abortions?  Would Romania make reproductive education part of the curriculum? 

    What measures were in place to address drugs or substance abuse?  Were there treatments available for children?  Romania had made substantial efforts for Ukrainian children and other groups of refugees.  How would the State integrate these children long-term?  Were there delays in the enrolment of refugee children and their families into the social services system?  Would amendments be considered in the asylum law to end the detention of families at the legislative level?  Did unaccompanied migrant children have access to services, including psychosocial support and disability services?  Were there any barriers which could hinder access to education? 

    What measures were being undertaken to end child labour, including begging?  What was being done to assist children in street situations?  How were perpetrators investigated and brought to justice?  Were there quality services for child victims of trafficking in place? Was the system of child justice established across the country?  Were adequate financial resources allocated to it?  Was free legal aid available to children in conflict with the law?  Was the detention of children used only as a last resort?  If yes, did it comply with international standards? 

    RINCHEN CHOPHEL, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Coordinator, said one in five children were affected by severe material and social deprivation, which was concerning.  What was the reality on the ground?  The minimum social assistance package had been introduced; could more information be provided on it?  Romania was increasingly vulnerable to droughts, heatwaves, floods and landslides, and it was also grappling with water pollution.  How had the national strategies pertaining to climate change helped to address the challenges of the environment and climate change in the country? What measures were being adopted to take into account children’s needs and views in the development of specific policies, including disaster-preparedness plans?  Were child rights impact assessments carried out when dealing with the business sector? 

    A Committee Expert asked what the national coverage of vaccinations was in the country?  Romania had an epidemic of measles; how did the population react to vaccinations?  How was confidence being built in vaccines?  Were people familiar with the law on rape?  What happened once the 30-day limit for registering births had elapsed? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    Romanian legislation completely prohibited violence against children, regardless of the environment.  However, despite the legislation, which was fully aligned with United Nations Conventions, the State needed to fight against mentalities and traditions and to practically change the minds of parents and caregivers, who believed corporal punishment would discipline children better.  Awareness-raising campaigns were being conducted for parents, and mechanisms including hotlines had been developed to support children, including the helpline 119. 

    Authorities were obligated to launch investigations immediately concerning any allegations of violence against children.  Romania was committed to continuing these efforts and to changing social norms and mentalities.  The numbers of cases of violence against children was increasing, which meant people were becoming more aware of the issue and reporting it. 

    Since 2016, the methodology applied in Romania clearly distinguished between the concept of disability and special education needs.  In Romania, the deinstitutionalisation process was one of the most important commitments of the Government, and the process was now concluding. Currently, out of the 167 residential centres operating in 2017, 149 had already been closed, and more than 6,000 children were benefiting from alternative care.  The legal framework stated that no placement centre could operate without the approved closure plan.  The deinstitutionalisation process also involved finding better alternative and family-based care for children.   Only 18 placement centres remained in the process of being closed, and by 2026 no such centre would be operating in Romania.  The State was still aiming to find family-style solutions for children with disabilities, and a project was being developed with the United Nations Children’s Fund to this end.

    If a birth was declared after the 30-day deadline but less than one year after the birth, the birth certificate could be issued based on approval from the mayor.  If the birth declaration was made more than one year after the birth, the certificate needed to be approved by the mayor and other administrative bodies. 

    More than 2.8 million students were enrolled in the 2023/2024 school year in Romania.  For high school, there had been a significant decrease in dropouts from 2.5 per cent in 2017 to 0.8 per cent in 2024. Around 4.5 per cent of the budget was allocated to education.  The Ministry of Education had taken steps to assist children with special educational needs, with the creation of frameworks offering them different kinds of support, based on the type of disability.  For students with temporary special needs, the law of education presented special measures, including the implementation of schooling hospitals, or schooling at home for those who were required to be in hospital or at home for medical reasons. 

    Adaptive measures had been taken for Roma children, including stimulating their participation in early education and in summer kindergartens, supporting education in their current language, and translating schoolbooks in their mother tongue, among others.  More than 66,000 teachers had been trained in digital and multimedia use.  An increasing number of contracts between schools and the business sector had been recorded, around 6,000 contracts in the school year 2023/2024.  Most teachers had been trained to create open educational resources.  Significant funds had been allocated to modernising rest room facilities in schools. 

    Any student could submit complaints of discrimination via an established framework.  Students benefitted from representation in the school system through several platforms.  The national strategy for sustainable development issued the methodology of the “green week programme”, which contributed to preschoolers and students’ competence in understanding basic concepts of climate change, to initiate individual and protective action to protect the environment.  Teachers were obliged to obtain 90 transferrable professional credits every five years, through attending courses offered by Romanian training houses.

    In recent years, infant mortality had remained relatively stable in Romania.  From 2023 to 2024, the number of doctors treating children increased by five per cent.  Regarding children’s access to medical services, all children were insured in Romania and benefitted from basic medical services across all sectors of health care.  The national health insurance fund also reimbursed certain services.  The Ministry of Health had launched a vaccination campaign in partnership with the Red Cross, to raise awareness of parents; this had been accompanied by a “catch-up” vaccination schedule, resulting in 1,500 children being vaccinated.  A protocol had been signed with the Orthodox Church to establish an active partnership to create a framework for anyone facing a possible cancer diagnosis, offering support.   

    World Breastfeeding Week was celebrated in August each year, as breastfeeding remained one of the most effective ways to provide children with the best start in life. Breast feeding recommendations had been developed with partners, including the World Health Organization, and were relayed to medical practitioners at the local level.  Around 200 integrated community centres would be restructured, elevated and equipped.  A television broadcast had been created to promote the importance of breastfeeding in the first six months of a child’s life.   

    Information and education campaigns had been carried out for children, parents and teachers about the benefits of a healthy diet and the consequences of unhealthy eating. Around 1,000 people had benefited from the campaign.  Substance abuse could be detected by family doctors and psychological services could be recommended.  The national health insurance house implemented the national mental health programme, providing treatment for persons with substance abuses, and ensuring specific treatment for patients with depressive disorders. 

    Questions by Committee Experts 

    RINCHEN CHOPHEL, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Coordinator, said the Government had approved a social assistance programme in 2011 which targeted all communes, but was underfinanced; could more information be provided?  The Environment Week presented was an excellent initiative; how was it being utilised? 

    JULIANA SCERRI FERRANTE, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, asked if there were any supervision orders, where children remained with their family but were supervised?  Were there age assessment procedures during the asylum procedure?  What rights did children applying for asylum have?  Could they appeal any decisions? 

    PHILIP JAFFE, Committee Vice-Chair and Country Taskforce Member, said according to research by the United Nations Children’s Fund, Romanian girls felt much lonelier than Romanian boys.  Was there a reason for this gap? 

    SOPHIE KILADZE, Committee Chair and Country Taskforce Member, asked for clarification on case management coordination? 

    A Committee Expert noted the prevalence of women among the large delegation and asked if women generally had an important and high-profile position in Romania, or if this only occurred when discussing children?  Had there been any programmes to prevent violence?  Had the concept of gender been fully institutionalised? Were teachers trained in detecting signs of violence?  What was the prevalence of child marriage in the country?  What about figures for marriages which were not officially recorded? Had there been any programmes to prevent the phenomenon or sanctions? 

    Was there any mapping of the at-risk populations in the country of female genital mutilation? Was female genital mutilation prohibited in law?  What was the most updated action on sexual exploitation?  Was there any cross-border cooperation between Romania and neighbouring countries?  Did Ukrainian children born in Romania have access to Romanian citizenship?  Did rape victims have access to emergency contraception?

    Another Expert asked about vaccinations from children aged zero to 12; was there distrust in the population when it came to vaccines?  It seemed that tuberculosis was a public health issue.  What was being done in the field of treatment? Were there children whose births had not been declared, particularly among refugees, Roma and migrants?

    A Committee Expert asked about the new concept introduced by the Parliament on parental alienation.  How had this concept been consulted on, particularly with children?  How would the best interests of the child be ensured? What specific measures were being taken to reduce school dropout and improve access to quality education for Roma children?  What mechanisms were in place to monitor and support Roma children who were at risk of dropping out? 

    Another Committee Expert said she was happy to hear about the programme for the deinstitutionalisation of alternative care centres; this was something Romania should be proud of, as well as all the foster arrangements being made, especially for children with disabilities.  What was the State doing to support the families of children with disabilities, particularly those with severe disabilities? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said emergency contraception was available to those who had experienced sexual assault and could be obtained without a prescription.  Adolescent pregnancies were a major concern for the Romanian public health system.  Contraceptives and medical devices were provided free of charge through family centres and through gynaecological departments, where abortions were performed upon request.  Romania was one of the first European countries to offer non-discriminatory HIV/AIDS treatment. 

    Refugees were granted a monthly allowance, one-month’s accommodation, and access to education for minors.  Legislation in the field of asylum provided for beneficiaries to apply for family reunification when family members were not in Romania.  Identity documents needed to be provided to prove family links. Family reunification of unaccompanied minors was carried out with the best interest of the child in mind. Minors from immigrant backgrounds benefitted from the same rights as minors who were Romanian citizens. Romanian language courses provided teaching support, textbooks and workbooks developed on linguistic levels according to the European Union framework.  Priority for asylum applications was given to unaccompanied minors. 

    Medical forensic expertise was used when an asylum applicant could not prove their age and there were serious doubts about their ethnicity.  The declared age of the asylum applicant was accepted if their refusal to undergo the medical expertise was based on compelling reasons.  The assessment was performed with full respect for the minor’s dignity and in as least invasive way as possible. 

    Investigations in child and human trafficking were undertaken by specialists with supervision from specialised prosecutors.  Through law 229/2024, the Romanian Parliament aimed to discourage sex tourism and the pimping of minors.  More than 1,200 criminal cases had been identified regarding child trafficking. The General Inspectorate of Romanian Police organised regular sessions for border police and 

    non-governmental organizations, with the purpose of identifying victims.  More than 125 trainings had been carried out to over 4,000 workers who may encounter trafficking victims through their work. The National Agency against Trafficking in Persons and the Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime had implemented a national action plan in the fight against human trafficking to improve the awareness of at-risk groups. 

    In 2024, prosecutors from the Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime took part in 35 seminars regarding identifying child victims, compensation for victims, international cooperation, and online sexual exploitation of children, among other topics.  A public awareness campaign had been launched relating to sexual acts between adults and minors.  The message stated that a sexual act committed against a minor of 16 years or under constituted rape, if the age gap was more than five years, and punishments applied. 

    According to Romanian legislation, minors benefited from free legal aid, whether they committed a crime, or if they were victims of a crime.  The Romanian penal system limited sanctions in regard to minors, and measures for deprivation of liberty were only given as a last resort and could only be ordered by a court. 

    The integrated social services project aimed to develop the academic knowledge of professionals working in the social assistance field, and to develop concrete measures for vulnerable groups of people. 

    During “green week”, schools organised activities around several topics relating to the environment.  These were uploaded on a specialised platform dedicated to education on climate change and varied from one educational cycle to another.  The Ministry of Education had developed a programme, the mechanism of early-living alert, which focused on early education for Roma children. 

    In Romania, social services were obligated to identify children in a risk situation.  Children could remain within families and be monitored by social services until the risks were removed.  The parental alienation provision was introduced in all cases relating to violence and neglect.  It was recommended that this provision be removed, as these measures should only be applied by the courts.  There were many trainings offered to judges on methods relating to children’s rights.  Social workers were also trained to provide necessary assistance to visiting parents. Social services could only assist; they could not intervene and solve disputes between parents. 

    Closing Remarks

    RINCHEN CHOPHEL, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Coordinator, reiterated the Committee’s appreciation for the Government of Romania’s support to Ukrainian refugees, particularly children.  The State was encouraged to continue to undertake these activities which were important for solidarity for children.  Significant progress had been made from the last reporting period to the current one, with many looking forward beyond the dialogue.  This was an indication of the Government’s commitment towards children.  As the country moved forward, it was important to put emphasis on implementation and ensure vulnerable children did not miss out. 

    HELENA OMNA-RAICU, President of the National Authority for the Protection of Child Rights and Adoption of Romania and head of the delegation, expressed deep gratitude for the dialogue.  The delegation welcomed the Committee’s emphasis on equality, accountability and sustainability, and would underpin the next stage of the State’s deinstitutionalisation journey.  The Committee’s concerns regarding urban disparities were noted.  It was recognised that rights delayed were rights denied, and the State was committed to accelerating affirmative action. Romania would treat the Committee’s recommendations as an opportunity for deeper transformation. 

    SOPHIE KILADZE, Committee Chair, thanked the delegation for the fruitful dialogue and commended its members for their clear and comprehensive answers.  Ms. Kiladze extended her best regards to the children of Romania. 

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

     

    CRC25.013E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Gaza, Haiti & other topics – Daily Press Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    -Occupied Palestinian Territory
    -Haiti
    -Secretary-General/ECOSOC
    -Syria
    -Sudan
    -Myanmar
    -Libya
    -International Days
    -4th International Conference on Financing for Development

    OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
    The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) says that yesterday and today, the Israeli authorities granted us access to Kerem Shalom so that our teams could reach additional humanitarian supplies that crossed into the Strip on Monday and Tuesday, crossed from Israel into Kerem Shalom loading areas. Other critical items such as hygiene products or fuel have not been allowed by the Israeli authorities into Kerem Shalom.
    So far, and this is as a few minutes ago, but the situation is obviously fluid, none of the supplies have been able to leave the Kerem Shalom loading area. This is because, by yesterday evening, Israeli authorities had only allowed our teams to go through one area that was highly congested, that we felt was insecure and where we felt looting was highly likely to take place, given the prolonged deprivation in Gaza since the blockade by the Israeli authorities for over 11 weeks. The UN hopes that will change very soon.  The discussions are ongoing as we speak between our colleagues and the Israeli security authorities.
    The UN is continuing to are engage with them to identify the best possible routes out of Kerem Shalom towards Gaza to ensure that the flow of aid is not disrupted or suspended. Partners are in touch with community leaders in Gaza to mitigate the risk of looting and ensure that the supplies entering Gaza reach the people who need them.
    However, it is important to underscore that the limited supplies finally being allowed to enter Kerem Shalom are nowhere near enough to meet the needs in Gaza, which are vast, which are tremendous. Much, much more aid needs to get in.
    Meanwhile, bombardment and shelling are continuing across the Gaza Strip. Today, the Gaza Ministry of Health reported dozens of people killed in the last 24 hours, and yesterday, it made an urgent call for blood donations for the sick and for those injured.
    OCHA is telling us that 80 per cent of the Gaza Strip is now either subject to displacement orders or located in Israeli-militarized zones. These zones require humanitarians to coordinate their movements with the Israeli security authorities. 
    UN partners says that over the past few days, almost half of the newly displaced people have fled with none of their belongings. The ongoing displacement of Gaza’s population is putting immense pressure on humanitarian teams, especially when there is no food or any basic items being allowed in.
    In Gaza City, our partners report an extreme lack of shelter space: Displacement sites and residential buildings are all very much overcrowded. People are settling in abandoned, unfinished, or destroyed or damaged structures. Some are sleeping out in the open. 
    And as we have been saying over, and over and over again, civilians need be protected, including those fleeing or forced to leave through displacement orders or those who remain despite the displacement orders.
    Meanwhile, continued attacks on healthcare facilities are ongoing.  Earlier today, Al Awda Hospital, which is the only partially functional hospital in North Gaza governorate, and still treating a dozen patients, was hit. Yesterday, Kamal Adwan Hospital ceased operations.
    As of yesterday, UN partners report that about 304,000 daily meals were prepared and delivered through about 70 kitchens. Five kitchens resumed operations, including two in Khan Younis and three that relocated to Gaza City following recent displacement orders from North Gaza. However, five others in Gaza City and Khan Younis were forced to shut down after their supplies were depleted. 
    UN partners providing water, sanitation and hygiene services say that the water situation is worsening by the day. For example, the largest desalination plant in the north of Gaza is in an area slated for displacement. This has disrupted access to drinking water for about 150,000 people. 
    In southern Gaza, in Al Mawasi, the water situation is also dire, as the area is not connected to the water network and relies heavily on water trucking. This requires both vehicles and fuel to serve the needy population.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=21%20May%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o494ZKBFyws

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Video: Gaza, Haiti & other topics – Daily Press Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    -Occupied Palestinian Territory
    -Haiti
    -Secretary-General/ECOSOC
    -Syria
    -Sudan
    -Myanmar
    -Libya
    -International Days
    -4th International Conference on Financing for Development

    OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
    The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) says that yesterday and today, the Israeli authorities granted us access to Kerem Shalom so that our teams could reach additional humanitarian supplies that crossed into the Strip on Monday and Tuesday, crossed from Israel into Kerem Shalom loading areas. Other critical items such as hygiene products or fuel have not been allowed by the Israeli authorities into Kerem Shalom.
    So far, and this is as a few minutes ago, but the situation is obviously fluid, none of the supplies have been able to leave the Kerem Shalom loading area. This is because, by yesterday evening, Israeli authorities had only allowed our teams to go through one area that was highly congested, that we felt was insecure and where we felt looting was highly likely to take place, given the prolonged deprivation in Gaza since the blockade by the Israeli authorities for over 11 weeks. The UN hopes that will change very soon.  The discussions are ongoing as we speak between our colleagues and the Israeli security authorities.
    The UN is continuing to are engage with them to identify the best possible routes out of Kerem Shalom towards Gaza to ensure that the flow of aid is not disrupted or suspended. Partners are in touch with community leaders in Gaza to mitigate the risk of looting and ensure that the supplies entering Gaza reach the people who need them.
    However, it is important to underscore that the limited supplies finally being allowed to enter Kerem Shalom are nowhere near enough to meet the needs in Gaza, which are vast, which are tremendous. Much, much more aid needs to get in.
    Meanwhile, bombardment and shelling are continuing across the Gaza Strip. Today, the Gaza Ministry of Health reported dozens of people killed in the last 24 hours, and yesterday, it made an urgent call for blood donations for the sick and for those injured.
    OCHA is telling us that 80 per cent of the Gaza Strip is now either subject to displacement orders or located in Israeli-militarized zones. These zones require humanitarians to coordinate their movements with the Israeli security authorities. 
    UN partners says that over the past few days, almost half of the newly displaced people have fled with none of their belongings. The ongoing displacement of Gaza’s population is putting immense pressure on humanitarian teams, especially when there is no food or any basic items being allowed in.
    In Gaza City, our partners report an extreme lack of shelter space: Displacement sites and residential buildings are all very much overcrowded. People are settling in abandoned, unfinished, or destroyed or damaged structures. Some are sleeping out in the open. 
    And as we have been saying over, and over and over again, civilians need be protected, including those fleeing or forced to leave through displacement orders or those who remain despite the displacement orders.
    Meanwhile, continued attacks on healthcare facilities are ongoing.  Earlier today, Al Awda Hospital, which is the only partially functional hospital in North Gaza governorate, and still treating a dozen patients, was hit. Yesterday, Kamal Adwan Hospital ceased operations.
    As of yesterday, UN partners report that about 304,000 daily meals were prepared and delivered through about 70 kitchens. Five kitchens resumed operations, including two in Khan Younis and three that relocated to Gaza City following recent displacement orders from North Gaza. However, five others in Gaza City and Khan Younis were forced to shut down after their supplies were depleted. 
    UN partners providing water, sanitation and hygiene services say that the water situation is worsening by the day. For example, the largest desalination plant in the north of Gaza is in an area slated for displacement. This has disrupted access to drinking water for about 150,000 people. 
    In southern Gaza, in Al Mawasi, the water situation is also dire, as the area is not connected to the water network and relies heavily on water trucking. This requires both vehicles and fuel to serve the needy population.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=21%20May%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o494ZKBFyws

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Repatriation of Syrians – E-000218/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission does not keep such registries.

    As of 6 March 2025, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that over 300 000 Syrians have returned to Syria via neighbouring countries since early December 2024, and that almost 890 000 internally displaced persons have returned to their home region since November 2024.

    While remaining cautious due to the volatile situation in Syria, and in line with the European Council conclusions of 19 December 2024[1], the EU is committed to help creating the conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees, as defined by the UNHCR, in particular by supporting Syrians who decide to go home and by stepping up its non-humanitarian early recovery support in sectors crucial for sustainable returns.

    Under the EU asylum rules, the Syrian nationals who benefit from international protection in a Member State have the right to reside in the Member State that granted them protection. EU law outlines the circumstances in which an individual protection status can be withdrawn and a number of related safeguards.

    The Return Directive[2] sets out common standards and procedures to be applied by the competent authorities of the Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, in compliance with fundamental rights as well as international law, including refugee protection and human rights obligations. Non-governmental organisations do not have a formal role in the carrying out those procedures.

    • [1] European Council (EUCO) 50/24: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/jhlenhaj/euco-conclusions-19122024-en.pdf.
    • [2] Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals.
    Last updated: 21 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Opening: 21-22 May 2025 plenary session

    Source: European Parliament

    MEPs added a debate on “the Hungarian government’s drift towards Russia-style repression” to today’s agenda.

    Changes to the agenda

    Wednesday

    Council and Commission statements on the Hungarian government’s drift towards Russia-style repression and legislative threats to freedom of expression and democratic participation are added to the agenda later on Wednesday, following the debate on the EU’s response to the Israeli government’s plan to seize the Gaza Strip. As a result of this addition, the sitting is extended to 23:00.

    Thursday

    The President announced a request from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development to fast-track a file under Rule 170(6) of the EP’s Rules of Procedure for the Commission proposal on additional assistance and further flexibility to outermost regions affected by severe natural disasters and in the context of cyclone Chido devastating Mayotte.

    The vote on this request will take place on Thursday. If approved, the file will be added to the June plenary agenda.

    Interinstitutional negotiations

    The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has decided to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, in accordance with Rule 72(1) of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, on the basis of the report available on the plenary website.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Sara Jacobs Grills Secretary Marco Rubio on President Trump’s Conflicts of Interest in UAE while Ignoring UAE’s Funding of Genocide in Sudan

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Sara Jacobs (D-CA-53)

    May 21, 2025

    Rep. Sara Jacobs (CA-51) grilled Secretary Marco Rubio on President Trump’s conflicts of interest in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In recent weeks, the Trump Organization has announced plans to build an 80-story Trump Tower in Dubai, and President Trump’s crypto company, World Liberty Financial, has secured a $2 billion deal with an Emirati company with deep ties to the government. Then the Trump Administration blew through a congressional hold on over $1.5 billion in arms sales to the UAE, which continues to arm and fund the Rapid Support Forces’ genocide in Sudan.

    Watch Rep. Sara Jacobs Here

    Rep. Sara Jacobs said: “Mr. Secretary, I want to turn to the war in Sudan. This is, as you know, the world’s largest displacement and humanitarian crisis, half a million people are facing famine. I saw firsthand the suffering when I visited Sudanese refugees in Chad.

    “Earlier this year and again yesterday, you reiterated that the Rapid Support Forces, a militia, is committing genocide in Sudan. Is that correct?” 

    Secretary Marco Rubio said: “We’re very concerned about what both sides are doing frankly, but the RSF in particular.” 

    Rep. Sara Jacobs said: “Correct, I agree with that. You also said that, as part of that, all of our engagement with the UAE, we need to ‘raise the fact that they’re openly supporting an entity that is carrying out a genocide.’ And yet, President Trump continues to arm the UAE. In fact, he just blew through Ranking Member Meeks’ congressional hold on over $1 billion in arms sales, ignoring this Committee’s longstanding role as an independent check on major arms sales. Now, we can have a policy debate on the merits of whether to arm the UAE or not, despite this genocide. I had that conversation with Secretary Blinken. But actually, I want to talk about the events that led up to that decision. 

    “So on April 30th, the Trump Organization, which Donald Trump still owns, unveiled plans to build an 80-story Trump Tower in Dubai. 

    “On May 1, Trump’s crypto company, World Liberty Financial, secured a $2 billion deal with an Emirati company with deep ties to the government.

    “And only 11 days later, on May 12, your Department notified our committee that it would ignore Ranking Member Meeks’ holds on UAE arms sales.

    “Secretary Rubio, we have a President who is personally profiting from a deal with a foreign government-backed company at the same time he is selling lethal weapons to that same government. Isn’t that a clear conflict of interest?”

    Secretary Marco Rubio said: “I think no matter who is president, they would have to deal with the UAE. We have to. They’re a member of…

    Rep. Sara Jacobs said: “That’s not my question. We can have a policy debate about how we should engage with the UAE. I was just there a few weeks ago.

    Secretary Marco Rubio said: “You’re making claims about corruption. I’m trying to answer them. Any President in the United States – I don’t care who it is – has to deal with the UAE. They’re a member of the Abraham Accords, number one. They’ve been incredibly cooperative on a bunch of other issues. We don’t agree with them 100%. We have some concerns about some of the things they do. But this is called the balancing of our foreign policy. It is in our national interest to have a good relationship with the UAE. And sometimes they do things we don’t like.

    Rep. Sara Jacobs said: “Secretary Rubio, I don’t disagree with you. I just visited the UAE a couple weeks ago and had these very same conversations there and I don’t think this is a complicated question. President Trump is personally profiting from a deal with a foreign government and selling weapons to that same government who is enabling a genocide. Policy aside, are you really saying you don’t think this is a conflict of interest?

    Secretary Marco Rubio said: “No, you’re making claims. The president’s family owns a business and they can conduct business anywhere in the world they want. The president has never once raised business deals in the UAE when talking about…Any President would have to have a relationship with the UAE.

    Rep. Sara Jacobs said: “Secretary Rubio, that’s just silly. President Trump has retained his ownership of these companies and I have an image right here from World Liberty Financial’s website, so the idea that President Trump is not the face of the brand of this company on top of benefiting from them. And it literally says on the website that Mr. Trump and his family members own a 60% stake in this company. That’s silly. We can talk about the policy merits – that’s not what I’m asking you. I’m asking you a very simple question: do you believe that it’s a conflict of interest to have a president personally profiting from a deal with a foreign government while selling weapons to that same government who is enabling a genocide?

    Secretary Marco Rubio said: “I don’t…I don’t accept the premise of your question. I think this has nothing to do with personally benefiting from anything. This has to do with the fact that in order to conduct foreign policy in the Middle East, you’re going to have to deal with the UAE. You have to have deals in place with the UAE.

    Rep. Sara Jacobs said: “Mr. Secretary, this is a clear conflict of interest. Anyone with any common sense can see that. The President is personally benefiting from billions of dollars in deals, and he doesn’t care at all about the people of Sudan who are experiencing famine and genocide.

    “It’s shocking to me that you can’t admit that. It’s clear to me that you seem more concerned about staying in Trump’s good graces than sticking up for human rights and American values that you once were a champion for. With that, I’m going to yield the rest of my time to Representative Olszewski.”

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Scott Perry Introduces the Taiwan PLUS Act

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Scott Perry (PA-10)

    Washington, D.C. – Today, Congressman Scott Perry (PA-10), with Senator Rick Scott (FL), and co-sponsored by Congressman Tom Tiffany (WI-07), introduced the Taiwan PLUS Act to strengthen U.S.–Taiwan defense cooperation and ensure peak efficiency in delivering vital weapons systems to deter the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

    Taiwan is on the front lines of CCP’s growing aggression, and it’s time our policies reflect the urgency of the threat,said Congressman Perry.This legislation streamlines our arms sales process to Taiwan, strengthens deterrence, and solidifies our commitment to defending American interests in the Indo-Pacific.”

    Under current law, Taiwan must wait for congressional notification and a 30-day review period when requesting critical weapons systems exceeding low financial thresholds – $14 million for major defense equipment, $50 million for defense services, and $200 million for construction support. The Taiwan PLUS Act boosts these thresholds ($25 million, $100 million, and $300 million, respectively) to the same levels afforded to “NATO Plus” partners and shortens the review window to 15 days. By elevating Taiwan to the same status as trusted U.S. defense partners like Australia, Israel, and Japan, the bill removes red tape and improves speed and efficiency in military aid.

    Communist China has tried to intimidate and overpower our ally, Taiwan for years. Communist China has made clear they are more than willing to invade Taiwan as it continues its attacks on democracy around the world, and the United States must make clear we will continue to stand by Taiwan,” said Senator Rick Scott. The Taiwan PLUS Act will cut red tape and make it faster and easier for Taiwan to purchase the weapons it needs from the U.S. to defend itself should Communist China invade. Taiwan is a critical partner in the Indo-Pacific, and the U.S. must act with urgency to strengthen our defense ties to help our nation and our ally counter these threats from Communist China. 

    Taiwan already is one of the United States’ closest defense collaborators – the top Foreign Military Sales customer in FY20, and historically tied with Japan as the third largest buyer since 1950. This bill ensures that future sales meet the moment by providing Taiwan with the tools needed to defend itself when needed.

    Streamlining the arms sale process will help ensure that Taiwan can defend itself in the face of Communist China’s reckless and relentless campaign of intimidation, said Congressman Tom Tiffany. “Promoting greater US-Taiwan security cooperation benefits both of our countries, and that’s exactly what this bill will do.

    As the CCP continues to escalate its hostile posture, the Taiwan PLUS Act sends a clear and unambiguous message: America stands with Taiwan, and will ensure our partners have the means to protect peace, freedom, and security in the Indo-Pacific.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Sophon Unveils zkTLS-Based Social Oracle to Integrate Private Web2 Data Onchain

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Sophon uses zkTLS to convert private Web2 credentials into verifiable on-chain assets without compromising privacy, enhancing user experiences and enabling new perspectives on applications.

    DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, May 21, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Sophon, a platform built to power consumer crypto experiences, has unveiled its integration of zkTLS (zero-knowledge Transport Layer Security) as the foundation for a new class of personalized and privacy-preserving blockchain applications. At the center of this effort is the Social Oracle, a system that verifies off-chain personal data, such as achievements, credentials, and social influence, on-chain, while preserving user privacy.

    While many blockchain apps focus on financial primitives or public data, such as token prices, Sophon addresses a critical gap: securely and verifiably incorporating private Web2 data. Using zkTLS allows users to selectively authenticate data from platforms like games, streaming services, or brokerages, unlocking custom experiences in Web3 while keeping sensitive details off-chain.

    What zkTLS Enables

    zkTLS is a cryptographic enhancement of the widely used TLS protocol (the basis of HTTPS), enabling verifiable proof of private data exchanged between a client and a server. While standard TLS ensures secure transmission, zkTLS makes it possible to verify that communication without exposing its contents.

    Whether proving a Steam gaming record to access a new release, verifying income without disclosing complete bank statements, or authenticating social activity without linking personal accounts, zkTLS facilitates selective, minimal disclosure tailored to the use case.

    Introducing the Social Oracle

    Built on zkTLS, Sophon’s Social Oracle acts as a trust layer for consumer crypto. With the user’s consent, fragmented digital behaviors, such as gameplay stats or streaming activity, can be converted into reusable credentials recognized across multiple apps.

    Rather than building redundant verification systems, developers on Sophon can tap into this shared infrastructure to access authenticated user signals while maintaining compliance with data protection standards. For users, this means frictionless access to gated experiences, role-based rewards, and digital reputation systems, all while maintaining control over what data they choose to reveal.

    Diverse zkTLS Models, Unified Vision

    Sophon supports multiple zkTLS architectures — including MPC-TLS for decentralization, TEE-TLS for hardware-based speed, and Proxy-TLS for scalability — giving developers flexibility based on performance and security needs.

    By staying infrastructure-agnostic and integrating providers like Reclaim Protocol, Sophon can support use cases across social platforms, gaming, DeFi, and tokenized marketplaces. More than a product, Sophon is a platform designed to support an ecosystem of apps that benefit from a common, privacy-first data layer.

    Unlike isolated apps that bolt on zkTLS in narrow ways, Sophon merges modular cryptographic trust with cross-app interoperability, creating a more composable foundation for user-centric Web3.

    Turning Data Into Momentum

    Sophon’s ecosystem is built on a virtuous cycle: users share verifiable Web2 data through zkTLS, becoming a secure network asset. Apps respond to this data by offering tailored rewards, exclusive access, or identity-based experiences, making the platform more appealing to new users, who bring in even more authenticated data.

    This network effect strengthens the Social Oracle with every new credential. Over time, the system evolves from a verification tool into a living, portable layer of user identity, recognized and respected across apps. It’s a model that moves away from temporary airdrops or mercenary incentives, instead generating lasting value from genuine engagement.

    Incentives Should Be Fun, Not Just Financial

    Many GameFi projects have faltered by prioritizing token rewards over user experience. Sophon flips this dynamic by rewarding meaningful activity, verified through zkTLS, not just with financial perks but access, recognition, and enjoyment.

    Whether unlocking an in-game item based on actual gameplay or gaining early access as a verified supporter, Sophon allows incentives to reflect earned identity rather than mere wallet activity.

    Making Blockchain Invisible, Benefits Obvious

    Due to privacy and verification constraints, Sophon’s zkTLS infrastructure already supports previously impractical apps. Users can verify Amazon Prime memberships to access curated marketplaces, prove brokerage balances to enhance DeFi yields, use airline miles for stock-based incentives, or authenticate multi-platform creator revenue for monetization tools. Even gaming platforms can now recognize off-chain achievements to mint items or establish player reputation.

    Crucially, Sophon removes the complexity typically associated with Web3. Instead of beginning with wallets, seed phrases, and technical onboarding, users start with platforms they already use and data they control. Sophon abstracts away the blockchain, letting trust and utility take center stage.

    Mainstream adoption won’t come from better blockchain explanations — it will come from making blockchain invisible while making its benefits undeniable.

    About Sophon

    Sophon is a consumer-focused platform designed to onboard the next generation of crypto users through everyday products that monetize and reward the data each of us naturally creates. Beyond just a blockchain, Sophon provides a complete operating system for crypto-powered experiences that functions as both a developer framework and user hub, delivering seamless interactions across gaming, social, AI and beyond.

    At the core of its architecture is zkTLS, a cryptographic enhancement of the standard TLS protocol that enables verifiable yet privacy-preserving data authentication. Built on this foundation, Sophon’s Social Oracle aggregates and transforms Web2 credentials, such as gaming history, financial records, and social activity, into reusable, trust-minimized proofs that can power personalized experiences across multiple decentralized applications. For developers, this creates powerful consumer insights that enable a whole new class of applications to be built onchain.

    Contact:
    Oskari Tempakka
    oskari@sophon.xyz

    Disclaimer: This is a paid post and is provided by Sophon. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice.Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed.Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility. Globenewswire does not endorse any content on this page.

    Legal Disclaimer: This media platform provides the content of this article on an “as-is” basis, without any warranties or representations of any kind, express or implied. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies, errors, or omissions. We do not assume any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information presented herein. Any concerns, complaints, or copyright issues related to this article should be directed to the content provider mentioned above.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/059f0146-dd74-489c-9259-f39296ef4c19

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Joint statement by the leaders of France, the United Kingdom and Canada on the situation in Gaza and the West Bank

    Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

    Published on May 21, 2025

    Lire la version

    We strongly oppose the expansion of Israel’s military operations in Gaza. The level of human suffering in Gaza is intolerable. Yesterday’s announcement that Israel will allow a basic quantity of food into Gaza is wholly inadequate. We call on the Israeli Government to stop its military operations in Gaza and immediately allow humanitarian aid to enter Gaza. This must include engaging with the UN to ensure a return to delivery of aid in line with humanitarian principles. We call on Hamas to release immediately the remaining hostages they have so cruelly held since 7 October 2023.

    The Israeli Government’s denial of essential humanitarian assistance to the civilian population is unacceptable and risks breaching international humanitarian law. We condemn the abhorrent language used recently by members of the Israeli Government, threatening that, in their despair at the destruction of Gaza, civilians will start to relocate. Permanent forced displacement is a breach of international humanitarian law.

    Israel suffered a heinous attack on 7 October. We have always supported Israel’s right to defend Israelis against terrorism. But this escalation is wholly disproportionate.

    We will not stand by while the Netanyahu Government pursues these egregious actions. If Israel does not cease the renewed military offensive and lift its restrictions on humanitarian aid, we will take further concrete actions in response.

    We oppose any attempt to expand settlements in the West Bank. Israel must halt settlements which are illegal and undermine the viability of a Palestinian state and the security of both Israelis and Palestinians.  We will not hesitate to take further action, including targeted sanctions.

    We strongly support the efforts led by the United States, Qatar and Egypt to secure an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. It is a ceasefire, the release of all remaining hostages and a long-term political solution that offer the best hope of ending the agony of the hostages and their families, alleviating the suffering of civilians in Gaza, ending Hamas’ control of Gaza and achieving a pathway to a two-state solution, consistent with the goals of the 18 June conference in New York co-chaired by Saudi Arabia and France. These negotiations need to succeed, and we must all work towards the implementation of a two-state solution, which is the only way to bring long-lasting peace and security that both Israelis and Palestinians deserve, and ensure long-term stability in the region.

    We will continue to work with the Palestinian Authority, regional partners, Israel and the United States to finalize consensus on arrangements for Gaza’s future, building on the Arab plan. We affirm the important role of the High-level Two-State Solution Conference at the UN in June in building international consensus around this aim. And we are committed to recognising a Palestinian State as a contribution to achieving a two-state solution and are prepared to work with others to this end./.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: 45 Senators Join Welch’s Senate Resolution Calling for End to Siege on Gaza – Republicans Block Passage  

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Peter Welch (D-Vermont)
    Israel is still blocking aid as the UN warns 14,000 babies will die without urgent humanitarian assistance 
    WASHINGTON, D.C.—U.S. Senator Peter Welch (D-Vt.) and 45 colleagues were blocked by Republicans when Senator Welch requested unanimous consent to pass his resolution calling for the delivery of lifesaving food and humanitarian aid for starving children in Gaza.  
    After an 11-week blockade by the Israeli government, 93 trucks entered Gaza yesterday but according to the UN, no aid has been distributed. An estimated 600 trucks of food, baby food, and medical supplies are needed, and the UN warned yesterday that 14,000 babies will die in the next 48 hours without aid.  
    “It’s not right for aid to be withheld as an instrument of war. And, regrettably, that appears to have been a decision that has been made by the Israeli government. It’s not right, it’s not necessary, it’s not helpful, it’s extraordinarily harmful to innocent children, to innocent mothers. My hope is that this Senate would pass a resolution making it very clear about our concern about the well-being of innocent Palestinians in Gaza. That food that innocent hat those Palestinians in Gaza need is right on the other side of the border. It’s there. All it needs is to be transported from where it is into Gaza and then distributed,” said Senator Welch. “We’ve got to feed those people. The food is there. We all want those innocent people to survive and avoid famine. Let us do every single thing we can to persuade the Israeli Netanyahu government to get that food in to people who desperately need it.” 
    Senator Jim Risch (R-Idaho) objected, saying: “Look, this is this is despicable. This is horrible. This is criminal. It’s beyond human understanding how human beings could treat other human beings the same way, especially when you relate it to them as they are in Palestine. I agree that this needs to stop, but the first thing that needs to be said is that this is the fault of Hamas and it is not our fault.”  
    Watch the exchange here:  
    The resolution called on the Trump Administration to use all diplomatic tools at its disposal to bring an end to the blockade of food and lifesaving humanitarian aid to address the needs of civilians in Gaza. In the resolution, Senators expressed grave concern about the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza, including the imminent starvation of tens of thousands of children. 
    Read S.Res.224 here. 
    The resolution was led by Senator Welch and sponsored by Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Senators Angela Alsobrooks (D-Md.); Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.); Michael Bennet (D-Colo.); Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.); Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-Del.); Cory Booker (D-N.J.); Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.); Chris Coons (D-Del.); Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.); Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.); Dick Durbin (D-Ill.); Ruben Gallego (D-Ariz.); Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.); Maggie Hassan (D-N.H.); Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.); John Hickenlooper (D-Colo.); Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii); Tim Kaine (D-Va.); Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.); Andy Kim (D-N.J.); Angus King (I-Maine); Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.); Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.); Ed Markey (D-Mass.); Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.); Chris Murphy (D-Conn.); Patty Murray (D-Wash.); Jon Ossoff (D-Ga.); Alex Padilla (D-Calif.); Gary Peters (D-Mich.); Jack Reed (D-R.I.); Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.); Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.); Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii); Adam Schiff (D-Calif.); Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.); Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.); Tina Smith (D-Minn.); Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.); Mark Warner (D-Va.); Reverend Raphael Warnock (D-Ga.); Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.); Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.); and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China opposes unjustified European sanctions against Chinese companies – Chinese Foreign Ministry

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, May 21 (Xinhua) — China strongly dissatisfied with and firmly opposed the European Union’s groundless sanctions against Chinese enterprises, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said Wednesday.

    Mao Ning made the statement at a regular briefing for journalists, commenting on a new package of restrictions against Russia announced by the European Union and Great Britain. This time, the sanctions list also includes companies from China and the United Arab Emirates.

    Speaking about the Ukrainian crisis, the official representative of the Chinese Foreign Ministry noted that China is firmly committed to advancing peace talks. China has never provided lethal weapons to the parties to the conflict and strictly controls the export of dual-use goods, she recalled.

    Normal exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and Russian enterprises should not be disrupted or affected, Mao Ning stressed, noting that most countries, including European countries and the United States, continue to trade with Russia.

    The European side must stop applying double standards to trade and economic cooperation with Russia and harming the legitimate interests of Chinese companies. China will take all necessary measures to resolutely protect its legitimate rights and interests, the Chinese diplomat added. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Israel allows a ‘limited’ amount of aid back into Gaza, where the humanitarian situation is desperate

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sarah Schiffling, Deputy Director of the HUMLOG (Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management Research) Institute, Hanken School of Economics

    After 11 weeks of blockading the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza, the Israeli government asked the UN to resume “limited” aid deliveries on May 18. The move came amid growing international outrage over what the UN secretary-general, António Guterres, has called a “policy of siege and starvation” in Gaza that “makes a mockery of international law”.

    Israel cleared nine aid trucks on Monday, May 19, only five of which entered Gaza. The Israeli military says closer to 100 trucks were inspected the following day. But, according to the UN, none of this aid has been distributed yet.

    It also goes without saying that even 100 aid trucks per day will not satisfy the desperate needs of Gaza’s 2.1 million inhabitants. The British, French and Canadian leaders have criticised Israel’s decision to allow a “basic amount of food” to enter the territory as “wholly inadequate”.

    The blockade has caused the already desperate humanitarian situation in Gaza to deteriorate further. Food security experts from the UN-backed Integrated Food Security Phase Classification platform say the entire territory is now facing crisis levels of food insecurity, with 22% of the population at risk of starvation.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    The World Food Programme ran out of supplies in Gaza in late April. Other organisations have had the same problem. This has caused 60% of community kitchens, which many Gazans rely on for a daily meal, to close down. Many food items are now unavailable and diets are extremely limited, largely consisting of bread and pulses.

    Prices of what little food is available have also skyrocketed. The price of wheat flour, for example, has risen by more than 4,000% since the start of the 11-week long blockade. And with 90% of households in Gaza experiencing financial hardship, it is impossible for many people to buy essentials.

    Cooking oil is no longer available and firewood has become scarce. The majority of people now burn waste, making cooking unsafe and unhealthy. On top of this, the healthcare system is on the brink of collapse and access to clean drinking water is very limited.

    At the same time, the efforts of humanitarian organisations to combat malnutrition have nearly come to a standstill because they lack necessary supplies. Malnutrition makes people more susceptible to disease.

    Militarising aid delivery

    The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, said it was necessary to resume aid to Gaza because Israel’s allies would not tolerate “images of mass starvation”. The move has still been criticised by some Israeli politicians, with hardline defence minister Israel Katz calling it a “grave mistake”.

    For now, aid will enter Gaza through established mechanisms. But the US and Israel are backing a proposal for a new aid delivery system involving private companies. The system will be managed by a newly formed independent American aid organisation called the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), which expects to become operational by the end of May.

    The GHF plans to set up what it is calling “secure distribution sites” in southern and central Gaza. From these sites, it will distribute food, hygiene kits and medical supplies initially to 1.2 million people – eventually scaling-up operations to cover the whole population. The GHF says it will coordinate with the IDF but that its sites will be protected by private military contractors.

    While the GHF claims to have secured funding and be in the process of procuring large amounts of goods, no details are currently available to the public on this massive undertaking. The plan has received widespread criticism and has been rejected by the UN.

    The main criticism of the plan is that it violates so-called humanitarian principles. It is generally accepted that humanitarian action is based upon four main principles: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.

    The principle of humanity states that suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with a special focus on the most vulnerable people. Neutrality means that, in an armed conflict, humanitarian aid should not favour any side.

    Impartiality requires that humanitarian aid is provided based solely on need without any discrimination. And independence means that humanitarian objectives should be autonomous of political, economic, military or other objectives.

    Humanitarian bodies argue that the GHF’s plan does not stand up to these principles. It would force people to travel long distances to acquire heavy aid goods, so excludes those who are less mobile and more vulnerable.

    Meanwhile, humanitarian organisations have rejected the plan as a “humanitarian cover for a military strategy of control and dispossession”. They have raised concerns that the limited number of food distribution sites, as well as their location, could encourage the forced displacement of Palestinians from northern Gaza.

    Satellite images showing the construction of sites in Gaza that are expected to be used as aid distribution centres also suggest they will be close to Israeli military bases. While private security contractors will secure the distribution sites, the mere presence of military forces so close by may make people hesitant to approach for fear of being targeted.

    UN agencies and other humanitarian organisations have refused to participate in the proposed plan. Any involvement with a plan that is allegedly aligned with Israel’s military strategy could undermine the ability of the UN to play a meaningful humanitarian role in Gaza in the future. And it would also be seen as an endorsement of the militarisation of aid delivery around the world.

    As humanitarian experts point out, there is already an established system for providing aid to Gaza. Humanitarian organisations have the people, distribution networks and the necessary goods – 160,000 pallets full of them – in place. Almost 9,000 aid trucks are ready to be dispatched across the border as soon as Israel allows it.

    During the ceasefire earlier in 2025, UN agencies and humanitarian organisations demonstrated how quickly they could scale-up a predictable and accountable delivery of aid to those in need all across Gaza. This can be done again.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Israel allows a ‘limited’ amount of aid back into Gaza, where the humanitarian situation is desperate – https://theconversation.com/israel-allows-a-limited-amount-of-aid-back-into-gaza-where-the-humanitarian-situation-is-desperate-257137

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: ZOOZ Power to Present at the 2025 Aegis Capital Virtual Conference

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Tel-Aviv, Israel, May 21, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — ZOOZ Power (Nasdaq and TASE: ZOOZ), a leading provider of flywheel-based power boosters and energy management systems enabling ultra-fast EV charging solutions, announced today that Erez Zimerman, ZOOZ Power’s Chief Executive Officer will present at the 2025 Aegis Capital Corp. Virtual Conference on May 22 at 4:00 p.m. ET.  

    For interested investors, a live webcast of the presentation can be accessed HERE.

    About The 2025 Aegis Capital Corp. Virtual Conference

    The conference brings together a lineup of companies and key business partners, and it features a network of retail brokers, institutional funds, and money managers. The conference is an excellent opportunity to gain insight into the latest developments happening at each of the presenting companies.

    About ZOOZ Power

    ZOOZ Power (NASDAQ/TASE: ZOOZ) is a leading provider of intelligent, flywheel-based energy-boosting and management solutions that empower the rapid deployment of ultra-fast EV charging infrastructure, without the need for expensive or time-consuming grid upgrades.

    As the electric vehicle market accelerates, ZOOZ addresses a critical challenge: the widening gap between growing consumer demand for ultra-fast charging and the limited capacity of existing electrical grids.

    ZOOZ’s proprietary flywheel technology enables Charging Point Operators (CPOs) and fleet owners to overcome local grid limitations by delivering high-performance, sustainable, and cost-effective power-boosting systems. These solutions ensure reliable ultra-fast charging capabilities while enhancing grid efficiency and flexibility.

    Engineered for long-term durability and environmental sustainability, ZOOZ Power’s solutions help customers accelerate infrastructure rollout, optimize utilization, and drive faster revenue and profitability growth.

    For more information, please visit: www.zoozpower.com

    Investor Contact:
    Miri Segal – CEO
    MS-IR LLC
    msegal@ms-ir.com

    Media enquiries:
    Media@zoozpower.com

    Forward-Looking Statement

    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the safe-harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such forward-looking statements are based on the current beliefs, expectations, and assumptions of ZOOZ Power. All statements other than statements of historical facts contained in this press release, including statements regarding ZOOZ Power, and any of ZOOZ Power’s strategy, future operations and statements related to the collaboration between ZOOZ Power and “ON” charging network (including any plans to implement ZOOZ Power’s solution and upgrade an additional site of “ON” on Route 6) are forward-looking statements. These statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other important factors that may cause ZOOZ Power’s actual results, performance or achievements to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements. These risks and other risks and uncertainties are more fully discussed in the “Risk Factors” section of ZOOZ’s most recent Annual Report on Form 20-F as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) as well as other documents that may be subsequently filed by the Company from time to time with the SEC. The words “anticipate,” “believe,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “intend,” “may,” “plan,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “should,” “target,” “will,” and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements contain these identifying words. Forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements relating to the limited operating history and evolving business model of ZOOZ Power, ZOOZ Power’s future prospects, ZOOZ Power’s planned global expansion, including the timing and the results thereof, statements regarding ZOOZ Power’s newly introduced Energy Storage System (ESS), intelligent boosting offering and Energy Management System (EMS), their adoption by the market and any benefits that they may have to ZOOZ Power, its operations, financial position and its current and potential customers, statements regarding the expansion of ZOOZ Power’s sales team and the effect of that expansion on ZOOZ Power’s planned global expansion, financial condition, market position and results of operations, statements relating to ZOOZ Power’s market position, statements regarding the demand for ZOOZ Power’s products, the potential outcome of ZOOZ Power’s collaborations with third parties for installation of its flywheel-based power boosting solution, and conditions in Israel and in the Middle East, including the effect of the evolving nature of the ongoing “Swords of Iron” war, may adversely affect ZOOZ Power’s operations. These forward-looking statements are only estimations, and ZOOZ Power may not actually achieve the plans, intentions or expectations disclosed in any forward-looking statements, so you should not place undue reliance on any forward-looking statements. Actual results or events could differ materially from the plans, intentions and expectations disclosed in forward-looking statements made in this Press Release. Management of ZOOZ Power has based these forward-looking statements largely on current expectations and projections about future events and trends that such persons believe may affect ZOOZ Power’s business, financial condition and operating results. Forward-looking statements contained in this Press Release are made as of the date hereof, and none of ZOOZ Power or any of its representatives or any other person undertakes any duty to update such information except as may be expressly required under applicable law.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The UK will keep supporting the Syrian people to rebuild their country and economy: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    The UK will keep supporting the Syrian people to rebuild their country and economy: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Statement by Ambassador James Kariuki, UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN Security Council meeting on Syria.

    We are encouraged to hear about the UN’s progress in strengthening engagement with the new Syrian Government.

    I will make three points today.

    First, we welcome President Trump’s announcement of lifting of US sanctions. 

    This positive step will create significant opportunity for economic recovery and development across Syria.  

    This follows the UK’s decision in April to lift our own sectoral sanctions on areas including trade, energy production and finance.

    We remain steadfast in our commitment to supporting the Syrian people in rebuilding their country and economy.

    Second, whilst economic recovery is vital, it must go hand in hand with an inclusive and peaceful transition that reconciles Syria’s diverse groups.

    The UK was appalled by the attacks this month against the Druze community in Syria. 

    There can be no lasting peace or better future for Syrians unless all of Syria’s communities are protected and fully included in Syria’s political transition.

    We call on all parties to reject violence, engage in dialogue and ensure the protection of civilians.

    We note progress in reconciling Syrian groups into centralised structures. 

    Existing agreements, including those signed with the Syrian Democratic Forces and with the Druze leadership, should now be implemented in full.

    We also call on Israel to refrain from actions that risk destabilising Syria and to respect Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

    Third, as the new Syrian Government enters its third month, we look forward to seeing a clear timeline for next steps in the political transition. 

    We welcome and stand ready to support the newly announced National Commissions for Transitional Justice and for Missing Persons. Both will help Syria heal and move forward after years of suffering. 

    This political transition should be inclusive and allow Syrians to have a say in what comes next.

    President, in conclusion, the UK stands ready to support the Syrian Government in their next steps on the path towards a more prosperous, peaceful and stable future that the Syrian people deserve.

    Updates to this page

    Published 21 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Afreximbank reports strong performance for Q1 2025 in line with expectations

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    Afreximbank reports strong performance for Q1 2025 in line with expectations The Group posted strong Net Income of US$215 million, a 21% increase year-on-year from US$178 million in the prior period CAIRO, Egypt, May 21, 2025/APO Group/ — African Export-Import Bank (“Afreximbank” or the “Group”) (www.Afreximbank.com) has released the consolidated financial statements of the Bank and its subsidiaries for the three months ended 31 March 2025. Financial Highlights Afreximbank Group delivered satisfactory financial performance for the first quarter of 2025, meeting expectations with solid profitability, strengthened liquidity and a resilient capital base. This performance provides a springboard for the Bank to continue playing its pivotal role of advancing the aspirations of Africa and the Caribbean for economic transformation and sustainable development in the months and years ahead. Net interest income grew by 4.53% to US$411.2 million compared to prior year, driven by growth in interest earning assets, complemented by effective management of borrowing costs, helping the Bank to cushion the marginal decline in total interest income due to softening benchmark rates. Fee income from Guarantees and Letters of Credit saw robust growth of 47% and 36% respectively, partially offsetting lower advisory fees to contribute to total unfunded income of US$26.9 million for Q1-2025. While this represented a 7.41% decrease from US$29.0 million in Q1 2024, the strong performance in Off-balance sheet assets is in line with the Bank’s strategy to grow unfunded business. The Group posted strong Net Income of US$215 million, a 21% increase year-on-year from US$178 million in the prior period. The Group’s total assets and contingent liabilities increased by 6.4%, reaching US$42.7 billion as of 31 March 2025, up from US$40.1 billion at FY’2024. On-balance sheet assets grew by 4.85% to US$37.0 billion, driven primarily by a 58% surge in cash balances to US$7.4 billion, while Off-balance sheet assets i.e. letters of credit and guarantee volumes increased by a 19% to reach US$5.7 billion at the end of Q1-2025. Net loans and advances closed Q1-2025 at US$27.8 billion, down from the FY2024 closing position reflecting early repayments from certain customers on account of improved foreign currency balances position of some sovereign borrowers. Importantly, the Loan Asset Quality remained strong, with the Non-Performing Loans (NPL) ratio at 2.44%, a modest increase from 2.33% at FY’2024 – well below the Bank’s strategic NPL ceiling of 4%. Driven by inflationary pressures and growing personnel costs, operating expenses rose by 23% to reach US$75.4 million by 31 March 2025. Despite this, Afreximbank Group maintained a healthy Cost-to-Income Ratio of 16%, below its strategic range of 17-30%. Afreximbank’s liquidity profile strengthened considerably, with liquid assets now comprising 20% of total assets, up from 13% at the close of FY’2024. This higher liquidity position was as a result of successful fund-raising, coupled with loan repayments received during the quarter. Shareholders’ funds increased by 3.4%, reaching US$7.5 billion, driven by strong internally generated capital of US$215.4 million in addition to new equity investments under the second General Capital Increase (GCI II) programme. Operating Highlights In line with the Afreximbank strategic objective of driving Industrialisation and export development, the Bank and the Government of Kenya ratified a number of initiatives designed to support the development Industrial Parks (IPs) and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Kenya under the US$3 billion Kenya country programme. These projects which include Dongo Kundu Industrial Park in Mombasa and Naivasha SEZ II in Mai Mahiu, are key components of Kenya’s Vision 2030 plan to boost export manufacturing and industrialisation. Afreximbank’s support for these initiatives will specifically enhance infrastructure development, attract investment, and strategically position Kenya as a key hub for African and global commerce. The rollout of the Pan-African Payments and Settlement System (PAPSS) continues to gain momentum with KCB Group in Kenya and Bank of Kigali in Rwanda launching the platform, becoming the first banks in their respective countries to offer seamless, instant, and affordable cross-border payments in local currencies across Africa. Aligned with its mandate to promote Global Africa following the recognition of the African Diaspora as the 6th region of Africa, the Bank further cemented its expansion and presence in the Caribbean with the historic groundbreaking ceremony to kick off the construction of the first ever Afreximbank African Trade Centre (AATC) outside of Africa in Bridgetown, Barbados. AATC Barbados will also host its regional office. The Barbados AATC is an authentic icon of trade embodying the ambition, resilience, and influence of leading commercial cities in Africa and the Caribbean that serve as dynamic focal points for commerce, fostering regional and global trade connections, and is expected to enhance intra-and extra-African trade, with a focus on countries of the Global South. Mr. Denys Denya, Afreximbank’s Senior Executive Vice President, commented: “Our QI 2025 results, which were in line with expectations, reflected a strong and resilient financial performance, notwithstanding continued macroeconomic challenges. With solid profitability growth, a strengthened liquidity position, and a well-capitalised balance sheet, the Group is firmly positioned to continue playing a pivotal role in advancing the aspirations of Africa and the Caribbean for economic transformation and sustainable development.” Highlights of the results for the Group are shown below:

    Income statement Financial Metrics

    Q1-2025

    Q1-2024

    Gross Income (US$ million)

    784.9

    753.8

    Operating Income (US$ million)

    474.2

    423.5

    Net Income (US$ million)

    215.4

    178.7

    Return on average assets (ROAA)

                2.38%

    2.19%

    Return on average equity (ROAE)

    12%

    12%

    Cost-to-income ratio

    16%

    15%

    Balance sheet financial metrics

    Q1-2025

    FY-2024

    Total Assets (US$ billion)

    37.0

    35.3

    Total Liabilities (US$ billion)

    29.5

    28.1

    Shareholders’ Funds (US$ billion)

    7.5

    7.2

    Net asset value per share (US$)

    71,671

    69,695

    Non-performing loans ratio (NPL)

    2.44%

    2.33%

    Cash/Total assets

    20%

    13%

    Capital Adequacy ratio (Basel II)

    26%

    24%

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Afreximbank. Media Contact: Vincent Musumba Communications and Events Manager (Media Relations) Email: press@afreximbank.com Follow us on: X: https://apo-opa.co/43pfUK5  Facebook: https://apo-opa.co/43uKQbW  LinkedIn: https://apo-opa.co/4jhrbSL  Instagram: https://apo-opa.co/43DKyk2 About Afreximbank: African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) is a Pan-African multilateral financial institution mandated to finance and promote intra- and extra-African trade. For over 30 years, the Bank has been deploying innovative structures to deliver financing solutions that support the transformation of the structure of Africa’s trade, accelerating industrialisation and intra-regional trade, thereby boosting economic expansion in Africa. A stalwart supporter of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), Afreximbank has launched a Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) that was adopted by the African Union (AU) as the payment and settlement platform to underpin the implementation of the AfCFTA. Working with the AfCFTA Secretariat and the AU, the Bank has set up a US$10 billion Adjustment Fund to support countries effectively participating in the AfCFTA. At the end of December 2024, Afreximbank’s total assets and contingencies stood at over US$40.1 billion, and its shareholder funds amounted to US$7.2 billion. Afreximbank has investment grade ratings assigned by GCR (international scale) (A), Moody’s (Baa1), China Chengxin International Credit Rating Co., Ltd (CCXI) (AAA), Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR) (A-) and Fitch (BBB). Afreximbank has evolved into a group entity comprising the Bank, its equity impact fund subsidiary called the Fund for Export Development Africa (FEDA), and its insurance management subsidiary, AfrexInsure (together, “the Group”). The Bank is headquartered in Cairo, Egypt. For more information, visit: www.Afreximbank.com Forward-Looking Statements: The Bank makes written and/or oral forward-looking statements, as shown in this presentation and in other communications, from time to time. Likewise, officers of the Bank may make forward-looking statements either in writing or during verbal conversations with investors, analysts, the media, and other key members of the investment community. Statements regarding the Bank’s strategies, objectives, priorities, and anticipated financial performance for the year, constitute forward-looking statements. They are often described with words like “should”, “would”, “may”, “could”, “expect”, “anticipate”, “estimate”, “project”, “intend”, and “believe”. By their very nature, these statements require the Bank to make assumptions that are subject to risks and uncertainties, especially uncertainties related to the financial, economic, regulatory, and social environment within which the Bank operates. Some of these risks are beyond the control of the Bank and may make actual results that are obtained to vary materially from the expectations inferred from the forward-looking statements. Risk factors that could cause such differences include regulatory pronouncements, credit, market (including equity, commodity, foreign exchange, and interest rate), liquidity, operational, reputational, insurance, strategic, legal, environmental, and other known and unknown risks. As a result, when making decisions with respect to the Bank, we recommend that readers apply further assessment and should not unduly rely on the Bank’s forward-looking statements. Any forward-looking statement contained in this presentation represents the views of management only as of the date hereof and they are presented for the purpose of assisting the Bank’s investors and analysts to understand the Bank’s financial position, strategies, objectives, priorities, anticipated financial performance in relation to the current period, and, as such, may not be appropriate for other purposes. The Bank does not undertake to update any forward-looking statement, whether written or verbal, that may be made from time to time, by it or on its behalf, except as required under applicable relevant regulatory provisions or requirements.

    Text copied to clipboard.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Europe: European Union – Foreign Affairs Council meeting of May 20 (21 May 2025)

    Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

    France took part in the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Brussels on May 20. This meeting focused on the situation in Ukraine and the Middle East.

    With regard to Ukraine, France welcomed the adoption of an ambitious sanctions package against Russia – the 17th – which must now be further strengthened, as that country is still refusing to negotiate a peace agreement. France is determined to continue current efforts to give Ukraine solid security guarantees.

    France reiterated its strong condemnation of the expansion of Israeli military operations in Gaza and its blockade against humanitarian aid, which violates the principles of international law. France stressed its strong concern over Israel’s settlement policy and underscored the need for an agreement by Member States on sanctions against violent settlers and entities that promote settlement activity. It also called on the EU to take concrete measures, including the reexamination of the association agreement between the EU and Israel, and commended the High Representative’s announcement in this regard at the end of the meeting. France reaffirmed its commitment to the two-State solution and noted its efforts to ensure its implementation at the conference it will co-chair with Saudi Arabia this June in New York.

    As for Syria, France supported the decision to lift economic sanctions against the country. This historic decision is the concrete expression of the commitments France made to the transition authorities with a view to supporting Syria’s economic recovery and transition process. France also emphasized that the easing of sanctions should go hand in hand with solid guarantees on transparency, the proper use of international funds and respect for our political conditions. The EU will have to continue ensuring that priority challenges are taken into account, especially the fight against terrorism. At France’s initiative, the EU member States also pledged to adopt sanctions against the perpetrators of human rights violations committed in Syria since the fall of Bashar al-Assad.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Lackawanna, New York, Man Going to Prison for His Role in Kidnapping Conspiracy Attempting to Force Sister to Marry in Yemen

    Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) State Crime Alerts (c)

    BUFFALO, N.Y. – U.S. Attorney Michael DiGiacomo announced today that Waleed Abughanem, 33, of Lackawanna, NY, who was convicted of misprision of felony, was sentenced to serve 36 months in prison by U.S. District Judge John L. Sinatra, Jr.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Charles M. Kruly and Maeve E. Huggins, who handled the case, stated that Abughanem is the son of Khaled Abughanem and the brother of Adham Abughanem. On September 8, 2021, Khaled and Adham Abughanem flew from Buffalo, NY, to Guadalajara, Mexico to kidnap Victim 1, who is the daughter of Khaled and the sister of Adham and Waleed. Between September 10, 2021, and April 6, 2023, Waleed, Khaled and Adham Abughanem conspired to transport Victim 1 from the Western District of New York to Cairo, Egypt, and then to Sanaa, Yemen, where they confined Victim 1 for approximately 16 months with the purpose of marrying her to a man not of her choosing.

    Waleed Abughanem knew Victim 1 was being held involuntarily, and during some of this period, he was present in Yemen. When he was not present in Yemen, Waleed Abughanem instructed his wife to monitor and supervise Victim 1. In December 2022, Waleed Abughanem traveled from Yemen to the United States. When questioned by U.S. Customs and Border Protection as to the whereabouts of his siblings, Waleed Abughanem told the CBP Officer that the Victim was in the United States. By making a false statement, Waleed Abughanem concealed that Victim 1 had been kidnapped and was being involuntarily held in Yemen.

    Khaled and Adham Abughanem were previously convicted by a federal jury at trial and are awaiting sentencing.

    Waleed Abughanem’s sentencing is the result of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, under the direction of Special Agent-in-Charge Matthew Miraglia, and the U.S. Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service, under the direction of Diplomatic Security Director Carlos Matus and Deputy Assistant Secretary Paul Houston. Additional assistance was provided by the Lackawanna Police Department, under the direction of Chief Mark Packard, Customs and Border Protection, under the direction of Director of Field Operations Rose Brophy, and CPB in Boston, Massachusetts.

    # # # #

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Award-winning author to hold talk at Central Library

    Source: Scotland – City of Aberdeen

    An international award-winning author will be hosting a free talk this Saturday at Aberdeen Central Library.  

    Leila Aboulela will discuss her latest book ‘A New Year’, released as part of this year’s World Book Night, as well as talking about her career, inspirations and love of reading and writing.  

    Councillor Martin Greig, Aberdeen City Council’s culture spokesperson, said: “We are delighted to welcome such a distinguished author to our library.  

    “Leila’s work is hugely influential and insightful and I encourage everyone to come along and be inspired.” 

    Leila Aboulela said: “I am delighted to be back at the central library. Here in the early 1990s, my ambition to become a writer was first ignited.  

    “I attended creative writing workshops and author events which introduced me to the works of Scotland’s top writers. And of course I borrowed and read lots of books. I also made friends at the library, lifelong friends. The library will always be one of my favourite places in Aberdeen.” 

    The talk will be followed by a book signing, and copies of Leila’s books will be available to purchase.  

    Born in Cairo, Egypt, and brought up in Khartoum, Sudan, Leila began her literary career after moving to Aberdeen. Her work has received critical recognition for its depiction of the interior lives of Muslim women and the exploration of identity, migration and Islamic spirituality.  

    An Afternoon with Leila Aboulela will be held on Saturday 24 May at 2:30pm at Aberdeen Central Library. Booking is required to attend this event. To reserve a place, please email libraryevents@aberdeencity.gov.uk or phone 01224 070707.  

    Image credit: Rania Rustom 

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Russia: HSE students win gold medals at international mathematical Olympiad in Ashgabat

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

    In Ashgabat (Turkmenistan) was held V Open Mathematical Olympiad for Students OMOUS-2025 (Open Mathematical Olympiad for University Students), which brought together teams from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Iran, Romania, Poland, the United Arab Emirates, Russia and India. In total, about 500 students joined the event.

    Four undergraduate students from HSE took part in the competition.Applied Mathematics and Computer ScienceFaculty of Computer Science (FKN) Vasily Silvestrov, Bogdan Butyrin, Daniil Soulnov and Anastasia Salimova, as well as the team coach, expert Center for Student Olympiads Igor Vorontsov.

    The Olympiad consisted of two rounds: individual and team. The individual round lasted four hours, the participants were asked to solve six problems. In this competition, the students of the Faculty of Computer Science showed excellent results, winning gold medals.

    The team round of the Olympiad took place the next day and lasted two hours, during which ten problems had to be solved. Here, the FKN team took second place, scoring 69 points out of 100.

    Vasily Silvestrov

    — Preparing for the problems of previous years, we understood that the Olympiad is not easy, but we have a good chance of winning gold medals. For me, this was the first international Olympiad, which added reasons to be nervous. We got a lot of points on the appeal. We prepared for it for two nights: we wrote alternative solutions and prepared criteria for them. Overall, it was an unforgettable experience: interesting culture, a beautiful city, delicious food. I would like to thank the organizers of the Olympiad for choosing and preparing the problems. We hope that next year, our university teams will also achieve excellent results.

    Text: Maria Vorontsova

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Reeves must resign over second wave of austerity

    Source: Scottish Greens

    Patrick Harvie calls for UK to take action on Israeli aid blockade

    Israeli forces must urgently allow aid to reach extremely vulnerable children, says Scottish Greens Co-Leader Patrick Harvie MSP, ahead of a Parliamentary committee hearing from aid agencies working in Gaza and the West Bank.

    It comes after warnings yesterday from the United Nations that 14,000 babies could die in Gaza unless extra aid arrived. Israel claims to have ended their 11-week aid blockade of Gaza, but the UN has warned that the aid trucks allowed in so far are just a “drop in the ocean” compared to what Gaza needs.

    Scottish Greens have continually called for the UK & Scottish Governments to end complicity in the war crimes being committed by Israel.

    The Labour UK Government has provided more arms to Israel in three months than the previous three years under Conservative governments, and the SNP Scottish Government have continued to fund arms manufacturers who produce parts for the F-35 fighter jets which have been used by Israel.

    Scottish Greens Co-Leader Patrick Harvie MSP said:

    “The situation in Gaza is unprecedented in modern times, with the world allowing Israel to inflict  collective punishment on a grotesque scale. Aid blockades and genocide are never acceptable yet governments across the West have overlooked Israel’s war crimes.

    “Israeli forces have withheld urgent aid from civilians for over 11 weeks, and despite their claims to be allowing aid into Palestinian territory, we have heard from the front lines that what is being allowed to enter is nowhere near enough.

    “Senior Ministers in the Israeli Government are quite explicit about their intention to destroy Palestinian life in Gaza, and their utter contempt for international law.

    “The UK Labour Government have blood on their hands, they have continued to enable and support Israel’s war crimes throughout this disgraceful campaign. They must now surely end all trade with Israel, and join with other countries to ensure that urgent aid is provided to meet the immediate needs of the people of Gaza.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Security: Russian GRU Targeting Western Logistics Entities and Technology Companies

    Source: US Department of Homeland Security

    Executive Summary

    This joint cybersecurity advisory (CSA) highlights a Russian state-sponsored cyber campaign targeting Western logistics entities and technology companies. This includes those involved in the coordination, transport, and delivery of foreign assistance to Ukraine. Since 2022, Western logistics entities and IT companies have faced an elevated risk of targeting by the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (85th GTsSS), military unit 26165—tracked in the cybersecurity community under several names (see “Cybersecurity Industry Tracking”). The actors’ cyber espionage-oriented campaign, targeting technology companies and logistics entities, uses a mix of previously disclosed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The authoring agencies expect similar targeting and TTP use to continue.

    Executives and network defenders at logistics entities and technology companies should recognize the elevated threat of unit 26165 targeting, increase monitoring and threat hunting for known TTPs and indicators of compromise (IOCs), and posture network defenses with a presumption of targeting.

    This cyber espionage-oriented campaign targeting logistics entities and technology companies uses a mix of previously disclosed TTPs and is likely connected to these actors’ wide scale targeting of IP cameras in Ukraine and bordering NATO nations.

    The following authors and co-sealers are releasing this CSA:

    • United States National Security Agency (NSA)
    • United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
    • United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK)
    • Germany Federal Intelligence Service (BND) Bundesnachrichtendienst
    • Germany Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
    • Germany Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz
    • Czech Republic Military Intelligence (VZ)  Vojenské zpravodajství
    • Czech Republic National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB) Národní úřad pro kybernetickou a informační bezpečnost
    • Czech Republic Security Information Service (BIS) Bezpečnostní informační služba
    • Poland Internal Security Agency (ABW) Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego
    • Poland Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW) Służba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego
    • United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
    • United States Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)
    • United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)
    • Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC)
    • Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS)
    • Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste
    • Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) Välisluureamet
    • Estonian National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-EE) Küberturvalisuse keskus
    • French Cybersecurity Agency (ANSSI) Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information
    • Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst
       

    Download the PDF version of this report:

    Russian GRU Targeting Western Logistics Entities and Technology Companies (PDF, 1,081KB)

    For a downloadable list of IOCs, visit:

    Introduction

    For over two years, the Russian GRU 85th GTsSS, military unit 26165—commonly known in the cybersecurity community as APT28, Fancy Bear, Forest Blizzard, BlueDelta, and a variety of other identifiers—has conducted this campaign using a mix of known tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), including reconstituted password spraying capabilities, spearphishing, and modification of Microsoft Exchange mailbox permissions.
    In late February 2022, multiple Russian state-sponsored cyber actors increased the variety of cyber operations for purposes of espionage, destruction, and influence—with unit 26165 predominately involved in espionage. [1] As Russian military forces failed to meet their military objectives and Western countries provided aid to support Ukraine’s territorial defense, unit 26165 expanded its targeting of logistics entities and technology companies involved in the delivery of aid. These actors have also targeted Internet-connected cameras at Ukrainian border crossings to monitor and track aid shipments.
    Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 17. See Appendix A: MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. This advisory uses the MITRE D3FEND® framework, version 1.0.

    Description of Targets

    The GRU unit 26165 cyber campaign against Western logistics providers and technology companies has targeted dozens of entities, including government organizations and private/commercial entities across virtually all transportation modes: air, sea, and rail. These actors have targeted entities associated with the following verticals within NATO member states, Ukraine, and at international organizations: 

    •  Defense Industry
    • Transportation and Transportation Hubs (ports, airports, etc.)
    • Maritime
    • Air Traffic Management
    • IT Services

    In the course of the targeting lifecycle, unit 26165 actors identified and conducted follow-on targeting of additional entities in the transportation sector that had business ties to the primary target, exploiting trust relationships to attempt to gain additional access [T1199].

    The actors also conducted reconnaissance on at least one entity involved in the production of industrial control system (ICS) components for railway management, though a successful compromise was not confirmed [TA0043].

    The countries with targeted entities include the following, as illustrated in Figure 1:

    • Bulgaria
    • Czech Republic
    • France
    • Germany
    • Greece
    • Italy
    • Moldova
    • Netherlands
    • Poland
    • Romania
    • Slovakia
    • Ukraine
    • United States
       
    Figure 1: Countries with Targeted Entities

    Initial Access TTPs

    To gain initial access to targeted entities, unit 26165 actors used several techniques to gain initial access to targeted entities, including (but not limited to):

    The actors abused vulnerabilities associated with a range of brands and models of small office/home office (SOHO) devices to facilitate covert cyber operations, as well as proxy malicious activity via devices with geolocation in proximity to the target [T1665]. [2]

    Credential Guessing/Brute Force

    Unit 26165 actors’ credential guessing [T1110.001] operations in this campaign exhibit some similar characteristics to those disclosed in the previous CSA “Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments.” [3] Based on victim network investigations, the current iteration of this TTP employs a similar blend of anonymization infrastructure, including the use of Tor and commercial VPNs [T1090.003]. The actors frequently rotated the IP addresses used to further hamper detection. All observed connections were made via encrypted TLS [T1573]. 

    Spearphishing

    GRU unit 26165 actors’ spearphishing emails included links [T1566.002] leading to fake login pages impersonating a variety of government entities and Western cloud email providers’ webpages. These webpages were typically hosted on free third-party services or compromised SOHO devices and often used legitimate documents associated with thematically similar entities as lures. The subjects of spearphishing emails were diverse and ranged from professional topics to adult themes. Phishing emails were frequently sent via compromised accounts or free webmail accounts [T1586.002, T1586.003]. The emails were typically written in the target’s native language and sent to a single targeted recipient. 

    Some campaigns employed multi-stage redirectors [T1104] verifying IP-geolocation [T1627.001] and browser fingerprints [T1627] to protect credential harvesting infrastructure or provide multifactor authentication (MFA) [T1111] and CAPTCHA relaying capabilities [T1056]. Connecting endpoints failing the location checks were redirected to a benign URL [T1627], such as msn.com. Redirector services used include:

    • Webhook[.]site
    • FrgeIO
    • InfinityFree
    • Dynu
    • Mocky
    • Pipedream
    • Mockbin[.]org

    The actors also used spearphishing to deliver malware (including HEADLACE and MASEPIE) executables [T1204.002] delivered via third-party services and redirectors [T1566.002], scripts in a mix of languages [T1059] (including BAT [T1059.003] and VBScript [T1059.005]) and links to hosted shortcuts [T1204.001].

    CVE Usage

    Throughout this campaign, GRU unit 26165 weaponized an Outlook NTLM vulnerability (CVE-2023-23397) to collect NTLM hashes and credentials via specially crafted Outlook calendar appointment invitations [T1187]. [4],[5] These actors also used a series of Roundcube CVEs (CVE-2020-12641, CVE-2020-35730, and CVE-2021-44026) to execute arbitrary shell commands [T1059], gain access to victim email accounts, and retrieve sensitive data from email servers [T1114].

    Since at least fall 2023, the actors leveraged a WinRAR vulnerability (CVE-2023-38831) allowing for the execution of arbitrary code embedded in an archive as a means of initial access [T1659]. The actors sent emails with malicious attachments [T1566.001] or embedded hyperlinks [T1566.002] that downloaded a malicious archive prepared using this CVE. 

    Post-Compromise TTPs

    After an initial compromise using one of the above techniques, unit 26165 actors conducted contact information reconnaissance to identify additional targets in key positions [T1589.002]. The actors also conducted reconnaissance of the cybersecurity department [T1591], individuals responsible for coordinating transport [T1591.004], and other companies cooperating with the victim entity [T1591.002].

    The actors used native commands and open source tools, such as Impacket and PsExec, to move laterally within the environment [TA0008]. Multiple Impacket scripts were used as .exe files, in addition to the python versions, depending on the victim environment. The actors also moved laterally within the network using Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) [T1021.001] to access additional hosts and attempt to dump Active Directory NTDS.dit domain databases [T1003.003] using native Active Directory Domain Services commands, such as in Figure 2: Example Active Directory Domain Services command:

    C:Windowssystem32ntdsutil.exe "activate instance ntds" ifm "create full C:temp[a-z]{3}" quit quit

    Figure 2: Example Active Directory Domain Services command

    Additionally, GRU unit 26165 actors used the tools Certipy and ADExplorer.exe to exfiltrate information from the Active Directory. The actors installed python [T1059.006] on infected machines to enable the execution of Certipy. Accessed files were archived in .zip files prior to exfiltration [T1560]. The actors attempted to exfiltrate archived data via a previously dropped OpenSSH binary [T1048].

    Incident response investigations revealed that the actors would take steps to locate and exfiltrate lists of Office 365 users and set up sustained email collection. The actors used manipulation of mailbox permissions [T1098.002] to establish sustained email collection at compromised logistics entities, as detailed in a Polish Cybercommand blog. [6]

    After initial authentication, unit 26165 actors would change accounts’ folder permissions and enroll compromised accounts in MFA mechanisms to increase the trust-level of compromised accounts and enable sustained access [T1556.006]. The actors leveraged python scripts to retrieve plaintext passwords via Group Policy Preferences [T1552.006] using Get-GPPPassword.py and a modified ldap-dump.py to enumerate the Windows environment [T1087.002] and conduct a brute force password spray [T1110.003] via Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). The actors would additionally delete event logs through the wevtutil utility [T1070.001].

    After gaining initial access to the network, the actors pursued further access to accounts with access to sensitive information on shipments, such as train schedules and shipping manifests. These accounts contained information on aid shipments to Ukraine, including: 

    • sender,
    • recipient,
    • train/plane/ship numbers,
    • point of departure,
    • destination,
    • container registration numbers,
    • travel route, and
    • cargo contents. 

    In at least one instance, the actors attempted to use voice phishing [T1566.004] to gain access to privileged accounts by impersonating IT staff.

    Malware

    Unit 26165’s use of malware in this campaign ranged from gaining initial access to establishing persistence and exfiltrating data. In some cases, the attack chain resulted in multiple pieces of malware being deployed in succession. The actors used dynamic link library (DLL) search order hijacking [T1574.001] to facilitate malware execution. There were a number of known malware variants tied to this campaign against logistics sector victims, including:

    • HEADLACE [7]
    • MASEPIE [8]

    While other malware variants, such as OCEANMAP and STEELHOOK, [8] were not directly observed targeting logistics or IT entities, their deployment against victims in other sectors in Ukraine and other Western countries suggest that they could be deployed against logistics and IT entities should the need arise. 

    Persistence

    In addition to the abovementioned mailbox permissions abuse, unit 26165 actors also used scheduled tasks [T1053.005], run keys [T1547.001], and placed malicious shortcuts [T1547.009] in the startup folder to establish persistence. 

    Exfiltration

    GRU unit 26165 actors used a variety of methods for data exfiltration that varied based on the victim environment, including both malware and living off the land binaries. PowerShell commands [T1059.001] were often used to prepare data for exfiltration; for example, the actors prepared zip archives [T1560.001] for upload to their own infrastructure. 

    The actors also used server data exchange protocols and Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) such as Exchange Web Services (EWS) and Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) [T1114.002] to exfiltrate data from email servers. In multiple instances, the actors used periodic EWS queries [T1119] to collect new emails sent and received since the last data exfiltration [T1029]. The actors typically used infrastructure in close geographic proximity to the victim. Long gaps between exfiltration, the use of trusted and legitimate protocols, and the use of local infrastructure allowed for long-term collection of sensitive data to go undetected. 

    Connections to Targeting of IP Cameras

    In addition to targeting logistics entities, unit 26165 actors likely used access to private cameras at key locations, such as near border crossings, military installations, and rail stations, to track the movement of materials into Ukraine. The actors also used legitimate municipal services, such as traffic cams. 

    The actors targeted Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) servers hosting IP cameras primarily located in Ukraine as early as March 2022 in a large-scale campaign, which included attempts to enumerate devices [T1592] and gain access to the cameras’ feeds [T1125]. Actor-controlled servers sent RTSP DESCRIBE requests destined for RTSP servers, primarily hosting IP cameras [T1090.002]. The DESCRIBE requests were crafted to obtain access to IP cameras located on logically distinct networks from that of the routers that received the request. The requests included Base64-encoded credentials for the RTSP server, which included publicly documented default credentials and likely generic attempts to brute force access to the devices [T1110]. An example of an RTSP request is shown in Figure 3.

    DESCRIBE rtsp://[IP ADDRESS] RTSP/1.0

    CSeq: 1

    Authorization: Basic

    User-Agent: WebClient

    Accept: application/sdp

    DESCRIBE rtsp://[IP ADDRESS] RTSP/1.0

    CSeq: 2

    Authorization: Digest username="admin", realm="[a-f0-9]{12}", algorithm="MD5", nonce="[a-f0-9]{32}", uri="", response="[a-f0-9]{32}"

    User-Agent: WebClient

    Accept: application/sdp

    Figure 3: Example RTSP request

    Successful RTSP 200 OK responses contained a snapshot of the IP camera’s image and IP camera metadata such as video codec, resolution, and other properties depending on the IP camera’s configuration. 

    From a sample available to the authoring agencies of over 10,000 cameras targeted via this effort, the geographic distribution of victims showed a strong focus on cameras in Ukraine and border countries, as shown in Table 1:

    Table 1: Geographic distribution of targeted IP cameras
    Country Percentage of Total Attempts
    Ukraine 81.0%
    Romania 9.9%
    Poland 4.0%
    Hungary 2.8%
    Slovakia 1.7%
    Others 0.6%

    Mitigation Actions

    General Security Mitigations

    Architecture and Configuration

    • Employ appropriate network segmentation [D3-NI] and restrictions to limit access and utilize additional attributes (such as device information, environment, and access path) when making access decisions [D3-AMED].
      • Consider Zero Trust principles when designing systems. Base product choices on how those products can solve specific risks identified as part of the end-to-end design. [9]
    • Ensure that host firewalls and network security appliances (e.g., firewalls) are configured to only allow legitimately needed data flows between devices and servers to prevent lateral movement [D3-ITF]. Alert on attempts to connect laterally between host devices or other unusual data flows.
    • Use automated tools to audit access logs for security concerns and identify anomalous access requests [D3-RAPA].
    • For organizations using on-premises authentication and email services, block and alert on NTLM/SMB requests to external infrastructure [D3-OTF].
    • Utilize endpoint, detection, and response (EDR) and other cybersecurity solutions on all systems, prioritizing high value systems with large amounts of sensitive data such as mail servers and domain controllers [D3-PM] first.
      • Perform threat and attack modeling to understand how sensitive systems may be compromised within an organization’s specific architecture and security controls. Use this to develop a monitoring strategy to detect compromise attempts and select appropriate products to enact this strategy.
    • Collect and monitor Windows logs for certain events, especially for events that indicate that a log was cleared unexpectedly [D3-SFA].
    • Enable optional security features in Windows to harden endpoints and mitigate initial access techniques [D3-AH]:
      • Enable attack surface reduction rules to prevent executable content from email [D3-ABPI].
      • Enable attack surface reduction rules to prevent execution of files from globally writeable directories, such as Downloads or %APPDATA% [D3-EAL].
      • Unless users are involved in the development of scripts, limit the local execution of scripts (such as batch scripts, VBScript, JScript/JavaScript, and PowerShell [10]) to known scripts [D3-EI], and audit execution attempts.
      • Disable Windows Host Scripting functionality and configure PowerShell to run in Constrained mode [D3-ACH].
    • Where feasible, implement allowlisting for applications and scripts to limit execution to only those needed for authorized activities, blocking all others by default [D3-EAL].
    • Consider using open source SIGMA rules as a baseline for detecting and alerting on suspicious file execution or command parameters [D3-PSA].
    • Use services that provide enhanced browsing services and safe link checking [D3-URA]. Significant reductions in successful spearphishing attempts were noted when email providers began offering link checking and automatic file detonation to block malicious content.
    • Where possible, block logins from public VPNs, including exit nodes in the same country as target systems, or, if they need to be allowed, alert on them for further investigation. Most organizations should not need to allow incoming traffic, especially logins to systems, from VPN services [D3-NAM].
    • Educate users to only use approved corporate systems for relevant government and military business and avoid the use of personal accounts on cloud email providers to conduct official business. Network administrators should also audit both email and web request logs to detect such activity.

    Many organizations may not need to allow outgoing traffic to hosting and API mocking services, which are frequently used by GRU unit 26165. Organizations should consider alerting on or blocking the following services, with exceptions allowlisted for legitimate activity [D3-DNSDL].

    • *.000[.]pe
    • *.1cooldns[.]com
    • *.42web[.]io
    • *.4cloud[.]click
    • *.accesscan[.]org
    • *.bumbleshrimp[.]com
    • *.camdvr[.]org
    • *.casacam[.]net
    • *.ddnsfree[.]com
    • *.ddnsgeek[.]com
    • *.ddnsguru[.]com
    • *.dynuddns[.]com
    • *.dynuddns[.]net
    • *.free[.]nf
    • *.freeddns[.]org
    • *.frge[.]io
    • *.glize[.]com
    • *.great-site[.]net
    • *.infinityfreeapp[.]com
    • *.kesug[.]com
    • *.loseyourip[.]com
    • *.lovestoblog[.]com
    • *.mockbin[.]io
    • *.mockbin[.]org
    • *.mocky[.]io
    • *.mybiolink[.]io
    • *.mysynology[.]net
    • *.mywire[.]org
    • *.ngrok[.]io
    • *.ooguy[.]com
    • *.pipedream[.]net
    • *.rf[.]gd
    • *.urlbae[.]com
    • *.webhook[.]site
    • *.webhookapp[.]com
    • *.webredirect[.]org
    • *.wuaze[.]com

    Heuristic detections for web requests to new subdomains, including of the above providers, may uncover malicious phishing activity [D3-DNRA]. Logging the requests for each sub-domain requested by users on a network, such as in DNS or firewall logs, may enable system administrators to identify new targeting and victims.

    Identity and Access Management

    Organizations should take measures to ensure strong access controls and mitigate against common credential theft techniques: 

    • Use MFA with strong factors, such as passkeys or PKI smartcards, and require regular re-authentication [D3-MFA]. [11], [12] Strong authentication factors are not guessable using dictionary techniques, so they resist brute force attempts.
    • Implement other mitigations for privileged accounts: including limiting the number of admin accounts, considering using hardware MFA tokens, and regularly reviewing all privileged user accounts [D3-JFAPA].
    • Separate privileged accounts by role and alert on misuse of privileged accounts [D3-UAP]. For example, email administrator accounts should be different from domain administrator accounts.
    • Reduce reliance on passwords; instead, consider using services like single sign-on [D3-TBA].
      • For organizations using on-premises authentication and email services, plan to disable NTLM entirely and migrate to more robust authentication processes such as PKI certificate authentication.
    • Do not store passwords in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). Remove all passwords previously included in GPP and change all passwords on the corresponding accounts [D3-CH]. [13]
    • Use account throttling or account lockout [D3-ANET]:
      • Throttling is preferred to lockout. Throttling progressively increases time delay between successive login attempts.
      • Account lockout can leave legitimate users unable to access their accounts and requires access to an account recovery process.
      • Account lockout can provide a malicious actor with an easy way to launch a Denial of Service (DoS).
      • If using lockout, then allowing 5 to 10 attempts before lockout is recommended.
    • Use a service to check for compromised passwords before using them [D3-SPP]. For example, “Have I Been Pwned” can be used to check whether a password has been previously compromised without disclosing the potential password.
    • Change all default credentials [D3-CRO] and disable protocols that use weak authentication (e.g., clear-text passwords or outdated and vulnerable authentication or encryption protocols) or do not support multi-factor authentication [D3-ACH] [D3-ET]. Always configure access controls carefully to ensure that only well-maintained and well-authenticated accounts have access. [13]

    IP Camera Mitigations

    The following mitigation techniques for IP cameras can be used to defend against this type of malicious activity:

    • Ensure IP cameras are currently supported. Replace devices that are out of support.
    • Apply security patches and firmware updates to all IP cameras [D3-SU].
    • Disable remote access to the IP camera, if unnecessary [D3-ITF].
    • Ensure cameras are protected by a security appliance, if possible, such as by using a firewall to prevent communication with the camera from IP addresses not on an allowlist [D3-NAM].
    • If remote access to IP camera feeds is required, ensure authentication is enabled [D3-AA] and use a VPN to connect remotely [D3-ET]. Use MFA for management accounts if supported [D3-MFA].
    • Disable Universal Plug and Play (UPnP), Peer-to-Peer (P2P), and Anonymous Visit features on IP cameras and routers [D3-NI].
    • Turn off other ports/services not in use (e.g., FTP, web interface, etc.) [D3-ACH].
    • If supported, enable authenticated RTSP access only [D3-AA].
    • Review all authentication activity for remote access to make sure it is valid and expected [D3-UBA]. Investigate any unexpected or unusual activity.
    • Audit IP camera user accounts to ensure they are an accurate reflection of your organization and that they are being used as expected [D3-UAP].
    • Configure, tune, and monitor logging—if available—on the IP camera.

    Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

    Note: Specific IoCs may no longer be actor controlled, may themselves be compromised infrastructure or email accounts, or may be shared infrastructure such as public VPN or Tor exit nodes. Care should be taken when basing triaging logs or developing detection rules on these indicators. GRU unit 26165 almost certainly uses extensive further infrastructure and TTPs not specifically listed in this report.

    Utilities and scripts

    Legitimate utilities

    Unauthorized or unusual use of the following legitimate utilities can be an indication of a potential compromise:

    • ntdsutil – A legitimate Windows executable used by threat actors to export contents of Active Directory
    • wevtutil – A legitimate Windows executable used by threat actors to delete event logs
    • vssadmin – A legitimate Windows executable possibly used by threat actors to make a copy of the server’s C: drive
    • ADexplorer – A legitimate window executable to view, edit, and backup Active Directory Certificate Services
    • OpenSSH – The Windows version of a legitimate open source SSH client
    • schtasks – A legitimate Windows executable used to create persistence using scheduled tasks
    • whoami – A legitimate Windows executable used to retrieve the name of the current user
    • tasklist – A legitimate Windows executable used to retrieve the list of running processes
    • hostname – A legitimate Windows executable used to retrieve the device name
    • arp – A legitimate Windows executable used to retrieve the ARP table for mapping the network environment
    • systeminfo – A legitimate Windows executable used to retrieve a comprehensive summary of device and operating system information
    • net – A legitimate Windows executable used to retrieve detailed user information
    • wmic – A legitimate Windows executable used to interact with Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), such as to retrieve letters assigned to logical partitions on storage drives
    • cacls – A legitimate Windows executable used to modify permissions on files
    • icacls – A legitimate Windows executable used to modify permissions to files and handle integrity levels and ownership
    • ssh – A legitimate Windows executable used to establish network shell connections
    • reg – A legitimate Windows executable used to add to or modify the system registry 

    Note: Additional heuristics are needed for effective hunting for these and other living off the land (LOTL) binaries to avoid being overwhelmed by false positives if these legitimate management tools are used regularly. See the joint guide, Identifying and Mitigating Living Off the Land Techniques, for guidance on developing a multifaceted cybersecurity strategy that enables behavior analytics, anomaly detection, and proactive hunting, which are part of a comprehensive approach to mitigating cyber threats that employ LOTL techniques.

    Malicious scripts

    • Certipy – An open source python tool for enumerating and abusing Active Directory Certificate Services
    • Get-GPPPassword.py – An open source python script for finding insecure passwords stored in Group Policy Preferences
    • ldap-dump.py – A script for enumerating user accounts and other information in Active Directory
    • Hikvision backdoor string: “YWRtaW46MTEK”

    Suspicious command lines

    While the following utilities are legitimate, and using them with the command lines shown may also be legitimate, these command lines are often used during malicious activities and could be an indication of a compromise:

    • edge.exe “-headless-new -disable-gpu”
    • ntdsutil.exe “activate instance ntds” ifm “create full C:temp[a-z]{3}” quit quit
    • ssh -Nf
    • schtasks /create /xml

    Outlook CVE Exploitation IOCs

    • md-shoeb@alfathdoor[.]com[.]sa
    • jayam@wizzsolutions[.]com
    • accounts@regencyservice[.]in
    • m.salim@tsc-me[.]com
    • vikram.anand@4ginfosource[.]com
    • mdelafuente@ukwwfze[.]com
    • sarah@cosmicgold469[.]co[.]za
    • franch1.lanka@bplanka[.]com
    • commerical@vanadrink[.]com
    • maint@goldenloaduae[.]com
    • karina@bhpcapital[.]com
    • tv@coastalareabank[.]com
    • ashoke.kumar@hbclife[.]in
    • 213[.]32[.]252[.]221
    • 124[.]168[.]91[.]178
    • 194[.]126[.]178[.]8
    • 159[.]196[.]128[.]120

    Commonly Used Webmail Providers

    • portugalmail[.]pt
    • mail-online[.]dk
    • email[.]cz
    • seznam[.]cz

    Malicious Archive Filenames Involving CVE-2023-38831

    • calc.war.zip
    • news_week_6.zip
    • Roadmap.zip
    • SEDE-PV-2023-10-09-1_EN.zip
    • war.zip
    • Zeyilname.zip

    Brute Forcing IP Addresses

    Disclaimer: These IP addresses date June 2024 through August 2024. The authoring agencies recommend organizations investigate or vet these IP addresses prior to taking action, such as blocking.

    June 2024 July 2024 August 2024
    192[.]162[.]174[.]94 207[.]244[.]71[.]84 31[.]135[.]199[.]145 79[.]184[.]25[.]198 91[.]149[.]253[.]204  
    103[.]97[.]203[.]29 162[.]210[.]194[.]2 31[.]42[.]4[.]138 79[.]185[.]5[.]142 91[.]149[.]254[.]75  
    209[.]14[.]71[.]127   46[.]112[.]70[.]252 83[.]10[.]46[.]174 91[.]149[.]255[.]122  
    109[.]95[.]151[.]207   46[.]248[.]185[.]236 83[.]168[.]66[.]145 91[.]149[.]255[.]19  
        64[.]176[.]67[.]117 83[.]168[.]78[.]27 91[.]149[.]255[.]195  
        64[.]176[.]69[.]196 83[.]168[.]78[.]31   91[.]221[.]88[.]76  
        64[.]176[.]70[.]18 83[.]168[.]78[.]55   93[.]105[.]185[.]139  
        64[.]176[.]70[.]238 83[.]23[.]130[.]49   95[.]215[.]76[.]209  
        64[.]176[.]71[.]201 83[.]29[.]138[.]115   138[.]199[.]59[.]43  
        70[.]34[.]242[.]220 89[.]64[.]70[.]69   147[.]135[.]209[.]245  
        70[.]34[.]243[.]226 90[.]156[.]4[.]204   178[.]235[.]191[.]182  
        70[.]34[.]244[.]100 91[.]149[.]202[.]215   178[.]37[.]97[.]243  
        70[.]34[.]245[.]215 91[.]149[.]203[.]73   185[.]234[.]235[.]69  
        70[.]34[.]252[.]168 91[.]149[.]219[.]158 192[.]162[.]174[.]67  
        70[.]34[.]252[.]186 91[.]149[.]219[.]23   194[.]187[.]180[.]20  
        70[.]34[.]252[.]222 91[.]149[.]223[.]130   212[.]127[.]78[.]170  
        70[.]34[.]253[.]13 91[.]149[.]253[.]118 213[.]134[.]184[.]167
        70[.]34[.]253[.]247   91[.]149[.]253[.]198    
        70[.]34[.]254[.]245 91[.]149[.]253[.]20    

    Detections

    Customized NTLM listener

    rule APT28_NTLM_LISTENER {

           meta:

                  description = "Detects NTLM listeners including APT28's custom one"

           strings:

                  $command_1 = "start-process powershell.exe -WindowStyle hidden"

                  $command_2 = "New-Object System.Net.HttpListener"

                  $command_3 = "Prefixes.Add('http://localhost:8080/')"

                  $command_4 = "-match 'Authorization'"

                  $command_5 = "GetValues('Authorization')"

                  $command_6 = "Request.RemoteEndPoint.Address.IPAddressToString"

                  $command_7 = "@(0x4e,0x54,0x4c,0x4d, 0x53,0x53,0x50,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x82,0x00,0x00,0x11,0x22,0x33,0x44,0x55,0x66,0x77,0x88,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00)"

                  $command_8 = ".AllKeys"

                  

                  $variable_1 = "$NTLMAuthentication" nocase

                  $variable_2 = "$NTLMType2" nocase

                  $variable_3 = "$listener" nocase

                  $variable_4 = "$hostip" nocase

                  $variable_5 = "$request" nocase

                  $variable_6 = "$ntlmt2" nocase

                  $variable_7 = "$NTLMType2Response" nocase

                  $variable_8 = "$buffer" nocase

           condition:

                  5 of ($command_*) 

                  or

                  all of ($variable_*)

    }

    HEADLACE shortcut

    rule APT28_HEADLACE_SHORTCUT {

           meta:

                  description = "Detects the HEADLACE backdoor shortcut dropper. Rule is meant for threat hunting."

           strings:

                  $type = "[InternetShortcut]" ascii nocase

                  $url  = "file://"

                  $edge = "msedge.exe"

                  $icon = "IconFile"

           condition:

                  all of them

    }

    HEADLACE credential dialogbox phishing 

    rule APT28_HEADLACE_CREDENTIALDIALOG {

           meta:

                  description = "Detects scripts used by APT28 to lure user into entering credentials"

           strings:

                  $command_1 = "while($true)"

                  $command_2 = "Get-Credential $(whoami)"

                  $command_3 = "Add-Content"

                  $command_4 = ".UserName"

                  $command_5 = ".GetNetworkCredential().Password"

                  $command_6 = "GetNetworkCredential().Password.Length -ne 0"

           condition:

                  5 of them

    }

    HEADLACE core script

    rule APT28_HEADLACE_CORE {

           meta:

                  description = "Detects HEADLACE core batch scripts"

           strings:

                  $chcp = "chcp 65001" ascii

                  $headless = "start "" msedge --headless=new --disable-gpu" ascii

                  

                  $command_1 = "taskkill /im msedge.exe /f" ascii

                  $command_2 = "whoami>"%programdata%" ascii

                  $command_3 = "timeout" ascii

                  $command_4 = "copy "%programdata%" ascii

                  $non_generic_del_1 = "del /q /f "%programdata%" ascii

                  $non_generic_del_3 = "del /q /f "%userprofile%Downloads" ascii

     

                  $generic_del = "del /q /f" ascii

           condition:

                  (

                          $chcp 

                          and 

                          $headless

                  )

                  and

                  (

                          1 of ($non_generic_del_*)

                          or

                          ($generic_del)

                          or

                          3 of ($command_*)

                  )

    }

    MASEPIE

    rule APT28_MASEPIE {

           meta:

                  description = "Detects MASEPIE python script"

           strings:

                  $masepie_unique_1 = "os.popen('whoami').read()"

                  $masepie_unique_2 = "elif message == 'check'"

                  $masepie_unique_3 = "elif message == 'send_file':"

                  $masepie_unique_4 = "elif message == 'get_file'"

                  $masepie_unique_5 = "enc_mes('ok'"

                  $masepie_unique_6 = "Bad command!'.encode('ascii'"

                  $masepie_unique_7 = "{user}{SEPARATOR}{k}"

                  $masepie_unique_8 = "raise Exception("Reconnect"

           condition:

                  3 of ($masepie_unique_*)

    }

    STEELHOOK

    rule APT28_STEELHOOK {

           meta:

                  description = "Detects APT28's STEELHOOK powershell script"

           strings:

                  $s_1 = "$($env:LOCALAPPDATAGoogleChromeUser DataLocal State)"

                  $s_2 = "$($env:LOCALAPPDATAGoogleChromeUser DataDefaultLogin Data)"

                  $s_3 = "$($env:LOCALAPPDATAMicrosoftEdgeUser DataLocal State)"

                  $s_4 = "$($env:LOCALAPPDATAMicrosoftEdgeUser DataDefaultLogin Data)"

                  $s_5 = "os_crypt.encrypted_key"

                  $s_6 = "System.Security.Cryptography.DataProtectionScope"

                  $s_7 = "[system.security.cryptography.protectdata]::Unprotect"

                  $s_8 = "Invoke-RestMethod"

           condition:

                  all of them

    }

    PSEXEC

    rule GENERIC_PSEXEC {

           meta:

                  description = "Detects SysInternals PSEXEC executable"

           strings:

                  $sysinternals_1 = "SYSINTERNALS SOFTWARE LICENCE TERMS"

                  $sysinternals_2 = "/accepteula"

                  $sysinternals_3 = "SoftwareSysinternals"

                  $network_1 = "%sIPC$"

                  $network_2 = "%sADMIN$%s"

                  $network_3 = "DeviceLanmanRedirector%sipc$"

                  $psexec_1 = "PSEXESVC"

                  $psexec_2 = "PSEXEC-{}-"

                  $psexec_3 = "Copying %s to %s..."

                  $psexec_4 = "gPSINFSVC"

           condition:

                  (

                          ( uint16( 0x0 ) ==0x5a4d )

                          and

                          ( uint16( uint32( 0x3c )) == 0x4550 )

                  )

                  and 

                          filesize < 1024KB

                  and

                  (

                          ( any of ($sysinternals_*) and any of ($psexec_*) )

                          or

                          ( 2 of ($network_*) and 2 of ($psexec_*))

                  )

    }

    The cybersecurity industry provides overlapping cyber threat intelligence, IOCs, and mitigation recommendations related to GRU unit 26165 cyber actors. While not all encompassing, the following are the most notable threat group names related under MITRE ATT&CK G0007 and commonly used within the cybersecurity community: 

    • APT28 [14]
    • Fancy Bear [14]
    • Forest Blizzard [14]
    • Blue Delta [15]

    Note: Cybersecurity companies have different methods of tracking and attributing cyber actors, and this may not be a 1:1 correlation to the U.S. government’s understanding for all activity related to these groupings.

    Further Reference

    To search for the presence of malicious email messages targeting CVE-2023-23397, network defenders may consider using the script published by Microsoft: https://aka.ms/CVE-2023-23397ScriptDoc

    For the Impacket TTP, network defenders may consider using the following publicly available Impacket YARA detection rule:
    https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/yara/gen_impacket_tools.yar

    Works Cited

    [1] Microsoft. Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War. 2022. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/22/defending-ukraine-early-lessons-from-the-cyber-war/  
    [2] FBI et al. Russian Cyber Actors Use Compromised Routers to Facilitate Cyber Operations. 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Feb/27/2003400753/-1/-1/0/CSA-Russian-Actors-Use-Routers-Facilitate-Cyber_Operations.PDF   
    [3] NSA et al. Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. 2021. https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/0/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF 
    [4] ANSSI. Campagnes d'attaques du mode opératoire APT28 depuis 2021. 2023. https://cert.ssi.gouv.fr/cti/CERTFR-2023-CTI-009/  
    [5] ANSSI. Targeting and compromise of french entities using the APT28 intrusion set. 2025. https://cert.ssi.gouv.fr/cti/CERTFR-2025-CTI-007/   
    [6] Polish Cyber Command. Detecting Malicious Activity Against Microsoft Exchange Servers. 2023. https://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/woc/articles/aktualnosci-w/detecting-malicious-activity-against-microsoft-exchange-servers/ 
    [7] IBM. Israel-Hamas Conflict Lures to Deliver Headlace Malware. 2023. https://securityintelligence.com/x-force/itg05-ops-leverage-israel-hamas-conflict-lures-to-deliver-headlace-malware/ 
    [8] CERT-UA. APT28: From Initial Attack to Creating Domain Controller Threats in an Hour. 2023. https://cert.gov.ua/article/6276894 
    [9] NSA. Embracing a Zero Trust Security Model. 2021. https://media.defense.gov/2021/Feb/25/2002588479/-1/-1/0/CSI_EMBRACING_ZT_SECURITY_MODEL_UOO115131-21.PDF  
    [10] NSA et al. Keeping PowerShell: Security Measures to Use and Embrace. 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/22/2003021689/-1/-1/0/CSI_KEEPING_POWERSHELL_SECURITY_MEASURES_TO_USE_AND_EMBRACE_20220622.PDF 
    [11] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Special Publication 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines – Authentication and Lifecycle Management. 2020. https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html 
    [12] NSA. Selecting Secure Multi-factor Authentication Solutions. October 16, 2020. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/31/2003515137/-1/-1/0/MULTIFACTOR_AUTHENTICATION_SOLUTIONS_UOO17091520.PDF  
    [13] NSA and CSA. NSA and CISA Red and Blue Teams Share Top Ten Cybersecurity Misconfigurations. 2023. https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/05/2003314578/-1/-1/0/JOINT_CSA_TOP_TEN_MISCONFIGURATIONS_TLP-CLEAR.PDF 

    [14] Department of Justice. Justice Department Conducts Court-Authorized Disruption of Botnet Controlled by the Russian Federation’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU). 2024. https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-conducts-court-authorized-disruption-botnet-controlled-russian  
    [15] Recorded Future. GRU’s BlueDelta Targets Key Networks in Europe with Multi-Phase Espionage Campaigns. 2024. https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/CTA-RU-2024-0530.pdf  
     

    Disclaimer of endorsement

    The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

    Purpose

    This document was developed in furtherance of the authoring agencies’ cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.

    Contact

    United States organizations

    • National Security Agency (NSA)
    • Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
      • U.S. organizations are encouraged to reporting suspicious or criminal activity related to information in this advisory to CISA via the agency’s Incident Reporting System, its 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870), or your local FBI field office. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment user for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.
    • Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3)

    United Kingdom organizations

    Germany organizations

    Czech Republic organizations

    Poland organizations

    Australian organizations

    • Visit cyber.gov.au or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories.

    Canadian organizations

    Estonia organizations

    French organizations

    • French organizations are encouraged to report suspicious activity or incident related to information found in this advisory by contacting ANSSI/CERT-FR by email at cert-fr@ssi.gouv.fr or by phone at: 3218 or +33 9 70 83 32 18. 

    See Table 2 through Table 14 for all the threat actor tactics and techniques referenced in this advisory.

    Table 2: Reconnaissance
    Tactic/Technique Title ID Use
    Reconnaissance TA0043 Conducted reconnaissance on at least one entity involved in the production of ICS components for railway management.
    Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses T1589.002 Conducted contact information reconnaissance to identify additional targets in key positions.
    Gather Victim Org Information T1591 Conducted reconnaissance of the cybersecurity department.
    Gather Victim Org Information: Identify Roles T1591.004 Conducted reconnaissance of individuals responsible for coordinating transport.
    Gather Victim Org Information: Business Relationships T1591.002 Conducted reconnaissance of other companies cooperating with the victim entity.
    Gather Victim Host Information T1592 Attempted to enumerate Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) servers hosting IP cameras.
    Table 3: Resource development
    Tactic/Technique Title ID Use
    Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts T1586.002 Sent phishing emails using compromised accounts.
    Compromise Accounts: Cloud Accounts T1586.003 Sent phishing emails using compromised accounts.
    Table 4: Initial Access
    Tactic/Technique Title ID Use
    Trusted Relationship T1199 Conducted follow-on targeting of additional entities in the transportation sector that had business ties to the primary target, exploiting trust relationships to attempt to gain additional access.
    Phishing T1566 Used spearphishing for credentials and delivering malware to gain initial access to targeted entities.
    Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1566.001 Sent emails with malicious attachments.
    Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 Used spearphishing with included links to fake login pages. Sent emails with embedded hyperlinks that downloaded a malicious archive.
    Phishing: Spearphishing Voice T1566.004 Attempted to use voice phishing to gain access to privileged accounts by impersonating IT staff.
    External Remote Services T1133 Exploited Internet-facing infrastructure, including corporate VPNs, to gain initial access to targeted entities.
    Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Exploited public vulnerabilities and SQL injection to gain initial access to targeted entities.
    Content Injection T1659 Leveraged a WinRAR vulnerability allowing for the execution of arbitrary code embedded in an archive.
    Table 5: Execution
    Tactic/Technique Title ID Use
    User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.001 Used malicious links to hosted shortcuts in spearphishing.
    User Execution: Malicious File T1204.002 Delivered malware executables via spearphishing.
    Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task T1053.005 Used scheduled tasks to establish persistence.
    Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059 Delivered scripts in spearphishing. Executed arbitrary shell commands.
    Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.001 PowerShell commands were often used to prepare data for exfiltration.
    Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.003 Used BAT script in spearphishing.
    Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic T1059.005 Used VBScript in spearphishing.
    Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python T1059.006 Installed python on infected machines to enable the execution of Certipy.
    Table 6: Persistence
    Tactic/Technique Title ID Use
    Account Manipulation: 
    Additional Email Delegate 
    Permissions
    Used manipulation of mailbox permissions to establish sustained email collection. 
    Modify Authentication Process: 
    Multi-Factor Authentication
    Enrolled compromised accounts in MFA mechanisms to increase the trust-level of compromised accounts and enable sustained access. 
    Hijack Execution Flow: DLL 
    Search Order Hijacking 
    T1574.001  Used DLL search order hijacking to facilitate malware execution. 
    Boot or Logon Autostart 
    Execution: Registry Run Keys / 
    Startup Folder

    T1547.001 

    Used run keys to establish persistence. 
    Boot or Logon Autostart 
    Execution: Shortcut 
    Modification

    T1547.009 

    Placed malicious shortcuts in the startup folder to establish persistence. 
    Table 7: Defense Evasion
    Tactic/Technique Title ID Use
    Indicator Removal: Clear 
    Windows Event Logs
    T1070.001  Deleted event logs through the wevtutil utility.
    Table 8: Credential access 
    Tactic/Technique Title ID Use

    Brute Force 

    Sent requests with Base64-encoded credentials for the RTSP server, which included publicly documented default credentials, and likely were generic attempts to brute force access to the devices. 

    Brute Force: Password Guessing 

    Used credential guessing to gain initial access to targeted entities. 

    Brute Force: Password Spraying 

    Used brute force to gain initial access to targeted entities. Conducted a brute force password spray via LDAP. 

    Multi-Factor Authentication Interception 

    Used multi-stage redirectors to provide MFA relaying capabilities in some campaigns. 

    Input Capture 

    Used multi-stage redirectors to provide CAPTCHA relaying capabilities in some campaigns. 

    Forced Authentication 

    Used an Outlook NTLM vulnerability to collect NTLM hashes and credentials via specially crafted Outlook calendar appointment invitations. 

    OS Credential Dumping: NTDS 

    Attempted to dump Active Directory NTDS.dit domain databases. 

    Unsecured Credentials: Group Policy Preferences 

    Retrieved plaintext passwords via Group Policy Preferences using Get-GPPPassword.py. 

    Table 9: Discovery
    Tactic/Technique Title ID Use

    Account Discovery: Domain Account

    T1087.002

    Used a modified ldap-dump.py to enumerate the Windows environment.

    Table 10: Command and Control
    Tactic/Technique Title ID Use

    Hide Infrastructure 

    T1665 

    Abused SOHO devices to facilitate covert cyber operations, as well as proxy malicious activity, via devices with geolocation in proximity to the target. 

    Proxy: External Proxy 

    T1090.002 

    Actor-controlled servers sent RTSP DESCRIBE requests destined for RTSP servers. 

    Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy 

    T1090.003 

    Used Tor and commercial VPNs as part of their anonymization infrastructure 

    Encrypted Channel 

    T1573 

    Connected to victim infrastructure using encrypted TLS. 

    Multi-Stage Channels 

    T1104 

    Used multi-stage redirectors for campaigns. 

    Table 11: Defense evasion (mobile framework)
    Tactic/Technique Title ID Use

    Execution Guardrails 

    Used multi-stage redirectors to verify browser fingerprints in some campaigns. 

    Execution Guardrails: Geofencing 

    Used multi-stage redirectors to verify IP-geolocation in some campaigns. 

    Table 12: Lateral movement
    Tactic/Technique Title ID Use

    Lateral Movement 

    Used native commands and open source tools, such as Impacket and PsExec, to move laterally within the environment. 

    Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol 

    Moved laterally within the network using RDP. 

    Table 13: Collection
    Tactic/Technique Title ID Use

    Email Collection 

    Retrieved sensitive data from email servers. 

    Email Collection: Remote Email Collection 

    Used server data exchange protocols and APIs such as Exchange Web Services (EWS) and IMAP to exfiltrate data from email servers. 

    Automated Collection 

    Used periodic EWS queries to collect new emails. 

    Video Capture 

    Attempted to gain access to the cameras’ feeds. 

    Archive Collected Data 

    Accessed files were archived in .zip files prior to exfiltration. 

    Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility 

    Prepared zip archives for upload to the actors’ infrastructure. 

    Table 14: Exfiltration
    Tactic/Technique Title ID Use

    Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol 

    Attempted to exfiltrate archived data via a previously dropped OpenSSH binary. 

    Scheduled Transfer 

    Used periodic EWS queries to collect new emails sent and received since the last data exfiltration. 

    Appendix B: CVEs exploited

    Table 15: Exploited CVE information
    CVE  Vendor/Product  Details

    RARLAB WinRAR 

    Allows execution of arbitrary code when a user attempts to view a benign file within a ZIP archive. 

    Microsoft Outlook 

    External actors could send specially crafted emails that cause a connection from the victim to an untrusted location of the actor’s control, leaking the Net-NTLMv2 hash of the victim that the actor could then relay to another service to authenticate as the victim. 

    Roundcube Webmail 

    Roundcube before 1.3.17 and 1.4.x before 1.4.12 is prone to a potential SQL injection via search or search params. 

    Roundcube Webmail 

    An XSS issue was discovered in Roundcube Webmail before 1.2.13, 1.3.x before 1.3.16 and 1.4.x before 1.4.10, where a plaintext email message with JavaScript in a link reference element is mishandled by linkref_addindex in rcube_string_replacer.php. 

    Roundcube Webmail 

    Roundcube Webmail before 1.4.4 allows arbitrary code execution via shell metacharacters in a configuration setting for im_convert_path or im_identify_path in rcube_image.php. 

    Appendix C: MITRE D3FEND Countermeasures

    Table 16: MITRE D3FEND countermeasures
    Countermeasure Title  ID  Details 

    Network Isolation 

    Employ appropriate network segmentation. Disable Universal Plug and Play (UPnP), Peer-to-Peer (P2P), and Anonymous Visit features on IP cameras and routers. 

    Access Mediation 

    Limit access and utilize additional attributes (such as device information, environment, and access path) when making access decisions. Configure access controls carefully to ensure that only well-maintained and well-authenticated accounts have access. 

    Inbound Traffic Filtering 

    Implement host firewall rules to block connections from other devices on the network, other than from authorized management devices and servers, to prevent lateral movement. 

    Resource Access Pattern Analysis 

    Use automated tools to audit access logs for security concerns and identify anomalous access requests. 

    Outbound Traffic Filtering 

    Block NTLM/SMB requests to external infrastructure. 

    Platform Monitoring 

    Install EDR/logging/cybersecurity solutions onto high value systems with large amounts of sensitive data such as mail servers and domain controllers. 

    System File Analysis 

    Collect and monitor Windows logs for certain events, especially for events that indicate that a log was cleared unexpectedly. 

    Application Hardening 

    Enable optional security features in Windows to harden endpoints and mitigate initial access techniques. 

    Application-based Process Isolation 

    Enable attack surface reduction rules to prevent executable content from email. 

    Executable Allowlisting 

    Enable attack surface reduction rules to prevent execution of files from globally writeable directories, such as Downloads or %APPDATA%. 

    Execution Isolation 

    Unless users are involved in the development of scripts, limit the execution of scripts (such as batch, JavaScript, and PowerShell) to known scripts. 

    Application Configuration Hardening 

    Disable Windows Host Scripting functionality and configure PowerShell to run in Constrained mode. Disable protocols that use weak authentication (e.g., clear-text passwords, or outdated and vulnerable authentication or encryption protocols) or do not support multi-factor authentication. Turn off other ports/services not in use (e.g., FTP, web interface, etc.). 

    Process Spawn Analysis 

    Use open source SIGMA rules as a baseline for detecting and alerting on suspicious file execution or command parameters. 

    URL Reputation Analysis 

    Use services that provide enhanced browsing services and safe link checking. 

    Network Access Mediation 

    Do not allow incoming traffic, especially logins to systems, from public VPN services. Where possible, logins from public VPNs, including exit nodes in the same country as target systems, should be blocked or, if allowed, alerted on for further investigation. Ensure cameras and other Internet of Things devices are protected by a security appliance, if possible. 

    DNS Denylisting 

    Do not allow outgoing traffic to hosting and API mocking services frequently used by malicious actors. 

    Domain Name Reputation Analysis 

    Heuristic detections for web requests to new subdomains may uncover malicious phishing activity. Logging the requests for each sub-domain requested by users on a network, such as in DNS or firewall logs, may enable system administrators to identify new targeting and victims. 

    Multi-factor Authentication 

    Use MFA with strong factors and require regular re-authentication, especially for management accounts. 

    Job Function Access Pattern Analysis 

    Implement other mitigations for privileged accounts: including limiting the number of admin accounts, considering using hardware MFA tokens, and regularly reviewing all privileged user accounts. 

    User Account Permissions 

    Separate privileged accounts by role and alert on misuse of privileged accounts. Audit user accounts on all devices to ensure they are an accurate reflection of your organization and that they are being used as expected. 

    Token-based Authentication 

    Reduce reliance on passwords; instead, consider using services like single sign-on. 

    Credential Hardening 

    Do not store passwords in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). Remove all passwords previously included in GPP and change all passwords on the corresponding accounts. 

    Authentication Event Threshholding 

    Use account throttling or account lockout. Throttling progressively increases time delay between successive login attempts. If using account lockout, allow between 5 to 10 attempts before lockout. 

    Strong Password Policy 

    Use a service to check for compromised passwords before using them. 

    Credential Rotation 

    Change all default credentials. 

    Encrypted Tunnels 

    Disable protocols that use weak authentication (e.g., clear-text passwords, or outdated and vulnerable authentication or encryption protocols). Use a VPN for remote connections to devices. 

    Software Update 

    Apply security patches and firmware updates to all devices. Ensure devices are currently supported. Replace devices that are end-of-life. 

    Agent Authentication 

    Ensure authentication is enabled for remote access to devices. If supported on IP cameras, enable authenticated RTSP access only. 

    User Behavior Analysis 

    Review all authentication activity for remote access to make sure it is valid and expected. Investigate any unexpected or unusual activity. 

    MIL Security OSI -

  • MIL-OSI Global: Israel has promised ‘basic amount’ of food into Gaza − but its policies have already created catastrophic starvation risk for millions

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Yara M. Asi, Assistant Professor of Global Health Management and Informatics, University of Central Florida

    Palestinians wait in line to receive meals in the Jabalia refugee camp in Gaza City, Gaza, on May 17, 2025. Mahmoud ssa/Anadolu via Getty Images

    After 18 months of punishing airstrikes, raids and an increasingly restrictive siege in Gaza, the United Nations on May 20, 2025, issued one of its most urgent warnings yet about the ongoing humanitarian crisis: an estimated 14,000 babies were at risk of death within the next 48 hours without an immediate influx of substantial aid, especially food.

    The assessment came a day after Israel allowed the first trickle of aid back into Gaza following its nearly three-month total blockade imposed on March 2. But on the first day of that resumption, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that only nine trucks were allowed into Gaza, when around 500 are required every day. The U.N. called it “a drop in the ocean of what is urgently needed.”

    As an expert in Palestinian public health, I and others have long warned about the potentially devastating humanitarian consequences of Israel’s military response to the Hamas attacks of Oct. 7, 2023, given the preexisting fragility of the Gaza Strip and Israel’s history of controlling humanitarian aid into the territory. Many of those worst-case humanitarian predictions have now become reality.

    Israel’s control of food and aid into Gaza has been a consistent theme throughout the past 18 months. Indeed, just two weeks after Israel’s massive military campaign in the Gaza Strip began in late 2023, Oxfam International reported that only around 2% of the usual amount of food was being delivered to residents in the territory and warned against “using starvation as a weapon of war.”

    Yet aid delivery continues to be inconsistent and well below what was necessary for the population, culminating in a dire warning by U.N. experts in early May that “the annihilation of the Palestinian population in Gaza” was possible without an immediate end to the violence.

    Putting Palestinians ‘on a diet’

    Already, an estimated near 53,000 Palestinians have died and some 120,000 have been injured in the conflict. Starvation could claim many more.

    Amid the broader destruction to lives and infrastructure, there is now barely a food system to speak of in Gaza.

    Since October 2023, Israeli bombs have destroyed homes, bakeries, food production factories and grocery stores, making it harder for people in Gaza to offset the impact of the reduced imports of food.

    A handful of trucks loaded with humanitarian aid for the Gaza Strip are seen at the Kerem Shalom crossing in southern Israel on May 20, 2025.
    AP Photo/Maya Alleruzzo

    But as much as things have worsened in the past 18 months, food insecurity in Gaza and the mechanisms that enable it did not start with Israel’s response to the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas.

    A U.N. report from 2022 found that 65% of people in Gaza were food insecure, defined as lacking regular access to enough safe and nutritious food.

    Multiple factors contributed to this preexisting food insecurity, not least the blockade of Gaza imposed by Israel and enabled by Egypt since 2007. All items entering the Gaza Strip, including food, became subject to Israeli inspection, delay or denial.

    Basic foodstuff was allowed, but because of delays at the border, it could spoil before it entered Gaza.

    A 2009 investigation by Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz found that foods as varied as cherries, kiwi, almonds, pomegranates and chocolate were prohibited entirely.

    At certain points, the blockade, which Israel claimed was an unavoidable security measure, has been loosened to allow import of more foods. In 2010, for example, Israel started to permit potato chips, fruit juices, Coca-Cola and cookies.

    By placing restrictions on food imports, Israel has claimed to be trying to put pressure on Hamas by making life difficult for the people in Gaza. “The idea is to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger,” said one Israeli government adviser in 2006.

    To enable this, the Israeli government commissioned a 2008 study to work out exactly how many calories Palestinians would need to avoid malnutrition. The report was released to the public only following a 2012 legal battle. Echoes of this sentiment can be seen in the Israeli decision in May 2025 to allow only “the basic amount of food” to reach Gaza to purportedly ensure “no starvation crisis develops.”

    The long-running blockade also increased food insecurity by preventing meaningful development of an economy in Gaza.

    Displaced Palestinians fleeing amid ongoing Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip arrive in Jabalia in northern Gaza on May 18, 2025.
    AP Photo/Jehad Alshrafi

    The U.N. cites the “excessive production and transaction costs and barriers to trade with the rest of the world” imposed by Israel as the primary cause of severe underdevelopment in the occupied territories, including Gaza. As a result, in late 2022 the unemployment rate in Gaza stood at around 50%. This, coupled with a steady increase in the cost of food, made affording food difficult for many Gazan households, rendering them dependent on aid, which fluctuates frequently.

    Hampering self-sufficency

    More generally, the blockade and the multiple rounds of destruction of parts of the Gaza Strip have made food sovereignty in the territory nearly impossible.

    Even prior to the latest war, Gaza’s fishermen were regularly shot at by Israeli gunboats if they ventured farther in the Mediterranean Sea than Israel permits. Because the fish closer to the shore are smaller and less plentiful, the average income of a fisherman in Gaza has more than halved since 2017.

    Much of Gaza’s farmland has been rendered inaccessible to Palestinians as a result of post-October 2023 actions by Israel.

    And the infrastructure needed for adequate food production – greenhouses, arable lands, orchards, livestock and food production facilities – has been destroyed or heavily damaged. International donors hesitate to rebuild facilities, knowing they cannot guarantee their investment will last more than a few years before being bombed again.

    The latest ongoing siege has only further crippled the ability of Gaza to be food self-sufficient. By May 2025, nearly 75% of croplands had been destroyed, along with significant amounts of livestock. Less than one-third of agricultural wells used for irrigation remain functional.

    Starvation as weapon of war

    The use of starvation as a weapon is strictly forbidden under the Geneva Conventions, a set of statutes that govern the laws of warfare. Starvation has been condemned by U.N. Resolution 2417, which decried the use of deprivation of food and basic needs of the civilian population and compelled parties in conflict to ensure full humanitarian access.

    Human Rights Watch has already accused Israel of using starvation as a weapon of war, and Amnesty International called the most recent siege evidence of genocidal intent.

    The Israeli government in turn continues to blame Hamas for any loss of life in Gaza and has increasingly made clear its aim for Palestinians to leave Gaza entirely.

    Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said publicly that Israel was permitting aid now only because allies were pressuring him over “images of mass famine.” This stance suggests that Israel will not soon increase aid beyond what his government deems politically acceptable.

    While there is more evidence than ever before that Israel is using food as a weapon of war, there is also, I believe, ample evidence that this was the reality long before Oct. 7, 2023.

    In the meantime, the implications for Palestinians in Gaza have never been more dire.

    Already, the World Health Organization estimates that 57 children have died from malnutrition just since the beginning of the March 2, 2025, blockade.

    More death is certain to follow. On May 12, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, a global system created to track food insecurity, released an alarming report on projections of food insecurity in Gaza.

    It warned that by September 2025, half a million people in Gaza – 1 in 5 of the population – will be facing starvation and that the entire population will experience acute food insecurity at crisis level, or worse.

    Editor’s note: Parts of this story were originally contained in an article published by The Conversation U.S. on Feb. 15, 2024.

    Yara M. Asi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Israel has promised ‘basic amount’ of food into Gaza − but its policies have already created catastrophic starvation risk for millions – https://theconversation.com/israel-has-promised-basic-amount-of-food-into-gaza-but-its-policies-have-already-created-catastrophic-starvation-risk-for-millions-257181

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Small Boat: this slim, devastating novel about a real migrant shipwreck reminds us of the cruelty of indifference

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Fiona Murphy, Assistant Professor in Refugee and Intercultural Studies, Dublin City University

    There’s a particular kind of story that’s rarely executed well – one without heroes, without lessons, without even the cold comfort of a villain you can confidently point at and say: there, that’s the evil. Vincent Delecroix’s Small Boat – a slim, bruising novel translated with quiet precision by Helen Stevenson – is that kind of story.

    Small Boat, which was shortlisted for the 2025 International Booker Prize, centres on a real horror: the drowning of 27 people in the English Channel on November 24 2021. They were crowded into an inflatable dinghy in the dark, reaching out over crackling radio lines, asking – in French, in English, in Kurdish – for help. They didn’t get it.

    What is known – not imagined in Delecroix’s pages – is that both French and British coastguards received their calls. And both hesitated, passing responsibility back and forth like a poisoned parcel. People died while operators discussed jurisdiction. The Cranston Inquiry, established to examine the failures of that night, is ongoing, its transcripts and testimonies peeling back the layers of bureaucratic neglect.

    Delecroix doesn’t give us the migrants’ stories directly. He focuses instead on a fictional French coastguard operator, a woman who spent that night on the radio, doing (or not doing) what her training, her weariness, her own justifications allowed. In the aftermath, she is questioned – not in a court, but in a room filled with mirrors. She faces a policewoman who looks like her, thinks like her, speaks with her same clipped, professional cadence.

    She listens back to recordings of her own voice on the rescue line promising help that would not come, offering assurances she did not believe. She is left to reckon with the unbearable fact that someone, somewhere (was it her?) spoke the words: “You will not be saved.”




    Read more:
    International Booker prize 2025: six experts review the shortlisted novels


    She isn’t especially monstrous. She’s tired. She’s professional. She has a young daughter at home and an ex-partner who sneers at her work. She runs on the beach to decompress. In one of the novel’s most arresting turns, she compares herself to a mass-produced tin opener: efficient, functional, affectless. Delecroix draws her with enough delicacy that we cannot quite hate her. And that, of course, is far more unsettling.

    Reading Small Boat, I thought – as one inevitably does – of Hannah Arendt’s banality of evil. Not evil as grand spectacle or ideology, but as administration, the quiet conviction that one is simply fulfilling a role. Arendt coined the phrase watching the trial of Adolf Eichmann, one of the chief Nazi organisers of the Holocaust. Eichmann organised the trains but claimed never to have hated the passengers. What Arendt saw was not a monster but a functionary – and that, of course, was the point.

    I thought too about my own work as an anthropologist researching forced displacement across Ireland, Turkey and Australia. I’ve sat with people whose lives are shaped not by violence in its cinematic form, but by violence as policy: the hotel room without a kitchen, the letter that never arrives, the bed that’s taken away with no warning.

    I’ve heard a senior Irish official describe the state’s provision of housing and support for asylum seekers as “sufficient”. Meanwhile people, stateless and waiting, are asked to prove their vulnerability again and again until even their grief is suspect.

    Institutional indifference

    The institutionalisation of indifference: that’s the real story here. The smugness of protocols. The liturgy of duty rosters and shift reports. It wasn’t evil that let those people drown in the Channel – it was ordinary people in warm offices, citing rules, filling forms, following scripts.

    We can see the birth of such indifference in policies like the UK’s abandoned Rwanda plan, which casually proposed outsourcing asylum itself, as if refuge were a commodity.

    Delecroix’s brilliance lies in showing how violence at the border is carried out not by villains, but by workers. By women with mortgages, men on night shifts, people who’ve learned to sort calls for help by urgency, credibility, accent. “Sorting,” the narrator explains, “is perhaps the most important part of the job.” Not all distress calls are equal. And the assumption – always lurking, never spoken – is that some lives are more likely to be saved.

    At one point, the narrator’s colleague Julien answers calls from migrants by quoting Pascal: “Vous êtes embarqués.” You are already embarked. A fatalist shrug disguised as wisdom. As if to say: you should have thought of all this before you left. The shrug does the work of a policy, the quotation the work of a wall.

    And yet, the narrator cannot fully perform indifference. She is haunted by the sea. She remembers loving it as a child. Now, it terrifies her. She feels it watching her, pursuing her, wanting to surge past the shore and swallow the continent whole. She runs along the beach to quiet her mind – a run that is almost the same length as the journey those on the dinghy tried to make.

    If Small Boat has a flaw, it’s that it sometimes flirts with making guilt into its own form of lyricism. But this too may be deliberate. It is easier, perhaps, to feel sorry than to feel implicated. And far easier to narrate moral confusion than to prevent its causes.

    What Delecroix has written is not a redemption story. It’s not a psychological thriller. It is a chamber piece for one voice and many ghosts. There are no grand gestures here. Just small refusals, small failures. And the small, flickering boats of each human life, drifting toward – or away from – one another in the dark.

    In a world ever more brutal towards those who flee war, hunger and despair, Delecroix’s novel is a necessary and merciless indictment. It reminds us that the shipwreck is not theirs alone. It is ours too.

    Fiona Murphy does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Small Boat: this slim, devastating novel about a real migrant shipwreck reminds us of the cruelty of indifference – https://theconversation.com/small-boat-this-slim-devastating-novel-about-a-real-migrant-shipwreck-reminds-us-of-the-cruelty-of-indifference-255052

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-Evening Report: Australia’s Wong condemns ‘abhorrent, outrageous’ Israeli comments over blocked aid

    Asia Pacific Report

    Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong has released a statement saying “the Israeli government cannot allow the suffering to continue” after the UN’s aid chief said thousands of babies were at risk of dying if they did not receive food immediately.

    “Australia joins international partners in calling on Israel to allow a full and immediate resumption of aid to Gaza,” Wong said in a post on X.

    “We condemn the abhorrent and outrageous comments made by members of the Netanyahu government about these people in crisis.”

    Wong stopped short of outlining any measures Australia might take to encourage Israel to ensure enough aid reaches those in need, as the UK, France and Canada said they would do with “concrete measures” in a recent joint statement.


    An agreement has been reached in a phone call between UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and his Israeli counterpart Gideon Saar, reports Al Jazeera.

    According to the Palestinian news agency WAM, the aid would initially cater to the food needs of about 15,000 civilians in Gaza.

    It will also include essential supplies for bakeries and critical items for infant care.

    ‘Permission’ for 100 trucks
    Earlier yesterday, a spokesperson for the UN humanitarian office in Geneva said Israel had given permission for about 100 aid trucks to enter Gaza.

    However, the UN also said no aid had been distributed in Gaza because of Israeli restrictions, despite a handful of aid trucks entering the territory.

    “But what we mean here by allowed is that the trucks have received military clearance to access the Palestinian side,” reports Tareq Abu Azzoum from Deir el-Balah, central Gaza.

    “They have not made their journey into the enclave. They are still stuck at the border crossing. Only five trucks have made it in.”

    Israel’s Gaza aid “smokescreen” showing the vast gulf between what the Israeli military have actually allowed in – five trucks only and none of the aid had been delivered at the time of this report. Image: Al Jazeera infographic/Creative Commons

    The few aid trucks alowed into Gaza are nowhere near sufficient to meet Gaza’s vast needs, says the medical charity Doctors Without Borders, known by its French initials MSF.

    Instead, the handful of trucks serve as a “a smokescreen” for Israel to “pretend the siege is over”.

    “The Israeli authorities’ decision to allow a ridiculously inadequate amount of aid into Gaza after months of an air-tight siege signals their intention to avoid the accusation of starving people in Gaza, while in fact keeping them barely surviving,” said Pascale Coissard, MSF’s emergency coordinator in Khan Younis.

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UK stands ready to send more aid to Gaza as Minister pledges further support

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    UK stands ready to send more aid to Gaza as Minister pledges further support

    Minister for Development announces new UK support for Gaza on first visit in her role to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories

    • extra UK aid announced today will support organisations on the ground seeking to get food, water and medicine to those who need it
    • Minister Chapman will call Israel’s decision to allow just a basic amount of food into Gaza ‘abominable’ after an ‘indefensible’ 11-week blockade.
    • on her first visit to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in her role, the Minister also emphasises the need to release all Israeli hostages held by Hamas and works towards a two-state solution

    Vulnerable Gazans must urgently be given full access to aid, UK Minister for Development, Jenny Chapman said today [Wednesday 21 May] on her first visit to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in her role. 

    Following the Government’s calls, together with partners, for restrictions on aid access to be lifted, the UK has announced £4m of new UK humanitarian support for Gazans as the Minister reaffirms the UK’s commitment to driving peace in the region.

    The visit comes the day after Foreign Secretary David Lammy announced new sanctions hitting violent West Bank settlers, paused free trade agreement negotiations with Israel and called the Government of Israel’s actions ‘egregious’ and ‘intolerable’. 

    On her visit the Development Minister will say the limited restart of aid deliveries into Gaza is ‘simply not enough’ and she will urge the Israeli government to allow the unhindered provision of aid. She will say the blockade has been appalling and indefensible, particularly following an IPC report noting the entire population of Gaza is experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity.

    The Minister will announce new UK support during a visit to a Red Crescent centre, highlighting that the UK stands ready to provide the urgent aid to those who desperately need it, while expressing frustration much of it cannot yet reach them.

    Backing up words with action, the new UK support would cover essential medicines and medical supplies for up to 32,000 people, safe drinking water for up to 60,000 people, and food parcels for up to 14,000 people.

    Minister for Development, Jenny Chapman said:

    The lack of aid reaching ordinary Gazans is appalling. The Israeli government’s failure to allow full humanitarian access to aid workers is abhorrent. Far too few trucks are crossing into Gaza. The UN has warned nearly half a million Palestinians, including children, are facing starvation.

    The UK is clear – Israel will not achieve security through prolonging the suffering of the Palestinian people.

    I have heard first hand from aid workers today of the abominable impact of this behaviour on real families. The UK has today pledged new support for Gazans but the brutal reality is most of it is stuck in limbo.

    We need to see an immediate ceasefire, the release of all hostages, a surge of aid, and a path towards long-term peace.

    During the first day of her visit (Wednesday, May 21), Minister Chapman has met with Palestinian Justice Minister Sharhabeel al-Zaeem, and talked to UNRWA representatives on resolving the challenges in getting aid to Palestinian communities.

    Tomorrow, she is due to meet the families of hostages cruelly held by Hamas, where she will highlight the importance of an immediate ceasefire and a negotiated end to the conflict which secures their urgent release. This is the only way to deliver long-term stability in the region, and at home, as part of the Government’s Plan for Change.

    Background

    • The £4 million contribution announced today will be made to the British Red Cross to deliver humanitarian relief in Gaza through their partner the Palestinian Red Crescent Society. This support has been allocated from the £101 million set aside for the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) in financial year 2025-26, announced during the official visit of Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa to the UK.
    • UK support to the OPTs since October 7, 2023, has so far provided 405,000 patient consultations across Gaza, food aid to at least 647,000 people, and improved water, sanitation and hygiene services to almost 300,000 people. 
    • Photos from the visit will be available on FCDO Flickr
    • See here for the Foreign Secretary’s statement announcing sanctions on West Bank violence network and the pause on negotiations for a free trade agreement.
    • See here for joint statement from the leaders of the UK, France and Canada on the situation in Gaza and the West Bank delivered on 19/05/2025.
    • See here for joint statement from UK and 26 other humanitarian partners delivered on 19/05/2025.

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Email the FCDO Newsdesk (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

    Updates to this page

    Published 21 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Security: U.S. – Qatari Forces Partner for Invincible Sentry

    Source: United States Central Command (CENTCOM)

    DOHA, Qatar (May 20, 2025) – For the third time in seven years, Qatar hosted U.S. forces to participate in a combined military exercise designed to improve interoperability and strengthen the enduring partnership between the two countries. 

    Exercise Invincible Sentry 2025 (IS-25) took place April 13-17 and was designed as a crisis-response rehearsal, using scenarios depicting a simulated transnational security threat. The exercise validated U.S. and Qatari crisis-response planning and strengthened staff proficiency and execution in critical mission areas. Qatar previously hosted IS in 2019 and 2021 in preparation for the country to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup tournament. 

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: Diamond Equity Research Releases Update Note on Almonty Industries, Inc. (TSX: AII) (ASX: AII) (OTCQX: ALMTF)

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    New York, May 21, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Diamond Equity Research, a leading equity research firm with a focus on small capitalization public companies has released an Update Note Almonty Industries, Inc. (TSX: AII) (ASX: AII) (FWB: ALI) (OTCPK: ALMT.F). The update note includes detailed information on the Almonty Industries’ business model, services, industry overview, financials, valuation, management profile, and risks.

    The full research report is available below.

    Almonty Industries Update Note May 2025

     Highlights from the report include:

    • Almonty Industries Secures Strategic Three-Year Offtake Agreement for Tungsten Oxide with Tungsten Parts Wyoming; Provides Predictable Revenue and Strengthens Strategic Alliances within U.S. and Allied Defense Networks: Almonty Industries Inc. recently announced a binding offtake agreement with Tungsten Parts Wyoming, Inc. (TPW), a prominent U.S.-based defense contractor, and Metal Tech (MT), an Israel-based tungsten processor, significantly enhancing its strategic position within the critical materials supply chain for U.S. defense applications. Under the agreement, TPW commits to purchasing at least 40 metric tons of tungsten oxide monthly from Almonty, exclusively for use in critical defense applications, including missiles, drones, and ordnance systems. MT will process the supplied tungsten oxide into tungsten metal powder in Israel or the U.S., exclusively for TPW’s defense production programs. Notably, the arrangement includes a hard floor price with no ceiling, providing revenue predictability and substantial upside potential. The initial term of the agreement spans three years from the commencement of deliveries, with provisions for automatic annual renewal thereafter. This offtake agreement is strategically significant for Almonty, ensuring predictable revenues and deepening its integration into defense-oriented supply chains. Management has highlighted the importance of securing long-term demand specifically tied to high-value defense programs, emphasizing the company’s ability to align commercial interests with strategic national security priorities. It should be that that these substantial offtake commitments signal strong confidence in Almonty’s asset quality and operational delivery capabilities. Investors tend to place a premium on predictable revenues and consistent cash flows, making this agreement particularly valuable from a market valuation perspective. We view this development positively, as it further solidifies Almonty’s competitive advantage in supplying critical materials to allied defense markets.
    • Q1 2025 Financial Results Reflect Stable Revenue, Enhanced Mining Margins, and Elevated Non-Cash Charges: In the first quarter of 2025, Almonty Industries reported a 1.3% year-over-year revenue increase to $7.9 million, driven by higher tungsten concentrate pricing under long-term contracts. Income from mining operations rose significantly by 24.1% to $0.75 million, supported by favorable pricing dynamics and increased output at the Panasqueira mine. Operating expenses rose substantially to $9.5 million from $4.3 million in the prior year quarter, largely due to higher non-cash share-based compensation, losses related to the revaluation of embedded derivative liabilities, and increased expenditures associated with the company’s planned redomiciling. The company reported a net loss of $34.6 million, compared to $3.8 million in the prior-year period, primarily due to a non-cash loss of $25.8 million arising from the revaluation of warrant liabilities. Adjusted EBITDA came in at $(3.5) million compared to $(1.3) million in the same quarter of the previous year, reflecting a 169.2% increase on a non-IFRS basis. As of March 31, 2025, cash and cash equivalents totaled $16.9 million, up from $7.8 million at year-end 2024, primarily due to the receipt of $8.7 in equity placement proceeds and $3.3 million from the exercise of warrant, partially offset by ongoing investments in the Sangdong Project in South Korea. Post the quarter-end, Almonty secured an additional $3.6 million through further warrant exercises. 
    • Valuation: The forthcoming commercialization of the high-grade Sangdong project, now construction-complete and in its final pre-production phase, is anticipated to serve as a key catalyst for Almonty’s growth trajectory and potential valuation re-rating. Strong operational performance at Panasqueira and a robust cash position of nearly $17 million provide a solid foundation for near-term execution. Strategic advancements, including a binding offtake agreement with a U.S. defense contractor and expanded partnerships with American Defense International and MZ Group, further reinforce Almonty’s position as a critical supplier within the allied tungsten value chain. Rolling over our financial model while incorporating the latest quarterly results and updated shares outstanding, we arrive at a valuation of $4.00 per share, contingent upon successful execution by the company.

    About Almonty Industries, Inc.  

    Almonty Industries Inc. is a global leader in tungsten mining, with strategically positioned assets in geopolitically stable regions including South Korea, Portugal, and Spain. The company is set to become the largest tungsten producer outside China upon the commissioning of its flagship Sangdong Mine. 

    About Diamond Equity Research

    Diamond Equity Research is a leading equity research and corporate access firm focused on small capitalization companies. Diamond Equity Research is an approved sell-side provider on major institutional investor platforms.

    For more information, visit https://www.diamondequityresearch.com.

    Disclosures:

    Diamond Equity Research LLC is being compensated by Almonty Industries, Inc. for producing research materials regarding Almonty Industries, Inc. and its securities, which is meant to subsidize the high cost of creating the report and monitoring the security, however the views in the report reflect that of Diamond Equity Research. All payments are received upfront and are billed for research engagement. As of 05/22/25 the issuer had paid us $50,000 for our company sponsored research services, which commenced 03/07/2025 and is billed annually. Diamond Equity Research LLC may be compensated for non-research related services, including presenting at Diamond Equity Research investment conferences, press releases and other additional services. The non-research related service cost is dependent on the company, but usually do not exceed $5,000. The issuer has not paid us for non-research related services as of 05/22/2025. Issuers are not required to engage us for these additional services. Additional fees may have accrued since then. Although Diamond Equity Research company sponsored reports are based on publicly available information and although no investment recommendations are made within our company sponsored research reports, given the small capitalization nature of the companies we cover we have adopted an internal trading procedure around the public companies by whom we are engaged, with investors able to find such policy on our website public disclosures page. This report and press release do not consider individual circumstances and does not take into consideration individual investor preferences. Statements within this report may constitute forward-looking statements, these statements involve many risk factors and general uncertainties around the business, industry, and macroeconomic environment. Investors need to be aware of the high degree of risk in small capitalization equities including the complete loss of their investment. Investors can find various risk factors in the initiation report and in the respective financial filings for Almonty Industries, Inc.

    Contact:
    Diamond Equity Research
    research@diamondequityresearch.com

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: GraniteShares launches new YieldBoost ETFs on NVIDIA (NVYY) and Bitcoin (XBTY)

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, May 21, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — GraniteShares, an ETF issuer specializing in high conviction ETFs, announced that it is launching two ETFs to add to its existing YieldBOOST lineup – the GraniteShares YieldBOOST NVDA ETF (NVYY) and the GraniteShares YieldBOOST Bitcoin ETF (XBTY).

    The GraniteShares YieldBOOST NVDA ETF (NVYY) is designed to generate income from options1 strategies linked to 2x Long NVDA Daily ETF. To generate income, NVYY sells put options2 on leveraged ETFs linked to 2x Long NVDA Daily ETF.

    The GraniteShares YieldBOOST Bitcoin ETF (XBTY) is designed to generate income from options1 strategies linked to 2x Long Bitcoin Daily ETF. To generate income, XBTY sells put options2 on leveraged ETFs linked to 2x Long Bitcoin Daily ETF.

    FUND NAME TICKER CUSIP
    GraniteShares YieldBOOST NVDA ETF NVYY 38747R637
    GraniteShares YieldBOOST Bitcoin ETF XBTY 38747R421
         

    “We are excited to launch the newest additions to our YieldBOOST options income suite,” said Will Rhind, Founder and CEO of GraniteShares. “The GraniteShares YieldBOOST NVDA ETF (NVYY) and the GraniteShares YieldBOOST Bitcoin ETF (XBTY) will seek to generate income from selling put options on their respective underlying leveraged ETFs.”

    Other existing YieldBOOST ETFs include the GraniteShares YieldBOOST SPY ETF (YSPY), the GraniteShares YieldBOOST QQQ ETF (TQQY) and the GraniteShares YieldBOOST TSLA ETF (TSYY).

    For more information, please visit: www.graniteshares.com.

    About GraniteShares:

    GraniteShares is an entrepreneurial ETF provider focused on high-conviction investment solutions. The firm offers a range of ETFs spanning leveraged, inverse, and high-yield strategies, empowering investors with differentiated tools for portfolio construction. Founded in 2016, GraniteShares has grown rapidly by delivering cutting-edge solutions tailored to modern market needs. For more information, visit www.graniteshares.com.

    Source: GraniteShares

    1An option is a contract that gives the holder the right, but not the obligation to buy or sell a specific asset at a predetermined price on or before a specified date. Options are a type of derivative, meaning their value is derived from the underlying asset.

    2A put option is a contract that gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to sell an underlying asset at a specified price by or on a specific date.

    RISK FACTORS & IMPORTANT INFORMATION

    Please see the funds’ prospectus for more details – https://graniteshares.com/media/u5odudej/graniteshares-etf-trust-prospectus-yb.pdf.

    Investors should consider the investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses carefully before investing. For a prospectus or summary prospectus with this and other information about the Funds, please call (844) 476 8747 or visit www.graniteshares.com. Read the prospectus or summary prospectus carefully before investing.

    The investment program of the Funds is speculative, entails substantial risks and include asset classes and investment techniques not employed by more traditional mutual funds.

    PRINCIPAL RISKS OF INVESTING IN THE FUND

    The principal risks of investing in the Fund are summarized below. As with any investment, there is a risk that you could lose all or a portion of your investment in the Fund. Each risk summarized below is considered a “principal risk” of investing in the Fund, regardless of the order in which it appears. Some or all of these risks may adversely affect the Fund’s net asset value per share (“NAV”), trading price, yield, total return and/or ability to meet its investment objectives. For more information about the risks of investing in the Fund, see the section in the Fund’s Prospectus titled “Additional Information About the Fund — Principal Risks of Investing in the Fund.”

    The Underlying NVDA ETF Risk. The Fund invests in options contracts that are based on the value of the Underlying NVDA ETF shares. This subjects the Fund to certain of the same risks as if it owned shares of the Underlying NVDA ETF, even though it may not. By virtue of the Fund’s investments in options contracts that are based on the value of the Underlying NVDA ETF shares, the Fund may also be subject to the following risks:

    Effects of Compounding and Market Volatility Risk. The Underlying NVDA ETF shares’ performance for periods greater than a trading day will be the result of each day’s returns compounded over the period, which is likely to differ from 200% of the Underlying Stock’s performance, before fees and expenses. Compounding has a significant impact on funds that are leveraged and that rebalance daily. The impact of compounding becomes more pronounced as volatility and holding periods increase and will impact each shareholder differently depending on the period of time an investment in the Underlying NVDA ETF is held and the volatility of the Underlying Stock during the shareholder’s holding period of an investment in the Underlying NVDA ETF.

    Leverage Risk. The Underlying NVDA ETF obtains investment exposure in excess of its net assets by utilizing leverage and may lose more money in market conditions that are adverse to its investment objective than a fund that does not utilize leverage. An investment in the Underlying NVDA ETF is exposed to the risk that a decline in the daily performance of the Underlying Stock will be magnified. This means that an investment in the Underlying NVDA ETF will be reduced by an amount equal to 2% for every 1% daily decline in the Underlying Stock, not including the costs of financing leverage and other operating expenses, which would further reduce its value. The Underlying NVDA ETF could lose an amount greater than its net assets in the event of an Underlying Stock decline of more than 50%.

    Derivatives Risk. Derivatives are financial instruments that derive value from the underlying reference asset or assets, such as stocks, bonds, or funds (including ETFs), interest rates or indexes. Investing in derivatives may be considered aggressive and may expose the Underlying NVDA ETF to greater risks, and may result in larger losses or smaller gains, than investing directly in the reference assets underlying those derivatives, which may prevent the Underlying NVDA ETF from achieving its investment objective.

    Counterparty Risk. If a counterparty is unwilling or unable to make timely payments to meet its contractual obligations or fails to return holdings that are subject to the agreement with the counterparty resulting in the Underlying NVDA ETF losing money or not being able to meet its daily leveraged investment objective.

    Industry Concentration Risk. The performance of the Underlying Stock, and consequently the Underlying NVDA ETF’s performance, is subject to the risks of the semiconductor industry. The Underlying Stock is subject to many risks that can negatively impact its revenue and viability including, but are not limited to price volatility risk, management risk, inflation risk, global economic risk, growth risk, supply and demand risk, operations risk, regulatory risk, environmental risk, terrorism risk and the risk of natural disasters. The Underlying Stock performance may be affected by NVIDIA Corporation’s ability to identify new products, technologies or services, global competition and business conditions, its dependence on third-party product manufacturers, product defect issues, cybersecurity breaches, and customer concentration. The Underlying Stock may also be affected by risks that affect the broader technology industry, including: government regulation; dramatic and often unpredictable changes in growth rates and competition for qualified personnel; heavy dependence on patent and intellectual property rights, the loss or impairment of which may adversely affect profitability; and a small number of companies representing a large portion of the technology sector as a whole. The Fund’s daily returns may be affected by many factors but will depend on the performance and volatility of the Underlying Stock.

    Indirect Investments in the Underlying NVDA ETF. Investors in the Fund will not have rights to receive dividends or other distributions or any other rights with respect to the Underlying NVDA ETF but will be subject to declines in the performance of the Underlying NVDA ETF. Although the Fund invests in the Underlying NVDA ETF only indirectly, the Fund’s investments are subject to loss as a result of these risks.

    Derivatives Risk. Derivatives are financial instruments that derive value from the underlying reference asset or assets, such as stocks, bonds, or funds, interest rates or indexes. The Fund’s investments in derivatives may pose risks in addition to, and greater than, those associated with directly investing in securities or other ordinary investments, including risk related to the market, imperfect correlation with underlying investments, higher price volatility, lack of availability, counterparty risk, liquidity, valuation and legal restrictions. The use of derivatives is a highly specialized activity that involves investment techniques and risks different from those associated with ordinary portfolio securities transactions. The use of derivatives may result in larger losses or smaller gains than directly investing in securities. When the Fund uses derivatives, there may be an imperfect correlation between the value of the Underlying NVDA ETF and the derivative, which may prevent the Fund from achieving its investment objectives. Because derivatives often require only a limited initial investment, the use of derivatives may expose the Fund to losses in excess of those amounts initially invested. In addition, the Fund’s investments in derivatives are subject to the following risks:

    • Options Contracts. The use of options contracts involves investment strategies and risks different from those associated with ordinary portfolio securities transactions. The prices of options are volatile and are influenced by, among other things, actual and anticipated changes in the value of the underlying instrument, including the anticipated volatility, which are affected by fiscal and monetary policies and by national and international political, changes in the actual or implied volatility or the reference asset, the time remaining until the expiration of the option contract and economic events. For the Fund, in particular, the value of the options contracts in which it invests is substantially influenced by the value of the Underlying NVDA ETF. Selling put options exposes the Fund to the risk of potential loss if the market value of the Underlying NVDA ETF falls below the strike price before the option expires. The Fund may experience substantial downside from specific option positions and certain option positions held by the Fund may expire worthless. As an option approaches its expiration date, its value typically increasingly moves with the value of the underlying instrument. However, prior to such date, the value of an option generally does not increase or decrease at the same rate at the underlying instrument. There may at times be an imperfect correlation between the movement in values of options contracts and the underlying instrument, and there may at times not be a liquid secondary market for certain options contracts. The value of the options held by the Fund will be determined based on market quotations or other recognized pricing methods. Additionally, the Fund’s practice of “rolling” may cause the Fund to experience losses if the expiring contracts do not generate proceeds enough to cover the costs of entering into new options contracts. Rolling refers to the practice of closing out one options position and opening another with a different expiration date and/or a different strike price. Further, if an option is exercised, the seller (writer) of a put option is obligated to purchase the underlying asset at the strike price, which can result in significant financial and regulatory obligations for the Fund if the market value of the asset has fallen substantially. Furthermore, when the Fund seeks to trade out of puts, especially near expiration, there is an added risk that the Fund may be required to allocate resources unexpectedly to fulfill these obligations. This potential exposure to physical settlement can significantly impact the Fund’s liquidity and market exposure, particularly in volatile market conditions.
    • Swap Risk: Swaps are subject to tracking risk because they may not be perfect substitutes for the instruments they are intended to hedge or replace. Over the counter swaps are subject to counterparty default. Leverage inherent in derivatives will tend to magnify the Fund’s losses. The swap agreements may reference standardized exchange-traded, FLEX, European Style or American Style put options contracts that are based on the values of the price returns of the Underlying ETF. that generate specific risks.

    Affiliated Fund Risk. In managing the Fund, the Adviser has the ability to select the Underlying NVDA ETF and substitute the Underlying NVDA ETF with other ETFs that it believes will achieve the Fund’s objective. The Adviser may be subject to potential conflicts of interest in selecting the Underlying NVDA ETF and substituting the Underlying NVDA ETF with other ETFs because the fees paid to the Adviser by some Underlying NVDA ETF may be higher than the fees charged by other Underlying NVDA ETF.

    Counterparty Risk. The Fund is subject to counterparty risk by virtue of its investments in options contracts. Transactions in some types of derivatives, including options, are required to be centrally cleared (“cleared derivatives”). In a transaction involving cleared derivatives, the Fund’s counterparty is a clearing house rather than a bank or broker. Since the Fund is not a member of clearing houses and only members of a clearing house (“clearing members”) can participate directly in the clearing house, the Fund will hold cleared derivatives through accounts at clearing members. In cleared derivatives positions, the Fund will make payments (including margin payments) to and receive payments from a clearing house through their accounts at clearing members. Customer funds held at a clearing organization in connection with any options contracts are held in a commingled omnibus account and are not identified to the name of the clearing member’s individual customers. As a result, assets deposited by the Fund with any clearing member as margin for options may, in certain circumstances, be used to satisfy losses of other clients of the Fund’s clearing member. In addition, although clearing members guarantee performance of their clients’ obligations to the clearing house, there is a risk that the assets of the Fund might not be fully protected in the event of the clearing member’s bankruptcy, as the Fund would be limited to recovering only a pro rata share of all available funds segregated on behalf of the clearing member’s customers for the relevant account class. The Fund is also subject to the risk that a limited number of clearing members are willing to transact on the Fund’s behalf, which heightens the risks associated with a clearing member’s default. If a clearing member defaults the Fund could lose some or all of the benefits of a transaction entered into by the Fund with the clearing member. If the Fund cannot find a clearing member to transact with on the Fund’s behalf, the Fund may be unable to effectively implement its investment strategy. In addition, a counterparty (the other party to a transaction or an agreement or the party with whom the Fund executes transactions) to a transaction (including repurchase transaction) with the Fund may be unable or unwilling to make timely principal, interest or settlement payments, or otherwise honor its obligations.

    Price Participation Risk. The Fund employs an investment strategy that includes the sale of in-the-money put options contracts, which limits the degree to which the Fund will participate in increases in value experienced by the Underlying NVDA ETF over the Call Period. This means that if the Underlying NVDA ETF experiences an increase in value above the strike price of the sold put options during a Call Period, the Fund will likely not experience that increase to the same extent and may significantly underperform the Underlying NVDA ETF over the Call Period. Additionally, because the Fund is limited in the degree to which it will participate in increases in value experienced by the Underlying NVDA ETF over each Call Period, but has full exposure to any decreases in value experienced by the Underlying NVDA ETF over the Call Period, the NAV of the Fund may decrease over any given time period. The Fund’s NAV is dependent on the value of each options portfolio, which is based principally upon the performance of the Underlying NVDA ETF. The degree of participation in the Underlying NVDA ETF gains the Fund will experience will depend on prevailing market conditions, especially market volatility, at the time the Fund enters into the sold put options contracts and will vary from Call Period to Call Period. The value of the options contracts is affected by changes in the value and dividend rates of the Underlying NVDA ETF, changes in interest rates, changes in the actual or perceived volatility of the Underlying NVDA ETF and the remaining time to the options’ expiration, as well as trading conditions in the options market. As the price of the Underlying NVDA ETF share changes and time moves towards the expiration of each Call Period, the value of the options contracts, and therefore the Fund’s NAV, will change. However, it is not expected for the Fund’s NAV to directly correlate on a day-to-day basis with the returns of the Underlying NVDA ETF share price. The amount of time remaining until the options contract’s expiration date affects the impact of the potential options contract income on the Fund’s NAV, which may not be in full effect until the expiration date of the Fund’s options contracts. Therefore, while changes in the price of the Underlying NVDA ETF share will result in changes to the Fund’s NAV, the Fund generally anticipates that the rate of change in the Fund’s NAV will be different than that experienced by the Underlying NVDA ETF share price.

    Distribution Risk. As part of the Fund’s investment objective, the Fund seeks to provide current monthly income. There is no assurance that the Fund will make a distribution in any given month. If the Fund makes distributions, the amounts of such distributions will likely vary greatly from one distribution to the next. Additionally, the monthly distributions, if any, may consist of returns of capital, which would decrease the Fund’s NAV and trading price over time. As a result, an investor may suffer significant losses to their investment.

    NAV Erosion Risk Due to Distributions. When the Fund makes a distribution, the Fund’s NAV will typically drop by the amount of the distribution on the related ex-dividend date. The repeated payment of distributions by the Fund, if any, may significantly erode the Fund’s NAV and trading price over time. As a result, an investor may suffer significant losses to their investment.

    Put Writing Strategy Risk. The path dependency (i.e., the continued use) of the Fund’s put writing strategy will impact the extent that the Fund participates in the positive price returns of the Underlying NVDA ETF and, in turn, the Fund’s returns, both during the term of the sold put options and over longer time periods. 187 If, for example, the Fund were to sell 10% in-the-money put options having a one-month term, the Fund’s participation in the positive price returns of the Underlying NVDA ETF will be capped at 10% for that month. However, over a longer period (e.g., a three-month period), the Fund should not be expected to participate fully in the first 30% (i.e., 3 months x 10%) of the positive price returns of the Underlying NVDA ETF, or the Fund may even lose money, even if the Underlying NVDA ETF share price has appreciated by at least that much over such period, if during any particular month or months over that period the Underlying NVDA ETF had a return less than 10%. This example illustrates that both the Fund’s participation in the positive price returns of the Underlying NVDA ETF and its returns will depend not only on the price of the Underlying NVDA ETF but also on the path that the Underlying NVDA ETF takes over time.

    If, for example, the Fund were to sell 5% out-of-the-money put options having a one-week term, the Fund’s downward protection against the negative price returns of the Underlying NVDA ETF will be capped at 5% for that week. However, over a longer period (e.g., a four-week period), the Fund should not be expected to be protected fully in the first 25% (i.e., 4 weeks x 5%) of the negative price returns of the Underlying NVDA ETF, and the Fund may lose money, even if the Underlying NVDA ETF share price has appreciated over such period, if during any particular week or weeks over that period the Underlying NVDA ETF share price had decreases by more than 5%. This example illustrates that both the Fund’s protection against the negative price returns of the Underlying NVDA ETF and its returns will depend not only on the price of the Underlying NVDA ETF but also on the path that the Underlying NVDA ETF takes over time.

    Under both cases the Fund may be fully exposed to the downward movements of the Underlying NVDA ETF, offset only by the premiums received from selling put contracts. The Fund does not seek to offer any downside protection, except for the fact that the premiums from the sold options may offset some or all of the Underlying NVDA ETF’s decline.

    Option Market Liquidity Risk. The trading activity in the option market of the Underlying NVDA ETF may be limited and the option contracts may trade at levels significantly different from their economic value. The lack of liquidity may negatively affect the ability of the Fund to achieve its investment objective. This risk may increase if the portfolio turnover is elevated, for instance because of frequent changes in the number of Shares outstanding, and if the net asset value of the Underlying NVDA ETF is modest. For the 12-month period ending September 30, 2024, the net asset value of the Underlying NVDA ETF ranged from $0.6m to $5,986m.

    Concentration Risk. To the extent that the Underlying NVDA ETF concentrates its investments in a particular industry, the Fund will be subject to the risks associated with that industry.

    ETF Risks.

    Authorized Participants, Market Makers, and Liquidity Providers Concentration Risk. The Fund has a limited number of financial institutions that are authorized to purchase and redeem Shares directly from the Fund (known as “Authorized Participants” or “APs”). In addition, there may be a limited number of market makers and/or liquidity providers in the marketplace. To the extent either of the following events occur, Shares may trade at a material discount to NAV and possibly face delisting: (i) APs exit the business or otherwise become unable to process creation and/or redemption orders and no other APs step forward to perform these services; or (ii) market makers and/or liquidity providers exit the business or significantly reduce their business activities and no other entities step forward to perform their functions.

    Cash Redemption Risk. The Fund currently expects to affect a significant portion of its creations and redemptions for cash, rather than in-kind securities. Paying redemption proceeds in cash rather than through in-kind delivery of portfolio securities may require the Fund to dispose of or sell portfolio securities or other assets at an inopportune time to obtain the cash needed to meet redemption orders. This may cause the Fund to sell a security and recognize a capital gain or loss that might not have been incurred if it had made a redemption in-kind. As a result, the Fund may pay out higher or lower annual capital gains distributions than ETFs that redeem in-kind. The use of cash creations and redemptions may also cause the Fund’s Shares to trade in the market at greater bid-ask spreads or greater premiums or discounts to the Fund’s NAV. Furthermore, the Fund may not be able to execute cash transactions for creation and redemption purposes at the same price used to determine the Fund’s NAV. To the extent that the maximum additional charge for creation or redemption transactions is insufficient to cover the execution shortfall, the Fund’s performance could be negatively impacted.

    Costs of Buying or Selling Shares. Due to the costs of buying or selling Shares, including brokerage commissions imposed by brokers and bid-ask spreads, frequent trading of Shares may significantly reduce investment results and an investment in Shares may not be advisable for investors who anticipate regularly making small investments.

    Shares May Trade at Prices Other Than NAV. As with all ETFs, Shares may be bought and sold in the secondary market at market prices. Although it is expected that the market price of Shares will approximate the Fund’s NAV, there may be times when the market price of Shares is more than the NAV intra-day (premium) or less than the NAV intra-day (discount) due to supply and demand of Shares or during periods of market volatility. This risk is heightened in times of market volatility, periods of steep market declines, and periods when there is limited trading activity for Shares in the secondary market, in which case such premiums or discounts may be significant.

    Trading. Although Shares are listed on a national securities exchange, such as The Nasdaq Stock Market, LLC (the “Exchange”), and may be traded on U.S. exchanges other than the Exchange, there can be no assurance that an active trading market for the Shares will develop or be maintained or that the Shares will trade with any volume, or at all, on any stock exchange. This risk may be greater for the Fund as it seeks to have exposure to a single underlying stock as opposed to a more diverse portfolio like a traditional pooled investment. In stressed market conditions, the liquidity of Shares may begin to mirror the liquidity of the Fund’s underlying portfolio holdings, which can be significantly less liquid than Shares. Shares trade on the Exchange at a market price that may be below, at or above the Fund’s NAV. Trading in Shares on the Exchange may be halted due to market conditions or for reasons that, in the view of the Exchange, make trading in Shares inadvisable. In addition, trading in Shares on the Exchange is subject to trading halts caused by extraordinary market volatility pursuant to the Exchange “circuit breaker” rules. There can be no assurance that the requirements of the Exchange necessary to maintain the listing of the Fund will continue to be met or will remain unchanged. In the event of an unscheduled market close for options contracts that reference a single stock, such as the Underlying NVDA ETF’s securities being halted or a market wide closure, settlement prices will be determined by the procedures of the listing exchange of the options contracts. As a result, the Fund could be adversely affected and be unable to implement its investment strategies in the event of an unscheduled closing.

    High Portfolio Turnover Risk. The Fund may actively and frequently trade all or a significant portion of the Fund’s holdings. A high portfolio turnover rate increases transaction costs, which may increase the Fund’s expenses. Frequent trading may also cause adverse tax consequences for investors in the Fund due to an increase in short-term capital gains.

    Inflation Risk. Inflation risk is the risk that the value of assets or income from investments will be less in the future as inflation decreases the value of money. As inflation increases, the present value of the Fund’s assets and distributions, if any, may decline.

    Liquidity Risk. Some securities held by the Fund, including options contracts, may be difficult to sell or be illiquid, particularly during times of market turmoil. This risk is greater for the Fund as it will hold options contracts on a single security, and not a broader range of options contracts. Markets for securities or financial instruments could be disrupted by a number of events, including, but not limited to, an economic crisis, natural disasters, epidemics/pandemics, new legislation or regulatory changes inside or outside the United States. Illiquid securities may be difficult to value, especially in changing or volatile markets. If the Fund is forced to sell an illiquid security at an unfavorable time or price, the Fund may be adversely impacted. Certain market conditions or restrictions, such as market rules related to short sales, may prevent the Fund from limiting losses, realizing gains or achieving a high correlation with the Underlying NVDA ETF. There is no assurance that a security that is deemed liquid when purchased will continue to be liquid. Market illiquidity may cause losses for the Fund.

    Management Risk. The Fund is subject to management risk because it is an actively managed portfolio. In managing the Fund’s investment portfolio, the portfolio managers will apply investment techniques and risk analyses that may not produce the desired result. There can be no guarantee that the Fund will meet its investment objective.

    Money Market Instrument Risk. The Fund may use a variety of money market instruments for cash management purposes, including money market funds, depositary accounts and repurchase agreements. Repurchase agreements are contracts in which a seller of securities agrees to buy the securities back at a specified time and price. Repurchase agreements may be subject to market and credit risk related to the collateral securing the repurchase agreement. Money market instruments, including money market funds, may lose money through fees or other means.

    New Fund Risk. The Fund is a recently organized management investment company with no operating history. As a result, prospective investors do not have a track record or history on which to base their investment decisions.

    Non-Diversification Risk. Because the Fund is “non-diversified,” it may invest a greater percentage of its assets in the securities of a single issuer or a smaller number of issuers than if it was a diversified fund. As a result, a decline in the value of an investment in a single issuer or a smaller number of issuers could cause the Fund’s overall value to decline to a greater degree than if the Fund held a more diversified portfolio.

    Operational Risk. The Fund is subject to risks arising from various operational factors, including, but not limited to, human error, processing and communication errors, errors of the Fund’s service providers, counterparties or other third-parties, failed or inadequate processes and technology or systems failures. The Fund relies on third-parties for a range of services, including custody. Any delay or failure relating to engaging or maintaining such service providers may affect the Fund’s ability to meet its investment objective. Although the Fund, Adviser, and Sub-Adviser seek to reduce these operational risks through controls and procedures, there is no way to completely protect against such risks.

    Recent Market Events Risk. U.S. and international markets have experienced significant periods of volatility in recent years and months due to a number of economic, political and global macro factors including the impact of COVID-19 as a global pandemic, which has resulted in a public health crisis, disruptions to business operations and supply chains, stress on the global healthcare system, growth concerns in the U.S. and overseas, staffing shortages and the inability to meet consumer demand, and widespread concern and uncertainty. The global recovery from COVID-19 is proceeding at slower than expected rates due to the emergence of variant strains and may last for an extended period of time. Continuing uncertainties regarding interest rates, rising inflation, political events, rising government debt in the U.S. and trade tensions also contribute to market volatility. Conflict, loss of life and disaster connected to ongoing armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia in Europe and Israel and Hamas in the Middle East could have severe adverse effects on the region, including significant adverse effects on the regional or global economies and the markets for certain securities. The U.S. and the European Union have imposed sanctions on certain Russian individuals and companies, including certain financial institutions, and have limited certain exports and imports to and from Russia. The war has contributed to recent market volatility and may continue to do so.

    Single Issuer Risk. Issuer-specific attributes may cause an investment in the Fund to be more volatile than a traditional pooled investment vehicle which diversifies risk or the market generally. The value of the Fund, which focuses on an individual security (the Underlying NVDA ETF), may be more volatile than a traditional pooled investment or the market as a whole and may perform differently from the value of a traditional pooled investment or the market as a whole.

    Tax Risk. The Fund intends to elect and to qualify each year to be treated as a RIC under Subchapter M of the Code. As a RIC, the Fund will not be subject to U.S. federal income tax on the portion of its net investment income and net capital gain that it distributes to Shareholders, provided that it satisfies certain requirements of the Code. If the Fund does not qualify as a RIC for any taxable year and certain relief provisions are not available, the Fund’s taxable income will be subject to tax at the Fund level and to a further tax at the shareholder level when such income is distributed. To comply with the asset diversification test applicable to a RIC, the Fund will attempt to ensure that the value of the derivatives it holds is never 25% of the total value of Fund assets at the close of any quarter. If the Fund’s investments in the derivatives were to exceed 25% of the Fund’s total assets at the end of a tax quarter, the Fund, generally, has a grace period to cure such lack of compliance. If the Fund fails to timely cure, it may no longer be eligible to be treated as a RIC. In addition, distributions received by the Fund from the Underlying NVDA ETF may generate “bad income” that could prevent the Fund from meeting the “Income Requirement” of Subchapter M of the Code, which may cause the Fund to fail to qualify as a RIC.

    Investing in U.S. Equities Risk. Investing in U.S. issuers subjects the Fund to legal, regulatory, political, currency, security, and economic risks that are specific to the U.S. Certain changes in the U.S., such as a weakening of the U.S. economy or a decline in its financial markets, may have an adverse effect on U.S. issuers.

    U.S. Government and U.S. Agency Obligations Risk. The Fund may invest in securities issued by the U.S. government or its agencies or instrumentalities. U.S. Government obligations include securities issued or guaranteed as to principal and interest by the U.S. Government, its agencies or instrumentalities, such as the U.S. Treasury. Payment of principal and interest on U.S. Government obligations may be backed by the full faith and credit of the United States or may be backed solely by the issuing or guaranteeing agency or instrumentality itself. In the latter case, the investor must look principally to the agency or instrumentality issuing or guaranteeing the obligation for ultimate repayment, which agency or instrumentality may be privately owned. There can be no assurance that the U.S. Government would provide financial support to its agencies or instrumentalities (including government-sponsored enterprises) where it is not obligated to do so.

    Fixed Income Securities Risk. The market value of Fixed Income Securities will change in response to interest rate changes and other factors, such as changes in the effective maturities and credit ratings of fixed income investments. During periods of falling interest rates, the values of outstanding Fixed Income Securities and related financial instruments generally rise. Conversely, during periods of rising interest rates, the values of such securities and related financial instruments generally decline. Fixed Income Securities are also subject to credit risk.

    Investments in Fixed Income Securities may also involve the following risks, depending on the instrument involved:

    • Asset-Backed/Mortgage-Backed Securities Risk – The market value and yield of asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities can vary due to market interest rate fluctuations and early prepayments of underlying instruments.
    • Credit Risk – An investment in the Fund also involves the risk that the issuer of a Fixed Income Security that the Fund holds will fail to make timely payments of interest or principal or go bankrupt, or that the value of the securities will decline because of a market perception that the issuer may not make payments on time, thus potentially reducing the Fund’s return.
    • Event Risk – Event risk is the risk that corporate issuers may undergo restructurings, such as mergers, leveraged buyouts, takeovers, or similar events financed by increased debt. As a result of the added debt, the credit quality and market value of a company’s bonds and/or other debt securities may decline significantly.
    • Extension Risk – Payment on the loans underlying Fixed Income Securities held by the Fund may be made more slowly when interest rates are rising.
    • Interest Rate Risk – Generally, the value of Fixed Income Securities will change inversely with changes in interest rates. As interest rates rise, the market value of Fixed Income Securities tends to decrease. Conversely, as interest rates fall, the market value of Fixed Income Securities tends to increase. This risk will be greater for long-term securities than for short-term securities. In recent periods, governmental financial regulators, including the U.S. Federal Reserve, have taken steps to maintain historically low interest rates. Very low or negative interest rates may magnify interest rate risk. Changes in government intervention may have adverse effects on investments, volatility, and illiquidity in debt markets.
    • Prepayment Risk – When interest rates are declining, issuers of Fixed Income Securities held by the Fund may prepay principal earlier than scheduled.

    The Fund is distributed by ALPS Distributors, Inc, which is not affiliated with GraniteShares or any of its affiliates ©2024 GraniteShares Inc. All rights reserved. GraniteShares, GraniteShares Trusts, and the GraniteShares logo are registered and unregistered trademarks of GraniteShares Inc., in the United States and elsewhere. All other marks are the property of their respective owners.

    Media Contact:
    GraniteShares Inc.
    Attn: Media Relations
    222 Broadway, 21st Floor
    New York, NY 10038
    844-476-8747
    info@graniteshares.com

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