Category: Middle East

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Transcript-interview-4BC Brisbane, Breakfast with Peter Fegan

    Source: Australian Ministers for Regional Development

    PETER FEGAN:  Now, you’ll remember last year we reported it here on 4BC and it made headlines nationally, the states were officially put on notice by the Federal Government. The states were saying, show me the money and the Federal Government was simply saying, well, prove what it’s worth. Federal Transport Minister Catherine King told state premiers if they wanted cash, they needed good business cases. It’s pretty smart politics, really. The good news is we’ve passed the test here in Brisbane. Today, we’ll be handed a cheque for $200 million, and it includes funding for one of Brisbane’s oldest icons. The Federal Transport Minister, Catherine King, joins me on the line. Minister, great to have your company this morning.

    CATHERINE KING: So lovely to be with you, Peter. It’s a beautiful day here in Brisbane.

    PETER FEGAN: Now, one of our landmarks, our most famous landmarks, will be getting some cash. Can you reveal it on the program please?

    CATHERINE KING: Yeah. So we’re working with the Brisbane City Council to start to investigate what the cost of and scope of work that are needed to restore and to future maintenance of what is obviously the most iconic bridge, one of the most iconic bridges in the country, apart from the Sydney Harbour Bridge, of course. But it’s- you know, it’s a landmark. And so we’re putting in alongside Brisbane City Council together, $5 million to really get that work done, to see what is it that we’re going to need to do. It’s going to need more cash into the future. But this is really starting the process of working with the council to look at what do we need to make sure this bridge stays there into the future and is as strong as it possibly can be, and we keep it there for many, many generations to enjoy.

    PETER FEGAN: Now, there was also $1 million that’s been put aside to investigate a bridge from West End to Toowong. Well, Minister, I’m going to do you a favour here this morning. I’m going to save you that $1 million, and I’m going to say this, just build it because we’ve wanted it for so long. 

    CATHERINE KING: [Laughs] Well, unfortunately we have to work out the cost of these things first. And part of what you do with the business case and the planning is you do the geotech work. You have a look at what services need to be moved so that you can then- the city council can come to me and say, well, look, we need this amount of money to actually build it. So that’s really just the start of the process. And I was at the opening, obviously, of Kangaroo Point Bridge. I’ve seen hundreds and hundreds of people have been using that. We want to see people being able to access all parts of the city. And so this is again, just working with the Brisbane City Council, doing that planning work, finding out how much- you know, we really need to understand how much it costs and then sort of getting on with it once we’ve got that understanding.

    PETER FEGAN: Minister, no more footbridges. We need cars to go across. We drive here in Brisbane. We don’t get transport, unfortunately.

    CATHERINE KING: Well, we do lots of things. I think people catch buses.

    PETER FEGAN: [Laughs]

    CATHERINE KING: So obviously, there’s the Brisbane Metro [indistinct], there’s people do that. People will cycle. I’ve seen people everywhere doing that. I’ve seen people walking across footbridges and then I’ve obviously seen- in terms of lots of cars as well. Everyone does all of those things. But cars are obviously pretty important here in Queensland.

    PETER FEGAN: Minister, I found this one very interesting, being somebody that grew up in the western suburbs of Brisbane, plenty of people listening to me from the west this morning, they’ll find this interesting. $78.5 million towards cost pressures on the Moggill Road Corridor upgrade project, replacing Indooroopilly roundabout with an overpass over Moggill Road. Now that’s great, but what about the Moggill Road corridor in particular? And then that’s further out towards Moggill. And I’m talking about land that had been put aside. Government land, Crown land that’s been put aside since Malcolm Fraser’s days. And yet people that live out in those western suburbs are still struggling to get to work, because we haven’t used that parcel of land. Can you give a guarantee that one day we may use it?

    CATHERINE KING: What again, we do is work in partnership with councils. So obviously Brisbane City Council is in a really unique position across the country that it has such a substantial road and obviously public transport network that it has to fund and build itself. So we work closely with Brisbane City Council and also state governments. They bring projects forward to us in budget and we make considerations of those. We’ve got to do the planning work first, make sure we understand it, but know if the council or the state government want to bring that forward. I, of course, will give it due consideration in the budget process.

    PETER FEGAN: $7.2 billion upgrade to fix the Bruce Highway. I think this is the most contentious topic here in Queensland. And I got to say, Minister, when it comes to the election, this will be one of the most divisive topics and I think you’ll either win or lose votes here. $7.2 billion upgrade to fix the Bruce, right? That’s one hell of an obligation to Queenslanders in particular. But I’ve got to say this, Minister, we are reluctant to believe either government, particularly this Labor Government at the moment, because it was this government that had turned its back on the Bruce and had switched the funding arrangement around. $7.2 billion sounds fantastic. I’ve got to say, on behalf of all Queensland, Minister, we just need to get on with it. We need this highway to be safe.

    CATHERINE KING: Absolutely. And that’s why, you know, the earliest possible opportunity we did, we’ve made the announcement at that $7.2 billion. Money will flow this year and every subsequent year.  We’ve said we’ll get it done in eight years. We’ve asked the Queensland Government to deliver that …

    PETER FEGAN: [Talks over] But it’s been 50.

    CATHERINE KING: … then obviously [indistinct].

    PETER FEGAN: 50 or 60 years, Minister. It’s 50 or 60 years and not one government can fix it.

    CATHERINE KING: Well, this Government has made the single biggest contribution to the Bruce Highway ever. And this is a Labor Government that has done that. And if you look back when we were last in office, prior to that, it was the then infrastructure minister, now Prime Minister, who then made the single biggest commitment to this.

    This is a Labor legacy, and we are absolutely committed to making the Bruce Highway safer. We’ve been in government obviously two and a half years. And I do want to make it really clear, no money has ever been cut from the Bruce Highway. What we have said is-

    PETER FEGAN: But the funding agreement- the funding- hang on, Minister, the funding agreement, that’s not true. The funding agreement was an 80/20 split…

    CATHERINE KING: [Talks over] That’s true…

    PETER FEGAN: … and you- but you changed that. So that’s funding cutting. Hang on, Minister, you changed that. It was an 80/20 split, but you say no funding has ever been cut. If you change- if you go from 80/20 to 50/50, that to me- I’m not a mathematician, but that’s a 30 per cent cut in funding.

    CATHERINE KING: So no, it isn’t. And so I want to make that really clear. I think there’s some confusion about that and been a bit of mischief about that. So first thing is not a single dollar has been cut from the Bruce Highway. In fact, the commitment that we’ve got, there’s $10 billion that has already been spent on the Bruce Highway. That has remained, and then we’ve put in an additional 7.2 billion. We’ve recognised on the Bruce Highway, in particular because of the safety concerns, 41 deaths just last year alone, that we will continue to fund that on an 80/20 basis.

    But what we did announce is that because the Commonwealth is now increasingly funding suburban roads, public transport and has stepped into the space of the state governments, largely, we’re now on other roads, particularly across the country, now requiring the state to also step up its commitment. We’re not dropping any of our funding. There’s still $125 billion worth of Commonwealth funding going to states and territories. We’re not dropping that. We’re just asking the states to step up with their contribution as well. So it’s not a cut to our funding. We’re asking the states to step in in the same way we’re stepping in on suburban roads now, but generally were 100 per cent of the state to fund.

    PETER FEGAN: It’s bang on quarter after eight. My guest this morning is the Federal Transport Minister, Catherine King. $200 million being announced today in funding for our roads here in Brisbane and in the South East. Minister, I’ve got to say this. It’s smart politics to ask the states to present you a case study because money is really, really tight, particularly on a federal level. So I like it. I think it’s good politics, and I think that that’s what the states should have to do. The reason I’m asking you about this, though, is because we need a really nice, new shiny stadium here in Queensland and particularly in Brisbane. We’ve got the Olympics coming. Now, if there was a case study put forward by David Crisafulli for a brand-new stadium, you’d be on board, wouldn’t you?

    CATHERINE KING: Well, the thing that we have put money towards, so there’s $3.5 billion capped from the Commonwealth going into the Olympics. We have said the Commonwealth’s contribution will go towards the Brisbane Arena. $2.5 billion is going towards that, we think, will leave a really significant legacy for an entertainment venue here in the heart of Brisbane – really necessary. We’ve also said we will 50/50 share the minor venues. Obviously, the Queensland Government is undertaking a review of those venues at the moment, but the Commonwealth has done- we’ve done the work, we’ve done the business case, the work is ready to go on the Brisbane Arena and that remains- you know, remains there on the table to build that arena for Brisbane. We think it’s needed and it will leave a great legacy for the community.

    PETER FEGAN: Let’s hope they’re listening, because it’s next month that we announce whether we’re going to get a new stadium or not. Before I let you go, Minister, what did you make of today’s announcements? I want to get your thoughts on this because your government has approved a deal between Virgin and Qatar Airways. Now, this is a deal that would see Qatar be able to invest in Virgin. It means there’s going to be more Qatar flights. It means we can spread our wings a little bit. Should hopefully cheapen flight prices here in Australia. But I’ve got to think back, if my memory serves me correctly, it was you that clipped Qatar’s wings in the first place.

    CATHERINE KING: So what we’ve had announced today is that the Treasurer has approved the Foreign Investment Review Board’s decision that Qatar Airways, the Qatari government, can invest in Virgin, and that obviously allows Virgin to do a number of things in terms of it going forward. Obviously, Bain Capital is wanting to withdraw and have Qatar now come in as the major investor. What it’s allowed us also to do is ensure that there are some Australians on the board of Virgin to make sure that we’ve got that in place and that they’re in fact opportunities to train Australian pilots, as again, Qatar has been granted through Virgin some wet leases to increase its flights, its international flights and create that competition. And I think that’s a good thing.

    PETER FEGAN: Before I let you go, we’ve got some breaking news. The election, 12 April. Is that right?

    CATHERINE KING: [Laughs] Very nice try there. What a sneaky way to do it, you cheeky thing.

    PETER FEGAN: [Laughs] I should have just – I shouldn’t have laughed.

    CATHERINE KING: You should have just- I know, I nearly believed you then. You just got me. I’ve got three brothers who do that to me all the time.

    PETER FEGAN: What would you have said, though?

    CATHERINE KING: I don’t know, I have absolutely no idea. [Indistinct] to the Prime Minister, but very cheeky. You nearly got me.

    PETER FEGAN: Good on you, Minister. We’ll chat again very soon.

    CATHERINE KING: Lovely to talk to you, Peter.

    PETER FEGAN: There she is. That’s the Federal Transport Minister, Catherine King.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Scottish businesses sell to the world with £42 million lift

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Scottish businesses sell to the world with £42 million lift

    £42 million of export finance deals brokered with Scottish businesses over the last six months.

    • £42 million of export finance deals brokered with Scottish businesses since July
    • Boosting Scottish exports plays a vital role in growing the economy, a key part of the Plan for Change
    • Companies from a range of sectors including food and drink and offshore wind are benefitting from credit guarantees and insurance

    Businesses behind Scotland’s most emblematic exports have been able to grow thanks to £42 million in UK Export Finance (UKEF) deals brokered so far since the summer.

    Enabling companies such as Ferguson Whisky and manufacturer of fire and rescue vehicles Emergency One, which the government of Iraq has contracted to replace some of its fleet of fire engines, to expand to markets abroad helps to grow the economy and create jobs, delivering on the Plan for Change. 

    The latest Scottish business to benefit from support is Aberdeen-based First Tech – one of many offshore services firms in Scotland driving the energy transition and making the country a world-renowned centre of engineering skills. Scotland’s marine economy generated around £4.9 billion in 2022.

    UKEF is renewing a £12 million support package delivered with Virgin Money for First Tech subsidiary First Subsea, allowing it to continue its growth into the offshore wind market and provide UK-made products like cable protections systems, bend restrictor products or heavy lift connectors, across the globe.

    Minister Douglas Alexander will join UKEF representatives today at the ‘Made in Scotland’ roadshow, where he will encourage Scottish businesses to take advantage of the opportunities to sell abroad and hear first-hand about the support UKEF has provided.

    Minister for Trade Policy Douglas Alexander said:

    “Growing the economy is a key part of this UK Government’s Plan for Change, and we recognise the importance of boosting Scottish exports in achieving this.

    “We’re working hard to ensure that Scottish businesses have the support they need to sell to the world and grow, and the help that UK Export Finance provides is a crucial part of this.”

    Martin Suttie, First Tech Ltd Chairman said:

    “First Tech is very proud to be at the forefront of the energy transition story with our continued expertise in oil and gas being a launchpad to make meaningful developments in both the fixed and floating offshore wind market through First Subsea and also First Marine Solutions. 

    “Floating wind technology enables almost every country in the world to integrate floating wind renewable energy into their energy mix.  It is therefore vitally important that the industry continues to develop and prove large scale commercial developments if we are going to genuinely change the energy mix around the globe. The First Tech Group is excited to play an important part in making this transition happen.”

    UKEF is the UK government’s export credit agency, providing credit guarantees and insurance helping smaller businesses to overcome financial barriers to exporting.  Export credit is an integral part of the government trade support being promoted at the first ‘Made in Scotland, Sold to the World’ trade fair of 2025. 

    In 2021, Scotland’s exports were worth £50.1 billion, of which the majority – £33.5 billion – were goods.

    UKEF’s specialised trade finance offer sits alongside other sources of support from public organisations like the Export Support Service, UK Export Academy and British Business Bank, which can offer more general access to finance.

    Notes to editors:

    • UKEF is a UK government ministerial department and the nation’s export credit agency (ECA). UKEF helps exporters access working capital and manage the risk of not getting paid by offering a government guarantee. It supports companies of all sizes and multiple sectors across the UK.

    • UKEF works alongside other sources of public financing and business support in Scotland, including DBT Scotland, Scottish Enterprise, UK Infrastructure Bank, British Business Bank and Scottish National Investment Bank.

    • In 2024, Ferguson Whisky Limited secured a new £450,000 funding package from Virgin Money thanks to UKEF support. Ferguson can support investments in whisky and also organises distillery tours and other events.

    • Based in Cumnock, Emergency One is the UK’s leading manufacturer of fire and rescue vehicles. A UKEF loan has allowed the Iraqi government to purchase 31 Emergency One vehicles and deliver one of its biggest-ever investments into its emergency services. The vehicles will help to tackle the frequent fires which break out in Iraq, especially in the summer.

    Updates to this page

    Published 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: Tajik National Arrested in Brooklyn for Conspiring to Provide Material Support to ISIS

    Source: US State of California

    Mansuri Manuchekhri, 33, of Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn, New York, was arrested today for allegedly conspiring to provide material support to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and to the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), possessing firearms while unlawfully in the United States, and immigration fraud. Manuchekhri was arrested today and made his initial appearance this afternoon in the Eastern District of New York.

    “Under no circumstances will my Department of Justice tolerate terrorism,” said Attorney General Pam Bondi. “We stand ready to find, arrest, and prosecute those who seek to harm American citizens with the full force of the law. I stand with our federal, state, and local law enforcement partners who work to keep Americans safe and evil off our streets.” 

    “The defendant allegedly supported ISIS and sent thousands of dollars overseas to individuals connected to ISIS,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “The FBI is focused on preventing acts of terrorism and ISIS has a long and violent record of harming U.S. citizens. We are committed to working with our law enforcement partners to find and hold accountable those who assist terrorists and endanger the safety of Americans at home or abroad.”

    “The Justice Department will relentlessly pursue those who fund and support terrorists,” said Sue Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. “We will not allow our immigration or financial systems to be exploited. Our country will not be a safe haven for those who try to harm Americans.”

    “As alleged, the defendant facilitated thousands of dollars in contributions to ISIS extremists overseas,” said U.S. Attorney John J. Durham for the Eastern District of New York. “Protecting the homeland and prosecuting evildoers who assist terrorist organizations by funding their violent and hateful agenda, here and abroad, will always be a priority of this office.”   

    As alleged in the complaint, Manuchekhri traveled to the United States from Tajikistan in June 2016 on a non-immigrant tourist visa and remained in the country after his visa expired in December 2016. In March 2017, Manuchekhri paid an American citizen to enter into a sham marriage with him so that he could obtain legal status in the United States. However, he failed to provide supporting documentation that was requested of him and his petition was never granted. 

    As alleged in the complaint, Manuchekhri traveled to the United States from Tajikistan in June 2016 on a non-immigrant tourist visa and remained in the country after his visa expired in December 2016. In March 2017, Manuchekhri paid an American citizen to enter into a sham marriage with him so that he could obtain legal status in the United States. However, he failed to provide supporting documentation that was requested of him and his petition was never granted.

    From approximately December 2021 through April 2023, while residing in Brooklyn, Manuchekhri facilitated more than $50,000 in payments to ISIS-affiliated individuals in Turkey and Syria, including to an individual who was later arrested by Turkish authorities for his alleged involvement in a January 2024 terrorist attack on a church in Istanbul for which ISIS-K publicly claimed responsibility. Manuchekhri expressed his support for ISIS to others by praising past ISIS attacks in the United States and by collecting jihadi propaganda videos promoting violence and martyrdom.

    The complaint further alleges that Manuchekhri possessed and used firearms and made frequent visits to shooting ranges even though he was prohibited from doing so as an alien unlawfully in the United States. In February 2022, Manuchekhri recorded himself firing an assault rifle at a shooting range in New Jersey and sent the video to one of the ISIS-affiliated individuals in Turkey with the message, “Praise God, I am ready, brother.”

    If convicted, Manuchekhri faces a maximum penalty of 45 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Robert M. Pollack and Andrew D. Reich for the Eastern District of New York are prosecuting the case with assistance from Trial Attorneys John Cella, Andrea Broach, George Kraehe, and Ryan White of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section and Paralegal Specialist Wayne Colón.

    A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-Evening Report: A middle power with ‘great and powerful friends’: Australia’s changing role in the region

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Rebecca Strating, Director, La Trobe Asia, and Professor of International Relations, La Trobe University

    Debating Australia’s role in world politics is not always high on the political agenda. Elections here are more often fought on economic issues than foreign or defence policy. And while the major parties have different views on foreign policy, there tends to be bipartisanship on the central tenets of our strategic policy, including Australia’s alliance with the United States.

    In recent years, however, Australia has found itself wedged between two great powers: its security guarantor, the US, and its major trading partner, China. The increasing strategic competition between these two great powers, especially in Asia, has raised new questions about how Australia should manage these relationships and conceive of its role in the world.

    For some countries, having a prominent role on the global stage may be more obvious than for others. Wealthy states with large militaries and populations, for example, often play the part of “great powers”. These countries tend to make claims about their unique rights and responsibilities, such as having a greater say in multilateral institutions (like the United Nations) and the “rules” intended to govern international conduct.

    However, most of the world’s countries are not great powers. For a middle-sized nation like Australia, its role on the global stage is not necessarily static but determined by how our leaders balance national interests and values.

    These, in turn, are shaped by “material factors”, such as geography, population and economy size, natural resources, shared political ideals (for example, our belief in democratic institutions), norms and culture.

    In addition, a middle-sized country’s global role can change depending on how leaders perceive contemporary threats and challenges to their security.

    Australia as a ‘middle power’

    The National Defence Strategy released in 2024 describes Australia as an “influential middle power”. According to the strategy, this is demonstrated by several things:

    • our enduring democratic values
    • our history of safeguarding international rules and contributing to regional partnerships
    • the strong foundations of our economy
    • the strength of our partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

    Whether Australia should be described as a “middle power”, though, has long been the subject of political debate. Since H.V. “Doc” Evatt, then-attorney general and minister for external affairs, used the term in 1945, it has been most often (but not always) associated with the Labor Party.

    Recent Coalition governments have been more reluctant to view Australia as “just” a middle power.

    Alexander Downer, the foreign minister in the Howard government, would occasionally use the term “pivotal power”. Pivotal powers, as one political analyst put it, are “destined to shape the contours of geopolitics in key regions of the world” due to their strategic location, economic power and political influence.

    Meanwhile, Julie Bishop, foreign minister in the Abbott and Turnbull administrations, preferred the term “top 20 country”, arguing this better reflected Australia’s standing and level of influence on the global stage.

    At the core of this historical debate is the extent to which a country like Australia can – and does – have influence in the region and globally.

    Middle powers have different characteristics from great or smaller powers. Size, geography and economic wealth affect the extent to which they can shape the world. As a result, middle powers often adopt certain types of actions or behaviours to enhance their influence.

    This concept, known as “middle power diplomacy”, has often been associated with Australia.

    There are a number of ways middle powers do this, such as by:

    • supporting adherence to international law and rules (because these can help restrain more powerful states from imposing their will on others)

    • encouraging cooperation through multilateralism (cooperation between multiple states)

    • finding creative new solutions to global problems, such as climate change

    • taking the diplomatic lead on specific, but important, issues.

    A liberal-democratic middle power, such as Australia, may also seek to promote its values internationally, including the respect for human rights, free and open trade, and the principles of democratic governance and accountability.

    Australia’s reliance on ‘great and powerful friends’

    In addition, middle powers often choose to align themselves with a bigger power to boost their influence even further.

    In Australia’s case, its strategic dependence on the United States developed, in part, by historical anxieties that faraway “great and powerful friends”, as former diplomat Allan Gyngell phrased it, might abandon it in a potentially hostile region.

    Prior to the second world war, Australia relied on its former colonial ruler, Britain, for its security. The Fall of Singapore in 1942, in which Japanese forces routed British and Australian troops defending the island, demonstrated the risks of our overdependence on a distant ally.

    In the aftermath of the war, Australia forged a new security alliance with a new global superpower, the United States, through the ANZUS Treaty. Yet, replacing one “great and powerful” but distant friend with another did not alleviate Australia’s abandonment anxieties.

    Since then, debates about Australia’s international role have largely focused on the extent to which it can – and should be – self-reliant in the context of the US alliance, or if it should pursue a more independent foreign policy.

    US domestic politics – particularly during President Donald Trump’s time in office – have also driven uncertainty about Washington’s reliability, as well as its commitment to Asia and the implications for allies like Australia.

    Despite such concerns, Australia’s relationship with the US is as strong and deeply entwined as it has ever been. In fact, it only got stronger during Trump’s first term. While Canberra has sought to deepen engagement with regional states it views as “like-minded”, such as Japan, South Korea and India, it has done so firmly in the context of its broader alliance with the United States.

    This, of course, is driven by the new anxieties over China’s rise as a major economic and military power in the region. In recent years, Beijing’s assertive and coercive behaviours in the region have made it the key national security threat facing Australia.

    This is a break from the past, when Australian leaders – both Labor and Liberal – broadly agreed that a “pragmatic approach” to engaging great powers meant Canberra would not have to “choose sides” between China and the US.

    In 2023, the Albanese government sought a détente of sorts with China, attempting to return to this pragmatic approach. But wariness of Beijing remains.

    Opponents to this strategy have called the government’s efforts to re-engage with China a “threat to Australian sovereignty, principles, and values”.

    Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to Beijing in late 2023.

    An Indo-Pacific power?

    In the context of these new challenges presented by a rising China, Australia has increasingly leaned into becoming an “Indo-Pacific” power in recent years. There are a number of ways in which this shift is observable.

    First, Australia has been instrumental in encouraging the global adoption of this phrase, “Indo-Pacific”, as a new way of referring to the region. This is partly driven by the desire to maintain US leadership and presence in Australia’s neighbourhood. The US is a Pacific state, so this concept anchors the US in our region in a way that “Asia” does not.

    And when people used the term “Asia-Pacific” to talk about the region in the past, this had a primarily economic connotation. This is due to the importance of the
    Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the move towards free-trade agreements between Australia and other countries in the region.

    However, the US has become less economically engaged in the region in recent years, with a focus on rebuilding its own industrial base. India, the other major economy in Asia, has also been reluctant to sign up to multilateral, regional free-trade agreements. Neither are parties to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CP-TPP) or the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreements.

    As such, the new term “Indo-Pacific” has become more of a security concept centred on the region’s waters. Generally, it is used to incorporate South, Southeast and Northeast Asia, Oceania (Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands) and the United States. By connecting the Indian (“Indo”) and the Pacific Oceans, it has become primarily a maritime strategic concept.

    The narratives usually associated with the Indo-Pacific also relate to the need to protect the international rules-based order, and freedom of navigation and overflight for ships and aircraft in the region. This, again, reflects the growing geopolitical anxieties about a rising China, particularly in the disputed South and East China seas and the Taiwan Strait.

    Australia does not have territorial or maritime claims in either sea, but we are nonetheless concerned about China’s efforts to undermine the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and what this might mean for the “rules-based order” more generally.

    The second way Australia is moving more towards becoming a regional power is in the narrowing of its core defence interests to an “inner ring” focused on the South Pacific and maritime Southeast Asia, and to a lesser extent, an “outer ring” in the broader Indo-Pacific and wider world. These geographical boundaries have consequences for how Australia views its international role.

    After nearly two decades of military engagement in the Middle East and Afghanistan, Australia is shifting its focus back on its home region. This reflects not just the limits of our military capabilities, but also new concerns about the changing balance of power in Asia.

    Third, Australia is increasingly focusing on a more strategic, narrower form of multilateralism. This, too, has been more centred on our region.

    Multilateralism has always been seen as an important part of middle power identity. Australia, for instance, played a key role in setting up institutions like the United Nations.

    However, this began to shift under recent Coalition governments. Prime Minister Scott Morrison expressed scepticism about such institutions, criticising them as an “often ill-defined borderless global community” that promoted “negative globalism”.

    Under successive Coalition governments, Australia instead became a key player in two smaller groups of nations – the re-branded “Quad” in 2017 (along with Japan, the US and India) and AUKUS in 2021 (with the US and United Kingdom).

    Under the Albanese government, global multilateralism was reinstated as an important pillar of foreign policy. But Australia’s investment and involvement in these smaller groups has only deepened.

    Both AUKUS and the Quad demonstrate Australia’s changing role as a regional power in the Indo-Pacific. These groups offer Australia an opportunity to shape the regional security agenda by joining forces with other powerful states. They also provide a way of encouraging the US to maintain its presence and leadership in the region and to counterbalance China’s rise.

    As part of this, Australia has become a key proponent of what the Biden administration coined “integrated deterrence”.

    This is a central pillar of the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy that seeks to mobilise “like-minded” states – especially its regional allies such as Australia, Japan and South Korea – to form a regional coalition against rival states. This strategy reflects a growing awareness the US can’t provide security in Asia alone.

    The AUKUS security agreement, including the commitment to develop new nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, is a part of this strategy.

    Since the announcement of the submarine plan in 2021, both the procurement plan and the language that American and Australian leaders have been using suggest that Canberra is preparing to play a bigger security role in the region alongside the US.

    Time for a new ‘strategic imagination’?

    Has Australia’s shift to an Indo-Pacific regional power served it well?

    It has allowed the deepening of defence relationships with partners like Japan and India. And through its roles in the Quad and AUKUS, Australia has a seat at the table and is more visible in regional security discussions.

    But there are risks to a more assertive regional power stance. Australia could be viewed by its neighbours as too focused on military and not invested enough (or in the right way) in diplomacy or regional development. Australia’s overseas aid contribution, for example, has been declining for three decades.

    It is also unclear which other regional states are likely to participate in a US-led coalition if a real conflict with China ever broke out. The Quad and AUKUS groups may be viewed by others as exclusionary or contributing to increasing tensions in the region.

    How nuclear-powered submarines will “deter” potential adversaries is also yet to be clearly explained. These submarines could potentially entangle Australia in a regional conflict instead. Being able to clearly articulate and distinguish between Australian and US interests will remain vital for ensuring that future governments don’t “sleepwalk” into war.

    Finally, Australia’s advocacy of the “rules-based order” has left it – and the US – exposed to criticisms of hypocrisy and double standards, particularly with Washington’s support for Israel’s war on Gaza.

    In our recent book, Girt by Sea: Re-imagining Australian Security, Joanne Wallis and I argue that Australia needs to reconceptualise its role as a regional actor to

    …one which can develop a coherent security strategy by working with old and new allies and partners to shape the regional order in ways that ensure its security.

    The approach emphasises the need for all parts of our government to work in coordination to protect Australians from the range of complex conventional and unconventional challenges it faces (including climate change).

    Australia’s security and its international role should not be viewed through the lens of the “China threat” alone. Doing so is counter-productive, as many states in the region do not share the same perception about China.

    Instead, as Wallis and I wrote, Australia needs a “more comprehensive, nuanced and contingent understanding of the range of security opportunities and threats” we face.


    This is an edited extract from How Australian Democracy Works, a new collection of essays from The Conversation on all aspects of the country’s political landscape.

    Rebecca Strating receives funding from Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

    ref. A middle power with ‘great and powerful friends’: Australia’s changing role in the region – https://theconversation.com/a-middle-power-with-great-and-powerful-friends-australias-changing-role-in-the-region-228897

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Marshall Introduces Legislation to Prevent Foreign Interference in American Agriculture

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Kansas Roger Marshall
    Washington, DC – U.S. Senator Roger Marshall, M.D. (R-Kansas) introduced the Protecting American Agriculture from Foreign Adversaries Act, which would permanently add the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to help prevent improper foreign interference and disruption to the U.S. agriculture industry.
    CFIUS is the governmental body that oversees the vetting process of foreign investment and acquisition of American companies. In addition to permanently adding the Secretary of Agriculture to CFIUS, the bill would require that the Secretary report any transaction that could threaten national security, specifically concerning purchases made by adversarial nations like China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran.
    “Food Security is national security, and it’s high time that we start recognizing this before it is too late,” said Senator Marshall. “The Secretary of Agriculture needs a seat at the table when the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States is considering foreign agricultural investments. Having an agriculture presence on CFIUS helps the committee better understand the risks foreign investment can pose to farmers and ranchers, and the Protecting American Agriculture from Foreign Adversaries Act ensures that.”
    The legislation is cosponsored by Senators John Barrasso (R-Wyoming), Todd Young (R-Indiana), Tammy Baldwin (D-Wisconsin), and Deb Fischer (R-Nebraska).
    “The Chinese Communist Party has proven over and over again they cannot be trusted. They are our adversary, not our ally. All Americans should be alarmed by the amount of American farmland China and other foreign entities own. Giving our adversaries any control over our agricultural resources is a direct threat to our national and food security. Senator Marshall’s legislation will help protect America’s farms and safeguard our food supply,” said Senator Barrasso.
    “Nearly two-thirds of land in Indiana – and more than half of all land in the United States – is farmland,” said Senator Young. “Recent efforts by China and other adversaries to buy agricultural land across the country could present a national security threat. Indiana is a leader in restricting these purchases, but Congress must act to ensure permanent safeguards are in place in all fifty states.”
    “Wisconsin’s farms are the backbone of our state,” said Senator Baldwin. “They’re not just about food, they’re about people’s livelihoods, our economy, and our way of life. That’s why I’m fighting to protect our family farms and agricultural communities from bad actors like China that threaten our food supply, economy, and national security. I’m proud to work with Democratic and Republican colleagues to protect our farmers and rural communities and ensure our Made in Wisconsin agricultural economy stays strong for the next generation.”
    “Allowing our adversaries to have any form of control over our food supply is a dangerous game, and one we should never play. Our commonsense legislation will protect America’s interests by ensuring that any foreign investments in the agricultural sector are thoroughly vetted,” said Senator Fischer.
    U.S. Representative Dan Newhouse (R-Washington-4) also introduced companion legislation in the House of Representatives.
    “The Chinese Communist Party is our most formidable adversary, and we must act immediately to defend our food and national security interests,” said Rep. Newhouse. “Farmers, ranchers, and landowners across the country deserve the certainty offered by adding the Secretary of Agriculture to CFIUS to ensure they are not selling land to an entity controlled by the CCP. We must prevent the CCP from purchasing land near federal property, including military installations and national laboratories, to protect our domestic security interests. I am glad to have the support of my colleagues in the House and Senate on these critical pieces of legislation and appreciate the comments by President Trump and Secretary Rollins to keep our enemies out of our backyard.”
    Specifically, the Protecting American Agriculture from Foreign Adversaries Act would:
    Add the Secretary of Agriculture as a member of CFIUS
    Protect the U.S. agriculture industry from foreign control through transactions, mergers, acquisitions, or agreements
    Designate agricultural supply chains as critical infrastructure and critical technologies
    Require a report to Congress on current and potential foreign investments in the U.S. agricultural industry from USDA and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
    Read the bill HERE.
    BACKGROUND:
    Over the past few years, the United States has experienced a rapid increase in foreign investment in the agricultural sector, particularly from China. Growing foreign investment in agriculture and other essential industries, like health care and energy, threatens our country’s national security. 
    According to USDA data from December 2023, foreign investors own approximately 45 million acres of U.S. agricultural land. This represents an increase of over 1.5 million acres in one calendar year. Foreign ownership of U.S. agricultural land increased modestly from 2012 to 2017 at an average increase of 0.6 million acres per year. However, since 2017, this number skyrocketed to an average of 2.6 million acres annually. Additionally, between 2010 and 2021, entities or individuals from China increased their ownership of U.S. agricultural land more than twentyfold, from 13,720 acres to 383,935 acres.
    Data from the 2023 Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act (AFIDA) report shows that Kansas agricultural land with foreign interest totals over 1.3 million acres.
    CFIUS is authorized to oversee and review foreign investment and ownership in domestic businesses as it relates to national security. Currently, the Committee does not directly consider the needs of the agriculture industry when reviewing foreign investment and ownership in domestic businesses.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Remarks by President Trump Before Cabinet Meeting

    Source: The White House

    class=”has-text-align-center”>Cabinet Room

    11:42 A.M. EST

         THE PRESIDENT:  Okay.  Thank you very much.  We appreciate you being here.  And we’ve put together a great Cabinet.  And we’ve had tremendous success.  We’ve been given a lot of credit for having a very successful first month, and we want to make that many months — and years, actually.  But we’re going to have many good months, and we’re going to have many good years, I hope.  And we’re going to solve a lot of problems. 

         We’re doing very well with Russia-Ukraine.  President Zelenskyy is going to be coming on Friday.  It’s now confirmed.  And we’re going to be signing an agreement, which will be a very big agreement.  And I want to thank Howard and Scott for the job you guys did in putting it together.  Really did an amazing job.  And that’ll be on rare earth and other things. 

         And as you know, we’re in for, probably, $350 billion and Europe is in for $100 billion.  And that’s a big difference.  So, we’re in for, probably, three times as much.  And yet, it’s very important to everybody, but Europe is very close.  We have a big ocean separating us.  So, it’s very important for Europe.  And they, hopefully, will step up and do maybe more than they’re doing and maybe a lot more.

         The previous administration put us in a very bad position, but we’ve been able to make a deal where we’re going to get our money back and we’re going to get a lot of money in the future.  And I think that’s appropriate, because we have taxpayers that are — shouldn’t be footing the bill, and they shouldn’t be footing the bill at more than the Europeans are paying. 

         So, it’s all been worked out.  We’re happy about it.  And I think that, very importantly, we’re going to be able to make a deal. 

         Most importantly, by far, we’re going to make a deal with Russia and Ukraine to stop killing people.  They’ll stop killing young Russian soldiers and young Ukrainian soldiers and other people, in addition, in the towns and cities.  And we will consider that a very important thing and a big accomplishment, because it was going nowhere until this administration came in.  They hadn’t spoken to President Putin in two years.  And so, we’ll keep you advised.

         Before we begin the Cabinet, I’d like to have Scott

    and a couple of people say a few things.  But most importantly — where are you?

         SECRETARY TURNER:  I’m right here, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  This is a gentleman who’s going places — the head of HUD.  And he’s going to say — you all know him.  And you’re going to say grace —

         SECRETARY TURNER:  Yes, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  — and then we’ll have our meeting, right?

    SECRETARY TURNER:  Yes.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you very much. 

         SECRETARY TURNER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Let’s pray.

         Father, we thank you for this awesome privilege, Father, to be in your presence.  God, thank you that you’ve allowed us to see this day.  The Bible says that your mercies are new every morning.  And, Father God, we give you the glory and the honor.  Thank you, God, for President Trump, Father, for appointing us.  Father God, thank you for anointing us to do this job.  Father, we pray you’ll give the president and the vice president wisdom, Father God, as they lead. 

         Father, I pray for all of my colleagues that are here around the table and in this room.  Lord God, we pray that we would lead with a righteous clarity, Father God, and as we serve the people of this country and every perspective agency, every job that we have, Father, we would humble ourselves before you that we would lead in a manner that you’ve called us to lead and to serve. 

         Father, the Bible says the blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord.  But, Father, we today honor you.  And in your rightful place, Father, thank you for giving us this opportunity to restore faith in this country and be a blessing to the people of America.  And, Lord God, today in our meeting, we pray that you will be glorified in our conversation.
        
         In Jesus’ name, amen.

         PARTICIPANTS:  Amen.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Scott, that was a very good job you did.  You’ve done that before, haven’t you?  (Laughter.)  Wow. 

         So, Scott Turner is a terrific young guy.  He’s heading up HUD, and he’s going to make us all very proud, right?

         SECRETARY TURNER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Yes, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you very much.  Great job. 

         In just over one month, illegal border crossings have plummeted by numbers that nobody has actually ever seen before.  It’s much more than 100 percent. 

    And we’ve unleashed American energy at levels that will soon be reported, but we think we’re going to get it going very quickly.  We have incredible people on the energy front. 

    I think we have really great people on every front.  I’ll let you know if they’re not good, but I think they really are. 

    And we’re fighting every day to get the prices down.  The inflation is stopping slowly, but part of the reason it’s stopping is because of high interest rates and other problems that we inherited.  But we have to get the prices down — not the inflation down — the prices of eggs and various other things.  Eggs are a disaster. 

         The secretary of Agriculture is going to be showing you a chart that’s actually mindboggling what’s happened — how low they were with us and how high they are now.  But I think we can do something about it —

         SECRETARY ROLLINS:  Yes, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  — Madam Secretary.

         SECRETARY ROLLINS:  Yes, sir.

         THE PRESIDENT:  And I think you’re going to do a fantastic job in that position. 

    One of the most important initiatives is DOGE, and we have cut billions and billions and billions of dollars.  We’re looking to get it maybe to a trillion dollars.  If we can do that, we’re going to start getting to be at a point where we can think in terms of balancing budgets, believe it or not, something you haven’t heard in many, many years — decades, actually.  And it’s a big — whether it’s this year or next year, I think we’ll be very close to balancing budgets.  And the DOGE is very important. 

    And Elon is here to give you a summary of what’s happening, some of the things they found — some of the horrible things they found — some of the theft and fraud, and we call it waste and abuse, but a lot of fraud, and probably some fraud that we’re not going to be able to prove is fraud, but when you hear the names and the places where this money is going, it’s a disgrace. 

         But we’ve requested that a lot of people — we want to make sure that the people are working.  So, letters were sent out, and I think everyone at this table is very much behind it.  And if they aren’t, I’d want them to speak up.  But they’re very much behind it. 

         Letters were sent out to people just to find out, if the people exist, do they work?  Who do they work for?  Where are they?  You know, where have they been working?  Have they been working for other companies or other entities at all and being paid by the government, so they have two jobs, but they’re supposed to have one? 

    And the letter asks some simple questions like, “What have you done lately?”  And if they can answer that — because I can.  I can tell you everything I’ve done for the last long period of time — a lot more than a week. 

    And in many cases, we haven’t gotten responses.  Usually that means that maybe that person doesn’t exist or that person doesn’t want to say they’re working for another company while being paid by the United States government. 

    So, there’s a lot of interesting things.  It’s very unique, but we have a very unique situation because we have a lot of people that were scamming our country.  We have a lot of dishonest people.  We have a lot of people that took advantage of a lot of different situations, and we’re not going to let that happen. 

    So, I’m going to ask, if it’s possible, to have Elon get up first and talk about DOGE, because it seems to be of great interest to everyone. 

    I will say that there is a large group of people in this country that have such admiration for what we’re doing.  I got elected with a tremendous vote — winning every swing state, winning the popular vote, winning the counties by thousands of counties.  I think it was 2,800 to 500.  2,800 counties to 500 counties.  Think of that. 

    And so, we have a mandate to do this, and this is part of the reason I got elected.  I got elected based on taxes and based on many things, the border, but also based on balancing budgets and getting our country back into shape, and this is a big part of it. 

    So, Elon, if you could get up and explain where you are, how you’re doing, and how much we’re cutting.  And it’s an honor to have you.  He’s been a tremendously successful guy.  He’s really working so hard.  And he’s got businesses to run.  And in many ways, they say, “How do you do this?”  And, you know, he’s sacrificing a lot and — getting a lot of praise, I’ll tell you, but he’s also getting hit.  And we would expect that, and that’s the way it works. 

    So, I’d like to have Elon Musk please say a few words.

         MR. MUSK:  Well, tha- — thank you —
        
         THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you, Elon.

    MR. MUSK:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Well, I a- — I actually just call myself humble tech support here — (laughter) — because this is actually — as crazy as it sounds, that — that is almost a literal description of the work that the DOGE team is doing is helping fix the government computer systems.  Many of these systems are extremely old.  They don’t communicate.  There are a lot of mistakes in the systems.  The software doesn’t work.  The — so, we are actually tech support.  It’s — it’s a — it’s ironic, but it’s true.

    The — the overall goal here with the DOGE team is to help address the enormous deficit.  We simply cannot sustain, as a country, $2 trillion deficits.  The interest rates — just the interest on the national debt now exceeds the Defense Department spending. 

    We spend a lot on the Defense Department, but we’re spending, like, over a trillion dollars on interest.  If this continues, the country will go — become de facto bankrupt.  It’s — it’s not an optional thing.  It is an essential thing.  That — that’s — that’s the reason I’m here and taking a lot of flak and getting a lot of death threats, by the way.  I can, like, stack them up, you know.

    But if we don’t do this, America will go bankrupt.  That’s why it has to be done.  And I’m confident, at this point — knock on wood, you know — knock on my wooden head — (laughter) — the — there’s a lot of wood up there — that we can actually find a trillion dollars in savings.  That would be roughly 15 percent of the $7 trillion budget.

    And obviously, that can only be done with the support of everyone in this room.  And I’d like to thank everyone for — for your support.  Thank you very much this.  This — this can only be done with — with your support.

    So, this is — it’s really — DOGE is a support function for the president and for the — the agencies and departments to help achieve those savings and to effect- — effectively find 15 percent in reduction in fraud and — and waste.

    And — and we bring the receipts.  So, people say, like, “Well, is this real?”  Just go to DOGE.gov.  We l- — we — line item by line item, we specify each item.  So — and w- — and I — I should say, we — also, we will make mistakes.  We won’t be perfect.  But when we make mistake, we’ll fix it very quickly. 

    So, for example, with USAID, one of the things we accidentally canceled, very briefly, was Ebola — Ebola prevention.  I think we all wanted Ebola prevention.  So, we restored the Ebola prevention immediately, and there was no interruption.

    But we do need to move quickly if we’re — if we’re to achieve a trillion-dollar deficit reduction in tw- — in — in financial year 2026.  It requires saving $4 billion per day, every day from now through the end of September.  But we can do it, and we will do it.

    Thank you. 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, do you have any questions of Elon while we’re on the subject of DOGE?  Because we’ll finish off with that.  And if you would have any questions, please ask — you could ask me or Elon.

    Go ahead, please. 

    Q    Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank you, Mr. Musk.  I just wanted to ask you, the — President Trump put out a Truth Social today saying that everybody in the Cabinet was — was happy with you.  I just wondered if that — if you had heard otherwise, and if you had heard anything about members of the Cabinet who weren’t happy with the way things were going.  And if so, what are you doing to address those — any dissatisfaction?

    MR. MUSK:  To the best of —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Hey, Elon, let the Cabinet speak just for a second.  (Laughter.) 

         Is anybody unhappy with Elon?  If you are, we’ll throw them out of here.  (Laughter.)  Is anybody unhappy?  (Applause.)

    They are — they have a lot of respect for Elon and that he’s doing this.  And some disagree a little bit, but I will tell you, for the most part, I think everyone is not only happy, they’re thrilled. 

    So, go ahead, Elon.

    SECRETARY ROLLINS:  And grateful.

    MR. MUSK:  And President Trump has put together, I think, the best cabinet ever, literally.  So, I — and I do not give false praise.  This — this is an incredible group of people.  I don’t think such a talented team has actually ever been assembled.  I think it’s literally the best cabinet that the country has ever had.  And I think the companies should be incredibly appreciative of the people in this room.

    Q    Mr. President —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Please.  Yeah.  Go ahead.

    Q    Mr. President, thank you.  Mr. Musk.  Are there — about half of the government employees so far appear to have responded to your request for what they’ve been doing over the past week.  Is there a timeline in place for next moves for people being fired?  And when can the American people expect to see results from that?

    MR. MUSK:  Yes.  Well, to be — to be clear, like, the — I think that email, perhaps, was misinterpreted as a performance review, but actually it was a pulse check review.  “Do you have a pulse?”  (Laughter.)  “Do you have a pulse and two neurons?”  (Laughter.)  So, if you have a pulse and two neurons, you can reply to an email.

    This is, you know, I think, not a high bar, is what I’m saying.  This is a — should be — anyone could accomplish this. 

    But what we are trying to get to the bottom of is we think there are a number of people on the government payroll who are dead, which is probably why they can’t respond, and — and some people who are not real people, like they’re literally fictional individuals that are collecting payche- — well, somebody is collecting paychecks on a fictional individual.  So, we’re just literally trying to figure out are these people real, are they alive, and can they write an email, which I think is a reasonable expectation for the Amer- — you know, the American public would have at least that expectation of someone in the public sector.

    Q    Mr. Musk —

    Q    Mr. Musk —

    Q    — roughly a million employees —

    MR. MUSK:  (Laughs.)  This is not a — this is not a high bar, guys.  Come on.  (Laughter.)

    Q    Roughly a million employees have responded so far to this email.  Does that mean that the remaining 1 million or so federal employees now risk being terminated?  And is it your understanding and expectation when you post a directive on X that the Cabinet secretaries will follow that order?  Because several agencies have instructed employees that this is voluntary or not to respond.

    MR. MUSK:  Yeah.  Well, I mean, to be cl — so, I guess there was a — like, last week, the president en- — encouraged me, via Truth Social and also via phone call, to be more aggressive.  And I was like, “Okay.”  You know, “Yes, sir, Mr. President.  We will indeed do that.”  The president is the commander in chief.  I — I do what the president asks.

    So — and I said, “Can we send out an email to everyone, just saying, ‘What did you get done last week?’”  The president said yes.  So, I — I did that. 

    And, you know, we — we got a partial response.  But we — we’re going to send another email.  But we — our — our goal is not to be capricious or — or unfair.  It’s — we want to give people every opportunity to send an email and the email could simply be “What I’m working on is too sensitive or classified to — to describe.”  Like, literally, just re- — that would be sufficient.  We’re — we’re — you know, I think this is just common sense. 

    Q    And what is your target number for — for how many workers, employees you’re looking to cut total?

    MR. MUSK:  We — we wish to keep everyone who is doing a job that is essential and doing that job well.  But if — if they’re — if the job is not essential or they’re not doing the job well, they obviously should not be on the public payroll. 

    (Cross-talk.)

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, I have to — I would like to add —

    (Cross-talk.)

    Wait a minute.  Wait.  Wait.  I’d like to add that those million people that haven’t responded, though, Elon, they are on the bubble.  You know, I wouldn’t say that we’re thrilled about it.  You know, they haven’t responded.  Now, maybe they don’t exist.  Maybe we’re paying people that don’t exist.

    Don’t forget, we just got here.  This group just got here.  But those people are on the bubble, as they say.  You know, maybe they’re going to be gone.  Maybe they’re not around.  Maybe they have other jobs.  Maybe they moved and they’re not where they’re supposed to be.  A lot of things could have happened.

    I wouldn’t say that Biden ran a very tight administration.  They spent money like nobody has ever spent money before, wasted money — the Green New Scam, all of the different things they spent money on. 

    And you’ve seen that.  You’ve seen that with some of the things that I read in speeches.  I read them, and people can’t believe, when I read them, $20 million here, $30 million here for, you know, a little educational course on something.  Circumcision, right?  Circumcision.  $20 million to inform the people of such-and-such a country on other things and other things other than that.

    So, yeah, those people are — right now, we’re trying to find out who those people are that haven’t responded.  Now, there’ll be some agencies — like Marco has people within State that are right now doing very classified, very confidential work.  And we understand that, and we’ve talked.  And, you know, we’re being a little more surgical. 

    And Marco is doing a lot of things himself.  He’s — and some of the secretaries are.  We’re going to be going to them.  We’re going to be talking about it today.  We’re going to ask them to do their own DOGE.  In other words, they’ll look in their group and who —

    I spoke with Lee Zeldin, and he thinks he’s going to be cutting 65 or so percent of the people from Environmental, and we’re going to speed up the process, too, at the same time.  He had a lot of people that weren’t doing their job — they were just obstructionists — and a lot of people that didn’t exist, I guess, Lee, too.  You found a lot of empty spots that the people weren’t there.  They didn’t exist.

    And I think Education is going to be one of those.  You go around Washington, you see all these buildings — the Department of Education.  We want to move education back to the states, where it belongs.  Iowa should have education.  Indiana should run their own education.  You’re going to see education go way up.

    Right now, we’re ranked at the very bottom of the list, but we’re at the top of the list in one thing: the cost per pupil.  We spend more money per pupil than any other country in the world, and yet it’s Denmark and Norway, Sweden.  And I — you hate to say this — and, you know, we’re going to get along very well with China, but it’s a competitor: They’re at the top of the list.  They’re among the top 10, usually.  And they’re a very big country, so we can’t use that as an excuse — right? — because we’re a very big country too.

    But we’re – we were ranked last time — under Biden, we were ranked 40 out of 40.  They do the 40 certain nations that they’ve done for a long time.  It seems to be 40, for whatever reason.  And we were ranked number 40.  A year ago, we were 38.  Then we were 39.  We’re — we hit 40.  And so, we’re last in that, and we’re first in cost per pupil.  So, I would say that’s unacceptable.

    Lawrence, do you have something?  Go ahead.

    Q    So, Mr. President, I know you like competition, and I know it’s early.  So, which department are you most impressed with? 

    And then, to Mr. Mu- — (laughter).  That’s the first one.  And, Mr. Musk, which department have you received the most resistance from? 

         Mr. President, you first.

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, I think both of those questions are a little bit — well, you’re a pretty controversial guy.  (Laughter.)  Look, it’s very early.  Right now, I think I’m impressed with everybody.  So far, everybody.  If I wasn’t, in the first month, we’d — and some of them just got here.  They just got approved two days ago, right?

    But I think I’m very impressed with everybody.  So far, I’m very happy with all of the choices.

    I think that Elon has done incredibly with some groups.  And some groups are much easier than others.  It is true: State is a, you know, very difficult situation.  We’re right now negotiating very successfully, I think, with Russia and with Ukraine, and we have a lot of countries involved.  And we have to be a little bit careful what we do and who we’re terminating.  But Marco is doing that very — I think he’s going to be very precise.  It’s going to be —

    We’re cutting down government.  We’re cutting down the size of government.  We have to.  We’re bloated.  We’re sloppy.  We have a lot of people that aren’t doing their job.  We have a lot of people that don’t exist. 

         You look at Social Security as an example.  I mean, you have so many people in Social Security where, if you believe it, they’re 200 years old.  And what we’re doing is finding out: Are checks going out for that and is somebody cashing those checks who’s maybe 35 years old?  Okay? 

         So, there’s a lot of dishonesty.  There’s a lot of fraud. 

         But I think at this moment, I’ll take Elon off the spot.  I think that he’s impressed — he said it very well –better than I can say it — that he’s impressed with the people in this room.  Very impressed.  And I am too.  And it’s too early to say, but I think everybody is on board.  They all know — we want to balance a budget.  We want to have a balanced budget within a reasonably short period of time, meaning maybe by next year or the year after, but maybe — maybe even sooner than that. 

         Q    Mr. President, your — your number one issue was the border.  We just got new information that they’re doxing our federal agents.  They’re putting their personal information out there, these activists, and they’re disrupting the operations.  So, you got Tren de Aragua running all across the country —

         THE PRESIDENT:  Well, we have activists.  That’s true.  And a lot of those —

         Q    So, what are we going to do about the activists —

         THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.  A lot of those activists are acting illegally.  And we’ll give that to our attorney general, and she’ll take a look at that very strongly.  But we’re also having tremendous support from Border Patrol, from ICE.  The ICE agents have been unbelievable.  Border Patrol — their leadership at Border Patrol has been incredible, and they’re working very well. 

         And, as you know — and I saw you reporting it this morning, actually — we set records on the least number of illegal aliens coming in, migrants coming into our country that we’ve had in more than 50 years.  And we did this all within a period of weeks, because we took over a mess.  The world was pouring in.  And remember, they were coming in from jails and prisons and mental institutions and insane asylums, and they were gang members and drug dealers.  Anybody who wanted to come in, they came.  And from not just South America, from all over the world.  So, it’s amazing what they’ve done. 

         And Kristi and — and Tom Homan, the job they’ve done has been absolutely amazing.  We set records for — and we want people to come into our country, by the way, but they want to come in — they have to come in legally. 

         I want that to be really understood.  We want people in our country, but they have to come in legally. 

         Q    Can I follow on that, Mr. President?

    Q    Mr. President.

    Q    About the — the Trump gold card idea —

         THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

         Q    — that you unveiled yesterday.

         THE PRESIDENT:  I hope you liked it.  (Laughter.)

         Q    I await more information.  But the question is: Does this reflect a view, on your part, that the American immigration system has never been properly monetized as you feel it should be?
        

         THE PRESIDENT:  Well, not so much monetized.  It hasn’t been properly run.  I get calls from, as an example, companies where they want to hire the number one student at a school.  A person comes from India, China, Japan, lots of different places, and they go to Harvard, the Wharton School of Finance.  They go to Yale.  They go to all great schools.  And they graduate number one in their class, and they are made job offers, but the offer is immediately rescinded because you have no idea whether or not that person can stay in the country.  I want to be able to have that person stay in the country. 

         These companies can go and buy a gold card, and they can use it as a matter of recruitment. 

         At the same time, the company is using that money to pay down debt.  We’re going to — we’re going to pay down a lot of debt with that.

         Q    Are they going to have to —

         THE PRESIDENT:  And I think the gold card is going to be used by — not only for that.  I mean, they’ll be used by companies.  I mean, I could see Apple — I’ve spoken with Tim Cook — and, by the way, he’s going to make a $500 billion investment in the country only because of the results of the election and, I think, because of tariffs.  He’s going to want to be in the country because of tariffs.  Because if you’re in the country, there is no tariff.  If you’re out of the country, you got to pay tariffs.  And that’s going to be a great investment, I think, that he’s making.  I know it’s going to be a great investment. 

         But we have to be able to get people in the country, and we want people that are productive people.  And I will tell you, the people that can pay $5 million, they’re going to create jobs.  They’re going to spend a lot of money on jobs.  They’re going to have to pay taxes on that too.  So, they’re going to be hiring people, they’re going to be bringing people in and companies in.  And, I don’t know, maybe it will sell like crazy.  I happen to think it’s going to sell like crazy.  It’s a bargain.

         But we’ll —

         Q    Will they have to commit to a certain number?

         THE PRESIDENT:  — know fairly soon.  I think Howard and — and Scott — a few of you, really, are responsible for it.  But, Howard, if you want to discuss that for a couple of minutes, I think I’d like to have you.  I think it’s going to be a very successful program.

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  Sure.

         THE PRESIDENT:  This is Commerce.

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  So, the EB-5 program, which has been around for many years, had investment of a million dollars into projects in America.  And those projects were often suspect, they didn’t really work out, there wasn’t any oversight of it.  And so, for a million-dollar investment, you got a visa, and then you came into the country and ended up with a green card. 

         So, it was poorly overseen, poorly executed.  Then you had our border open, where millions of people came through. 

         So, the idea is we will have a proper business.  We will modify the EB-5 agreement.  Kristi and I are working on it together.  For $5 million, they’ll get a license from the Department of Commerce.  Then they’ll make a proper investment on the EB-5, right?  And we think Scott and I will design the EB-5 investment model, because Scott and I are the best people together to do that.  So, this is joint. 

         This is exactly the Trump administration.  We all work together.  We work it out to be the best.  And if we sell — just remember — 200,000 — there’s a line for EB-5 of 250,000 right now — 200,000 of these gold green cards is $1 trillion

    to pay down our debt, and that’s why the president is doing it, because we are going to balance this budget, and we are going to pay off the debt under President Trump. 

         Q    Mr. —

    Q    And to qualify, do you have to promise and make commitments to create a certain number of jobs here in the U.S.?

         THE PRESIDENT:  No.  No.  Because not all these people are going to be job builders.  They’ll be successful people, or they’ll be people that were hired from colleges, like — sort of like paying an athlete a bonus.  I mean, Apple or one of the companies will go out and they’ll spend five mil- — they’ll buy five of them, and they’re going to get five people. 

         Look, I’ve had the complaint where — I’ve had the complaint from a lot of companies where they go out to hire people, and they can’t hire them b- — out of colleges.  And you know what they do?  They go back to India, or they go back to the country where they came, and they open up a company, and they become billionaires.  They become — and they’re employing thousands and there are a lot of examples. 

    There are some really big examples where they were forced out of the country.  They graduated top in their class at a great school, and they weren’t able to stay.  This is all the time you hear it. 

    And the biggest complaint I get from companies, other than overregulation, which we took care of, but we’re going to have to take care of it here, because a lot of that was put back on by Biden.  But the biggest complaint is the fact that they can’t have any longevity with people.  This way, they have pretty much unlimited longevity. 

    Also, with the $5 million, you know, that’s a path to citizenship.  So, that’s going to be — it’s sort of a green card-plus, and it’s a path to citizenship.  We’re going to call it the gold card.  And I think it’s going to be very treasured.  I think it’s going to do very well.  And we’re going to start selling, hopefully, in about two weeks.

    Now, just so you understand, if we sell a million — right? — a million, that’s $5 trillion.  Five trillion.  Howard was using a different number, but that’s $5 trillion.  If we sell 10 million, which is possible — 10 million highly productive people coming in or people that we’re going to make productive — they’ll be young, but they’re talented, like a talented athlete — that’s $50 trillion. 

    That means our debt is totally paid off, and we have $15 trillion above that.  And — now, I don’t know that we’re going to sell that many.  Maybe we won’t so many at all.  But I think we’re going to sell a lot, because I think there’s — there really is a thirst. 

    No other country can do this, because people don’t want to go to other countries.  They want to come here.  Everybody wants to come here, especially since November 5th.  (Laughter.)

    (Cross-talk.)

    SECRETARY LUTNICK:  They’ll all be vetted, by the way.  All these people will be vetted. 

    Q    How?

    SECRETARY LUTNICK:  Okay?  They’ll be vetted.

    Q    Mr. President, on Ukraine.  Can you talk a lot — a little bit about what type of security guarantees you’re willing to make?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, I’m not going to make security guarantees beyond very much.  We’re going to have Europe do that, because it’s in — you know, we’re talking about Europe is their next-door neighbor.  But we’re going to make sure everything goes well. 

    And as you know, we’ll be making a — we’ll be really partnering with Ukraine in terms of rare earth.  We very much need rare earth.  They have great rare earth.  We’ll be working with Secretary Burgum and with Chris.  You’ll be working on that together. 

    And we’re going to be able to have tremendous — I mean, this gives us — because we don’t have that much of it here.  We have some, but we don’t have that much, and we need a lot more to really propel us to the next level of — to lead in every way.  We’re leading right now with AI.  We’re leading with everything right now, but we have to — we need resources. 

    We have to double our electric capacity.  We have to do many things.  We have to really triple, if you think of it, the electric capacity from what we have right now, if you can believe it.  (Laughter.) 

    Q    But will the United States — can I —

    THE PRESIDENT:  So, I just say this.  So, the deal we’re making gets us — it brings us great wealth.  We get back the money that we spent, and we hope that we’re going to be able to settle this up. 

    We want to settle it.  We want to stop — I tell you what.  I’m doing it for two reasons, but the number one reason, by far, is to watch — all these people being killed.  I see pictures every week from — I assume satellite pictures, mostly, but there’s some pictures on site of thousands of soldiers that are being killed.  They’re being decimated, because equipment today — military equipment is so powerful and so devastating.  And, number one, I want to see people stop. 

    And they’re not from here.  They’re from primarily two other countries. 

    And then, by the way, let’s talk about the Middle East.  We got to solve that problem too.  And that’s come a long way.  We’re doing very well in that also.  A lot of things are happening on that.  But I’m watching soldiers being killed — Ukrainian and Russian soldiers being killed.  My number one thing is to get that stopped. 

    My number two thing is I don’t want to have to pay any more money, because we’ve — Biden has spent $350 billion without any chance of getting it back.  Now we’re going to be getting all of that money back, plus a lot more.  And we provided a great thing.  I mean, we’ve provided something very important, and we’ll be working with Ukraine and — because we’ll be taking that — we’re going to be taking what we’re entitled to take. 

    Now, they spent $350 billion, and Europe spent $100 billion.  Now, does anybody really think that’s fair?  But then we find out, a little while ago — not so long ago, a few months ago, I found out that the money they spent, they get back, but the money we spent, we don’t get back.  I said, “Well, we’re going to get it back.” 

    And we’ll be able to make a deal.  And again, President Zelenskyy is coming to sign the deal.  And it’s a great thing.  It’s a great deal for Ukraine, too, because they get us over there, and we’re going to be working over there.  We’ll be on the land.  And, you know, in that way, it’s — there’s sort of automatic security, because nobody’s going to be messing around with our people when we’re there.  And so, we’ll be there in that way. 

    But Europe will be watching it very closely.  I know that UK has said and France has said that they want to put — they volunteered to put so-called peacekeepers on the site.  And I think that’s a good thing.

    (Cross-talk.)

    Q    Mr. President, you had mentioned the high cost of eggs, and we’ve seen consumer confidence this week have a sharp drop from last month — the biggest dip in, I believe, three years.  Why is that — your assessment, why is that the case and is there anything you can do? 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, I think that consumer confidence — if you look at confidence in the nation, it had the biggest increase in the history of the chart.  It went up 42 points in a period of, like, days after the election, since the election.  So, since the election, the confidence in our nation — including right track, wrong track — the first time it’s ever happened, where we were on the right track, because this country has been on the wrong track for a long time. 

    So, the confidence in business, confidence in the country has reached an all-time high.  We have never reached levels like we are right now.

    Okay.

    (Cross-talk.)

    Q    Mr. President, you said — Mr. President, you’ve been very clear in saying that as long as you’re president, Iran will never get a nuclear weapon. 

    THE PRESIDENT:  That’s true. 

    Q    Is it also your policy that as long as you’re president, China will never take Taiwan by force?

    THE PRESIDENT:  I never comment on that.  I don’t comment on any — because I don’t want to ever put myself in that position.  And if I said it, I certainly wouldn’t be saying it to you.  I’d be saying it to other people, maybe people around this table — (laughter) — and very specific people around this table.  

    Q    Is it a concern (inaudible)?

    THE PRESIDENT:  So, I don’t want to put myself in that position.  But I can tell you what, I have a great relationship with President Xi.  I’ve had a great relationship with him.  We want them to come in and invest. 

    I see so many things saying that we don’t want China in this country.  That’s not right.  We want them to invest in the United States.  That’s good.  That’s a lot of money coming in.  And we’ll invest in China.  We’ll do things with China. 

    The relationship we’ll have with China would be a very good one.  I see all of these phony reports that we don’t want their money; we don’t want anything to do with them.  That’s wrong. 

    We’re going to have a good relationship with China, but they won’t be able to take advantage of us.  What they did to Biden was — he didn’t know what was happening.  He didn’t know what he was doing.  The administration didn’t know what they were doing.  It was very sad to watch. 

         But we’re going to have a good relationship with China and Russia and Ukraine and the Middle East.  We’re doing things that —

    Look, when I left, we had no wars.  We had defeated ISIS totally.  We had no inflation.  We didn’t have the Afghanistan withdrawal — the worst withdrawal anybody has ever seen.  I think that’s one of the reasons that President Putin looked at that.  He said, “Wow, these guys are a paper tiger.  Look at” — we’re no paper tiger. 

    Don’t forget: We got rid of ISIS in three weeks.  People said it would take five years.  We did it, because when I came in, I let them do what they had to do.  And the man that headed that operation is now going to be your — your chairman, right?

    SECRETARY HEGSETH:  Yes, sir.

    THE PRESIDENT:  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 

    SECRETARY HEGSETH:  Yes, sir.

    THE PRESIDENT:  And — “Razin” Caine.  I liked him right from the beginning.  As soon as I heard his name, I said, “That’s my guy.” 

    Okay.  Any other questions?

    (Cross-talk.)

    Q    Mr. President, has there been enough de- — decreases in crossings at the border for you to continue the pause on tariffs against Mexico and Canada?  And, if not —

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, no.  I’m going to — I’m not stopping the tariffs, no.  Millions of people have died because of the fentanyl that comes over the border. 

    Q    Even with the 90 percent drop in border crossings, though, this —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, that’s — well —

    Q    — last month compared to about a year ago?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, they’ve been good, but that’s also due to us.  Mostly due to us.  I mean —

    Q    Mr. President —

         Q    Mr. President, on CBS — 

    THE PRESIDENT:  — it’s very hard.  It’s, right now, very hard to come through the border.  But the — look, the damage has been done.  We’ve lost millions of people due to fentanyl.  It comes mostly from China, but it comes through Mexico, and it comes through Canada. 

    Q    Mr. Presi- —

    THE PRESIDENT:  And I have to tell you that, you know, on April 2nd — I was going to do it on April 1st, but I’m a little bit superstitious, so I made it April 2nd — the tariffs go on, not all of them but a lot of them.  And I think you’re going to see something that’s going to be amazing. 

    We’ve been taken advantage of as a country for a long period of time.  We’ve been — we’ve been tariffed, but we didn’t tariff.  Now, I did.  When I was here, I tariffed.  We took in $700 billion from China — $700 billion.  Not one president in this — in the history of our country took in 10 cents from China.  At the same time, China respected us. 

    Now, when COVID came in, that was a different deal.  I used to call it the China virus.  I guess I can call it the China virus again, but, you know, it was — it’s an accurate term, but I won’t do that out of respect to China.  Okay?

    (Cross-talk.)

    Say it again.  What?

    Q    On Gaza.  I just wondered if there’s any progress towards the second phase of the ceasefire that you can tell us about.

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, I’m very disappointed when I see four — four bodies came in today.  These are young people.  Young people don’t die.  Okay?  Young people don’t die.  These are young people.  Four bodies came in today.  They think they’re doing us a favor by sending us bodies. 

    So, look, that’s a decision that has to be made by Israel, by Bibi, but Israel has to make that decision.  We got a lot of hostages back, but it’s very sad what happened to those people.  I mean, you had a young lady with her hand practically blown off.  You know why it blew up?  Because she put up her hand to try and stop a bullet that was coming her way, and it hit her hand and blew off her fingers, big part of her hand. 

    This is a vicious group of people, and Israel is going to have to decide what they’re doing.  Phase one is going to be ending.  Think of it: Today, they sent in four bodies.  Bodies. 

    And I will say one thing, though.  I’ve spoken to a lot of the parents and a lot of the people involved.  They want those bodies almost as much and maybe even just as much as they wanted their son or their daughter.  Amazing.  “Please, sir.  Please.  My son is dead, but they have his body.  Please can you get it for us?”  They — it’s the biggest thing.  It’s incredible the level — they want the bodies of these people.  They’re dead.  They’re dead. 

    And, you know, when I saw the ones that came in two weeks ago, they looked like they just got out of a concentration camp.  Then, the following week, a group came in, and they weren’t as bad — in as bad of shape.

    But Israel is going to have to make a decision.  You’re right, phase one, and now phase two has started.  And today, we got some, you know, very, very sad — we knew they were dead, by the way.  We knew they were going to be bodies, as opposed to people that were living.  But it’s a very sad situation. 

    At some point, somebody is going to say we got to do something about this.

    (Cross-talk.)

    Q    Mr. President, you were just talking about Afghanistan and the botched withdrawal.  Have all the generals or command staff that were involved with the withdrawal been fired or relieved of duty?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, that’s a great idea.  It’s — (laughter) — sorry, I’m not going to tell this man what to do, but I will say that.  If I had his place, I’d fire every single one of them, Pete.  Pete, that’s a very good question. 

    SECRETARY HEGSETH:  Well, it’s a question we’ve thought a lot about.  We’re doing a complete review of every single aspect of what happened with the botched withdrawal of Afghanistan and plan to have full accountability.  It’s one of the first things we announced at the Defense Department for that reason, sir. 

    Certainly General “Razin” Caine, who’s on his way in, was not a part of that.  Instead, was a part of leading the effort against ISIS by untying the hands of war fighters and finishing the job properly and then bringing our troops home. 

    So, we’re taking a very different view, obviously, than the previous administration, and there will be full accountability. 

    THE PRESIDENT:  I don’t see big promotions in that group.  (Laughter.)  And I think they’re going to be largely gone.  I know the man on my left.  I think they’re going to be largely gone. 

    That was a horrible display.  And, you know, I’ve dealt with the parents and the family of the 13 that were killed.  But, you know, nobody ever talks about the 40 that were so badly hurt, with the arms and the legs and the face and the whole thing — the missing arms and legs.  It was so terrible, the way that was handled.

    And it should have been gone through Bagram.  We have a big base with big fences that nobody can get in, and you have, you know, hundreds of acres, instead of a little local airport where the whole place went crazy.  That was so badly handled.  And I would think that most of those people are going to be gone. 

    Q    Are we going to take Bagram back?

    THE PRESIDENT:  So, I’ll tell you what has bothered me very much — very, very much: We give billions of dollars to Afghanistan.  Nobody knows that.  Nobody knew that.  Do you know we give billions of dollars to Afghanistan?  And yet we left behind all of that equipment, which wouldn’t have happened. 

    You know, we were getting out under me.  I’m the one that got it down to 5,000 people.  We were going to get out, but we were going to keep Bagram, not because of Afghanistan but because of China, because it’s exactly one hour away from where China makes its nuclear missiles. 

    So, we were going to keep Bagram.  We were going to keep a small force on Bagram.  We were going to have Bagram Air Base, one of the biggest air bases in the world.  One of the biggest runways, one of the most powerful runways, in the sense that it was very heavy concrete and steel.  You could carry about anything.  You could land anything on those runways. 

    We gave it up.  And you know who’s occupying it right now?  China.  China.  Biden gave it up.  So, we’re going to keep that, and we’re going to have a withdrawal, and we’re going to take our equipment.  We’re going to do it properly.  We’re going to do it very — we’re going to keep the equipment. 

         Well, they ran out.  It was — what happened there was a — in fact, you know, in all fairness to Putin, when he saw that, he said, “Well, this is our time to go and go into Ukraine,” I guess, because it was — the timing seemed to be about right. 

         But we send them billions of dollars in aid, which nobody knows.  If they — if the American public knew that — they know it now.  And if we’re doing that, I think they should give our equipment back.  And I told Pete to study that. 

    But we left billions — tens of billions of dollars’ worth of equipment behind.  Brand-new trucks.  You see them display it every year on their little roadway someplace where they have a road and they drive the — you know, waving the flag and talking about America.  Beautiful equipment that’s all — I mean, the top-of-the-line stuff, brand-new stuff.  Now it’s getting older. 

         But you know what?  We’re going to pay them.  I think we should get a lot of that equipment back. 

         You know that Afghanistan is one of the biggest sellers of military equipment in the world.  You know why?  They’re selling the equipment that we left.  We’re first.  They were second or third.  Can you believe it?  They’re selling 777,000

    rifles, 70,000 armor-plated — many of them were armor-plated trucks and vehicles — 70,000. 

         If you think of a used car lot, the biggest one in the country, you have — I would say, JD, if somebody had 500 cars, that would be a lot. 

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, that would be quite a lot.

    THE PRESIDENT:  This is 70,000 vehicles we had there, and we left it for them.  I think we should get it back.

         (Cross-talk.)

         Q    Mr. President, the spending bill that passed last night aims to cut $2 trillion.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Right.

         Q    Can you guarantee that Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security will not be touched?

         THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.  I mean, I have said it so many times, you shouldn’t be asking me that question.  Okay?  This will not be “read my lips.”  It won’t be “read my lips” anymore: We’re not going to touch it.

         Now, we are going to look for fraud.  I’m sure you’re okay with that, like people that shouldn’t be on, people that are illegal aliens and others — criminals, in many cases.  And that’s with Social Security.  We have a lot of people — you see that immediately.  When you see people that are 200 years old that are being sent checks for Social Security — some of them are actually being sent checks. 

    So, we’re tracing that down, and I have a feeling that Pam is going to do a very good job with that.  But you have a lot of fraud. 

         But, no, I’m not — we’re not doing anything on that.

         Q    Mr. President, part of your mission, sir —

         Q    Mr. President — Mr. President, on CBS News.  Mr. President, you’re in litigation —
        
         Q    Part of your mission has been — thank you.  I’m sorry. 

         Part of your mission has been to restore executive control over the executive branch.  Is it your view of your authority that you have the power to call up any one of or all of the people seated at this table and issue orders that they’re bound to follow?

         THE PRESIDENT:  Oh, yeah.  They’ll follow the orders.  Yes, they will. 

         Q    No exceptions? 

         THE PRESIDENT:  No except- — well, let’s see.  Let me think.  Oh, yeah.  Yeah.  She’ll have an exception.  (The president points at Secretary Rollins.)  (Laughter.)

         Of course, no exceptions.  You know that.

         Q    Mr. President, can you clarify the Canada/Mexico tariffs.  You had put that 30-day pause. 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.

    Q    You just referred to —

         THE PRESIDENT:  It’s 25 percent.

         Q    Twenty-five percent.  When does it go into effect?

         THE PRESIDENT:  April 2nd. 

         Q    April 2nd for Canada and Mexico?

         THE PRESIDENT:  Correct.  And for —

         Q    And for the reciprocal?

         THE PRESIDENT:  — and for everything. 

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  Well, we have the — the — fentanyl-related is a pause.  If they can prove to the president they’ve done an excellent job, that’s what they first do in 30 days.

         Q    Have you guys seen any changes?

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  But then the overall is April 2nd.  So, the big transaction is April 2nd, but the fentanyl-related things, if they’re working hard on the border, at the end of that 30 days, they have to prove to the president that they’ve satisfied him to that regard.  If they have —

         THE PRESIDENT:  It’s going to be hard to satisfy.

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  — then we’ll give them a pause or he won’t. 

         THE PRESIDENT:  It’s going to be hard to satisfy.

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  But that’s up to him to see.

         THE PRESIDENT:  We lose 300,000 people a year to fentanyl.  Not 100-, not 95-, not 60-, like you read.  You know, you’ve been reading it for years. 

         We lost, in my opinion, over the last couple of years, on average, maybe close to 300,000 people dead, and the families are ruined.  You know, when they lose a daughter, when they lose a son, the families are never the same.  You’re never going to be the same.  So, you’re talking about a million people. 

         But when the daughters die, I see it — daughters die and the sons die because of fentanyl.  And in some cases, they don’t even know they’re taking it.  They — they’re buying something else, and it’s laced with fentanyl, and they end up dying.  And I’ve known many people who have lost children to fentanyl and for other reasons, but to fentanyl.  It’s such a big killer.  And those people are never the same people. 
        
         I mean, I’ve seen people that — for the rest of their lives, they’re not the same people.  They’re so different, it’s not even believable.  Dynamic people, happy people that are — they die a miserable death.  And that’s because of the crap that comes in through China and through Mexico and through Canada.  A lot of it comes through Canada. 

         The — Canada — look, we support Canada $200 billion a year in subsidies one way or the other.  We let them make millions of cars.  We let them send us lumber.  We don’t need their lumber.  We’re going to free up our lumber.  Lee is going to do — the head of environmental.  We’re going to free up our lumber.  We have the best lumber there is.  We don’t need their lumber.  What do we need their lumber for?

         When you look at the — we subsidize them $200 billion a year.  Without us, Canada can’t make it.  You know, Canada relies on us 95 percent.  We rely on them 4 percent.  Big difference.  And I say Canada should be our 51st state.  There’s no tariffs, no nothing. 
        
         And — and I say that, we give them military protection.  They have a very small military.  They spend very little money on military.  Or NATO, they’re just about last in terms of payment, because they say, “Why should we spend on military?”  That’s a tremendous cost.  Most nations can’t afford to even think about it.  “Why should we spend on military?  The United States protects us.” 

         And I would say that’s largely true.  We protect Canada.  But it’s not fair.  It’s not fair that they’re not paying their way.  And if they had to pay their way, they couldn’t exist. 

         When I spoke to — let’s call it the prime minister, rather than the governor.  (Laughter.)  But when I spoke to him, I said, “Why are we giving you $200 billion a year?”  He was unable to answer the question.  I said, “Why are we letting you make millions of cars and send them in?”  He was unable to answer the question — Justin Trudeau, a nice guy.  I think he’s a very good guy.  I call him Governor Trudeau. 

         He should be governor, because the fact is that if we don’t give them cars — we don’t have to give them cars.  The c- — tariffs will make it impossible for them to sell cars into the United States.  The tariffs will make it impossible to — for them to sell lumber or anything else into the United States. 

    And all I’m asking to do is break even or lose a little bit, but not lose $200 million.  And we love Canada.  I love Canada.  I love the people of Canada.  And — but, honestly, it’s not fair for us to be supporting Canada.  And if we don’t support them, they don’t subsist as a — as a nation. 

    Okay.

    Q    Mr. President, when you were talking to Elon —

    Q    Mr. President, on the EU tariffs.  Mr. President, have you made a decision on what level you will seek on tariffs on the European Union?

    THE PRESIDENT:  We have made a decision, and we’ll be announcing it very soon.  And it’ll be 25 percent, generally speaking, and that’ll be on cars and all other things. 

    And European Union is a different case than Canada — different kind of case.  They’ve really taken advantage of us in a different way.  They don’t accept our cars.  They don’t accept, essentially, our farm products.  They use all sorts of reasons why not.  And we accept everything of them, and we have about a $300 billion deficit with the European Union. 

    Now, I love the countries of Europe.  I guess I’m from there at some point, a long time ago, right?  (Laughter.)  But indirectly — well, pretty directly, too, I guess.  But I love the countries of Europe.  I — I love all countries, frankly.  All different.

    But European Union has been — it was formed in order to screw the United States.  I mean, look, let’s be honest.  The European Union was formed in order to screw the United States.  That’s the purpose of it, and they’ve done a good job of it, but now I’m president.

    Q    What will happen if these countries or the EU retaliate?

    THE PRESIDENT:  They can’t.  I mean, they can try, but they can’t. 

    Q    China did.  They imposed tariffs —

    Q    They are pledging to, sir.

    Q    — that are — went into effect, China’s retaliatory tariffs —

    THE PRESIDENT:  That’s right.  That’s right.  But —

    Q    — on the — the 10th of February.  Has there been any —

    THE PRESIDENT:  That’s right.

    Q    — impact that you’ve been able to observe?

    THE PRESIDENT:  That’s right.  No, they can do it, and they can try, but the numbers can never equal what ours, because we can go off.  We are the pot of gold.  We’re the one that everybody wants.  And they can retaliate, but it cannot be a successful retaliation, because we just go cold turkey.  We don’t buy anymore.  And if that happens, we win. 

    Q    Are you talking to Erik Prince about privatat- —

    THE PRESIDENT:  No.

    Q    — privatizing deportations?

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, I haven’t.  I haven’t.

    Q    Mr. President, you’re in litigation with CBS News.  Is this a case that you’d like to see go to trial, or are you open a settelm- —

    THE PRESIDENT:  With who?

    Q    CBS, the — “60 Minutes.”

    THE PRESIDENT:  CBS?

    Q    Yes.

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, CBS did something that was amazing.  Kamala was unable to answer a question properly, and they took the question that they asked, and they inserted an answer.  They gave her an answer.  This was two days before the election, right before — the Sunday night before the election.  And they wrote out a — they put her words from another question that was asked about a half an hour later, and they put that into the question. 

    Nobody’s ever even heard of it before.  Nobody’s ever heard of anything like this before.  But they then did it, they say, on numerous occasions.  And the FCC is looking at it very strongly, and everybody’s looking at it, and I’m — but nobody’s ever seen anything. 

    Think of it.  They took her answers, and they changed them.  And I don’t mean they changed a word or two, or they cut off a half a sentence, or they cut off a couple of words.  I mean, I’ve had that happen too.  But that, you — you just say — you know, then they say, “Well, we want brevity.  You know, we wanted to do it for time.” 

    Q    Would — would you encourage —

    THE PRESIDENT:  They took out her answer, and they inserted an entirely different answer that made her sound competent.  And they did this, and nobody’s ever — I thought I’ve heard of everything when it comes to that stuff.  No — I’ve never heard of it.  Nobody has ever seen.  So, we sued, and we are in discussions of settlement. 

    Q    What would a number be?  Like a hu- — what — what’s a number that you would think would be appropriate?

    THE PRESIDENT:  I think it’s a lot.  (Laughter.) 

    Q    What’s the timeline and process —

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, I mean, it — look, it could have — it probably did affect the election.  I mean, we won by a lot.  As I said, “Too big to rig.”  But it probably did affect the election.  Yeah, probably could have won by more, but I could have lost the election because of that. 

    It’s — we have to get to honest elections.  We have to go back to paper ballots.  We have to go back to voter ID.  One-day election, ideally, or short term, not these 48-day and 61-day elections where boxes are put in a room, and, “Oh, let’s move the boxes, because we’re putting in a new air conditioning system.”  Then you see the boxes move, and then you say, “Well, where are all the boxes?”  You know, —

    Q    But would you —

    THE PRESIDENT:  “What happened to the boxes that never came back?” 

    No, our elections are extremely dishonest.  We’re the only country in the world that has mail-in voting and all of these different things that we put in.  Nobody — no other country in the world has it. 

    You know, France went to — they had some of the things that we had, and they went to same-day voting, all paper.  And, you know, paper is very sophisticated now.  It’s a very sophisticated — it’s a very sophisticated form of voting right now.  It’s a very safe form of voting. 

    You know, the other thing is for the governors.  I wish the governors would do it, because the paper ballots will cost 9 percent of the machines, and they’re 100 percent.  You know, they’re — I don’t — nothing’s foolproof, but they’re as close as you get.  So, we’ll see what happens. 

    But on the “60 Minute” thing, nobody’s ever seen anything like it. 

    Q    And would you link the FCC action to the litigation?  I mean, does it make se- —

    THE PRESIDENT:  I don’t think it’s linked, but probably the lawyers look at it, you know, because I know it’s going along.  FCC is headed by a very competent person, and you have some very competent people on the board, and so I think they’re looking at it very seriously. 

    Yeah.

    Q    Mr. President —

    Q    Sir, of all the deals that you’ve done in your life, all the people you’ve sat across from and negotiated with, is President Putin distinct in any way?

    THE PRESIDENT:  He’s a very smart guy.  He’s a very cunning person.  But I’ve dealt with some people that — I’ve dealt with some really bad people.  But I will tell you, as far as this is concerned, we’ve — you have to understand, he was — he had no intention, in my opinion, of settling this war.  I think he wanted the whole thing. 

    When I got elected, we spoke, and I think we’re going to have a deal.  I can’t guarantee you that.  You know, a deal is a deal.  Lots of crazy things happen in deals, right?  But I think we’re going to have a deal. 

    If I didn’t get elected, I believe he would have just continued to go through Ukraine, and over a period of time, a lot of people — a lot of people would have been killed.  It would have lasted for a period of time. 

    And the reason that Ukraine — and I give — I have great respect for the Ukraine as fighters.  They have great fighters.  But without our equipment, that war would have been over, like people said, in a very short period of time. 

    Q    Is there a timeline (inaudible) — 

    THE PRESIDENT:  And if you remember, I gave the Javelins, and the Javelins are the things that knocked out those tanks right at the beginning of the war.  They said that — that Obama, at the time, gave sheets, and Trump gave Javelins.  Well, I was the one that did that.  But I want to see it come to an end. 

    Q    Will he have to make concessions — President Putin?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, he will.  He will.  He’s going to have to.  And —

    Q    Can you preview that?

    THE PRESIDENT:  And I think — I believe that, because we got elected, that war will come to an end.  And I also believe, if we didn’t get elected, if this administration didn’t win the election by a lot, that that war would go on for a long time, and he would want to take the whole thing. 

    Q    What concessions?  What concessions?

    Q    On the — on the —

    THE PRESIDENT:  The big question I had is: Does he want to take the whole thing?  But the reason — and — and the Ukrainians are good fighters, I have to say, but without the equipment — without our equipment — we have the best equipment in the world.  We have the best military equipment in the world.  Without our equipment, that would have been over very quickly. 

    Q    What concessions would you like to see? 

    Q    On the (inaudible), sir?  On — on the —

    Q    What concessions would you like to see?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Oh, I don’t want to tell right now.  But I can tell you that NATO, you can forget about.  That’s been — I think that’s probably the reason the whole thing started.  And I think, JD, we can say that. 

    What — do you have a statement on that?  You’ve been very much involved. 

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  (Laughs.)

    THE PRESIDENT:  I gave him the beauty.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Great.  You gave me the — the hardest question, sir. 

    Q    Concessions from Russia.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  I mean, look, as the president said, we’re not going to do the negotiation in public with the American media.  He’s going to do it in private with the president of — of Russia, with the president of Ukraine, and with other leaders.  And I think that’s how this has to go. 

    I think the — I just want to push back against some of the criticism I’ve seen in the administration on this, because every single time the president engages in diplomacy, you guys preemptively accuse him of conceding to Russia.  He hasn’t conceded anything to anyone.  He’s doing the job of a diplomat, and he is, of course, the diplomat in chief as the president of the United States. 

    Q    On the gold cards, sir.  Can you talk a little bit more about the vetting process, you know —

    THE PRESIDENT:  They’ll go through a process.  The process is being worked out right now, and we’re going to be — we’re going to be very careful. 

    Q    And will there be restrictions on, for instance, can Chinese nationals get one? 

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, we’re not going to restrict. 

    Q    Can Iranian nationals get —

    THE PRESIDENT:  We’re probably not going to be restricting too much in — in terms of countries, but maybe in terms of individuals.  We want to make sure we have people that love our country and are capable of loving the country.

    Q    Is there a process, sir —

    Q    Mr. President, there is a measles outbreak in Texas at the moment in which a child is reported to have died.  Do you have concerns about that?  And have you asked Secretary Kennedy to look into that outbreak? 

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, why don’t we — Bobby, do you want to speak on that, please?

    SECRETARY KENNEDY:  We are following the measles epidemic every day.  I think there’s 124 people who have contracted measles at this point, mainly in Gaines County, Texas; mainly, we’re told, in the Mennonite community. 

    There are two people who have died, but the — we’re watching it.  And there — there are about 20 people hospitalized, mainly for quarantine. 

    We’re watching it.  We put out a post on it yesterday, and we’re going to continue to follow it. 

    Q    Mr. President —

    SECRETARY KENNEDY:  Inci- — incidentally, there have been four measles outbreaks this year in this country.  Last year, there were 16.  So, it’s not unusual.  We have measles outbreaks every year. 

    Q    You sound a little under the weather yourself right now.  Are you all right?

    SECRETARY KENNEDY:  I just — I have a permanently bad throat. 

    Q    (Inaudible) coughing.

    Q    Mr. President, would you — would you send U.S. peacekeepers to just — to support the — the European peacekeepers?  Would you do any sort of U.S. —

    THE PRESIDENT:  No, we’re going to support Europe, yeah. 

    Q    And how would we do that?  How would the United States do that?

    THE PRESIDENT:  We’re very friendly with Europe.  We have a great relationship with Europe.  I mean, you could ask — you could talk about France.  You could talk about any of them.  Yeah, we have a great relationship with Europe. 

    Q    But how will we — how will the United States do that?  Would there be boots on —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Well, how?  I mean, you’re asking me a question: What are we doing in the — let’s worry — I hope we have that problem, where we can worry about peacekeeping.  We got to get there first.

    (Secretary Lutnick knocks on the table.)

    But I hope we have the problem of worrying about peacekeeping.  That’ll be the easiest problem, I think, JD, that we’ve ever had.  (Laughter.)

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  I think so, sir.

    Q    That would be part of the deal, presumably, that the Ukrainians —

    THE PRESIDENT:  We’ll — we’re —

    Q    — would want —

    THE PRESIDENT:  We’ll do it at the time, but we’ll — peacekeeping is very easy.  It’s making the deal that’s very tough. 

    And, again, nobody was speaking to Russia at all.  And, you know, probably a million and a half soldiers have been killed — close to a million and a half soldiers, not to mention a treme- — I will tell you, the — the thing with that horrible war that should have never started — it would have never started if I were president, and it didn’t start for four years, and it was not even thought about starting.  But the thing with that war is that you’re highly underestimating the number of people that have been killed.  Far more people have been killed in that war than you talk about.  You know, you like to talk about numbers, like, a million people.  Well, they had much more than a million soldiers killed.

    But you have a lot of cities that have been knocked to the ground.  They’re demolition sites.  Literally, demolition sites.  Every single building is knocked to the ground, and a lot of people were killed in those buildings.  And you’ll hear a report, “Two people were minorly injured” or “just injured a little bit.”  No.  No.  People were killed by the thousands.

    And there are a lot more people killed in that war than the media wants to talk about, because Biden did a horrible, horrible job.  He should have prevented that war.  He could have prevented that war. 

    Putin would have never gone in.  I’ll tell you one thing: He would have never gone in.  That war would never have taken place if I were president. 

    Q    I think what people are trying to understand, Mr. President —

    Q    Mr. President —

    Q    — is how would the United States — what would you be willing to do to support this European peacekeeping effort?  Would there be —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Again, you’re asking me the same question?  (Laughter.)

    Q    I’m just trying —

    THE PRESIDENT:  How many times do you have to answer it?  You’re talking about after we make peace.  Let me make peace first. 

    Once we make peace, I’ll give you all the answers you want.  But how many times can you ask the same question?

    Q    Mr. President, on the Middle East.  Did you receive —

    Q    Is loosening the sanctions on —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah, go ahead.  Behind.

    Q    Is loosening the sanctions on Russia a potential option as part of an overall deal?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Not now, no.  No.  We have sanctions on Russia.  No, I want to see if we make a deal first.  But I think we will.  I’ve had very —

    Q    But is it a bargaining chip, I’m asking.

    THE PRESIDENT:  I’ve had very good conversations with President Putin.  I’ve had very good conversations with President Zelenskyy.  And until four weeks ago, nobody had conversations with anybody.  It wasn’t even a consideration.  Nobody thought you could make peace.  I think you can. 

    Q    Mr. President, just —

    Q    But if Mr. Putin gets to keep his —

    Q    — just to bring this —

    Q    — the land that was claimed by force, if the Russians get to keep the territory that they — they claimed by force, doesn’t that send a dangerous message, let’s say, to China about Taiwan?

    THE PRESIDENT:  Oh, okay.  You try and take it away, right?  We’re going to do the best we can.  (Laughter.)  We’re going to do the best we can to make the best deal we can for both sides.  But for Ukraine, we’re going to try very hard to make a good deal so that they can get as much back as possible.  We want to get as much back as possible. 

    Q    Mr. President, just to bring this full —

    THE PRESIDENT:  And we’ll — we’ll cut it out after maybe this question.  Go ahead.

    Q    To bring this full circle, back to —

    THE PRESIDENT:  Unless it’s a bad question, and then we’ll (inaudible).  (Laughter.)

    Q    And back to —

    THE PRESIDENT:  You always like to finish on a good one.

    THE VICE PRESIDENT:  But, sir, they want you to negotiate with them instead of President Putin.

    THE PRESIDENT:  I know.  I know.

    Q    Back to the question about the —

    THE PRESIDENT:  They want to continue to talk about the peacekeepers.  (Laughter.)  They’re — you have a lot of confidence in us, because you assume there’s going to be peace.  You know, it’s possible it doesn’t work out.  There is possibility. 

         Q    And I had —

         THE PRESIDENT:  But I hope it does, for the sake of humanity, because if you look at the pictures that I’ve looked at, you don’t want to look at them. 

         Go ahead.

         Q    I had a question back on these cuts to the federal workforce.  You mentioned you — you’re interested in doing another round of this email.  When would you like to

    see that?  What would be the deadline?  And —

         THE PRESIDENT:  I — I’m not — I think —

         Q    — this time, would it be mandatory?

         THE PRESIDENT:  I think Elon — I think Elon wants to.  And I think it’s a good idea because, you know, those people, as I said before, they’re on the bubble.  You got a lot of people that have not responded, so we’re trying to figure out, do they exist?  Who are they?  And it’s possible that a lot of those people will be actually fired. 

         Q    And —

         THE PRESIDENT:  And if that happened, that’s okay, because that’s what we’re trying to do. 

         This country has gotten bloated and fat and disgusting and incompetently run. 

         I think we had the worst president in the history of our country.  He just left office.  I think he’s a disgrace.  What he’s done to our country by allowing millions of people to come into our country like that and all of the other things — the inflation, which he caused because of energy and stupid spending.  To spend hundreds of millions, trillions and trillions of dollars on the Green New Scam — a total scam.  I have the best energy people, the best environmental people in the world around this table, and they — they can’t even believe he got away with it. 

         And then, in leaving office, to send $20 billion here and $20 million there and $10 million and $5 million, and they couldn’t spend the money fast enough, and “Let’s get it out before Trump gets in.  Let’s just get it out to anybody.”  This is a disgrace to our nation.

         And you don’t write the fair thing.  But, look, you know the good news?  The people see it, and that’s why we won the election by so much. 

         Thank you very much, everybody.  I appreciate it.  Thank you.  Thank you.   

         Q    Thank you, Mr. President.

         THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you very much, Doug.  Pulitzer Prize.

         THE VICE PRESIDENT:  Sir, how many peacekeepers are you going to send to — (laughter) —

         THE PRESIDENT:  “What will you do?”  “How will it be?”  (Laughter.)

         SECRETARY LUTNICK:  “How will you address this?”

                                    END            12:47 P.M. EST

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Amid ‘Hellscape’, Uptick in Violence in North Darfur, Senior Humanitarian Official Urges Security Council to Take Immediate Action to Protect Civilians in Sudan

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    12 Million People Displaced, 24.6 Million Face Acute Hunger Nationwide, Yet Aid Groups Forced to Suspend Operations in Zamzam Displacement Camp Due to Insecurity

    The “already catastrophic” situation in Sudan has worsened in recent weeks, a senior United Nations humanitarian official warned today, as she outlined alarming developments in North Darfur, and urged the Security Council to take immediate action to ensure all actors abide by international humanitarian law and protect civilians in Zamzam camp and beyond. 

    “Nearly two years of relentless conflict in Sudan have inflicted immense suffering and turned parts of the country into a hellscape,” said Edem Wosornu, Director, Operations and Advocacy Division, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.  Ms. Wosornu briefed the 15-member body on behalf of Tom Fletcher, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. 

    More than 12 million people in Sudan have been displaced while 24.6 million people are experiencing acute hunger, she told the Council.  In North Darfur, violence in and around the Zamzam displacement camp — which hosts hundreds of thousands of civilians — has further intensified.  Satellite imagery confirms the use of heavy weaponry there in recent weeks.  Many have been killed, including at least two humanitarian workers, she said. 

    Earlier this week, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the main provider of health and nutrition services in Zamzam, announced that it has been forced to halt its operations in the camp due to the deteriorating security situation.  The World Food Programme (WFP) has also confirmed the suspension of voucher-based food assistance due to insecurity and the destruction of the market at Zamzam. 

    Moreover, the UN Human Rights Office has verified reports of summary executions of civilians in areas that have changed hands, she went on to say.  In the south of the country, fighting has spread into new areas in North Kordofan and South Kordofan.  “We have also seen shocking reports of further atrocities in While Nile state, including a wave of attacks earlier this month reported to have killed scores of civilians,” she said, welcoming the decision by the Sudanese authorities to extend the authorization of the use of the Adre crossing for humanitarian aid. 

    United Nations 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan Requires $6 Billion

    She said that the UN’s 2025 response plan for Sudan and the region requires $6 billion to support close to 21 million people in Sudan and up to 5 million others in neighbouring countries.  “The international community — in particular members of the Council — must spare no effort in trying to mitigate this,” she stressed. 

    In the ensuing discussion, Council members expressed alarm over the increasing attacks on civilians, underscoring the harrowing plight of the Sudanese people, particularly children, and urging all parties to the conflict to put down their weapons. 

    World’s Greatest Crisis of Displaced Children 

    “Sudan is experiencing one of the most devastating conflicts of our times,” said Panama’s delegate, noting that the country is home to the world’s greatest crisis of displaced children.  Slovenia’s delegate echoed a similar sentiment, saying that Sudanese children are left with the deepest scars of this war.  “These young lives plead for an end to the massacre, for the guns that keep them awake to be silenced, and they ask for food,” he added. 

    ‘Unspeakable Violence’ against Women and Girls Must Stop 

    “This conflict has unleashed a wave of unspeakable violence against women and girls,” Denmark’s delegate also added, underscoring that survivors need urgent access to healthcare and post-rape support.  The “entrenched impunity” has become one of the main drivers of conflict, she said.  Greece’s representative said that addressing the crimes against women and girls requires gender-sensitive interventions such as specialized healthcare, psychosocial support, and legal assistance. 

    Delegates Condemn Rapid Support Forces’ Attacks in Internally Displaced Persons Camps 

    Pakistan’s representative condemned the Rapid Support Forces’ attack on the only functioning hospital in the besieged El Fasher — the Saudi Teaching Maternal Hospital — which killed over 70 people.  “RSF must immediately stop its killing campaigns in Zamzam and Abu Shouk IDP camps,” he asserted, calling on the Council to ensure the implementation of resolution 2736 (2024). 

    “It does not need to be this way”, said the delegate from the United Kingdom, urging the parties to end their military ambitions and focus on creating the conditions for peace.  While welcoming the Sudanese Armed Forces’ decision to keep the Adré border crossing open, she underscored that — with over 30 million people in humanitarian need — “it is simply not enough”. 

    The representative of the Russian Federation said that the “shortest way to settle” the humanitarian situation is via “very close cooperation” with the Sudanese Government and its related parties.  “We cannot recall a single instance where the authorities refuse to cooperate with the humanitarians,” he said.  Sudanese authorities are working on simplifying logistical chains and streamlining document processing for humanitarian cargo.  No one will provide more support to the peaceful civilians in Sudan than their Government and the army. 

    “Both belligerents have committed atrocities,” emphasized the representative of the United States, expressing concern over attacks on the Zamzam refugee camp by the Rapid Support Forces and the use of civilians as human shields by militias allied with the Sudanese Armed Forces.  “We cannot let Sudan again become a permissive environment for terrorists and transnational criminal organizations,” he added.

    The humanitarian crisis is the direct result of the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, France’s delegate echoed, adding that it is vital to respect the territorial integrity of Sudan.  All actors must engage in good faith in an intra-Sudanese political dialogue, facilitated by the African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

    Speakers Urge Ceasefire during Holy Month of Ramadan 

    Several speakers highlighted the upcoming holy month of Ramadan as an opportunity for all parties to lay down their arms, with the representative of the Republic of Korea urging all parties to immediately seize hostilities.  “If both parties to the conflict in Sudan continue to rely on a military solution and persist in the belief that political victory can be achieved on the battlefield the fragmentation of Sudan may soon become a reality,” he warned. 

    African Solutions, African-Owned Initiatives Key to Resolving Conflict 

    Algeria’s delegate also speaking for Guyana, Somalia and Sierra Leone, echoed the call for a ceasefire during Ramadan, and welcomed the transition road map announced by the Government, which includes “the formation of a civilian Government to be led by a civilian technocratic personality”. Expressing concern over the announcement by the leaders of the Rapid Support Forces to establish a parallel authority, he stressed the need to coordinate diplomatic initiatives, while preserving the central role of the African Union and the United Nations. “Foreign interferences” remain a persistent challenge in the search for a lasting solution to the conflict in Sudan, he said. 

    African solutions and African-owned initiatives must continue to play a leading role, added Angola’s delegate.  “While the root cause of this conflict is reportedly linked to the internal ethnic tensions, we must recognize that it has been exacerbated by a few external factors,” he added.  The Jeddah Process, facilitated by Saudi Arabia and United States, and the African Union’s Peace and Security Council Ad Hoc Presidential Committee on Sudan remain hopeful prospects.  

    International Community Must Do More to Alleviate Suffering 

    Several Council members called on the international community to do more to alleviate the suffering in Sudan and warned that the conflict could spill over.  China’s delegate stressed the need to fund the 2025 Humanitarian Needs Response Plan in order for Sudan to meet the challenges of food insecurity, refugee displacement and conflict spillover. 

    “We all share the responsibility of supporting the Sudan so that its crisis does not turn from a regional crisis with repercussions limited to neighbouring countries in Africa to a crisis that threatens international peace and security,” said Egypt’s delegate.  The crisis in Sudan could threaten the safety of navigation in the Red Sea, increase illegal migration to Europe, and turn Sudan into a haven for criminal groups or armed militias. 

    Kenya’s delegate said that his country has received and engaged “official delegations” from Sudan, “who reaffirm their commitment to end the war and restore Sudan to civilian administration”.  Spotlighting the recent signing of a peace charter in Nairobi — which “must be viewed in that context” — he noted that a collective of 24 groups, drawn from an inclusive cross-section of civilian, political and military actors, associated themselves with that instrument.  He emphasized, however:  “Neither President William Ruto nor the Government of Kenya has recognized any independent entity in the Sudan or elsewhere.”

    Sudan’s Speaker Cites Cooperation with UN Special Envoy, Urges Militias to End Attacks on El Fasher 

    Sudan’s representative said that on his Government’s cooperation with the Special Envoy, Sudanese authorities have facilitated meetings with the leadership in the political, civilian and diplomatic spheres without interference.  “We have facilitated a briefing for him on the dynamics of the conflict […] and presented our readiness to reach a peaceful settlement,” he said, emphasizing the neutrality and centrality of the UN.

    However, “certain elements behind the scenes” sabotaged his Government’s efforts with the aim “to achieve their demonic aims”, he cautioned, noting that the main reason for the continuation of the war is the United Arab Emirates’ support for the Rapid Support Forces. For its part, Khartoum presented a national plan to protect civilians and implement the Jeddah Agreement and resolutions 1591 (2005) and 2736 (2024).  It has also designated airports in several areas for air transport of humanitarian assistance.  Calling on the militias to end their attacks on the Sudanese capital of El Fasher — which target civilians, health facilities and basic infrastructure — he stated:  “We welcome any practical and implementable humanitarian pause.”  Nevertheless, “any ceasefire is rejected if El Fasher’s siege is not lifted”, he asserted, urging the rebels to withdraw from the areas they occupy.

    Sudan’s Government is exerting great efforts to fulfil refugee and internally displaced persons’ needs through coordination with organizations active in Sudan as well as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. To that end, he spotlighted several projects, including rehabilitating schools, higher education and rural hospitals, providing health services, repairing water networks and restoring police stations.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Xbox reveals agenda for developers at GDC 2025 March 17-21

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: Xbox reveals agenda for developers at GDC 2025 March 17-21

    As we gear up for the Game Developers Conference (GDC) 2025, we couldn’t be more excited to meet up with our friends and colleagues in the industry and explore the many incredible new opportunities that await. This year, GDC takes place from March 17-21 at the Moscone Convention Center in San Francisco, California. We’ll host partner meetings, participate in conference sessions, and sponsor events like the IGF Awards and the ESA Foundation’s Nite to Unite. Attendees that come by the Xbox Lounge in Moscone South will have a chance to see the latest Xbox experience on PC, join a Q&A with an Xbox development expert, and learn about the opportunities and benefits of building with Xbox across PC, Cloud and Console.

    Xbox is expanding to any screen on any device, making it easier for anyone to play with the friends they want – whether they choose to play with Xbox console, PC, Smart TV or mobile. At GDC, we’re inviting game developers to go behind the scenes to better understand what it means for Xbox to be playable on any screen. We’re committed to empowering game developers to tap into that opportunity by building cross-capable games that take advantage of Xbox across devices. Our presence will reveal the many ways game developers can reach more players with Xbox and showcase success stories of developers who are maximizing the opportunity.

    Whether you’re an indie developer or a seasoned professional, Xbox speakers will be presenting insights for every stage of your development journey. Check out the full schedule below. If you will be engaging remotely, you can learn more by visiting our Game Development Resource Hub here and to learn more about AI for Gaming, check out our Gaming AI Resource Hub here.

    For us, GDC 2025 is as much about showcasing the Xbox developer experience as it is about fostering collaboration with partners and driving our gaming future, together. See you there!

    Monday, March 17

    UX Summit: UX Writing: A New(ish) Craft in Mobile Games
    Speaker: Patricia Gomez (King)
    Date: Monday, March 17
    Time: 9:30am – 10:30am
    Location: Room 2010, West Hall

    Community Management Summit: Social Media Microtalks: Authenticity from You and the Business “We”
    Speaker: Cindy Tran (Obsidian Entertainment), Antonio Cara (DeNA Corp.), Harper Jay MacIntyre (Double Fine Productions Inc), Livvy Hall (Xbox Game Studios Publishing), Megan Spurr (Microsoft)
    Date: Monday, March 17
    Time: 10:50am – 11:50am
    Location: Room 2014, West Hall

    Live Service Games Summit: Reinventing ‘Candy Crush Soda’ for the Next 10 years
    Speaker: Abigail Rindo (King), Paul Hellier (King)
    Date: Monday, March 17
    Time: 10:50am – 11:50am
    Location: Room 2006, West Hall

    Animation Summit: ‘Diablo 4’: Bringing to Life the Priestess of Hatred
    Speaker: Chad Waldschmidt (Blizzard Entertainment)
    Date: Monday, March 17
    Time: 3:50 pm – 4:20 pm
    Location: Room 2018, West Hall

    UX Summit: Making the World Playful: The Importance of Accessible Mobile Games
    Speaker:
    Emilio Jeldrez (King)
    Date: Monday, March 17
    Time: 5:30pm – 6:00pm
    Location: Room 2010, West Hall

    Tuesday, March 18

    Live Service Games Summit: Mass Engagement Winning Strategies: The 15M Player Tournament of ‘Candy Crush Saga’
    Speaker: Margaux Diaz (King), Roberto Kusabbi (King)
    Date: Tuesday, March 18
    Time: 9:30am – 10:30am
    Location: Room 2006, West Hall

    Thriving Players Summit: Prosocial Design Workshop
    Speaker:
    Natasha Miller (Blizzard Entertainment), Weszt Hart (Riot Games)
    Date: Tuesday, March 18
    Time: 9:30am – 11;50am
    Location: Room 3005, West Hall

    The Climate Crisis Workshop
    Speaker: Grant Shonkwiler (Shonkventures LLC), Trevin York (Dire Lark), Paula Angela Escuadra (Microsoft / Xbox), Jennifer Estaris (ustwo games), Arnaud Fayolle (Ubisoft)
    Date: Tuesday, March 18
    Time: 10:00am – 6:00pm
    Location: Room 204, South Hall

    Gaming Reimagined: Mobile’s Impact on Play Today (Presented by King)
    Speaker: Todd Green (King), Paula Ingvar (King), Peiwen Yao (Blizzard Entertainment)
    Date: Tuesday, March 18
    Time: 10:50am – 11:50am
    Location: Room 2000, West Hall

    Unpacking Anti-Toxicity Strategy in “Call of Duty” (Presented by Community Clubhouse)
    Speaker: Mark Frumkin (Modulate), Grant Cahill (Activision)
    Date: Tuesday, March 18
    Time: 2:40pm – 3:40pm
    Location: Esplanade 158, South Hall

    Live Service Games Summit: Game Designer’s Notebook
    Speakers: Marta Cortiñas (King), Kenny Dinkin (King)
    Time: 2:40pm – 3:40pm
    Location: Room 2006, West Hall

    Wednesday, March 19

    Opening a Billion Doors with Xbox (Presented by Microsoft)
    Speaker: Leo Olebe (Microsoft), Chris Charla (Microsoft)
    Date: Wednesday, March 19
    Time: 12:30pm – 1:30pm
    Location: Room 3022, West Hall

    Accelerating Your Inner Loop with Visual Studio and GitHub Copilot AI (Presented by Microsoft)
    Speaker: David Li (Microsoft), Michael Price (Microsoft)
    Date: Wednesday, March 19
    Time: 12:30pm – 1:30pm
    Location: GDC Industry Stage, Expo Floor, South Hall

    Grow Your Audience with the Updated Xbox Experience on PC (Presented by Microsoft)
    Speaker:
    Tila Nguyen (Microsoft), Jose Rady (Microsoft)
    Date: Wednesday, March 19
    Time: 2:00pm – 3:00pm
    Location: GDC Industry Stage, Expo Floor, South Hall

    Make your Game Available ANYWHERE with Xbox Cloud Gaming (Presented by Microsoft)
    Speaker: Harrison Hoffman (Microsoft), Jordan Cohen (Microsoft)
    Date: Wednesday, March 19
    Time: 2:00pm – 3:00pm
    Location: Room 2000, West Hall

    Masterworking Systems: Lessons Learned from the Engineering of Season of Loot Reborn in ‘Diablo IV’
    Speaker: Patrick Ferland (Blizzard Entertainment)
    Date: Wednesday, March 19
    Time: 2:00pm – 3:00pm
    Location: Room 2006, West Hall

    Ask Game Lawyers Anything Roundtable Day 1
    Speaker: Ryan Black (DLA Piper (Canada) LLP), Brandon Huffman (Odin Law and Media), Angelo Alcid (Microsoft Corp.), Yan Perng (Netflix)
    Date: Wednesday, March 19
    Time: 3:30pm – 4:30pm
    Location: Room 308, South Hall

    Xbox Game Studios Panel: Scaling Cross-Platform Development Across Xbox and PC (Presented by Microsoft)
    Speaker: Kate Rayner (Microsoft), Soren Hannibal Nielsen (Microsoft, Chuck Rozhon (Obsidion Entertainment), Chad Dawson (Double Fine Productions) Phil Cousins (Microsoft), Magnus Auvinen (Machine Games)
    Date: Wednesday, March 19
    Time: 3:30pm – 4:30pm
    Location: Room 2000, West Hall

    Thursday, March 20

    DirectX State of the Union: Raytracing and PIX Workflows (Presented by Microsoft)
    Speaker: Claire Andrews (Microsoft), Austin Kinross (Microsoft)
    Date: Thursday, March 20
    Time: 9:30am – 10:30am
    Location: Room 2009, West Hall

    VFX Storytelling: How “Hearthstone” Breathes Life Into Hundreds of Cards
    Speaker: Alex Cortes (Blizzard Entertainment)
    Date: Thursday, March 20
    Time: 11:00am – 12:00pm
    Location: Room 2006, West Hall

    Strategies for Indie Devs: How to Succeed with Xbox (Presented by Microsoft)
    Speaker: James Lewis (Microsoft)
    Date: Thursday, March 20
    Time: 11:30am – 12:30pm
    Location: GDC Industry Stage, Expo Floor, South Hall

    G.A.N.G. Demo Derby: Sound Design
    Speaker: Nick Hartman (Sound Lab), Scott Gershin (Sound Lab), Charles Deenen (Source Sound Inc), Gary Miranda (Injected Senses Audio), Brian Farr (Blizzard Entertainment)
    Date: Thursday, March 20
    Time: 12:15pm – 1:45pm
    Location: Room 3018, West Hall

    From Idea to Action: Lessons from a New Accessibility Initiative (Presented by The Entertainment Software Association)
    Speaker: Aubrey Quinn  (Entertainment Software Association), Paul Amadeus Lane  (Amadeus 4th Corp), Amy Lazarus  (Electronic Arts), Dara Monasch  (Google), Anna Waismeyer  (Microsoft/Xbox), Steven Evans  (Nintendo of America), David Tisserand  (Ubisoft)
    Date: Thursday, March 20
    Time: 12:15pm – 1:15pm
    Location: GDC Main Stage, West Hall, Street Level

    Windows Productivity Tools for Game Developers (Presented by Microsoft)
    Speaker: Demitrius Nelon (Microsoft), Kayla Cinnamon (Microsoft)
    Date: Thursday, March 20
    Time: 12:15pm – 1:15pm
    Location: Room 2024, West Hall

    Securing the Joy of Gaming: Xbox’s Commitment to Gaming Security and Innovation (Presented by Microsoft)
    Speaker: Temi Adebambo (Microsoft)
    Date: Thursday, March 20
    Time: 2:00pm – 3:00pm
    Location: GDC Industry Stage, Expo Floor, South Hall

    Xbox Play Anywhere Developer Roundtable (Presented by Microsoft)
    Speaker: Chris Charla (Microsoft)
    Date: Thursday, March 20
    Time: 2:00pm – 3:00pm
    Location: Room 2004, West Hall

    King: Enhancing Mobile Audio with Accessibility and Inclusion
    Speaker: Eduardo Broseta  (King)
    Date: Thursday, March 20
    Time: 2:30pm – 3:00pm
    Location: Room 3024, West Hall

    Friday, March 21

    Game Career Seminar: STR, DEX and INT: A Genre-Spanning Way to Think About Gameplay
    Speaker: Joseph Shely  (Blizzard Entertainment)
    Date: Friday, March 21
    Time: 11:50am – 12:20pm
    Location: Room 3005, West Hall

    Game Career Seminar: Killer Portfolio or Portfolio Killer Part 2: Portfolio Reviews
    Speakers:
    Greg Foertsch  (Bit Reactor), Sarah LeBlanc  (Bit Reactor), Rembert Montald  (Lightspeed LA), David Yee  (Unannounced), Jeffrey Johnson  (inXile Entertainment), Jade Law  (Wardog Studios), Gaurav Mathur  (E-Line Media), Jessica Kutrakun  (Hypixel Studios), Inmar Salvatier  (Maxis), Jeff Parrott  (Blizzard), Daanish Syed  (Bit Reactor), David Johnson  (UndertoneFX), Jeff Skalski  (Yellow Brick Games)
    Date:
    Friday, March 21
    Time:
    2:00pm – 5:00pm
    Location:
    Room 3000, West Hall

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Security: Tajik National Arrested in Brooklyn for Conspiring to Provide Material Support to ISIS

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    A criminal complaint was unsealed today in federal court in Brooklyn charging Mansuri Manuchekhri with conspiring to provide material support to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and to the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), possessing firearms while unlawfully in the United States and immigration fraud.  Manuchekhri was arrested today and made his initial appearance this afternoon before United States Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy who ordered the defendant detained.

    John J. Durham, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Sue Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, James E. Dennehy, Assistant Director in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York Field Office (FBI) and Jessica S. Tisch, Commissioner, New York City Police Department (NYPD), announced the arrest and charges.

    “As alleged, the defendant, who was in the United States illegally, not only facilitated tens of thousands of dollars in contributions to ISIS extremists overseas, but trained with assault rifles at shooting ranges in the United States and declared his readiness to ISIS,” stated United States Attorney Durham.  “Protecting the homeland and prosecuting evildoers who assist terrorist organizations by funding their violent and hateful agenda, here and abroad, will always be a priority of this Office.”   

    Mr. Durham praised the outstanding investigative work of the FBI’s New York Joint Terrorism Task Force, which consists of investigators and analysts from the FBI, the NYPD and over 50 other federal, state and local agencies.

    “The Justice Department will relentlessly pursue those who fund and support terrorists,” stated Sue Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.  “We will not allow our immigration or financial systems to be exploited. Our country will not be a safe haven for those who try to harm Americans.”

    “Today’s arrest demonstrates the FBI’s commitment to protecting the American people from the threat of terrorism,” stated FBI Assistant Director in Charge Dennehy.  “As alleged in the complaint, the defendant not only violated our immigration laws, but while unlawfully in the United States also provided substantial financial support to violent extremists affiliated with a designated foreign terrorist organization. In his promotion of violence and praise for terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, the defendant made clear his desire to support violent extremism, and I am grateful to all our folks on the Joint Terrorism Task Force for their vigilance and dedication to disrupting this threat and putting him behind bars.”

    “The NYPD will stop at nothing to protect New Yorkers from those who support and pledge loyalty to violent ISIS extremists,” stated NYPD Commissioner Tisch.  “I commend the NYPD investigators and all of our local, state, and federal law enforcement partners for identifying and arresting this gun-toting fraudster, and for thwarting the dangerous domestic threat he posed to our communities.”

    As alleged in the complaint, Manuchekhri traveled to the United States from Tajikistan in June 2016 on a non-immigrant tourist visa and remained in the country after his visa expired in December 2016.  In March 2017, Manuchekhri paid an American citizen to enter into a sham marriage with him so that he could obtain legal status in the United States.  However, he failed to provide certain supporting documentation that was requested by the government and his petition was never granted. 

    From approximately December 2021 through April 2023, while residing in Brooklyn, Manuchekhri facilitated approximately $70,000 in payments to ISIS-affiliated individuals in Turkey and Syria, including to an individual who was later arrested by Turkish authorities for his alleged involvement in a January 2024 terrorist attack on a church in Istanbul for which ISIS-K publicly claimed responsibility.  Manuchekhri expressed his support for ISIS to others by praising past ISIS attacks in the United States and by collecting jihadi propaganda videos promoting violence and martyrdom.

    The complaint further alleges that Manuchekhri possessed and used firearms and made frequent visits to shooting ranges even though he was prohibited from doing so as an alien unlawfully in the United States.  In February 2022, Manuchekhri recorded himself firing an assault rifle at a shooting range in New Jersey and sent the video to one of the ISIS-affiliated individuals in Turkey with the message, “Thank God, I am ready, brother.”        

    The charges in the complaint are allegations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.  If convicted, Manuchekhri faces a maximum sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment.

    The government’s case is being handled by the Office’s National Security and Cybercrime Section.  Assistant United States Attorneys Robert M. Pollack and Andrew D. Reich are in charge of the prosecution with assistance from Trial Attorneys John Cella and Andrea Broach of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section and Paralegal Specialist Wayne Colón.

    The Defendant:

    MANSURI MANUCHEKHRI
    Age: 33
    Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn

    E.D.N.Y. Docket No. 25-MJ-64

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Boozman, Murray Unveil Bipartisan Legislation to Improve Support for Disabled Veterans and Their Families, Including Young Caregivers

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Arkansas – John Boozman

    WASHINGTON––U.S. Senators John Boozman (R-AR) and Patty Murray (D-WA), senior members of the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, introduced the Helping Heroes Act, legislation to support the families and children of disabled veterans who take on caregiving roles.

    The Helping Heroes Act seeks to improve the assistance provided to children under the age of 18 that offer invaluable support to the veteran family members they live with. Because these dependents face unique challenges and take on responsibilities that their peers do not carry, this bill aims to bolster the accessibility and quality of mental health care and peer support services they can receive through the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).

    “Investing in the families of our veterans is part of the commitment we have made to those who have served,” said Boozman. “By expanding the VA’s capabilities and resources to better support the needs of caregivers, including the children of disabled veterans, they will benefit in their own lives as well as enjoy more access to comprehensive tools and networks. Better grasping and responding to the impact of caring for their loved ones is an important step to raise their quality of life.”

    “I’m proud to reintroduce my bipartisan legislation to help VA better support the families of disabled veterans—especially children who frequently take on caregiving roles in their families and could benefit from additional supportive services,” said Murray, daughter of a WWII veteran and Purple Heart recipient who was later diagnosed with multiple sclerosis during her childhood. “Veterans and their families have sacrificed so much for our country, and we have a responsibility to make sure the federal government is there for them and that we’re constantly working to improve the services they get through VA.”

    Specifically, the Helping Heroes Act would:

    • Establish a permanent Family Support Program to provide supportive services to eligible family members of disabled veterans;
    • Require a coordinator at each Veterans Integrated Services Network (VISN) to assess the needs of veteran families in their catchment area and refer them to available local, state and federal resources; and
    • Require VA to collect data on the experiences of disabled veteran families to better identify and understand their needs.

    The legislation is also cosponsored by Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Adam Schiff (D-CA), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Tim Kaine (D-VA) and Peter Welch (D-VT).

    The Helping Heroes Act is supported by the Elizabeth Dole Foundation, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Paralyzed Veterans of America, Disabled American Veterans, The American Legion, Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, American Veterans and the Association of the United States Army.

    More information on supporting the healthy development of children from military and veteran caregiving homes can be found in this report commissioned by the Elizabeth Dole Foundation. 

    Click here for full text of the legislation.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Coons, colleagues introduce bipartisan, bicameral bill to restore injunctive relief for patent infringement

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Delaware Christopher Coons

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Chris Coons (D-Del.) and Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) today introduced the Realizing Engineering, Science, and Technology Opportunities by Restoring Exclusive (RESTORE) Patent Rights Act of 2025. This bipartisan, bicameral bill would restore the presumption that courts will issue an injunction to stop patent infringers, strengthening protections for U.S. inventors, entrepreneurs, universities, and startups. This legislation was initially introduced in the 118th Congress. Representatives Nathaniel Moran (R-Texas) and Madeleine Dean (D-Pa.) also introduced the House companion bill. 

    “Thanks to a wrongheaded decision from the Supreme Court, there are now companies who steal patented technologies rather than license them from inventors and then justify their actions as simply the cost of doing business. Innovators at universities and startups who lack resources are often unable to stop patent infringement in court and are forced into licensing deals they do not want,” said Senator Coons. “The RESTORE Patent Rights Act will protect innovators across the country, stop the infringe-now, pay-later model in its tracks, and strengthen America’s economic competitiveness for generations to come.”

    “American ingenuity should be rewarded and protected,” said Senator Cotton. “Current patent law fails to protect inventors and leaves them vulnerable to intellectual property theft from adversaries like China. This bipartisan legislation will help solidify America’s edge in technological innovation.”

    For more than two centuries, courts granted injunctive relief in most patent cases upon a finding of infringement, preventing patent infringers from continuing to produce goods that ran afoul of patent laws. However, this practice was upended in 2006 when the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange created a four-factor test to determine whether a permanent injunction is warranted in infringement cases, altering the longstanding remedy for patent infringement.

    Since that decision, obtaining injunctive relief in patent cases has become significantly more difficult and rare. A recent study found that requests for permanent injunctions in patent cases fell by 65% for companies that use their patented technology to manufacture a product; grants of permanent injunctions to those companies fell even more significantly. Requests and grants for licensing patent owners like universities and research clinics dropped even further: Requests fell by 85%, and grants fell by 90%. 

    The RESTORE Patent Rights Act would undo the damage of the eBay decision by returning to patent owners a rebuttable presumption that an injunction is warranted after a court makes a final ruling that their rights are being infringed. This would deter predatory infringers and restore meaning to the right to exclude.

    “American innovation is only as strong as the confidence in knowing ideas cannot be stolen by competitors. In the last two decades, innovators have found it harder to obtain a permanent injunction from U.S. courts, which stops bad actors from stealing their intellectual property (IP). Our legislation will restore the rights of American innovators by ensuring permanent injunctions are accessible from U.S. courts. This bill will provide greater certainty in the protection of IP and prevent cases from being taken overseas to countries like China. When U.S. courts enforce the exclusivity of patent rights, America becomes a world leader in innovation,” said Congressman Moran.  

    “Enforceable patents are vital to our ability to invent, improve and advance – yet today, it is increasingly difficult for patent holders to enforce their rights through permanent injunctions, even after proving infringement in court,” said Congresswoman Dean. “The bipartisan, bicameral RESTORE Act addresses this issue and safeguards American innovation. I’m grateful to be joined by Congressman Moran, Senator Coons, and Senator Cotton in our push to protect patentholders, including universities, research laboratories, and startups.”

    The Innovation Alliance, Council for Innovation Promotion, Association of University Technology Managers, Conservatives for Property Rights, Alliance of U.S. Startups & Inventors for Jobs, The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers-USA, Inventors Defense Alliance, and the Medical Device Manufacturers Association have endorsed the RESTORE Patent Rights Act.

    “The Innovation Alliance applauds Senators Coons and Cotton and Representatives Moran and Dean for reintroducing the bipartisan, bicameral RESTORE Patent Rights Act. With a simple, single-sentence clarification of the law, RESTORE will bring balance back to patent law and allow small inventors to stand toe to toe with Big Tech after a court has ruled that Big Tech is stealing their inventions. We urge Congress to pass this vital bill,” said Brian Pomper, Executive Director of the Innovation Alliance.

    “Our nation’s economic success and national security depend on inventors having confidence that their intellectual property will not be unfairly exploited,” said Andrei Iancu, board co-chair of C4IP and former Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and USPTO Director from 2018 to 2021. “The RESTORE Patent Rights Act will provide inventors with the reassurance they need to propel American leadership in critical technology fields.”

    “Now more than ever, it’s critical that our leaders stand up for the startups and entrepreneurs who drive our nation’s economy and create life-changing breakthroughs,” said David Kappos, board co-chair of C4IP and former Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and USPTO Director from 2009 to 2013. “By passing the RESTORE Patent Rights Act, Congress can reinvigorate the U.S. patent system and reaffirm America’s commitment to protecting its innovators.”

    “AUTM thanks Senator Coons and the other co-sponsors for introducing this legislation. Strengthening the ability of patent holders to protect their patents via injunction is crucial to incentivizing innovation. We look forward to working with the committee on this important legislation,” said Steve Susalka, CEO of AUTM. 

    “The RESTORE Patent Rights Act restores meaning to the promised exclusive rights to one’s invention. Without fully enforceable exclusive rights, the inventor’s end of the ‘patent bargain’ is broken. Since 2006, the Supreme Court’s eBay v. MercExchange ruling has made permanent injunction extremely difficult to obtain in patent infringement cases. Courts have thereby turned the right to exclude into a compulsory licensing clause. This is unjust. The RESTORE Patent Rights Act ends the judicially created categorical rule of routinely denying injunctions. It restores the historical remedy of injunctive relief in patent cases, as it is with other forms of property, including other intellectual property,” said James Edwards, Executive Director, Conservatives for Property Rights

    “The RESTORE Patent Rights Act is, perhaps, the most impactful thing that can be done to empower American inventors, entrepreneurs and disruptive startups. The ability to pursue injunctive relief when a competitor infringes on a patented invention was the standard in the United States for over 200 years. The Supreme Court moved the goalposts in 2006 and set up a convoluted test that makes it nearly impossible for a growth tech startup to stop the predatory infringement of their intellectual property by larger competitors. This practice has been perfected by Big Tech companies that now routinely ingest the innovations of disruptive competitors knowing that they cannot be stopped. Patent law and legislation is often complicated. The RESTORE Act is not. It is a clear and unambiguous bill that simply restores balance between large corporations that ingest others’ IP and the startups and entrepreneurs that invent it,” said Chris Israel, Executive Director of The Alliance of U.S. Startups & Inventors for Jobs (USIJ).

    “A functioning IP system must be fair, and as importantly, be perceived to be fair. Nondiscriminatory access to the legal system for enforcing and defending IP property rights is essential for securing the property rights necessary for investment. When innovators are unable to secure the property right embodied in a patent, investment is deterred and commercial activity, innovation and job creation impeded,” said Timothy Lee, IEEE-USA president.

    “The RESTORE Patent Rights Act is a crucial step in safeguarding America’s small businesses, startups, and entrepreneurs from predatory patent infringement. By providing a clear path for justice and injunctive relief, this bill empowers innovators and fosters a more equitable patent system that benefits American inventors and consumers,” said Kristen Osenga, the chief policy counselor at the Inventors Defense Alliance.

    “There unfortunately continues to be ongoing efforts across the world to steal American innovations and intellectual property, and it is critical that Congress establishes new protections so that the United States can remain the global leader in medical technology innovation,” said Mark Leahy, President and CEO, Medical Device Manufacturers Association. “The ‘RESTORE Patent Rights Act’ would help restore a level playing field if enacted, and would codify the presumption that a permanent injunction will be granted after infringement is proven.  MDMA applauds Senators Coons and Cotton and Representatives Moran and Dean for their leadership in helping America’s innovators protect their intellectual property, and we will continue to work closely with them so the medical technology ecosystem can deliver the cures, therapies and diagnostics that patients and providers need.”

    The text of the bill is available here.

    A one-pager is available here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Ormat Technologies Reports Fourth Quarter and Year-End 2024 Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    STRATEGIC PORTFOLIO EXPANSION SUPPORTS CONTINUED REVENUE AND ADJUSTED EBITDA GROWTH

    STRONG FULL-YEAR RESULTS REINFORCES ORMAT’S MOMENTUM, REMAINING ON PACE TO ACHIEVE GENERATING CAPACITY GOALS OF 2.6 TO 2.8 GW BY 2028

    HIGHLIGHTS

    • TOTAL REVENUES FOR THE FULL-YEAR INCREASED 6.1% COMPARED TO 2023, DRIVEN BY GROWTH IN ALL THREE SEGMENTS
    • FULL YEAR OPERATING INCOME AND ADJUSTED EBITDA IMPROVED 3.5% AND 14.3%, RESPECTIVELY
    • FOURTH QUARTER NET INCOME AND ADJUSTED NET INCOME IMPROVED BY 14.3% AND 7.7% YEAR-OVER-YEAR, RESPECTIVELY
    • ORMAT ANNOUNCES FULL YEAR 2025 OUTLOOK AND GROWTH EXPECTATIONS

    RENO, Nev., Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Ormat Technologies, Inc. (NYSE: ORA) (the “Company” or “Ormat”), a leading renewable energy company, today announced financial results for the fourth quarter and full year ended December 31, 2024.

    KEY FINANCIAL RESULTS

      Q4
    2024
    Q4
    2023
    Change (%) 12 months 2024 12 months 2023 Change (%)  
    GAAP Measures              
    Revenues ($ millions)              
    Electricity 180.1   183.9   (2.1)%   702.3   666.8   5.3%    
    Product 39.6   50.4   (21.4)%   139.7   133.8   4.4%    
    Energy Storage 11.0   7.0   56.7%   37.7   28.9   30.6%    
    Total Revenues 230.7   241.3   (4.4)%   879.7   829.4   6.1%    
    Gross Profit              
    73.6   78.5   (6.2)%   272.6   264.0   3.3%    
    Gross margin (%)              
    Electricity 34.9%   39.5%     34.6%   36.6%      
    Product 24.5%   12.6%     18.4%   13.4%      
    Energy Storage 9.5%   (8.9)%     10.9%   6.4%      
    Gross margin (%) 31.9%   32.5%     31.0%   31.8%      
                   
    Operating income ($ millions) 49.1   51.6   (4.9)%   172.5   166.6   3.5%    
    Net income attributable to the Company’s stockholders 40.8   35.7   14.3%   123.7   124.4   (0.5)%    
    Diluted EPS ($) 0.67   0.59   13.6%   2.04   2.08   (1.9)%    
                   
    Non-GAAP Measures              
    Adjusted Net income attributable to the Company’s stockholders 43.6   40.5   7.7%   133.7   121.9   9.7%    
    Adjusted Diluted EPS ($) 0.72   0.67   7.5%   2.20   2.05   7.3%    
    Adjusted EBITDA1($ millions) 145.5   139.0   4.6%   550.5   481.7   14.3%    

    “2024 was another successful year for Ormat and our growth trajectory, highlighted by a top-line improvement of 6.1%, translating into a 3.5% increase in operating income and a 14.3% increase in adjusted EBITDA, with solid growth performance across all three of our business segments,” said Doron Blachar, Chief Executive Officer of Ormat Technologies. “In 2024, we added 253MW of new capacity organically and through strategic, accretive M&A, with 133MW added to our Electricity segment and 120MW to our Energy Storage business.”

    “Within our Electricity segment, the Enel assets Ormat acquired at the beginning of the year have been immediately accretive and have played a key role in our year-over-year growth. Our performance was further supported by the Heber complex repowering project, the enhanced output at the Olkaria power plant, and the improved generation performance and pricing at the Puna power plant, helping to more than offset the impact of unplanned maintenance at Dixie Valley and the previously disclosed curtailments in the U.S.”

    “We continue to make great progress towards improving the revenue and margin profile of our Energy Storage business, positioning the segment to become a more stable and consistent factor in our consolidated growth. This strategic effort is reflected by the 56.7% and 30.6% increase in revenue on a quarter-over-quarter and year-over-year basis, respectively. We expect this improved performance to carry forward into 2025 as we begin to recognize the benefits of the recent CODs at our 80MW/320MWh Bottleneck and 20MW/20MWh Montague facilities, as well as the other Energy Storage projects in our development pipeline that are expected to come online later this year.”

    Blachar continued, “Looking ahead, we expect to benefit from the growing global demand for renewable power needed to support data centers and the transition to a cleaner energy future. We are currently in negotiations for approximately 250MW with hyper-scalers with favorable conditions for both new projects and expiring PPAs at rates exceeding $100 per MWh. To help ensure that we are well-positioned to meet the growing level of demand we have taken strategic actions to safe harbor, for PTC eligibility (pursuant to the current provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act and related guidance), all geothermal projects with expected CODs through 2028, as well as the associated ITC benefits for all energy storage projects through 2026. This has strengthened our confidence in our trajectory, and we believe will help us remain on track to achieve our generating capacity goals of 2.6 to 2.8 GW by the end of 2028.”

    FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS

    • Net income attributable to the Company’s stockholders for the fourth quarter and for the full year 2024 was $40.8 million and $123.7 million, respectively, an increase of 14.3% and a decrease of 0.5%, respectively, compared to last year. Diluted EPS for the fourth quarter and for the full year 2024 were $0.67 and $2.04 per share, respectively, an increase of 13.6% and a decrease of 1.9%, respectively, compared to last year.
    • Adjusted net income attributable to the Company’s stockholders and diluted EPS for the fourth quarter increased 7.7% and 7.5% compared to last year. Adjusted net income attributable to the Company’s stockholders and diluted EPS for the full year 2024 increased 9.7% and 7.3% compared to last year.
    • Adjusted EBITDA for the fourth quarter and for the year was $145.5 million, and $550.5 million, respectively, an increase of 4.6% and 14.3%, respectively, compared to 2023. The year-over-year increase in Adjusted EBITDA was driven, in the Electricity segment, by the contribution of the acquired assets in the first quarter of 2024, the improved performance of the Olkaria complex in Kenya, higher pricing of our Puna power plant and the sale of tax benefits from newly built plants. In the Product segment, the increase was derived from the improved contracts’ margin and Energy Storage drove improved performance due to the contribution of the new assets as well as a legal settlement with a battery supplier, which we expect to continue to receive over the next 5 quarters, to compensate us for lost revenues as a result of battery non- supply.
    • Electricity segment revenues decreased by 2.1% for the fourth quarter and increased by 5.3% in the full year 2024, compared to 2023. The year-over-year decrease in fourth quarter revenue was driven by the partial outage at our Dixie Valley power plant, which returned to full operation in November 2024. Additionally, in the fourth quarter we experienced heavy curtailments mainly to our McGinness complex due to maintenance on the transmission line by the local grid operator. Full-year revenue growth was driven by the contribution of our acquired Enel assets, Heber complex repowering, and higher generation and pricing at Puna.
    • Product segment revenues decreased by 21.4% in the fourth quarter and increased by 4.4% in the full year 2024, largely due to the timing of revenue recognition. Gross margin increased from 12.6% in the fourth quarter 2023 to 24.5% in 2024 and from 13.4% in the full year 2023 to 18.4% in 2024.
    • Product segment backlog stands at a record of approximately $340.0 million as of February 25, 2025, and includes approximately $210.0 million from the recently signed Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) contract for the development of the Te Mihi Stage 2 geothermal plant in New Zealand.
    • Energy Storage segment revenues increased 56.7% for the fourth quarter and 30.6% for the full year compared to 2023, supported by a total of 120MW/360 MWh of new capacity that started operation since the beginning of 2024 as well as new assets that came online during the second half of 2023.

    BUSINESS HIGHLIGHTS:

    • Won a tender, in February 2025, issued by the Israeli Electricity Authority and was awarded two separate 15-year tolling agreements for two energy storage facilities. The facilities under the tolling agreements are expected to have a combined capacity of approximately 300MW/1200MWh and we will have 50% equity interest.
    • In February 2025, commenced commercial operations of the 35MW Ijen geothermal power plant in Indonesia, in which the Company holds a 49% equity interest.
    • Signed a 10-year Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), in January 2025, with Calpine Energy Solutions for up to 15MW of carbon-free geothermal capacity at favorable terms that will replace the current lower price PPA with Southern California Edison for Mammoth 2 in the first quarter of 2027.
    • In December 2024, commenced commercial operations at the Montague energy storage facility to deliver 20MW/20MWh of energy storage capacity to the PJM market.
    • In October 2024, commenced commercial operations of the 80MW/320MWh Bottleneck Energy Storage facility in the Central Valley of California. The Bottleneck facility is the Company’s largest energy storage facility in its portfolio.

    2025 GUIDANCE TBU

    • Total revenues of between $935 million and $975 million.
    • Electricity segment revenues between $710 million and $725 million.
    • Product segment revenues of between $172 million and $187 million.
    • Energy Storage revenues of between $53 million and $63 million.
    • Adjusted EBITDA to be between $563 million and $593 million.
      • Adjusted EBITDA attributable to minority interest of approximately $23 million.

    The Company provides a reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA, a non-GAAP financial measure for the three and twelve months ended December 31, 2024. However, the Company does not provide guidance on net income and is unable to provide a reconciliation for its Adjusted EBITDA guidance range to net income without unreasonable efforts due to high variability and complexity with respect to estimating certain forward-looking amounts. These include impairments and disposition and acquisition of business interests, income tax expense, and other non-cash expenses and adjusting items that are excluded from the calculation of Adjusted EBITDA.

    DIVIDEND

    On February 26, 2025, the Company’s Board of Directors declared, approved, and authorized payment of a quarterly dividend of $0.12 per share pursuant to the Company’s dividend policy. The dividend will be paid on March 26, 2025, to stockholders of record as of the close of business on March 12, 2025. In addition, the Company expects to pay a quarterly dividend of $0.12 per share in each of the next three quarters.

    CONFERENCE CALL DETAILS

    Ormat will host a conference call to discuss its financial results and other matters discussed in this press release on Thursday, February 27, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. ET.

    Participants within the United States and Canada, please dial +1-800-715-9871, approximately 15 minutes prior to the scheduled start of the call. If you are calling outside of the United States and Canada, please dial +1-646-960-0440. The access code for the call is 9044930. Please request the “Ormat Technologies, Inc. call” when prompted by the conference call operator. The conference call will also be accompanied by a live webcast which will be hosted on the Investor Relations section of the Company’s website.

    A replay will be available one hour after the end of the conference call. To access the replay within the United States and Canada, please dial 1-800-770-2030. From outside of the United States and Canada, please dial +1-647-362-9199. Please use the replay access code 9044930. The webcast will also be archived on the Investor Relations section of the Company’s website.

    ABOUT ORMAT TECHNOLOGIES

    With over five decades of experience, Ormat Technologies, Inc. is a leading geothermal company and the only vertically integrated company engaged in geothermal and recovered energy generation (“REG”), with robust plans to accelerate long-term growth in the energy storage market and to establish a leading position in the U.S. energy storage market. The Company owns, operates, designs, manufactures and sells geothermal and REG power plants primarily based on the Ormat Energy Converter – a power generation unit that converts low-, medium- and high-temperature heat into electricity. The Company has engineered, manufactured and constructed power plants, which it currently owns or has installed for utilities and developers worldwide, totaling approximately 3,400 MW of gross capacity. Ormat leveraged its core capabilities in the geothermal and REG industries and its global presence to expand the Company’s activity into energy storage services, solar Photovoltaic (PV) and energy storage plus Solar PV. Ormat’s current total generating portfolio is 1,538MW with a 1,248MW geothermal and solar generation portfolio that is spread globally in the U.S., Kenya, Guatemala, Indonesia, Honduras, and Guadeloupe, and a 290MW energy storage portfolio that is located in the U.S.

    ORMAT’S SAFE HARBOR STATEMENT

    Information provided in this press release may contain statements relating to current expectations, estimates, forecasts and projections about future events that are “forward-looking statements” as defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. All statements, other than statements of historical facts, included in this press release that address activities, events or developments that we expect or anticipate will or may occur in the future, including such matters as our projections of annual revenues, expenses and debt service coverage with respect to our debt securities, future capital expenditures, business strategy, competitive strengths, goals, development or operation of generation assets, market and industry developments and incentives and the growth of our business and operations, are forward-looking statements. When used in this press release, the words “may”, “will”, “could”, “should”, “expects”, “plans”, “anticipates”, “believes”, “estimates”, “predicts”, “projects”, “potential”, or “contemplate” or the negative of these terms or other comparable terminology are intended to identify forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements contain such words or expressions. These forward-looking statements generally relate to Ormat’s plans, objectives and expectations for future operations and are based upon its management’s current estimates and projections of future results or trends. Although we believe that our plans and objectives reflected in or suggested by these forward-looking statements are reasonable, we may not achieve these plans or objectives. Actual future results may differ materially from those projected as a result of certain risks and uncertainties and other risks described under “Risk Factors” as described in Ormat’s most recent annual report, and in subsequent filings.

    These forward-looking statements are made only as of the date hereof, and, except as legally required, we undertake no obligation to update or revise the forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    ORMAT TECHNOLOGIES, INC AND SUBSIDIARIES
    Condensed Consolidated Statement of Operations
    For the three and twelve month periods Ended December 31, 2024, and 2023

      Three Months Ended
    December 31,
    Year Ended 
    December 31,
      2024   2023   2024   2023  
      (Dollars in thousands, except per share data)
    Revenues:        
    Electricity 180,147   183,921   702,264   666,767  
    Product 39,643   50,432   139,661   133,763  
    Energy storage 10,951   6,987   37,729   28,894  
    Total revenues 230,741   241,340   879,654   829,424  
    Cost of revenues:        
    Electricity 117,340   111,201   459,526   422,549  
    Product 29,929   44,073   113,911   115,802  
    Energy storage 9,911   7,610   33,598   27,055  
    Total cost of revenues 157,180   162,884   607,035   565,406  
    Gross profit 73,561   78,456   272,619   264,018  
    Operating expenses:        
    Research and development expenses 1,391   2,452   6,501   7,215  
    Selling and marketing expenses 4,153   4,307   17,694   18,306  
    General and administrative expenses 19,583   18,654   80,119   68,179  
    Other operating income (3,125)     (9,375)    
    Impairment of long-lived assets     1,280    
    Write-off of unsuccessful exploration activities and storage activities 2,474   1,415   3,930   3,733  
    Operating income 49,085   51,628   172,470   166,585  
    Other income (expense):        
    Interest income 1,389   2,363   7,883   11,983  
    Interest expense, net (34,525)   (25,803)   (134,031)   (98,881)  
    Derivatives and foreign currency transaction gains (losses) (4,319)   712   (4,187)   (3,278)  
    Income attributable to sale of tax benefits 20,020   18,676   73,054   61,157  
    Other non-operating income (expense), net 66   1,272   188   1,519  
    Income from operations before income tax and equity in earnings (losses) of investees 31,716   48,848   115,377   139,085  
    Income tax (provision) benefit 11,771   (8,188)   16,289   (5,983)  
    Equity in earnings (losses) of investees (862)   (1,827)   (425)   35  
    Net income 42,625   38,833   131,241   133,137  
    Net income attributable to noncontrolling interest (1,804)   (3,107)   (7,508)   (8,738)  
    Net income attributable to the Company’s stockholders 40,821   35,726   123,733   124,399  
    Earnings per share attributable to the Company’s stockholders:        
    Basic: 0.67   0.59   2.05   2.09  
    Diluted: 0.67   0.59   2.04   2.08  
    Weighted average number of shares used in computation of earnings per share attributable to the Company’s stockholders:        
    Basic 60,480   60,367   60,455   59,424  
    Diluted 60,770   60,505   60,790   59,762  
             

    ORMAT TECHNOLOGIES, INC AND SUBSIDIARIES
    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheet
    For the Periods Ended December 31, 2024, and 2023

      December 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
    ASSETS
    Current assets:      
    Cash and cash equivalents 94,395     195,808  
    Restricted cash and cash equivalents (primarily related to VIEs) 111,377     91,962  
    Receivables:      
    Trade less allowance for credit losses of $224 and $90, respectively (primarily related to VIEs) 164,050     208,704  
    Other 50,792     44,530  
    Inventories 38,092     45,037  
    Costs and estimated earnings in excess of billings on uncompleted contracts 29,243     18,367  
    Prepaid expenses and other 59,173     41,595  
    Total current assets 547,122     646,003  
    Investment in an unconsolidated company 144,585     125,439  
    Deposits and other 75,383     44,631  
    Deferred income taxes 153,936     152,570  
    Property, plant and equipment, net ($3,271,248 and $2,802,920 related to VIEs, respectively) 3,501,886     2,998,949  
    Construction-in-process ($251,442 and $376,602 related to VIEs, respectively) 755,589     814,967  
    Operating leases right of use ($13,989 and $9,326 related to VIEs, respectively) 32,114     24,057  
    Finance leases right of use (none related to VIEs) 2,841     3,510  
    Intangible assets, net 301,745     307,609  
    Goodwill 151,023     90,544  
    Total assets 5,666,224     5,208,279  
           
    LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
    Current liabilities:      
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses 234,334     214,518  
    Short term revolving credit lines with banks (full recourse)     20,000  
    Commercial paper (less deferred financing costs of $23 and $29, respectively) 99,977     99,971  
    Billings in excess of costs and estimated earnings on uncompleted contracts 23,091     18,669  
    Current portion of long-term debt:      
    Limited and non-recourse (primarily related to VIEs):
    (primarily related to VIEs and less deferred financing costs of $8,473 and $7,889, respectively)
    70,262     57,207  
    Full recourse 161,313     116,864  
    Financing Liability 4,093     5,141  
    Operating lease liabilities 3,633     3,329  
    Finance lease liabilities 1,375     1,313  
    Total current liabilities 598,078     537,012  
    Long-term debt, net of current portion:      
    Limited and non-recourse (primarily related to VIEs and less deferred financing costs of $8,849 and $7,889, respectively) 578,204     447,389  
    Full recourse (less deferred financing costs of $4,671 and $3,056, respectively) 822,828     698,187  
    Convertible senior notes (less deferred financing costs of $6,820 and $8,146, respectively) 469,617     423,104  
    LT Financing liability-Dixie 216,476     220,619  
    Operating lease liabilities 22,523     19,790  
    Finance lease liabilities 1,529     2,238  
    Liability associated with sale of tax benefits 152,292     184,612  
    Deferred income taxes 68,616     66,748  
    Liability for unrecognized tax benefits 6,272     8,673  
    Liabilities for severance pay 10,488     11,844  
    Asset retirement obligation 129,651     114,370  
    Other long-term liabilities 29,270     22,107  
    Total liabilities 3,105,844     2,756,693  
           
    Redeemable noncontrolling interest 9,448     10,599  
           
    Equity:      
    The Company’s stockholders’ equity:      
    Common stock, par value $0.001 per share; 200,000,000 shares authorized; 60,500,580 and 60,358,887 issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2024 and December 31, 2023, respectively 61     60  
    Additional paid-in capital 1,635,245     1,614,769  
    Treasury stock, at cost (258,667 shares held as of December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively) (17,964)     (17,964)  
    Retained earnings 814,518     719,894  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss (6,731)     (1,332)  
    Total stockholders’ equity attributable to Company’s stockholders 2,425,129     2,315,427  
    Noncontrolling interest 125,803     125,560  
    Total equity 2,550,932     2,440,987  
    Total liabilities, redeemable noncontrolling interest and equity 5,666,224     5,208,279  

    ORMAT TECHNOLOGIES, INC AND SUBSIDIARIES
    Reconciliation of EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA
    For the three and twelve month period ended December 31, 2024 and 2023

    We calculate EBITDA as net income before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and accretion. We calculate Adjusted EBITDA as net income before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and accretion, adjusted for (i) mark-to-market gains or losses from accounting for derivatives not designated as hedging instruments; (ii) stock-based compensation, (iii) merger and acquisition transaction costs; (iv) gain or loss from extinguishment of liabilities; (v) costs related to a settlement agreement; (vi) non-cash impairment charges; (vii) write-off of unsuccessful exploration activities; and (viii) other unusual or non-recurring items. We adjust for these factors as they may be non-cash, unusual in nature and/or are not factors used by management for evaluating operating performance. We believe that presentation of these measures will enhance an investor’s ability to evaluate our financial and operating performance. EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA are not measurements of financial performance or liquidity under accounting principles generally accepted in the United States, or U.S. GAAP, and should not be considered as an alternative to cash flow from operating activities or as a measure of liquidity or an alternative to net earnings as indicators of our operating performance or any other measures of performance derived in accordance with U.S. GAAP. Our Board of Directors and senior management use EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA to evaluate our financial performance. However, other companies in our industry may calculate EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA differently than we do.

    The following table reconciles net income to EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA for the three and twelve month periods ended December 31, 2024, and 2023:

      Three Months Ended
    December 31,
      Year Ended December 31,
      2024     2023     2024     2023  
      (Dollars in thousands)   (Dollars in thousands)
    Net income 42,625     38,833     131,241     133,137  
    Adjusted for:              
    Interest expense, net (including amortization of deferred financing costs) 33,136     23,440     126,148     86,898  
    Income tax provision (benefit) (11,771)     8,188     (16,289)     5,983  
    Adjustment to investment in unconsolidated companies: our Proportionate share in interest expense, tax and depreciation and amortization in Sarulla and Ijen 4,964     5,243     17,637     16,069  
    Depreciation, amortization and accretion 68,907     59,331     259,151     221,415  
    EBITDA 137,861     135,035     517,888     463,502  
    Mark-to-market on derivative instruments (14)     (2,490)     856     (2,206)  
    Stock-based compensation 5,310     4,243     20,197     15,478  
    Impairment of long-lived assets         1,280      
    Allowance for bad debts 13         355      
    Merger and acquisition transaction costs 570     816     1,949     1,234  
    Legal fees related to a settlement agreement with a third-party battery systems supplier (750)         4,000      
    Write-off of unsuccessful exploration and Storage activities 2,474     1,415     3,930     3,733  
    Adjusted EBITDA 145,464     139,019     550,455     481,741  

    ORMAT TECHNOLOGIES, INC AND SUBSIDIARIES
    Reconciliation of Adjusted Net Income attributable to the Company’s stockholders and Adjusted EPS
    For the Three and twelve-month periods ended December 31, 2024, and 2023

    Adjusted Net Income attributable to the Company’s stockholders and Adjusted EPS are adjusted for one-time expense items that are not representative of our ongoing business and operations. The use of Adjusted Net income attributable to the Company’s stockholders and Adjusted EPS is intended to enhance the usefulness of our financial information by providing measures to assess the overall performance of our ongoing business.

    The following tables reconciles Net income attributable to the Company’s stockholders and Adjusted EPS for the three and twelve -month periods ended December 31, 2024, and 2023.

                   
      Three Months Ended December 31,   Twelve Months Ended December 31,
      2024     2023   2024   2023  
                   
    GAAP Net income attributable to the Company’s stockholders 40.8     35.7   123.7   124.4  
    Impact of changes in the Kenya Finance Act 2023     2.0     (7.4)  
    Tax asset write-off in Sarulla, our unconsolidated company 0.9     1.0   0.9   1.0  
    Impairment of long-lived assets       1.0    
    Write-off of unsuccessful exploration activities and Storage activities 2.0     1.1   3.1   2.9  
    Merger and acquisition transaction costs 0.5     0.6   1.5   1.0  
    Allowance for bad debts 0.0       0.3    
    Legal fees related to a settlement agreement with a third-party battery supplier (0.6)       3.2    
    Adjusted Net income attributable to the Company’s stockholders 43.6     40.5   133.7   121.9  
    GAAP diluted EPS 0.67     0.59   2.04   2.08  
    Impact of changes in the Kenya Finance Act 2023     0.03     (0.12)  
    Tax asset write-off in Sarulla, our unconsolidated company 0.01     0.02   0.01   0.02  
    Impairment of long-lived assets         0.02    
    Write-off of unsuccessful exploration activities and Storage activities 0.03     0.02   0.05   0.05  
    Merger and acquisition transaction costs 0.01     0.01   0.03   0.02  
    Allowance for bad debts 0.00       0.00    
    Legal fees related to a settlement agreement with a third-party battery supplier (0.01)       0.05    
    Diluted Adjusted EPS ($) 0.72     0.67   2.20   2.05  
    Ormat Technologies Contact: Investor Relations Agency Contact:
    Smadar Lavi Joseph Caminiti or Josh Carroll
    VP Head of IR and ESG Planning & Reporting Alpha IR Group
    775-356-9029 (ext. 65726) 312-445-2870
    slavi@ormat.com ORA@alpha-ir.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: APA Corporation Announces Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2024 Financial and Operational Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    HOUSTON, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — APA Corporation (Nasdaq: APA) today announced fourth-quarter and full-year 2024 results. Results can be found on the company’s website by visiting www.apacorp.com or investor.apacorp.com.

    APA will host a conference call on Feb. 27 at 10 a.m. Central time via the webcast link available on the company website to discuss the results. Following the conference call, a replay will be available for one year on the “Investors” page of the company’s website.

    About APA

    APA Corporation owns consolidated subsidiaries that explore for and produce oil and natural gas in the United States, Egypt and the United Kingdom and that explore for oil and natural gas offshore Suriname and elsewhere. APA posts announcements, operational updates, investor information and press releases on its website, www.apacorp.com.

    Contacts

    Investor: (281) 302-2286
    Media: (713) 296-7276
    Website: www.apacorp.com
       

    APA-F

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: NTA and Enlight Sign a $22m Power Purchase Agreement

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NTA, a government-owned company building the light rail and metro in the Tel Aviv metropolitan region, will operate the mass transit network using clean energy supplied by Enlight

    The agreement significantly reduces NTA’s electricity costs

    TEL AVIV, Israel, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Enlight Renewable Energy (“Enlight”, “the Company”, NASDAQ: ENLT, TASE: ENLT.TA), a leading renewable energy platform, announced today that NTA Metropolitan Mass Transit System Ltd. (“NTA”) has signed a 5-year PPA with an aggregate value of $22m, and also includes an option to significantly increase purchase volumes through the life of the contract.

    The agreement was signed within the framework of Israel’s deregulated electricity market, which allows independent power producers to enter into direct sales agreements with consumers. The agreement follows others reached by Enlight in recent months, with NTA joining Big Shopping Centers, SodaStream, Applied Materials, Amdocs, and other noteworthy companies in purchasing green electricity from Enlight. Serving as examples of environmental responsibility, these firms’ decision to switch to clean energy consumption will positively impact Israel’s economy. In January 2025, the Weizmann Institute of Science, based in Rehovot, signed an agreement with Enlight to supply all of the Institute’s electricity needs for the next 12 years.

    The agreement with Enlight will help NTA, which is building the light rail and metro networks in the Tel Aviv metropolitan region, to reduce its electricity costs significantly. It will also reduce annual carbon emissions equivalent to the planting of approximately 380,000 new trees per year or removing about 9,000 private fuel-powered vehicles from the road annually.

    Itamar Ben Meir, CEO of NTA, commented, “We welcome this important agreement with Enlight. The mass transit system being built by NTA is good news for the congested Tel Aviv region, and is similar to advanced countries around the world in its use of renewable energy. Green power dramatically cuts air pollution as well as representing a significant cost savings. Each light rail train removes more than 100 private cars from the road, reducing traffic congestion and wasted time, while increasing comfort and safety.”

    Gilad Peled, CEO of Enlight MENA, commented, “Enlight congratulates NTA on its transition to clean and environmentally friendly energy. The deal with Enlight will allow NTA to save millions of Shekels of public funds on its electricity bill, while simultaneously serving as an environmental leader. The agreement drives Enlight MENA’s growth further after doubling our revenues in Israel last year to over $150m. This agreement further reinforces the fact that today, clean energy is also the cheapest form of energy. Moreover, clean energy’s rising share of the deregulated power market leads to greater competition and lower electricity prices for all Israeli consumers.”

    About NTA

    NTA is a government-owned company building metropolitan Tel Aviv’s mass transit network as part of the largest infrastructure project ever initiated in Israel. The network comprises three light rail lines, including the Red Line, which already transports millions of passengers every month, and the Green and Purple Lines, which are expected to begin commercial operation in the coming years. The light rail network will be joined by three metro lines that will connect into the Tel Aviv region from Rehovot in the south and Kfar Saba in the north. With an annual expected ridership of 850 million passengers and 2 million trips per day, the project’s total cost is estimated at approximately ILS 200bn.

    About Enlight Renewable Energy

    Founded in 2008, Enlight develops, finances, constructs, owns, and operates utility-scale renewable energy projects. Enlight operates across the three largest renewable segments today: solar, wind and energy storage. A global platform, Enlight operates in the United States, Israel and 10 European countries. Enlight has been traded on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange since 2010 (TASE: ENLT) and completed its U.S. IPO (Nasdaq: ENLT) in 2023. Learn more at www.enlightenergy.co.il.

    Contacts:

    Yonah Weisz
    Director IR
    investors@enlightenergy.co.il

    Erica Mannion or Mike Funari
    Sapphire Investor Relations, LLC
    +1 617 542 6180
    investors@enlightenergy.co.il

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. We intend such forward-looking statements to be covered by the safe harbor provisions for forward-looking statements as contained in Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. All statements contained in this press release other than statements of historical fact, including, without limitation, statements regarding the Company’s expectations relating to the Project, the PPA and the related interconnection agreement and lease option, and the completion timeline for the Project, are forward-looking statements. The words “may,” “might,” “will,” “could,” “would,” “should,” “expect,” “plan,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “target,” “seek,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential,” “continue,” “contemplate,” “possible,” “forecasts,” “aims” or the negative of these terms and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements, though not all forward-looking statements use these words or expressions. These statements are neither promises nor guarantees, but involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other important factors that may cause our actual results, performance or achievements to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements, including, but not limited to, the following: our ability to site suitable land for, and otherwise source, renewable energy projects and to successfully develop and convert them into Operational Projects; availability of, and access to, interconnection facilities and transmission systems; our ability to obtain and maintain governmental and other regulatory approvals and permits, including environmental approvals and permits; construction delays, operational delays and supply chain disruptions leading to increased cost of materials required for the construction of our projects, as well as cost overruns and delays related to disputes with contractors; our suppliers’ ability and willingness to perform both existing and future obligations; competition from traditional and renewable energy companies in developing renewable energy projects; potential slowed demand for renewable energy projects and our ability to enter into new offtake contracts on acceptable terms and prices as current offtake contracts expire; offtakers’ ability to terminate contracts or seek other remedies resulting from failure of our projects to meet development, operational or performance benchmarks; various technical and operational challenges leading to unplanned outages, reduced output, interconnection or termination issues; the dependence of our production and revenue on suitable meteorological and environmental conditions, and our ability to accurately predict such conditions; our ability to enforce warranties provided by our counterparties in the event that our projects do not perform as expected; government curtailment, energy price caps and other government actions that restrict or reduce the profitability of renewable energy production; electricity price volatility, unusual weather conditions (including the effects of climate change, could adversely affect wind and solar conditions), catastrophic weather-related or other damage to facilities, unscheduled generation outages, maintenance or repairs, unanticipated changes to availability due to higher demand, shortages, transportation problems or other developments, environmental incidents, or electric transmission system constraints and the possibility that we may not have adequate insurance to cover losses as a result of such hazards; our dependence on certain operational projects for a substantial portion of our cash flows; our ability to continue to grow our portfolio of projects through successful acquisitions; changes and advances in technology that impair or eliminate the competitive advantage of our projects or upsets the expectations underlying investments in our technologies; our ability to effectively anticipate and manage cost inflation, interest rate risk, currency exchange fluctuations and other macroeconomic conditions that impact our business; our ability to retain and attract key personnel; our ability to manage legal and regulatory compliance and litigation risk across our global corporate structure; our ability to protect our business from, and manage the impact of, cyber-attacks, disruptions and security incidents, as well as acts of terrorism or war; the potential impact of the current conflicts in Israel on our operations and financial condition and Company actions designed to mitigate such impact; changes to existing renewable energy industry policies and regulations that present technical, regulatory and economic barriers to renewable energy projects; the reduction, elimination or expiration of government incentives for, or regulations mandating the use of, renewable energy; our ability to effectively manage our supply chain and comply with applicable regulations with respect to international trade relations, tariffs, sanctions, export controls and anti-bribery and anti-corruption laws; our ability to effectively comply with Environmental Health and Safety and other laws and regulations and receive and maintain all necessary licenses, permits and authorizations; our performance of various obligations under the terms of our indebtedness (and the indebtedness of our subsidiaries that we guarantee) and our ability to continue to secure project financing on attractive terms for our projects; limitations on our management rights and operational flexibility due to our use of tax equity arrangements; potential claims and disagreements with partners, investors and other counterparties that could reduce our right to cash flows generated by our projects; our ability to comply with tax laws of various jurisdictions in which we currently operate as well as the tax laws in jurisdictions in which we intend to operate in the future; the unknown effect of the dual listing of our ordinary shares on the price of our ordinary shares; various risks related to our incorporation and location in Israel; the costs and requirements of being a public company, including the diversion of management’s attention with respect to such requirements; certain provisions in our Articles of Association and certain applicable regulations that may delay or prevent a change of control; and other risk factors set forth in the section titled “Risk factors” in our Annual Report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) and our other documents filed with or furnished to the SEC.

    These statements reflect management’s current expectations regarding future events and speak only as of the date of this press release. You should not put undue reliance on any forward-looking statements. Although we believe that the expectations reflected in the forward-looking statements are reasonable, we cannot guarantee that future results, levels of activity, performance and events and circumstances reflected in the forward-looking statements will be achieved or will occur. Except as may be required by applicable law, we undertake no obligation to update or revise publicly any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, after the date on which the statements are made or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Syria: UN scales up aid deliveries as regional fighting continues

    Source: United Nations 2

    By Vibhu Mishra

    Humanitarian Aid

    UN humanitarians on Wednesday reported a scaling up of humanitarian aid into northwest Syria, even as hostilities continue to impact civilians and limit access in different parts of the country.

    UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric told journalists at a regular news briefing in New York that aid trucks from Türkiye to Idlib via Bab Al-Hawa are continuing to get through with vital assistance to communities in need.

    “Yesterday, 43 trucks carrying more than 1,000 metric tonnes of food from the World Food Programme (WFP), as well as blankets, solar lamps and other items provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) crossed the border,” he said.

    Since the start of the year, nearly 400 trucks have crossed from Türkiye into Syria – five times the number recorded during the same period last year.

    Rehabilitation efforts underway

    Across Syria, humanitarian organizations are working to rebuild infrastructure and restore essential services.

    In northwest Syria, 350 homes have been rehabilitated since last month, while in Damascus and surrounding rural areas, more than 700 people have received support to repair their damaged homes.

    Over the past two weeks, three water stations in Latakia have been restored, providing much-needed access to clean water.

    “We and our partners continue to provide this assistance as security, logistical and funding conditions permit,” Mr. Dujarric added.

    Despite these efforts, “the toll of destruction remains overwhelming”, he added.

    In Aleppo, 34 facilities in former frontline areas have sustained severe damage or complete destruction, requiring urgent rehabilitation to restore healthcare, education, and other essential services.

    Hostilities continue

    While humanitarian assistance is reaching many communities, the fighting continues to take a toll on civilians and restrict aid access in various regions.

    “In eastern Aleppo – including in the vicinity of the Tishreen Dam and the Al-Khafsa water pumping station – and in the south of the country, hostilities have resulted in casualties, as well as restrictions in humanitarian access and movements of people,” Mr. Dujarric said.

    Returns top a million

    Meanwhile, more than one million displaced Syrians have returned home since the fall of the Assad regime in early December last year, according to a recent update from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

    The number includes approximately 292,150 Syrian refugees returning from neighbouring countries, including Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt as of 20 February. An additional 829,490 internally displaced persons (IDPs) have also returned to their places of origin.

    UNHCR continues to monitor voluntary returns, offering legal counselling, as well as support with transportation, particularly in Jordan.

    Inside Syria, the agency is delivering protection and humanitarian assistance to refugees moving home and IDPs, including early recovery interventions.

    “In view of the cold winter months and continued electricity shortages, distributions of core relief items and warm winter clothing, as well as urgent shelter repairs, such as new windows and doors, continued to be priority interventions,” UNHCR said.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI: ARKO Corp. Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    RICHMOND, Va., Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — ARKO Corp. (Nasdaq: ARKO) (“ARKO” or the “Company”), a Fortune 500 company and one of the largest convenience store operators in the United States, today announced financial results for the fourth quarter and the full year ended December 31, 2024.

    Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Key Highlights (vs. Year-Ago Period)1,2

    • Net loss for the quarter was $2.3 million compared to net income of $1.1 million.  For the year, net income was $20.8 million compared to $34.6 million.
    • Adjusted EBITDA for the quarter was $56.8 million compared to $61.8 million.  For the year, Adjusted EBITDA was $248.9 million compared to $276.3 million. 
    • Merchandise margin rate for the quarter increased to 33.0% compared to 32.9%.  For the year, merchandise margin rate increased to 32.8% compared to 31.8%.
    • Merchandise contribution for the quarter was $134.9 million compared to $146.8 million; more than half of the merchandise contribution decline for the quarter was associated with the Company’s accretive dealerization program.  For the year, merchandise contribution was $579.6 million compared to $585.1 million.
    • Retail fuel margin for the quarter was 38.7 cents per gallon compared to 39.2 cents per gallon, resulting from macroeconomically-driven lower fuel prices and reduced price volatility. For the year, retail fuel margin increased to 39.6 cents per gallon compared to 38.8 cents per gallon.
    • Retail fuel contribution for the quarter was $100.2 million compared to $109.3 million. For the year, retail fuel contribution was $428.2 million compared to $435.3 million.

    Other Key Highlights

    • As part of the Company’s developing transformation plan, the Company converted 153 retail stores to dealer sites during the year ended December 31, 2024, including approximately 100 stores converted in the fourth quarter of 2024. The Company expects to convert a meaningful number of additional stores throughout 2025, including another approximately 100 retail stores by the end of the first quarter of 2025. The stores converted to dealer locations in 2024 are expected to produce an annualized benefit to combined wholesale segment and retail segment operating income of approximately $8.5 million. The Company now expects that, at scale, its channel optimization will yield a cumulative annualized benefit of operating income in excess of $20 million. This channel optimization is also expected to enable the Company to better focus and prioritize future investments in its remaining retail stores.
    • In 2024, the Company expanded its planned pipeline of NTI (new-to-industry) stores to eight, including two stores that opened in 2024 and an additional two stores opened in the first quarter of 2025. The Company expects to open the four remaining NTI locations over the course of 2025.
    • The Board declared a quarterly dividend of $0.03 per share of common stock to be paid on March 21, 2025 to stockholders of record as of March 10, 2025.

    1 See Use of Non-GAAP Measures below.
    2 All figures for fuel costs, fuel contribution and fuel margin per gallon exclude the estimated fixed margin or fixed fee paid to the Company’s wholesale fuel distribution subsidiary, GPM Petroleum LP (“GPMP”) for the cost of fuel (intercompany charges by GPMP).

    “We navigated a challenging macroeconomic environment in 2024, while advancing the development of our multi-year transformation plan,” said Arie Kotler, Chairman, President, and CEO of ARKO. “We made progress with our dealerization program by strategically refining our retail footprint, strengthening merchandising initiatives, and enhancing customer engagement through value-driven promotions for in-store merchandise and, more recently, a more aggressive value offer at the pump. Our focus on operational efficiencies and the dealerization program allowed us to manage through industry-wide headwinds while making strategic investments in high-growth areas, such as food service and other tobacco products to meet evolving customer preferences.”

    Mr. Kotler continued: “Looking ahead to 2025, we remain committed to driving sustainable long-term growth and value creation for our stakeholders. We plan to strengthen our competitiveness by continuing to invest in higher-growth categories, delivering further value to our customers and further optimizing our store portfolio. We are acutely focused on delivering innovative, value-driven solutions that enhance the customer experience while maximizing profitability and expanding revenue opportunities.”

    Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Segment Highlights

    Retail

      For the Three Months
    Ended December 31,
        For the Year
    Ended December 31,
     
      2024     2023     2024     2023  
      (in thousands)  
    Fuel gallons sold   258,856       279,035       1,080,990       1,122,321  
    Same store fuel gallons sold decrease (%) 1   (4.4 %)     (7.5 %)     (6.1 %)     (5.3 %)
    Fuel contribution 2 $ 100,212     $ 109,336     $ 428,216     $ 435,322  
    Fuel margin, cents per gallon 3   38.7       39.2       39.6       38.8  
    Same store fuel contribution 1,2 $ 96,830     $ 104,262     $ 403,503     $ 422,090  
    Same store merchandise sales (decrease) increase (%) 1   (4.3 %)     (2.8 %)     (5.4 %)     0.4 %
    Same store merchandise sales excluding cigarettes (decrease) increase (%) 1   (2.1 %)     (1.8 %)     (3.8 %)     2.5 %
    Merchandise revenue $ 408,826     $ 446,727     $ 1,767,345     $ 1,838,001  
    Merchandise contribution 4 $ 134,873     $ 146,773     $ 579,569     $ 585,122  
    Merchandise margin 5   33.0 %     32.9 %     32.8 %     31.8 %
    Same store merchandise contribution 1,4 $ 129,376     $ 135,532     $ 543,368     $ 560,321  
    Same store site operating expenses 1 $ 179,302     $ 181,527     $ 736,727     $ 737,158  
                           
    Same store is a common metric used in the convenience store industry. The Company considers a store a same store beginning in the first quarter in which the store had a full quarter of activity in the prior year. Refer to Use of Non-GAAP Measures below for discussion of this measure.  
    Calculated as fuel revenue less fuel costs; excludes the estimated fixed margin or fixed fee paid to GPMP for the cost of fuel.  
    Calculated as fuel contribution divided by fuel gallons sold.  
    Calculated as merchandise revenue less merchandise costs.  
    Calculated as merchandise contribution divided by merchandise revenue.  
       

    Merchandise contribution for the fourth quarter of 2024 decreased $11.9 million, or 8.1%, compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, while merchandise margin increased to 33.0% in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to 32.9% in 2023. The decrease in merchandise contribution was due to a decrease in same store merchandise contribution of $6.2 million and a decrease of $7.7 million related to underperforming retail stores that were closed or converted to dealers, partially offset by an increase in merchandise contribution of $2.0 million from the SpeedyQ acquisition that closed in April 2024.  Merchandise contribution at same stores decreased in the fourth quarter of 2024 primarily due to lower contribution from several core destination categories and cigarettes, partially offset by higher contribution from other tobacco products.

    For the year ended December 31, 2024, merchandise contribution decreased $5.6 million, or 0.9%, compared to the year ended December 31, 2023, while merchandise margin increased to 32.8% in 2024 from 31.8% in 2023. The decrease in merchandise contribution was due to a decrease in same store merchandise contribution of $17.0 million and a decrease in merchandise contribution of $11.6 million related to underperforming retail stores that were closed or converted to dealers, partially offset by incremental merchandise contribution from recent acquisitions of $21.7 million.

    For the fourth quarter of 2024, retail fuel contribution decreased $9.1 million to $100.2 million compared to the prior year period, with a same store fuel contribution decrease of $7.4 million attributable to gallon demand declines reflecting the challenging macro-economic environment. Fuel margin of 38.7 cents per gallon was down 0.5 cents per gallon compared to the fourth quarter of 2023, resulting from lower fuel costs and reduced price volatility this year. In addition, a decrease in retail fuel contribution of $3.7 million was related to underperforming retail stores that were closed or converted to dealers, partially offset by incremental fuel contribution from the SpeedyQ acquisition of approximately $1.8 million. 

    For the year ended December 31, 2024, fuel contribution decreased $7.1 million, or 1.6%, compared to the year ended December 31, 2023, while fuel margin per gallon increased. Same store fuel margin per gallon for 2024 increased to 39.7 cents per gallon from 39.0 cents per gallon for 2023. Incremental fuel contribution from recent acquisitions of approximately $16.8 million was more than offset by a decrease in same store fuel contribution of $18.6 million. In addition, a decrease in fuel contribution of $6.1 million was related to underperforming retail stores that were closed or converted to dealers compared to 2023.

    Wholesale

      For the Three Months
    Ended December 31,
        For the Year
    Ended December 31,
     
      2024     2023     2024     2023  
      (in thousands)  
    Fuel gallons sold – fuel supply locations   201,317       199,861       794,796       801,260  
    Fuel gallons sold – consignment agent locations   38,563       40,144       154,560       168,005  
    Fuel contribution – fuel supply locations $ 12,004     $ 11,499     $ 47,930     $ 48,396  
    Fuel contribution – consignment agent locations $ 10,270     $ 10,101     $ 42,420     $ 44,512  
    Fuel margin, cents per gallon – fuel supply locations   6.0       5.8       6.0       6.0  
    Fuel margin, cents per gallon – consignment agent locations   26.6       25.2       27.4       26.5  
                           
    Calculated as fuel revenue less fuel costs; excludes the estimated fixed margin or fixed fee paid to GPMP for the cost of fuel.  
    Calculated as fuel contribution divided by fuel gallons sold.  
       

    Fuel contribution was approximately $22.3 million for the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to $21.6 million for the fourth quarter of 2023. Fuel contribution for the fourth quarter of 2024 at fuel supply locations increased by $0.5 million, and fuel contribution at consignment agent locations increased by $0.2 million, as compared to the prior year period, with fuel margin increases of 0.2 cents per gallon and 1.4 cents per gallon, respectively. For the fourth quarter of 2024, other revenues, net, increased by approximately $1.8 million, while site operating expenses increased by $0.6 million compared to the prior year period, resulting from the retail stores that were converted to dealers.

    For the year ended December 31, 2024, wholesale operating income increased $0.8 million, compared to 2023. An increase of approximately $3.4 million in other revenues, net, was partially offset by a decrease in fuel contribution of approximately $2.6 million in 2024 compared to 2023. At fuel supply locations, fuel contribution decreased by $0.5 million, and fuel margin per gallon remained consistent with 2023, primarily due to decreased prompt pay discounts related to lower fuel costs and lower volumes at comparable wholesale sites, which was partially offset by incremental contribution from recent acquisitions and the retail stores converted to dealers. At consignment agent locations, fuel contribution decreased $2.1 million while fuel margin per gallon increased for 2024 compared to 2023, primarily due to incremental contribution from recent acquisitions and the retail stores converted to dealers, which was offset by lower rack-to-retail margins and decreased prompt pay discounts related to lower fuel costs.

    Fleet Fueling

      For the Three Months
    Ended December 31,
        For the Year
    Ended December 31,
     
      2024     2023     2024     2023  
      (in thousands)  
    Fuel gallons sold – proprietary cardlock locations   32,888       33,285       136,104       130,995  
    Fuel gallons sold – third-party cardlock locations   3,239       3,201       12,814       9,832  
    Fuel contribution – proprietary cardlock locations $ 15,823     $ 13,146     $ 62,612     $ 54,685  
    Fuel contribution – third-party cardlock locations $ 509     $ 245     $ 1,677     $ 1,215  
    Fuel margin, cents per gallon – proprietary cardlock locations   48.1       39.5       46.0       41.7  
    Fuel margin, cents per gallon – third-party cardlock locations   15.8       7.6       13.1       12.4  
                           
    Calculated as fuel revenue less fuel costs; excludes the estimated fixed fee paid to GPMP for the cost of fuel.  
    Calculated as fuel contribution divided by fuel gallons sold.  
       

    For the fourth quarter of 2024, fuel contribution increased by $2.9 million compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. At proprietary cardlocks, fuel contribution increased by $2.7 million, and fuel margin per gallon also increased for the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. At third-party cardlock locations, fuel contribution increased by $0.3 million, and fuel margin per gallon also increased for the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.

    For the year ended December 31, 2024, fuel contribution increased by $8.4 million compared to the year ended December 31, 2023. At proprietary cardlocks, fuel contribution increased by $7.9 million, and fuel margin per gallon also increased for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to the year ended December 31, 2023. At third-party cardlock locations, fuel contribution increased $0.5 million, and fuel margin per gallon also increased for 2024 compared to 2023. These changes were primarily due to higher volumes and the cardlocks acquired in the Company’s acquisition of certain sites from WTG Fuels Holdings, LLC in 2023.

    Site Operating Expenses

    For the quarter ended December 31, 2024, convenience store operating expenses decreased $13.0 million, or 6.5%, compared to the prior year period primarily due to a decrease of $14.3 million from underperforming retail stores that were closed or converted to dealers and a decrease in same store operating expenses of $2.2 million, or 1.2%. The decrease in convenience store operating expenses was partially offset by incremental expenses related to the SpeedyQ acquisition that closed in April 2024.

    For the year ended December 31, 2024, convenience store operating expenses increased $11.2 million, or 1.4%, as compared to the year ended December 31, 2023, primarily due to $33.1 million of incremental expenses related to recent acquisitions. The increase in site operating expenses was partially offset by a decrease in same store operating expenses of $0.4 million, and $22.1 million of reduced expenses for underperforming retail stores that were closed or converted to dealers.

    Liquidity and Capital Expenditures

    As of December 31, 2024, the Company’s total liquidity was approximately $841 million, consisting of approximately $262 million of cash and cash equivalents and approximately $579 million of availability under lines of credit. Outstanding debt was $881 million, resulting in net debt, excluding lease related financing liabilities, of approximately $619 million. Capital expenditures were $36.1 million, and $113.9 million for the quarter and year ended December 31, 2024, respectively. 

    Quarterly Dividend and Share Repurchase Program

    The Company’s ability to return cash to its stockholders through its cash dividend program and share repurchase program is consistent with its capital allocation framework and reflects the Company’s confidence in the strength of its cash generation ability and strong financial position.

    The Board declared a quarterly dividend of $0.03 per share of common stock to be paid on March 21, 2025 to stockholders of record as of March 10, 2025.

    There was approximately $25.7 million remaining under the share repurchase program as of December 31, 2024. 

    Company-Operated Retail Store Count and Segment Update

    The following tables present certain information regarding changes in the retail, wholesale and fleet fueling segments for the periods presented:

      For the Three Months
    Ended December 31,
        For the Year
    Ended December 31,
     
    Retail Segment 2024     2023     2024     2023  
    Number of sites at beginning of period   1,491       1,552       1,543       1,404  
    Acquired sites               21       166  
    Newly opened or reopened sites   1             3       4  
    Company-controlled sites converted to                      
    consignment or fuel supply locations, net   (102 )     (3 )     (153 )     (16 )
    Sites closed, divested or converted to rentals   (1 )     (6 )     (25 )     (15 )
    Number of sites at end of period   1,389       1,543       1,389       1,543  
                                   
      For the Three Months
    Ended December 31,
        For the Year
    Ended December 31,
     
    Wholesale Segment 1 2024     2023     2024     2023  
    Number of sites at beginning of period   1,832       1,825       1,825       1,674  
    Acquired sites                     190  
    Newly opened or reopened sites 2   9       25       39       83  
    Consignment or fuel supply locations converted                      
    from Company-controlled or fleet fueling sites, net   102       2       153       15  
    Closed or divested sites   (21 )     (27 )     (95 )     (137 )
    Number of sites at end of period   1,922       1,825       1,922       1,825  
                           
    Excludes bulk and spot purchasers.  
    Includes all signed fuel supply agreements irrespective of fuel distribution commencement date.  
       
      For the Three Months
    Ended December 31,
        For the Year
    Ended December 31,
     
    Fleet Fueling Segment 2024     2023     2024     2023  
    Number of sites at beginning of period   281       295       298       183  
    Acquired sites                     111  
    Newly opened or reopened sites         2       1       6  
    Fleet fueling locations converted                      
    from fuel supply locations, net         1             1  
    Closed or divested sites   (1 )           (19 )     (3 )
    Number of sites at end of period   280       298       280       298  
                                   

    First Quarter and Full Year 2025 Guidance

    The Company currently expects first quarter 2025 Adjusted EBITDA to range between $27 million and $33 million, with an assumed range of average retail fuel margin from 37.0 to 39.0 cents per gallon. The Company currently expects full year 2025 Adjusted EBITDA to range between $233 million and $253 million, with an assumed range of average retail fuel margin from 39.5 to 41.5 cents per gallon.   

    The Company is not providing guidance on net income at this time due to the volatility of certain required inputs that are not available without unreasonable efforts, including future fair value adjustments associated with its stock price, as well as depreciation and amortization related to its capital allocation as part of its focus on accelerating organic growth.

    Conference Call and Webcast Details

    The Company will host a conference call today, February 26, 2025, to discuss these results at 5:00 p.m. Eastern Time. Investors and analysts interested in participating in the live call can dial 877-605-1792 or 201-689-8728.

    A simultaneous, live webcast will also be available on the Investor Relations section of the Company’s website at https://www.arkocorp.com/news-events/ir-calendar. The webcast will be archived for 30 days.

    About ARKO Corp.

    ARKO Corp. (Nasdaq: ARKO) is a Fortune 500 company that owns 100% of GPM Investments, LLC and is one of the largest operators of convenience stores and wholesalers of fuel in the United States. Based in Richmond, VA, our highly recognizable Family of Community Brands offers delicious, prepared foods, beer, snacks, candy, hot and cold beverages, and multiple popular quick serve restaurant brands. We operate in four reportable segments: retail, which includes convenience stores selling merchandise and fuel products to retail customers; wholesale, which supplies fuel to independent dealers and consignment agents; fleet fueling, which includes the operation of proprietary and third-party cardlock locations, and issuance of proprietary fuel cards that provide customers access to a nationwide network of fueling sites; and GPM Petroleum, which sells and supplies fuel to our retail and wholesale sites and charges a fixed fee, primarily to our fleet fueling sites. To learn more about GPM stores, visit: www.gpminvestments.com. To learn more about ARKO, visit: www.arkocorp.com.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This document includes certain “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forward-looking statements may address, among other things, the Company’s expected financial and operational results and the related assumptions underlying its expected results. These forward-looking statements are distinguished by use of words such as “accretive,” “anticipate,” “aim,” “believe,” “continue,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “guidance,” “intends,” “may,” “might,” “plan,” “possible,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “should,” “will,” “would” and the negative of these terms, and similar references to future periods. These statements are based on management’s current expectations and are subject to uncertainty and changes in circumstances. Actual results may differ materially from these expectations due to, among other things, changes in economic, business and market conditions; the Company’s ability to maintain the listing of its common stock and warrants on the Nasdaq Stock Market; changes in its strategy, future operations, financial position, estimated revenues and losses, projected costs, prospects and plans; expansion plans and opportunities; changes in the markets in which it competes; changes in applicable laws or regulations, including those relating to environmental matters; market conditions and global and economic factors beyond its control; and the outcome of any known or unknown litigation and regulatory proceedings. Detailed information about these factors and additional important factors can be found in the documents that the Company files with the Securities and Exchange Commission, such as Form 10-K, Form 10-Q and Form 8-K. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date the statements were made. The Company does not undertake an obligation to update forward-looking information, except to the extent required by applicable law.

    Use of Non-GAAP Measures

    The Company discloses certain measures on a “same store basis,” which is a non-GAAP measure. Information disclosed on a “same store basis” excludes the results of any store that is not a “same store” for the applicable period. A store is considered a same store beginning in the first quarter in which the store had a full quarter of activity in the prior year. The Company believes that this information provides greater comparability regarding its ongoing operating performance. Neither this measure nor those described below should be considered an alternative to measurements presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in the United States (“GAAP”).

    The Company defines EBITDA as net income before net interest expense, income taxes, depreciation and amortization. Adjusted EBITDA further adjusts EBITDA by excluding the gain or loss on disposal of assets, impairment charges, acquisition and divestiture costs, share-based compensation expense, other non-cash items, and other unusual or non-recurring charges. Both EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA are non-GAAP financial measures.

    The Company uses EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA for operational and financial decision-making and believe these measures are useful in evaluating its performance because they eliminate certain items that it does not consider indicators of its operating performance. EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA are also used by many of its investors, securities analysts, and other interested parties in evaluating its operational and financial performance across reporting periods. The Company believes that the presentation of EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA provides useful information to investors by allowing an understanding of key measures that it uses internally for operational decision-making, budgeting, evaluating acquisition targets, and assessing its operating performance.

    EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA are not recognized terms under GAAP and should not be considered as a substitute for net income or any other financial measure presented in accordance with GAAP. These measures have limitations as analytical tools and should not be considered in isolation or as substitutes for analysis of its results as reported under GAAP. The Company strongly encourages investors to review its financial statements and publicly filed reports in their entirety and not to rely on any single financial measure.

    Because non-GAAP financial measures are not standardized, same store measures, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA, as defined by the Company, may not be comparable to similarly titled measures reported by other companies. It therefore may not be possible to compare the Company’s use of these non-GAAP financial measures with those used by other companies.

    Company Contact
    Jordan Mann
    ARKO Corp.
    investors@gpminvestments.com

    Investor Contact
    Sean Mansouri, CFA
    Elevate IR
    (720) 330-2829
    ARKO@elevate-ir.com

      Consolidated Statements of Operations  
      For the Three Months
    Ended December 31,
        For the Year Ended
    December 31,
     
      2024     2023     2024     2023  
      (in thousands)  
    Revenues:                      
    Fuel revenue $ 1,556,185     $ 1,759,216     $ 6,858,919     $ 7,464,372  
    Merchandise revenue   408,826       446,727       1,767,345       1,838,001  
    Other revenues, net   27,098       27,217       105,698       110,358  
    Total revenues   1,992,109       2,233,160       8,731,962       9,412,731  
    Operating expenses:                      
    Fuel costs   1,416,234       1,613,230       6,271,696       6,876,084  
    Merchandise costs   273,953       299,954       1,187,776       1,252,879  
    Site operating expenses   209,906       222,751       875,272       860,134  
    General and administrative expenses   39,690       38,102       162,920       165,294  
    Depreciation and amortization   33,989       32,648       132,414       127,597  
    Total operating expenses   1,973,772       2,206,685       8,630,078       9,281,988  
    Other expenses, net   3,962       1,168       7,858       12,729  
    Operating income   14,375       25,307       94,026       118,014  
    Interest and other financial income   4,229       2,197       30,591       20,273  
    Interest and other financial expenses   (23,942 )     (25,099 )     (97,752 )     (91,516 )
    (Loss) income before income taxes   (5,338 )     2,405       26,865       46,771  
    Income tax benefit (expense)   2,995       (1,317 )     (6,144 )     (12,166 )
    Income (loss) from equity investment   45       38       124       (39 )
    Net (loss) income $ (2,298 )   $ 1,126     $ 20,845     $ 34,566  
    Less: Net income attributable to non-controlling interests         48             197  
    Net (loss) income attributable to ARKO Corp. $ (2,298 )   $ 1,078     $ 20,845     $ 34,369  
    Series A redeemable preferred stock dividends   (1,445 )     (1,449 )     (5,750 )     (5,750 )
    Net (loss) income attributable to common shareholders $ (3,743 )   $ (371 )   $ 15,095     $ 28,619  
    Net (loss) income per share attributable to common shareholders – basic $ (0.03 )   $ (0.00 )   $ 0.13     $ 0.24  
    Net (loss) income per share attributable to common shareholders – diluted $ (0.03 )   $ (0.00 )   $ 0.13     $ 0.24  
    Weighted average shares outstanding:                      
    Basic   115,771       116,638       116,139       118,782  
    Diluted   115,771       116,638       116,949       119,605  
                                   
      Consolidated Balance Sheets  
      December 31, 2024     December 31, 2023  
      (in thousands)  
    Assets          
    Current assets:          
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 261,758     $ 218,120  
    Restricted cash   30,650       23,301  
    Short-term investments   5,330       3,892  
    Trade receivables, net   95,832       134,735  
    Inventory   231,225       250,593  
    Other current assets   97,413       118,472  
    Total current assets   722,208       749,113  
    Non-current assets:          
    Property and equipment, net   747,548       742,610  
    Right-of-use assets under operating leases   1,386,244       1,384,693  
    Right-of-use assets under financing leases, net   157,999       162,668  
    Goodwill   299,973       292,173  
    Intangible assets, net   182,355       214,552  
    Equity investment   3,009       2,885  
    Deferred tax asset   67,689       52,293  
    Other non-current assets   53,633       49,377  
    Total assets $ 3,620,658     $ 3,650,364  
    Liabilities          
    Current liabilities:          
    Long-term debt, current portion $ 12,944     $ 16,792  
    Accounts payable   190,212       213,657  
    Other current liabilities   159,239       179,536  
    Operating leases, current portion   71,580       67,053  
    Financing leases, current portion   11,515       9,186  
    Total current liabilities   445,490       486,224  
    Non-current liabilities:          
    Long-term debt, net   868,055       828,647  
    Asset retirement obligation   87,375       84,710  
    Operating leases   1,408,293       1,395,032  
    Financing leases   211,051       213,032  
    Other non-current liabilities   223,528       266,602  
    Total liabilities   3,243,792       3,274,247  
                   
    Series A redeemable preferred stock   100,000       100,000  
               
    Shareholders’ equity:          
    Common stock   12       12  
    Treasury stock   (106,123 )     (74,134 )
    Additional paid-in capital   276,681       245,007  
    Accumulated other comprehensive income   9,119       9,119  
    Retained earnings   97,177       96,097  
    Total shareholders’ equity   276,866       276,101  
    Non-controlling interest         16  
    Total equity   276,866       276,117  
    Total liabilities, redeemable preferred stock and equity $ 3,620,658     $ 3,650,364  
                   
      Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows  
      For the Three Months
    Ended December 31,
        For the Year
    Ended December 31,
     
      2024     2023     2024     2023  
      (in thousands)  
    Cash flows from operating activities:                      
    Net (loss) income $ (2,298 )   $ 1,126     $ 20,845     $ 34,566  
    Adjustments to reconcile net (loss) income to net cash provided by operating activities:                      
    Depreciation and amortization   33,989       32,648       132,414       127,597  
    Deferred income taxes   (9,136 )     (652 )     (12,796 )     (4,680 )
    Loss on disposal of assets and impairment charges   1,661       660       6,798       6,203  
    Foreign currency (gain) loss   (6 )     (101 )     35       29  
    Gain from issuance of shares as payment of deferred consideration related to business acquisition               (2,681 )      
    Gain from settlement related to business acquisition               (6,356 )      
    Amortization of deferred financing costs and debt discount   669       661       2,669       2,518  
    Amortization of deferred income   (4,351 )     (1,840 )     (14,477 )     (8,142 )
    Accretion of asset retirement obligation   661       709       2,532       2,399  
    Non-cash rent   3,530       3,750       14,335       14,168  
    Charges to allowance for credit losses   112       244       845       1,265  
    (Income) loss from equity investment   (45 )     (38 )     (124 )     39  
    Share-based compensation   4,077       1,777       12,339       15,015  
    Fair value adjustment of financial assets and liabilities   (222 )     842       (10,985 )     (10,785 )
    Other operating activities, net   (627 )     352       125       2,631  
    Changes in assets and liabilities:                      
    Decrease (increase) in trade receivables   21,946       44,550       38,058       (17,937 )
    Decrease (increase) in inventory   5,262       15,373       22,689       (2,013 )
    (Increase) decrease in other assets   (16 )     (957 )     13,893       (29,386 )
    Decrease in accounts payable   (18,032 )     (35,836 )     (24,169 )     (6,169 )
    (Decrease) increase in other current liabilities   (20,664 )     (8,002 )     (2,820 )     990  
    Decrease in asset retirement obligation   (634 )     (69 )     (917 )     (23 )
    Increase in non-current liabilities   6,852       2,090       29,606       7,809  
    Net cash provided by operating activities   22,728       57,287       221,858       136,094  
    Cash flows from investing activities:                      
    Purchase of property and equipment   (36,133 )     (35,561 )     (113,914 )     (111,164 )
    Purchase of intangible assets                     (45 )
    Proceeds from sale of property and equipment   2,196       3,134       53,549       310,240  
    Business and asset acquisitions, net of cash         33       (54,549 )     (494,871 )
    Prepayment for acquisitions         (1,000 )           (1,000 )
    Loans to equity investment, net   14       18       56       18  
    Net cash used in investing activities   (33,923 )     (33,376 )     (114,858 )     (296,822 )
    Cash flows from financing activities:                      
    Receipt of long-term debt, net         20,810       47,556       99,643  
    Repayment of debt   (5,794 )     (5,640 )     (26,357 )     (22,157 )
    Principal payments on financing leases   (1,360 )     (1,260 )     (4,940 )     (5,497 )
    Early settlement of deferred consideration related to business acquisition               (17,155 )      
    Proceeds from sale-leaseback                     80,397  
    Payment of Additional Consideration   (3,354 )     (3,505 )     (3,354 )     (3,505 )
    Payment of Ares Put Option                     (9,808 )
    Common stock repurchased         (8,495 )     (31,989 )     (33,694 )
    Dividends paid on common stock   (3,473 )     (3,497 )     (14,015 )     (14,272 )
    Dividends paid on redeemable preferred stock   (1,445 )     (1,449 )     (5,750 )     (5,750 )
    Net cash (used in) provided by financing activities   (15,426 )     (3,036 )     (56,004 )     85,357  
    Net (decrease) increase in cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash   (26,621 )     20,875       50,996       (75,371 )
    Effect of exchange rate on cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash   18       106       (9 )     23  
    Cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash, beginning of period   319,011       220,440       241,421       316,769  
    Cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash, end of period $ 292,408     $ 241,421     $ 292,408     $ 241,421  
                                   

    Supplemental Disclosure of Non-GAAP Financial Information

      Reconciliation of EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA  
      For the Three Months
    Ended December 31,
        For the Year
    Ended December 31,
     
      2024     2023     2024     2023  
      (in thousands)  
    Net (loss) income $ (2,298 )   $ 1,126     $ 20,845     $ 34,566  
    Interest and other financing expenses, net   19,713       22,902       67,161       71,243  
    Income tax (benefit) expense   (2,995 )     1,317       6,144       12,166  
    Depreciation and amortization   33,989       32,648       132,414       127,597  
    EBITDA   48,409       57,993       226,564       245,572  
    Acquisition and divestiture costs (a)   1,249       1,099       5,168       9,079  
    Loss on disposal of assets and impairment charges (b)   1,661       660       6,798       6,203  
    Share-based compensation expense (c)   4,077       1,777       12,339       15,015  
    (Income) loss from equity investment (d)   (45 )     (38 )     (124 )     39  
    Fuel and franchise taxes received in arrears (e)               (1,427 )      
    Adjustment to contingent consideration (f)   978       68       (20 )     (604 )
    Other (g)   519       230       (438 )     956  
    Adjusted EBITDA $ 56,848     $ 61,789     $ 248,860     $ 276,260  
                           
    Additional information                      
    Non-cash rent expense (h)   3,530       3,750       14,335       14,168  
                           
    (a) Eliminates costs incurred that are directly attributable to business acquisitions and divestitures (including conversion of retail stores to dealer sites) and salaries of employees whose primary job function is to execute the Company’s acquisition and divestiture strategy and facilitate integration of acquired operations. 
                           
    (b) Eliminates the non-cash loss from the sale or disposal of property and equipment, the loss recognized upon the sale of related leased assets, and impairment charges on property and equipment and right-of-use assets related to closed and non-performing sites. 
                           
    (c) Eliminates non-cash share-based compensation expense related to the equity incentive program in place to incentivize, retain, and motivate employees, certain non-employees and members of the Board. 
                           
    (d) Eliminates the Company’s share of (income) loss attributable to its unconsolidated equity investment. 
                           
    (e) Eliminates the receipt of historical fuel and franchise tax amounts for multiple prior periods. 
                           
    (f) Eliminates fair value adjustments to the contingent consideration owed to the seller for the 2020 Empire acquisition. 
                           
    (g) Eliminates other unusual or non-recurring items that the Company does not consider to be meaningful in assessing operating performance. 
                           
    (h) Non-cash rent expense reflects the extent to which GAAP rent expense recognized exceeded (or was less than) cash rent payments. GAAP rent expense varies depending on the terms of the Company’s lease portfolio. For newer leases, rent expense recognized typically exceeds cash rent payments, whereas, for more mature leases, rent expense recognized is typically less than cash rent payments. 
     

    Supplemental Disclosures of Segment Information

    Retail Segment

      For the Three Months
    Ended December 31,
        For the Year
    Ended December 31,
     
      2024     2023     2024     2023  
      (in thousands)  
    Revenues:                      
    Fuel revenue $ 779,352     $ 913,534     $ 3,509,935     $ 3,858,777  
    Merchandise revenue   408,826       446,727       1,767,345       1,838,001  
    Other revenues, net   15,768       17,104       65,264       74,406  
    Total revenues   1,203,946       1,377,365       5,342,544       5,771,184  
    Operating expenses:                      
    Fuel costs 1   679,140       804,198       3,081,719       3,423,455  
    Merchandise costs   273,953       299,954       1,187,776       1,252,879  
    Site operating expenses   187,981       200,952       790,645       779,448  
    Total operating expenses   1,141,074       1,305,104       5,060,140       5,455,782  
    Operating income $ 62,872     $ 72,261     $ 282,404     $ 315,402  
                           
    Excludes the estimated fixed margin or fixed fee paid to GPMP for the cost of fuel.  
       

    The table below shows financial information and certain key metrics of the SpeedyQ acquisition in the Retail Segment for which there is no comparable information for any of the prior periods.

      For the Three Months
    Ended December 31, 2024
        For the Year
    Ended December 31, 2024
     
      SpeedyQ 1  
      (in thousands)  
    Date of Acquisition: April 9, 2024  
    Revenues:          
    Fuel revenue $ 11,359     $ 38,937  
    Merchandise revenue   6,469       20,719  
    Other revenues, net   311       809  
    Total revenues   18,139       60,465  
    Operating expenses:          
    Fuel costs 2   9,580       33,455  
    Merchandise costs   4,473       14,709  
    Site operating expenses   3,373       9,760  
    Total operating expenses   17,426       57,924  
    Operating income $ 713     $ 2,541  
    Fuel gallons sold   3,768       11,865  
    Fuel contribution 3 $ 1,779     $ 5,482  
    Merchandise contribution 4 $ 1,996     $ 6,010  
    Merchandise margin 5   30.9 %     29.0 %
               
    Acquisition of seven Speedy’s retail stores.  
    Excludes the estimated fixed margin paid to GPMP for the cost of fuel.  
    Calculated as fuel revenue less fuel costs.  
    Calculated as merchandise revenue less merchandise costs.  
    Calculated as merchandise contribution divided by merchandise revenue.  
       

    Wholesale Segment

      For the Three Months
    Ended December 31,
        For the Year
    Ended December 31,
     
      2024     2023     2024     2023  
      (in thousands)  
    Revenues:                      
    Fuel revenue $ 652,016     $ 700,026     $ 2,799,869     $ 3,039,904  
    Other revenues, net   8,681       6,909       29,140       25,775  
    Total revenues   660,697       706,935       2,829,009       3,065,679  
    Operating expenses:                      
    Fuel costs 1   629,742       678,426       2,709,519       2,946,996  
    Site operating expenses   10,997       10,400       39,679       39,703  
    Total operating expenses   640,739       688,826       2,749,198       2,986,699  
    Operating income $ 19,958     $ 18,109     $ 79,811     $ 78,980  
                           
    Excludes the estimated fixed margin or fixed fee paid to GPMP for the cost of fuel.  
       

    Fleet Fueling Segment

      For the Three Months
    Ended December 31,
        For the Year
    Ended December 31,
     
      2024     2023     2024     2023  
      (in thousands)  
    Revenues:                      
    Fuel revenue $ 117,196     $ 136,801     $ 515,462     $ 530,937  
    Other revenues, net   2,131       2,616       9,135       7,818  
    Total revenues   119,327       139,417       524,597       538,755  
    Operating expenses:                      
    Fuel costs 1   100,864       123,410       451,173       475,037  
    Site operating expenses   6,056       6,259       24,917       22,298  
    Total operating expenses   106,920       129,669       476,090       497,335  
    Operating income $ 12,407     $ 9,748     $ 48,507     $ 41,420  
                           
    Excludes the estimated fixed fee paid to GPMP for the cost of fuel.  

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Human Rights Council: Gaza ceasefire must hold, Türk insists

    Source: United Nations 4

    Human Rights

    UN human rights chief Volker Türk issued a strong appeal on Wednesday for the fragile ceasefire in Gaza to hold, amid delays to talks between Hamas and Israel on extending the truce into the second phase.

    Addressing the Human Rights Council in Geneva on conditions inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Mr. Türk condemned the Hamas-led terror attacks on Israel that sparked the war in October 2023.

    The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also said there was no justification for Israel’s devastating military operations in Gaza, which have left more than 48,000 Palestinians dead, according to local authorities.

    Search for a better future

    “At this tenuous moment the world must ask itself how to resolve this decades old conflict and stop the cycle of violence,” he said.

    Any plans for a better future must deal with the past, so accountability and justice for violations are crucial.”

    The High Commissioner added that each phase of the ceasefire must be implemented “in good faith, and in full. All of us must do everything in our power to build on it.”

    He said it must be for the Palestinians themselves to determine their own future.

    According to news reports, the delayed release by Israel of Palestinian prisoners is expected to go ahead imminently, in exchange for the return of the bodies of four hostages.

    ‘Unprecedented disregard’

    Summing up the “raft of human rights violations” inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory and lack of accountability, he said there had been “an unprecedented disregard” for basic principles of international humanitarian law by both sides since the outbreak of hostilities in October 2023.

    Mr. Türk maintained there were serious doubts over Israel’s capacity and will to deliver full accountability, notably in relation to unlawful killings in Gaza and the West Bank.

    With Hamas and other Palestinian militants who have taken and tortured hostages, fired indiscriminate projectiles into Israel – amounting to war crimes – there are concerns that they may also have committed serious breaches “including the intentional co-location of military objectives and Palestinian civilians.”

    “Any attempts at shaping a peaceful future where such horrors do not recur must ensure that perpetrators are held to account,” said the High Commissioner. 

    Impunity when given free rein, harms not only those directly impacted but generations down the line, he contended.

    In an apparent response to the outlawing of the UN Palestine refugee relief agency, UNRWA, by Israel and the sanctions against the International Criminal Court by the US earlier this month, the UN rights chief said that “delegitimising and threatening international institutions that are there to serve people and uphold international law also harms us all.”

    He also said any attempt to annex Palestinian land or “forced transfer” of civilians must be resisted.

    “This is the moment for voices of reason to prevail; for solutions that will deliver justice and make space for compassion, healing and truth telling,” said Mr. Türk.

    ‘Systemic’ repression in Nicaragua

    Investigators tasked by the UN Human Rights Council to track alleged grave abuses of power by top Nicaraguan officials insisted on Wednesday that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) should prosecute what they called the systematic and systemic repression of the country’s people.

    The Group of Experts on Nicaragua – who act in an independent capacity and are not UN staff – have previously reported that the Government’s violations appear to constitute crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment and torture – including rape.

    Their latest report will be presented later this week to the Council.

    The group maintains that President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Rosario Murillo, have created “an authoritarian State where no independent institutions remain, opposition voices are silenced and the population…faces persecution, forced exile, and economic retaliation”.

    Stifling dissent

    It was in response to grave concerns about the severe repression of civil rights in Nicaragua that the international community decided in 2018 to establish an investigative body to report back to the Council.

    “We call on States to hold Nicaragua accountable for its violations of the UN Convention on Torture and the UN Convention on Statelessness before the International Court of Justice…the international community cannot just bear witness. It needs to take concrete measures,” said Reed Brody, member of the Group of Experts.

    “No country in the world has used the arbitrary detention of nationality against political opponents at the same scale that Nicaragua has done; and this is a violation of its obligations under international law under the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,” Mr. Brody continued.

    ‘Machine of repression’

    According to the panel’s chair, Jan-Michael Simon, State machinery and the ruling Sandinista party “have virtually fused into a unified machine of repression with domestic and transnational impact.”

    This development – which has reduced the judicial, legislative and electoral powers “to mere bodies coordinated by the presidency” – has resulted in myriad deaths, “arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture, expulsion of nationals, arbitrary deprivation of nationality,” Mr. Simon insisted.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: British Ambassador presents credentials to Paraguayan Government

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    British Ambassador presents credentials to Paraguayan Government

    HMA Danielle Dunne presented her credentials to President Santiago Peña as the new British Ambassador to Paraguay.

    Danielle Dunne, British Ambassador to Paraguay, presents credential letters to Paraguayan President Santiago Peña

    In a protocol act held this morning at the Government Palace, Her Excellency Danielle Dunne, Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to Paraguay, made the official presentation of her credentials to Paraguayan President, Santiago Peña.

    Foreign Minister, Rubén Ramírez Lezcano, together with other national authorities and diplomatic representatives of Paraguay and the United Kingdom, attended the ceremony. On the occasion, President Peña also received the credential letters of the United Arab Emirates ambassador, Arsaghira Wabran Hamad Mubarak al-Ahbabi.

    Next, Ambassador Dunne went to Panteón de los Héroes, a memorial site in the city of Asuncion, to make a floral offering to the Paraguayan national heroes on the occasion of the next commemoration of the Heroes Day in country.

    During the meeting, Ambassador Dunne reaffirmed the United Kingdom’s commitment to continue strengthening bilateral ties with Paraguay, through an approach oriented to the development of bilateral trade, the fight against climate change and sustainable development.

    Danielle Dunne has been appointed Ambassador of His Majesty King Charles III in succession of Mr. Ramin Navai, who moved to another destination within the British diplomatic service. Mrs. Dunne arrived in the country in early 2025 and served as director of the Western African anti -terrorism network and Sahel in Abuja, Nigeria, before arriving in Paraguay.

    Updates to this page

    Published 26 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Sudan war: Any peace deal must respect national sovereignty, UN envoy says

    Source: United Nations 2

    By Abdelmonem Makki 

    Peace and Security

    As the war in Sudan approaches a second year, the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for the country has emphasized the need to re-double and coordinate efforts towards a peace agreement that respects national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity – and end the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. 

    In an exclusive interview with UN News’s Arabic service in New York, Ramtane Lamamra stressed that the solution must be political, calling for reliance on wisdom and the ability to deal with the root causes that led to the brutal conflict. 

    He affirmed that the Sudanese people are sovereign and have the final say in their future.

    A deteriorating situation

    The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and a powerful formerly allied paramilitary group called the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) erupted in April 2023, causing widespread death, destruction and displacement.

    More than 12 million people have fled to safety, whether elsewhere in the country or across the border. Famine has been confirmed in 10 locations, and another 17 are on the brink.

    Mr. Lamamra addressed the deteriorating situation in Sudan and the challenges facing peace efforts, noting that he is making every effort to convince the warring parties and decision-makers that the only solution is one that stems from their shared political will.

    The envoy underscored the critical need to prioritize the protection of civilians, reiterating the Secretary-General’s call for a cessation of hostilities during the Holy Month of Ramadan, which begins this Friday evening.

    © UNFPA/Karel Prinsloo

    Central African Republic, 2024. Newly arrived Sudanese refugees at Korsi refugee camp.

    Learn from the past

    Mr. Lamamra urged the Sudanese to learn from the lessons of past experiences, stating that ongoing efforts to reach a peaceful solution must take place within the context of respecting sovereignty, independence, and unity – both of the people and the land. 

    “I believe that this is fundamental and indisputable,” he said.

    “As for the United Nations – and for myself personally – I will continue to reiterate and insist on this point because it is essential, as we want to emerge from this ordeal with a strong and unified Sudan: a Sudan that learns from the lessons of its contemporary historical experiences and makes the necessary decisions so that the mistakes that led to the outbreak of wars in the recent past, including the current war, are not repeated.” 

    Nairobi Declaration

    Regarding the recent developments in Kenya’s capital Nairobi, where political and military groups signed a declaration expressing their intention to establish a governing authority in the areas controlled by the RSF, the envoy referred to the statements of the UN Secretary-General which expressed grave concern over the move as it further increases the risk of Sudan’s fragmentation. 

    Mr. Lamamra cautioned that anything that would widen the gap between the Sudanese instead of uniting them, is “undesirable.”

    He also mentioned the roadmap that was issued in Port Sudan on 9 February, which he said the UN chief welcomed and asked all interested Sudanese to share their ideas for possible inclusion, as this would facilitate the necessary discussions to rebuild a cohesive and unified Sudanese State.

    The Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy stated that building on the current proposal is the next step that he is ready to take “despite its sensitivity and difficulty.”

    He emphasized the need for coordination among the various initiatives proposed to reach a comprehensive national dialogue in Sudan.

    Soundcloud

    The role of the international community

    In this regard, Mr. Lamara called on the international community to assume its responsibilities and coordinate efforts to support peace in Sudan.

    He warned that any serious international engagement to resolve the crisis requires “careful and objective study and a thorough understanding” of the situation, including the roots of the conflict, its history, dimensions, those influencing it, foreign interventions, and other factors that must be taken into account.

    Mr. Lamamra underscored that international and regional efforts must be unified to become “one strong voice” to avoid conflicts between initiatives.

    “Undoubtedly, resolving the crisis in Sudan, ending the war, the tragedy, and the suffering of the citizens are all integral. There are many entry points, and efforts must be coordinated through serious work at each entry point of the crisis,” he added.

    Consultations with Sudanese society

    The UN envoy also shed light on the extensive consultations he has held with a wide sector of the Sudanese people – including youth, women, and civil society organizations – to listen to their views and suggestions. 

    He stressed the importance of these consultations in understanding the situation and setting priorities.

    Mr. Lamamra explained that he is careful to work with “discretion,” away from “megaphone diplomacy.” He said that he officially submitted to the two leaderships a list of recommendations that emerged from these consultations regarding protection of civilians and urged decision-makers to act. 

    “Work is underway at full speed, and we will make our full and complete effort,” he added, noting that the absence of a breakthrough will not diminish the determination to reach a desirable outcome.

    Respect, balance and trust

    In the same context, Mr. Lamamra said that his meetings with Government officials in Port Sudan are characterized by respect, noting that he is careful to listen to all parties. 

    “I believe that the duty of balance and gaining everyone’s trust is what drives me when taking the viewpoints of the parties,” he told UN News.

    I believe that each party has a complete and integrated perspective built – naturally – on the love of Sudan, because I believe that none of them has an alternative homeland, so the focus must be on this one homeland that accommodates everyone,” he added.

    “And I believe that the time will come when this feeling of the desired peaceful solution will emerge.”

    UNECA/Daniel Getachew

    African Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

    Momentum at AU Summit

    Mr. Lamamra recently participated in the African Union (AU) Summit in Addis Ababa as part of the UN Secretary-General’s delegation.

    There, he discussed ways to achieve a peaceful solution in Sudan in coordination with neighbouring countries, and regional and international organizations, starting with the AU, the League of Arab States, East African bloc IGAD, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. 

    He affirmed that the Sudan crisis had been at the forefront of discussions. 

    In this context, he welcomed the election of Mahmoud Ali Youssef as Chairperson of the AU Commission and praised his role in supporting peace efforts in Sudan. 

    Hope for the Jeddah Declaration

    Nearly two years ago, the warring parties in Sudan signed a declaration in the city of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, aimed at protecting civilians and providing unhindered humanitarian access.

    When asked about the possibility of implementing the agreement on the ground, and the obstacles that prevent it, the Mr. Lamamra described the declaration as “a promising and positive document, which is the only document that everyone signed and agreed upon days after the outbreak of the war.” 

    He stressed that preparatory technical talks needed to start soon in order to start implementing the declaration. 

    ‘A message of brotherhood’

    Concluding his interview with UN News, Mr. Lamamra addressed a message to the Sudanese people and the warring parties on the occasion of Ramadan.

    He said the Sudanese people love freedom, peace, and peaceful coexistence.

    “My message is a message of brotherhood. A message with the values of Islam that are valued by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Those concerned must always follow the teachings of true Islam and appreciate the sanctity of human life,” he said. 

    Our hope is that our brothers will seize this opportunity to think about a Ramadan free of violence, a Ramadan filled with brotherhood and the aspiration for a better future.” 

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Trade Facilitation Agreement: Eight years of cutting trade costs and boosting growth for all members

    Source: World Trade Organization

    The WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) has been a game-changer for international trade. As the first major multilateral trade agreement added to the WTO rulebook since the Uruguay Round in 1995, it has already boosted trade by more US$ 230 billion across the globe. Since taking effect in 2017, the TFA has simplified customs procedures, cut through red tape and increased regulatory transparency — making cross-border trade faster, cheaper and more predictable for businesses of all sizes.

    The benefits of trade facilitation are broadly enjoyed across the full WTO membership, creating more opportunities for resilient, secure and efficient trade and supply chains for developed and developing members alike.

    Streamlining trade

    Trade inefficiencies are not just an inconvenience: they impose substantial economic costs. Delays in transit can account for up to 44 per cent of transport costs, resulting from storage charges, bottlenecks at weighbridges, police checks and border crossings. Every hold-up chips away at competitiveness and increases costs. This can cost businesses valuable contracts and revenue. 

    A single trade transaction on average involves as many as 36 original documents and 240 copies. This administrative burden not only increases costs but also discourages micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) from participating in global trade.

    • Since its entry into force, the TFA has expedited the movement, release and clearance of goods and enhanced the transparency of trade regulations and procedures. It has also reduced excessive paperwork, unnecessary delays and inefficiencies at borders, and has fostered cooperation between customs authorities and other stakeholders.
    • TFA implementation has cut trade costs worldwide by an average of 1 to 4 per cent, leading to an increase in trade of over US$ 230 billion, with the most significant gains observed in agriculture. Developing and least-developed country (LDC) members have gained the most, demonstrating the Agreement’s capacity to foster efficient trade systems worldwide and creating opportunities for more people to benefit. 

    Many WTO members have reported that TFA-driven targeted reforms have led to notable reductions in the time and costs involved in border crossings, demonstrating the tangible impact of trade facilitation measures.

    For example, Montenegro has increased express shipments released within one hour of arrival from 25 to 53 per cent, while Indonesia has reduced import licence processing time by an average of four days. Ecuador has cut processing times by 67 per cent annually, while Brazil has cut export costs by an ad valorem equivalent of 9 per cent and import costs by 7 per cent. Jordan has slashed processing time by as much as 75 per cent, saving US$ 15 per unit.

    Infrastructure improvements stimulated by the TFA have also played a crucial role in enhancing efficiency. One-stop border posts have significantly reduced waiting times at borders, cutting customs processing time and queuing delays by 62 per cent at the Kenya-Uganda border and by 87 per cent at the Kenya-Tanzania border, creating more incentives for intra-African trade as well as African trade with the rest of the world. These examples illustrate how targeted reforms, digitalization and improved border coordination are helping WTO members streamline trade processes and unlock economic benefits.

    TFA implementation is well underway but technical assistance is needed to ensure its full benefits

    When implementing the TFA, developing and LDC members can categorize their commitments, giving them flexibility in putting the Agreement’s provisions into practice. Category A commitments must be implemented immediately, whereas commitments under categories B and C can be implemented later. Category C allows members capacity-building support to undertake the commitment. To clarify their commitments, members underwent a notification process, which has concluded. The focus now is on-the-ground implementation.

    Figure 1: Number of Category B measures due to be implemented yearly

    Source: TFA Database

    Most Category B commitments have now been implemented, with only four still to be implemented by 2030 (see Figure 1). Meanwhile, 196 Category C measures are scheduled for implementation this year (see Figure 2). While Category C measures due for implementation will gradually decline from 2026 onwards, the timeline continues well into the 2040s. The magnitude of these commitments underscores the scale of technical assistance and capacity-building support required by many developing and LDC members to fully unlock the benefits of the TFA.

    Figure 2: Number of Category C measures due to be implemented yearly

    Source: TFA Database

    Figure 3 highlights the provisions registering the greatest number of Category C commitments over the next two years. These measures are often some of the most complex to implement as they require not only regulatory changes but also significant investment in infrastructure, technology and inter-agency coordination.

    Figure 3: Top five Category C measures due for implementation in 2025-26

    Source: TFA Database

    For instance, single window systems — a single platform to collect and process import, export, or transit information in an efficient and cost-effective manner — demand extensive digitalization efforts, requiring the integration of various agencies and the streamlining of data-sharing processes. Border agency cooperation to align procedures across multiple institutions can be challenging due to differences in mandates, resources and regulatory frameworks. In addition, risk management necessitates advanced data analytics and compliance verification mechanisms. These may be difficult to establish without sustained technical assistance and capacity-building support.

    As implementation progresses, sustained support will be essential to ensure that all members can fully reap the benefits of the TFA. Full implementation of the Agreement promises to deliver significant gains in trade efficiency and cost reduction, but only if there is ongoing investment in developing expertise, infrastructure and regulatory reforms. The 2025 peak in Category C commitments demonstrates the urgent need for targeted interventions to address persistent structural and financial barriers.

    The WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility (TFAF) plays a key role in helping developing and LDC members mobilize the technical assistance and capacity-building support they need to implement the TFA. Since its establishment, the TFAF has been instrumental in supporting developing and LDC members through their ratification of the Agreement and their submission of more than 130 notifications within agreed deadlines.

    It has also assisted 46 developing members, including 18 LDCs, in securing assistance from development partners — either by sharing information or by providing project preparation grants. Thanks to TFAF support, ten developing members, including two LDCs, have successfully partnered with donors to meet their TFA capacity-building needs.

    With more than 500 commitments still due for implementation over the next five years, the TFAF remains a critical mechanism for channelling resources and ensuring that technical assistance aligns with members’ evolving needs.

    How improvements in trade facilitation efforts can be leveraged

    Digitalization offers ways to further enhance efficiency, transparency and coordination at borders. While approaches to using digital trade facilitation differ, members are discussing its role in shaping the future of trade procedures.

    In 2024, members decided to use the WTO Committee on Trade Facilitation to share experiences on the impact of digitalization on TFA implementation. Discussions have highlighted both successes and challenges, with some members showcasing innovative digital solutions, and others emphasizing the need for capacity-building to bridge the digital divide across economies with different levels of development. Digitalization will continue to be on the Committee’s agenda throughout 2025.

    At the domestic level, national trade facilitation committees (NTFCs) provide a critical institutional framework to drive effective implementation of the TFA. These committees coordinate efforts among government agencies, often in collaboration with private sector stakeholders, to ensure a holistic approach to trade facilitation reforms. NTFCs are key to identifying implementation bottlenecks, streamlining regulatory processes and aligning technical assistance with national priorities. As members navigate the complex reforms required for full TFA implementation, NTFCs will be instrumental in ensuring that trade facilitation improvements translate into tangible economic benefits.

    Value of full TFA implementation for all members

    Eight years after its entry into force, the TFA continues to reduce trade costs, improve customs efficiency and expand market opportunities for all members. As full implementation progresses, the benefits for businesses and economies will accelerate.

    While the benefits of trade facilitation are often highlighted in the context of developing and LDC members, the advantages extend across the entire WTO membership, including developed members. As more WTO members implement the TFA, businesses in developed members also benefit from smoother, more predictable trade flows, less red tape and fewer costly delays at borders.

    Lower trade costs and greater efficiency enhance global supply chain resilience, minimizing disruptions and ensuring more secure and reliable access to products. Ultimately, continued implementation of the TFA strengthens global trade networks, making trade more inclusive, efficient and resilient to external shocks.

    With sustained engagement from WTO members and development partners, trade facilitation will be a key driver of global trade efficiency and economic growth for years to come.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Scotland: Amnesty welcomes review of Scottish Enterprise human rights checks

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Amnesty International have today welcomed the Scottish Government’s agreement to review the human rights checks conducted by Scottish Enterprise, following a Scottish Parliament debate brought by the Scottish Greens in which MSPs from a range of parties expressed concerns about Scottish Enterprise grants to arms companies.

    Commenting after the debate, Neil Cowan (Scotland Programme Director at Amnesty International UK) said:

    “Today’s debate made clear that is simply not acceptable to continue to award Scottish Enterprise grants to companies involved in the manufacture and sale of arms to states accused of grave human rights abuses, including Israel.

    So we strongly welcome the fact that the Scottish Government have listened to Amnesty’s long-standing call, and the call of many others including MSPs from a range of parties, and agreed to conduct a review of the human rights checks in place at Scottish Enterprise. It has long been clear that, with no company ever failing one of the checks, they are not credible and require overhaul.

    It is now essential that the Scottish Government sets out what that review will involve, with it being critical that it includes independent input, review and analysis, and that it is focused on meeting Scotland’s international obligations.”

    View latest press releases

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI USA: Murray, Boozman Reintroduce Bipartisan Legislation to Improve Support for Disabled Veterans and Their Families, Including Young Caregivers

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray
    Washington, D.C. — Today, U.S. Senators Patty Murray (D-WA) and John Boozman (R-AR), senior members of the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, reintroduced their Helping Heroes Act, legislation to support the families of disabled veterans, including children who take on caregiving roles.
    The Helping Heroes Act recognizes the work done by the approximately 2.3 million children under the age of 18 living in a household with a disabled veteran, who provide invaluable support to their veteran family members and, in doing so, face unique challenges and often take on responsibilities that their peers do not carry. The bill seeks to improve the support and assistance provided to these children—including mental health care, peer support, and other supportive services that can help children in veteran families lead healthier lives. More about this issue can be found in this report commissioned by the Elizabeth Dole Foundation on supporting the healthy development of children from military and veteran caregiving homes.
    “I’m proud to reintroduce my bipartisan legislation to help VA better support the families of disabled veterans—especially children who frequently take on caregiving roles in their families and could benefit from additional supportive services,” said Senator Murray. “Veterans and their families have sacrificed so much for our country, and we have a responsibility to make sure the federal government is there for them and that we’re constantly working to improve the services they get through VA.”
    “Investing in the families of our veterans is part of the commitment we have made to those who have served,” said Senator Boozman. “By expanding the VA’s capabilities and resources to better support the needs of caregivers, including the children of disabled veterans, they will benefit in their own lives as well as enjoy more access to comprehensive tools and networks. Better grasping and responding to the impact of caring for their loved ones is an important step to raise their quality of life.”
    In addition to Senators Murray and Boozman, Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Adam Schiff (D-CA), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Tim Kaine (D-VA), and Peter Welch (D-VT) are original cosponsors of the legislation.
    Specifically, the Helping Heroes Act would:
    Establish a permanent Family Support Program to provide supportive services to eligible family members of disabled veterans.
    Require a coordinator at each VISN to assess the needs of veteran families in their catchment area and refer them to available local, state, and federal resources.
    Require VA to collect data on the experiences of disabled veteran families to better identify and understand their needs.
    The Helping Heroes Act is supported by the Elizabeth Dole Foundation,  Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA), Disabled American Veterans (DAV), The American Legion, Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America (IAVA), American Veterans (AMVETS), and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA).
    Senator Murray, the daughter of a WWII veteran and Purple Heart recipient who was later diagnosed with multiple sclerosis during her childhood, has been a longtime advocate of veterans and has placed an emphasis on expanding benefits and support for veteran caregivers. During her time as Chair of the Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee, Senator Murray oversaw the initial implementation of the Caregiver Support Program in 2011 and has been following its implementation closely and worked diligently to expand it since then.  Senator Murray has long pushed back against efforts to curtail eligibility of the program, and she urged former VA Secretary Denis McDonough to revise VA’s unnecessarily restrictive criteria for caregivers program to ensure it aligns with Congressional intent so that veterans and their families can access the critical services and care they have earned.
    In September 2022, following Murray’s push, VA announced that it would extend eligibility for its Caregivers program for legacy participants through September 2025. Senator Murray’s Helping Heroes Act, which she has introduced every Congress since 2022, builds on her longtime efforts to support veteran families and caregivers.
    The full text of the legislation is HERE.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn, Blumenthal Introduce Bill to Ensure U.S. Victims of Terrorism Receive Compensation

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn

    Cornyn, Blumenthal Introduce Bill to Ensure U.S. Victims of Terrorism Receive Compensation

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators John Cornyn (R-TX) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) today introduced the American Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, which would strengthen the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism (USVSST) Act to provide financial compensation to Americans injured in acts of international state-sponsored terrorism and their families:
    “It’s unacceptable that many victims and their families are still without justice for the tremendous trauma they have experienced at the hands of terrorists,” said Sen. Cornyn. “This bipartisan legislation would help ensure these brave Americans receive compensation when terrorist defendants refuse to pay for their heinous acts, and I’m glad to lead my colleagues in introducing it to show each and every American victim of terrorism they are not alone.”
    “This measure will help ensure victims of state-sponsored terrorism are justly compensated,” said Sen. Blumenthal. “The existing law is in dire need of an update, as the fund intended for the victims has not achieved its goals. This bill will start to correct course, providing victims of terror with the compensation they deserve and setting up a mechanism to help new victims.”
     The legislation is cosponsored by Sens. Kevin Cramer (R-ND), Chuck Schumer (D-NY), and Adam Schiff (D-CA) and led by Congressmen Mike Lawler (NY-17) and Josh Gottheimer (NJ-05) in the House of Representatives.
    Background:
    Enacted in 2015, the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism (USVSST) Act provided American victims who hold court judgments against state sponsors of terrorism a mechanism to recover on those judgments given the terrorist defendants’ refusal to pay. However, the fund created by the Justice for USVSST Act has made few distributions since its inception.
    The USVSST fund depends almost exclusively on fines and penalties collected by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) against wrongdoers who have violated U.S. sanctions by doing business with state sponsors of terrorism. Due to the DOJ’s decreased enforcement actions, narrow interpretation of the statute, and diversion of funds to other buckets, the USVSST fund has left victims without meaningful distributions for many years.
    The American Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act would ensure there is a clear path to help compensate victims for the losses and harms they’ve suffered by:
    Providing an immediate distribution in 2025 and providing a mechanism to ensure that the USVSST fund has a backstop for regular, consistent, and predictable distributions in the future;
    Establishing a sustainable mechanism to help new victims seek and receive judgments against state sponsors of terrorism;
    And ensuring that existing uses and pending claims for asset forfeiture are covered before any funds can be transferred to the USVSST fund. 
    The legislation is endorsed by American victims of the October 7th terrorist attack by Hamas on Israel, IED attacks on U.S. military in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, the 2016 Bastille Day attack in Nice, France, the September 11th terrorist attacks, the 2000 U.S.S. Cole attack, the 1998 East African Embassy bombings, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, the passengers of TWA Flight 847 hijacked in 1985 by Iran-backed Hezbollah terrorists while on route to the United States, the 1983 and 1984 U.S. Embassy and Embassy Annex bombings in Beirut, the 1983 Beirut Marine Barracks bombing, the 1979 hostage taking of Americans at the diplomatic compound in Tehran, and the 1968 U.S.S. Pueblo attack.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 – A10-0012/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024

    (2024/2081(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

     having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,

     having regard to Articles 2, 3, 8, 21 and 23 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

     having regard to Articles 17 and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other United Nations human rights treaties and instruments,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

     having regard to the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,

     having regard to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol thereto,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 43/29 of 22 June 2020 on the prevention of genocide,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment  of 10 December 1984 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 18 December 2002,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities  of 12 December 2006 and the Optional Protocol thereto, adopted on 13 December 2006,

     having regard to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1976,

     having regard to the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 18 December 1992,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/144 on 9 December 1998,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 13 September 2007,

     having regard to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas of 28 September 2018,

     having regard to the Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference of Population and Development in 1994 and its review conferences,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto, adopted on 25 May 2000,

     having regard to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, which entered into force on 24 December 2014, and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports of 5 June 1998,

     having regard to the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of September 1995 and its review conferences,

     having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted on 25 September 2015, in particular goals 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 16 thereof,

     having regard to the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted on 19 December 2018 and the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees adopted on 17 December 2018,

     having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on 17 July 1998, which entered into force on 1 July 2002,

     having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the International Criminal Court on cooperation and assistance of 10 April 2006[1],

     having regard to the Council of Europe Conventions of 4 April 1997 for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, and the Additional Protocols thereto, of 16 May 2005 on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, and of 25 October 2007 on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,

     having regard to the Council of Europe Convention of 11 May 2011 on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), which not all Member States have ratified but which entered into force for the EU on 1 October 2023,

     having regard to Protocols Nos 6 and 13 to the Council of Europe Convention of 28 April 1983 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty,

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe[3],

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 22 January 2024 on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2024,

     having regard to the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, adopted by the Council on 17 November 2020 and its Mid-term Review adopted on 9 June 2023,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 May 2024 on the alignment of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 with the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027,

     having regard to the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) III – an ambitious agenda for gender equality and women’s empowerment in external action (JOIN(2020)0017),

     having regard to the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0152),

     having regard to the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0698),

     having regard to the EU strategy on the rights of the child (COM(2021)0142),

     having regard to the EU Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 (COM(2021)0101),

     having regard to the EU anti-racism action plan 2020-2025 (COM(2020)0565),

     having regard to the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation (COM(2020)0620),

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on human rights defenders, adopted by the Council on 14 June 2004 and revised in 2008, and the second guidance note on the Guidelines’ implementation, endorsed in 2020,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them, adopted by the Council on 8 December 2008,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) of 2005, as updated in 2009,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on the death penalty, as updated by the Council on 12 April 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by LGBTI persons, adopted on 24 June 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, adopted by the Council on 24 June 2013,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline, adopted by the Council on 12 May 2014,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on non-discrimination in external action, adopted by the Council on 18 March 2019,

     having regard to the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, adopted by the Council on 17 June 2019,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on EU policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on human rights dialogues with partner/third countries, approved by the Council on 22 February 2021,

     having regard to the revised EU Guidelines on children and armed conflict, approved by the Council on 24 June 2024,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 12 September 2012 entitled ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external relations’ (COM(2012)0492),

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 10 March 2023 on the role of the civic space in protecting and promoting fundamental rights in the EU,

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859[4],

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 14 September 2022 for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market (COM(2022)0453),

     having regard to the joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 for a Council regulation on restrictive measures against serious acts of corruption (JOIN(2023)0013),

     having regard to the 2023 EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World,

     having regard to its Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, which in 2024 was awarded to María Corina Machado, as the leader of the democratic forces in Venezuela, and President-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, representing all Venezuelans inside and outside the country fighting for the reinstitution of freedom and democracy,

     having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2019 on EU Guidelines and the mandate of the EU Special Envoy on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU[5],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 October 2020 on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2021 on human rights protection and the EU external migration policy[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EU Magnitsky Act)[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023[9], and to its previous resolutions on earlier annual reports,

     having regard to its resolutions on breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (known as urgency resolutions), adopted in accordance with Rule 150 of its Rules of Procedure, in particular those adopted in 2023 and 2024,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0012/2025),

    A. whereas the EU is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as set out in Articles 2 and 21 TEU; whereas the EU’s action worldwide must be guided by the universality and indivisibility of human rights and by the fact that the effective protection and defence of human rights and democracy is at the core of the EU’s external action;

    B. whereas consistency and coherence across the EU’s internal and external policies are key for achieving an effective and credible EU human rights policy, and in defending and supporting freedom and democracy;

    C. whereas democratic systems are the most suitable to guarantee that every person has the ability to enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms; whereas effective rules-based multilateralism is the best organisational system to defend democracies;

    D. whereas the EU strongly believes in and fully supports multilateralism, a rules-based global order and the set of universal values, principles and norms that guide the UN member states and that the UN member states have pledged to uphold, in accordance with the UN Charter; whereas a world of democracies, understood as a world of political systems that defend and protect human rights worldwide, is a safer world, as democracies have significant checks and balances in place to prevent the unpredictability of autocracies;

    E. whereas the rise in authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism threatens the global rules-based order, the protection and promotion of freedom and human rights in the world, as well as the values and principles on which the EU is founded;

    F. whereas in December 2023, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights celebrated its 75th anniversary; whereas today, more than ever since the UN’s foundation, totalitarian regimes challenge the UN Charter’s basic principles, seek to rewrite international norms, undermine multilateral institutions and threaten peace and security globally;

    G. whereas in November 2024, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child celebrated its 35th anniversary;

    H. whereas the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action is regarded as a turning point for the global agenda on gender equality and will celebrate its 30th anniversary in 2025;

    I. whereas the legitimacy and functioning of the international rules-based order are dependent on compliance with the orders of, and respect for, international bodies, such as United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and orders and decisions of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC); whereas multilateralism is being challenged by increasing global threats, such as terrorism and extremism, which threaten compliance with such orders and decisions, as well as, generally, with provisions of international law, human rights law and international humanitarian law in emerging and ongoing conflict situations; whereas international institutions, their officials, and those cooperating with them, are the subject of attacks and threats; whereas the international community, including the EU, has a responsibility to uphold the international rules-based order by enforcing universal compliance, including by its partners;

    J. whereas the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court establishes a framework of accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; whereas the independence of the ICC is vital to ensure that justice is delivered impartially and without political interference;

    K. whereas the 2023 Mid-term Review of the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024, now extended to 2027, has shown that, despite the progress achieved so far, more needs to be done, in cooperation with like-minded democratic partners, especially in the context of the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption;

    L. whereas human rights defenders (HRDs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) are crucial partners in the EU’s efforts to safeguard and advance human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as to prevent conflicts globally; whereas state and non-state actors around the world are increasingly censoring, silencing and harassing, among others, HRDs, CSOs, journalists, religious communities, opposition leaders and other vulnerable groups in their work, shrinking the civil space ever further; whereas this behaviour includes measures encompassing strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), restrictive government policies, transnational repression, defamation campaigns, discrimination, intimidation and violence, including extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings, abductions, and arbitrary arrests and detention; whereas attacks on HRDs are increasingly extending to their families and communities, including those living in exile;

    M. whereas gender equality is a core EU value, and the human rights of women and girls, including their sexual and reproductive rights, continue to be violated across the world; whereas women experience unique and disproportionate impacts from conflicts, climate change and migration, including increased risks of gender-based violence, economic marginalisation and barriers to accessing resources; whereas women HRDs and CSOs continue to experience shrinking space for their critical work, as well as threats of violence, harassment and intimidation;

    N. whereas the past year has been marked by a further proliferation of laws on ‘foreign agents’ or foreign influence, including in countries with EU candidate status, targeting CSOs and media outlets and attempting to prevent them from receiving financial support from abroad, including from the EU and its Member States, fostering a climate of fear and self-censorship;

    O. whereas in 2024, more than half the world’s population went to the polls, and many of these elections were marked by manipulation, disinformation and attempts at interference from inside or outside the country;

    P. whereas the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) warns of a decline in the intent of states and other political forces to protect press freedom; whereas, according to RSF, 47 journalists and media workers have been killed, most of them in conflict zones, and 573 have been imprisoned since 1 January 2024;

    Q. whereas 251 million children and young people are deprived of their fundamental right to education and remain out of school, according to the UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report 2024; whereas girls and women are affected not only by poverty but also by cultural norms, gender bias, child marriage and violence through official, discriminatory policies that prevent them from accessing education and the labour market and attempt to erase them from public life;

    R. whereas at least one million people are unjustly imprisoned for political reasons, among them several laureates and finalists of Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought;

    S. whereas environmental harm and the impacts of climate change are intensifying precariousness, marginalisation and inequality, and increasingly displacing people from their homes or trapping them in unsafe conditions, thereby heightening their vulnerability and jeopardising their human rights;

    Global challenges to democracy and human rights

    1. Reasserts the universality, interdependence, interrelatedness and indivisibility of human rights and the inherent dignity of every human being; reaffirms the duty of the EU and its Member States to promote and protect democracy and the universality of human rights around the world; calls for the EU and its Member States to lead by example, in line with its values, to promote and strictly uphold human rights and international justice;

    2. Insists that respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and fundamental freedoms must be the cornerstone of the EU’s external policy, in line with its founding principles; strongly encourages the EU and its Member States, to that end, to strive for a continued ambitious commitment to make freedom, democracy and human rights and their protection a central part of all EU policies in a streamlined manner and to enhance the consistency between the EU’s internal and external policies in this field, including through all of its international agreements;

    3. Stresses that the EU must be fully prepared to counter the rise of authoritarianism, totalitarianism and populism, as well as the increasing violations of the principles of universality of human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law;

    4. Condemns the increasing trend of violations and abuses of human rights and democratic principles and values across the world, such as, among others, threats of backsliding on human rights, notably women’s rights, as well as executions, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill treatment, gender-based violence, clampdowns on civil society, political opponents, marginalised and vulnerable groups including children and elderly people, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and  ethnic and religious minorities; condemns, equally, slavery and forced labour, excessive use of violence by public authorities, including violent crackdowns on peaceful protests and other assemblies, systematic and structural discrimination, instrumentalisation of the judiciary, censorship and threats to independent media, including threats in the digital sphere such as online surveillance and internet shutdowns, political attacks against international institutions and the rules-based international order, and increasing use of unlawful methods of war in grave breach of international humanitarian law and human rights law; deplores the weakening of the protection of democratic institutions and processes, and the shrinking space for civil societies around the world; denounces the transnational repression, by illiberal regimes, of citizens and activists who have sought refuge abroad, including on EU soil;

    5. Notes with deep concern the ongoing international crisis of accountability and the challenge to the pursuit of ending impunity for violations of core norms of international human rights and humanitarian law in conflicts around the world; reaffirms the neutrality and importance of humanitarian aid in all conflicts and crises; underlines the serious consequences of discrediting and attacking the organisations of multilateral forums, such as the UN, which can foster a culture of impunity and undermine the trust in and functioning of the UN system; calls for the EU to uphold the international legal system and take effective measures to enforce compliance;

    6. Notes with satisfaction that there are also ‘human rights bright spots’ within this context of major challenges to human rights worldwide; highlights, in particular, the work of CSOs and HRDs; underlines the need for a more strategic communication on human rights and democracy by spreading news about positive results, policies and best practices; supports the Good Human Rights Stories initiative[10] as a way of promoting positive stories about human rights and recommends that it be updated; underlines the role of the EU’s public and cultural diplomacy, as well as international cultural relations, in the promotion of human rights, and calls for the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to increase its efforts in this regard;

    Strengthening the EU’s toolbox for the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy around the world

    7. Notes with concern the increasing divide worldwide; stresses the shared responsibility of the EU to continue defending democratic values and principles and human rights, international justice, peace and dignity around the world, which are even more important to defend in the current volatile state of global politics; calls upon the EU to keep communication channels open with different stakeholders and to continue to develop a comprehensive toolbox to strengthen human rights and democracy globally;

    EU action plan on human rights and democracy

    8. Observes that the EU and its Member States have made substantial progress in implementing the EU action plan on human rights and democracy, although they have not reached all of its goals, in part also due to the unprecedented challenges the world has experienced since its adoption; welcomes, in this sense, the extension of the action plan until 2027, with a view to maximising the synergies and complementarity between human rights and democracy at local, national and global levels;

    EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Human Rights

    9. Fully supports the work of the EUSR for Human Rights in contributing to the visibility and coherence of the EU’s human rights actions in its external relations; upholds the EUSR’s central role in the EU’s promotion and protection of human rights by engaging with non-EU countries and like-minded partners; underlines the need for close cooperation between the EUSR for Human Rights and other EUSRs and Special Envoys in order to further improve this coherence, and calls for greater visibility for the role of the EUSR for Human Rights; calls for the EUSR to be supported in his work with increased resources and better coordination with EU delegations around the world; regrets, despite continuous calls, Parliament’s exclusion from the process of selecting the EUSR; insists on the need for the EUSR to report back to Parliament regularly;

    Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe and the human rights and democracy thematic programme

    10. Recalls the fundamental role of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – Global Europe, including its thematic programme on human rights and democracy, as a flagship EU instrument in promoting and protecting human rights and democracy around the world; highlights the need to engage with civil society in all the EU’s relevant external activities, including the Global Gateway Strategy which is financed through the NDICI-Global Europe; reiterates the importance of streamlining a human-rights based approach in the EU’s external action instruments; underlines Parliament’s role in the instrument’s programming process and calls on the Commission and the EEAS to share all relevant information in a timely manner in order to enable Parliament to play its role accordingly, in particular during high-level geopolitical dialogues with the Commission and in the mid-term review process as well as in its resolutions; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that a response is provided to the recommendation letters following each geopolitical dialogue and each resolution; urges the Commission to develop and launch a comprehensive, centralised website dedicated to the NDICI-Global Europe, including information on all the multiannual indicative programmes, detailing their respective budgets, associated actions and the financial allocations they are backing, organised both by country and by theme; notes that the NDICI-Global Europe and all future instruments must focus on the fundamental drivers of ongoing challenges, including the need to strengthen the resilience of local communities and democracy support activities by supporting economic development;

    11. Calls for independent, ex ante assessments to determine the possible implications and risks of projects with regard to human rights, in line with Article 25(5) of  Regulation (EU) 2021/947; calls for independent human rights monitoring throughout the implementation of projects in third countries, especially in relation to projects entailing a high risk of violations; calls for a suspension of projects that (in)directly contribute to human rights violations in non-EU countries; reiterates the prohibition on allocating EU funds to activities that are contrary to EU fundamental values, such as terrorism or extremism; calls on the Commission to share all human rights-related assessments with Parliament in a proactive manner;

    EU trade and international agreements

    12. Reiterates its call to integrate human rights assessments and include robust clauses on human rights in agreements between the EU and non-EU countries, supported by a clear set of benchmarks and procedures to be followed in the event of violations; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to ensure that the human rights clauses in current international agreements are actively monitored and effectively enforced and to improve their communication with Parliament concerning considerations and decisions regarding this enforcement; reiterates that in the face of persistent breaches of human rights clauses by its partner countries, including those related to the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus programme, the EU should react swiftly and decisively, including by suspending the agreements in question if other options prove ineffective; calls for the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal to be implemented, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, or for the Commission’s Single Entry Point to be adapted to allow complaints regarding failure to comply with human rights clauses to be submitted; calls on the EU institutions to engage regularly with the business community and civil society in order to strengthen the links between international trade, human rights and economic security; calls for the EU to ensure human rights promotion and protection through its Global Gateway investments and projects, by ensuring that they do no harm;

    EU human rights dialogues

    13. Stresses the important role of human rights dialogues within the EU’s human rights toolbox and as a key vehicle for the implementation of the EU action plan on human rights and democracy; highlights that these dialogues must address the overall situation of human rights and democracy with the relevant countries; notes that human rights dialogues should be seen as a key element of sustained EU engagement and not as a free-standing instrument, and that the persistent failure of non-EU countries to genuinely engage in dialogues and to implement key deliverables should lead to the use of other appropriate foreign policy tools; recalls that these dialogues need to be used in conjunction and synergy with other instruments, using a more-for-more and a less-for-less approach; reiterates the need to raise individual cases, in particular those of Sakharov Prize laureates and those highlighted by Parliament in its resolutions, and ensure adequate follow-up; calls on the EEAS and EU delegations to increase the visibility of these dialogues and their outcomes, ensuring that they are results-oriented and based on a clear set of benchmarks that can be included in a published joint press statement, and to conduct suitable follow-up action on it; calls for the enhanced and meaningful involvement of civil society in the dialogues; stresses that genuine CSOs must not be impeded from participating in human rights dialogues and that any dialogue must include all genuine CSOs without any limitations;

    EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR – EU Magnitsky Act)

    14. Welcomes the increasing use of the EU GHRSR as a key political tool in the EU’s defence of human rights and democracy across the world; regrets, however, that its use has continued to be limited, especially in the current geopolitical landscape; notes, however, the challenges that the requirement of unanimity poses in the adoption of sanctions and reiterates its call on the Council to introduce qualified majority voting for decisions on the GHRSR; recalls, in this regard, the formal request submitted by Parliament to the Council in 2023, on calling an EU reform convention, with the aim, among others, of increasing the number of decisions taken by qualified majority; calls for a stronger use of the GHRSR and other ad hoc sanctions regimes on those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including high-level officials; fully supports the possibility of imposing targeted anti-corruption sanctions within the EU framework in this regard, which has been a long-standing priority of Parliament, whether through its inclusion in the GHRSR or under a different regime; highlights the need for the complete enforcement of sanctions and calls for circumventions to be tackled;

    Democracy support activities

    15. Reiterates its concern regarding the increasing attacks by authoritarian and illiberal regimes on democratic principles, values and pluralism; stresses that the defence and support of democracy around the world is increasingly becoming of geopolitical and strategic interest; emphasises the importance of Parliament’s efforts in capacity-building for partner parliaments, promoting mediation and encouraging a culture of dialogue and compromise, especially among young political leaders, and empowering women parliamentarians, HRDs and representatives from civil society and independent media; reiterates its call on the Commission to continue and expand its activities in these areas by increasing funding and support for EU bodies, agencies and other grant-based organisations; stresses the critical importance of directly supporting civil society and persons expressing dissenting views, particularly in the current climate of growing global tensions and repression in increasing numbers of countries; reiterates the importance of EU election observation missions and Parliament’s contribution to developing and enhancing their methodology; calls for the development of an EU toolbox to be used in cases of disputed or non-transparent election results in order to prevent political and military crises in the post-election environment; calls for enhanced EU action to counter manipulative and false messages against the EU in election campaigns, in particular in countries that receive significant EU humanitarian and development assistance and in countries that are candidates for EU membership; calls for enhanced collaboration between Parliament’s Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group, the relevant Commission directorates-general and the EEAS;

    EU support for human rights defenders

    16. Is extremely concerned by the continuing restriction of civil society space and rising threats to the work of HRDs and members of CSOs, as well as their families, communities and lawyers, and finds particularly concerning the increasingly sophisticated means used to persecute them; strongly condemns their arbitrary detentions and killings; deplores the harassment of CSOs through legislative provisions such as foreign agents laws and similar, and other restrictions they face; deplores the fact that women HRDs continue to face relentless and ever more sophisticated violations against them, including targeted killings, physical attacks, disappearances, smear campaigns, arrests, judicial harassment and intimidation; notes with concern that these attacks seem designed to systematically silence women HRDs and erase their voices from the public sphere; supports wholeheartedly the work of HRDs and EU action to ensure their protection worldwide; underscores the pressing need for a comprehensive and timely revision of the EU Guidelines on HRDs, with a view to addressing the emerging challenges and threats, and to ensuring their applicability and effectiveness in the protection of HRDs globally, while integrating gender-sensitive and intersectional approaches in the updated Guidelines, reflecting the diverse backgrounds and experiences of HRDs, and taking into account the specific vulnerabilities they may face; calls for the complete and consistent application of the EU Guidelines on HRDs by the EU and its Member States; calls for efforts to enhance communication strategies to increase the visibility of EU actions and channels for the protection of and the support mechanisms for HRDs;

    17. Raises serious concerns over the increasing phenomenon of transnational repression against HRDs, journalists and civil society; calls for the formulation of an EU strategy harmonising national responses to transnational repression;

    18. Expresses deep concern regarding the increasingly precarious financial landscape faced by HRDs and communities advocating for rights, particularly within a global context characterised by intensifying repression; notes that, as a result of the current geopolitical context, HRDs’ need for support has increased; calls, therefore, for the EU and its Member States to make full use of their financial support for HRDs, ensuring the establishment of flexible, accessible and sustained funding mechanisms that enable these defenders to continue their vital work in the face of mounting challenges;

    19. Insists that the EEAS, the Commission and the EU delegations pay particular attention to the situation of the Sakharov Prize laureates and finalists at risk and take resolute action, in coordination with the Member States and Parliament, to ensure their well-being, safety or liberation;

    20. Welcomes the update of the EU Visa Code Handbook in relation to HRDs and calls for its full and consistent application by the Member States; reiterates its call for the Commission to take a proactive role in the establishment of a coordinated approach among the Member States for HRDs at risk, for instance streamlining visa procedures and promoting harmonisation in the EU’s visa application process;

    Combating impunity and corruption

    21. Underlines that both impunity and corruption enable and aggravate human rights violations and abuses and the erosion of democratic principles; welcomes the anti-corruption actions in EU external policies in the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012); supports the anti-corruption provisions included in the EU trade agreements with non-EU countries; stresses the important role of civil society and journalists in non-EU countries in the oversight of the fight against impunity and corruption; calls for the EU and its Member States to increase their efforts in justice reforms, the fight against impunity, and the improvement of transparency and of anti-corruption institutions in non-EU countries; encourages the EU and its Member States to coordinate more closely with allies and partners wherever possible in order to counter systemic corruption that enables autocrats to maintain power, deprives societies of key resources and undermines democracy, human rights and the rule of law;

    22. Insists on the need for the EU to take clear steps to recognise the close link between corruption and human rights violations in order to target economic and financial enablers of human rights abusers;

    EU actions at multilateral level

    23. Reaffirms that promoting the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights around the world requires strong international cooperation at a multilateral level; underlines the particularly important role of the UN and its bodies as the main forum which must be able to effectively advance efforts for peace and security, sustainable development and respect for human rights and international law; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue supporting the work of the UN, its agencies and special procedures, both politically and financially, to ensure that it is fit for purpose, and to push back against the influence of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes; stresses that the current multilateral order needs to fully incorporate into its architecture the new global actors, especially those focusing on democracy and human rights; reiterates the need for the EU and its Member States to speak with one voice at the UN and in other multilateral forums in order to effectively tackle global challenges to human rights and democracy in multilateral forums and to support the strongest possible language in line with international human rights standards; calls, to this end, for progress in ensuring that the EU has a seat in international organisations, including the UN Security Council, in addition to the existing Member States’ seats; calls for EU delegations to play a stronger role in multilateral forums, for which they should have appropriate resources available;

    24. Is deeply concerned by growing attacks against the rules-based global order by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, including through unprovoked and unjustified aggression against peaceful neighbours and through the undermining of the functioning of UN bodies, namely the abuse of veto power at the UN Security Council; underlines that the diminished effectiveness of these bodies brings with it real costs in terms of conflicts, lives lost and human suffering, and seriously weakens the general ability of countries to deal with global challenges; calls on the Member States and like minded partners to develop a robust strategy and to intensify their efforts to reverse this trend and to send a united and strong message of support to those organisations when they are attacked or threatened; believes that the UN, its bodies, and other multilateral organisations are in need of reform, in order to address these growing challenges and threats;

    25. Reiterates the strong support of the EU for the International Court of Justice and the ICC as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions amid a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls that a well-funded ICC is essential for the effective prosecution of serious international crimes; welcomes the political and financial support the EU has given to the ICC, including the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC, and the launch of the ‘Global initiative to fight against impunity for international crimes’ offering financial support to CSOs dedicated to fostering justice and accountability for international crimes and serious human rights violations, including by facilitating survivors’ participation in legal proceedings; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and intensify their support to the ICC – including to the ICC Trust Fund for Victims – with the necessary means, including resources and political backing, and to use all instruments at their disposal to combat impunity worldwide and enable the ICC to fulfil its mandate effectively; calls on all the Member States to respect and implement the actions and decisions of the International Court of Justice and all organs of the ICC, including the OTP and the Chambers, to urge other countries to join and cooperate with the court, including to enforce ICC arrest warrants, and to support their work as an independent and impartial international justice institution everywhere in the world; regrets the failure of some ICC member states to execute ICC arrest warrants, thereby undermining the court’s work; calls for the EU to urge non-EU countries, including its major partners, to recognise the ICC and become a state party to the Rome Statute;

    26. Stresses the importance of not politicising the ICC, as trust in the court is eroded if its mandate is misused; condemns, in particular and in the most critical terms, the political attacks, sanctions and other coercive measures introduced or envisaged against the ICC itself and against its staff; calls on the Member States and the EU institutions to cooperate to work on solutions in order to protect the institution of the ICC and its staff from any future sanctions that would threaten the functioning of the court;

    27. Recognises universal jurisdiction as an important tool of the international criminal justice system to prevent and combat impunity and promote international accountability; calls on the Member States to apply universal jurisdiction in the fight against impunity;

    28. Calls for the EU and its Member States to lead the global fight against all forms of extremism and welcomes the adoption of an EU strategy to this end; demands that the fight against terrorism be at the top of the EU’s domestic and foreign affairs agenda;

    Upholding international humanitarian law

    29. Notes with concern the increasing disregard for international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly in the form of ongoing conflicts around the world; strongly condemns the increase in deliberate, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians and civilian objects in multiple conflict settings; underlines that it is of the utmost importance that all UN and humanitarian aid agencies are able to provide full, timely and unhindered assistance to all people in vulnerable situations and calls on all parties to armed conflicts to fully respect the work of these agencies and ensure they can meet the basic needs of civilians without interference; denounces attempts to undermine UN agencies delivering humanitarian aid; urges all parties to armed conflicts to protect civilian populations, humanitarian and medical workers, and journalists and media workers; calls on all parties to armed conflicts to respect the legitimacy and inviolability of UN peacekeeping missions; calls on all states to unconditionally and fully conform with international humanitarian law; calls on the international community, and the Member States in particular, to promote accountability and the fight against impunity for grave breaches of international humanitarian law; calls for the systematic creation of humanitarian corridors in regions at war and in combat situations, whenever necessary, in order to allow civilians at risk to escape conflicts, and strongly condemns any attacks on them; demands unhindered access for humanitarian organisations monitoring and assisting prisoners of war, as provided for in the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War; expects international organisations to abide by international law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war; calls for international cooperation and assistance in the return of forcibly deported persons, in particular children and hostages;

    30. Reiterates its call on the Member States to help contain armed conflicts and serious violations of human rights or international humanitarian law by strictly abiding by the provisions of Article 7 of the UN Arms Trade Treaty of 2 April 2013 on Export and Export Assessment and Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment;

    31. Given the gendered impacts of armed conflicts, deplores the insufficient priority and focus given to sexual and gender-based violence and to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) across the EU’s humanitarian and refugee response; reiterates that humanitarian crises intensify SRHR- and gender-related challenges and recalls that in crisis zones, particularly among vulnerable groups such as refugees and migrants, women and girls are particularly exposed to sexual violence, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual exploitation, rape as a weapon of war and unwanted pregnancies; calls on the Commission and the Member States to give high priority to gender equality and SRHR in their humanitarian aid and refugee response, as well as accountability and access to justice and redress for sexual and reproductive rights violations and gender-based violence, including in terms of training for humanitarian actors, and existing and future funding;

    Team Europe approach

    32. Recognises the potential for stronger alignment in approaches to human rights protection and promotion between EU institutions, Member States’ embassies and EU delegations in non-EU countries, particularly in encouraging those countries to comply with their international obligations and to refrain from harassment and persecution of critical voices; emphasises the opportunity for Member States’ embassies to take an increasingly active role in advancing and safeguarding human rights, while also supporting civil society in these countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to use all possible means to urge countries to release political prisoners; highlights the importance of shared responsibility between Member States and EU delegations in these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to intensify their collective efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights and to support democracy worldwide; encourages careful monitoring and assessment of the capacity of EU delegations to ensure that each one has a designated point of contact for cases of human rights violations, and that this mandate is allocated sufficient resources to respond in an effective and timely manner; reiterates, in this context, the importance, for the EU delegations, of existing EU guidelines related to specific areas of human rights;

    Responding to universal human rights and democracy challenges

    Right to freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

    33. Condemns any action or attempt to legalise, instigate, authorise, consent or acquiesce to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment methods under any circumstances; condemns the increasing reports of the use of torture by state actors in many different contexts, including in custodial and extra-custodial settings – of political prisoners, among others – and in conflict situations around the world, notably in violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, as well as the killing of prisoners of war, which amounts to a war crime, and reiterates the non-derogable nature of the right to be free from torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment; reiterates the EU’s zero-tolerance policy to torture and other ill-treatment and calls on the relevant institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights, to take a thorough stance on any such case;

    34. Reiterates its calls for universal ratification of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol thereto, and for the need for states to bring their national provisions in this respect in line with international standards; reiterates, in accordance with the revised Guidelines on the EU’s policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, adopted by the Council on 16 September 2019, the importance of engaging with relevant stakeholders in the fight to eradicate torture, and to monitor places of detention;

    Right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association

    35. Reiterates the need to protect the EU democratic space and the exercise of fundamental freedoms therein, particularly freedoms of assembly and association; highlights the growing violent repression of protest and peaceful assemblies within the EU civic space, with cases of torture and ill-treatment resulting in deaths and other serious violations; underscores the need to strengthen this fundamental right in conjunction with the absolute prohibition of torture and ill-treatment;

    Right to food, water and sanitation

    36. Recalls that the right to food, including having physical and economic access to adequate food or the means to its procurement, is a human right; is extremely concerned about the challenges to the right to food worldwide, especially in situations of war and conflicts; condemns the increasing reports of the weaponisation of food in situations of armed conflict; calls for the EU and its Member States to promote mandatory guidelines on the right to food without discrimination within the UN system; urges the EU and the Member States to fully support, politically and financially, organisations and agencies working to secure the right to food in conflict zones; recalls the importance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas in view of attaining food security; commends the work of the UN World Food Programme, in this regard;

    37. Reaffirms the rights to safe drinking water and to sanitation as human rights, both rights being complementary; underlines that access to clean drinking water is indispensable to a healthy and dignified life and is essential for the maintenance of human dignity; highlights the fact that the right to water is a fundamental precondition for the enjoyment of other rights, and as such must be guided by a logic grounded in the public interest, and in common public and global goods; underscores the importance of the EU Guidelines on safe drinking water and sanitation, and urges the EU institutions and the Member States to implement and promote their application in non-EU countries and in multilateral forums;

    Climate change and the environment

    38. Highlights that climate change and its impact on the environment has direct effects on the effective enjoyment of all human rights; recognises the important work of CSOs, indigenous peoples and local communities, land and environmental HRDs and indigenous activists for the protection of a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, including access to land and water sources; deplores the risks that environmental HRDs and indigenous activists face and calls for their effective protection to be guaranteed; notes that communities contributing the least to climate change are the ones more likely to be affected by climate risks and natural disasters and calls, in this regard, for increasing support to the most vulnerable groups; recalls that indigenous peoples and local communities play an important role in the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity; recalls that the transition to clean energy must be fair and respect everyone’s fundamental rights; reiterates the importance of the achievement of the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs) for the protection of the human rights of present and future generations;

    39. Notes with deep concern the increasing threats to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment posed by the deployment of weapons of mass destruction and other forms of warfare that adversely and disproportionately affect the environment; stresses the need to effectively address the displacement of people caused by environmental destruction and climate change, which increases the risk of human rights violations and heightens vulnerabilities to different forms of exploitation; recognises that children face more acute risks from climate-related disasters and are also one of the largest groups to be affected; calls for the EU to focus on addressing the impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of the rights of the child;

    Rights of the child

    40. Calls for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights, including for those most marginalised and those in the most vulnerable situations, through all of the EU’s external policies; calls for more concerted efforts to promote the respect, protection and fulfilment of children’s rights in crisis or emergency situations; condemns the decline in respect for the rights of the child and the increasing violations and abuses of these rights, including through violence, early and forced marriage, sexual abuse including genital mutilation, trafficking, child labour, honour killings, recruitment of child soldiers, lack of access to education and healthcare, malnutrition and extreme poverty; further condemns the increase in deaths of children in situations of armed conflict and stresses the need for effective protection of children’s rights in active warfare; calls for new EU initiatives to promote and protect children’s rights, with a view to rehabilitating and reintegrating conflict-affected children, ensuring that they have a protected, family- and community-based environment as a natural context for their lives, in which assistance and education are fundamental elements; reiterates its call for a systematic and consistent approach to promoting and defending children’s rights through all EU external policies; calls on all countries to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as a matter of urgency, in order to allow for the universal ratification of this foundational instrument;

    41. Stresses the importance of closing the financing gap that would enable countries to meet their SDG 4 targets on quality education and ensure access to education for all children and young people; reiterates its calls to address cultural norms and gender biases that prevent girls and women from receiving an education and urges the creation of gender-responsive education systems worldwide;

    42. Stresses that education represents the starting point for cultivating principles and values that contribute to the personal development of children, as well as to social cohesion and democracy, and the rule of law around the world; to that end calls for the EU to promote its values through supporting access to education and learning for women and girls;

    Rights of women and gender equality

    43. Stresses that women’s rights and gender equality are indispensable and indivisible human rights, as well as a basis for the rule of law and inclusive resilient democracies; deplores the fact that millions of women and girls continue to experience discrimination and violence, especially in the context of conflicts, post-conflict situations and displacements, and are denied their dignity, autonomy and even life; condemns the impunity with which perpetrators commit violations against women HRDs; is appalled by the use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war and stresses the need to shed light on these instances, and for better international cooperation on fighting impunity for these crimes; calls for the EU, its Member States and like-minded partners to step up their efforts to ensure the full enjoyment and protection of women’s and girls’ human rights, and to incorporate a gender mainstreaming approach across all policies, taking into account the differentiated impacts of global challenges such as climate change or conflicts; condemns in the strongest terms the increasing attacks on SRHR around the world, as well as gender-based violence; strongly deplores cases of female genital mutilation, honour killings, child marriages and forced marriages; welcomes the accession of the EU to the Istanbul Convention and strongly encourages the remaining EU Member States to ratify the Istanbul Convention without further delay; calls for the EU and its international partners to strengthen their efforts to ensure that women fully enjoy human rights and are treated equally to men; emphasises the importance of safeguarding the rights of women, ensuring that their health, safety and dignity are protected, particularly in the context of healthcare access and workplace protections; underlines the need to keep opposing and condemning, in the strongest terms, anti-abortion laws that punish women and girls with decades-long jail sentences, even in cases of rape, incest or when the life of the pregnant woman is at risk; stresses the need to pursue efforts to fully eradicate the practice of female genital mutilation; fully supports the role of the EU Ambassador for Gender and Diversity;

    44. Recognises that gender apartheid constitutes a systematic and institutionalised form of oppression, depriving women and girls of fundamental rights solely on the basis of their gender; notes with deep concern the entrenchment of gender apartheid in certain regions, where women face extensive restrictions on education, employment, healthcare and freedom of movement, often underpinned by legal and cultural frameworks that reinforce gender-based discrimination; urges the EU and the Member States to proactively address gender apartheid through strengthened diplomatic efforts, targeted economic measures and accountability mechanisms that support civil society organisations advocating for gender equality; calls for the formal recognition of gender apartheid as a distinct human rights violation and for support for international initiatives for its classification as a crime against humanity, thus contributing to the establishment of a global accountability standard;

    Rights of refugees and asylum seekers

    45. Denounces the erosion of the human rights and the safety of refugees, asylum seekers and forcibly displaced persons; reaffirms their inalienable human rights and fundamental right to seek asylum; recalls the obligation of states to protect them in accordance with international law; underlines the importance of identification and registration of individuals, including children, as a key tool for protecting refugees and ensuring the integrity of refugee protection systems, preventing human trafficking and the recruitment of children into armed militias; calls for the EU and its Member States to effectively uphold their rights in the EU’s asylum and migration policy and in the EU’s cooperation with partner countries in this regard; deplores the increasing xenophobia, racism and discrimination towards migrants, as well as the different forms of violence they face, including during their displacement, and the many barriers they face, including in access to healthcare; condemns the instrumentalisation of migration at EU borders by foreign actors, which constitutes hybrid attacks against the Member States as well as a dehumanisation of migrants; stresses that the EU should step up its efforts to acknowledge and develop ways to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, building the resilience of migrants’ communities of origin and helping them offer their members the possibility to enjoy a decent life in their home country; calls for the EU and its Member States to continue and, where possible, step up their support for countries hosting the most refugees, as well as for transit countries; reiterates that close cooperation and engagement with non-EU countries, with full respect for fundamental rights, remain key to preventing migrant smuggling; stresses, in this regard, that the dissemination of information and awareness-raising campaigns on the risks of smuggling are crucial, as well as of the migration laws of the destination countries, in order to prevent the undertaking of unnecessarily risky journeys by those who do not have grounds for asylum; calls for EU-funded humanitarian operations to take into consideration the specific needs and vulnerabilities of children and to ensure their protection while they are displaced; underlines the importance of developing an effective framework of safe and legal pathways to the EU and welcomes, in this regard, the Commission communication on attracting skills and talent to the EU[11], including the development of talent partnerships with partner countries; calls for respect for the principle of non-refoulement to countries where the life and liberty of people would be threatened; calls for the EU and its Member States to discuss the phenomenon of instrumentalised migration orchestrated by authoritarian regimes and organised crime groups, and emphasises the need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, develop effective countermeasures, and consider its implications for the human rights framework;

    46. Reaffirms that no agreement with a non-EU country designated as a transit country should be concluded without Parliament’s scrutiny, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to include robust human rights clauses, monitoring mechanisms and impact assessments therein; reiterates its call on the Commission to integrate ex ante human rights impact assessments into such agreements;

    Rights of LGBTIQ+ persons

    47. Deplores the human rights violations, including discrimination, persecution, violence and killings, against lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, non-binary, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) persons around the world; is extremely concerned by the spreading of hatred and anti-LGBTIQ+ narratives and legislation that target LGBTIQ+ persons and HRDs; calls for the adoption of policies that protect LGBTIQ+ people and give them the tools to safely report a violation of their rights, in line with the EU Guidelines to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by LGBTI Persons; expresses special concern over LGBTIQ+ people living under non-democratic regimes or in conflict situations, and calls for rapid response mechanisms to protect them as well as their defenders; reiterates its calls for the full implementation of the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025 as the EU’s tool for improving the situation of LGBTIQ+ people around the world; calls for  the use of the death penalty to be rejected under all circumstances, including any legislation that would impose the death penalty for homosexuality; calls for the EU and its Member States to further engage the countries with such legislation in reconsidering their position on the death penalty; notes further that the imposition of the death penalty on the basis of such legislation is arbitrary killing per se, and a breach of Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

    Rights of persons with disabilities

    48. Is concerned by the challenges to the full enjoyment of the rights of persons with disabilities; reiterates its calls for the EU to assist partner countries in the development of policies in support of carers of persons with disabilities; calls for the raising of social awareness and the combating of discriminatory behaviours against persons with disabilities; points to the additional complications faced by persons with disabilities in conflict situations and natural disasters, as they are more vulnerable to violence and often do not receive adequate support; urges all parties to conflict situations worldwide to take adequate measures to mitigate the risks to them as much as possible; emphasises the need to safeguard children with disabilities from any form of exploitation; calls for the EU, in its external policy, to make use of the strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030 as a tool to improve the situation of persons with disabilities, particularly concerning poverty and discrimination, but also problems with access to education, healthcare and employment, and participation in political life; encourages the EU to support partner countries in developing inclusive economic policies that promote accessible vocational training and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, fostering their full and active economic participation;

    Rights of elderly people

    49. Reiterates its call for the EU and its Member States to develop new avenues to strengthen the rights of elderly people, taking into account the multiple challenges they face, such as age-based discrimination, poverty, violence and a lack of social protection, healthcare and other essential services, as well as barriers to employment; calls for the implementation of specific measures to combat the risk of poverty for older women through increased social support; underlines the work of the UN Open-ended Working Group on Ageing on a legally binding instrument to strengthen the protection of the human rights of older people and calls for the EU and its Member States to consider actively supporting that work; stresses the need for a cross-cutting intergenerational approach in EU policies, in order to build and encourage solidarity between young people and elderly people;

    Right to equality and non-discrimination

    50. Reiterates its condemnation of all forms of racism, intolerance, antisemitism, Islamophobia, persecution of Christians, xenophobia and discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, social class, disability, caste, religion, belief, age, sexual orientation or gender identity; condemns the growing international threat of hate speech and speech that incites violence, including online; reiterates the crucial role of education and dialogue in promoting tolerance, understanding and diversity; calls for the adoption or the strengthening of mechanisms for reporting discriminatory behaviours as well as access to effective legal remedies, to help end the impunity of those who engage in this behaviour;

    Right to life: towards the universal abolition of the death penalty

    51. Reiterates its principled opposition to the death penalty, which is irreversible and incompatible with the right to life and with the prohibition of torture, and a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment; stresses that the EU must be relentless in its pursuit of the universal abolition of the death penalty as a major objective of its human rights foreign policy; notes that despite the trend in some non-EU countries to take steps towards abolishing the death penalty, significant challenges in this regard still exist; deplores the fact that in other non-EU countries the number of death sentences that have been carried out has reached its highest level in the last five years; reiterates its call for all countries to completely abolish the death penalty or establish an immediate moratorium on the use of the death penalty (sentences and executions) as a first step towards its abolition; urges, in this regard, the EU to intensify diplomatic engagement with countries that continue to practise the death penalty, encouraging dialogue and cooperation on human rights issues and providing support for the development of judicial reforms that could lead towards its abolition;

    Right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief

    52. Reiterates its concern regarding violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; is concerned about the worldwide increase in intolerance towards different religious communities; deplores the instrumentalisation of religious or belief identities for political purposes and the exclusion of persons belonging to religious and belief minorities and religious communities, including from political participation, as well as the destruction and vandalism of sites and works of art of cultural and historical value, in certain non-EU countries; stresses that the freedom to choose one’s religion, to believe or not to believe is a human right that cannot be punished; condemns, therefore, the existence and implementation of so-called apostasy laws and blasphemy laws that lead to harsh penalties, degrading treatment and, in some cases, even to death sentences; calls for the abolition of apostasy laws and blasphemy laws; stresses that the Special Envoy for the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief outside the EU should be granted more resources so that he can efficiently carry out his mandate; highlights the need for the Special Envoy to continue to work closely and in a complementary manner with the EUSR for Human Rights and the Council Working Party on Human Rights; calls for the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, to raise these issues at UN human rights forums and to continue working with the relevant UN mechanisms and committees; calls for the EU to request and consolidate reports by EU delegations on the state of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief;

    53. Recalls that most of the drivers of violent conflicts worldwide involve minority grievances of exclusion, discrimination and inequalities linked to violations of the human rights of minorities, as observed by the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues; stresses the need to mainstream the protection of the rights of minorities and for the development of protection mechanisms at the level of the UN; recalls the obligations of states to protect the rights of their national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic minorities within their respective territories; calls on the Commission to support the protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities worldwide, including this as a priority under the human rights and democracy thematic programme of the EU’s NDICI-Global Europe;

    Right to freedom of expression, academic freedom, media freedom and the right to information

    54. Emphasises the critical significance of freedom of expression and access to trustworthy and diverse sources of information for sustaining democracy and a thriving civic space; recalls that democracies can only function when citizens have access to independent and reliable information, making journalists key players in the safeguarding of democracy; is therefore seriously concerned about the increasing restrictions on freedom of expression in numerous countries worldwide, particularly for journalists, through censorship, enforced self-censorship, so-called foreign agents laws and the misuse of counter-terrorism or anti-corruption laws to suppress journalists and civil society groups; is concerned by the use of hate speech against journalists, both online and offline, leading to a deterrent effect; raises concerns, additionally, about the physical security of journalists and media workers and their being targeted in conflict zones; notes the number of journalists killed in conflict situations in 2023, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, has increased alarmingly – by 85 % – since 2022;

    55. Calls urgently for the EU to back trustworthy media and information outlets that promote the accountability of authorities and support democratic transitions, while stressing the need to preserve the principles of pluralism, transparency and independence; highlights the role played by fact checkers in the media landscape, ensuring that the public can trust the information they receive; is concerned that they are therefore major targets for attacks by illiberal regimes that originate and disseminate disinformation, propaganda and fake news; condemns the extensive use of SLAPPs to silence journalists, activists, trade unionists and HRDs globally; welcomes, in this context, the directive designed to shield journalists and HRDs from abusive legal actions and SLAPPs; encourages lawmakers in non-EU countries to develop legislation with the same goal, as part of broader efforts to promote and protect media freedom and pluralism; requests that attacks on media freedom, as well as the persistent and systematic erosion of the right to information, be taken into account in the EU’s monitoring of the compliance of international agreements;

    56. Welcomes the Commission’s plan to finance initiatives that support journalists on legal and practical matters, including beyond the EU, through the European Democracy Action Plan; calls for the EU to strengthen its efforts to aid targeted journalists globally, recalling that independent journalists are on the frontline of the fight against disinformation, which undermines democracies; acknowledges the contribution to achieving this goal of programmes such as the now-defunct Media4Democracy and other EU-funded activities, including those of the European Endowment for Democracy; urges the EU to help make reliable news sources available to more people living in countries that restrict press freedom;

    57. Remains deeply concerned by the deteriorating state of press freedom around the world; condemns the censorship of journalists, HRDs and CSOs through the application of so-called foreign agents laws, as well as other legislative and non-legislative measures adopted by authoritarian and illiberal regimes;

    58. Reaffirms its commitment to protecting and promoting academic freedom as a key component of open and democratic societies; underlines the attacks to academic freedom not only by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, but also by extreme and populist forces worldwide; calls for the development of benchmarks for academic freedom into institutional quality assurance within academic rankings, procedures and criteria;

    59. Notes with concern that more than half of the world’s population lives within environments of completely or severely restricted levels of academic freedom, which has severe consequences for the right to education, the enjoyment of the benefits of scientific progress and the freedom of opinion and expression; urges the EU and its Member States to step up their efforts to halt censorship, threats or attacks on academic freedom, and especially the imprisonment of scholars worldwide; welcomes the inclusion of academics at risk in the EU Human Rights Defenders Mechanism; calls on the Commission to ensure continued high-level support for the Global Campus of Human Rights, which has provided a safe space for students and scholars who had to flee their countries for defending democracy and human rights;

    Rights of indigenous peoples

    60. Notes with regret that indigenous peoples continue to face widespread and systematic discrimination and persecution worldwide, including forced displacements; condemns arbitrary arrests and the killing of human rights and land defenders who stand up for the rights of indigenous peoples; stresses that the promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples and their traditional practices are key to achieving sustainable development, combating climate change and conserving biodiversity; urges governments to pursue development and environmental policies that respect economic, social and cultural rights, and that are inclusive of indigenous peoples and local populations, in line with the UN SDGs; reiterates its call for the EU, its Member States and their partners in the international community to adopt all necessary measures for the recognition, protection and promotion of the rights of indigenous people, including as regards their languages, lands, territories and resources, as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including the principle of free, prior and informed consent; calls on all states to ensure that indigenous peoples and local communities are included in the deliberations and decision-making processes of international climate diplomacy; encourages the Commission to continue to promote dialogue and collaboration between indigenous peoples and the EU;

    Right to public participation

    61. Deplores that the right to participate in free and fair elections is not respected in authoritarian, illiberal, and totalitarian regimes; highlights that these regimes conduct fake elections with the aim of entrenching their power, as they lack real political contestation and pluralism; is alarmed by current trends in electoral processes, such as the increasing decline in electoral participation and democratic performance or the growing disputes concerning the credibility of elections; highlights with deep concern the growing interference by some states in other countries’ elections through hybrid tactics; reaffirms the necessity of increasing political representation of women, young people and vulnerable groups and to guarantee the public participation of minorities; underlines that distrust in the electoral process can be exacerbated not only by irregularities but also by public statements, including from participants; emphasises that public perception of electoral process is as crucial as the process itself, as its manipulation can lead to polarisation or targeted attacks; calls on non-EU countries to reinforce their efforts to clearly communicate all the steps of their respective electoral processes and systems, as well as the existing accountability mechanisms in case of irregularities; calls on the EEAS and the Commission to analyse and report to Parliament their initiatives to tackle the challenges posed by articifical intelligence (AI) in electoral processes;

    Human rights, business and trade

    62. Stresses the role of trade as a major instrument to promote and improve the human rights situation in the EU’s partner countries; urges the Commission to improve coordination between the EU’s trade, investment and development policies and prioritise and promote the development of human rights through EU trade policies, including the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus; notes, however, that there has been little to no improvement in some of the countries concerned; stresses the responsibilities of states and other actors, such as corporations, to mitigate the effects of climate change, prevent their negative impact on human rights and promote appropriate policies in compliance with human rights obligations; deplores the detrimental effects of some excessive and exploitative business activities on human rights and democracy; welcomes the harmonisation resulting from the adoption of the Directive on corporate sustainability due diligence with binding EU rules on responsible corporate behaviour with regard to human, labour and environmental rights; further welcomes the Regulation on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market[12] and calls for its swift implementation at Member State level; calls for the implementation of the EU Ombudsman’s recommendation concerning the creation of a complaint-handling portal, within the framework of EU trade and financial instruments, and for the adaptation of the Commission’s Single Entry Point to allow for the submission of complaints regarding failures to comply with human rights clauses, which should be accessible, citizen-friendly and transparent; calls for the EU to continue its efforts to eliminate child labour, and forced and bonded labour; stresses the importance of remediation and access to justice measures that are in line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, including financial and non-financial measures in consultation with the victims; calls on the Council to adopt an ambitious mandate for the EU to engage in the ongoing negotiations on the UN legally binding instrument on business and human rights as soon as possible;

    63. Highlights that in many regions of the world, micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are often the driving force of local economies with an increasing number of women running them; underlines that MSMEs account for 90 % of businesses, 60 to 70 % of employment and 50 % of gross domestic product worldwide; highlights the importance of MSMEs in their contribution to the 2030 Agenda and the achievement of the SDGs, namely those on the eradication of poverty and decent working conditions for all;

    Human rights and digital technologies

    64. Is concerned by the threat that AI can pose to democracy and human rights, especially if it is not duly regulated; highlights the need for oversight, robust transparency and appropriate safeguards for new and emergent technologies, as well as a human-rights based approach; welcomes the Council conclusions on Digital Diplomacy of 26 June 2023 to strengthen the EU’s role and leadership in global digital governance, in particular its position as a shaper of the global digital rulebook based on democratic principles; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act which aims to harmonise the rules on AI for protecting human rights, and the advantages that AI can bring to human wellbeing; is deeply concerned about the harmful consequences of the misuse of AI and deepfakes, particularly for women and children; notes with concern the adverse effects of the ‘fake content industry’ on the right to information and press freedom, including the rapid development of AI and the subsequent empowerment of the disinformation industry[13]; condemns the use of new and emerging technologies, such as facial recognition technology and digital surveillance, as coercive instruments and their use in the increasing harassment, intimidation and persecution of HRDs, activists, journalists and lawyers; calls on the Council for the listing under the EUGHRSR of state and non-state actors that are engaging in these practices; notes with concern the rapid development of AI in military applications, as well as the potential development and deployment of autonomous systems that could make life-or-death decisions without human input;

    65. Recalls that the international trade in spyware to non-EU countries where such tools are used against human rights activists, journalists and government critics, is a violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter;

    66. Welcomes the adoption in May 2024 of the first Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, aimed at ensuring that activities within the entire life cycle of AI systems are fully consistent with human rights, democracy and the rule of law; reiterates the need for greater legislative attention to be paid to the profound changes arising from activities within the life cycle of AI systems, which have the potential to promote human prosperity, individual and social well-being, sustainable development, gender equality, and the empowerment of all women and girls, but also pose the risk of creating or exacerbating inequalities and incentivising cyber and physical violence, including violence experienced by women and individuals in vulnerable situations;

    67. Stresses that the internet should be a place where freedom of expression prevails; considers, nevertheless, that the rights of individuals need to be respected; is of the opinion that, where applicable, what is considered to be illegal offline, should be considered illegal online; expresses concern for the growing number of internet shutdowns; highlights that internet shutdowns are often used by authoritarian regimes, among others, to silence political dissidence and curb political freedom; calls urgently for the EU to combat this alarming phenomenon, including considering allowing EU-based providers to offer safe communication tools to people who have been thereby deprived of online access; urges the EU to take a firm stance against any attempts by tech giants to circumvent or undermine national legal systems and independent court decisions, and to protect democratic principles and implement measures to maintain the integrity of elections, as well as to protect the right to information, especially during electoral periods;

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    68. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the European Union Special Representative for Human Rights, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Union Heads of Delegation.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Each year, the European Parliament adopts three annual reports on the EU’s foreign, security and defence, and human rights policies.

     

    The three reports are on:

     

     the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy – annual report 2024 (based on the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) – competence of the AFET Committee,

     Human Rights and Democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2024 (based on the EU Annual report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World) – competence of the DROI Subcommittee, and

     the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy – annual report 2024 (based on the report of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy) – competence of the SEDE Subcommittee.

     

    These reports monitor and assess the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the EU policy on Human Rights and the Common Security and Defence Policy. They are a key component of the European Parliament’s contribution to EU foreign policy making, most notably in regard to the strengthened right of scrutiny conferred to the European Parliament by the Treaty of Lisbon. It is essential that the European Parliament responds to the annual reports issued by other institutions as soon as they are published.

    ANNEX I: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, until the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    European Partnership for Democracy/International Dalit Solidarity Network

    Clean Clothes Campaign

    Protection International

    Race & Equality

    FIDH – International Federation for Human Rights

    International Partnership for Human Rights

    Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

    Front Line Defenders

    Save the Children

    Avocats Sans Frontières

    Center for Reproductive Rights

    Reporters without Borders

    End FGM European Network

     

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

     

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do ), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

    ANNEX II: INDIVIDUAL CASES RAISED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT FROM DECEMBER 2023 TO JANUARY 2025

     

    COUNTRY

     

    Individual

    BACKGROUND

    ACTION TAKEN BY THE PARLIAMENT

    AFGHANISTAN

     

    Manizha Seddiqi Ahmad Fahim Azimi

    Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee  Ezatullah Zwab

    Manizha Seddiqi, Ahmad Fahim Azimi, Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee and Ezatullah Zwab are human rights defenders who have been detained in Afghanistan.

    In its resolution of 14 March 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the arbitrary detention of human rights defenders, including Manizha Seddiqi, Ahmad Fahim Azimi, Sediqullah Afghan, Fardin Fedayee and Ezatullah Zwab;

     

    – Calls for victims of violence against women and girls to be released from prison, where they are being held in inhumane conditions to the detriment of their mental and physical health.

     

    ALGERIA

     

    Boualem Sansal

    French-Algerian writer Boualem Sansal was detained on 16 November 2024 by the Algerian authorities, his whereabouts remained unknown for over a week, during which time he was denied access to his family and legal counsel; he was subsequently charged with national security-related offences under Article 87bis of the Algerian Penal Code, and he is awaiting trial.

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the arrest and detention of Boualem Sansal and calls for his immediate and unconditional release;

     

    – Equally condemns the arrests of all other activists, political prisoners, journalists, human rights defenders and others detained or sentenced for exercising their right to freedom of opinion and expression, including journalist Abdelwakil Blamm and writer Tadjadit Mohamed, and calls for their release;

     

    – Reiterates, as enshrined in the EU-Algeria Partnership Priorities, the importance of the rule of law in order to consolidate freedom of expression; stresses that renewing this agreement must be based upon continued and substantial progress in the aforementioned domains and underscores that all future disbursements of EU funds should consider the progress made in this regard.

     

    AZERBAIJAN

     

    Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu

    Ilhamiz Guliyev

    Ulvi Hasanli Sevinj Vagifgizi

    Nargiz Absalamova

    Hafiz Babali,

    Elnara Gasimova Aziz Orujov

    Rufat Muradli

    Avaz Zeynalli

    Elnur Shukurov

    Alasgar Mammadli

    Farid Ismayilov

     

    Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist and opposition figure, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life.

     

    Ilhamiz Guliyev, a human rights defender, was arbitrarily arrested on 4 December 2023 on dubious accusations of drug trafficking after he testified as whistleblower about the police tampering with evidence against government critics; he is facing up to 12 years in prison.

     

    Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev are political prisoners, and Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov are human rights defenders and journalists.

    In its resolution of 25 April 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release Ilhamiz Guliyev; notes that Gubad Ibadoghlu has been released and placed under house arrest and calls on the authorities to lift the travel ban and drop all charges against him; calls on Azerbaijan to urgently ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad;

     

    – Urges Azerbaijan to immediately and unconditionally release all other political prisoners, including Tofig Yagublu, Akif Gurbanov, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, human rights defenders and journalists Ulvi Hasanli, Sevinj Vagifgizi, Nargiz Absalamova, Hafiz Babali, Elnara Gasimova, Aziz Orujov, Rufat Muradli, Avaz Zeynalli, Elnur Shukurov, Alasgar Mammadli, Farid Ismayilov, as well as EU and other nationals.

     

    AZERBAIJAN

     

    Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Kamran Mammadli, Rufat Safarov and Meydan TV

    Political prisoner and 2024 Sakharov Prize finalist Gubad Ibadoghlu remains under house arrest; the European Court of Human Rights ruled that his health condition is critical, requiring hospitalisation and urgent heart surgery.

     

    Civil society leader Anar Mammadli has been in pre-trial detention since April 2024 on bogus charges, with his health deteriorating due to denied healthcare.

     

    In early December 2024, the Azerbaijani authorities arrested MeydanTV journalists Aynur Ganbarova, Aytaj Ahmadova, Khayala Agayeva, Natig Javadli and Aysel Umudova, and journalists Ramin Jabrayilzade and Ahmad Mukhtar; they also arrested Baku Journalism School deputy director Ulvi Tahirov, political leader Azer Gasimli and human rights defender Rufat Safarov; all face unfounded, politically motivated charges.

     

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to immediately end the crackdown on all dissident groups and unconditionally release and drop all charges against human rights defenders, journalists and political and other activists prosecuted under fabricated, politically motivated charges;

     

    – Demands that the authorities immediately lift the travel ban on Ibadoghlu, unconditionally drop all charges against him and allow him to receive urgent treatment abroad; deplores the fact that Ibadoghlu was not allowed to attend the Sakharov Prize ceremony or connect remotely;

     

    – Calls on Azerbaijan to lift undue restrictions on independent media by aligning its laws on the registration and funding of non-governmental groups and media with Venice Commission recommendations; demands that the authorities end the repression of MeydanTV, ToplumTV, Abaz Media and Kanal13;

     

    – Calls for EU sanctions under its global human rights sanctions regime to be imposed on Azerbaijani officials responsible for serious human rights violations, including Fuad Alasgarov, Vilayat Eyvazov and Ali Naghiyev.

     

    BELARUS

     

    Marina Adamovich, Mikalai Statkevich  Tatsiana Seviarynets, Pavel Seviarynets Daria Losik

    Ihar Losik

    Mikalai Kazlou

    Ryhor Kastusiou Mikalai Statkevich Pavel Seviarynets

    Marina Adamovich, wife of Mikalai Statkevich (political prisoner), Tatsiana Seviarynets, mother of Pavel Seviarynets (political prisoner), and earlier-arrested Daria Losik, wife of Ihar Losik (political prisoner), have suffered interrogations and detentions by the KGB. 

     

    Mikalai Kazlou, Ryhor Kastusiou, Mikalai Statkevich and Pavel Seviarynets, all political prisoners, face isolation, torture, denial of medical care and forced labour.

    In its resolution of 14 December 2023, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the recent wave of mass arrests in Belarus and urges the illegitimate Lukashenka regime to cease repression, especially any gender-based persecution, and reminds the regime of its international obligations;

     

    – Calls for the immediate unconditional release and compensation of all more than 1 400 political prisoners, as well as their families and arbitrarily detained persons, while restoring their full rights.

     

    BELARUS

     

    Mikola Statkevich

    Ales Bialiatski

    Maria Kalesnikava Siarhei Tsikhanouski Viktar Babaryka Maksim Znak

    Pavel Sevyarynets Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk

    Andrzej Poczobut  Ihar Losik

    Former presidential candidate and 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate Mikola Statkevich has been imprisoned on politically motivated charges for 14 years; he is kept in solitary confinement under maximum security; his health is deteriorating and his lawyers and family have been denied information and contact for over 300 days.

     

    Prominent Belarusian political prisoners, including Ales Bialiatski, Maria Kalesnikava, Siarhei Tsikhanouski, Viktar Babaryka, Maksim Znak, Pavel Sevyarynets, Palina Sharenda-Panasiuk, Andrzej Poczobut and Ihar Losik, have been subjected to similar isolation.

    In its resolution of 8 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Demands the immediate, unconditional release of Mikola Statkevich and all 1 500 political prisoners; calls for the withdrawal of all charges against them, their full rehabilitation and financial compensation for the damage suffered as a result of being deprived of liberty;

     

    – Insists that the prisoners must receive proper medical assistance and access to lawyers, family, diplomats and international organisations, which can assess their condition and provide aid; regrets the inaction of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Belarus;

     

    – Strongly condemns the unjustified, politically motivated sentences and continued repression of Belarusian democratic forces, civil society, human rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists, clergy, political activists and their family members.

     

    CHINA

     

    Ding Yuande

    Ma Ruimei

     

    On 12 May 2023 Falun Gong practitioners Mr Ding Yuande and his wife Ms Ma Ruimei were arrested without a warrant; Ms Ma was released on bail, but was then intimidated by police because of a rescue campaign launched by their son abroad.

     

    Mr Ding was detained with no family visits for eight months; on 15 December 2023 he was sentenced to three years in prison with a CNY 15 000 fine.

    In its resolution of 18 January 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly urges the PRC to immediately end the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and other minorities, including Uyghurs and Tibetans; demands the immediate and unconditional release of Mr Ding and all Falun Gong practitioners in China;

     

    – Calls for the PRC to end domestic and transnational surveillance and control and the suppression of religious freedom; urges the PRC to abide by its obligations under international law and its own constitution to respect and protect human rights.

     

    CHINA

     

    Ilham Tohti

    Gulshan Abbas

    In 2014 Ilham Tohti was convicted of politically motivated charges of ‘separatism’ and sentenced to life imprisonment; he worked to foster dialogue between Uyghurs and Han Chinese; he was awarded the 2019 Sakharov Prize. Gulshan Abbas has been serving a 20-year sentence on fallacious terrorism-related charges relating to activities of her sister, a defender of the human rights of persecuted Uyghurs in the PRC.

     

     

    Gulshan Abbas, is a Uyghur retired doctor, who was forcibly disappeared in retaliation of her sisters public criticism of the treatment of Uyghurs. She has received a 20-year sentence in 2020, for participating in a terrorist organisation.

     

    In its resolution of 10 October 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the PRC’s violations of the human rights of Uyghurs and people in Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and mainland China;

     

    – Urges the PRC to immediately and unconditionally release Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas, as well as those arbitrarily detained in China and those mentioned by the EU during the 57th session of the UN Human Rights Council, guarantee their access to medical care and lawyers, provide information on their whereabouts and ensure family visiting rights; calls for the EU and the Member States to apply pressure in this respect at every high-level contact;

     

    – Demands that the PRC authorities halt their repression and targeting of Uyghurs with abusive policies, including intense surveillance, forced labour, sterilisation, birth prevention measures and the destruction of Uyghur identity, which amount to crimes against humanity and a serious risk of genocide; calls for the closure of all internment camps;

     

    – Strongly condemns the PRC for not implementing the recommendations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); calls on the PRC to allow the OHCHR independent access to XUAR and invites the OHCHR to issue a comprehensive situational update and an action plan for holding the PRC accountable;

     

    – Welcomes the EU’s forced labour regulation and insists on its full implementation; calls on businesses operating in the PRC, particularly in XUAR, to comply with their HR due diligence obligations.

     

    CUBA

     

    José Daniel Ferrer Garcia

     

    Human rights defender and opposition leader José Daniel Ferrer García was detained on 11 July 2021 in the context of widespread protests in Cuba, and has been held in isolation since 14 August 2021; the Cuban regime has imprisoned, harassed and intimidated him for over a decade for his peaceful political activism; since March 2023, he has been held incommunicado and his family have received no information about his health and have been denied the right to visit him.

    In its resolution of 19 September 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – The Cuban regime holds political prisoners in the most appalling conditions; whereas reports indicate that José Daniel Ferrer is in a critical condition and has been held without access to medical treatment, with inadequate food and in unsanitary conditions, which constitute forms of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment;

     

    – The human rights situation in Cuba is alarming, particularly for dissidents, who are subjected to worrying levels of surveillance and arbitrary detention; whereas the number of political prisoners is unknown but reliable sources state that the regime holds over a thousand prisoners, including minors; whereas among the many political prisoners are Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara and Lizandra Gongora, whose health condition is critical;

     

    – Urges the Cuban regime to immediately and unconditionally release José Daniel Ferrer and all persons politically and arbitrarily detained for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;

     

    – Condemns the torture and inhuman, degrading and ill-treatment perpetrated by the Cuban authorities against José Daniel Ferrer and the other political prisoners; calls for the families of victims of the regime’s persecution to be granted immediate access to them, pending their release, and for the victims to be given medical care.

     

    CRIMEA

    Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov

    Crimean journalist and human rights defender Iryna Danylovych was abducted in 2022, accused of possessing explosives and sentenced to 6 years and 11 months of imprisonment; NGO activist Tofik Abdulhaziiev was arrested in 2019 and sentenced to 12 years in a maximum security prison on trumped-up charges, and since 2023 is being held in a prison some 2 700 km away from Crimea; citizen journalist Amet Suleymanov was sentenced to 12 years of prison in 2021.

     

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns Russia’s continuous targeting of ethnic Ukrainians and systematic persecution of indigenous Crimean Tatars, which aims to erase their identity, heritage and culture, echoing, for the Crimean Tatars, the genocidal deportations of 1944; considers that Crimea’s future is tied to its recognition as the Crimean Tatars’ historic homeland;

     

    – Condemns the persecution of journalists, civil society activists and human rights defenders and the deportation of civilians including political prisoners from Crimea to penitentiary institutions across Russia, contrary to international law;

     

    – Demands the immediate and unconditional release of Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov and other political prisoners; calls for immediate medical care to be provided; denounces the upholding of verdicts against seriously ill individuals, which constitutes a blatant violation of international human rights standards; calls on the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN to establish the whereabouts of civilian detainees from Crimea.

     

    DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

     

    Jean-Jacques Wondo

    Jean-Jacques Wondo, a Belgian-Congolese security, military and political expert, was arrested following a failed coup on 19 May 2024, for which he was accused of being the ‘intellectual perpetrator’, on 13 September 2024, Wondo and 36 others were sentenced to death by a military court.

     

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the sentencing to death of Wondo and others and the grave violations of their right to a fair trial;

     

    – Urges the DRC Government to immediately overturn the death sentences, reinstate a moratorium on executions and take steps towards the full abolition of the death penalty;

     

    –  Expresses deep concern about Wondo’s deteriorating health, calls for him to be given immediate access to medical treatment and insists on his immediate release;

     

    – Calls for systemic reforms to be implemented in the DRC to rebuild the judiciary into an independent, fair and efficient institution that guarantees due process and the protection of fundamental rights.

     

    GREECE

     

    George Karaivaz

    George Karaivaz was a journalist who have been murdered on 9 April 2021.

    In its resolution of 7 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Is deeply concerned by the failure of law enforcement and the judicial authorities in Greece to make progress in the investigation into the murder of the Greek journalist George Karaivaz on 9 April 2021; notes that two suspects were arrested in April 2023, but otherwise there has not been any discernible activity in the police investigation; strongly urges the authorities to take all the necessary steps towards conducting a thorough and effective investigation, and to bring those involved in the murder, at any level, to justice; urges the authorities to request assistance from Europol.

     

    HONG KONG

     

    Andy Li

    Joseph John

    Andy Li, a pro-democracy activist and key witness in Jimmy Lai’s trial, allegedly confessed, under torture, to conspiracy and collusion with foreign entities.

     

    Joseph John, a HK-Portuguese dual national, is the first extraterritorial application of the NSL to an EU citizen; John was arrested for allegedly posting anti-China social media content and committing, from Europe, incitement to ‘secession’, and was sentenced on 11 April 2024 to five years’ imprisonment.

    In its resolution of 25 April 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release Li, John, Lai, Kok Tsz-lun and all other pro-democracy representatives and activists detained for exercising their freedoms and democratic rights, and to drop all charges against them;

     

    – Highlights the SNSO’s undermining of press freedoms; calls on the authorities to stop harassing and prosecuting journalists.

     

    HONG KONG/ CHINA

     

    Jimmy Lai

    Jimmy Lai has been detained since 2020 on trumped-up charges; his trial started in 2023 after various delays; he denied these charges and faces life imprisonment; his British lawyer has been refused permission to represent him. Jimmy Lai a British national since 1996, is a Hong Kong media tycoon, and a known pro- democracy supporter.  Political prisoners in HK endure difficult conditions, often affecting their health, throughout lengthy pre-trial detentions, as with 76-year-old Lai, who has diabetes and has been denied Communion in prison.

     

    45 pro-democracy politicians, activists and journalists were sentenced for subversion, in the ‘Hong Kong 47’ case, for organising unofficial election primaries; their trials were the largest national security trials to date;

     

    In its resolution of 28 November 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the sentencing of pro-democracy activists on national security charges, in violation of international law; calls for the repeal of the NSL and the SNSO; denounces the degradation of basic freedoms in HK;

     

    – Urges the HK Government to immediately and unconditionally release all pro-democracy activists, including Lai and Chung, and to drop all charges against them;

     

    – Calls on the EEAS and the Member States to warn China that its actions in HK will have consequences for EU-China relations; calls on the Council to review its 2020 conclusions on HK and to impose targeted sanctions on John Lee and other HK and Chinese officials responsible for human rights violations, to revoke HK’s favourable customs treatment and review the status of the HK Economic Trade Office in Brussels; urges the Member States to file an ICJ case against China’s decision to impose the NSL on HK and Macau.

     

    IRAN

     

    Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi

    Kurdish activists, social worker Pakhshan Azizi and advocate for women’s rights Verisheh (Wrisha) Moradi were sentenced to death for ‘armed rebellion against the state’.

    In its resolution of 23 January 2025, the European Parliament:

     

    – Denounces the Iranian regime’s unrestrained repression of human rights, in particular the targeting of women activists; strongly condemns the death sentence against Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi; demands that Iran immediately and unconditionally release all unjustly imprisoned human rights defenders and political prisoners, including Pakhshan Azizi, Wrisha Moradi and at least 56 other political prisoners on death row;

     

    – Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase support for Iranian human rights defenders and expresses its full support and solidarity with Iranians united in the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement;

     

    – Urges the Iranian authorities to immediately release, safely repatriate and drop all charges against EU nationals, including Olivier Grondeau, Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and Ahmadreza Djalali; strongly condemns Iran’s use of hostage diplomacy; calls for the EU and its Member States to undertake joint diplomatic efforts and work collectively towards their release;

     

    – Strongly condemns the murder of Jamshid Sharmahd; urges the Islamic regime in Iran to provide details of the circumstances of his death and for his remains to be immediately returned to his family;

     

    – Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and to extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for human rights violations, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, Prosecutor-General Mohammad Movahedi-Azad and Judge Iman Afshari;

     

    – Urges the Iranian authorities to provide the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Iran and the UN fact-finding mission with full, unimpeded access to enact their mandates.

     

    KYRGYZSTAN

     

    Temirlan Sultanbekov

    Temirlan Sultanbekov is the leader of the Kyrgyzstan Social Democrats party (SDK), he and other party officials have been arrested for vote-buying allegations, with an audiotape of unknown origin serving as the primary evidence, for which the judicial authorisation is unclear and its connection with the detainees unknown.

    In its resolution of 19 December 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to immediately release Mr Sultanbekov and other party officials and adopt alternative measures to detention, while respecting their right to due process in line with the civil and political rights guaranteed under the Kyrgyz constitution and international obligations; calls on the authorities to ensure his safety and well-being;

     

    – Urges the Kyrgyz government to halt its campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, independent media outlets and journalists; is concerned by the adoption of the Russian-style ‘foreign agents’ law; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to drop all charges against human rights defenders, including Makhabat Tazhibek Kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aktilek Kaparov and Ayke Beishekeeva, journalists from the Temirov Live and Ait Ait Dese channels.

     

    RUSSIA

     

    Alexei Navalny

    Vladimir Kara-Murza

    Yuri Dmitriev

    Ilya Yashin

    Alexei Gorinov

    Lilia Chanysheva Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin

    Daniel Kholodny Vadim Kobzev

    Igor Sergunin

    Alexei Liptser Viktoria Petrova Maria Ponomarenko Alexandra Skochilenko

    Svetlana Petriychuk Evgenia Berkovich Dmitry Ivanov

    Ioann Kurmoyarov Igor Baryshnikov Dmitry Talantov Alexei Moskalev

    Oleg Orlov

    Boris Kagarlitsky

    Ivan Safronov

     

    Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian political figure and the 2021 laureate of the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, perished in a Siberian penal colony north of the Arctic Circle while serving a unfounded, politically motivated prison sentence. He had been in detention since 17 January 2021, the date on which he returned to Russia following medical rehabilitation after an attempted state-sponsored assassination using the internationally banned nerve agent Novichok; he had previously been detained and arrested many times and had been sentenced, on fabricated and politically motivated grounds, to long prison terms in evident attempts to stop his political activities and anti-corruption campaigns.

     

    Vladimir Kara-Murza, Yuri Dmitriev, Ilya Yashin, Alexei Gorinov, Lilia Chanysheva, Ksenia Fadeeva, Vadim Ostanin, Daniel Kholodny, Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin, Alexei Liptser, Viktoria Petrova, Maria Ponomarenko, Alexandra Skochilenko, Svetlana Petriychuk, Evgenia Berkovich, Dmitry Ivanov, Ioann Kurmoyarov, Igor Baryshnikov, Dmitry Talantov, Alexei Moskalev, Oleg Orlov, Boris Kagarlitsky and Ivan Safronov are political prisoners.

     

    In its resolution of 29 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the murder of Alexei Navalny; expresses its wholehearted condolences to his family, associates and colleagues, and to his countless supporters across Russia; expresses its full support to Yulia Navalnaya in her determination to continue the work started by Alexei Navalny with her support, and to the Anti-Corruption Foundation founded by Navalny, which is continuing its work under the new circumstances;

     

    – Calls on the Russian authorities to drop all arbitrary charges and to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons.

    TAJIKISTAN

     

    Abdullo Ghurbati Daler Imomali Zavqibek Saidamini Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva Khushruz Jumayev Khurshed Fozilov

    Manuchehr Kholiknazarov Buzurgmehr Yorov

     

    Abdullo Ghurbati, Daler Imomali, Zavqibek Saidamini, Abdusattor Pirmuhammadzoda, Ulfatkhonim Mamadshoeva, Khushruz Jumayev and Khurshed Fozilov are journalists who have been sentenced to between seven and over 20 years in prison in retaliation for their coverage of social issues and human rights abuses, including in GBAO.

     

    Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Buzurgmehr Yorov  are human rights lawyers who have been detained.

    In its resolution of 18 January 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Strongly condemns the ongoing crackdown, including anti-extremism legislation, against independent media, government critics, human rights activists and independent lawyers; condemns the closure of independent media and websites, including the online media outlets Pamir Daily News, New Tajikistan 2 and Akhbor.com;

     

    – Condemns all politically motivated trials and the lack of fair and public hearings by independent courts; urges the authorities to stop persecuting journalists, immediately and unconditionally release those who have been arbitrarily detained and drop all charges against them, stop the persecution of lawyers defending government critics and release human rights lawyers Manuchehr Kholiknazarov and Buzurgmehr Yorov;

     

    – Urges the government to ensure that detainees have access to adequate healthcare; calls for a thorough investigation into allegations of mistreatment in custody and forced confessions, and those responsible to be brought to justice.

     

    TÜRKIYE

     

    Bülent Mumay

    Bülent Mumay is a Turkish journalist and coordinator of the Istanbul bureau of Deutsche Welle’s Turkish editorial office, was sentenced to 20 months in prison for social media posts about a pro-government company’s seizure of Istanbul Municipality’s subway funds during the AKP administration; his appeal was rejected, and his tweets removed.

    In its resolution of 10 October 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Condemns the sentence against Bülent Mumay, which follows a broader pattern of silencing critical journalism; calls on the Turkish authorities to drop the charges against Bülent Mumay, and all arbitrarily detained media workers and journalists, as well as political opponents, human rights defenders, civil servants and academics;

     

      Is deeply concerned about the ongoing deterioration of democratic standards in Türkiye, relentless crackdown on any critical voices and targeting of independent journalists, activists and opposition members amid frequent reports of legal intimidation, censorship and financial coercion as ways to suppress criticism and investigative journalism.

     

    VENEZUELA

     

    Rocío San Miguel

    General Hernández Da Costa 

    Ronald Ojeda

    María Corina Machado

    Juan Freites

    Luis Camacaro Guillermo Lopez Emil Brandt

     

    Rocío San Miguel is a lawyer and human rights activist with Spanish nationality, who got kidnapped by the Venezuelan regime on 9 February 2024, and sentenced on politically motivated grounds of suspected conspiracy against Nicolás Maduro and his regime; she is currently being detained in El Helicoide prison, which is known for human rights abuses, including torture.

     

    Hernández Da Costa has been a political prisoner since August 2018; on 19 February 2024, he was forcibly transferred to El Rodeo 1 prison, designed to detain political prisoners; an unknown number of prisoners, including some EU citizens, were also transferred; the general suffers from medical ailments that require constant treatment, which he is being denied.

     

    Ronald Ojeda was a former political prisoner who escaped the Maduro regime, and got murdered in Chile.

     

    Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro, Guillermo Lopez and Emil Brandt are four campaign coordinators working for the opposition to the regime’s presidential candidate, and have been detained on political grounds.

     

    In its resolution of 14 March 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Demands the immediate unconditional release of all political prisoners and arbitrarily detained persons, and the full restoration of their rights; exhorts the regime to cease its policy of repression and attacks on civil society and the opposition;

     

    – Strongly condemns the Maduro regime for imprisoning hundreds of political prisoners;

     

    – Calls on the international community to support a return to democracy in Venezuela, particularly in the light of the upcoming elections, in which the leader of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, must be allowed to fully participate.

    VENEZUELA

     

    Maria Corina Machado

    Juan Freites

    Luis Camacaro Guillermo López

    Maria Corina Machado was selected as the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, winning with 92,35 % of the votes in the primary elections. She got a disqualification of 15 years.

     

    For several months, members of María Corina Machado’s campaign team – including Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo López, who were unlawfully detained and have since been reported missing.

    In its resolution of 8 February 2024, the European Parliament:

     

    – Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all the arbitrarily arrested political and social leaders, including three campaign staffers of the presidential candidate of the opposition to the regime María Corina Machado, namely Juan Freites, Luis Camacaro and Guillermo Lopez;

     

    – Strongly condemns the attempts to disqualify the presidential candidate of the democratic opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and others, such as Henrique Capriles, from holding public office;

     

    – Urges the Venezuelan regime to immediately stop the persecution of the primary winner and thus fully legitimate candidate of the opposition to the regime, María Corina Machado, and other opposition politicians.

     

     

     

     

    ANNEX III: LIST OF SAKHAROV PRIZE LAUREATES AND FINALISTS IMPRISONED AND DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY

     

    Year of Sakharov Prize award

    Name and surname

    Laureate / Finalist

    Country

    Situation (Detention / house arrest / temporarily released)

    Length of prison sentence

    Start date of detention

    2024

    Gubad Ibadoghlu

    Finalist

    Azerbaijan

    Under travel ban

     

    A court rejected Ibadoglu’s appeal against the travel ban on 3/12/2024

    2021

    Alexei Navalny

    Laureate

     

    Russia

    Deceased in prison on 16/2/2024

     

    3,5 + 9 + 19 years

    Last detained 17/2/21, last sentenced 4/8/23

    2020

    Siarhei Tsikhanouski

     

    Maryia Kalesnikava

     

    Mikola Statkevich

     

     

    Ales Bialiatski

    Laureate

     

    Laureate

     

    Laureate

     

     

    Laureate

    Belarus

     

    Detention

     

    Detention

     

    Detention

     

     

    Detention

    18 years

     

    11 years

     

    14 years

     

     

    10 years

     

    Detained 29/5/20, sentenced 14/12/21

    Detained 07/9/20, sentenced 06/9/21

    Last detained 31/5/20, last sentenced 14/12/21

    Last detained 15/7/21, last sentenced 03/03/23

    2020

    Porfirio Sorto Cedillo, José Avelino Cedillo, Orbin Naún Hernández, Kevin Alejandro Romero, Arnold Javier Aleman, Ever Alexander Cedillo, Daniel Marquez and Jeremías Martínez Díaz

    Finalists

    Honduras

    Detention

    Unknown

    1/9/2019, released on 24/2/2022, after a ruling by the Supreme Court of Honduras

    2019

    Ilham Tohti

    Laureate

    China

    Detention

    Unknown

    23/9/2014

    2018

    Nasser Zefzafi

     

    Finalist

    Morocco

    Detention

    20 years

    5/4/2019

    2017

    Dawit Isaak

    Finalist

    Eritrea

    Incommunicado detention

    Unknown

    23/9/2001

    2015

    Raif Badawi

    Laureate

    Saudi Arabia

    Released on 11/3/2022, since then under a 10-year travel ban

     

    10 years

    First sentenced on 17/12/2012, but announced on 30/3/2013

    2012

    Nasrin Sotoudeh

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Jafar Panahi

    Laureate

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Laureate

    Iran

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Iran

    Detention, on temporary medical furlough since July 2021, arrested again 29/10/2023 and released 15/11/2023

     

    Detained in 2022,

    released on 3/2/2023 after hunger strike

    38 years

     

     

     

     

     

     

    6 years

    6/3/2019 (most recent)

     

     

     

     

     

    compelled in July 2022 to serve a 10-years old prison sentence

    2011

    Razan Zaitouneh

    Laureate

    Syria

    Kidnapped in 2013. Presumptions of detention and death.

     

    9/12/2013

    2009

    Memorial – Oleg Orlov

    Laureate

     

     

    Russia

    Released on 1/8/2024 as part of a prisoner exchange with the US and Germany

    2.5 years

    Latest sentence in February 2024. Memorial as legal entity liquidated in January 2022.

     

     

    ANNEX IV: LIST OF RESOLUTIONS

    List of resolutions adopted by the European Parliament from December 2023 to January 2025 and related directly or indirectly to human rights violations in the world

     

     

    Country/Region

    Date of adoption in plenary

     

    Title

    Africa

     

     

    Algeria

    23.01.2025

    The case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria

    Democratic Republic of the Congo

    23.01.2025

    The case of Jean-Jacques Wondo

     

    Gambia

     

    25.04.2024

    On the proposed repeal of the law banning female genital mutilation in The Gambia

    Nigeria

    08.02.2024

    On the recent attacks on Christmas Eve in Plateau State in Nigeria

    Sudan

    18.01.2024

    On the threat of famine following the spread of the conflict in Sudan

    Tanzania

    14.12.2023

    On the Maasai Communities in Tanzania

    Americas

     

     

    Cuba

    29.02.2024

    On the critical situation in Cuba

    Cuba

    19.09.2024

    The case of José Daniel Ferrer García in Cuba

    Guatemala

    14.12.2023

    On the attempt at a coup d’état in Guatemala

    Venezuela

    08.02.2024

    On further repression against the democratic forces in Venezuela: attacks on presidential candidate María Corina Machado

     

    Venezuela

     

    14.03.2024

    On the case of Rocío San Miguel and General Hernández Da Costa, among other political prisoners in Venezuela

    Venezuela

    19.09.2024

    Situation on Venezuela

    Venezuela

    23.01.2025

    Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025

    Asia

     

     

     

    Afghanistan

     

     

    14.03.2024

    On the repressive environment in Afghanistan, including public executions and violence against women

    Afghanistan

    19.09.2024

    The deteriorating situation of women in Afghanistan due to the recent adoption of the law on the “Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice”

     

    Azerbaijan

     

    25.04.2024

    On Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev

    Azerbaijan

    19.12.2024

    Continued repression of civil society and independent media in Azerbaijan and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Kamran Mammadli, Rufat Safarov and Meydan TV

    Cambodia

    28.11.2024

    The shrinking space for civil society in Cambodia, in particular the case of the labour rights organisation CENTRAL

     

    China

     

    18.01.2024

    On the ongoing persecution of Falun Gong in China, notably the case of Mr Ding Yuande

    China

     

    10.10.2024

    The cases of unjustly imprisoned Uyghurs in China, notably Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas

    China/ Taiwan

    24.10.2024

    Misinterpretation of UN resolution 2758 by the People’s Republic of China and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan

     

    Hong Kong

     

    25.04.2024

    On the new security law in Hong Kong and the cases of Andy Li and Joseph John

    Hong Kong/ China

     

    28.11.2024

    Hong Kong, notably the cases of Jimmy Lai and the 45 activists recently convicted under the national security law

    Kyrgyzstan

    19.12.2024

    Human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov

    Tajikistan

    18.01.2024

    On Tajikistan: state repression against the independent media

     

    Tibet

     

    14.12.2023

    On the abduction of Tibetan children and forced assimilation practices through Chinese boarding schools in Tibet

    Middle East

     

     

     

    Iran/Israel

     

    25.04.2024

    On Iran’s unprecedented attack against Israel, the need for de-escalation and an EU response

     

    Iran

     

    08.02.2024

    On the increased number of executions in Iran, in particular the case of Mohammad Ghobadlou

    Iran

    28.11.2024

    The increasing and systematic repression of women in Iran

    Iran

    23.01.2025

    Systematic repression of human rights in Iran

    Iraq

    10.10.2024

    Iraq, notably the situation of women’s rights and the recent proposal to amend the Personal Status Law

     

    Palestine

     

    18.01.2024

    On the humanitarian situation in Gaza, the need to reach a ceasefire and the risks of regional escalation

     

    Palestine

     

    14.03.2024

    On the immediate risk of mass starvation in Gaza and the attacks on humanitarian aid deliveries

    Europe and Eastern Partnership countries

     

     

     

    Azerbaijan/Armenia

     

    13.03.2024

    On closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia

    Azerbaijan/ Armenia

    24.10.2024

    Situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

     

    Belarus

     

    14.12.2023

    On the unknown status of Mikola Statkevich and the recent attacks on Belarusian politicians’ and activists’ family members

     

    Belarus

     

    08.02.2024

    on the new wave of mass arrests in Belarus of opposition activists and their family members

    Belarus

    19.09.2024

    The severe situation of political prisoners in Belarus

    Belarus

    22.01.2025

    Actions to address the continued oppression and fake elections in Belarus

    Crimea

    19.12.2024

    11th year of the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and the deteriorating human rights situation in occupied Crimea, notably the cases of Iryna Danylovych, Tofik Abdulhaziiev and Amet Suleymanov

     

    Georgia

     

    25.04.2024

    On attempts to reintroduce a foreign agent law in Georgia and its restrictions on civil society

    Georgia

    09.10.2024

    The democratic backsliding and threats to political pluralism in Georgia

    Georgia

    28.11.2024

    Georgia’s worsening democratic crisis following the recent parliamentary elections and alleged electoral fraud

    Greece

    07.02.2024

    On the rule of law and media freedom in Greece

     

    Hungary

     

    24.04.2024

    On ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications

    Hungary

    18.01.2024

    On the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds

    Moldova

    09.10.2024

    Strengthening Moldova’s resilience against Russian interference ahead of the upcoming presidential elections and a constitutional referendum on EU integration

     

    Russia

     

    29.02.2024

    On the murder of Alexei Navalny and the need for EU action in support of political prisoners and oppressed civil society in Russia

     

    Russia

     

    08.02.2024

    On Russiagate: allegations of Russian interference in the democratic processes of the European Union

     

     

    Russia

     

     

    25.04.2024

    On new allegations of Russian interference in the European Parliament, in the upcoming EU elections and the impact on the European Union

     

    Russia

     

    25.04.2024

    On Russia’s undemocratic presidential elections and their illegitimate extension to the occupied territories

    Russia

     

    14.11.2024

    EU actions against the Russian shadow fleets and ensuring a full enforcement of sanctions against Russia

    Russia

     

    23.01.2025

    Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine

    Russia/ North Korea

    28.11.2024

    Reinforcing EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia

    Serbia

    08.02.2024

    On the situation in Serbia following the elections

     

    Slovakia

     

    17.01.2024

    On the planned dissolution of key anti-corruption structures in Slovakia and its implications for the rule of law

    Türkiye

    10.10.2024

    European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye

    Cross-cutting issues

     

     

    Children liberty

    13.12.2023

    On the situation of children deprived of liberty in the world

     

    LGBTIQ rights

     

    08.02.2024

    On the implementation of the EU LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025

     

     

    Protection of journalists

     

     

    27.02.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings

     

    Human rights and democracy

     

    28.02.2024

    Human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter – annual report 2023

    Foreign and security policy

    28.02.2024

    Implementation of the common foreign and security policy – annual report 2023

     

     

    Media freedom

     

     

    13.03.2024

    On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market

     

     

    Forced labour

     

     

    23.04.2024

    On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market

    Right of abortion

    11.04.2024

    On including the right to abortion in the EU Fundamental Rights Charter

     

     

    Due diligence

     

     

    24.04.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence and amending Directive

     

    Fundamental rights

     

    18.01.2024

    On the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023

    Hate speech

    18.01.2024

    On extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime

     

     

    Business and human rights

     

     

    18.01.2024

    On shaping the EU’s position on the UN binding instrument on business and human rights, in particular on access to remedy and the protection of victims

    Freedom of scientific research

    17.01.2024

    On promotion of the freedom of scientific research in the EU

    Citizens, equality, rights and values

    16.01.2024

    On the implementation of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme 2021-2027

     

     

    Violence against women

     

     

    24.04.2024

    On the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating violence against women and domestic violence

     

    Human beings traffic

     

    23.04.2024

    On preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Impact of the Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership Agreement on EU-Iran relations – E-000208/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU has always been very clear on Iran’s unacceptable military support to Russia and has repeatedly called on Iran to immediately cease any direct or indirect assistance to Russia, which constitutes a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter[1].

    The Russia-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership signals that the two countries intend to work even closer together in many areas.

    The EU will monitor very closely the implications of this agreement, as well as its potential impact on EU security and the rules-based international system and will react resolutely if needed.

    • [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf
    Last updated: 26 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The consequent steps to be taken by the EU with regard to Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestinian territories – E-002219/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Council would refer to its reply to Written Question E-001779/2024. As last discussed at the European Council on 17 October 2024[1], the European Union has reiterated its unwavering commitment to a just, comprehensive and lasting peace based on the two-state solution and the Union’s support to the Palestinian Authority to help address its most pressing needs and support its reform agenda.

    The European Union will actively support and engage with international partners on concrete irreversible steps towards the two-state solution reviving a political process to this end, including through the holding of an international peace conference as soon as possible. The EU has stressed that a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood is a crucial component of that political process.

    The EU has also recalled the need to fully implement the International Court of Justice orders.

    As regards the issue of the supply of military or related material to Israel, the Council refers to its reply to Written Question P-003630/2023, and recalls that the control on the export of arms by Member States is subject to national legislation, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP[2] and the Arms Trade Treaty[3] (ATT).

    The competent authorities of the Member States take the final decision whether to authorise or deny an individual licence for the export or transit of military equipment, in accordance with the said legal frameworks.

    The Council, through its competent Working Party, works towards increased convergence amongst Member States’ arms export policies, including recently through exchanges of views on the application of the criteria set out in the Common Position, in the light of the conflict in Gaza.

    • [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008E0944
    • [3] https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-text.html?templateId=209884
    Last updated: 26 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement and recognition of the State of Palestine – E-001357/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Union is gravely concerned with the situation in Gaza and the escalation in the West Bank. In its conclusions of 27 June and 17 October 2024, the European Council welcomed the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2735 calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, the release of all hostages and a significant and sustained increase in the flow of humanitarian assistance. It further condemned the ongoing extremist settler violence in the West Bank and deplored all loss of civilian life.

    The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) regularly discusses the situation in the Middle East. On 18 March 2024, the FAC had an exchange of views on the EU-Israel Association Agreement which is based on shared values such as the respect for human rights, the rule of law and democracy[1].

    On 24 June 2024, the FAC further discussed the matter, including the possibility of an Association Council with Israel[2].

    In response to the question on possible initiatives regarding the Association Agreement, it should be pointed out that, in accordance with Article 218(9) TFEU, it is for the Commission or the High Representative, as the case may be, to submit a proposal for a Council decision.

    In that respect, on 18 November 2024, the FAC discussed the proposal of the High Representative to suspend the political dialogue between the EU and Israel under the Association Agreement[3].

    The European Union has reiterated its unwavering commitment to lasting and sustainable peace in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.

    It has also reaffirmed that its long-standing position on the Middle East Process — as set out in several Council conclusions — is a commitment to achieving a two-state solution with the State of Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous, sovereign and viable State of Palestine living side-by-side in peace, security and mutual recognition[4], and stressed that a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood is a crucial component of that political process.

    • [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2024/03/18/
    • [2] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2024/06/24/
    • [3] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2024/11/18/?utm_source= brevo&utm_campaign=AUTOMATED%20-%20Alert%20-%20Newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_id=3318
    • [4] 13103/22, 11954/14

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Use of European ports to further Israel’s genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity – E-002450/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Union is deeply alarmed by the dramatic military escalation in the Middle East and it has called on all parties to exercise the utmost restraint, put an end to all hostilities immediately and fully abide by international law, including international humanitarian law.

    It has also reiterated Israel’s right to defend itself and the European Union’s commitment to Israel’s security and to regional stability. In exercising its right to defend itself, Israel must fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, in all circumstances. The EU has also recalled the need to fully implement the International Court of Justice orders[1].

    In relation to the situation, the Council has also imposed restrictive measures against a number of persons and entities under the EU framework of restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses[2], as well as against those who support, facilitate or enable violent actions by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad[3].

    Concerning arms trade, the Council is not in a position to comment on shipments from or through Member States. In this regard, the Council refers to its reply to Written Question P-003630/2023, and the fact that the control on the export of arms by Member States is subject to national legislation, Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP[4] and the Arms Trade Treaty[5] (ATT).

    The competent authorities of the Member States take the final decision on whether to authorise or deny an individual export or transit license for military equipment, in accordance with said legal frameworks.

    The Council, through its competent Working Party, works towards increased convergence amongst Member States’ arms export policies. This includes exchanges of views on the application of the criteria set out in the Common Position.

    • [1] www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/17/european-council-conclusions-17-october-2024/; www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/28/european-council-conclusions-27-june-2024/
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02020R1998-20240913&qid=1732270490517
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02024R0386-20240913&qid=1732270685388
    • [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008E0944.
    • [5] https://thearmstradetreaty.org/treaty-text.html?templateId=209884

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Pacvue Launches Walmart Display Campaign Management to Seamlessly Create and Manage Onsite Display Campaigns

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LOS ANGELES, Feb. 26, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Pacvue, the leading commerce acceleration platform that integrates retail media, commerce management and measurement, today announced the launch of Walmart Display Campaign Management, empowering advertisers to effortlessly create and manage their onsite display campaigns directly through the Pacvue platform. The new campaign management tool leverages Pacvue’s robust integration with Walmart Connect to streamline workflows, unlock advanced audience targeting tools and take action with advanced reporting insights.

    “We are thrilled to provide our clients with this new display ad functionality to expand their advertising efforts on Walmart,” said Melissa Burdick, co-founder and president of Pacvue. “With our new Walmart Display Campaign Management solution, advertisers now have the ability to reach shoppers at critical points in their shopping journey across multiple ad formats through one centralized place for a seamless experience.”

    Pacvue was selected as a beta partner for Walmart Connect’s Display Advertising API functionality, giving clients immediate access to Onsite Display self-service offering. Now, advertisers can create and modify campaign attributes, item sets, creatives, audience targeting and more directly through Pacvue’s integration with Walmart Connect.

    “Access to Pacvue’s beta programs, such as Walmart Display Self-Service Advertising, has empowered Acadia to stay ahead of the curve, allowing us to reach our target audience with precision and creativity,” said Jordan Ripley, Director of Operations, Retail at Acadia. “This launch enables us to expand our clients’ campaign types and tap into new areas of the purchase funnel on Walmart.com.”

    With Pacvue, advertisers benefit from enhanced features that go beyond standard functionality, enabling a more targeted and effective approach to campaign management, including:

    • Comprehensive Campaign Management: Easily create, adjust and manage display campaigns, including attributes, item sets, creatives and targeting. Batch updates allow for quick modifications across multiple campaigns, saving time and reducing manual errors.
    • Advanced Audience Targeting: Leverage Walmart’s first-party data to connect with high-value shoppers actively browsing Walmart’s site and app. Advertisers can target behavioral, contextual and demographic segments, tailoring campaigns to reach frequent buyers, first-time customers and lifestyle-specific personas.
    • Actionable Reporting: Gain insights into campaign performance with detailed reports integrated into My Report, offering data on audience engagement, campaign effectiveness and sales impact.
    • Enhanced Optimizations: Features like Budget Management, Dayparting and Campaign Rules empower advertisers with greater control, enabling full-funnel impact—from brand awareness to conversion.

    Pacvue continues to lead the way in transforming how businesses engage with customers online, and this launch marks another significant step in enhancing the advertising landscape on one of the largest retail platforms.

    Visit Pacvue.com to learn about its latest commerce solutions and recent company developments.

    About Pacvue:
    Pacvue is the leading commerce acceleration platform that integrates retail media, commerce management and measurement. The company’s first-to-market platform drives incrementality, profitability and market share for brands, while turning insights into actionable recommendations. Backed by a global team of experts, Pacvue works with over 70,000 brands and agencies across 95+ retailers worldwide including Amazon, Walmart, Target and Instacart. With the incorporation of Pacvue’s enterprise solution with Helium 10 for SMBs, Pacvue is now the most comprehensive commerce and retail media platform available in the market. Founded in 2018, their global presence includes locations in Seattle, New York, Los Angeles, Washington DC, London, Shanghai and Tokyo. For more information, visit www.pacvue.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: SNP block action to halt funding for companies arming Israel

    Source: Scottish Greens

    Not a penny of public money should go to companies arming genocide.

    The SNP has used a wrecking amendment to keep grants for arms companies complicit in Israel’s genocidal assault on Gaza.

    The Scottish Government has rightly and strongly opposed the bombing and collective punishment of Gaza. Despite this, since the war began, it has given over £1 million to companies that have armed Israel via Scottish Enterprise.

    Scottish Green Co-leader Lorna Slater said:

    “The humanitarian crisis in Gaza is one of the worst in the world, and this was an opportunity for our parliament to take concrete steps to ensure that Scotland is playing no part in it. It is deeply disappointing that the SNP chose to block action.

    “The Scottish Government is right to support a ceasefire in Gaza, but it is simply hypocritical for them to continue backing companies who are enabling and profiting from the atrocities that have been inflicted by Israeli forces.

    “When Russia invaded Ukraine the Scottish Government rightly took action against companies who were supporting Putin and his war machine, with measures that went far further than arms companies. It is time for them to do the same for Israel.

    “Not a penny of public money should be given to companies that are profiting from genocide or war crimes whether they are being carried out by Russian forces or by Israel.”

    As part of the debate the SNP agreed to review the human rights checks which are applied by public bodies to grant applicants. To date, no company has ever failed one of the existing tests, including many of the world’s biggest arms companies.

    Ms Slater added:

    “We welcome the SNP’s commitment to review the human rights checks that are applied, but it should not have taken our debate to make them do that.

    “The new tests need to be far more robust than anything we have had to date, as no human rights check worthy of the name would allow grants to companies that are complicit in genocide.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom