Category: Middle East

  • MIL-OSI Video: Türkiye, Lebanon/Israel, Yemen & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (23 Oct 2024) | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon briefing by Farhan Haq, Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    -Türkiye
    -Occupied Palestinian territory
    -Lebanon/Israel
    -Lebanon/humanitarian
    -Yemen
    -Brics
    -Deputy Secretary-General/Travel
    -Central African Republic
    -Security Council/Syria
    -Women, Peace and Security

    TÜRKIYE
    In a statement issued today, the Secretary-General strongly condemned the terrorist attack on Turkish Aerospace Industries’ facilities in Ankara. He expressed his deepest condolences to the victims and their families and wished a speedy and full recovery to those injured.
    The United Nations stands in solidarity with the people and Government of the Republic of Türkiye.

    OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
    The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warns that Palestinians in North Gaza Governorate are experiencing extreme suffering as the Israeli siege there continues. OCHA says there are harrowing levels of death, injury and destruction in the north.
    Civilians are trapped under rubble. The sick and wounded are going without life-saving health care. Families lack food. Their homes have been destroyed. They have no shelter. And nowhere is safe.
    International humanitarian law demands that civilians have the essentials they need to survive – that’s food, shelter, medical care, and other critical assistance. OCHA appeals once again for rapid, unimpeded humanitarian relief – which must reach civilians in need.
    Our partners on the ground report that two water stations in North Gaza have stopped operating due to the lack of fuel. The suspension of service is affecting large areas, including the neighbourhoods of Al-Daraj, Al-Tuffah, Al-Zarga and Sheikh Radwan. A request earlier this week to deliver 23,000 litres of fuel to North Gaza Governorate was denied by Israeli authorities.
    From 6 October through yesterday, several attempts to get fuel to Gaza Governorate were also denied. Another mission was impeded and therefore unable to be accomplished.
    The UN and our partners have also been compelled to postpone the polio vaccination campaign in northern Gaza due to the escalating violence, intense bombardment, mass displacement orders, and the lack of assured humanitarian pauses across most of the north.
    This final phase of the vaccination effort was supposed to begin today, with the aim of reaching more than 119,000 children across northern Gaza.
    The current conditions – including ongoing attacks on civilian infrastructure – continue to jeopardize people’s safety and movement in northern Gaza, making it impossible for families to safely bring their children for vaccination, and for health workers to operate.
    It is imperative to stop the polio outbreak in Gaza, before more children are paralyzed and the virus spreads. To interrupt transmission, at least 90 per cent of all children in every community and neighbourhood must be vaccinated. The vaccination campaign must be facilitated in the north through the implementation of humanitarian pauses.
    UN humanitarian partners say that all logistics, supplies and trained personnel were prepared to vaccinate children across the north with their second dose of the polio vaccine. However, given that the area currently approved for temporary humanitarian pauses was substantially reduced in geographic size from the previous round of the vaccination campaign – and is now limited only to Gaza City – many children in northern Gaza would have missed out on a second dose.
    The UN and its humanitarian partners continue their efforts to get assistance to people in northern Gaza. On 15 October, the World Food Programme (WFP) was able to deliver one convoy into Gaza City. However, the Israeli siege on North Gaza Governorate has prevented the agency from reaching people there for the past three weeks.
    WFP warns that September and October saw some of the lowest levels of humanitarian aid entering Gaza since late 2023, alongside a drastic reduction in commercial cargo.
    In October, to date, only 20 per cent of the agency’s operational food needs have entered Gaza. A drastic shortage of supplies across Gaza has almost halted general food distribution.
    WFP says very limited aid supplies have entered the south due to insecurity at the Kerem Shalom crossing point. There is a critical need for a safe and enabling environment for humanitarian operations and convoy movements into and within Gaza.

    Full Highlight: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=23%20October%202024

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kJXrMLA8PBg

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Human Rights Committee Welcome France’s Efforts to Combat Homophobia, Raise Questions on Violence in New Caledonia and Rules Governing Identity Checks

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the sixth periodic report of France on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with Committee Experts welcoming France’s national plan combatting hatred against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons and plans to combat homophobia, while raising questions on violence in New Caledonia and rules governing identity checks. 

    One Committee Expert said the Committee welcomed the national plan for equality and against hatred and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons (2020-2026) and the government plan (2023-2026) to combat homophobia and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. 

    Another Expert said it appeared that the current violence in the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia was linked to reforms of the Nouméa Accord and a lack of progress in the decolonisation process.  What was the progress made on the issue of self-determination of the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia as well as that of French Polynesia, and the participation and consultation processes put in place with the indigenous peoples living in these territories to obtain their free and informed consent and access to independence? 

    Another Expert asked if the State party could indicate whether mandatory training on racial and ethnic discrimination and profiling was systematically offered to law enforcement officials, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories?  Did the State party systematically collect data to monitor the use of identity checks, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories?  Would the State party be prepared to implement a template for all individuals subject to an identity check?  Would it be willing to introduce a centralised record of all identity checks to have an overview of how they were used, with whom and where?

    The delegation said France supported the recognition of indigenous peoples.  New Caledonia was one of the most advanced examples of the French Government recognising the rights of indigenous peoples.  Since the Nouméa Accord, an institutional framework had been put into place allowing for shared governance between the communities, representing the customs of the Kanak people.  On 1 October, the Prime Minister announced the postponement of elections in 2025, which was unanimously agreed by Parliament.  Since 1998, France had been cooperating with the decolonisation committee and the work had been fruitful.

    The delegation said all French citizens were equal before the law. The code of ethics for the police and national gendarmerie prohibited discriminatory identity checks.  When the law authorised an identity check, the police should not rely on any physical trait, unless there were specific grounds. Any act of discrimination could be reported by someone who believed they were a victim of discriminatory profiling. There were several ways to do this, including through the various controlling and monitoring authorities and the judiciary.

    Introducing the report, Isabelle Rome, Ambassador for Human Rights of France and head of the delegation, said human rights were a priority for France.  In December 2023, the President of the Republic announced that a House of Human Rights would be created in Paris to support civil society organizations. France had strengthened its public policies on the judiciary, democracy and the law enforcement agencies since 2022, paying particular attention to conditions for the use of force, and compliance with the rules of ethics during all police operations.  Ms. Rome concluded by saying that France believed in its democratic model, in liberty, equality and fraternity, as illustrated this summer by the Olympic and Paralympic Games.

    In concluding remarks, Ms. Rome thanked the Committee for the dialogue.  France was deeply attached to the rule of law and the Committee’s recommendations would be scrupulously considered.  The country was committed to renewing dialogue with the territory of New Caledonia and its inhabitants. 

    Tania María Abdo Rocholl, Committee Chairperson, thanked the delegation for the dialogue, which had covered a wide range of subjects under the Covenant.   The Committee aimed to ensure the highest level of implementation of the Covenant in France. 

    The delegation of France was made up of representatives of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of the Interior and Overseas; the Ministry of Justice; the State Council; the Interministerial delegation to the fight against racism, anti-Semitism, and hatred; the French office for the protection of refugees and stateless persons; and the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-second session is being held from 14 October to 7 November 2024.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 23 October, to begin its consideration of the second periodic report of Türkiye (CCPR/C/TUR/2).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the sixth periodic report of France (CCPR/C/FRA/6).

    Presentation of Report

    ISABELLE ROME, Ambassador for Human Rights of France and head of the delegation, said human rights were a priority for France.  In December 2023, the President of the Republic announced that a House of Human Rights would be created in Paris to support civil society organizations.  Launched in 2021, the Marianne initiative for human rights defenders aimed to encourage the activities of human rights defenders, both in their country of origin, and by welcoming them in France.  The fight against the death penalty was also a priority for France.  France would host the ninth World Congress against the Death Penalty in Paris in 2026.  France was also contributing to the organization of the first World Congress on Enforced Disappearances in Geneva on 15 and 16 January 2025. 

    The State’s new feminist diplomacy strategy would be published by the end of 2024.  France was proud that the Paris 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games were the first gender-balanced games in history.  Through its diplomatic and consular network, France supported projects of democratic governance, respect for the rule of law, the fight against impunity, access to justice, and mechanisms to monitor the effective exercise of civil and political rights.  In 2019, France launched the Partnership for Information and Democracy, which was joined by 54 States from all regions, to guarantee freedom of expression.  In May 2024, the President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister of New Zealand announced the creation of a new non-governmental organization, the Christchurch Call Foundation, to coordinate the work of the Christchurch Call to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online. 

    France had strengthened its public policies on the judiciary, democracy and the law enforcement agencies since 2022, paying particular attention to conditions for the use of force, and compliance with the rules of ethics during all police operations.  The national law enforcement plan published in 2021 provided for an adaptation of the employment strategies of the republican security companies and the mobile gendarmerie squadrons during public demonstrations.  The right to demonstrate was guaranteed by the Constitution in France.  By getting in touch with the prefects and police units involved in public demonstrations, journalists could be added to communication channels, allowing them to receive live information and ask questions. 

    Between 2020 and 2024, the Ministry of Justice’s budget increased by 33 per cent, from €7.6 billion in 2020 to €10.1 billion in 2024. In five years, the French Ministry of Justice would have recruited as many magistrates as in the last 20 years. To combat prison overcrowding, the Ministry of Justice was implementing a proactive prison regulation policy, based on the development of alternatives to incarceration, the strengthening of early release mechanisms, and an ambitious prison real estate programme creating 15,000 net prison places.  An Interministerial Committee for Overseas Territories was set up in July 2023.  France had mobilised authorities to enable and guarantee the return to calm and security of people in New Caledonia. Emergency measures were deployed last June.  The mediation and work mission continued its work, with the aim of renewing political dialogue. 

    France had been implementing a new interministerial plan for gender equality 2023-2027, which contained 161 measures divided into four priority areas: the fight against violence against women; the global approach to women’s health; professional and economic equality; and the dissemination and transmission of a culture of equality.  The law of July 2023 aimed at strengthening women’s access to responsibilities in the public service.  It increased the mandatory quota of first-time female appointments to senior and management positions to 50 per cent.  On 8 March 2024, France became the first country in the world to enshrine the freedom to have access to voluntary termination of pregnancy in its Constitution. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert welcomed that France’s report was prepared in consultation with the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, whose role was to monitor France’s international commitments and the implementation of recommendations issued by international and regional bodies.  In May 2024, despite the provisions of the Nouméa Accord which provided for a process of gradual transfer of power from France to New Caledonia, the National Assembly voted in favour of expanding the electorate of New Caledonia.  Thousands of Kanak demonstrators mobilised to denounce these reforms, which were allegedly passed without adequate consultation or free, prior and informed consent.  In the absence of sufficient dialogue on the part of the authorities, a violent conflict had been raging since that date. 

    The French Government had deployed considerable military resources to restore order, but at the cost of numerous allegations of excessive use of force that led to several deaths among Kanak protesters and security forces, as well as injuries.  According to information received by the Committee, at least 11 people were shot dead and 169 others were injured; 2658 demonstrators were arrested, many of whom were arbitrarily arrested and detained, dozens of them were also transferred to metropolitan France. 

    It appeared that the current violence in the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia was linked to reforms of the Nouméa Accord and a lack of progress in the decolonisation process.  What was the progress made on the issue of self-determination of the non-self-governing territory of New Caledonia as well as that of French Polynesia, and the participation and consultation processes put in place with the indigenous peoples living in these territories to obtain their free and informed consent and access to independence?

    There had been several prominent court cases regarding the removal of headscarves in France.  In the opinion of the French State, should the Committee’s Views be followed only in the case where the Committee considered a complaint to be inadmissible or agreed with the arguments presented by the French Government? Were there intentions to lift reservations to the Covenant?  Who currently appointed the magistrates of the courts?  What was the current state of the constitutional reform initiated with a view to making the Prosecutor’s Office independent of the executive?  How could the full independence of judges and prosecutors be guaranteed?

    Since 2015, France had put in place measures to combat terrorism, which had been seen over the years to be increasingly detrimental to people’s rights and freedoms.

    Was the new legislation accompanied by sufficient guarantees against the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory implementation of these measures?  What independent and impartial expertise did public authorities have to assess the impact of new technologies on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Covenant? 

    It was understood that mass surveillance technology was used during the Olympic and Paralympic Games.  How did the State party ensure that it did not lead to profiling that disproportionately affected racial, ethnic and religious minorities?  How did the State party ensure that continuous surveillance by algorithm-based systems did not violate the right to privacy and respected the requirements of proportionality and necessity?  For how long could the data collected in this way be kept? 

    What were the current conditions for the communication of information to the intelligence services, particularly in the area of sensitive data? What information could be transmitted and what traceability requirements were in place?  Under what conditions could information provided by the intelligence services be made available to the judicial authority and the Public Prosecutor’s Office?  What means of access was available to defendants and those accused of acts of terrorism?

    Another Expert said the Committee was informed that people of colour were subjected to identity checks by the police about 20 times more often than other citizens.  They also faced discriminatory treatment during police stops and searches, including direct fines, often without objective suspicion and without being informed of the reasons.  What could be done to ensure that the use of identity checks and fines was not left to the discretion of law enforcement agencies, and was based only on objective and individualised conditions, and not on racial origins?  Did the State party have explicit guidelines for law enforcement agencies that clearly prohibited racial profiling in police operations as well as discriminatory identity checks? 

    Could the State party indicate whether mandatory training on racial and ethnic discrimination and profiling was systematically offered to law enforcement officials, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories?  Did the State party systematically collect data to monitor the use of identity checks, both in metropolitan France and in the overseas territories?  Would the State party be prepared to implement a template for all individuals subject to an identity check?  Would it be willing to introduce a centralised record of all identity checks to have an overview of how they were used, with whom and where?

    The Committee had received extensive information that showed the persistent problem of systemic racial discrimination, as well as the use of negative stereotypes against minorities.  What measures had the State party taken to effectively combat all forms of hate speech and hate crimes against racial, ethnic and religious minorities? What training was provided to law enforcement officers, judges and prosecutors, and what awareness campaigns were organised to prevent and combat hate crime and hate speech?  Would France develop data collection and research in compliance with data protection rules, to effectively identify cases of racial or ethnic profiling and offences in metropolitan France and overseas?

    The Committee welcomed the national plan for equality and against hatred and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons (2020-2026) and the government plan (2023-2026) to combat homophobia and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  How would the State party ensure adequate resources and the active participation of civil society in the implementation of these plans?  Did these programmes sufficiently take into account minorities within minorities, such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex asylum seekers? 

    The Committee was informed that some of the measures granting extensive powers to the administrative authorities, developed in the context of the state of emergency, had been granted permanent status.  What measures had the State party taken to ensure that initial emergency measures were in conformity with the Covenant in terms of necessity and proportionality?  How did the State party promote the accessibility of judicial procedures and ensure that they were effective?

    How would France ensure that anti-terrorism legislation did not disproportionately target Muslims and that actions were based on alleged criminal behaviour rather than religious practices?  How did the State party ensure that house searches and dissolution of organizations were conducted by the courts?  What was the percentage of terrorist offences in relation to criminal offences committed in the last five years?  The Committee was informed of the law establishing a new security regime, which subjected the accused to certain obligations, with a view of ensuring their reintegration.  How did France ensure that this monitoring system, which was based on the rather vague notion of “dangerousness”, was not arbitrary and did not disproportionately infringe on the rights of persons who had served their sentences?

    One Committee Expert said the Committee particularly welcomed the State party’s commitment of significant financial resources to address the needs of vulnerable groups during the health crisis of COVID-19. What was the impact of the measures described in the State party’s report, to ensure that the COVID-19 pandemic did not exacerbate inequalities, discrimination and exclusion, including among vulnerable groups?  Specifically, regarding domestic violence against women, which was said to have increased during the pandemic, what was the assessment of the effectiveness and impact of the measures taken? 

    While noting the information provided by the State party, including on the judicial review of the restrictions imposed, could the proportionality of the measures imposed to address COVID-19 be explained, including the ban on any gathering of more than 10 people imposed for a certain period? What assessment did the State party make of this experience for a better consideration of human rights in future crises?      

    Another Expert said the State party had reported on humanitarian repatriations from Syria of women and children of French nationality.  With regard to returns, according to public reports, there was still a significant number of women and children detained or held in camps and rehabilitation centres in Syria.  What was the number, the current situation, and the measures taken by the State party to ensure the full repatriation of all French women and children still in detention camps and rehabilitation centres for minors in Syria? 

    What was the estimated number of detained men and women in Syria who participated as Islamic State fighters?  Had measures been taken to ensure that due process standards were strictly respected in the trials before the Syrian national courts? According to information, in May and June 2019, 11 French nationals had been sentenced to death in Iraq for their involvement as Islamic State fighters.  Could the delegation provide an update on that information and indicate what steps the State party had taken to prevent the continued imposition of death sentences on its nationals in that country?  What other penalties had been applied to these French nationals in lieu of the death penalty?

    The Committee had requested information related to the Arms Trade Treaty, in order to know whether the State party carried out an evaluation for the granting of export licenses aimed at determining that the recipient country used the weapons included in the respective license within the framework of respect for the right to life.  Did the evaluation of an arms export take this into account?  Had any measures been taken to ensure a total ban on arms sales to countries where there was a clear risk that such weapons could be used to violate international human rights law?  Was it possible to access information on arms exports so that civil society could carry out oversight?  What measures had been taken to prevent the negative effects on the right to life of the operations of French companies abroad, especially in the province of Cabo Delgado in Mozambique? 

    A Committee Expert said the Committee was informed that there had been a rise in police violence in recent years, with multiple incidents resulting in fatal outcomes, some of them young boys.   Could more information be provided on trainings on racism for police officers?  Had improvements been made, bearing in mind previous incidents?  The Committee was informed that investigations and legal procedures of unlawful killings by law enforcement officials were not expeditious, sometimes even leading to de facto police impunity, or that sentences were not commensurate with the gravity of the crime. 

    Had there been plans to amend legal norms and review legal conditions for the use of firearms by the police and the gendarmerie, aiming to reduce the risks of disproportionate use of lethal force, and to strike a better balance with the principles of absolute necessity and strict proportionality?  What was the status of investigations of fatalities and injuries, including those related to alleged excessive use of force, which emerged during conflicts that started in May 2024 in New Caledonia? Had trainings been undertaken for those operating in France’s overseas territories? 

    The Committee welcomed the reported introduction of the new right to appeal introduced by article 803-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as a step forward.  However, Experts had been informed that there were several challenges preventing its full use and benefits.  Since the right to a judicial remedy against undignified conditions of detention was introduced in 2021, what were the steps taken by the State party to disseminate it within the incarcerated population?  Was the information on the creation of a new legal tool easily reachable in all penitentiaries under the jurisdiction of the State party?  Had legal aid been introduced to those incarcerated persons who could not afford a lawyer or judicial taxes?  Were there plans to introduce wider use of alternatives to detention or a more restricted use of detention as a last resort?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said France supported the recognition of indigenous peoples.  New Caledonia was one of the most advanced examples of the French Government recognising the rights of indigenous peoples.  Since the Nouméa Accord, an institutional framework had been put into place allowing for shared governance between the communities, representing the customs of the Kanak people.  On 1 October, the Prime Minister announced the postponement of elections in 2025, which was unanimously agreed by Parliament.  Since 1998, France had been cooperating with the decolonisation committee and the work had been fruitful.

    Since 2015, the technical intelligence community had been working on a specific legal framework.  The law included respect for the private lives of citizens and had a strict principle of proportionality.  The law set forth the procedures to be respected when it came to implementing intelligence techniques, including prior authorisation by the Prime Minister.  There were restrictions on how long the data could be held.  The enhanced video surveillance was enacted in advance of the Olympics and Paralympics Games.  France chose to engage in a rigorous oversight mechanism regarding this surveillance.  This was a tool for detecting events without having to resort to facial recognition. 

    All French citizens were equal before the law.  The code of ethics for the police and national gendarmerie prohibited discriminatory identity checks.  When the law authorised an identity check, the police should not rely on any physical trait, unless there were specific grounds.  Any act of discrimination could be reported by someone who believed they were a victim of discriminatory profiling.  There were several ways to do this, including through the various controlling and monitoring authorities and the judiciary.

    At the end of the state of emergency, which followed the attacks carried out on France in 2015, the Government acknowledged the need to keep these tools in place due to the possibility of other attacks.  Four new measures had then been created.  These laws were only for preventing terrorism and were accompanied with significant guarantees for citizens.  The law of 30 July 2021 on preventing acts of terrorism gave these measures permanency.  The Constitutional Council believed this was a balanced approach that ensured achieving the goal of preventing terrorism while respecting private life.  House searches could not be instigated unless there was prior authorisation from a judge; 1,447 remedies were presented for the state of emergency.  The law of 2021 applied to people who had been sentenced to acts of terrorism. Sentences for terrorist activities represented around 0.04 per cent of all criminal activities. 

    A plan had been developed to prepare the plan on combatting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex hatred, involving members of civil society.  The plan contained 16 key measures, including a ten-million-euro fund by 2027 to improve the host centres for these individuals.  The goal was to have two centres per region in France.  For hate speech, the legislation provision had recently been strengthened.  In 2021, there was a vote to govern the digital space and that law had a set of provisions on combatting online hate speech to better regulate illegal behaviour. There had been significant progress made in this area, given that a bill had been introduced in the European Parliament to regulate heinous content online. 

    In France, 2020 was the year that the State had the lowest rate of femicide.  This meant that the measures set up were effective, and that the police and justice systems were able to act swiftly to combat family violence.  There were also provisions which allowed complaints to be raised. 

    Measures adopted during the pandemic were considered to be proportional.  The measures taken to address the pandemic did not overturn other measures in place. During COVID-19, the number of calls to victim support groups for violence had increased.  The accelerated measures implemented by France to support victims included electronic bracelets to ensure restraining orders were complied with.   In 2021, emergency plans were implemented to ensure people were protected.  At the end of the pandemic, the State provided hotlines 24/7 and reception centres in shopping malls.  More specialised support was also provided in courts. 

    International commitments by France to human rights did not involve a repatriation of citizens in an area where France had no control.  Authorities responded systematically to requests for repatriation made by French citizens.  Since 2019, repatriation efforts for minors had been organised.  France exported weapons to countries that wished to strengthen their armies, only with strict national oversight. 

    Force was only used when necessary in cases set forth by law and in a manner which was proportional to the threat.  A police or member of the gendarmerie would only use force if it was essential in their work, such as in cases of self-defence.  Police had additional guidelines on the use of weapons.  There should never be doubt regarding the reasons of an arrest warrant. 

    France had a law which allowed for all inmates to request guarantees for their detention conditions, ensuring they were dignified. A provision was in place which allowed individuals to benefit from jurisdictional support, in place since 2023. Template forms for this purpose were provided to all detainees upon their detention. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the problem with the New Caledonia information was the outcome of the projects which arose in France in 1984. The idea of postponing elections to 2025 was a positive sign as this would allow for mediation between the local and French authorities.  Over recent years, there had been a considerable strengthening of anti-terrorist measures.  However, the majority of terrorist threats were foiled by international cooperation efforts.  Were the measures justified by the threats the State faced?  How could this be transmitted between different intelligence branches?  How long was intelligence data stored and what measures were provided to keep the information secure? 

    Another Expert asked for disaggregated data on what law enforcement officials had been charged with?  Were inmates allowed to apply to a collective appeal so that others could benefit? 

    An Expert said there were laws which prohibited discrimination in identification checks; how was it ensured that this legislation was implemented?

    Another Committee Expert asked for the delegation to bear in mind the matter of redress granted to victims of violence. 

    One Expert asked for a more specific response to the measures adopted to comply with the rulings of the European courts against certain cases against France?  How did the State party ensure effective judicial control and parliamentary oversight in weapon exportation? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the French overseas territories met all international criteria under the law.  France had completed the decolonisation process and no longer administered non-self-governing territories.  As for French Polynesia, in 2023, France decided to speak before the General Assembly, illustrating ongoing dialogue between the State and French Polynesia. France supported the development of French Polynesia. 

    The French Government followed the individual communications procedure before the Committee.  Any communications were the subject of broad consultations among many ministries and institutions. 

    When France ended the state of emergency of 2015 to 2017, the risk of terrorism in the country was still high.  While this risk had come down, threats still persisted; 45 attacks had been foiled between 2017 and now. 

    In 2022, over 700 people brought cases to court regarding acts of violence committed by people in public authority.  Over 200 of these led to convictions. 

    The Ministry of Education and Youth was currently creating a programme to consider the new kinds of racism and anti-Semitism which had cropped up in recent years. 

    The French law enforcement force represented the population and was diverse.  Inmates could ask for specific improvements to detention conditions which impacted their dignity.  Improvements had been carried out in several penitentiaries as a result of this. Several inmates could present these complaints together.   

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said since the end of the state of health emergency on 10 July 2020, the situation of exiled people in Calais had deteriorated.  The nearly 1,200 homeless men, women and children in Calais had seen their living conditions deteriorated due to the brutal “evacuations” of several large camps, and the dramatic reduction in vital services such as food distributions, and lack of access to showers and water points.  Additionally, around 100 unaccompanied minors had settled in tents in Jules Ferry Square to highlight that they had been abandoned by the State. Could the State party comment on this?

    According to information received, journalists and media organizations were reportedly facing increasing challenges in carrying out their duties, including restrictions on reporting, potential abuses of power, and other pressures that undermined press freedom.  Reporters without Borders reported that police reportedly assaulted several “clearly identifiable” journalists.  There were several cases cited to support these allegations, including journalists in New Caledonia who stated they were constantly harassed for their coverage of the riots.  Could the delegation comment on these allegations?  What measures did the State party intend to take to better protect journalists and human rights defenders in the exercise of their work? Had the perpetrators of the mentioned cases been prosecuted and what was the outcome, including convictions and reparations?

    Another Expert noted the numerous allegations of prison overcrowding in the State party and the serious health risks during the most critical period of the COVID-19 pandemic, asking what were the reasons for providing, through decree-law 2020-303, for the full continuation of pre-trial detention, which even affected minors?  What were the conditions for the application of the measure of full maintenance of pre-trial detention to children and how many children were affected by this measure? How did law no. 2021-646 of 25 May 2021 on global security preserving freedoms effectively guarantee respect for privacy, especially in the use of portable cameras by law enforcement officers and cameras installed on unmanned aerial vehicles?  Did it include the principles of proportionality and necessity? In the case of the use of surveillance devices in public demonstrations by law enforcement officers, were there safeguards or limitations to prevent their use from affecting the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression? 

    It was alleged that four former national secretaries of the General Confederation of Labour were being investigated for defamation and public slander following a complaint filed against them by the Directorate of the National School of Prison Administration.  Could information on this be provided?  The Committee would also like information on the processes followed against various union, political and community leaders for the crime of glorifying terrorism after the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023.  It was reported that during the recent Olympic Games, there were many cases of systematic Islamophobia that mainly affected Muslim athletes and communities, a situation exacerbated by the security measures adopted. Could the delegation comment on this? What measures had the State party taken to combat hate speech against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons?

    One Expert said the Committee had unfortunately been informed that the situation of migrants in Calais and Grande-Synthe was still very worrying, with authorities continuing to apply the “zero point of fixation” policy, under which temporary shelters were systematically dismantled, sometimes with excessive use of force, every 48 hours.  How were migrants informed of the 48 hour rule and the possible dismantling of their temporary shelters?  Could the State consider the use of more humane and proportionate alternatives to dismantling these shelters, including increasing the capacity of reception centres?  What measures had been adopted to facilitate reporting on police abuses? 

    The Committee was concerned by reports that migrants had been detained at the French-Italian border without having obtained legal documents explaining their detention.  How did France ensure that such detentions were not arbitrary and that all migrants were informed of their procedural rights?  The Committee was also informed that the immigration law of 2 January 2024 expanded the criteria for expulsion to include minor offences, and allowed authorities to place a foreign person in administrative detention for reasons related to a potential threat to public order without justification, as well as allowing detention to be extended and reducing procedural rights.  How was it ensured that these measures were compatible with the provisions of the Covenant? 

    The Committee had received information that the State party continued to issue expulsion notices for the return of persons to countries where they were at risk of serious violations of their rights.  How did the State party ensure respect for the principle of non-refoulement in all cases of expulsion?  Regarding the internal borders of the Schengen area, in particular the issue of rapid refoulement at the border between France and Italy, the Committee noted with appreciation the State party’s follow-up to the conclusion of the Court of Justice of the European Union.  The Committee welcomed the annulment by the Council of State, in February, of certain parts of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum. 

    However, information had been received that foreign nationals continued to be forcibly returned to Italy without having had access to a proper asylum procedure.  How did France ensure the individualised examination of all applications and effective access to asylum procedures?  Did the State intend to end the use of bone tests in law and in practice?  What was the objective of the January 2024 law to establish files to identify unaccompanied minors suspected of a criminal offence?  Who controlled these files and who kept them?  What measures had been taken to ensure adequate temporary accommodation and emergency accommodation for unaccompanied minors?

    One Committee Expert said France had adopted the third national action plan against human trafficking (2024-2027) at the beginning of 2024.  Could the evaluation of achievements from the second action plan be provided and what goals were set for the third plan?  What were the measures developed to combat trafficking?  Could victims receive compensation within the criminal procedure, or did they have to undergo civil suits for compensation?  What safeguards were in place to protect victims themselves from criminal accountability?  What methods had been developed for victims’ identification?  Had trainings been organised for prosecutors, judges and lawyers on human trafficking? 

    The Committee was concerned by numerous reports that the ban on manifestation of religious beliefs by means of clothing, headgear or other religious symbols was a source of tension in French society and was seen by some as disrespect for multiculturism, fuelling the sense of discrimination, racism, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia.  What measures were being taken to ensure that the ban on expressing religion by means of religious clothing, headgear or symbols did not have a discriminatory effect in practice?  How was it ensured that all visible religious symbols were treated equally? What criteria was used to decide what symbol should be treated as conspicuous and thus be banned, while others were treated as discrete and allowed?  How did the State party avoid that the ban on manifestation of religious beliefs by means of clothing affected predominantly Muslim girls and women? 

    What safeguards were in place to ensure that provisions on the dissolution of association would not be broadly interpreted and end in violating the right to freedom of assembly?  There had been examples of associations, such as Uprisings of the Earth, labelled as eco-terrorists.  Could the delegation provide its views on this?  The Committee was concerned at the expansion of police powers to stop and check persons in the vicinity of protests, and the effect that this could have on the effective enjoyment of the right of peaceful assembly.  A significant number of protesters had been arrested and detained and a small percentage of the protesters arrested had been charged.  What was the position of the State party on these allegations?  How were personal dignity and respect understood by the courts?

    Another Expert said the year 2023 was marked by a succession of bans on demonstrations, particularly related to the mobilisation against the pension reform, or those carried out in support of the Palestinian people.  In October 2023, the Minister of the Interior issued a memo calling on local authorities to pre-emptively ban all demonstrations of solidarity with the Palestine people.  The ban was challenged before the Council of State, which determined that local authorities had to judge on a case-by-case basis the risks to public order and thus avoid repression by invoking public order, excessive force or arbitrary arrest.  This had had repercussions, even in the area of the right to information, which was concerning.

    Did the National Law Enforcement Scheme adopted in September 2020 mention the path of “de-escalation”, as a strategic principle for policing political manifestations in Europe, supported by the European Union?  The Committee had expressed concern about allegations of ill treatment, excessive use of force, and disproportionate use of intermediate force weapons, in particular during arrests, forced evacuations, and law enforcement operations.  A 2017 law (the Cazeneuve law) created a common framework for the use of weapons, allowing police to use armed force in five different cases.  However, the number of deaths had increased fivefold after the 2017 law, causing France to become the country in the European Union with the largest numbers of people killed or injured by shots fired by police. 

    Could the delegation explain the extent to which law enforcement agencies followed the applicable protocols in practice, with supporting statistics, and respected the principles of necessity, proportionality, precaution, non-discrimination and self-defence in the use of weapons?  What measures, in terms of training for law enforcement agencies, were envisaged?  Would the State party be willing to review the legal framework on the use of weapons and limit the use of firearms within the Security Code?  What follow-up had been given to decision 2020-131 of the Defender of Rights on general recommendations on law enforcement practices with regard to the rules of ethics? 

    According to a decision by the Ombudsman, France was the only country in Europe to use stun grenades to keep demonstrators at bay. Would grenades continue to be used despite the serious mutilations and injuries they caused?  Could the delegation provide updated information on the number of persons who had died as a result of police operations during arrests, including through the excessive use of force, and on the outcome of investigations into such deaths, sanctions imposed, and reparations provided to victims and their families?  Could statistics be provided on the number of proposals for sanctions presented by the Defender of Rights and what became of them, in particular the number of prosecutions? 

    Would the Brigades for the Repression of Motorised Violent Actions be dissolved?  The State party’s report provided information on complaints and investigations initiated concerning members of the security forces.  What measures would be taken to make the relevant statistical data more reliable, disaggregated and complete?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the evacuations of camps in Calais which took place were done through either a legal or an administrative decision. These decisions were carried out with proper supervision and were overseen by the Government and social organizations.  Unaccompanied minors were housed in emergency shelter systems when possible and the same for adults when possible. 

    France guaranteed the right to protest and freedom of collective speech and expression of ideas.  The French State allowed journalists free circulation.  France was seeking to strike a balance because there were now many journalists without press identification who ran risks, placing themselves between protesters and law enforcement officials.  Law enforcement officers were called on to show professional behaviour at all times, including in situations where protests were violent. 

    Videos in public spaces were used to call attention to pre-determined actions; they did not have any impact on the right to protest. France supported the European plan for protecting journalists against violence.  This had allowed for additional guarantees to be provided in certain cases. 

    French authorities were mobilised to support efforts against hate speech, and there were efforts to address this phenomenon within the Ministry of Justice.  When cases were thrown out, they could be appealed before the appeals court.  Investigations into allegations of hate speech were underway. 

    The administrative police were evacuating camps, which were aimed at putting an end to illegal occupation and squatting of lands.  These operations on the ground involved parameters being established.  Regarding expulsions in Calais, 36 operations had taken place.  They were based on the same legal foundations; the anti-squat laws had been utilised to proceed with the evacuation.  Minors were always supported.  The State was aware of the situation of unaccompanied minors in Calais. Systems had been put in place to address these realities and identify the unaccompanied minors.  Work was being done with associations on the ground in Calais, including Doctors without Borders.  The shelters were only 20 minutes from Calais and allowed for daily operations and support.  This distance was far enough to protect unaccompanied minors from traffickers found in these camps. 

    When foreigners were not eligible for asylum seeking procedures, they could then be placed under administrative detention in administrative detention centres.  These decisions were subjected to oversight by judges.  During the detention period, foreigners benefitted from health care support and legal counsel.  Voluntary returnees received financial support.  Some countries were not considered to be safe, and therefore returns were only on a voluntary basis.  Since October 2022, the Government was active in Mayotte, allowing active participation in the asylum-seeking process. 

    There were 2,100 victims of trafficking and exploitation in 2023, a six per cent increase compared to 2022.  Around 882 people had been sentenced for exploitation and trafficking.  France thanked civil society for helping contribute to the National Action Plan against Trafficking.  Training was an important part of the strategy to combat trafficking; there was a training course on human trafficking with a focus on modern slavery. Training was provided to 150 different professionals.  To care for the victims of human trafficking, several mechanisms were in place, including an early detection mechanism.

    France guaranteed the rights of citizens at the highest level, and any restrictions applied to all religions equally.  There was freedom for an individual to display religious signs, but this needed to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  Any restriction on a religious symbol was only imposed if they were identified as a risk to the public service. 

    Freedom of expression was guaranteed in France, but this could result in some groups promoting racist and hate speech.  The law of 2021 amended the list of cases where a dissolution could take place, broadening the list of discriminatory measures which could lead to a dissolution. 

    The Public Ministry could carry out prosecutions.  Sometimes the Prosecutor could enact educational measures instead, which was used in some cases of minors.  The judges of France were required to argue for their decisions, given that there were no automatic sentences in the State.  This was also true for those found guilty of threatening public order. 

    France was one of the first countries to call for a ceasefire in Gaza.  There had been a significant increase in anti-Semitic acts since October 2023. Freedom to demonstrate was a fundamental right protected by the Constitution and protests were not subjected to authorisation.  There should be a notification to law enforcement around 15 days before to protect the safety of those participating and those living in the area.  The prohibition of protests was only carried out if it was believed they were a threat to public order, and this was done with the oversight of a judge.  Exceptionally, some protests had been prohibited due to the risk they posed to public order. 

    The use of firearms in France was regulated by the Criminal Code. This allowed a gradual response to respect necessity and proportionality to the violence and the threat.  The goal was to reduce the risk of threatening life and the integrity of people.  The police and gendarmerie were trained on how to use these weapons.  Regarding the brigades, several changes in the practices of demonstrators, including the increase in use of social media, had meant that for three years, the strategy had changed.  On average, there were two to three protests every day in Paris.  To meet this challenge, the brigades were developed and had been used to break up certain disruptive groups.  Since October 2023, the Ministry of Justice had circulated a document on combatting offences related to terrorist activities. 

    The fight against Islamophobia was a strong State policy. The strong Muslim community in France should be able to live with their beliefs peacefully to enjoy their religion. Any law which might be seen as a restriction did not target any specific population or any specific religion. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert asked if minors in Mayotte could be afforded the same protections as in metropolitan France? 

    Another Expert said hate speech online affected artists and activists in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. What had been done to prevent this? 

    An Expert said there had been a significant increase in those killed or wounded during protests or police operations.  Were grenades and defensive bullets still used?  What happened when police used these weapons? Was there a compulsory inquiry? Was there oversight regarding each use of weapons? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    Minors were subjected to an age evaluation before they were recorded as minors.  If recorded as a minor, they should not undergo another evaluation.  The dismantling of camps was based on public legal rulings.  The individuals were informed, and efforts were made to help them find shelters or to change their immigration status.  Readmission into the Schengen space was a complex issue. 

    There was a doctrine for the use of medium weapons which allowed gradual and proportionate use.  Recent changes allowed France to address the risk of wounds with these weapons.  Law enforcement officers needed to be clearly trained on each type of weapon on a regular basis.  There was a proposal to replace grenades with non-lethal “flash-bangs”. Random visits were undertaken to police and gendarmerie stations as a form of auditing.  Efforts were made to identify the amount of time weapons were used. 

    Closing Remarks

    ISABELLE ROME, Ambassador for Human Rights of France and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the dialogue.  France was deeply attached to the rule of law and was a living democracy; the Committee’s recommendations would be scrupulously considered.  France would continue to progress with an open-minded spirit, in partnership with civil society and the national human rights institution.  The country was committed to renewing dialogue with the territory of New Caledonia and its inhabitants. 

    TANIA MARÍA ABDO ROCHOLL, Committee Chairperson, thanked the delegation for the dialogue, which had covered a wide range of subjects under the Covenant.  The Committee aimed to ensure the highest level of implementation of the Covenant in France. 

    __________

    CCPR.24.024E

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the information media; not an official record.

    English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI—Hagerty Joins Mornings With Maria on Fox Business to Discuss BRICS Summit, Biden-Harris Emboldening China, Stablecoin Bill

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Tennessee Bill Hagerty
    NEW YORK CITY—United States Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN), a member of the Senate Banking and Foreign Relations Committees and former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, yesterday joined Mornings With Maria on Fox Business to discuss yesterday’s BRICS Summit, the Biden-Harris Administration’s weakness towards China, and his stablecoin legislation to establish a clear regulatory framework for the regulation and supervision of stablecoin issuers.

    *Click the photo above or here to watch*
    Partial Transcript
     Hagerty on the BRICS Summit: “Were it not for the tremendous leadership void that exists today because of America’s exit from the international stage, we wouldn’t be seeing this happen. And under President [Donald] Trump, this would have never happened. They’ve expanded BRICS now to 32 nations, as you’ve said. This is all about Vladimir Putin trying to find a way to get around the type of sanctions regime that we will come back and put in place once President Trump is back in office. Interestingly, I noticed that the UN Secretary General Gutierrez is going to be there in Russia for this event. You know, were this event held anywhere else, Gutierrez, I think, would be obligated to enforce the arrest warrant that his own international criminal court has put out for Putin. It’s just shocking to me that these nations would step up and participate in this, and that Gutierrez himself would be involved in a situation where Iran is actually going to be brought into this group. It’s amazing. The only common bond, it seems, is that America’s not part of it, and they want to demonstrate their pushback. And the fact that the UN is engaged in this as well [is] really quite shocking and disturbing to me as it should be to all of us.”
    Hagerty on China’s economic leverage against BRICS nations: “You mentioned China; that is another common bond here: China’s economic ties and leverage over these countries with the Belt and Road Initiative and the fact that they’re buying oil from Iran and from Russia. That is another common bond that these guys share. But if you think about how the Harris Administration would respond, look no further than what they did with the spy balloon that they allowed to fly over the entirety of the United States of America. And then send four cabinet members over to kowtow, just to beg them to come to San Francisco for a meeting, I’m very concerned. Americans should be deeply concerned what would happen and should Kamala Harris be put in a position to stand up to Xi. I’ve been with President Trump when he’s met with Xi. Xi respects Trump. President Trump will bring respect and order back to these types of relationships. I cannot imagine how Kamala Harris would stand up to that type of pressure.”
    Hagerty on Obama’s former AG suing the Pentagon on behalf of a Chinse company: “This is exactly why President Trump has said we must drain the swamp. This is just another example of the revolving door. And the fact is that the first time this DJI was cited was back in 2017 when President Trump was in office—the Army took them down then—there’s no way that Loretta Lynch would be bringing the suit under the Trump Administration. But again, they’re trying to squeeze everything in that they can in the last days, the waning days of this Administration. You’ve got to ask yourself: who are they working for? Because every one of the foreign policies that Biden and Harris have pursued basically make China the net winner. We’ve got to stop this […] Ever since 2018, that’s been the case, because that’s what the Chinese National Security law says. Chinese companies that collect data anywhere in the world need to and have to expose that data to the Chinese intelligence services when asked. So, of course, that’s what it means. That’s the vulnerability that was seen back in the Trump Administration; that seems to be something that Loretta Lynch wants to undo and make these Chinese companies have access to the most sensitive data that our U.S. military would pick up. It’s unconscionable that she’d do this […] Barack Obama’s top law enforcement officer, the former Attorney General, is the one defending this Chinese company trying to get them off of this list, when she knows the exposure [and] the national security risk that would pose to America. It is just shocking.”
    Hagerty on his stablecoin legislation to establish clear regulatory framework: “As you mentioned, this builds upon some excellent work that was done in the House of Representatives. I’ve come in and made some adjustments that I think it’ll make it easier to get through both bodies [in Congress]. The impact of this, though, actually gets back to the beginning of the story that you and I talked about. You think about the efforts that Vladimir Putin and these BRICS nations undertaking to get around the United States as the reserve currency of the world. This will actually strengthen our posture as a reserve currency. It will increase demand, not only for U.S. treasuries, but also the stablecoins will increase demand for U.S. dollars on a global basis. We need the proper regulatory framework in place here in America—we need legal certainty—the Biden and Harris Administration have done everything they can to destroy that sort of legal certainty. This will begin to chip away at the Democrats’ war on cryptocurrency and put us back in the driver’s seat when it comes to maintaining the reserve currency status that the dollar has enjoyed and should continue to enjoy […] The assumption is very clear that this legislation will move through and be ripe for a new Administration.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Horizon Bancorp, Inc. Reports Third Quarter 2024 Results, Including EPS of $0.41 and Continued Profitability Improvement, as well as Accretive Balance Sheet Initiatives

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MICHIGAN CITY, Ind., Oct. 23, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — (NASDAQ GS: HBNC) – Horizon Bancorp, Inc. (“Horizon” or the “Company”), the parent company of Horizon Bank (the “Bank”), announced its unaudited financial results for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2024.

    Net income for the three months ended September 30, 2024 was $18.2 million, or $0.41 per diluted share, compared to net income of $14.1 million, or $0.32, for the second quarter of 2024 and compared to net income of $16.2 million, or $0.37 per diluted share, for the third quarter of 2023.

    Net income for the nine months ended September 30, 2024 was $46.3 million, or $1.05 per diluted share, compared to net income of $53.2 million, or $1.21, for the nine months ended September 30, 2023.

    Third Quarter 2024 Highlights

    • Net interest income increased for the fourth consecutive quarter to $46.9 million, compared to $45.3 million in the linked quarter of 2024. Net interest margin, on a fully taxable equivalent (“FTE”) basis1, expanded for the fourth consecutive quarter to 2.66%, compared to 2.64% in the linked quarter of 2024.
    • Total loans held for investment (“HFI”) were $4.8 billion at September 30, 2024, relatively unchanged from June 30, 2024 balances. However, consistent with the Company’s stated growth strategy, the commercial portfolio showed continued organic growth momentum during the quarter, which was offset with planned run-off of lower-yielding indirect auto loans in the consumer loan portfolio. 
    • Positive deposit growth of 1.7% during the quarter, to $5.7 billion at period end. The quarter was highlighted by stable non-interest bearing deposit balances and growth in core relationship consumer and commercial portfolios. 
    • Credit quality remains strong, with annualized net charge offs of 0.03% of average loans during the third quarter. Non-performing assets to total assets of 0.32% remains well within expected ranges, with no material change in the loss outlook. Provision for loan losses of $1.0 million reflects continued positive credit performance.

    “Horizon continues to execute well on its key strategic initiatives of consistently improving our operating performance through a more productive balance sheet, growth in non-interest income and continued disciplined in our operating model. As a result, we are optimistic on the positive momentum of the franchise through year-end 2024 and into 2025. During the quarter, our commercial team was able to deliver another quarter of quality loan growth, even coming off a strong end to the second quarter. The strength of Horizon’s core deposit franchise showed solid performance, and our credit metrics remain well managed. These efforts led to a third consecutive quarter of sequential growth in pre-tax pre-provision income,” President and Chief Executive Officer Thomas M. Prame said. “Importantly, we continue our efforts to optimize our business model, and are pleased to announce the repositioning of a portion of our securities portfolio and the intended sale of our mortgage warehouse business during the fourth quarter. These shareholder accretive actions are expected to yield sustainable improvement in the profitability of our business that will be evident in the fourth quarter, and positively impact Horizon’s financial performance in 2025.”

    _________________________
    1
    Non-GAAP financial metric. See non-GAAP reconciliation included herein for the most directly comparable GAAP measure.

    Accretive Fourth Quarter 2024 Strategic Actions

    Horizon announced strategic actions taking place in the fourth quarter of 2024, which are designed to simplify its business, strengthen the balance sheet and improve long-term structural profitability. In October, the Company completed the repositioning of about $325 million of available-for-sale securities. Additionally, the Company has signed a letter of intent to sell its mortgage warehouse business, which is expected to generate a gain-on-sale. Details on these actions, the use of proceeds, and the expected financial impact are available in the Company’s third quarter 2024 investor presentation published at investor.horizonbank.com.

     
    Financial Highlights
    (Dollars in Thousands Except Share and Per Share Data and Ratios, Unaudited)
      Three Months Ended
      September 30,   June 30,   March 31,   December 31,   September 30,
      2024   2024   2024   2023   2023
    Income statement:                  
    Net interest income $ 46,910     $ 45,279     $ 43,288     $ 42,257     $ 42,090  
    Credit loss expense   1,044       2,369       805       1,274       263  
    Non-interest income   11,511       10,485       9,929       (20,449 )     11,830  
    Non-interest expense   39,272       37,522       37,107       39,330       36,168  
    Income tax expense   (75 )     1,733       1,314       6,419       1,284  
    Net income $ 18,180     $ 14,140     $ 13,991     $ (25,215 )   $ 16,205  
                       
    Per share data:                  
    Basic earnings per share $ 0.42     $ 0.32     $ 0.32     $ (0.58 )   $ 0.37  
    Diluted earnings per share   0.41       0.32       0.32       (0.58 )     0.37  
    Cash dividends declared per common share   0.16       0.16       0.16       0.16       0.16  
    Book value per common share   17.27       16.62       16.49       16.47       15.89  
    Market value – high   16.57       12.74       14.44       14.65       12.68  
    Market value – low   11.89       11.29       11.75       9.33       9.90  
    Weighted average shares outstanding – Basic   43,712,059       43,712,059       43,663,610       43,649,585       43,646,609  
    Weighted average shares outstanding – Diluted   44,112,321       43,987,187       43,874,036       43,649,585       43,796,069  
    Common shares outstanding (end of period)   43,712,059       43,712,059       43,726,380       43,652,063       43,648,501  
                       
    Key ratios:                  
    Return on average assets   0.92 %     0.73 %     0.72 %   (1.27)        %     0.81 %
    Return on average stockholders’ equity   9.80       7.83       7.76       (14.23 )     8.99  
    Total equity to total assets   9.52       9.18       9.18       9.06       8.71  
    Total loans to deposit ratio   83.92       85.70       82.78       78.01       76.52  
    Allowance for credit losses to HFI loans   1.10       1.08       1.09       1.13       1.14  
    Annualized net charge-offs of average total loans(1)   0.03       0.05       0.04       0.07       0.07  
    Efficiency ratio   67.22       67.29       69.73       180.35       67.08  
                       
    Key metrics (Non-GAAP)(2):                  
    Net FTE interest margin   2.66 %     2.64 %     2.50 %     2.43 %     2.41 %
    Return on average tangible common equity   12.65       10.18       10.11       (18.76 )     11.79  
    Tangible common equity to tangible assets   7.58       7.22       7.20       7.08       6.72  
    Tangible book value per common share $ 13.46     $ 12.80     $ 12.65     $ 12.60     $ 12.00  
                       
                       
    (1) Average total loans includes loans held for investment and held for sale.
    (2) Non-GAAP financial metrics. See non-GAAP reconciliation included herein for the most directly comparable GAAP measures.
     

    Income Statement Highlights

    Net Interest Income

    Net interest income was $46.9 million in the third quarter of 2024, compared to $45.3 million in the second quarter of 2024, driven by net growth in average interest earning assets of $117.5 million and continued net FTE interest margin expansion during the quarter. Horizon’s net FTE interest margin1 was 2.66% for the third quarter of 2024, compared to 2.64% for the second quarter of 2024, attributable to the favorable mix shift in average interest earning assets toward higher-yielding loans and in the average funding mix toward lower-cost deposit balances. Interest accretion from the fair value of acquired loans did not contribute significantly to the third quarter net interest income, or net FTE interest margin.

    Provision for Credit Losses

    During the third quarter of 2024, the Company recorded a provision for credit losses of $1.0 million. This compares to a provision for credit losses of $2.4 million during the second quarter of 2024, and $0.3 million during the third quarter of 2023. The decrease in the provision for credit losses during the third quarter of 2024 when compared with the second quarter of 2024 was primarily attributable to less total loan growth in the current quarter relative to the prior quarter.

    For the third quarter of 2024, the allowance for credit losses included net charge-offs of $0.4 million, or an annualized 0.03% of average loans outstanding, compared to net charge-offs of $0.6 million, or an annualized 0.05% of average loans outstanding for the second quarter of 2024, and net charge-offs of $0.7 million, or an annualized 0.07% of average loans outstanding, in the third quarter of 2023.

    The Company’s allowance for credit losses as a percentage of period-end loans HFI was 1.10% at September 30, 2024, compared to 1.08% at June 30, 2024 and 1.14% at September 30, 2023.

    Non-Interest Income

    For the Quarter Ended September 30,   June 30,   March 31,   December 31,   September 30,
    (Dollars in Thousands) 2024
      2024
      2024
      2023   2023
    Non-interest Income                  
    Service charges on deposit accounts $ 3,320     $ 3,130     $ 3,214     $ 3,092     $ 3,086  
    Wire transfer fees   123       113       101       103       120  
    Interchange fees   3,511       3,826       3,109       3,224       3,186  
    Fiduciary activities   1,394       1,372       1,315       1,352       1,206  
    Gains (losses) on sale of investment securities                     (31,572 )      
    Gain on sale of mortgage loans   1,622       896       626       951       1,582  
    Mortgage servicing income net of impairment   412       450       439       724       631  
    Increase in cash value of bank owned life insurance   349       318       298       658       1,055  
    Other income   780       380       827       1,019       964  
    Total non-interest income $ 11,511     $ 10,485     $ 9,929     $ (20,449 )   $ 11,830  
                                           

    Total non-interest income was $11.5 million in the third quarter of 2024, compared to $10.5 million in the second quarter of 2024, due primarily to higher realized gains on sale of mortgage loans and increased other income.

    _________________________
    1
    Non-GAAP financial metric. See non-GAAP reconciliation included herein for the most directly comparable GAAP measure.

    Non-Interest Expense

    For the Quarter Ended September 30,   June 30,   March 31,   December 31,   September 30,
    (Dollars in Thousands) 2024
      2024
      2024
      2023
      2023
    Non-interest Expense                  
    Salaries and employee benefits $ 21,829     $ 20,583     $ 20,268     $ 21,877     $ 20,058  
    Net occupancy expenses   3,207       3,192       3,546       3,260       3,283  
    Data processing   2,977       2,579       2,464       2,942       2,999  
    Professional fees   676       714       607       772       707  
    Outside services and consultants   3,677       3,058       3,359       2,394       2,316  
    Loan expense   1,034       1,038       719       1,345       1,120  
    FDIC insurance expense   1,204       1,315       1,320       1,200       1,300  
    Core deposit intangible amortization   844       844       872       903       903  
    Other losses   297       515       16       508       188  
    Other expense   3,527       3,684       3,936       4,129       3,294  
    Total non-interest expense $ 39,272     $ 37,522     $ 37,107     $ 39,330     $ 36,168  
                                           

    Total non-interest expense was $39.3 million in the third quarter of 2024, compared with $37.5 million in the second quarter of 2024. The increase in non-interest expense during the third quarter of 2024 was primarily driven by a $1.2 million increase in salaries and employee benefits expense, which is partially attributable to a legacy benefits program expense, and a $0.6 million increase in outside services and consultants expense related to strategic initiatives.

    Income Taxes

    Horizon’s effective tax rate was -0.4% for the third quarter of 2024, as compared to 10.9% for the second quarter of 2024. The decrease in the effective tax rate during the third quarter was primarily due to an increase in net realizable tax credits for the current year, which reduced the Company’s estimated annual effective tax rate.

    Balance Sheet

    Total assets increased by $14.9 million, or 0.2%, to $7.93 billion as of September 30, 2024, from $7.91 billion as of June 30, 2024. The increase in total assets is primarily due to increases in federal funds sold of $79.5 million, or 230.6%, to $113.9 million as of September 30, 2024, compared to $34.5 million as of June 30, 2024. The increase in federal funds sold during the period was partially offset by a decrease in other assets of $46.6 million, or 28.1%, to $119.0 million as of September 30, 2024, from $165.7 million as of June 30, 2024.

    Total investment securities remained unchanged, at $2.4 billion as of September 30, 2024, compared to June 30, 2024, as the positive market impact to available for sale securities was offset by normal pay-downs and maturities. There were no purchases of investment securities during the third quarter of 2024.

    Total loans HFI and loans held for sale were relatively consistent at $4.8 billion as of September 30, 2024 compared to $4.8 billion as of June 30, 2024, as growth in commercial loans of $9.5 million were offset by a decline in consumer loans of $43.3 million.

    Total deposit balances increased by $96.9 million, or 1.7%, to $5.7 billion as of September 30, 2024 when compared to balances as of June 30, 2024. Non-interest bearing deposit balances were essentially unchanged during the quarter.

    Total borrowings decreased by $86.4 million, or 7.0%, to $1.1 billion as of September 30, 2024, primarily related to the repayment of a portion of Federal Home Loan Bank advances, when compared to balances as of June 30, 2024.

    Capital

    The following table presents the consolidated regulatory capital ratios of the Company for the previous three quarters:

    For the Quarter Ended September 30,   June 30,   March 31, December 31,
      2024*   2024   2024** 2023**
    Consolidated Capital Ratios            
    Total capital (to risk-weighted assets)   13.52 %     13.41 %     13.75 %   14.04 %
    Tier 1 capital (to risk-weighted assets)   11.70 %     11.59 %     11.89 %   12.13 %
    Common equity tier 1 capital (to risk-weighted assets)   10.74 %     10.63 %     10.89 %   11.11 %
    Tier 1 capital (to average assets)   9.01 %     9.02 %     8.91 %   8.61 %
    *Preliminary estimate – may be subject to change  
    **Prior periods were previously revised (see disclosure in Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ending June 30, 2024)  
       

    As of September 30, 2024, the ratio of total stockholders’ equity to total assets is 9.52%. Book value per common share was $17.27, increasing $0.65 during the third quarter of 2024.

    Tangible common equity1 totaled $588.5 million at September 30, 2024, and the ratio of tangible common equity to tangible assets1 was 7.58% at September 30, 2024, up from 7.22% at June 30, 2024. Tangible book value, which excludes intangible assets from total equity, per common share1 was $13.46, increasing $0.66 during the third quarter of 2024.

    Credit Quality

    As of September 30, 2024, total non-accrual loans increased by $5.3 million, or 29.0%, from June 30, 2024, to 0.49% of total loans HFI. Total non-performing assets increased $5.1 million, or 25.0%, to $25.6 million, compared to $20.5 million as of June 30, 2024. The ratio of non-performing assets to total assets increased to 0.32% compared to 0.26% as of June 30, 2024.

    As of September 30, 2024, net charge-offs decreased by $0.2 million to $0.4 million, compared to $0.6 million as of June 30, 2024 and remain just 0.03% annualized of average loans.

    _________________________
    1
    Non-GAAP financial metric. See non-GAAP reconciliation included herein for the most directly comparable GAAP measure.

    Earnings Conference Call

    As previously announced, Horizon will host a conference call to review its third quarter financial results and operating performance.

    Participants may access the live conference call on October 24, 2024 at 7:30 a.m. CT (8:30 a.m. ET) by dialing 833-974-2379 from the United States, 866-450-4696 from Canada or 1-412-317-5772 from international locations and requesting the “Horizon Bancorp Call.” Participants are asked to dial in approximately 10 minutes prior to the call.

    A telephone replay of the call will be available approximately one hour after the end of the conference through November 1, 2024. The replay may be accessed by dialing 877-344-7529 from the United States, 855-669-9658 from Canada or 1–412–317-0088 from other international locations, and entering the access code 9847279.

    About Horizon Bancorp, Inc.

    Horizon Bancorp, Inc. (NASDAQ GS: HBNC) is the $7.9 billion-asset commercial bank holding company for Horizon Bank, which serves customers across diverse and economically attractive Midwestern markets through convenient digital and virtual tools, as well as its Indiana and Michigan branches. Horizon’s retail offerings include prime residential and other secured consumer lending to in-market customers, as well as a range of personal banking and wealth management solutions. Horizon also provides a comprehensive array of in-market business banking and treasury management services, as well as equipment financing solutions for customers regionally and nationally, with commercial lending representing over half of total loans. More information on Horizon, headquartered in Northwest Indiana’s Michigan City, is available at horizonbank.com and investor.horizonbank.com.

    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    Certain information set forth in this press release refers to financial measures determined by methods other than in accordance with GAAP. Specifically, we have included non-GAAP financial measures relating to net income, diluted earnings per share, pre-tax, pre-provision net income, net interest margin, tangible stockholders’ equity and tangible book value per share, efficiency ratio, the return on average assets, the return on average common equity, and return on average tangible equity. In each case, we have identified special circumstances that we consider to be non-recurring and have excluded them. We believe that this shows the impact of such events as acquisition-related purchase accounting adjustments and swap termination fees, among others we have identified in our reconciliations. Horizon believes these non-GAAP financial measures are helpful to investors and provide a greater understanding of our business and financial results without giving effect to the purchase accounting impacts and one-time costs of acquisitions and non–recurring items. These measures are not necessarily comparable to similar measures that may be presented by other companies and should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for the related GAAP measure. See the tables and other information below and contained elsewhere in this press release for reconciliations of the non-GAAP information identified herein and its most comparable GAAP measures.

    Forward Looking Statements

    This press release may contain forward–looking statements regarding the financial performance, business prospects, growth and operating strategies of Horizon Bancorp, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, “Horizon”). For these statements, Horizon claims the protection of the safe harbor for forward-looking statements contained in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Statements in this press release should be considered in conjunction with the other information available about Horizon, including the information in the filings we make with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”). Forward-looking statements provide current expectations or forecasts of future events and are not guarantees of future performance. The forward-looking statements are based on management’s expectations and are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties. We have tried, wherever possible, to identify such statements by using words such as “anticipate,” “estimate,” “project,” “intend,” “plan,” “believe,” “will” and similar expressions in connection with any discussion of future operating or financial performance.

    Although management believes that the expectations reflected in such forward-looking statements are reasonable, actual results may differ materially from those expressed or implied in such statements. Risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially include: current financial conditions within the banking industry; changes in the level and volatility of interest rates, changes in spreads on earning assets and changes in interest bearing liabilities; increased interest rate sensitivity; the aggregate effects of elevated inflation levels in recent years; loss of key Horizon personnel; increases in disintermediation; potential loss of fee income, including interchange fees, as new and emerging alternative payment platforms take a greater market share of the payment systems; estimates of fair value of certain of Horizon’s assets and liabilities; changes in prepayment speeds, loan originations, credit losses, market values, collateral securing loans and other assets; changes in sources of liquidity; macroeconomic conditions and their impact on Horizon and its customers; legislative and regulatory actions and reforms; changes in accounting policies or procedures as may be adopted and required by regulatory agencies; litigation, regulatory enforcement, and legal compliance risk and costs; rapid technological developments and changes; cyber terrorism and data security breaches; the rising costs of cybersecurity; the ability of the U.S. federal government to manage federal debt limits; climate change and social justice initiatives; the inability to realize cost savings or revenues or to effectively implement integration plans and other consequences associated with mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures; acts of terrorism, war and global conflicts, such as the Russia and Ukraine conflict and the Israel and Hamas conflict; and supply chain disruptions and delays. These and additional factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed in the forward-looking statements are discussed in Horizon’s reports (such as the Annual Report on Form 10-K, Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q, and Current Reports on Form 8-K) filed with the SEC and available at the SEC’s website (www.sec.gov). Undue reliance should not be placed on the forward–looking statements, which speak only as of the date hereof. Horizon does not undertake, and specifically disclaims any obligation, to publicly release the result of any revisions that may be made to update any forward-looking statement to reflect the events or circumstances after the date on which the forward–looking statement is made, or reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events, except to the extent required by law.

       
      Condensed Consolidated Statements of Income
      (Dollars in Thousands Except Per Share Data, Unaudited)
      Three Months Ended   Nine Months Ended
      September 30,   June 30,   March 31,   December 31,   September 30,   September 30,   September 30,
      2024   2024
      2024
      2023   2023
      2024
      2023
    Interest Income                          
    Loans receivable $ 75,488     $ 71,880     $ 66,954     $ 65,583     $ 63,003     $ 214,322     $ 178,961  
    Investment securities – taxable   8,133       7,986       7,362       8,157       8,788       23,481       26,253  
    Investment securities – tax-exempt   6,310       6,377       6,451       6,767       7,002       19,138       21,617  
    Other   957       738       4,497       3,007       1,332       6,192       1,960  
    Total interest income   90,888       86,981       85,264       83,514       80,125       263,133       228,791  
    Interest Expense                          
    Deposits   30,787       28,447       27,990       27,376       24,704       87,224       58,481  
    Borrowed funds   11,131       11,213       11,930       11,765       11,224       34,274       30,713  
    Subordinated notes   830       829       831       870       880       2,490       2,641  
    Junior subordinated debentures issued to capital trusts   1,230       1,213       1,225       1,246       1,227       3,668       3,469  
    Total interest expense   43,978       41,702       41,976       41,257       38,035       127,656       95,304  
    Net Interest Income   46,910       45,279       43,288       42,257       42,090       135,477       133,487  
    Provision for loan losses   1,044       2,369       805       1,274       263       4,218       1,185  
    Net Interest Income after Provision for Loan Losses   45,866       42,910       42,483       40,983       41,827       131,259       132,302  
    Non-interest Income                          
    Service charges on deposit accounts   3,320       3,130       3,214       3,092       3,086       9,664       9,135  
    Wire transfer fees   123       113       101       103       120       337       345  
    Interchange fees   3,511       3,826       3,109       3,224       3,186       10,446       9,637  
    Fiduciary activities   1,394       1,372       1,315       1,352       1,206       4,081       3,728  
    Gains (losses) on sale of investment securities                     (31,572 )                 (480 )
    Gain on sale of mortgage loans   1,622       896       626       951       1,582       3,144       3,372  
    Mortgage servicing income net of impairment   412       450       439       724       631       1,301       1,984  
    Increase in cash value of bank owned life insurance   349       318       298       658       1,055       965       3,051  
    Other income   780       380       827       1,019       964       1,987       1,675  
    Total non-interest income   11,511       10,485       9,929       (20,449 )     11,830       31,925       32,447  
    Non-interest Expense                          
    Salaries and employee benefits   21,829       20,583       20,268       21,877       20,058       62,680       58,932  
    Net occupancy expenses   3,207       3,192       3,546       3,260       3,283       9,945       10,095  
    Data processing   2,977       2,579       2,464       2,942       2,999       8,020       8,684  
    Professional fees   676       714       607       772       707       1,997       1,873  
    Outside services and consultants   3,677       3,058       3,359       2,394       2,316       10,094       7,548  
    Loan expense   1,034       1,038       719       1,345       1,120       2,791       3,635  
    FDIC insurance expense   1,204       1,315       1,320       1,200       1,300       3,839       2,680  
    Core deposit intangible amortization   844       844       872       903       903       2,560       2,709  
    Other losses   297       515       16       508       188       828       543  
    Other expense   3,527       3,684       3,936       4,129       3,294       11,147       10,255  
    Total non-interest expense   39,272       37,522       37,107       39,330       36,168       113,901       106,954  
    Income /(Loss) Before Income Taxes   18,105       15,873       15,305       (18,796 )     17,489       49,283       57,795  
    Income tax expense   (75 )     1,733       1,314       6,419       1,284       2,972       4,599  
    Net Income /(Loss) $ 18,180     $ 14,140     $ 13,991     $ (25,215 )   $ 16,205     $ 46,311     $ 53,196  
    Basic Earnings /(Loss) Per Share $ 0.42     $ 0.32     $ 0.32     $ (0.58 )   $ 0.37     $ 1.06     $ 1.22  
    Diluted Earnings/(Loss) Per Share   0.41       0.32       0.32       (0.58 )     0.37       1.05       1.21  
                                                           
      Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
      (Dollars in Thousands)
      September 30,
    2024
      June 30,
    2024
      March 31,
    2024
      December 31,
    2023
      September 30,
    2023
    Assets                  
    Interest earning assets                  
    Federal funds sold $ 113,912     $ 34,453     $ 161,704     $ 401,672     $ 71,576  
    Interest earning deposits   12,107       4,957       9,178       12,071       4,718  
    Interest earning time deposits   735       1,715       1,715       2,205       2,207  
    Federal Home Loan Bank stock   53,826       53,826       53,826       34,509       34,509  
    Investment securities, available for sale   541,170       527,054       535,319       547,251       865,168  
    Investment securities, held to maturity   1,888,379       1,904,281       1,925,725       1,945,638       1,966,483  
    Loans held for sale   2,069       2,440       922       1,418       2,828  
    Gross loans held for investment (HFI)   4,803,996       4,822,840       4,618,175       4,417,630       4,359,002  
    Total Interest earning assets   7,416,194       7,351,566       7,306,564       7,362,394       7,306,491  
    Non-interest earning assets                  
    Allowance for credit losses   (52,881 )     (52,215 )     (50,387 )     (50,029 )     (49,699 )
    Cash   108,815       106,691       100,206       112,772       98,843  
    Cash value of life insurance   37,115       36,773       36,455       36,157       149,212  
    Other assets   119,026       165,656       160,593       177,061       152,280  
    Goodwill   155,211       155,211       155,211       155,211       155,211  
    Other intangible assets   11,067       11,910       12,754       13,626       14,530  
    Premises and equipment, net   93,544       93,695       94,303       94,583       94,716  
    Interest receivable   39,366       43,240       40,008       38,710       37,850  
    Total non-interest earning assets   511,263       560,961       549,143       578,091       652,943  
    Total assets $ 7,927,457     $ 7,912,527     $ 7,855,707     $ 7,940,485     $ 7,959,434  
    Liabilities                  
    Savings and money market deposits $ 3,420,827     $ 3,364,726     $ 3,350,673     $ 3,369,149     $ 3,322,788  
    Time deposits   1,220,653       1,178,389       1,136,121       1,179,739       1,250,606  
    Borrowings   1,142,744       1,229,165       1,219,812       1,217,020       1,214,016  
    Repurchase agreements   122,399       128,169       139,309       136,030       142,494  
    Subordinated notes   55,703       55,668       55,634       55,543       59,007  
    Junior subordinated debentures issued to capital trusts   57,423       57,369       57,315       57,258       57,201  
    Total interest earning liabilities   6,019,749       6,013,486       5,958,864       6,014,739       6,046,112  
    Non-interest bearing deposits   1,085,535       1,087,040       1,093,076       1,116,005       1,126,703  
    Interest payable   11,400       11,240       7,853       22,249       16,281  
    Other liabilities   55,951       74,096       74,664       68,680       76,969  
    Total liabilities   7,172,635       7,185,862       7,134,457       7,221,673       7,266,065  
    Stockholders’ Equity                  
    Preferred stock                            
    Common stock                            
    Additional paid-in capital   358,453       357,673       356,599       356,400       355,478  
    Retained earnings   454,050       442,977       435,927       429,021       461,325  
    Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)   (57,681 )     (73,985 )     (71,276 )     (66,609 )     (123,434 )
    Total stockholders’ equity   754,822       726,665       721,250       718,812       693,369  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 7,927,457     $ 7,912,527     $ 7,855,707     $ 7,940,485     $ 7,959,434  
                                           
      Loans and Deposits        
      (Dollars in Thousands, Unaudited)        
      September 30,   June 30,   March 31,   December 31,   September 30,   % Change
      2024   2024   2024   2023   2023   Q3’24 vs Q2’24   Q3’24 vs Q3’23
    Commercial:                          
    Commercial real estate $ 2,105,459     $ 2,117,772     $ 1,984,723     $ 1,962,097     $ 1,916,056       (1 )%     10 %
    Commercial & Industrial   808,600       786,788       765,043       712,863       673,188       3 %     20 %
    Total commercial   2,914,059       2,904,560       2,749,766       2,674,960       2,589,244       %     13 %
    Residential Real estate   801,356       797,956       782,071       681,136       675,399       %     19 %
    Mortgage warehouse   80,437       68,917       56,548       45,078       65,923       17 %     22 %
    Consumer   1,008,144       1,051,407       1,029,790       1,016,456       1,028,436       (4 )%     (2 )%
    Total loans held for investment   4,803,996       4,822,840       4,618,175       4,417,630       4,359,002       %     10 %
    Loans held for sale   2,069       2,440       922       1,418       2,828       (15 )%     (27 )%
    Total loans $ 4,806,065     $ 4,825,280     $ 4,619,097     $ 4,419,048     $ 4,361,830       %     10 %
                               
    Deposits:                          
    Interest bearing deposits                          
    Savings and money market deposits $ 3,420,827     $ 3,364,726     $ 3,350,673     $ 3,369,149     $ 3,322,788       2 %     3 %
    Time deposits   1,220,653       1,178,389       1,136,121       1,179,739       1,250,606       4 %     (2 )%
    Total Interest bearing deposits   4,641,480       4,543,115       4,486,794       4,548,888       4,573,394       2 %     1 %
    Non-interest bearing deposits                          
    Non-interest bearing deposits   1,085,535       1,087,040       1,093,076       1,116,005       1,126,703       %     (4 )%
    Total deposits $ 5,727,015     $ 5,630,155     $ 5,579,870     $ 5,664,893     $ 5,700,097       2 %     %
                                                           
      Average Balance Sheet
      (Dollars in Thousands, Unaudited)
      Three Months Ended
      September 30, 2024   June 30, 2024   September 30, 2023
      Average
    Balance
    Interest(4) Average
    Rate(4)
      Average
    Balance
    Interest(4) Average
    Rate(4)
      Average
    Balance
    Interest(4) Average
    Rate(4)
    Assets
    Interest earning assets                      
    Federal funds sold $ 64,743   $ 860     5.28 %   $ 47,805   $ 645     5.43 %   $ 92,305   $ 1,247     5.36 %
    Interest earning deposits   8,781     97     4.39 %     7,662     93     4.88 %     8,018     85     4.21 %
    Federal Home Loan Bank stock   53,826     1,607     11.88 %     53,827     1,521     11.36 %     34,509     618     7.10 %
    Investment securities – taxable (1)   1,301,830     6,526     1.99 %     1,309,305     6,465     1.99 %     1,650,081     8,170     1.96 %
    Investment securities – non-taxable (1)   1,125,295     7,987     2.82 %     1,132,065     8,072     2.87 %     1,220,998     8,863     2.88 %
    Total investment securities   2,427,125     14,513     2.38 %     2,441,370     14,537     2.39 %     2,871,079     17,033     2.35 %
    Loans receivable (2) (3)   4,775,788     75,828     6.32 %     4,662,124     72,208     6.23 %     4,280,700     63,254     5.89 %
    Total interest earning assets $ 7,330,263   $ 92,905     5.04 %   $ 7,212,788   $ 89,004     4.96 %   $ 7,286,611   $ 82,237     4.59 %
    Non-interest earning assets                      
    Cash and due from banks $ 108,609         $ 108,319         $ 100,331      
    Allowance for credit losses   (52,111 )         (50,334 )         (49,705 )    
    Other assets   471,259           508,555           587,514      
    Total average assets $ 7,858,020         $ 7,779,328         $ 7,924,751      
                           
    Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity
    Interest bearing liabilities                      
    Interest bearing deposits $ 3,386,177   $ 18,185     2.14 %   $ 3,334,490   $ 16,814     2.03 %   $ 3,267,594   $ 12,661     1.54 %
    Time deposits   1,189,148     12,602     4.22 %     1,134,590     11,633     4.12 %     1,271,104     12,043     3.76 %
    Borrowings   1,149,952     10,221     3.54 %     1,184,172     10,278     3.49 %     1,180,452     10,399     3.50 %
    Repurchase agreements   123,524     910     2.93 %     125,144     935     3.00 %     136,784     825     2.39 %
    Subordinated notes   55,681     830     5.93 %     55,647     829     5.99 %     58,983     880     5.92 %
    Junior subordinated debentures issued to capital trusts   57,389     1,230     8.53 %     57,335     1,213     8.51 %     57,166     1,227     8.52 %
    Total interest bearing liabilities $ 5,961,871   $ 43,978     2.93 %   $ 5,891,378   $ 41,702     2.85 %   $ 5,972,083   $ 38,035     2.53 %
    Non-interest bearing liabilities
    Demand deposits $ 1,083,214         $ 1,080,676         $ 1,159,241      
    Accrued interest payable and other liabilities   74,563           80,942           77,942      
    Stockholders’ equity   738,372           726,332           715,485      
    Total average liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 7,858,020         $ 7,779,328         $ 7,924,751      
    Net FTE interest income (non-GAAP) (5)   $ 48,927         $ 47,302         $ 44,202    
    Less FTE adjustments (4)     2,017           2,023           2,112    
    Net Interest Income   $ 46,910         $ 45,279         $ 42,090    
    Net FTE interest margin (Non-GAAP) (4)(5)       2.66 %         2.64 %         2.41 %
     
    (1) Securities balances represent daily average balances for the fair value of securities. The average rate is calculated based on the daily average balance for the amortized cost of securities.
    (2) Includes fees on loans held for sale and held for investment. The inclusion of loan fees does not have a material effect on the average interest rate.
    (3) Non-accruing loans for the purpose of the computation above are included in the daily average loan amounts outstanding. Loan totals are shown net of unearned income and deferred loan fees.
    (4) Management believes fully taxable equivalent, or FTE, interest income is useful to investors in evaluating the Company’s performance as a comparison of the returns between a tax-free investment and a taxable alternative. The Company adjusts interest income and average rates for tax-exempt loans and securities to an FTE basis utilizing a 21% tax rate
    (5) Non-GAAP financial metric. See non-GAAP reconciliation included herein for the most directly comparable GAAP measure.
     
      Credit Quality        
      (Dollars in Thousands Except Ratios, Unaudited)        
      Quarter Ended        
      September 30,   June 30,   March 31,   December 31,   September 30,   % Change
      2024   2024   2024   2023   2023   3Q24 vs 2Q24   3Q24 vs 3Q23
    Non-accrual loans                          
    Commercial $ 6,830     $ 4,321     $ 5,493     $ 7,362     $ 6,919       58 %     (1 )%
    Residential Real estate   9,529       8,489       8,725       8,058       7,644       12 %     25 %
    Mortgage warehouse                                 %     %
    Consumer   7,208       5,453       4,835       4,290       4,493       32 %     60 %
    Total non-accrual loans   23,567       18,263       19,053       19,710       19,056       29 %     24 %
    90 days and greater delinquent – accruing interest   819       1,039       108       559       392       (21 )%     109 %
    Total non-performing loans   24,386       19,302       19,161       20,269       19,448       26 %     25 %
                               
    Other real estate owned                          
    Commercial $ 1,158     $ 1,111     $ 1,124     $ 1,124     $ 1,287       4 %     (10 )%
    Residential Real estate                     182       32       %     (100 )%
    Mortgage warehouse                                 %     %
    Consumer   36       57       50       205       72       (37 )%     (50 )%
    Total other real estate owned $ 1,194     $ 1,168     $ 1,174     $ 1,511     $ 1,391       2 %     (14 )%
                               
    Total non-performing assets $ 25,580     $ 20,470     $ 20,335     $ 21,780     $ 20,839       25 %     23 %
                               
    Loan data:                          
    Accruing 30 to 89 days past due loans $ 18,087     $ 19,785     $ 15,154     $ 16,595     $ 13,089       (9 )%     38 %
    Substandard loans   59,775       51,221       47,469       49,526       47,563       17 %     26 %
    Net charge-offs (recoveries)                          
    Commercial   (55 )     57       (57 )     233       142       (196 )%     (139 )%
    Residential Real estate   (9 )     (4 )     (5 )     21       (39 )     (125 )%     77 %
    Mortgage warehouse                                 %     %
    Consumer   439       534       488       531       619       (18 )%     (29 )%
    Total net charge-offs   375       587       426       785       722       (36 )%     (48 )%
                               
    Allowance for credit losses                          
    Commercial   32,854       31,941       30,514       29,736       29,472       3 %     11 %
    Residential Real estate   2,675       2,588       2,655       2,503       2,794       3 %     (4 )%
    Mortgage warehouse   862       736       659       481       714       17 %     21 %
    Consumer   16,490       16,950       16,559       17,309       16,719       (3 )%     (1 )%
    Total allowance for credit losses $ 52,881     $ 52,215     $ 50,387     $ 50,029     $ 49,699       1 %     6 %
                               
    Credit quality ratios                          
    Non-accrual loans to HFI loans   0.49 %     0.38 %     0.41 %     0.45 %     0.44 %        
    Non-performing assets to total assets   0.32 %     0.26 %     0.26 %     0.27 %     0.26 %        
    Annualized net charge-offs of average total loans   0.03 %     0.05 %     0.04 %     0.07 %     0.07 %        
    Allowance for credit losses to HFI loans   1.10 %     1.08 %     1.09 %     1.13 %     1.14 %        
                                                   
    Non–GAAP Reconciliation of Net Fully-Taxable Equivalent (“FTE”) Interest Margin
    (Dollars in Thousands, Unaudited)
        Three Months Ended
        September 30,   June 30,   March 31,   December 31,   September 30,
        2024   2024   2024   2023   2023
    Interest income (GAAP) (A) $ 90,888     $ 86,981     $ 85,264     $ 83,514     $ 80,125  
    Taxable-equivalent adjustment:                    
    Investment securities – tax exempt (1)     1,677       1,695       1,715       1,799       1,861  
    Loan receivable (2)     340       328       353       314       251  
    Interest income (non-GAAP) (B)   92,905       89,004       87,332       85,627       82,237  
    Interest expense (GAAP) (C)   43,978       41,702       41,976       41,257       38,035  
    Net interest income (GAAP) (D) =(A) – (C)   46,910       45,279       43,288       42,257       42,090  
    Net FTE interest income (non-GAAP) (E) = (B) – (C)   48,927       47,302       45,356       44,370       44,202  
    Average interest earning assets (F)   7,330,263       7,212,788       7,293,559       7,239,034       7,286,611  
    Net FTE interest margin (non-GAAP) (G) = (E*) / (F)   2.66 %     2.64 %     2.50 %     2.43 %     2.41 %
                         
    (1) The following represents municipal securities interest income for investment securities classified as available-for-sale and held-to-maturity
    (2) The following represents municipal loan interest income for loan receivables classified as held for sale and held for investment
    *Annualized
     
    Non–GAAP Reconciliation of Return on Average Tangible Common Equity
    (Dollars in Thousands, Unaudited)
        Three Months Ended
        September 30,   June 30,   March 31,   December 31,   September 30,
        2024   2024   2024   2023   2023
                         
    Net income (loss) (GAAP) (A) $ 18,180     $ 14,140     $ 13,991     $ (25,215 )   $ 16,205  
                         
    Average stockholders’ equity (B)   738,372       726,332       725,083       702,793       715,485  
    Average intangible assets (C)   166,819       167,659       168,519       169,401       170,301  
    Average tangible equity (Non-GAAP) (D) = (B) – (C) $ 571,553     $ 558,673     $ 556,564     $ 533,392     $ 545,184  
    Return on average tangible common equity (“ROACE”) (non-GAAP) (E) = (A*) / (D)   12.65 %     10.18 %     10.11 %   (18.76 )%     11.79 %
    *Annualized                    
                         
    Non–GAAP Reconciliation of Tangible Common Equity to Tangible Assets
    (Dollars in Thousands, Unaudited)
        Three Months Ended
        September 30,   June 30,   March 31,   December 31,   September 30,
        2024   2024   2024   2023   2023
    Total stockholders’ equity (GAAP) (A) $ 754,822     $ 726,665     $ 721,250     $ 718,812     $ 693,369  
    Intangible assets (end of period) (B)   166,278       167,121       167,965       168,837       169,741  
    Total tangible common equity (non-GAAP) (C) = (A) – (B) $ 588,544     $ 559,544     $ 553,285     $ 549,975     $ 523,628  
                         
    Total assets (GAAP) (D)   7,927,457       7,912,527       7,855,707       7,940,485       7,959,434  
    Intangible assets (end of period) (B)   166,278       167,121       167,965       168,837       169,741  
    Total tangible assets (non-GAAP) (E) = (D) – (B) $ 7,761,179     $ 7,745,406     $ 7,687,742     $ 7,771,648     $ 7,789,693  
                         
    Tangible common equity to tangible assets (Non-GAAP) (G) = (C) / (E)   7.58 %     7.22 %     7.20 %     7.08 %     6.72 %
                                             
    Non–GAAP Reconciliation of Tangible Book Value Per Share
    (Dollars in Thousands, Unaudited)
        Three Months Ended
        September 30,   June 30,   March 31,   December 31,   September 30,
        2024
      2024
      2024
      2023
      2023
    Total stockholders’ equity (GAAP) (A) $ 754,822     $ 726,665     $ 721,250     $ 718,812     $ 693,369  
    Intangible assets (end of period) (B)   166,278       167,121       167,965       168,837       169,741  
    Total tangible common equity (non-GAAP) (C) = (A) – (B) $ 588,544     $ 559,544     $ 553,285     $ 549,975     $ 523,628  
    Common shares outstanding (D)   43,712,059       43,712,059       43,726,380       43,652,063       43,648,501  
                         
    Tangible book value per common share (non-GAAP) (E) = (C) / (D) $ 13.46     $ 12.80     $ 12.65     $ 12.60     $ 12.00  
                                             
    Contact: John R. Stewart, CFA
      EVP, Chief Financial Officer
    Phone: (219) 814–5833
    Fax: (219) 874–9280
    Date: October 23, 2024
       

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Bel Reports Third Quarter 2024 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Sales and Gross Margin Percentage Above Mid-Point of Expected Ranges
    Provides Q4-24 Sales and Gross Margin Guidance

    WEST ORANGE, N.J., Oct. 23, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Bel Fuse Inc. (Nasdaq: BELFA and BELFB) today announced preliminary financial results for the third quarter of 2024.

    Third Quarter 2024 Highlights

    • Net sales of $123.6 million compared to $158.7 million in Q3-23
    • Gross profit margin of 36.1%, up from 35.0% in Q3-23
    • Net earnings of $8.1 million versus $19.4 million in Q3-23
    • Adjusted EBITDA of $20.6 million (16.7% of sales) as compared to $29.9 million (18.8% of sales) in Q3-23
    • Repurchased 26,647 shares of Bel stock at an aggregate cost of $1.9 million in Q3-24

    “We were pleased that our third quarter results landed above the midpoint of guidance for both sales and gross margin,” said Daniel Bernstein, President and CEO. “Each of our three product segments performed as expected, given the current market, regulatory and seasonal factors outlined in last quarter’s disclosures and on the Q2 earnings call.

    “During the third quarter, the team focused on a variety of operational and other internal initiatives. With our announcement of the signing our definitive purchase agreement in September, we welcomed Enercon to the Bel family and are positioned to introduce new customers, end markets and geographies to our Power segment upon the closing expected later this quarter. In a project scheduled to be completed during the first quarter of 2025, our fuse manufacturing, located in China, will be consolidated into other existing Bel facilities thus reducing our footprint further. The fuse initiative is anticipated to achieve annual cost savings of approximately $1.5 million once completed. We are also pleased to announce the addition of two senior associates in newly-created positions to Bel’s corporate team. Uma Pengali has joined as Global Head of Sales and Marketing and Anubhav Gothi has joined as Bel’s Global Head of Contracts. We believe Uma and Anubhav will be instrumental contributors to Bel’s long-term success,” concluded Mr. Bernstein.

    Farouq Tuweiq, CFO, added, “We have started to see positive trends in bookings during the months of September and October across each of our product segments, which is a positive indicator as we enter 2025. These green shoots are largely in our networking and industrial markets, and in the distribution channel. Looking to the fourth quarter of 2024, we expect GAAP net sales in the range of $117 to $125 million with gross margins of approximately 34 – 36%, based on information available as of today. This guidance excludes any potential incremental contribution related to the previously-announced acquisition of Enercon, which is expected to close during the fourth quarter.

    “Overall, we are encouraged by the sequential improvement in market conditions that we are seeing and believe this will bode well for 2025. We are excited to continue our journey of growth and continuous improvement with our new team members,” concluded Mr. Tuweiq.

    Non-GAAP financial measures, such as Non-GAAP net earnings, Non-GAAP EPS, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA, adjust corresponding GAAP measures for provision for income taxes, interest expense, and depreciation and amortization, and also exclude, where applicable for the covered period presented in the financial statements, certain unusual or special items identified by management such as restructuring charges, gains/losses on sales of businesses and properties, acquisition related costs, and certain litigation costsNon-GAAP adjusted net sales exclude expedite fee revenue. Please refer to the financial information included with this press release for reconciliations of GAAP financial measures to Non-GAAP financial measures and our explanation of why we present Non-GAAP financial measures.

    Conference Call
    Bel has scheduled a conference call for 8:30 a.m. ET on Thursday, October 24, 2024 to discuss these results. To participate in the conference call, investors should dial 877-407-0784, or 201-689-8560 if dialing internationally. The presentation will additionally be broadcast live over the Internet and will be available at https://ir.belfuse.com/events-and-presentations. The webcast will be available via replay for a period of at least 30 days at this same Internet address. For those unable to access the live call, a telephone replay will be available at 844-512-2921, or 412-317-6671 if dialing internationally, using access code 13749258 after 12:30 pm ET, also for 30 days.

    About Bel
    Bel (www.belfuse.com) designs, manufactures and markets a broad array of products that power, protect and connect electronic circuits. These products are primarily used in the networking, telecommunications, computing, general industrial, high-speed data transmission, military, commercial aerospace, transportation and eMobility industries. Bel’s portfolio of products also finds application in the automotive, medical, broadcasting and consumer electronics markets. Bel’s product groups include Magnetic Solutions (integrated connector modules, power transformers, power inductors and discrete components), Power Solutions and Protection (front-end, board-mount and industrial power products, module products and circuit protection), and Connectivity Solutions (expanded beam fiber optic, copper-based, RF and RJ connectors and cable assemblies). The Company operates facilities around the world.

    Company Contact:
    Farouq Tuweiq  
    Chief Financial Officer  
    ir@belf.com

    Investor Contact:
    Three Part Advisors
    Jean Marie Young, Managing Director or Steven Hooser, Partner
    631-418-4339
    jyoung@threepa.com; shooser@threepa.com

    Cautionary Language Concerning Forward-Looking Statements
    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of the “safe harbor” provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, including but not limited to, our guidance for the fourth quarter of 2024, and our statements regarding our expectations for future periods generally including anticipated financial performance, projections and trends for the remainder of the year and other future periods including 2025, and our statements regarding future events, performance, plans, intentions, beliefs, expectations and estimates, including statements regarding matters such as trends and expectations as to our sales, gross margin, products, product segments, customers, end markets, geographies and bookings, statements regarding our views and expectations about the impact of market trends and seasonal factors, statements about the closing of the Enercon Technologies, Ltd. (“Enercon”) acquisition including the anticipated timing thereof, and statements about the anticipated benefits and impact of the Enercon acquisition including in terms of introducing new customers, end markets and geographies to our Power segment, as well as any potential incremental contribution by Enercon post-closing to Bel’s financial results, statements regarding consolidation projects and initiatives, the expected timing of implementation and completion thereof, and the anticipated projections of cost savings to be realized thereby, statements about future contributions of new employees and the role of newly-created positions in the corporate team in contributing to Bel’s long-term success, statements regarding our expectations and beliefs regarding trends in the Company’s business and industry and the markets in which Bel operates, and about the broader economy and macroeconomic environment generally, including statements about trends in bookings and views about indicators of economic conditions including as to particular sectors or markets, improvement in market conditions, and statements about Bel’s growth and improvement, and other statements regarding the Company’s positioning, its strategies, future progress, investments, plans, targets, goals, and other focuses and initiatives, and the expected timing and potential benefits thereof. These forward-looking statements are made as of the date of this release and are based on current expectations, estimates, forecasts and projections as well as the beliefs and assumptions of management. Words such as “expect,” “anticipate,” “should,” “believe,” “hope,” “target,” “project,” “forecast,” “outlook,” “goals,” “estimate,” “potential,” “predict,” “may,” “will,” “might,” “could,” “intend,” variations of these terms or the negative of these terms and similar expressions are intended to identify these forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties, many of which involve factors or circumstances that are beyond Bel’s control. Bel’s actual results could differ materially from those stated or implied in our forward-looking statements (including without limitation any of Bel’s projections) due to a number of factors, including but not limited to, unanticipated difficulties, delays or expenditures relating to the proposed Enercon acquisition, including, without limitation, difficulties that result in the failure to realize the expected benefits and synergies within the expected time period (if at all); disruptions of Bel’s or Enercon’s current plans, operations and relationships with customers, suppliers, distributors, business partners and regulators caused by the announcement and pendency of the proposed Enercon acquisition; potential difficulties in employee retention due to the announcement and pendency of the proposed Enercon acquisition; the possibility that the proposed Enercon acquisition does not close, including, but not limited to, failure to satisfy the closing conditions; the market concerns facing our customers, and risks for the Company’s business in the event of the loss of certain substantial customers; the continuing viability of sectors that rely on our products; the effects of business and economic conditions, and challenges impacting the macroeconomic environment generally and/or our industry in particular; the effects of rising input costs, and cost changes generally, including the potential impact of inflationary pressures; difficulties associated with integrating previously acquired companies, and any difficulties that may be experienced in integrating Enercon following the closing of the Enercon acquisition; capacity and supply constraints or difficulties, including supply chain constraints or other challenges; the impact of public health crises (such as the governmental, social and economic effects of COVID or other future epidemics or pandemics); difficulties associated with the availability of labor, and the risks of any labor unrest or labor shortages; risks associated with our international operations, including our substantial manufacturing operations in China, and following the acquisition of Enercon, risks associated with operations in Israel, which may be adversely affected by political or economic instability, major hostilities or acts of terrorism in the region; risks associated with restructuring programs or other strategic initiatives, including any difficulties in implementation or realization of the expected benefits or cost savings; product development, commercialization or technological difficulties; the regulatory and trade environment including the potential effects of trade restrictions that may impact Bel, its customers and/or its suppliers; risks associated with fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates and interest rates; uncertainties associated with legal proceedings; the market’s acceptance of the Company’s new products and competitive responses to those new products; the impact of changes to U.S. and applicable foreign legal and regulatory requirements, including tax laws, trade and tariff policies; and the risks detailed in Bel’s most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023 and in subsequent reports filed by Bel with the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as other documents that may be filed by Bel from time to time with the Securities and Exchange Commission. In light of the risks and uncertainties impacting our business, there can be no assurance that any forward-looking statement will in fact prove to be correct. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. The forward-looking statements included in this press release represent Bel’s views as of the date of this press release. Bel anticipates that subsequent events and developments will cause its views to change. Bel undertakes no intention or obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. These forward-looking statements should not be relied upon as representing Bel’s views as of any date subsequent to the date of this press release.

    Non-GAAP Financial Measures
    The Non-GAAP financial measures identified in this press release as well as in the supplementary information to this press release (Non-GAAP adjusted net sales, Non-GAAP net earnings, Non-GAAP EPS, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA) are not measures of performance under accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America (“GAAP”). These measures should not be considered a substitute for, and the reader should also consider, income from operations, net earnings, earnings per share and other measures of performance as defined by GAAP as indicators of our performance or profitability. Our non-GAAP measures may not be comparable to other similarly-titled captions of other companies due to differences in the method of calculation. We present results adjusted to exclude the effects of certain unusual or special items and their related tax impact that would otherwise be included under U.S. GAAP, to aid in comparisons with other periods. We believe that these non-GAAP measures of financial results provide useful information to management and investors regarding certain financial and business trends relating to our financial condition and results of operations. We use these non-GAAP measures to compare the Company’s performance to that of prior periods for trend analysis and for budgeting and planning purposes. We also believe that the use of these non-GAAP financial measures provides an additional tool for investors to use in evaluating ongoing operating results and trends and in comparing the Company’s financial measures with other similarly situated companies in our industry, many of which present similar non-GAAP financial measures to investors. We also use non-GAAP measures in determining incentive compensation. For additional information about our use of non-GAAP financial measures in connection with our Incentive Compensation Program for 2023, please see the Executive Compensation discussion appearing in our Definitive Proxy Statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 1, 2024.

    Website Information
    We routinely post important information for investors on our website, www.belfuse.com, in the “Investor Relations” section. We use our website as a means of disclosing material, otherwise non-public information and for complying with our disclosure obligations under Regulation FD. Accordingly, investors should monitor the Investor Relations section of our website, in addition to following our press releases, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, public conference calls, presentations and webcasts. The information contained on, or that may be accessed through, our website is not incorporated by reference into, and is not a part of, this document.

    [Financial tables follow]

               
               
    Bel Fuse Inc.
    Supplementary Information(1)
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (in thousands, except per share amounts)
    (unaudited)
               
      Three Months Ended     Nine Months Ended  
      September 30,     September 30,  
      2024     2023     2024     2023  
                                   
    Net sales $ 123,638     $ 158,682     $ 384,933     $ 499,803  
    Cost of sales   78,961       103,217       238,782       335,137  
    Gross profit   44,677       55,465       146,151       164,666  
    As a % of net sales   36.1 %     35.0 %     38.0 %     32.9 %
                                   
    Research and development costs   5,443       5,292       16,652       16,521  
    Selling, general and administrative expenses   26,700       23,717       75,785       74,149  
    As a % of net sales   21.6 %     14.9 %     19.7 %     14.8 %
    Restructuring charges   1,087       2,091       1,790       6,306  
    Gain on sale of property         (147 )           (3,819 )
    Income from operations   11,447       24,512       51,924       71,509  
    As a % of net sales   9.3 %     15.4 %     13.5 %     14.3 %
                                   
    Gain on sale of Czech Republic business         (135 )           980  
    Interest expense   (414 )     (512 )     (1,263 )     (2,402 )
    Interest income   1,480             3,741        
    Other income/expense, net   (1,325 )     (96 )     21       (286 )
    Earnings before income taxes   11,188       23,769       54,423       69,801  
                                   
    Provision for income taxes   3,108       4,321       11,663       8,006  
    Effective tax rate   27.8 %     18.2 %     21.4 %     11.5 %
    Net earnings $ 8,080     $ 19,448     $ 42,760     $ 61,795  
    As a % of net sales   6.5 %     12.3 %     11.1 %     12.4 %
                                   
    Weighted average number of shares outstanding:                              
    Class A common shares – basic and diluted   2,116       2,142       2,126       2,142  
    Class B common shares – basic and diluted   10,434       10,636       10,512       10,636  
                                   
    Net earnings per common share:                              
    Class A common shares – basic and diluted $ 0.61     $ 1.46     $ 3.23     $ 4.63  
    Class B common shares – basic and diluted $ 0.65     $ 1.54     $ 3.41     $ 4.88  
     
    (1) The supplementary information included in this press release for 2024 is preliminary and subject to change prior to the filing of our upcoming Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
     
    Bel Fuse Inc.
    Supplementary Information(1)
    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (in thousands, unaudited)
     
      September 30, 2024     December 31, 2023  
    Assets              
    Current assets:              
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 134,266     $ 89,371  
    Held to maturity U.S. Treasury securities   29,541       37,548  
    Accounts receivable, net   75,998       84,129  
    Inventories   124,885       136,540  
    Other current assets   22,959       33,890  
    Total current assets   387,649       381,478  
    Property, plant and equipment, net   36,735       36,533  
    Right-of-use assets   22,901       20,481  
    Related-party note receivable   3,070       2,152  
    Equity method investment   10,014       10,282  
    Goodwill and other intangible assets, net   72,772       76,033  
    Other assets   51,276       44,672  
    Total assets $ 584,417     $ 571,631  
                   
    Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity              
    Current liabilities:              
    Accounts payable $ 37,139     $ 40,441  
    Operating lease liability, current   6,451       6,350  
    Other current liabilities   53,297       63,818  
    Total current liabilities   96,887       110,609  
    Long-term debt   60,000       60,000  
    Operating lease liability, long-term   16,808       14,212  
    Other liabilities   43,360       46,252  
    Total liabilities   217,055       231,073  
    Stockholders’ equity   367,362       340,558  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 584,417     $ 571,631  
     
    (1) The supplementary information included in this press release for 2024 is preliminary and subject to change prior to the filing of our upcoming Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
     
    Bel Fuse Inc.
    Supplementary Information(1)
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (in thousands, unaudited)
         
      Nine Months Ended  
      September 30,  
      2024     2023  
                   
    Cash flows from operating activities:              
    Net earnings $ 42,760     $ 61,795  
    Adjustments to reconcile net earnings to net cash provided by operating activities:              
    Depreciation and amortization   10,759       9,962  
    Stock-based compensation   2,782       2,712  
    Amortization of deferred financing costs   27       33  
    Deferred income taxes   (5,366 )     (4,894 )
    Net unrealized losses on foreign currency revaluation   1,275       130  
    Gain on sale of property         (3,819 )
    Gain on sale of Czech Republic business         (980 )
    Other, net   628       (495 )
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:              
    Accounts receivable, net   8,366       11,931  
    Unbilled receivables   7,482       1,590  
    Inventories   12,266       29,313  
    Accounts payable   (3,302 )     (18,674 )
    Accrued expenses   (11,849 )     4,536  
    Accrued restructuring costs   (590 )     (148 )
    Income taxes payable   4,809       2,008  
    Other operating assets/liabilities, net   (4,327 )     (13,575 )
    Net cash provided by operating activities   65,720       81,425  
                   
    Cash flows from investing activities:              
    Purchases of property, plant and equipment   (7,906 )     (9,659 )
    Purchases of held to maturity U.S. Treasury securities   (131,309 )      
    Proceeds from held to maturity securities   139,316        
    Payment for equity method investment         (9,975 )
    Investment in related party notes receivable   (918 )     (1,905 )
    Proceeds from sale of property, plant and equipment   236       5,403  
    Proceeds from sale of business         5,063  
    Net cash used in investing activities   (581 )     (11,073 )
                   
    Cash flows from financing activities:              
    Dividends paid to common stockholders   (2,487 )     (2,490 )
    Deferred financing costs   (330 )      
    Repayments under revolving credit line         (40,000 )
    Borrowings under revolving credit line         5,000  
    Purchases of common stock   (16,053 )      
    Net cash used in financing activities   (18,870 )     (37,490 )
                   
    Effect of exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents   (1,374 )     (2,903 )
                   
    Net increase in cash and cash equivalents   44,895       29,959  
    Cash and cash equivalents – beginning of period   89,371       70,266  
    Cash and cash equivalents – end of period $ 134,266     $ 100,225  
                   
                   
    Supplementary information:              
    Cash paid during the period for:              
    Income taxes, net of refunds received $ 15,556     $ 18,148  
    Interest payments $ 3,010     $ 3,738  
    ROU assets obtained in exchange for lease obligations $ 4,711     $ 5,887  
     
    (1) The supplementary information included in this press release for 2024 is preliminary and subject to change prior to the filing of our upcoming Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
     
    Bel Fuse Inc.
    Supplementary Information(1)
    Product Group Highlights
    (dollars in thousands, unaudited)
     
      Sales     Gross Margin  
      Q3-24     Q3-23     % Change     Q3-24     Q3-23     Basis Point Change  
    Power Solutions and Protection $ 48,680     $ 74,862       -35.0 %     39.4 %     41.7 %     (230 )
    Connectivity Solutions   55,715       51,771       7.6 %     36.6 %     35.8 %     80  
    Magnetic Solutions   19,243       32,049       -40.0 %     27.3 %     22.0 %     530  
    Total $ 123,638     $ 158,682       -22.1 %     36.1 %     35.0 %     110  
      Sales     Gross Margin  
      YTD September 2024     YTD September 2023     % Change     YTD September 2024     YTD September 2023     Basis Point Change  
    Power Solutions and Protection $ 167,478       245,134       -31.7 %     43.2 %     37.5 %     570  
    Connectivity Solutions   167,822       160,010       4.9 %     37.3 %     35.8 %     150  
    Magnetic Solutions   49,633       94,659       -47.6 %     23.9 %     23.0 %     90  
    Total $ 384,933     $ 499,803       -23.0 %     38.0 %     32.9 %     510  
     
    (1) The supplementary information included in this press release for 2024 is preliminary and subject to change prior to the filing of our upcoming Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
     
    Bel Fuse Inc.
    Supplementary Information(1)
    Reconciliation of GAAP Net Sales to Non-GAAP Adjusted Net Sales(2)
    Reconciliation of GAAP Net Earnings to EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA(2)
    (in thousands, unaudited)
               
      Three Months Ended     Nine Months Ended  
      September 30,     September 30,  
      2024     2023     2024     2023  
                                   
    GAAP net sales $ 123,638     $ 158,682     $ 384,933     $ 499,803  
    Expedite fee revenue         1,008       57       14,425  
    Non-GAAP adjusted net sales $ 123,638     $ 157,674     $ 384,876     $ 485,378  
      Three Months Ended     Nine Months Ended  
      September 30,     September 30,  
      2024     2023     2024     2023  
                                   
    GAAP Net earnings $ 8,080     $ 19,448     $ 42,760     $ 61,795  
    Interest expense   414       512       1,263       2,402  
    Provision for income taxes   3,108       4,321       11,663       8,006  
    Depreciation and amortization   3,636       3,391       10,759       9,962  
    EBITDA $ 15,238     $ 27,672     $ 66,445     $ 82,165  
    % of net sales   12.3 %     17.4 %     17.3 %     16.4 %
                                   
    Unusual or special items:                              
    Restructuring charges   1,087       2,091       1,790       6,306  
    MPS litigation costs         132             2,903  
    Gain on sale of Czech Republic business         135             (980 )
    Gain on sale of properties         (147 )           (3,819 )
    Acquisition related costs   4,292             4,292        
    Adjusted EBITDA $ 20,617     $ 29,883     $ 72,527     $ 86,575  
    % of net sales   16.7 %     18.8 %     18.8 %     17.3 %
     
    (1) The supplementary information included in this press release for 2024 is preliminary and subject to change prior to the filing of our upcoming Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
    (2) In this press release and supplemental information, we have included Non-GAAP financial measures, including Non-GAAP adjusted net sales, Non-GAAP net earnings, Non-GAAP EPS, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA. We present results adjusted to exclude the effects of certain specified items and their related tax impact that would otherwise be included under GAAP, to aid in comparisons with other periods. We believe that these non-GAAP measures of financial results provide useful information to management and investors regarding certain financial and business trends relating to our financial condition and results of operations. We use these non-GAAP measures to compare the Company’s performance to that of prior periods for trend analysis and for budgeting and planning purposes. We also believe that the use of these non-GAAP financial measures provides an additional tool for investors to use in evaluating ongoing operating results and trends and in comparing the Company’s financial measures with other similarly situated companies in our industry, many of which present similar non-GAAP financial measures to investors. We also use non-GAAP measures in determining incentive compensation. See the section above captioned “Non-GAAP Financial Measures” for additional information.
     
    Bel Fuse Inc.
    Supplementary Information(1)
    Reconciliation of GAAP Measures to Non-GAAP Measures(2)
    (in thousands, except per share data) (unaudited)
     
    The following tables detail the impact that certain unusual or special items had on the Company’s net earnings per common Class A and Class B basic and diluted shares (“EPS”) and the line items in which these items were included on the consolidated statements of operations.
     
        Three Months Ended September 30, 2024     Three Months Ended September 30, 2023  
    Reconciling Items   Earnings before taxes     Provision for income taxes     Net earnings     Class A EPS(3)     Class B EPS(3)     Earnings before taxes     Provision for income taxes     Net earnings     Class A EPS(3)     Class B EPS(3)  
                                                                                     
    GAAP measures   $ 11,188     $ 3,108     $ 8,080     $ 0.61     $ 0.65     $ 23,769     $ 4,321     $ 19,448     $ 1.46     $ 1.54  
    Restructuring charges     1,087       154       933       0.07       0.07       2,091       407       1,684       0.13       0.13  
    MPS litigation costs                                   132       30       102       0.01       0.01  
    Gain on sale of Czech Republic business                                   135       7       128       0.01       0.01  
    Gain on sale of properties                                   (147 )     (29 )     (118 )     (0.01 )     (0.01 )
    Acquisition related costs     4,292       987       3,305       0.25       0.27                                
    Non-GAAP measures   $ 16,567     $ 4,249     $ 12,318     $ 0.94     $ 0.99     $ 25,980     $ 4,736     $ 21,244     $ 1.59     $ 1.68  
        Nine Months Ended September 30, 2024     Nine Months Ended September 30, 2023  
    Reconciling Items   Earnings before taxes     Provision for income taxes     Net earnings     Class A EPS(3)     Class B EPS(3)     Earnings before taxes     Provision for income taxes     Net earnings     Class A EPS(3)     Class B EPS(3)  
                                                                                     
    GAAP measures   $ 54,423     $ 11,663     $ 42,760     $ 3.23     $ 3.41     $ 69,801     $ 8,006     $ 61,795     $ 4.63     $ 4.88  
    Restructuring charges     1,790       317       1,473       0.11       0.12       6,306       1,007       5,299       0.40       0.42  
    MPS litigation costs                                   2,903       667       2,236       0.17       0.18  
    Gain on sale of Czech Republic business                                   (980 )     (49 )     (931 )     (0.07 )     (0.07 )
    Gain on sale of properties                                   (3,819 )     (763 )     (3,056 )     (0.23 )     (0.24 )
    Acquisition related costs     4,292       987       3,305       0.25       0.26                                
    Non-GAAP measures   $ 60,505     $ 12,967     $ 47,538     $ 3.59     $ 3.80     $ 74,211     $ 8,868     $ 65,343     $ 4.89     $ 5.16  
     
    (1) The supplementary information included in this press release for 2024 is preliminary and subject to change prior to the filing of our upcoming Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
    (2) In this press release and supplemental information, we have included Non-GAAP financial measures, including Non-GAAP adjusted net sales, Non-GAAP net earnings, Non-GAAP EPS, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA. We present results adjusted to exclude the effects of certain specified items and their related tax impact that would otherwise be included under GAAP, to aid in comparisons with other periods. We believe that these non-GAAP measures of financial results provide useful information to management and investors regarding certain financial and business trends relating to our financial condition and results of operations. We use these non-GAAP measures to compare the Company’s performance to that of prior periods for trend analysis and for budgeting and planning purposes. We also believe that the use of these non-GAAP financial measures provides an additional tool for investors to use in evaluating ongoing operating results and trends and in comparing the Company’s financial measures with other similarly situated companies in our industry, many of which present similar non-GAAP financial measures to investors. We also use non-GAAP measures in determining incentive compensation. See the section above captioned “Non-GAAP Financial Measures” for additional information.
    (3) Individual amounts of earnings per share may not agree to the total due to rounding.
     

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Tillis Statement on Vote to Confirm Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for North Carolina Thom Tillis
    WASHINGTON D.C. – Today, Senator Thom Tillis released the following statement on his decision to vote to confirm Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense:
    “From the beginning, I have been clear about my position: if President Trump’s nominees were reported favorably out of the relevant committees, I would support their confirmation on the Senate floor absent new material information about their qualifications. Once Pete Hegseth’s nomination was sent to the floor by my colleagues on the Senate Armed Services Committee, I conducted my own due diligence, including asking tough questions of Pete and I appreciated his candor and openness in answering them. Pete has a unique perspective as a veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and is unquestionably passionate about modernizing our military and supporting the brave patriots like himself who serve our nation. I will support his confirmation and look forward to working with him to rebuild our military and advance President Trump’s peace through strength agenda.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: “America’s Best Deserves the Best” – Senator Hassan Outlines Risk Pete Hegseth Poses to U.S. National Security in Senate Floor Speech

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Maggie Hassan
    WASHINGTON – In a speech on the Senate floor, U.S. Senator Maggie Hassan (D-NH) today outlined how Pete Hegseth’s lack of qualifications to serve as Secretary of Defense would put U.S. national security, and our men and women in uniform, at risk.
    Some key quotes from the Senator’s remarks include:
    “Unfortunately, it is clear that Mr. Hegseth does not have the skills, experience, record, or character to lead a department that has a budget of more than $800 billion, and is the largest employer of men and women in our country, and is tasked with safeguarding our nation’s security and freedom.”
    “If Mr. Hegseth could not and did not effectively manage organizations with around 100 employees, surely no one can actually believe that he is ready to manage one of 3.4 million people.”
    “In the past, when we have looked for leaders of our armed forces, we have searched for our country’s best and brightest; the most gifted minds of America’s boardrooms, the brightest stars to come out of West Point, the most revered public servants to serve in these halls… we did not need then, nor do we need now to turn to the green rooms of cable TV networks for the Secretary of Defense.”
    “Surely the armed forces of the United States of America…the victors of the Ardennes, of Gettysburg, and Midway and a thousand places in between and since…surely, they need a leader who they can have full faith in; surely America’s best deserves the best.”
    “There are strong, experienced, and able members of the President’s party whose views align with his who could be exceptional leaders of the Department of Defense. Mr. Hegseth is not one of them.”
    Click here to see Senator Hassan’s remarks, or see a transcript below:
    Mister President, I rise right now and today for the purpose of joining my colleagues from both sides of the aisle in opposing Mr. Hegseth’s nomination as Secretary of Defense. I appreciate Mr. Hegseth’s military service, indeed when evaluating his nomination, his service was what I appreciated most about his background.
    But unfortunately, it is clear that Mr. Hegseth does not have the skills, experience, record, or character to lead a department that has a budget of more than $800 billion, and is the largest employer of men and women in our country, and is tasked with safeguarding our nation’s security and freedom.
    We take pride as Americans in the fact that our military is the very best. The standard of excellence and professionalism set by the men and women of our armed forces is central to our military’s success and our country’s success.
    This high standard of competency and character, of both unmatched ability and uncommon virtue, is why America’s armed forces command the respect of our friends, the fear of our foes, and the abiding faith of freedom-loving people everywhere.
    America boasts the greatest fighting force in the history of the world…the heroes who serve in our armed forces deserve a leader who is worthy of that greatness. And Mr. Hegseth is plainly not up to that task.
    Like many of my colleagues, I have concerns regarding Mr. Hegseth’s character – the documented accusations about his excessive and uncontrolled drinking, his sexual harassment, sexual assault, and now, accusations of being abusive to his ex-wife.
    It is ironic that Mr. Hegseth and some of my colleagues have dismissed these concerns as partisan, because sadly if this wasn’t a partisan confirmation process – for example, if my Republican colleagues were considering hiring Mr. Hegseth to join their staffs – we would all agree that these accusations would immediately be disqualifying.
    Mr. Hegseth dismisses these multiple accusations from disparate people as “a coordinated smear campaign.” I don’t think that the concerns of his former colleagues, friends, and family should be quickly dismissed as smears. And many other of the nominees who are being considered by this body aren’t facing similar accusations even though there are people who vehemently oppose their confirmation. Which begs the question of why Mr. Hegseth continues to face multiple, similar accusations from different sources. But for a moment, let’s do as Mr. Hegseth asks and put aside these accusations.
    Let us say for a moment that those who occupy the highest positions in public life shouldn’t be above reproach, though indeed they should;
    Let us say that our service members do not deserve a leader whose strength of character matches their own, though I believe they do;
    And let us say for a moment that character does not count, though indeed it surely always does.
    Let us, in short, ignore everything that Mr. Hegseth demanded we ignore in his hearing. Even if we did that, I would submit that based on experience alone, Mr. Hegseth is plainly unqualified for the job as Secretary of Defense.
    The Secretary of Defense is responsible for a budget of more than $800 billion and responsible for 3.4 million employees who serve on every continent across the globe. To lead the Defense Department is a daunting task that requires leadership and managerial skills of the highest order.
    However, Mr. Hegseth’s managerial experience begins and ends with his leadership at two small nonprofits. And his tenure at both resulted in concerns about his financial mismanagement at their helm. If Mr. Hegseth could not and did not effectively manage organizations with around 100 employees, surely no one can actually believe that he is ready to manage one of 3.4 million people. 
    We live in a dangerous and uncertain world. Iran and its proxies continue to menace our forces in the Middle East. Vladimir Putin is on the march in Europe. North Korea persists in testing our allies and testing its missiles. And China…China looks with a conqueror’s gaze toward Taiwan.
    To my Republican colleagues, I understand that you wish to support President Trump. But Presidents are sometimes wrong. We are talking about our nation’s vital security. We are considering the confirmation of the person who will be entrusted to marshal our resources as the enemy approaches, attacks our cyber defenses, or invades an ally.
    It matters. It matters that we have the right person in this job. It matters that we get this one right. Surely there is someone in this great country of brilliant and brave people of all political stripes who is more capable; who has the experience and character necessary to forge under pressure the judgement that will keep us safe and free.
    This is America, we have the finest fighting force ever assembled, we have more strength and power than any fighting force has had in human history.
    And in the past, when we have looked for leaders of our armed forces, we have searched for our country’s best and brightest; the most gifted minds of America’s boardrooms, the brightest stars to come out of West Point, the most revered public servants to serve in these halls… we did not need then, nor do we need now to turn to the green rooms of cable TV networks for the Secretary of Defense.
    Tomorrow marks the 80th anniversary of the [end of the] Battle of the Bulge, a campaign in which my father served. In freezing temperatures, outnumbered and often undersupplied, our forces held the line against Hitler’s onslaught. Our soldiers won because they were brave, they won because they were skilled, and they won because they were well led.
    Surely the armed forces of the United States of America…the victors of the Ardennes, of Gettysburg, and Midway and a thousand places in between and since…surely, they need a leader who they can have full faith in; surely America’s best deserves the best.
    Government’s most important task is to keep America safe, secure, and free. It is a complex, fast moving, and evolving challenge. It is a job that at times presents its occupant, the Secretary of Defense, no good or easy options. It is, in short, a deadly serious job where both success and failure have enormous ramifications. It’s a job that depends on experience and character – the prerequisites for good judgement – like no other.
    No Senator should vote for someone who they can only hope will learn on the job. Not for the Secretary of Defense. No Senator should vote for a nominee on the hope that he will display more personal discipline once he gets the job.
    There are strong, experienced, and able members of the President’s party whose views align with his who could be exceptional leaders of the Department of Defense. Mr. Hegseth is not one of them. I urge my colleagues to reject this nominee, and I yield the floor.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Activist News – No humanitarian visas for Palestinians victims of genocide but plenty of rest and recreation for Israeli soldiers involved in genocide – PSNA

    Source: Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa (PSNA)

    Nationwide rallies this weekend will be calling for the government to suspend entry to New Zealand from soldiers in the Israeli Defence Forces.

     

    “New Zealand should not be providing rest and recreation for Israeli soldiers fresh from the genocide in Gaza”, says PSNA National Chair John Minto. “We wouldn’t allow Russian soldiers to come here for rest and recreation from the invasion of Ukraine so why would we accept soldiers from the genocidal, apartheid state of Israel?”

     

    As well as the working holiday visa, since 2019 Israelis can enter New Zealand for three months without needing a visa at all. This visa-waiver is used by Israeli soldiers for “rest and recreation” from the genocide in Gaza.

     

    Israeli Defence Forces actions have resulted in at least 47,000 Palestinians killed – 70% of whom are women and children.

     

    The International Court of Justice has declared Israeli actions a “plausible genocide” Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch have used the terms genocide and extermination which the latest report from United Nations Special Rapporteur, Francesca Albanese, is entitled “Genocide as colonial erasure”.

     

    Meanwhile the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defence minister Yoav Gallant for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

     

    All these red flags for genocide have been visible for months but the government is still giving the green light to those involved in war crimes to enter New Zealand.

     

    PSNA has written to the government again in December asking for the suspension of travel to New Zealand for all Israeli soldiers and reservists.

     

    New Zealand has signed the Genocide convention which requires us to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. The government is complicit with its silence.

     

    It’s long past the time for the government to step up.

     

    John Minto

    National Chair

    Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Economic Forums – Saudi Arabia to Host Regular World Economic Forum Global Meeting

    Source: AETOSWire ( https://www.aetoswire.com/en/news/2401202544185 )

    DAVOS, Switzerland – Saudi Ministry of Economy and Planning – The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will host a regular high-level World Economic Forum (WEF) global meeting in Riyadh, with the first slated for the Spring of 2026, it was announced today.

    The announcement was made today by His Excellency Faisal F. Alibrahim, Minister of Economy and Planning, and Børge Brende, World Economic Forum President, on the final day of the 55th Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

    The global WEF meeting in Riyadh will serve as a vital platform for global leaders, experts, policy- and decision-makers from diverse fields including the public and private sectors, academia, international organizations, and civil society to convene and address the challenges defining our world.

    His Excellency Faisal F. Alibrahim, Minister of Economy and Planning for Saudi Arabia, commented on the announcement: “Hosting a regular global World Economic Forum meeting in the Kingdom is a testament to the global platform for dialogue, collaboration and innovation the Saudi Arabia has become, and that the World Economic Forum continues to be. This meeting represents a significant opportunity to further unite the world in capturing the immense potential that lies ahead.

    “In this critical juncture for the global economy, we’re not only inspired by the opportunities before us, but also deeply confident that our collective efforts will forge a brighter, more inclusive and more prosperous future for all. We look forward to welcoming the global community again in Saudi Arabia in the spring of 2026.”

    President and CEO of the World Economic Forum, Børge Brende, said: “The World Economic Forum is looking forward to coming back to the Kingdom in 2026. To close the 55th World Economic Forum with this announcement puts us on a strong course for the years ahead. Years that will have immense consequence. Because the progress we make over the coming months will not only deliver results in the near term, but will shape our course for years to come.”

    Building on the success of the World Economic Forum Special Meeting held in Riyadh in April 2024, this new development solidifies Saudi Arabia’s position as a central player in shaping the global agenda. The Kingdom’s bold leadership and determination to foster global dialogues between developed and developing economies and drive inclusive global growth make it an ideal host to address complex global challenges with the WEF community.

    The World Economic Forum Global Meeting in Riyadh is set to become a cornerstone event in the global calendar, reflecting the Kingdom’s position as a key bridge between the north and south, east and west, and a beacon for constructive dialogue and action.

    MIL OSI – Submitted News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Markey Reintroduces Resolution to Fight Back Against President Trump’s Day-One Withdrawal of United States from Paris Climate Agreement

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts Ed Markey
    Resolution Text (PDF)
    Washington (January 24, 2025) – Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), co-author of the Green New Deal resolution and member of the Environment and Public Works Committee, today introduced the We Are Still In resolution with 21 colleagues to express support for continued work on every level to achieve the goals set out in the Paris climate agreement, in response to President Donald Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the agreement through a day-one executive order. Congressman Brad Schneider (IL-10) is leading a similar effort in the House.
    The We Are Still In resolution signals ongoing support for U.S. climate ambition by leaders in Congress, who are continuing to work with and highlight local, state, regional, Tribal, and nongovernmental climate partners. The resolution underscores significant climate and clean energy actions taken by local and state governments, critical investments made through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and Inflation Reduction Act, and widespread support for the Paris climate agreement garnered through the America is All In coalition. With President Trump’s withdrawal, the United States joins Iran, Yemen, and Libya as the only countries in the world not party to the Paris climate agreement.
    “Over the past four years, the United States has supercharged its international climate leadership with the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, the largest climate and clean energy investment in history, which has already created more than 400,000 jobs and unleashed $420 billion in clean energy investments nationwide. By withdrawing from the Paris climate agreement, President Trump is attempting to sacrifice our leadership on the world stage and put our livable future at risk—all for the benefit of Big Oil billionaires,” said Senator Markey. “But our national climate agenda doesn’t live or die by President Trump’s pen, which is why I am reintroducing the We Are Still In resolution, signaling that climate action will continue to create good-paying jobs and a healthy environment regardless of our official stature within the Paris climate agreement. To our international allies: when it comes to fighting the climate crisis by your side, we still mean business.” 
    “The climate crisis unfolding before our eyes is already costing the U.S. tens of billions of dollars every year, which is why Congress has passed historic investments over the past four years to transition to a clean energy economy, slow climate change, and create good-paying jobs. Legislation such as the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the Inflation Reduction Act demonstrated America’s commitment and leadership to the rest of the world. President Trump’s irresponsible decision to pull out of the Paris agreement sends a shameful signal to our allies and adversaries alike, showing that the U.S. is turning its back on the health and safety of our planet. This ill-considered decision puts us at a competitive disadvantage to adversaries like China and will certainly lower global ambitions to tackle climate change with the seriousness and urgency it demands,” said Congressman Schneider.
    Cosponsors include Senators Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Tina Smith (D-Minn.), Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Peter Welch (D-Vt.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), Brian Schatz (D-Hawai’i), Cory Booker (D-N.J.), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), Alex Padilla (D-Calif.), Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), Chris Coons (D-Del.), Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.), and Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.).
    The resolution is endorsed by Union of Concerned Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).
    On November 4, 2020, the first Trump administration withdrew the United States from the Paris climate agreement. The Biden administration re-entered the United States back into the agreement in January 2021. In December 2024, the Biden administration released an updated Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris climate agreement, which established an emission-reduction target of 61 to 66 percent below 2005 levels by 2035.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Gaza: Children Deserve Security, Education, & Hope – Humanitarian UN Official | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Tom Fletcher today (23 Jan) told the Security Council that “the children of Gaza are not collateral damage” and are “as deserving as children everywhere of security, education and hope.”

    Before today’s meeting on the situation of children in the occupied Palestinian territory began, Russian Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya asked for the floor. Nebenzya said, “the refusal” of UNICEF’s Head Catherine Russell to brief today’s Council session, was “a flagrant step which deserves our most serious censure.”

    The Russian Ambassador said Russell, “during the US presidency of the Security Council, came to brief us at the drop of a hat at a disgraceful, politicized briefing about the so-called children’s aspects of the situation in Ukraine, on the 4th of December of last year.” Adding, “it would appear that for UNICEF, children in Gaza are less important than children in Ukraine.”

    United States Ambassador Dorothy Shea also requested the floor and said, “the idea that the United States is responsible for the terrible suffering there is, just unacceptable to us, and we reject it, in its totality.”

    Fletcher told the Council that children in Gaza, “have been killed, starved and frozen to death. They have been maimed, orphaned, separated from their family. Conservative estimates indicate that over 17,000 children are without their families in Gaza. Some died before their first breath, perishing with their mothers in childbirth. An estimated 150,000 pregnant women and new mothers are in desperate need of health services. Children have lost their schools and their education.”

    He said children in Gaza “tell us that the world was not there for them throughout this war. We must be there for them now.”

    Palestinian author Bisan Nateel, who writes children books, told the Council, “we have always been waiting for the moment when the Security Council would announce a ceasefire to end all these massacres and violations against the Palestinians in Gaza. Today, I hope. To live the ceasefire and for all our children to go back to their schools and for us to go back to our normal life when we used to go to our schools, to work, when we used to play, plant, work. The natural act of life, just to live.”

    Palestinian Ambassador Riyad Mansour called upon the international community “to enable UNWRA to reopen its schools in the Gaza Strip, and to equip it to welcome thousands of children to resume formal education. And to reach every young boy and girl evenly and safely.”

    For his part, Israeli Ambassador Danny Danon said, “it is Hamas, not Israel, that has turned Gaza into a war zone. It is Hamas, not Israel, that uses children as human shields. It is Hamas, not Israel, that places its terror infrastructure in schools, hospitals and civilian neighbourhoods. But time and time again, this Council chooses to ignore these facts.”

    The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that large volumes of humanitarian aid continue to enter Gaza through the Erez and Zikim crossings in the north and Kerem Shalom crossing in the south.

    Inside Gaza, OCHA says that aid cargo and humanitarian personnel are moving into areas that were previously hard to reach.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gUwQzZluwFM

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages – P10_TA(2025)0004 – Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Iran,

    –  having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A.  whereas the human rights situation in Iran has significantly worsened, with a sharp rise in executions, including over 900 individuals in 2024 alone, many of whom were women, political dissidents and individuals connected to the protests sparked by the murder of Jina Mahsa Amini;

    B.  whereas Kurdish activists, social worker Pakhshan Azizi and advocate for women’s rights Verisheh (Wrisha) Moradi, who fought ISIS in Kurdistan, were sentenced to death for ‘armed rebellion against the state’; whereas they were denied a fair trial and subjected to torture and solitary confinement;

    C.  whereas in January 2025 the Supreme Court of Iran upheld a death sentence against Pakhshan Azizi and others;

    D.  whereas dozens of innocent EU nationals have been arbitrarily detained in Iran, without access to fair trials, as part of Iran’s broader strategy of hostage diplomacy;

    1.  Denounces the Iranian regime’s unrestrained repression of human rights, in particular the targeting of women activists; strongly condemns the death sentence against Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi; demands that Iran immediately and unconditionally release all unjustly imprisoned human rights defenders and political prisoners, including Pakhshan Azizi, Wrisha Moradi and at least 56 other political prisoners on death row;

    2.  Reiterates its strong opposition to the death penalty and calls on the Iranian Government to introduce an immediate moratorium on and abolish it;

    3.  Calls for the EU and its Member States to increase support for Iranian human rights defenders and expresses its full support and solidarity with Iranians united in the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement;

    4.  Urges the Iranian authorities to immediately release, safely repatriate and drop all charges against EU nationals, including Olivier Grondeau, Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and Ahmadreza Djalali; strongly condemns Iran’s use of hostage diplomacy; calls for the EU and its Member States to undertake joint diplomatic efforts and work collectively towards their release;

    5.  Strongly condemns the murder of Jamshid Sharmahd; urges the Islamic regime in Iran to provide details of the circumstances of his death and for his remains to be immediately returned to his family;

    6.  Condemns the Iranian regime’s systemic suppression of human rights movements and persecution of minorities, including Kurds, Baluchis, Christians, facing persecution after conversion, and Baha’is, all of them facing ethnic and religious discrimination, arrest and violations of fundamental rights aimed at silencing dissent;

    7.  Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and to extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for human rights violations, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, Prosecutor-General Mohammad Movahedi-Azad and Judge Iman Afshari;

    8.  Urges the Iranian authorities to provide the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Iran and the UN fact-finding mission with full, unimpeded access to enact their mandates; calls for the EU and the Member States to fully support the mission and support the renewal of its mandate;

    9.  Reiterates its call for increased financial support for Iranian civil society;

    10.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the VP/HR, the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Export of asbestos banned in the EU – P-002866/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Regulation (EU) No 649/2012[1] implements the United Nations Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in international trade.

    The export notification is built on the principle that it is for importing countries to decide whether to consent to the import of certain chemicals ( including asbestos ) and that exporting countries must respect those decisions.

    According to the Commission’s information, in the past 5 years Chrysotile was exported in 2021 from France to India in a quantity of 0.001 tonnes in the form of articles containing the fibre (contained in aircrafts).

    As regards exports of asbestos fibres ( Actinolite, Amosite, Anthophyllite, Chrysotile, Crocidolite, Tremolite) in the past 5 years, according to the database on export notifications[2], exports from EU Member States had only been planned in 2020 (to Australia, Canada, China, Israel, Switzerland, Singapore, Taiwan, United States) and in 2022 (to the United Kingdom).

    These exports are exempted from the scope of the PIC Regulation as the chemicals are ‘exported for the purpose of research or analysis in quantities that are unlikely to affect human health or the environment and that in any event do not exceed 10 kg from each exporter to each importing country per calendar year’[3]. But the Commission does not know whether these exports took place and in which quantity below 10 kg.

    In parallel, the Chemicals strategy for sustainability[4] states that the EU will, in line with international commitments, ensure that hazardous chemicals banned in the EU are not produced for export, including by amending relevant legislation if and as needed. A study on this initiative is ongoing and will inform about the available options.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) No 649/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 concerning the export and import of hazardous chemicals (recast), OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 60-106.
    • [2] https://echa.europa.eu/fr/information-on-chemicals/pic/export-notifications
    • [3] Article 2(3) of the PIC Regulation.
    • [4] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/strategy/chemicals-strategy_en

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Debates – Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg – Revised edition

    Source: European Parliament

    Verbatim report of proceedings
     344k  764k
    Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg
    1. Opening of the sitting
      2. Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (debate)
      3. Resumption of the sitting
      4. Cryptocurrencies – need for global standards (debate)
      5. Resumption of the sitting
      6. Composition of new committees
      7. Composition of committees and delegations
      8. Voting time
        8.1. Case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RC-B10-0069/2025, B10-0065/2025, B10-0069/2025, B10-0070/2025, B10-0072/2025, B10-0078/2025, B10-0081/2025, B10-0084/2025) (vote)
        8.2. Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (RC-B10-0066/2025, B10-0063/2025, B10-0066/2025, B10-0067/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025, B10-0086/2025) (vote)
        8.3. Case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (RC-B10-0087/2025, B10-0087/2025, B10-0088/2025, B10-0089/2025, B10-0090/2025, B10-0091/2025, B10-0092/2025, B10-0093/2025) (vote)
        8.4. Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (RC-B10-0074/2025, B10-0074/2025, B10-0075/2025, B10-0076/2025, B10-0077/2025, B10-0079/2025) (vote)
        8.5. Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (RC-B10-0064/2025, B10-0064/2025, B10-0068/2025, B10-0071/2025, B10-0080/2025, B10-0083/2025) (vote)
      9. Resumption of the sitting
      10. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting
      11. Major interpellations (debate)
      12. Explanations of votes
      13. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted
      14. Dates of forthcoming sittings
      15. Closure of the sitting
      16. Adjournment of the session

       

    PRÉSIDENCE: YOUNOUS OMARJEE
    Vice-Président

     
    1. Opening of the sitting

       

    (La séance est ouverte à 09h01)

     

    2. Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (debate)


     

      Jessika Roswall, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, healthy soils are fundamental for our collective future. Without rich and fertile soils, we have no food and many farmers have their livelihoods affected. We must pay more attention to combating land degradation and enhancing drought resilience for our economy and for our security.

    Europe is not immune to these issues. One of our key political priorities for the coming mandate, the new water resilience strategy, comes from the realisation that our European and global waters are under unsustainable pressure. At the same time, our Joint Research Centre Soil Observatory notes that at least 62 % of EU soils are affected by degradation.

    Droughts have substantial impacts on nearly all regions of the EU. This is why I travelled to Riyadh for the opening of the desertification COP16 on my first day as European Commissioner. I wanted to send a strong signal of the EU’s clear commitment to multilateralism and to cooperation with international partners on our key environmental challenges.

    The desertification COP followed the two meetings of the climate and biodiversity COPs. The day before it started, countries failed to agree on a global treaty on plastic pollution. On desertification, despite the EU’s strong engagement, we reached a mixed result in Riyadh. Parties were not able to reach a compromise on the main topic on the agenda – an instrument to address droughts. It is disappointing that we cannot bridge our differences and reach consensus on such critical issues.

    We were also disappointed in the outcome on gender and civil society organisations. The participation of these organisations increases transparency and democratic accountability. Their contribution is essential. However, some countries increasingly challenge the role and contributions of civil society organisations.

    Finally, we were disappointed that the parties were reluctant to embrace synergies across the three Rio Conventions on desertification, climate and biodiversity.

    However, we did also make progress on several fronts, and every bit of multilateral success is worth celebrating. We reached an agreement on establishing the Science-Policy Interface as a permanent body. We also adopted decisions on land tenure, on migration related to desertification, land degradation and droughts, and on avoiding, reducing and reversing degradation on agricultural land. It was the first time in the history of the Convention that agricultural land degradation was addressed. We must look at sustainable agricultural practices and healthy land together.

    Finally, after a 10‑year freeze, the parties agreed to increase the core budget of the Convention. This is an important step to ensure that global challenges like desertification, drought and water scarcity are properly addressed in the multilateral agenda.

    The EU is contributing to the concrete implementation of the Convention, particularly through our continued support for the Great Green Wall, an inspiring UNCCD flagship initiative that the EU is proud to champion. Building on this commitment, the EU has launched the second phase of the UN World Restoration Flagship, Regreening Africa, which is a key contribution to the Green Wall Initiative.

    Honourable Members, the EU and its Member States will need to step up efforts to protect our values and implement international commitments in the UNCCD and within the EU. In this regard, I am happy to report that the Commission is responding to the commitments of the European Court of Auditors by developing a methodology to assess land degradation and certification for the EU. This will require careful preparation and strategic alliances. We need to address land use, climate change, biodiversity loss, water scarcity and pollution in a coherent manner.

    Honourable Members, these are reflections from my first ever COP, and I am convinced that this COP on desertification needs to be more central. We also cannot look at the outcome of Riyadh without acknowledging that international negotiations have become more difficult, more complex and interconnected when the world is facing several ecological crises. Biodiversity, climate, food, water and energy challenges are all interconnected with land use.

    I’m now looking forward to hearing your views.

     
       

     

      Carmen Crespo Díaz, en nombre del Grupo PPE. – Señor presidente, señora comisaria, gracias por el empuje al tema del agua desde la nueva Comisión. Creemos que es fundamental. Yo soy de una tierra desértica, al lado del desierto de Europa de Tabernas, y allí se demuestra con la huerta de Europa —porque el 80 % del producto de frutas y hortalizas se exporta desde allí —que es posible abordar esta cuestión. ¿Por qué? Porque hay veinte veces menor huella hídrica en todos los productos agroalimentarios.

    Ese es el gran milagro: que para las infraestructuras hidráulicas se utilicen los fondos Next Generation, el Banco Europeo de Inversiones y se creen infraestructuras donde la ciencia, con todo lo que se está investigando, permita. Creo en estos momentos que es fundamental prestar atención a todas las fuentes hídricas: todas son necesarias, algunas en prevención y otras adecuadas a las cuestiones agrarias. Creo que es importantísima la economía circular, y las aguas residuales nos dan una oportunidad en Europa de tener agua regenerada, que incluso podemos inyectar a nuestra hucha del futuro, que son, en este caso, todas las aguas subterráneas.

    Por ello, creo que se puede hacer, que tenemos la obligación de hacerlo y que, además, en este momento, los países como España, como el mío, deberían trabajar en estas infraestructuras hidráulicas de prevención —también adaptadas a lo que es el tema agrario— y, por supuesto, bajar los impuestos, el IVA de los alimentos, que la rebaja no se ha prorrogado en este momento en ese decreto trampa que ayer llevaron al Congreso de los Diputados. Creo que es fundamental la seguridad alimentaria y, para conseguirla, tenemos que trabajar en las infraestructuras hidráulicas, como la nueva Comisión y la nueva comisaria están haciendo en este momento en Europa.

     
       

     

      Marta Temido, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Senhor Presidente, Senhora Comissária, Caros Colegas, a desertificação e a degradação dos solos, tal como as alterações climáticas, são uma realidade que põe em causa os direitos humanos mais básicos, como o direito à alimentação ou o direito ao acesso à água limpa e segura. Atingem, em especial, as comunidades mais vulneráveis, as mulheres, as crianças, os povos indígenas, mas, potencialmente, vão atingir-nos a todos.

    E a COP 16, que decorreu em Riade no passado mês de dezembro, reforçou a urgência do combate a estes fenómenos, através da intensificação da colaboração internacional e de uma abordagem integrada. A União Europeia reafirmou o seu compromisso com a meta global de neutralidade da degradação da terra e o empenho em atingir este objetivo até 2030, através de incentivos aos Estados-Membros para que adotem políticas que favoreçam a restauração das terras e a implementação de práticas agrícolas sustentáveis.

    Por isso, a União Europeia tem de continuar a incentivar a adoção destas práticas agrícolas regenerativas, que respeitem os ecossistemas naturais e contribuam para a restauração de solos degradados, e deve bater-se pela implementação da Lei do Restauro da Natureza. Mas a inclusão da sociedade civil e do setor privado neste combate são essenciais, e isso exige iniciativas de apoio.

    Quero referir, aqui, uma iniciativa da sociedade civil do meu país, Portugal, que exemplifica bem esta luta que precisamos de levar a cabo com ela. E é a iniciativa Pró-Montado Alentejo, um projeto que visa promover a construção de uma barreira florestal ativa na região sul de Portugal, baseada no montado de sobreiro e azinheira, com o objetivo de mitigar os efeitos das alterações climáticas, combater a desertificação, proteger a diversidade e, enfim, combater o despovoamento.

     
       

     

      Julien Leonardelli, au nom du groupe PfE. – Monsieur le Président, la COP16 a été, sans aucun doute, la plus grande réunion d’États à ce jour sur le sujet de la désertification. Elle se tenait à Riyad, ce qui a permis aux participants de constater à quel point ce problème bouleverse des puissances régionales qui reposaient autrefois sur l’agriculture, comme l’Éthiopie ou l’Égypte. Ce véritable fléau est aujourd’hui à nos portes. On l’observe déjà en Grèce, en Italie, mais aussi dans ma région au sud de la France, en Occitanie, où l’eau courante des habitants est désormais rationnée en été, lors des canicules, où les agriculteurs ne peuvent pas toujours arroser leurs cultures et où les feux de forêt se font de plus en plus fréquents.

    Aujourd’hui, le temps n’est plus aux belles intentions et aux fausses promesses, mais au changement. Les Européens touchés par l’artificialisation des sols et la sécheresse méritent mieux que les ânonnements suffisants de ceux qui se tiennent dans des tours de verre et de béton. Pour répondre à ce défi, il faut privilégier les circuits courts, réduire le libre-échange débridé qui pollue notre air et nos océans et se tourner vers l’innovation et la recherche, à l’image des pays du Golfe. Ne restons pas spectateurs, soyons les acteurs de notre salut avant qu’il ne soit trop tard.

     
       

     

      Francesco Ventola, a nome del gruppo ECR. – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, dal rapporto COP16 la desertificazione e la siccità rappresentano non solo emergenze ambientali, ma anche minacce sociali ed economiche per intere regioni.

    I dati forniti sottolineano che oltre il 40 % delle terre globali è degradato e che la siccità provoca perdite economiche annuali che superano i 300 miliardi. In Italia, questo si traduce in una crisi che colpisce soprattutto il comparto agricolo.

    Si rende sempre più necessaria e indispensabile la realizzazione di infrastrutture che ottimizzino il sistema di raccolta, conservazione e distribuzione della risorsa acqua. È necessario investire in impianti di riuso delle acque reflue. Nessuna goccia deve essere dispersa: non ce lo possiamo permettere.

    Non possiamo più accettare false politiche ambientali ideologizzate, che bloccano sui territori la realizzazione di progetti innovativi e realmente sostenibili. Bisogna intraprendere tutte le strade che la scienza e la tecnologia ci offrono per fronteggiare il rischio desertificazione.

    Cari colleghi, non limitiamoci solo a parlare dei problemi: agiamo per risolverli e facciamolo con determinazione, per il bene dei nostri territori, dell’Europa e delle generazioni future.

     
       

     

      Martin Hojsík, za skupinu Renew. – Vážený pán predsedajúci, vážená pani komisárka, vážené kolegyne, vážení kolegovia, aj keď sa takpovediac symbolicky konferencia dohody OSN o dezertifikácii konala v Saudskej Arábii uprostred púšte, nie je to téma, ktorá sa týka len Arabského polostrova a Afriky. Je to téma, ktorá sa veľmi bytostne týka aj nás v Európe. Dezertifikácia je každodenným problémom na Cypre, v Španielsku, v Taliansku, ale aj uprostred Európy. U nás doma na Slovensku každým rokom vidíme väčší a väčší podiel pôdy, ktorú už farmári nedokážu obhospodarovať, ktorá sa nám stráca takpovediac priamo pred očami, pretože sa vysušuje. O tom je dezertifikácia. Sucho a nedostatok vody sa stali fenoménom našej doby a keď prídu, tak prídu ako záplavy. Klimatická kríza sa mení na klimatickú katastrofu. Ničíme biodiverzitu a meníme krajinu v púšť. V niektorých častiach Slovenska farmári prišli až o 40 % svojich výnosov kvôli dezertifikácii. Taký obrovský to je problém. Preto ako spravodajca Európskeho parlamentu pre zákon o pôde, naozaj vás chcem vyzvať, aby ste ho podporili. Dúfam, že sa nám spolu s Komisiou a Radou podarí dosiahnuť čoskoro v trialógu dohodu. Základom je mať kvalitné informácie. V Rijáde sa dohodla medzinárodná platforma. V Európe takú nemáme, zákon o pôde ju vie poskytnúť.

     
       

     

      Pär Holmgren, för Verts/ALE gruppen. – Herr talman! Kommissionär Roswall! Klimatförändringarna handlar verkligen inte bara om att det blir varmare på planeten, utan ett mycket större hot i stora delar av världen är förändringarna i nederbördsklimatet. Det blir mer nederbörd, kraftigare nederbörd på de platser där vi redan har mycket vatten. Men framför allt, i det här sammanhang som vi diskuterar nu, på många platser, inte minst där vi har en stor del av mänskligheten, där vi har en stor del av jordbruk och matproduktion, blir det nu sakta men säkert torrare.

    Det är ett enormt stort akut hot mot oss och vår matproduktion. Det här gäller inte bara andra delar av världen, det gäller här hemma i Europa också. Vi ser delar av framför allt Sydeuropa, hur skördar av till exempel majs och vete redan har sjunkit med storleksordningen 60 %.

    Vi vet också att det torrare klimatet, det torrare, lokala och regionala klimatet, medför en massa riskkonsekvenser. Till exempel de förskräckliga översvämningar som vi såg i Valencia senast förvärrades så mycket av att marken där först hade blivit så torr och hård att den inte kunde ta emot vatten.

    Som kommissionär Roswall konstaterade: På COP16, visst i vissa steg, i vissa sammanhang tog vi steg framåt, men som ofta i sådana här sammanhang var det lite blandade resultat. Det största problemet är att vi återigen misslyckades med att få ett bindande globalt ramverk när det gäller att bekämpa torka.

    Hade ansvariga politiker redan i slutet på 1900‑talet tagit hänsyn till den forskning som fanns då hade vi förhoppningsvis inte varit där vi är nu. Men nu är vi där vi är, och det innebär att vi, inte minst här i EU, måste höja ambitionerna, både när det gäller att minska utsläppen och arbeta ännu mer aktivt med klimatanpassning.

     
       

     

      Catarina Martins, em nome do Grupo The Left. – Senhor Presidente, nos próximos 25 anos, três em cada quatro pessoas será afetada pela seca a nível mundial. É uma catástrofe e está aqui. A Europa está a aquecer mais rápido do que o resto do mundo e a seca prolongada chegou décadas antes do que estava previsto.

    Por isso mesmo, e apesar do veto dos Estados Unidos e do Japão a um acordo para um regime global de resiliência à seca, a União Europeia não pode desistir desse objetivo e deve agir a todos os níveis.

    Venho de um país, Portugal, onde a agricultura superintensiva condena boa parte da população alentejana e algarvia, incluindo os pequenos agricultores, a uma vida sem água. O que produzem não alimenta essas populações nem deixa riqueza no país. Tudo é exportado, incluindo os lucros. Por lá, ficam só os solos degradados.

    Por isso, bem sei que esta não é a luta da ecologia contra a agricultura, é a das nossas vidas, incluindo a produção alimentar, contra a voragem das multinacionais do agronegócio. E por isso, Senhora Comissária, vai ser mesmo preciso coragem para enfrentar alguns dos mais poderosos interesses económicos.

     
       

     

      Zsuzsanna Borvendég, a ESN képviselőcsoport nevében. – Tisztelt Elnök Úr! Magyarország termőföldjei az emberi tevékenység miatt száradnak ki. A Kárpát-medence természetes vízháztartása elegendő vizet biztosítana, ha a tájnak megfelelő módon gazdálkodnánk.

    De ma mindent a profitéhség határoz meg, amely kizsákmányolja a környezetet. Ártereink helyén zöldhasút termő szántóföldek vannak. Hagyjuk, hogy a folyók átvágtassanak az országon, ahelyett, hogy átitatnák a talajt az éltető vízzel.

    Az uniós döntéshozatal a klímaválság kapcsán a levegő összetételére fókuszál, és erre hivatkozva betarthatatlan emissziós szabályokat alkot, de az ennek érdekében használt új technológiák a talaj és a talajvizek elszennyeződését fokozzák.

    Magyarországon az aszállyal párhuzamosan az akkumulátorgyárak vízszennyező hatásával is számolni kell, vagyis nálunk is a gazdasági lobbik írják felül a környezetvédelmet.

    A Föld egy komplex rendszer, amely komplex válaszokat igényel, nem lehet kiragadni egyes problémákat. Ha valós megoldásokat akarunk, akkor a lokalitás felé kell mozdulnunk, és uniós forrásokból is a helyi sajátosságoknak megfelelő természetközeli megoldásokat kell támogatnunk.

     
       

     

      Christine Schneider (PPE). – Herr Präsident, Frau Kommissarin, meine sehr geehrten Damen und Herren! Wüstenbildung ist eine globale Herausforderung, und Europa ist immer stärker betroffen. Unsere Ernährungssicherheit, die wir lange für selbstverständlich hielten, ist bedroht. Eine Lösung kann nur mit und nicht gegen unsere Landwirtinnen und Landwirte gefunden werden. Was passiert, wenn wir über ihre Köpfe hinweg entscheiden, das haben die letzten Jahre gezeigt. Bauernproteste sind zwischenzeitlich vor diesem Haus zum Alltag geworden. Daher mein dringender Appell: Beziehen Sie von Anfang an den Berufsstand mit ein, insbesondere bei der angekündigten Water Resilience Strategy.

    Drei Aspekte möchte ich hervorheben: Wir brauchen erstens ein intelligentes Wassermanagement. Nutzen wir die künstliche Intelligenz, um Wasserressourcen effizient zu verteilen. Setzen wir auf Wiederverwendung von Grauwasser und Abwasser, und bauen wir wassersparende Infrastruktur aus. So können wir Wasser nachhaltig zwischen den Regionen und Sektoren nutzen. Zweitens: dürreresistentes Saatgut. Es ist unverzichtbar, um Erträge selbst unter extremen Klimabedingungen zu sichern. Dazu brauchen wir neue Züchtungstechnologien, und die Blockade im Rat muss beendet werden. Drittens: Innovative Bewässerungslösungen, Tröpfchen- und Präzisionsbewässerung nutzen Sensorendaten, setzen Wasser ganz gezielt ein und vermeiden dadurch Verluste. Diese Technologien müssen wir stärker fördern, um unsere Landwirtschaft noch effizienter und nachhaltiger zu machen.

    Kurz zusammengefasst: Wenn wir Ernährungssicherheit wollen, brauchen wir neue Technologien und innovative Lösungen in enger Zusammenarbeit mit unseren internationalen Partnern, mit unseren Landwirten, aber auch mit uns Verbraucherinnen und Verbrauchern.

     
       

     

      Σάκης Αρναούτογλου (S&D). – Κύριε Πρόεδρε, η Γη μας, πηγή ζωής για αιώνες, αντιμετωπίζει τον κίνδυνο να μετατραπεί σε πηγή αφανισμού. Οφείλουμε να αποτρέψουμε τη μετατροπή εύφορων περιοχών σε ερημωμένα τοπία. Όταν το έδαφος καταστρέφεται, διακυβεύεται το μέλλον της ανθρωπότητας. Η ζωή δεν μπορεί να ευδοκιμήσει σε καμένη γη. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση καλείται να αναλάβει ηγετικό ρόλο, διακηρύσσοντας την ανάγκη για ορθολογική διαχείριση των φυσικών πόρων και τερματισμό επιτέλους της αδράνειας. Η συνέχιση της παρούσας πορείας θα οδηγήσει στη συγκομιδή των συνεπειών της αδιαφορίας μας και όχι των καρπών της γης. Προτείνω τη σύναψη ενός Συμφώνου για Ζωντανή Γη, μια συμφωνία που θα προβλέπει την αντιστάθμιση κάθε χαμένης έκτασης με την αναγέννηση διπλάσιας έκτασης μέσω βιώσιμων επενδύσεων. Μια τέτοια πρωτοβουλία θα μπορούσε να αποτελέσει ένα νέο παγκόσμιο πρότυπο για τη βιώσιμη διαχείριση των εδαφών. Δεν πρόκειται για μια ουτοπική ιδέα, αλλά για μια επιτακτική ανάγκη. Παρά τις προσπάθειες για την προστασία του πλανήτη, παρατηρούμε την εστίαση ορισμένων στην εξερεύνηση διαστημικών προορισμών, παραβλέποντας την ανάγκη για άμεση δράση στη Γη. Φαίνεται να προκρίνεται η κατάκτηση ενός απομακρυσμένου κόκκινου πλανήτη εις βάρος της διαφύλαξης του πράσινου πλανήτη μας. Επιπλέον, διαπιστώνεται η ενίσχυση ρητορικών που αμφισβητούν την κρισιμότητα της κατάστασης, υποβαθμίζοντας τις περιβαλλοντικές προκλήσεις σε πολιτικά παιχνίδια. Η φύση μάς απευθύνει επείγουσα έκκληση. Ας την αφουγκραστούμε, πριν η σιωπή της γίνει πιο εκκωφαντική από οποιαδήποτε φωνή. Ο χρόνος για δράση είναι τώρα. Και σε όσους αναζητούν καταφύγιο σε άλλους πλανήτες, ας τους υπενθυμίσουμε ότι εκεί οι συνθήκες είναι ήδη ερημικές και θα έρθει η ερημοποίηση και στον πλανήτη μας, αν αυτό επιζητούν.

     
       

     

      Mireia Borrás Pabón (PfE). – Señor presidente, señora comisaria, señorías, voy a ser muy clara: la CP16 ha sido otro espectáculo bochornoso de hipocresía, con líderes mundiales que vuelan en sus jets privados a Arabia Saudí; un país, por cierto, que incumple el 75 % de las restricciones medioambientales que ustedes desde aquí, desde Bruselas, imponen sin piedad a nuestros agricultores. Sí, aquellos mismos que evitan la desertificación del territorio. ¿Y qué resultados hemos obtenido? Ninguno, ningún compromiso vinculante.

    Nos enfrentamos a un gran problema, señora comisaria: casi el 70 % de las tierras agrícolas mediterráneas están en riesgo de desertificación y solo en España —en mi país— dos millones de hectáreas ya están clasificadas como desérticas. ¿Y qué hace la Comisión al respecto? Lo de siempre: culpabilizar al cambio climático. Pero ¿se han planteado, por un momento, que el principal problema fuera, por ejemplo, la falta de inversión en infraestructuras hídricas? En Europa se pierden millones de toneladas de agua de riego debido a infraestructuras hídricas que están tremendamente anticuadas.

    Miremos a Israel —un país que tiene recursos hídricos muy escasos y condiciones casi desérticas—, que ha revolucionado su agricultura con tecnología muy avanzada; mientras ellos aumentan su productividad un 30 %, aquí en Europa nuestros agricultores se ven obligados a abandonar sus tierras. Desde Vox ya seguimos en esta línea y propusimos un plan: un gran Plan Hidrológico Nacional para garantizar el agua y cohesionar el territorio. ¿Y qué es lo que votó toda la izquierda en bloque? Un no rotundo. ¿Y qué es lo que votó el Partido Popular? Pues se abstuvo, como siempre, cuando le gustan nuestras iniciativas, pero tienen complejo en admitirlo.

    Miremos ahora a Jaén: Marmolejo, Arjona, Lopera. ¿Les suenan, señores del PP? Son lugares de España donde el Partido Popular está expropiando tierras cultivadas con olivos para construir masivamente plantas fotovoltaicas. ¿Les preocupa de verdad la desertificación, señores del PP? 100 000 olivos a la basura, en nombre de la sostenibilidad. Empezamos a pensar que ustedes prefieren el aceite de Marruecos al aceite de Jaén, pero lo cierto es que no me extrañaría ver dentro de muy poco tanto al Partido Popular como a la izquierda manifestándose juntos en contra de sus propias políticas, esta vez no en apoyo de las nucleares, sino en su falsa solidaridad con los agricultores de Jaén, tan falsa como la sostenibilidad que defienden.

     
       

     

      Laurence Trochu (ECR). – Monsieur le Président, Madame la Commissaire, mes chers collègues, face aux enjeux climatiques, il est triste de voir que les solutions idéologiques prennent trop souvent le pas sur le bon sens. La question de la désertification n’y fait pas exception et les réponses apportées à ce problème, que personne ne nie d’ailleurs, sont souvent illusoires. À ce titre, l’opposition féroce et même, parfois, violente des écologistes français à des solutions de bon sens telles que les mégabassines, qui stockent le surplus d’eau de l’hiver pour le réutiliser l’été, est un exemple éloquent.

    Alors, plutôt que de voir en l’homme uniquement un prédateur-pollueur, l’homme doit être la solution, par l’innovation, le progrès technique et la recherche. La désertification ne peut être combattue par une écologie punitive et normative à outrance, ruineuse pour notre compétitivité, comme l’a d’ailleurs souligné le rapport Draghi.

    Nos agriculteurs, qui ont façonné nos paysages, sont las d’être désignés comme les principaux responsables et d’être écrasés de normes. Dernier artefact idéologique, le changement climatique est aussi utilisé comme prétexte pour justifier une immigration de masse venue du Sud dont plus personne ne veut. Alors, chers collègues, pour relever le défi du climat, sortons enfin de l’idéologie.

     
       

     

      Billy Kelleher (Renew). – Mr President, as I stand here, my home country of Ireland is preparing to be battered by one of the strongest storms in decades. And if you look at the weather forecasts across Europe, there’s rain in many areas. So it’s a concept that is very hard to understand when we sometimes speak about desertification.

    But, in reality, the scale of this problem – the desertification – should be everyone’s concern. It affects the land of homes to 1.5 billion people. The UN estimates that 135 million people have already been displaced due to desertification, and this could rise to 700 million by 2050. This land is also important agricultural land, and the UN estimates that 40 % of agricultural land has already been degraded.

    The consequences are far-reaching: humanitarian, migration, environmental problems, food and water security, political stability or political instability, for global security, for trade and supply chains there are significant challenges. And each of these consequences will have an impact also on Europe and the daily lives of our citizens.

    We cannot reverse the problems in the very short term, but we have to plan and we must make real collective efforts to halt its spread and to address its long-term implications. So while I welcome the commitments at the COP16 of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, especially regarding the financial commitments from both the public and private sector, we do need to ensure that we make a common effort to bring forward the challenges regarding drought and the protocols with regard to tackling the same.

    If we are going to halt this runaway train, we need to have a common, coherent plan for tackling drought and that involves governments, businesses, local people, scientists and engineers.

     
       

     

      Kai Tegethoff (Verts/ALE). – Mr President, the summer of 2024 is the hottest on record in the EU and globally. Thirteen Member States, meaning almost 50 % of the Member States of the EU, are affected by desertification and almost 25 % of the territory is sensitive to desertification. Still, while the EU promotes the leadership role globally, we are not prepared ourselves.

    The desertification COP16 failed to agree on a global drought framework, and the Commission promised to present a water resilience strategy already a year ago. I hope this will come very soon.

    And Commissioner Roswall, in your introduction, in your first sentence you said that we need to focus on helping farmers, and in the second sentence it was ‘focus on economy’. I think what we really need in that water resilience strategy is water saving targets. We need to improve efficiency and reuse of water. We need to protect and restore our water supplies and the whole catchment area.

    And then at the same time, considering the wildfires and the flooding that we deal with here every single plenary session, we have to make sure that this water resilience strategy is accompanied and embedded into a real European climate adaptation law.

     
       

     

      João Oliveira (The Left). – Senhor Presidente, o problema da desertificação é um problema ambiental ou climático, mas é essencialmente um problema da relação do ser humano com a natureza, é um problema humano, social e económico.

    As conclusões da COP16 contêm muitos dos elementos relevantes para o debate sobre o combate à desertificação, mas revelam também as muitas dificuldades que é preciso ainda superar.

    Há muito por fazer para que haja verdadeiramente soluções, relativamente ao uso e à gestão eficientes da água e dos recursos hídricos, relativamente à ocupação e ordenamento equilibrado do território, relativamente à promoção de práticas produtivas sustentáveis, equilibradas, seja na agricultura, na pecuária, na silvicultura. Há muito por fazer no investimento público que é preciso nos territórios rurais, para travar o abandono da população e a consequente desertificação do território.

    Permitam-me trazer, aqui, um aspeto que é relevante em Portugal, que é o montado de sobreiros e azinheiras, que é característico do meu país. O montado não é apenas um conjunto de árvores que retêm carbono e resistem melhor aos incêndios. O montado é um sistema agrosilvopastoril que tem de ser encarado como tal em todas as suas dimensões, não apenas pelo valor ambiental, mas pelo enorme valor social que tem, porque cria emprego, fixa as populações, permite práticas produtivas sustentáveis e equilibradas, garante um adequado ordenamento do território na compatibilização da sua utilização para fins produtivos, mas também tem preocupações ambientais.

    Este é um exemplo do investimento que precisamos de fazer em áreas e em recursos que, sendo naturais de cada país, naturalmente permitem uma resposta mais eficaz ao combate à desertificação.

     
       

     

      Daniel Buda (PPE). – Domnule președinte, doamnă comisară, doamnelor și domnilor colegi, deșertificarea este o realitate care nu poate fi contestată, iar la COP 16 s-a subliniat acest lucru. Potrivit datelor oficiale, deșertificarea generează costuri globale de peste 300 de miliarde de euro și afectează mai mult de 1,5 miliarde de oameni, crescând presiunile migraționiste și alimentând războaiele pentru resurse.

    Uniunea pierde anual 74 de miliarde de euro din cauza degradării terenurilor, iar lipsa acțiunii va reduce randamentele culturilor cu cel puțin 10 % până în 2050, generând o penurie, atât pentru apă, cât și pentru alimente. România, țara mea, se confruntă din plin cu aceste fenomene. Avem nevoie urgent de acțiuni curajoase, care nu doar să prevină acest fenomen, ci chiar să-l inverseze pe termen lung.

    Pentru a ne proteja securitatea alimentară, trebuie să investim în tehnologii și soluții inovatoare, precum noile tehnici genomice în gestionarea durabilă a apei și dezvoltarea unor sisteme inteligente de irigații la prețuri accesibile pentru toți fermierii, și subliniez acest lucru: la prețuri accesibile pentru toți fermierii.

    În același timp, se impune utilizarea eficientă a apelor uzate, mai ales în jurul marilor centre urbane, și investiții serioase în ceea ce înseamnă desalinizarea apei marine, toate acestea trebuind să devină o prioritate strategică și o obligație față de cetățenii noștri.

    Investițiile din sectorul privat trebuie încurajate, iar Comisia trebuie să se asigure că statele membre utilizează eficient și rapid banii pentru împăduriri și perdele forestiere. Europa are la dispoziție soluții, însă fără investiții direcționate și finanțare adecvată, nu va putea face față acestor provocări.

    Stimați colegi, alegerea este a noastră: să acționăm acum sau generațiile viitoare vor suporta consecințele imobilismului nostru destructibil.

     
       

     

      Maria Grapini (S&D). – Domnule președinte, doamnă comisară, stimați colegi, sigur, dezbatem o problemă foarte importantă, păcat că sunt așa de puțini membri ai Parlamentului European în sală. Așa cum s-a declarat și aici, cum a fost și în declarația Convenției, se degradează anual terenul. S-a ajuns la 70 % din terenuri care au fost transformate din starea lor naturală.

    Secetele cauzează pagube și costuri și daune, peste 300 de miliarde pe an. Unde merg aceste daune și pagube? Evident, la fermieri și, până la urmă, la cetățeni. Doar în perioada 2015-2019, circa 100 de milioane de hectare de terenuri sănătoase și productive au fost degradate anual, amenințând evident, securitatea alimentară a globului, precum și disponibilitatea apei.

    Ce trebuie făcut, doamnă comisară? Ne-ați relatat ce a fost la Convenție și că nu s-a ajuns la compromisuri importante. Eu cred că Uniunea Europeană trebuie să fie preocupată mai ales de ce se întâmplă în Uniunea Europeană, sigur, și global. Eu cred că trebuie să îmbunătățim instrumentele politice naționale și europene pentru abordarea productivă de gestionare a secetei. Aici avem foarte mult de făcut. Este nevoie de alocarea de bugete pentru finanțarea restaurării terenurilor, creșterea rezistenței la secetă, prin cercetare și inovare.

    Comisia Europeană trebuie să aibă un plan de acțiuni la nivelul Uniunii Europene care să combată degradarea terenurilor în colaborare cu statele membre. Și mai trebuie făcut ceva, doamnă comisară: politicile Uniunii Europene, ale Comisiei, nu trebuie să se anuleze ca la algebră – plus și minus – sunt mii de hectare acum, cu parcuri fotovoltaice, terenuri care nu mai sunt recuperate zeci de ani.

    Trebuie să vedem cum corelăm politica energetică cu această politică de protejare a terenurilor și cred foarte mult că este nevoie să vă gândiți, în principal, la cum să nu creăm presiune asupra fermierilor din Uniunea Europeană, asupra cetățenilor din Uniunea Europeană, atât timp cât în restul globului, Statele Unite, Japonia și celelalte state, nu au votat la această Convenție.

     
       

     

      Mathilde Androuët (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, à l’issue de la COP16 consacrée à la désertification qui a eu lieu à Riyad, 12 milliards ont été sécurisés d’ici 2030 pour améliorer les terres, dont dix proviennent de la Banque islamique de développement. Dans un rassemblement international, les pétromonarchies sont donc venues au secours des déserts de sable, déserts où parfois on construit, en dépit de tout souci environnemental et économique, des pistes de ski.

    Voilà, une fois de plus, la démonstration qu’aux problèmes environnementaux, qui sont des problèmes localisés, on ne peut avoir de réponse globalisée. Les COP sont des rassemblements de déblocage ou de création de fonds financiers, aucunement des lieux de réflexion et d’apport de solutions environnementales. Aussi, sur le problème majeur de la désertification et de l’assèchement des sols, ayons une vision et des solutions locales. La gestion de l’eau est une question sensible et différente d’un pays à l’autre et, parfois, d’une région à l’autre dans un seul et même pays. L’an passé, dans le nord de la France, les cultures ont souffert de trop de pluies, soit l’inverse exact des Pyrénées orientales, en manque d’eau permanent.

    Si vous vous refusez au traitement local pour n’opérer qu’à l’échelle européenne, prenons des problèmes communs. En Bulgarie comme en Guadeloupe, 60 % de l’eau est perdue tant les infrastructures sont vétustes et fuyardes. De même, encouragez le reboisement, le replantage des haies pour favoriser la captation de l’eau par les sols. Bref, appuyez-vous sur ceux qui connaissent le mieux leur environnement, à savoir les paysans, plutôt que sur les financiers des pétromonarchies pour régler nos problèmes d’eau et de désertification en Europe. À problème local, solution nationale.

     
       

     

      Marie Toussaint (Verts/ALE). – Monsieur le Président, la désertification, c’est l’autre nom de l’injustice climatique et de la vulnérabilité. C’est d’ailleurs peut-être parce qu’elle a d’abord touché les pays les plus pauvres que les pays les plus riches n’y ont, pendant si longtemps, prêté que si peu d’attention. La désertification est aujourd’hui sur nous. La Corse et les parties les plus pauvres de la Méditerranée, Perpignan et ses quartiers parmi les plus précaires de France, ou encore la dévastée Mayotte, n’ont plus d’eau. En Guadeloupe, l’érosion côtière frappe, puisant dans l’assèchement des terres. Quand dans le Massif central, ce sont évidemment les petits paysans qui souffrent le plus et qui n’ont pas les moyens d’acheter du foin pour leurs élevages lorsque celui-ci vient à manquer.

    Au fond, la désertification continue dans l’indifférence, parce qu’elle frappe d’abord et de manière évidente les plus vulnérables. Mais ne soyons pas naïfs: nous réaliserons bientôt que la désertification est notre affaire à tous. Espérons qu’alors il ne sera pas trop tard. En Afrique, c’est déjà 16 % du PIB qui s’est évaporé du fait de la désertification.

    Madame la Commissaire, nous ne sommes pas impuissants, ici, sur le territoire européen, pour un enjeu qui est bien un enjeu planétaire. La désertification est liée au dérèglement climatique et aux énergies fossiles. Alors sortons-en, et plus vite qu’aujourd’hui. Elle est aussi liée à l’agriculture intensive et à la déforestation que nous pouvons, que nous devons combattre. Alors agissons! Il n’y a plus de temps à perdre.

     
       

     

      Valentina Palmisano (The Left). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, non è necessario guardare al Sahara per comprendere la desertificazione: i deserti si trovano ormai dietro casa. Sempre più spesso, immagini surreali, e allo stesso tempo drammatiche, mostrano paesaggi trasformati, fiumi ridotti a sentieri e laghi completamente prosciugati.

    Il 40 % del suolo del Sud Italia è già a rischio, come tanti paesi del Mediterraneo. In questo modo, stiamo trasformando paesaggi millenari.

    E questo non è soltanto il risultato del cambiamento climatico, ma anche di pratiche agricole non sostenibili, che hanno impoverito il nostro suolo. Ecco, il nostro approccio deve cambiare, privilegiando la qualità delle produzioni e la rigenerazione del suolo.

    Il degrado non è inevitabile, per fortuna: possiamo invertire la rotta. Servono però incentivi per modelli agricoli basati sulla qualità e sulla rigenerazione del suolo. La politica deve smettere di finanziare pratiche obsolete e supportare invece l’innovazione.

    Colleghi, la desertificazione, infatti, non è soltanto una sfida tecnica, ma è anche una questione di giustizia verso i nostri territori e soprattutto verso le generazioni future.

    Il mio monito è che non sia la COP17 a salvare il suolo europeo, ma il nostro impegno concreto, oggi.

     
       

     

      Salvatore De Meo (PPE). – Signor Presidente, signora Commissaria, onorevoli colleghi, la desertificazione è una delle sfide più urgenti del nostro tempo, aggravata dal cambiamento climatico e dalle attività dell’uomo.

    Non è solo una crisi ambientale, ma un problema sociale ed economico che minaccia la biodiversità, la sicurezza alimentare e la stabilità delle nostre comunità, alimentando tensioni e migrazioni forzate.

    Pensate che, ogni anno, 12 milioni di ettari vengono degradati, mettendo a rischio la sopravvivenza di oltre un miliardo di persone. Questo dato ci allarma e ci ricorda che la desertificazione, insieme alla crescente scarsità dell’acqua, richiede risposte immediate, coordinate e ambiziose.

    La COP16 è stata un’occasione per riflettere sulle nostre responsabilità, perché l’Unione europea manca di un’azione comune adeguata e le risorse dedicate sono ancora troppo limitate rispetto alla portata degli interventi.

    Dobbiamo impegnarci e sostenere lo sviluppo di politiche sostenibili, promuovendo pratiche agricole rigenerative e resilienti, un uso responsabile delle risorse idriche e l’innovazione tecnologica per ripristinare gli ambienti degradati.

    La cooperazione internazionale, inoltre, è importante perché nessun paese può affrontare da solo questa battaglia. La desertificazione non conosce confini e le sue conseguenze si ripercuotono su scala globale. Solo lavorando insieme possiamo affrontare la complessità di questa sfida. Ciò significa condividere conoscenze, tecnologie e risorse, oltre a costruire – come si sta facendo – partenariati solidi tra governi, organizzazioni internazionali, società civile e settore privato.

    Combattere la desertificazione significa investire nel futuro, nella nostra diversità, nella sicurezza alimentare e nella stabilità delle generazioni future.

     
       

     

      Thomas Bajada (S&D). – Mr President, desertification is not a story from far, far away. Its serious implications have long been affecting the Mediterranean region due to its unique ecosystems, economic dependencies and limited natural resources.

    In southern Spain, over-irrigation has led to soil erosion. In Crete, aquifers have been overexploited, leading to salinisation. In the neighbouring Sahel region, desertification has displaced millions of people, increasing migratory pressures towards Europe. And in Malta, increased pressure on desalinisation plants raised energy consumption and costs, which are passed on to households and businesses.

    Today this is not a story only for southern Europeans. It is also a story shared with other Europeans from temperate and humid climates like Bulgaria. In fact, last year 45 % of the EU’s territory faced drought, threatening food production and water security.

    Desertification is about humanity, our dependence on water for survival, and our need for water security and food security. Therefore, our response must be people-centred. The fight against desertification demands global cooperation, but it also starts at home in this very House. We need to dramatically increase our political commitment to water – we need to preserve our lands, help our nature to recover and conserve our water. And, dear Commissioner, we need to act now, with an ambitious European water resilience strategy before it is too late.

    As rapporteur of the Parliament’s initiative, I call for decisive action to protect our people and resources and build a sustainable future of a liveable world for future generations to come.

     
       

     

      France Jamet (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, la désertification est une menace importante, mais il en est une dont on ne parle pas assez, c’est la désertification de nos fonds marins. Déplorer l’acidification de nos océans, le réchauffement des eaux ou la hausse du niveau de la mer ne suffit pas. Il faut aussi dénoncer les causes de ce désastre. En France, par exemple, dans le Morbihan, on les trouve dans la construction stérilisante de parcs éoliens offshores ou dans les ravages de bateaux-usines sans-frontiéristes. Deux activités nocives, deux activités pourtant encouragées par l’Union européenne, qui témoignent de l’hypocrisie générale, voire de l’imposture pseudo-écologiste sur la préservation et la pérennité de nos écosystèmes.

    Depuis quinze ans, on constate la dégradation alarmante de nos océans, qui menace nos richesses maritimes, les métiers qui en dépendent, au premier rang desquels nos pêcheurs, et nos ressources alimentaires. Cet équilibre si fragile, aggravé par la pollution terrestre qui se déverse dans nos mers, a aussi un impact sur nos climats et sur la désertification terrestre. La pluie salvatrice qu’attendent nos agriculteurs et les populations touchées par la sécheresse, cette pluie salvatrice ne tombe pas du ciel, elle vient de nos océans.

    Alors tous ces vœux pieux et autres déclarations d’intention ne résoudront rien si nous ne remettons pas en cause l’écosystème mondialiste que vous avez mis en place, basé sur un libre-échangisme dérégulé au détriment d’un localisme raisonné et national.

     
       

     

      Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Verts/ALE). – Señor presidente, en los últimos diez años, la superficie desertificada en la península ibérica se ha multiplicado por veintitrés. Es especialmente preocupante en el sur de Alicante, en la Vega Baja, un territorio de transición, precisamente donde la presión urbanística es salvaje, donde la presión del sobreturismo es salvaje, y donde ahora ya no ocurre de forma aislada que se corte el agua, sino que ya es de forma recurrente. Y no solo se corta en verano, también en otros periodos del año. Ni pasa solo con el agua destinada a la gente y, por lo tanto, con el agua de boca, sino también con la que usan los agricultores.

    En el mismo territorio también ya hay una lucha que se va viviendo en toda Europa, que es por la privatización del agua. Tenemos cada vez menos agua y cada vez está gestionada por menos manos y mirando siempre hacia el negocio. Por eso, hacen falta de una vez por todas políticas valientes que custodien el territorio, que nos adapten al cambio climático y que protejan a la ciudadanía, por ejemplo, ante situaciones como la dana que hemos vivido en Valencia. Y hace falta que el agua sea gestionada de forma pública para que sea un derecho garantizado para el conjunto de la ciudadanía.

    (El orador acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul»)

     
       

     

      João Oliveira (The Left), Pergunta segundo o procedimento «cartão azul». – Senhor Deputado, o Governo de Portugal avançou recentemente com uma lei chamada Lei dos Solos, que tem como objetivo permitir a construção em solos onde até hoje essa construção não era permitida. Esta decisão, naturalmente, favorece a especulação imobiliária, mas cria também problemas de desordenamento do território.

    O senhor deputado vem da região de Valência — onde ainda recentemente houve uma tragédia, na sequência de umas cheias —, por isso, queria colocar-lhe uma questão precisamente a partir da sua experiência.

    Considerando a experiência na região de Valência, decisões como esta do Governo português, de desordenamento do território e de favorecimento da especulação imobiliária, permitem a solução de algum problema, por exemplo, o problema da habitação — que é o pretexto que o Governo português utiliza —, ou o combate à desertificação dos territórios? Ou, pelo contrário, opções destas de desordenamento do território agravam ainda mais as consequências de catástrofes naturais, como aquelas que atingiram a região de Valência?

     
       

     

      Vicent Marzà Ibáñez (Verts/ALE), respuesta de «tarjeta azul». – Sí, señor diputado Oliveira, la presión urbanística y la urbanización salvaje de hoy son las víctimas del mañana. Lo hemos visto en nuestra tierra con la dana: se ha construido donde no se podía construir, porque se ha visto que el territorio solo era un espacio de especulación y no para que la gente tuviera garantizado su espacio vital y se protegieran sus vidas.

    La gente ha muerto por estar, entre otras cosas, urbanizando territorios que no se pueden urbanizar. Ha habido una dana que ha llegado con esa cantidad de agua brutal porque estaba absolutamente todo cimentado, porque la tierra no ha podido acoger toda el agua también. Por eso es tan importante que se combatan esas iniciativas como la del Gobierno portugués que usted dice, porque urbanizar, insisto, de forma salvaje es crear víctimas en el futuro.

     
       

     

      Sebastian Everding (The Left). – Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! „Wälder gehen den Völkern voran, die Wüsten folgen ihnen“. Das sagte schon im 17. Jahrhundert der französische Schriftsteller Chateaubriand. Der Klimawandel und der massive Einsatz von Düngemitteln verstärken die Bodenerosion und auch das Artensterben. Grundwasserentnahmen für Bergbautätigkeiten, die industrielle Massentierhaltung und die Bewässerung in der Landwirtschaft entziehen Wäldern das Grundwasser, das dringend für die Regeneration in Dürrezeiten benötigt wird. Sie tragen zur Bodenversandung bei, schädigen das Ökosystem und trocknen CO2-Senken wie Moore aus. Hier muss dringend durch mehr Schutzzonen und mehr Entnahmeeinschränkungen gehandelt werden.

    Ein weiteres Mittel gegen Wüstenbildung könnte ein stärkerer Fokus auf die Agroforstwirtschaft sein. Dürren bedrohen bereits jetzt die Lebensgrundlage von rund 1,8 Milliarden Menschen weltweit und bringen gefährdete Gemeinschaften immer weiter an den Rand des Abgrundes. Darüber hinaus kosten sie 300 Milliarden US‑Dollar pro Jahr und bedrohen wichtige Wirtschaftssektoren wie die Landwirtschaft, Energie und Wasser. Liebe Frau Kommissarin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen, wie bei allen anderen Aspekten des Klimawandels gilt auch hier: Es ist weitaus günstiger, jetzt zu handeln, als später zu versuchen, die Folgen zu kompensieren.

    (Der Redner ist damit einverstanden, auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ zu antworten.)

     
       



     

      Gabriella Gerzsenyi (PPE). – Tisztelt Elnök Úr! A teve helyes állat, de nem szeretnénk közlekedési eszközként használni. Az éghajlatváltozás miatt az elsivatagosodás Magyarországon is egyre nagyobb probléma. Duna-Tisza közi homokhátság hazánk területének mintegy 10%-a, most már az ENSZ szerint hivatalosan is félsivatag.

    Ez a kormányzati tétlenségnek a szimbóluma. Csökkennek a terméshozamok, megnehezül a megélhetés, homokviharok előfordulnak, tavak száradnak ki és élőhelyek szűnnek meg. S nem csak környezeti, hanem társadalmi és gazdasági válság is, hiszen veszélyben az élelmiszer-ellátás és elnéptelenedik a vidék.

    Már két évtizede tudományos tanulmány és program készült a problémára. Az akkori kormány elfogadta, a Fidesz-kormány azonban tudatosan figyelmen kívül hagyja a szakértők figyelmeztetéseit, elhanyagolja a vízgazdálkodást, a talajvédelmet, ellenben százmilliárdokat költ presztízsberuházásokra, például stadionokra.

    A megoldás kulcsa az uniós, nemzeti és a helyi összefogás. Úgy véljük, hogy európai szinten átfogó stratégiára van szükség a fenntartható földhasználat és a vízvisszatartó technológiák támogatására.

    A Tisza Magyarország legnépszerűbb pártja. Kormányra kerülésünk után vissza fogjuk állítani az önálló környezetvédelmi minisztériumot. Kiemelten foglalkozni fogunk a talajvédelemmel, vízgazdálkodással, európai forrásokat irányítunk az érintett közösségekhez, és támogatni fogjuk a gazdákat ebben a küzdelemben is.

     
       

     

      César Luena (S&D). – Señor presidente, señorías, es un debate en un contexto bastante difícil, porque tenemos al nuevo inquilino de la Casa Blanca y su negacionismo, y un Grupo PPE retardista, ya lo siento. El discurso de ayer del señor Tusk nos lleva por esos senderos peligrosos.

    Presento dos ideas que son como dos evidencias. El suelo es un recurso no renovable, es importante no olvidarlo. ¿Saben cuánto han aumentado las sequías en los últimos 25 años? Un 30 %. Y, en este contexto, señora comisaria, ¿qué puede hacer la Unión? Le digo que defender las políticas verdes —al paso que vamos— va a ser algo casi contracultural. Pues mire, en primer lugar, una evaluación de riesgo de desertificación y degradación de las tierras, como sugirió el Tribunal de Cuentas Europeo en el año 2018. No sabemos nada de ese informe. La Ley de vigilancia del suelo, por favor, se lo pido a sus colegas del Grupo PPE, porque la están rebajando y rebajando, como todas las normativas medioambientales. Podemos declararnos como región en riesgo de desertificación en el marco de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas. Para eso no tenemos que esperar a ninguna cumbre internacional, eso podemos hacerlo ya nosotros. Y, sobre todo, presente una estrategia específica de desertificación, como le ha dicho este Parlamento.

    Fíjese: hasta cuatro grandes medidas podemos hacer nosotros solos —la Unión Europea— y dar ejemplo en el mundo. Pero claro, hay demasiado retardismo en la derecha. No caiga en eso, señora comisaria, hay muchos Grupos que la vamos a apoyar.

    (El orador acepta responder a una pregunta formulada con arreglo al procedimiento de la «tarjeta azul»)

     
       


     

      César Luena (S&D), respuesta de «tarjeta azul». – Estaba mirando, señor presidente, por si era alguien de la extrema derecha, porque no hubiera aceptado nunca nada, ni tarjeta azul ni verde.

    Mire, todo lo relacionado con los fondos europeos, a pesar de su Grupo y de su política en España, lo estamos sacando adelante bien. Y no quiero recordar aquí lo que han intentado ustedes hacer con la vicepresidenta primera, Teresa Ribera. Es decir, que a pesar de que ustedes aquí estén en contra de todo y siempre estén poniendo obstáculos y problemas, nosotros estamos aplicando muy bien los fondos NextGenerationEU en España y lo seguiremos haciendo. Solo le pido una cosa: está bien que me haga esa pregunta, pero después, en España, ayuden, que siempre están en contra de todo.

     
       

     

      Jutta Paulus (Verts/ALE). – Herr Präsident, Frau Kommissarin, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Als ich ein Kind war, war Wüste die Sahara oder die Gobi. Ferne, beeindruckende Orte, beschrieben in den Romanen von Karl May oder den Schilderungen von Sven Hedin. Und heute, nur wenige Jahrzehnte später, sehen wir Wüstenbildung in Spanien, in Portugal, in Italien, in Griechenland, in Ungarn, in Bulgarien. Wer sich da wundert, hat die Wissenschaft ignoriert oder den Einflüsterern der fossilen Industrie geglaubt. Die haben Milliarden investiert, um Zweifel zu säen – Zweifel an den Erkenntnissen, die Exxon selbst schon in den 70ern ermittelt hatte, um sie dann in den Giftschrank zu legen und öffentlich die Wissenschaft zu diskreditieren.

    Die Leugner sitzen auch in diesem Haus bei den Rechten, den noch Rechteren und den noch noch Rechteren, und bei der Welt‑Wüsten‑Konferenz haben wir leider auch keine großen Fortschritte gemacht, denn auch hier sitzen ja die Petrostaaten mit am Tisch. Deshalb: Europa muss handeln. Wir brauchen ein Klimaanpassungsgesetz, das naturbasierte Lösungen in den Mittelpunkt stellt, und eine glaubwürdige Unterstützung für die Länder, die am stärksten betroffen sind.

    (Die Rednerin ist damit einverstanden, auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“ zu antworten.)

     
       


     

      Jutta Paulus (Verts/ALE), Antwort auf eine Frage nach dem Verfahren der „blauen Karte“. – Vielen Dank, Frau Kollegin, für die Frage. Es ist mir ein Rätsel, wo Sie Ihre Anschuldigungen und Informationen hernehmen, denn wir sind ja durchaus die Partei, die für eine bäuerliche, kleinbäuerliche, familienzentrierte Landwirtschaft eintritt, die für eine nachhaltige Landwirtschaft eintritt, die im Einklang mit dem steht, was uns die Wissenschaft empfiehlt.

    Da brauchen Sie bloß mal in die Berichte unserer eigenen Agentur zu schauen – die Europäische Umweltagentur ist eine Agentur dieser Europäischen Union. Da sitzen hochmögende Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler, die sich seit Jahren und Jahrzehnten mit diesen Fragen beschäftigen. Und das, was wir in unseren Programmen, in unseren Vorschlägen aufgreifen, entspricht dem, was diese Wissenschaft uns vorschlägt, denn wir stehen auf dem Boden der Wissenschaft und nicht auf dem Boden der Lobbyinteressen, die hier leider ihre Papiere verbreiten.

     
       


     

      Borja Giménez Larraz (PPE). – Señor presidente, el agua es vida y el agua es desarrollo. Hoy vemos como la desertificación avanza. La falta de agua se ha convertido en una amenaza, especialmente para los países y las regiones del sur de Europa. Aunque algunos somos más vulnerables, este desafío nos afecta a todos. Hablamos del acceso a un bien básico. Hablamos de un recurso fundamental para la agricultura y para la ganadería, para la industria, para crear empleo y fijar la población.

    La Unión Europea debe implicarse de lleno en el impulso de un pacto europeo del agua que establezca medidas integrales para garantizar una gestión sostenible y eficiente de los recursos hídricos. Y ese pacto hay que dotarlo de fondos: necesitamos fondos para construir y modernizar infraestructuras hidráulicas, como embalses y presas que permitan regular cauces y gestionar periodos de sequía de forma más eficaz. Necesitamos fondos para mejorar y modernizar los sistemas de regadío. Todo ello acompañado de políticas de gestión eficiente del agua. Y hay que actuar con urgencia.

    En España, en mi región, Aragón, que tiene zonas profundamente áridas y desérticas, el Parlamento autonómico aprobó por unanimidad en 1992 el llamado Pacto del Agua, un acuerdo que reivindica las obras hidráulicas necesarias para garantizar las necesidades presentes y futuras de la comunidad. Pues bien, en estos treinta años hemos avanzado muy poco: tenemos más de treinta obras pendientes. Sabemos desde hace décadas qué es lo que queremos, lo que necesitamos, pero la falta de voluntad y fondos lo ha dejado en el olvido. Ante la inacción del Gobierno de España, la Unión Europea debe adoptar un papel activo. Debe contribuir a financiar estas obras. Hoy ya no es una opción: es una obligación.

     
       

     

      Camilla Laureti (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, la desertificazione va affrontata a livello globale, perché mette a rischio biodiversità, risorse idriche e sicurezza alimentare e fa tremare la giustizia sociale.

    Spaventa pensare che, anche a causa degli effetti della desertificazione e della siccità, entro il 2050 oltre 200 milioni di persone potrebbero essere costrette a migrare.

    Lo vediamo anche in Europa: il Sud soffre sempre di più per siccità e carenza di acqua. In Italia abbiamo intere regioni che restano per lunghi periodi senz’acqua, anche a causa di una scorretta gestione della risorsa idrica. L’acqua – il nostro bene più prezioso – non è una merce, ma è un diritto, e dobbiamo incentivarne conservazione e riuso e lavorare sulle reti idriche.

    Dobbiamo proteggere e ripristinare i nostri suoli, favorire con finanziamenti ad hoc e risorse il passaggio da metodi di coltivazione intensivi a pratiche agricole sostenibili. Se perdiamo i nostri suoli, perdiamo il pianeta.

    La desertificazione l’abbiamo vista arrivare e porta anche, e soprattutto, la nostra impronta: per questo, dobbiamo smettere di far finta che non esista e dobbiamo agire sin da ora.

     
       

     

      Marco Falcone (PPE). – Signor Presidente, signora Commissaria, onorevoli colleghi, in un momento in cui larga parte del continente fronteggia l’inverno, potrebbe apparire fuori contesto parlare di desertificazione e carenza idrica. Eppure, questo dovrebbe essere l’atteggiamento che qui in Europa dovremmo tutti avere: occuparci per tempo di questa enorme sfida, di questa enorme emergenza, prima che sia troppo tardi.

    E ve lo dice chi arriva qua a Strasburgo da una delle due più importanti isole del Mediterraneo, la Sicilia, e rappresenta due delle più importanti isole – assieme alla Sicilia, anche la Sardegna – entrambe fortemente a rischio. Si immagina che più del 50 % del territorio delle due regioni, addirittura entro i prossimi trent’anni, potrebbe essere a rischio desertificazione.

    Certo, il cambiamento climatico è un fattore decisivo. Purtroppo, però, la lotta alla desertificazione non può essere affidata solo alle misure collegate in qualche modo al Green Deal. Anzi, questo grande contenitore potrebbe diventare un luogo in cui tutto si perde, e già la Corte dei conti europea, nel 2018, aveva invitato l’Unione europea ad avere una visione completa e a porre in essere dei programmi di pianificazione.

    Ecco perché noi del Partito Popolare Europeo siamo per la difesa del territorio, certamente, e riteniamo che le isole debbano essere guardate con grande attenzione. Come? Tramite un serio programma di investimenti e, se vogliamo, di infrastrutture, non solo di transizione energetica.

    L’Europa deve avere il coraggio di varare un grande piano di stanziamenti strutturali per la lotta all’avanzare del deserto.

    (L’oratore accetta di rispondere a una domanda “cartellino blu”)

     
       


     

      Marco Falcone (PPE), risposta a una domanda “cartellino blu”. – Noi del Partito Popolare Europeo guardiamo a un approccio molto pragmatico. Certamente, la transizione ecologica diventa per noi il faro, ma al contempo riteniamo che un serio programma di investimenti debba essere calibrato alle esigenze del territorio. Non dobbiamo eccedere in un senso, ma nemmeno in un altro.

    Certamente, gli interventi in agricoltura, gli interventi tecnologici e, se vogliamo, anche un serio piano di investimenti, soprattutto in condutture idriche di adduzione e, se vogliamo, di approvvigionamento, possono rappresentare certamente una soluzione.

    Lo dico per la Sicilia – io provengo dalla Sicilia – dove l’acqua non manca, ma mancano le infrastrutture. Per cui, grazie per il suo input.

     
       

     

      Leire Pajín (S&D). – Señor presidente, señorías, se ha dicho aquí reiteradamente, nos enfrentamos a una crisis aparentemente silenciosa, pero profundamente devastadora: la desertificación, la pérdida de suelos fértiles y de recursos hídricos. De nuevo, es una crisis global que nos afecta a todos, también en Europa, especialmente en el Mediterráneo, en países como España, en regiones como Alicante.

    Hasta el 40 % de las tierras del mundo —casi la mitad— están degradadas. Esto supone una amenaza a la biodiversidad, pero también a la seguridad alimentaria. Las cifras lo dejan bien claro: el 90 % de la población mundial pasa hambre; es decir, más de 700 millones de personas, por no hablar de los cientos de miles de desplazados y de refugiados por la desertificación y por el cambio climático.

    El derecho a la alimentación es fundamental. Señorías, no podemos estar hablando aquí de las sequías y de la desertificación, pero luego intentar retrasar y retardar las normas que protegen contra la degradación de los suelos o que protegen la biodiversidad. No podemos hablar aquí de las cifras, pero después querer ser más laxos con las leyes que luchan contra eso.

    Por eso, señorías, como dijo el Tribunal de Cuentas, como dijo Naciones Unidas y como ha dicho el Consejo, necesitamos un plan ambicioso, transversal, que se coordine con otras Convenciones de las Naciones Unidas, con presupuesto y con objetivos, sin más demora.

     
       

     

      Manuela Ripa (PPE). – Herr Präsident! Die Wüstenbildung ist eines der drängendsten Probleme unserer Zeit – nicht nur etwa in Afrika oder in Asien, auch in Europa. 13 EU‑Länder in Süd‑, Mittel‑ und Osteuropa sind nach eigenen Angaben bereits betroffen. Auch in anderen Teilen Europas schreitet die Austrocknung von Böden voran. Zukünftig könnten auch hier Wüsten entstehen. Dass es dringenden Handlungsbedarf gibt, dieses Bewusstsein war nicht ausreichend vorhanden bei der COP16 in Riad. Auch in der EU wird definitiv nicht genügend getan. Probleme sind voranschreitende Bodenversiegelung, Entwaldung, zu intensive Landnutzung, falsche Bewirtschaftung. Der Klimawandel mit Dürren und Starkregenereignissen beschleunigt zudem noch den Verlust fruchtbarer Böden.

    Daher ist es von entscheidender Bedeutung, dass wir in Europa neben einer effektiven Wasserstrategie das EU‑Bodengesetz verabschieden – als erster wichtiger Schritt hin zu mehr Bodenschutz und gegen Wüstenbildung. Bei der Wüstenbildung ist es wie beim Klimawandel. Es ist viel kostengünstiger und einfacher, jetzt Gegenmaßnahmen zu ergreifen, als die Dinge umzukehren, wenn der Schaden schon eingetreten ist. Denn dann ist es zu spät.

     
       

     

      Jean-Marc Germain (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, mes chers collègues, Bakou, Cali, Riyad, les différentes COP se suivent et se ressemblent. Elles sont toujours utiles par leur existence même, mais jamais à la hauteur: 40 % des sols seraient dégradés dans le monde et 75 % de la population mondiale en sera affectée d’ici à 2050, 75 %. On le sait, les plus vulnérables en sont les premières victimes.

    Appelons un chat un chat: cette COP fut une déception. Et si l’Europe a fait preuve de volontarisme sur la promotion de la résilience à la sécheresse, son rôle a été plus ambigu: en s’opposant à un protocole juridiquement contraignant sur la sécheresse, en portant insuffisamment les pratiques agricoles durables et par une contribution financière insuffisante. Le Partenariat mondial de résilience à la sécheresse et ses 12 milliards de promesses a le mérite d’exister. Mais c’est une goutte d’eau, si je puis dire, par rapport aux 2 500 milliards nécessaires pour restaurer le milliard d’hectares de terres dégradées.

    Alors que Donald Trump vient de sortir de l’accord sur le climat, faisons preuve de leadership. Allons en Mongolie pour la COP17 avec des propositions et des aides concrètes, faute de quoi la planète et les générations futures ne nous le pardonneront pas.

     
       

     

      Dan-Ştefan Motreanu (PPE). – Doamnă comisară, domnule președinte, stimați colegi, deșertificarea afectează deja 13 state membre, iar seceta cauzează pierderi de 9 miliarde de euro anual. Doar în România, 400 de mii de hectare sunt afectate de deșertificare. Adoptarea Regulamentului privind restaurarea naturii impune statelor membre să refacă 20 % din terenurile degradate până în 2030.

    Din păcate, regulamentul nu a fost însoțit de alocări bugetare suplimentare. Drept urmare, solicit Comisiei Europene ca în următorul exercițiu financiar să abordeze această insuficiență și să pună fonduri concrete la dispoziția țărilor din Uniune.

    Totodată, pentru menținerea securității alimentare, este esențial să sporim investițiile în dezvoltarea sistemelor de irigații inteligente, utilizarea apelor urbane reziduale tratate, captarea apei pluviale și construirea de rezervoare.

    În plus, rezultatele cercetării privind desalinizarea apei marine din programul Orizont Europa trebuie să fie accesibile statelor membre pentru implementarea acestor tehnologii moderne la costuri reduse.

     
       

     

      Stefano Bonaccini (S&D). – Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, siccità, incendi e pratiche produttive che minano la fertilità dei suoli stanno innalzando il rischio di desertificazione anche qui in Europa, dove 13 paesi, tra cui il mio e altri sei nel bacino del Mediterraneo in particolare, sono colpiti da questo fenomeno.

    A rimetterci sono produzione e sicurezza alimentare, tessuto sociale ed economico delle aree colpite, e i nostri agricoltori, prime vittime dei cambiamenti climatici che qualcuno, addirittura ancora oggi, nega.

    L’Unione europea deve essere protagonista in questa sfida a livello globale, diffondendo nei paesi più a rischio buone pratiche – ad esempio, irrigazione di precisione o depurazione e riuso agricolo delle acque reflue – e con un piano europeo per le acque, e per l’acqua, che con più risorse per le politiche di sviluppo regionale e rurale – confido per delega nel Commissario Fitto – sostenga e semplifichi investimenti per una maggiore capacità di accumulo – dighe invasi, bacini e reti di distribuzione più efficienti – e autorizzi nuove colture che necessitano di meno acqua.

    Il prossimo bilancio pluriennale, allora, deve diventare l’occasione per migliorare alcune politiche dell’Unione e sostenere con i fatti, e non le parole, cittadini e imprese nel contrasto al cambiamento climatico.

     
       

     

      Ştefan Muşoiu (S&D). – Domnule președinte, doamnă comisară, dragi colegi, la nivelul Uniunii, deșertificarea afectează 8 % din teritoriu, așa cum au precizat și colegii mei antevorbitori. Zonele cele mai prejudiciate însă sunt cele din Europa Centrală, de Sud și de Est. Și țara mea, România, suferă din cauza acestui proces nesănătos al naturii. 40 % din suprafața sa agricolă este în pericol să se transforme în dune de nisip.

    De aceea, nu trebuie să permitem ca acest neajuns major să devină o amenințare la adresa siguranței alimentare a generațiilor viitoare de europeni. Acest fenomen grav trebuie decelerat prin strategii comunitare concrete și ferme.

    Trebuie să avem în vedere că micii fermieri din toate aceste zone de pe continent, afectate de deșertificare, sunt și ei în pericol. Nu au cum să se lupte singuri împotriva naturii și trebuie să le venim în ajutor. Au nevoie de susținere financiară europeană care să dubleze eforturile mai mari sau mai mici ale guvernelor naționale. Mizez pe înțelepciunea noastră comună și pe o reacție mai bine conturată a Comisiei pentru frânarea acestui fenomen natural periculos.

     
       

       

    Interventions à la demande

     
       


     

      Hélder Sousa Silva (PPE). – Senhor Presidente, Senhora Comissária, a desertificação é um desafio crescente que se coloca à União Europeia, especialmente nos Estados-Membros do Sul e, particularmente, próximos do Mediterrâneo.

    A falta de água, a exaustão dos solos e as alterações climáticas são, hoje, uma dura realidade nalgumas zonas da União e, além disso, assistimos também ao despovoamento de algumas regiões do interior por falta de atratividade e de competitividade.

    Portugal enfrenta cumulativamente estes dois problemas. As regiões do Alentejo e do Algarve evidenciam uma brutal falta de água, quer para agricultura, quer para consumo humano. E as regiões próximas da fronteira com Espanha sofrem de despovoamento.

    Em resultado destas duas situações, assistimos a fluxos migratórios do interior para o litoral, das zonas rurais para as zonas urbanas, que são verdadeiros problemas. Por isso, considero que o próximo quadro financeiro plurianual deve responder à desertificação e ao despovoamento e, assim, resolver o problema de coesão territorial que enfrentamos na nossa União.

     
       

     

      Seán Kelly (PPE).(Níor phioc an micreafón suas tús na hóráide) … labhairt ar an ábhar tábhachtach seo, gaineamhlú an domhain.

    And depending on who you’re listening to, between 20 % and 40 % of land is threatened with desertification, particularly in places like the Sahel, Gobi Desert, South America. I think it’s good that the European Union are now emphasising that deforestation, in particular, has to end in any free trade deals we’ll be doing.

    Within Europe, we will be shortly discussing the next CAP and, obviously, protection of the soil, nature restoration are going to be key in that. And I would make one suggestion: give every farmer in Europe a minimum of 50 trees native to their own area to set on their farm. This would help to restore nature, protect the soils and be a small step to end desertification.

    Bímis ag dul ar aghaidh de réir a chéile, mar de réir a chéile a dhéantar na caisleáin.

     
       

       

    (Fin des interventions à la demande)

     
       

     

      Jessika Roswall, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, your interventions show how important it is for the EU to continue tackling the interconnected challenges of droughts, land use, climate change, biodiversity loss and water scarcity together for our economy, our security and our livelihoods. They show that we are not ignoring the difficulties we face in the current geopolitical climate. And as many of you have also mentioned, we are all affected.

    I just also want to say – and this is to César Luena – that the Commission is not ignoring this. And I just want to repeat one thing that I said in my first remark: the Commission is responding to the recommendation of the European Court of Auditors by developing a methodology to assess land degradation and desertification for the EU.

    Although we didn’t leave Riyadh with all our desired outcomes, we should still acknowledge and build on the important progress that was made. So now we need to keep up the momentum. We need to accelerate implementation at national and international levels, and continue our work to agree on the outstanding COP16 decisions, especially on droughts.

    Many of you have underlined the importance of water and the need to make progress on strengthening our water resilience, so I also want to say – as I said earlier, and I know you know – that the Commission has made it a priority to present a new strategy on this.

    I know Parliament is already making progress on its reports on this. I thank you today for your input, and I look forward to close dialogue with you, with your rapporteur, Thomas Bajada, and all of you on this important topic, and of course, on continuing fighting desertification.

     
       


       

    (La séance est suspendue quelques instants)

     
       

       

    IN THE CHAIR: CHRISTEL SCHALDEMOSE
    Vice-President

     

    3. Resumption of the sitting

       

    (The sitting resumed at 10:29)

     

    4. Cryptocurrencies – need for global standards (debate)


     

      Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, honourable Members, first of all, sorry I’m a couple of minutes late – I was in the office, actually, but I didn’t make it here on time, I’m sorry about that. Also, thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this debate on the need to agree on global policy standards for crypto. As you may well know, these standards, of course, do exist and have been agreed in international fora. Let me give you a brief overview of how they came about and where the EU stands in their implementation.

    International regulatory and policy organisations have been working on international crypto standards for a number of years now. Early on, there was an international understanding that crypto markets are global markets and are largely unregulated and pose, of course, also risks that need to be addressed. And then in 2023 the G20 unveiled the crypto-asset policy implementation roadmap, which reflected the policy and regulatory responses developed primarily by the International Monetary Fund, the Financial Stability Board and standard-setting bodies covering specific areas of finance such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions on investor protection, or also the Financial Action Task Force on anti-money laundering.

    The core of these international standards on crypto are the FSB recommendations on crypto-asset markets and activities, and recommendations for global stablecoin arrangements. The European Union is the first major jurisdiction to have reflected those standards in law. We have done this by adopting the regulation on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA), which has now started to apply, and we have also amended other legislation such as the Anti-Money Laundering Directive and also the Transfer of Funds Regulation.

    We are strongly committed to ensuring the global implementation of international standards. We regularly advocate this in the relevant international fora in which we as a European Union participate.

    Implementation of international standards of course is necessary, not only to ensure a minimum level of policy and regulatory convergence internationally, but also to ensure that jurisdictions follow a sensible common denominator in addressing the risks also posed by the crypto markets. This is particularly important in crypto markets, which are global in nature, of course – yes, everyone knows that, with crypto exchanges and platforms operating across borders and assets also moving on open networks that are widely accessible.

    The adoption of international crypto standards has so far been incremental. Indeed, jurisdictions have made progress also in implementing the policy and also the regulatory responses developed by, as I said, the IMF, the FSB and the standard‑setting bodies. Almost all FSB jurisdictions have plans to develop new – or at least revise existing – regulatory frameworks for crypto.

    Information gathered at the international level suggests that the majority of FSB member jurisdictions expect to achieve alignment with the FSB framework by this year, by 2025. And this is of course very good news. We will continue to support relevant international organisations to ensure that the momentum we have now in implementing international standards on crypto is maintained. And we stand, of course, ready to work with jurisdictions that wish to benefit from our experience with MiCA. This includes the US. The US has been heavily involved in defining, together with other partners, the international standards on crypto, and I’m convinced that the new administration is fully aware of the fact that a robust policy response to crypto requires also an international effort.

    We therefore look forward, of course, to continuing working with the US authorities as they consider their policy approach to crypto assets and related service providers, and we would view it as a positive development if the US were to make progress on crypto‑specific legislation that would provide greater legal clarity on the treatment of crypto assets and related service providers, while at the same time also addressing the risks we are facing. And we believe existing international standards should form the basis of any crypto framework, including, of course, the one in the US, not least because they ensure international convergence in this area and contribute to a level playing field.

    Our experience in the European Union has shown that ensuring legal clarity is the right way to support innovation in these markets, while mitigating, on the other hand, of course, also the risks we are facing. Developments in the crypto market since the adoption of MiCA have only strengthened the case for legal clarity. Whatever approach the US ultimately takes, we do hope it will ensure that innovation flourishes while allowing, of course, on the other hand, also bad actors to be weeded out.

     
       

     

      Markus Ferber, im Namen der PPE-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin, Herr Kommissar, liebe Kolleginnen, liebe Kollegen! Diverse Kryptowährungen, allen voran Bitcoin, haben in den vergangenen Tagen Rekordkurse erklommen. Der Grund ist klar: Die neue Administration in den Vereinigten Staaten ist diese Woche ins Amt gekommen, und sie wird sehr viel kryptofreundlicher sein als die Vorgängerverwaltung. Der neue US-Präsident spricht gar davon, eine strategische Bitcoin-Reserve aufzubauen und die USA zum Krypto-Mekka der Welt machen zu wollen. Dass Donald Trump es wohl ernst meint, sieht man auch daran, dass er selbst einen eigenen Meme Coin aufgelegt hat, der wohl nur ein Ziel hat: seinen Reichtum noch etwas zu vergrößern. Ich glaube, die Anleger werden nichts davon haben.

    Unabhängig davon, wie man zu Kryptowährungen steht, unterstreicht diese Entwicklung ein grundsätzliches Problem: Obwohl Kryptowährungen ein globales Phänomen sind, haben wir keinen internationalen Ordnungsrahmen. Ein Regierungswechsel in den USA führt deshalb sehr schnell dazu, dass sich die Marktlage rapide verändert und da auch der Verbraucherschutz, auch für europäische Anleger, massiv unter die Räder kommt. In anderen Teilen des Finanzmarkts, vom Bankensektor bis zum Clearing, haben wir uns aus guten Gründen auf internationale Standards verständigt. Die haben wir im Kryptosektor bisher nicht, und das rächt sich jetzt auch.

    In der Europäischen Union sind wir mit der Verordnung über Märkte für Krypto-Assets, der MiCAR, weltweit Vorreiter. Wir haben in der EU ein glaubwürdiges Regelwerk geschaffen, das den Wildwest-Auswüchsen wie in den USA einen Riegel vorschiebt und gleichzeitig Vorhersehbarkeit und Planbarkeit für alle Marktteilnehmer schafft. Es gäbe also bereits eine Blaupause für internationale Mindeststandards. Deswegen, lieber Herr Kommissar, sollten wir von dieser Blaupause Gebrauch machen und auf internationale Lösungen hinwirken. Dass das nicht einfach ist, ist klar. Aber wenn wir nicht anfangen, werden wir es nie schaffen.

     
       

     

      Jonás Fernández, en nombre del Grupo S&D. – Señora presidenta, señor comisario, sin duda, yo creo que todos podríamos convenir en la necesidad de esas normas internacionales para el mercado de las cripto. Así he entendido las palabras de la Comisión apelando a la necesidad de fijar esos estándares mínimos.

    Pero, ciertamente, viendo lo que estamos viendo al otro lado del Atlántico, yo creo que deberíamos empezar a reconsiderar los buenos propósitos y empezar a trabajar más para proteger Europa, en un tiempo en que Donald Trump e incluso su mujer emiten su propia moneda —como decía mi colega Markus Ferber— en los días previos a tomar posesión, mostrando poco respeto, en mi opinión, por la propia institucionalidad. Deberíamos recibir el mensaje en Europa, y yo creo que el mensaje que tenemos que recibir es que no podemos contar con la Administración estadounidense en los próximos años para llegar a ningún tipo de acuerdo mínimo sobre criptomonedas.

    Por lo tanto, en vez de apelar a los buenos propósitos en los que llevamos empeñados años, deberíamos tener una posición mucho más asertiva y ser conscientes de que ese escenario va a ser casi imposible y que, por lo tanto, tenemos que aplicar el Reglamento MiCA —claro que hay que aplicar el Reglamento MiCA—, pero tenemos que también proteger a nuestro sector financiero, a nuestros bancos y a nuestros seguros de posibles impactos de inestabilidad financiera derivada de las cripto más allá de Europa. Y debemos también acelerar la negociación para tener un euro digital en Europa que permita ofrecer una respuesta propia a las necesidades, al parecer, de algunos inversores.

     
       


     

      Marlena Maląg, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Szanowni Państwo. Unia Europejska dzięki wprowadzeniu przepisów MICA stała się globalnym pionierem w regulacji rynku kryptoaktywów, wyzwalając je tak naprawdę z szarej strefy. Należy docenić fakt, że regulacja MICA wprowadza obowiązek raportowania, zapewnia mechanizmy kontroli wewnętrznej oraz wymaga separacji aktywów klienta od aktywów dostawców usług kryptowalutowych. To podstawy, które zapewniają większą przejrzystość, bezpieczeństwo inwestorów. Co ważne, zabezpieczone są także interesy państw członkowskich spoza strefy euro.

    Kryptowaluty, jak wiemy, nie mają granic. Musimy sobie jednak jasno powiedzieć, że różnice między krajami znacząco obniżają atrakcyjność tego rynku i spowalniają jego rozwój. Dlatego konieczne jest wypracowanie globalnych standardów regulacyjnych. Unia Europejska, choć jest liderem w tej dziedzinie, musi uważać, by nie przyjąć jak zwykle zbyt restrykcyjnego podejścia, które mogłoby wepchnąć innowacje, inwestycje w bardziej elastyczne rynki spoza Unii Europejskiej.

    Jeszcze niedawno kryptowaluty ożywiały marzenia części inwestorów o infrastrukturze finansowej niezależnej od banków centralnych. Dziś te marzenia nieco osłabły. Ale kryptowaluty są i będą trwałym elementem globalnej gospodarki. Naszym zadaniem jest traktowanie kryptowalut jako narzędzi finansowych, które wymagają odpowiedniej regulacji, ale bliskich rynkom tradycyjnym, takich regulacji, które zapewnią bezpieczeństwo inwestorom, nie tłumiąc jednocześnie innowacji. Nie możemy przespać tej rewolucji. Przyszłość rynku kryptowalut wymaga równowagi między ochroną interesów klienta a umożliwieniem przede wszystkim dalszego rozwoju.

     
       

     

      Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, au nom du groupe Renew. – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, aux États-Unis, Donald Trump se rêve en président de la crypto. Résultat, la cryptosphère s’enflamme, une cryptomonnaie créée à son effigie et une autre dédiée à Melania, le bitcoin qui s’envole et la démission du président de l’Autorité des marchés financiers américains. Pendant ce chaos, en Europe, nous avons fait un choix différent: réguler pour protéger.

    Avec le règlement MiCA, nous avons posé les bases d’un marché des cryptomonnaies sécurisé, imposant des mesures solides contre le blanchiment d’argent et contre le financement du terrorisme, comme par exemple la vérification des identités et le signalement des activités suspectes. Car oui, les cryptomonnaies ont des avantages. Elles offrent de nouvelles opportunités d’investissement, encouragent les plus jeunes à venir investir, et permettent un soutien vital face à des systèmes corrompus ou en zone de guerre, comme pour la diaspora ukrainienne.

    Mais elles ne doivent pas devenir une jungle mondiale au service des fraudeurs et des criminels. À ceux qui, en Europe, flirtent avec les leaders américains du bitcoin: savez-vous que leur véritable objectif est de contourner nos devises officielles, à commencer par l’euro, et de saboter notre système monétaire en Europe? Drôles de souverainistes. Comme pour l’intelligence artificielle ou la taxation minimale, l’Europe doit pousser pour un cadre mondial. Les cryptomonnaies ne doivent pas devenir un eldorado pour les tricheurs, mais un outil au service de tous les investisseurs 2.0.

    Monsieur le Commissaire, agissez maintenant pour adopter au plus vite des normes mondiales minimales. Il y va de la souveraineté de l’Europe, de celle de l’euro et de la protection de nos concitoyens européens.

     
       

     

      Rasmus Andresen, im Namen der Verts/ALE-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! Seit knapp einer Woche gibt es den Trump Meme Coin – ökonomisch wertlos und für Trump‑Fans vor allem eine emotionale Bindung zu ihrem großen Idol. Der TrumpCoin ist eine Betrugsmaschine, das zum Teil auch ausländische Geld geht in die Kassen der Trump‑Familie. Während Ex‑US‑Präsident Jimmy Carter Ende der 70er-Jahre noch seine Erdnussfarm verkaufen musste, als er gewählt wurde, betrügt Trump auf der ganzen Linie. Aber der TrumpCoin ist vor allem auch eine Symbolik für eine andere US‑Politik im Bereich der Kryptowährungsregulierung, und das sollte uns Sorgen machen. Wir sollten hier ganz klar feststellen, dass Anlagen in Kryptos mit hohen Risiken verbunden sind und dass wir auch wissen, dass das Geldwäscherisiko bei Kryptowährungen deutlich höher ist als in anderen Bereichen.

    Der Mehrwert, der durch Kryptowährungen geschaffen wird, ist fraglich. US‑Präsident Trump öffnet mit blinder Deregulierung und auch, indem er Krypto‑Ultras in wichtige Finanzämter in seiner Administration befördert, der Privatisierung des Währungssystems Tür und Tor. Lassen Sie mich ganz klar sagen: Das darf nicht der europäische Weg sein. Ich bin froh, dass eigentlich aus den großen Fraktionen fast alle Redner auch Skepsis zum Ausdruck gebracht haben und deutlich gemacht haben, dass wir auf der einen Seite internationale Standards brauchen – ja –, aber dass wir nicht den Kurs einschlagen sollten, den die Trump‑Administration hier auf den Weg bringt.

     
       


     

      Pasquale Tridico, a nome del gruppo The Left. – Signora Presidente, signor Commissario, onorevoli colleghi, mentre negli Stati Uniti, con l’insediamento di Trump, il Bitcoin raggiunge valori storici e persino una moneta meme di Trump guadagna miliardi di capitalizzazione, in Europa il dibattito sulle valute digitali resta fermo, specialmente per quanto riguarda l’euro digitale.

    L’euro digitale emesso dalla Banca centrale europea rappresenterebbe una risposta pubblica, sicura e indipendente, a sostegno della nostra autonomia strategica ed economica rispetto alle criptovalute, che, a causa della loro volatilità e della mancanza di regolamentazione, non possono offrire un metodo di pagamento stabile.

    Questo progetto, però, rimane bloccato per alcuni paesi che mettono il veto e gruppi politici. Noi, invece, sosteniamo con forza l’introduzione di questo strumento, perché garantirebbe l’indipendenza strategica dell’Europa dai colossi stranieri, principalmente americani, che monopolizzano i pagamenti elettronici, permetterebbe la costruzione di un’infrastruttura europea per i pagamenti digitali, ridurrebbe i costi di transazione per consumatori e venditori e, inoltre, aumenterebbe la stabilità finanziaria.

    L’euro digitale rappresenterebbe anche una risposta cruciale nella lotta all’evasione, che ogni anno priva il welfare europeo di 824 miliardi di euro di gettito fiscale.

    Commissario, Le chiediamo un passo in avanti rispetto all’euro digitale.

     
       

     

      René Aust, im Namen der ESN-Fraktion. – Frau Präsidentin! In den vergangenen Jahren sind weltweit die staatlichen Möglichkeiten gewachsen, uns Bürger zu überwachen. Der Wunsch, sich gegen diese Überwachung zu schützen, wächst jedoch ebenso. Darum erleben Kryptowährungen wie Bitcoin einen solchen Aufschwung. Während der Coronazeit haben wir beispielsweise in Kanada erleben müssen, wie unliebsamen Regierungskritikern die Konten gesperrt wurden. Manche Betroffene hatten nach diesen Kontoschließungen nicht einmal mehr die Möglichkeit, ihre Mieten zu bezahlen. Kryptowährungen schützen durch Verschlüsselungstechnologien unsere Bürger vor übergriffigen Staaten. Gut so!

    Darüber hinaus wollen wir, dass unser Geld sicher ist vor staatlicher Manipulation. Immer mehr Gelddruckerei durch Zentralbanken entwertet das Geld weltweit. Der Euro hat seit dem Jahr 2001 um mehr als ein Drittel seiner Kaufkraft verloren. Darum wollen viele Bürger eine manipulationssichere Währung. Auch das versprechen Kryptowährungen. Im Übrigen: Wenn hier gerade davon gesprochen wird, dass Terrorfinanzierung und Drogenfinanzierung durch Bitcoin begangen wird: 90 Prozent aller Terrorfinanzierungen finden nach wie vor durch Dollar oder Euro statt. Wir setzen uns für die Souveränität unserer Nationen ein, aber genauso setzen wir uns ein für die Souveränität unserer Bürger. Wir trauen ihnen zu, für sich selber zu entscheiden. Darum wollen wir Neuerungen wie Bitcoin und Co. auch weiterhin zulassen, und zwar so, dass nicht Politiker, die keine Ahnung von diesen Dingen haben, darin rummanipulieren. Die neue Trump‑Regierung macht es vor: keine Angst vor Innovation, sondern die Chancen ergreifen. Technologieoffenheit also auch im Finanzbereich.

     
       

     

      Regina Doherty (PPE). – Madam President, colleagues, we have spent the last few months since I’ve been here intensively talking about the importance of innovation, and it is clear that, despite all of the risks it entails, crypto stems from a desire to innovate and operate outside traditional norms and structures.

    In general, legislators and regulators should focus on creating the conditions for innovation and sectors to thrive. But in this case, there’s vital issues of trust, consumer protection and there is obviously the serious potential for financial crime that still exists.

    And yet, on the other side of the Atlantic, we hear the promises of the new administration of the sector, even as the President’s own meme coins were launched and then crashed and lost half their value in the space of one weekend.

    I think there are serious questions that have to be asked about a situation where the most powerful politician and one of the richest men in the world can self‑enrich himself through a scheme while purporting to be in charge of the regulators of that particular innovation? And while these questions go unaddressed, the cryptocurrency industry will continue to face serious pushback by some of us in this Chamber and outside.

    The EU’s legal framework for the sector seeks to promote innovation while tackling market abuse and the very large elements of criminality, and its full implementation has literally only just begun, it’s in its infancy. So, I hope that when we eventually come to review and have an international standard, that our efforts will be used for that global standard.

     
       

     

      Eero Heinäluoma (S&D). – Madam President, despite the hurray mood in parts of the crypto world since the election of Trump, it’s important to look at the facts. I see at least three reasons to remain concerned about this bubble.

    Firstly, despite all the measures adopted, crypto seems to remain the favourite tool for sanctions evaders and gangsters, including cocaine cartels, North Korean hackers, Iranian and Russian spies and fentanyl smugglers. If we want to tackle these problems seriously, let’s hit them where it hurts. Secondly, as well outlined by the ECB, the recent rise in Bitcoin value benefits mainly a happy few at the expense of the many. From an investor protection perspective, this is far from optimal. Finally, in times of high energy prices and energy scarcity, investing in infrastructure to mine bitcoins is wasting energy.

    Therefore, it is good to have this debate. We indeed need global standards for crypto to tackle these challenges, and the EU should take the lead as MiCA and the AML package can give some inspiration. But we should go further and we need a MiCA 2 to close remaining regulatory loopholes, for example, around NFTs and decentralised finance applications. We count, therefore, on this new commission to pick up this role and push this agenda forward.

     
       

     

      Aleksandar Nikolic (PfE). – Madame la Présidente, comme avec Internet, le cloud et l’IA, nous sommes une fois encore à la charrette des grandes puissances sur la cryptomonnaie. 10 % des Européens détiendraient des cryptomonnaies. En France, ils seraient déjà 12 %, soit plus de 8 millions de Français. Et cela continue d’augmenter.

    Et vous? Votre premier réflexe, c’est d’avoir peur. Ce n’est pas de savoir comment investir dans cette nouvelle technologie, la fameuse chaîne de blocs, mais comment la réguler, comment taxer les profits de monsieur Tout-le-Monde et comment la contrôler. Car au fond, c’est ça qui vous terrifie dans le monde de la crypto: il échappe aux technocrates. Quand il y a une nouvelle technologie, immédiatement vous en avez peur et vous voulez la réguler.

    Nous, on se demande comment s’y adapter et comment en tirer profit. Nos préoccupations sont: pourquoi l’Europe n’innove plus et comment utiliser ces technologies pour booster notre compétitivité. Plutôt que de taxer, favorisons l’investissement dans l’industrie européenne et l’économie réelle, incitons les détenteurs de crypto à transformer les plus-values en actions dans des entreprises innovantes, faisant en sorte que les futurs Nakamoto ou Musk soient européens et créent des technologies de rupture sur notre sol. Soyons enfin un continent d’avenir. Oui, il faut rendre la crypto utile et pour cela, il faut se débarrasser des technos inutiles.

     
       

     

      Guillaume Peltier (ECR). – Madame la Présidente, partout, le socialisme mène à la ruine. Il y eut, certes, l’URSS, Cuba, l’Angola ou le Brésil qui se réveillèrent pauvres comme jamais. Mais aujourd’hui, c’est l’Europe que les gauches tentent d’asservir. Pas un jour qui ne passe sans que les politiciens de gauche n’inventent, en France ou ailleurs, une nouvelle norme, une nouvelle taxe, une nouvelle contrainte. Pas un jour qui ne passe sans que les vieilles gauches sur ces bancs ne hurlent contre le mérite, l’effort, le succès, le travail. Alors, je le dis à tous ces politiciens: laissez-nous tranquilles. Quand laisserez-vous respirer les entrepreneurs et les originaux de tout poil dont vous sabordez le talent?

    Le pénible babil technocratique de ce débat sur les cryptomonnaies est le symptôme d’une Europe en dormition, épuisée par la fièvre socialiste. Dépassée et déclassée, voilà l’Europe que vous proposez au monde, transformant la terre de Jacques Cœur en mouroir de l’esprit d’entreprise. Pire: à l’heure où le monde entier fait le choix de la liberté avec Donald Trump, Elon Musk ou Javier Milei, vous voulez nous contraindre à la relégation. Pourtant, l’histoire est têtue. En connaissez-vous beaucoup des gens de gauche qui, à la chute du mur de Berlin, se sont enfuis à l’Est? Le monde entier s’éveille et vous, la gauche, vous voulez continuer à dormir de vos vieilles lunes ou, pire, vous ronflez de vos impôts fatigués. Alors écoutez bien: nous ne voulons plus de vous, nous ne voulons plus être ni taxés ni spoliés, nous voulons être libres!

     
       

     

      Gilles Boyer (Renew). – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, les cryptomonnaies gagnent d’évidence en popularité. Elles fonctionnent en dehors de toute législation financière et dans l’anonymat le plus total. Comme tout instrument de spéculation, elles feront la fortune des uns et l’infortune des autres, sans jamais contribuer à l’économie réelle. Mais n’oublions pas, et c’est notre rôle, que c’est avant tout à la puissance publique d’organiser la circulation des monnaies en s’adaptant aux nouveaux usages et de garantir la stabilité et l’utilisation de l’euro.

    C’est le sens du projet d’euro numérique, un équivalent à l’argent liquide dans un portefeuille numérique, émis et garanti par la Banque centrale européenne, à l’inverse des cryptomonnaies. Ce sera un moyen de paiement gratuit, sécurisé, accepté partout en Europe, même dans les zones sans connexion Internet et avec, dans certains cas, un niveau d’anonymat similaire à l’argent liquide. L’euro numérique permettra à l’Union européenne de préserver et de renforcer sa souveraineté monétaire dans un secteur des paiements de plus en plus numérisé. Les colégislateurs doivent s’y atteler sans tarder, au premier rang desquels notre Parlement.

     
       


     

      Catarina Martins (The Left). – Senhora Presidente, todas as épocas tiveram as suas bolhas e fraudes financeiras. Hoje, são as criptomoedas, uma burla disfarçada de investimento, que gera uma montanha de poluição sem produzir um alfinete.

    Sem surpresa e sem escrúpulos, Trump acaba de anunciar a criação da sua própria criptomoeda, que será regida pelas regras que o próprio criará como presidente dos Estados Unidos. Como em qualquer esquema de pirâmide, só os criadores, como Trump, sairão sempre cheios de dinheiro, mas, neste caso, dinheiro real, euros, dólares. Os incautos e deslumbrados vão perder tudo.

    Senhor Comissário, ao permitir as criptomoedas a pretexto da regulação, as instituições europeias estão a normalizar a burla, contribuindo para enganar cidadãos e, ao permitir aos bancos a constituição de carteiras de criptoativos, estão a criar um mecanismo crescente de contágio aos mercados, ignorando até os avisos do FMI. Na crise do Silicon Valley Bank, já tivemos um cheiro deste mecanismo.

    Sejamos claros: regular as criptomoedas tem de ser proibir as criptomoedas, impedir os bancos de as comprar, proteger as pessoas da burla, evitar a próxima crise financeira.

     
       


     

      Kateřina Konečná (NI). – Paní předsedající, vážený pane komisaři, vážené kolegyně, vážení kolegové, kryptoměny s sebou nesou příslib inovací, ale také celou řadu rizik. Miliony lidí v nich vidí příležitost, ale bohužel je zde i mnoho těch, kteří kvůli podvodům a nejasným pravidlům již přišli o své celoživotní úspory. A to vyžaduje od států a jejich institucí velkou opatrnost. Kryptoměny nelze apriori odmítat. Přináší nové možnosti v oblasti financí, nezávislosti i v investicích. Nicméně je nezbytné, aby jejich rozvoj byl ukotven v jasných principech. Jedním z těch klíčových je i právo občanů platit hotově, což považuji za základní svobodu, kterou musíme chránit. Nové metody oběhu finančních prostředků nemohou vést k zániku těch stávajících, které slouží právě jako pojistka celého systému. Kryptoměny a blockchain mohou ohrozit například prudký vývoj kvantových počítačů. Na toto všechno musíme být připraveni. Proto vyzývám k vytvoření globálních standardů, které zajistí ochranu uživatelů, jejich případné odškodnění v případě podvodů, transparentnost trhu, pravidla zdanění a zároveň respekt k finančním právům občanů.

     
       

     

      Kinga Kollár (PPE). – Tisztelt Elnök Asszony! Világszinten növekedik a kriptoeszközökbe való befektetések volumene. Ugyanakkor az nem kérdés, hogy ez a befektetési forma különösen kockázatos. Ezért az ilyen termékekkel való kereskedéshez nagyfokú pénzügyi jártasság és tudatosság szükséges.

    Legyünk reálisak! Egy OECD-jelentés szerint a befektetők kevesebb, mint fele érti a kamatos kamat számítását, így azt gondolom, jól tettük, hogy Európa megfelelő időben a szabályozás mellett tette le voksát, és globális standardokért harcol.

    Hiszen jól tudjuk a kétezres évekből, hogy a pénzügyi válságok nem állnak meg a határokon. Az áttekintő szabályozást az is indokolja, hogy a kriptoeszközök a feketegazdaság valutájaként is funkcionálnak.

    Ugyanakkor a túlszabályozást is el kell kerülnünk, mert az sem elfogadható, hogy a szabályozás akadályozza az európai innovációt, és ezáltal az európai vállalkozások lemaradnak a globális piacokon.

    Versenyképesség, prudencia, fogyasztóvédelem és a magas standardok globális kiterjesztése. Ez az irány, amit követnünk kell, de még inkább a pénzügyi ismeretek és tudatosság növelésére van szükség, mert ez a kulcs ahhoz, hogy az európai állampolgárok jó befektetési döntéseket hozzanak, és ezáltal növeljék vagyonukat, Európa vagyonát.

     
       

     

      Aurore Lalucq (S&D). – Madame la Présidente, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, parce que sans régulation, le marché des crypto-actifs, ce ne sont pas des monnaies, ce ne sont pas des technologies, ce sont des actifs financiers. Ce serait fait d’arnaques, de financements, de pratiques illicites en tout genre, dont celle du financement de groupes terroristes tels que Daesh. Nous avons choisi de les réglementer dans un climat hostile, violent, toxique, fait de menaces et de cyber-harcèlement.

    Il est donc cocasse de voir aujourd’hui que ceux-là mêmes qui nous harcelaient à l’époque et hurlaient qu’ils allaient partir aux États-Unis à cause de nous, se plaignent des pratiques actuelles de l’administration de Donald Trump, lequel a déstabilisé le marché avec le lancement de son «coin». Ils sont en train d’expérimenter ce qu’est la loi du plus fort quand elle ne leur est pas favorable. Donc oui, évidemment, comme nous l’avons toujours dit, il nous faut des réglementations au niveau international. Il faut aussi protéger la nôtre, se renforcer sur la question de la stabilité financière, mais surtout, par pitié, ne perdons pas trop de temps avec ce débat. On sait ce qu’il faut faire dans le domaine des cryptomonnaies. En revanche, on doit avancer en ce qui concerne l’euro numérique et la création de nos propres «big tech».

     
       

     

      Mathilde Androuët (PfE). – Madame la Présidente, l’essor des cryptomonnaies est un défi majeur pour nos États et pour l’Union européenne. Ces systèmes alternatifs, échappant souvent au contrôle des banques centrales, ne doivent pas compromettre un principe fondamental: la souveraineté monétaire des nations. La monnaie est un attribut régalien indispensable pour garantir la stabilité économique et protéger nos concitoyens.

    Pourtant, pendant que l’Europe s’interroge, d’autres pays avancent à grands pas. Les États-Unis, par exemple, ne se contentent pas d’encadrer ces nouvelles technologies; ils les soutiennent, les développent et les utilisent comme un levier d’influence stratégique à l’échelle mondiale. De leur côté, la Chine et d’autres puissances investissent massivement pour asseoir leur domination numérique.

    Face à cela, l’Europe ne peut rester figée dans une culture de la surréglementation. Certes, il est essentiel de garantir un cadre sûr, transparent et respectueux de nos valeurs. Mais réglementer sans agir, c’est accepter de subir. Nous devons changer de paradigme. Investissons dans les technologies numériques comme la chaîne de blocs, soutenons les entreprises innovantes et encourageons l’émergence de solutions européennes compétitives. Il en va de notre souveraineté économique et monétaire.

    Nous ne pouvons pas laisser des acteurs extérieurs imposer leurs règles, dicter leurs normes et nous asservir à des technologies qu’ils contrôlent seuls. Soyons ambitieux, bâtissons une Europe qui ose, qui innove et qui s’affirme comme un leader mondial. Oui, l’avenir de notre souveraineté ne s’écrira pas dans l’attentisme; l’Europe doit être forte, visionnaire et audacieuse.

     
       

     

      Adrian-George Axinia (ECR). – Doamnă președintă, un aforism care a devenit celebru în ultimii ani este că regulile fizicii se aplică indiferent dacă noi credem sau nu în ele. Parafrazând și luând în considerare propunerea de reglementare Markets in Crypto Assets (MiCA) putem spune că aceste monede virtuale vor exista, indiferent dacă Uniunea Europeană sau orice alt stat membru crede că sunt bune sau încearcă să le controleze total. Ceea ce nu înțelege Comisia Europeană, ține de rațiunea de a exista a acestor criptomonede.

    Li se aplică logica unei monede bazate pe încredere, a cetățenilor sau a piețelor. Or, apariția acestor monede virtuale este mai degrabă rezultatul neîncrederii în modul de funcționare a economiei și al sistemelor politico-administrative complexe. Mulți se refugiază în cripto pentru a-și proteja valoarea proprietății în fața inflației, a turbulențelor financiare și economice, dar și ca tentativă de ocolire a unui sistem Big Brother care vrea să știe la secundă ce face fiecare cetățean cu banii.

    În forma actuală, Markets in Crypto Assets va eșua tocmai din dorința prea mare de a intra în intimitatea oamenilor și de a verifica și controla fluxurile financiare. Exact cum s-a întâmplat și cu tentativa de interzicere sau limitare a plăților cash.

    Abordarea propusă de Comisie este deci mai aproape de China, unde tranzacțiile cripto sunt interzise, decât de un sistem financiar deschis spre inovație. Inclusiv în această privință, Bruxelles-ul ar avea de învățat de la noua administrație de la Washington.

     
       

     

      Cynthia Ní Mhurchú (Renew). – A Uachtaráin, criptea-airgeadraí. Forbairt mhór teicneolaíochta, gan dabht, le deiseanna dearfacha ar nós córas airgeadais níos ionchuimsithí, idirbhearta trasteorann níos tapúla agus féidearthachtaí réabhlóideacha trí theicneolaíocht bhlocshlabhra. Níor chóir dúinn san Eoraip neamhaird a dhéanamh de chriptea. Ach, ná ligimis orainn go mbeidh sé seo brea éasca.

    Tá fíordhúshlán ag baint leis na deiseanna seo. Guagacht praghsanna, gníomhaíochtaí mídhleathacha agus easpa cosaintí láidre do thomhaltóirí. Ábhair imní dhlisteanacha iad seo a éilíonn freagairt láidir shoiléir, ach, ag an am céanna, níor cheart dúinn rialú iomarcach a dhéanamh ar bhonn eagla na heagla. Má dhéanaimid nuálaíocht a thachtadh, tá an baol ann go gcaillfimid an borradh díreach céanna a d’fhéadfadh ceannaire domhanda a dhéanamh den Eoraip sa gheilleagar digiteach.

    Seachas sin, caithfidh ár gcur chuige a bheith cliste, ag féachaint chun tosaigh agus réidh le lúbadh mar a oireann. Tá rialacha ag teastáil a chuireann trédhearcacht chun cinn, mar shampla cosaintí láidre i gcoinne sciúradh airgid agus cosaintí do thomhaltóirí. Ar an gcaoi chéanna, ní mór dúinn an nuálaíocht a chothú trí oibriú le nuálaithe príobháideacha, trí chreataí solúbtha a chruthú. I ndeireadh na dála, tá deis ar leith ag an Eoraip anseo le criptea. Ba chóir dúinn an deis a thapú.

     
       

     

      Giuseppe Antoci (The Left). – Signora Presidente, signor Commissario Brunner, onorevoli colleghi, Europol ci segnala un incremento nell’uso criminale delle criptovalute nel riciclaggio di denaro e per la richiesta dei riscatti dopo gli attacchi informatici. La blockchain facilita trasferimenti rapidi di capitali a livello globale, offrendo ai criminali un vantaggio significativo.

    Nel campo della cibercriminalità emergono tecniche avanzatissime, che richiedono competenze elevate degli investigatori. Tali competenze necessitano di personale adeguatamente formato.

    Inoltre, cresce l’uso di criptovalute ancorate al valore delle materie prime, apprezzate dai capi criminali per la loro stabilità e facile comprensione.

    La mancanza di strumenti adeguati per il tracciamento delle criptovalute in alcuni Stati membri sta facendo aumentare le richieste di supporto investigativo a Europol.

    Di fronte a queste sfide – e conoscendo la Sua grande sensibilità – è essenziale un impegno coordinato per sviluppare standard globali e condivisi, al fine di combattere efficacemente l’uso illegale di questa tecnologia.

     
       

     

      Marcin Sypniewski (ESN). – Pani Przewodnicząca! Noblista Fryderyk von Hayek powiedział, że nie ma odpowiedzi, dlaczego monopol na emisję pieniądza jest taki niezbędny w dzisiejszym świecie. I gdy po kryzysie w 2008 roku chroniliście banki przed upadkiem, do którego pośrednio doprowadziliście, to programista czy grupa programistów, znani jako Satoshi Nakamoto, powiedzieli „dość”. Powiedzieli dość pokusie nadużycia, z której korzystają rządy i banki, dość psucia pieniądza przez jego emisję, dość fałszywemu pieniądzowi. I w ten sposób powstał bitcoin. Jest to najlepszy kandydat do stania się pieniądzem. Jest rzadki, podzielny, trudny do podrobienia, a przede wszystkim nie uznaje nad sobą dyktatów rządów i banków. Jest też antykruchy. I wszystkie te zakusy, żeby go ograniczyć, tylko go wzmacniają. I patrząc na te wszystkie proponowane ograniczenia, wiem chyba, jaka jest odpowiedź na pytanie Hayeka. Powiedział on, że najgorszym monopolem w rękach rządów jest monopol na pieniądz. I te dążenia do ograniczenia kryptowalut wynikają z tego, że są to niepaństwowe środki wymiany, które wygrywają z inwigilowanym, przeregulowanym pieniądzem dekretowym. Pamiętajmy o tym, że pieniądz powinien służyć ludziom, a nie – elitom.

     
       

     

      Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus (NI). – Doamnă președintă, stimați colegi, România a fost teatrul unor operațiuni financiare absolut tragice pentru poporul român în anii 90. Scheme Ponzi implementate de tipi care erau manipulați de servicii secrete și politicieni au reușit să devalizeze buzunarele poporului român.

    Ulterior, sigur, societatea a evoluat. În 2001 au apărut avioanele care au dărâmat blocurile gemene și, sigur, a început războiul împotriva terorismului. În 2008 a apărut Bitcoin pe fondul crizei din America, criză ce s-a transferat și în Europa, desigur, și ulterior criptomonedele au luat avânt.

    V-ați gândit, poate, că acest imbold al statelor împotriva cetățeanului de a bloca deținerea cash-ului a favorizat acest avânt al criptomonedelor? Și acum, noi vrem să reglementăm. A apărut acest regulament MiCA ce reglementează anumite lucruri, dar nu reușește să facă o diferență între oamenii care au rea-voință de la început și oamenii care într-adevăr vor să facă proiecte serioase în criptomonede.

     
       


     

      Lídia Pereira (PPE). – Senhora Presidente, mais do que exportar legislação, a Europa tem de exportar inovação. Mas vamos ser claros: não fomos pioneiros na tecnologia que suporta os criptoativos e devíamos ter sido, mas para criar o regulamento, obrigações e burocracias, aí não perdemos tempo.

    É evidente que os criptoativos precisam de um quadro legal. São um ativo financeiro, por isso, há mínimos de transparência e, muito importante, de proteção do investidor. Mas é também evidente que essas leis têm de garantir segurança e previsibilidade para quem quer inovar e investir.

    Se aqui na Europa não estamos a garantir nem uma coisa nem outra, como vamos defender uma regulação global? Primeiro, temos de garantir que o regulamento de mercado de criptoativos é bem implementado. Segundo, temos de apoiar a inovação em blockchain com a consciência de que é uma tecnologia que não se esgota em criptomoedas, mas que pode e deve ser aplicada noutras áreas. Terceiro, temos de perceber que criptomoedas são hoje ativos financeiros como qualquer outro.

    Tentar uma regulação global tem impacto na concorrência livre, na dinâmica do mercado e na liberdade financeira das pessoas. Não podemos viver num faroeste financeiro, quando falamos de criptomoedas, mas também não podemos aprisionar novos projetos, novas ideias e novos investimentos que criam emprego e oportunidades.

    Este já não é o tempo de desconfiar de tudo quanto é novo, é o tempo de confiar naqueles que inovam, que investem, que fazem futuro no presente.

     
       


     

      Nikos Papandreou (S&D). – Madam President, Commissioner, from this discussion I think the answer is staring us in the face.

    We have two distinct philosophies, one on one side of the Atlantic and one on the other side. The US is a free market, let it bloom, let’s have the $TRUMP coin and then we regulate. Ours is let’s regulate and see what happens.

    What’s happening now is, besides the criminal activities with crypto, it’s also used by poor people in countries with inflation. So they put it into crypto, a very unsafe coin, and then turn it back into their currency.

    What we need to do is to create the Spinelli coin, which is the digital euro, and to have our own digital crypto competing so that we can impose international standards with safe asset from Europe.

    We will not be able to regulate the huge space from the rest of the world, unless we have our own digital coin that people will trust in, not only in Europe but internationally. MiCA helps on that. The way we will impose international standards and MiCA is by having our own innovation and our own Europe.

    (The speaker agreed to take a blue-card question)

     
       

     

      Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă (NI), întrebare adresată conform procedurii „cartonașului albastru”. – Ați vorbit de regulamentul MiCA. Aici avem o regulă în care se menționează că ofertanții sau persoanele care solicită admiterea la tranzacționare cu criptoactive, altele decât jetoanele de referință la active și jetoanele de bani electronici, trebuie să fie persoane juridice, să publice o carte albă, iar următoarea regulă este: să acționați cinstit, corect și profesional. Puteți să-mi spuneți, vă rog frumos – și în calitate de avocat, vă întreb – cum veți ajunge la concluzia că persoana respectivă acționează cinstit, corect și profesional, înainte de a fi în calitatea lor de ofertanți sau persoanele care solicită admiterea la tranzacționare?

     
       


     

      Angéline Furet (PfE). – Madame la Présidente, la chaîne de blocs et les cryptomonnaies sont nées d’une idée simple: redonner le contrôle aux individus, renforcer la transparence et garantir un accès équitable à des systèmes ouverts. Décentralisation, transparence et sécurité sont donc les valeurs fondamentales de cette révolution. Mais aujourd’hui, la chaîne de blocs va bien au-delà des transactions financières. Elle révolutionne la gestion des données, la traçabilité et la confiance numérique en transcendant les frontières et en appelant à une coopération mondiale. Cependant, avec cet immense potentiel viennent aussi des défis: fraudes, inégalités d’accès et manque de réglementations claires.

    C’est donc ici que réside notre responsabilité collective. Il faut bâtir des normes mondiales, non pas pour étouffer l’innovation, mais pour l’encadrer et l’amplifier. Ces normes doivent donc 1) sécuriser les utilisateurs; 2) préserver la décentralisation; 3) favoriser un cadre propice à l’innovation.

    L’Europe, avec des initiatives comme le règlement MiCA, a démontré qu’une réglementation, bien que partielle, est envisageable. Elle doit donc maintenant agir comme un pont pour initier un dialogue mondial. La chaîne de blocs est une chance unique de construire des systèmes plus justes et équitables. Ensemble, nous pouvons orienter cette révolution vers un avenir plus ouvert et prospère.

     
       

     

      Ondřej Krutílek (ECR). – Vážená paní předsedající, vážený pane komisaři, ke kryptoměnám musíme přistupovat konstruktivně. Od loňského roku platí nařízení MiCA a já věřím, že jeho zavádění do praxe probíhá bez větších problémů.

    V Česku se díky našemu poslanci Jiřímu Havránkové podařilo prosadit jak automatické právo na zřízení bankovního účtu pro kryptopodnikatele, tak osvobození od daně při prodeji kryptoměn po třech letech. Myslím si, že tímto přístupem by se mohly inspirovat i další evropské státy. Naopak nápady typu zdanění nerealizovaných zisků z kryptoměn, které slyšíme z některých zemí, bych opravdu nedoporučoval.

    Američané mají k regulaci kryptoměn odlišný přístup, a tak se domnívám, že dosažení globálních standardů minimálně v tuhle chvíli nepřichází v úvahu. I proto bychom měli být opatrní s jakoukoli další možnou regulací od nás z Evropské unie. Důležité je, aby přehnaná regulace a nepředvídatelné právní prostředí nemotivovaly startupy a další firmy k úprku z Evropy.

    Pokud se bavíme o blockchainu, je to technologie budoucnosti, která nabízí řadu praktických aplikací. Příští týden v úterý pořádám v Bruselu akci, na kterou bych vás chtěl všechny pozvat. Bude na ní mimo jiné představen i projekt Českého vysokého učení technického a půjde o inovativní blockchainovou platformu pro decentralizované vydávání dluhopisů pro malé a střední podniky. Tak se stavte.

     
       


     

      Adnan Dibrani (S&D). – Fru talman! Kommissionär! Kryptovaluta, som en gång varit väldigt nischat, har snabbt fått genomslag i hela världen. Det är också en digital revolution som öppnat upp nya möjligheter inom andra sektorer.

    Det finns en stor potential i blockchain‑tekniken som kan innebära vinster för till exempel offentlig sektor, för mer robusta och effektiva system. Just nu undersöks därhemma till exempel hur vi ska använda den här tekniken inom vården, för att kunna säkrare hantera och dela personlig hälsodata.

    Det är viktigt att vi främjar ny teknik när den kommer, men samtidigt är det viktigt att den nya tekniken har en viss kontroll. Teknik får inte användas för att skada konsumenter, för terrorismfinansiering, för penningtvätt och så vidare. Här har EU gått före och reglerat krypto. Men krypto existerar på global nivå och därav behöver vi standarder på global nivå, så att vi kan dra nytta av potentialen, inte hämma den, och se till så att tekniken används på rätt sätt och inte används av suspekta nationer för att skada konsumenter och våra system som vi håller så kärt.

     
       

     

      Diego Solier (NI). – Señora presidente, señor comisario, el Reglamento MiCA, aunque presentado como un avance hacia la regulación de los criptoactivos, representa una amenaza directa a los derechos de los ciudadanos.

    Bajo el pretexto de proteger al consumidor y garantizar la estabilidad financiera, este marco podría socavar la privacidad, la libertad financiera y la innovación. Imponer estándares globales en un sistema creado para ser descentralizado es, literalmente, ponerle puertas al campo.

    Medidas como la recopilación masiva de datos personales, requisitos de capital inalcanzables para start-ups y la prohibición de ciertos criptoactivos no solo ahogan la innovación, sino que limitan la libertad de elección de los ciudadanos. Además, la vigilancia y la supervisión excesiva abren la puerta a un control digital sin precedentes.

    Mi pregunta es clara: ¿estamos regulando para proteger al ciudadano o para reforzar el control de los grandes poderes económicos y políticos sobre sus vidas? No podemos permitir que este Reglamento traicione la esencia de las criptomonedas: descentralización, autonomía y libertad.

     
       

     

      Andrey Kovatchev (PPE). – Madam President, Commissioner, dear colleagues, the European tech sector faces challenges that create a perception of stagnation compared to dynamic regions like South‑East Asia and the US. The EU is a global pioneer in the introduction of regulations such as the MiCA, with the aim to protect customers, but without hamper the growth. Yes, we need global standards, and the EU must be in the lead of this introduction. But also, we need to wake up.

    Talent migration is a big concern, with 90 % of the EU tech workers willing to relocate to the US for better salaries and funding opportunities. To reclaim the position of Europe, we need innovation‑friendly policies, including clear regulatory frameworks and sandbox environments for start-ups that will promote prosperity and growth.

    The rapid development of cryptocurrency markets highlights the urgent need to educate people on how to navigate the evolving landscape responsibly. Without proper knowledge, individuals and businesses risk falling victim to scams, fraud, financial crimes or malign global players. Europe needs to act now and act fast, if we are serious about our fostering competitiveness, and to act together with the responsible crypto community and not in a war with them.

    Are we ready to take bold decisions to ensure our success or will we risk again being left behind as others seize opportunities which we hesitate to explore? Commission and Council and colleagues, we need to act now.

     
       

     

      Waldemar Buda (ECR). – Doregulować, przeregulować i zabić. Taka jest regulacja i takie są działania Unii Europejskiej w wielu sprawach. Tak było z przedsiębiorcami, tak było z rolnikami. I teraz dokładnie tak samo podchodzimy do blockchain i kryptowalut. Za chwilę się okaże, że cały świat na tym zarabia, cały świat się rozwija, a my nie traktujemy tego jako szansy, tylko traktujemy to jako zagrożenie. Dzisiaj największe aktywa w kryptowalutach mają Chiny i Stany Zjednoczone, a Europa zastanawia się, jak to ograniczyć? Jak to zwalczyć? Za chwilę miliard osób na świecie będzie miało kryptowaluty.

    W Polsce 12% osób w wieku produkcyjnym ma już kryptowaluty. Ja się więc bardziej boję tego, że wy będziecie doregulowywać niż że nie będziecie robić nic, bo to pewnie zabije ten rynek i inni będą na tym zarabiać. Oczywiście nieprawidłowości trzeba ścigać, ale rozsądnie. Dzisiaj jak w Polsce się próbuje to uregulować, to lobbyści obsiedli urzędy i instytucje i ciężko cokolwiek zrobić. I ci, co mają na tym zarobić, i tak zarobią. A zwykli ludzie niestety nie mogą inwestować i się w tej sprawie rozwijać.

     
       

     

      Caterina Chinnici (PPE). – Signor Presidente, signor Commissario Brunner, onorevoli colleghi, “follow the money”: è questo il metodo per contrastare davvero la criminalità organizzata, come l’esperienza investigativa e giudiziaria italiana ci insegna da oltre quarant’anni. E “focus on the money” è oggi il motto della Procura europea nel solco di quell’insegnamento.

    Quando il denaro si fa virtuale, le sfide per le autorità di regolamentazione e di contrasto si complicano, mentre invece si moltiplicano le opportunità per le organizzazioni criminali: decentralizzazione, anonimato, bassa tracciabilità, scarsità di controlli, possibilità di effettuare rapidi trasferimenti di denaro transfrontalieri e di creare catene complesse di transazioni sono solo alcune delle ragioni che rendono criptovalute e blockchain strumenti sempre più utili per la criminalità organizzata transnazionale e per le organizzazioni terroristiche globali.

    In criptovalute si pagano i traffici di droga, armi ed esseri umani e, attraverso le operazioni che le criptovalute consentono, i capitali illeciti vengono riciclati e reinvestiti agevolmente nell’economia legale.

    Per questo, è necessario regolamentare il fenomeno. Certo, con il regolamento sui mercati delle cripto‑attività, le norme sui trasferimenti di cripto‑attività e le nuove norme su antiriciclaggio e confisca abbiamo iniziato a farlo, però l’Unione deve continuare a sostenere l’adozione di regole uniformi e standard globali, per impedire alle organizzazioni criminali di sfruttare a proprio vantaggio lacune e differenze normative, arginare il jurisdiction shopping e, così, contrastare davvero il crimine economico e finanziario.

     
       

     

      Seán Kelly (PPE). – Madam President, digital and cryptocurrencies present an important opportunity for Europe, provided we establish the necessary safeguards. We must strike the right balance between regulating to enhance consumer protection and promote financial stability, while ensuring we do not hinder innovation or impede the financial inclusion that cryptocurrencies can offer.

    The MiCA Regulation demonstrates Europe’s willingness to lead in establishing best-in-class regulatory frameworks. Recent events, such as the collapse of the FTX in November 2022, have shown why proper standards are essential to protect our citizens from irresponsible, and even fraudulent, market behaviour.

    However, the new Trump administration’s pro-crypto stance provides an opportunity for us to reflect. We hear from the crypto industry that the US is now becoming a more attractive jurisdiction than the EU, with its regulatory approach expected to be looser than ours. On this I make two points.

    One: here in Europe we must approach this industry with the same competitiveness lens we apply to all sectors. It is vital to monitor the impact of our regulations and remain adaptable enough to amend them if needed, ensuring we maintain the right balance.

    Two: those in the crypto industry eyeing Trump’s America with enthusiasm might reflect on the Trump coin debacle before this week’s inauguration. Be careful what you wish for!

    Ultimately, the cross-border and decentralised nature of cryptocurrencies demands international cooperation to address clear regulatory gaps, as was stated by the Commissioner and my colleague Markus Ferber. So let us collaborate closely with our global partners to establish clear and enforceable global standards.

     
       

       

    Catch-the-eye procedure

     
       

     

      Niels Geuking (PPE). – Frau Präsidentin, Herr Kommissar! Die ursprüngliche Idee von Kryptowährungen, ein globales und dezentrales Finanzsystem aufzubauen, hatte schon ihren Reiz und war leicht faszinierend, aber selbst der Bitcoin ist heute eine Riesenmogelpackung: 60 Prozent aller Bitcoins werden gerade mal von weniger als 18 000 Adressen verwahrt. Wo ist da der dezentrale Gedanke geblieben?

    Auf dem Kryptomarkt insgesamt herrscht dann auch eine Wildwest-Mentalität. Die Meme Coins sind Betrug mit Ansage. Vom Hawk Tuah Girl bis zum TrumpCoin – es mangelt schlicht und ergreifend überall an Substanz. Am Ende versucht dann jeder, jemand Dümmeren zu finden, der bereit ist, mehr zu bezahlen, als man selbst investiert hat. Es ist ein Spiel mit Verlierern und ein modernes Beispiel der Tulpenmanie, getrieben von Profitgier und Dummheit. 2021 sagte Trump selbst noch, Kryptowährungen seien eine potenzielle Katastrophe, gar Betrug – zumindest, bis er selbst einen Deal machen konnte. Weltweit durchsetzbare Regeln ohne die USA? Schwierig. Dabei braucht es sie, und zwar vor allem für die Technologie und den Fortschritt brauchen wir die globalen Standards. Zur Not …

    (Die Präsidentin entzieht dem Redner das Wort.)

     
       

     

      Maria Grapini (S&D). – Doamnă președintă, domnule comisar, de teama evaziunii nu trebuie să ne opunem inovației. Sigur, criptomonedele sunt rezultatul unei inovații. Ați spus foarte bine, avem regulament, avem directivă, ne gândim la standarde internaționale, pentru că da, nu suntem singuri pe lume, avem o piață globală.

    Problema este că, din punctul meu de vedere, nu trebuie să obstrucționăm cetățenii în a-și folosi veniturile, nu trebuie să obstrucționăm întreprinderile să investească așa cum doresc, ci trebuie să avem reguli pe care să le respecte.

    Ați spus, domnule comisar, între altele, că doriți să scoateți actorii dăunători. Trebuie să vedeți și cum, trebuie să spuneți ce măsuri, trebuie foarte multă transparență. Nu știu dacă aveți o statistică în Uniunea Europeană, în statele membre: Câte cazuri avem de evaziune, de înșelătorii prin criptomonede?

    Dar trebuie făcute aceste lucruri și cred că trebuie să rămânem cu această inovație – criptomonede – și în Uniunea Europeană, însă cu o reglementare și o supraveghere corectă.

    (Președinta a retras cuvântul vorbitoarei)

     
       

     

      Alexander Jungbluth (ESN). – Frau Präsidentin! Ich glaube, diese heutige Debatte hat wieder gezeigt, dass es unterschiedliche Menschenbilder gibt, die in diesem Parlament hier vertreten werden. Und eigentlich werden hier in diesem Haus immer Debatten darüber geführt, dass man Dinge regulieren muss, Dinge steuern muss. Freie Meinungen werden über den DSA eingeschränkt, und bei den Kryptowährungen ist es auch das Ziel, das möglichst an die kurze Leine zu legen.

    Ich glaube, wir sollten hier an dieser Stelle mal feststellen, dass unser Menschenbild ist, dass wir freie, mündige Bürger haben. Und freie, mündige Bürger sind auch in der Lage, sich eine freie Währung zu suchen. Und aus dem Grund, glaube ich, sind Kryptowährungen genau das Mittel, sich gegen staatliche Repressionen zu wehren, sich abzukoppeln von Staaten und einer Europäischen Union, die immer übergriffiger werden.

     
       


     

      Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis (S&D). – Gerbiama pirmininke, komisare G. Braunai, labai malonu pasveikinti ir labai tikrai geras sumanymas ir teisinga linkme. Čia vienas kolega kalbėjo apie Dievo laiminimą, tai jam priminsiu, kad Dievas ne tik laimino, bet davė Dekalogą ir davė virš trijų šimtų įsakų ir įsakymų. Taigi, reguliavimas prasidėjo nuo Dievo. Tai visiems linkiu to nepamiršti. Toliau, antras dalykas, noriu atkreipti dėmesį – taip, godumas, spekuliacijos, pinigų plovimas, visos šitos bėdos yra didžiulės. Prisiminkite, kas atsitiko su finansų krize, kai griuvo didieji bankai. Tuomet su privačiais lėktuvais važiavo gelbėtis pas ką? Pas vyriausybes. Kai įvyko didžiulės krizės jau su kripto bankais vėl gi buvo tas pats. Todėl išties tie, kurie per daug kalbate apie laisvę, atminkit vieną, kai būna skaudžios pasekmės, tuomet ir tenka ieškoti pagalbos ne kitur, o valstybėse ir reguliuojamuose bankuose.

    (posėdžio pirmininkė iš kalbėtojo atima žodį)

     
       

     

      Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă (NI). – Am văzut că vă deranjează foarte mult că Donald Trump și-a făcut propriul Bitcoin. Bravo lui! De ce nu faceți și dumneavoastră? Dumneavoastră sunteți cu băncile, băncile opresive! Ca avocat, am văzut cum băncile și-au bătut joc de clienții lor, i-au lăsat fără case, fără pământuri, fără nimic, oameni care s-au sinucis din cauza băncilor – cămătari legali.

    În acest context, bitcoinul – vreți și pe acesta să îl monopolizați, să îi faceți regulamente, oricum, extrem de proaste, pentru că niciodată nu o să puteți să garantați că o persoană sau o companie acționează cinstit, corect și profesional. În fapt, nicio companie nu poate acționa cinstit, corect și profesional din cauza impozitelor voastre.

    Mi-aduc aminte, statul român, ca să mă oprească, în „plandemie”, să mai lupt împotriva măștii și a vaccinării, mi-au blocat toate conturile și mi-au luat toți banii din bănci și mi-au dat 30 000 de euro amendă. Așa, ca să fiu controlată, să nu mai am cu ce să-mi cresc copiii. Bitcoinul este libertate și …

    (Președinta a retras cuvântul vorbitoarei)

     
       

       

    (End of catch-the-eye procedure)

     
       

     

      Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, what an interesting discussion and God bless Europe, I would say. I would like to conclude maybe this discussion by saying that we, of course, remain strong supporters of international standards for crypto. These represent a common set of principles around which jurisdictions around the world can converge.

    These standards ensure, at the end, an appropriate policy framework for crypto markets allowing innovation – yes, that is very important – to take place while ensuring that risks are appropriately mitigated. And with this EU MiCA Regulation all of you and most of you were talking about, Europe is the first major jurisdiction to achieve compliance also with international crypto standards.

    However, the Commission is well aware that our efforts alone, or even a partial international effort, cannot ensure that the risks posed by these global crypto markets are adequately addressed, and it is therefore crucial that the adoption of international crypto standards continues to grow.

    The US, that was mentioned as well as a key partner, of course, in promoting the adoption of international standards. We therefore do hope that the new administration will act as a catalyst for further progress in bringing regulatory clarity to crypto asset markets in the United States. And we would expect that any new policy and regulatory developments in the US fully, of course, reflect international standards.

    Thanks again for the discussion and for giving the Commission also the opportunity to participate in this very important exchange.

     
       


       

    (The sitting was suspended at 11:48)

     
       

       

    IN THE CHAIR: SABINE VERHEYEN
    Vice-President

     

    5. Resumption of the sitting

       

    (The sitting resumed at 11:59)

     

    6. Composition of new committees

     

      President. – Following the creation of the standing committees on security and defence and public health, and the special committees on the European Democracy Shield and on the housing crisis in the European Union, the political groups and the non-attached Members have notified the President of appointments to these new standing and special committees as of 23 January 2025.

    The list of the committees’ members will be published online and in the minutes.

     

    7. Composition of committees and delegations
























     

      President. – Sorry. We have clear rules on what are points of order. Some colleagues are very generous when there are actual accidents or things that are happening. But sorry, we have to stick to the points of order, because on Monday we have the one-minute speeches so you can make your position on special issues you want to raise.

    But we are here exactly for points of order. And that is what I exercise, clearly to the Rules. And there is no discussion about what has happened yesterday or the week after, or 20 weeks before or later. Sorry, we have clear order to rule it like it is.

    (Applause)

     

    8. Voting time

     

      President. – The next item is the vote.

     

    8.1. Case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RC-B10-0069/2025, B10-0065/2025, B10-0069/2025, B10-0070/2025, B10-0072/2025, B10-0078/2025, B10-0081/2025, B10-0084/2025) (vote)

     

      President. – The first vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on the case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see minutes, item 8.1).

     

    8.2. Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (RC-B10-0066/2025, B10-0063/2025, B10-0066/2025, B10-0067/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025, B10-0086/2025) (vote)

     

      President. – The next vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on the systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (see minutes, item 8.2).

     

    8.3. Case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (RC-B10-0087/2025, B10-0087/2025, B10-0088/2025, B10-0089/2025, B10-0090/2025, B10-0091/2025, B10-0092/2025, B10-0093/2025) (vote)

     

      President. – The next vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on the case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (see minutes, item 8.3).

     

    8.4. Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (RC-B10-0074/2025, B10-0074/2025, B10-0075/2025, B10-0076/2025, B10-0077/2025, B10-0079/2025) (vote)

     

      President. – The next vote is on the joint motion for a resolution tabled by five groups on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (see minutes, item 8.4).

     

    9. Resumption of the sitting

       

    (Sēde tika atsākta plkst. 15:00.)

     

    10. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

     

      Priekšsēdētājs. – Ir pieejams vakardienas sēdes protokols un pieņemtie teksti. Vai ir kādas piezīmes? Protokols ir apstiprināts.

     

    11. Major interpellations (debate)

     

      Priekšsēdētājs. – Nākamais darba kārtības punkts ir debates par plašu interpelāciju, uz kuru jāatbild rakstiski un kurai seko debates, un kuru ECR vārdā iesniedza Charlie Weimers, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Kristoffer Storm, Jaak Madison, Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Alexandr Vondra, Patryk Jaki, Johan Van Overtveldt, Roberts Zīle, Emmanouil Fragkos, Georgiana Teodorescu, Geadis Geadi, Marion Maréchal, Ivaylo Valchev, Kosma Złotowski, Mariusz Kamiński, Maciej Wąsik, Dick Erixon, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Beatrice Timgren, Nicolas Bay, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Ondřej Krutílek, Guillaume Peltier, Michał Dworczyk, Laurence Trochu, Şerban-Dimitrie Sturdza, Tobiasz Bocheński un Gheorghe Piperea Komisijai par ES finansējumu fiziskiem robežu aizsardzības elementiem, piemēram, sienām, žogiem vai citām barjerām, pie ES ārējām robežām (G-001002/2024).

     
       

     

      Jaak Madison, author. – Mr President, first of all, we are pretty many Members here on the last day of the week.

    First of all, in September, on September 20, 30 Members of the Parliament, so pretty many, have addressed written questions to the Commission. Unfortunately, we haven’t got any answer in six weeks. So, c’est la vie, and the result is that we have to discuss the question here.

    And I’m even more happy that on this very important topic, we can ask directly from the new Commissioner from Austria, who understands probably very well about the consequences of the illegal migration, about security, about the defence questions.

    The question was about the EU funds and is there any kind of consideration in the European Commission to finance also the projects to protect our external borders physically? For example, in February 2023, the European Council implored the Commission to immediately mobilise substantial EU funds and means in order to help countries bolster their border protection capabilities and infrastructure.

    Commission President von der Leyen has said that the EU will act to strengthen our external borders, specifically by providing an integrated package of mobile and stationary infrastructure from cars to cameras, from watchtowers to electronic surveillance.

    Unfortunately, we understand very well that it’s not enough to fight against, for example, the hybrid attacks by Russia, where they are using thousands of people as a weapon against Finland, against Poland, Lithuania, maybe next day to Estonia. And if those people are used by Russia’s hybrid attack, how can we stop to move them to Germany, to Austria, to the inside of the European Union, thanks to the Schengen free movement that we have?.

    That is why we had only two concrete questions: why has the Commission not yet recognised the reality on the ground at the EU’s external borders and moved to lift its anachronistic moratorium on EU funding for physical border barriers?

    And secondly, considering the ongoing hostile activities at the eastern border and the Member States have taken to constructing border barriers to counter the instrumentation of migrants, will the Commission change its approach and support Member States’ external border barrier projects financially via the EU budget?

     
       

     

      Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, honourable Members, thank you, first of all, for bringing this very important topic to the agenda this afternoon. Let me start by saying that I fully agree with the imperative of reinforced management of our external borders. It must be, of course, us and not the smugglers who decide who comes to our European Union and under what circumstances. This is all the more imperative given precisely the hybrid threats you mentioned. Our response must be as united as it is resolute.

    Coming from a ministry of finance for the last three years, allow me to start my intervention with some figures. In 2024, we saw a 38 % drop in irregular arrivals compared with the previous year. So it’s 239 000 compared with 386 000. And this includes a sharp 78 % drop on the Western Balkan route and 59 % fall on the central Mediterranean route. And that’s stated, as you mentioned, by President von der Leyen in her latest letter also to the European Council. This is the result of the EU’s active engagement with our partner countries, and it is working. We see that and we must continue to pursue these efforts.

    But, as you rightly mentioned, in parallel, we are very much aware that some regions are still under pressure, of course. In particular, there was a threefold increase in irregular crossings at the eastern border, in part as a result, as you mentioned, of the instrumentalisation of migrants by Russia and Belarus in their attempt to destabilise the European Union and undermine also our security. As a response, last month, the Commission issued a communication on countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of migration and also strengthening security at the EU’s external borders. The Commission recognised that Member States can take proportionate, on the one hand, and also temporary measures to address the threat posed by both Russia and Belarus.

    Member States have the responsibility, of course, also to maintain law and order and safeguard national security. That’s pretty obvious. But they do so with the support of the European Union and also its budget on a European Union level. Those Member States bordering Russia and Belarus have recently received additional funding of EUR 170 million to enhance border surveillance altogether.

    This is just part of the broader picture of EU budgetary support to border management. All EU funding for border management has more than tripled over the past three multiannual financial frameworks (the famous MFF), with up to 7.7 billion allocated for border management and also visa instrument in the current 2021 to 2027 period. With these funds, the European Union is building one of the most advanced border management systems in the world and the largest share of this amount – that’s EUR 4.3 billion – is allocated directly to Member States under their national programmes.

    Also the EU’s decentralised agencies – Frontex, eu-LISA, the EUAA, of course, the asylum agency – they also play a key role when it comes to border management, and their budget for the current period amounts to EUR 9.8 billion. In the future, the strengthening of Frontex with increased operational capabilities, including a tripling of its standing corps, will also further contribute to supporting the Member States – because that’s what Frontex is here for – in addressing the challenges at the external borders.

    I would therefore argue that not only has the Commission recognised the reality on the ground, but it is actively also supporting enhanced border management with substantial means, actually. I would also underline that this remains a key priority for me and for the Commission in general. And we are committed to continuing to strengthen the EU’s external borders and supporting the Member States, of course, both operationally and financially, to boost border surveillance.

    I am also very keenly aware, however, that budgets are limited, and the EU budget, of course, is no exception here. It is essential to make the most of every single euro, channelling it to where it is most effective at the end of the day and has the biggest impact, of course. Given these considerations, the Commission has so far focused funding, where the needs are the most urgent and where European money can have a real added value. This has included financing for mobile and stationary units, for border surveillance systems and equipment, for refurbishment of border crossing points, new installations for IT systems, plus also, of course, the maintenance of the equipment. All this increases situational awareness on border control capabilities, which are, of course, crucial for effective border protection, combined, as I said before, with continued support and also continued deployment by Frontex.

    That is the picture of today: EU funding is available to Member States to provide well‑equipped and also modern infrastructure for a very high level of security at the European external borders and to help also combat irregular migration. These things must go hand in hand. On top of this, Member States can decide, of course, themselves to finance structures such as fences, for instance, themselves, while always ensuring, of course, respect for fundamental rights.

    Now, the next step – and this is very important what I’m going to say now – going forward, Mr Madison, and following the trend also observed in the last years, it is clear that the overall needs for border management must be reassessed as part of the preparation of the next multiannual financial framework. This process is currently underway and should of course not be pre-empted. We will, of course, take into account the border management needs we have for the next months and years to come, which must be considered in a holistic manner for the different needs, priorities and resources available, whilst always ensuring that measures are, of course, proportionate and also respect fundamental rights.

    The views of the European Parliament in preparation of that process are, of course, incredibly important. At the same time, constant engagement is necessary to achieve results on external border management, and the European Union will continue to deepen these comprehensive and strategic relations that it is building with key countries of origin, but also key countries of transit, including migration in the spectrum of key interests covered by these agreements.

     
       

     

      Lena Düpont, on behalf of the PPE Group. – Mr President, Commissioner, I’d like to address the topic of today on two levels: on a procedural one and on a content one.

    On the procedure, as a representative of this House, of course, I also need to underline the request towards the Commission to respect the timelines and, of course, to adhere to the timelines. There’s a reason why we set timelines for the answering of the questions, and I think that we can do more actually also to work together to come closer again in that sense.

    On content, as it is mainly about instrumentalism – where, by the way, the ECR had the rapporteurship in the previous term – I think the question here at stake does not necessarily reflect the dynamic in the policy field. The Commission, the Commission President, they are in close debate with the Member States concerned. There are proposals on the table, both with financial support and additional money, but also in the adaptation of the policy response.

    As a general remark, Europe is the strongest when we act together and we, as the EPP, will make sure to do so further down the road. And while I say that some here in the House need to accept that there is a thing such instrumentalism – that it is part of hybrid attacks, and it needs to be seen in the geopolitical context – other parts here in the House also need to accept that as well, because the very same reason why we are speaking about this cynical, state-sponsored and state-accepted smuggling business is Moscow and Minsk attacking – trying to pressure – the European Union.

    So at least actors, some here in the House, want to align closer with. I would call that cognitive dissonance, but solve that out on your own. Rest assured that we, as the EPP, will go forward working on a common solution as a European Union that is strong and proud of its roots and values.

     
       

     

      Ana Catarina Mendes, em nome do Grupo S&D. – Senhor Presidente, Senhor Comissário, Caros Colegas, fiquei muito preocupada com o final da sua intervenção, Senhor Comissário, permita-me partilhar isto consigo.

    Em 2021, quando se aumentou a verba para o Fundo de Gestão Integrada das Fronteiras, a Senhora Presidente da Comissão afirmou — e cito — «a União Europeia não financiará nem muros, nem arame, nem cercas». O Senhor Comissário terminou a sua intervenção a dizer: «vamos aumentar o financiamento para as cercas».

    E queria dizer-lhe, em nome dos Socialistas e Democratas, que estamos totalmente de acordo que é preciso gerir as nossas fronteiras, mas gerir as nossas fronteiras não significa violação dos direitos humanos, como temos assistido frequentemente.

    Por isso, as verbas que foram atribuídas — mais verbas —, para as fronteiras, para este fundo, não podem ser para as câmaras de vigilância, para as cercas, para os muros, porque isso é ao arrepio daquilo que tem sido a política de migrações da União Europeia ao longo dos anos.

    E, por isso, Senhor Comissário, aquilo que lhe queria dizer é que tenha em conta os dados que aqui referiu, que eu, ontem, referi na minha outra intervenção, e que são verdade: em 2024, houve um decréscimo da imigração irregular em 38 %.

    Isso significa, Senhor Comissário, que nós temos de continuar a estar atentos à implementação do Pacto das Migrações e ter uma visão humanista daquilo que é a imigração. Nós não vamos parar a imigração com a mão, como não paramos o vento com as mãos, é impossível. Os fluxos migratórios existem desde sempre.

    A Frontex tem sido, muitas vezes, acusada de violar direitos fundamentais e, recentemente, a plataforma para a cooperação sobre cidadãos não documentados alertou para a violação sistemática, nas fronteiras, dos direitos humanos destes cidadãos, por isso, aquilo que lhe peço é que continue a ser o guardião dos tratados e a tratar as pessoas com dignidade.

     
       

     

      András László, on behalf of the PfE Group. – Mr President, EU countries want border walls and other barriers against illegal immigration, and the EU should pay for it. The majority of European leaders demanded that the European Commission immediately mobilise substantial funding for this. This was two years ago and Ursula von der Leyen did nothing.

    What did the Commission do instead? They sued Hungary for defending the EU’s external borders. For not allowing illegal entry into the EU, Hungary received a EUR 200 million fine. In addition, they demand that we pay a fine of EUR 1 million for each and every day that we refuse to give up our efforts to keep illegal migrants out of the EU.

    European citizens don’t want a Christmas like in Magdeburg. They don’t want a New Year’s Eve like in Brussels or Cologne. Europeans want tough border protection on the outer borders of the European Union. The radical ideology of Brussels elites about open borders is a failure. It goes against the will of EU governments, it goes against the will of European citizens and it goes against common sense.

    Ultimately, European citizens pay the highest price for it. In 10 years, Hungary has already spent EUR 2 billion to defend the EU’s borders on the south. In the east, several countries are now spending vast resources to keep illegal immigrants out.

    Pay for the fence in Hungary; pay for the fence in Finland; pay for the fence in Poland and all other countries that defend our external borders. This was the demand of the European governments so that European citizens won’t have to pay with their blood.

     
       

     

      Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, w imieniu grupy ECR. – Panie Przewodniczący! Szanowni Państwo, od czerwca 2021 roku Polska, Łotwa i Litwa doświadczają kryzysu na swojej granicy z Białorusią, gdzie dziesiątki tysięcy migrantów i osób ubiegających się o azyl, głównie z Afryki i Bliskiego Wschodu, próbowały przedostać się i próbują przedostać się do Unii Europejskiej przy wsparciu władz białoruskich. Od 2023 roku dołączyła tutaj również Finlandia. Już bezpośrednio Rosja, bez pomocy swojego pomocnika, jakim jest Łukaszenka, tak samo próbuje wepchnąć na terytorium Unii Europejskiej nielegalnych imigrantów.

    Tymczasem nowe rozporządzenie kryzysowe, które jest częścią Paktu o Azylu i Migracji, odnosi się do problemu instrumentalizacji migracji jedynie z perspektywy prawa azylowego i jedynie poprzez zapewnienie bardzo ograniczonego katalogu odstępstw od obowiązujących przepisów, które mają być stosowane przez państwa członkowskie zaatakowane w ten hybrydowy sposób. Oczekujemy jednak, jako Europejczycy od Unii Europejskiej bardziej asertywnych rozwiązań, skupiających się przede wszystkim na bezpieczeństwie obywateli Unii Europejskiej. Rozwiązania takie powinny obejmować wzmocnienie infrastruktury granicznej, budowę barier fizycznych i modernizację systemu granic, współpracę organów ścigania i odpowiednie wsparcie Europolu i Frontexu z wykorzystaniem również narzędzi współpracy międzynarodowej, w tym skutecznej współpracy z państwami trzecimi w zakresie powrotów i umów o readmisji.

    Szanowni Państwo, chciałbym przypomnieć też o sytuacji, która miała miejsce, kiedy ta hybrydowa wojna Putina się rozpoczęła. Byliśmy świadkami w tej Izbie festiwalu hipokryzji i wystąpień zgoła kabaretowych. Przedstawiciele nie tylko lewicy, ale również PPE atakowali w sposób grubiański i skrajnie niemądry ówczesny rząd polski, rząd Prawa i Sprawiedliwości za budowę muru na granicy polsko- białoruskiej i za ochronę granicy zewnętrznej Unii Europejskiej. Ba, nawet został zdymisjonowany ówczesny szef Frontexu, za to tylko, że wsparł ówczesne działania rządu polskiego. Nie kto inny, jak ówczesny lider PPE, sam Donald Tusk, grzmiał, że migranci zwiezieni przez Łukaszenkę to biedni ludzie, których należy wpuścić, bo przybywają oni tutaj w poszukiwaniu lepszego życia.

    Europosłowie Platformy Obywatelskiej, którzy dzisiaj zasiadają w tej Izbie, pajacowali na granicy, atakując werbalnie funkcjonariuszy polskiej Straży Granicznej, policji czy wojska. A dzisiaj jesteśmy świadkami cudu. Nie kto inny, a ten sam Donald Tusk wczoraj z tego miejsca mówi, że najważniejsze jest bezpieczeństwo i wzywa do ochrony granic zewnętrznych.

    Szanowni Państwo, jego kolega, pan Max Weber z tego miejsca gratuluje Tuskowi odsunięcie Prawa i Sprawiedliwości od władzy i wysyła premiera Jarosława Kaczyńskiego na emeryturę. Panie Weber, gdyby nie premier Jarosław Kaczyński, którego siła i wola polityczna powstrzymała ten nielegalny proceder, to te setki tysięcy migrantów miałby Pan dzisiaj w Berlinie, w Monachium i w innych miastach niemieckich. Jeżeli ktoś ma iść na emeryturę to Pan, Ursula von der Leyen i zabierzcie Tuska, dzięki Wam ma już wysoką emeryturę europejską.

     
       

     

      Fabienne Keller, au nom du groupe Renew. – Monsieur le Président, cher Roberts Zīle, Monsieur le Commissaire Magnus Brunner, nous avons eu ce débat de très nombreuses fois et, en dépit d’arguments logiques, factuels, et de statistiques démontrant que construire des murs aux frontières non seulement ne marche pas, mais que ce n’est pas non plus dans notre ADN européen, nous y voilà encore.

    Contrairement à ce qu’aime prétendre l’extrême droite, il ne suffit pas de construire des murs à nos frontières pour régler la question de l’immigration illégale. Bien sûr que nous devons protéger nos frontières, nous organiser pour les faire respecter, comme vous l’avez expliqué, Monsieur le Commissaire; nous nous y employons. Mais la meilleure gestion de la migration et la meilleure protection de nos frontières, elle passe aussi par l’application de ce pacte, qui n’est pas encore en œuvre. En effet, un volet majeur de la mise en œuvre du pacte est consacré à cette protection des frontières.

    Cela passe par la création de procédures accélérées aux frontières, d’un filtrage rigoureux, d’une base de données sur l’asile et la migration et de moyens budgétaires supplémentaires. Le pacte comprend également un volet de coopération avec les États tiers afin de prévenir les départs irréguliers, de lutter contre le trafic des migrants, de coopérer en matière de réadmission et de promouvoir des voies d’accès légales. Ce sont ces mesures novatrices que nous devons financer avec le budget européen.

    Ce budget doit être utilisé pour rassembler. Il doit être mis au service des citoyens et de la solidarité. Le budget européen, chers collègues, doit construire des ponts, pas des murs.

     
       

     

      Mélissa Camara, au nom du groupe Verts/ALE. – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, barrières, barbelés, divisions. Là est l’obsession d’une partie de la classe politique européenne. Partout où des États ont dressé des murs, ils n’ont semé que souffrance et désespoir. Aujourd’hui, une soixantaine de murs parsèment le globe de cicatrices de béton. Depuis une vingtaine d’années, les barrières physiques se multiplient aux frontières de l’Union européenne, en Hongrie, en Espagne, en Grèce, en Bulgarie. Ce sont désormais 13 % des frontières terrestres de l’Union européenne qui sont clôturées.

    Les murs, donc, comme seule perspective politique, partout. Regardez ce mur entre les États-Unis et le Mexique érigé sous Bush, toujours plus haut sous Trump, plus de 1 000 kilomètres d’acier et de méfiance. Ce mur que, chaque année, des centaines de milliers de personnes cherchent à franchir, poussées par l’espoir d’une vie meilleure. Et ici, en Europe, c’est la même histoire. Ceuta et Melilla, par exemple. Une porte close, des regards détournés. Ces barrières ne résolvent rien. Elles brisent des vies, elles éteignent les rêves et tuent. Souvenons-nous du 24 juin 2022 à Melilla: le gaz lacrymogène, les balles en caoutchouc, des migrants piégés entre les clôtures, blessés, abandonnés, sans soins… 23 vies fauchées. Et combien d’autres en Europe?

    Les murs n’arrêtent pas les pas. Ils allongent les routes. Ils poussent les exilés vers des chemins plus périlleux où l’ombre de la traite les guette. Les murs ne stoppent pas non plus les catastrophes humanitaires et climatiques, les guerres, les persécutions qui ont lieu partout dans le monde. Je l’ai dit hier dans une autre intervention et je souhaite le rappeler aujourd’hui: personne ne quitte son pays, ses repères, sa famille et ses proches par choix. Les murs ne protègent pas, ils séparent, ils creusent des fossés entre les peuples. Ils nourrissent la peur et la haine.

    Puisque les murs ne suffisent pas, désormais, des caméras, des drones de surveillance et tout un arsenal numérique sont déployés aux frontières de l’Europe. Mais les gens continueront d’essayer. Leur permettre de franchir les frontières n’est ici qu’une question d’humanité et de solidarité.

    Cette Europe forteresse n’est pas la mienne. Mon Europe est celle d’un accueil digne et inconditionnel, celle des droits humains et de l’égalité. Jamais nous n’accepterons la surenchère des moyens sécuritaires contre les personnes exilées, comme la droite et l’extrême droite de ce Parlement le réclament. Des milliards qui partent en fumée chaque année, pour quelle protection? Pour quel résultat, sinon la mort et le désespoir? Cessons enfin l’apathie morale. L’Europe doit choisir l’humanité, la solidarité, les ponts et refuser les murs.

     
       

     

      Christine Anderson, im Namen der ESN-Fraktion. – Herr Präsident! Europa wird angegriffen – nicht durch Panzer oder Raketen, sondern durch den Migrantenansturm auf unsere Grenzen, der als Waffe gegen uns eingesetzt wird. Und das funktioniert, weil wir uns von linken Spinnern haben einreden lassen, Pushbacks seien illegal. Pushbacks – also das konsequente Zurückweisen von Migranten an den Grenzen – sind aber das effektivste Mittel, um illegale Grenzübertritte zu verhindern und diesen Angriff auf unsere Heimatländer abzuwehren.

    Dass wir sie nicht nutzen dürfen, verdanken wir einer massiven Lobbyarbeit von Pro-Migrations-NGOs, finanziert von exzentrischen Milliardären, die sich als moralische Instanz aufspielen. Tatsächlich aber gefährdet deren Agenda nicht nur die Sicherheit Europas, sondern Europa an sich. Jedes souveräne Land hat das Recht, ja, die Pflicht, seine Grenzen zu schützen. Die Behauptung, dass dies rechtswidrig sei, ist eine dreiste Lüge, die Europa jeder Möglichkeit der Selbstverteidigung beraubt.

    Und natürlich brauchen wir physische Barrieren an den Außengrenzen – sie wirken, sie schützen, sind legal und legitim. Diese Zäune und Mauern sind nichts anderes als ein in Stacheldraht und Beton gegossener Pushback. Also bauen wir sie endlich, diese physischen Barrieren, und schützen wir endlich unsere Heimatländer und unsere Bürger.

    Auch Sie, Herr Kommissar Brunner, sollten doch inzwischen zur Kenntnis genommen haben, dass die politische Landschaft im Wandel ist. Ihre christdemokratische Partei wird bald Juniorpartner der FPÖ sein. Sie werden Ihren Kurs ohnehin ändern müssen. Warum nicht jetzt? Und wenn nicht jetzt, wann dann?

    Aber die nächsten Wahlen werden ohnehin zeigen, dass die Bürger keine Parteien mehr wählen werden, die sich weigern, die Grenzen zu schützen. Sie werden keine Parteien mehr wählen, die die Sicherheit der eigenen Bürger auf dem Altar imaginärer Rechte und Ansprüche von Millionen von rückständigen Masseninvasoren opfern und – mehr noch – sie ihnen erbarmungslos zum Fraß vorwerfen.

    Kommen Sie endlich zur Besinnung. Handeln Sie – und zwar entschieden und jetzt!

     
       


     

      Murielle Laurent (S&D). – Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le Commissaire, chers collègues, «structures physiques de protection des frontières», il s’agit là du titre de ce débat. Ce n’est en réalité que du verbiage politiquement correct pour parler de murs, de barrières, de barbelés. Cette sémantique nous renvoie à une période bien sombre de notre histoire.

    La Communauté européenne a été bâtie sur un idéal de paix, d’union et d’ouverture. Notre but n’est pas d’ériger des murs, mais de les faire tomber, comme ce fut le cas le 9 novembre 1989 avec la chute du mur de Berlin. Financer de telles infrastructures serait une insulte à la construction européenne. Plutôt que de construire des murs, nous devrions consacrer notre budget à défendre la démocratie, menacée par les populistes et non par les migrants. Comme je l’ai dit hier, ici même, lors du débat sur les liens entre la criminalité et la migration: il n’y a qu’en assumant une migration positive, en mettant en place des voies légales de migration et en engageant des partenariats sérieux avec les autres pays que nous pourrons y parvenir. Non, ce ne sont pas des idioties, c’est du bon sens. Le respect des droits fondamentaux, c’est du bon sens.

     
       

     

      France Jamet (PfE). – Monsieur le Président, 30 000 personnes. 30 000 personnes sont mortes en tentant de traverser la Méditerranée, à la poursuite d’un eldorado fictif, à la poursuite d’un eldorado que vous leur avez vendu. Ces morts tragiques, elles ne sont pas à mettre sur le compte de la lutte contre l’immigration illégale, mais sur celui de votre idéologie sans-frontiériste, des pompes aspirantes que vous avez mises en place et de votre mansuétude vis-à-vis des réseaux mafieux de passeurs. On voit d’ailleurs à Mayotte, sur notre sol, aujourd’hui, le résultat de cette politique du laissez-faire.

    Alors c’est vrai, construire des infrastructures pour stopper cette pression migratoire, qui pèse sur nos comptes publics, notre économie et la sécurité de nos compatriotes, ne sera pas suffisant sans un arsenal juridique et la volonté politique. Pour cela, il faut d’abord avoir le courage de dire: «Sachez que si vous entrez illégalement sur notre territoire, ce sera l’expulsion et le retour.»

     
       


       

    Brīvais mikrofons

     
       


     

      Bogdan Rzońca (ECR). – Panie Przewodniczący! Chciałem zabrać głos, żeby oddać hołd 21 letniemu Mateuszowi Sitkowi. Polski żołnierz, 21 letni żołnierz, został zabity przez bandytów na granicy polsko-białoruskiej. Zabity, zamordowany. I chcę o tym tu powiedzieć, bo wtedy, kiedy my, Polacy, broniliśmy granicy Unii Europejskiej, kiedy Putin i Łukaszenka wpychał uchodźców do Polski, prowadząc wojnę hybrydową, wy świetnie tu bawiliście się w Parlamencie Europejskim na fałszywym filmie polskiej reżyserki, która ośmieszała polską policję, polskich żołnierzy, tych wszystkich, którzy bronili granicy Unii Europejskiej.

    Musicie się za to wstydzić. Będę wam o tym zawsze przypominał, dlatego że dzisiaj oczywiście ta debata jest ważna, cieszę się, że komisarz przyjął takie, a nie inne stanowisko, ale wołaliśmy o te pieniądze na granicy, o to bezpieczeństwo w poprzednich latach i się nie udawało. A wczoraj oklaskiwaliście Donalda Tuska, który tutaj, w Brukseli, powiedział tak: To, co robi polski rząd Prawa i Sprawiedliwości, to szpetna propaganda. A myśmy po prostu zwyczajnie bronili granicy Unii Europejskiej. (przewodniczący odebrał mówcy głos)

    (Przewodniczący przerwał mówcy)

     
       

     

      Siegbert Frank Droese (ESN). – Herr Präsident! Ich hatte selber die Gelegenheit, als Bundestagsabgeordneter die litauische Außengrenze, die bulgarische Außengrenze zu besuchen, und es gab immer Kritik an den Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten durch die EU, dass eben zu viel humanitäre Maßnahmen gefördert wurden, aber kein robuster Grenzschutz. Insofern sind die Ausführungen von Politkommissar Brunner ein kleiner Fortschritt.

    Alleine mir fehlt der Glaube an den Willen. Wir brauchen den Willen zur Festung Europa. Wir brauchen einen, wenn Sie so wollen, neuen Eisernen Vorhang an den Außengrenzen Europas. Aber wir brauchen auch im Inneren Europas Ordnung. Wir werden daher nicht umhin kommen, Millionen von Straftätern und illegalen Migranten auszuweisen. Also wir brauchen millionenfache Remigration innerhalb Europas.

    Und das ist leider in Ihren Worten, Herr Politkommissar Brunner, überhaupt nicht vorgekommen. Solange dieses Thema nicht zentral als Aufgabe von Ihnen angesehen wird, kann ich leider Ihren schönen Worten keinen Glauben schenken.

     
       

       

    (Brīvā mikrofona uzstāšanos beigas.)

     
       

     

      Magnus Brunner, Member of the Commission. – Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, honourable Members, thank you very much, first of all, for your interventions.

    Border protection, I think we all agree, is a shared responsibility. We know the dimension of the challenge, definitely. And we will continue to dedicate also massive resources to meet it in cooperation, of course, with national authorities, with the EU agencies dealing with the topic, and with partner countries of origin and also of transit, as I said in my former statement.

    EU funds will have a strong role to play in this, and the preparation of the next MFF will be the moment to reassess the needs for border management and how these can be better addressed, whilst always ensuring – and this is also very important – that measures are proportionate and of course respect fundamental rights.

    I stand ready to engage with you on this in the weeks to come. I think that is very important. And I stand, of course, also ready to listen to you all.

     
       

     

      President. – Thank you very much, Commissioner.

    The debate is closed.

     

    12. Explanations of votes

     

      Priekšsēdētājs. – Nākamais darba kārtības punkts bija paredzēts balsojumu skaidrojumi, bet tā kā neviens balsojuma skaidrojums nav saņemts, tad pāreju pie šīs sēdes nobeiguma.

     

    13. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted

     

      Priekšsēdētājs. – Šīs sēdes protokols tiks iesniegts Parlamentam apstiprināšanai nākamās sēdes sākumā.

    Ja nav iebildumu, šodienas sēdē pieņemtās rezolūcijas nosūtīšu tajās norādītajām personām un struktūrām.

     

    14. Dates of forthcoming sittings

     

      Priekšsēdētājs. – Nākamā sesija notiks 2025. gada 29. janvārī Briselē.

     

    15. Closure of the sitting

       

    (Sēde tika slēgta plkst. 15:41.)

     

    16. Adjournment of the session

     

      Priekšsēdētājs. – Eiropas Parlamenta sesiju pasludinu par pārtrauktu.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Capito Commends President Trump for Re-designating Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for West Virginia Shelley Moore Capito
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.) commended President Donald J. Trump’s move this week to re-designate Ansarallah, more commonly known as the Houthis, as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). The Houthis, a paramilitary organization in Yemen funded by Iran, pose a significant security threat to the United States as well as the peace and stability of Israel and the Middle East.
    Senator Capito is an original co-sponsor of legislation known as the Standing Against Houthi Aggression Act, which was introduced prior to President Trump’s announcement and would codify the Houthis’ FTO designation as U.S. law. 
    “The Houthis have spent more than a year consistently attacking U.S. ships at sea, targeting civilian commercial ships, and firing ballistic missiles at innocent civilians in Israel. It is imperative that we call these attacks exactly what they are – acts of terrorism – and respond accordingly. I was proud to join Senator Daines in introducing legislation to re-designate the Houthis as a FTO following President Biden’s weak response to Houthi aggression. I commend President Trump for taking swift action to reinstate the Houthis’ designation, which will finally impose stronger consequences for their unacceptable attacks,” Senator Capito said. 
    BACKGROUND:
    President Trump’s Secretary of State Mike Pompeo designated the Houthis as an FTO on January 19, 2021. Approximately one month later, former President Joe Biden’s Secretary of State Antony Blinken revoked their FTO designation. In January 2024, Biden re-designated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), which falls short of the FTO designation needed to implement full sanctions and has not deterred Houthi aggression.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Federal Jury Convicts Former OSBI Investigator Of Sexual Abuse Of A Minor

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    MUSKOGEE, OKLAHOMA – The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Oklahoma announced today that Jordan Francis Toyne, 36, of Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, was found guilty by a federal jury of three counts of Sexual Abuse of a Minor in Indian Country.

    The jury trial began with testimony on January 21, 2025, and concluded on January 23, 2025, with the guilty verdicts.

    During the trial, the United States presented evidence that Toyne sexually assaulted a minor over a period of time beginning in the Summer of 2020 until 2023, when the victim reached 16 years of age.  The United States also presented evidence that Toyne sexually abused another minor in 2021.

    At the time of the assaults, Toyne served as an investigator with the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation’s Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) unit.  Toyne resigned from his post prior to the completion of an internal investigation conducted by the OSBI.  The victims were unrelated to Toyne’s official duties with the OSBI.  However, the United States presented evidence Toyne used his specialized knowledge as a Child Crimes Investigator to groom the victims and evade detection of his crimes.

    The guilty verdicts were the result of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Owasso Police Department, together with cooperation and special assistance from OSBI.

    The United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Oklahoma prosecuted the case because the victim is a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe and the crimes occurred in Pittsburg County, within the boundaries of the Choctaw Nation Reservation of Oklahoma, in the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

    The Honorable Ronald A. White, Chief U.S. District Judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, presided over the trial and ordered the completion of a presentence report.  The sentencing will be scheduled following completion of the report.  The defendant was remanded to the custody of the United States Marshals pending sentencing.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Nicole Paladino and Emily Wittlinger represented the United States.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: California Man Sentenced To 87 Months For Role In $50 Million Wire And Securities Fraud Scheme

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    NEWARK, N.J. – A California man was sentenced on Tuesday, January 21, 2025, to 87 months in prison by U.S. District Court Judge Esther Salas for his role in a $50 million internet-enabled fraud scheme, Acting U.S. Attorney Vikas Khanna announced.

    Allen Giltman, 59, of Irvine, California, previously pleaded guilty in Newark federal court to a two-count Information charging him with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud.

    According to the documents filed in this case and statements made in court:

    Between 2012 and October 2020, Giltman and others engaged in an internet-based financial fraud scheme, which generally involved the creation of fraudulent websites to solicit funds from investors. At times, the fraudulent websites were designed to closely resemble websites being operated by actual, well-known, and publicly reputable financial institutions; at other times, the fraudulent websites were designed to resemble legitimate-seeming financial institutions that did not exist.

    Victims of the fraud scheme typically discovered the fraudulent websites via internet searches.  The fraudulent websites advertised various types of investment opportunities, most prominently the purchase of certificates of deposit, or CDs.  The fraudulent websites advertised higher than average rates of return on the CDs to lure potential victims.

    The fraudulent websites used a variety of means to appear legitimate and to gain and maintain the trust of prospective investors, including by (a) displaying the actual names and logos of real financial institutions;  (b) purporting that the institutions were members of and/or regulated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), the Securities Investor Protection Corporation, or New York Stock Exchange; (c) claiming that deposits made to the institutions associated with the fraudulent websites were FDIC insured; and (d) using FINRA and/or FDIC member identification numbers issued to real financial institutions and real FINRA broker-dealers.

    After discovering one of the fraudulent websites, victims would contact an individual via telephone or email as directed on the sites.  As alleged in the Information, this individual was Giltman.  During his communications with victims of the fraud scheme, Giltman impersonated real FINRA broker-dealers by using their names and FINRA CRD numbers.  Giltman would then provide the victims with applications and wiring instructions for the purchase of a CD.  The funds wired by the victims would then be moved to various domestic and international bank accounts, including accounts in Russia, the Republic of Georgia, Hong Kong, and Turkey.  None of the victims received a CD after wiring the funds.

    To date, law enforcement has identified at least 150 fraudulent websites created as part of the scheme.  At least 70 victims of the fraud scheme nationwide, including in New Jersey, collectively transmitted funds that they believed to be investments in the aggregate amount of at least approximately $50 million.

    * * *

    In addition to the prison term, Judge Salas sentenced Giltman to 3 years of supervised release and ordered forfeiture of numerous assets seized from Giltman at the time of his arrest in 2020.

    The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) previously filed a civil complaint against Giltman based on the same conduct.

    Acting U.S. Attorney Khanna credited special agents of the FBI under the direction of Acting Special Agent in Charge Terence G. Reilly in Newark.  He also thanked the SEC for the assistance provided by its Enforcement Division.

    The government is represented by Assistant U.S. Attorney Anthony P. Torntore, Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s Cybercrime Unit in Newark.

    25-020                                                              ###

    Defense counsel:

    Nina Marino, Esq. and Jennifer Lieser, Esq, Beverly Hills, California

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: World News in Brief: More UN staffers detained in Yemen, education hit by climate crisis, Nigeria aid plan

    Source: United Nations 4

    Peace and Security

    The UN has suspended all official movements by its teams into and out of Houthi-held areas of Yemen, after more UN staffers were detained on Thursday.

    The de facto rulers of much of the country, including the capital Sana’a, released the crew of a merchant ship who had been held for more than a year, earlier this week.

    The move raised hopes that more than 60 staff from the UN, international organizations and diplomatic missions already being held by the Houthis over the past year, might be released.

    Friday’s safety measure announced by Julien Harneis, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, comes as the organization faces mounting security challenges in its operations in the region.

    The Houthis and the internationally-recognized Government have been fighting for control of the country in what has become a wider regional proxy war, for over a decade.

    Security measure

    “Yesterday, the de facto authorities in Sana’a detained additional UN personnel working in areas under their control,” Mr. Harneis said.

    “To ensure the security and safety of all its staff, the United Nations has suspended all official movements into and within areas under the de facto authorities’ control…this measure will remain in place until further notice.”

    Deputy Spokesperson Farhan Haq elaborated on the response later on Friday, highlighting the UN’s ongoing efforts: “Our officials in Yemen are actively engaging with senior representatives of the de facto authorities, demanding the immediate and unconditional release of all UN personnel and partners.”

    The detentions mark a troubling escalation for humanitarian operations in Yemen, where access and security remain critical concerns.

    The UN continues to emphasise the importance of upholding the safety and neutrality of its personnel to ensure lifesaving aid reaches those in need.

    Nearly 250 million children’s schooling disrupted by climate crises in 2024

    At least 242 million students in 85 countries had their schooling disrupted by extreme climate events in 2024, the UN Children’s Fund, UNICEF, has warned.

    Heatwaves, tropical cyclones, storms, floods and droughts are among of the dangers that have made the global learning crisis worse, new UNICEF analysis has shown.

    Coinciding with the International Day of Education, the UN agency released data showing that at least one in seven students had their schooling disrupted because of climate hazards in 2024.

    Multiple closures

    Of the 85 countries affected, 23 experienced multiple rounds of school closures and 74 per cent of all those affected students live in low and lower-middle-income countries.

    South Asia was the most affected region in 2024 with 128 million students impacted by climate-related school disruptions. East Asia and the Pacific region followed, impacting 50 million students.

    In 2024, heatwaves were the most significant climate hazard to affect schooling, concerning around 171 million students.

    Nigeria humanitarian response plan aims to help 3.6 million people: OCHA

    To Nigeria, where UN aid teams have launched a humanitarian appeal which again focuses on the northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe – the Bay states -where conflict, climate shocks and economic instability continue to blight communities’ wellbeing.

    OCHA, the UN aid coordination office, said that the target this year is to reach 3.6 million people in the northeast with health services, food, water, sanitation and hygiene.

    Nutrition for children is also part of the $910 million appeal, along with support for protection, education and other basic services.

    Funding challenge

    To absorb declining global funding, OCHA insisted that the Nigeria plan aims to make scarce resources go further, by supporting those delivering assistance locally more directly – and by shifting to cash and voucher assistance where possible.

    A key part of the aid appeal includes prevention work to lessen the impact of floods and disease outbreaks.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security Council Decides to Hold Election for Filling New Vacancy in International Court of Justice on 27 May, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2770 (2025)

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    9847th Meeting (PM)

    Following the resignation of Judge Nawaf Salam of the International Court of Justice on 14 January 2025, the Security Council today set the date for an election to fill this vacancy.

    Unanimously adopting resolution 2770 (2025) (to be issued as document S/RES/2770(2025)), the 15-member organ — in accordance with article 14 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice — decided that the election to fill the vacancy will take place on 27 May 2025 at a meeting of the Security Council and at a meeting of the General Assembly at its seventy-ninth session. 

    The newly elected judge’s term will begin the date that the successful candidate is elected by both bodies, and in accordance with article 15, serve for the remainder of his or her predecessor’s term, expiring on 5 February 2027. 

    Mr. Nawaf resigned from his Court position on 13 January 2025 after being designated as the Prime Minister of Lebanon and tasked with forming a new government by Joseph Aoun, who was elected President of Lebanon on 9 January 2025.

    For information media. Not an official record.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Nuclear Energy in the Clean Energy Transition

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    Dispatchable energy

    Unlike wind and solar, nuclear power plants and hydropower offer dispatchable energy, meaning they are able to adjust their output to meet electricity demand. Additionally, the expanded use of nuclear power for non-electric applications, including district heating, hydrogen production, desalination and heat for industrial processes, offers further options to reduce emissions.

    To support this increasing nuclear energy demand, the IAEA is actively assisting countries by providing technical expertise and capacity building to help them establish or expand nuclear power plants.

    Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Reviews (INIR) are an example where the IAEA assists countries to assess the status of their national infrastructure as they embark on establishing nuclear power plants. INIR missions enable countries to engage in discussions and receive guidance from experts about recommendations and best practices in nuclear power infrastructure development.

    These missions ensure that the infrastructure necessary for the safe, secure and sustainable use of nuclear power is developed and implemented in a responsible and orderly manner.

    In 2009, the IAEA conducted the first INIR Mission to a country initiating the use of nuclear power. Since then, INIR missions have been hosted by various states including the United Arab Emirates, that has successfully established the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant. This year, it is expected to supply around 25 per cent of the UAE’s electricity, up from its current contribution of 20 per cent, reducing the country’s carbon emissions by 22 million tonnes annually.

    Similarly, countries like Sweden, France and Finland have utilized nuclear energy combined with hydro and renewables to largely decarbonize their electricity production.  France has an extremely low level of CO2 emissions from electricity generation, since over 90 per cent of its electricity is from low-carbon sources, 70 per cent of that from nuclear power. And 94 percent of Sweden’s electricity comes from low carbon sources in Sweden with more than a third coming from nuclear, according to the IEA.

    Newcomer countries

    The IAEA is also supporting newcomer countries and developing countries in their transition to nuclear energy, with trainings, technical assistance, and technology transfer of tools and methodologies to help them evaluate the role of different technologies in meeting their future energy needs while reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 

    “A few years ago, discussions might have been about phasing out nuclear energy. Today, at the World Economic Forum, we’re on the road to tripling nuclear capacity. This shows a shift in how nuclear energy is increasingly seen as essential for net-zero and energy transition,” said Mr Grossi this week at the first ever public session on nuclear energy at the World Economic forum Annual Meeting in Davos.

    The IAEA’s latest projections indicate that world nuclear capacity will increase 2.5 times the current capacity by 2050. At present, 31 countries operate power plants, with 419 reactors in operation, a combined electrical capacity of 378.1 gigawatt GW, producing about 10 per cent of the world’s electricity.  Additionally, over 62 reactors are currently under construction, highlighting the growing adoption of nuclear energy worldwide.

    “I am confident 2025 will see commitments translated into concrete projects. Nuclear energy is still providing the world with a quarter of its low-carbon power and supporting the roll out of intermittent renewables like solar and wind. In future we will see even more nuclear deliver the clean, reliable, and secure power the world needs. As always, IAEA will be there to assist countries in making it happen,” said Mr Grossi.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: First Capital, Inc. Reports Annual and Quarterly Earnings

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    CORYDON, Ind., Jan. 24, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — First Capital, Inc. (the “Company”) (NASDAQ: FCAP), the holding company for First Harrison Bank (the “Bank”), today reported net income of $11.9 million, or $3.57 per diluted share, for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to net income of $12.8 million, or $3.82 per diluted share, for the year ended December 31, 2023.

    Results of Operations for the Years Ended December 31, 2024 and 2023

    Net interest income after provision for credit losses increased $894,000 for the year ended December 31, 2024 compared to the same period in 2023. Interest income increased $6.9 million when comparing the two periods due to an increase in the average tax-equivalent yield(1) on interest-earning assets from 3.96% for the year ended December 31, 2023 to 4.49% for the same period in 2024. Interest expense increased $5.7 million as the average cost of interest-bearing liabilities increased from 1.11% for the year ended December 31, 2023 to 1.73% for the same period in 2024, in addition to an increase in the average balance of interest-bearing liabilities from $809.2 million for the year ended December 31, 2023 to $850.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. As a result of the changes in interest-earning assets and interest-bearing liabilities, the tax-equivalent net interest margin(1) increased from 3.16% for the year ended December 31, 2023 to 3.20% for the same period in 2024. Refer to the accompanying average balance sheet for more information regarding changes in the composition of the Company’s balance sheet and resulting yields and costs from the year ended December 31, 2023 to the year ended December 31, 2024.

    Based on management’s analysis of the Allowance for Credit Losses (“ACL”) on loans and unfunded loan commitments, the provision for credit losses increased from $1.1 million for the year ended December 31, 2023 to $1.4 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was due to loan growth during the period, the increase in nonperforming assets during the year described later in this release, as well as management’s consideration of macroeconomic uncertainty. The Bank recognized net charge-offs of $173,000 for the year ended December 31, 2024 compared to $469,000 for the same period in 2023.  

    Noninterest income increased $24,000 for the year ended December 31, 2024 as compared to the year ended December 31, 2023 primarily due to increases in gains on the sale of loans and service charges on deposit accounts of $133,000 and $59,000, respectively. These were partially offset by the Company recognizing a $374,000 loss on equity securities during the year ended December 31, 2024 compared to a $207,000 loss during the same period in 2023.

    Noninterest expenses increased $1.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2024 as compared to the same period in 2023. This was primarily due to increases in professional fees, compensation and benefits, and other expenses of $663,000, $536,000 and $260,000, respectively, when comparing the two periods.   The increase in professional fees is primarily due to increased costs associated with the Company’s annual audit and fees being accrued for the Company’s ongoing core contract negotiations. The increase in compensation and benefits is due to standard increases in salary and wages as well as increases in the cost of Company-provided health insurance benefits. The increase in other expenses included a $90,000 increase in the Company’s support of local communities through sponsorships and donations, a $64,000 increase in check and debit card fraud losses, $30,000 in increased dues and subscriptions, and $25,000 in increased expenses related to employee training and education.

    Income tax expense decreased $32,000 for the year ended December 31, 2024 as compared to the same period in 2023 resulting in an effective tax rate of 15.6% for the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to 14.9% for the same period in 2023.

    Results of Operations for the Three Months Ended December 31, 2024 and 2023

    The Company’s net income was $3.3 million, or $0.97 per diluted share, for the quarter ended December 31, 2024, compared to $3.1 million, or $0.93 per diluted share, for the quarter ended December 31, 2023.

    Net interest income after provision for credit losses increased $822,000 for the quarter ended December 31, 2024 as compared to the same period in 2023. Interest income increased $1.6 million when comparing the periods due to an increase in the average tax-equivalent yield(1) on interest-earning assets from 4.20% for the fourth quarter of 2023 to 4.64% for the fourth quarter of 2024. Interest expense increased $693,000 when comparing the periods due to an increase in the average cost of interest-bearing liabilities from 1.51% for the fourth quarter of 2023 to 1.76% for the fourth quarter of 2024, in addition to an increase in the average balance of interest-bearing liabilities from $821.1 million for the fourth quarter of 2023 to $859.6 million for the fourth quarter of 2024. As a result of the changes in interest-earning assets and interest-bearing liabilities, the tax-equivalent net interest margin(1) increased from 3.11% for the quarter ended December 31, 2023 to 3.33% for the same period in 2024. Refer to the accompanying average balance sheet for more information regarding changes in the composition of the Company’s balance sheet and resulting yields and costs from the quarter ended December 31, 2023 to the quarter ended December 31, 2024.

    Based on management’s analysis of the ACL on loans and unfunded loan commitments, the provision for credit losses increased from $308,000 for the quarter ended December 31, 2023 to $346,000 for the quarter ended December 31, 2024.   The Bank recognized net charge-offs of $24,000 and $89,000 for the quarters ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively.

    Noninterest income increased $103,000 for the quarter ended December 31, 2024 as compared to the same period in 2023.   The Company recognized increases in gain on sale of loans, service charges on deposit accounts, and an increase in the cash surrender value of bank owned life insurance policies of $56,000, $29,000, and $15,000, respectively, when comparing the two periods. These were partially offset by a $21,000 decrease in ATM and debit card fees. In addition, the Company recognized a $104,000 loss on equity securities during the quarter ended December 31, 2024 compared to a $121,000 loss during the same period in 2023.

    Noninterest expense increased $567,000 for the quarter ended December 31, 2024 as compared to the same period in 2023, due primarily to increases in professional fees, compensation and benefits, and occupancy and equipment expenses of $239,000, $162,000, and $66,000, respectively. The increase in professional fees is primarily due to increased costs associated with the Company’s annual audit and fees being accrued for the Company’s ongoing core contract negotiations. The increase in compensation and benefits is due to standard increases in salary and wages as well as increases in the cost of Company-provided health insurance benefits. The increase in occupancy and equipment expenses is primarily due to increased depreciation expense and facility repairs.

    Income tax expenses increased $206,000 for the fourth quarter of 2024 as compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. This was due primarily to the finalization of estimates associated with the Company’s investment in solar tax credit producing facilities during 2024. As a result, the effective tax rate for the quarter ended December 31, 2024 was 17.3% compared to 13.3% for the same period in 2023.

    Comparison of Financial Condition at December 31, 2024 and 2023

    Total assets were $1.19 billion at December 31, 2024 compared to $1.16 billion at December 31, 2023. Total cash and cash equivalents and net loans receivable increased $67.2 million and $16.8 million, respectively, from December 31, 2023 to December 31, 2024, while securities available for sale decreased $48.0 million during the same period. Deposits increased $41.2 million from $1.03 billion at December 31, 2023 to $1.07 billion at December 31, 2024.   The Bank had no borrowed funds outstanding at December 31, 2024 compared to $21.5 million in borrowings outstanding through the Federal Reserve Bank’s BTFP at December 31, 2023. Nonperforming assets (consisting of nonaccrual loans, accruing loans 90 days or more past due, and foreclosed real estate) increased from $1.8 million at December 31, 2023 to $4.5 million at December 31, 2024. The increase was primarily due to the nonaccrual classification of two commercial loan relationships totaling $2.6 million. Loans in the relationship are secured by a variety of real estate and business assets.

    The Bank currently has 18 offices in the Indiana communities of Corydon, Edwardsville, Greenville, Floyds Knobs, Palmyra, New Albany, New Salisbury, Jeffersonville, Salem, Lanesville and Charlestown and the Kentucky communities of Shepherdsville, Mt. Washington and Lebanon Junction.

    Access to First Harrison Bank accounts, including online banking and electronic bill payments, is available through the Bank’s website at http://www.firstharrison.com. For more information and financial data about the Company, please visit Investor Relations at the Bank’s aforementioned website. The Bank can also be followed on Facebook.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release may contain certain forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements can be identified by the use of the words “anticipate,” “believe,” “expect,” “intend,” “could” and “should,” and other words of similar meaning. Forward-looking statements are not historical facts nor guarantees of future performance; rather, they are statements based on the Company’s current beliefs, assumptions, and expectations regarding its business strategies and their intended results and its future performance.

    Numerous risks and uncertainties could cause or contribute to the Company’s actual results, performance and achievements to be materially different from those expressed or implied by these forward-looking statements. Factors that may cause or contribute to these differences include, without limitation, general economic conditions, including changes in market interest rates and changes in monetary and fiscal policies of the federal government; competition; the ability of the Company to execute its business plan; legislative and regulatory changes; the quality and composition of the loan and investment portfolios; loan demand; deposit flows; changes in accounting principles and guidelines; and other factors disclosed periodically in the Company’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    Because of the risks and uncertainties inherent in forward-looking statements, readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on them, whether included in this press release, the Company’s reports, or made elsewhere from time to time by the Company or on its behalf. These forward-looking statements are made only as of the date of this press release, and the Company assumes no obligation to update any forward-looking statements after the date of this press release.

    Contact:
    Joshua Stevens
    Chief Financial Officer
    812-738-1570

    (1) Reconciliations of the non–U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) measures are set forth at the end of this press release.

     
    FIRST CAPITAL, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    Consolidated Financial Highlights (Unaudited)
                   
      Three Months Ended   Year Ended
      December 31,   December 31,
    OPERATING DATA 2024   2023   2024   2023
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share data)              
                   
    Total interest income $ 13,192     $ 11,639     $ 50,471     $ 43,605  
    Total interest expense   3,784       3,091       14,681       9,017  
    Net interest income   9,408       8,548       35,790       34,588  
    Provision for credit losses   346       308       1,449       1,141  
    Net interest income after provision for credit losses   9,062       8,240       34,341       33,447  
                   
    Total non-interest income   1,934       1,831       7,656       7,632  
    Total non-interest expense   7,047       6,480       27,828       26,028  
    Income before income taxes   3,949       3,591       14,169       15,051  
    Income tax expense   684       478       2,216       2,248  
    Net income   3,265       3,113       11,953       12,803  
    Less net income attributable to the noncontrolling interest   3       3       13       13  
    Net income attributable to First Capital, Inc. $ 3,262     $ 3,110     $ 11,940     $ 12,790  
                   
    Net income per share attributable to              
    First Capital, Inc. common shareholders:              
    Basic $ 0.97     $ 0.93     $ 3.57     $ 3.82  
                   
    Diluted $ 0.97     $ 0.93     $ 3.57     $ 3.82  
                   
    Weighted average common shares outstanding:              
    Basic   3,347,043       3,345,910       3,346,161       3,347,341  
                   
    Diluted   3,347,321       3,345,910       3,346,161       3,347,341  
                   
    OTHER FINANCIAL DATA              
                   
    Cash dividends per share $ 0.29     $ 0.27     $ 1.12     $ 1.08  
    Return on average assets (annualized)   1.10 %     1.09 %     1.02 %     1.12 %
    Return on average equity (annualized)   11.33 %     13.67 %     10.97 %     14.03 %
    Net interest margin   3.26 %     3.03 %     3.14 %     3.08 %
    Net interest margin (tax-equivalent basis) (1)   3.33 %     3.11 %     3.20 %     3.16 %
    Interest rate spread   2.81 %     2.61 %     2.69 %     2.77 %
    Interest rate spread (tax-equivalent basis) (1)   2.88 %     2.69 %     2.76 %     2.85 %
    Net overhead expense as a percentage of average assets (annualized)   2.38 %     2.26 %     2.38 %     2.28 %
                   
      December 31,   December 31,        
    BALANCE SHEET INFORMATION 2024   2023        
                   
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 105,917     $ 38,670          
    Interest-bearing time deposits   2,695       3,920          
    Investment securities   396,243       444,271          
    Gross loans   640,480       622,414          
    Allowance for credit losses   9,281       8,005          
    Earning assets   1,119,944       1,083,898          
    Total assets   1,187,523       1,157,880          
    Deposits   1,066,439       1,025,211          
    Borrowed funds         21,500          
    Stockholders’ equity, net of noncontrolling interest   114,599       105,233          
    Allowance for credit losses as a percent of gross loans   1.45 %     1.29 %        
    Non-performing assets:              
    Nonaccrual loans   4,483       1,751          
    Accruing loans past due 90 days                  
    Foreclosed real estate                  
    Regulatory capital ratios (Bank only):              
    Community Bank Leverage Ratio (2)   10.57 %     9.92 %        
                   
    (1) See reconciliation of GAAP and non-GAAP financial measures for additional information relating to the calculation of this item.
    (2) Effective March 31, 2020, the Bank opted in to the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR) framework. As such, the other regulatory ratios are no longer provided.
                   
     
    FIRST CAPITAL, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    Consolidated Average Balance Sheets (Unaudited)
                     
        For the Year ended December 31,
        2024   2023
            Average
          Average
        Average   Yield/   Average   Yield/
        Balance Interest Cost   Balance Interest Cost
    (Dollars in thousands)                
    Interest earning assets:                
    Loans (1) (2):                
    Taxable   $ 624,193   $ 37,974   6.08 %   $ 582,465   $ 33,153   5.69 %
    Tax-exempt (3)     9,805     377   3.84 %     8,144     249   3.06 %
    Total loans     633,998     38,351   6.05 %     590,609     33,402   5.66 %
                     
    Investment securities:                
    Taxable (4)     333,195     6,918   2.08 %     358,860     5,635   1.57 %
    Tax-exempt (3)     121,947     3,329   2.73 %     147,667     4,236   2.87 %
    Total investment securities     455,142     10,247   2.25 %     506,527     9,871   1.95 %
                     
    Federal funds sold     45,563     2,357   5.17 %     19,512     989   5.07 %
    Other interest-earning assets (5)     6,473     294   4.54 %     7,078     285   4.03 %
    Total interest earning assets     1,141,176     51,249   4.49 %     1,123,726     44,547   3.96 %
                     
    Non-interest earning assets     28,479           20,140      
    Total assets   $ 1,169,655         $ 1,143,866      
                     
    Interest bearing liabilities:                
    Interest-bearing demand deposits   $ 433,495   $ 6,086   1.40 %   $ 447,895   $ 4,652   1.04 %
    Savings accounts     230,353     810   0.35 %     255,126     917   0.36 %
    Time deposits     156,534     6,331   4.04 %     91,423     2,672   2.92 %
    Total deposits     820,382     13,227   1.61 %     794,444     8,241   1.04 %
                     
    FHLB Advances     1,736     99   5.70 %     6,084     340   5.59 %
    BTFP Advances     27,918     1,355   4.85 %     8,632     436   5.05 %
    Total interest bearing liabilities     850,036     14,681   1.73 %     809,160     9,017   1.11 %
                     
    Non-interest bearing liabilities                
    Non-interest bearing deposits     203,699           236,471      
    Other liabilities     7,046           7,056      
    Total liabilities     1,060,781           1,052,687      
    Stockholders’ equity (6)     108,874           91,179      
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 1,169,655         $ 1,143,866      
                     
    Net interest income (tax equivalent basis)   $ 36,568         $ 35,530    
    Less: tax equivalent adjustment       (778 )         (942 )  
    Net interest income     $ 35,790         $ 34,588    
                     
    Interest rate spread       2.69 %       2.77 %
    Interest rate spread (tax equivalent basis) (7)     2.76 %       2.85 %
    Net interest margin       3.14 %       3.08 %
    Net interest margin (tax equivalent basis) (7)     3.20 %       3.16 %
    Ratio of average interest earning assets to average interest bearing liabilities       134.25 %       138.88 %
                     
    (1) Interest income on loans includes fee income of $727,000 and $961,000 for the years ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively.
    (2) Average loan balances include loans held for sale and nonperforming loans.
    (3) Tax-exempt income has been adjusted to a tax-equivalent basis using the federal marginal tax rate of 21%.
    (4) Includes taxable debt and equity securities and FHLB Stock.
    (5) Includes interest-bearing deposits with banks and interest-bearing time deposits.
    (6) Stockholders’ equity attributable to First Capital, Inc.
    (7) Reconciliations of the non-U.S. GAAP measures are set forth at the end of this press release.
                     
     
    FIRST CAPITAL, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    Consolidated Average Balance Sheets (Unaudited)
                     
        For the Three Months ended December 31,
        2024   2023
            Average
          Average
        Average   Yield/   Average   Yield/
        Balance Interest Cost   Balance Interest Cost
    (Dollars in thousands)                
    Interest earning assets:                
    Loans (1) (2):                
    Taxable   $ 627,125   $ 9,748   6.22 %   $ 608,688   $ 9,018   5.93 %
    Tax-exempt (3)     11,339     123   4.34 %     8,079     63   3.12 %
    Total loans     638,464     9,871   6.18 %     616,767     9,081   5.89 %
                     
    Investment securities:                
    Taxable (4)     314,345     1,739   2.21 %     352,377     1,521   1.73 %
    Tax-exempt (3)     121,445     838   2.76 %     139,865     996   2.85 %
    Total investment securities     435,790     2,577   2.37 %     492,242     2,517   2.05 %
                     
    Federal funds sold     72,271     867   4.80 %     13,765     194   5.64 %
    Other interest-earning assets (5)     6,884     78   4.53 %     6,386     69   4.32 %
    Total interest earning assets     1,153,409     13,393   4.64 %     1,129,160     11,861   4.20 %
                     
    Non-interest earning assets     30,640           16,953      
    Total assets   $ 1,184,049         $ 1,146,113      
                     
    Interest bearing liabilities:                
    Interest-bearing demand deposits   $ 437,573   $ 1,535   1.40 %   $ 427,832   $ 1,413   1.32 %
    Savings accounts     224,311     159   0.28 %     239,355     146   0.24 %
    Time deposits     185,112     1,936   4.18 %     122,163     1,104   3.61 %
    Total deposits     846,996     3,630   1.71 %     789,350     2,663   1.35 %
                     
    FHLB Advances                 16,321     232   5.69 %
    BTFP Advances     12,621     154   4.88 %     15,402     196   5.09 %
    Total interest bearing liabilities     859,617     3,784   1.76 %     821,073     3,091   1.51 %
                     
    Non-interest bearing liabilities                
    Non-interest bearing deposits     202,008           227,613      
    Other liabilities     7,294           6,415      
    Total liabilities     209,302           234,028      
    Stockholders’ equity (6)     115,130           91,012      
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 1,184,049         $ 1,146,113      
                     
    Net interest income (tax equivalent basis)   $ 9,609         $ 8,770    
    Less: tax equivalent adjustment       (201 )         (222 )  
    Net interest income     $ 9,408         $ 8,548    
                     
    Interest rate spread       2.81 %       2.61 %
    Interest rate spread (tax-equivalent basis) (7)     2.88 %       2.69 %
    Net interest margin       3.26 %       3.03 %
    Net interest margin (tax-equivalent basis) (7)     3.33 %       3.11 %
    Ratio of average interest earning assets to average interest bearing liabilities       134.18 %       137.52 %
                     
    (1) Interest income on loans includes fee income of $210,000 and $180,000 for the three months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively.
    (2) Average loan balances include loans held for sale and nonperforming loans.
    (3) Tax-exempt income has been adjusted to a tax-equivalent basis using the federal marginal tax rate of 21%.
    (4) Includes taxable debt and equity securities and FHLB Stock.
    (5) Includes interest-bearing deposits with banks and interest-bearing time deposits.
    (6) Stockholders’ equity attributable to First Capital, Inc.
    (7) Reconciliations of the non-U.S. GAAP measures are set forth at the end of this press release.
                     
                   
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP AND NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES (UNAUDITED):
                   
    This presentation contains financial information determined by methods other than in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America (“GAAP”). Management uses these “non-GAAP” measures in its analysis of the Company’s performance. Management believes that these non-GAAP financial measures allow for better comparability with prior periods, as well as with peers in the industry who provide a similar presentation, and provide a further understanding of the Company’s ongoing operations. These disclosures should not be viewed as a substitute for operating results determined in accordance with GAAP, nor are they necessarily comparable to non-GAAP performance measures that may be presented by other companies. The following table summarizes the non-GAAP financial measures derived from amounts reported in the Company’s consolidated financial statements and reconciles those non-GAAP financial measures with the comparable GAAP financial measures.
                                   
      Three Months Ended   Year Ended
      December 31,   December 31,
      2024   2023   2024   2023
    (Dollars in thousands)              
    Net interest income (A) $ 9,408     $ 8,548     $ 35,790     $ 34,588  
    Add: Tax-equivalent adjustment   201       222       778       942  
    Tax-equivalent net interest income (B)   9,609       8,770       36,568       35,530  
    Average interest earning assets (C)   1,153,409       1,129,160       1,141,176       1,123,726  
    Net interest margin (A)/(C)   3.26 %     3.03 %     3.14 %     3.08 %
    Net interest margin (tax-equivalent basis) (B)/(C)   3.33 %     3.11 %     3.20 %     3.16 %
                   
    Total interest income (D) $ 13,192     $ 11,639     $ 50,471     $ 43,605  
    Add: Tax-equivalent adjustment   201       222       778       942  
    Total interest income tax-equivalent basis (E)   13,393       11,861       51,249       44,547  
    Average interest earning assets (F)   1,153,409       1,129,160       1,141,176       1,123,726  
    Average yield on interest earning assets (D)/(F); (G)   4.57 %     4.12 %     4.42 %     3.88 %
    Average yield on interest earning assets tax-equivalent (E)/(F); (H)   4.64 %     4.20 %     4.49 %     3.96 %
    Average cost of interest bearing liabilities (I)   1.76 %     1.51 %     1.73 %     1.11 %
    Interest rate spread (G)-(I)   2.81 %     2.61 %     2.69 %     2.77 %
    Interest rate spread tax-equivalent (H)-(I)   2.88 %     2.69 %     2.76 %     2.85 %
                                   

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Hoeven, Colleagues Reintroduce FARM Act to Add Ag Secretary to CFIUS

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for North Dakota John Hoeven

    01.24.25

    WASHINGTON – Senator John Hoeven joined Senator Tommy Tuberville (R-AL) and Senator John Fetterman (D-PA) in reintroducing the bipartisan, bicameral Foreign Adversary Risk Management (FARM) Act, to permanently add the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), the governmental body that oversees the vetting process of foreign investment and acquisition of American companies. Currently, CFIUS does not directly consider the needs of the agriculture industry when reviewing foreign investment and ownership in domestic businesses.

    “Our foreign adversaries are buying up American farmland and threatening American food security,” said Senator Hoeven. “We must have stronger supervision of foreign investments that affect the American food supply, and this bill will help achieve that by adding the Agriculture Secretary to CFIUS. This is a logical step to protect our essential food infrastructure and ensure North Dakota and our country remains a leader in agriculture.”

    “Over the last decade, we’ve seen a surge of American farmland purchases from our foreign adversaries,” said Senator Tuberville. “These foreign investments are now reaching every piece of the very large puzzle that makes up our agriculture industry, from farming and processing to packaging and shipping. Food security is national security, and we cannot allow our adversaries to have a foot in the door to our critical supply chains. We must prioritize oversight of foreign investment in our food supply chains, especially from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. This starts with giving the agriculture community a permanent seat at the table on CFIUS. As Alabama’s voice on the Senate Ag Committee, I will keep fighting to secure our ag supply chains so that our agriculture community can continue to put food on the table for American families.” 

    “Pennsylvania is home to about 50,000 farms and the farmers who power them already face enough challenges to stay competitive. They shouldn’t also have to compete with foreign adversaries buying up American farmland,” said Senator Fetterman. “America’s farms are critical infrastructure, and CFIUS exists to protect our critical infrastructure from foreign threats. So, adding the Secretary of Agriculture is just plain common sense. I’ve said it before, and I’ll say it again: foreign adversaries have no business owning American farmland. This bill makes that clear and I’m proud to partner with my colleague to get it done.”

      Joining Hoeven, Tuberville and Fetterman in reintroducing this legislation are Senators Roger Marshall (R-KS), Rick Scott (R-FL), Eric Schmitt (R-MO), Kevin Cramer (R-ND), Katie Britt (R-AL), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Deb Fischer (R-NE), Steve Daines (R-MT), Cynthia Lummis (R-WY), and Tim Sheehy (R-MT).

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Statement by the Secretary-General – on detention of United Nations personnel in Yemen [scroll down for Arabic version]

    Source: United Nations

    I strongly condemn the arbitrary detention by the Houthi de facto authorities on 23 January of seven additional United Nations personnel in areas under their control.

    I demand the immediate and unconditional release of those detained on Thursday, as well as the personnel from the United Nations, international and national non-governmental organizations, civil society and diplomatic missions arbitrarily detained since June 2024 and those held since 2021 and 2023. Their continued arbitrary detention is unacceptable.

    The personnel of the UN and its partners must not be targeted, arrested or detained while carrying out their duties for the UN for the benefit of the people they serve. The safety and security of UN personnel and property must be guaranteed.

    The continued targeting of UN personnel and its partners negatively impacts our ability to assist millions of people in need in Yemen. The Houthis must deliver on their previous commitments and act in the best interests of the Yemeni people and the overall efforts to achieve peace in Yemen.

    The United Nations will continue to work through all possible channels to secure the safe and immediate release of those arbitrarily detained. I welcome the collective support of international partners, NGOs and all those working to support the people of Yemen in these efforts.

    *****

     بيان صادر عن الأمين العام – حول احتجاز موظفي الأمم المتحدة في اليمن

    إنني أُدين بشدة الاحتجاز التعسفي الذي قامت به سلطات الأمر الواقع الحوثية في 23 كانون الثاني/يناير لسبعة موظفين إضافيين من الأمم المتحدةفي المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرتها.

    أُطالب بالإفراج الفوري وغير المشروط عن الذين تم احتجازهم يوم الخميس، وكذلك عن موظفي الأمم المتحدة والمنظمات غير الحكومية الدوليةوالوطنية والمجتمع المدني والبعثات الدبلوماسية المحتجزين تعسفيًا منذ حزيران/يونيو 2024، بالإضافة إلى موظفي الأمم المتحدة المحتجزين منذعامي 2021 و2023. إن استمرار احتجازهم التعسفي أمر غير مقبول. 

    لا ينبغي استهداف موظفي الأمم المتحدة وشركائها أو اعتقالهم أو احتجازهم أثناء قيامهم بواجباتهم التابعة للأمم المتحدة لصالح الناس الذين يستفيدونمن خدماتهم. يلزم ضمان سلامة وأمن موظفي الأمم المتحدة وممتلكاتها.

    يؤثر الاستهداف المستمر لموظفي الأمم المتحدة وشركائها سلبا على قدرتنا على مساعدة ملايين الأشخاص المحتاجين في اليمن. أدعو الحوثيين إلىوقف عرقلة الجهود الإنسانية التي تبذلها الأمم المتحدة وشركاؤها لمساعدة الملايين من ذوي الاحتياج في اليمن. يجب على الحوثيين الوفاءبالتزاماتهم السابقة والتصرف بما يحقق مصلحة الناس في اليمن ومجمل الجهود المبذولة لتحقيق السلام في اليمن.

    ستواصل الأمم المتحدة العمل عبر جميع القنوات الممكنة لكفالة الإفراج الآمن والفوري عن المحتجزين تعسفا. اُقدّر الدعم الجماعي من الشركاءالدوليين والمنظمات غير الحكومية وجميع من يعملون من أجل دعم الناس في اليمن في هذه الجهود.

    نيويورك، 24 كانون الثاني/يناير 2025

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Statement by the Secretary-General – on detention of United Nations personnel in Yemen [scroll down for Arabic version]

    Source: United Nations – English

    strongly condemn the arbitrary detention by the Houthi de facto authorities on 23 January of seven additional United Nations personnel in areas under their control.

    I demand the immediate and unconditional release of those detained on Thursday, as well as the personnel from the United Nations, international and national non-governmental organizations, civil society and diplomatic missions arbitrarily detained since June 2024 and those held since 2021 and 2023. Their continued arbitrary detention is unacceptable.

    The personnel of the UN and its partners must not be targeted, arrested or detained while carrying out their duties for the UN for the benefit of the people they serve. The safety and security of UN personnel and property must be guaranteed.

    The continued targeting of UN personnel and its partners negatively impacts our ability to assist millions of people in need in Yemen. The Houthis must deliver on their previous commitments and act in the best interests of the Yemeni people and the overall efforts to achieve peace in Yemen.

    The United Nations will continue to work through all possible channels to secure the safe and immediate release of those arbitrarily detained. I welcome the collective support of international partners, NGOs and all those working to support the people of Yemen in these efforts.

    *****

     بيان صادر عن الأمين العام – حول احتجاز موظفي الأمم المتحدة في اليمن

    إنني أُدين بشدة الاحتجاز التعسفي الذي قامت به سلطات الأمر الواقع الحوثية في 23 كانون الثاني/يناير لسبعة موظفين إضافيين من الأمم المتحدةفي المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرتها.

    أُطالب بالإفراج الفوري وغير المشروط عن الذين تم احتجازهم يوم الخميس، وكذلك عن موظفي الأمم المتحدة والمنظمات غير الحكومية الدوليةوالوطنية والمجتمع المدني والبعثات الدبلوماسية المحتجزين تعسفيًا منذ حزيران/يونيو 2024، بالإضافة إلى موظفي الأمم المتحدة المحتجزين منذعامي 2021 و2023. إن استمرار احتجازهم التعسفي أمر غير مقبول. 

    لا ينبغي استهداف موظفي الأمم المتحدة وشركائها أو اعتقالهم أو احتجازهم أثناء قيامهم بواجباتهم التابعة للأمم المتحدة لصالح الناس الذين يستفيدونمن خدماتهم. يلزم ضمان سلامة وأمن موظفي الأمم المتحدة وممتلكاتها.

    يؤثر الاستهداف المستمر لموظفي الأمم المتحدة وشركائها سلبا على قدرتنا على مساعدة ملايين الأشخاص المحتاجين في اليمن. أدعو الحوثيين إلىوقف عرقلة الجهود الإنسانية التي تبذلها الأمم المتحدة وشركاؤها لمساعدة الملايين من ذوي الاحتياج في اليمن. يجب على الحوثيين الوفاءبالتزاماتهم السابقة والتصرف بما يحقق مصلحة الناس في اليمن ومجمل الجهود المبذولة لتحقيق السلام في اليمن.

    ستواصل الأمم المتحدة العمل عبر جميع القنوات الممكنة لكفالة الإفراج الآمن والفوري عن المحتجزين تعسفا. اُقدّر الدعم الجماعي من الشركاءالدوليين والمنظمات غير الحكومية وجميع من يعملون من أجل دعم الناس في اليمن في هذه الجهود.

    نيويورك، 24 كانون الثاني/يناير 2025

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senators Marshall, Tuberville, and Colleagues Introduce the FARM Act

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Kansas Roger Marshall

    Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senators Roger Marshall, M.D., Tommy Tuberville (R-AL), Rick Scott (R-FL), Eric Schmitt (R-MO), Kevin Cramer (R-ND), John Fetterman (D-PA), Katie Britt (R-AL), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Deb Fischer (R-NE), Steve Daines (R-MT), John Hoeven (R-ND), Cynthia Lummis (R-WY), and Tim Sheehy (R-MT) introduced the bipartisan, bicameral Foreign Adversary Risk Management (FARM) Act. 
    The FARM Act will permanently add the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture to the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS), the governmental body that oversees the vetting process of foreign investment and acquisition of American companies, a move to prevent improper foreign interference and disruption to the U.S. agriculture industry.
    “Food Security is National Security, it’s high time that we start recognizing this before it is too late,” said Senator Marshall. “The Secretary of Agriculture needs a seat at the table to help the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States vet foreign agricultural investments like land. This committee currently does not directly consider the needs of the agriculture industry, the FARM Act changes that.”
    “Over the last decade, we’ve seen a surge of American farmland purchases from our foreign adversaries,” said Senator Tuberville. “These foreign investments are now reaching every piece of the very large puzzle that makes up our agriculture industry, from farming and processing to packaging and shipping. Food security is national security, and we cannot allow our adversaries to have a foot in the door to our critical supply chains. We must prioritize oversight of foreign investment in our food supply chains, especially from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. This starts with giving the agriculture community a permanent seat at the table on CFIUS. As Alabama’s voice on the Senate Ag Committee, I will keep fighting to secure our ag supply chains so that our agriculture community can continue to put food on the table for American families.”
    “Pennsylvania is home to about 50,000 farms and the farmers who power them already face enough challenges to stay competitive. They shouldn’t also have to compete with foreign adversaries buying up American farmland,” said Senator John Fetterman. “America’s farms are critical infrastructure, and CFIUS exists to protect our critical infrastructure from foreign threats. So, adding the Secretary of Agriculture is just plain common sense. I’ve said it before, and I’ll say it again: foreign adversaries have no business owning American farmland. This bill makes that clear and I’m proud to partner with my colleague to get it done.”
    Two previous AG secretaries under Democrat administrations have expressed support for making the Secretary of Agriculture a permanent member of CFIUS. U.S. Representative Ronny Jackson (R-TX-13) reintroduced the bipartisan, companion legislation in the House of Representatives. 
    “America’s agricultural industry is no exception to the increasing national security threats our country faces,” said Rep. Jackson. “Biden’s failed leadership allowed unchecked foreign influence, particularly from the Chinese Communist Party, to interfere with and attempt to control our food supply chain. Representing Texas’s top agricultural-producing district, I am committed to ensuring our nation’s food production remains free from foreign manipulation. This is why I am proud to reintroduce the FARM Act, putting America first and ensuring that our agricultural industry remains robust, secure, and free from foreign interference. Thank you to Senator Tuberville for leading companion legislation in the Senate, and we hope this bipartisan legislation, which is crucial to our food security, will move forward quickly to President Trump’s desk.” 
    Read the bill HERE.
    BACKGROUND:
    Over the past few years, the United States has experienced a rapid increase in foreign investment in the agricultural sector, particularly from China. Growing foreign investment in agriculture and other essential industries, like health care and energy, threaten our country’s national security. As Alabama’s voice on the Senate AG Committee, Senator Tuberville has been sounding the alarm about foreign ownership of American farmland and other elements of our food supply chain.
    According to USDA data from December 2023, foreign investors own approximately 45 million acres of U.S. agricultural land. This represents an increase of over 1.5 million acres in one calendar year. Foreign ownership of U.S. agricultural land increased modestly from 2012 to 2017 at an average increase of 0.6 million acres per year. However, since 2017, this number skyrocketed to an annual average of 2.6 million acres annually. Additionally, between 2010 and 2021, entities or individuals from China increased their ownership of U.S. agricultural land more than twentyfold, from 13,720 acres to 383,935 acres. Alabama has the fourth-highest amount of foreign-owned agricultural land in the United States, with 2.2 million acres, most of which is forestland.
    CFIUS is authorized to oversee and review foreign investment and ownership in domestic businesses as it relates to national security. Currently, the Committee does not directly consider the needs of the agriculture industry when reviewing foreign investment and ownership in domestic businesses. 
    Specifically, the FARM Act would:
    add the Secretary of Agriculture as a member to CFIUS;
    protect the U.S. agriculture industry from foreign control through transactions, mergers, acquisitions, or agreements; designate agricultural supply chains as critical infrastructure and critical technologies,
    and require a report to Congress on current and potential foreign investments in the U.S. agricultural industry from USDA and the Government Accountability Office (GAO)

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Strongly Condemning Houthi De Facto Authorities’ Arbitrary Detention of United Nations Personnel in Yemen, Secretary-General Demands Their Immediate, Unconditional Release

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    The following statement by UN Secretary-General António Guterres was issued today:

    I strongly condemn the arbitrary detention by the Houthi de facto authorities on 23 January of seven additional United Nations personnel in areas under their control.

    I demand the immediate and unconditional release of those detained on Thursday, as well as the personnel from the United Nations, international and national non-governmental organizations, civil society and diplomatic missions arbitrarily detained since June 2024 and those held since 2021 and 2023.  Their continued arbitrary detention is unacceptable.

    The personnel of the UN and its partners must not be targeted, arrested or detained while carrying out their duties for the UN for the benefit of the people they serve.  The safety and security of UN personnel and property must be guaranteed.

    The continued targeting of UN personnel and its partners negatively impacts our ability to assist millions of people in need in Yemen.  The Houthis must deliver on their previous commitments and act in the best interests of the Yemeni people and the overall efforts to achieve peace in Yemen.

    The United Nations will continue to work through all possible channels to secure the safe and immediate release of those arbitrarily detained.  I welcome the collective support of international partners, non-governmental organizations and all those working to support the people of Yemen in these efforts.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Career Offender from Fort Dodge Sentenced to Federal Prison for 16 Years

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    A man who possessed methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it was sentenced on January 23, 2025, in federal court in Sioux City.

    Jordan Taylor, 35, from Fort Dodge, Iowa, pled guilty on April 11, 2024, to possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of pure methamphetamine.  Taylor had been convicted of two prior drug trafficking offenses which made him a career offender.  

    Evidence at the plea and sentencing hearings showed that on multiple occasions in August 2023, Taylor distributed methamphetamine to an individual working with law enforcement.  In September 2023, law enforcement executed a search warrant at a hotel in Fort Dodge where Taylor was staying.  During the execution of the search warrant on the room, law enforcement found Taylor in the bathroom attempting to flush methamphetamine down the toilet.  In the room, law enforcement seized about one pound of pure methamphetamine, along with psilocin mushrooms, pharmaceutical tablets, over $1,100 in cash, and drug distribution paraphernalia.  Further investigation showed Taylor was responsible for the possession and distribution of approximately three pounds of methamphetamine.        

    Sentencing was held before United States District Court Judge Leonard T. Strand.  Taylor was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment and must serve a five-year term of supervised release following imprisonment.  There is no parole in the federal system.  Taylor remains in U.S. Marshals custody until he can be transported to a federal prison. 

    The case was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Patrick T. Greenwood and was investigated by the Iowa Division of Narcotics Enforcement, Iowa DCI Laboratory, Webster County Sheriff’s Office, Iowa State Patrol, and the Fort Dodge Police Department.  

    Court file information at https://ecf.iand.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl.  

    The case file number is 23-3041.  

    Follow us on X @USAO_NDIA.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Minutes – Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg – Final edition

    Source: European Parliament

    PV-10-2025-01-23

    EN

    EN

    iPlPv_Sit

    Minutes
    Thursday, 23 January 2025 – Strasbourg

     Abbreviations and symbols

    + adopted
    rejected
    lapsed
    W withdrawn
    RCV roll-call votes
    EV electronic vote
    SEC secret ballot
    split split vote
    sep separate vote
    am amendment
    CA compromise amendment
    CP corresponding part
    D deleting amendment
    = identical amendments
    § paragraph

    IN THE CHAIR: Younous OMARJEE
    Vice-President

    1. Opening of the sitting

    The sitting opened at 09:01.


    2. Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (debate)

    Commission statement: Combating Desertification: 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) of the United Nations Convention (2025/3018(RSP))

    Jessika Roswall (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Carmen Crespo Díaz, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marta Temido, on behalf of the S&D Group, Julien Leonardelli, on behalf of the PfE Group, Francesco Ventola, on behalf of the ECR Group, Martin Hojsík, on behalf of the Renew Group, Pär Holmgren, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Catarina Martins, on behalf of The Left Group, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, on behalf of the ESN Group, Christine Schneider, Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Laurence Trochu, Billy Kelleher, Kai Tegethoff, João Oliveira, Daniel Buda, Maria Grapini, Mathilde Androuët, Marie Toussaint, Valentina Palmisano, Salvatore De Meo, Thomas Bajada, France Jamet, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Sebastian Everding, who also answered a blue-card question from Sander Smit, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, César Luena, who also answered a blue-card question from Carmen Crespo Díaz, Jutta Paulus, who also answered a blue-card question from Maria Grapini, Nikolas Farantouris, Borja Giménez Larraz, Camilla Laureti, Marco Falcone, who also answered a blue-card question from Kai Tegethoff, Leire Pajín, Manuela Ripa, Jean-Marc Germain, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Stefano Bonaccini and Ştefan Muşoiu.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Grzegorz Braun, Hélder Sousa Silva and Seán Kelly.

    The following spoke: Jessika Roswall.

    The debate closed.

    (The sitting was suspended for a few moments.)


    IN THE CHAIR: Christel SCHALDEMOSE
    Vice-President

    3. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 10:29.


    4. Cryptocurrencies need for global standards (debate)

    Commission statement: Cryptocurrencies – need for global standards (2025/2514(RSP))

    Magnus Brunner (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Markus Ferber, on behalf of the PPE Group, Jonás Fernández, on behalf of the S&D Group, Pierre Pimpie, on behalf of the PfE Group, Marlena Maląg, on behalf of the ECR Group, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin, on behalf of the Renew Group, Rasmus Andresen, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group (the President reminded the speaker of the rules on conduct), Pasquale Tridico, on behalf of The Left Group, René Aust, on behalf of the ESN Group, Regina Doherty, Eero Heinäluoma, Aleksandar Nikolic, Guillaume Peltier, Gilles Boyer, Damian Boeselager, Catarina Martins, Stanislav Stoyanov, Kateřina Konečná, Kinga Kollár, Aurore Lalucq, Mathilde Androuët, Adrian-George Axinia, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Giuseppe Antoci, Marcin Sypniewski, Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus, Lídia Pereira (the President provided some clarifications on the blue-card procedure), Nikos Papandreou, who also answered a blue-card question from Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Angéline Furet, Ondřej Krutílek, Michalis Hadjipantela, Adnan Dibrani, Diego Solier, Andrey Kovatchev, Waldemar Buda, Caterina Chinnici and Seán Kelly.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Niels Geuking, Maria Grapini, Alexander Jungbluth, Grzegorz Braun, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis and Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă.

    The following spoke: Magnus Brunner.

    The debate closed.

    (The sitting was suspended at 11:48.)


    IN THE CHAIR: Sabine VERHEYEN
    Vice-President

    5. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 11:59.


    6. Composition of new committees

    Following the creation of the standing committees on security and defence and on public health, and the creation of the special committees on the European Democracy Shield and on the housing crisis in the European Union, the President had received nominations for membership of these new standing and special committees from the political groups and the non-attached Members, in accordance with Rules 212 and 213.

    The decisions took effect as of that day.

    The lists of Members nominated to form these committees are annexed to these minutes (minutes of 23.1.2025 Annex 1).


    7. Composition of committees and delegations

    The Renew Group and non-attached Members had notified the President of the following decisions changing the composition of committees:

    – ITRE Committee: Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez to replace Barry Andrews, Elena Yoncheva

    – REGI Committee: Elsi Katainen

    – LIBE Committee: Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle

    – PETI Committee: Cynthia Ní Mhurchú and Eugen Tomac were no longer members, Taner Kabilov

    The decisions took effect as of that day.

    The following spoke: Jordan Bardella, Carlo Fidanza and Patryk Jaki on points of order (the President cut off the speakers as their remarks did not constitute points of order).


    8. Voting time

    For detailed results of the votes, see also ‘Results of votes’ and ‘Results of roll-call votes’.




    8.2. Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (vote)

    Motions for resolutions RC-B10-0066/2025 (minutes of 23.1.2025, item I), B10-0063/2025, B10-0066/2025, B10-0067/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025 and B10-0086/2025 (minutes of 22.1.2025, item 1) (2025/2511(RSP))

    The debate had taken place on 22 January 2025 (minutes of 22.1.2025, item 16.2).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0004)

    (Motions for resolutions B10-0063/2025 and B10-0067/2025 fell.)

    Detailed voting results








    9. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 15:00.


    10. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

    The minutes of the previous sitting were approved.


    11. Major interpellations (debate)

    Major interpellation for written answer with debate (G-001002/2024) submitted by Charlie Weimers, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Kristoffer Storm, Jaak Madison, Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Alexandr Vondra, Patryk Jaki, Johan Van Overtveldt, Roberts Zīle, Emmanouil Fragkos, Georgiana Teodorescu, Geadis Geadi, Marion Maréchal, Ivaylo Valchev, Kosma Złotowski, Mariusz Kamiński, Maciej Wąsik, Dick Erixon, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Beatrice Timgren, Nicolas Bay, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Ondřej Krutílek, Guillaume Peltier, Michał Dworczyk, Laurence Trochu, Şerban-Dimitrie Sturdza, Tobiasz Bocheński, Gheorghe Piperea, on behalf of the ECR Group, to the Commission: EU funding of physical border protection structures such as walls, fences or other barriers at the external border (B10-0001/2025)

    Jaak Madison moved the major interpellation.

    Magnus Brunner (Member of the Commission) answered the major interpellation.

    The following spoke: Lena Düpont, on behalf of the PPE Group, Ana Catarina Mendes, on behalf of the S&D Group, András László, on behalf of the PfE Group, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, on behalf of the ECR Group, Fabienne Keller, on behalf of the Renew Group, Mélissa Camara, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Christine Anderson, on behalf of the ESN Group, Fredis Beleris, Murielle Laurent, France Jamet and Riho Terras.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Kinga Kollár, Bogdan Rzońca and Siegbert Frank Droese.

    The following spoke: Magnus Brunner.

    The debate closed.


    12. Explanations of vote

    Written explanations of vote

    Explanations of vote submitted in writing under Rule 201 appear on the Members’ pages on Parliament’s website.


    13. Approval of the minutes of the sitting and forwarding of texts adopted

    In accordance with Rule 208(3), the minutes of the sitting would be put to the House for approval at the beginning of the afternoon of the sitting on Monday, 10 February 2025.

    With Parliament’s agreement, the texts adopted during the part-session would be forwarded to their respective addressees without delay.


    14. Dates of forthcoming sittings

    The next sitting would be held on 29 January 2025.


    15. Closure of the sitting

    The sitting closed at 15:41.


    16. Adjournment of the session

    The session of the European Parliament was adjourned.

    Alessandro Chiocchetti

    Roberta Metsola

    Secretary-General

    President


    LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVING AS A BASIS FOR THE DEBATES AND DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENT


    I. Motions for resolutions tabled

    Case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

    on the case of Jean-Jacques Wondo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2025/2510(RSP)) (RC-B10-0069/2025)
    (replacing motions for resolutions B10-0069/2025, B10-0072/2025, B10-0078/2025, B10-0081/2025 and B10-0084/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, Wouter Beke, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Michael Gahler, Luděk Niedermayer, Christophe Gomart, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Danuše Nerudová, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Jessica Polfjärd, Tomáš Zdechovský, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Elio Di Rupo
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Waldemar Tomaszewski, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Sebastian Tynkkynen
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Bernard Guetta, Petras Auštrevičius, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Catarina Vieira
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    Systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages

    Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

    on the systematic repression of human rights in Iran, notably the cases of Pakhshan Azizi and Wrisha Moradi, and the taking of EU citizens as hostages (2025/2511(RSP)) (RC-B10-0066/2025)
    (replacing motions for resolutions B10-0066/2025, B10-0073/2025, B10-0082/2025, B10-0085/2025 and B10-0086/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, Tomáš Zdechovský, Loucas Fourlas, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, David McAllister, Michael Gahler, Željana Zovko, Christophe Gomart, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Javier Zarzalejos, Luděk Niedermayer, Wouter Beke, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Jessica Polfjärd, Danuše Nerudová, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Chloé Ridel, Daniel Attard, Alessandra Moretti
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Rihards Kols, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Carlo Fidanza, Reinis Pozņaks, Aurelijus Veryga, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alberico Gambino, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Dick Erixon, Beatrice Timgren, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Alexandr Vondra, Marion Maréchal, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Carlo Ciccioli, Charlie Weimers
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Petras Auštrevičius, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Bart Groothuis, Bernard Guetta, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Hannah Neumann
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Per Clausen, Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt

    Case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria

    Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

    on the case of Boualem Sansal in Algeria (2025/2512(RSP)) (RC-B10-0087/2025)
    (replacing motions for resolutions B10-0087/2025, B10-0089/2025, B10-0091/2025, B10-0092/2025 and B10-0093/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, Christophe Gomart, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Michael Gahler, Luděk Niedermayer, Wouter Beke, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Jessica Polfjärd, Tomáš Zdechovský, Andrey Kovatchev, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Marta Temido
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Alexandr Vondra, Marion Maréchal, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Małgorzata Gosiewska
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Helmut Brandstätter, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Bernard Guetta, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Leoluca Orlando
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine

    Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 136(2) to wind up the debate:

    on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0074/2025)
    Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Thijs Reuten, Raphaël Glucksmann
    on behalf of the S&D Group

    on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0075/2025)
    Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Siegfried Mureşan, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Mika Aaltola, Krzysztof Brejza, Daniel Caspary, Sandra Kalniete, Seán Kelly, Ondřej Kolář, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Miriam Lexmann, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Ana Miguel Pedro, Paulius Saudargas, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Pekka Toveri, Inese Vaidere, Milan Zver
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0076/2025)
    Sergey Lagodinsky, Hannah Neumann, Markéta Gregorová, Mārtiņš Staķis, Maria Ohisalo, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Villy Søvndal, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Reinier Van Lanschot
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0077/2025)
    Bernard Guetta, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Olivier Chastel, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Michał Kobosko, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (B10-0079/2025)
    Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Rihards Kols, Ondřej Krutílek, Jaak Madison, Ivaylo Valchev, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Veronika Vrecionová, Roberts Zīle, Aurelijus Veryga, Maciej Wąsik, Michał Dworczyk, Cristian Terheş, Reinis Pozņaks, Alexandr Vondra
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 136(2) and (4):

    on Russia’s disinformation and historical falsification to justify its war of aggression against Ukraine (2024/2988(RSP)) (RC-B10-0074/2025)
    (replacing motions for resolutions B10-0074/2025, B10-0075/2025, B10-0076/2025, B10-0077/2025 and B10-0079/2025)
    Rasa Juknevičienė, Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Siegfried Mureşan, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Mika Aaltola, Krzysztof Brejza, Daniel Caspary, Sandra Kalniete, Seán Kelly, Ondřej Kolář, Łukasz Kohut, Andrey Kovatchev, Miriam Lexmann, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Ana Miguel Pedro, Paulius Saudargas, Davor Ivo Stier, Michał Szczerba, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Matej Tonin, Pekka Toveri, Inese Vaidere, Milan Zver
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Thijs Reuten, Raphaël Glucksmann
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Rihards Kols, Reinis Pozņaks, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Roberts Zīle, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Jaak Madison, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Cristian Terheş, Maciej Wąsik, Ivaylo Valchev, Aurelijus Veryga, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Bernard Guetta, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Karin Karlsbro, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Michał Kobosko, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Sophie Wilmès, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Sergey Lagodinsky
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    Situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025

    Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 136(2) to wind up the debate:

    on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0064/2025)
    Gabriel Mato, Sebastião Bugalho, Davor Ivo Stier
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0068/2025)
    Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Hermann Tertsch, Jorge Martín Frías, Silvia Sardone, Nikola Bartůšek, Susanna Ceccardi, Roberto Vannacci, António Tânger Corrêa, Enikő Győri
    on behalf of the PfE Group

    on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0071/2025)
    Leire Pajín
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Catarina Vieira, Ville Niinistö, Nicolae Ştefănuță
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0080/2025)
    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Valérie Devaux, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Ana Vasconcelos, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (B10-0083/2025)
    Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Alberico Gambino, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Diego Solier, Rihards Kols, Ondřej Krutílek, Jaak Madison, Nora Junco García, Şerban-Dimitrie Sturdza, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Veronika Vrecionová, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Alexandr Vondra
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 150(5) and Rule 136(4):

    on the situation in Venezuela following the usurpation of the presidency on 10 January 2025 (2025/2519(RSP)) (RC-B10-0064/2025)
    (replacing motions for resolutions B10-0064/2025, B10-0080/2025 and B10-0083/2025)
    Gabriel Mato, Sebastião Bugalho, Davor Ivo Stier, Francisco José Millán Mon
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Carlo Fidanza, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński, Ivaylo Valchev, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Rihards Kols, Alexandr Vondra, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Alberico Gambino, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Ana Vasconcelos, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group


    II. Decisions to draw up own-initiative reports

    Decisions to draw up own-initiative reports (Rule 55)

    (Following the Conference of Presidents’ decision of 15 January 2025)

    AFCO Committee

    – Reform of the European Electoral Act – hurdles to ratification and implementation in the Member States (2025/2028(INI))

    – Institutional aspects of the Report on the future of European Competitiveness (Draghi Report) (2025/2013(INI))

    – Stock-taking of the European elections 2024 (2025/2012(INI))

    AFET Committee

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Ukraine (2025/2026(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova (2025/2025(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia (2025/2024(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye (2025/2023(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia (2025/2022(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on North Macedonia (2025/2021(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro (2025/2020(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Kosovo (2025/2019(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina (2025/2018(INI))

    – 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania (2025/2017(INI))

    DEVE Committee

    – Financing for development – ahead of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville (2025/2004(INI))

    – Implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals in view of the 2025 High-Level Political Forum (2025/2014(INI))
    (opinion: FEMM)

    IMCO Committee

    – Implementation and streamlining of EU internal market rules to strengthen the single market (2025/2009(INI))

    ITRE Committee

    – Future of the EU biotechnology and biomanufacturing sector: leveraging research, boosting innovation and enhancing competitiveness (2025/2008(INI))

    – European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure (2025/2007(INI))

    – Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system (2025/2006(INI))

    JURI Committee

    – Monitoring the application of European Union law in 2023 and 2024 (2025/2016(INI))
    (opinion: PETI)

    – European Union regulatory fitness and subsidiarity and proportionality – report on Better Law-Making covering 2023 and 2024 (2025/2015(INI))

    PECH Committee

    – Fisheries management approaches for safeguarding sensitive species, tackling invasive species and benefiting local economies (2025/2011(INI))

    – The role of social, economic and environmental standards in safeguarding fair competition for all aquatic food products and improving food security (2025/2010(INI))

    PETI Committee

    – Deliberations of the Committee on Petitions in 2023 (2025/2027(INI))

    (Following the Conference of Presidents’ decision of 19 December 2024)

    – The multiannual plan for the Baltic Sea and ways forward (2024/2127(INI))

    – The impact of the implementation of the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive 2014/89/EU on fisheries in selected fishing areas and sea basins (2024/2126(INI))

    – Decarbonisation and modernisation of EU fisheries, and the development and deployment of fishing gear (2024/2123(INI))

    AGRI Committee

    – The position of farmers in the agri-food value chain (2024/2122(INI))

    ECON Committee

    – The role of simple tax rules and tax fragmentation in European competitiveness (2024/2118(INI))

    – A coherent tax framework for the EU’s financial sector (2024/2117(INI))

    – Facilitating the financing of investments and reforms to boost European competitiveness and creating a Capital Markets Union (Draghi Report) (2024/2116(INI))
    (opinion: BUDG)

    FEMM Committee

    – Gender Equality Strategy 2025 (2024/2125(INI))
    (opinion: LIBE)

    – Women’s entrepreneurship in rural and island areas and outermost regions (2024/2124(INI))
    (opinion: AGRI)

    IMCO Committee

    – A new legislative framework for products that is fit for the digital and sustainable transition (2024/2119(INI))

    REGI Committee

    – The role of cohesion policy in supporting the just transition (2024/2121(INI))
    (opinion: EMPL)

    – The role of cohesion policy investment in resolving the current housing crisis (2024/2120(INI))
    (opinion: EMPL)


    III. Consent procedure

    Reports with a motion for a non-legislative resolution (consent procedure) (Rule 107(5))

    (Following notification by the Conference of Committee Chairs on 15 January 2025)

    AFET Committee

    – Interim report in view of the consent procedure on the Agreement establishing an association between the EU and the Principality of Andorra and the Republic of San Marino (2024/0101R(NLE)2024/0101(NLE))
    (opinion: ECON, IMCO)


    IV. Petitions

    Petitions Nos 1427-24 to 1518-24 had been entered in the register on 17 January 2025 and had been forwarded to the committee responsible, in accordance with Rule 232(9) and (10).

    The President had, on 17 January 2025, forwarded to the committee responsible, in accordance with Rule 232(15), petitions addressed to the European Parliament by natural or legal persons who were not citizens of the European Union and who did not reside, or have their registered office, in a Member State.


    V. Documents received

    The following documents had been received from Members:

    – Mathilde Androuët, Gerolf Annemans, Jordan Bardella, Nikola Bartůšek, Rachel Blom, Barbara Bonte, Paolo Borchia, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Irmhild Boßdorf, Jaroslav Bžoch, Klara Dostalova, Marieke Ehlers, Dick Erixon, Tomasz Froelich, Petras Gražulis, Branko Grims, Catherine Griset, Enikő Győri, Roman Haider, Fernand Kartheiser, Ondřej Knotek, Vilis Krištopans, Julien Leonardelli, Jorge Martín Frías, Milan Mazurek, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Jana Nagyová, Hans Neuhoff, Julie Rechagneux, Dominik Tarczyński, Hermann Tertsch, Isabella Tovaglieri, António Tânger Corrêa, Milan Uhrík, Tom Vandendriessche, Harald Vilimsky, Ewa Zajączkowska-Hernik and Auke Zijlstra. Motion for a resolution on Dismantling Overregulation and Government Encroachment: reclaiming competitiveness and innovation in the European Union (B10-0214/2024)
    referred to committee responsible: JURI
    opinion: ITRE

    – Pekka Toveri and Sebastian Tynkkynen. Motion for a resolution on restricting the ability of passenger and cargo traffic to enter European Union airspace from Russia (B10-0220/2024)
    referred to committee responsible: TRAN
    opinion: AFET

    – Matthieu Valet. Motion for a resolution on EU policy on Syrian refugees following the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime (B10-0237/2024)
    referred to committee responsible: LIBE

    – Christine Anderson, Anja Arndt, René Aust, Arno Bausemer, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, Markus Buchheit, Petr Bystron, Elisabeth Dieringer, Siegbert Frank Droese, Marc Jongen, Mary Khan, Sarah Knafo, Maximilian Krah and Jaroslava Pokorná Jermanová. Motion for a resolution on financial and organisational support for Member States to repatriate Syrian nationals (B10-0238/2024)
    referred to committee responsible: LIBE


    ATTENDANCE REGISTER

    Present:

    Aaltola Mika, Abadía Jover Maravillas, Adamowicz Magdalena, Aftias Georgios, Agirregoitia Martínez Oihane, Agius Peter, Agius Saliba Alex, Allione Grégory, Al-Sahlani Abir, Anadiotis Nikolaos, Anderson Christine, Andersson Li, Andresen Rasmus, Andrews Barry, Andriukaitis Vytenis Povilas, Androuët Mathilde, Angel Marc, Annemans Gerolf, Antoci Giuseppe, Arias Echeverría Pablo, Arimont Pascal, Arłukowicz Bartosz, Arnaoutoglou Sakis, Arndt Anja, Arvanitis Konstantinos, Asens Llodrà Jaume, Assis Francisco, Attard Daniel, Aubry Manon, Auštrevičius Petras, Axinia Adrian-George, Azmani Malik, Bajada Thomas, Baljeu Jeannette, Ballarín Cereza Laura, Bardella Jordan, Barley Katarina, Barna Dan, Barrena Arza Pernando, Bartulica Stephen Nikola, Bartůšek Nikola, Bausemer Arno, Bay Nicolas, Bay Christophe, Beke Wouter, Beleris Fredis, Bellamy François-Xavier, Benea Adrian-Dragoş, Benifei Brando, Benjumea Benjumea Isabel, Beňová Monika, Berendsen Tom, Berger Stefan, Berg Sibylle, Berlato Sergio, Bernhuber Alexander, Biedroń Robert, Bielan Adam, Bischoff Gabriele, Blaha Ľuboš, Blinkevičiūtė Vilija, Blom Rachel, Bloss Michael, Bocheński Tobiasz, Boeselager Damian, Bogdan Ioan-Rareş, Bonaccini Stefano, Bonte Barbara, Borchia Paolo, Borrás Pabón Mireia, Borvendég Zsuzsanna, Borzan Biljana, Bosanac Gordan, Bosse Stine, Botenga Marc, Boyer Gilles, Boylan Lynn, Brandstätter Helmut, Brasier-Clain Marie-Luce, Braun Grzegorz, Brejza Krzysztof, Bricmont Saskia, Brnjac Nikolina, Brudziński Joachim Stanisław, Bryłka Anna, Buczek Tomasz, Buda Daniel, Buda Waldemar, Budka Borys, Bugalho Sebastião, Buła Andrzej, Burkhardt Delara, Buxadé Villalba Jorge, Bžoch Jaroslav, Camara Mélissa, Canfin Pascal, Carberry Nina, Casa David, Caspary Daniel, Cassart Benoit, Castillo Laurent, del Castillo Vera Pilar, Cavazzini Anna, Cavedagna Stefano, Ceccardi Susanna, Cepeda José, Ceulemans Estelle, Chahim Mohammed, Chaibi Leila, Chastel Olivier, Chinnici Caterina, Christensen Asger, Ciccioli Carlo, Cifrová Ostrihoňová Veronika, Ciriani Alessandro, Cisint Anna Maria, Clausen Per, Clergeau Christophe, Cormand David, Corrado Annalisa, Costanzo Vivien, Cotrim De Figueiredo João, Cowen Barry, Cremer Tobias, Crespo Díaz Carmen, Cristea Andi, Cunha Paulo, Danielsson Johan, Dauchy Marie, Dávid Dóra, David Ivan, Decaro Antonio, de la Hoz Quintano Raúl, Della Valle Danilo, Deloge Valérie, De Masi Fabio, De Meo Salvatore, Demirel Özlem, Deutsch Tamás, Devaux Valérie, Dibrani Adnan, Diepeveen Ton, Dieringer Elisabeth, Dîncu Vasile, Di Rupo Elio, Doherty Regina, Doleschal Christian, Dömötör Csaba, Do Nascimento Cabral Paulo, Donazzan Elena, Dorfmann Herbert, Dostál Ondřej, Droese Siegbert Frank, Düpont Lena, Ecke Matthias, Ehler Christian, Ehlers Marieke, Eriksson Sofie, Erixon Dick, Eroglu Engin, Everding Sebastian, Ezcurra Almansa Alma, Falcone Marco, Farantouris Nikolas, Farreng Laurence, Farský Jan, Ferber Markus, Fernández Jonás, Fidanza Carlo, Fiocchi Pietro, Firmenich Ruth, Fita Claire, Fourlas Loucas, Fourreau Emma, Fragkos Emmanouil, Freund Daniel, Frigout Anne-Sophie, Fritzon Heléne, Froelich Tomasz, Fuglsang Niels, Furet Angéline, Furore Mario, Gahler Michael, Galán Estrella, Gálvez Lina, Gambino Alberico, García Hermida-Van Der Walle Raquel, Garraud Jean-Paul, Gasiuk-Pihowicz Kamila, Geadi Geadis, Gedin Hanna, Geese Alexandra, Geier Jens, Geisel Thomas, Gemma Chiara, Georgiou Giorgos, Gerbrandy Gerben-Jan, Germain Jean-Marc, Gerzsenyi Gabriella, Geuking Niels, Gieseke Jens, Giménez Larraz Borja, Girauta Vidal Juan Carlos, Glavak Sunčana, Glück Andreas, Glucksmann Raphaël, Goerens Charles, Gomart Christophe, Gomes Isilda, Gómez López Sandra, Gonçalves Bruno, Gonçalves Sérgio, González Pons Esteban, Gori Giorgio, Gosiewska Małgorzata, Gotink Dirk, Gozi Sandro, Grapini Maria, Gražulis Petras, Grims Branko, Griset Catherine, Gronkiewicz-Waltz Hanna, Groothuis Bart, Grossmann Elisabeth, Grudler Christophe, Gualmini Elisabetta, Guarda Cristina, Guetta Bernard, Guzenina Maria, Hadjipantela Michalis, Hahn Svenja, Haider Roman, Halicki Andrzej, Hassan Rima, Häusling Martin, Hava Mircea-Gheorghe, Hazekamp Anja, Heide Hannes, Heinäluoma Eero, Henriksson Anna-Maja, Herbst Niclas, Herranz García Esther, Hetman Krzysztof, Hohlmeier Monika, Hojsík Martin, Holmgren Pär, Hölvényi György, Homs Ginel Alicia, Humberto Sérgio, Ijabs Ivars, Imart Céline, Incir Evin, Inselvini Paolo, Iovanovici Şoşoacă Diana, Jalloul Muro Hana, Jamet France, Jerković Romana, Jongen Marc, Joński Dariusz, Joron Virginie, Jouvet Pierre, Joveva Irena, Juknevičienė Rasa, Junco García Nora, Jungbluth Alexander, Kabilov Taner, Kalfon François, Kaljurand Marina, Kalniete Sandra, Kamiński Mariusz, Kanev Radan, Karlsbro Karin, Kartheiser Fernand, Karvašová Ľubica, Katainen Elsi, Kefalogiannis Emmanouil, Kelleher Billy, Keller Fabienne, Kelly Seán, Kemp Martine, Kennes Rudi, Khan Mary, Kobosko Michał, Köhler Stefan, Kohut Łukasz, Kokalari Arba, Kolář Ondřej, Kollár Kinga, Kols Rihards, Konečná Kateřina, Kopacz Ewa, Körner Moritz, Kountoura Elena, Kovatchev Andrey, Krah Maximilian, Krištopans Vilis, Kruis Sebastian, Krutílek Ondřej, Kubín Tomáš, Kuhnke Alice, Kulja András Tivadar, Kulmuni Katri, Kyllönen Merja, Kyuchyuk Ilhan, Lagodinsky Sergey, Lakos Eszter, Lalucq Aurore, Lange Bernd, Langensiepen Katrin, Laššáková Judita, László András, Laurent Murielle, Laureti Camilla, Laykova Rada, Lazarov Ilia, Lazarus Luis-Vicențiu, Le Callennec Isabelle, Leggeri Fabrice, Lenaers Jeroen, Leonardelli Julien, Lewandowski Janusz, Lexmann Miriam, Liese Peter, Lins Norbert, Loiseau Nathalie, Løkkegaard Morten, Lopatka Reinhold, López Javi, López Aguilar Juan Fernando, López-Istúriz White Antonio, Lövin Isabella, Luena César, Łukacijewska Elżbieta Katarzyna, Lupo Giuseppe, McAllister David, Madison Jaak, Magoni Lara, Maij Marit, Maląg Marlena, Manda Claudiu, Mandl Lukas, Maniatis Yannis, Mantovani Mario, Maran Pierfrancesco, Marczułajtis-Walczak Jagna, Mariani Thierry, Marino Ignazio Roberto, Martín Frías Jorge, Martins Catarina, Martusciello Fulvio, Marzà Ibáñez Vicent, Matthieu Sara, Mavrides Costas, Mayer Georg, Mazurek Milan, Mažylis Liudas, McNamara Michael, Mebarek Nora, Mehnert Alexandra, Meleti Eleonora, Mendes Ana Catarina, Mendia Idoia, Mertens Verena, Mesure Marina, Metsola Roberta, Metz Tilly, Mikser Sven, Millán Mon Francisco José, Miranda Paz Ana, Molnár Csaba, Montero Irene, Montserrat Dolors, Morace Carolina, Moreira de Sá Tiago, Moreno Sánchez Javier, Moretti Alessandra, Motreanu Dan-Ştefan, Mularczyk Arkadiusz, Müller Piotr, Mullooly Ciaran, Mureşan Siegfried, Muşoiu Ştefan, Nagyová Jana, Navarrete Rojas Fernando, Negrescu Victor, Nemec Matjaž, Nerudová Danuše, Nesci Denis, Neuhoff Hans, Neumann Hannah, Nevado del Campo Elena, Niebler Angelika, Niedermayer Luděk, Niinistö Ville, Nikolic Aleksandar, Ní Mhurchú Cynthia, Noichl Maria, Nordqvist Rasmus, Novakov Andrey, Nykiel Mirosława, Obajtek Daniel, Ódor Ľudovít, Oetjen Jan-Christoph, Ohisalo Maria, Oliveira João, Olivier Philippe, Omarjee Younous, Ondruš Branislav, Ó Ríordáin Aodhán, Ozdoba Jacek, Paet Urmas, Pajín Leire, Palmisano Valentina, Papadakis Kostas, Papandreou Nikos, Pappas Nikos, Pascual de la Parte Nicolás, Pedro Ana Miguel, Pedulla’ Gaetano, Pellerin-Carlin Thomas, Peltier Guillaume, Penkova Tsvetelina, Pennelle Gilles, Pereira Lídia, Peter-Hansen Kira Marie, Petrov Hristo, Picaro Michele, Picula Tonino, Piera Pascale, Pimpie Pierre, Piperea Gheorghe, de la Pisa Carrión Margarita, Pokorná Jermanová Jaroslava, Polato Daniele, Polfjärd Jessica, Popescu Virgil-Daniel, Pozņaks Reinis, Princi Giusi, Protas Jacek, Pürner Friedrich, Rackete Carola, Radev Emil, Radtke Dennis, Rafowicz Emma, Ratas Jüri, Rechagneux Julie, Regner Evelyn, Repasi René, Repp Sabrina, Ressler Karlo, Reuten Thijs, Riba i Giner Diana, Ricci Matteo, Riehl Nela, Ripa Manuela, Rodrigues André, Ros Sempere Marcos, Roth Neveďalová Katarína, Rougé André, Ruissen Bert-Jan, Ruotolo Sandro, Rzońca Bogdan, Saeidi Arash, Salini Massimiliano, Salis Ilaria, Salla Aura, Sánchez Amor Nacho, Sanchez Julien, Sancho Murillo Elena, Saramo Jussi, Sardone Silvia, Šarec Marjan, Sargiacomo Eric, Satouri Mounir, Saudargas Paulius, Sbai Majdouline, Sberna Antonella, Schaldemose Christel, Schaller-Baross Ernő, Schenk Oliver, Scheuring-Wielgus Joanna, Schieder Andreas, Schilling Lena, Schneider Christine, Schwab Andreas, Scuderi Benedetta, Seekatz Ralf, Sell Alexander, Serrano Sierra Rosa, Serra Sánchez Isabel, Sienkiewicz Bartłomiej, Simon Sven, Singer Christine, Sinkevičius Virginijus, Sippel Birgit, Sjöstedt Jonas, Śmiszek Krzysztof, Smith Anthony, Smit Sander, Sokol Tomislav, Solier Diego, Sommen Liesbet, Sonneborn Martin, Sorel Malika, Sousa Silva Hélder, Søvndal Villy, Squarta Marco, Staķis Mārtiņš, Stancanelli Raffaele, Stier Davor Ivo, Stöteler Sebastiaan, Stoyanov Stanislav, Strack-Zimmermann Marie-Agnes, Strada Cecilia, Streit Joachim, Strik Tineke, Strolenberg Anna, Stürgkh Anna, Sypniewski Marcin, Szczerba Michał, Szekeres Pál, Szydło Beata, Tamburrano Dario, Tânger Corrêa António, Tarquinio Marco, Târziu Claudiu-Richard, Tavares Carla, Tegethoff Kai, Temido Marta, Teodorescu Georgiana, Teodorescu Måwe Alice, Ter Laak Ingeborg, Terras Riho, Thionnet Pierre-Romain, Timgren Beatrice, Tinagli Irene, Tobback Bruno, Tobé Tomas, Tolassy Rody, Tomašič Zala, Tomc Romana, Tonin Matej, Toom Jana, Topo Raffaele, Torselli Francesco, Tosi Flavio, Toussaint Marie, Toveri Pekka, Tridico Pasquale, Trochu Laurence, Tsiodras Dimitris, Tudose Mihai, Tynkkynen Sebastian, Uhrík Milan, Ušakovs Nils, Vaidere Inese, Valchev Ivaylo, Vălean Adina, Valet Matthieu, Van Brempt Kathleen, Van Brug Anouk, van den Berg Brigitte, Vandendriessche Tom, Van Dijck Kris, Van Lanschot Reinier, Van Leeuwen Jessika, Vannacci Roberto, Van Overtveldt Johan, Van Sparrentak Kim, Varaut Alexandre, Vasconcelos Ana, Vasile-Voiculescu Vlad, Vautmans Hilde, Vedrenne Marie-Pierre, Ventola Francesco, Verheyen Sabine, Verougstraete Yvan, Veryga Aurelijus, Vieira Catarina, Vigenin Kristian, Vilimsky Harald, Vincze Loránt, Vind Marianne, Vistisen Anders, Vivaldini Mariateresa, Volgin Petar, von der Schulenburg Michael, Vondra Alexandr, Voss Axel, Vozemberg-Vrionidi Elissavet, Vrecionová Veronika, Vázquez Lázara Adrián, Waitz Thomas, Walsmann Marion, Warborn Jörgen, Warnke Jan-Peter, Wąsik Maciej, Wawrykiewicz Michał, Wcisło Marta, Wechsler Andrea, Werbrouck Séverine, Wiesner Emma, Wiezik Michal, Wilmès Sophie, Winkler Iuliu, Winzig Angelika, Wiseler-Lima Isabel, Wiśniewska Jadwiga, Wölken Tiemo, Wolters Lara, Yar Lucia, Yon-Courtin Stéphanie, Zacharia Maria, Zajączkowska-Hernik Ewa, Zalewska Anna, Žalimas Dainius, Zan Alessandro, Zarzalejos Javier, Zdechovský Tomáš, Zdrojewski Bogdan Andrzej, Zijlstra Auke, Zīle Roberts, Zingaretti Nicola, Złotowski Kosma, Zoido Álvarez Juan Ignacio, Zovko Željana, Zver Milan

    Excused:

    Sidl Günther


    ANNEX 1 – Composition of new committees

    C01A SEDE

    [ 20/01/2025 – ]

    Комисия по сигурност и отбрана

    Comisión de Seguridad y Defensa

    Výbor pro bezpečnost a obranu

    Udvalget om Sikkerhed og Forsvar

    Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung

    Julgeoleku- ja kaitsekomisjon

    Επιτροπή Ασφάλειας και Άμυνας

    Committee on Security and Defence

    Commission de la sécurité et de la défense

    An Coiste um Shlándáil agus Cosaint

    Odbor za sigurnost i obranu

    Commissione per la sicurezza e la difesa

    Drošības un aizsardzības komiteja

    Saugumo ir gynybos komitetas

    ssBiztonság- és Védelempolitikai Bizottság

    Kumitat għas-Sigurtà u d-Difiża

    Commissie veiligheid en defensie

    Komisja Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony

    Comissão da Segurança e da Defesa

    Comisia pentru securitate și apărare

    Výbor pre bezpečnosť a obranu

    Odbor za varnost in obrambo

    Turvallisuus- ja puolustuspolitiikan valiokunta

    Utskottet för säkerhet och försvar

    (43 members)

    PPE (11)

    BEKE Wouter

    DE MEO Salvatore

    GOMART Christophe

    HERBST Niclas

    MEIMARAKIS Vangelis

    NOVAKOV Andrey

    PASCUAL DE LA PARTE Nicolás

    SZCZERBA Michał

    TEODORESCU MÅWE Alice

    TERRAS Riho

    TOVERI Pekka

    S&D (8)

    CREMER Tobias

    DI RUPO Elio

    GLUCKSMANN Raphaël

    LÓPEZ Javi

    MAVRIDES Costas

    MENDES Ana Catarina

    MIKSER Sven

    TUDOSE Mihai

    PfE (5)

    HÖLVÉNYI György

    POKORNÁ JERMANOVÁ Jaroslava

    STÖTELER Sebastiaan

    THIONNET Pierre-Romain

    VANNACCI Roberto

    ECR (5)

    DONAZZAN Elena

    DWORCZYK Michał

    GAMBINO Alberico

    POZŅAKS Reinis

    VONDRA Alexandr

    Renew (5)

    AUŠTREVIČIUS Petras

    LOISEAU Nathalie

    ŠAREC Marjan

    STRACK-ZIMMERMANN Marie-Agnes

    YAR Lucia

    Verts/ALE (3)

    NEUMANN Hannah

    STAĶIS Mārtiņš

    VAN LANSCHOT Reinier

    The Left (3)

    BOTENGA Marc

    DEMIREL Özlem

    KYLLÖNEN Merja

    ESN (1)

    NEUHOFF Hans

    NI (2)

    PAPADAKIS Kostas

    VON DER SCHULENBURG Michael

    C08A SANT

    [ 20/01/2025 – ]

    Комисия по обществено здраве

    Comisión de Salud Pública

    Výbor pro veřejné zdraví

    Udvalget om Folkesundhed

    Ausschuss für öffentliche Gesundheit

    Rahvatervishoiu komisjon

    Επιτροπή Δημόσιας Υγείας

    Committee on Public Health

    Commission de la santé publique

    An Coiste um Shláinte Phoiblí

    Odbor za javno zdravlje

    Commissione per la sanità pubblica

    Sabiedrības veselības komiteja

    Visuomenės sveikatos komitetas

    Közegészségügyi Bizottság

    Kumitat għas-Saħħa Pubblika

    Commissie volksgezondheid

    Komisja Zdrowia Publicznego

    Comissão da Saúde Pública

    Comisia pentru sănătate publică

    Výbor pre verejné zdravie

    Odbor za javno zdravje

    Kansanterveyden valiokunta

    Utskottet för folkhälsa

    (43 members)

    PPE (11)

    ARŁUKOWICZ Bartosz

    CASTILLO Laurent

    HADJIPANTELA Michalis

    JARUBAS Adam

    KULJA András Tivadar

    LIESE Peter

    MORATTI Letizia

    NEVADO DEL CAMPO Elena

    POLFJÄRD Jessica

    SCHENK Oliver

    SOKOL Tomislav

    S&D (8)

    ANDRIUKAITIS Vytenis Povilas

    CLERGEAU Christophe

    GONZÁLEZ CASARES Nicolás

    JERKOVIĆ Romana

    MORETTI Alessandra

    NEGRESCU Victor

    PAPANDREOU Nikos

    WÖLKEN Tiemo

    PfE (5)

    BRASIER-CLAIN Marie-Luce

    DE LA PISA CARRIÓN Margarita

    FERENC Viktória

    HAUSER Gerald

    KNOTEK Ondřej

    ECR (5)

    BUDA Waldemar

    FRAGKOS Emmanouil

    PICARO Michele

    RAZZA Ruggero

    TROCHU Laurence

    Renew (5)

    BOSSE Stine

    CANFIN Pascal

    CHASTEL Olivier

    CIFROVÁ OSTRIHOŇOVÁ Veronika

    VASILE-VOICULESCU Vlad

    Verts/ALE (3)

    HÄUSLING Martin

    MARINO Ignazio Roberto

    METZ Tilly

    The Left (3)

    MARTINS Catarina

    PALMISANO Valentina

    TAMBURRANO Dario

    ESN (1)

    ANDERSON Christine

    NI (2)

    BEŇOVÁ Monika

    DOSTÁL Ondřej

    CS01 EUDS

    [ 20/01/2025 – ]

    Специална комисия относно европейския щит за демокрацията

    Comisión Especial sobre el Escudo Europeo de la Democracia

    Zvláštní výbor pro Evropský štít pro demokracii

    Det Særlige Udvalg om Det Europæiske Demokratiskjold

    Sonderausschuss für den Europäischen Schutzschild für die Demokratie

    Euroopa demokraatia kaitse erikomisjon

    Ειδική Επιτροπή για την Ευρωπαϊκή Ασπίδα Δημοκρατίας

    Special committee on the European Democracy Shield

    Commission spéciale sur le bouclier européen de la démocratie

    An Coiste Speisialta um an Sciath Eorpach don Daonlathas

    Posebni odbor za europski štit za zaštitu demokracije

    Commissione speciale sullo scudo europeo per la democrazia

    Īpašā komiteja attiecībā uz Eiropas demokrātijas vairogu

    Specialusis komitetas Europos demokratijos skydo klausimais

    Az európai demokráciapajzzsal foglalkozó különbizottság

    Kumitat Speċjali dwar it-Tarka Ewropea għad-Demokrazija

    Bijzondere Commissie inzake een schild voor de Europese democratie

    Komisja Specjalna ds. Europejskiej Tarczy Demokracji

    Comissão Especial sobre o Escudo Europeu da Democracia

    Comisia specială pentru Scutul democrației europene

    Osobitný výbor pre európsky štít na obranu demokracie

    Posebni odbor za evropski ščit za demokracijo

    Eurooppalaista demokratian kilpeä käsittelevä erityisvaliokunta

    Särskilda utskottet för det europeiska demokratiförsvaret

    (33 members)

    PPE (9)

    AALTOLA Mika

    BOGDAN Ioan-Rareş

    DÜPONT Lena

    KALNIETE Sandra

    MARTUSCIELLO Fulvio

    SIENKIEWICZ Bartłomiej

    TOBÉ Tomas

    ZDECHOVSKÝ Tomáš

    ZOIDO ÁLVAREZ Juan Ignacio

    S&D (6)

    DÎNCU Vasile

    MENDES Ana Catarina

    MOLNÁR Csaba

    PICIERNO Pina

    SCHALDEMOSE Christel

    VAN BREMPT Kathleen

    PfE (4)

    BŽOCH Jaroslav

    LEGGERI Fabrice

    SCHALLER-BAROSS Ernő

    TÂNGER CORRÊA António

    ECR (4)

    CAVEDAGNA Stefano

    KANKO Assita

    SZYDŁO Beata

    TERHEŞ Cristian

    Renew (4)

    BRANDSTÄTTER Helmut

    GROOTHUIS Bart

    LOISEAU Nathalie

    WILMÈS Sophie

    Verts/ALE (2)

    GEESE Alexandra

    VAN SPARRENTAK Kim

    The Left (2)

    ARVANITIS Konstantinos

    DELLA VALLE Danilo

    ESN (1)

    ANDERSON Christine

    NI (1)

    PANAYIOTOU Fidias

    CS02 HOUS

    [ 20/01/2025 – ]

    Специална комисия относно жилищната криза в Европейския съюз

    Comisión Especial sobre la Crisis de la Vivienda en la Unión Europea

    Zvláštní výbor pro krizi v oblasti bydlení v Evropské unii

    Det Særlige Udvalg om Boligkrisen i Den Europæiske Union

    Sonderausschuss zur Wohnraumkrise in der Europäischen Union

    Euroopa Liidu eluasemekriisi erikomisjon

    Ειδική Επιτροπή για τη στεγαστική κρίση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση

    Special committee on the Housing Crisis in the European Union

    Commission spéciale sur la crise du logement dans l’Union européenne

    An Coiste Speisialta um an nGéarchéim Tithíochta san Aontas Eorpach

    Posebni odbor za stambenu krizu u Europskoj uniji

    Commissione speciale sulla crisi degli alloggi nell’Unione europea

    Īpašā komiteja mājokļu krīzes risināšanai Eiropas Savienībā

    Specialusis komitetas būsto krizės Europos Sąjungoje klausimais

    Az Európai Unióban tapasztalható lakhatási válsággal foglalkozó különbizottság

    Kumitat Speċjali dwar il-Kriżi tal-Akkomodazzjoni fl-Unjoni Ewropea

    Bijzondere Commissie inzake de huisvestingscrisis in de Europese Unie

    Komisja Specjalna ds. Kryzysu Mieszkaniowego w Unii Europejskiej

    Comissão Especial sobre a Crise de Habitação na União Europeia

    Comisia specială pentru criza locuințelor în Uniunea Europeană

    Osobitný výbor pre krízu bývania v Európskej únii

    Posebni odbor za stanovanjsko krizo v Evropski uniji

    Asuntokriisiä Euroopan unionissa käsittelevä erityisvaliokunta

    Särskilda utskottet för bostadskrisen i Europeiska unionen

    (33 members)

    PPE (9)

    BUGALHO Sebastião

    CASA David

    DOHERTY Regina

    EZCURRA ALMANSA Alma

    FALCONE Marco

    FERBER Markus

    GOTINK Dirk

    LE CALLENNEC Isabelle

    MARCZUŁAJTIS-WALCZAK Jagna

    S&D (6)

    BISCHOFF Gabriele

    GOMES Isilda

    HOMS GINEL Alicia

    MEBAREK Nora

    SCHIEDER Andreas

    TINAGLI Irene

    PfE (4)

    BLOM Rachel

    DOSTALOVA Klara

    HÖLVÉNYI György

    RECHAGNEUX Julie

    ECR (4)

    JUNCO GARCÍA Nora

    MAGONI Lara

    SBERNA Antonella

    TEODORESCU Georgiana

    Renew (4)

    HOJSÍK Martin

    MULLOOLY Ciaran

    TOOM Jana

    VAN DEN BERG Brigitte

    Verts/ALE (2)

    MARZÀ IBÁÑEZ Vicent

    OHISALO Maria

    The Left (2)

    CHAIBI Leila

    MONTERO Irene

    ESN (1)

    BOSSDORF Irmhild

    NI (1)

    ZACHARIA Maria

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Video: Arab States: Joint effort w/ UN to improve lives across Arab region – Briefing | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Briefing by Khaled Khiari, Assistant Secretary-General for Middle East, Asia and the Pacific in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, on Cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States in maintaining international peace and security.

    ———————–

    “This critical and long-awaited agreement offers a ray of hope,” said Khaled Khiari, Assistant Secretary-General for Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific, as the UN Security Council convened to discuss the Middle East’s fragile ceasefire and broader regional issues.

    Today’s (23 Jan) meeting comes in the wake of a recently brokered ceasefire in Gaza and the release of hostages, a development Khiari described as providing “much-needed relief for Palestinians in Gaza and for the hostages reunited with their loved ones.”

    While acknowledging the progress, Khiari emphasized the need for sustained international efforts to secure a just and lasting peace. “The League has always supported the Palestinian people, including through its efforts to rally international support for a ceasefire. A negotiated two-state solution remains the only viable path to ensuring peace, security, and coexistence for both Israelis and Palestinians.”

    The discussion also touched on the broader regional context, with Khiari noting, “The situation in the Middle East remains fragile and several key conflicts continue unabated.” He highlighted opportunities for positive change, referencing the cessation of hostilities in Lebanon and developments in Syria.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oivGzIPia-I

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Video: Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Haiti & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (23 January 2025)

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon briefing by Farhan Haq, Deputy Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations
    Syria
    Security Council
    Haiti
    Sudan
    Holocaust
    Guest Tomorrow
    Honour Roll

    OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
    The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports that large volumes of humanitarian aid continue to enter Gaza through the Erez and Zikim crossings in the north and Kerem Shalom crossing in the south.
    Inside Gaza, OCHA says that aid cargo and humanitarian personnel are moving into areas that were previously hard to reach. Our humanitarian partners on the ground say the operating environment has improved significantly. The surge in supplies entering Gaza each day and the return of law and order has allowed aid organizations to scale up the delivery of life-saving assistance and services.
    In central and southern Gaza, partners have resumed monthly food distributions with full rations. Yesterday, humanitarian organizations on the ground in Gaza transported 118 trucks of food parcels and flour from UNRWA warehouses to more than 60 distribution points in the south.
    Across southern Gaza, UNICEF continues dispatching high-energy biscuits and ready-to-use food – enough for thousands of infants.
    While food items currently account for the bulk of supplies that have entered the Gaza Strip since the ceasefire took effect, more medicines, shelter materials, and water, sanitation and hygiene supplies are expected over the coming days.
    Yesterday, partners in southern Gaza distributed medical disposables and trauma management kits to 14 hospitals, as well as sexual and reproductive health kits to 28 health facilities – enough for 58,000 people.
    Meanwhile, fuel deliveries in central and southern Gaza are keeping functional water wells, desalination plants and sewage pumps running.
    And yesterday, our humanitarian partners delivered seven trucks of fuel to northern Gaza. This is the first such shipment since the ceasefire began.
    The supplies will help power the back-up generators that are sustaining critical humanitarian services provided by UNRWA, the World Food Programme, the World Health Organization and other partners.
    Also, in Gaza City yesterday, two of UNRWA’s primary health service points reopened – the Beach health centre and Daraj medical point.
    Across the Strip, OCHA reports that most Palestinians remain at displacement sites – either because their homes are in ruins or contaminated by explosive ordnance, or because movement back to northern Gaza has not yet been allowed.
    And turning to the situation in the West Bank, OCHA reports that the Jenin Government Hospital remains disconnected from water and electricity, and access is extremely difficult due to road damage. The facility is relying on dwindling water reserves from emergency tanks installed just weeks ago through an allocation by the Occupied Palestinian Territory Humanitarian Fund, which is managed by OCHA.

    UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR PEACE OPERATIONS
    Starting this Saturday, the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, will travel to the Middle East.
    He will visit two UN peacekeeping missions and travel to Damascus to meet with caretaker authorities and Israeli authorities in Jerusalem.
    Mr. Lacroix will first travel to Syria, where he will spend time at the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) before visiting the headquarters of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Jerusalem.
    Mr. Lacroix’s priorities are to express his solidarity with and support for UN peacekeepers and to highlight the importance of mine action and removal of explosive remnants of war.

    Full highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=23%20January%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wt2pGiYdMwg

    MIL OSI Video