The images coming out of Gaza break my heart every single day – they paint a horrifying picture of human suffering, starvation and desperation.
This suffering has been referred to as a humanitarian catastrophe. This is true – but using that type of language risks leaving people with the idea that this horror has simply come out of the ether as some sort of natural phenomenon.
So I will speak plainly. This suffering is a result of the ongoing actions of the government of Israel. Israel has imposed a suffocating blockade on Gaza since early March – with severe restrictions on food and aid shipments into Gaza throughout the war.
Thousands of people have been killed and injured. Children are dying of starvation and lack of water. Entire cities have been almost completely erased and populations displaced. Pregnant women are unable to access critical medical care, and the rate of miscarriage in Gaza has increased by 300% since October 2023.
The population has been pushed past breaking point, and the suffering being inflicted on the people of Gaza is beyond any justification.
This must end now. The hostages must be released immediately. Israel must lift all restrictions and allow unfettered, safe, and dignified access to humanitarian aid throughout Gaza immediately. The international community must insist on it.
The statements made this week by Israel’s Defence Minister on his plans to force all Palestinians in Gaza into a camp built on the ruins of Rafah – plans which are illegal, inhumane and risk worsening the humanitarian crisis in Gaza – must be rejected by all.
We must stand firm against all efforts to make the conflict in Gaza go on one minute longer than it has gone on today. A two-state solution, one which recognises the sovereignty and the independence of a Palestinian state, is vital for a just and lasting peace, and will be at heart of the Scottish Government’s work towards justice on the international agenda.
In the last year, we have provided £550,000 to charities working in the Middle East who are helping people affected by the ongoing conflict with access to emergency assistance, including food, clean water and medical care. That support is important, but not in itself enough – we are ready and willing to do more.
Getting injured children out of Gaza
Earlier this week, I met with Unicef who raised the particular issue of medical evacuations with me. With hospitals destroyed and medical supplies running out, this is an emergency and a race against time to provide specialist medical care for the children and babies suffering from injuries caused by the war.
Scotland’s world-class National Health Service stands ready to play our full part in supporting these medical evacuations and the treatment of injured Palestinian children.
This requires the support of the UK Government, and I have asked the Prime Minister to support facilitating a transfer of these children, who need medical care to survive, to Scotland.
The suffering of the people of Gaza is one of the greatest international failings of my lifetime – and the international community cannot let it go on one second longer than it already has.
We need to see nations across the world demand that international law is enforced and renew their efforts to support a just and lasting peace for civilians both in Israel and Palestine. History will judge world leaders on how they act at this moment and up until now, that judgement will be damning.
I can give my assurance, that Scotland’s position on the world stage will continue to be one of compassion, justice and global citizenship – and we will keep using our voice to demand peace in the region, and justice for the Palestinian people.
We need to see nations across the world demand that international law is enforced and renew their efforts to support a just and lasting peace for civilians both in Israel and Palestine. History will judge world leaders on how they act at this moment and up until now, that judgement will be damning.
I can give my assurance, that Scotland’s position on the world stage will continue to be one of compassion, justice and global citizenship – and we will keep using our voice to demand peace in the region, and justice for the Palestinian people.
This article was first published in The National on the 10th of July 2025.
Save the Children and its partners spoke to over 450 of these displaced children in Tawila for the assessment “Children Caught in Conflict”, with children describing traumatic journeys and expressing fear, grief, and a profound sense of uncertainty about their futures.
Hundreds of children have recounted harrowing stories of terror and loss after their homes in Sudan’s North Darfur region were attacked, with many telling Save the Children how they lost contact with friends and loved ones [1].
Violence is happening daily in North Darfur, the epicentre of Sudan’s two-year conflict, with fighting intensifying over the past 12 months and spiking in April this year when the Zamzam camp housing people forced from their homes was viciously attacked.
Nearly 500,000 people – including 260,000 children – were displaced from Zamzam camp between April and May, which amounts to 99% of the camp’s population. About 75% of the displaced people ended up in the Tawila camp [2], which is located around 60km southeast of Zamzam.
Save the Children and its partners spoke to over 450 of these displaced children in Tawila for the assessment “Children Caught in Conflict”, with children describing traumatic journeys and expressing fear, grief, and a profound sense of uncertainty about their futures.
Many children witnessed killings and dead bodies in the streets, with some reporting witnessing young people being arrested or killed, and more than half of the girls interviewed (53%) reported incidents of sexual violence during their journey out of Zamzam to Tawila.
Three children reported that their mothers died during the journey to Tawila, while four others said they lost a brother, and five reported the death of their fathers.
Some children recounted supporting elderly relatives travelling long distances on donkeys, with others saying they were forced to leave behind exhausted family members under threat of violence.
Salma*, 12, originally from El Fasher, was displaced twice — first to Zamzam, then to Tawila. She described witnessing rape, killings, and looting along the road. Her grandfather died during the journey due to exhaustion and lack of care. Upon arrival in Tawila, her family had no food or shelter and slept in the open.
Talha*, 12, was fetching water for his family when the Zamzam camp came under attack. He witnessed shootings, and widespread panic. He ran home to find his family but discovered the house empty. He searched the schools where people were hiding but couldn’t find them. Believing his family had fled to Tawila, Talha followed the crowds on foot. After arriving, he stayed with a host family for seven days before they too left, leaving him alone. Talha told the survey team his only wish is to return to El Fasher and reunite with his family — though he doesn’t know if they are still alive.
While some children said they feel relatively safe in Tawila, many — especially girls — expressed deep grief over the loss of family members and fear of ongoing violence.
Children cited poor living conditions, including sleeping on the ground, extreme heat, food shortages, and the presence of armed individuals, as sources of distress.
Girls reported high levels of fear and vulnerability, particularly when using toilets or traveling long distances for water. Many shared that friends were raped during displacement or in the camps. Both boys and girls acknowledged a rise in sexual violence, with girls aged 12–18 being the most affected. Boys were also aware of the abuse experienced by their sisters and peers.
Francesco Lanino, Deputy Country Director of Programmes and Operations for Save the Children in Sudan, said:
“Children in North Darfur have been to hell and back. They are grieving deeply, while contemplating uncertain futures. Many lost family members before and during their displacement, and don’t have adequate tools to process their experiences. Some children have described to our staff harrowing experiences of parting with older family members on the route, many of whom they haven’t seen since.
“Since the conflict began, children’s lives have been upended. They now wake to the sound of gunfire and shelling. Families dig trenches for protection, schools are closed, and access to healthcare is limited. Many children reported that their peers have joined armed groups or been forced into early marriage due to economic hardship.
“Children’s rights have been completely ignored in Sudan. They are being separated from their families, seeing loved ones killed or maimed, and have already missed years of critical education, with terrible consequences for their long-term well-being. We are incredibly concerned for these children’s futures – and the future of Sudan – if this conflict doesn’t end now.”
Save the Children is urging the international community to redouble efforts to demand a ceasefire in Sudan, to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access and a drastic scale-up of humanitarian assistance.
Save the Children has worked in Sudan since 1983 and is currently supporting children and their families across Sudan providing health, nutrition, education, child protection and food security and livelihoods support. Save the Children is also supporting refugees from Sudan in Egypt and South Sudan.
Since April 2025, Save the Children has been leading a major humanitarian response in North Darfur, addressing the urgent needs of displaced populations following mass displacement from Zamzam camp and El Fasher. With hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons across the region, Save the Children has scaled up operations in El Fasher, Tawila and Central Darfur, delivering life-saving services in health, nutrition, water and sanitation, protection, and shelter.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Save the Children.
Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
TIANJIN, July 10 (Xinhua) — Igor Khodachek, director of the Eurasian Studies Center of the European University at St. Petersburg, entered his name on a computer while visiting the Tianjin Vocational Institute of Light Industry and a laser marking machine engraved his name on the surface of a metal plate.
“This is a wonderful souvenir of this trip,” said I. Khodachek, who participated in the “Dialogue of World Mayors – SCO Summit Cities,” which was held from July 6 to 9 in Tianjin, northern China. During the event, guests at the aforementioned institute visited an exhibition hall dedicated to Lu Ban’s Workshop and a base integrating production and training in the field of high-precision instrument manufacturing and intelligent manufacturing.
Lu Ban Workshop, named after the famous ancient Chinese craftsman Lu Ban, is a brand of international vocational education initiated and promoted by Tianjin City Government.
To date, China has built 34 Lu Ban Workshops in 30 countries and regions around the world. 10 of them were established in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Pakistan, Cambodia, Egypt and other SCO countries.
With the construction of a practical training center and the provision of modern teaching equipment in Lu Ban Workshop, Chinese teachers and technical personnel are also sent to learn technical skills from local teachers who may be invited to China for experience exchange.
Since 2022, Wu Zhengpeng, a teacher from Tianjin Vocational and Technical Institute of Urban Administration and Construction, has been teaching at Lu Ban Workshop in Tajikistan using China’s advanced equipment and 3D teaching resources.
“We had a comprehensive discussion with the teachers of the Tajik side and jointly formulated the curriculum, discussed the methodology and agreed to invite them to Tianjin for exchanges,” Wu Zhengpeng shared. In July last year, representatives of the teachers and students of the Tajik Technical University named after Academician M.S. Osimi visited Tianjin as planned.
Lu Ban’s workshop provides an opportunity for more and more young people from SCO countries to study abroad.
Ibrahim Maher, a 21-year-old student from Egypt, is currently studying at Tianjin Light Industry Vocational and Technical Institute under the Lu Ban Workshop project, majoring in Computer Numerical Control (CNC) technology.
“Lu Ban Workshop has many advanced teaching equipment and data centers from China, which enables students to transform theoretical knowledge into practical skills and adapt to the working environment more quickly. We are also provided with many opportunities to visit companies, participate in internships, and experience a large number of projects in practice,” he said.
At the end of the tour, Director of the Institute of World Politics of Kyrgyzstan Sheradil Baktygulov said that Lu Ban’s Workshop provides assistance to Kyrgyzstan in developing such areas as robotics, autonomous driving and computer technology.
At present, Lu Ban’s Workshop is an important platform for international exchanges and cooperation in the field of professional education, and also serves as a bridge to promote humanities exchanges and the rapprochement of peoples. -0-
Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.
by Cosimo GrazianiBanjul (Agenzia Fides) – In West African countries, the local fishing industry is in crisis. European countries are also to blame for this. Gambian activist Mustapha Manneh also spoke out at the United Nations World Oceans Conference, which took place this year in Nice from June 9 to 13.The core of the problem is the fishing of local species to produce fish feed for aquaculture farms in Greece and Turkey. The phenomenon affects the entire region and has the same characteristics: local species such as sardines and bonga are caught in large quantities and processed locally into fish feed for aquaculture; the produced material is shipped to Turkey, Greece, and China (these are the currently known destinations), where it is used in fish farms. The fish produced, in the case of Turkish farms, are mainly sea bream and bass. These farmed fish reach the stores of the destination countries and the tables of consumers, unaware that the consumed fillets are causing social and economic problems for entire populations on the African continent, where in the meantime, hundreds of families have lost their only source of income. As Manneh points out, the fishermen can no longer bring home enough fish to feed their families and face ever-increasing fuel costs: Whereas they used to be able to catch large quantities of fish in a shorter time, using only 20 liters of diesel, they now have to stay away longer to ensure a sufficient catch, and the amount of fuel required has at least tripled.The fishermen are not the only ones hit hard: an entire social fabric has been affected by this problem. In Senegal and Gambia, the fish was caught by men and sold by women, a system that, in its own way, also ensured relative social and economic equality. Now that catches are scarce, markets have disappeared in many cases, along with the stalls run by women, who must now find other sources of income. Another problem that fishermen in West Africa have faced in recent years is the presence of fishing boats from other countries—for example, from China—which significantly reduces the availability of fish to catch. In Guinea-Bissau, fishing boats from other countries often use trawling, which is prohibited due to the damage it can cause to ecosystems. The presence of foreign fishing boats in African waters is often regulated by agreements such as those concluded by the European Union with these countries. According to Manneh, their presence in Gambia is viewed with growing hostility by the local population, especially young people. The EU signed the last of a long line of fishing protocols with Gambia in 2019, which expire on July 30. This protocol stipulated that vessels from Spain, Greece, and France could fish in Gambian territorial waters for an annual fee of €550,000, a fee that was intended, among other things, to finance measures to protect the marine ecosystem. Similar agreements have been concluded with other countries in the region: In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the agreement was approved by the European Parliament last April and provides for compensation of up to €100 million per year. Alongside this agreement, the Parliament adopted a recommendation calling on the European Commission and Guinea-Bissau to improve fishing controls in the African country’s territorial waters. The fishing crisis in West African countries is also fueling illegal emigration to Europe. From the coasts of Senegal, it is possible to reach the Canary Islands, which belong to Spain. While reaching the Canary Islands represents an alternative to poverty for many, others become smugglers for the same reason, earning a living by transporting migrants. In Gambia, earnings for a single trip on a boat full of migrants can reach up to €200,000, an unimaginable sum for a Gambian fisherman. (Agenzia Fides, 10/7/2025)
Share:
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, July 10, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Byzanlink, a next-generation tokenization platform bridging traditional and decentralized finance, today announced a strategic partnership with the Hedera Foundation. In the first phase of the partnership, Byzanlink will integrate and deploy on the Hedera Network, the enterprise-grade public network renowned for its high-performance and energy-efficient distributed ledger technology. This collaboration marks a strategic step toward building a compliant, programmable infrastructure for tokenized financial assets.
Byzanlink is set to leverage Hedera’s scalable and secure architecture to accelerate the development of tokenized real-world assets and expand institutional access to compliant, yield-generating financial instruments. The integration enables real-time settlement, increased transparency, and automated asset lifecycle management across a wide range of asset classes.
“We’re excited to collaborate with the Hedera Foundation as we bring real-world financial assets onchain,” said Anbu Kannappan, Founder and CEO of Byzanlink. “Hedera’s enterprise-grade capabilities align well with our vision of building secure, programmable, and transparent financial infrastructure for the future of global capital markets.”
As part of its long-term vision, Byzanlink is targeting the tokenization of over $100 million in real-world assets over the coming years, focused on enabling institutional access to secure, yield-generating financial instruments. Byzanlink’s compliant architecture and partnership with Hedera position the platform to deliver scalable, transparent, and automation-driven solutions for the next generation of capital markets.
Byzanlink is developing an integrated platform that enables institutions, treasuries, and fintechs to interact with tokenized financial assets through a seamless and compliant framework. Through this integration, Byzanlink will leverage Hedera’s Network to ensure scalable deployment and real-time settlement for tokenized asset classes.
“Byzanlink’s infrastructure is aligned with our vision for enabling the next generation of institutional finance on Hedera,” said Vignesh Raja, Director of Business for Middle East & South Asia at Hedera Foundation. “We believe their model offers a compelling framework for tokenizing real-world assets at scale, and we’re proud to support their growth.”
The collaboration will focus on key areas including technical integration, real-world asset token issuance, ecosystem collaboration, and expanded regional efforts across the Middle East and beyond.
About Byzanlink Byzanlink is a multi-asset tokenization platform enabling institutional-grade access to real-world yield through blockchain infrastructure. Its core offerings focus on compliant, secure, and interoperable rails that connect traditional finance to digital economies.
About Hedera Foundation Hedera Foundation drives the growth of decentralized finance (DeFi) and enterprise applications on the Hedera Network by empowering developers, builders, and innovators with resources and expert guidance. As a key entity in the Hedera ecosystem, the Foundation is dedicated to supporting projects through their journey from ideation to production, fostering growth and expanding the reach of the Hedera Network.
Disclaimer: This content is provided by Byzanlink. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice. Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed. Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility. Globenewswire does not endorse any content on this page.
Legal Disclaimer: This media platform provides the content of this article on an “as-is” basis, without any warranties or representations of any kind, express or implied. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies, errors, or omissions. We do not assume any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information presented herein. Any concerns, complaints, or copyright issues related to this article should be directed to the content provider mentioned above.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
Chinese Premier Li Qiang meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Cairo, Egypt, July 10, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
CAIRO, July 10 — Chinese Premier Li Qiang said here on Thursday that China is willing to strengthen Belt and Road cooperation with Egypt in such areas as economy, trade, finance, manufacturing, new energy, science and technology, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges.
During his meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Li also said that China is willing to encourage more capable Chinese enterprises to invest in Egypt.
Li conveyed to Sisi cordial greetings from Chinese President Xi Jinping, saying that China-Egypt relations have flourished in recent years under the strategic guidance of the two heads of state.
The Chinese side, Li said, is ready to work with Egypt to take the 70th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the two countries next year as an opportunity to carry forward the traditional friendship, consolidate political mutual trust, and continue to firmly support each other on issues concerning each other’s core interests.
China is also willing to join Egypt to continue to enrich the China-Egypt comprehensive strategic partnership, push for more achievements in cooperation in various fields between the two nations, and keep moving forward to the goal of building a China-Egypt community with a shared future in the new era.
The international landscape is marked by mounting turbulence and escalating disorder, with prolonged and unresolved conflicts particularly afflicting the West Asian and North African regions, Li said.
China stands ready to maintain close communication with Egypt and promote an early ceasefire in Gaza, Li said.
The Chinese side is also ready to join Egypt in alleviating the humanitarian crisis, preventing the spillover and escalation of the conflict, and making unremitting efforts for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Palestinian issue, said the Chinese premier.
He said China is willing to work with Egypt to enhance communication and coordination within multilateral platforms including the United Nations, BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and practice true multilateralism.
Li added that China will work with Egypt to promote an equal and orderly multipolar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization, and push for the steady and long-term development of China-Arab and China-Africa cooperation.
Chinese Premier Li Qiang meets with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Cairo, Egypt, July 10, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
CAIRO, July 10 — China is willing to work with Egypt to practice true multilateralism, and promote an equal and orderly multipolar world and a universally beneficial and inclusive economic globalization, Chinese Premier Li Qiang said here on Thursday.
Li’s remarks came during his meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. Li is on an official visit to the country at the invitation of Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Kamal Madbouly.
Source: Government of the Russian Federation – Government of the Russian Federation –
An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.
Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, who oversees the North Caucasus Federal District, held the first meeting of the organizing committee for the preparation and holding of the Caucasus Investment Forum in 2026.
The event was attended by representatives of federal authorities, heads of regions that are part of the North Caucasus Federal District, top managers of the largest state corporations, members of business associations and public organizations, and representatives of industry communities.
The Caucasus Investment Forum is held in order to increase the investment potential of the North Caucasus Federal District and in the interests of its sustainable socio-economic development.
Opening the meeting, Alexander Novak thanked the organizers, members of the organizing committee, representatives of departments and companies that took part in organizing the Caucasus Investment Forum in 2025, noted the high assessment of the past event by the country’s leadership, the high-quality composition of the participants, including foreign ones.
Over the three days, the forum was attended by over 4,100 people from 32 countries, including 1,450 representatives of Russian and foreign businesses, nine federal ministers, heads of four federal agencies, seven heads of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, as well as high-ranking delegations from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Kazakhstan and Qatar. 86 agreements worth over 206 billion rubles were signed, including five agreements with international partners. The forum program covered over 78 events with the participation of 440 speakers and an emphasis on key development areas – from industry and logistics to education and healthcare. Particular attention was paid to the youth agenda: over 1,000 students from 40 universities in the country took part in a rich program dedicated to career development, leadership and creative industries.
“The Caucasus Investment Forum 2025 in Mineralnye Vody was an important step forward – both in terms of organization and content. We were able to exceed last year’s bar, and this is the result of the teamwork of all participants. The growth of investor interest in the region was demonstrated by the “Vershina” award – 266 applications from 49 regions. I believe it is important to continue holding it in 2026. The youth program covered key areas – IT, science, entrepreneurship, tourism. This confirms that the Caucasus has a strong human resource. Today, we are already starting preparations for the CIF-2026 in order to hold it even more effectively,” said Alexander Novak.
Adviser to the President, responsible secretary of the organizing committee of the KIF-2025 Anton Kobyakov emphasized that the development of the North Caucasus is among the strategic priorities. He paid attention to the participation of Russian regions in the future Caucasus Investment Forum.
“I expect that the subjects of the Russian Federation and companies interested in investing in the North Caucasus Federal District will take a more active part in the preparation and holding of KIF-2026. It is important to have a mutual movement here: on the one hand, the regions’ interest in the possibilities of the North Caucasus Federal District, on the other, the proactive position of the North Caucasus subjects and businesses themselves. It is necessary to present their projects more widely, attract partners, and form sustainable business ties. It is this approach – mutual interest and openness – that we will lay in the concept of the forum’s exhibition program and the basis of the invitation campaign for KIF-2026 participants,” said Anton Kobyakov.
The business program of KIF-2026 will be attended by heads of government bodies, representatives of Russian and international companies, mass media, youth and scientific communities. The forum will become a platform for negotiations and conclusion of business contracts for the purpose of developing investment projects and public-private partnerships in Russian regions.
The business program in 2026 will place special emphasis on expanding international economic cooperation, primarily with the countries of the Azov-Black Sea and Caspian basins. It is planned that representatives of these countries will actively participate in the forum, which will open up new opportunities for creating international transport and logistics routes and implementing joint investment projects in such areas as mining, ecology and cultural interaction.
According to the decision of the organizing committee for the preparation and holding of KIF-2026, next year the forum will be held from May 17 to 19 in the city of Mineralnye Vody at the MinvodyExpo IEC.
The organizer of the CIF is the Roscongress Foundation with the support of the Ministry of Economic Development.
Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.
Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
CHONGQING, July 10 (Xinhua) — An express train loaded with telecommunications equipment, auto parts and other goods departed from the southwest Chinese metropolis of Chongqing on the China-Europe international rail freight route at around 12 p.m. on Wednesday, marking the start of regular freight express service on the route.
The new services are said to be a new logistics product jointly developed by Chongqing-based supply chain management company Yuxinou and Turkish company Pacific Global Logistics.
The train will cross the border at the Khorgos checkpoint in Northwest China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, pass through Azerbaijan and Georgia, and eventually reach Turkey and then European cities.
Regular operation of such an express will reduce the time for delivery of goods from Chongqing to Europe via the Middle Corridor /Trans-Caspian International Transport Route/ to 25-30 days, which is at least ten days faster than the traditional method, said the chairman of the board of the above-mentioned Turkish company, Askar Sadik.
On the same day, a project was also signed to transform Chongqing into an international procurement hub along the Middle Corridor, establish a cooperation network for enterprises in the fields of trade, industrial chains and supply chains in Eurasia, and establish a mechanism for their regular dialogue. -0-
Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.
Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
CAIRO, July 10 (Xinhua) — China is ready to maintain close communication with Egypt and promote an early ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, Chinese Premier Li Qiang said at a meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi here on Thursday.
According to him, the Chinese side is also willing to work with Egypt to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, prevent the spread and escalation of the conflict, and make unremitting efforts for a comprehensive, fair and lasting settlement of the Palestinian issue. –0–
Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.
Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
CAIRO, July 10 (Xinhua) — China is willing to strengthen cooperation with Egypt under the Belt and Road Initiative in areas including economy, trade, finance, manufacturing, new energy, science and technology, as well as cultural and people-to-people exchanges, Chinese Premier Li Qiang said here on Thursday during a meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
China is ready to encourage more competitive Chinese companies to invest in Egypt’s economy, he added. –0–
Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.
Source: People’s Republic of China – Ministry of National Defense
BEIJING, July 9 — Recently, the 23rd Chinese Peacekeeping Multi-Role Engineering Company to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) passed the UN equipment inspection withhigh standards.
The equipment inspection is conducted under the requirements of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by the UN with the troop-contributing countries to assess whether the peacekeeping troops’ weapons, equipment, and facilities meet corresponding standards.
The inspection team, composed of more than ten members dispatched by the UNIFIL headquarters, thoroughly inspected over 10,000 pieces of equipment in 27 categories including weapons and ammunition, vehicles, mine-clearing equipment, and medical equipment.
Since its deployment, the 23rd Chinese Peacekeeping Multi-Role Engineering Company to UNIFIL has completed minefield clearing, road barrier removal, medical assistance, and various other tasks, contributing to maintaining world peace with concrete actions.
African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) (www.Afreximbank.com) launched the second edition of Foundations and Evolution of Structured Trade Finance, a landmark publication on a specialised field of trade finance shaped by decades of real-world application.
Authored by Professor Benedict O. Oramah, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Afreximbank and a pivotal figure in the development of Structured Trade Finance (STF), the book provides a practical, step-by-step guide to structuring trade finance transactions. It delves into real-world case studies, explores risks and the theoretical foundations of STF, and broadens its scope beyond commodities to address a wide range of trade scenarios.
The updated edition introduces dedicated chapters on reserve-based lending, supply chain finance, and the use of emerging technologies in structured trade finance. These additions make the book particularly relevant in today’s complex and increasingly risk-sensitive global regulatory environment.
Speaking at the book launch and signing event held during the 32nd Afreximbank Annual Meetings in Abuja, Nigeria, Professor Oramah reflected on the significant progress made in trade finance since the early 1990s.
“When I joined Afreximbank in 1994 the world was still grappling with a severe sovereign debt crisis, and structured trade finance was just beginning to emerge as a tool for financing trade in challenging markets.
“As Afreximbank began operations in 1994, we embraced structured trade finance for its ability to mitigate risk. At its core, structured trade finance enables practitioners to be innovative, as its fundamental principle allows for the transfer of risks from parties who are less able to bear them to those who are more capable of absorbing shocks,” said Professor Oramah.
The first edition of the book highlighted trade finance structures that largely supported North-South trade—an approach that contributed to trade diversion, with businesses often favouring extra-African over intra-African trade due to more accessible financing.
Today, global trade dynamics have shifted dramatically. South-South trade now dominates, with Africa’s trade with other developing countries rising from approximately 23% of its total trade in 1995 to an estimated 68% in 2024. Over the same period, Africa’s trade with advanced economies has declined to less than 50%.
Structured Trade Finance has played a transformative role in reversing Africa’s trend of de-industrialisation. By extending beyond commodity-based structures, STF has supported the emergence of African manufacturing hubs, fostered regional and domestic value chains, and enabled the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises. Afreximbank continues to build the continent’s economic future on this foundation of innovation and resilience.
The second edition of Foundations and Evolution of Structured Trade Finance is now available via Globe Law and Business (www.GlobeLawAndBusiness.com), Amazon, and major retailers including Blackwell’s, Waterstones, Wildy’s, Baker & Taylor, and Gardners.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Afreximbank.
Media Contact: Vincent Musumba Communications and Events Manager (Media Relations) Email: press@afreximbank.com
About Afreximbank: African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) is a Pan-African multilateral financial institution mandated to finance and promote intra- and extra-African trade. For over 30 years, the Bank has been deploying innovative structures to deliver financing solutions that support the transformation of the structure of Africa’s trade, accelerating industrialisation and intra-regional trade, thereby boosting economic expansion in Africa. A stalwart supporter of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), Afreximbank has launched a Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) that was adopted by the African Union (AU) as the payment and settlement platform to underpin the implementation of the AfCFTA. Working with the AfCFTA Secretariat and the AU, the Bank has set up a US$10 billion Adjustment Fund to support countries effectively participating in the AfCFTA. At the end of December 2024, Afreximbank’s total assets and contingencies stood at over US$40.1 billion, and its shareholder funds amounted to US$7.2 billion. Afreximbank has investment grade ratings assigned by GCR (international scale) (A), Moody’s (Baa1), China Chengxin International Credit Rating Co., Ltd (CCXI) (AAA), Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR) (A-) and Fitch (BBB-). Afreximbank has evolved into a group entity comprising the Bank, its equity impact fund subsidiary called the Fund for Export Development Africa (FEDA), and its insurance management subsidiary, AfrexInsure (together, “the Group”). The Bank is headquartered in Cairo, Egypt.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) vide public document ‘High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action’ – 13 June 2025, has called on its members and other jurisdictions to refer to the statement on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran adopted in February 2020 which remains in effect. Further, Myanmar was added to the list of High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action in the October 2022 FATF plenary and FATF has called on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risk arising from Myanmar. When applying enhanced due diligence measures, countries have been advised to ensure that flows of funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate NPO activity and remittances are not disrupted. The status of Myanmar in the list of countries subject to a call for action, remains unchanged.
FATF had earlier identified the following jurisdictions as having strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing and had placed the jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring, which had developed action plan with the FATF to deal with them. These jurisdictions were: Algeria, Angola, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Lebanon, Mali, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, South Africa, South Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Venezuela, Vietnam and Yemen. As per the June 13, 2025 FATF public statement, Bolivia and the Virgin Islands (UK) have been added to the list of Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring while Croatia, Mali and Tanzania have been removed from this list based on review by the FATF.
FATF plenary releases documents titled “High-Risk jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action” and “Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring” with respect to jurisdictions that have strategic AML/CFT deficiencies as part of the ongoing efforts to identify and work with jurisdictions with strategic Anti-Money Laundering (AML)/Combating of Financing of Terrorism (CFT) deficiencies. This advice does not preclude the regulated entities from legitimate trade and business transactions with these countries and jurisdictions mentioned there.
The detailed information is available in the updated public statements and document released by FATF on June 13, 2025. The statements and document can be accessed at the following URL:
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 by the Ministers of its Member jurisdictions. The objectives of the FATF are to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF monitors the progress of its members in implementing necessary measures, reviews money laundering and terrorist financing techniques and counter-measures, and promotes the adoption and implementation of appropriate measures globally. The FATF’s decision making body, the FATF Plenary, meets three times a year and updates these statements, which may be noted.
Ajit Prasad Deputy General Manager (Communications)
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) vide public document ‘High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action’ – 13 June 2025, has called on its members and other jurisdictions to refer to the statement on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran adopted in February 2020 which remains in effect. Further, Myanmar was added to the list of High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action in the October 2022 FATF plenary and FATF has called on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risk arising from Myanmar. When applying enhanced due diligence measures, countries have been advised to ensure that flows of funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate NPO activity and remittances are not disrupted. The status of Myanmar in the list of countries subject to a call for action, remains unchanged.
FATF had earlier identified the following jurisdictions as having strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing and had placed the jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring, which had developed action plan with the FATF to deal with them. These jurisdictions were: Algeria, Angola, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Lebanon, Mali, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, South Africa, South Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Venezuela, Vietnam and Yemen. As per the June 13, 2025 FATF public statement, Bolivia and the Virgin Islands (UK) have been added to the list of Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring while Croatia, Mali and Tanzania have been removed from this list based on review by the FATF.
FATF plenary releases documents titled “High-Risk jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action” and “Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring” with respect to jurisdictions that have strategic AML/CFT deficiencies as part of the ongoing efforts to identify and work with jurisdictions with strategic Anti-Money Laundering (AML)/Combating of Financing of Terrorism (CFT) deficiencies. This advice does not preclude the regulated entities from legitimate trade and business transactions with these countries and jurisdictions mentioned there.
The detailed information is available in the updated public statements and document released by FATF on June 13, 2025. The statements and document can be accessed at the following URL:
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 by the Ministers of its Member jurisdictions. The objectives of the FATF are to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF monitors the progress of its members in implementing necessary measures, reviews money laundering and terrorist financing techniques and counter-measures, and promotes the adoption and implementation of appropriate measures globally. The FATF’s decision making body, the FATF Plenary, meets three times a year and updates these statements, which may be noted.
Ajit Prasad Deputy General Manager (Communications)
In response to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announcing sanctions against the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Francesca Albanese, Amnesty International’s Secretary General Agnès Callamard said:
“This is a shameless and transparent attack on the fundamental principles of international justice. Special Rapporteurs are not appointed to please governments or to be popular but to deliver their mandate. Francesca Albanese’s mandate is to advocate for human rights and international law, essential at a time when the very survival of Palestinians in the occupied Gaza Strip is at stake. These sanctions come just days after she published a new report detailing how companies have profited from Israel’s illegal occupation, its brutal system of apartheid and its ongoing genocide in Gaza.
This is a shameless and transparent attack on the fundamental principles of international justice.
Amnesty International’s Secretary General Agnès Callamard
“Following the recent sanctions against the International Criminal Court, the measures announced today are a continuation of the Trump administration’s assault on international law and its efforts to protect the Israeli government from accountability at all costs. They are the latest in a series of Trump administration policies seeking to intimidate and silence those that dare speak out for Palestinians’ human rights. Instead of attacking the Special Rapporteur and further undermining the rule-based order, the US government should focus on putting an end to its unconditional support to Israel, enabling total impunity for its crimes in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
“States must forcefully reject these disgraceful, vindictive sanctions and exert maximum diplomatic pressure on the US government to reverse them. The United Nations must also fully support her as an independent UN expert appointed by the UN Human Rights Council. Governments around the world and all actors who believe in the rule-based order and international law must do everything in their power to mitigate and block the effect of the sanctions against Francesca Albanese and more generally to protect the work and independence of Special Rapporteurs.”
Iran’s president said on Thursday the U.N. nuclear watchdog should drop its “double standards” if Tehran is to resume cooperation with it over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme, Iranian state media reported.
President Masoud Pezeshkian last week enacted a law suspending cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the IAEA said it had pulled its last remaining inspectors out of Iran.
Relations between Iran and the IAEA have worsened since the United States and Israel bombed Iranian nuclear facilities in June, saying they wanted to prevent Tehran developing an atomic weapon. Iran says its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes only and denies seeking atomic weapons.
“The continuation of Iran’s cooperation with the agency (IAEA) depends of the latter correcting its double standards regarding the nuclear file,” state media quoted Pezeshkian as telling European Council President Antonio Costa by phone.
“Any repeated aggression (against Iran) will be met with a more decisive and regrettable response,” he said.
Tehran accuses the IAEA of failing to condemn the attacks by the United States and Israel, and says the nuclear watchdog paved the way for the bombing by issuing a resolution declaring Iran in breach of its non-proliferation obligations.
“Failure to observe the principle of impartiality in reporting is one of the examples that casts doubt on the status and credibility of the IAEA,” Pezeshkian said.
The bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities led to a 12-day war, during which Iran launched drones and missiles at Israel.
IAEA inspectors have not been able to inspect Iran’s facilities since the bombing campaign, even though IAEA chief Rafael Grossi has said it is his top priority.
2. Negotiations ahead of Parliament’s first reading (Rule 72) (action taken)
The decisions of the JURI, TRAN, BUDG, ECON, REGI and EMPL committees to enter into interinstitutional negotiations had been announced on 7 July 2025 (minutes of 7.7.2025, item 5).
As no request for a vote pursuant to Rule 72(2) had been made, the committees responsible had been able to enter into negotiations upon expiry of the deadline.
3. Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 26 June 2025 (debate)
European Council and Commission statements: Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 26 June 2025 (2025/2981(RSP))
The President provided some clarifications on the way in which the debate would be conducted, as a new format was being tested.
António Costa (President of the European Council) and Ursula von der Leyen (President of the Commission) made the statements.
The following spoke: Dolors Montserrat, on behalf of the PPE Group, Kathleen Van Brempt, on behalf of the S&D Group, Kinga Gál, on behalf of the PfE Group, Nicolas Bay, on behalf of the ECR Group, Valérie Hayer, on behalf of the Renew Group, Bas Eickhout, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Manon Aubry, on behalf of The Left Group, René Aust, on behalf of the ESN Group, Paulo Cunha, Nicola Zingaretti, Paolo Borchia, Carlo Fidanza, Estrella Galán, Milan Uhrík, Kostas Papadakis, Luděk Niedermayer, Dan Nica, Marieke Ehlers, Reinhold Lopatka and Javier Moreno Sánchez.
IN THE CHAIR: Christel SCHALDEMOSE Vice-President
The following spoke: Anna Bryłka, Gaetano Pedulla’, Seán Kelly, Marta Temido, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, and Csaba Dömötör.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Maria Grapini, João Oliveira, Alexander Jungbluth, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Malika Sorel and Milan Mazurek.
The following spoke: Maroš Šefčovič (Member of the Commission) and António Costa.
The debate closed.
4. The EU’s post-2027 long-term budget: Parliament’s expectations ahead of the Commission’s proposal (debate)
Council and Commission statements: The EU’s post-2027 long-term budget: Parliament’s expectations ahead of the Commission’s proposal (2025/2803(RSP))
Marie Bjerre (President-in-Office of the Council) and Piotr Serafin (Member of the Commission) made the statements.
The following spoke: Siegfried Mureşan, on behalf of the PPE Group, Mohammed Chahim, on behalf of the S&D Group, Tamás Deutsch, on behalf of the PfE Group, Patryk Jaki, on behalf of the ECR Group, Fabienne Keller, on behalf of the Renew Group, Terry Reintke, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, João Oliveira, on behalf of The Left Group, Alexander Jungbluth, on behalf of the ESN Group, Karlo Ressler, Carla Tavares, Angéline Furet, Johan Van Overtveldt, Lucia Yar, Rasmus Nordqvist, Younous Omarjee, Milan Mazurek, Thomas Geisel, Herbert Dorfmann, Victor Negrescu, Ruggero Razza, Ľubica Karvašová, Andrey Novakov, Nicola Zingaretti, Jaak Madison, Rasmus Andresen, Christian Ehler, Andreas Schieder, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Jean-Marc Germain, Tomasz Buczek, Bogdan Rzońca, Anouk Van Brug, Danuše Nerudová, Sandra Gómez López, Moritz Körner and Janusz Lewandowski.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Georgios Aftias, Thomas Bajada, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Petras Gražulis, Branislav Ondruš, Dariusz Joński, Hélder Sousa Silva and Nina Carberry.
The following spoke: Piotr Serafin and Marie Bjerre.
The debate closed.
(The sitting was suspended at 11:56.)
IN THE CHAIR: Roberta METSOLA President
5. Resumption of the sitting
The sitting resumed at 12:00.
⁂
The following spoke: Terry Reintke.
6. Requests for the waiver of immunity
The competent Austrian authorities had sent the President a request for Harald Vilimsky’s immunity to be waived in connection with legal proceedings in Austria.
Pursuant to Rule 9(1), the request had been referred to the committee responsible, in this case the JURI Committee.
7. Voting time
For detailed results of the votes, see also ‘Results of votes’ and ‘Results of roll-call votes’.
7.1. European Climate Law ***I (vote)
European Climate Law (COM(2025)0524 – C10-0137/2025 – 2025/0524(COD)) – ENVI Committee
REQUESTS FOR AN URGENT DECISION from the Verts/ALE, Renew and S&D groups (Rule 170(5))
Rejected
The following had spoken:
Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Lena Schilling and Tiemo Wölken (movers of the requests), and Jeroen Lenaers (against the requests), before the vote.
(‘Results of votes’, item 1)
7.2. Objection pursuant to Rule 114(3): amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add certain countries to the list of high-risk third countries, and to remove other countries from that list (vote)
Motions for resolutions B10-0311/2025,B10-0315/2025,B10-0316/2025andB10-0318/2025pursuant to Rule 114(3)(minutes of 9.7.2025, item I)
(Majority of Parliament’s component Members required)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION B10-0311/2025
Rejected
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION B10-0315/2025
Rejected
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION B10-0316/2025
Rejected
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTIONB10-0318/2025
Rejected
The following had spoken:
Maria Luís Albuquerque (Member of the Commission), before the vote, to make a statement.
(‘Results of votes’, item 2)
7.3. Objection pursuant to Rule 115(2) and (3): Deforestation Regulation – list of countries presenting a low or high risk (vote)
Motion for a resolution tabled by the ENVI Committee pursuant to Rule 115(2) and (3), on the draft Commission regulation on Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1093 of 22 May 2025 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards a list of countries that present a low or high risk of producing relevant commodities for which the relevant products do not comply with Article 3, point (a) (2025/2739(RPS)) (B10-0321/2025)–Member responsible:Alexander Bernhuber
(Majority of the votes cast)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0149)
(‘Results of votes’, item 3)
7.4. Amending Regulation (EU) No 1026/2012 on certain measures for the purpose of the conservation of fish stocks in relation to countries allowing non-sustainable fishing ***I (vote)
Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1026/2012 on certain measures for the purpose of the conservation of fish stocks in relation to countries allowing non-sustainable fishing [COM(2024)0407 – C10-0098/2024 – 2024/0224(COD)] – Committee on Fisheries. Rapporteur: Thomas Bajada (A10-0070/2025)
(Majority of the votes cast)
PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT
Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0150)
Parliament’s first reading thus closed.
The following had spoken:
Thomas Bajada, before the vote, to make a statement on the basis of Rule 165(4).
(‘Results of votes’, item 4)
7.5. Draft amending budget No 1/2025: entering the surplus of the financial year 2024 (vote)
Report on the Council position on Draft amending budget No 1/2025 of the European Union for the financial year 2025 entering the surplus of the financial year 2024 [09619/2025 – C10-0125/2025 – 2025/0091(BUD)] – Committee on Budgets. Rapporteur: Victor Negrescu (A10-0116/2025)
(Majority of the votes cast)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0151)
The following had spoken:
Victor Negrescu, before the vote, to make a statement on the basis of Rule 165(4).
(‘Results of votes’, item 5)
7.6. Mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund: assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods that occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods that occurred in October 2024 (vote)
Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024 [COM(2025)0250 – C10-0102/2025 – 2025/0138(BUD)] – Committee on Budgets. Rapporteur: Andrzej Halicki (A10-0114/2025)
(Majority of the votes cast)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0152)
(‘Results of votes’, item 6)
7.7. Mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund: Application EGF/2025/000 TA 2025 – Technical assistance at the initiative of the Commission (vote)
Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers – EGF/2025/000 TA 2025 – Technical assistance at the initiative of the Commission [COM(2025)0680 – C10-0103/2025 – 2025/0135(BUD)] – Committee on Budgets. Rapporteur: Jean-Marc Germain (A10-0115/2025)
(Majority of the votes cast)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0153)
The following had spoken:
Jean-Marc Germain, before the vote, to make a statement on the basis of Rule 165(4).
(‘Results of votes’, item 7)
7.8. Product safety and regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports (vote)
Report on product safety and regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports [2025/2037(INI)] – Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection. Rapporteur: Salvatore De Meo (A10-0133/2025)
(Majority of the votes cast)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0154)
(‘Results of votes’, item 8)
7.9. 2023 and 2024 reports on Albania (vote)
Report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania [2025/2017(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Andreas Schieder (A10-0106/2025)
(Majority of the votes cast)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0155)
(‘Results of votes’, item 9)
7.10. 2023 and 2024 reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina (vote)
Report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina [2025/2018(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Ondřej Kolář (A10-0108/2025)
(Majority of the votes cast)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0156)
(‘Results of votes’, item 10)
7.11. 2023 and 2024 reports on North Macedonia (vote)
Report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on North Macedonia [2025/2021(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Thomas Waitz (A10-0118/2025)
(Majority of the votes cast)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0157)
(‘Results of votes’, item 11)
7.12. 2023 and 2024 reports on Georgia (vote)
Report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia [2025/2024(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Rasa Juknevičienė (A10-0110/2025)
(Majority of the votes cast)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0158)
The following had spoken:
– Rasa Juknevičienė, to move an oral amendment to Amendment 9. Parliament had agreed to put the oral amendment to the vote.
– Urmas Paet, to move an oral amendment to paragraph 16. Parliament had agreed to put the oral amendment to the vote.
(‘Results of votes’, item 12)
7.13. Implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals in view of the 2025 High-Level Political Forum (vote)
Report on implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals in view of the 2025 High-Level Political Forum [2025/2014(INI)] – Committee on Development – Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety. Rapporteurs: Robert Biedroń and Nikolas Farantouris (A10-0125/2025)
(Majority of the votes cast)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0159)
The following had spoken:
Robert Biedroń and Nikolas Farantouris, before the vote, to make a statement on the basis of Rule 165(4).
(‘Results of votes’, item 13)
7.14. The human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians (vote)
Motions for resolutions RC-B10-0304/2025, B10-0303/2025, B10-0304/2025, B10-0305/2025, B10-0306/2025, B10-0307/2025 and B10-0308/2025 (2025/2710(RSP))
The debate had taken place on 16 June 2025 (minutes of 16.6.2025, item 21).
(Majority of the votes cast)
JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION RC-B10-0304/2025
Adopted (P10_TA(2025)0160)
(Motion for a resolution B10-0303/2025 fell.)
(‘Results of votes’, item 14)
(The sitting was suspended at 13:01.)
IN THE CHAIR: Sabine VERHEYEN Vice-President
8. Resumption of the sitting
The sitting resumed at 13:05.
9. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting
The minutes of the previous sitting were approved.
10. Lessons from Budapest Pride: the urgent need for an EU wide anti-discrimination law and defending fundamental rights against right-wing attacks (topical debate)
The following spoke: Ana Catarina Mendes to open the debate proposed by the S&D Group.
The following spoke: Marie Bjerre (President-in-Office of the Council) and Michael McGrath (Member of the Commission).
The following spoke: Sven Simon, on behalf of the PPE Group, Klára Dobrev, on behalf of the S&D Group, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, on behalf of the PfE Group, Alessandro Ciriani, on behalf of the ECR Group, Fabienne Keller, on behalf of the Renew Group, Alice Kuhnke, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Manon Aubry, on behalf of The Left Group (the President reminded the speaker of the rules on conduct), Zsuzsanna Borvendég, on behalf of the ESN Group, Maria Walsh, Marc Angel, Tom Vandendriessche, Paolo Inselvini, Sophie Wilmès, Tineke Strik, Irene Montero, Irmhild Boßdorf (the President reminded the House of the rules on conduct), Michał Wawrykiewicz, Raphaël Glucksmann, András László, Georgiana Teodorescu, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Nicolae Ștefănuță, Özlem Demirel, Ewa Zajączkowska-Hernik, Sirpa Pietikäinen, Evin Incir, Petra Steger, Maciej Wąsik, Moritz Körner, Kim Van Sparrentak, Carolina Morace, Markus Buchheit, Adrián Vázquez Lázara, Birgit Sippel, Jaroslava Pokorná Jermanová, Marlena Maląg, Hilde Vautmans (the President reminded the speaker of the rules on conduct), Daniel Freund, Li Andersson, Milan Uhrík, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Krzysztof Śmiszek, Julien Sanchez, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Cynthia Ní Mhurchú, Mélissa Camara, Mary Khan, Alessandro Zan, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, Cristian Terheş, Lukas Sieper on the previous speaker’s remarks (the President took note of this and again reminded the House of the rules on conduct), and Juan Fernando López Aguilar.
The following spoke: Michael McGrath.
IN THE CHAIR: Younous OMARJEE Vice-President
The following spoke: Marie Bjerre.
The debate closed.
11. EU-US trade negotiations (debate)
Council and Commission statements: EU-US trade negotiations (2025/2804(RSP))
Marie Bjerre (President-in-Office of the Council) and Maroš Šefčovič (Member of the Commission) made the statements.
The following spoke: Jörgen Warborn, on behalf of the PPE Group, Kathleen Van Brempt, on behalf of the S&D Group, Enikő Győri, on behalf of the PfE Group, Rihards Kols, on behalf of the ECR Group, Karin Karlsbro, on behalf of the Renew Group, Anna Cavazzini, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Martin Schirdewan, on behalf of The Left Group, Michał Szczerba, Bernd Lange, Séverine Werbrouck, Svenja Hahn, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Lynn Boylan, Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus, Željana Zovko, Brando Benifei, Jorge Martín Frías, Dick Erixon, Dan Barna, Sergey Lagodinsky, Marina Mesure, Kateřina Konečná, Daniel Caspary, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper, Alex Agius Saliba, Gilles Pennelle, Adrian-George Axinia, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, who also answered a blue-card question from Bruno Gonçalves, Catarina Vieira, Pasquale Tridico, Branislav Ondruš, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Silvia Sardone, Jacek Ozdoba, Sophie Wilmès, Lukas Sieper, Céline Imart, Evin Incir, Pierre Pimpie, Anna Zalewska, Massimiliano Salini, Jean-Marc Germain, Francisco José Millán Mon, Cristina Maestre, Miriam Lexmann, Mika Aaltola, Jessika Van Leeuwen, Nina Carberry, Luděk Niedermayer, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Wouter Beke, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Maria Walsh and Michalis Hadjipantela.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Regina Doherty, Maria Grapini, Sebastian Tynkkynen and Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez.
The following spoke: Maroš Šefčovič and Marie Bjerre.
The debate closed.
12. EU Preparedness Union in light of the upcoming wildfire and droughts season (debate)
Council and Commission statements: EU Preparedness Union in light of the upcoming wildfire and droughts season (2025/2771(RSP))
Marie Bjerre (President-in-Office of the Council) made the statement.
IN THE CHAIR: Antonella SBERNA Vice-President
Hadja Lahbib (Member of the Commission) made the statement.
The following spoke: Lena Düpont, on behalf of the PPE Group, Antonio Decaro, on behalf of the S&D Group, Sergio Berlato, on behalf of the ECR Group, Grégory Allione, on behalf of the Renew Group, Benedetta Scuderi, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Valentina Palmisano, on behalf of The Left Group, Raúl de la Hoz Quintano, Marta Temido, Csaba Dömötör, who also answered a blue-card question from Stine Bosse, Diego Solier, Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Elena Kountoura, Nikolaos Anadiotis, Matej Tonin, Leire Pajín, Julien Leonardelli, who also answered blue-card questions from Grégory Allione and Thomas Pellerin-Carlin, Ruggero Razza, who also answered a blue-card question from Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy, Mārtiņš Staķis, Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos, Ana Miguel Pedro, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Ana Miranda Paz, Thomas Pellerin-Carlin, Ana Vasconcelos, Ana Miranda Paz, Péter Magyar, Victor Negrescu, Marjan Šarec, Dimitris Tsiodras, Sofie Eriksson, Giusi Princi, Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Daniel Buda, Hannes Heide, Sunčana Glavak, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Sérgio Humberto and Michalis Hadjipantela.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Francisco José Millán Mon, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Viktória Ferenc, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Ciaran Mullooly, Diana Riba i Giner, Maria Zacharia and Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă.
The following spoke: Hadja Lahbib and Marie Bjerre.
IN THE CHAIR: Martin HOJSÍK Vice-President
The debate closed.
13. Composition of committees and delegations
The ECR Group had notified the President of the following decision changing the composition of the committees and delegations:
– Delegation to the Africa-EU Parliamentary Assembly: Galato Alexandraki was no longer a member
The decision took effect as of that day.
14. Presentation of stockpiling strategies – strengthening response capacities for a changing risk and threat landscape (debate)
Commission statement: Presentation of stockpiling strategies – strengthening response capacities for a changing risk and threat landscape (2025/2790(RSP))
Hadja Lahbib (Member of the Commission) made the statement.
The following spoke: Tomislav Sokol, on behalf of the PPE Group, Christophe Clergeau, on behalf of the S&D Group, Valérie Deloge, on behalf of the PfE Group, Kosma Złotowski, on behalf of the ECR Group, Grégory Allione, on behalf of the Renew Group, Pär Holmgren, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Catarina Martins, on behalf of The Left Group, Christine Anderson, on behalf of the ESN Group, Mirosława Nykiel, Nicolás González Casares, Stine Bosse, Ruth Firmenich, Paulius Saudargas, Marta Temido, Liesbet Sommen and Michalis Hadjipantela.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis and Sebastian Tynkkynen.
The following spoke: Hadja Lahbib.
The debate closed.
15. Alleged misuse of EU funds by Members of the far-right and measures to ensure institutional integrity (debate)
Statements by Parliament: Alleged misuse of EU funds by Members of the far-right and measures to ensure institutional integrity (2025/2808(RSP))
The following spoke: Niclas Herbst, on behalf of the PPE Group, Chloé Ridel, on behalf of the S&D Group, Moritz Körner, on behalf of the Renew Group, Mélissa Camara, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Manon Aubry, on behalf of The Left Group, Arno Bausemer, on behalf of the ESN Group, Tomáš Zdechovský, who also answered a blue-card question from Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Giuseppe Lupo, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, who also answered blue-card questions from Tomáš Zdechovský and Sebastian Tynkkynen, Daniel Freund, who also answered blue-card questions from Arno Bausemer and Moritz Körner (the President reminded the speaker to keep to the subject of the debate), Jonas Sjöstedt, Reinhold Lopatka, Andreas Schieder and Helmut Brandstätter.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Juan Fernando López Aguilar.
The debate closed.
16. Democratic Republic of the Congo-Rwanda peace deal agreement (debate)
Council and Commission statements: Democratic Republic of the Congo-Rwanda peace deal agreement (2025/2792(RSP))
Jozef Síkela (Member of the Commission) made the statement on behalf of the Commission.
The following spoke: Ingeborg Ter Laak, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marit Maij, on behalf of the S&D Group, Philippe Olivier, on behalf of the PfE Group, Nicolas Bay, on behalf of the ECR Group, Hilde Vautmans, on behalf of the Renew Group, Mounir Satouri, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Marc Botenga, on behalf of The Left Group, Wouter Beke and Francisco Assis.
IN THE CHAIR: Victor NEGRESCU Vice-President
The following spoke: France Jamet, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Pernando Barrena Arza, Jan Farský and Hannes Heide.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Juan Fernando López Aguilar.
The following spoke: Jozef Síkela.
The debate closed.
17. Outcome of the Conference on the Financing for Development in Seville (debate)
Council and Commission statements: Outcome of the Conference on the Financing for Development in Seville (2025/2793(RSP))
Marie Bjerre (President-in-Office of the Council) and Jozef Síkela (Member of the Commission) made the statements.
The following spoke: Lukas Mandl, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marit Maij, on behalf of the S&D Group, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, on behalf of the PfE Group, Mario Mantovani, on behalf of the ECR Group, Barry Andrews, on behalf of the Renew Group, Isabella Lövin, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Marc Jongen, on behalf of the ESN Group, Udo Bullmann, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Beatrice Timgren, Charles Goerens, Leire Pajín, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, Robert Biedroń, Murielle Laurent, Francisco Assis and Joanna Scheuring-Wielgus.
The following spoke: Jozef Síkela and Marie Bjerre.
The debate closed.
18. 51 years after the Turkish invasion of the Republic of Cyprus: condemning the continued Turkish occupation and supporting the resumption of negotiations for a comprehensive solution in line with international law, the UNSC resolutions, EU principles and acquis (debate)
Commission statement: 51 years after the Turkish invasion of the Republic of Cyprus: condemning the continued Turkish occupation and supporting the resumption of negotiations for a comprehensive solution in line with international law, the UNSC resolutions, EU principles and acquis (2025/2794(RSP))
Jozef Síkela (Member of the Commission) made the statement.
The following spoke: Loucas Fourlas, on behalf of the PPE Group, Costas Mavrides, on behalf of the S&D Group, Afroditi Latinopoulou, on behalf of the PfE Group, Geadis Geadi, on behalf of the ECR Group, Kai Tegethoff, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Giorgos Georgiou, on behalf of The Left Group, and Marc Jongen, on behalf of the ESN Group.
The following spoke: Jozef Síkela.
The debate closed.
19. Debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (debate)
(For the titles and authors of the motions for resolutions, see minutes of 9.7.2025, item I.)
19.1. Case of Ryan Cornelius in Dubai
Motions for resolutions B10-0328/2025, B10-0333/2025, B10-0336/2025, B10-0340/2025 and B10-0341/2025 (2025/2796(RSP))
Seán Kelly and Aodhán Ó Ríordáin introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.
IN THE CHAIR: Javi LÓPEZ Vice-President
Petras Auštrevičius and Catarina Vieira introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.
The following spoke: Reinhold Lopatka, on behalf of the PPE Group, and Barry Andrews, on behalf of the Renew Group.
The following spoke: Jozef Síkela (Member of the Commission).
The debate closed.
Vote: 10 July 2025.
19.2. Arbitrary arrest and torture of Belgian-Portuguese researcher Joseph Figueira Martin in the Central African Republic
Motions for resolutions B10-0323/2025, B10-0327/2025, B10-0334/2025, B10-0339/2025 and B10-0342/2025 (2025/2797(RSP))
Wouter Beke, Francisco Assis, Hilde Vautmans, Saskia Bricmont and Catarina Martins introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.
The following spoke: Kathleen Van Brempt, on behalf of the S&D Group, and João Cotrim De Figueiredo, on behalf of the Renew Group.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Seán Kelly.
The following spoke: Jozef Síkela (Member of the Commission).
The debate closed.
Vote: 10 July 2025.
19.3. Urgent need to protect religious minorities in Syria following the recent terrorist attack on Mar Elias Church in Damascus
Motions for resolutions B10-0325/2025, B10-0335/2025, B10-0338/2025, B10-0343/2025, B10-0344/2025, B10-0345/2025, B10-0346/2025 and B10-0347/2025 (2025/2798(RSP))
Ingeborg Ter Laak, Marco Tarquinio, Nathalie Loiseau, Hannah Neumann, Nikolas Farantouris, Silvia Sardone, Bert-Jan Ruissen and Tomasz Froelich introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.
The following spoke: Sander Smit, on behalf of the PPE Group, Yannis Maniatis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Matthieu Valet, on behalf of the PfE Group, Małgorzata Gosiewska, on behalf of the ECR Group, Michalis Hadjipantela, Evin Incir, Margarita de la Pisa Carrión, Laurence Trochu, Christophe Gomart, Paolo Inselvini, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński and Geadis Geadi.
The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Fredis Beleris and Costas Mavrides.
The following spoke: Jozef Síkela (Member of the Commission).
The debate closed.
Vote: 10 July 2025.
20. Explanations of votes in writing (Rule 201)
Explanations of votes given in writing would appear on the Members’ pages on Parliament’s website.
21. Agenda of the next sitting
The next sitting would be held the following day, 10 July 2025, starting at 09:00. The agenda was available on Parliament’s website.
22. Approval of the minutes of the sitting
In accordance with Rule 208(3), the minutes of the sitting would be put to the House for approval at the beginning of the afternoon of the next sitting.
23. Closure of the sitting
The sitting closed at 22:02.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVING AS A BASIS FOR THE DEBATES AND DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENT
I. Motions for resolutions tabled
Case of Ryan Cornelius in Dubai
The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:
on the case of Ryan Cornelius in Dubai (2025/2796(RSP)) (B10-0328/2025) Rasmus Andresen, Villy Søvndal, Maria Ohisalo, Nicolae Ștefănuță, Mélissa Camara, Mounir Satouri, Catarina Vieira, Ville Niinistö on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
on the case of Ryan Cornelius in Dubai (2025/2796(RSP)) (B10-0333/2025) Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar on behalf of the Renew Group
on the case of Ryan Cornelius in Dubai (2025/2796(RSP)) (B10-0336/2025) Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin on behalf of The Left Group
on the case of Ryan Cornelius in Dubai (2025/2796(RSP)) (B10-0340/2025) Sebastião Bugalho, Seán Kelly, Tomáš Zdechovský, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Tomas Tobé, Wouter Beke, Davor Ivo Stier, Łukasz Kohut, Mirosława Nykiel, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Inese Vaidere on behalf of the PPE Group
on the case of Ryan Cornelius in Dubai (2025/2796(RSP)) (B10-0341/2025) Adam Bielan, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Marlena Maląg, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Ivaylo Valchev, Anna Zalewska, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová on behalf of the ECR Group
Arbitrary arrest and torture of Belgian-Portuguese researcher Joseph Figueira Martin in the Central African Republic
The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:
on the arbitrary arrest and torture of Belgian-Portuguese researcher Joseph Figueira Martin in the Central African Republic (2025/2797(RSP)) (B10-0323/2025) Catarina Martins on behalf of The Left Group
on the arbitrary arrest and torture of Belgian-Portuguese researcher Joseph Figueira Martin in the Central African Republic (2025/2797(RSP)) (B10-0327/2025) Yannis Maniatis, Kathleen Van Brempt, Francisco Assis on behalf of the S&D Group Saskia Bricmont, Mélissa Camara, Catarina Vieira, Maria Ohisalo, Mounir Satouri, Nicolae Ștefănuță, Ville Niinistö on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
on the arbitrary arrest and torture of Belgian-Portuguese researcher Joseph Figueira Martin in the Central African Republic (2025/2797(RSP)) (B10-0334/2025) Hilde Vautmans, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Lucia Yar on behalf of the Renew Group
on the arbitrary arrest and torture of Belgian-Portuguese researcher Joseph Figueira Martin in the Central African Republic (2025/2797(RSP)) (B10-0339/2025) Sebastião Bugalho, Wouter Beke, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Andrey Kovatchev, Tomas Tobé, Tomáš Zdechovský, Davor Ivo Stier, Łukasz Kohut, Liudas Mažylis, Vangelis Meimarakis, Loránt Vincze, Seán Kelly, Mirosława Nykiel, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Inese Vaidere on behalf of the PPE Group
on the arbitrary arrest and torture of Belgian-Portuguese researcher Joseph Figueira Martin in the Central African Republic (2025/2797(RSP)) (B10-0342/2025) Adam Bielan, Aurelijus Veryga, Carlo Fidanza, Marlena Maląg, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alexandr Vondra, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Ivaylo Valchev, Alberico Gambino, Anna Zalewska, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Assita Kanko, Michał Dworczyk, Waldemar Tomaszewski on behalf of the ECR Group
Urgent need to protect religious minorities in Syria following the recent terrorist attack on Mar Elias Church in Damascus
The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:
on the urgent need to protect religious minorities in Syria following the recent terrorist attack on Mar Elias Church in Damascus (2025/2798(RSP)) (B10-0325/2025) Nikolas Farantouris, Özlem Demirel on behalf of The Left Group
on the urgent need to protect religious minorities in Syria following the recent terrorist attack on Mar Elias Church in Damascus (2025/2798(RSP)) (B10-0335/2025) Hannah Neumann, Maria Ohisalo, Katrin Langensiepen, Nicolae Ștefănuță, Mounir Satouri, Catarina Vieira on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
on the urgent need to protect religious minorities in Syria following the recent terrorist attack on Mar Elias Church in Damascus (2025/2798(RSP)) (B10-0338/2025) Tomasz Froelich, Petr Bystron, Alexander Sell, Marc Jongen on behalf of the ESN Group
on the urgent need to protect religious minorities in Syria following the recent terrorist attack on Mar Elias Church in Damascus (2025/2798(RSP)) (B10-0343/2025) Silvia Sardone, Susanna Ceccardi, Roberto Vannacci, Matthieu Valet, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, António Tânger Corrêa, Afroditi Latinopoulou, Hermann Tertsch on behalf of the PfE Group
on the urgent need to protect religious minorities in Syria following the recent terrorist attack on Mar Elias Church in Damascus (2025/2798(RSP)) (B10-0344/2025) Nathalie Loiseau, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar on behalf of the Renew Group
on the urgent need to protect religious minorities in Syria following the recent terrorist attack on Mar Elias Church in Damascus (2025/2798(RSP)) (B10-0345/2025) Adam Bielan, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Aurelijus Veryga, Carlo Fidanza, Marlena Maląg, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Alexandr Vondra, Reinis Pozņaks, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Emmanouil Fragkos, Ivaylo Valchev, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Guillaume Peltier, Alberico Gambino, Marion Maréchal, Nicolas Bay, Laurence Trochu, Anna Zalewska, Assita Kanko, Waldemar Tomaszewski on behalf of the ECR Group
on the urgent need to protect religious minorities in Syria following the recent terrorist attack on Mar Elias Church in Damascus (2025/2798(RSP)) (B10-0346/2025) Sebastião Bugalho, Ingeborg Ter Laak, David McAllister, François-Xavier Bellamy, Andrzej Halicki, Wouter Beke, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Andrey Kovatchev, Tomas Tobé, Tomáš Zdechovský, Davor Ivo Stier, Sander Smit, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Eleonora Meleti, Vangelis Meimarakis, Georgios Aftias, Dimitris Tsiodras, Emmanouil Kefalogiannis, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Matej Tonin, Massimiliano Salini, Łukasz Kohut, Loránt Vincze, Seán Kelly, Mirosława Nykiel, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Inese Vaidere, Michalis Hadjipantela, Miriam Lexmann on behalf of the PPE Group
on the urgent need to protect religious minorities in Syria following the recent terrorist attack on Mar Elias Church in Damascus (2025/2798(RSP)) (B10-0347/2025) Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Marco Tarquinio, Hana Jalloul Muro, Evin Incir, Nikos Papandreou on behalf of the S&D Group
Objection pursuant to Rule 114(3): amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add certain countries to the list of high-risk third countries, and to remove other countries from that list
Motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 114(3) by Jorge Buxadé Villalba, on behalf of the PfE Group, on the Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list (C(2025)3815) – 2025/2740(DEA)) (B10-0311/2025)
Motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 114(3) by Rasmus Andresen, Kira Marie Peter-Hansen, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Murielle Laurent, Brando Benifei, Kathleen Van Brempt, Francisco Assis, Raphaël Glucksmann, Aurore Lalucq, Cecilia Strada, Christophe Clergeau, Eric Sargiacomo, Nora Mebarek, Chloé Ridel, Claire Fita, Thomas Pellerin-Carlin, Birgit Sippel, Gabriele Bischoff, Lucia Annunziata, Sandro Ruotolo, Emma Rafowicz, Pina Picierno, Alessandra Moretti, Pierre Jouvet, Annalisa Corrado, Evelyn Regner, Jean-Marc Germain, Marco Tarquinio, Udo Bullmann, Alessandro Zan, on the Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list (C(2025)3815) – 2025/2740(DEA)) (B10-0315/2025)
Motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 114(3) by Damien Carême, Jussi Saramo, on behalf of The Left Group, on the Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list (C(2025)03815 – 2025/2740(DEA)) (B10-0316/2025)
Motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 114(3) by Luděk Niedermayer, Javier Zarzalejos, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Maravillas Abadía Jover, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Francisco José Millán Mon, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Gabriel Mato, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Esther Herranz García, Borja Giménez Larraz, Raúl de la Hoz Quintano, Susana Solís Pérez, Alma Ezcurra Almansa, Dolors Montserrat, Elena Nevado del Campo, Adrián Vázquez Lázara, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Marco Falcone, Esteban González Pons, Pablo Arias Echeverría, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Danuše Nerudová, David Casa, Tomáš Zdechovský, Kinga Kollár, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Herbert Dorfmann, Christophe Gomart, Ondřej Kolář, Jan Farský, Michalis Hadjipantela, Siegfried Mureşan, Dan-Ştefan Motreanu, Virgil-Daniel Popescu, Iuliu Winkler, Gheorghe Falcă, Mircea-Gheorghe Hava, Daniel Buda, Paulius Saudargas, Maria Walsh, Loucas Fourlas, Verena Mertens, François-Xavier Bellamy, Karlo Ressler, Laurent Castillo, Sirpa Pietikäinen, Andrzej Halicki, on the Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list (C(2025)03815 – 2025/2740(DEA)) (B10-0318/2025)
The human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians
Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 136(2) to wind up the debate:
on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians (2025/2710(RSP)) (B10-0303/2025) Özlem Demirel, Danilo Della Valle on behalf of The Left Group
on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians (2025/2710(RSP)) (B10-0304/2025) Sergey Lagodinsky, Markéta Gregorová, Ville Niinistö, Jutta Paulus, Mārtiņš Staķis on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians (2025/2710(RSP)) (B10-0305/2025) Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Thijs Reuten on behalf of the S&D Group
on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians (2025/2710(RSP)) (B10-0306/2025) Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Siegfried Mureşan, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Krzysztof Brejza, Lena Düpont, Jan Farský, Mircea-Gheorghe Hava, Rasa Juknevičienė, Ewa Kopacz, Andrey Kovatchev, Reinhold Lopatka, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Liudas Mažylis, Ana Miguel Pedro, Paulius Saudargas, Oliver Schenk, Michał Szczerba, Davor Ivo Stier, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Riho Terras, Pekka Toveri, Inese Vaidere on behalf of the PPE Group
on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians (2025/2710(RSP)) (B10-0307/2025) Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Anna-Maja Henriksson, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas on behalf of the Renew Group
on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians (2025/2710(RSP)) (B10-0308/2025) Michał Dworczyk, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Anna Zalewska, Reinis Pozņaks, Roberts Zīle, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Bogdan Rzońca, Rihards Kols, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Aurelijus Veryga, Charlie Weimers, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Assita Kanko, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Adam Bielan, Mariusz Kamiński on behalf of the ECR Group
Joint motion for a resolution tabled under Rule 136(2) and (4):
on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians (2025/2710(RSP)) (RC-B10-0304/2025) (replacing motions for resolutionsB10-0304/2025, B10-0305/2025, B10-0306/2025, B10-0307/2025 and B10-0308/2025) Michael Gahler, Andrzej Halicki, Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Siegfried Mureşan, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Krzysztof Brejza, Lena Düpont, Jan Farský, Mircea-Gheorghe Hava, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Ewa Kopacz, Andrey Kovatchev, Reinhold Lopatka, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Liudas Mažylis, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Ana Miguel Pedro, Paulius Saudargas, Oliver Schenk, Michał Szczerba, Davor Ivo Stier, Alice Teodorescu Måwe, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Pekka Toveri, Inese Vaidere on behalf of the PPE Group Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Thijs Reuten on behalf of the S&D Group Adam Bielan, Michał Dworczyk, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Roberts Zīle, Reinis Pozņaks, Ivaylo Valchev, Aurelijus Veryga, Mariusz Kamiński, Charlie Weimers, Alexandr Vondra, Assita Kanko, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński on behalf of the ECR Group Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Anna-Maja Henriksson, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas on behalf of the Renew Group Sergey Lagodinsky on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
II. Documents received
The following documents had been received from other institutions:
– Proposal for transfer of appropriations INF 6/2025 – Section VI – Economic and Social Committee (N10-0026/2025 – C10-0131/2025 – 2025/2123(GBD)) referred to committee responsible: BUDG
– Proposal for transfer of appropriations V/INF-01/C/25 – Section V – Court of Auditors (N10-0027/2025 – C10-0132/2025 – 2025/2124(GBD)) referred to committee responsible: BUDG
– Proposal for transfer of appropriations V/INF-02/C/25 – Section V – Court of Auditors (N10-0028/2025 – C10-0133/2025 – 2025/2125(GBD)) referred to committee responsible: BUDG
– Proposal for transfer of appropriations V/INF-03/T/25 – Section V – Court of Auditors (N10-0029/2025 – C10-0134/2025 – 2025/2126(GBD)) referred to committee responsible: BUDG
– Proposal for transfer of appropriations V/INF-04/A/25 – Section V – Court of Auditors (N10-0030/2025 – C10-0135/2025 – 2025/2127(GBD)) referred to committee responsible: BUDG
– Proposal for transfer of appropriations V/INF-05/C/25 – Section V – Court of Auditors (N10-0031/2025 – C10-0136/2025 – 2025/2128(GBD)) referred to committee responsible: BUDG
– Proposal for transfer of appropriations 1/2025 – Section VIII – European Ombudsman (N10-0032/2025 – C10-0138/2025 – 2025/2129(GBD)) referred to committee responsible: BUDG
III. Delegated acts (Rule 114(2))
Draft delegated acts forwarded to Parliament
– Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the minimum contents of the liquidity management policy and procedures for certain issuers of asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens (C(2025)00602 – 2025/2777(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 27 June 2025
referred to committee responsible: ECON
– Commission Delegated Regulation amending the regulatory technical standards laid down in Delegated Regulations (EU) 2017/583 and (EU) 2017/587 as regards transparency requirements for trading venues and investment firms in respect of bonds, structured finance products, emission allowances and equity instruments (C(2025)03104 – 2025/2773(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 18 June 2025
referred to committee responsible: ECON
– Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards an increase of the minimum mesh size when fishing for squid in the North Sea and North Western Waters (C(2025)03720 – 2025/2769(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 16 June 2025
Extension of the deadline for raising objections: 2 months at the European Parliament’s request
referred to committee responsible: PECH
– Commission Delegated Regulation correcting certain language versions of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1366 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing a network code on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows (C(2025)03833 – 2025/2774(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 19 June 2025
referred to committee responsible: ITRE
– Commission Delegated Directive adapting to scientific and technical progress Annexes I and II to Directive (EU) 2022/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council on uniform procedures for checks on the transport of dangerous goods by road (C(2025)03886 – 2025/2775(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 23 June 2025
referred to committee responsible: TRAN
– Commission Delegated Regulation amending Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/2534 on household tumble dryers regarding information on repairability and clarifying some aspects of the measurements and calculation methods, the product information sheet, the technical documentation and the verification procedure (C(2025)03986 – 2025/2782(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 1 July 2025
referred to committee responsible: ITRE
– Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 as regards the correction of the territorial scope of provisions concerning short-necked clam and red seabream (C(2025)04074 – 2025/2778(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 27 June 2025
referred to committee responsible: PECH
– Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the method for identifying the main risk driver of a position and for determining whether a transaction represents a long or a short position as referred to in Articles 94(3), 273a(3) and 325a(2) (C(2025)04105 – 2025/2781(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 1 July 2025
referred to committee responsible: ECON
– Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Directive (EU) 2024/1275 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the establishment of a comparative methodology framework for calculating cost-optimal levels of minimum energy performance requirements for buildings and building elements (C(2025)04133 – 2025/2779(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 30 June 2025
referred to committee responsible: ITRE opinion: TRAN
– Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the conditions for assessing the materiality of extensions of, and changes to, the use of alternative internal models, and changes to the subset of the modellable risk factors (C(2025)04338 – 2025/2805(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 3 July 2025
referred to committee responsible: ECON
– Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council by laying down the technical conditions and procedures under which providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines are to share data with vetted researchers (C(2025)04340 – 2025/2799(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 2 July 2025
referred to committee responsible: IMCO opinion: ITRE, JURI, LIBE
– Commission Delegated Regulation amending Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2178 as regards the simplification of the content and presentation of information to be disclosed concerning environmentally sustainable activities and Commission Delegated Regulations (EU) 2021/2139 and (EU) 2023/2486 as regards simplification of certain technical screening criteria for determining whether economic activities cause no significant harm to environmental objectives (C(2025)04568 – 2025/2806(DEA))
Deadline for raising objections: 4 months from the date of receipt of 4 July 2025
referred to committee responsible: ECON, ENVI
Draft delegated act for which the period for raising objections had been extended
– Commission Delegated Regulation on the implementation of the Union’s international obligations, as referred to in Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part, as regards picked dogfish C(2025)03715 – 2025/2768(DEA)
Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 13 June 2025
Extension of the deadline for raising objections: 2 months at the request of the European Parliament
referred to committee responsible: PECH
IV. Transfers of appropriations and budgetary decisions
In accordance with Article 31(1) of the Financial Regulation, the Committee on Budgets had decided to approve the European Commission’s transfers of appropriations DEC 08/2025, DEC 09/2025 and DEC 10/2025 – Section III – Commission.
V. Action taken on Parliament’s positions and resolutions
The Commission communication on the action taken on the resolutions adopted by Parliament during the March 2025 part-session (third part) was available on Parliament’s website.
Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
JERUSALEM, July 10 (Xinhua) — The Israeli army said it intercepted a rocket fired from Yemen toward Israel early Thursday morning, after air raid sirens went off in several areas including Tel Aviv.
Israel’s national health service, Magen David Adom, said it had received no reports of casualties.
The Houthis have not yet commented on this information.
The missile was fired days after Israel launched massive airstrikes on Sunday against Houthi-controlled targets, including three Red Sea ports, a power plant and a ship.
Israel has carried out a barrage of strikes on key ports and infrastructure in Yemen in recent months, while the Houthis continue to fire rockets into Israel, claiming to be acting in solidarity with Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. –0–
Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
SCIO organizes media trip to exhibition marking 80th anniversary of victory against Japanese aggression, fascism
China SCIO | July 10, 2025
The State Council Information Office (SCIO) organized a media trip on Tuesday to the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in Beijing. The participating journalists included foreign correspondents from the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Iraq. The group visited a themed exhibition in commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.
Lai Shengliang, deputy curator of the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, introduces the exhibition to reporters in Beijing, July 8, 2025. [Photo by Liu Jian/China SCIO]
Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –
An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.
Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News
UNITED NATIONS, July 10 (Xinhua) — China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Geng Shuang called on Yemen’s Houthis to stop attacking merchant ships in the Red Sea at a UN Security Council meeting on Wednesday.
China expresses deep concern over the recent armed attacks on two cargo ships in the Red Sea and once again calls on the Houthis to respect the navigation rights of commercial vessels of all countries in the Red Sea in accordance with international law, refrain from attacking commercial vessels and ensure the safety of the Red Sea waterways, the Chinese diplomat said.
China is concerned about the latest exchange of attacks between the Houthis and Israel and the deteriorating situation, Geng Shuang said. “We call on all parties to exercise calm and restraint and refrain from actions that lead to escalation of tensions,” he said.
The Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the UN called on all parties to the conflict in Yemen to show political will, strengthen dialogue, gradually build mutual trust and create conditions for a final political settlement of the Yemeni crisis.
He also called on the international community to increase humanitarian aid to Yemen and help alleviate the humanitarian crisis on the ground.
According to Geng Shuang, the settlement of the problems in Yemen and the Red Sea is impossible without easing and de-escalating the overall situation in the region. “The war in Gaza must be stopped as soon as possible. The humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza must be stopped as soon as possible. The principle of “two states for two peoples” must be implemented as soon as possible,” he noted.
The US-led ceasefire between Israel and Iran must be respected, the Chinese diplomat added, saying the sovereignty of the state must be respected and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter must be upheld. –0–
Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.
On July 6, an arson attack targeted the East Melbourne Synagogue. It was the latest in a series of antisemitic incidents recorded across Australia since October 7 2023, when Hamas carried out a horrific terrorist attack, killing about 1,200 Israelis. These domestic incidents have escalated in both number and severity.
Australia has not previously experienced antisemitism at this scale. In response, the Albanese government appointed Jillian Segal as the nation’s first special envoy for combating antisemitism, and commissioned a plan with recommendations to address the issue.
1. Preventing violence and crime, including a proposed law enforcement framework to improve coordination between agencies, and new policies aimed at stopping dangerous individuals from entering Australia.
2. Strengthening protections against hate speech, by regulating all forms of hate, including antisemitism, and increasing oversight of platform policies and algorithms.
3. Promoting antisemitism-free media, education and cultural spaces, through journalist training, education programs, and conditions on public funding for organisations that promote or fail to address antisemitism.
The government has said it will consider the recommendations.
These measures are broadly reasonable and make practical sense. Some – such as those aimed at preventing violence and crime – are more straightforward to implement than others. It would also be logical to apply them to all forms of hate, not just antisemitism.
But that needs to be done with caution. We don’t want to create an environment in which any criticism of a community or group is shut down by regulation.
In a democracy, open and robust debate is essential. The challenge lies in the details: how we define hate, and where we draw the threshold for what counts as hate.
The document ignores the elephant in the room: whether the plan could be used to silence legitimate criticism of Israel.
The special envoy’s plan notes antisemitism has risen since October 7, but it does not fully explain the context. Israel’s military response in Gaza, which has killed more than 57,000 Palestinians, has prompted a wave of global protest and criticism of Israel, including accusations of genocide.
In this context, the line between antisemitism and criticism of Israel has become more difficult and contested than ever. Some people who attack Israel or Zionism may be expressing antisemitic views. Others may not. Distinguishing between the two is complex, but essential.
The envoy adopts the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s definition of antisemitism, which covers both direct attacks on Jewish identity and certain criticisms of Israel, such as comparisons with Nazi Germany.
In my experience as a researcher working on online hate (including antisemitism), even members of the Jewish community adopting this definition often disagree on how to apply it.
The threshold varies – for example when deciding whether an online post or a statement crosses the line into antisemitism.
So where should we draw that line? It’s a crucial question. If the envoy’s recommendations are implemented, decisions about funding, visas, and even criminal charges could depend on it.
There is, of course, broad agreement on some cases. Setting fire to a synagogue is clearly antisemitic – it targets a Jewish place of worship.
Similarly, attacking a Jewish-owned business or damaging property in a Jewish neighbourhood suggests the target was chosen because it was Jewish.
Some people – often those already harbouring anti-Jewish views – treat the entire Jewish community as if it represents the Netanyahu government or the Israel Defense Forces.
This ignores the diversity of views within Jewish communities. That lack of nuance fuels antisemitism.
Few would disagree that antisemitic acts include attacks on Jewish people or property carried out indiscriminately, or when anti-Israel protests attempt to hold the whole Jewish community collectively responsible for the actions of the Israeli government.
But we also need to be realistic. We are unlikely to eliminate all forms of antisemitic hate or intimidation from public life. Hate can be expressed without breaching laws, and people can intimidate others while staying just within legal boundaries.
Humour, sarcasm and coded language are often used to incite hatred without triggering any formal consequence. That kind of harm is much harder to prevent – and it may be something we have to learn to live with, while continuing to push back against it.
Rebuilding trust
In the long term, the only real solution is building mutual understanding. That’s why personal relationships matter.
Knowing someone who is Jewish is one of the strongest antidotes to antisemitism. When you have a Jewish friend, you’re less likely to believe or spread the myths that circulate online and offline about what Jewish people think, believe or represent.
The same applies to all forms of hate. Direct contact helps break down stereotypes across all communities.
The problem is that the current context is pushing communities apart. Segregation and isolation are increasing. Before October 7, there was meaningful interfaith work happening – Jewish students visiting the Islamic Museum, Muslim students visiting the Holocaust Museum. That work has largelystopped.
Now, people are retreating into fear, distrust and generalisations. All nuance is lost. The “other” becomes a single, threatening enemy.
It will take time to rebuild that trust – and the longer the war continues, the harder it will be.
Matteo Vergani receives funding from the Campbell Collaboration, NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet, the Department of Home Affairs.
On July 6, an arson attack targeted the East Melbourne Synagogue. It was the latest in a series of antisemitic incidents recorded across Australia since October 7 2023, when Hamas carried out a horrific terrorist attack, killing about 1,200 Israelis. These domestic incidents have escalated in both number and severity.
Australia has not previously experienced antisemitism at this scale. In response, the Albanese government appointed Jillian Segal as the nation’s first special envoy for combating antisemitism, and commissioned a plan with recommendations to address the issue.
1. Preventing violence and crime, including a proposed law enforcement framework to improve coordination between agencies, and new policies aimed at stopping dangerous individuals from entering Australia.
2. Strengthening protections against hate speech, by regulating all forms of hate, including antisemitism, and increasing oversight of platform policies and algorithms.
3. Promoting antisemitism-free media, education and cultural spaces, through journalist training, education programs, and conditions on public funding for organisations that promote or fail to address antisemitism.
The government has said it will consider the recommendations.
These measures are broadly reasonable and make practical sense. Some – such as those aimed at preventing violence and crime – are more straightforward to implement than others. It would also be logical to apply them to all forms of hate, not just antisemitism.
But that needs to be done with caution. We don’t want to create an environment in which any criticism of a community or group is shut down by regulation.
In a democracy, open and robust debate is essential. The challenge lies in the details: how we define hate, and where we draw the threshold for what counts as hate.
The document ignores the elephant in the room: whether the plan could be used to silence legitimate criticism of Israel.
The special envoy’s plan notes antisemitism has risen since October 7, but it does not fully explain the context. Israel’s military response in Gaza, which has killed more than 57,000 Palestinians, has prompted a wave of global protest and criticism of Israel, including accusations of genocide.
In this context, the line between antisemitism and criticism of Israel has become more difficult and contested than ever. Some people who attack Israel or Zionism may be expressing antisemitic views. Others may not. Distinguishing between the two is complex, but essential.
The envoy adopts the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s definition of antisemitism, which covers both direct attacks on Jewish identity and certain criticisms of Israel, such as comparisons with Nazi Germany.
In my experience as a researcher working on online hate (including antisemitism), even members of the Jewish community adopting this definition often disagree on how to apply it.
The threshold varies – for example when deciding whether an online post or a statement crosses the line into antisemitism.
So where should we draw that line? It’s a crucial question. If the envoy’s recommendations are implemented, decisions about funding, visas, and even criminal charges could depend on it.
There is, of course, broad agreement on some cases. Setting fire to a synagogue is clearly antisemitic – it targets a Jewish place of worship.
Similarly, attacking a Jewish-owned business or damaging property in a Jewish neighbourhood suggests the target was chosen because it was Jewish.
Some people – often those already harbouring anti-Jewish views – treat the entire Jewish community as if it represents the Netanyahu government or the Israel Defense Forces.
This ignores the diversity of views within Jewish communities. That lack of nuance fuels antisemitism.
Few would disagree that antisemitic acts include attacks on Jewish people or property carried out indiscriminately, or when anti-Israel protests attempt to hold the whole Jewish community collectively responsible for the actions of the Israeli government.
But we also need to be realistic. We are unlikely to eliminate all forms of antisemitic hate or intimidation from public life. Hate can be expressed without breaching laws, and people can intimidate others while staying just within legal boundaries.
Humour, sarcasm and coded language are often used to incite hatred without triggering any formal consequence. That kind of harm is much harder to prevent – and it may be something we have to learn to live with, while continuing to push back against it.
Rebuilding trust
In the long term, the only real solution is building mutual understanding. That’s why personal relationships matter.
Knowing someone who is Jewish is one of the strongest antidotes to antisemitism. When you have a Jewish friend, you’re less likely to believe or spread the myths that circulate online and offline about what Jewish people think, believe or represent.
The same applies to all forms of hate. Direct contact helps break down stereotypes across all communities.
The problem is that the current context is pushing communities apart. Segregation and isolation are increasing. Before October 7, there was meaningful interfaith work happening – Jewish students visiting the Islamic Museum, Muslim students visiting the Holocaust Museum. That work has largelystopped.
Now, people are retreating into fear, distrust and generalisations. All nuance is lost. The “other” becomes a single, threatening enemy.
It will take time to rebuild that trust – and the longer the war continues, the harder it will be.
Matteo Vergani receives funding from the Campbell Collaboration, NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet, the Department of Home Affairs.
1 / 7Show Caption +Hide Caption –Samantha Beltran, left, Joint Theater Forensic Analysis Center Army CID FXD latent print examiner, demonstrates fingerprint analysis techniques to French Forces in Djibouti personnel at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, June 12, 2025. The JTFAC analyzes evidence from the field, including DNA, fingerprints, firearms, and electronic media, to provide actionable intelligence in support of U.S., allied, and partner nation operations across Africa. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Hardy-Bannerman) (Photo Credit: Staff Sgt. Marcus Hardy-Bannerman) VIEW ORIGINAL2 / 7Show Caption +Hide Caption –Natassha Robinson, Joint Theater Forensic Analysis Center Army CID FXD latent print examiner, demonstrates fingerprint analysis techniques to Japanese Self-Defense Force members at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, June 19, 2025. The JTFAC collaborates with various partner forces across the U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility to support operations to enhance regional security and stability. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Hardy-Bannerman) (Photo Credit: Staff Sgt. Marcus Hardy-Bannerman) VIEW ORIGINAL3 / 7Show Caption +Hide Caption –A sign for the Joint Theater Forensic Analysis Center is displayed at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, May 5, 2025. The JTFAC is U.S. Africa Command’s sole provider of comprehensive forensic capabilities across the range of military operations. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Joseph Bartoszek) (Photo Credit: Senior Airman Joseph Bartoszek) VIEW ORIGINAL4 / 7Show Caption +Hide Caption –Emily Rue, Joint Theater Forensic Analysis Center, observes a color test to isolate the compound in the sample in Bizerte, Tunisia, April 28, 2025. African Lion 25 (AL25) is set to be the largest annual military exercise in Africa, bringing together over 40 nations, including seven NATO allies and 10,000 troops to conduct realistic, dynamic and collaborative training in an austere environment that intersects multiple geographic and functional combatant commands. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) on behalf of the U.S. Africa Command, AL25 takes place from April 14 to May 23, 2025, across Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. This large-scale exercise will enhance our ability to work together in complex, multi-domain operations—preparing forces to deploy, fight and win. (U.S. Army Reserve Photo By Lt. Col Dale D. Barnes.) (Photo Credit: Lt. Col. Dale Barnes) VIEW ORIGINAL5 / 7Show Caption +Hide Caption –The Joint Theater Forensic Analysis Center and Tunisian Armed Forces use a variety of chemicals to retrieve serial numbers removed from equipment in Bizerte, Tunisia, April 28, 2025. African Lion 25 (AL25) is set to be the largest annual military exercise in Africa, bringing together over 40 nations, including seven NATO allies and 10,000 troops to conduct realistic, dynamic and collaborative training in an austere environment that intersects multiple geographic and functional combatant commands. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) on behalf of the U.S. Africa Command, AL25 takes place from April 14 to May 23, 2025, across Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. This large-scale exercise will enhance our ability to work together in complex, multi-domain operations—preparing forces to deploy, fight and win. (U.S. Army Reserve photo by Lt. Col. Dale D. Barnes.) (Photo Credit: Lt. Col. Dale Barnes) VIEW ORIGINAL6 / 7Show Caption +Hide Caption –Lauren Kraul, Joint Theater Forensic Analysis Center, discusses methods to retrieve serial numbers removed from equipment with Tunisian Armed Forces in Bizerte, Tunisia, April 28, 2025. African Lion 25 (AL25) is set to be the largest annual military exercise in Africa, bringing together over 40 nations, including seven NATO allies and 10,000 troops to conduct realistic, dynamic and collaborative training in an austere environment that intersects multiple geographic and functional combatant commands. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) on behalf of the U.S. Africa Command, AL25 takes place from April 14 to May 23, 2025, across Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. This large-scale exercise will enhance our ability to work together in complex, multi-domain operations—preparing forces to deploy, fight and win. (U.S. Army Reserve Photo By Lt. Col Dale D. Barnes.) (Photo Credit: Lt. Col. Dale Barnes) VIEW ORIGINAL7 / 7Show Caption +Hide Caption –The Joint Theater Forensic Analysis Center and Tunisian Armed Forces collaborate during exercise African Lion 2025 (AL25) in Bizerte, Tunisia, April 28, 2025. Fluorescent lighting is used to view fingerprints on items being tested. AL25 is set to be the largest annual military exercise in Africa, bringing together over 40 nations, including seven NATO allies and 10,000 troops to conduct realistic, dynamic and collaborative training in an austere environment that intersects multiple geographic and functional combatant commands. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) on behalf of the U.S. Africa Command, AL25 takes place from April 14 to May 23, 2025, across Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. This large-scale exercise will enhance our ability to work together in complex, multi-domain operations—preparing forces to deploy, fight and win. (U.S. Army Reserve photo by Lt. Col. Dale D. Barnes.) (Photo Credit: Lt. Col. Dale Barnes) VIEW ORIGINAL
Back to
U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF)
VICENZA, Italy – When U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) identified a need to gather evidence, the U.S. Army’s Joint Theater Forensic Analysis Center (JTFAC) answered the call. Its forensic team launched into action at sea, turning expertise into real-world impact.
At the request of the CENTCOM and AFRICOM, JTFAC personnel deployed to collect and analyze forensic evidence from a vessel carrying Iranian-supplied advanced conventional weapons. The seized cargo included ballistic missile components, anti-ship ballistic missile parts and a warhead, all bound for Houthi rebel forces in Yemen.
The forensic evidence helped secure a June 5, 2025, federal conviction of the ship’s captain, Muhammad Pahlawan, a Pakistani national who worked closely with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, on six charges related to smuggling Iranian-made advanced conventional weaponry destined for the Houthis in Yemen, as well as threatening multiple witnesses.
“The JTFAC forensic team conducted rapid sensitive site exploitation at expeditionary locations, including within the maritime environment,” said U.S. Army Lt. Col. Kyle Thomason, provost marshal for U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF), which provides oversight to JTFAC operations.
To meet the unique demands of a maritime environment, the team rapidly adapted its Fly Away Kit, a mobile forensic toolkit designed for land and sea missions. This self-contained toolkit enabled JTFAC scientists to conduct on-site analysis, including chemical trace detection, biometric collection, and confirmed and inventoried types of weapons and equipment aboard the vessel.
The vessel’s initial interdiction resulted in the deaths of two Navy SEALs off the coast of Somalia in Jan. 2024, making international headlines at the time. However, the loss of service members was not in vain.
The interdiction successfully prevented anti-ship ballistic missiles from targeting U.S. and partner-nation vessels. The type of weaponry found aboard the vessel was consistent with the weapon systems used by the Houthi rebel forces during the time of the charged conspiracy against merchant ships and U.S. military vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden after the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack in Israel.
“The JTFAC services the Joint Interagency Intergovernmental Multinational community within AFRICOM,” said Thomason. “Their mission enables U.S. and partner nation forces to accomplish AFRICOM campaign objectives.”
Along with AFRICOM and CENTCOM, U.S. European Command was also involved in this offshore mission, highlighting JTFAC’s reach across geographic boundaries and interagency lines.
“We’re glad to have had the opportunity to fit into the seams of multiple commands to support this consequential operation,” added Thomason.
The mission not only demonstrated the center’s technical capabilities, but also deepened collaboration between defense, justice and diplomatic agencies operating in the AFRICOM area of responsibility. It marked a significant milestone in JTFAC’s expanding role as a forensic enabler for both military and civilian partners.
“The lab is internationally accredited, meaning its scientists can serve as expert witnesses in both the U.S. and abroad,” said Greg Sanson, the JTFAC liaison officer to SETAF-AF. “This comes in handy when either the U.S. or a partner nation wants to take legal action against subjects identified through our forensic analysis.”
JTFAC’s recent support of African Lion exercises laid the groundwork for this success. During those multinational events, Forensic Exploitation Team (FXT) scientists provided hands-on training to host-nation forces in Tunisia and Morocco, covering topics such as latent fingerprint development, DNA analysis and post-blast evidence recovery.
In addition, AFRICOM’s exercise Cutlass Express included 21 legal advisors from 12 countries converging in Victoria, Seychelles, Feb. 10-14, 2025. The multinational team discussed legal processes and examined possible scenarios that support search and seizure operations such as the type of mission which brought about this latest conviction.
“These engagements not only enhance the forensic science capabilities of our partners across the African continent, but also reinforce our center’s readiness for real-world contingencies,” added U.S. Army Maj. Lucas Poon, the JTFAC director at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.
JTFAC’s capabilities stem from both military and civilian personnel, operating under the umbrella of the Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID). The Army CID’s Forensic Exploitation Division (FXD) staffs the majority of JTFAC positions. While the JTFAC is operationally controlled by SETAF-AF, a unique team from multiple U.S. Army commands enables this function.
The FXD supports numerous annual partner nation engagements and deploys on six-month rotations as part of the JTFAC in Djibouti.
“The lab’s ongoing mission provides multiple other benefits to partner nations, civilians and service members who operate in this area,” said Sanson. “Accurate forensic assessments lead to updated tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as revisions to protective equipment and policies to keep people safe now and into the future.”
As threats grow more complex and transnational, JTFAC continues to prove that science, when deployed with precision, can be a decisive force for justice and security.
About SETAF-AF
U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) prepares Army forces, executes crisis response, enables strategic competition and strengthens partners to achieve U.S. Army Europe and Africa and U.S. Africa Command campaign objectives.
The State of Qatar participated in the109th session of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), held in The Hague.
The Qatari delegation was headed by HE Ambassador of the State of Qatar to the Kingdom of the Netherlands and its Permanent Representative to the OPCW Dr. Mutlaq bin Majid Al Qahtani.
In Qatar’s statement during the session, His Excellency noted that the meeting is taking place amid serious challenges to international peace and security, foremost among them the war waged by Israel on the Gaza Strip, which has resulted in severe humanitarian tragedies.
His Excellency affirmed Qatar’s support for the request made by the State of Palestine, as a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, for an immediate investigation into Israel’s use of prohibited substances during its military operations in Gaza.
His Excellency stressed that such actions constitute a blatant violation of international law and relevant conventions and require accountability for the perpetrators.
In this context, His Excellency condemned Israel’s repeated targeting of sites within Syrian territory, which hinders the work of OPCW missions and endangers the lives of its experts, especially as Syria continues its cooperation with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to identify sites containing chemical materials and develop destruction plans.
HE the Ambassador praised the recent positive progress in cooperation between the Syrian Arab Republic and the OPCW Technical Secretariat, commending the vital role played by the organization in this regard and Qatar’s support for enhancing this cooperation, calling on the Executive Council to engage positively with this new reality and to take the necessary steps to restore Syria’s rights and privileges as an active member of the organization.
His Excellency also reiterated Qatar’s position calling for the resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis through dialogue and diplomatic means, and for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.
An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.
On July 10, our country celebrates the Day of the Russian army’s victory over the Swedes in the Battle of Poltava – one of the 20 days of military glory in the Russian holiday calendar.
The Battle of Poltava became the decisive battle of the Northern War (1700-1721), in which the Russian Tsardom, which was in the period of reforms of Peter I, was confronted by the powerful Swedish Kingdom, led by the talented military leader Charles XII.
Charles’s self-confidence played a cruel joke on him. Being in the minority, cut off from supplies, having lost his baggage train in the battle near the village of Lesnoy and having suffered serious losses in attempts to take Poltava by storm, the Swedish king decided on a general battle, hoping to defeat the Russian army, which was not yet well trained and equipped. Contrary to his expectations, the Russians had an overwhelming advantage in artillery and well-fortified positions.
In the first stage of the battle, the Swedes managed to occupy two unfinished redoubts on the move, but they were no longer able to advance. Having withstood heavy artillery fire and mixed up their ranks, they moved into a decisive attack, which quickly turned into a bayonet fight. Two hours later, they were surrounded by the Russians from the flanks, panicked, and fled the battlefield.
As a result, the Swedish corps was completely routed. About 9,000 people were killed, and 19,000, including all the generals, were captured. The Russians got the entire royal treasury, but Charles XII himself managed to escape to Turkey with a small detachment, where he continued to intrigue against Russia.
Despite the fact that the Northern War lasted for another 12 long years after the Battle of Poltava, Sweden could no longer pose a significant threat to the Russians. At the end of the war, Russia retained the territories of Karelia, Livonia, Estonia, Ingria and free access to the Baltic Sea, opening up broad strategic and trade opportunities.
Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source of the information. It is an accurate report of what the source claims and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.
Union Minister of Commerce and Industry Piyush Goyal on Wednesday addressing the ICC: Krishi Vikram thematic session in New Delhi, said that India’s agriculture and fisheries exports have reached ₹4.5 lakh crore and hold the potential to scale up to ₹20 lakh crore. The key to unlocking this potential, he said, lies in strengthening food processing, branding, and packaging standards.
Highlighting India’s expanding footprint in global agri-markets, the Minister noted that newer items such as jamun, litchi, pineapple, and bottle gourd are now being exported. He cited recent shipments of jamun to the UK and litchis from Punjab to Doha and Dubai as signs of growing international demand for Indian produce. India’s export presence is increasing notably in Gulf nations like the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
Shri Goyal praised Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s global advocacy of millets through the International Year of Millets, which brought international attention to India’s traditional grains and their health benefits.
He stressed the importance of building resilient agricultural supply chains, including inputs like seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, and essential equipment. India, he said, must ensure self-reliance in agricultural inputs to buffer against global disruptions.
A major focus of Shri Goyal’s address was on the adoption of drip irrigation, which he described as a game changer for Indian agriculture. He called for scaling up water conservation methods and turning them into a mass movement. Establishing small water bodies at the village level and widely adopting drip irrigation, he said, would make Indian agriculture more climate-resilient and export-ready by improving crop predictability and yield.
To further support this transformation, the Minister recommended replacing outdated water pumps with energy-efficient smart pumps that can be remotely operated via mobile phones and provide real-time data on water usage. When used alongside drip systems, such pumps reduce water wastage, prevent crop damage from over-irrigation, and lower input costs.
Encouraging agri-entrepreneurs to partner with farmers, Shri Goyal pointed to recent developments like the creation of the Turmeric Board to boost spice exports. He also noted that coffee exports have doubled, and spice exports continue to rise. However, he emphasised the need for more targeted efforts to scale India’s global presence in these sectors.
He further spoke about the growing potential of natural and organic farming. To enhance credibility in the global market, the government is tightening certification norms using blockchain technology to ensure transparency and traceability. Additionally, it will support innovative packaging and design, helping Indian agri-products compete effectively in global markets.
Shri Goyal stressed that when farmers, industries, and exporters collaborate, challenges can be resolved faster. The government, he said, will continue to provide support for packaging and design innovation as a means to boost exports.
Reflecting on India’s agricultural transformation, the Minister said the journey has been both challenging and inspiring. He attributed the nation’s growing self-reliance in agriculture to the richness of Indian soil, the relentless efforts of farmers, and consistent government support. Citing the evolution from Lal Bahadur Shastri’s “Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan” to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of Atmanirbhar Bharat, he reiterated that agriculture has always been a national priority.
He reaffirmed the government’s commitment to enhancing farmers’ income and productivity. Under PM-Kisan Yojana, financial support is being provided directly to farmers. The government has also absorbed rising fertiliser prices by increasing subsidies.
Goyal shared that 1,400 mandis have been integrated with the e-NAM platform to enable transparent price discovery, while Farmer Producer Organisations (FPOs) are helping improve access to mechanisation. A ₹1 lakh crore Agriculture Infrastructure Fund is aiding the development of rural agri-infrastructure.
He also discussed the Drone Didi initiative, under which 1.5 lakh women have been trained to operate drones for fertiliser spraying. The government is promoting intercropping, horticulture, and floriculture, and is encouraging entrepreneurs to study and adopt international best practices to drive innovation in Indian farming.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has formally nominated United States President Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. He says the president is “forging peace as we speak, in one country, in one region after the other”.
Trump, who has craved the award for years, sees himself as a global peacemaker in a raft of conflicts from Israel and Iran, to Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
With the conflict in Gaza still raging, we ask five experts – could Trump be rewarded with the world’s most prestigious peace prize?
Emma Shortis
Adjunct Senior Fellow, School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University
Nominating Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize is like entering a hyena in a dog show.
Of course Trump does not deserve it. That we’re being forced to take this question seriously is yet another indication – as if we needed one – of his extraordinary ability to set and reset the terms of our politics.
There is no peace in Gaza. Even if Trump announced another ceasefire tomorrow, it would not last. And it would not build genuine peace and security.
Trump has neither the interest nor the attention span required to build long term peace. His administration is not willing to bear any of the costs or investments that come with genuine, lasting diplomacy. And he is not anti-war.
There is no peace in Iran. Trump’s bombing of Iran simply exacerbates his decision in 2018 to end nuclear negotiations with Tehran. It pushes the world closer to, not further from, nuclear catastrophe.
Under the Trump administration, there will be no peace in the Middle East. Both the US and Israeli governments’ approach to “security” puts the region on a perpetual war footing. This approach assumes it is possible to bomb your way to peace – a “peace” which both Trump and Netanyahu understand as total dominance and violent oppression.
The Trump administration is deliberately undermining the institutions and principles of international and domestic law.
He has deployed the military against American citizens. He is threatening the United States’ traditional allies with trade wars and annexation. His administration’s dismantling of USAID will result, according to one study, in the deaths of 14 million people, including 4.5 million children, by 2030.
Indulging Trump’s embarrassing desire for trophies might appease him for a short time. It would also strip the Nobel Peace Prize of any and all credibility, while endorsing Trump’s trashing of the international rule of law.
What kind of peace is that?
Ali Mamouri
Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University
The nomination of Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize by a man who is facing charges of war crimes is an unprecedented and deeply dark irony that cannot be overlooked.
Trump’s role in brokering the Abraham Accords was hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough. It led to the normalisation of relations between Israel and several Arab countries, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco.
But this achievement came at a significant cost. The accords deliberately sidelined the Palestinian issue, long recognised as the core of regional instability, and disregarded decades of international consensus on a two-state solution.
Israeli soldiers guarding Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank. Dom Zaran/Shutterstock
His silence in the face of a growing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza was equally telling. Perhaps most disturbing was the tacit or explicit endorsement of proposals to forcibly relocate Palestinians to neighbouring Arab countries, a position that evokes ethnic cleansing and fundamentally undermines principles of justice, dignity and international law.
In addition, there is Trump’s unconditional support for Israel’s military campaigns across the region, including his authorisation of attacks on Iranian civilian, military and nuclear infrastructure. The strikes lacked any clear legal basis, contributed further to regional instability and, according to Tehran, killed more than a thousand civilians.
His broader disregard for international norms shattered decades of post-second world war diplomatic order and increased the risk of sustained and expanded conflict.
Against this backdrop, any serious consideration of Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize seems fundamentally at odds with its stated mission: to honour efforts that reduce conflict, uphold human rights and promote lasting peace.
Whatever short-term diplomatic gains emerged from Trump’s tenure are eclipsed by the legal, ethical and humanitarian consequences of his actions.
Ian Parmeter
Research Scholar, Middle East Studies, Australian National University
Netanyahu’s nomination of Donald Trump for one of the world’s most coveted awards was clearly aimed at flattering the president.
Trump is clearly angling for the laurel, which his first term predecessor, Barack Obama, won in his first year in office.
Obama was awarded the prize in 2009 for promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and fostering a “new climate” in international relations, particularly in reaching out to the Muslim world.
Given neither of these ambitions have since borne fruit, what claims might Trump reasonably make at this stage of his second term?
Trump has claimed credit for resolving two conflicts this year: the brief India–Pakistan clash that erupted after Pakistani militants killed 25 Indian tourists in Kashmir in May; and the long-running dispute between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi disputes Trump brokered peace. He says the issue was resolved by negotiations between the two countries’ militaries.
With regards to the Rwanda–DRC conflict, the countries signed a peace agreement in the Oval Office in June. But critics argue Qatar played a significant role
which the Trump administration has airbrushed out.
Trump can legitimately argue his pressure on Israel and Iran forced a ceasefire in their 12-day war in June.
But his big test is the Gaza war. For Trump to add this to his Nobel claim, he will need more than a ceasefire.
The Biden administration brokered two ceasefires that enabled the release of significant numbers of hostages, but did not end the conflict.
Trump would have to use his undoubted influence with Netanyahu to achieve more than a temporary pause. He would have to end the war definitively and effect the release of all Israeli hostages.
Beyond that, if Trump could persuade Netanyahu
to take serious steps towards negotiating a two-state solution, that would be a genuine Nobel-worthy achievement.
Trump isn’t there yet.
Jasmine-Kim Westendorf
Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict and Co-Director of the Initiative for Peacebuilding, The University of Melbourne
Although controversial or politicised awards are not new, awardees are generally individuals or groups who’ve made
significant contributions to a range of peace initiatives.
They include reducing armed conflict, enhancing international cooperation, and human rights efforts that contribute to peace.
Inspiring examples include anti-nuclear proliferation organisations and phenomenal women peacemakers. And Nadia Murad and Denis Mukwege, who won in 2011 for their work trying to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war.
Trump has declared his “proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier”. But he is neither.
There has been a concerning trend towards using the Nobel Peace Prize to encourage certain political directions, rather than reward achievements.
Barack Obama’s 2008 Prize helped motivate his moves toward diplomacy and cooperation after the presidency of George W. Bush.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s 2018 award was for efforts to resolve the 20-year war with Eritrea. The peace prize encouraged Ahmed to fulfill his promise of democratic elections in 2020. Embarrassingly, within a year Ahmed launched a civil war that killed over 600,000 people and displaced 3 million more.
This week’s nomination follows efforts by global leaders to flatter Trump in order – they hope – to secure his goodwill.
These motivations explain why Netanyahu has put forward Trump’s name to the Nobel Committee. It comes at the very moment securing Trump’s ongoing support during ceasefire negotiations is critical for Netanyahu’s political survival.
They will never give me a Nobel Peace Prize […] It’s too bad. I deserve it, but they will never give it to me.
Prizes to genuine peacemakers amplify their work and impact.
1984 winner Desmond Tutu said: “One day no one was listening. The next, I was an oracle.” A Nobel can be a powerful force for peace.
Trump is no peacemaker, he doesn’t deserve one.
Shahram Akbarzadeh
Director, Middle East Studies Forum (MESF), Deakin University
Benjamin Netanyahu would have us believe Donald Trump is a peacemaker.
Nothing could be further from the truth. His record is stained with blood and misery. The fact Trump believes himself to be worthy of the Nobel Peace Prize only attests to his illusions of grandeur in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
The war in Gaza has gone into its 20th month because Trump did not use the levers at his control to bring the senseless war to a close.
Some estimates put the true Gaza death toll at 100,000 people, and counting. They have been killed by American-made bombs Israel is dropping across the densely populated strip; from starvation because Israel has enforced a blockade of the Gaza Strip and prevented UN food delivery with the blessings of America; and from gunshots at food distribution centres, set up with US private security.
All under Trump’s watch.
Trump could do something about this. Israel is the largest recipient of US aid, most of it military support.
This has multiplied since Israel commenced its attack on Gaza in response to Hamas terrorism on October 7 2023. Trump has approved the transfer of US military hardware to Israel, knowing full well it was being used against a trapped and helpless population.
This is not the act of a peacemaker.
Now the Israeli government is planning to “facilitate” population transfer of Gazans to other countries – a euphemism for ethnic cleansing.
This is the textbook definition of genocide: deliberate and systematic killing or persecution of people. Trump legitimised this travesty of decency and international law by promising a Gaza Riviera.
The outlandish extent of Trump’s ideas would be laughable if their consequences were not so devastating.
When Israel attacked Iran in the middle of nuclear talks, Trump had a momentary pause, before jumping to Netanyahu’s aid and bombing Iran. He then claimed his action paved the way for peace.
Trump’s idea of peace is the peace of the graveyard.
Emma Shortis is Director of International and Security Affairs at The Australia Institute, an independent think tank.
Jasmine-Kim Westendorf has received funding from the Australian Research Council.
Shahram Akbarzadeh receives funding from Australia Research Council.
Ali Mamouri and Ian Parmeter do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Israel and Hamas may be able to reach a Gaza ceasefire and hostage-release deal within one or two weeks but such an agreement is not likely to be secured in just a day’s time, a senior Israeli official said on Wednesday.
Speaking during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington, the official said that if the two sides agree to a proposed 60-day ceasefire, Israel would use that time to offer a permanent ceasefire that would require the Palestinian militant group to disarm.
If Hamas refuses, “we’ll proceed” with military operations in Gaza, the official said on condition of anonymity.
Trump met Netanyahu on Tuesday for the second time in two days to discuss the situation in Gaza, with the president’s Middle East envoy indicating that Israel and Hamas were nearing an agreement on a U.S.-brokered ceasefire proposal after 21 months of war.
Trump had previously predicted that a deal could be reached this week, raising speculation about a possible announcement before Netanyahu leaves for Israel on Thursday.
On Wednesday, however, Trump appeared to extend the timeframe somewhat, telling reporters that while an agreement was “very close,” it could happen this week or even next – though “not definitely.”
A source familiar with Hamas’ thinking said four days of indirect talks with Israel in Qatar did not produce any breakthroughs on main sticking points.
The Israeli official, who briefed reporters in Washington, declined to provide details on the negotiations.
Trump’s Middle East special envoy Steve Witkoff told reporters at a Cabinet meeting on Tuesday that the anticipated agreement would involve the release of 10 living and nine deceased hostages.
Netanyahu’s visit came just over two weeks after the president ordered the bombing of Iranian nuclear sites in support of Israeli air strikes. Trump then helped arrange a ceasefire in the 12-day Israel-Iran war.
Trump and his aides have tried to seize on any momentum created by the weakening of Iran, which backs Hamas, to push both sides for a breakthrough to end the Gaza war.
The Gaza conflict began with a Hamas attack on southern Israel in October 2023 that killed approximately 1,200 people and saw 251 hostages taken, according to Israeli figures. Around 50 hostages remain in Gaza, with 20 believed to be alive.
Israel’s retaliatory war has killed more than 57,000 Palestinians, Gaza’s health ministry says, and reduced much of Gaza to rubble.
Netanyahu has used his U.S. visit to publicly thank Trump for joining with Israel in striking Iran.
Trump has repeatedly declared that the U.S. bombing of three of Iran’s nuclear sites had “obliterated” them, though some experts have questioned the extent of the damage and raised the possibility that Iran had secreted away part of its enriched uranium stockpile before the strikes.
The Israel official said Israeli intelligence indicated that Iran’s enriched uranium remained at Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan, the sites that the U.S. hit last month, and had not been moved.
The official suggested, however, that the Iranians might still be able to gain access to Isfahan but it would be hard to remove any of the material there.
The Israeli military said on Thursday that a missile launched from Yemen was intercepted after air raid sirens sounded in several areas across the country.
The Iran-aligned Houthis, who control the most populous parts of Yemen, have been firing at Israel and attacking shipping lanes.
Houthis have repeatedly said that their attacks are an act of solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, where Israel’s military assault since late 2023 has killed more than 57,000 people, Gaza authorities say.
Most of the dozens of missiles and drones they have launched have been intercepted or fallen short. Israel has carried out a series of retaliatory strikes.
