NewzIntel.com

Category: Middle East

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Will the fragile ceasefire between Iran and Israel hold? One factor could be crucial to it sticking

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ali Mamouri, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

    Amir Levy/Getty Images

    After 12 days of war, US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire between Israel and Iran that would bring to an end the most dramatic, direct conflict between the two nations in decades.

    Israel and Iran both agreed to adhere to the ceasefire, though they said they would respond with force to any breach.

    If the ceasefire holds – a big if – the key question will be whether this signals the start of lasting peace, or merely a brief pause before renewed conflict.

    As contemporary war studies show, peace tends to endure under one of two conditions: either the total defeat of one side, or the establishment of mutual deterrence. This means both parties refrain from aggression because the expected costs of retaliation far outweigh any potential gains.

    What did each side gain?

    The war has marked a turning point for Israel in its decades-long confrontation with Iran. For the first time, Israel successfully brought a prolonged battle to Iranian soil, shifting the conflict from confrontations with Iranian-backed proxy militant groups to direct strikes on Iran itself.

    This was made possible largely due to Israel’s success over the past two years in weakening Iran’s regional proxy network, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shiite militias in Syria.

    Over the past two weeks, Israel has inflicted significant damage on Iran’s military and scientific elite, killing several high-ranking commanders and nuclear scientists. The civilian toll was also high.

    Additionally, Israel achieved a major strategic objective by pulling the United States directly into the conflict. In coordination with Israel, the US launched strikes on three of Iran’s primary nuclear facilities: Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan.

    Despite these gains, Israel has not accomplished all of its stated goals. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had voiced support for regime change, urging Iranians to rise up against Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s government, but the senior leadership in Iran remains intact.

    Additionally, Israel has not fully eliminated Iran’s missile program. (Iran continued striking to the last minute before the ceasefire.) And Tehran did not acquiesce to Trump’s pre-war demand to end uranium enrichment.

    Although Iran was caught off-guard by Israel’s attacks — particularly as it was engaged in nuclear negotiations with the US — it responded by launching hundreds of missiles towards Israel.

    While many were intercepted, a significant number penetrated Israeli air defences, causing widespread destruction in major cities, dozens of fatalities and hundreds of injuries.

    Iran has demonstrated its capacity to strike back, though Israel has succeeded in destroying many of its air defence systems, some ballistic missile assets (including missile launchers) and multiple energy facilities.

    Since the beginning of the assault, Iranian officials have repeatedly called for a halt to resume negotiations. Under such intense pressure, Iran has realised it would not benefit from a prolonged war of attrition with Israel — especially as both nations face mounting costs and the risk of depleting their military stockpiles if the war continues.

    As theories of victory suggest, success in war is defined not only by the damage inflicted, but by achieving core strategic goals and weakening the enemy’s will and capacity to resist.

    While Israel claims to have achieved the bulk of its objectives, the extent of the damage to Iran’s nuclear program is not fully known, nor is its capacity to continue enriching uranium.

    Both sides could remain locked in a volatile standoff over Iran’s nuclear program, with the conflict potentially reigniting whenever either side perceives a strategic opportunity.

    Sticking point over Iran’s nuclear program

    Iran faces even greater challenges when it emerges from the war. With a heavy toll on its leadership and nuclear infrastructure, Tehran will likely prioritise rebuilding its deterrence capability.

    That includes acquiring new advanced air defence systems — potentially from China — and restoring key components of its missile and nuclear programs. (Some experts say Iran has not used some of its most powerful missiles to maintain this deterrence.)

    Iranian officials have claimed they safeguarded more than 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium before the attacks. This stockpile could theoretically be converted into nine to ten nuclear warheads if further enriched to 90%.

    Trump declared Iran’s nuclear capacity had been “totally obliterated”, whereas Rafael Grossi, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog chief, said damage to Iran’s facilities was “very significant”.

    However, analysts have argued Iran will still have a depth of technical knowledge accumulated over decades. Depending on the extent of the damage to its underground facilities, Iran could be capable of restoring and even accelerating its program in a relatively short time frame.

    And the chances of reviving negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program appear slimmer than ever.

    What might future deterrence look like?

    The war has fundamentally reshaped how both Iran and Israel perceive deterrence — and how they plan to secure it going forward.

    For Iran, the conflict has reinforced the belief that its survival is at stake. With regime change openly discussed during the war, Iran’s leaders appear more convinced than ever that true deterrence requires two key pillars: nuclear weapons capability, and deeper strategic alignment with China and Russia.

    As a result, Iran is expected to move rapidly to restore and advance its nuclear program, potentially moving towards actual weaponisation — a step it had long avoided, officially.

    At the same time, Tehran is likely to accelerate military and economic cooperation with Beijing and Moscow to hedge against isolation. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasised this close engagement with Russia during a visit to Moscow this week, particularly on nuclear matters.

    Israel, meanwhile, sees deterrence as requiring constant vigilance and a credible threat of overwhelming retaliation. In the absence of diplomatic breakthroughs, Israel may adopt a policy of immediate preemptive strikes on Iranian facilities or leadership figures if it detects any new escalation — particularly related to Iran’s nuclear program.

    In this context, the current ceasefire already appears fragile. Without comprehensive negotiations that address the core issues — namely, Iran’s nuclear capabilities — the pause in hostilities may prove temporary.

    Mutual deterrence may prevent a more protracted war for now, but the balance remains precarious and could collapse with little warning.

    Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Will the fragile ceasefire between Iran and Israel hold? One factor could be crucial to it sticking – https://theconversation.com/will-the-fragile-ceasefire-between-iran-and-israel-hold-one-factor-could-be-crucial-to-it-sticking-259669

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Ibn Battuta, a 14th-century judge and ambassador, travelled further than Marco Polo. The Rihla records his adventures

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ismail Albayrak, Professor of Islam and Catholic Muslim Relations, Australian Catholic University

    In our guides to the classics, experts explain key literary works.

    Ibn Battuta, was born in Tangier, Morocco, on February 24, 1304. From a statement in his celebrated travel book the Rihla (“legal affairs are my ancestral profession,”) he evidently came from an intellectually distinguished family.

    According to the Rihla (travelogue), Ibn Battuta embarked on his travels from Tangier at the age of 22 with the intention of performing the Hajj (the sacred pilgrimage to Mecca) in 1325. Although he returned to Fez (his adopted home-town) around the end of 1349, he continued to visit various regions, including Granada and Sudan, in subsequent years.

    Over the course of his almost 30 years of travel, Ibn Battuta covered an astonishing distance of approximately 73,000 miles (117,000 kilometres), visiting a region that today encompasses more than 50 countries. His journeys covered much of the medieval Islamic world and beyond, excluding Northern Europe.

    In 1355, he returned to Morocco for the last time and remained there for the rest of his life. Upon his return he dictated his experiences, observations and anecdotes to the Andalusian scholar Ibn Juzayy, with a compilation of his travels completed in 1355 or 1356.

    The work, formally titled A Gift to Researchers on the Curiosities of Cities and the Marvels of Journeys, is more commonly referred to as Rihlat Ibn Battuta or simply Rihla.

    A painting of Ibn Battuta (on right) in Egypt by Leon Benett.
    Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

    More than a travelogue or geographical record, this book provides rich insights into 14th-century social and political life, capturing cultural diversity across nations. Ibn Battuta details local lifestyles, linguistic traits, beliefs, clothing, cuisines, holidays, artistic traditions and gender relations, as well as commercial activities and currencies.

    His observations also include geographical features such as mountains, rivers and agricultural products. Notably, the work highlights his encounters with over 60 sultans and more than 2,000 prominent figures, making it a valuable historical resource.

    The travels

    His travels began after a dream. According to Ibn Battuta, one night, while in Fuwwa, a town near Alexandria in Egypt, he dreamed of flying on a massive bird across various lands, landing in a dark, greenish country.

    To test the local sheikh’s mystical knowledge, he decided if the sheikh knew of his dream, he was truly extraordinary. The next morning, after leading the dawn prayer, he saw the sheikh bid farewell to visitors. Later, the sheikh astonishingly revealed knowledge of Ibn Battuta’s dream and prophesied his pilgrimage through Yemen, Iraq, Turkey and India.

    At the time, the Middle East was under the rule of the Mamluk sultanate, Anatolia was divided among principalities and the Mongol Ilkhanate state controlled Iran, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent.

    Ibn Battuta initially travelled through North Africa, Egypt, Palestine and Syria, completing his first Hajj in 1326.

    He then visited Iraq and Iran, returning to Mecca. In 1328, he explored East Africa, reaching Mogadishu, Mombasa, Sudan and Kilwa (modern Tanzania), as well as Yemen, Oman and Anatolia, where he documented cities like Alanya, Konya, Erzurum, Nicaea and Bursa.

    His descriptions are vivid. Describing the city of Dimyat, on the bank of the Nile, he says:

    Many of the houses have steps leading down to the Nile. Banana trees are especially abundant there, and their fruit is carried to Cairo in boats. Its sheep and goats are allowed to pasture at liberty day and night, and for this reason the saying goes of Dimyat, ‘Its wall is a sweetmeat and its dogs are sheep’. No one who enters the city may afterwards leave it except by the governor’s seal […]

    Farmland on the banks of the Nile river today.
    Alice-D/shutterstock

    When it comes to Anatolia (in modern-day Turkey), he declares:

    This country, known as the Land of Rum, is the most beautiful in the world. While Allah Almighty has distributed beauty to other lands separately, He has gathered them all here. The most beautiful and well-dressed people live in this land, and the most delicious food is prepared here […] From the moment we arrived, our neighbors — both men and women — showed great concern for our wellbeing. Here, women do not shy away from men; when we departed, they bid us farewell as if we were family, expressing their sadness through tears.

    A judge and husband

    In 1332, Ibn Battutua met the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos III Palaiologos.
    Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

    Since Ibn Battuta dictated his work, it’s difficult to assess the extent of the scribe’s influence in recording his narratives. Despite being an educated man, he occasionally narrates like a commoner and sometimes exceeds the bounds of polite language. At times, he provides excessive detail, giving the impression he may be quoting from sources beyond his own observations.

    Nevertheless, the Rihla stands out for its engaging style and captivating anecdotes, drawing readers in.

    Ibn Battuta later journeyed through Crimea, Central Asia, Khwarezm (a large oasis region in the territories of present-day Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), Bukhara (a city in Uzbekistan), and the Hindu Kush Mountains. In 1332, he met Byzantine Emperor Andronikos III Palaiologos and travelled to Istanbul with the caravan of Uzbek Khan’s third wife. He mentions a caravan that even has a market:

    Whenever the caravan halted, food was cooked in great brass cauldrons, called dasts, and supplied from them to the poorer pilgrims and those who had no provisions. […] This caravan contained also animated bazaars and great supplies of luxuries and all kinds of food and fruit. They used to march during the night and light torches in front of the file of camels and litters, so that you saw the countryside gleaming with light and the darkness turned into radiant day.

    Ibn Battuta arrived in Delhi in 1333, where he served as a judge under Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq for seven years. He married or was married to local women in many of the places he stayed. Among his wives were ordinary people as well as the daughters of the administrative class.

    Miniature painting in Mughal style depicting the court of Muhammad bin Tughluq.
    Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

    The Sultan’s generosity, intelligence and unconventional ruling style both impressed and surprised Ibn Battuta. However, Muhammad bin Tughluq was known for making excessively harsh and abrupt decisions at times, which led Ibn Battuta to approach him with caution. Nevertheless, with the Sultan’s support, he remained in India for a long time and was eventually chosen as an ambassador to China in 1341.

    In 1345 his mission was disrupted when his ship capsized off the coast of Calcutta (then known as Sadqawan) in the Indian Ocean. Though he survived, he lost most of his possessions.

    After the incident, he remained in India for a while before continuing his journey by other means. During this period, he travelled through India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. He served as a judge in the latter for one and a half years. In 1345, he journeyed to China via Bengal, Burma and Sumatra, reaching the city of Guangzhou but limiting his exploration to the southern coast.

    He was among the first Arab travellers to record Islam’s spread in the Malay Archipelago, noting interactions between Muslims and Hindu-Buddhist communities. Visiting Java and Sumatra, he praised Sultan Malik al-Zahir of Sumatra as a generous, pious and scholarly ruler and highlighted his rare practice of walking to Friday prayers.

    On his return, Ibn Battuta explored regions such as Iran, Iraq, North Africa, Spain and the Kingdom of Mali, documenting the vast Islamic world.

    Back in his homeland, Ibn Battuta served as a judge in several locations. He died around 1368-9 while serving as a judge in Morocco and was buried in his birthplace, Tangier.

    Historic copy of selected parts of the Travel Report by Ibn Battuta, 1836 CE, Cairo.
    Wikimedia Commons, CC BY

    The status of women

    Ibn Battuta’s travels revealed intriguing insights into the status of women across regions. In inner West Africa, he observed matriarchal practices where lineage and inheritance were determined by the mother’s family.

    Among Turks, women rode horses like raiders, traded actively and did not veil their faces.

    In the Maldives, husbands leaving the region had to abandon their wives. He noted that Muslim women there, including the ruling woman, did not cover their heads. Despite attempting to enforce the hijab as a judge, he failed.

    He offers fascinating insights into food cultures. In Siberia, sled dogs were fed before humans. He described 15-day wedding feasts in India.

    He tried local produce such as mango in the Indian subcontinent, which he compared to an apple, and sun-dried, sliced fish in Oman.

    Religious practices

    Ibn Battuta’s accounts of the Hajj (pilgrimage) rituals he performed six times provide a unique perspective. He references a fatwa by Ibn Taymiyyah, prominent Islamic scholar and theologian known for his opposition to theological innovations and critiques of Sufism and philosophy, advising against shortening prayers for those travelling to Medina.

    Ibn Battuta’s accounts, particularly regarding the Iranian region, offer important perspectives into religious sects during a period when Iran started shifting from Sunnism to Shiism. He describes societies with diverse demographics, including Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs and Baluchis. His observations on religious practices are especially significant.

    Inclined toward Sufism, Ibn Battuta often dressed like a dervish during his travels. He offers a compelling view of Islamic mysticism. He considered regions like Damascus as places of abundance and Anatolia as a land of compassion, interpreting them with a spiritual perspective.

    His accounts of Sufi education, dervish lodges, zawiyas (similar to monasteries), and tombs, along with the special invocations of Sufi masters, are important historical records. He also observed and documented unique practices, such as the followers of the Persian Sufi saint Sheikh Qutb al-Din Haydar wearing iron rings on their hands, necks, ears, and even private parts to avoid sexual intercourse.

    While Ibn Battuta primarily visited Muslim lands, he also travelled to non-Muslim territories, offering key understandings into different religious cultures, for instance interactions between Crimean Muslims and Christian Armenians in the Golden Horde region.

    He also documented churches, icons and monasteries, such as the tomb of the Virgin Mary in Jerusalem. His observation of Muslims openly reciting the call to prayer (adhan) in China is significant.

    Other anecdotes include the division of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus into a mosque and Christian church. Most importantly, his encounters with Hindus and Buddhists in the Indian subcontinent and Malay Islands provide rich historical context.

    Umayyad Mosque, Damascus.
    eyetravelphotos/shutterstock

    His accounts of death rituals reveal diverse practices. In Sinop (a city in Turkey), 40 days of mourning were declared for a ruler’s mother, while in Iran, a funeral resembled a wedding celebration. He observed similarities in cremation practices between India and China and described a chilling custom in some regions where slaves and concubines were buried alive with the deceased.

    Ibn Battuta’s Rihla, widely translated into Eastern and Western languages, has drawn some criticism for containing depictions that sometimes diverge from historical continuity or borrow from other works. Ibn Battuta himself admitted to using earlier travel books as references.

    Despite limited recognition in older sources, the Rihla gained prominence in the West in the 19th century. His legacy remains vibrant today. Morocco declared 1996–1997 the “Year of Ibn Battuta,” and established a museum in Tangier to honour him. In Dubai, a mall is named after him.

    Notably, Ibn Battuta travelled to more destinations than Marco Polo and shared a broader range of humane anecdotes, showcasing the depth and diversity of his experiences.

    Ismail Albayrak does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Ibn Battuta, a 14th-century judge and ambassador, travelled further than Marco Polo. The Rihla records his adventures – https://theconversation.com/ibn-battuta-a-14th-century-judge-and-ambassador-travelled-further-than-marco-polo-the-rihla-records-his-adventures-246148

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Israel bombed an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 − it pushed program underground and spurred Saddam Hussein’s desire for nukes

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jeffrey Fields, Professor of the Practice of International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

    The Osirak nuclear power research station in 1981. Jacques Pavlovsky/Sygma via Getty Images

    Israel, with the assistance of U.S. military hardware, bombs an adversary’s nuclear facility to set back the perceived pursuit of the ultimate weapon. We have been here before, about 44 years ago.

    In 1981, Israeli fighter jets supplied by Washington attacked an Iraqi nuclear research reactor being built near Baghdad by the French government.

    The reactor, which the French called Osirak and Iraqis called Tammuz, was destroyed. Much of the international community initially condemned the attack. But Israel claimed the raid set Iraqi nuclear ambitions back at least a decade. In time, many Western observers and government officials, too, chalked up the attack as a win for nonproliferation, hailing the strike as an audacious but necessary step to prevent Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein from building a nuclear arsenal.

    But the reality is more complicated. As nuclear proliferation experts assess the extent of damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities following the recent U.S. and Israeli raids, it is worth reassessing the longer-term implications of that earlier Iraqi strike.

    The Osirak reactor

    Iraq joined the landmark Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970, committing the country to refrain from the pursuit of nuclear weapons. But in exchange, signatories are entitled to engage in civilian nuclear activities, including having research or power reactors and access to the enriched uranium that drives them.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is responsible through safeguards agreements for monitoring countries’ civilian use of nuclear technology, with on-the-ground inspections to ensure that civilian nuclear programs do not divert materials for nuclear weapons.

    But to Israel, the Iraqi reactor was provocative and an escalation in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

    Israel believed that Iraq would use the French reactor – Iraq said it was for research purposes – to generate plutonium for a nuclear weapon. After diplomacy with France and the United States failed to persuade the two countries to halt construction of the reactor, Prime Minister Menachem Begin concluded that attacking the reactor was Israel’s best option. That decision gave birth to the “Begin Doctrine,” which has committing Israel to preventing its regional adversaries from becoming nuclear powers ever since.

    Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin addresses the press after the 1981 attack on the Osarik nuclear reactor.
    Israel Press and Photo Agency/Wikimedia Commons

    In spring 1979, Israel attempted to sabotage the project, bombing the reactor core destined for Iraq while it sat awaiting shipment in the French town of La Seyne-sur-Mer. The mission was only a partial success, damaging but not destroying the reactor.

    France and Iraq persisted with the project, and in July 1980 – with the reactor having been delivered – Iraq received the first shipment of highly enriched uranium fuel at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center near Baghdad.

    Then in September 1980, during the initial days of the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian jets struck the nuclear research center. The raid also targeted a power station, knocking out electricity in Baghdad for several days. But a Central Intelligence Agency situation report assessed that “only secondary buildings” were hit at the nuclear site itself.

    It was then Israel’s turn. The reactor was still unfinished and not in operation when on June 7, 1981, eight U.S.-supplied F-16s flew over Jordanian and Saudi airspace and bombed the reactor in Iraq. The attack killed 10 Iraqi soldiers and a French civilian.

    Revisiting the ‘success’ of Israeli raid

    Many years later, U.S. President Bill Clinton commented: “Everybody talks about what the Israelis did at Osirak in 1981, which I think, in retrospect, was a really good thing. You know, it kept Saddam from developing nuclear power.”

    But nonproliferation experts have contended for years that while Saddam may have had nuclear weapons ambitions, the French-built research reactor would not have been the route to go. Iraq would either have had to divert the reactor’s highly enriched uranium fuel for a few weapons or shut the reactor down to extract plutonium from the fuel rods – all while hiding these operations from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    As an additional safeguard, the French government, too, had pledged to shut down the reactor if it detected efforts to use the reactor for weapons purposes.

    In any event, Iraq’s desire for a nuclear weapon was more aspirational than operational. A 2011 article in the journal International Security included interviews with several scientists who worked on Iraq’s nuclear program and characterized the country’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability as “both directionless and disorganized” before the attack.

    Iraq’s program begins in earnest

    So what happened after the strike? Many analysts have argued that the Israeli attack, rather than diminish Iraqi desire for a nuclear weapon, actually catalyzed it.

    Nuclear proliferation expert Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, the author of the 2011 study, concluded that the Israeli attack “triggered a nuclear weapons program where one did not previously exist.”

    In the aftermath of the attack, Saddam decided to formally, if secretively, establish a nuclear weapons program, with scientists deciding that a uranium-based weapon was the best route. He tasked his scientists with pursuing multiple methods to enrich uranium to weapons grade to ensure success, much the way the Manhattan Project scientists approached the same problem in the U.S.

    In other words, the Israeli attack, rather than set back an existing nuclear weapons program, turned an incoherent and exploratory nuclear endeavor into a drive to get the bomb personally overseen by Saddam and sparing little expense even as Iraq’s war with Iran substantially taxed Iraqi resources.

    From 1981 to 1987, the nuclear program progressed fitfully, facing both organizational and scientific challenges.

    As those challenges were beginning to be addressed, Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, provoking a military response from the United States. In the aftermath of what would become Operation Desert Storm, U.N. weapons inspectors discovered and dismantled the clandestine Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

    The Tammuz nuclear reactor was hit again during the 1991 Gulf War.
    Ramzi Haidar/AFP via Getty Images

    Had Saddam not invaded Kuwait over a matter not related to security, it is very possible that Baghdad would have had a nuclear weapon capability by the mid-to-late 1990s.

    Similarly to Iraq in 1980, Iran today is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the time President Donald Trump withdrew U.S. support in 2018 for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, colloquially known as the Iran nuclear deal, the International Atomic Energy Agency certified that Tehran was complying with the requirements of the agreement.

    In the case of Iraq, military action on its nascent nuclear program merely pushed it underground – to Saddam, the Israeli strikes made acquiring the ultimate weapon more rather than less attractive as a deterrent. Almost a half-century on, some analysts and observers are warning the same about Iran.

    Jeffrey Fields receives funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and Schmidt Futures.

    – ref. Israel bombed an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 − it pushed program underground and spurred Saddam Hussein’s desire for nukes – https://theconversation.com/israel-bombed-an-iraqi-nuclear-reactor-in-1981-it-pushed-program-underground-and-spurred-saddam-husseins-desire-for-nukes-259618

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: The Learning Refuge: How women-led community efforts help refugees resettle in Cyprus

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Suzan Ilcan, Professor of Sociology & University Research Chair, University of Waterloo

    A grassroots organization in Paphos, Cyprus, is bringing women together to address the needs of refugees in the city. (Shutterstock)

    Since 2015, the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) has seen a steady rise in migrant arrivals and asylum applications, primarily from people from Middle Eastern and African countries like Syria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cameroon.

    But many asylum-seekers face significant challenges. Refugees formally in the asylum system are often denied residency permits, which means they face persistent insecurity, poverty and isolation

    These conditions are compounded by restrictive and limited services for asylum-seekers. This deepens the precarity and exclusion refugees face within a political and economic system that treats them more like economic burdens than as human beings with rights who need help.

    In response to these institutional failures, citizens, volunteers and refugees themselves have begun to build grassroots networks of care and solidarity in the ROC and beyond to support refugee communities.

    In 2022 and 2023, we conducted interviews with women volunteers and refugees affiliated with The Learning Refuge, a civil society organization in the city of Paphos in southwest Cyprus that cultivates dialogue and collaboration among these two diverse groups.

    Women-led initiatives

    Many displaced people first arrive on the island of Cyprus through the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). However, the absence of a functioning asylum system or international legal protections leaves them in limbo.

    With no viable path to status in the TRNC, most cross the Green Line that bifurcates Cyprus into the ROC, where European Union asylum frameworks exist but remain limited in practice.

    Women-led community-building is often a response to the negative effects of inadequate state support and humanitarian aid for refugees. In Cyprus, this situation leaves many refugees without access to sufficient food, satisfactory health care, accommodation, employment, clothing and language training. In this current environment, refugees are increasingly experiencing insecure and fragile situations, especially women.

    In Cyprus, as in many other countries, a variety of community-building efforts are important responses to limited or restricted state support and humanitarian aid for refugees.

    Women-led efforts offer opportunities to deliver educational activities and establish networks, and to help improve the welfare and social protection of refugee women, however imperfectly.

    These and other similar efforts highlight how women refugees and volunteers can mobilize to foster dialogue and collaboration.

    The Learning Refuge

    Founded in 2015, The Learning Refuge began as community meetings in a city park. The organization then used space from a nearby music venue to conduct support activities, and later, established itself in a dedicated building.

    Organizations like The Learning Refuge emerged to address the limited state support and humanitarian assistance services available to refugees.

    The Learning Refuge cultivates dialogue and collaboration among a diverse group of community volunteers.
    (Suzan Ilcan)

    As Syrian families began arriving in Paphos in 2015, local mothers started working with Syrian children, assisting them with homework, providing skills-training opportunities and language classes.

    The Learning Refuge cultivates dialogue and collaboration among a diverse group of community volunteers, including schoolteachers, artists, musicians, local residents, refugees and other migrants.

    With the aid of 20 volunteers, the loosely organized groups provide women refugees with material support and resources to enhance collective activities, including art and music projects, while also engaging in educational and friendship activities.

    While modest in scale, the organization has formed partnerships with local and international organizations, including Caritas Cyprus, UNHCR-Cyprus and the Cyprus Refugee Council to extend its outreach to various refugee groups.

    The organization has also launched creative initiatives aimed at cultivating additional inclusive civic spaces. One such effort, “Moms and Babies Day,” was developed in response to the rising number of single mothers from Africa arriving on the island. These women often face poverty and isolation, and struggle with language barriers.

    These efforts highlight how grassroots responses — especially those led by women — can offer partial but vital educational and emotional support to refugees struggling to find their footing in a new country.

    Negotiated belonging

    Through participation in The Learning Refuge, refugee women in Paphos engage in a dynamic process of negotiated belonging, navigating challenges like language barriers, gendered isolation, domestic violence and poverty while contributing to broader community-building efforts.

    For example, Maryam, a Syrian woman and mother of three, told us how The Learning Refuge helped her children establish friendships and learn Greek. She also highlighted that it helped her form close ties with volunteers and other Syrian women living in Cyprus, and find paid work in the city.

    The volunteers and women refugees participating in The Learning Refuge’s activities emphasized not only their capacity to develop new forms of belonging and solidarity; they also help reshape communal knowledge and generate supportive spaces for women from various backgrounds.

    Our research shows that women-led community-building is an effective, though short-term, response to insufficient state support and humanitarian aid systems that leave many refugees in precarious situations.

    In varying degrees, these efforts offer women and their families spaces to learn and cultivate new relationships, and foster collective projects and better visions of resettlement and refuge.

    Suzan Ilcan receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada.

    Seçil Daǧtaș receives funding from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

    – ref. The Learning Refuge: How women-led community efforts help refugees resettle in Cyprus – https://theconversation.com/the-learning-refuge-how-women-led-community-efforts-help-refugees-resettle-in-cyprus-252682

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Canada Day: How Canadian nationalism is evolving with the times — and will continue to do so

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Eric Wilkinson, Postdoctoral Fellow in Philosophy, University of British Columbia

    Tariffs imposed on Canada by the United States have fuelled a surge in nationalist sentiment that played a significant role in the outcome of April’s federal election.

    Mark Carney’s new Liberal government has signalled an interest in pursuing nation-building projects that hearken back to an earlier period in Canadian history.

    Economic, cultural and social policy in Canada has often served the purpose of building national unity to facilitate cohesion and collective action. But some commentators have cautioned Canadians to dampen their reinvigorated sense of pride in their nation.



    Read more:
    Canadians are more patriotic than ever amid Trump’s trade war — but it’s important not to take national pride too far

    Those on the right view Canadian nationalism as an obstacle to neo-liberal economic policies while the left perceives it as irredeemably flawed.

    For people on the right, free trade and globalization are thought to produce the best economic outcomes, and nationalism obstructs those outcomes. But those on the progressive left argue that Canada was founded on racist policies and settler colonialism, so nationalism should be rejected because of this original sin.



    Read more:
    This Canada Day, settler Canadians should think about ‘land back’

    What is a nation?

    Both perspectives — and the public discussion of Canada’s national identity more generally — remain mired in confusion over the nature of nations. As a political philosopher, I have worked to clear up this confusion by determining what nations are and how they evolve.

    In the 19th century, French scholar Ernest Renan outlined a definition of nation that has yet to be improved upon. For Renan, a nation consists of two things: the daily commitment of a people to continue to live and work together and a collective memory of a shared past together.

    In contemporary times, Irish social scientist Benedict Anderson described nations as “imagined communities,” since the character of the nation is determined by the limits of the collective imagination of its citizens.

    These are subjective definitions of nations because they define national communities in terms of the identification of their members with the community.

    There are other, more common objective definitions of a nation involving identity, including shared ethnicity, religion or culture. But these definitions have long been criticized since many national identities transcend ethnicity, religion, culture or any other identity markers.

    Nations vs. states

    A national community is distinct from a state. The state constitutes the formal political institutions of a society, while the nation is the community of people within that society who view each other as compatriots. This is why the phrase “the people” is often used as a synonym for the national community.

    While some nations are stateless, in other cases, multiple nations co-exist within a single state.

    In Canada, there is the Québécois nation and many Indigenous nations within the Canadian nation. Although they are distinct, states and their governments will often build national identities around themselves to enable cohesion and collective action. Canada’s national identity was systematically shaped by successive governments — from Confederation onward — to build the society that Canadians live in today.

    The character of a particular nation is not fixed.

    The beliefs, practices and culture of the people who choose to live and work together can be shaped into anything they collectively decide on. A nation can adopt new values, redefine its membership or have one of its definitive characteristics fade from prominence.

    Accordingly, there is no reason to think that moral failings of a national community’s past must compromise it forever. A nation can, and sometimes does, recognize its past failures and become something better.

    Patriotism vs. nationalism

    A distinction is sometimes drawn between “patriotism” and “nationalism,” with the most famous being made by English social critic and novelist George Orwell.

    For Orwell, patriotism is devotion to a particular way of life without the desire to force it on other people, while nationalism denotes an impulse to seek power for one’s nation. Patriotism, then, is a benign, ethical form of partiality to one’s nation.

    Other thinkers have sought to explain how national identities and communities can be cultivated in an ethical way, described by Israeli philosopher Yael Tamir as “liberal nationalism.”

    The liberal nationalist, according to Tamir, seeks to construct a national identity that adopts the correct ethical values. They hope to harness the energy of nationalism to build a nation committed to liberty, inclusivity and progress.

    In 1867, George-Étienne Cartier described the Canadian identity that he and the other Fathers of Confederation sought to create as a “political nationality.” He viewed Canadian identity as being defined by shared principles rather than language or ethnicity.

    More than 150 years later, political theorist Michael Ignatieff made a similar distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism. In an ethnic nation, citizens identify with each other because they belong to the same ethnic, religious or cultural community. Meanwhile, in a civic nation, the people unite behind certain civic principles, like a commitment to democracy.

    Cartier’s concept of a political nationality was crucial to making sense of the political experiment that was Confederation. Having mostly abandoned their efforts to assimilate the French-Canadians, the British settlers in North America would now join with them to build a new national identity instead.

    Reshaping Canadian identity

    In his recent book, historian Raymond Blake explains how Canada’s post-Second World War prime ministers, through their speeches and public statements, reshaped Canada’s national identity.



    Read more:
    40 years later: A look back at the Pierre Trudeau speech that defined Canada

    Up through Louis St-Laurent, various prime ministers would refer to the “deux nations” origin of Canada as inspirational. British and French settlers had come together despite their differences to build a new society together, they pointed out.

    As time went on, it became clear this definition of Canada’s national identity wasn’t nearly inclusive enough, making no mention of Indigenous Peoples.

    The multicultural character of Canadian society was increasingly acknowledged by the government and Canadians at large until it was central to Canada’s identity. Canada’s national narrative has been reframed in recent years to recognize Indigenous Peoples as one of the three founding pillars of Canadian society. This evolution exemplifies exactly the change citizens should expect in a national community.

    This transformation in Canadian national identity shows that national communities can change over time — including, perhaps, in response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats against Canada.

    In the end, Canadians decide what sort of nation they want to inhabit. Canada’s political nationality has proven more resilient than even some of its founders might have anticipated, but not for lack of effort. There will always remain the work of building a better nation — and it’s work worth doing.

    Eric Wilkinson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Canada Day: How Canadian nationalism is evolving with the times — and will continue to do so – https://theconversation.com/canada-day-how-canadian-nationalism-is-evolving-with-the-times-and-will-continue-to-do-so-259352

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Why have athletes stopped ‘taking a knee’?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ciprian N. Radavoi, Associate Professor in Law, University of Southern Queensland

    Eli Harold, Colin Kaepernick and Eric Reid of the San Francisco 49ers kneel ahead of a game in 2016. Michael Zagaris/San Francisco 49ers/Getty Images

    It’s almost a decade since San Francisco 49ers quarterback Colin Kaepernick started a worldwide trend and sparked fierce debate when he knelt during the US national anthem.

    In 2016, Kaepernick refused to follow the pre-game protocol related to the national anthem and knelt instead, saying:

    I am not going to stand up to show pride in a flag for a country that oppresses black people and people of colour.

    Soon, many athletes and teams began “taking a knee” at sports events to express their solidarity with victims of racial injustice.

    Now, they appear to have stopped, which prompted us to research the decline.

    Initial widespread support

    Following the intense public debate over the appropriateness of Kaepernick’s act, the ritual quickly spread worldwide, with athletes in major soccer leagues, cricket, rugby, Formula 1, top-tier tennis and the US’s Major League Baseball and National Basketball Association taking a knee.

    Athletes didn’t always kneel during national anthems, with the majority kneeling at certain points pre-game.

    Despite the occasional “defection” of a small number of players who would stand while their teammates knelt – such as Israel Folau in rugby league, Wilfried Zaha in soccer and Quinton de Kock in cricket – the ritual was widely embraced by teams and athletes and helped raise awareness of the issue.

    Even major sports organisations notorious for prohibiting any type of political activism generally accepted the kneeling ritual. For example, soccer’s International Football Federation (FIFA) showcased kneeling as a “stand against discrimination” and as human rights advocacy.

    The International Olympic Committee (IOC) initially stood firm by its Rule 50, which states “no kind of demonstration or political, religious, or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas”.

    But just three weeks before the 2021 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo, the IOC relaxed its interpretation, and athletes were permitted to express their views in ways that included taking a knee.

    A surprising turn of events

    Despite permission and even encouragement from sports governing bodies, our research shows the practice is disappearing from major sports competitions.

    Take soccer, for example. At the FIFA World Cup 2022, England and Wales were the only national teams that knelt at their games in Qatar.

    At the FIFA Women’s World Cup 2023 in Australia and New Zealand, no teams or players knelt.

    The same happened at the 2024 Olympic soccer tournament in Paris.

    That only a handful of teams knelt in Tokyo at the 2021 Olympics, two at the FIFA Mens’ World Cup in Qatar in 2022, none at the FIFA Womens’ World Cup in Australia and New Zealand in 2023, and again none at the Paris 2024 Olympics indicates a growing reluctance throughout the sports world.

    This surely cannot mean athletes have become indifferent to racial injustice or other forms of oppression in the interval between the late 2010s and the mid-2020s.

    The explanation must be sought elsewhere. A hint was provided when Crystal Palace soccer player Zaha, the first player of colour in the UK who refused to kneel, explained:

    I feel like taking the knee is degrading, because growing up my parents just let me know that I should be proud to be Black no matter what and I feel like we should just stand tall.

    The explanation may therefore be, at least in part, the players’ uncomfortable feelings related to the kneeling posture.

    In sociology, this bothersome state of mind is called “cognitive dissonance”: the mental conflict a person experiences in the presence of contrasting beliefs.

    A history of kneeling

    The body posture of kneeling is not deemed, in any culture, as expressing solidarity.

    Ancient Greek and the Roman societies, on whose values Western civilisation was built, rejected kneeling as improper, even when praying to gods.

    Then, with the spread of Christianity in the Western world, kneeling became widely used, but only as an act of worship, confessing guilt, or praying for mercy.

    When performed outside the church, kneeling meant submission to nobility or royalty.

    The significance of kneeling as humility is not limited to the Western world.

    In African tribal culture, the young kneel in front of elders, and everyone kneels before the king.

    In China in 1949, Chairman Mao famously proclaimed at the first plenary of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference:

    From now on our nation […] will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up.

    With this in mind, kneeling may be deemed unfit at sporting events, which often feature a powerful cocktail of emotions, values and social expectations.

    The inconsistency between the excitement of competition and the expectation to kneel — a gesture associated with submission and humility — likely creates a bothersome state of mind for athletes.

    This potentially motivates some players to reject one of the two – in this case, the kneeling – to restore cognitive harmony.

    What could replace the kneeling ritual?

    After refusing, by unanimous players’ vote, to take a knee before their October 2020 game against the All Blacks, the Australian rugby union team chose instead to wear a First Nations jersey.

    The same year, several teams in German soccer’s top league chose to show their support for Black Lives Matter by wearing distinctive armbands.

    So it appears wearing a distinctive jersey or at least an armband is more easily accepted by modern-day athletes. This may be challenging given the governing bodies of many sports, such as FIFA, ban athletes from wearing political symbols on their clothing.

    Depending on whether sports code accept this type of activism in the future, wearing suportive clothing could replace taking a knee as symbolic communication of solidarity with oppressed minorities.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Why have athletes stopped ‘taking a knee’? – https://theconversation.com/why-have-athletes-stopped-taking-a-knee-259047

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Japanese prime minister’s abrupt no-show at NATO summit reveals a strained alliance with the US

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Craig Mark, Adjunct Lecturer, Faculty of Economics, Hosei University

    Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has sent a clear signal to the Trump administration: the Japan–US relationship is in a dire state.

    After saying just days ago he would be attending this week’s NATO summit at The Hague, Ishiba abruptly pulled out at the last minute.

    He joins two other leaders from the Indo-Pacific region, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, in skipping the summit.

    The Japanese media reported Ishiba cancelled the trip because a bilateral meeting with US President Donald Trump was unlikely, as was a meeting of the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) NATO partners (Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan).

    Japan will still be represented by Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya, showing its desire to strengthen its security relationship with NATO.

    However, Ishiba’s no-show reveals how Japan views its relationship with the Trump administration, following the severe tariffs Washington imposed on Japan and Trump’s mixed messages on the countries’ decades-long military alliance.

    Tariffs and diplomatic disagreements

    Trump’s tariff policy is at the core of the divide between the US and Japan.

    Ishiba attempted to get relations with the Trump administration off to a good start. He was the second world leader to visit Trump at the White House, after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

    However, Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs imposed a punitive rate of 25% on Japanese cars and 24% on all other Japanese imports. They are already having an adverse impact on Japan’s economy: exports of automobiles to the US dropped in May by 25% compared to a year ago.

    Six rounds of negotiations have made little progress, as Ishiba’s government insists on full tariff exemptions.

    Japan has been under pressure from the Trump administration to increase its defence spending, as well. According to the Financial Times, Tokyo cancelled a summit between US and Japanese defence and foreign ministers over the demand. (A Japanese official denied the report.)

    Japan also did not offer its full support to the US bombings of Iran’s nuclear facilities earlier this week. The foreign minister instead said Japan “understands” the US’s determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

    Japan has traditionally had fairly good relations with Iran, often acting as an indirect bridge with the West. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe even made a visit there in 2019.

    Japan also remains heavily dependent on oil from the Middle East. It would have been adversely affected if the Strait of Hormuz had been blocked, as Iran was threatening to do.

    Unlike the response from the UK and Australia, which both supported the strikes, the Ishiba government prioritised its commitment to upholding international law and the rules-based global order. In doing so, Japan seeks to deny China, Russia and North Korea any leeway to similarly erode global norms on the use of force and territorial aggression.

    Strategic dilemma of the Japan–US military alliance

    In addition, Japan is facing the same dilemma as other American allies – how to manage relations with the “America first” Trump administration, which has made the US an unreliable ally.

    Earlier this year, Trump criticised the decades-old security alliance between the US and Japan, calling it “one-sided”.

    “If we’re ever attacked, they don’t have to do a thing to protect us,” he said of Japan.

    Lower-level security cooperation is ongoing between the two allies and their regional partners. The US, Japanese and Philippine Coast Guards conducted drills in Japanese waters this week. The US military may also assist with upgrading Japan’s counterstrike missile capabilities.

    But Japan is still likely to continue expanding its security ties with partners beyond the US, such as NATO, the European Union, India, the Philippines, Vietnam and other ASEAN members, while maintaining its fragile rapprochement with South Korea.

    Australia is now arguably Japan’s most reliable security partner. Canberra is considering buying Japan’s Mogami-class frigates for the Royal Australian Navy. And if the AUKUS agreement with the US and UK collapses, Japanese submarines could be a replacement.

    Ishiba under domestic political pressure

    There are also intensifying domestic political pressures on Ishiba to hold firm against Trump, who is deeply unpopular among the Japanese public.

    After replacing former prime minister Fumio Kishida as leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) last September, the party lost its majority in the lower house of parliament in snap elections. This made it dependent on minor parties for legislative support.

    Ishiba’s minority government has struggled ever since with poor opinion polling. There has been widespread discontent with inflation, the high cost of living and stagnant wages, the legacy of LDP political scandals, and ever-worsening geopolitical uncertainty.

    On Sunday, the party suffered its worst-ever result in elections for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, winning its lowest number of seats.

    The party could face a similar drubbing in the election for half of the upper house of the Diet (Japan’s parliament) on July 20. Ishiba has pledged to maintain the LDP’s majority in the house with its junior coalition partner Komeito. But if the government falls into minority status in both houses, Ishiba will face heavy pressure to step down.

    Craig Mark does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Japanese prime minister’s abrupt no-show at NATO summit reveals a strained alliance with the US – https://theconversation.com/japanese-prime-ministers-abrupt-no-show-at-nato-summit-reveals-a-strained-alliance-with-the-us-259694

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Trump’s f-bomb: a psychologist explains why the president makes fast and furious statements

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Geoff Beattie, Professor of Psychology, Edge Hill University

    Donald Trump’s latest forthright outburst was made as part of his attempts to create a peace deal with Iran and Israel. “I’m not happy with Israel,” he told reporters on June 24. “We basically have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard that they don’t know what the fuck they’re doing.”

    This came a day after Trump had announced a ceasefire between Israel and Iran. By the next day, the ceasefire had been violated by both Iran and Israel. Trump was clearly furious, and his language showed it.

    This was not a verbal slip – there was no immediate correction, no apology, no nonverbal indication of embarrassment. He just stormed off, clearly angry.

    This is not the kind of language that is normally associated with a president. Some have been reported to use the f-word before, but usually behind closed doors.

    Donald Trump uses the f-word in a press conference.

    We expect presidents to be calm, measured, thoughtful, considered. Trump’s comment was none of these things. Theodore Roosevelt, the 26th US president, once recommended a foreign policy strategy that was based on speaking softly and carrying a big stick. He was suggesting quiet menace, but Trump showed frustration, barely contained. His furious, aggressive response was like something straight out of an old psychology textbook.

    In the 1930s, psychologists developed the frustration-aggression hypothesis to explain how aggressive behaviour can arise. The hypothesis suggested that when a person’s goal is blocked in some way, it leads to frustration, which then results in aggression. Aggression was considered a “natural” way of releasing this unpleasant state of frustration. They were clearly different times.

    Over the next few decades, this hypothesis was thought by most psychologists to be a gross oversimplification of complex human behaviour. It assumed a direct causal relationship between frustration and aggression, ignoring all the other situational and cognitive factors that can intervene.

    Human beings are more complex than that, psychologists argued — they find other ways of dealing with their frustrations. They use their rational system of thought to find solutions. They don’t have to lash out when they’re frustrated in this seemingly primitive way.

    Perhaps, that’s why many people feel shocked when they watch this US president in certain situations. To many of us, it all seems so basic, so unsophisticated, so frightening.

    Fast v slow thinking

    The Nobel laureate and psychologist Daniel Kahneman, in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), characterised the two systems that underpin everyday decision-making. His work may help with understanding of what’s going on here.

    He describes system one as the evolutionary, basic system. It operates unconsciously, automatically and very quickly, handling everyday tasks like reading other people’s emotions, without any effort. It is an intuitive system designed to work in a world full of approach and avoidance, scary animals and friendly animals. It is heavily reliant on affect to guide decision-making.

    In contrast, system two is slower, more deliberative. It requires conscious effort and is used for complex thinking, solving difficult problems, or making careful decisions.

    The relationship between the two systems is critical, and that may get us thinking about Trump in more detail.

    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

    Kahneman says that system one is a bit of a “workaholic”, beavering away all the time, making “suggestions” for system two to endorse. Good decisions – depend upon system two checking the suggestions of system one. But system one often jumps quickly and unconsciously to certain conclusions. System two should check them, but often doesn’t, even when it would be easy.

    Here is a well-known example. Answer the following question: “A bat and ball cost one pound ten pence, the bat costs one pound more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?”

    One answer looks blatantly obvious – but it isn’t correct. The correct answer (after a bit of thought) is five pence.

    About 80% of university students give the very quick and incorrect answer of ten pence because it “looks” right. Their system two never checked.

    In many people, it seems system two is not used nearly enough. There are striking individual differences in the way that people rely on emotion and gut instinct versus the rational system in making decisions.

    Emotional decisions?

    It appears that Trump makes decisions very quickly (classic system one), often without extensive deliberation or consultation with advisers. Both in his presidency and in his business career, he seemed to prioritise immediate action over any sort of prolonged and thoughtful analysis. That’s why he changes his mind so often.

    His decisions seem to be driven by strong emotions. His response to events, opponents and issues are often passionate and visceral. This could lead to to decisions being unduly influenced by personal feelings, first impressions based on arbitrary cues, and interpersonal perceptions, rather than anything more substantial.

    Trump’s style of decision-making emphasises immediacy and emotional conviction, which can be effective in rallying supporters and creating a sense of decisiveness. However, it also can lead to unpredictable outcomes and, as has been seen again and again, somewhat controversial, impulsive actions.

    Many suggest that Trump’s decision-making style reflects his background in the high-pressure and high-stakes world of business, where quick judgements and gut instinct can be advantageous in these sorts of competitive winner-takes-all environments

    But the world at war is a more precarious place, where system one needs to be kept more firmly in check. Gut instincts may have a role to play, but that old lazy system two needs to be more vigilant. Especially, it would seem, in Trump’s case.

    This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something from bookshop.org The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

    Geoff Beattie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump’s f-bomb: a psychologist explains why the president makes fast and furious statements – https://theconversation.com/trumps-f-bomb-a-psychologist-explains-why-the-president-makes-fast-and-furious-statements-259735

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister Carney speaks with President of Egypt Abdel Fattah el-Sisi

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    Today, the Prime Minister, Mark Carney, spoke with the President of Egypt, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

    Prime Minister Carney and President el-Sisi underscored the economic and cultural ties between Canada and Egypt, and emphasized opportunities to deepen trade, commerce, and investment.

    The leaders discussed the situation in the Middle East and stressed the imperative of a ceasefire in Gaza. The Prime Minister reiterated that Hamas must release all hostages and have no future role in the governance of Gaza. He called for urgent, life-saving humanitarian aid to reach civilians and affirmed Canada’s support for a two-state solution.

    The Prime Minister and the President agreed to remain in contact.

    Associated Link

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Alford, Gonzales Introduce Bill to Create Military Campaign Service Medal for Service Members Who Supported Operation Midnight Hammer

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Mark Alford (Missouri 4th District)

    Today, Congressmen Mark Alford (MO-04) and Tony Gonzales (TX-23) introduced the Iranian Campaign Medal Act. This legislation authorizes the Secretary of Defense to establish and award a United States military decoration to service members who served in direct support of Operation Midnight Hammer.

     “As the Congressman representing Whiteman Air Force Base, I’m proud to co-lead this bill recognizing our airmen’s contributions to Operation Midnight Hammer,” said Congressman Alford. “It was not just the pilots—it was also the maintenance, planning, operational, and support personnel whose unparalleled coordination made this mission a resounding success. The Iranian Campaign was the ultimate testament to President Trump’s peace through strength agenda.”

    “During my 20 years of military service, including multiple campaigns in the Middle East, I served side by side with the finest troops in the world. No matter what the mission is, American servicemembers always rise to the challenge, and Operation Midnight Hammer in Iran is no exception. There is no other military in the world that could have executed a precision strike on nuclear sites with such excellence, and the men and women who made it happen deserve full recognition for their efforts. I’m especially proud that the airmen involved received training at our military installations in San Antonio, which highlights yet again the importance of Military City, U.S.A.,” said Congressman Tony Gonzales. “The Iranian Campaign Medal Act will authorize the Department of Defense to establish a military service medal for our troops deployed to Iran under President Trump’s decisive leadership.”

    Read the text of the legislation here.

    U.S. Representatives Sam Graves (R-MO), Pat Fallon (R-TX), August Pfluger (R-TX), Zach Nunn (R-IA), Claudia Tenney (R-NY), Frank Lucas (R-OK), Mike Simpson (R-ID), Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL), Mike Lawler (R-NY), Juan Ciscomani (R-AZ), and Rob Bresnahan (R-PA) supported Congressmen Alford and Gonzales’ legislation as original co-sponsors.

    Background:

    On June 22, 2025, President Trump authorized a precision strike at three Iranian nuclear sites to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. Executed by 14 American pilots flying seven B-2 bombers out of Whiteman AFB, and supported by over 125 U.S. aircraft, including dozens of aerial refueling tankers, a guided missile submarine, and approximately 75 precision-guided munitions, the strike successfully targeted critical Iranian nuclear infrastructure at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. In keeping with longstanding tradition, Congress has the authority to establish a commemorative service medal to honor service members for their contributions to military operations.

    The Iranian Campaign Medal Act authorizes the creation and award of a United States military decoration to service members who served in Iran in direct support of Operation Midnight Hammer, as well as any additional operations or periods the Secretary of Defense may designate.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Trump’s worldview is causing a global shift of alliances – what does this mean for nations in the middle?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva, Lecturer in Government – National Security College, Australian National University

    Since US President Donald Trump took office this year, one theme has come up time and again: his rule is a threat to the US-led international order.

    As the US political scientist John Mearsheimer famously argued, the liberal international order

    was destined to fail from the start, as it contained the seeds of its own destruction.

    This perspective has gained traction in recent years. And now, Trump’s actions have caused many to question whether a new world order is emerging.

    Trump has expressed a desire for a new international order defined by multiple spheres of influence — one in which powers like the US, China and Russia each exert dominance over distinct regions.

    This vision aligns with the idea of a “multipolar” world, where no single state holds overarching global dominance. Instead, influence is distributed among several great powers, each maintaining its own regional sphere.

    This architecture contrasts sharply with earlier periods – the bipolar world of the Cold War, dominated by the US and the Soviet Union; and the unipolar period that followed, dominated by the US.

    What does this mean for the world order moving forward?

    Shifting US spheres of influence

    We’ve seen this shift taking place in recent months. For example, Trump has backed away from his pledge to end the war between Russia and Ukraine and now appears to be leaving it to the main protagonists, and Europe, to find a solution.

    Europe, which once largely spoke in a unified voice with the US, is also showing signs of policy-making which is more independent. Rather than framing its actions as protecting “Western democratic principles”, Europe is increasingly focused on defining its own security interests.

    In the Middle East, the US will likely maintain its sphere of influence. It will continue its unequivocal support for Israel under Trump.

    Amid shifting global alliances, the Trump administration will continue to support Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
    noamgalai/Shutterstock

    The US will also involve itself in the region’s politics when its interests are at stake, as we witnessed in its recent strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

    This, along with increasing economic ties between the US and Gulf states, suggests US allies in the region will remain the dominant voices shaping regional dynamics, particularly now with Iran weakened.

    Yet it’s clear Trump is reshaping US dynamics in the region by signaling a desire for reduced military and political involvement, and criticising the nation building efforts of previous administrations.

    The Trump administration now appears to want to maintain its sphere of influence primarily through strong economic ties.

    Russia and China poles emerging elsewhere

    Meanwhile, other poles are emerging in the Global South. Russia and China have deepened their cooperation, positioning themselves as defenders against what they frame as Western hegemonic bullying.

    Trump’s trade policies and sanctions against many nations in the Global South have fuelled narratives (spread by China and Russia) that the US does not consistently adhere to the rules it imposes on others.

    Trump’s decision to slash funding to USAID has also opened the door to China, in particular, to become the main development partner for nations in Africa and other parts of the world.

    And on the security front, Russia has become more involved in many African and Middle Eastern countries, which have become less trustful and reliant on Western powers.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Xinping see opportunities to spread their influence in the Global South.
    plavi011/Shutterstock

    In the Indo-Pacific, much attention has been given to the rise of China and its increasingly assertive posture. Many of Washington’s traditional allies are nervous about its continued engagement in the region and ability to counter China’s rise.

    Chinese leader Xi Jinping has sought to take advantage of the current environment, embarking on a Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia push earlier this year. But many nations continue to be wary of China’s increasing influence, in particular the Philippines, which has clashed with China over the South China Sea.

    Strategic hedging

    Not all countries, however, are aligning themselves neatly with one pole or another.

    For small states caught between great powers, navigating this multipolar environment is both a risk and an opportunity.

    Ukraine is a case in point. As a sovereign state, Ukraine should have the freedom to decide its own alignments. Yet, it finds itself ensnared in great power politics, with devastating consequences.

    Other small states are playing a different game — pivoting from one power to another based on their immediate interests.

    Slovakia, for instance, is both a NATO and EU member, yet its leader, Robert Fico, attended Russia’s Victory Day Parade in May and told President Vladimir Putin he wanted to maintain “normal relations” with Russia.

    Then there is Central Asia, which is the centre of a renewed “great game,” with Russia, China and Europe vying for influence and economic partnerships.

    Yet if any Central Asian countries were to be invaded by Putin, would other powers intervene? It’s a difficult question to answer. Major powers are reluctant to engage in direct conflict unless their core interests or borders are directly threatened.

    As a result, Central Asian states are hedging their bets, seeking to maintain relations with multiple poles, despite their conflicting agendas.

    A future defined by regional power blocs?

    While it is still early to draw definitive conclusions, the events of the past few months underscore a growing trend. Smaller countries are expressing solidarity with one power, but pragmatic cooperation with another, when it suits their national interests.

    For this reason, regional power blocs seem to be of increasing interest to countries in the Global South.

    For instance, the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has become a stronger and larger grouping of nations across Eurasia in recent years.

    Trump’s focus on making “America Great Again,” has taken the load off the US carrying liberal order leadership. A multipolar world may not be the end of the liberal international order, but it may be a reshaped version of liberal governance.

    How “liberal” it can be will likely depend on what each regional power, or pole, will make of it.

    Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump’s worldview is causing a global shift of alliances – what does this mean for nations in the middle? – https://theconversation.com/trumps-worldview-is-causing-a-global-shift-of-alliances-what-does-this-mean-for-nations-in-the-middle-257113

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Trump’s worldview is causing a global shift of alliances – what does this mean for nations in the middle?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva, Lecturer in Government – National Security College, Australian National University

    Since US President Donald Trump took office this year, one theme has come up time and again: his rule is a threat to the US-led international order.

    As the US political scientist John Mearsheimer famously argued, the liberal international order

    was destined to fail from the start, as it contained the seeds of its own destruction.

    This perspective has gained traction in recent years. And now, Trump’s actions have caused many to question whether a new world order is emerging.

    Trump has expressed a desire for a new international order defined by multiple spheres of influence — one in which powers like the US, China and Russia each exert dominance over distinct regions.

    This vision aligns with the idea of a “multipolar” world, where no single state holds overarching global dominance. Instead, influence is distributed among several great powers, each maintaining its own regional sphere.

    This architecture contrasts sharply with earlier periods – the bipolar world of the Cold War, dominated by the US and the Soviet Union; and the unipolar period that followed, dominated by the US.

    What does this mean for the world order moving forward?

    Shifting US spheres of influence

    We’ve seen this shift taking place in recent months. For example, Trump has backed away from his pledge to end the war between Russia and Ukraine and now appears to be leaving it to the main protagonists, and Europe, to find a solution.

    Europe, which once largely spoke in a unified voice with the US, is also showing signs of policy-making which is more independent. Rather than framing its actions as protecting “Western democratic principles”, Europe is increasingly focused on defining its own security interests.

    In the Middle East, the US will likely maintain its sphere of influence. It will continue its unequivocal support for Israel under Trump.

    Amid shifting global alliances, the Trump administration will continue to support Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
    noamgalai/Shutterstock

    The US will also involve itself in the region’s politics when its interests are at stake, as we witnessed in its recent strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

    This, along with increasing economic ties between the US and Gulf states, suggests US allies in the region will remain the dominant voices shaping regional dynamics, particularly now with Iran weakened.

    Yet it’s clear Trump is reshaping US dynamics in the region by signaling a desire for reduced military and political involvement, and criticising the nation building efforts of previous administrations.

    The Trump administration now appears to want to maintain its sphere of influence primarily through strong economic ties.

    Russia and China poles emerging elsewhere

    Meanwhile, other poles are emerging in the Global South. Russia and China have deepened their cooperation, positioning themselves as defenders against what they frame as Western hegemonic bullying.

    Trump’s trade policies and sanctions against many nations in the Global South have fuelled narratives (spread by China and Russia) that the US does not consistently adhere to the rules it imposes on others.

    Trump’s decision to slash funding to USAID has also opened the door to China, in particular, to become the main development partner for nations in Africa and other parts of the world.

    And on the security front, Russia has become more involved in many African and Middle Eastern countries, which have become less trustful and reliant on Western powers.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Xinping see opportunities to spread their influence in the Global South.
    plavi011/Shutterstock

    In the Indo-Pacific, much attention has been given to the rise of China and its increasingly assertive posture. Many of Washington’s traditional allies are nervous about its continued engagement in the region and ability to counter China’s rise.

    Chinese leader Xi Jinping has sought to take advantage of the current environment, embarking on a Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia push earlier this year. But many nations continue to be wary of China’s increasing influence, in particular the Philippines, which has clashed with China over the South China Sea.

    Strategic hedging

    Not all countries, however, are aligning themselves neatly with one pole or another.

    For small states caught between great powers, navigating this multipolar environment is both a risk and an opportunity.

    Ukraine is a case in point. As a sovereign state, Ukraine should have the freedom to decide its own alignments. Yet, it finds itself ensnared in great power politics, with devastating consequences.

    Other small states are playing a different game — pivoting from one power to another based on their immediate interests.

    Slovakia, for instance, is both a NATO and EU member, yet its leader, Robert Fico, attended Russia’s Victory Day Parade in May and told President Vladimir Putin he wanted to maintain “normal relations” with Russia.

    Then there is Central Asia, which is the centre of a renewed “great game,” with Russia, China and Europe vying for influence and economic partnerships.

    Yet if any Central Asian countries were to be invaded by Putin, would other powers intervene? It’s a difficult question to answer. Major powers are reluctant to engage in direct conflict unless their core interests or borders are directly threatened.

    As a result, Central Asian states are hedging their bets, seeking to maintain relations with multiple poles, despite their conflicting agendas.

    A future defined by regional power blocs?

    While it is still early to draw definitive conclusions, the events of the past few months underscore a growing trend. Smaller countries are expressing solidarity with one power, but pragmatic cooperation with another, when it suits their national interests.

    For this reason, regional power blocs seem to be of increasing interest to countries in the Global South.

    For instance, the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has become a stronger and larger grouping of nations across Eurasia in recent years.

    Trump’s focus on making “America Great Again,” has taken the load off the US carrying liberal order leadership. A multipolar world may not be the end of the liberal international order, but it may be a reshaped version of liberal governance.

    How “liberal” it can be will likely depend on what each regional power, or pole, will make of it.

    Dilnoza Ubaydullaeva does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump’s worldview is causing a global shift of alliances – what does this mean for nations in the middle? – https://theconversation.com/trumps-worldview-is-causing-a-global-shift-of-alliances-what-does-this-mean-for-nations-in-the-middle-257113

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Presidential Permit Authorizing South Bow (USA) LP to Operate and Maintain Pipeline Facilities at Cavalier County, North Dakota, at the International Boundary Between the United States and Canada

    Source: US Whitehouse

    class=”has-text-align-left”>Dear Mr. Speaker:   (Dear Mr. President:)

    On the night of June 21, 2025, at my direction, United States forces conducted a precision strike against three nuclear facilities in Iran used by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran for its nuclear weapons development program.  The strike was taken to advance vital United States national interests, and in collective self-defense of our ally, Israel, by eliminating Iran’s nuclear program.

    The strike was limited in scope and purpose.  The United States discretely targeted three Iranian nuclear facilities.  Iranian troops and other military facilities were not targeted.  No United States ground forces were used in the strike, and the mission was planned and executed in a manner designed to minimize casualties, deter future attacks, and limit the risk of escalation.

    I directed this military action consistent with my responsibility to protect United States citizens both at home and abroad as well as in furtherance of United States national security and foreign policy interests.  I acted pursuant to my constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct United States foreign relations.  The United States took this necessary and proportionate action consistent with international law, and the United States stands ready to take further action, as necessary and appropriate, to address further threats or attacks.

    I am providing this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148).  I appreciate the support of the Congress in this action.

                      Sincerely,

                                 DONALD J. TRUMP

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions

    Source: US Whitehouse

    By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-175) (Syria Accountability Act), the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182, title III) (CBW Act), the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, as amended (22 U.S.C. 8791 note) (Caesar Act), the Illicit Captagon Trafficking Suppression Act of 2023 (Public Law 118-50, div. P), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered:

    Section 1.  Background.  The United States is committed to supporting a Syria that is stable, unified, and at peace with itself and its neighbors.  A united Syria that does not offer a safe haven for terrorist organizations and ensures the security of its religious and ethnic minorities will support regional security and prosperity.  The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury have taken initial steps towards this goal through the issuance on May 23, 2025, of General License 25 and a waiver of sanctions under the Caesar Act. 

    Sec. 2.  Policy.  It is the policy of the United States to recognize that circumstances that gave rise to the actions taken in the Executive Orders described in section 3(a) of this order, related to the policies and actions of the former regime of Bashar al-Assad, have been transformed by developments over the past 6 months, including the positive actions taken by the new Syrian government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa.  This order supports United States national security and foreign policy goals by directing additional actions, including the removal of sanctions on Syria, the issuance of waivers that permit the relaxation of export controls and other restrictions on Syria, and other actions to be taken by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce, as well as by other executive departments and agencies (agencies) of the United States, without providing relief to ISIS or other terrorist organizations, human rights abusers, those linked to chemical weapons or proliferation-related activities, or other persons that threaten the peace, security, or stability of the United States, Syria, and its neighbors. 

    Sec. 3.  Revocation of Syria Sanctions.  (a)  Effective July 1, 2025, I hereby terminate the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004 (Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods to Syria), and revoke that order, as well as Executive Order 13399 of April 25, 2006 (Blocking Property of Additional Persons in Connection With the National Emergency With Respect to Syria), Executive Order 13460 of February 13, 2008 (Blocking Property of Additional Persons in Connection With the National Emergency With Respect to Syria), Executive Order 13572 of April 29, 2011 (Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to Human Rights Abuses in Syria), Executive Order 13573 of May 18, 2011 (Blocking Property of Senior Officials of the Government of Syria), and Executive Order 13582 of August 17, 2011 (Blocking Property of the Government of Syria and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Syria).
         (b)  Pursuant to section 202(a) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1622(a)), termination of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13338, as modified in scope and relied upon for additional steps taken in Executive Order 13399, Executive Order 13460, Executive Order 13572, Executive Order 13573, and Executive Order 13582 shall not affect any action taken or pending proceeding not finally concluded or determined as of July 1, 2025, any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to July 1, 2025, or any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred prior to July 1, 2025.

    Sec. 4.  Accountability for the Former Regime of Bashar al‑Assad.  I find that additional steps must be taken to ensure meaningful accountability for perpetrators of war crimes, human rights violations and abuses, and the proliferation of narcotics trafficking networks in and in relation to Syria during the former regime of Bashar al-Assad and by those associated with it.  Perpetrators of such actions threaten to undermine peace, security, and stability in the region, and thereby constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.
         (a)  I hereby expand the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13894 of October 14, 2019 (Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Syria), as amended in and relied on for additional steps taken in Executive Order 14142 of January 15, 2025 (Taking Additional Steps With Respect to the Situation in Syria), to deal with that threat, and accordingly further amend Executive Order 13894 by:
            (i)   striking section 1(a) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:
         “Section 1.  (a)  All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in: 
            (i)  any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State:
              (A)  to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, any of the following in or in relation to Syria:
                 (1)  actions or policies that further threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Syria; or
                 (2)  the commission of serious human rights abuse;
              (B)  to be a former government official of the former regime of Bashar al-Assad or a person who acted for or on behalf of such an official;
              (C)  to have engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the illicit production and international illicit proliferation of captagon;
              (D)  to be responsible for or complicit in, to have directly or indirectly engaged in, or to be responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, instances in which a United States national ((i) as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22) or 8 U.S.C. 1408, or (ii) a lawful permanent resident with significant ties to the United States) went missing in Syria during the former regime of Bashar al-Assad; 
              (E)  to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of: 
                 (1)  the former regime of Bashar al-Assad; 
                 (2)  any activity described in subsections (a)(i)(A)–(a)(i)(D) of this section; or 
                 (3)  any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; 
              (F)  to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; or
              (G)  to be an adult family member of a person designated under subsections (a)(i)(A)–(a)(i)(D) of this section.”; and
            (ii)  striking section 2(a) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:  
         “Sec. 2.  (a)  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and other officials of the United States Government as appropriate, is hereby authorized to impose on a foreign person any of the sanctions described in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, upon determining that the person, on or after the date of this order: 
            (i)    is responsible for or complicit in, has directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, or financed the obstruction, disruption, or prevention of efforts to promote a Syria that is stable, unified, and at peace with itself and its neighbors, including:
              (A)  the convening and conduct of a credible and inclusive Syrian-led constitutional process;
              (B)  the preparation for and conduct of supervised elections, pursuant to the new constitution, that are free and fair and to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability; or
              (C)  the development of a Syrian government that is representative and reflects the will of the Syrian people;
            (ii)   is an adult family member of a person designated under subsection (a)(i) of this section; or
            (iii)  is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in, the expropriation of property, including real property, for personal gain or political purposes in Syria.”
         (b)  I additionally amend Executive Order 13606 of April 22, 2012 (Blocking the Property and Suspending Entry into the United States of Certain Persons With Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria Via Information Technology), by removing the following text from the preamble:  “Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004, as modified in scope and relied upon for additional steps in subsequent Executive Orders” and replacing it with:  “Executive Order 13894 of October 14, 2019, and relied upon for additional steps and further amended in subsequent Executive Orders.”

    Sec. 5.  Caesar Act.  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall examine whether the criteria set forth in section 7431(a) of the Caesar Act have been met, and on the basis of that examination may, pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of March 31, 2020 (Delegation of Certain Functions and Authorities Under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020), suspend in whole or in part the imposition of sanctions otherwise required under the Caesar Act.  If the Secretary of State determines to suspend in whole or in part the imposition of such sanctions, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall provide the briefing to the appropriate congressional committees required by section 7431(b) of the Caesar Act within 30 days of such determination.  Further, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall continue to review the situation in Syria, and if the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, determines that the criteria set forth in section 7431(a) are no longer met, the Secretary of State shall reimpose sanctions. 

    Sec. 6.  Syria Accountability Act.  I hereby determine pursuant to section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability Act that it is in the national security interest of the United States to waive the application of subsection (a)(1), with respect to items on the Commerce Control List (supp. No. 1 to 15 C.F.R. part 774) only, and subsection (a)(2)(A) of the Syria Accountability Act only.  The Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the report required under section 5(b) of that Act.

    Sec. 7.  CBW Act.  (a)  Pursuant to section 307(d)(1)(B) of the CBW Act, I hereby determine and certify that there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.  Accordingly, I hereby waive the following sanctions imposed on Syria for the prior use of chemical weapons under the former regime of Bashar al-Assad:
            (i) the restriction on foreign assistance under section 307(a)(1) of the CBW Act;
            (ii)   the restriction on United States Government credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance under section 307(a)(4) of the CBW Act;
            (iii)  the restrictions on the export of national security-sensitive goods and technology under section 307(a)(5) of the CBW Act and on all other goods and technology under section 307(b)(2)(C) of the CBW Act; and
            (iv)   the restriction on United States banks from making any loan or providing any credit to the Government of Syria under section 307(b)(2)(B) of the CBW Act.
         (b)  The Secretary of State shall transmit this waiver determination and report as required by sections 307(d)(1)(B) and (d)(2) of the CBW Act to the appropriate congressional committees.  This waiver shall be effective 20 days after it has been so transmitted.

    Sec. 8.  Counterterrorism Designations.  (a)  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, shall take all appropriate action with respect to the designation of al-Nusrah Front, also known as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and other aliases, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under 8 U.S.C. 1189 and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under 50 U.S.C. 1702 and Executive Order 13224, as well as the designation of Abu Muhammad al Jawlani, commonly known as Ahmed al-Sharaa, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.
         (b)  The Secretary of State shall take all appropriate action to review the designation of Syria as a State Sponsor of Terrorism consistent with section 1754(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232; 50 U.S.C. 4813(c)), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (Public Law 90-629, as amended; 22 U.S.C. 2780), and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-195, as amended; 22 U.S.C. 2371).

    Sec. 9.  United Nations.  The Secretary of State shall take appropriate steps to advance United States policy objectives at the United Nations to support a Syria that is stable and at peace and to support Syrian efforts to counter terrorism and comply with its responsibilities and obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons.  The Secretary of State is further directed to explore avenues at the United Nations to provide sanctions relief in support of these objectives.

    Sec. 10.  Implementation.  The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce, as appropriate, are hereby authorized to take such actions, including adopting rules and regulations, as may be necessary to implement this order.  The Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce may, consistent with applicable law, redelegate any of these functions within their respective agencies.  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Transportation, as appropriate, is authorized to exercise the functions and authorities conferred upon the President in section 5 of the Syria Accountability Act and to redelegate these functions and authorities consistent with applicable law.  All agencies of the United States shall take all appropriate measures within their authority to implement this order, consistent with applicable law.

    Sec. 11.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
            (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
            (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
         (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
         (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
         (d)  The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of State.

                            DONALD J. TRUMP

    THE WHITE HOUSE,
    June 30, 2025.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Provides for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions

    Source: US Whitehouse

    TERMINATING SANCTIONS ON SYRIA: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a historic Executive Order terminating the Syria sanctions program to support the country’s path to stability and peace.

    • The Order removes sanctions on Syria while maintaining sanctions on Bashar al-Assad, his associates, human rights abusers, drug traffickers, persons linked to chemical weapons activities, ISIS or its affiliates, and Iranian proxies.
    • The Order directs the Secretary of State to evaluate suspending sanctions, either in whole or in part if specific criteria are met, under the Caesar Act, a law that sanctions the Assad regime for atrocities.
    • The Order permits the relaxation of export controls on certain goods and waives restrictions on certain foreign assistance to Syria.
    • The Order directs the Secretary of State to review Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
    • The Order directs the Secretary of State to review HTS and Ahmed al-Sharaa’s designations as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.
    • The Order directs the Secretary of State to review Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
    • The Order directs the Secretary of State to explore avenues for sanctions relief at the United Nations to support stability in Syria.

    GIVING SYRIA A CHANCE TO SUCCEED: President Trump is committed to supporting a Syria that is stable, unified, and at peace with itself and its neighbors.

    • President Trump wants Syria to succeed—but not at the expense of U.S. interests. While seeking to reengage constructively, this Administration will continue to guard against all threats and monitor progress on key priorities: taking concrete steps toward normalizing ties with Israel, addressing foreign terrorists, deporting Palestinian terrorists and banning Palestinian terrorist groups, helping the United States prevent a resurgence of ISIS, and assuming responsibility for ISIS detention centers in northeast Syria.
    • U.S. sanctions were imposed in response to the Assad regime’s brutal actions against the Syrian people and their direct support for terrorism in the region.
    • Recent positive changes and actions taken by the Government of Syria, after the fall of the brutal Assad Regime, demonstrate promise for a stable and peaceful future.
    • Removing sanctions will support Syria’s efforts to rebuild and counter terrorism without empowering harmful actors.
    • A unified Syria that protects its people and rejects extremism strengthens security and prosperity in the Middle East.
    • This policy aligns with U.S. goals to promote peace and stability in the region while holding accountable those responsible for past atrocities or terrorism.

    PROMISE MADE, PROMISE KEPT: President Trump is delivering on his commitment to give Syria a chance to rebuild and thrive by lifting sanctions and ensuring accountability for harmful actors.

    • On May 13, President Trump announced he would be lifting sanctions on Syria to “give them a chance at greatness.”
      • President Trump: “The sanctions were brutal and crippling and served as an important — really an important function — nevertheless, at the time. But now it’s their time to shine … So, I say, ‘Good luck, Syria.’ Show us something very special.”
    • The Treasury Department quickly took the first step in lifting sanctions on Syria by issuing a general license, known as GL25, to authorize transactions involving the interim Syrian government, its central bank, and state-owned enterprises. Simultaneously, the State Department issued a 180-day waiver of sanctions under the Caesar Act. 
    • President Trump is now fully delivering on that promise by taking bold action to implement the termination of the Syria sanctions program.
    • The world should take notice—if you want to take meaningful steps towards peace and stability, then the United States is willing to move rapidly to support you. 
    • President Trump hopes that Syria’s new government “will hopefully succeed in stabilizing the country in keeping peace.”
    • President Trump believes “there is great potential in working with Syria to stop Radicalism, improve Relations, and secure Peace in the Middle East.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI: Ellomay Capital Reports Results for the Three Months Ended March 31, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TEL-AVIV, Israel, June 30, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Ellomay Capital Ltd. (NYSE American; TASE: ELLO) (“Ellomay” or the “Company”), a renewable energy and power generator and developer of renewable energy and power projects in Europe, USA and Israel, today reported its unaudited interim consolidated financial results for the three month period ended March 31, 2025.

    Financial Highlights

    • Total assets as of March 31, 2025 amounted to approximately €721.2 million, compared to total assets as of December 31, 2024 of approximately €677.3 million.
    • Revenues for the three months ended March 31, 2025 were approximately €8.9 million, compared to revenues of approximately €8.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
    • Profit for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was approximately €6.8 million, compared to loss of approximately €4.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
    • EBITDA for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was approximately €2.9 million, compared to EBITDA of approximately €1.6 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. See below under “Use of Non-IFRS Financial Measures” for additional disclosure concerning EBITDA.

    Financial Overview for the Three Months Ended March 31, 2025

    • Revenues were approximately €8.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €8.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The increase in revenues mainly results from revenues generated from our 19.8 MW and 18.1 MW Italian solar facilities that were connected to the grid in February-May 2024 and in January 2025, respectively.
    • Operating expenses were approximately €4.6 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €4.6 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. Depreciation and amortization expenses were approximately €4.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €4.1 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
    • Project development costs were approximately €1 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €1.4 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The decrease in project development costs is mainly due to projects that reached “ready to build” status, which results in the commencement of the capitalization of expenses related to such projects into fixed assets.
    • General and administrative expenses were approximately €1.7 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €1.6 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
    • The Company’s share of profits of equity accounted investee, after elimination of intercompany transactions, was approximately €1.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €1.3 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
    • Other income was approximately €0.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to €0 for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The income during the three months ended March 31, 2025 was recognized based on insurance compensation in connection with the fire near the Talasol and Ellomay Solar facilities in Spain in July 2024 due to loss of income in 2025.
    • Financing income, net, were approximately €7.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to financing expenses of approximately €3.3 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024. The change in financing expenses, net, was mainly attributable to higher income resulting from exchange rate differences that amounted to approximately €10.7 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to loss from exchange rate differences of approximately €0.6 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024, an aggregate change of approximately €11.3 million. The exchange rate differences were mainly recorded in connection with the New Israeli Shekel (“NIS”) cash and cash equivalents and the Company’s NIS denominated debentures and were caused by the 5.9% devaluation of the NIS against the euro during the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to a revaluation of 0.8% during the three months ended March 31, 2024. The increase in financing income for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was partially offset by an increase in financing expenses of approximately €0.9 million in connection with derivatives and warrants for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to the three months ended March 31, 2024.
    • Tax benefit was approximately €0.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to tax benefit of approximately €0.8 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
    • Loss from discontinued operation (net of tax) was €0 for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to a loss from discontinued operation (net of tax) of approximately €0.3 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
    • Profit for the three months ended March 31, 2025 was approximately €6.8 million, compared to loss of approximately €4.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
    • Total other comprehensive loss was approximately €4.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to total other comprehensive income of approximately €12 million in the three months ended March 31, 2024. The change in total other comprehensive income (loss) is primarily as the result of foreign currency translation adjustments due to the change in the NIS/euro exchange rate and by changes in fair value of cash flow hedges, including a material decrease in the fair value of the liability resulting from the financial power swap that covers approximately 80% of the output of the Talasol solar plant (the “Talasol PPA”). The Talasol PPA experienced a high volatility due to the substantial change in electricity prices in Europe. In accordance with hedge accounting standards, the changes in the Talasol PPA’s fair value are recorded in the Company’s shareholders’ equity through a hedging reserve and not through the accumulated deficit/retained earnings. The changes do not impact the Company’s consolidated net profit/loss or the Company’s consolidated cash flows.
    • Total comprehensive income was approximately €1.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to total comprehensive income of approximately €7.1 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
    • EBITDA was approximately €2.9 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €1.6 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
    • Net cash from operating activities was approximately €0.3 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, compared to approximately €1.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
    • On February 16, 2025, the Company issued in an Israeli public offering an aggregate principal amount of NIS 214,479,000 of newly issued Series G Debentures, due December 31, 2032. The net proceeds of the offering, net of related expenses such as consultancy fee and commissions, were approximately NIS 211.7 million (approximately €56.7 million as of the issuance date).

    CEO Review for the First Quarter of 2025

    In the first quarter, the Company’s revenues amounted to €8.9 million, an increase of approximately 9% in revenues compared to the corresponding quarter last year. These revenues do not include the Company’s share of Dorad’s revenues. The Company presented an increase of approximately 81% in EBITDA compared to the corresponding quarter last year (€2.9 million compared to €1.6 million in the corresponding quarter last year). The Company’s first quarter is a winter quarter and is characterized by low production and revenues compared to the other quarters of the year.

    In the first half of 2025, the Company recorded significant progress in the start of construction and connection to the grid of new projects, which are expected to contribute to revenue growth in the near future.

    In Italy – Financing agreements were signed for solar projects with a total capacity of 198 MW (of which 38 MW are already connected to the electricity grid), and a transaction was signed and consummated with Clal Insurance to enter as a partner (49%) in the aforementioned 198 MW. Construction work on 160 MW has begun and construction is progressing as planned. The remainder of the portfolio held by the Company (100%) is approximately 264 MW solar, of which 124 MW have received construction permits and the rest are expected to receive permits in the near future. These 264 MW are scheduled to begin construction in the last quarter of 2026.

    In the US – The Company is advancing additional solar projects with a capacity of approximately 50 MW (beyond the existing portfolio (49 MW) which has completed construction), which are expected to begin construction during 2025. The intention is that these projects will be able to enjoy the full tax benefit currently in effect. The addition of battery storage to each of the projects is also under planning.

    In the Netherlands – the Company received, after March 31, 2025, a license to increase production at the GGG facility by 64%. Licenses to increase production at the two additional facilities are in advanced stages. The new regulation for the obligation to blend green gas with fossil gas will commence according to the law in January 2027 (a delay of one year), but the targets for the first year have increased. Agreements have been signed for the sale of green certificates issued under the new regulation at a price of approximately €1 per certificate. The blending obligation is expected to significantly increase the profitability of operations in the Netherlands at current production capacity. The expected increase in production capacity from 16 million cubic meters of gas per year to around 24 million cubic meters of gas per year is expected to add significantly beyond that.

    In Israel – the Company is in negotiations with the Israeli Electricity Authority for compensation for delays and war damage to the Manara project. Ellomay Luzon (50% owned) provided a notice of exercise of its right of first refusal on the Zorlu-Phoenix transaction for the sale of Dorad’s shares. Ellomay Luzon and another shareholder exercised their right of first refusal with respect to all of the shares offered (15% of Dorad’s shares), and, subject to the timely fulfillment of the conditions to closing, Ellomay Luzon and the other shareholder are expected to share these shares in equal parts.

    In Spain – The Company’s development activity in Spain focuses on battery storage, due to the high volatility in electricity prices in Spain, which stems from an excess of renewable energy during the transition seasons and causes damage to the stability of the grid. In the Company’s assessment, the solution is a significant increase in storage capacity, which is currently at very low levels in Spain. Regulation in Spain is also starting to move in this direction.

    Use of Non-IFRS Financial Measures

    EBITDA is a non-IFRS measure and is defined as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization. The Company presents this measure in order to enhance the understanding of the Company’s operating performance and to enable comparability between periods. While the Company considers EBITDA to be an important measure of comparative operating performance, EBITDA should not be considered in isolation or as a substitute for net income or other statement of operations or cash flow data prepared in accordance with IFRS as a measure of profitability or liquidity. EBITDA does not take into account the Company’s commitments, including capital expenditures and restricted cash and, accordingly, is not necessarily indicative of amounts that may be available for discretionary uses. Not all companies calculate EBITDA in the same manner, and the measure as presented may not be comparable to similarly-titled measure presented by other companies. The Company’s EBITDA may not be indicative of the Company’s historic operating results; nor is it meant to be predictive of potential future results. The Company uses this measure internally as performance measure and believes that when this measure is combined with IFRS measure it add useful information concerning the Company’s operating performance. A reconciliation between results on an IFRS and non-IFRS basis is provided on page 17 of this press release.

    About Ellomay Capital Ltd.

    Ellomay is an Israeli based company whose shares are registered with the NYSE American and with the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange under the trading symbol “ELLO”. Since 2009, Ellomay focuses its business in the renewable energy and power sectors in Europe, USA and Israel.

    To date, Ellomay has evaluated numerous opportunities and invested significant funds in the renewable, clean energy and natural resources industries in Israel, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Texas, USA, including:

    • Approximately 335.9 MW of operating solar power plants in Spain (including a 300 MW solar plant in owned by Talasol, which is 51% owned by the Company) and 51% of approximately 38 MW of operating solar power plants in Italy;
    • 9.375% indirect interest in Dorad Energy Ltd., which owns and operates one of Israel’s largest private power plants with production capacity of approximately 850MW, representing about 6%-8% of Israel’s total current electricity consumption;
    • Groen Gas Goor B.V., Groen Gas Oude-Tonge B.V. and Groen Gas Gelderland B.V., project companies operating anaerobic digestion plants in the Netherlands, with a green gas production capacity of approximately 3 million, 3.8 million and 9.5 million Nm3 per year, respectively;
    • 83.333% of Ellomay Pumped Storage (2014) Ltd., which is involved in a project to construct a 156 MW pumped storage hydro power plant in the Manara Cliff, Israel;
    • 51% of solar projects in Italy with an aggregate capacity of 160 MW that commenced construction processes;
    • Solar projects in Italy with an aggregate capacity of 134 MW that have reached “ready to build” status; and
    • Solar projects in the Dallas Metropolitan area, Texas, USA with an aggregate capacity of approximately 27 MW that are connected to the grid and additional 22 MW that are awaiting connection to the grid.

    For more information about Ellomay, visit http://www.ellomay.com.

    Information Relating to Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements that involve substantial risks and uncertainties, including statements that are based on the current expectations and assumptions of the Company’s management. All statements, other than statements of historical facts, included in this press release regarding the Company’s plans and objectives, expectations and assumptions of management are forward-looking statements. The use of certain words, including the words “estimate,” “project,” “intend,” “expect,” “believe” and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The Company may not actually achieve the plans, intentions or expectations disclosed in the forward-looking statements and you should not place undue reliance on the Company’s forward-looking statements. Various important factors could cause actual results or events to differ materially from those that may be expressed or implied by the Company’s forward-looking statements, including changes in electricity prices and demand, regulatory changes increases in interest rates and inflation, changes in the supply and prices of resources required for the operation of the Company’s facilities (such as waste and natural gas) and in the price of oil, the impact of the war and hostilities in Israel and Gaza and between Israel and Iran, the impact of the continued military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, technical and other disruptions in the operations or construction of the power plants owned by the Company, inability to obtain the financing required for the development and construction of projects, inability to advance the expansion of Dorad, increases in interest rates and inflation, changes in exchange rates, delays in development, construction, or commencement of operation of the projects under development, failure to obtain permits – whether within the set time frame or at all, climate change, and general market, political and economic conditions in the countries in which the Company operates, including Israel, Spain, Italy and the United States. and general market, political and economic conditions in the countries in which the Company operates, including Israel, Spain, Italy and the United States. These and other risks and uncertainties associated with the Company’s business are described in greater detail in the filings the Company makes from time to time with Securities and Exchange Commission, including its Annual Report on Form 20-F. The forward-looking statements are made as of this date and the Company does not undertake any obligation to update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    Contact:
    Kalia Rubenbach (Weintraub)
    CFO
    Tel: +972 (3) 797-1111
    Email: hilai@ellomay.com

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Financial Position
      March 31,   December 31,   March 31,
    2025   2024   2025
    Unaudited   Audited   Unaudited
    € in thousands
    		   Convenience Translation
    into US$ in thousands*
    Assets          
    Current assets:          
    Cash and cash equivalents 35,148   41,134   38,021
    Short term deposits 36,301   –   39,268
    Restricted cash 656   656   710
    Intangible asset from green certificates 195   178   211
    Trade and revenue receivables 5,911   5,393   6,394
    Other receivables 15,518   15,341   16,786
    Derivatives asset short-term 650   146   703
      94,379   62,848   102,093
    Non-current assets          
    Investment in equity accounted investee 40,107   41,324   43,385
    Advances on account of investments 547   547   592
    Fixed assets 487,100   482,747   526,914
    Right-of-use asset 41,276   34,315   44,650
    Restricted cash and deposits 15,569   17,052   16,842
    Deferred tax 8,525   9,039   9,222
    Long term receivables 13,882   13,411   15,017
    Derivatives 19,855   15,974   21,478
      626,861   614,409   678,100
               
    Total assets 721,240   677,257   780,193
               
    Liabilities and Equity          
    Current liabilities          
    Current maturities of long-term bank loans 20,761   21,316   22,458
    Current maturities of other long-term loans 5,866   5,866   6,345
    Current maturities of debentures 47,233   35,706   51,094
    Trade payables 9,928   8,856   10,738
    Other payables 8,913   10,896   9,642
    Current maturities of derivatives 40   1,875   43
    Current maturities of lease liabilities 733   714   793
    Warrants 1,740   1,446   1,882
      95,214   86,675   102,995
    Non-current liabilities          
    Long-term lease liabilities 32,673   25,324   35,344
    Long-term bank loans 242,177   245,866   261,972
    Other long-term loans 29,578   30,448   31,996
    Debentures 186,691   155,823   201,951
    Deferred tax 2,652   2,609   2,869
    Other long-term liabilities 950   939   1,028
    Derivatives 135   288   146
      494,856   461,297   535,306
    Total liabilities 590,070   547,972   638,301
               
    Equity          
    Share capital 25,613   25,613   27,707
    Share premium 86,275   86,271   93,327
    Treasury shares (1,736)   (1,736)   (1,878)
    Transaction reserve with non-controlling Interests 5,697   5,697   6,163
    Reserves 7,381   14,338   7,984
    Accumulated deficit (3,567)   (11,561)   (3,859)
    Total equity attributed to shareholders of the Company 119,663   118,622   129,444
    Non-Controlling Interest 11,507   10,663   12,448
    Total equity 131,170   129,285   141,892
    Total liabilities and equity 721,240   677,257   780,193

    * Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at March 31, 2025: euro 1 = US$ 1.082)

                    

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
    Condensed Consolidated Interim Statements of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income (Loss)
      For the three months
    ended March 31,    		 For the year
    ended
    December 31,    		   For the three
    months ended
    March 31,
      2025   2024   2024   2025
      Unaudited
    		   Audited   Unaudited
      € in thousands (except per share data)
    		   Convenience Translation into US$*
    Revenues 8,860   8,243   40,467   9,584
    Operating expenses (4,627)   (4,563)   (19,803)   (5,005)
    Depreciation and amortization expenses (4,238)   (4,055)   (15,887)   (4,584)
    Gross profit (loss) (5)   (375)   4,777   (5)
                   
    Project development costs (1,045)   (1,415)   (4,101)   (1,130)
    General and administrative expenses (1,662)   (1,620)   (6,063)   (1,798)
    Share of profits of equity accounted investee 1,189   1,286   11,062   1,286
    Other income 198   –   3,409   214
    Operating profit (loss) (1,325)   (2,124)   9,084   (1,433)
                   
    Financing income 11,483   631   2,495   12,422
    Financing income (expenses) in connection with derivatives and warrants, net (376)   536   1,140   (407)
    Financing expenses in connection with projects finance (1,375)   (1,501)   (6,190)   (1,487)
    Financing expenses in connection with debentures (1,741)   (1,711)   (6,641)   (1,883)
    Interest expenses on minority shareholder loan (476)   (554)   (2,144)   (515)
    Other financing expenses (294)   (713)   (8,311)   (318)
    Financing income (expenses), net 7,221   (3,312)   (19,651)   7,812
    Profit (loss) before taxes on income 5,896   (5,436)   (10,567)   6,379
    Tax benefit 922   828   1,424   997
    Profit (loss) from continuing operations 6,818   (4,608)   (9,143)   7,376
    Profit (loss) from discontinued operation (net of tax) –   (312)   137   –
    Profit (loss) for the period 6,818   (4,920)   (9,006)   7,376
    Profit (loss) attributable to:              
    Owners of the Company 7,994   (3,613)   (6,524)   8,647
    Non-controlling interests (1,176)   (1,307)   (2,482)   (1,271)
    Profit (loss) for the period 6,818   (4,920)   (9,006)   7,376
                   
    Other comprehensive income items              
    That after initial recognition in comprehensive income were or will be transferred to profit or loss:              
    Foreign currency translation differences for foreign operations (9,538)   1,124   8,007   (10,318)
    Foreign currency translation differences for foreign operations that were recognized in profit or loss –   –   255    
    Effective portion of change in fair value of cash flow hedges 4,264   10,461   5,631   4,613
    Net change in fair value of cash flow hedges transferred to profit or loss 337   457   (813)   365
    Total other comprehensive income (4,937)   12,042   13,080   (5,340)
                   
    Total other comprehensive income (loss) attributable to:              
    Owners of the Company (6,957)   6,656   10,039   (7,526)
    Non-controlling interests 2,020   5,386   3,041   2,186
    Total other comprehensive income (loss) (4,937)   12,042   13,080   (5,340)
    Total comprehensive income for the period 1,881   7,122   4,074   2,036
                   
    Total comprehensive income for the period attributable to:              
    Owners of the Company 1,037   3,043   3,515   1,121
    Non-controlling interests 844   4,079   559   915
    Total comprehensive income for the period 1,881   7,122   4,074   2,036
                   

    * Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at March 31, 2025: euro 1 = US$ 1.082)

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
    Condensed Consolidated Interim Statements of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income (Loss) (cont’d)
      For the three months
    ended March 31,    		 For the year
    ended
    December 31,    		   For the three months
    ended March 31,
    2025   2024   2024   2025
    Unaudited
    		   Audited   Unaudited
    € in thousands (except per share data)
    		   Convenience Translation into US$*
                   
    Basic profit (loss) per share 0.62   (0.28)   (0.51)   0.67
    Diluted profit (loss) per share 0.62   (0.28)   (0.51)   0.67
                   
    Basic profit (loss) per share continuing operations 0.62   (0.31)   (0.52)   0.67
    Diluted profit (loss) per share continuing operations 0.62   (0.31)   (0.52)   0.67
                   
    Basic profit (loss) per share discontinued operation –   (0.02)   0.01   –
    Diluted profit (loss) per share discontinued operation –   (0.02)   0.01   –

    * Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at March 31, 2025: euro 1 = US$ 1.082)

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
    Condensed Consolidated Interim Statements of Changes in Equity
              Attributable to shareholders of the Company
    		   Non- controlling   Total
                                    Interests   Equity
    Share capital   Share premium   Accumulated Deficit   Treasury shares   Translation reserve from
    foreign operations    		   Hedging Reserve   Interests Transaction reserve with
    non-controlling Interests    		   Total        
    € in thousands
                                           
    For the three months                                      
    ended March 31, 2025 (unaudited):                                      
    Balance as at January 1, 2025 25,613   86,271   (11,561)   (1,736)   8,446   5,892   5,697   118,622   10,663   129,285
    Profit for the period –   –   7,994   –   –   –   –   7,994   (1,176)   6,818
    Other comprehensive income for the period –   –   –   –   (9,329)   2,372   –   (6,957)   2,020   (4,937)
    Total comprehensive income for the period –   –   7,994   –   (9,329)   2,372   –   1,037   844   1,881
    Transactions with owners of the Company, recognized directly in equity:                                      
    Share-based payments –   4   –   –   –   –   –   4   –   4
    Balance as at March 31, 2025 25,613   86,275   (3,567)   (1,736)   (883)   8,264   5,697   119,663   11,507   131,170
                                           
    For the three months                                      
    ended March 31, 2024 (unaudited):                                      
    Balance as at January 1, 2024 25,613   86,159   (5,037)   (1,736)   385   3,914   5,697   114,995   10,104   125,099
    Loss for the period –   –   (3,613)   –   –   –   –   (3,613)   (1,307)   (4,920)
    Other comprehensive income for the period –   –   –   –   1,088   5,568   –   6,656   5,386   12,042
    Total comprehensive income (loss) for the period –   –   (3,613)   –   1,088   5,568   –   3,043   4,079   7,122
    Transactions with owners of the Company, recognized directly in equity:                                      
    Share-based payments –   30   –   –   –   –   –   30   –   30
    Balance as at March 31, 2024 25,613   86,189   (8,650)   (1,736)   1,473   9,482   5,697   118,068   14,183   132,251
    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
    Condensed Consolidated Interim Statements of Changes in Equity (cont’d)
              Attributable to shareholders of the Company
    		   Non- controlling   Total
                                    Interests   Equity
    Share capital   Share premium   Accumulated Deficit   Treasury shares   Translation reserve from
    foreign operations    		   Hedging Reserve   Interests Transaction reserve with
    non-controlling Interests    		   Total        
    € in thousands
    For the year ended                                      
    December 31, 2024 (audited):                                      
    Balance as at January 1, 2024 25,613   86,159   (5,037)   (1,736)   385   3,914   5,697   114,995   10,104   125,099
    Loss for the year –   –   (6,524)   –   –   –   –   (6,524)   (2,482)   (9,006)
    Other comprehensive income for the year –   –   –   –   8,061   1,978   –   10,039   3,041   13,080
    Total comprehensive income (loss) for the year –   –   (6,524)   –   8,061   1,978   –   3,515   559   4,074
    Transactions with owners of the Company, recognized directly in equity:                                      
    Share-based payments –   112   –   –   –   –   –   112   –   112
    Balance as at December 31, 2024 25,613   86,271   (11,561)   (1,736)   8,446   5,892   5,697   118,622   10,663   129,285
    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
    Condensed Consolidated Interim Statements of Changes in Equity (cont’d)
              Attributable to shareholders of the Company
    		   Non- controlling
    Interests    		   Total
    Equity
                                         
    Share capital   Share premium   Accumulated Deficit   Treasury shares   Translation reserve from
    foreign operations    		   Hedging Reserve   Interests Transaction reserve with
    non-controlling Interests    		   Total        
    Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at March 31, 2025: euro 1 = US$ 1.082)
    For the three months                                      
    ended March 31, 2025 (unaudited):                                      
    Balance as at January 1, 2025 27,707   93,323   (12,506)   (1,878)   9,136   6,374   6,163   128,319   11,533   139,852
    Loss for the period –   –   8,647   –   –   –   –   8,647   (1,271)   7,376
    Other comprehensive income for the period –   –   –   –   (10,092)   2,566   –   (7,526)   2,186   (5,340)
    Total comprehensive income for the period –   –   8,647   –   (10,092)   2,566   –   1,121   915   2,036
    Transactions with owners of the Company, recognized directly in equity:                                      
    Share-based payments –   4   –   –   –   –   –   4   –   4
    Balance as at March 31, 2025 27,707   93,327   (3,859)   (1,878)   (956)   8,940   6,163   129,444   12,448   141,892
    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
    Condensed Consolidated Interim Statements of Cash Flow
      For the three months
    ended March 31,    		 For the year
    ended
    December 31,    		   For the three months
    ended March 31,
    2025   2024   2024   2025
    Unaudited
    		   Audited   Unaudited
    € in thousands
    		   Convenience
    Translation into US$*
    Cash flows from operating activities              
    Profit (loss) for the period 6,818   (4,920)   (9,006)   7,376
    Adjustments for:              
    Financing expenses (income), net (7,221)   3,167   19,247   (7,812)
    Loss from settlement of derivatives contract –   –   316   –
    Impairment losses on assets of disposal groups classified as held-for-sale –   601   405   –
    Depreciation and amortization expenses 4,238   4,084   15,935   4,584
    Share-based payment transactions 4   30   112   4
    Share of profit of equity accounted investees (1,189)   (1,286)   (11,062)   (1,286)
    Payment of interest on loan from an equity accounted investee –   –   –   –
    Change in trade receivables and other receivables   6,178   (2,342)   (8,824)   6,683
    Change in other assets (496)   –   3,770   (537)
    Change in receivables from concessions project –   315   793   –
    Change in trade payables 1,267   (68)   (31)   1,371
    Change in other payables (5,538)   2,796   4,455   (5,796)
    Tax benefit (922)   (805)   (1,429)   (997)
    Income taxes refund (paid) –   564   623   –
    Interest received 351   907   2,537   380
    Interest paid (3,408)   (1,892)   (9,873)   (3,687)
      (6,556)   6,071   16,974   (7,093)
    Net cash from operating activities 262   1,151   7,968   283
                   
    Cash flows from investing activities              
    Acquisition of fixed assets (18,550)   (9,020)   (72,922)   (20,066)
    Interest paid capitalized to fixed assets (876)   –   (2,515)   (948)
    Proceeds from sale of investments –   –   9,267   –
    Advances on account of investments –   –   (163)   –
    Proceeds from advances on account of investments –   –   514   –
    Investment in settlement of derivatives, net –   14   (316)   –
    Proceed from restricted cash, net 1,307   1,153   689   1,414
    Proceeds from investment in short-term deposits (39,132)   (28)   1,004   (42,331)
    Net cash used in investing activities (57,251)   (7,881)   (64,442)   (61,931)
                   
    Cash flows from financing activities              
    Issuance of warrants –   3,735   2,449   –
    Cost associated with long term loans (658)   (638)   (2,567)   (712)
    Payment of principal of lease liabilities (372)   (299)   (2,941)   (402)
    Proceeds from long-term loans 306   380   19,482   331
    Repayment of long-term loans (1,792)   (2,357)   (11,776)   (1,938)
    Repayment of debentures —   –   (35,845)   –
    Proceeds from issuance of debentures, net 56,729   36,450   74,159   61,366
    Net cash from financing activities 54,213   37,271   42,961   58,645
                   
    Effect of exchange rate fluctuations on cash and cash equivalents (3,210)   1,667   3,092   (3,472)
    Increase (decrease) in cash and cash equivalents (5,986)   32,208   (10,421)   (6,475)
    Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of year 41,134   51,555   51,127   44,496
    Cash from disposal groups classified as held-for-sale –   (1,041)   428   –
    Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the period 35,148   82,722   41,134   38,021

    * Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at March 31, 2025: euro 1 = US$ 1.082)

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
    Operating Segments
      Italy   Spain
    		   USA   Netherlands   Israel
    		   Total        
        Subsidized   28 MV                       reportable       Total
    Solar   Plants   Solar   Talasol   Solar   Biogas   Dorad   Manara   segments   Reconciliations   consolidated
    For the three months ended March 31, 2025
    € in thousands
                                               
    Revenues 945   786   406   3,246   –   3,477   15,061   –   23,921   (15,061)   8,860
    Operating expenses (435)   (105)   (84)   (1,024)   (305)   (3,206)   (11,693)   –   (16,851)   12,224   (4,627)
    Depreciation expenses (225)   (229)   (252)   (2,839)   –   (676)   (1,268)   –   (5,489)   1,251   (4,238)
    Gross profit (loss) 313   452   84   (617)   (305)   (405)   2,100   –   1,623   (1,628)   (5)
                                               
    Adjusted gross profit (loss) 313   452   84   (617)   (305)   (405)   2,100   –   1,623   (1,628)   (5)
    Project development costs                                         (1,045)
    General and administrative expenses                                         (1,662)
    Share of loss of equity accounted investee                                         1,189
    Other income, net                                         198
    Operating profit                                         (1,325)
    Financing income                                         11,483
    Financing income in connection                                          
    with derivatives and warrants, net                                         (376)
    Financing expenses in connection with projects finance                                         (1,375)
    Financing expenses in connection with debentures                                         (1,741)
    Interest expenses on minority shareholder loan                                         (476)
    Other financing expenses                                         (294)
    Financing expenses, net                                         7,221
    Loss before taxes on income                                         5,896
                                               
    Segment assets as at March 31, 2025 87,185   13,242   19,475   223,844   60,458   32,801   108,858   180,504   726,366   (5,126)   721,240  
    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
    Reconciliation of Profit (Loss) to EBITDA
      For the three months
    ended March 31,    		 For the year
    ended
    December 31,    		   For the three months
    ended March 31,
    2025   2024   2024   2025
    € in thousands
    		   Convenience Translation
    into US$*
    Net profit (loss) for the period 6,818   (4,920)   (9,006)   7,376
    Financing expenses (income), net (7,221)   3,312   19,651   (7,812)
    Tax benefit (922)   (828)   (1,424)   (997)
    Depreciation and amortization expenses 4,238   4,055   15,887   4,584
    EBITDA 2,913   1,619   25,108   3,151

    * Convenience translation into US$ (exchange rate as at March 31, 2025: euro 1 = US$ 1.082)

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
    Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders

    Financial Covenants

    Pursuant to the Deeds of Trust governing the Company’s Series C, Series D, Series E, Series F and Series G Debentures (together, the “Debentures”), the Company is required to maintain certain financial covenants. For more information, see Items 4.A and 5.B of the Company’s Annual Report on Form 20-F submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 30, 2025, and below.

    Net Financial Debt

    As of March 31, 2025, the Company’s Net Financial Debt, (as such term is defined in the Deeds of Trust of the Company’s Debentures), was approximately €170 million (consisting of approximately €3031 million of short-term and long-term debt from banks and other interest bearing financial obligations, approximately €241.42 million in connection with (i) the Series C Debentures issuances (in July 2019, October 2020, February 2021 and October 2021), (ii) the Series D Convertible Debentures issuance (in February 2021), (iii) the Series E Secured Debentures issuance (in February 2023), (iv) the Series F Debentures issuance (in January, April, August and November 2024) and (v) the Series G Debentures issuance (in February 2025)), net of approximately €71.4 million of cash and cash equivalents, short-term deposits and marketable securities and net of approximately €3033 million of project finance and related hedging transactions of the Company’s subsidiaries).

    Discussion concerning Warning Signs

    Upon the issuance of the Company’s Debentures, the Company undertook to comply with the “hybrid model disclosure requirements” as determined by the Israeli Securities Authority and as described in the Israeli prospectuses published in connection with the public offering of the company’s Debentures. This model provides that in the event certain financial “warning signs” exist in the Company’s consolidated financial results or statements, and for as long as they exist, the Company will be subject to certain disclosure obligations towards the holders of the Company’s Debentures.

    One possible “warning sign” is the existence of a working capital deficiency if the Company’s Board of Directors does not determine that the working capital deficiency is not an indication of a liquidity problem. In examining the existence of warning signs as of March 31, 2025, the Company’s Board of Directors noted the working capital deficiency as of March 31, 2025, in the amount of approximately €0.96 million. The Company’s Board of Directors reviewed the Company’s financial position, outstanding debt obligations and the Company’s existing and anticipated cash resources and uses and determined that the existence of a working capital deficiency as of March 31, 2025, does not indicate a liquidity problem. In making such determination, the Company’s Board of Directors noted the following: (i) the execution of the agreement to sell tax credits in connection with the US solar projects, which is expected to contribute approximately $19 million during the next twelve months, (ii) the Company’s positive cash flow from operating activities during 2023 and 2024, and (iii) funds received from the investment transaction with Clal Insurance Company Ltd. that was consummated in June 2025.

     

    Ellomay Capital Ltd.
    Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)


    Information for the Company’s Series C Debenture Holders

    The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series C Debentures (as amended on June 6, 2022, the “Series C Deed of Trust”), includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for two consecutive quarters is a cause for immediate repayment. As of March 31, 2025, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series C Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series C Deed of Trust) was approximately €116.6 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 59.3%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA,4 was 6.3.

    The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s profit and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series C Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025:

        For the four-quarter period
    ended M    arch 31, 2025
      Unaudited
      € in thousands
    Profit for the period   2,274
    Financing expenses, net   9,118
    Taxes on income   (1,641)
    Depreciation and amortization expenses   16,651
    Share-based payments   86
    Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model   484
    Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series C Deed of Trust   26,972

    The Series C Debentures were fully repaid on June 30, 2025 in accordance with their terms. 

    Ellomay Capital Ltd.
    Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)

    Information for the Company’s Series D Debenture Holders

    The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series D Debentures includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for the periods set forth in the Series D Deed of Trust is a cause for immediate repayment. As of March 31, 2025, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series D Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series D Deed of Trust) was approximately €116.6 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 59.3%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA5 was 6.1.

    The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s profit and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series D Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025:

        For the four-quarter period
    ended M    arch 31, 2025
      Unaudited
      € in thousands
    Loss for the period   2,274
    Financing expenses, net   9,118
    Taxes on income   (1,641)
    Depreciation and amortization expenses   16,651
    Share-based payments   86
    Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model   484
    Adjustment to data relating to projects with a Commercial Operation Date during the four preceding quarters6   899
    Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series D Deed of Trust   27,871
    Ellomay Capital Ltd.
    Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)


    Information for the Company’s Series E Debenture Holders

    The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series E Debentures includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for the periods set forth in the Series E Deed of Trust is a cause for immediate repayment. As of March 31, 2025, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series E Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series E Deed of Trust) was approximately €116.6 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 59.3%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA7 was 6.1.

    The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s profit and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series E Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025:

        For the four-quarter period
    ended March 31, 2025
      Unaudited
      € in thousands
    Profit for the period   2,274
    Financing expenses, net   9,118
    Taxes on income   (1,641)
    Depreciation and amortization expenses   16,651
    Share-based payments   86
    Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model   484
    Adjustment to data relating to projects with a Commercial Operation Date during the four preceding quarters8   899
    Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series E Deed of Trust   27,871
         

    In connection with the undertaking included in Section 3.17.2 of Annex 6 of the Series E Deed of Trust, no circumstances occurred during the reporting period under which the rights to loans provided to Ellomay Luzon Energy Infrastructures Ltd. (formerly U. Dori Energy Infrastructures Ltd. (“Ellomay Luzon Energy”)), which were pledged to the holders of the Company’s Series E Debentures, will become subordinate to the amounts owed by Ellomay Luzon Energy to Israel Discount Bank Ltd.

    As of March 31, 2025, the value of the assets pledged to the holders of the Series E Debentures in the Company’s books (unaudited) is approximately €40.1 million (approximately NIS 161.3 million based on the exchange rate as of such date).

    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
    Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)

    Information for the Company’s Series F Debenture Holders

    The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series F Debentures includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for the periods set forth in the Series F Deed of Trust is a cause for immediate repayment. As of March 31, 2025, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series F Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series F Deed of Trust) was approximately €115.9 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 59.4%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA9 was 6.1.

    The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s profit and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series F Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025:

        For the four-quarter period
    ended March 31, 2025
      Unaudited
      € in thousands
    Profit for the period   2,274
    Financing expenses, net   9,118
    Taxes on income   (1,641)
    Depreciation and amortization expenses   16,651
    Share-based payments   86
    Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model   484
    Adjustment to data relating to projects with a Commercial Operation Date during the four preceding quarters10   899
    Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series F Deed of Trust   27,871
         
    Ellomay Capital Ltd. and its Subsidiaries
    Information for the Company’s Debenture Holders (cont’d)


    Information for the Company’s Series G Debenture Holders

    The Deed of Trust governing the Company’s Series G Debentures includes an undertaking by the Company to maintain certain financial covenants, whereby a breach of such financial covenants for the periods set forth in the Series G Deed of Trust is a cause for immediate repayment. As of March 31, 2025, the Company was in compliance with the financial covenants set forth in the Series G Deed of Trust as follows: (i) the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity (as defined in the Series G Deed of Trust) was approximately €115.9 million, (ii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt (as set forth above) to the Company’s CAP, Net (defined as the Company’s Adjusted Shareholders’ Equity plus the Net Financial Debt) was 59.4%, and (iii) the ratio of the Company’s Net Financial Debt to the Company’s Adjusted EBITDA11 was 6.1.

    The following is a reconciliation between the Company’s profit and the Adjusted EBITDA (as defined in the Series G Deed of Trust) for the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025:

        For the four-quarter period ended March 31, 2025
      Unaudited
      € in thousands
    Profit for the period   2,274
    Financing expenses, net   9,118
    Taxes on income   (1,641)
    Depreciation and amortization expenses   16,651
    Share-based payments   86
    Adjustment to revenues of the Talmei Yosef PV Plant due to calculation based on the fixed asset model   484
    Adjustment to data relating to projects with a Commercial Operation Date during the four preceding quarters12   899
    Adjusted EBITDA as defined the Series G Deed of Trust   27,871
         

    ____________________________
    1 The amount of short-term and long-term debt from banks and other interest-bearing financial obligations provided above, includes an amount of approximately €4.5 million costs associated with such debt, which was capitalized and therefore offset from the debt amount that is recorded in the Company’s balance sheet.

    2 The amount of the debentures provided above includes an amount of approximately €6.7 million associated costs, which was capitalized and discount or premium and therefore offset from the debentures amount that is recorded in the Company’s balance sheet. This amount also includes the accrued interest as at March 31, 2025 in the amount of approximately €0.8 million.

    3 The project finance amount deducted from the calculation of Net Financial Debt includes project finance obtained from various sources, including financing entities and the minority shareholders in project companies held by the Company (provided in the form of shareholders’ loans to the project companies).

    4 The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series C Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef solar plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments. The Series C Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series C Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of NON-IFRS Financial Measures.”

    5 The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series D Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef PV Plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments, when the data of assets or projects whose Commercial Operation Date (as such term is defined in the Series D Deed of Trust) occurred in the four quarters that preceded the relevant date will be calculated based on Annual Gross Up (as such term is defined in the Series D Deed of Trust). The Series D Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series D Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of NON-IFRS Financial Measures.”

    6 The adjustment is based on the results of solar plants in Italy that were connected to the grid and commenced delivery of electricity to the grid during the year ended December 31, 2024 (two plants) and the three months ended March 31, 2025 (one plant). The Company recorded revenues and only direct expenses in connection with these solar plants from the connection to the grid and until PAC (Preliminary Acceptance Certificate – reached with respect to two of the three plants during the fourth quarter of 2024). However, for the sake of caution, the Company included the expected fixed expenses in connection with these solar plants in the calculation of the adjustment.

    7 The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series E Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef PV Plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments, when the data of assets or projects whose Commercial Operation Date (as such term is defined in the Series E Deed of Trust) occurred in the four quarters that preceded the relevant date will be calculated based on Annual Gross Up (as such term is defined in the Series E Deed of Trust). The Series E Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series E Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of NON-IFRS Financial Measures.”

    8 The adjustment is based on the results of solar plants in Italy that were connected to the grid and commenced delivery of electricity to the grid during the year ended December 31, 2024 (two plants) and the three months ended March 31, 2025 (one plant). The Company recorded revenues and only direct expenses in connection with these solar plants from the connection to the grid and until PAC (Preliminary Acceptance Certificate – reached with respect to two of the three plants during the fourth quarter of 2024). However, for the sake of caution, the Company included the expected fixed expenses in connection with these solar plants in the calculation of the adjustment.

    9 The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series F Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef PV Plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments, when the data of assets or projects whose Commercial Operation Date (as such term is defined in the Series F Deed of Trust) occurred in the four quarters that preceded the relevant date will be calculated based on Annual Gross Up (as such term is defined in the Series F Deed of Trust). The Series F Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series F Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of Non-IFRS Financial Measures.”

    10 The adjustment is based on the results of solar plants in Italy that were connected to the grid and commenced delivery of electricity to the grid during the year ended December 31, 2024 (two plants) and the three months ended March 31, 2025 (one plant). The Company recorded revenues and only direct expenses in connection with these solar plants from the connection to the grid and until PAC (Preliminary Acceptance Certificate – reached with respect to two of the three plants during the fourth quarter of 2024). However, for the sake of caution, the Company included the expected fixed expenses in connection with these solar plants in the calculation of the adjustment.

    11 The term “Adjusted EBITDA” is defined in the Series G Deed of Trust as earnings before financial expenses, net, taxes, depreciation and amortization, where the revenues from the Company’s operations, such as the Talmei Yosef PV Plant, are calculated based on the fixed asset model and not based on the financial asset model (IFRIC 12), and before share-based payments, when the data of assets or projects whose Commercial Operation Date (as such term is defined in the Series G Deed of Trust) occurred in the four quarters that preceded the relevant date will be calculated based on Annual Gross Up (as such term is defined in the Series G Deed of Trust). The Series G Deed of Trust provides that for purposes of the financial covenant, the Adjusted EBITDA will be calculated based on the four preceding quarters, in the aggregate. The Adjusted EBITDA is presented in this press release as part of the Company’s undertakings towards the holders of its Series G Debentures. For a general discussion of the use of non-IFRS measures, such as EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA see above under “Use of Non-IFRS Financial Measures.”

    12 The adjustment is based on the results of solar plants in Italy that were connected to the grid and commenced delivery of electricity to the grid during the year ended December 31, 2024 (two plants) and the three months ended March 31, 2025 (one plant). The Company recorded revenues and only direct expenses in connection with these solar plants from the connection to the grid and until PAC (Preliminary Acceptance Certificate – reached with respect to two of the three plants during the fourth quarter of 2024). However, for the sake of caution, the Company included the expected fixed expenses in connection with these solar plants in the calculation of the adjustment.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: CORRECTION: African Development Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) sign Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) renewing their collaboration on sustainable economic development for Africa

    The African Development Bank (www.AfDB.org) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) have signed an agreement strengthening their collaboration on sustainable economic development, designed to boost infrastructure development and economic opportunities across the African continent.

    The Memorandum of Understanding, which builds on an earlier one in 2018, was signed by African Development Bank president, Dr. Akinwumi Adesina, and AIIB President and Chair of the Board of Directors Jin Liqun on Saturday 28 June. The signing took place on the sidelines of a meeting of Heads of Multilateral Development Banks held in Paris, France, the same day.

    The agreement outlines continued collaboration from both parties in six priority areas, aligned with the Bank Group’s Ten-Year Strategy 2024–2033 as well as AIIB’s Corporate Strategy and its Strategy on Financing Operations in Non-Regional Members. The areas are:

    (i) Green infrastructure

    (ii) Industrialization

    (iii) Private capital mobilization including Public – Private Partnerships

    (iv) Cross-border-connectivity

    (v) Digitalization; and

    (vi) Policy-based financing

    The MOU will promote among other things, co-financing, co-guaranteeing and other forms of joint participation in financial assistance for development projects primarily in sustainable infrastructure. The African Development Bank and AIIB’s existing cooperation in this area, includes providing guarantees to support the issuance of Egypt’s first Sustainable Panda Bond in 2023, valued at RMB 3.5 billion.

    This historic issuance—backed by guarantees from both AfDB and AIIB—marked the first African sovereign bond placed in the Chinese interbank bond market. The guarantees provided by the two triple-A-rated multilateral banks were instrumental in de-risking the transaction, enabling Egypt to secure competitive terms and attract investor confidence.

    “This partnership continues to be an effective pathway to provide economic development for our member countries, especially in infrastructure. By reaffirming today, we are boosting energy access by accelerating Mission 300 which is targeting to connect 300 million people to electricity by 2030,” Dr Adesina said.

    Mr. Jin Liqun remarked: “The renewal of our partnership with the African Development Bank reflects AIIB’s commitment to supporting sustainable development beyond Asia. Through this collaboration, we can leverage our combined expertise to deliver transformative projects that will benefit millions across the continent and create prosperity through quality infrastructure investment.”

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Development Bank Group (AfDB).

    Editor’s note:
    This press release is re-issued to correct an error in the number of members AIIB has worldwide. An earlier version issued today 30 June, incorrectly stated that it has 84 members, instead of 110.

    Contact:
    Amba Mpoke-Bigg
    Communication and External Relations Department
    Email: media@afdb.org

    About the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB):
    The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a multilateral development bank dedicated to financing “infrastructure for tomorrow,” with sustainability at its core. AIIB began operations in 2016, now has 110 approved members worldwide, is capitalized at USD100 billion and is AAA-rated by major international credit rating agencies. AIIB collaborates with partners to mobilize capital and invest in infrastructure and other productive sectors that foster sustainable economic development and enhance regional connectivity.

    About the African Development Bank Group:
    The African Development Bank Group is Africa’s premier development finance institution. It comprises three distinct entities: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF). On the ground in 41 African countries with an external office in Japan, the Bank contributes to the economic development and the social progress of its 54 regional member states. For more information: www.AfDB.org

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Joint Statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers on Iran and the Middle East

    Source: Government of Canada News

    June 30, 2025 – Ottawa, Ontario – Global Affairs Canada

    We the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, met in The Hague on June 25, 2025, where we discussed recent events in the Middle East.

    We reiterate our support for the ceasefire between Israel and Iran announced by U.S. President Trump, and urge all parties to avoid actions that could further destabilize the region.

    We appreciate Qatar’s important role in facilitating the ceasefire and express our full solidarity to Qatar and Iraq following the recent strikes by Iran and its proxies and partners against their territory. We welcome all efforts in the region towards stabilization and de-escalation.

    We reaffirm that the Islamic Republic of Iran can never have nuclear weapons, and urge Iran to refrain from reconstituting its unjustified enrichment activities. We call for the resumption of negotiations, resulting in a comprehensive, verifiable and durable agreement that addresses Iran’s nuclear program.

    In order to have a sustainable and credible resolution, we call on Iran to urgently resume full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as required by its safeguards obligations and to provide the IAEA with verifiable information about all nuclear material in Iran, including by providing access to IAEA inspectors. We condemn calls in Iran for the arrest and execution of IAEA Director General Grossi

    We underscore the centrality of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is essential that Iran remains party to and fully implements its obligations under the Treaty.

    We reiterate our commitment to peace and stability in the Middle East. In this context, we reaffirm that Israel has a right to defend itself. We reiterate our support for the security of Israel.

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: UK: disappointing High Court arms to Israel judgment ‘does not change the facts’ of Gaza genocide

    Source: Amnesty International –

    UK: DISAPPOINTING HIGH COURT ARMS TO ISRAEL JUDGMENT ‘DOES NOT CHANGE THE FACTS’ OF GAZA GENOCIDE

    Amnesty International UK has expressed disappointment following today’s High Court ruling that the court found it did not have the constitutional authority to intervene in the Government’s policy of supplying spare parts for the F35 fighter jet for use by Israel in the occupied Gaza Strip. 

    Amnesty International will be considering the implications of the full judgment with more details to follow.

    In response to the verdict, Sacha Deshmukh, Chief Executive of Amnesty International UK, said:

    “We are disappointed by today’s ruling, but the court has been clear that while it does not have the authority to make a judgment on UK exports of F-35 arms parts, this does not absolve the executive and Parliament from their responsibilities to act.

    “The UK has a legal obligation to help prevent and punish genocide and yet it continues to authorise the export of weapons to Israel despite the clear risks that these weapons will be used to commit genocide.

    “The horrifying reality in Gaza is unfolding in full view of the world: entire families obliterated, civilians killed in so-called safe zones, hospitals reduced to rubble, and a population driven into starvation by a cruel blockade and forced displacement. These are not isolated tragedies; they are part of a systematic assault on a besieged population

    “This judgment does not change the facts on the ground, nor does it absolve the UK government of its responsibilities under international law. The risk that UK arms may be used to facilitate serious international crimes remains alarmingly high. If the courts will not intervene, then the moral and legal burden on the Government and Parliament to act – before more lives are lost and further irreparable harm is done – is even greater.

    “The UK must end all arms transfers to Israel if we are serious as a country about our commitments to international law and human rights.”

    Interveners

    The case, brought by campaigners seeking to halt UK arms transfers to Israel, highlighted the devastating impact of Israeli military operations in the occupied Gaza Strip – attacks that have led to the killing of tens of thousands of civilians, the destruction of essential infrastructure, and the forced displacement of over a million people. These exports have been linked to potential war crimes in Gaza, including bombings in Al-Mawasi, a designated safe zone where at least 90 people were reported to have been killed in a single attack.  

    Amnesty International UK and Human Rights Watch intervened in the case, submitting extensive documentation and legal arguments demonstrating Israel’s sustained disregard for international humanitarian law, and underscoring the UK’s binding obligation under Article 1 of the Genocide Convention to act to prevent genocide.

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Members explore technology transfer case studies, patent information, trade-related IP data

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Members explore technology transfer case studies, patent information, trade-related IP data

    Discussions at the meeting saw a high level of engagement by delegations. Members highlighted how voluntary technology transfer to developing economies can boost innovation, productivity and development, drawing on sectoral case studies. They also focused on better harnessing information from expired patents and underlined the importance of systematic, transparent reporting on global IP trade flows.
    A paper entitled “Intellectual Property and Innovation: Technology Transfer case studies” was submitted by Australia, Canada, the European Union, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei, the United Kingdom and the United States.
    The paper highlights how technology enhances productivity, competitiveness, growth and development, motivating countries to foster an environment that attracts voluntary technology transfer and innovation. The paper invites members to submit case studies on voluntary transfers of patent-protected or trade secret technologies and highlights the importance of domestic policies and capacity-building. The aim of the paper is to inform TRIPS Council discussions on incentivizing mutually beneficial technology transfer to address global challenges.
    The paper indicates that practical examples are useful in illustrating how technology transfer occurs across sectors such as agriculture, sustainability and manufacturing. IP offices and WIPO GREEN,  an online platform for technology exchange, provide case studies and opportunities to promote green technology exchange. TRIPS Article 66.2 on technology transfer details incentives for transfer to least-developed countries (LDCs). In public health, the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) enables voluntary sublicensing of patented treatments, increasing access to lifesaving medicines and supporting local production.
    Colombia submitted a communication titled “After-life of patents” proposing joint efforts ahead of the 14th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC14), to be held in Cameroon in March 2026, to explore better use of patent information, potentially expanding the discussion to copyrighted works. The proposal envisions a cooperative WTO approach, without affecting debates on the need for balance in IP protection. Colombia said it is considering an MC14 decision where members would agree to make patent disclosures publicly accessible, promote good practices for their use, permit artificial intelligence (AI) training on such data, and establish a global, publicly accessible repository for such information. 
    Colombia submitted a second paper for discussion: “Trade-Related Figures of Intellectual Property at the WTO: The Case of IP Royalties at the Global Level”. The paper argues that since the TRIPS Agreement’s adoption in 1995, WTO members have applied common IP standards yet little focus has been placed on trade-related IP metrics. Unlike goods and services, IP trade flows – such as royalty payments – receive limited, inconsistent attention in WTO data. Occasional studies exist but lack regularity. However, reliable data is available through IMF and World Bank sources, which track cross-border royalty payments in national balance of payments statistics, offering an important resource for understanding global IP trade dynamics.
    The paper suggests the WTO should implement systematic, detailed reporting on IP-related financial flows, integrating this data into TRIPS Council updates, Trade Policy Reviews and WTO databases. Disaggregated by IP category, such data would support informed policy decisions and foster balanced, evidence-based debate on the global IP regime.
    Notifications
    Members were updated on notifications under various provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that the Council has received since its last meeting in March.
    The Chair of the Council, Emmanuelle Ivanov-Durand of France, said that the pace of notifications to the Council has increased in recent years, but they are still not keeping up with the actual development of laws and regulations relating to TRIPS. She emphasized that TRIPS Article 63.2 is not a “one-off” requirement but a core element of TRIPS transparency and a central part of the Council’s work. It obliges members to notify new or amended laws on TRIPS, including those recently adopted to address the COVID-19 pandemic.
    This requirement includes the notification of legislative changes to implement the special compulsory licensing system to export medicines covered by TRIPS Article 31bis. The notification of relevant laws and regulations can assist members in preparing for the potential use of the system. It would also help the WTO Secretariat in its efforts to provide informed technical support to members.   
    The Chair recalled that the e-TRIPS Submission System is available for members to easily notify their laws and to make other required submissions to the TRIPS Council. The platform also permits digital access, consultation and analysis of information through the e-TRIPS Gateway, an easy-to-use interface to search and display information related to the TRIPS Council.
    Members agreed to test the e-Agenda tool at the next TRIPS Council meeting on a trial, non-committal basis. Developed by the Secretariat and already in use across over 20 WTO bodies, the e-Agenda enhances transparency, organization and access to meeting documents and statements. The Chair stressed that implementation costs would be minimal, with a tailored prototype and training available. The trial aims to assess the practical value of the tool without altering established procedures.
    Non-violation and situation complaints
    Members repeated their well-known positions on the issue of non-violation and situation complaints (NVSCs) under the TRIPS Agreement. With less than a year to go to the 14th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC14), the Chair reminded members that it is a ministerial mandate for the Council to examine the scope and modalities for NVSCs, and that members should make serious efforts to do so.
    The Chair noted that members have not displayed much appetite for advancing substantive discussions in this area. If this situation persists in the coming months, it is difficult to foresee any outcome in this area at MC14 other than an extension of the moratorium or its expiry, she noted. She suggested that if discussion on this matter is going to be limited to choosing between these two options, members could decide in Geneva ahead of MC14.
    At the 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13) in Abu Dhabi in 2024, ministers adopted a Decision on TRIPS Non-Violation and Situation Complaints, instructing the TRIPS Council to continue reviewing the issue and submit recommendations to MC14. Until then, members agreed not to initiate such complaints under the TRIPS Agreement.
    The Decision on TRIPS Non-Violation and Situation Complaints concerns whether and how WTO members can bring disputes to the WTO alleging that an action or situation has nullified expected benefits under the TRIPS Agreement, even without a specific violation.
    Other issues
    WTO members continued talks on how to proceed on the long overdue review of the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. Under Article 71.1, the TRIPS Council is required to conduct a review of the implementation of the Agreement after two years and at periodic intervals thereafter. However, the initial review in 1999 was never completed and no review has subsequently been initiated.
    The Chair recalled that members were able to propose last year a process for the first review, which ultimately could not be adopted. After holding informal consultations in May with the most active member on this issue to find a way forward, the Chair has concluded that the concerns that prevented the adoption of the proposal remain.
    Ms Ivanov-Durand noted that the mandate set out in TRIPS Article 71.1 is highly significant and encouraged delegations to keep working towards the initiation of the implementation review. A number of delegations expressed their willingness to continue discussions on this issue. The Chair expressed her availability to conduct further informal consultations once there is greater likelihood of members agreeing on how to make substantial progress.
    The Council did not agree on renewing the invitation to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to participate in the TRIPS Council as ad hoc observer. This invitation had been renewed on a meeting-to-meeting basis since 2012. A number of members said that the current list of observers is not balanced and asked the Council to reassess the situation with regards other international intergovernmental organizations whose requests have been pending for years. It was suggested that the Chair could address this issue in the technical meetings she is planning with members.
    The updated list of pending requests for observer status in the TRIPS Council by intergovernmental organizations is contained in document IP/C/W/52/Rev.14.
    The Chair said that there have been no new acceptances of the protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement since the last Council meeting. This means that, to date, the amended TRIPS Agreement applies to 141 members. Twenty-five members have yet to accept the Protocol. The current period for accepting the protocol runs until 31 December 2025.  
    Next meeting
    The next regular meeting of the TRIPS Council is scheduled for 10-11 November 2025.

    Share

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI USA: CISA and Partners Urge Critical Infrastructure to Stay Vigilant in the Current Geopolitical Environment

    News In Brief – Source: US Computer Emergency Readiness Team

    Today, CISA, in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3), and the National Security Agency (NSA), released a Fact Sheet urging organizations to remain vigilant against potential targeted cyber operations by Iranian state-sponsored or affiliated threat actors. 

    Over the past several months, there has been increasing activity from hacktivists and Iranian government-affiliated actors, which is expected to escalate due to recent events. These cyber actors often exploit targets of opportunity based on the use of unpatched or outdated software with known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures or the use of default or common passwords on internet-connected accounts and devices.

    At this time, we have not seen indications of a coordinated campaign of malicious cyber activity in the U.S. that can be attributed to Iran. However, CISA, FBI, DC3, and NSA strongly urge critical infrastructure asset owners and operators to implement the mitigations recommended in the joint Fact Sheet, which include: 

    • Identifying and disconnecting operational technology and industrial control systems devices from the public internet,
    • Protecting devices and accounts with strong, unique passwords,
    • Applying the latest software patches, and
    • Implementing phishing-resistant multifactor authentication for access to OT networks.

    Review the joint Fact Sheet: Iranian Cyber Actors May Target Vulnerable US Networks and Entities of Interest and act now to understand the Iranian state-backed cyber threat, assess and mitigate cybersecurity weaknesses, and review and update incident response plans to strengthen your network against malicious cyber actors. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Joint Statement from CISA, FBI, DC3 and NSA on Potential Targeted Cyber Activity Against U.S. Critical Infrastructure by Iran

    News In Brief – Source: US Computer Emergency Readiness Team

    Iranian state-sponsored or affiliated threat actors are known to conduct a range of targeted cyber activity to include exploit known vulnerabilities in unpatched or outdated software, compromise internet-connected accounts and devices that use default or weak passwords and work with ransomware affiliates to encrypt, steal and leak sensitive information.

    At this time, we have not seen indications of a coordinated campaign of malicious cyber activity in the U.S. that can be attributed to Iran. However, we are urging critical infrastructure organizations to stay vigilant to Iranian-affiliated cyber actors that may target U.S. devices and networks. We strongly urge organizations to review our joint fact sheet and implement recommended actions to strengthen our collective defense against this potential cyber activity.

     The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) and the National Security Agency (NSA) are actively monitoring and coordinating with government, industry, and international partners to identify and share actionable intelligence and provide resources and assistance. We also strongly urge organizations report suspicious or criminal activity related to potential Iranian cyber activity.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: FfD4, Gender Equality, Gaza & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (30 June 2025)

    Source: United Nations (video statements)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    Secretary-General/Conference on Financing for Development
    Deputy Secretary-General/FfD4
    Gender Equality
    Gaza
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Security Council
    An Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
    Syria
    Ukraine
    Sudan
    DRC/Rwanda
    Afghanistan Refugees
    International Days
    Financial Contribution
    UNGA80
    Programming Note

    SECRETARY-GENERAL/CONFERENCE ON FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT
    The Secretary-General is in Sevilla, Spain, where he is attending the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development. This morning, at the opening of the Conference, he said that financing is the engine of development, and right now, this engine is sputtering.
    “As we meet,” the Secretary-General pointed out, “the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, our global promise to transform our world for a better, fairer future, is in danger. He stressed that the conference is not about charity, it’s about restoring justice and lives of dignity.”
    The Secretary-General also added that the conference is not about money, it’s about investing in the future we want to build, together.
    In the afternoon, at the launch of the Sevilla Platform for Action, the Secretary-General highlighted that the Platform offers an ambitious, action-oriented response to the global financing challenge.
    Soon after, at the opening of the International Business Forum, the Secretary-General underscored that by uniting public and private sector leaders, regulators and development banks, we can ensure that the conference is not an end, but rather a beginning.
    The Secretary-General also addressed that media in a joint press encounter with the President of the Government of Spain, Pedro Sánchez. He stressed that with the adoption of the Sevilla Commitment document, countries are proving their dedication to getting the engine of development revving again.
    Today, the Secretary-General also held a bilateral meeting with the President of the Government of Spain, and yesterday, he met His Majesty Don Felipe VI, King of Spain, He is also having a number of bilateral meetings with other delegation leaders who will be at the conference. We will share readouts of some of those meetings shortly.

    DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL/FFD4
    Ms. Amina Mohammed, the Deputy Secretary-General, joined the Secretary-General for the opening ceremony of the conference and his meeting with the President of the Government of Spain.
    Later, she delivered remarks at side events focused on closing the SDG financing gap, including on the role of public-private cooperation, the centrality of gender equality in sustainable finance, and the leadership of African women in advancing the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063.
    She also held bilateral meetings with senior government officials and Heads of Government attending the conference.

    GENDER EQUALITY
    At the Fourth International Financing for Development conference in Spain, the adoption of the Compromiso de Sevilla reaffirmed the global commitment to inclusive sustainable development. However, UN Women is warning that chronic underfunding and unfair financial systems are hindering gender equality progress.
    Developing countries are falling short by an estimated $420 billion a year in the funding needed to achieve gender equality under the Sustainable Development Goals.
    UN Women is urging world leaders to match political commitments with the sustained, transparent, and accountable financing needed to deliver on promises to half the world’s population.

    Full Highlights:
    https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=30%20June%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=svTsTXC1aiw

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI Video: FfD4, Gender Equality, Gaza & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (30 June 2025)

    Source: United Nations (video statements)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    Secretary-General/Conference on Financing for Development
    Deputy Secretary-General/FfD4
    Gender Equality
    Gaza
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Security Council
    An Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
    Syria
    Ukraine
    Sudan
    DRC/Rwanda
    Afghanistan Refugees
    International Days
    Financial Contribution
    UNGA80
    Programming Note

    SECRETARY-GENERAL/CONFERENCE ON FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT
    The Secretary-General is in Sevilla, Spain, where he is attending the 4th International Conference on Financing for Development. This morning, at the opening of the Conference, he said that financing is the engine of development, and right now, this engine is sputtering.
    “As we meet,” the Secretary-General pointed out, “the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, our global promise to transform our world for a better, fairer future, is in danger. He stressed that the conference is not about charity, it’s about restoring justice and lives of dignity.”
    The Secretary-General also added that the conference is not about money, it’s about investing in the future we want to build, together.
    In the afternoon, at the launch of the Sevilla Platform for Action, the Secretary-General highlighted that the Platform offers an ambitious, action-oriented response to the global financing challenge.
    Soon after, at the opening of the International Business Forum, the Secretary-General underscored that by uniting public and private sector leaders, regulators and development banks, we can ensure that the conference is not an end, but rather a beginning.
    The Secretary-General also addressed that media in a joint press encounter with the President of the Government of Spain, Pedro Sánchez. He stressed that with the adoption of the Sevilla Commitment document, countries are proving their dedication to getting the engine of development revving again.
    Today, the Secretary-General also held a bilateral meeting with the President of the Government of Spain, and yesterday, he met His Majesty Don Felipe VI, King of Spain, He is also having a number of bilateral meetings with other delegation leaders who will be at the conference. We will share readouts of some of those meetings shortly.

    DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL/FFD4
    Ms. Amina Mohammed, the Deputy Secretary-General, joined the Secretary-General for the opening ceremony of the conference and his meeting with the President of the Government of Spain.
    Later, she delivered remarks at side events focused on closing the SDG financing gap, including on the role of public-private cooperation, the centrality of gender equality in sustainable finance, and the leadership of African women in advancing the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063.
    She also held bilateral meetings with senior government officials and Heads of Government attending the conference.

    GENDER EQUALITY
    At the Fourth International Financing for Development conference in Spain, the adoption of the Compromiso de Sevilla reaffirmed the global commitment to inclusive sustainable development. However, UN Women is warning that chronic underfunding and unfair financial systems are hindering gender equality progress.
    Developing countries are falling short by an estimated $420 billion a year in the funding needed to achieve gender equality under the Sustainable Development Goals.
    UN Women is urging world leaders to match political commitments with the sustained, transparent, and accountable financing needed to deliver on promises to half the world’s population.

    Full Highlights:
    https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=30%20June%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=svTsTXC1aiw

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Releasing political prisoners in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as a prerequisite for trade negotiations – E-002427/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002427/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Per Clausen (The Left), Kira Marie Peter-Hansen (Verts/ALE), Rasmus Nordqvist (Verts/ALE), Villy Søvndal (Verts/ALE), Stine Bosse (Renew)

    We are astonished to note that the Commission will now be embarking on trade and strategic partnership negotiations with the six GCC countries – Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – without first clearly demanding the release of all EU citizens who are being held as political prisoners in the GCC countries’ brutal prisons.

    A case in point is that of Danish national Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja. He is a sick man who has been imprisoned in Bahrain for his work for democracy and human rights, and his case has been repeatedly raised by the European Parliament.

    Accordingly:

    • 1.Will the Commission do the decent and reasonable thing and clearly demand the release of all political prisoners from EU countries who may be imprisoned or subject to various restrictions in GCC countries, such as Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja, before formally opening negotiations on trade agreements and/or strategic partnerships with the countries concerned?
    • 2.How will the Commission clearly and unambiguously raise the issue of political prisoners in the six GCC countries at meetings with those countries’ representatives?
    • 3.Will the Commission guarantee that any agreements will include mechanisms to ensure that agreements can be suspended in the event of human rights violations by contracting parties?

    Submitted: 17.6.2025

    Last updated: 30 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: 2025 Honours List and Justices of the Peace appointments

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region – 4

         â€‹The 2025 Honours List and Justices of the Peace (JPs) appointments are published in the Government Gazette today (July 1).
     
    For the Honours List, the Chief Executive has given a total of 427 awards this year. The award recipients come from different walks of life with diverse backgrounds, benefitting various domains and sectors of the community, including public and community service, education, medical and public health, finance, trade and industry, innovation and technology, charity, arts and culture, sports, housing, transport, construction and urban development, environment, religion, labour and welfare, women and youth affairs, and professional services. Details are as follows:
     

         Award Number
    (a) Grand Bauhinia Medal (GBM) 3
    (b) Gold Bauhinia Star (GBS) 20
    (c) Silver Bauhinia Star (SBS) 29
    (d) Distinguished Service Medals for the disciplined services and the ICAC 12
    (e) Bronze Bauhinia Star (BBS) 46
    (f) Medal for Bravery (Bronze) (MBB) 3
    (g) Meritorious Service Medals for the disciplined services and the ICAC 46
    (h) Medal of Honour (MH) 111
    (i) Chief Executive’s Commendation for Community Service 76
    (j) Chief Executive’s Commendation for Government/Public Service 81
      427

     
    The citations of the award recipients of the 2025 Honours List are provided in Appendix 1.
     
    The Chief Executive, Mr John Lee, extends his congratulations to all award recipients and expresses gratitude for their significant contributions, hoping that they will continue to excel in their own fields and serve the community.
     
    Mr Lee said, “I also express my gratitude to nine officers for their outstanding contributions to safeguarding national security. In the situation facing targeted malicious attacks from external forces, they have remained fearlessly committed to duty and displayed an extraordinary level of determination in discharging their duties, and actively participated in work related to the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law and the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance. They deserve the honours as recognition of their significant contributions.
     
    “Regarding the No. 3 alarm fire at New Lucky House in Jordan, which led to multiple deaths and injuries on April 10 last year, I would like to thank two citizens who bravely saved a number of trapped people, and therefore awarded the Medal for Bravery (Bronze) to these two citizens.
     
         “I also take this opportunity to express my thanks for the contributions of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region search and rescue team deployed to assist in the search and rescue work in the quake-stricken areas in Myanmar in March and April this year, and therefore awarded the Chief Executive’s Commendation for Community Service and the Chief Executive’s Commendation for Government/Public Service to these officers.”
     
    The presentation ceremony for the awards will be held later this year. 
     
    Moreover, a total of 66 persons have been appointed as JPs by the Chief Executive, of whom 48 were appointed under section 3(1)(b) of the Justices of the Peace Ordinance (Cap. 510) (commonly referred to as Non-official JPs), and 18 were appointed under section 3(1)(a) of the same ordinance (commonly referred to as Official JPs).
     
    The main function of JPs is to visit correctional institutions, detention centres or other institutions to ensure their effective management and that no individual is unfairly treated or deprived of his or her rights. JPs will ensure that complaints lodged by individuals are handled in a fair and transparent manner.
     
    The name list of JPs appointed under section 3(1)(b) and section 3(1)(a) of the Justices of the Peace Ordinance is provided in Appendix 2.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: DHS Highlights Worst of the Worst Criminal Illegal Aliens Arrested in Florida Including Murderers, Pedophiles, and Rapists Ahead of Opening of Alligator Alcatraz

    Source: US Department of Homeland Security

    “Alligator Alcatraz, and other facilities like it, will give us the capability to lock up some of the worst scumbags who entered our country under the previous administration.” – Secretary Noem 

    WASHINGTON – Ahead of President Trump and Secretary Noem’s visit to Alligator Alcatraz this week, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is highlighting some of the worst of the worst arrested by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in Florida since President Trump and Secretary Noem unleashed ICE. This new detention facility expands facility and bed space by the thousands in just days.

    “Alligator Alcatraz, and other facilities like it, will give us the capability to lock up some of the worst scumbags who entered our country under the previous administration,” said DHS Secretary Kristi Noem. “We will expand facilities and bed space in just days, thanks to our partnership with Florida. Make America safe again.” 

    Below are some of the dangerous criminal illegal aliens arrested by ICE in Florida. These are the types of violent criminal illegal aliens who could end up being detained at Alligator Alcatraz. 

    • On May 20, 2025, ICE Miami arrested Santo Villaba-Reyes, an illegal alien from Venezuela, who was convicted of homicide.
    • On February 6, 2025, ICE Miami arrested Alberto Godinez-Lopez, an illegal alien from Guatemala, who was convicted of homicide.
    • On February 7, 2025, ICE Miami arrested Johnny Dieudonne, an illegal alien from Haiti, who was convicted of kidnapping-false imprisonment.
    • On March 1, 2025, ICE Miami arrested Jan Veslino, an illegal alien from the Philippines, who was convicted of obscene communication-traveling to meet a minor for sex.
    • On April 13, 2025, ICE Miami arrested Mauro Gomes-Barbosa, an illegal alien from Brazil, who was convicted of homicide.
    • On March 17, 2025, ICE Miami Paul Urquiza-Orosco, an illegal alien from Peru, who was convicted of producing and distributing child pornography.
    • On March 27, 2025, ICE Miami arrested Noel Acosta-Moya, an illegal alien from Venezuela, who was convicted of kidnapping and sexual assault of a child under 13.
    • On June 9, 2025, ICE Miami arrested Adolfo Santoscoy-Rodriguez, an illegal alien from Mexico, who was convicted of child abuse and forcible rape.
    • On June 13, 2025, ICE Miami arrested Roberto Mosquera-Del Peral, an illegal alien from Cuba, who was convicted of assault, escape from custody, vehicle theft, aggravated assault of a police officer, and homicide. He is also a member of the Latin Kings gang.
    • On June 22, 2025, ICE Miami arrested Maher Elbrahimizada, an illegal alien fromIran, who was convicted of arson and homicide.
    • On June 24, 2025, ICE Miami arrested Mauricio Lopez-Cardona, an illegal alien from Colombia, who was convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine, murder in connection with narcotics trafficking, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and conspiring to support a foreign terrorist organization.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Appropriate follow-up to report by the EU Special Representative for Human Rights – E-002434/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002434/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Thijs Reuten (S&D), Tineke Strik (Verts/ALE), Catarina Vieira (Verts/ALE), Barry Andrews (Renew), Maria Walsh (PPE), Wouter Beke (PPE), Kathleen Van Brempt (S&D)

    On 3 June 2025, EUobserver leaked a report by the EU Special Representative for Human Rights on the situation in the Middle East, dated 11 November 2024 and bearing ARES number (2024)8069555. The report describes flagrant human rights violations, including by the Israeli authorities. This information is directly relevant to the deliberations by the Commission and/or the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) around suspending the Association Agreement (AA) with Israel.

    • 1.Assuming that the VP/HR does not deny the existence of this report, does the VP/HR agree that the situation described therein has not improved since November 2024?
    • 2.Given Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Articles 17(1), 21(1) and 218(9) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), Article 2 AA and the case-law of the International Court of Justice, why and under whose ultimate responsibility was the decision made not to act on the basis of this report, including by proposing the suspension of the AA to the European Council?
    • 3.Given Article 218(10) TFEU and Article 36 TEU, why, on what legal basis and under whose ultimate responsibility was the decision made not to inform Parliament about this report or its contents, especially given the many parliamentary questions and debates on the topic?

    Submitted: 17.6.2025

    Last updated: 30 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Benchmarks to measure human rights improvements in Egypt – E-002532/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002532/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tineke Strik (Verts/ALE)

    On 18 June 2025, Parliament adopted a decision on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt, granting it a sum of EUR 4 billion. Article 2(1) of the decision states that ‘a pre-condition for granting the Union’s macro-financial assistance shall be that Egypt continues to make concrete and credible steps towards respecting effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system, and the rule of law, and guaranteeing respect for human rights’.

    Article 8(1) of the decision requires the Commission to report to Parliament each year on the concrete steps taken by Egypt towards respecting democratic mechanisms and the rule of law and guaranteeing human rights.

    The Commission is asked to answer the following questions individually, numbering its answers:

    • 1.What specific measures does the Commission expect Egypt to take to respect the pre-condition of continuing to ‘make concrete and credible steps’ on human rights and democracy?
    • 2.What indicators and benchmarks will the Commission use to measure progress, and will it clearly indicate these in its reports to Parliament?
    • 3.Will the Commission suspend the payments if Egypt does not meet these human rights benchmarks?

    Submitted: 24.6.2025

    Last updated: 30 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Qatar strongly condemns attack on military convoy in Pakistan

    Source: Government of Qatar

    Doha – June 30, 2025

    The State of Qatar expresses its strong condemnation and denunciation of the terrorist attack that targeted a military convoy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, resulting in deaths and injuries.

    The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterates the States of Qatar’s stance rejecting violence, terrorism and criminal acts, regardless of their motives and causes.

    The Ministry extends the State of Qatar’s condolences to the families of the victims, as well as to the government and people of Pakistan, and wishes the injured a speedy recovery.

    MIL OSI Africa –