Category: Middle East

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Jordan—IMF Executive Board Completes Third Review of the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement and Approves US$ 700 Million Arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 25, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board completed the third review under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement with Jordan, providing the authorities with immediate access to the equivalent of SDR 97.784 million (about US$134 million), to support the authorities’ economic program.
    • Jordan’s economic program supported by the EFF arrangement remains firmly on track, demonstrating the authorities’ strong commitment to sound macro-economic policies and structural reforms to strengthen Jordan’s resilience and accelerate growth to enhance job creation and provide opportunities for all Jordanians.
    • Thanks to the continued pursuit of sound economic policies, and despite the considerable external headwinds, including the conflicts in the region, Jordan has maintained macro-stability and broad-based economic growth.
    • The Executive Board also approved a new 30-month arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) with Jordan, with access equivalent to SDR 514.65 million (about US$700 million), to support Jordan’s efforts to address longer-term vulnerabilities in the water and electricity sectors and to enhance their ability to address public health emergencies, including future pandemics.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today completed the third review of the arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF). Jordan’s four-year EFF arrangement, with access amounting to SDR 926.37 million (about US$1.3 billion, equivalent to 270 percent of Jordan’s quota in the IMF), was approved by the IMF Executive Board on January 10, 2024 (see Press Release No. 24/004). This decision allows for an immediate purchase of an amount equivalent to SDR 97.784 million (around US$134 million), bringing the total purchases under the EFF arrangement to the equivalent of SDR 437.454 million (about $595 million). In addition, the IMF Executive Board approved an arrangement under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) with Jordan, with access equivalent to SDR 514.65 million (about US$ 700 million, equivalent to 150 percent of Jordan’s quota).

    Jordan’s continued economic resilience in a challenging external environment, with continuing conflicts in the region and high uncertainty, is a testament to the authorities’ resolve to pursue sound macroeconomic policies. The authorities’ ownership of the EFF arrangement remains strong, with program targets consistently met. Jordan registered stronger growth in 2024 and so far in 2025 than previously anticipated, demonstrating continued resilience. Growth reached 2.5 percent in 2024. Economic activity is expected to gradually strengthen in the coming years, supported by continued sound macroeconomic policies and accelerated reform implementation.

    Inflation remains stable and low, reflecting the Central Bank of Jordan’s (CBJ) firm commitment to monetary and financial stability and the exchange rate peg. Jordan’s external position remains stable, with the current account deficit projected to remain close to 6 percent of GDP. The CBJ’s gross international reserves increased to over US$20 billion by end-2024, with reserve adequacy exceeding 100 percent of the Fund’s ARA metric. The financial sector remains healthy and well-capitalized. While the spillover effects from regional conflicts have also affected government finances, the authorities continue to make progress with a gradual fiscal consolidation to place public debt on a downward path, while creating room for social assistance and needed public investment. Jordan’s structural reform agenda focuses on fostering inclusive private sector-led growth by enhancing the business environment and improving labor market policies, including to expand opportunities for youth and women.

    The RSF arrangement will support the authorities’ efforts to strengthen Jordan’s longer-term balance of payments stability by promoting economic resilience and sustainability. The RSF arrangement aims to address longer-term vulnerabilities in the water and electricity sectors and enhance the authorities’ ability to address public health emergencies, including future pandemics. Reform measures focus on: (i) enhancing the energy sector’s financial sustainability and energy efficiency; (ii) improving the water sector’s financial sustainability and water management; (iii) strengthening fiscal and financial sector resilience; and (iv) enhancing pandemic preparedness. The arrangement will augment policy space and financial buffers to mitigate risks arising from these challenges.

    Following the Executive Board’s discussion on Jordan, Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

    “Jordan continues to maintain macroeconomic stability despite external headwinds from regional conflicts and heightened global economic uncertainty, owing to the authorities’ steadfast pursuit of sound policies and continued strong international support. Growth in 2024 and so far in 2025 ended up stronger than anticipated, inflation is low, and reserve buffers are strong. Against elevated risks in the region, it is important that the authorities stay the course with sound fiscal and monetary policies to safeguard macroeconomic stability.

    “The authorities continue to make progress with a gradual fiscal consolidation and strengthening fiscal sustainability, thanks to fiscal reforms that have improved revenue administration and expenditure efficiency. Looking ahead, efforts should continue to further enhance revenue mobilization and spending efficiency and to take contingency measures as needed to keep public debt on a steady downward path, while protecting priority social and capital spending. Efforts should also continue to improve the efficiency and viability of the public utilities to preserve the sustainability of public finances, while improving service delivery.

    “Monetary policy remains appropriately focused on safeguarding monetary and financial stability and supporting the exchange rate peg that has served Jordan well and helped keeping inflation low. Jordan’s banking sector remains healthy, and the central bank continues to strengthen its systemic risk analysis, financial sector oversight, and crisis management.  

    “Structural reforms should be accelerated to improve the business environment, promote competition, and attract private investment that is crucial to create a dynamic and resilient private sector, foster job-rich growth, and achieve the objectives of Jordan’s Economic Modernization Vision. Strong and timely donor support remains essential to help Jordan navigate the challenging external environment, host the large number of refugees, and meet Jordan’s development objectives.

    “The reforms under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility aim to support the authorities’ efforts to address long-term vulnerabilities in the water and energy sectors and to be better prepared for public health emergencies, including pandemics. These reforms will strengthen Jordan’s balance of payments stability by promoting economic resilience and sustainability and by augmenting policy space and financial buffers to mitigate risks arising from these challenges.”

    Jordan: Selected Economic Indicators, 2023–26

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

     

    Proj.

    Proj.

    Output and Prices

    Real GDP growth

    2.9

    2.5

    2.7

    2.9

    GDP deflator

    1.8

    1.9

    2.3

    2.6

    Nominal GDP (JD billions)

    36.3

    37.9

    39.8

    42.0

    Inflation 1/

    2.1

    1.9

    2.2

    2.6

    Unemployment

    22.0

    21.4

    Government Finances (in percent of GDP)

    Central government fiscal operations

    Revenue and grants 2/

    25.2

    24.9

    25.4

    26.0

       Of which: grants

    2.0

    1.9

    1.8

    2.0

    Expenditures 2/

    30.6

    31.4

    31.2

    30.5

    Overall central government balance

    -5.4

    -6.4

    -5.8

    -4.5

    Central government primary balance (exc. grants, NEPCO and WAJ)

    -2.7

    -2.8

    -2.0

    -1.0

    Electricity company (NEPCO) losses

    Combined public sector balance 3/

    -4.5

    -4.5

    -3.6

    -2.4

    Government gross debt 4/

    113.5

    114.7

    115.7

    114.9

    Government gross debt, net of SSC holdings of government debt 4/

    89.0

    90.2

    89.7

    87.5

    Money and Credit

         Broad money (percent change)

    2.3

    6.1

    5.1

    5.6

         Credit to the private sector (percent change)

    1.7

    2.9

    4.6

    6.0

    Balance of payments

    Current account (in percent of GDP)

    -3.6

    -5.9

    -5.5

    -5.9

    FDI (in percent of GDP)

    3.6

    3.0

    3.3

    3.4

    Gross reserves (in months of imports)

    6.9

    7.7

    7.1

    7.1

    In percent of Reserve Adequacy Metric

    101

    110

    105

    105

    Sources: Jordanian authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

    1/ Consumer Price Index (annual average).

    2/ Includes the programmed amount of fiscal measures that are needed to meet fiscal targets.

    3/ Sum of the primary central government balance (exc. grants and net transfers to NEPCO-electricity company and WAJ-water company) and the net loss of NEPCO, WAJ and water sector distribution companies.

    4/ Government’s direct and guaranteed debt (including NEPCO and WAJ debt). SSC stands for Social Security Corporation.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/25/pr25221-jordan-imf-completes-3rd-rev-eff-arrangement-approves-us-700-mill-arrangement-under-rsf

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Cleaver’s Statement on President Trump’s Unconstitutional Bombing of Three Sites in Iran

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Emanuel Cleaver II (5th District Missouri)

    (Washington, D.C.) – Today, U.S. Representative Emanuel Cleaver, II (D-MO) released the following statement on the bombing of three sites in Iran.

    “President Trump’s bombing of 3 sites in Iran was unconstitutional; only Congress can declare war. 

    “I remain hopeful that Iran’s nuclear capabilities have been seriously weakened or destroyed. However, I’m concerned that Trump’s actions threaten to trap the U.S. in an escalating conflict. 

    “Recently both Democratic and Republican presidencies have felt comfortable in overstepping their article 2 constitutional authorities. This is a power grab.

    “Any further military action must first be voted on by Congress.”

    ###

    Emanuel Cleaver, II is the U.S. Representative for Missouri’s Fifth Congressional District, which includes Kansas City, Independence, Lee’s Summit, Raytown, Grandview, Sugar Creek, Greenwood, Blue Springs, North Kansas City, Gladstone, and Claycomo. He is a member of the exclusive House Financial Services Committee and Ranking Member of the House Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Cleaver Co-Sponsors War Powers Resolutions to Prohibit U.S. Involvement in Iran

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Emanuel Cleaver II (5th District Missouri)

    (Washington, D.C.) – Today, U.S. Representative Emanuel Cleaver, II (D-MO) co-sponsored two War Powers Resolutions to prohibit American involvement in Iran, following President Trump’s unilateral, unconstitutional, and dangerous decision to use U.S. Armed Forces to strike Iran directly. 

    The first resolution, introduced by Reps. Thomas Massie (R-KY) and Ro Khanna (D-CA), would prohibit the U.S. Armed Forces from unauthorized hostilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

    The second resolution, introduced by the Democratic Ranking Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Armed Services Committee, and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, would order the removal of U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities against Iran absent a Congressional authorization, while preserving the ability for U.S. Armed Forces to defend the U.S. and its partners and allies from imminent attack.

    “For far too long and on a bipartisan basis, the Congress has ceded its Article I power to declare war, eliminating an essential check on the Executive Branch and giving one individual far too much power to drag the nation into protracted military conflicts,” said Congressman Cleaver. “While we all agree that Iran can never be allowed to procure a nuclear weapon, it is also critical that Congress leave no doubt that the president is not allowed to unilaterally begin a war with Iran, or any other country, without the approval of the People’s representatives. Both of these resolutions make clear that the president does not have this authority and ensure that the U.S. will not enter yet another costly conflict in the Middle East unless granted explicit approval from Congress.”

     

    Emanuel Cleaver, II is the U.S. Representative for Missouri’s Fifth Congressional District, which includes Kansas City, Independence, Lee’s Summit, Raytown, Grandview, Sugar Creek, Greenwood, Blue Springs, North Kansas City, Gladstone, and Claycomo. He is a member of the exclusive House Financial Services Committee and Ranking Member of the House Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Hamas says it is committed to working with mediators on a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    GAZA, June 25 (Xinhua) — Palestinian movement Hamas on Wednesday said it remains actively involved in ongoing mediation efforts to reach a ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip.

    In its press release, Hamas said it was committed to engaging with mediators and responding constructively to any serious proposals that could lead to a comprehensive agreement and stop what the movement called “aggression and war of extermination” against the Palestinian people.

    Hamas stressed the need for a lasting ceasefire, a complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip, unimpeded access for humanitarian aid, the beginning of the reconstruction of the Palestinian enclave and a prisoner exchange deal.

    The movement blamed the delay in reaching an agreement on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, accusing the latter of “obstruction and delay” for the sake of “personal political goals” and “reinforcing the illusion of total victory” through military means.

    The announcement came hours after US President Donald Trump announced “significant progress” on a ceasefire agreement in Gaza, Israeli state broadcaster Kan reported without giving details. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: In Aftermath of Iran Strikes, Reed Urges Trump Admin. to Strengthen Cybersecurity

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Rhode Island Jack Reed

    WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. cyber officials and private experts are warning that Iran and Iran-linked groups may try to target the U.S. with a range of cyberattacks that could cause serious damage and disruption to private and public sector interests.  In the wake of U.S. airstrikes on Iran, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued a bulletin through the National Terrorism Advisory System, which read: “Low-level cyber attacks against U.S. networks by pro-Iranian hacktivists are likely, and cyber actors affiliated with the Iranian government may conduct attacks against U.S. networks.”

    In addition to these warnings, U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), the Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, is urging the Trump Administration to take action to bolster the nation’s cyber defenses and assist American industries and municipalities that may be targeted for attacks. 

    “As sophisticated cyber threats mount, we should be surging resources and reinforcements to America’s cyber defenses.  We’ve got to secure our infrastructure and protect critical systems.  Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has undermined the capacity and capabilities of our country’s most critical cybersecurity agencies,” said Senator Reed.

    Reed warns that the Trump Administration’s partisan efforts to purge the federal workforce and slash the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) — America’s primary cyber agency — is putting U.S. national security at risk.  CISA is the frontline federal agency in charge of defending federal networks, state and local governments, and critical infrastructure against cyber threats.  CISA’s mission includes ransomware defense, supply chain resilience, and public-private coordination.

    The Trump Administration has targeted CISA for downsizing, already forcing out over 1,000 CISA employees – roughly one-third of CISA’s workforce.  The drastic staff reductions coupled with proposed future budget cuts jeopardize America’s ability to effectively repel, thwart, and deter cyberattacks; defend federal networks; and support critical infrastructure operators.

    Reed stated: “As the cyber threat level is rising from Iran, affiliated hacktivists, and other adversaries, the Trump Administration is gutting CISA and taking down our best defenses, leaving America dangerously exposed to cyberattacks.  The Trump Administration must stop undermining the capacity of America’s cyber defense agency.  I urge the Trump Administration to take immediate action to rehire technical cyber talent, restore CISA funding, and reinstate key cyber defense programs immediately.  We need to ramp up in the weeks and months ahead and be vigilant in defending against offensive cyber operations by Iran or their partners.”

    The Trump Administration is seeking to reduce CISA’s budget by over $490 million – reducing the agency’s operational funding obligations from $2.38 billion to $1.96 billion.  This includes dismantling and eliminating several key programs entirely, such as the agency’s Election Security Program and the innovative Cyber Safety Review Board.

    Meanwhile, the Trump Administration is targeting other key U.S. cyber defense assets for major budget cuts, including:

    • The FBI, which leads domestic cybercriminal investigations, would have its budget reduced $560 million, alongside a loss of nearly 1,900 staff.
    • The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) National Security Division, which handles foreign intelligence surveillance policy and various counterintelligence operations, would have its budget reduced by $14 million, accompanied by a reduction of full-time employees.
    • The U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security and Emergency Response, which oversees cybersecurity for the nation’s electric grid, would see a sharp cut of $43 million and a staffing reduction of more than 30 percent.
    • The National Science Foundation’s computer science research activities would be cut by $606 million, or 64 percent of its budget, in FY26.

    Beyond CISA and domestic cyber defenses, President Trump abruptly fired the previous director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and head of U.S. Cyber Command, General Timothy Haugh, and his top deputy, without explanation this April, following a meeting with right-wing activist Laura Loomer at the White House.  With support from U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Army Lt. General Richard Angle was then announced as the nominee to be the successor for the job.  However, the White House then opted not to move forward with Lt. General Angle’s nomination, without public explanation.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Dan Goldman Delivers Poignant Address on Corruption, Erosion of Accountability, and a Roadmap for Restoring Public Trust

    Source: US Congressman Dan Goldman (NY-10)

    Rep. Dan Goldman: “Democracy depends on a basic understanding: that we, the people, entrust elected officials with power in exchange for their service for the public good. That trust is not a given—it must be earned. And when those in power use their positions to enrich themselves, to favor allies, or to punish enemies, that contract begins to dissolve.” 

    Goldman: “Restoring faith in our system is going to take more than these specific and tangible legislative objectives. We can’t predict every possible ethics violation or potential corrupt deal. The voters – the people – must have higher expectations of their elected officials, and must hold them accountable.” 

    Watch the Full Address Here: 

    New York, NY – Congressman Dan Goldman (NY-10) delivered the featured speech at New York Law School’s 199th CityLaw Breakfast titled, “Democracy on the Brink: Corruption and the Public Trust.”  

    In a moment of historic political upheaval, Goldman issued a candid assessment of how public corruption and the erosion of guardrails and forms of accountability – on both sides of the political aisle and at every level of government – are threatening the very foundation of American democracy and the willingness of the public to buy into the American social contract.  

    Drawing on recent cases, public opinion data, and a call to action for institutional reform, Congressman Goldman offered both a warning and a roadmap for restoring public confidence in government and the imperative of doing so to preserve liberal democracy. 

    Remarks as prepared are available below: 

    Rep. Dan Goldman

    “We gather here today at a time when the very foundations of our democracy are enduring a stress test. 

    To be sure, we are facing threats abroad from Russia, Iran and China, and partisan gridlock in Washington makes it incredibly difficult to govern as the framers imagined.  

    But I’m not referring to those challenges, which are ones that our great nation has grappled with – and conquered – many times over our 250 year history.  

    I’m instead talking about something far more insidious — something that corrodes from within and is a more significant existential threat to the future of the republic. That threat is naked, unbridled, and brazen corruption at the highest levels of our government.   

    In so many ways, our founding fathers anticipated many potential obstacles and pitfalls in drafting the constitution – including the fundamental concept that the separation of powers among three branches of government would naturally provide the necessary checks and balances to preserve and protect the will of the people.  

    Article One confers to Congress the power of the purse and the power to declare war.  

    Article Two requires the Executive Branch to faithfully execute the laws passed by Congress and to oversee foreign relations. 

    And Article III charges the judiciary with saying what the law is, properly insulated from political pressure by lifetime tenure for judicial appointees. 

    This daring and innovative structure presupposed two assumptions that, if lacking, would crater the entire system:  

    • First, that members of one branch of government would prioritize their own power and authority over pure tribalism;  

    • and second, that the President of the United States would unconditionally believe in the validity and authority of the Constitution in the first place. 

    Sadly, we are witnessing the combination of these two conditions that has our system of government teetering on the brink. No President – not even Nixon – so disregarded the law and the constitution as Donald Trump does. And I can think of no majority in the Congress that has so completely turned over all of its own power and authority to a different branch of government as this Republican Congress has to President Trump.  

    But this inflection point did not come out of nowhere. We can have as many laws and institutions as we want, but if the American people do not have trust that those laws are fairly and equally applied or that those institutions are placing the public good ahead of personal interests, then they aren’t worth the paper they are written on or the dilapidated buildings they reside in. 

    Sadly, trust in elected representatives is at an all-time low. The National Election Study has been tracking public trust in government since 1958, when the percentage of Americans who said they trust the government to do what is right “just about always” or “most of the time” was 73 percent. In 1964 it was 77 percent. 

    Today, that number stands at a horrifying 22 percent. Only 2 percent of respondents say they trust the government to do what is right “just about always.” Two percent. Since 2007, the share of Americans saying they trust the government hasn’t broken 30 percent. 

    And while Donald Trump has taken official corruption to new lows, he is only able to do that because the erosion of the public trust has been well underway for years – by both parties, especially here in New York. 

    As the lead counsel in the first impeachment of Donald Trump for corruptly abusing his official power to try to coerce a foreign government to help his personal campaign, very little that Donald Trump does surprises me.  If there is anything that does, it is not that he is engaged in widespread abuse of his power for personal gain, but rather how openly and brazenly he is doing it.    

    Take just a couple of examples. 

    A few weeks ago, President Trump accepted a reported $400 million luxury jet from the royal family of Qatar without the consent of Congress — a clear violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, which requires Congress to consent to any foreign gift, title or emolument. Remember, President Ulysses S. Grant requested consent from Congress to receive the Statue of Liberty from France, and as far as I know it was never going to be used by Grant’s presidential library after he left office. 

    President Trump openly bragged about the plane just a couple of days after he announced a $2 billion financial deal with the UAE in connection to a crypto stablecoin recently issued by his own crypto company, which yielded him hundreds of millions of dollars.  He literally announced this deal on his first official international trip.  

    And he’s grifting at home too. He sold 25 VIP White House tours to the top 25 shareholders of his crypto company – without any known national security vetting – that saw the value of his shares go up by 50%.  

    Yesterday, the Senate voted on stablecoin legislation that very well may make it to the resolute desk for his signature – yes, he might be asked to sign legislation that has a direct impact on his own financial interests.  

    Remember when the public was outraged during his first term when he only ceased day-to-day involvement in the Trump Organization, rather than fully divesting his interests? 

    Now he is soliciting foreign investments in his crypto company and selling White House tours to the largest investor, and there isn’t a hint of an investigation from the Department of Justice nor from the Republican majority in Congress. 

    *************************** 

    Perhaps some of the reasons for such little outrage can be summed up in a statement I hear all the time: “oh, every politician is corrupt.” Too many people simply have come to accept an expectation that elected officials are corrupt and – someway, somehow – every politician is making money from his or her office. 

    As frustrated as I get hearing that over and over, it’s hard to argue with.  
     

    Just look here at our great city and state.  Our current mayor was charged last year for alleged honest services fraud and campaign finance violations tied to foreign money and influence. And while I do think the legal basis for the corruption charge was suspect, I couldn’t help but notice that the most common conversation I had with people about the Indictment began with the question, “is what he did really worthy of a federal indictment?”  

    In other words, expectations are so low for politicians that some degree of corruption is expected and accepted, so much so that federal charges should be saved for only the most egregious conduct.  

    Those who believe that are sadly in very good company: the Supreme Court also seems to believe that is what the law requires.  

    The running joke nowadays is that in order to be convicted of federal corruption charges, the FBI needs to find gold bars in your closet. 

    That of course is what happened to former Democratic Senator Bob Menendez of New Jersey, who was convicted of honest services fraud here in the Southern District of New York after accepting gold bars in exchange for a variety of official actions taken on behalf of the Egyptian government, which gave him the gold bars. 

    We can be frustrated that the Supreme Court has repeatedly narrowed the reach of federal corruption law but it’s not actually a close call in their mind: just about every Supreme Court ruling from the McDonell opinion to the present has been unanimous, 9-0. That includes the Buffalo Billions case and Joe Percoco here in New York, and it caused both State Senate Majority Leader Dean Skelos and Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver to be retried before they were each ultimately convicted.   

    The fact of the matter is that both Democrats and Republicans have repeatedly succumbed to personal greed over the public good.  And while Donald Trump is attacking all forms of political accountability – including weaponizing the Department of Justice to reward his allies and punish his enemies – the stage had long ago been set for a wannabe dictator like Trump to come along and take a battering ram to a rule of law that had been fraying at the edges for some time.   

    The damage to our system goes far beyond any individual tragedy. It goes to the very foundation of our democracy.  

    Democracy depends on a basic understanding: that we, the people, entrust elected officials with power in exchange for their service for the public good. That trust is not a given—it must be earned. And when those in power use their positions to enrich themselves, to favor allies, or to punish enemies, that contract begins to dissolve.  

    That broken trust – that decaying social contract – is, in my view, what paved the way for the resurrection of the current resident of the White House. He has turned suspicion into toxic cynicism. He has turned facts into a partisan debate. He has used distrust of the system to frame himself as that system’s victim. 

    The question asked is no longer whether politicians are true to their oaths of office. It is instead a question of moral relativism – is she as bad as he is? And once the average voter believes that all politicians are corrupt, that no facts can be trusted, that the pursuit of power justifies any means necessary, the foundations of our democracy crumble and we invite a dangerous new normal: where truth is optional, ethics are flexible, and accountability is partisan. 

    There are many things to be concerned about these days.  We are dealing with many threats to the rule of law and our basic democratic values and foundations.

    But I firmly believe that the path towards restoring faith in our government – in this great experiment that we call democracy – must start by addressing public corruption.  And that is not only through revising our criminal statutes but also by altering the structure of our electoral system. 

    ********************** 

    So if you aren’t ready to crawl into a hole after that ever-so-uplifting recitation of the current state of distrust in our system, let me try to propose some ideas and solutions that can restore confidence in our elected officials – and, by extension, our government.  

    First, voters must see a renewed commitment to ethical government from candidates for office. Donald Trump has normalized the once-heretic idea that a President of the United States does not believe in the constitution. That must end, and it must end now. Not just by following the law, but by holding politicians to a higher standard – and by those within the same party.  

    It frustrates me to no end when I hear people say that some alleged misconduct is okay because the official was not criminally charged or convicted.  That is not the standard we should hold each other to.  

    A criminal conviction is an incredibly high standard – 12 unanimous jurors must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the admissible evidence was sufficient to meet every legal element of the charge.  That must not be – it can not be – the standard that elected representatives are held to.  

    Second, we must set an example by setting guardrails for ourselves. 

    Take stock trading by members of Congress.  I’ve been in Congress about two and a half years, and I’m confident that I haven’t received a single piece of confidential information through my official duties that would have helped me play the market.  But it doesn’t matter – because simply the appearance of receiving confidential information is more than enough to raise questions about whether that information was used in connection with trading stocks by members for their personal gain. 

    And that’s simply why members of Congress should not be permitted to buy and sell individual stocks.  

    When I came into Congress, I sold all of my individual stocks and put my money in a blind trust. But that should be the norm, not the exception. We must pass a law prohibiting individual stock trading by members of Congress.  We can set an example for ourselves. 

    There are other actions that we can take to restore trust in our democracy and our elected officials. 

    We must eliminate big money in politics – at a minimum there must be full transparency in campaign finance. No more dark money. Sunlight is the best disinfectant.  

    We must set clear rules and guidelines on gifts and conflicts of interests – and there must be consequences for violating them.  

    Similarly, we can no longer trust that our elected officials – especially our president – will view the plain language of the Constitution as binding. So we must pass legislation that not only creates an enforcement vehicle for the Emoluments Clause, the Hatch Act, and other ethics laws and rules, but imposes consequences as well.    

    I believe we must draft legislation to codify the independence of the Department of Justice from personal influence by the President.  The evisceration of the Public Integrity Section, the firing of so many apolitical and upstanding career prosecutors, Executive Orders by the President directing the FBI to investigate political enemies – all must be addressed and prohibited.  That is the stuff of banana republics, not a constitutional republic.  

    And finally, we need to rewrite federal public corruption law, which I am in the process of working on right now. The Supreme Court has repeatedly urged Congress to revise the corruption statute, and I plan to take them up on their suggestion. Every branch of government – elected officials, prosecutors, and judges – must have a clear understanding of what is – and is not – official corruption. 

    But restoring faith in our system is going to take more than these specific and tangible legislative objectives. We can’t predict every possible ethics violation or potential corrupt deal. The voters – the people – must have higher expectations of their elected officials, and must hold them accountable. 

    I ran for Congress to preserve and protect our democracy and ensure that the rule of law remains our nation’s guiding light. And I believe that if we are honest with the public, accountable in our actions, uncompromising in what we expect of ourselves, and courageous in our convictions, we can restore the trust that has been lost. 

    But that work starts with integrity. It starts with doing the right thing, not the easy thing. It starts with a willingness to look the American public in the eye, to admit the fault of those we share this awesome responsibility with, and to pledge that we can, we must, we will do better. 

    History is watching.” 

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Former Vice-President of Asphalt Paving Company Incarcerated for Bid Rigging

    Source: US State of California

    A former senior executive of a Michigan asphalt paving company was sentenced today to six months in prison and a $500,000 fine for his role in multiple conspiracies to rig bids for asphalt paving services contracts in Michigan.

    Bruce F. Israel, former vice-president of Pontiac-based Asphalt Specialists LLC (ASI), pleaded guilty in January 2024 to conspiring with Al’s Asphalt Paving Company Inc. (Al’s Asphalt), F. Allied Construction Company Inc. (Allied), and employees from those companies to rig bids in each other’s favor. Israel is one of seven individuals that have been charged as part of an ongoing federal antitrust investigation into bid rigging and other anticompetitive conduct in the asphalt paving services industry. Three companies also have been charged as part of the investigation, which to date has resulted in over $8.7 million in criminal fines.

    “Bid rigging is cheating, plain and simple,” said Assistant Attorney General Abigail Slater of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “By their own admissions, the defendant and his co-conspirators cheated their customers and betrayed the basic notions of free and fair competition, all to benefit themselves. The Antitrust Division and its law enforcement partners will bring to justice all individuals who deprive the public of the benefits of competition by seeking their incarceration.”

    “Anyone choosing corporate greed over open and fair competition should take note of the sentence handed down today,” said Special Agent in Charge Anthony Licari of the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General, Midwestern Region. “This result underscores our firm resolve and ongoing collaboration with law enforcement and prosecutorial partners to identify, expose, and dismantle any efforts to undermine the systems that exist to protect consumers.”

    “Today’s sentence reflects the seriousness of bid rigging that degrades the competitive process,” said Inspector General Tammy Hull of the United States Postal Service. “We will continue to pursue and bring to justice those companies that commit fraud by conspiring to engage in anticompetitive practices for personal gain and corporate greed.”

    According to court documents, the co-conspirators coordinated each other’s bid prices so that the agreed-upon losing company would submit intentionally non-competitive bids. These bids gave customers the false impression of competition when, in fact, the co-conspirators already had decided among themselves who would win the contracts. Israel participated in the conspiracy with Al’s Asphalt from March 2013 through November 2018 and the Allied conspiracy from July 2017 through May 2021.

    Israel’s former employer, ASI, also pleaded guilty for its participation in the Al’s Asphalt and Allied conspiracies in January 2024. Another former ASI executive, Daniel Israel, pleaded guilty for his participation in the conspiracy with Al’s Asphalt in October 2023, and a third former ASI executive, Timothy Baugher, pleaded guilty for his participation in the Allied conspiracy in January 2025. ASI was sentenced in August 2024 to pay a fine of $6,500,000.

    The Antitrust Division’s Chicago Office and the Offices of Inspectors General for the Department of Transportation and U.S. Postal Service investigated the case.

    The Antitrust Division’s Chicago Office is prosecuting the case.

    Anyone with information in connection with this investigation should contact the Antitrust Division’s Complaint Center at 888-647-3258 or visit www.justice.gov/atr/report-violations.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Former Vice-President of Asphalt Paving Company Incarcerated for Bid Rigging

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    A former senior executive of a Michigan asphalt paving company was sentenced today to six months in prison and a $500,000 fine for his role in multiple conspiracies to rig bids for asphalt paving services contracts in Michigan.

    Bruce F. Israel, former vice-president of Pontiac-based Asphalt Specialists LLC (ASI), pleaded guilty in January 2024 to conspiring with Al’s Asphalt Paving Company Inc. (Al’s Asphalt), F. Allied Construction Company Inc. (Allied), and employees from those companies to rig bids in each other’s favor. Israel is one of seven individuals that have been charged as part of an ongoing federal antitrust investigation into bid rigging and other anticompetitive conduct in the asphalt paving services industry. Three companies also have been charged as part of the investigation, which to date has resulted in over $8.7 million in criminal fines.

    “Bid rigging is cheating, plain and simple,” said Assistant Attorney General Abigail Slater of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “By their own admissions, the defendant and his co-conspirators cheated their customers and betrayed the basic notions of free and fair competition, all to benefit themselves. The Antitrust Division and its law enforcement partners will bring to justice all individuals who deprive the public of the benefits of competition by seeking their incarceration.”

    “Anyone choosing corporate greed over open and fair competition should take note of the sentence handed down today,” said Special Agent in Charge Anthony Licari of the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General, Midwestern Region. “This result underscores our firm resolve and ongoing collaboration with law enforcement and prosecutorial partners to identify, expose, and dismantle any efforts to undermine the systems that exist to protect consumers.”

    “Today’s sentence reflects the seriousness of bid rigging that degrades the competitive process,” said Inspector General Tammy Hull of the United States Postal Service. “We will continue to pursue and bring to justice those companies that commit fraud by conspiring to engage in anticompetitive practices for personal gain and corporate greed.”

    According to court documents, the co-conspirators coordinated each other’s bid prices so that the agreed-upon losing company would submit intentionally non-competitive bids. These bids gave customers the false impression of competition when, in fact, the co-conspirators already had decided among themselves who would win the contracts. Israel participated in the conspiracy with Al’s Asphalt from March 2013 through November 2018 and the Allied conspiracy from July 2017 through May 2021.

    Israel’s former employer, ASI, also pleaded guilty for its participation in the Al’s Asphalt and Allied conspiracies in January 2024. Another former ASI executive, Daniel Israel, pleaded guilty for his participation in the conspiracy with Al’s Asphalt in October 2023, and a third former ASI executive, Timothy Baugher, pleaded guilty for his participation in the Allied conspiracy in January 2025. ASI was sentenced in August 2024 to pay a fine of $6,500,000.

    The Antitrust Division’s Chicago Office and the Offices of Inspectors General for the Department of Transportation and U.S. Postal Service investigated the case.

    The Antitrust Division’s Chicago Office is prosecuting the case.

    Anyone with information in connection with this investigation should contact the Antitrust Division’s Complaint Center at 888-647-3258 or visit www.justice.gov/atr/report-violations.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Global: How Israel’s domestic crises and Netanyahu’s aim to project power are reshaping the Middle East

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Spyros A. Sofos, Assistant Professor in Global Humanities, Simon Fraser University

    Israel’s recent strikes on Iranian territory have been widely framed as an act of deterrence or yet another episode in a protracted regional rivalry.

    Such interpretations overlook the deeper motivations behind Israel’s actions.

    As a global humanities scholar who specializes in Middle Eastern politics, I believe the world is watching the convergence of a domestic political crisis and a profound strategic shift as Israel evolves into a more aggressive entity in a fragmented international order.

    Political survival

    At the centre of Israel’s current strategic turn lies Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — a beleaguered leader fighting for political survival, but also considered a calculating, opportunistic operator with a particular vision of the Middle East.

    At home, Netanyahu, confronting an unprecedented convergence of challenges — multiple corruption indictments, mass protests against what many consider a self-serving judicial overhaul and a fragile governing coalition — has leaned into military escalation as both a defensive reflex and a political instrument. He’s seemingly deploying it to both mute dissent at home and assert control abroad.

    Israelis opposed to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul plan set up bonfires and block a highway during a protest in March 2023.
    (AP Photo/Ohad Zwigenberg)

    But Netanyahu’s ambitions appear to extend beyond his immediate political survival. He seems to be striving for a legacy-defining “1967 moment” — a transformative reordering of the regional landscape in the Middle East that sidelines the Palestinian issue and entrenches Israeli supremacy.

    This dual imperative — domestic survival and amassing power in the region — likely shapes Netanyahu’s recent actions, including the strike on Iran, the expanded occupation of Syrian territory, the October 2024 attack on Lebanon and the ongoing assaults on Gaza and the West Bank.

    By describing each military campaign as a reluctant necessity — forced upon him by Iran, Hamas or even his coalition hardliners — Netanyahu maintains public support as he consolidates power. His government has used war-time conditions to suppress public protest, push forward its radical constitutional agenda and advance his geopolitical vision.

    The result is a volatile but calculated strategy that is likely to mark Netanyahu’s tenure, though with significant repercussions for regional stability.

    Israel’s grand strategy

    While Netanyahu’s actions could serve his immediate political ends, they also reflect a longer-term shift in Israeli grand strategy. Following the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attacks, Israel intensified a long-standing pattern of pre-emptive strikes and campaigns to neutralize its adversaries. This strategy has been pursued at an unprecedented scale in Gaza, but often without a clearly articulated political endgame.

    This pattern echoes a regional policy doctrine Netanyahu laid out in his 1993 book A Place Among the Nations when he asserted “the only peace that will endure in the region is the peace of deterrence.”

    This policy advocates the projection of overwhelming Israeli power, the emasculation of regional challengers and efforts to radically reorder the Middle East.

    Netanyahu’s doctrine, a more aggressive revision of Israel’s earlier pre-emptive security traditions, stands in sharp contrast to the approach pursued by the Oslo Accords-era leadership of the 1990s and 2000s — figures such as Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and later Ehud Barak.

    They emphasized diplomacy over coercive leverage and perpetual confrontation. They sought genuine political settlements and a negotiated co-existence with Palestinians and neighbouring Arab states. This strategy — rooted in compromise and limited reconciliation — has now been decisively eclipsed by Netanyahu’s highly militarized approach and his vision for achieving strategic power in the Middle East.

    This approach underpins all of Israel’s modern-day actions — from its reoccupation of parts of Lebanon to its growing military footprint in Syrian territory, the obliteration of Gaza, its aggression against Iran and the increasing calls for Iranian regime change from the current Israeli cabinet.

    From buffer to power projection

    Nowhere is this clearer than in Israel’s expanding operations across its northern front. In Syria, Israel seized upon the post-Bashar al-Assad vacuum to entrench military control over at least 12 square kilometres of new terrain, constructing infrastructure and outposts far beyond prior ceasefire lines.

    This had less to do with protecting minority populations or deterring Iranian proxies — as officials claimed — and more with establishing long-term buffer zones and projecting dominance into a fragile post-war Syria.

    A similar pattern is evident in Lebanon. Following months of border escalation, Israel has sought not only to undermine Hezbollah’s capacity but to create no-go zones controlled by the Israeli military along the frontier. These operations reflect older strategic instincts but are now integrated in the ongoing process of Israel’s northern border redesign.

    Finally, Israel’s bombing campaign against Iran reflects a doctrine to move beyond containment toward strategic dismantlement of the Iranian regime’s regional power and to erode its ability to control its own territory.

    The escalation is the outcome of Israel’s pursuit of a favourable regional moment — the weakening of the so-called “Axis of Resistance” following the Abraham Accords of 2020 aimed at establishing diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab nations — and months of war in Lebanon and Syria.

    From ‘western ally’ to regional challenger

    A constellation of domestic and international changes has enabled Israel’s transformation.

    These include a shift in Israeli political culture encouraged by Netanyahu’s rejection of efforts to pursue some sort of regional co-existence and co-operation; the far right’s growing influence in government; and the ongoing disruption of the international order amid Donald Trump’s second presidency in the United States that gave Israel more room to manoeuvre.

    This constellation has eroded the few constraints the liberal international order had in the past imposed on Israel’s pursuit of its regional policies amid an era of expansionism, permanent conflict and the aggressive management — not resolution — of the Palestinian issue.

    Israel is now heading down the same path as Russia and Turkey, capitalizing on vast disparities in military and intelligence capabilities among regional powers to its advantage, disregarding international norms, undermining diplomacy and preferring transactional alliances instead of long-term peace processes.

    The U.S. has facilitated this transformation. Former president Joe Biden and now Trump have made very little effort to constrain Netanyahu.

    Trump’s “Gaza Riviera” plan, along with his isolationist rhetoric, have effectively left regional decision-making to Israel while he continues to underwrite Israeli military dominance and its use of overwhelming force to reshape its regional environment.




    Read more:
    Why Israel and the U.S. are sure to encounter the limits of air power in Iran


    Netanyahu’s reluctance to accept the current ceasefire as a definitive end to hostilities with Iran reveals his and his cabinet’s regional revisionist reflexes.

    Broader regional destabilization lies ahead as Israel seeks to destroy threats with immense military power without any strategic foresight.

    Spyros A. Sofos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. How Israel’s domestic crises and Netanyahu’s aim to project power are reshaping the Middle East – https://theconversation.com/how-israels-domestic-crises-and-netanyahus-aim-to-project-power-are-reshaping-the-middle-east-259359

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Kazakhstan, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Ask about Excessive Use of Force during 2022 Demonstrations and Internet Censorship

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the third periodic report of Kazakhstan on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with Committee Experts commending the State’s abolition of the death penalty, and raising issues concerning excessive use of force by law enforcement officials during demonstrations in January 2022 and internet censorship.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, and other Committee Experts commended Kazakhstan for its abolition of the death penalty and ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant.

    A Committee Expert cited reports of excessive use of force during demonstrations in January 2022 that resulted in the deaths of several peaceful protesters.  Investigations into these incidents were reportedly insufficient. What measures would the State party take to hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies to victims and their families?

    Another Committee Expert said Kazakhstan had not amended legislation allowing the Prosecutor General to shut down websites without court approval.  Provisions designed to protect children from cyberbullying were reportedly misused to censor and restrict information, as were internet blackouts. Could the delegation comment on these issues?

    Botagoz Zhaxelekova, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, said that, as part of national action plans, systemic efforts had been made to enhance human rights protections.  These included the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, without reservations.  Kazakhstan was currently working with countries in Central Asia and Mongolia to make the region the first death penalty-free zone.

    In the ensuing discussion, the delegation said that the 2022 incident was a mass uprising that led to numerous injuries to law enforcement officials.  Investigations had been initiated into the incident, with nine officials sentenced for the excessive use of arms.  Monitoring visits had led to the release of around 400 people who were arbitrarily detained.

    On internet censorship, the delegation said this year, around 1,000 warning letters were issued to website operators calling for illegal content to be removed.  If it was removed, the site was not blocked.  Internet services could only be suspended in emergency situations and when there was an extreme threat to public safety, such as during the January 2022 events.  The 2023 law on online platforms was based on the European Union’s digital services act. It was geared toward the liberalisation of the online sphere.

    Ms. Zhaxelekova, in concluding remarks, thanked the Committee for the constructive dialogue, and all those who had facilitated the dialogue.  The Committee’s recommendations would be considered by the State and incorporated into future human rights action plans, she said.

    In his concluding remarks, Mr. Soh said the delegation had engaged actively in the dialogue, which had addressed judicial independence, the prohibition of torture, and the rights of vulnerable groups, among other topics.  The Committee expressed particular concern regarding the lack of accountability for the January 2022 events and restrictions on civil society and freedom of assembly.  It hoped that the dialogue would translate into increased protection of civil and political rights in Kazakhstan.

    The delegation of Kazakhstan was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Population; Ministry of Culture and Information; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Court Administration; Anti-Corruption Agency; Prosecutor General’s Office; and the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 26 June to begin its consideration of the initial report of Guinea Bissau (CCPR/C/GNB/1).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the third periodic report of Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/KAZ/3).

    Presentation of the Report

    BOTAGOZ ZHAXELEKOVA, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, said international obligations were an integral part of Kazakhstan’s national legal system.  The provisions of the Covenant took precedence over national legislation, and the State’s primary priority was the protection of citizens’ rights.

    During the reporting period, the State made far-reaching reforms aiming to consolidate democracy and build a just Kazakhstan. In 2022, constitutional reforms reinforced human rights protections for all Kazakh citizens, moving the State from a super-Presidential form of Government to a Presidential Republic with a strengthened Parliament.  The President could now serve only a single seven-year term and could not seek re-election. Rural mayors were now directly elected, and regional authorities had been granted greater autonomy. 

    The role of the lower house of Parliament in forming the Government had been strengthened – Parliament’s consent was now required for the appointment of the Prime Minister and other members of the Government.  The lower house was also empowered to hear reports from the Government, including on human rights issues.

    In addition, the registration process for political parties had been simplified; the electoral process had been improved; and the registration threshold had been reduced fourfold, from 20,000 to 5,000 members.  For the first time, six political parties, including opposition parties, were represented in the lower house.  Nearly half of the members of Parliament had been newly elected, including independent candidates.  A 30 per cent quota for women, youth, and persons with disabilities was introduced for the allocation of party list mandates.  The Mazhilis (lower house of Parliament) now included 18 women, six persons with disabilities, and eight individuals under the age of 35.

    The Constitutional Court had been re-established as a key mechanism for protecting rights and freedoms.  All citizens could appeal to it free of charge, and interpretation services were available.  To date, the Court had issued over 500 rulings and 71 final decisions.  In 20 per cent of reviewed cases, legal provisions were found to be unconstitutional.

    Constitutional law had expanded the powers of the Human Rights Commissioner, who could now directly address the President, both chambers of Parliament, and the Government with proposals to improve human rights mechanisms and initiate systemic legislative measures.  The Ombudsman was empowered to file lawsuits to defend the rights of an unlimited number of individuals, access all penal institutions freely, interview any person, and intervene in cases of rights violations. Regional Ombudspersons for the rights of children and for socially vulnerable groups had also been appointed across the country.

    Extensive work had been carried out in the field of lawmaking.  Laws adopted during the reporting period included the law on peaceful assemblies, which introduced a notification-based system for assemblies; a law decriminalising defamation; a law granting citizens and civil society organizations the right to oversee Government and quasi-public entities; a law obliging the Government to respond to petitions that received more than 50,000 signatures; a law expanding journalists’ rights to access and disseminate information; and the Social Code, which guaranteed equality and the inadmissibility of discrimination in all areas of life and increased State social benefits by 15 per cent. 

    Other laws adopted included a law aimed at protecting victims of domestic violence, which led to the annual number of crimes against women decreasing by 2.5 times; legislation increasing penalties for crimes against the sexual integrity of children; a law granting public monitoring commissions and the national preventive mechanism unrestricted access to all closed facilities in the country without prior notice and establishing criminal liability for cruel and inhuman treatment; and a law on combatting human trafficking.

    As a result of preventive measures, the number of registered torture cases had declined each year.  In 2024, the number fell by 40 per cent.  Since 2020, a Compensation Fund for Victims of Torture had been operating, and over the past five years, more than 3,000 compensation payments had been made.

    Kazakhstan was also taking measures to protect its citizens abroad.  From 2019 to 2021, the country carried out special operations repatriating 754 individuals from Syria, including 526 children and citizens of neighbouring countries.  All children received passports and women were supported to return to a normal life.

    As part of national action plans, systemic efforts had been made to enhance human rights protections.  A total of 94 actions had been planned, more than 75 per cent of which had already been implemented.  These included the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, without reservations.  This commitment was also enshrined in the Constitution.  Kazakhstan was currently working with countries in Central Asia and Mongolia to make the region the first death penalty-free zone.  In 2023, Kazakhstan also ratified two Optional Protocols: one to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and another to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 

    To ensure the effective implementation of decisions and requests from United Nations committees, a working group was established in 2022.  It included representatives from the main State authorities.  Kazakhstan had responded positively to decisions on individual communications by United Nations committees, including through the payment of compensation in the cases of Gerasimov, Bayramov and Malykhin. 

    The State party had also incorporated the recommendations of the United Nations High Commissioner Volker Türk, who visited Kazakhstan in 2023, into a comprehensive action plan on human rights and the rule of law.  The action plan focused on protecting the rights of women, children, and persons with disabilities; combatting domestic violence; strengthening labour rights; and safeguarding freedom of association.

    The Government has been actively engaging with civil society on all major reforms.  One notable example of this engagement was the “Dialogue Platform for the Human Dimension” under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Since 2013, more than 50 meetings had been held, and their outcomes were reflected in three human rights action plans, including recently adopted laws on combatting human trafficking, the criminalisation of domestic violence, and the fight against torture.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Committee welcomed Kazakhstan’s abolition of the death penalty and its ratification of the Second Optional Protocol in 2022, as well as the strengthening of the Constitutional Court in 2023 and the establishment of several mechanisms and institutions.  The Committee had, in recent years, issued a substantial number of Views concluding violations of the Covenant by the State party, but had received disturbing information that most of these had not been followed up.  Would the State party extend the mandate of the interagency working group, which was tasked with analysing these Views?  What measures had been taken to give full effect to the Committee’s recommendations?  How were members of the judiciary trained on international procedures?

    The adoption of the international treaties act enhanced the role of international treaties in the national legal order. Did the Covenant have direct effect? The Committee welcomed national plans related to human rights.  How effective had implementation of these plans been?  Domestic courts had assessed a substantial number of cases involving the Covenant.  Had these courts directly implemented the Covenant?  Was training on the Covenant for the judiciary compulsory?  How was the public educated on the Committee’s work?

    The Committee welcomed that the Human Rights Commission’s mandate had been expanded but noted that it had “B” status since 2012. Had the State worked to have it accredited with “A” status?  What were the obstacles in this regard?  How did the State party guarantee a transparent and independent procedure for appointing members of the Commission?  How did the Commissioner monitor the implementation of the Covenant?  Could the Commissioner be held accountable for inaction?  The State party had invested in the national preventive mechanism against torture, but this institution depended on the Human Rights Commission to carry out its operations and reportedly needed to announce visits to places of detention in advance.  How would the State party strengthen the mechanism?

    Another Committee Expert welcomed the significant changes to the national framework, including the establishment of the national Anti-Corruption Agency.  There were concerns about the influence of public officials over this institution. What measures were in place to ensure the independence of the Agency?  Media reportedly faced political pressure when reporting on corruption, with some having been imprisoned.  What measures were in place to protect media personnel investigating corruption?

    The law on countering extremism included a vague definition of “extremism” that allowed for arbitrary interpretation.  Would this definition be revised?  Were media personnel pressured to expose colleagues’ actions to reduce sentences against them?  Did the State party plan to remove people convicted of non-violent crimes from the list of people accused of financing terrorism?  Which objective standards were used in courts to define extremist activities?  The Committee called for statistics on persons tried for extremist crimes.

    The Committee welcomed legal safeguards against surgical sterilisation, but was concerned about uneven access to contraception and high rates of teenage pregnancy.  What steps had been taken to expand access to affordable contraceptives and family planning programmes?  The Committee was concerned by reports of forced sterilisation and abortion, particularly targeting persons with disabilities, and gender stereotypes embedded in school curricula.  What measures were in place to address these issues and develop adequate sexual and reproductive health education?

    A Committee Expert said that demonstrations in December 2011 resulted in the deaths and injuries of civilians, and reported torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals put under trial related to these protests.  Investigations into these incidents and many alleged perpetrators of human rights violations were reportedly insufficient.  What measures would the State party take to hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies to victims and their families?  How many investigations had been carried out thus far and what convictions had been handed down?

    The Committee welcomed measures taken to address the high suicide rate in detention centres, but this high rate reportedly persisted.  What further measures were planned to reduce the suicide rate and to investigate all deaths in custody?

    One Committee Expert said that the State party’s laws on discrimination did not address all forms of discrimination included in the Covenant, despite high levels of discrimination against certain groups in the State party.  Efforts to revise anti-discrimination laws seemed to have stalled.  Was there a plan to revive these?

    The Committee welcomed the State party’s efforts to promote the rights of persons with disabilities.  Would it remove discriminatory language in its laws related to persons with disabilities?

    In 2020, the Dungan community experienced ethnic violence resulting in deaths, injuries, property damage, and the displacement of thousands of community members.  Law enforcement authorities reportedly ignored these incidents, delaying investigations and prosecutions.  What progress had been made in setting up a reconciliation committee and in providing remedies to victims?

    There were credible reports of violence and discrimination targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals. Why had organizations of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons been denied formal registration and the right to peaceful assembly?  The Kazakhstan Union of Parents had submitted a petition seeking to ban “propaganda” related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.  How had the Government responded to this petition?  Public funding had been removed from gender reassignment surgery and the minimum age for such procedures had been raised to 21.  How would the Government support persons who sought such surgery?

    Another Committee Expert welcomed that Kazakhstan’s law prohibited gender-based discrimination, but expressed concern that women accounted for only 27 per cent of the Mazhilis, and had limited representation in decision-making positions in public and private bodies.  There was a major salary gap between men and women, and the law did not ensure equal pay for equal work.  What measures had the State party taken to ensure substantive equality between men and women and to address discrimination in access to education, land and property rights?  How did the State party promote women’s representation in decision-making bodies and managerial roles?  What measures were in place to address the gender pay gap?

    The Committee welcomed that the State party had financed gender equality initiatives, but noted that the gender equality strategy had been replaced with the gender and family policy.  The 2009 law on domestic violence was limited to violence by immediate family members.  What legislative and other measures had been taken to combat violence against women and girls?  How had the State party tackled the rise in domestic violence observed during the COVID-19 pandemic?  How was it addressing issues such as forced and early marriages and ensuring a victim-centred approach to investigations and prosecutions? 

    Stigma surrounded reporting of cases of domestic and gender-based violence and police were reportedly reluctant to act on such cases. How did the State party encourage reporting of violence by victims, ensure adequate funding for victim support services, and collect data on complaints, investigations and sentences? What measures were in place to strengthen awareness raising campaigns on violence against women targeting public officials and civil society?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Covenant was directly applicable in Kazakhstan and took precedence over domestic legislation. Over the past eight years, over 7,000 decisions were handed down by the courts that referenced the Covenant. Training seminars on Covenant rights were held for members of the judiciary.  The Government had made good progress on the human rights action plan, having implemented around 75 action points thus far, including actions promoting gender equality and women’s representation in decision-making bodies, as well as the investigation of torture.

    The Ombudsperson’s status was enshrined in the Constitution.  It did not report to Government bodies and had immunity in carrying out its activities. Its financial independence was guaranteed and it had direct access to all Government bodies.  In 2023, the Ombudsperson representatives carried out more than 700 monitoring visits and issued over 600 recommendations, some 70 per cent of which were implemented.  An assessment of institutional capacity was carried out in 2023 by the Human Rights Commissioner towards its accreditation with “A” status by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions.

    The independent national preventive mechanism consisted of 126 members, a large percentage of whom were representatives of non-governmental organizations.  They were elected through a transparent process by the coordination council.  The Ombudsperson was working on improving the professional knowledge of the mechanism’s members.  Its annual budget was spent exclusively on its needs.  It had unlimited access to all detention centres in the country and did not need prior permission to conduct visits.

    The Anti-Corruption Agency was independent. It had held several high-level officials accountable for corruption and had seized several millions of dollars in assets from those officials, investing those assets directly in Government programmes such as school construction projects.  The Agency provided free consultations with citizens periodically and worked with citizen volunteers who monitored corruption.

    The State ensured the safety of journalists who investigated corruption, providing all assistance necessary to those journalists. Journalists had broad rights to receive answers to their questions from public officials and to attend public events.

    The concepts of “extremism” and “terrorism” defined in national legislation and the Constitution were in line with those of international law.  The State party welcomed the Committee’s recommendations for improving these laws. All inclusions in the list of organizations linked to terrorism financing were based on the sentences of judges.  Around 1,000 persons had been removed from the list after review, including persons already serving sentences under the Criminal Code and persons found to have given up extremist views.

    Kazakhstan’s Health Code guaranteed the right to reproductive healthcare.  Women had the right not to be subjected to forced abortions or sterilisation and had access to all sexual and reproductive health services.  Gynaecologists determined whether terminations of pregnancy were necessary.  Minors could seek terminations with the written permission of their parents. Family planning and contraception services were provided by the State.  Medical, out-patient and in-patient services had been established in rural areas – 308 medical facilities had been built last year. Events were held that promoted reproductive health and aimed to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies.  Increased access to maternal health services had led to a reduction in maternal mortality and the number of abortions.

    The Prosecutor’s Office had conducted investigations into the events of December 2011, as had monitoring bodies from the United Nations.  The Government had allowed representatives of non-governmental organizations and the media to attend trials related to these events.  Some 1,100 witness testimonies were conducted as part of investigations, which led to the sentencing of 13 officials.  All persons who had been arrested were now released. Investigations found that there was no evidence of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of arrested persons by public officials.  One official had been charged with granting officers permission to use lethal firearms, which led to the death of 12 persons.  These victims’ families had been granted damages by the courts.

    Discrimination was not allowed on grounds of sex, ethnicity, race, status, property or religion, among other characteristics. The State party had created a committee promoting inter-ethnic harmony, which had developed guidelines on access to legal remedies for victims of discrimination and recommendations for improving legislation on discrimination. 

    All citizens were equal before the law and no person could be subject to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  Members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community had access to all fundamental rights.  The State party had agreed to conduct research on the impact of propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in response to the petition it had received.  Sex changes were regulated by domestic law; persons aged 21 or over with legal capacity had the right to change their sex.

    Some 87 persons had been convicted for having taking part in mass unrest in 2020 affecting the Dungan community, damaging property and obstructing the actions of the police.  All victims had had their property restored.

    The law on persons with disabilities granted persons with category two disabilities priority access to public housing. National standards were in place that supported access to infrastructure and services for persons with disabilities. The accessibility level of buildings was mapped by the State party, and more than 124,000 buildings had been adapted to promote accessibility.

    In April 2024, a law was adopted that aimed to protect women and girls from violence.  There was criminal liability for battery and bodily harm.  Police were obliged to investigate all suspected cases of domestic violence, even when there was no report.  The punishment for sexual violence had been increased to up to life imprisonment.  Forced marriage was punished with up to 10 years imprisonment.  Measures were in place to ensure that victims could file complaints.  The Government funded a specific unit on combatting domestic violence and provided training to officials on responding to domestic violence.  Courts issued restraining orders and instructions relating to behaviour in domestic violence cases as required.  Mobile units responded in a timely manner to reports of violence; they had worked with more than 100,000 families.

    The share of women in local assemblies was 22.7 per cent. There were three women ministers and eight women vice-ministers, and the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court was a woman.  Some 53 per cent of judges were women.  The State party was working actively to ensure that the quota of 30 per cent female candidates was respected.

    The ideology of the gender equality strategy had not changed.  The State party was working with United Nations agencies to promote gender-sensitive budgeting and establish bodies within ministries with gender-related mandates.

    Around 15 per cent of senior public officials were women. Since 2018, some 7,000 women had served in military operations and 15 Kazakh women had served in United Nations peacekeeping roles.  Equal pay for equal work for men and women was enshrined in the Constitution. Discrimination on any grounds was not allowed.  The Labour Code prohibited discrimination on the grounds of gender.  Women who felt they had been discriminated against could turn to the courts to seek remedies.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert welcomed that the procedure for follow-up on Views had led to legal changes and the payment of compensation to victims.  The Expert also welcomed efforts made by the State party to inform the public about the Committee’s work.  Another Committee Expert welcomed measures promoting access to registration for civil society organizations.  One Committee Expert commended the participation of 15 Kazakh women in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the increasing number of women in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, said he was impressed by the abolition of the death penalty and progress in improving the representation of women, but noted that there were still issues that needed to be addressed.

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on how the State party promoted the independence of the Ombudsperson, despite the President’s role in appointing its members; investigations into individual cases of killings and claims of torture occurring during December 2011 protests and reparations provided to victims’ families, and whether an official public apology had been issued for these human rights violations; whether the State party would formally recognise the right of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons to protection from discrimination; details on planned revisions to discrimination legislation; the status of research into propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons; whether a law on gender-based harassment would be promulgated soon; and resistance to laws on violence against women from conservative segments of society.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the national preventive mechanism carried out more than 500 monitoring visits per year.  It had issued more than 16,000 recommendations to institutions as of 2020, of which 44 per cent had been implemented.

    An investigation was carried out into events related to December 2011 protests.  There was no evidence of the acts of torture that were alleged, preventing judicial investigation of those allegations.  The investigations into the murder of 12 individuals and the injury of six determined that arms were used with unlawful intent, inflicting grievous bodily harm, but not necessarily murder.  One official had refused to provide medical care to an injured person and was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

    Issues related to discrimination legislation and the petition on propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons would be considered once research into these issues was completed. Civil society was invited to join discussions related to the petition and other Government measures.

    National legislation allowed for liability for various forms of harassment.  Last year, changes were brought to the Criminal Code banning sexual activity with minors under age 16.  The Government was assessing the effectiveness of current legislation on gender-based violence, which would be revised in 2027.

    The 2022 constitutional law on the Human Rights Commissioner expanded the powers of the Ombudsperson and the mandate of the Human Rights Commissioner.  The findings of the visits of the national preventive mechanism were published in its annual report.  As a result of its findings, disciplinary actions had been taken against over 440 officials.  In addition to the national preventive mechanism, members of Parliament, judges, prosecutors and the Commissioner for the Rights of the Child could also visit places of detention without prior authorisation. 

    The Ombudsperson could participate in discussions on national reports for human rights treaty bodies.  They had not exercised their right to appeal to the Constitutional Court, as they had been able to address all complaints they had received through other legal recourses.  This did not indicate a refusal to exercise this authority.

    The Labour Code prohibited discrimination against women and regulated workers’ rights to respect and dignity. Employers were obliged to ensure safe and healthy working conditions.  Workers could submit complaints of workplace harassment to the Workplace Ethics Committee or to the police.

    There were 170 suicides in prisons between 2017 and 2024.  For each case, an investigation was carried out to determine the causes, and around 150 officials had been sanctioned for not fulfilling their care duties. Training was provided to prison guards on identifying at-risk inmates and preventing suicides, and to prisoners on promoting self-confidence and preparing for release.  Several additional measures had been implemented in prisons to prevent suicides.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the State party did not have a specific law on the use of force and firearms by officials.  Did it plan to enact such a law that was in line with international standards?  There were allegations of excessive use of force during January 2022 protests, which had led to the death of several peaceful protesters.  Did the State party plan to conduct thorough, independent investigations into these allegations, hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies for victims?  The mass detention of protesters reportedly led to disappearances, and detainees had been denied access to lawyers and medical care.  What further steps would the State party take to ensure that all detainees were informed of their rights, provided access to a lawyer and medical treatment, and to investigate all allegations of mistreatment of detainees and hold those responsible accountable?

    Peaceful assemblies held without advanced authorisation were typically dispersed by authorities, with demonstrators arrested. How would the State party bring its administrative detention practices in line with international standards? Courts had a high rate of extending pre-trial detention.  How did the State party ensure that pre-trial detention was used only as a last resort, and in line with international standards?

    Another Committee Expert said that the State party had not sufficiently responded to the Committee’s previous recommendation to align legal definitions of torture with those of the Convention against Torture. Despite the high number of torture cases, few effective punishments were imposed on perpetrators, and some persons who reported torture were punished for the crime of reporting false information. What steps had been taken to bring the definition of torture in the Criminal Code in line with international standards and ensure timely investigations?  How many complaints of torture had been filed, legal proceedings launched, and officials punished?

    Kazakhstan had not amended legislation allowing the Prosecutor General to shut down websites without court approval. Provisions designed to protect children from cyberbullying were reportedly misused to censor and restrict information, as were internet blackouts.  Could the delegation comment on these issues?  Laws adopted in 2023 and 2024 expanded State control over free speech, resulting in politically motivated trials against journalists and political opposition figures.  What steps had been taken to fully decriminalise defamation?  Could the State party provide statistics on detentions of journalists and human rights defenders?  What had the working group on the protection of human rights defenders achieved?

    A Committee Expert commended steps to transfer prison health services from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Health.  How was the State party supporting drug-dependent inmates and working to ensure the availability of sufficient medical equipment in prisons?  Were medical staff trained in detecting torture? Military schools were excluded from the mandate of the national preventive mechanism.  Did the State party intend to address this?

    The Committee was concerned that the right to conscientious objection to military services was not defined in law.  Were there plans to define this in law and establish an alternative to military service?  What steps had been taken to revise religious law to ensure full compliance with the Covenant?  The Committee was concerned by reports that some individuals had been imprisoned for engaging in non-violent religious expression.  How did the State party ensure that persons were not detained solely for expressing religious beliefs?

    What steps had been taken to remove complex registration requirements for non-governmental organizations and trade unions, and to prevent excessive State control of the activities of those organizations?

    Minorities continued to face discrimination and limited access to decision-making positions.  What was the legal and administrative framework covering political parties?  What steps had been taken to promote the effective participation of members of the Roma community in political life?

    One Committee Expert commended the State party for the 2024 law on combatting trafficking in persons and the amendment to article 128 of the Criminal Code.  How did the State party ensure the effective implementation of these reforms? There were reports of a lack of training for labour inspectors on trafficking.  How were inspectors trained to detect trafficking?  How did the State party ensure that the cases of all potential trafficking victims were assessed before deportation, and that all migrant children were properly registered and documented?  The Committee welcomed efforts to enhance trafficking penalties, but was concerned that trafficking offences were often not appropriately classified, leading to lower penalties.  Would this be addressed?

    There was no de facto procedure for processing asylum applications and authorities were reportedly reluctant to grant asylum to persons of Russian or Uzbek nationality.  Reportedly, migrants had been detained without being given access to legal representation.  Was the State party addressing these issues?  How did it ensure protection against refoulement?  Individuals were required to renounce their citizenship to apply for Kazakh nationality.  Would the State revise this law to prevent the risk of statelessness?

    What State services were provided to victims of domestic violence, including children?  Could children obtain these services independently of their parents? The Committee was concerned that the State party had not prohibited all forms of corporal punishment.  Would this be done?  Could children file complaints of mistreatment with the Human Rights Commissioner?  Workers at an orphanage had been caught on video beating children.  How was the State party working to prevent such abuse and promoting the foster family system?  Children born outside of medical institutions to undocumented parents did not receive birth certificates.  Would the State party address this issue?

    Another Committee Expert asked how the State party guaranteed the independence of Supreme Court judge candidates, who were nominated by the President, and of lawyers?  There were reports of corruption throughout the judicial system. How was the State fighting this? Had any judicial officials been found guilty of corruption?  Attorneys were not automatically appointed to suspects, and did not always get access to all case files.  How would this be addressed?  How were suspects made aware of their rights?  How did the State party prevent cases being unduly declared “secret”?  What percentage of court cases were now solely held online?  How did the State ensure proper proceedings in online cases?

    To what extent were spontaneous assemblies possible in Kazakhstan?  How did the State party ensure that notification procedures did not create delays or restrictions preventing assemblies?  Could people appeal restrictions on assemblies?  Foreigners were prohibited from participating in assemblies.  How did the State party ensure that foreigners’ assembly rights were respected?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said that in cases of mass violence, the State had the authority to use force to ensure public security.  The 2022 incident was a mass uprising that led to numerous injuries to law enforcement officials.  Investigations had been initiated into the incident, with nine officials sentenced for the excessive use of arms.  Changing the law on the excessive use of force was unnecessary, as the law functioned effectively.  All persons affected by violence related to this incident were provided with appropriate medical assistance, including detainees. Monitoring visits had led to the release of around 400 people who were arbitrarily detained.  There were 29 minors who had been detained after carrying out serious offences; they had since been released.

    There were 1,500 peaceful assemblies organised legally between 2017 and 2024.  Some 400 planned demonstrations had been cancelled because authorities had responded to complaints before the demonstration was held.  Some 1,000 demonstrations held during the reporting period were deemed unlawful as protesters had failed to respect notification deadlines or to correctly submit notification documents.  The State party continued to inform the public about notification procedures; this had led to a two-fold decrease in the number of illegal assemblies between 2022 and 2024.  Organisers of such assemblies were brought to court only in exceptional circumstances; in most cases, they were issued fines or warnings.  Law enforcement bodies needed to provide alternative proposals if the location for a planned demonstration was already being used by another event.

    As of 2019, exemption from liability for torture was not possible in Kazakhstan, nor were suspended sentences for perpetrators of torture.  There were 40,000 video cameras placed in detention centres to prevent torture. There had been a downward trend in the number of torture cases reported, from around 800 in 2019 to around 100 in 2024. More than 200 officials had been convicted of torture offences, and no officials found guilty of torture had received amnesties.  Housing and compensation payments were provided to the families of victims of torture. The State party intended to increase the amount of compensation provided to victims of torture ten-fold.

    This year, around 1,000 warning letters were issued to website operators calling for illegal content to be removed.  If it was removed, the site was not blocked. Internet services could only be suspended in emergency situations and when there was an extreme threat to public safety, such as during the January 2022 events.  The 2023 law on online platforms was based on the European Union’s digital services act.  It was geared toward the liberalisation of the online sphere.

    Defamation had been downgraded to an administrative offence.  There had been a downward trend in the number of cases of defamation in recent years. In 2024, only four cases of spreading misinformation were registered.  Journalists and activists were not prosecuted for defaming public officials.  Persons could not be charged for defaming public or private institutions.

    All persons who entered prisons were provided with a medical assessment.  Detainees requiring specialised assistance were brought to outpatient clinics, and they were isolated when they showed symptoms of contagious diseases.  Legal amendments were made to allow detainees with serious diseases to serve their sentences in appropriate facilities or to have their sentences commuted.

    Over the past few years, there had been an increase in religious practitioners and missionaries, and a decrease in the number of people fined for religious activities.  In the first quarter of this year, only 46 people had been fined. Kazakhstan recognised the right to practice and disseminate religion.  Only persons who practiced religion for financial or extremist purposes were sanctioned.  Legislation on religion was in line with the Covenant.  Members of religious institutions could be released from the obligation to carry out military service.

    Kazakhstan was a multi-ethnic State.  It had a special quota for members of the Senate who were representatives of different ethnic groups.  There were no limitations on the political participation of ethnic groups.

    The national preventive mechanism operated under the Ombudsperson, but maintained operational independence.  Work was underway to expand the national preventive mechanism’s mandate to include facilities under the aegis of the Ministry of Defence.  A draft law on the national preventive mechanism was currently under discussion with State authorities.

    In 2023, the State adopted a law reducing the number of members needed to form a public association to three.  There were no restrictions on organizations receiving foreign funding.  To date, 543 trade unions had been registered.  Political parties’ activities could be restricted when they threatened public order, but such restrictions were temporary.  Liquidation of political parties could only be forced by a court order.

    A law on combatting trafficking in persons was introduced in 2024, which aimed to bring the State’s mechanisms for combatting trafficking in line with international standards, and to increase identification and support for victims.  New offences had been established linked to trafficking, including related to procuring a minor for prostitution and online trafficking. Some 170 labour inspections had been held thus far this year.  These had led to the identification of trafficking victims and the disbanding of organised crime groups, the members of which were held criminally liable. Over 190 victims had been identified and punishments of up to 20 years imprisonment were issued to perpetrators.

    Legislation on refugees and asylum seekers was in line with international law.  Kazakhstan abided by the principle of non-refoulement.  Refugees had the right to seek medical assistance and education, and could apply for permanent or temporary residence in the State. Kazakhstan did not permit the extradition of individuals whose asylum requests were under consideration. Individuals had the right to appeal extradition requests to the Supreme Court.  Kazakhstan was a party to the Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, which included provisions specifying that signatories needed to respect international norms related to non-refoulement.

    Only citizens could participate in demonstrations in Kazakhstan; foreigners and stateless persons could not.  However, they could pursue other means to lodge complaints with the State.  Police did not monitor whether demonstrators were foreigners or not.

    The Judicial Office provided free legal assistance to persons involved in court cases.  Many court cases took place online.  Artificial intelligence helped judges to automate routine cases, allowing for the analysis of millions of cases and for the maintenance of judicial standards.  Court materials were provided in accessible formats.

    The State party had revised the judiciary’s financing model, allowing the judicial administrative body to set the budget. This had led to a large increase in the judicial budget.  There were sanctions imposed for judges who engaged in corrupt practices.  Cases of corruption were assessed by a judicial panel.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on criteria used to determine whether to send warning letters to citizens regarding online content; alternatives to residential care facilities being developed; plans to prohibit corporal punishment; whether spontaneous protests were possible; whether persons who did not respect notification laws were restricted from filing future notifications; how the judiciary ensured that artificial intelligence was used in a safe manner that protected citizens’ rights; whether the Government intended to abolish the registry of organizations with foreign funding sources; and planned reforms to the registration process for non-governmental organizations.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said there was a specialised structure that monitored the information space and detected violations of Kazakh law.  When violations were detected, warning letters were sent to offending parties, often through social network operators, that explained why the content was illegal and needed to be removed.

    The State paid particular attention to the rights of children.  New legislation discouraged corporal punishment.  The number of beatings of children recorded by the State had been falling year-on-year; last year, there were only 250 cases.  Thorough investigations were carried out into complaints of corporal punishment in residential homes.  Video surveillance tools were installed in schools and kindergartens.  There was a hotline for reporting violence and providing consultations to children.

    There was no plan to amend the registry of organizations funded by foreign sources, which was developed in line with international principles.  The State party did not plan to develop a bill on foreign agents.

    All judicial services that used artificial intelligence had been assessed in terms of their implications on security.  They were implemented by the judiciary independently.  The State party had implemented use of electronic monitoring bracelets in around 1,000 cases as an alternative to pre-trial detention.

    Closing Remarks

    BOTAGOZ ZHAXELEKOVA, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, expressed gratitude to the Committee for the constructive dialogue, and to all those who had facilitated the dialogue.  The State party welcomed the 22 alternative reports submitted by Kazakh civil society organizations, which it had reviewed carefully.  The Committee’s recommendations would be considered by the State and incorporated into future human rights action plans.  The State party thanked the Committee for its contributions to human rights in Kazakhstan and around the world.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed sincere gratitude to all those who contributed to the constructive dialogue. The delegation had engaged actively in the dialogue, which had addressed judicial independence, the prohibition of torture, the right to peaceful assembly, and the rights of vulnerable groups, among other topics.  The Committee expressed particular concern regarding the lack of accountability for the January 2022 events and restrictions on civil society and freedom of assembly.  It hoped that the dialogue would translate into increased protection of civil and political rights in Kazakhstan.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

     

    CCPR25.010E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Mast Exposes Spies, Lies and Mismanagement at the U.S. Agency for Global Media

    Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Media Contact 202-321-9747

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast delivered opening remarks at a full committee hearing titled, “Spies, Lies, and Mismanagement: Examining the U.S. Agency for Global Media’s Downfall.”

    Watch Here

    -Remarks-

    The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the efficacy of the US Agency for Global Media, by allowing members the opportunity to discuss the agency’s history of national security concerns, the use of taxpayer dollars, and the Trump administration’s vision for a path forward. And I’m now going to recognize myself for an opening statement. As we meet to discuss the downfall of the US Agency for Global Media, or USAGM as we call it, an independent government agency.

    It’s an agency that can trace its roots back to fighting Nazi propaganda during World War II. But instead of staying true to its mandate of combating our adversaries and advocating for American values, in recent decades USAGM has unfortunately lost its way. Prior to this administration taking office again, the agency was riddled with OIG reports and investigations demonstrating that USAGM had been a cesspool of spies, lies and mismanagement.

    That is not an exaggeration. The agency has promoted the very propaganda that it was created to defeat.

    A case in point is Voice of America, or VOA as it’s known, a media outlet overseen directly by USAGM and funded by the American taxpayer, of course — because of Chinese pressure, Voice of America censored interviews with Chinese dissidents.

    VOA hired an admitted Taliban fighter, a jihadist, to criticize President Trump’s terror travel ban decision — it’s reminiscent of a headline that would be in the Babylon Bee: Terrorist hired to criticize President Trump’s travel ban — while instructing its reporters not to call Hamas terrorists, unless they used air quotes when they did so.

    VOA suppressed negative stories about Iran and its terrorist proxies. And VOA, which peddled the Russian collusion hoax, hired foreign nationals who previously worked for Russian state sponsored news outlets to tell that story.

    USAGM is a government agency tasked with promoting American ideals. But instead, it’s hired foreign adversaries with your tax dollars, who promoted anti-American propaganda, both at home and abroad.

    This is only a partisan issue because President Trump is in the White House. The fact is, Republicans and Democrat administrations alike have exposed USAGM’s hiring, vetting and messaging failures.

    During the Biden era, the State Department Inspector General found that USAGM skirted federal hiring guidelines when doling out jobs to foreign nationals. Many of these foreign nationals were quite literally security risks, yet they were given access to extremely sensitive information. To be specific, what’s known as tier 3 and tier 5, which are the equivalent of secret and top secret information. Everybody should be asking themselves why foreign nationals hired to be journalists need access to top secret information that most foreign militaries don’t get access to.

    This was not just incompetence. It was taxpayer funded self-sabotage. American taxpayers would have been better off if that money had just been lit on fire.

    Before President Trump won his historic second term, USAGM embraced and regurgitated enemy propaganda. It became a mouthpiece for our adversaries paid for, again, by your tax dollars. And we’re here to say that the grift is over.

    It’s not that USAGM has never provided any value. It’s that USAGM had drastically lost their way and allowed themselves to become a source of espionage. However, it’s clear that USAGM cannot continue to operate as it has in recent times. Drastic measures have to be taken to ensure that every taxpayer dollar for where those dollars come from, the American people. Not Xi Jinping. Not Vladimir Putin, not the Ayatollah.

    I want to thank our witness, Kari Lake, for appearing in front of this committee today. I’m looking forward to hearing your testimony. I’m looking forward to a productive and probably a rowdy discussion about the Trump administration’s vision for the future of US broadcasting.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Whose story is being told — and why? 4 questions museum visitors should ask themselves this school holidays

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Olli Hellmann, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Waikato

    The winter school holidays will mean families across Aotearoa New Zealand will be looking for indoor activities to entertain children. With millions of visitors each year, museums focused on the country’s history will inevitably play host to local and international visitors.

    Museums tend to enjoy a high level of trust among the public. They’re widely seen as neutral, factual sources of historical knowledge.

    But like all forms of storytelling, museums present the past in particular ways. They narrate events from a certain group’s or individual’s perspective and explain why events unfolded in the way they did.

    In this respect, museums are not so different from historical films. Consider the different ways two recent movies – 1917 and the remake of All Quiet on the Western Front – narrate the first world war.

    In 1917, the storyteller takes the British side, encouraging viewers to invest in the bravery and endurance of British soldiers. But All Quiet on the Western Front is narrated from a German perspective, inviting viewers to grieve for German soldiers as victims of a political system that glorified war.

    Museum exhibitions tell stories in a similar way. Visitors should be asking not just what story is told, but why.

    Spoiler alert: it often has to do with national identity. Museums tell particular stories of the past because these stories support a particular image of New Zealand as a nation.

    Four questions for your next museum visit

    At its core, every story has two basic ingredients: actors and events. To turn these into a compelling narrative, the storyteller connects the events into a plot, so they build on each other. The storyteller also transforms actors into characters by giving them particular traits — brave, selfish, wise, cruel and the like. Museums do this, too.

    As you move through a museum exhibition, try asking yourself the following questions:

    1. Which historical events are included — and which are left out?

    Every story begins somewhere. Museums choose which events to include and which to leave out, shaping how visitors understand what happened and why.

    Take Te Papa’s Gallipoli: The Scale of Our War exhibition. It opens with the landing at ANZAC Cove but skips over events in the lead-up to WWI — such as Britain’s earlier moves to seize Ottoman territories like Cyprus and Egypt.

    Leaving these out helps frame Gallipoli as a noble – albeit tragic – “coming of age” for New Zealand. But in reality, ANZAC soldiers were fighting to support Britain’s imperial ambitions in the Middle East.

    2. How are events organised into a plot?

    Museums don’t just say “this happened, then that happened”. They link events into a larger plot — a chain of cause and effect that explains how one thing led to another. This can happen through text, but also through spatial layout, lighting, sound and other techniques that guide visitors through rising and falling moments of narrative tension.

    Often, museums use familiar plot types to connect events. One common example is the quest narrative — a story in which heroes must navigate unknown terrain, and where mistakes are part of the journey and threaten to derail the mission. It’s a bit like The Lord of the Rings: a journey full of challenges, wrong turns and personal growth.

    At Te Kōngahu Museum of Waitangi, Aotearoa New Zealand’s Treaty story is told using this quest structure. The Treaty is presented as something unique and unfamiliar and the British, confronted with this unknown, fall back on familiar colonial practices — the “mistake” that led to the New Zealand wars.

    Because this misstep is treated as part of the learning curve typical of any quest, the exhibition avoids harder questions about this violent part of history, and instead preserves the image of Aotearoa New Zealand as fundamentally tolerant and respectful.

    3. Who are the main actors in the story — and who is missing?

    Every story needs protagonists, and whose perspective frames the story matters. In many smaller regional museums, history is still told almost entirely from the viewpoint of European settlers. But what about Māori experiences of colonisation? Or the histories of Chinese communities and other migrants who arrived in the 1800s?

    By focusing narrowly on European settlers as the main actors, these museums present a one-sided view of the past and construct an image of New Zealand as a European nation — one that expects others to assimilate.

    4. How are the main actors characterised — and how are we meant to feel about them?

    It’s not surprising that museums portray some actors positively and others less so. What’s more revealing is how certain individuals are elevated as symbols of the nation and how museums invite us to form personal connections with them.

    In Te Papa’s Gallipoli exhibition, visitors can open drawers and boxes containing soldiers’ personal belongings. This intimate activity encourages us to feel close to these figures — not just learning about them, but identifying with them as embodying national qualities: bravery, resilience and a commitment to peace.

    Why does this matter?

    Historical museum narratives aren’t necessarily inaccurate — but, much like historical movies, they are selective. They highlight certain events, actors and cause-and-effect chains to tell a particular kind of story. Often, that story supports a specific idea of what it means to be an Aotearoa New Zealander.

    By reading museum exhibitions with a critical eye, visitors can better understand not just the past, but how storytelling shapes national identity in the present — and imagine how it might be shaped differently.

    Olli Hellmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Whose story is being told — and why? 4 questions museum visitors should ask themselves this school holidays – https://theconversation.com/whose-story-is-being-told-and-why-4-questions-museum-visitors-should-ask-themselves-this-school-holidays-259538

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Scotland: Amnesty ‘deeply concerned’ about transparency and accountability of Scottish Enterprise review

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Amnesty International has today expressed its deep concern around the transparency and accountability of the review into Scottish Enterprise’s human rights checks, after the Scottish Government announced that the review had been completed.

    The review, undertaken in-house by Scottish Enterprise, came after sustained pressure from Amnesty International and others after it was revealed that — despite Scottish Enterprise awarding grants worth millions of pounds to arms companies linked to states like Israel and Saudi Arabia — no company had ever failed one of its human rights checks. 

    Issuing an update today, the Scottish Government said that the review — which took place behind-closed-doors — was complete and that Scottish Enterprise was putting in place some changes to its processes. But with the update light on detail and being published only a day before MSPs break up for summer recess, Amnesty have criticised the lack of transparency around the process, as well as the inability of MSPs to now scrutinise the review’s conclusions. 

    Responding today, Neil Cowan (Scotland Director at Amnesty International) said:

    “The update released by the Scottish Government was not only light on detail, but it was published the day before the Scottish Parliament enters a two-month recess in the knowledge that MSPs will have no opportunity to scrutinise it. 

    Amnesty has been deeply concerned from the outset about the lack of transparency and accountability surrounding this review. And the manner in which the review has finally concluded makes clear we were right to be concerned. 

    The Scottish public must be assured that this review has not simply swept the issues under the carpet. Scottish Enterprise and the Scottish Government need to urgently publish their findings and recommendations in full.”

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Promise of gender equality: another case of possible misuse of EU funding in Gaza – E-002605/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU has a robust policy in place to monitor and evaluate projects and programmes implemented under its financial support. Independent final evaluations provide information on the results and impact reached and help to inform EU’s programming. They notably systematically include cross-cutting themes of human rights and gender.

    The specific support to the Palestinian Authority (PA) channelled through PEGASE mechanism[1] directly benefits thousands of civil servants and vulnerable families by contributing to the payment of salaries, pensions and social allowances. Selection of beneficiaries follows a strict safeguard mechanism through ex-ante and ex-post screening.

    Within the framework of the EU’s cooperation with Palestine[2] for the period 2014-2021, for a total amount of EUR 2.4 billion, the EU’s strategy has been aligned with the needs of the most vulnerable Palestinian populations and has played a key role in support to the PA to provide basic services to end beneficiaries.

    Gender equality is a cross-cutting issue within the five pillars of the European Joint Strategy in support to Palestine 2021-2024[3]. The Joint Strategy implementation report for 2022-2023[4] showed progress in improving gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls through the PA gender transformative agenda, the fight against gender-based violence and the promotion of economic, labour and social rights.

    It noted challenges in achieving comprehensive gender equality, aggravated by the current conflict. The EU Gender Action Plan III for the period 2021-2025 is under implementation in Palestine[5].

    • [1] ‘Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d’Aide Socio-économique’ launched in 2008.
    • [2] * This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.
    • [3] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/european-joint-strategy-support-palestine-2021-2024_en?s=206.
    • [4] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EJS%20Implementation%20Report_2022%202023.pdf.
    • [5] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/eu-gender-action-plan-iii-country-level-implementation-plan-west-bank-and-gaza-2021-2025_en?s=206.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Chinese Defense Minister Meets with Participants of SCO Defense Ministers’ Meeting

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    QINGDAO, June 25 (Xinhua) — Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun held separate meetings with his counterparts from Belarus, Iran, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia in Qingdao, east China’s Shandong Province, on Wednesday.

    From June 25 to 26, the above-mentioned officials are taking part in a meeting of defense ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states.

    Dong Jun stated that the world is currently witnessing a strengthening of the regressive tendencies of unilateralism and protectionism, while manifestations of hegemonism, despotism and bullying are seriously undermining the international order, becoming the biggest sources of chaos and troubles.

    The Chinese minister called for strengthening coordination within multilateral structures such as the UN and the SCO, upholding international fairness and justice, and protecting global strategic stability.

    Dong Jun’s interlocutors highly appreciated China’s active efforts and important contribution as the rotating chair of the SCO aimed at strengthening institutional mechanisms and deepening cooperation in all areas, expressing their firm intention to strengthen and develop cooperation in the military sphere. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: US to hold talks with Iran next week – D. Trump

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    THE HAGUE, June 25 (Xinhua) — U.S. President Donald Trump announced in The Hague, the Netherlands, on Wednesday that the United States will hold talks with Iran next week.

    “We are going to talk to them – to Iran – next week. We can sign an agreement,” D. Trump said at a press conference following the NATO summit.

    Earlier on Wednesday, Trump noted that the ceasefire between Iran and Israel was being observed “very well.” –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Iran says military commander killed in Israeli airstrike

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    TEHRAN, June 25 (Xinhua) — Ali Shadmani, chief of the central staff of Iran’s Khatam al-Anbia Armed Forces, has died from wounds sustained in an Israeli air strike, the headquarters said on Wednesday.

    According to the semi-official Tasnim news agency, A. Shadmani, who recently replaced Gholam Ali Rashid as chief of staff, was seriously wounded during Israeli strikes on Iran last week.

    The Jewish state’s army then announced that it had killed A. Shadmani in a nighttime airstrike on a command center located in central Tehran. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Jimmy Gomez Statement On Supporting War Powers Resolution

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Jimmy Gomez (CA-34)

    WASHINGTON, DC – Today, Rep. Jimmy Gomez (CA-34) released the following statement announcing his cosponsorship of H.Con.Res.40, the War Powers Resolution to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran without congressional approval:

    “I support the War Powers Resolution to prevent the Trump administration from launching further offensive action against Iran without congressional approval. Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon — but Trump failed to properly consult Congress, and we shouldn’t have to take the President’s word on why this strike happened at this particular moment.

    “No intelligence of an imminent threat was presented to bipartisan congressional leadership, committees of jurisdiction or Congress as a whole ahead of time — and still hasn’t been presented to us. The administration continues to delay providing Congress with an explanation of the alleged imminent threat that prompted the strike. Now, media reports indicate the Defense Department isn’t even confident the strikes destroyed Iran’s nuclear facilities, and that Iran may have moved key equipment and uranium ahead of time.

    “Trump’s ‘shoot first, ask questions later’ foreign policy doctrine weakens America’s global standing, makes us less safe and unnecessarily puts our troops in harm’s way without achieving any meaningful defense or security goals.”

    “The American people, including my constituents, do not want to be dragged into another avoidable war. The Trump administration’s lack of transparency is unacceptable. Congress has the power to authorize the use of force against a foreign power — and it’s time we reassert that authority.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran – RC-B10-0284/2025/REV1

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0284/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0285/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0296/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0299/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0300/2025 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Michał Wawrykiewicz, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Loucas Fourlas, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Daniel Attard, Chloé Ridel
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Rihards Kols, Aurelijus Veryga, Diego Solier, Nora Junco García, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Charlie Weimers, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alexandr Vondra, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Bogdan Rzońca, Assita Kanko, Marlena Maląg, Marion Maréchal, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Kris Van Dijck
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Abir Al‑Sahlani, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Bart Groothuis, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Alice Kuhnke
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Jonas Sjöstedt

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0284/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0284/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran

    (2025/2753(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran,

     having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Swedish-Iranian national Dr Ahmad Reza Djalali, a specialist in emergency medicine and a scholar at Belgium’s Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Italy’s Università del Piemonte Orientale, was arrested on 24 April 2016 by the Iranian security forces;

    B. whereas Djalali was sentenced to death on spurious espionage charges in October 2017 following a grossly unfair trial based on a confession extracted under torture; whereas the sentence was upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court on 17 June 2018;

    C. whereas Djalali has been denied adequate medical care despite the severe deterioration in his physical health and the risk to his life, including a recent heart attack at Evin prison; whereas Iran has continued to threaten to implement his death sentence;

    D. whereas hundreds of individuals have already been executed in 2025 and at least 972 were executed in 2024, a 14 % increase on 2023;

    E. whereas the Iranian Government refuses to recognise Djalali’s Swedish citizenship;

    F. whereas this case is part of a systematic pattern of unlawful detentions and hostage diplomacy by the Iranian regime;

    1. Calls on Iran to immediately release Dr Djalali along with all political prisoners currently being detained; calls on Iran to put a moratorium on executions and to abolish the death penalty;

    2. Strongly condemns Djalali’s sham trial and the Iranian authorities’ brutal treatment of him, amounting to torture and ill treatment, as he was subjected to months of interrogation in solitary confinement, and then sentenced to death;

    3. Urges Iran to provide Djalali, whose health is deteriorating, with immediate and unrestricted access to necessary specialised medical care at an external hospital; urges Iran, furthermore, to provide Djalali with legal representation and legal defence, and allow him regular contact with his family;

    4. Calls on the relevant Member States and the European External Action Service to intensify diplomatic efforts and adopt targeted measures in response to Iran’s continued detention of EU nationals, including Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and others, as part of its hostage diplomacy and in violation of international law;

    5. Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for taking EU nationals hostage and for mass executions of opposition voices and other human rights violations;

    6. Demands that Iran grant full access to UN human rights mechanisms, including the Special Rapporteur, and the EU’s full support and increase support for civil society organisations;

    7. Emphasises that EU-Iran engagements must be founded on tangible progress on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the release of all political prisoners;

    8. Asks the VP/HR to raise Djalali’s case publicly and in all engagements with her Iranian counterparts;

    9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government of Iran, the VP/HR, the Commission, the Member States and the United Nations.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia – A10-0110/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia

     

    (2025/2024(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0697),

     having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[1],

     having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,

     having regard to the final report of 20 December 2024 of the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 June 2024 on Georgia and of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0110/2025),

    A. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 and primarily relating to reforms in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights would be taken;

    B. whereas the situation in Georgia has deteriorated significantly since the publication of the 2024 Commission report on the country on 30 October 2024, particularly as a result of the actions of the Georgian Government;

    C. whereas Georgia has been experiencing democratic backsliding in recent years and in particular since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which failed to meet international democratic standards and comply with Georgia’s OSCE commitments, and resulted in an illegitimate parliament composed of only one political party, Georgian Dream; whereas Russia has systematically interfered in democratic processes in Georgia; whereas the fraudulent elections included voter intimidation, vote buying and harassment of election observers;

    D. whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations, which have the strong support of the Georgian people;

    E. whereas concerns over the direction in which the country is heading and the decision to pause the efforts to start accession negotiations sparked large-scale protests across the country, with protesters demanding new, free and fair elections, the return of the country to its European path, an end to political violence and repression, investigations into and accountability for the serious human rights violations committed against protesters by law enforcement agencies, and the release of political prisoners; whereas protests have been taking place every day without interruption since 28 November 2024; whereas pro-EU protests have significantly increased across Georgia in 2025, with tens of thousands of citizens demonstrating against the government’s perceived shift away from EU integration; whereas these self-organised and spontaneous protests involving all segments of Georgian society underscore the Georgian people’s strong commitment to European values and democratic governance;

    F. whereas in response to the peaceful protests, the Georgian authorities began an unprecedented violent crackdown on demonstrations, accompanied by the unlawful use of force, torture and other ill-treatment by the de facto authorities; whereas since November 2024, at least 62 people have been criminally charged in connection with their participation in pro-European protests and 54 remain in pre-trial detention; whereas more than 500 people have been detained under administrative procedures, some 300 of whom have reportedly been subjected to torture or other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and at least 157 of whom have suffered visible signs of serious physical injury;

     

    G. whereas the de facto Georgian Dream authorities systematically subject civil society and independent media to pressure, legal restrictions and physical violence; whereas at least 138 incidents of media freedom violations have been documented in the context of pro-European protests or related events since November 2024, and a total of 174 media professionals have been the target of state repression; whereas at least 30 reporters have suffered repeated violations, including physical assaults, damage to professional equipment, administrative fines, criminal charges and judicial harassment; whereas journalist Mzia Amaglobeli is currently in pre-trial detention on trumped-up charges;

     

    H. whereas the Georgian authorities have been restructuring or eliminating structures within the Georgian civil service responsible for pro-European reforms and dismissing professionals and civil servants en masse, in particular those who have criticised government policies, expressed pro-European views and condemned violence against peaceful demonstrators;

     

    I. whereas the illegitimate Georgian parliament has established the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission on the Activities of the Regime and Political Figures of 2003-2012, which was the period when President Mikheil Saakashvili was at the helm and paving the way for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions; whereas this commission is a tool for the further persecution of political opponents, especially leaders of opposition movements; whereas on 22 May 2025, Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze, the leader of the Girchi – More Freedom party and one of the leaders of the Coalition for Change, was arrested for refusing to appear before this politically motivated commission created and controlled by Georgian Dream, whose long-term ambition is to eradicate political opposition in Georgia; whereas on 29 May 2025, Nika Melia, another leader of the Coalition for Change, was arrested one day before he was due to appear in court for refusing to appear before the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission;

     

    J. whereas, in order to maintain and further increase its grip on power, the ruling Georgian Dream party has unilaterally and without consultation adopted changes to the municipal electoral system for the elections to the city councils in October 2025; whereas the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has recommended repealing these changes and the leaders of the main opposition parties have announced that their parties will not participate in those elections; whereas reforms to the formation process of the Central Election Commission further compromise election integrity, limit citizen participation and restrict the ability of observers and media to effectively monitor the electoral process;

     

    K. whereas despite progress towards a more equal and inclusive society, deep-rooted inequalities and stereotypes persist, resulting in high levels of gender-based violence, severe restrictions for persons with disabilities and violence and harassment against the LGBTI community; whereas due to insecurity at home, many LGBTI people choose to flee the country; whereas Georgia’s legal definition of rape does not comply with the standards set in the Istanbul Convention;

    Suspension of Georgia’s EU integration

    1. Reiterates its solidarity with the Georgian people and its unwavering support for their legitimate European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, as expressed in mass protests that continue despite brutal crackdowns by the authorities; remains ready to assist the Georgian people in achieving these goals; strongly condemns the violent repression, arbitrary and politically motivated detention without sufficient legal grounds and the reported systemic torture of peaceful protesters, civil society actors, political opponents and media representatives; demands that the Georgian authorities refrain from using force, respect the freedoms of assembly and of expression and annul the recently adopted draconian legislation aimed at stifling popular protests, notably through extortionate fines; expresses its particular concern regarding the growing number of political prisoners and reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all of them; calls for all acts of violence to be effectively and credibly investigated and for those responsible to be held accountable; expresses concern about the lack of independence within the judiciary, with high-placed judges with links to the Georgian Dream overseeing politically motivated court proceedings against peaceful protesters and government critics;

    2. Expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party failed to use the historic opportunity granted to Georgia, as a candidate country, to progress on its European integration path, noting that European integration continues to be supported by an overwhelming majority of the population; recalls that candidate status was granted to Georgia with the benefit of the doubt, despite the already concerning trajectory of the Georgian Dream government’s actions, which were increasingly at odds with European values and democratic principles; underlines that Georgia under Georgian Dream’s rule has not moved forward, and has in fact even regressed, on the key provisions of the nine steps indicated by the Commission, despite the authorities’ claims to the contrary; stresses that Georgia’s EU integration process has effectively been suspended as a result of the continued democratic backsliding in the country and the rigged October 2024 parliamentary elections amounting to a clear turning point towards an authoritarian regime, the ensuing illicit capture of the state institutions and democratic safeguards, and the adoption of a series of anti-democratic legislative acts that run counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action jeopardises Georgia’s EU path and urges the Georgian Dream to return to the course of democratic reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration;

    3. Deplores the dismissal of approximately 700 civil servants since December 2024 due to their participation in or support for pro-European protests; stresses that such retaliation erodes public trust in democratic institutions, violates freedom of expression and association, and contributes to the deepening authoritarian tendencies of the current regime; calls on the Georgian authorities to abide by labour law standards and to allow civil servants to register a trade union in order to protect them from the unjustified restriction of their labour rights; expresses its concern about the growing politicisation of civil service appointments, and calls for a repeal of the amendments to the Law on Public Service adopted in December 2024 that remove the competition rule for the appointment of civil servants and instead grant direct appointment powers to the heads of public institutions; reiterates that these amendments constitute worrying backsliding from the successful public service reform that was implemented by Georgia under the EU-Georgian Association Agreement and calls for their repeal; 4.  Stresses the need for an immediate and comprehensive audit of the EU’s policy towards Georgia given the ongoing democratic backsliding and the increasingly repressive political and legislative environment that constitutes a regression for many of Georgia’s democratic achievements and successful EU reforms, fundamentally weakens democratic institutions and further consolidates power in the hands of the ruling party; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to review the implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the blatant breach of Georgia’s obligations regarding the general principles laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms; reiterates that non-fulfilment of these obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and the privileges afforded by the Agreement;

    5. Deplores the fact that high-level ruling party officials, members of parliament and government-affiliated media regularly spread manipulative narratives, disinformation and conspiracy theories about the EU, its Member States, leaders and politicians, as well as European integration; stresses that the ruling party’s regime continues its purposefully deceitful and ambiguous discourse, fuelling the false belief among parts of the Georgian public that it remains in favour of European integration; regrets the fact that the media and information environment is being suppressed and dominated by TV and media outlets supported by Georgian Dream, which spread false narratives about EU integration, thereby emulating and playing into Russian-inspired propaganda and facilitating polarisation in society;

     

    6. Underlines the responsibility of Bidzina Ivanishvili and other officials and political leaders, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze, and the former Georgian Dream chair Irakli Garibashvili, for the deterioration of the political process in Georgia by enabling democratic backsliding resulting in the autocratic consolidation of power and by acting against the country’s constitutional objective of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls, therefore, for immediate and targeted personal sanctions to be imposed against Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family members and his companies and calls for the EU, in cooperation with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom, to freeze his financial assets; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on the imposition of sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia; condemns the unilateral actions by the Hungarian Government seeking to legitimise Georgian Dream;

     

    Continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law and the autocratic consolidation of power

     

    7. Reiterates its position that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections, which should be held in the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international and independent domestic observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process that would reflect the true will of the people;

    8. Stresses that it does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities established by the Georgian Dream party following the rigged parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 and that it considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; consequentially rejects any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country, such as the rushed adoption of amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations; regrets the fact that the parliament of Georgia is a one-party parliament formed on the basis of fraudulent elections, which is incompatible with a pluralistic parliamentary democracy and the standards expected from an EU candidate country; welcomes the rejection of Georgian Dream’s credentials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Georgian delegation;

    9. Deplores the continued attempts by the ruling Georgian Dream party to persecute political opponents, including through their illegal arrest and detention, threats and physical attacks; reiterates its calls for an end to politically motivated hostilities, an improvement to the political environment and the building of trust and cross-party dialogue;

     

    10. Condemns the unlawful prosecution of political opponents by the investigative committee of the de facto Georgian parliament under the leadership of the Georgian Dream party, which disproportionately targets the actions of the government that ended its mandate more than twelve years ago; highlights the political nature of the ‘investigation’, noting that the Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 but launched the investigative committee in parallel with its attempts to ban genuine opposition parties; notes with concern the statements by the chair of the investigative committee, Tea Tsulukiani, spreading Russian narratives; strongly condemns the arrest of Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze and Nika Melia, and the threats to arrest  other politicians, and considers these individuals to be political prisoners;

     

    11. Expresses deep concern over recent declarations by leaders of the ruling Georgian Dream party indicating their intention to declare opposition parties – primarily the United National Movement – unconstitutional; recalls that the United National Movement played a pivotal role in initiating and advancing Georgia’s European integration process; notes the parallels between the conduct of the Georgian Dream de facto authorities and the current Kremlin regime, which cemented its rule by outlawing opposition parties; condemns the draft amendment to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens and to the Law on the Constitutional Court adopted on 13 May 2025, which would empower the Constitutional Court to effectively and arbitrarily ban all opposition parties;

     

    12. Strongly reiterates its demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of seeking the necessary medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the Georgian authorities bear full responsibility for his health and well-being and must be held accountable for any harm that befalls him; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili;

     

    13. Underlines that the policy of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the one-party parliament and the president appointed by it should continue until there is a tangible change in the political course of Georgia and new free and fair parliamentary elections are held; calls for the EU’s and the Member States’ representatives and members of parliament to refrain from meetings with representatives of the regime, starting with the current de facto president; continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

     

    14. Points out that the upcoming municipal elections in autumn 2025 present yet another test for the resilience of Georgia’s democracy and political pluralism; calls on the opposition to seize the opportunity presented by these elections to reflect the unity of the Georgian people in favour of democracy and the rule of law, as already demonstrated in the peaceful protests against the manipulation of the parliamentary elections and repression; calls for the municipal elections to be held in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process;

     

    15. Is deeply concerned, in this context, by the further deterioration of the electoral system and the overall democratic environment ahead of the municipal elections, in particular the fast-tracked adoption of new amendments to Georgia’s Organic Law and to the Election Code in December 2024 that undermine the principle of equal suffrage and aim to solidify the ruling party’s dominance at all levels of governance; recalls that these amendments have been criticised by the Venice Commission and calls for them to be repealed; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consider imposing additional individual sanctions against Georgian officials if the upcoming municipal elections fail to meet the criteria for fair and free elections;

     

    16. Strongly condemns the continuing and deliberate destruction of the environment for Georgia’s vibrant civil society, with the adoption of several pieces of restrictive Russian-style legislation, including on the transparency of foreign influence, threats, and stigmatisation by the authorities; strongly denounces the new legislative initiative that requires the registration of all civil society organisation grants with the government and that obliges foreign donors to obtain executive approval to disburse grants to local organisations; regrets the recent decision by the authorities to freeze the bank accounts of crowdfunding initiatives and campaigns in support of political prisoners and their families; calls on the authorities to immediately cease the intimidation, threats, politically motivated prosecutions and physical assaults against civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists, journalists and media workers in Georgia; condemns the arbitrary and unjustified refusal of several European journalists’ entry to Georgia;

    17. Condemns the recent adoption, without due public consultation, of legislation that enables further political persecution, limits the right of assembly, and further shrinks the space for civil society, independent media and the opposition to operate freely, including the Russian-style foreign agent law, the amendments to the Law on Public Service, the amendments to the Law on Grants, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, as well as new restrictive amendments to the Broadcasting Law; calls for the Georgian authorities to repeal these legislative changes; stresses that Georgian Dream’s political conduct, including its strategic alignment with the Russian Federation and the accelerated adoption of tools characteristic of authoritarian regimes, mirrors such developments within Russia itself;

     

    18. Commends the work of Georgia’s civil society in the past months, providing free legal aid, documenting serious human rights violations and taking the lead on domestic and international litigation to seek justice and accountability against a background of continued attacks, the criminalisation of civic space, and disinformation campaigns against the work of civil society;

     

    19. Stresses the urgent need to support Georgia’s civil society and independent media in the light of the growing repression and the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore asks the Commission to increase financial support and disburse it without any further delay; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment and for funds to be reallocated to directly support civil society organisations, independent media and human rights defenders; stresses further, in this regard, that the Member States should be ready to receive and support Georgian civil society organisations and independent media outlets so that they can continue their work in exile;

     

    20. Stresses that beyond Georgian Dream’s rejection of Georgia’s EU integration, it rejects more generally international human rights law and democratic standards, while speedily moving along the negative trajectory previously witnessed in Russia; is deeply concerned, specifically, that this will have further trickle-down effects on the rights and well-being of women, minorities, migrants, persons with disabilities, LGBTI people, people living below the poverty line, and other vulnerable or at-risk groups; strongly condemns the adoption of anti-LGBTI legislation by the Georgian parliament in October 2024, which mirrors authoritarian, Russian-style policies and violates the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and calls for it to be repealed; calls for the reinstatement of gender quotas that were abolished by the parliament of Georgia in April 2024; calls on the EU Member States, when assessing asylum applications, to adequately take into account the fact that Georgia now has one of the most repressive anti-LGBTI laws in Europe; is concerned about the lack of protection of ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia;

     

    21. Reiterates that the measures taken by the EU so far in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments do not reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and its consequences across the region; regrets the lack of proactive measures taken and the generally limited and delayed reaction by the Council and the Commission; stresses that the absence of unanimity among the Member States should not prevent those willing to take appropriate and effective measures from doing so; calls on the EU’s leadership to urgently rally like-minded Member States to take coordinated action and thereby surmount the political obstacles to adopting EU-wide sanctions;

    22. Calls for the EU and its Member States to introduce, on a bilateral and coordinated basis, personal sanctions against key Georgian Dream political leaders, officials and the regime’s enablers in the administration, business, media, justice system, law enforcement agencies and the electoral commission who are responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists; further calls for sanctions to extend to mid- and lower-level public officials responsible for implementing repressive measures against the regime’s opponents and to maintain them until Georgian democracy is adequately restored; welcomes the imposition of bilateral sanctions by Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Czechia, Germany and Poland, as well as by like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ukraine, and invites other EU Member States to follow suit; calls for the consideration of further restrictive measures, such as SWIFT cut-off or sectoral sanctions, aimed at cutting off the financial flows and sources of income of the Georgian Dream regime;

     

    23. Welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials as a first step in response to the persistent negative developments in Georgia; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspending it if the relevant benchmarks and standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not met because of the ruling party’s actions; stresses that Georgian Dream is fully responsible for any consequences stemming from the possible suspension of the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens; stresses the importance of visa-free travel for Georgian civil society actors, human rights activists and journalists, among others, both for travelling to the EU to inform European actors of developments in Georgia, but also for enabling them to quickly leave the country, as many face political persecution by the authorities;

    Alignment on foreign policy matters

    24. Deplores the fact that Georgian Dream is undoing decades of progress towards democracy, the rule of law and Euro-Atlantic integration and is alienating its allies, which had supported it throughout the process; regrets that Georgia has made no progress on implementing the EU’s recommendations on foreign, security and defence policy and that the level of Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains remarkably low, at 49 %, demonstrating its lack of commitment to European integration; emphasises that progress in the EU accession process requires full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in line with the expectations for all candidate countries; regrets the fact that Georgia does not participate in the EU’s crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; regrets the fact that misalignment of Georgia’s foreign policy is leading to self-isolation and that Georgian Dream’s repressive regime is worsening the instability in the South Caucasus region and the Black Sea;

    25. Notes that Georgia, under the current government, is moving in a direction that puts it at risk of becoming a Russian vassal state like Belarus; regrets the fact that, at a time when the democratic world is standing in strong support of Ukraine against the Russian Federation’s unprovoked war of aggression, the current Georgian authorities are increasingly aligning themselves with Kremlin policies and rhetoric, thereby contributing to historical revisionism; notes that Georgia has not aligned with the vast majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran, but has claimed that it has cooperated with the EU to prevent sanctions circumvention; expresses its concern, however, over reports alleging Georgia’s role in facilitating the evasion of EU sanctions against Russia; calls, therefore, on the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation into such allegations;

     

    26. Notes also with concern the recent strategic turn by the Georgian Dream government towards China and its increasing cooperation with Iran; notes the Georgian Dream’s public support for Chinese geostrategic initiatives and strengthened bilateral economic relations, including the award of the Anaklia deep-sea port construction project to a Chinese-led consortium; emphasises that such a move contradicts Georgia’s stated commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration; underscores that the Anaklia project now risks becoming a vehicle for increasing Chinese political, financial and economic leverage in the region, thereby further distancing Georgia from its strategic partners in the West; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to review and, if necessary, suspend or redirect funding for regional connectivity projects; expresses serious concern about Georgia’s increased multifaceted cooperation with Teheran, which can lead to Georgia’s further isolation;

     

    27. Warns that Georgia’s ongoing turn towards authoritarianism and increasing alignment with Russia constitutes a growing threat to European security, particularly in view of Georgia’s strategic location and access to the Black Sea, which is critical to Russia projecting power in the region; underlines that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s strategy may be replicated elsewhere as a playbook for hybrid state capture; is concerned about regional repercussions and warns that the credibility of European action in the wider South Caucasus is at stake, especially in anticipation of the forthcoming EU Black Sea strategy;

     

    28. Is deeply concerned about Georgian Dream’s collaboration, rapprochement and ideological convergence with Russia and other authoritarian regimes, despite Russia’s creeping occupation of Georgia’s territory; denounces Georgian Dream’s promotion of and participation in Russian disinformation and manipulation, including the weaponisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine as a propaganda tool, which are at odds with the undiminished and extraordinarily high public support for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; regrets the lack of cooperation with the EU in the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

    29. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s ongoing occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the continued ‘borderisation’ process, which constitutes a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Georgian government to maintain a clear and consistent position on Russian aggression and calls for the EU to remain actively engaged in conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and support for affected communities;

    30. Recommends the reinforcement of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) with increased resources and a broader mandate to monitor foreign interference and border destabilisation; urges the Member States to ensure adequate funding and personnel for the EUMM to respond to the current political and security crisis;

    31. Notes that support from the European Peace Facility, worth EUR 30 million, was rightfully suspended in 2024 in response to the democratic backsliding in Georgia and that no support is planned for 2025; highlights that this suspension will have detrimental consequences on the national stability and security of Georgia; reiterates that any future financial support can only be authorised with the stipulation that the self-declared Georgian regime step down and fair and impartial elections be held;

     

    °

    ° °

    32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part – A10-0111/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part

    (10724/22 – C10‑0057/2024 – 2022/0184M(NLE))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (10724/22),

     having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council on 27 June 2024 in accordance with Articles 207 and 209, in conjunction with Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0057/2024),

     having regard to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part[1] (EPCA),

     having regard to the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia of 23 October 2023,

     having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 May 2019 entitled ‘The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership’ (JOIN(2019)0009),

     having regard to the Commission’s assessment reports on the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) with Kyrgyzstan,

     having regard to the first EU-Central Asia summit on 4 April 2025,

     having regard to the 11th High-Level Political and Security Dialogue between the European Union and the countries of Central Asia, held in Brussels on 5 June 2024,

     having regard to the joint press statement of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Sadyr Zhaparov, and the then President of the European Council, Charles Michel, published on 3 June 2023,

     having regard to the 14th Human Rights Dialogue, held in Bishkek on 25 June 2024,

     having regard to the 19th meeting of the EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council, held in Brussels on 15 November 2022,

     having regard to the opinions of the Venice Commission on recent legal amendments abridging the freedom of the press and hampering the work of non-governmental organisations in Kyrgyzstan,

     having regard to reports on Kyrgyzstan published by human rights organisations, such as the 2022, 2023 and 2024 annual world reports by Human Rights Watch,

     

     having regard to the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) briefing on the protection of fundamental freedoms and civic space in Kyrgyzstan, published in February 2025,

     having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the EU strategy on Central Asia[2],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Kyrgyzstan, notably that of 19 December 2024 on the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov[3],

     having regard to the visit of the delegation of its Subcommittee on Human Rights to Kyrgyzstan from 25 to27 February 2025,

     having regard to the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, following his official visit to Kyrgyzstan from 19 to 20 March 2025,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

     having regard to its legislative resolution of […] on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part,

     having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0111/2025),

    A. whereas Kyrgyzstan occupies an important position in Central Asia, a region of increasing geopolitical significance that the EU has recognised as a key partner with which it engaged in structured dialogue at the first EU-Central Asia summit;

    B. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have been partners since the country gained independence in 1991, and have established a comprehensive legal framework for their cooperation through the EU-Kyrgyzstan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1999;

    C. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have recently agreed to deepen their partnership by signing an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), which represents a modern and ambitious framework for strengthening dialogue and cooperation in key areas such as trade and investment, sustainable development and connectivity, research and innovation, education, the environment and climate change, as well as the rule of law, human rights and civil society;

     

    D. whereas the EPCA could also facilitate stronger cooperation on foreign and security policy, including conflict prevention and crisis management, risk reduction, cybersecurity, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and arms export control;

     

    E. whereas the EPCA, which enhances the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, was signed on 25 June 2024; whereas the EPCA requires Parliament’s consent for it to enter into force;

    F. whereas Kyrgyzstan has benefited from unilateral and preferential access to the EU market through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) since 2016; whereas Kyrgyzstan has acceded to 27 international conventions related to labour and human rights, environmental and climate protection, and good governance in order to be able to benefit from this scheme;

     

    G. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 98 million to support governance and digital transformation, human development and a green and climate-resilient economy in Kyrgyzstan over the 2021-2027 period, aligning with the National Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic;

     

    H. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 12 million to enhance the quality of legislation and increase the efficiency, independence, professionalism and capacities of the judiciary and services of the justice sector in Kyrgyzstan, thereby signalling its willingness to invest in stable growth that is consistent with the rule of law; whereas concerns over the independence of the judiciary persist, with politically motivated cases that target individuals critical of the government; whereas the 2021 reform of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic has reintroduced the heavily criticised 1997 version of the Code, which gives greater power to law enforcement while reducing citizens’ rights;

     

    I. whereas the EPCA stipulates that the EU and Kyrgyzstan shall cooperate to strengthen civil society and its role in the economic, social and political development of an open democratic society;

     

    J. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 100th in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, and has been classified as a country with ‘no impact’ of terrorism;

     

    K. whereas, despite the Government of Kyrgyzstan repeatedly expressing its commitment to the principles of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law, human rights organisations have called attention to democratic backsliding and hardening authoritarian practices and persecution of civil society organisations in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, including during the negotiation of the EPCA and since its signing, with Transparency International and Freedom House finding that Kyrgyzstan has turned from a bastion of democracy with a vibrant civil society to a consolidated authoritarian regime that uses its justice system to target critics and whose authorities further undermine the balance of power and the system of checks and balances;

    L. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 146 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index; whereas, at President Japarov’s initiative, the law on public procurement was amended to allow state-owned enterprises to circumvent tendering procedures; whereas there is no proper oversight of public spending due to a lack of access to such information; whereas state funds and national resources are used by the ruling elites to consolidate their power, silence dissent and resist reform;

     

    M. whereas human rights defender, investigative journalist and founder of the Temirov Live media outlet, Bolot Temirov, has been stripped of his Kyrgyz citizenship and forced to leave the country in retaliation for his work investigating widespread corruption; whereas at least 11 of his colleagues were arrested in January 2024, including Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov;

     

    N. whereas in March 2025, independent journalist and activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova was arrested and remains in detention in retaliation for her social media posts critical of the government;

     

    O. whereas Kyrgyz Government propaganda has used false narratives to discredit independent media in the eyes of society and to portray them as ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘slaves of the West’;

     

    P. whereas in recent years, democratic standards and human rights have deteriorated alarmingly in Kyrgyzstan; whereas Kyrgyzstan has fallen from 72nd to 144th place in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; whereas it ranks as the country that has had the sharpest decline in press freedom leading up to 2025;

     

    Q. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities seek to shut down Aprel TV; whereas, as stated by the Committee to Protect Journalists, the prosecutors’ filing indicates that the authorities seek to shut down the media outlet on the basis of allegations that the outlet’s critical reporting portrays the authorities ‘in an unfavourable light’ and ‘undermines the authority of the government’;

     

    R. whereas Parliament expressed its concern about the persecution of opposition parties and independent media in its resolutions of 13 July 2023[4] and of 19 December 2024; whereas the persecution of members of the Social Democrats party (SDK) persists, despite repeated calls to ensure free and fair elections; whereas the leader of the SDK, Temirlan Sultanbekov, and two other members, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever, remain in detention; whereas there is cause for concern about Temirlan Sultanbekov’s medical condition following his prolonged hunger strike;

    S. whereas the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, adopted by the Kyrgyz Parliament in March 2024, which requires non-profits that receive funding from abroad and engage in broadly defined political activity to register as ‘foreign representatives’, discriminates against and stigmatises journalists, human rights activists and other non-profit workers and subjects them to intrusive oversight, burdensome reporting requirements and excessive fines; whereas this law mimics repressive legislation in other authoritarian regimes and can be considered a precursor to further attempts to suppress independent civil society and media;

    T. whereas the crackdown on human rights has targeted LGBTIQ+ people in particular; whereas Kyrgyzstan’s new legislative landscape, along with the broader political shift and repression, has effectively decimated the work of LGBTIQ+ rights organisations and activists, with key organisations completely shut down; whereas on 14 August 2023, Kyrgyzstan enacted discriminatory provisions against the LGBTIQ+ community under the pretext of protecting minors from ‘harmful information’; whereas the anti-discrimination bill recently considered by the Kyrgyzstan Supreme Council failed to include sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories;

     

    U. whereas the law adopted on 6 October 2023 giving the President of Kyrgyzstan the power to overturn rulings of the Constitutional Court if they conflict with his own interpretation of ‘moral values’ fundamentally weakens the separation of powers – a foundational element of the rule of law – and constitutes a hollowing out of judicial independence in Kyrgyzstan;

    V. whereas Kyrgyzstan is increasingly investing in the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment, particularly through key national frameworks such as the National Strategy on Gender Equality until 2030; whereas Kyrgyzstan still faces high rates of domestic violence, over 20 % of marriages in Kyrgyzstan occur through ‘ala kachuu’ (bride kidnapping) and women hold only 22 % of parliamentary seats despite existing gender quotas; whereas, on average, women earn 25 % less than men, as they are predominantly employed in low-paying sectors such as education, healthcare and social services;

     

    W. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have engaged in actions that limit freedom of speech in the country and have arrested, put in long pre-trial detention or imprisoned journalists, bloggers, poets and regular social media users for criticising the country’s leadership or the situation in the country, and have also closed down an award-winning investigative media outlet;

     

    X. whereas Kyrgyzstan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2014; whereas tentative steps have been taken towards improving accessibility for persons with disabilities and introducing the concept of inclusive education, though challenges remain, in particular concerning the institutionalisation of persons with disabilities;

     

    Y. whereas the law on ‘false information’, enacted on 24 August 2021, has been used to target independent media and individuals critical of the government; whereas on 10 April 2025, the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan approved amendments to the law that provide for administrative sanctions for the dissemination of ‘false information’ on social media;

     

    Z. whereas the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan is currently considering the re-criminalisation of the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, which has previously been misused against peaceful religious practitioners, and which, on account of the bill’s vague wording, could be used to silence legitimate political speech;

     

    AA. whereas two new laws on freedom of religion came into force on 1 January 2025; whereas these laws maintain the ban on all unregistered exercise of freedom of religion or belief and make it impossible for communities with fewer than 500 adult members to gain legal status;

     

    AB. whereas the negligence of the Kyrgyz law enforcement authorities in response to a campaign of intimidation and harassment has forced journalists and human rights workers to flee the country;

     

    AC. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have silenced, arrested, detained and extradited refugees fleeing Russia for protesting against the war in Ukraine, contravening Kyrgyzstan’s obligation under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees not to return people to countries where their life or freedom is under threat on account of their political views, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to serious human rights violations such as torture or other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;

     

    AD. whereas the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a border demarcation agreement on 13 March 2025, which legally recognises the borders between the two countries and allows for the development of interstate roads and energy infrastructure, contributing to regional stability and opportunities for enhanced cross-border cooperation on energy, transport and trade; whereas the border agreement itself has not been made public or open to public consultations;

    AE. whereas the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship on 31 March 2025;

     

    AF. whereas the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, has drawn attention to the concerning signs of democratic backsliding in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, with particular emphasis on the increasing restrictions on civil society and independent journalism;

     

    AG. whereas Central Asia has yet to create horizontal regional frameworks free from the dominance of external actors pursuing their own geopolitical gains;

     

    AH. whereas Kyrgyzstan has historically close and intertwined relations with Russia, with both being members of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States; whereas in October 2023, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bishkek during Putin’s first foreign trip since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him; whereas Kyrgyzstan, along with other Central Asian countries, has become a transit point for circumventing sanctions imposed on Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas exports of advanced technology and dual-use items to Kyrgyzstan – which are then exported to Russia – have significantly increased; whereas Kyrgyzstan has either abstained from voting or sided with Russia on votes on numerous UN resolutions on human rights and, in particular, on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

     

    AI. whereas OJSC Keremet Bank, based in Kyrgyzstan, was involved in a sanctions evasion scheme with Russian state-owned defence bank Promsvyazbank Public Joint-Stock Company (PSB), where it facilitated cross-border transfers on behalf of PSB; whereas in 2024, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance sold a controlling stake in Keremet Bank to a Russian oligarch with ties to the Russian Government; whereas the United States has imposed sanctions on Keremet Bank;

     

    EU-Kyrgyzstan EPCA

    1. Despite the shared interests in strengthening the EU-Kyrgyzstan important political and trade relations, is concerned by the deteriorating situation of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the context of the completion of negotiations and the signing of the EPCA; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities, in this context, to respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular media freedom and freedom of expression, and to foster an environment of cooperation and involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; underlines the importance of Parliament’s close involvement in monitoring the implementation of all parts of the EPCA; calls for an effective evaluation by both parties to the agreement, to be conducted within three years, of the implementation of its essential elements, with clear human rights benchmarks and time frames; calls on the Commission to present to Parliament the outcome of such evaluations; expects that, given the recent backsliding on these fronts and ahead of the EPCA vote in the European Parliament and its subsequent implementation, the Kyrgyz Government will take some concrete steps towards addressing the pressing concerns outlined in this report, such as releasing political prisoners and repealing recently adopted repressive legislation; considers that a negative assessment of the implementation of these essential elements could lead to Article 316 of the EPCA being triggered;

    EU-Kyrgyzstan relations

    2. Welcomes the long-standing and strategic relations between the EU and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the increasing cooperation and exchanges; recalls that Kyrgyzstan is the EU’s third-largest trading partner in Central Asia; reiterates its commitment to work together with the country and with its partners in Central Asia to ensure peace, security, stability, prosperity, democracy and sustainable development;

    3. Welcomes the outcomes of the first EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand on 4 April 2025; welcomes their commitment to regional and global stability, to the promotion and protection of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to addressing climate action, connectivity and education; notes also the 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting held in Ashgabat on 27 March 2025;

     

    4. Highlights the need for cooperation in promoting green initiatives based on a sustainable market economy, private sector innovation, and long-term environmental stewardship, early warning systems for natural disasters, low-carbon development and the transition to renewable energy sources; highlights Kyrgyzstan’s initiatives to promote the mountain agenda on global platforms, including the preservation of mountain ecosystems, the protection of the environment  and the development of sustainable tourism and mountain communities; stresses that investments in Kyrgyzstan’s green energy goals would significantly contribute to reducing the country’s regional energy dependence and to tackling environmental challenges; commends the Kyrgyz Republic’s involvement in the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy and Climate Change;

    5. Supports Kyrgyzstan’s efforts towards sustainable development, aligning its initiatives with the country’s National Development strategy for 2018-2040, alongside the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and the EU strategy for Central Asia; recalls that the EU-Kyrgyzpartnership prioritises governance and digital transformation in order to enhance transparency and efficiency in public administration;

     

    6. Welcomes Team Europe initiatives seeking to build a green and climate-resilient economy in order to address environmental challenges and promote sustainable growth; highlights the recent signing of the agreement between the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which will strengthen the Kyrgyz Climate-Resilient Water Services Programme;

     

    7. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to continue promoting joint cooperation initiatives in strategic areas such as energy infrastructure, in particular the hydropower sector, sustainable development and culture, while also building on the positive experiences of the Member States already active in the region;

     

    8. Highlights the importance of enhancing cooperation on critical raw materials, which have been identified as strategically important for ensuring secure, sustainable and diversified supply chains; takes note of the endorsement of the EU-Central Asia Joint Declaration of Intent on Critical Raw Materials at the first EU-Central Asia summit, and of Kyrgyzstan’s proposal to establish a partnership with the EU for the development of critical raw materials;

     

    9. Notes that the Erasmus+ programme has been instrumental in facilitating academic exchanges; welcomes the EU’s support for digitalisation and education in the country, and calls for the creation of a programme for the exchange of entrepreneurs in the field of digital transformation and the green transition; stresses the importance of fostering convergence and coordinated reforms in higher education, such as by aligning the Kyrgyz National Qualifications Framework with the European Qualifications Framework; highlights the need to foster academic and cultural exchanges between Kyrgyzstan and the EU Member States and the active involvement of Kyrgyz young people in non-formal education and civil society programmes; underlines the importance of strengthening academic and vocational exchanges, building on the 2024 education agreement;

     

    10. Welcomes the EU’s increased support for young people, gender equality and human rights in Kyrgyzstan, with the aim of empowering youth and women’s organisations, strengthening the country’s Ombudsman’s Office and enhancing the capabilities of its National Centre for the Prevention of Torture; expresses serious concern about attempts to dissolve the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture;

     

    11. Recalls that the EU has already allocated EUR 12 million to support the reform of Kyrgyzstan’s judicial system, confirming the EU’s commitment to the country’s institutional development; stresses the importance of continuing to invest in institution building, transparency and the independence of the judiciary;

     

    12. Expresses its concern, in view of the widespread corruption in Kyrgyzstan, about the transparent and efficient use of the EUR 98 million in EU assistance for the 2021-2027 period; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to publish detailed reports on the use of EU funds and to strengthen cooperation with international anti-fraud bodies, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), in order to uphold global fund management standards and implement robust anti-fraud measures that protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission and other relevant EU institutions to ensure the highest possible level of oversight of the use of EU funds and to consider allocating additional resources to strengthen the financial and operational capacity of Kyrgyz agencies involved in their management;

     

    13. Stresses the importance of enhanced information exchange on terrorist threats, full compliance with international counterterrorism financing standards and the implementation of robust measures to prevent the acquisition, transfer and use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials for terrorist purposes;

     

    14. Underlines the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, facilitating cooperation between competent agencies and bringing national laws in line with international transparency standards in order to investigate financial crimes and promote good corporate governance; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in eradicating corruption and not to use the fight against it as an excuse for cracking down on civil society and government critics;

     

    15. Calls on the Kyrgyz Republic to review its technical regulations and strengthen collaboration on standards, metrology, market surveillance, accreditation and conformity assessment procedures to facilitate mutual market access, deepen bilateral trade with the EU and ensure fair treatment of investors; urges Kyrgyzstan to avoid restrictive measures that could disadvantage EU investors;

     

    Regional cooperation and global challenges

    16. Considers Central Asia to be a region of strategic interest for the EU in terms of security, connectivity, energy diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral, rules-based international order, especially in a historical moment marked by profound geopolitical change; encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia on political, economic and security matters in line with the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law that underpin EU external action; highlights that any further EU cooperation with Central Asian countries cannot be achieved at the expense of these values; emphasises the need for increased dialogue and collaboration on foreign and security policy issues, including cybersecurity, regional stability, crisis management, disarmament and arms control, in line with the principles of international law and the UN Charter;

    17. Underlines that the EU and Central Asia are facing profound global and regional geopolitical shifts and challenges; stresses, in this regard, the need to work towards long-term, structured and mutually beneficial cooperation on matters of common interest; strongly encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia, given the region’s geostrategic importance, and to promote a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries by expanding cooperation at political and economic level; welcomes the increased high-level contact between the EU and Central Asia;

    18. Highlights the growing momentous challenges to multilateralism and a rules-based order for both the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic, such as Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, with concern, the neutral stance of Kyrgyzstan and other countries in the region towards the conflict, and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold international norms and contribute to regional efforts to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity; notes Russia’s influence in the region despite efforts by Central Asian countries to diversify their foreign relations; regrets that Kyrgyzstan has not condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine;

    19. Deplores the active role of Kyrgyz companies and banks, such as Keremet Bank, in helping Russia to evade sanctions and obtain technology and dual-use goods for its war effort against Ukraine; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to take further measures to stop the transit of sanctioned goods to Russia through Kyrgyz territory, such as enforcing stricter licensing requirements and conducting due diligence on companies involved in the trade of dual-use goods; highlights that failure to address the export of dual-use technologies could lead to secondary sanctions; calls on the Commission to assess the current level of sanctions evasion by Russia with the help of actors in Central Asian countries, and to propose concrete solutions for addressing this; recommends the establishment of a working group focused on monitoring and tracking the trade of dual-use goods;

     

    20. Regrets that, despite its stated commitment to respect democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as agreed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, Kyrgyzstan does not align its positions with those of democratic countries, in particular the EU Member States, when voting at the UN General Assembly;

     

    21. Deplores the fact that the Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity was granted observer status by the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and was present at the OTS summit in Bishkek; reiterates that, as part of the Joint Declaration following the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, the Central Asian states, including the Kyrgyz Republic, are committed to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions – 541 (1983) and 550 (1984);

     

    22. Recognises the need to strengthen relations to foster deeper, closer and values-based cooperation in facing common threats and achieving shared goals worldwide;

    23. Welcomes initiatives aimed at strengthening the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and takes note of the Coordination Platform for the Corridor;

    24. Highlights the EU’s role as an important donor of aid to the region; stresses the need to increase the EU’s efforts in its support for development cooperation in Central Asia, in particular in Kyrgyzstan under the newly signed EPCA;

     

    25. Welcomes the border agreement reached between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and its recent ratification; urges both parties to take the necessary steps to implement the agreement, including by triggering consultations with the local populations, and to adopt measures to strengthen cross-border cooperation and support the border communities that have been hit hardest by the recent cross-border conflict; welcomes the EU’s financial support for the construction of facilities in the Sughd region of Tajikistan, which borders Kyrgyzstan; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to investigate the serious crimes, documented by independent observers, that took place during the September 2022 armed conflict and to hold those responsible to account;

    26. Welcomes the first trilateral summit bringing together Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan without mediation by external actors; welcomes Central Asian aspirations to strengthen their regional ties and set up a horizontal cooperation architecture in the region without the assertive involvement of external powers;

     

    Human rights, democracy and the rule of law

    27. Stresses that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law strengthens stability, sustainable development and security, as they establish legal certainty, predictability and strong institutions; recalls that strong democratic legal frameworks and institutions foster innovation, trade, investments and economic expansion, while ensuring inclusive development and equal access to social and economic rights, and reducing social inequalities, and are indispensable in building resilient societies capable of resisting authoritarian influence and external destabilisation;

    28. Encourages Kyrgyzstan to enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that includes sexual orientation, gender, disability and ethnicity as protected categories; stresses that the protection of minorities in Kyrgyzstan requires a multifaceted strategy that addresses the root causes of discrimination, including existing obstacles in accessing justice;

     

    29. Welcomes the legislative acts to enhance protection against domestic, sexual and gender-based violence; calls on the Kyrgyz Government to ensure that the law is consistently enforced and perpetrators are formally charged with the relevant crimes, and to maintain efforts towards eliminating gender-based and domestic violence;

     

    30. Is concerned about the entry into force of new legislation restricting freedom of religion or belief in Kyrgyzstan, as it increases state surveillance and control over religious groups by creating a state registry for religious entities and buildings, introduces fines for wearing certain religious attire, such as the niqab, in state institutions and public places, and increases oversight of religious education; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure freedom of religion or belief is protected in the country, in line with international human rights standards and commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

     

    31. Encourages the Kyrgyz Government to develop a national action plan for human rights with the involvement of civil society, in line with the recommendations made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

     

    32. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to unconditionally release all wrongfully imprisoned or detained journalists, bloggers and activists, including Kanyshai Mamyrkulova and those affiliated with Temirov Live, such as Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, and Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov, and to drop all charges against them, as well as to restore Bolot Temirov’s citizenship and refrain from other unlawful practices; condemns the sentencing in October 2024 of journalists Azamat Ishenbekov and Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, from the Temirov Live platform known for its investigations into corruption, to five and six years in prison respectively; highlights the opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recognising the detention of Temirov Live’s journalists as arbitrary; welcomes the pardoning of journalist and Temirov Live employee Azamat Ishenbekov, and of activist Zarina Torokulova, who were convicted on charges of ‘inciting mass unrest’;

    33. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to ensure adherence to the principles of free and fair elections by safeguarding the rights to contest and campaign, while maintaining administrative neutrality towards all political parties throughout the current election cycle, in line with international standards; strongly condemns the Kyrgyz Government’s campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, particularly the SDK, which was removed by the Kyrgyz authorities from the November 2024 local elections in Bishkek; notes that discussions on electoral reform have taken place in the Kyrgyz Parliament;

     

     

    34. Strongly deplores the detention of Temirlan Sultanbekov, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever on 13 November 2024, and calls on the Kyrgyz Government to urgently end their politically motivated prosecution by dropping all restrictions imposed on their respective sentences; condemns the fact that the proceedings against them have been marred by dubious practices, a lack of legal protections since the start and the violation of their right to due process; recalls that an audio recording of unknown origin, serving as the primary evidence and lacking judicial authorisation, is what initiated the investigation; laments that their trials have been held in a closed-door format without any audio or video recordings; denounces the fact that the conditions for their release on probation are disproportionate and violate their right to participate in public affairs;

    35. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from pursuing politically motivated prosecutions or exerting undue pressure on political opposition and dissenting voices, such as the SDK; emphasises that political pluralism is a necessary component of any modern democracy and must be respected to maintain long-term legitimacy and stability;

     

    36. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure the right to peaceful assembly by lifting the ban on protests in Bishkek city centre, which was initiated in response to a request from the Russian embassy to end anti-war protests outside its premises in 2022;

     

    37. Welcomes the acquittal of Klara Sooronkulova, Gulnara Dzhurabayeva, Asya Sasykbayeva and other members of the Committee for the Protection of the Kempir-Abad Water Reservoir; urges the Kyrgyz Government to drop its appeal of the decision of the court of first instance, and bring the politically motivated prosecution to an end;

    38. Strongly condemns, and urges the Kyrgyz authorities to end, the recent crackdown on civil society and to foster an environment of cooperation, with the involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; deplores, in particular, the politically motivated detention of human rights activist Rita Karasartova, and calls for her urgent release; deplores further the seizure of the house of imprisoned human rights activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova; expresses its admiration for Kyrgyz civil society and independent media which, despite the persecution and at great personal risk, remains one of the most vibrant civil societies in Central Asia;

     

    39. Calls on the EU Member States and the EU institutions to support Kyrgyz civil society organisations, human rights defenders and lawyers, LGBTIQ+ and environmental activists, independent media and bloggers, to express their grave concern over the deterioration of human rights in the country in all their exchanges with the authorities of Kyrgyzstan, and to reassess the country’s GSP+ benefits and adopt appropriate measures, including sanctions under the EU’s global human rights sanctions regime (‘EU Magnitsky Act’) as a last resort, if Kyrgyzstan continues to disregard its commitments to international conventions;

     

    40. Deplores several recent cases of individuals critical of the Kyrgyz Government living outside of Kyrgyzstan facing the threat of extradition to Kyrgyzstan, where they risk politically motivated arrest, imprisonment and torture in retaliation for their criticism; denounces the case of exiled activist Tilekmat Kurenov who was recently extradited from the United Arab Emirates to Kyrgyzstan, where he had previously been subjected to politically motivated imprisonment, torture and threats because of his activism;

     

    41. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to revoke the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, which severely impairs the ability of civil society to carry out legitimate public interest work and operate without undue interference and harassment while ensuring a safe working environment, and which contradicts Kyrgyzstan’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its commitments as an EU partner under the EPCA; urges the Commission to ensure that the EU’s programmes and initiatives are not compromised by the proposed laws, which may limit freedom of expression and curtail the activities of non-governmental organisations;

    42. Urges Kyrgyzstan to respect and protect media freedom and pluralism, which are fundamental conditions for democracy, refraining from forcibly closing independent media outlets, as in the case of Kloop, or levelling unsubstantiated allegations against them due to their investigative and critical reporting; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to allow independent media professionals to carry out their work, to guarantee journalists and reporters will not face retaliatory persecution for their professional activities, including investigative journalism, and to provide adequate protection to reporters that might be harassed for their reporting; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to ensure the continued operation of the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty service;

    43. Calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan to conduct active public diplomacy and address false narratives spread by the Kyrgyz authorities, in particular those that misrepresent EU values and policies with the aim of discrediting independent media and civil society; urges EU and Member State diplomats in Kyrgyzstan to attend politically motivated trials and to provide support to the unjustly persecuted individuals and their families;

     

    44. Condemns the Kyrgyz authorities’ attempts to shut down Aprel TV by revoking its broadcasting license and terminating its social media operations on the basis of an investigation by Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security; laments these actions in a context of shuttering media outlets on illegitimate grounds;

     

    45. Expresses concern about the re-criminalisation of libel and insult laws and calls on the Kyrgyz Government not to abuse these provisions to target journalists and legitimate political opposition; invites the authorities to review this legislation in accordance with the Venice Commission’s recommendations;

     

    46. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to revoke the law on ‘false information’ and the law prohibiting ‘LGBT propaganda’, which contravene Kyrgyzstan’s obligations under international law and have been systematically used to silence critical voices, including journalists and civil society actors; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure that the mass media law is fully in line with international standards and does not result in violations of the freedoms of media or expression;

    47. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to protect journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and activists from intimidation and harassment, including those facing death threats and other threats to their safety while in prison, and calls on the EU Delegation to closely monitor such threats and report regularly on the situation of at-risk individuals; deplores the government raids, blocking of news sites and prosecution of journalists and bloggers; condemns the court’s closure of the organisation behind the Kloop investigative platform over its alleged ‘negative’ coverage; regrets President Japarov’s call for the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to be shut down, accusing the Kyrgyz service of spreading misinformation;

    48. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from criminalising the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, as human rights watchdogs have warned that this could lead to the further deterioration of freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan, given the potential for abuse of the law, and to maintain clear legal safeguards to prevent the misuse of laws that penalise public incitements of extremist activity; urges Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Council to uphold the right to freedom of expression and recalls that countering ‘false information’ cannot lead to a crackdown on independent media, the opposition and others critical of the government;

    49. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to strengthen the rule of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in line with international standards, to establish processes to measure judicial performance, improve public oversight and increase transparency within the judiciary, and to enhance the engagement of the judiciary with civil society and other branches of government; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in guaranteeing equal access to justice, the right to a fair trial and the fulfilment of the right to due process;

     

    50. Is concerned by the high number of pre-trial detention cases, which has been highlighted by the Kyrgyz Ombudsperson Dzhamilia Dzhamanbaeva, and echoes the Ombudsperson’s call on Kyrgyz law enforcement and judiciary bodies to adhere to international standards, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures;

     

    51. Notes the penitentiary system reforms carried out in recent years, mainly comprising the development of probation, the digitalisation of different processes and the introduction of alternative preventive measures; regrets, however, cases of mistreatment of prisoners and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to take all necessary steps to ensure that prisoners do not experience inhuman or degrading treatment or conditions, and receive adequate healthcare in safe and secure conditions;

     

    52. Underlines the need to develop new legislation in the field of administrative law and justice, including the reform of public administration and alternative dispute resolution, and to strengthen the professional capacities of public administration and judiciary representatives, which could be partly achieved by adopting e-governance systems;

     

    53. Asks the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold the independence of the legal profession and ensure that lawyers are not subjected to interference or harassment as a result of fulfilling their professional duties, including the defence of their clients in politically sensitive cases;

     

    54. Commends Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the Central Asia Rule of Law Programme, which supported national efforts to prevent and fight corruption and money laundering, and raised awareness about human rights standards among legal professionals, among other matters;

     

    55. Notes the return of the controversial Land Code to the Kyrgyz Parliament by President Japarov, following public protests against it;

     

    °

    ° °

    56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Kyrgyz Republic.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina – A10-0108/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina

    (2025/2018(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (the Dayton Peace Agreement),

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 June 2015,

     having regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for EU membership, submitted on 15 February 2016,

     having regard to the Commission opinion of 29 May 2019 on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2019)0261),

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 15 December 2022 granting EU candidate country status to Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024 on opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 6 May 2020, 13 December 2023 and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

     having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2021/1923 of 4 November 2021 on an Assistance Measure under the European Peace Facility to support capacity building for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina[4],

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2022/2353 of 1 December 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to strengthen the capacities of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina[5],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 entitled ‘Report on progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina – March 2024’ (COM(2024)0129),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0691),

     having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the Economic Reform Programme of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the fifth EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Council of 19 July 2023 and the seventh EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Committee meeting of 19 September 2024,

     having regard to the outcomes of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth meetings of the EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 30 and 31 October 2023, 13 and 14 March 2024, 30 October 2024 and 12 and 13 March 2025 respectively,

     having regard to the expert report of 5 December 2019 on rule of law issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the European Council’s political agreement of 12 June 2022 on a on principles for ensuring a functional Bosnia and Herzegovina that advances on the European path,

     having regard to the 63rd, 64th, 65th and 66th reports of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the UN of 9 May 2023, 2 November 2023, 15 May 2024, 1 November 2024 respectively,

     having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2757 (2024) of 1 November 2024, which extends the mandate of the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) until 2 November 2025,

     having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 78/282 of 23 May 2024, designating 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), ratified by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 March 1992, and to its three Optional Protocols, namely: the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, ratified on 10 October 2003; the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, ratified on 4 September 2001, and the Optional Protocol on a Communications Procedure, ratified on 19 October 2018,

     having regard to the UNESCO resolutions on the right of education in the mother tongue, the UNESCO Convention of 17 October 2003 for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, as well as the UNESCO Convention of 20 October 2005 on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,

     having regard to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the amended Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina imposed by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 March 2024,

     having regard to the visits of the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas and of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to Bosnia and Herzegovina in March and April 2025,

     having regard to the statement of the President of the European Council António Costa to the political leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2025,

     having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement[6],

     having regard to its report of 17 January 2024 on the ‘Role of preventive diplomacy in tackling frozen conflicts around the world – missed opportunity or change for the future?’[7],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0108/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is one of the EU’s most effective foreign policy instruments and a geostrategic investment in peace, democracy, stability, security and prosperity on the European continent, and remains of crucial importance, particularly in the context of rapid major geopolitical shifts and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

    B. whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental EU values, human rights, minority rights and media freedoms;

    C. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be largest trade and investment partner of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), accounting for the majority of its foreign trade flows and playing a central role in its economic integration process;

    D. whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina is a candidate country and the clear majority of its citizens aspires to Euro-Atlantic integration for sustainable peace, democracy and prosperity; whereas 2025 marks the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which continues to form the foundation of BiH’s institutional set-up and that was intended as a safeguard for the equality of its three constituent peoples;

    E. whereas public support remains fragile owing to anti-EU narratives promoted by illiberal actors from the region and beyond;

    F. whereas the Dayton Peace Agreement despite its shortcomings, has fostered peace and the subsequent stabilisation in BiH by creating the key institutions that enabled the country to progress along the path of EU and NATO integration;

    G. whereas 30 years after the end of the war, BiH remains dysfunctional and finds itself again in a deep political and security crisis, with attempts at secession, and a high degree of corruption;

    H. whereas the EU strongly supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and will not accept any attempts to undermine it; whereas the Strategic Compass stated that as a matter of security and stability it is of a particular interest to support the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of BiH;

    I. whereas the President of the Republika Srpska (RS) entity, Milorad Dodik, and politicians from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) have initiated unconstitutional actions to nullify state laws within the RS entity and attacked the key institutions of the state, namely the Office of the High Representative, the BiH Constitutional Court, and the judiciary; whereas the authorities of the RS entity participated in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’; whereas a process of forming a new pro-EU majority has been initiated;

    J. whereas EUFOR Althea is an EU CSDP mission helping BiH to maintain a stable and secure environment in the country and is supporting the armed forces’ efforts to align with NATO standards, while serving as a deterrent against any foreign threats;

    K. whereas BiH’s EU path is increasingly targeted by malign foreign actors, notably the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, which exploit ethnic divisions and institutional fragility to obstruct reforms, undermine the constitutional order and erode public trust in the EU; whereas Russian state-controlled media, including Sputnik Serbia and RT Balkan, continue to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the RS entity, spreading disinformation and pro-Kremlin narratives in violation of EU sanctions on Russian propaganda outlets;

    L. whereas BiH is a multi-ethnic state in whose territory different religious and ethnic groups have lived for centuries, demonstrating that peoples with different views can coexist in an environment of tolerance and mutual respect; whereas linguistic and cultural diversity is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union, as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

    M. whereas, for the 2022 general elections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) Election Observation Mission concluded that the electoral process remained vulnerable to external interference, including the misuse of administrative resources and biased media coverage influenced by foreign-backed platforms, and called for enhanced protections against disinformation, transparency in campaign finance, and safeguards for journalists and civil society;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Reaffirms its support for BiH’s EU accession through a merit-based process based on the Copenhagen criteria, grounded in unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality among its citizens;

    2. Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with BiH in the context of the changed geopolitical reality following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the adoption of several key laws in the run-up to this decision, but regrets that the positive reform dynamic has stalled, and notes the inadequate implementation and enforcement of the adopted laws; regrets that the legislative process has been marred by a lack of transparency and limited access for key stakeholders; notes the recent adoption of the Laws on Border Control and on Personal Data Protection and calls for their thorough implementation; calls for preparations to establish the institutional and financial basis for this enlargement to ensure sustainable EU integration;

    3. Urges BiH’s legitimate political leaders at all levels to take all relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022, in full respect for proper democratic, transparent and inclusive procedures within the competent institutions, with a view to the negotiating framework being adopted by the Council once these conditions are met, and to step up the efforts to deliver on the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission in 2019; calls on all political actors to uphold BiH’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from all divisive rhetoric and acts, including secessionist rhetoric and acts, incitement to ethnic, religious and racial intolerance, denial of genocide and other war crimes, and the glorification of war crimes and their perpetrators;

    4. Reiterates that BiH’s accession process needs to be rooted in functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, as well as respect for fundamental rights and non-discrimination for all citizens, including constituent peoples, regardless of ethnic, religious or other affiliations;

    5. Strongly condemns the repeated use of inflammatory rhetoric and the adoption of secessionist laws and policies by Milorad Dodik, President of the RS entity, the SNSD party, and the Assembly of the RS entity, including the celebration of the so-called ‘Day of Republika Srpska’ and the Day of the State of the Republic of Serbia; emphasises that such actions undermine BiH’s constitutional order, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and are incompatible with its EU accession process and undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement;

    6. Urges all the Member States – and calls for their unity – as well as he European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, to act more decisively to respond to these direct threats to European security and reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against all destabilising actors, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking RS entity and Serbian officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council and to impose them bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if their adoption in the Council is not possible; condemns the Hungarian Government’s role in blocking sanctions; endorses the statements made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 10 March 2025 in Sarajevo and by VP/HR Kaja Kallas on 8 April in Sarajevo and calls for stability in the country to be safeguarded; believes that high-level EU officials should not engage with actors undermining the constitutional order of BiH in order not to harm the credibility of the EU in supporting BiH state institutions and welcomes the travel bans imposed on high-ranking RS individuals by some Member States;

    7. Takes note of the ruling of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Milorad Dodik on 26 February 2025 and is highly alarmed by the escalating tensions and actions he has since led, including unprecedented attacks on BiH institutions and intimidation of opposition in the RS; deplores the support given to such policies by Russian and Serbian authorities, and calls upon all internal, regional and international actors to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH; calls for the international isolation of Milorad Dodik; condemns the recent decision of the RS entity’s government to declare a senior German foreign ministry official as persona non grata; notes with concern that Interpol refused to issue a Red Notice for an international warrant and calls on EUFOR to provide concrete support to the BiH authorities to put an end to the continued efforts to undermine the country’s legal and political stability, and to demonstrate the EU’s and EUFOR’s commitment and ability to uphold peace, enforce the rule of law, and maintain the integrity of legal institutions;

    8. Deplores that Milorad Dodik’s policies and actions, including frequent blockades of State-level bodies and decision-making and the hollowing out of the BiH institutions necessary for the technical work on alignment with the EU acquis, are a major factor in BiH’s troubled EU accession path and a clear violation of the 12 June 2022 political agreement; welcomes the work of the competent BiH institutions and calls on them to follow due procedures and to execute and implement all decisions in full respect for the rule of law; urges all political actors, notably in the RS entity, to reject all secessionist steps undermining of the country’s unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security; urges the RS National Assembly to ensure that its Official Gazette reflects the decisions of the BiH Constitutional Court regarding RS legislation, which has been found to undermine the constitutional order and been taken out of effect;

    9. Urges the Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States and international partners, including the Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, to take stock of the lessons learned over the past 15 years of European engagement in BiH and to recalibrate its strategy accordingly, with a renewed focus on delivering tangible progress and reforms that accelerate the country’s path toward EU membership, thereby reaffirming the EU’s unwavering commitment to the full integration of BiH into the Union;

    10. Welcomes BiH’s formal full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including restrictive measures in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and urges the effective implementation of these measures; welcomes BiH’s continued participation in EU crisis management missions and operations; condemns the pro-Russian stance of the RS entity’s leadership and its frequent meetings with Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials; expresses serious concerns about the security risks posed by these ties; urges the EU to investigate the use of the RS entity as a gateway for Russian intelligence operations and hybrid attacks on EU Member States; calls for support to BiH in countering disinformation campaigns originating from Russia as part of a joint effort against hybrid threats; strongly supports BiH’s sustained aspirations towards Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO membership and calls on all political actors to take concrete political action to achieve them;

    11. Reiterates its support for the Office of the High Representative and EUFOR Operation Althea in overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in accordance with their mandates based on political neutrality and full respect for the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, until the country has fulfilled the ‘5+2 agenda’ and its international supervision ends; welcomes the renewal of the mandate of EUFOR Operation Althea; regrets that BiH is still heavily reliant on the mandate of the Office of the High Representative, and the presence of EUFOR Althea, but acknowledges and values it as a crucial institution in safeguarding not only peace, but also the bare functioning of the country;

    12. Recalls that EUFOR Operation Althea plays a key role in safeguarding the security, territorial integrity, stability, sovereignty and political independence of BiH, while ensuring that local stakeholders act in accordance with these fundamental principles as outlined in the Dayton Peace Agreement and UN Security Council resolutions; urges EUFOR to communicate this mandate unequivocally to the citizens of BiH as a confidence-building measure;

    13. Further welcomes the Council’s decision on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility worth EUR 10 million to the benefit of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) and the Cooperation and Training Contract for 2023 between the AFBiH and EUFOR; calls on the Council and VP/HR to enable all eligible Member States to participate in the EU peacekeeping missions, such as EUFOR’s Operation Althea in BiH; calls on the BiH authorities, NATO and EUFOR Althea to launch a reform process of the BiH armed forces;

    14. Remains concerned by malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by foreign actors in BiH, notably Russia and China, as well as their transmission through local media and political structures, particularly by the RS entity; expresses grave concern over Kremlin support for secessionist rhetoric, attempts to delegitimise state institutions, and interference in judicial and electoral matters; highlights recent Russian efforts at the UN Security Council to defend unconstitutional actions by RS entity authorities;

    15. Calls for further steps, inter alia aligning BiH legislation with the EU acquis, and EU support to effectively counter malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns; calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation to BiH to intensify efforts in promoting the benefits of closer integration and to invest in communication campaigns to fight anti-democratic narratives and other forms of foreign influence;

    16. Deplores the participation of RS entity authorities in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’ and rejects its declaration which undermines the sovereignty of BiH and other Western Balkan countries and fails to promote good neighbourly relations; condemns Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s interference in the affairs of BiH, including by expressing support for the illegitimate actions of Milorad Dodik and organising the Russia-backed ‘All-Serb Assembly’ which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH;

    17. Condemns the increase in Iran’s malign influence in the country and in the Western Balkans, which poses a threat to security for the EU and its Member States;

    18. Welcomes BiH’s renewed and sustained engagement in the EU-BiH Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee in fulfilment of one of the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission;

    19. Urges the BiH authorities to reform the coordination mechanism for EU matters, which has proved to be ineffective and inefficient in addressing EU integration-related tasks; calls on the authorities to submit a national programme for the adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA) in accordance with the Commission’s comments and to ensure coordinated alignment with the EU acquis throughout the country; highlights the need to establish an operational negotiating structure following the European Council’s decision to commence accession negotiations, including nomination of a negotiation team and a chief negotiator who is fully authorised to present the country’s position;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    20. Regrets the fact that political actors have still not enacted the necessary changes to the constitution and the electoral law to align them with the European Convention on Human Rights and to implement relevant rulings of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Court of Human Rights to eliminate all forms of inequality and discrimination in the electoral process and ensure non-discrimination, protection of fundamental rights, and equality for all BiH citizens to ‘move from Dayton to Brussels’; reiterates that failing to implement these rulings is incompatible with EU values and BiH’s EU integration; stresses the need for all constitutional and electoral reform processes to be inclusive, based on comprehensive consultations with citizens, civil society and independent experts and all relevant stakeholders in the country, and in line with European standards and principles; reiterates that any electoral reform must not deepen or cement ethnic division;

    21. Regrets that the BiH authorities have not been able to unite society or to create a just and functional system in the country, but rather have largely contributed to deepening divisions; calls on the EU and its Member States to initiate a transparent and inclusive reform process that would enable a sustainable transformation of the Dayton Peace Agreement into a constitution, fully in line with European standards and principles, with a view to ensuring a functional, accountable, representative, and popularly legitimate governance system, to overcome ethno-nationalistic divisions and achieve sustainable progress on the path towards the EU;

    22. Notes the changes made to the Election Law by the High Representative in March 2024 that introduced important integrity standards and confidence-building measures, aiming to restore voters’ trust in the overall election process; calls on the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH to urgently address all outstanding recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR, of the Venice Commission and of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) especially on matters regarding election administration, the conduct of polling and counting, campaigning and campaign finance, explicit prohibition of indirect buying of votes, election dispute resolution, countering disinformation and foreign interference, increasing protection of journalists and sanctioning the misuse of administrative resources;

    23. Welcomes the fact that the local elections of 6 October 2024 were competitive and effectively managed; regrets that they were held in an environment lacking social and political cohesion;

    24. Strongly condemns the RS entity’s actions undermining BiH’s constitutional order and the competences of state bodies, and its obstructionism towards the Constitutional Court of BiH; condemns all illegal actions that conflict with the constitutional framework and calls on all political actors in BiH to pursue a pro-European approach;

    25. Notes the limited progress on justice reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in relation to the independence, professionalism, efficiency and accountability of the judicial system; calls for urgent measures to accelerate reforms in these areas, ensuring full alignment with EU standards and strengthening the capacity of the judiciary to effectively serve justice and uphold the rule of law;

    26. Remains seriously concerned about corruption, notably high-level corruption, in BiH, which is a structural problem deeply embedded in the country’s highly complex governance system, and urges the relevant authorities to take a more decisive, coordinated, transparent and proactive stance in fighting it, including by improving anti-corruption legislation fully in line with international standards and recommendations and ensuring the effective implementation of laws, such as those on preventing conflicts of interest and protecting whistleblowers; encourages BiH to engage in structured cooperation and exchange of best practices with Member States; welcomes the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 and the adoption of the action plan for its implementation, as well as ongoing international cooperation efforts;

    27. Regrets that the laws on public procurement, conflict of interest and the High Judicial Council are still not in line with European standards and urges the adoption of a new law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission; calls for the establishment of an independently functioning Asset Declarations Department within the HJPC, and advocates for the impartial and effective prosecution of high-level corruption cases;

    28. Stresses the need to strengthen the system for managing conflicts of interest among individuals holding top executive functions, in particular by ensuring that statements of interests are subject to regular and substantive verification; underlines that all individuals holding top executive functions, whether elected or appointed, should be subject to uniform disclosure obligations, and that all such declarations should systematically be made public and easily accessible online, in the interest of transparency and public accountability;

    29. Urges BiH to step up the fight against organised crime; is deeply concerned by vulnerabilities to criminal infiltration in the political, legal and economic systems; commends the BiH authorities for signing a Cooperation Agreement on Eurojust on 24 October 2024 to increase the efficiency of investigations and prosecution in the fields of organised crime, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, cybercrime and other criminal activities;

    30. Stresses that cooperation with the EU in the fight against drugs trafficking must be improved; calls for BiH to appoint a correspondent agent as part of its cooperation with the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA);

    31. Welcomes the new Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism Financing and urges BiH to strengthen measures in this area, including the adoption of the necessary by-laws required for the effective implementation of the law, with particular attention to effective enforcement and monitoring; stresses, in particular, the need to fully align the anti-terrorism legislation with the EU acquis and international law; calls for the establishment of stricter sanctions for terrorism offences;

    32. Welcomes the adoption of BiH’s Law on Border Control aimed at improving compliance with European standards, and calls for full alignment with the EU’s visa policy as part of a controlled migration policy; stresses that BiH must uphold security at its borders and cooperate with Frontex and neighbouring countries to prevent irregular migration while ensuring sufficient access to asylum procedures for those eligible for international protection;

    33. Stresses the need to ensure that the appointment of senior police officials, particularly in the Border Police and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), is based on merit and conducted through open, standardised and transparent selection procedures;

    34. Recalls the need for a professional and depoliticised civil service; welcomes the steps taken in public administration reform; calls for the administrative burden in public administration to be reduced; calls on the BiH authorities to improve public authorities’ responsiveness to information requests;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    35. Strongly condemns discrimination, violence and hate speech against all minorities; calls for the effective prosecution of such incidents; urges BiH to promote and safeguard the human rights, non-discrimination and protection of all minorities; calls for enhanced implementation of anti-discrimination mechanisms in BiH, with a particular focus on combating intolerance, hate speech and all forms of inequality; calls on the authorities to improve access to social, housing, education and healthcare services for all minorities and vulnerable groups; emphasises the importance of protecting the cultural and linguistic expression of all minorities in BiH;

    36. Expresses deep concern over the sharp increase in violence – including emerging forms of digital violence – against women, children, seniors and other vulnerable groups, including the LGBTIQ community; urges the BiH authorities to align their policies, legislation and practices on combating sexual and digital violence against women and girls with Council of Europe standards, particularly the Istanbul Convention, relevant ECtHR case law and the EU acquis; calls for targeted support to key institutions, for training professionals to provide victims with effective support, and for increased public awareness and institutional capacity to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence; stresses the key role of women’s associations in reaching out to the most vulnerable; calls on BiH to establish an official centralised data collection system on femicide; welcomes the 9 April 2025 decision of the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) to include femicide in the criminal code and calls on the Parliament to urgently approve this new law;

    37. Regrets that the 2023-2027 gender action plan has so far lacked funding and monitoring; calls for an increase in the public and political participation of women in BiH; recognises the additional barriers and discrimination faced by women from ethnic minorities, particularly in accessing services;

    38. Condemns the RS entity’s adoption of legislative amendments that have removed gender identity as a protected characteristic, and those that no longer guarantee protection for children of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities;

    39. Calls on the relevant BiH authorities to develop and adopt the pending national action plan on the protection of the rights of the child; stresses that poverty and social exclusion affect a high percentage of children in the country, especially children from vulnerable groups, including Roma, children with disabilities, children in conflict with the law, and children on the move; recalls that BiH must uphold its international commitments so that no child is left behind;

    40. Emphasises the importance of inclusive and quality education, including the right to education in the mother tongue, and inter alia the importance of systematically reforming divisive curricula that seriously hamper internal mobility and limit critical thinking skills; reiterates its call for an end to the segregation practice of the ‘two schools under one roof’ system, which hampers social cohesion and equal opportunities, and stresses the need to favour reconciliation and integration and protect the right of every national community, including minorities, to their culture, language and identity; calls for the adoption of a common curriculum in history textbooks based on court-established facts related to the war as a means of avoiding historical revisionism and encourages the EU to support this initiative;

    41. Calls on BiH to guarantee the freedoms of assembly, association and expression, enabling the inclusion of civil society in policymaking; calls on the authorities to ensure meaningful, systematic and inclusive public consultation processes; condemns the RS entity’s reintroduction of a Russian-style law on ‘foreign agents’ and urges the authorities to repeal it; condemns the RS entity authorities’ use of criminalised defamation laws as a tool to stifle freedom of expression and calls for restoring criminalised defamation solely to the domain of civil law to prevent its misuse in restricting freedom of expression; calls on the Commission to attach strict conditionality to the revocation of these laws;

    42. Encourages the BiH Council of Ministers to adopt the Strategy for the Development of an Enabling Environment for Civil Society, ensuring that it unequivocally focuses on improving the legislative framework and securing more substantial and transparent funding for CSOs; calls for stronger protection of human rights defenders in BiH, including women activists, journalists and NGOs;

    43. Stresses the key importance of independent media and of respecting freedom of expression standards; calls on BiH to ensure the financial sustainability, emphasising the urgent financial crisis of the state-level public broadcaster BHRT, and political independence of public broadcasters and the Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH; calls on BiH to adopt legislation on media ownership transparency and public funding of the media; urges the state to accelerate the adoption of the Law on Electronic Communications, in line with the Digital Services Act[8] (DSA) and the new EU Media Freedom Act[9]; calls for ensuring pluralism in public media throughout the territory of BiH, including equal representation of all minorities; notes the appointment of the Public Broadcaster Board in FBiH after 12 years of blockages and calls on it to ensure impartial and objective information;

    44. Is strongly concerned by Russian propaganda in the RS entity’s public broadcaster and deplores the broadcasting of the RT (formerly Russia Today) channel, in violation of EU sanctions;

    45. Condemns the political pressure, attacks, intimidation, threats, demeaning remarks and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) against journalists and media workers, especially by high-level politicians or their proxy organisations, and by foreign-aligned actors; regrets the lack of progress in guaranteeing freedom of expression and in amending the criminal laws to strengthen the protection of journalists from threats and attacks, in line with EU requirements, and calls on the authorities to adopt laws that effectively protect journalists, NGOs, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against SLAPPs; stresses the importance of ensuring appropriate judicial follow-up in cases of threats and violence against journalists;

    46. Urges BiH to ensure and effectively enforce relevant laws on general human rights; urges BiH to prosecute discriminatory crimes;

    47. Recalls the need for solidarity-based and fair migration and asylum management that combines upholding human rights with effective border control; calls on the EU to help BiH to take full responsibility for the management of reception centres, which are often at the border with the EU, to ensure sufficient reception conditions, and to guarantee access to effective and feasible asylum procedures in full respect for international law and human rights; is concerned about reports of insufficient reception conditions in the EU-funded centre in Lipa; stresses the need to increase transparency and democratic scrutiny in the allocation and implementation of EU funds in the field of migration; welcomes BiH’s upgraded status agreement with the Frontex and calls for its prompt signature; recalls that any eventual agreement with this agency should fully respect fundamental rights and international standards; urges BiH to step up its efforts against cross-border crime, especially human trafficking;

    Reconciliation, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    48. Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the EU enlargement process;

    49. Stresses the importance of reconciliation in BiH and urges all authorities to actively promote and guarantee access to truth, justice and inclusive redress, including the adoption of a state-level law establishing minimum rights for wartime victims across the country, and the promotion of a women’s culture of remembrance; recognises that accountability as well as mutual respect among individuals and communities, and the promotion of mutual understanding, particularly among young people, can have a positive effect towards reconciliation; urges the BiH authorities to adopt a national transitional justice strategy; calls for further efforts to address the issue of missing persons; urges the Commission to invest additional efforts in promoting, supporting and facilitating reconciliation processes in BiH;

    50. Calls on the authorities of BiH to accelerate the prosecution of war crimes in accordance with the Revised State Strategy for Prosecuting War Crimes; highlights the importance of enhanced regional cooperation through the extradition of suspects, as well as cooperation between judicial authorities and exchange in all relevant formal aspects aimed at prosecution; encourages BiH authorities to align their legislation to ensure that all victims of war crimes have equal access to rights and protections;

    51. Recognises the extremely important role played by the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), including by ensuring the institutional capacity, supporting families and providing evidence to Courts; urges the EU to ensure that the ICMP has access to sufficient funding to continue its activities;

    52. Reiterates its call for additional measures and concrete programmes to be implemented with regard to the sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, access to healthcare and employment, social protection and education, and for full respect of all their rights to compensation for non-returnable property;

    53. Deplores all forms of historical revisionism, genocide denial, irredentism, glorification of war crimes and criminals, and contestation of facts or the independence and impartiality of international and domestic tribunals, especially by political leaders;

    54. Is concerned about the adoption of the ‘Declaration on the Protection of National and Political Rights and the Common Future of the Serbian People’ which is in violation of several aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and undermines BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity; notes that the ideas of Srpski Svet are incompatible with aspirations to join the EU; calls on Serbia to be constructively committed to the stability and territorial integrity of BiH and actively support BiH’s accession path;

    55. Emphasises the importance of preventive diplomacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina; calls on the EEAS to strengthen skills development among staff to improve the EU’s understanding of the local historical, cultural and religious contexts, as emphasised in the report on the role of preventive diplomacy adopted by Parliament in January 2024;

    56. Welcomes the UN General Assembly’s decision to designate 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica; calls on the authorities to ensure the security of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial Centre; emphasises that the Memorial Centre has had to temporarily close as a result of security concerns;

    57. Emphasises that regional cooperation via the common regional market is a beneficial attribution to promoting economic growth; calls on BiH to swiftly ratify all regional mobility agreements under the Berlin Process and to further strengthen economic cooperation through this market, in line with the objectives of EU enlargement;

    Socio-economic reforms

    58. Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which includes the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, envisaging an indicative allocation for more than EUR 1 billion for BiH; regrets that BiH remains the only country in the Western Balkans that has not adopted a reform agenda; urges the Council of ministers and the cantons of BiH to unblock the adoption of its reform agenda without further delay in order to avoid its funding allocation being distributed among the other Western Balkan countries, and to establish a robust mechanism for transparent, inclusive and timely monitoring of its implementation; emphasises the need to prioritise key areas such as public administration, the rule of law, anti-corruption, decarbonisation, digitalisation, connectivity and human capital development, while also addressing social challenges; believes that embracing the opportunities of the Growth Plan would enhance BiH’s economy; calls on the Commission to explore ways of cooperating with willing and committed regional authorities, making more flexible use of the Reform and Growth Facility;

    59. Recalls that EU funding for projects in the RS entity should remain frozen until the reversal of democratic backsliding by the RS entity and until full alignment with the CFSP;

    60. Encourages BiH to make best use of all EU financial support; calls on the Commission to continue providing financial and technical support for BiH’s EU integration based on clearly defined conditionality and rigorous monitoring of spending and results, in line with the EU objectives of efficient and accountable budget management; believes that EU funds should better support the democratic reforms of the country; in that context, calls for the relevant EU funding to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting technical assistance in absorbing the funds, judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its competences in accession countries; encourages BiH to swiftly conclude bilateral working arrangements with the EPPO;

    61. Regrets that sustainable improvement and progress in this area is also hindered by the governance structure and a lack of country-wide strategies in all areas and on all levels; calls for the swift appointment of an IPA III coordinator and calls for better absorption of IPA III funds in BiH, including at local and regional levels; calls for the capacity of local and regional authorities to implement socio-economic reforms and manage projects co-financed from EU funds to be strengthened, in order to increase absorption and reduce regional inequalities;

    62. Urges BiH to prioritise measures aimed at improving competitiveness and the business environment, while improving economic and social cohesion, including progress towards the European Pillar of Social Rights, boosting economic diversification, promoting the digital and green transitions, addressing the informal economy and tackling unemployment;

    63. Expresses concern at the extremely negative demographic trends in the country, prompted in particular by the large number of young people leaving, and stresses the importance of the urgent adoption of additional measures to address this challenge; calls for a focus on youth as the driving force for EU integration in the country; calls on BiH to finalise and adopt the Youth Guarantee to improve access to employment, education, training and apprenticeships for young people, address high youth unemployment and skills mismatches and to promote social inclusion;

    64. Encourages EU institutions to work with civil society and experts to develop avenues to make health and social protections flexible and portable, to ensure equality and mobility within BiH;

    65. Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkans into the EU’s Digital Single Market before actual EU membership, which would crucially benefit the creation of safe digital environment;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity, sustainable development and connectivity

    66. Encourages BiH to accelerate the diversification of energy sources, particularly regarding ending its gas dependence on Russia; urges BiH to enhance energy security and efficiency by strengthening its electricity transmission and distribution grids, coupling with the European market and transitioning to renewables, particularly to solar and wind, while ensuring meaningful public consultations and effective environmental safeguards;

    67. Urges BiH to adopt its long-overdue national energy and climate plan and implement countrywide environmental protection strategies, including by legally protecting its candidate Emerald sites, improving the adequacy of its Emerald network, and ensuring the full implementation of the Habitats Directive[10], the Birds Directive[11] and the Water Framework Directive[12], while improving the quality and transparency of environmental investments; reiterates the need for effective air and water quality protection and improvement, and for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for breaches of environmental law; notes that progress in the area of environmental and climate protection as well as alignment with the EU standards has remained low, and therefore urges BiH’s authorities to ensure greater alignment with EU standards and policy objectives on climate protection and energy in line with the 2020 Green Agenda and the Paris Agreement;

    68. Calls on the BiH authorities to reduce transboundary air pollution, especially in the case of Bosanski Brod oil refinery; recalls that BiH is a signatory party of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991) and is bound by its obligations;

    69. Underlines the need to improve ex ante comprehensive strategic environmental assessments with the meaningful involvement of local communities, civil society organisations and independent experts; highlights the need to increase the transparency of procedures for infrastructure projects across eco-sensitive sectors; stresses the importance of increasing environmental mainstreaming across sectoral policies;

    70. Urges the country to implement measures to protect the biodiversity and ecologic integrity of rivers in line with the Espoo Convention;

    71. Expresses deep concern about the harmful impact of mining activities, including those conducted by foreign companies, on the environment in BiH and the health of its citizens; calls on all mining entities operating in BiH to fully comply with national legislation and to prioritise environmental protection and public health;

    72. Stresses the urgent need for the FBiH to adopt a fair, modern and expert-driven law on forests; further calls for stronger protection of forests and rivers through improved inspection oversight and the creation of a stringent legal framework in line with environmental and systemic standards; calls for the abolition of the provision in the relevant regulation in the FBiH that permits the release of waste water into rivers with minimal oversight, thereby posing a significant threat to public health and the environment;

    73.  Calls upon BiH to urgently finalise and adopt the legal designation of Livanjsko Polje as a Category V Protected Landscape, ensure appropriate monitoring;

    74. Stands in solidarity with BiH and all victims of the devastating floods and landslides of 3-4 October 2024; calls on the Federation of BiH authorities to increase support for those affected and ensure that any shortcomings in law enforcement and forest management that may have exacerbated the disaster are addressed;

    °

    ° °

    75. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the Presidency, Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the governments and parliaments of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska entity and the Brčko District, and the Office of the High Representative.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania – A10-0106/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania

    (2025/2017(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part[1],

     having regard to Albania’s application for EU membership, submitted on 24 April 2009,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0690),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Albania’ (SWD(2024)0828),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0690),

     having regard to the Reform Agenda of Albania submitted under the EU’s Reform and Growth Facility, as approved by the Commission on 23 October 2024,

     having regard to the final report of 29 September 2023 by the Election Observation Mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Albania’s local elections of 14 May 2023,

     having regard to the final report of 26 July 2021 by the Election Observation Mission of the OSCE/ODIHR on Albania’s parliamentary elections of 25 April 2021,

     having regard to the Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR of 11 December 2020 on the amendments to the Albanian constitution of 30 July 2020 and the amendments to Albania’s electoral code of 5 October 2020,

     having regard to the Sofia Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018, and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

     having regard to the Zagreb Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 6 May 2020,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits held in Brussels on 13 December 2023 and 18 December 2024,

     having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to Reporters Without Borders’ 2024 World Press Freedom Index,

     having regard to Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index,

     having regard to the 2024 Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Albania,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0106/2025),

     

    A. whereas enlargement is the most effective EU foreign policy instrument and a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be by far Albania’s biggest trade and investment partner and its largest provider of financial assistance;

    C. whereas enlargement is a merit-based process based on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; whereas Albania’s EU accession depends on lasting, in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas, starting with the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions;

    D. whereas Albania has been an EU candidate country since 2014, began accession negotiations in July 2022 and successfully completed the screening process in November 2023;

    E. whereas Albania opened negotiations on ‘Cluster 1: Fundamentals’ on 15 October 2024 and on ‘Cluster 6: External Relations’ on 17 December 2024;

    F. whereas Albania is a reliable foreign policy partner and is fully aligned with the EU’s common foreign and security policy;

    G. whereas Albania has been a target of foreign malign influence campaigns aiming to sow discord, provoke tensions and violence and destabilise the whole region, including Russian disinformation and election meddling, as well as questionable investments from non-EU actors such as China; whereas Russian and Iranian cyber attacks against Albania in 2022 and 2023 disrupted critical government functions, illustrating the hybrid threat environment Albania faces as it progresses toward EU integration;

    H. whereas electoral shortcomings and serious vulnerabilities persist in Albania’s electoral system; whereas the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations to further improve the conduct of elections in Albania have not yet been fully addressed;

    I. whereas Albania participates in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, including in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

    J. whereas protection of national and ethnic minorities is crucial for aspiring EU Member States; whereas the implementing legislation on free self-identification and the use of minority languages has been adopted in Albania;

    K. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlights the critical importance of EU enlargement for ensuring security and stability on our continent;

    1. Welcomes Albania’s unwavering commitment to EU integration, reflecting consensus among all political parties, both governmental and opposition, and overwhelming support among citizens, and commends its consistent full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and promotion of the rules-based international order, including its categorical response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine through its alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus; acknowledges the country’s active role in the region and in regional initiatives;

    2. Welcomes Albania’s ambition of closing accession negotiations by the end of 2027 and the swift progress made in recent years, notably the opening of two clusters of negotiating chapters in 2024; recalls that candidate countries undergo in-depth transformations to fulfil membership criteria during accession negotiations, which last as long as it takes to implement the necessary reforms; stresses the need to strengthen the transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of the accession process, including its parliamentary dimension; cautions against any actions that could undermine the system of checks and balances;

    3. Notes that the pace of EU accession is determined by the candidate country’s progress on aligning with the EU acquis, its track record on implementing it and the due functioning of all the country’s institutions, and is grounded in the rule of law, good governance and fundamental rights; urges Albania to accelerate reforms to strengthen the rule of law and economic growth, counter corruption and organised crime, prevent human trafficking, ensure the protection of fundamental rights and make progress in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of information and media pluralism and independence;

    4. Welcomes the EU’s new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, which will provide EUR 922 million in grants and loans to Albania when it meets the conditions set out in its ambitious Reform Agenda;

    5. Takes note of Albania’s adoption of the National Plan for European Integration 2024-2026; welcomes the fact that Albania has established the bodies in charge of the integration process; calls for greater efforts to increase transparency and engage in public communication on EU integration;

    6. Welcomes the decision to open the European Parliament’s antenna office for the Western Balkans in Tirana; notes that the office will serve as a key contact point between the European Parliament and national parliaments, civil society and local partners from across the Western Balkans region; 

    7. Welcomes the involvement of 18 Albanian participants in the Enlargement Candidate Members initiative launched by the European Economic and Social Committee, which aims to foster closer ties with candidate countries and facilitate their gradual integration into the EU;

    Democratic institutions, media and civil society

    8. Insists on the importance of constructive political debate and orderly parliamentary conduct as key aspects of democratic governance; reaffirms the joint responsibility of Albania’s political forces to strengthen constructive and inclusive political dialogue and overcome ongoing high political polarisation in the country; deplores the continued confrontations and inflammatory rhetoric by politicians from all parties and the clashes between the ruling majority and the opposition; underlines the need to foster a political culture based on mutual respect and adherence to democratic norms, ensuring that political competition does not undermine institutional stability, and to demonstrate full respect for the role of parliamentarism, by putting an end to political attacks; calls for genuine dialogue to promote political stability and progress, emphasising the need for cross-party consensus on the EU integration agenda and the meaningful involvement of civil society; emphasises the need for more effective parliamentary oversight and improved functioning of institutions;

    9. Recognises the growing threat of foreign malign influence and hybrid interference in Albania’s democratic institutions; highlights that Kremlin-aligned narratives have sought to erode public confidence in democratic institutions and promote anti-Western sentiment; calls on Albania to enhance institutional resilience against covert political funding, media manipulation and cyber threats that directly impact its EU accession process; calls for the EU institutions to closely monitor Albania’s exposure to foreign malign influence;

    10. Welcomes Albania’s blocking of  Russian disinformation domains but stresses the need for a coordinated EU-Albania disinformation response mechanism, modelled on the EUvsDisinfo platform, to rapidly debunk and counteract Kremlin narratives; advocates for increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; warns of the increasing footprint of Chinese state-backed media in Albania;

    11. Emphasises the Albanian Parliament’s duty to respect the rulings of the Constitutional Court without delay; stresses the fundamental and irreplaceable role of parliament in safeguarding checks and balances; calls on Albania to ensure genuine democratic accountability and stronger, more transparent governance;

    12. Takes note of the July 2024 amendments to Albania’s electoral code, which enable out-of-country voting by the Albanian diaspora and introduce partially open candidate lists; takes note of the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025 and underlines that, based on the preliminary conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR, the elections were competitive and professionally conducted but took place in a highly polarised environment and contestants did not enjoy a level playing field; expresses concern that the ruling party benefited from the widespread use of administrative resources; calls on all parties to demonstrate political will for a comprehensive and inclusive electoral reform to implement all recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission fully and in a timely manner, including those on the electoral and party financing framework;

    13. Regrets that the environment for free media and independent journalists has been declining in recent years; notes with concern that media independence and pluralism in Albania continue to be affected by high market concentration, the overlap of business and political interests, lack of transparency of funding and ownership, intimidation and precarious working conditions for journalists; notes that, according to the 2024 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, Albania ranks 99th, reflecting ongoing issues related to media ownership concentration, political interference and threats against journalists; highlights that the lack of transparency in media financing and ownership structures increases the risk of editorial bias and foreign propaganda penetration and undermines public trust in journalism; calls on the Albanian authorities to ensure media ownership transparency and enforce a policy of zero tolerance for the intimidation of journalists; calls on the Albanian Government to support independent fact-checking platforms as a means to ensure public access to accurate information and to uphold the integrity of the information space;

    14. Recalls that any revision of media laws should be in line with the Venice Commission recommendations and should take place in a transparent and inclusive manner in consultation with media organisations, with the aim of improving media freedom and self-regulation; welcomes the Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists launched by the Council of Europe, together with the EU and a network of prominent press freedom organisations; regrets  that there has been no progress in aligning the legislative framework with the EU acquis and EU standards, including the European Media Freedom Act[4]; recalls the need to strengthen investigative journalism, fact-checking and media literacy and to tackle hate speech, disinformation and fake news; expresses concern over enduring inflammatory anti-media rhetoric, including by high-level politicians, public officials and other public figures, which fuels the culture of intimidation; strongly condemns the increasing verbal attacks against journalists reporting on rule of law and corruption matters, as well as misogynistic online harassment targeting women journalists, smear campaigns, violence and rioting, and calls for the final convictions of the attackers to be ensured; regrets that the criminal code does not provide protection to journalists against threats and violence, calls on the authorities to adopt a legal framework that efficiently protects journalists, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against the concerning increase of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), to decriminalise defamation and to respect the role of independent journalism as a crucial check on power and to engage with the media in a manner that upholds democratic principles;

    15. Recalls the responsibility of national and local authorities to improve transparency, accountability and inclusiveness by conducting meaningful and regular public stakeholder consultations; notes with concern that the Albanian Parliament’s implementation of the legal framework for public consultations remains predominantly formal; stresses the need for greater transparency regarding public data and key legislative projects; insists that the financial resources, administrative capacity and fiscal autonomy of local authorities should be improved;

    16. Welcomes Albania’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a crucial and positive role in the reform process; welcomes the improvement of electoral monitoring and the increasing participation of civil society in overseeing the democratic process; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress; encourages the Albanian Government to bolster the role of civil society, including women’s rights organisations, in the EU accession process, from an early stage and in a transparent legislative process; regrets that civil society organisations operate in a challenging environment and receive limited public funding; insists that the groundwork for an effective VAT exemption system be laid in compliance with the commitments taken by Albania under the EU-Albania Cooperation Agreement and the IPA III; urges the authorities to speed up the drafting of the 2024-2027 roadmap for the government policy towards a more enabling environment for civil society development and to closely monitor the implementation of this roadmap;

    17. Welcomes the establishment of the new position of Minister of State for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption and underlines the importance of its effectiveness and of delivering public administration and anti-corruption reforms; remains concerned, however, that there has been limited progress in public administration reform; insists that the Albanian authorities effectively implement provisions on merit-based recruitment and review the effectiveness of the current monitoring structures for the new public administration and anti-corruption reforms; underlines the need to foster a culture of accountability, non-partisan access to public information and scrutiny of public institutions, including with regard to the implementation of the Reform Agenda; notes that public entities need to improve their compliance with transparency requirements and their responsiveness to information requests;

    18. Regrets that limited progress has been made in aligning the legal framework for procurement with the EU acquis; expresses concern over the newly introduced temporary exemptions in public procurement law; calls on the Albanian authorities to improve competitive procurement procedures in line with the EU acquis;

    19. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in improving data transmission to Eurostat;

    Fundamental rights

    20. Notes that Albania’s legal framework for gender-based violence is not yet fully aligned with the Istanbul Convention; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; welcomes the establishment of a femicide watch by the Ombudsperson; urges the enhancement of support services for victims, particularly healthcare, shelter funding, free legal aid, and victim reintegration and rehabilitation; stresses the need for increased financial and institutional support to be given to prevention programmes, public awareness campaigns, and specialised training for law enforcement and judicial authorities to ensure a victim-centred approach;

    21. Expresses concern about persistent shortcomings, such as non-alignment or partial alignment with the EU acquis, regarding persons with disabilities and gender equality; recognises the need for Albania to fully align its legal framework on gender-based violence with the Istanbul Convention; notes that, according to the World Economic Forum’s 2024 Global Gender Gap Report, Albania has fallen six places to rank 23rd globally, indicating a widening gender gap; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; calls for the full and effective implementation of existing legislation, including stricter enforcement of protective measures and enhanced judicial responsiveness to gender-based violence cases, as highlighted in the European Commission’s 2024 report on Albania;

    22. Welcomes the adoption of a new and better-financed national action plan for LGBTI+ persons; regrets, however, that there has been no progress in initiating the necessary legislation in this field and calls on the authorities to adopt the necessary legislation on the recognition of gender identity and sex characteristics, as well as on same-sex partnerships/marriages; deplores the fact that LGBTI+ persons continue to face threats and derogatory media campaigns, with public institutions failing to provide adequate protection; notes that women living in rural and remote areas, Roma and Egyptian women and LGBTI+ individuals continue to face limited access to primary healthcare; urges public institutions to demonstrate strong commitment to protecting LGBTI+ rights and to act decisively against discriminatory and hateful language towards the LGBTI+ community;

    23. Welcomes the adoption of the pending implementing legislation on the rights of persons belonging to minorities, specifically on self-identification and the use of minority languages, and underscores that these by-laws have to be fully and effectively implemented in order to render the exercise of minority and education rights feasible in practice; calls on the authorities to increase the capacity of the State Committee on National Minorities; expresses concern over persistent issues of discrimination and social exclusion affecting minority groups in Albania; calls on the Albanian Government to fully respect and protect human rights, including the rights of minorities, and to ensure that all allegations of human rights abuses, including hate speech, are promptly and thoroughly investigated; urges the Albanian authorities to enhance institutional mechanisms to prevent discrimination and ensure the meaningful political participation of all communities, in line with the recommendations of the Commission’s 2024 report on Albania; calls on Albania to protect and promote the cultural heritage, languages and traditions of its national minorities; calls on Albania to provide education for national minorities in minority languages and to ensure adequate access to state primary, secondary and higher education for all of its citizens; 

     

    24. Recalls that Albania should safeguard the right to property, in particular, by making decisive progress on first registration and compensation, improving the transparency of the state cadastre and the quality of the property register cadastral data, and ensuring that the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy are respected in cases of expropriation and removal of properties;

    25. Calls for increased investment in the modernisation of the education system, ensuring its quality and inclusiveness; calls on Albania to implement measures to foster opportunities in employment and education for persons with disabilities;

    26. Commends the successful 2024 census held in an atmosphere of trust and transparency and its results; believes that Albania should serve as a positive model for conducting a population census in the region;

    27. Welcomes the adoption of the law on personal data protection, aimed at full alignment with the EU acquis; commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of the implementing legislation on the procedure and fair compensation for the use of orphan works and the database of copyright works, but expresses serious concern about the handling of personal data and weaknesses in IT systems; calls on the Albanian authorities to strengthen safeguards against data breaches, enhance prevention and public awareness, and improve institutional capacity in order to effectively implement the new Law on Personal Data Protection; calls on Albania to further collaborate with the EU Intellectual Property Office;

    28. Recognises the closer cooperation between Albania and the EU in managing migration flows and border control processes, in particular through the new national strategy on migration for 2024‑2026 and cooperation with Frontex; takes note of the Italy-Albania Memorandum of Understanding;

    Rule of law

    29. Commends the progress Albania has achieved in the implementation of the justice reforms aimed at strengthening the independence, transparency and accountability of the judiciary, including on the vetting process, completed at first instance; welcomes the new reform process ‘Good governance, rule of law and anti-corruption for Albania 2030’ launched by the Albanian Parliament; stresses that any initiative to strengthen governance, rule of law and anti-corruption efforts must be built on inclusivity, transparency and collaboration;

    30. Expresses concern about continued political interference with and pressure on the judicial system; notes with concern  shortcomings in the merit-based appointments of non-magistrate members of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecution Council and their integrity;

    31. Calls for urgent steps to ensure judicial independence and institutional integrity;

    32. Highlights that Albania ranked 80th in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, indicating the need for substantial progress in combating high-level corruption and ensuring judicial independence; underscores the key work of Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure (SPAK) in building up a track record of investigating, prosecuting and convicting in high-level corruption cases as well as cases involving the protection of the EU’s financial interests; stresses the importance of ensuring the full independence of anti-corruption institutions and encourages the strengthening of their operational and investigative capacity; welcomes high-level corruption investigations and proceedings; stresses that increasing the number of final convictions of high-level officials remains an important priority;  urges all actors to refrain from any actions that undermine the work of independent institutions such as SPAK; expresses its regret at the environment of intimidation that the judiciary operates in, and at instances of undue pressure that it endures, which pose a serious threat to judicial independence; expresses concern that the lack of institutional support for magistrates facing threats weakens public trust and seriously jeopardises the rule of law and Albania’s EU integration process;

    33. Notes the challenges concerning the quality and efficiency of the justice system, including the high number of judicial vacancies, insufficient court staff, the quality of initial and continuous judicial training, the consistency of case-law and the lack of a modern integrated case management system; notes that budget allocations are insufficient, particularly for the court component; underlines that reducing the backlog of unprocessed files in the judicial system should remain a priority; welcomes, however, the fact that the Constitutional Court of Albania has improved its efficiency by reducing its backlog and continues to uphold institutional checks and balances;

    34. Welcomes the adoption of national legislation to align with the EU acquis on anti-money laundering; notes the need to establish a strong asset recovery office and to improve vetting procedures and the processes for investigating, prosecuting and obtaining convictions in high-level corruption cases, including through the seizure and final confiscation of criminal assets;

    35. Calls on Albania to continue aligning its legal framework, and notably the criminal code, with the EU acquis on the fight against organised crime and the trade in drugs and firearms, as well as combating cybercrime, extremism and terrorist threats; notes the appointment of additional prosecutors to the Special Prosecution Office as well as the establishment of a financial investigation unit; commends Albania’s participation in joint operations and cooperation under the European multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats (EMPACT) on drug trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime; further acknowledges the intensified cooperation with EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, INTERPOL and the CARIN Network in fighting organised crime and dismantling transnational crime networks; encourages Albania to strengthen its mechanisms for sharing intelligence with EU agencies to enhance regional stability; calls for sustained efforts to align Albania’s security policies with EU strategies, fostering a more integrated and resilient regional security framework; calls on Albania to strengthen the fight against human trafficking in cooperation with the Member States and EU agencies; stresses the need to counter the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as Albania remains both a destination and a transit country; welcomes the adoption of a new strategy for the protection of victims of crime; emphasises the importance of continuous training for migration control personnel to ensure the effective implementation of European regulations and a stronger response to human trafficking networks;

    36. Encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to further help boost Albania’s resilience against hybrid threats in the area of cyber security, information manipulation and protection of critical infrastructure; calls on Albania to assess the risks associated with foreign direct investment and to screen such investment, particularly in strategic sectors such as energy, mining and telecommunications, in order to avoid economic dependencies and debt traps and protect national interests, enhance security and ensure consistency with EU standards;

    37. Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries with a view to facilitating close cooperation and the prosecution of misuse of EU funds; welcomes the fact that Albania has concluded a bilateral working arrangement with the EPPO;

    Socio-economic reforms

    38. Welcomes Albania’s engagement in implementing the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, encompassing EU single market integration, regional economic integration, fundamental reforms and increased financial support;

    39. Reiterates the importance of improving the public infrastructure within the Western Balkan countries and developing connections with EU Member States; recalls the potential of the economic and investment plan for the Western Balkans to enhance regional connectivity through rail and road infrastructure; in that respect, urges the authorities in all countries to complete Corridor VIII connecting Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria; recalls the importance of improving flight connections between the Western Balkan countries and with the EU Member States;

    40. Welcomes Albania’s Reform Agenda addressing the business environment, human capital, digitalisation, energy and the green transition, fundamental rights and the rule of law; welcomes, furthermore, Albania’s participation in the EU’s Digital Europe programme; welcomes the fact that Albania has been ranked as a regional leader in public administration and digital public procurement by the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management programme, run by the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;

    41. Encourages the Albanian authorities to reduce the risk of poverty and social exclusion by further improving access to education and housing, as well as social and healthcare services, especially for disadvantaged populations and minority groups, including Roma and Egyptians; calls for the implementation of Albania’s National Social Protection Strategy 2024-2030 and National Employment and Skills Strategy 2023-2030; calls on Albania to adopt further measures to fight against youth unemployment and calls on the Albanian authorities to effectively implement the National Agenda for the Rights of the Child by providing assistance to children facing exclusion and poverty;

    42. Commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of legislative acts to reform higher education and for the implementation of the National Strategy for Education 2021-2026; calls on Albania to expand media literacy as a core subject in school curricula while ensuring that teachers receive dedicated training and modern resources to deliver high-quality programmes; encourages collaboration with EU educational initiatives and regional networks such as the Western Balkans Media Literacy Observatory to implement best practices in critical thinking and digital literacy education;

    43. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in concluding bilateral agreements with EU Member States on social security and in its preparations to enable the connection of its employment services system to EURES, the European network of employment services;

    44. Welcomes the fact that Albania joined the Single Euro Payments Area in November 2024, which reduces costs for citizens and businesses and will contribute to Albania’s further integration into the single market; commends the Albanian authorities on the alignment with the EU acquis on payments (Payment Accounts Directive[5]) and on their actions that have resulted in Albania’s removal from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force; recognises Albania’s efforts to improve economic competitiveness and calls on the government to continue with structural reforms to foster a more attractive business environment in line with EU standards; regrets that the inefficiency in public administration, an excessive regulatory framework, corruption and large informal economy undermines the business environment and impedes competition;

    45. Commends the improvement of Albania’s fiscal performance; calls on the Albanian authorities to further enhance fiscal risk analysis by strengthening the relevant Ministry of Finance department; calls for greater transparency and accountability of state-owned enterprises through annual financial reports; calls on Albania to strengthen its public internal financial control and to ensure that the recommendations of the Supreme Audit Institution (ALSAI) are implemented;

    46. Welcomes the further alignment of legislation with the EU acquis on private pension funds, bank recovery and the resolution framework; calls on Albania to complete its alignment with the EU acquis on insurance, capital markets, securities markets, investment funds and financial market infrastructures;

    47. Welcomes the agreement reached at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; in this respect, calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to work towards achieving the agreed targets of substantially reducing roaming charges for data and further reducing prices for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU to levels close to domestic prices by 2027; welcomes the implementation of the first phase of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    48. Is concerned about the lack of progress in company law legislation in Albania; calls on the Albanian authorities to complete the alignment of company law legislation with the EU acquis;

    Environment, biodiversity, energy and transport, sustainable tourism

    49. Stresses that more efforts are needed for Albania to align with the EU acquis on the environment; calls for its alignment with the EU’s Environmental Impact Assessment[6] and Strategic Environmental Assessment[7] directives; underlines the need to strengthen the fight against environmental crime;

    50. Highlights the need for transparent and inclusive public consultations in line with the Aarhus Convention, ensuring the active involvement of local communities, NGOs and scientific institutions in environmental decision-making processes, especially on projects with large environmental and socio-economic repercussions; warns that the lack of proper stakeholder engagement undermines governance standards and Albania’s compliance with its obligations under the EU acquis; expresses concern about the economic and environmental impact of non-competitive foreign-funded development projects;

    51. Recalls that substantial efforts are needed for Albania to achieve the goals relating to climate protection, energy efficiency, diversification and greening of energy supply and transport; notes that air and water quality and waste management remain particularly challenging issues for the country; urges the central government and local authorities to step up their efforts to improve air quality and reduce potentially lethal pollution; urges the Albanian Government to prioritise the implementation of climate adaptation strategies, the development of renewable energy sources and the modernisation of the country’s waste management system to meet EU standards and support sustainable economic growth; encourages the Albanian authorities to strengthen measures and investments to expand the public transport and railway systems;

    52. Firmly believes that environmental protection and sustainable tourism development must go hand in hand; welcomes the establishment of the first wild river national park in Europe, the Vjosa Wild River National Park, and calls for sufficient resources to be allocated to its protection; calls on the authorities to fully respect the national park’s ecological integrity and to reconsider infrastructure projects, notably the water abstraction project on the Shushica river, in line with international biodiversity conservation standards and best practice to ensure that the park’s biodiversity, habitats and ecological functions remain intact; reiterates its concern over the construction of the Vlora airport in the Vjosa-Narta Protected Area, in violation of national and international biodiversity protection norms, and calls on the Commission to address the issue in chapter 27 of the accession negotiations; calls on the Albanian authorities to adopt the implementing legislation for the Law on Cultural Heritage and Museums;

    53. Expresses serious concern regarding recent amendments to Albania’s Law on Protected Areas that allow large infrastructure and tourism projects in ecologically sensitive zones; calls for these legislative amendments to be reversed with a view to ensuring full and strict compliance with national and international legal frameworks and conservation standards and addressing marine waste pollution affecting neighbouring countries;

    54. Calls on the Albanian authorities to designate and effectively manage key protected areas for the survival of critically endangered species, in particular the Balkan lynx, including through comprehensive biodiversity monitoring programmes, and to implement and strictly enforce anti-poaching legislation; urges Albania to abandon the plans for the Skavica hydropower plant on the Black Drin river, given its severe ecological, social and cultural impacts, including the displacement of local communities;

    Regional cooperation and foreign policy

    55. Welcomes the Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and Albania, adopted on 19 November 2024, which establishes a platform for enhanced dialogue and cooperation on security and defence issues and represents a significant step forward; stresses the importance of ensuring that this partnership translates into concrete actions, including joint training initiatives, shared intelligence capabilities and enhanced border security measures to address regional and global security challenges; underlines the need for deeper security cooperation within the Western Balkans, fostering closer coordination among regional partners to combat organised crime, cyber threats, and hybrid challenges; calls for strengthened EU support for regional security initiatives that enhance stability and resilience across the Western Balkans; acknowledges that this partnership represents a significant step forward in strengthening Albania’s role as a reliable security partner of the EU; further emphasises that the partnership will, among other things, facilitate joint initiatives and capacity-building efforts, thereby contributing to a more resilient and integrated security architecture in the Western Balkans;

    56. Welcomes the adoption of the national security strategy in 2024 to further fight hybrid threats and the new law on cybersecurity; welcomes the joint declaration signed by Albania, Kosovo and Croatia, which aims to improve cooperation and strengthen defence potential, while providing full support for Euro-Atlantic and regional defence integration;

    57. Commends Albania’s full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including its support for EU sanctions against third countries, and its positive contribution to common security and defence policy missions, particularly EUFOR Althea, which underlines the country’s commitment to contributing to regional and international security and stability, and welcomes Albania’s participation in operations led by the EU and by NATO, and its collaboration with Europol and Interpol; calls for its further participation in EU-led crisis management operations and common security and defence policy missions such as the maritime security operation EUNAVFOR Aspides; recognises the strategic importance of the Adriatic-Ionian region for European security and economic stability; calls on Albania to enhance its maritime security capabilities in coordination with the EU and NATO;

    58. Welcomes the Albanian Government’s continued efforts in promoting good neighbourly relations; recalls, in this respect, the importance of Albania’s undertaking to resolve any border disputes in conformity with the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including, if necessary, by following the judgments of the International Court of Justice; welcomes Albania’s active contribution to the Berlin Process; further encourages sustained and constructive engagement in regional cooperation initiatives, in line with EU values and enlargement objectives, as it contributes to peace, security and stability in the Western Balkans; cautions against any actions, such as the Open Balkans initiative, that could undermine the common regional market or deviate from the Berlin Process, to the extent that they create obstacles to EU integration and cohesion, potentially jeopardising Albania’s progress toward deeper regional and European integration;

    59. Welcomes the ratification by Albania of bilateral agreements on the coordination of social security systems with Croatia, Montenegro and Bulgaria;

    60. Emphasises Albania’s constructive role in promoting stability and cooperation in the Western Balkans, particularly through bilateral dialogue with neighbouring countries and its engagement in regional organisations;

    °

    ° °

    61. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, to the Council, to the Commission, to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Albania.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: State of Utah Renews 5-Year Electronics Recycling Contract with Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR), Taking Advantage of Increased Discounts and Services

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SALT LAKE CITY, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR) is proud to announce it has been awarded a second consecutive 5-year statewide contract (MA 4483) to provide Electronics Recycling and Secure Data Destruction services for the State of Utah, including all departments, agencies, institutions, and political subdivisions.  

    This new contract, effective through May 2029, reinforces ATR’s position as the State’s premier choice for responsible, secure, and cost-effective management of end-of-life electronics and IT assets.

    “We’re honored to renew our partnership with the State of Utah and excited to expand our services to both local government and private sector clients throughout the region,” said Pete Swavely, National Business Development Manager at ATR. “Whether you’re a public agency or an enterprise looking to improve your IT asset management strategy, ATR offers proven performance, unbeatable value, and personalized lifecycle management solutions.”

    Contract Award Highlights

    • Top-ranked vendor: ATR once again earned the highest score on the State’s competitive scoring algorithm, maintaining its leading position from the 2019–2024 contract period.
    • Second consecutive win: This marks ATR’s second successful contract term, reinforcing a strong performance history with the State of Utah.
    • Cost-efficient provider: ATR outscored the other two qualifying vendors by a wide margin in the cost evaluation, demonstrating unmatched value and affordability.
    • Best-in-class service: Selection criteria also prioritized logistics, compliance, service capabilities, and regulatory performance—areas where ATR continues to excel.
    • Strategic West Coast expansion: Services will be supported by ATR’s upgraded Salt Lake City facility; part of a broader expansion aimed at strengthening logistics and asset management coverage across the Western U.S.

    Why Advanced Technology Recycling Was the Clear Winner

    The State of Utah’s Evaluation Committee—comprised of subject matter experts from the Department of Government Operations, Department of Agriculture, and Jordan School District—conducted a rigorous, multi-phase scoring process following the Utah Procurement Code (Part 7), with oversight from the Division of State Purchasing.

    Out of 1,000 possible points, ATR earned the highest total score across all evaluated categories, securing its place as the top-ranked and most cost-effective vendor.

    Final Total Scores (out of 1,000 points)

    Vendor Technical Score Cost Score Total
    Advanced Technology Recycling 597.50 262.71 860.21
    Vendor #2 570.00 104.58 674.58
    Vendor #3 577.50 59.02 636.52
           

    Key Takeaways

    • ATR led in both technical and cost categories.
    • ATR outscored the second-place vendor by nearly 200 points.
    • ATR’s pricing model received full cost points, showing exceptional value.
    • ATR met or exceeded top scores in data destruction, security, and surplus resale categories critical to State and agency compliance.

    What Makes ATR Different?

    At Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR), we recognize the complex challenges facing today’s IT industry, particularly in implementing sustainable Information Technology Asset Disposition (ITAD) strategies that reduce risk and drive measurable value. Our ability to support your organization’s triple bottom line —people, planet, and profit —is what truly sets us apart.

    ATR’s proprietary asset management database enables our team to create a fully customized Statement of Work (SOW) for each customer, with individual asset-level tracking from pickup through final disposition. This powerful system ensures end-to-end transparency and compliance for every project, regardless of scale.

    Through our secure web-based portal, customers gain 24/7 access to real-time reports, scheduling tools, audit trails, and downloadable compliance documentation. This centralized platform is currently managing millions of assets and is trusted by an expanding list of Fortune 100 and 500 companies across the United States.

    Designed for scalability, ATR’s technology and services adapt to meet the needs of both small enterprises and large, distributed organizations. Our nationwide infrastructure, advanced security standards, and commitment to innovation make us the ideal partner for companies seeking to transform their IT lifecycle management while meeting sustainability and regulatory goals.

    About Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR)

    Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR) is a nationally recognized, multi-certified IT Asset Disposition (ITAD) and electronics recycling provider, proudly serving Utah since 2016. We are fully ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) registered and GSA Schedule approved, delivering secure and scalable solutions for data centers, enterprises, and government clients across the United States.

    With over 30 years of industry expertise since our founding in 1992, ATR has remained at the forefront of innovation in electronics lifecycle management. Our seasoned team of technology professionals leverages advanced tools and best practices to design tailored, cost-effective strategies that help clients optimize IT infrastructure, enhance data security, and meet or exceed sustainability objectives.

    As part of our continued national growth, ATR has opened a new, state-of-the-art facility located within the Salt Lake City retail district at:

    Advanced Technology Recycling
    1967 South 300 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84115

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    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Marshall: The Reconciliation Bill Will Give Us More Prosperity and Security

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Kansas Roger Marshall

    Senator Marshall Joins Newsmax to Discuss the Iran and Israel Conflict and the Reconciliation Package in the Senate.
    Washington – On Tuesday night, U.S. Senator Roger Marshall, M.D. (R-Kansas), joined Ed Henry on Newsmax’s The Briefing to discuss the President’s handling of the Iran and Israel conflict, the President’s push for peace worldwide, and what the Senate is doing to pass the reconciliation package. 

    Click HERE or on the image above to watch Senator Marshall’s full remarks.
    On CNN’s Iran Aftermath Report
    “I think it’s more lies from fake news. But you know, the proof will be in the pudding, and we’ll see what the pictures are in a week or two. I think it would take a year just to remove the rubble to get to where this facility once was. I just can’t imagine. …14 bombs we dropped, these were all a direct strike, the likes of which we’ve never seen. These are 30,000 pounds each – I’m going to bet on the United States Air Force. They know what they’re doing. It was a direct strike. I bet we got our mission done. We’ll wait for the final pictures here.”
    On President Trump being the ‘Peace President’:
    “President Trump is the most transparent President in history. This morning, we knew exactly where he was. He didn’t have to send an aide to go tell Bibi to knock it off – he told him in front of the whole world, and that’s who President Trump is.
    “I think that the regime in Iran is more worried about regime change than they are about nuclear weapons in the future. I think that’s what their big fear is. They’re trying to save face as well. And here’s President Trump offering another olive branch. He wants peace. He cares about the Iranian people who have been tortured and murdered by their government for decades as well. So, I think it’s another master class in negotiations by President Trump.
    “Look, we’re tired of the killing. That’s all I can say, we’re tired of the killing here. We’re tired of the killing in Gaza. We’re tired of the killing in Ukraine. President Trump wants to end all that, and when that happens, the economy, the world economy, will improve if we can get all these wars back under control.”
    On Democrats’ hypocrisy on foreign precision strikes:
    “And this is what I was talking about earlier, going from Trump obsession to Trump psychosis. And this is what you have, that they are dissociated from truth, from reality. The President has a constitutional duty to protect this nation. Iran was one week away from having a nuclear warhead – they had enough 60% enriched uranium to build 10 atomic bombs. The President had a duty to protect us. That’s what he did.
    “You pointed this out early, the hypocrisy of Obama, who did similar things. Clinton did similar things. President Nixon, of course, as well. So, this is psychosis. Thank God for President Trump that this is not phasing him, it’s not slowing him down. He’s going to do the right thing. I even saw some polling recently, 90% of Republicans support how President Trump has handled all this – I think he’s growing stronger, more popular. The United States is respected more. This is what peace through strength looks like.”
    On the next steps in the reconciliation process:
    “Like you said, President Trump’s done his job. Now it’s time for us to do our job. This bill is not perfect, but it’s going to prevent the largest tax increase for hard-working, middle-income families in the history of our country. It’s going to build 2000 miles of barrier. It’s going to give us border security funding for four years – we’re going to run out of funding very soon to secure the border. It’s going to give our military pay raises, make the military stronger for the next four years as well.
    “You know, some things that people aren’t talking about out there that I think are very important… this is going to defund Planned Parenthood. It’s going to allow us to purchase short-barreled rifles again. It’s going to give more flexibility with 529 education plans and with Pell Grants as well. … There are so many good things in this. It’s going to increase your Child Tax Credits to $2200 – If we don’t do this, it would be $1,000. So, there are so many great things in this bill. It’s going to be a rising tide that floats all boats. It’s going to give us more prosperity and security. We don’t have a choice – we need to get it done.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: LEADER JEFFRIES: “THE FACT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO RUN AWAY FROM CONFRONTING THESE SITUATIONS ON CAPITOL HILL IS VERY PROBLEMATIC”

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Hakeem Jeffries (8th District of New York)

    Today, Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries appeared on MSNBC’s Morning Joe where he emphasized that Iran is a sworn enemy of the United States and the Trump administration must follow the Constitution and stop hiding its actions in the Middle East from Congress and the American people.

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: Leader Jeffries, thanks so much for being with us. I’m wondering, do you consider his win last night in New York City, do you think it provides a roadmap for Democrats running in 2026 on how to energize the base?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: I think what’s clear is that the relentless focus on affordability had great appeal all across the City of New York. He also clearly out-worked, out-organized and out-communicated the opposition. And when someone is successful in being able to do all three things at the same time, it’s usually going to work out for them.

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: Yeah, The New York Times editorialized that he was not qualified to be mayor. Of course, The Wall Street Journal and others say that he is far too extreme on economic issues and even issues involving Israel. I’m curious what your thoughts are on him ideologically. Is that—does he have an ideology that you would want your candidates in 2026 to have?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, from the standpoint of House Democrats and what our focus has been, clearly, we have an affordability crisis in the United States of America, and our focus will continue to be on driving down the high cost of living in this country. Donald Trump promised to lower costs on day one. Costs haven’t gone down. They’re going up. He’s crashing the economy in real time, his tariffs are going to impose thousands of dollars in additional cost on everyday Americans per year and he may even be driving us toward a recession. That’s the reason why Donald Trump has become so unpopular, it’s because he’s failed the country on the economy. And so, our vision is going to be for an affordable America—work hard, play by the rules, live the good life, provide a comfortable living for yourself and for your family. That means being able to actually afford a home, educate your children, have access to healthcare, go on vacation with your children and your family every now and then and, of course, Joe, one day retire with grace and dignity.

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: Democrats look at Donald Trump’s approval ratings and you have a lot of other Democrats and people on media asking the question, why is the Democratic Party’s approval ratings, why are they lower than Donald Trump’s? I take it that’s something that you all grapple with every day. Why has the Democratic Party over the past year found itself at sort of its lowest ebb in recent history? And how do Democrats get out of that?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: Yeah, no, it’s a very important question and, listen, institutions are unpopular right now in the United States of America and that includes, of course, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. The dynamics that we have to work through, of course, one, Donald Trump and Republicans have given the American people every reason to run away from them, and it’s going to be important for us to continue to make clear why this administration failed on the economy, failed foreign policy, trying to take away healthcare from tens of millions of Americans, ripping food out of the mouths of children and seniors and veterans. Of course, all of that is problematic, all of that is unpopular. That’s why the One Big Ugly Bill has such a high disapproval rate in the United States of America. We also recognize, as Democrats, that it’s going to be important for us to articulate our affirmative agenda, what we stand for, this principle of working hard and playing by the rules, being able to live the good life, an affordable life for hardworking American taxpayers. And that is something that we’re going to have to lean into. The other thing I’d note, Joe, as you know, perhaps the most important thing in terms of a midterm election dynamic, is what’s the generic ballot say to us? Every single significant generic ballot poll has House Democrats beating House Republicans consistently, including a recent Fox News poll that had us up by about eight points. And so, at the end of the day, yes, we have to lean into improving the Democratic brand. But at the end of the day, what will be most significant, most important is how our vision contrasts with the management of this President, which has been a failure in the United States of America.

    JONATHAN LEMIRE: Leader Jeffries, let’s turn you now to the situation in Iran. We played some sound from you earlier in the show, expressing unhappiness that the administration briefing was postponed. The White House saying it’s well, it’s so Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense can be part of it later this week. Is that acceptable to you, and do you have concerns that the administration is not being fully forthcoming as to what actually transpired in Iran over the weekend?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: Yes, there’s every reason to be concerned. There was this briefing that had been scheduled to take place in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. There was absolutely no reason that we’ve been provided that it should have been canceled in terms of the important questions that need to be asked and answered by the Trump administration. What was the imminent threat to the safety and security of the United States of America that justified this strike without seeking the congressional authorization required by the Constitution? What is the assessment of the damage that was done to Iran’s nuclear program? Was it completely and totally decimated? No evidence to date has been provided to suggest that that representation made by Donald Trump is accurate. What is the plan to avoid another costly failed war in the Middle East? Why was aggressive diplomacy abandoned by the Trump administration, notwithstanding the success that had taken place under President Obama’s administration in actually pushing back Iran’s nuclear aspirations. These are questions that need to be answered by the administration. And the fact that they continue to run away from confronting these situations on Capitol Hill is very problematic.

    JONATHAN LEMIRE: So, Leader Jeffries, to that point, you and many people who have had your position in the decades before this, have expressed frustration when presidents don’t seek congressional authority for military action like this. Do you feel like that a greater good was achieved here if Iran’s program was, if not destroyed, but at least significantly delayed? What should be the next steps for this administration in this process?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, to be clear, Iran can never be allowed to become a nuclear-capable power. Iran is a sworn enemy of the United States, of Israel, of Jordan, of our allies in the Middle East, a sworn enemy of the free world. But the question, of course, is, was this strike successful in meaningfully pushing back Iran’s nuclear aspirations, or is it going to complicate things in the Middle East in ways that put our men and women in uniform, American troops and America in harm’s way? That’s simply the reason that having an all-Member briefing on Capitol Hill sooner rather than later is important so these answers can be obtained for the American people, the representatives of the American People, in the United States Congress. That is the reason, fundamentally, why it’s been Congress that was given the power to declare war, to authorize military force and when administrations act differently, they have an obligation and a responsibility to provide the facts, the evidence and the truth, justifying their actions to the American people.

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: Well, this has been the debate, and we talked about it yesterday with another Member of Congress. This has been a debate going back 30, 40, 50 years. Obviously Republicans were saying this after Barack Obama attacked Libya. Republicans were saying this with Bill Clinton in the 1990s on Kosovo. But if you’re going to have a surprise attack with B-2 bombers that are going to be going over to Iran, striking their nuclear facilities. Do you think it’s a good idea to inform 535 members of Congress before that operation takes off?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, the key here is what was the imminent nature of the threat that justified immediate military action and surprise military action—

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: Right—

    LEADER JEFFRIES: If there was no imminent threat—

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: Well, the United Nations, I’m curious if you’re concerned, like the United Nation’s nuclear agency, the IAEA had said that Iran had already enriched uranium up to 60 percent, and as you know, the jump from 60 to 100 percent is negligible, and had enough enriched uranium for several weapons. Would you consider that to be considerable enough? A considerable enough threat to strike Iran under those circumstances?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, certainly it’s a challenging situation, but one of the reasons why we need a briefing, Joe, is to have an understanding, was that enriched uranium even damaged or was it removed by the Iranians prior to the strike? We don’t know the answers to that question. It certainly is something that should be talked about, and the American people should be informed about the reality of whether it was a successful strike or not. In terms of the Iranian nuclear threat, I think we’ve all been clear that Iran can never be permitted to become nuclear capable. But the constitution is not a mere inconvenience, it’s the reality and if members of the executive branch, if hawkish individuals across the country want to change things, there’s Article I, Section 8, Clause 11. They can put forward a constitutional amendment but the framers of this country saw fit to vest this authority within the House and the Senate, not the executive branch.

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: Right. And at what point should that be triggered? Should it be triggered by every strike, like, for instance, Barack Obama in 2011 in Libya, or countless strikes by the Bush administration and the Obama administration after September the 11th? Is it every strike or is it when you are going in sending troops in? When do you think that action is triggered?

    LEADER JEFFRIES: Seems to me, and it’s a great question, Joe, that it has to relate to whether the step that was taken, one, is in response to an imminent threat to American interests, and two, whether it’s an act of war. And part of the reason why, after the fact, it’s important for Members of Congress to be able to have a briefing with the administration that is comprehensive and that gives Members the opportunity to ask questions so we can provide these answers to the American people who clearly do not want another failed, costly, deadly war in the Middle East.

    JOE SCARBOROUGH: All right. Leader Hakeem Jeffries, thank you so much for being with us.

    Full interview can be watched here.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Alleged Perpetrator of Terror Attack in Colorado Charged with Hate Crimes

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    An indictment was unsealed today in Denver charging Mohamed Sabry Soliman with 12 hate crime counts, including nine counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 249 and three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), for using Molotov cocktails to attack members of the group “Run for Their Lives” and others who had gathered in the park in front of the Boulder County Courthouse on June 1. Soliman had previously been charged by complaint with a federal hate crime offense on June 2.

    According to the indictment, on June 1, Soliman entered the park carrying both a backpack weed sprayer that contained a flammable liquid and a black plastic container that held at least 18 glass bottles and jars, all of which contained a flammable liquid and several of which had red rags stuffed through the top to act as wicks (commonly referred to as Molotov cocktails).

    At approximately 1:30 p.m., Soliman approached the Run for Their Lives group and threw two Molotov cocktails that he had ignited. When throwing one of the Molotov cocktails, he shouted, “Free Palestine!”

    A handwritten document was later recovered from the vehicle driven by Soliman. The document included the following statements: “Zionism is our enemies untill [sic] Jerusalem is liberated and they are expelled from our land,” and further described Israel as a “cancer entity.”

    The indictment further alleges that during an interview with law enforcement, Soliman stated, among other things, that he viewed “anyone supporting the exist [sic] of Israel on our land” to be “Zionist.” The defendant stated that he “decide[d] to take [his] revenge from these people” and “search[ed] the internet looking for any Zionist event.” Soliman stated that he learned of the Run for Their Lives group through internet searches for “Zionist” events and that he identified the “Zionist” group when he saw the flags and signs they carried at the courthouse.

    The case is being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Boulder Police Department.

    The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado and the Civil Rights Division’s Criminal Section are prosecuting the case.

    An indictment is merely an allegation. All individuals are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Global: Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex

    During Donald Trump’s first term, he made clear that he wanted his foreign policy to be as unpredictable as possible, stating: “I don’t want them to know what I’m thinking.”

    With the US’s recent attack on Iran, Trump certainly kept everyone in suspense. While US enemies may not have known what Trump was thinking, the problem was neither did US allies nor US legislators. Trump apparently did not bother to inform his own vice-president, J.D. Vance, when he had made the decision.

    Trump has portrayed this as a strength, that he is the only one capable of getting certain things done in foreign policy because his unpredictability and risk-taking behaviour gives him more leverage.

    But thus far he has had fewer successes than wins with this approach. His dalliance with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Trump’s first term only resulted in the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear programme.

    His great relationship with Vladimir Putin has so far led to no concessions from Moscow regarding the war in Ukraine, even causing Trump to effectively give up trying to resolve that crisis, at least for now.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    In Trump’s second term his Maga base has been a bit more divided than in his first. On the issue of tariffs, key Republican senators begged him to backpedal with concerns that the new tariffs would be catastrophic for the US economy – one of the issues that propelled him to victory. Yet he went ahead with the tariffs anyway, as some members of his base were in support.

    With the Middle East crisis, Trump supporters appeared to be mostly against the US getting involved in a foreign conflict, with “no more wars” being a common slogan on the campaign trail.

    In the lead up to the US strikes, key leaders in the Maga movement criticised the idea of the US getting involved in the conflict. Right-wing podcaster Tucker Carlson told hawkish Senator Ted Cruz that he should know far more about the regime that the senator wanted to topple. Former Trump strategist Steve Bannon and Representative Marjorie Taylor Green were also calling for the US to stay out of the conflict.

    Before the attacks, a YouGov poll showed that 60% of Americans did not want the US to get involved in the conflict, which has since increased to 80%. However when asked more specifically about support for US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as many as 94% of Maga Republicans gave their approval.

    Trump announces that the US has carried out air strikes on Iran.

    Is there voter backing?

    Trump also believes he can sell the strikes on Iranian nuclear sites as a huge win, making good on his promise to eradicate Iran’s nuclear programme. The US intelligence community is saying otherwise, but Trump has rejected this.

    Trump took an early victory lap, claiming that Iran’s nuclear programme had been “completely destroyed”. It was arguably comparable to George W. Bush’s “mission accomplished” announcement in May 2003, after Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was ousted by US-led forces. Bush’s approval ratings were as high as 70% in the immediate aftermath, but had plunged by 40 points by 2008 after five years of fighting the Iraqi insurgency that emerged in Hussein’s absence.

    Trump seems to be revelling in taking more risks and being more unpredictable. As he has become increasingly bold in his second term, he has been more willing to test the loyalty of his base when they don’t agree with his instincts. Though the isolationist wing of Maga has been critical, Trump assumes that his base will unite and rally around him.

    Trump was more careful to not betray his base in his first term. Trump had ordered strikes on Iran in 2019, but backed down at the last minute. But now he has gone so far as to suggest the door may be open to regime change in Tehran.

    With the ceasefire now in place (at least in theory), Trump is heralding his action as a huge win. Iran has backed down after a limited attack on its nuclear facilities.

    Just weeks ago, the US seemed less relevant in the Middle East, and more likely to follow Israel’s instructions than the other way around. With Trump’s confidence growing, it is now Trump that is telling Israel that he is not happy.

    For Trump the risks involved were huge. There may appear to be the potential for some short-term domestic political gains if the ceasefire holds. But Trump may not have thought through the long-term implications of his decision on stability in the Middle East more generally, or what voters will think about his foreign policy gambles when the next election rolls around.

    Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds? – https://theconversation.com/will-trumps-high-risk-iran-strategy-pay-dividends-at-home-if-the-peace-deal-holds-259736

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex

    During Donald Trump’s first term, he made clear that he wanted his foreign policy to be as unpredictable as possible, stating: “I don’t want them to know what I’m thinking.”

    With the US’s recent attack on Iran, Trump certainly kept everyone in suspense. While US enemies may not have known what Trump was thinking, the problem was neither did US allies nor US legislators. Trump apparently did not bother to inform his own vice-president, J.D. Vance, when he had made the decision.

    Trump has portrayed this as a strength, that he is the only one capable of getting certain things done in foreign policy because his unpredictability and risk-taking behaviour gives him more leverage.

    But thus far he has had fewer successes than wins with this approach. His dalliance with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Trump’s first term only resulted in the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear programme.

    His great relationship with Vladimir Putin has so far led to no concessions from Moscow regarding the war in Ukraine, even causing Trump to effectively give up trying to resolve that crisis, at least for now.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    In Trump’s second term his Maga base has been a bit more divided than in his first. On the issue of tariffs, key Republican senators begged him to backpedal with concerns that the new tariffs would be catastrophic for the US economy – one of the issues that propelled him to victory. Yet he went ahead with the tariffs anyway, as some members of his base were in support.

    With the Middle East crisis, Trump supporters appeared to be mostly against the US getting involved in a foreign conflict, with “no more wars” being a common slogan on the campaign trail.

    In the lead up to the US strikes, key leaders in the Maga movement criticised the idea of the US getting involved in the conflict. Right-wing podcaster Tucker Carlson told hawkish Senator Ted Cruz that he should know far more about the regime that the senator wanted to topple. Former Trump strategist Steve Bannon and Representative Marjorie Taylor Green were also calling for the US to stay out of the conflict.

    Before the attacks, a YouGov poll showed that 60% of Americans did not want the US to get involved in the conflict, which has since increased to 80%. However when asked more specifically about support for US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as many as 94% of Maga Republicans gave their approval.

    Trump announces that the US has carried out air strikes on Iran.

    Is there voter backing?

    Trump also believes he can sell the strikes on Iranian nuclear sites as a huge win, making good on his promise to eradicate Iran’s nuclear programme. The US intelligence community is saying otherwise, but Trump has rejected this.

    Trump took an early victory lap, claiming that Iran’s nuclear programme had been “completely destroyed”. It was arguably comparable to George W. Bush’s “mission accomplished” announcement in May 2003, after Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was ousted by US-led forces. Bush’s approval ratings were as high as 70% in the immediate aftermath, but had plunged by 40 points by 2008 after five years of fighting the Iraqi insurgency that emerged in Hussein’s absence.

    Trump seems to be revelling in taking more risks and being more unpredictable. As he has become increasingly bold in his second term, he has been more willing to test the loyalty of his base when they don’t agree with his instincts. Though the isolationist wing of Maga has been critical, Trump assumes that his base will unite and rally around him.

    Trump was more careful to not betray his base in his first term. Trump had ordered strikes on Iran in 2019, but backed down at the last minute. But now he has gone so far as to suggest the door may be open to regime change in Tehran.

    With the ceasefire now in place (at least in theory), Trump is heralding his action as a huge win. Iran has backed down after a limited attack on its nuclear facilities.

    Just weeks ago, the US seemed less relevant in the Middle East, and more likely to follow Israel’s instructions than the other way around. With Trump’s confidence growing, it is now Trump that is telling Israel that he is not happy.

    For Trump the risks involved were huge. There may appear to be the potential for some short-term domestic political gains if the ceasefire holds. But Trump may not have thought through the long-term implications of his decision on stability in the Middle East more generally, or what voters will think about his foreign policy gambles when the next election rolls around.

    Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds? – https://theconversation.com/will-trumps-high-risk-iran-strategy-pay-dividends-at-home-if-the-peace-deal-holds-259736

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Bombing Iran: has the UN charter failed?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Caleb H. Wheeler, Senior Lecturer in Law, Cardiff University

    The recent US attack on Iran’s nuclear sites has prompted renewed questions about whether the UN charter’s prohibition on the use of force is meaningful.

    Considered one of the keystones of international law, article 2(4) of the charter specifically forbids member states from using force – or threatening to do so – against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or “in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.

    A significant amount of commentary exists about what the prohibition entails. This tries to clarify ambiguities around the terms “force”, “threats of force”, “territorial integrity” and “political independence”. Although no absolute consensus has been reached, it is commonly thought that member states are prohibited from launching armed attacks against other states, or threatening to do so, unless acting in self-defence or with the authorisation of the UN security council.

    Other exceptions have been suggested. These include use of force as part of a larger humanitarian intervention operation. There’s also a question of whether it’s permissible when a state is rescuing its nationals abroad. But the legality of either of these situations is contentious and remains unsettled.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    Early in its existence, the UN made concerted efforts to protect and respect article 2(4) and to comply with its provisions. In 1950, the security council authorised UN member states to provide South Korea with the assistance necessary to repel the armed attack launched by North Korea, triggering the increased internationalisation of the Korean war.

    While article 2(4) was not explicitly mentioned in resolution 83, it was alluded to through repeated references to North Korea’s “armed attack” against South Korea. As such, it can be interpreted as an effort by the security council to use its authority to address a violation of article 2(4), even if it did not clearly frame it in those terms.

    The security council also authorised member states in 2011 to take all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya. Unfortunately, it quickly became apparent that the member states may have exceeded their authority in Libya and carried out acts that could themselves be construed as violations of the UN charter.

    Rather than just protecting civilians, as the security council resolution instructed, legal experts were concerned they had effectively intervened in a civil war. Any possible violations went unpunished by the security council.

    Security council actions taken with regard to Korea were, in many ways, the high watermark for the prohibition of the use of force, given the scale of the conflict. There are two reasons for that. First, a significant proportion of the wars taking place after 1945 have been domestic and not subject to the provisions of article 2(4). The prohibition specifically applies to a member state’s international relations so is not inapplicable when a member state attacks a group within its own borders.

    Second, the UN has failed to address many of the acts occurring after 1945 that might fall under the provisions of article 2(4). The reason for this inaction lies primarily in the flawed structure on which the UN is built.

    Chapter VII of the charter makes the security council responsible for addressing acts of aggression that would constitute uses of force under article 2(4). But it has repeatedly failed to fill that role, allowing states to commit these acts without meaningful response.

    The UN veto problem

    UN security council decisions can only be enacted when at least nine members vote in favour. This must also include the affirmative vote or abstention of all five of the permanent members: the US, Russia, China, the UK and France. This essentially gives each of the permanent members the right to veto security council resolutions.

    Permanent members have commonly used the threat of their veto in their own political interests. This can be seen in a variety of instances, most notably the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Both situations clearly involved uses of force prohibited by article 2(4), and in both situations the security council was prevented from acting by some of its permanent members.

    This inaction is consistent with the UN’s failure to address many other acts that might fall under the provisions of article 2(4), including US involvement in south-east Asia in the 1960s and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s.

    The security council’s failure to adequately perform its role has caused some to try and find a workaround. The Council of Europe, disappointed at the lack of accountability for Russia’s acts of aggression against Ukraine, has entered into an agreement with Ukraine to establish a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.

    In the special tribunal’s draft statute, an act of aggression is defined to almost exactly mirror the type of conduct that would constitute a use of force under the UN charter.

    Bombing Iran

    Which brings us to the current situation in Iran. There is little question that the US violated article 2(4) when it bombed Iranian nuclear sites in Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan on the evening of Saturday June 21. This is a clear use of force against the territory of another state.

    But even if the attacks themselves were not enough to establish a violation, they were also accompanied by US president Donald Trump’s suggestion that a regime change in Iran might be appropriate. These comments, coming immediately after the initial attack, could be construed as a threat of further force against Iran’s political independence should such a change not occur.

    Under the UN charter, such threats and uses of force should elicit a response from the security council. But just as with Iraq in 2003 and Ukraine in 2022, none will probably be forthcoming as the US will block any efforts to hold it to account.

    But equally chilling is the lack of condemnation of the US actions by its allies. German chancellor Friedrich Merz saw “no reason to criticise” the bombings, and Nato secretary general Mark Rutte insisted that the bombings did not violate international law.

    As the respected Dutch scholar of international law André Nollkaemper suggests, this refusal to condemn a clear violation of the prohibition of the use of force creates a real danger that the bar for when a state can legally use force will be lowered.

    Should that be allowed to happen it could further hollow out the prohibition, effectively making it less likely that states will be held to account for violating international law. Further, it could also lead to the return of a world where “might makes right”. This would undo more than a century of legal evolution.

    Caleb H. Wheeler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Bombing Iran: has the UN charter failed? – https://theconversation.com/bombing-iran-has-the-un-charter-failed-259751

    MIL OSI – Global Reports