Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.
The following two tables show New Zealand and the 24 other economies in the world most easily and fruitfully compared to New Zealand. The countries are sorted with the worst-performing economies (in terms of economic growth per capita) listed at the top. Thus, taking four-year compounded growth for 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023, Germany was the worst performer (ranked 25 out of 25); its economy, adjusted for population growth, shrank over four years by 1.2 percent.
The ‘top’ three countries in the table all had such negative growth.
Table 1: Rankings for 25 Advanced Economies 2019-23
2019-23*
growth pc
inflation
interest
population
rank
rank
rank
rank
Germany
25
6
9
18
Finland
24
19
9
20
Austria
23
1
9
9
United Kingdom
22
2
4
12
Canada
21
14
3
3
Spain
20
15
9
10
France
19
16
9
19
Japan
18
24
25
24
Norway
17
10
7
6
Sweden
16
9
21
15
New Zealand
15
4
1
5
Switzerland
14
25
24
7
Australia
13
11
8
4
Belgium
12
8
9
13
Portugal
11
17
9
16
Netherlands
10
3
9
8
Italy
9
12
9
23
Israel
8
22
6
1
United States
7
5
2
11
Slovenia
6
7
9
17
Denmark
5
18
23
14
Korea
4
21
5
21
Greece
3
20
9
25
Taiwan
2
23
22
22
Ireland
1
13
9
2
*
end of year data for inflation and interest
source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025
On growth, New Zealand was in the middle of the pack, with 3.9 percent compounded growth per capita; that averages out to just below one percent per annum.
On inflation and interest rates, a high ranking is generally regarded as a poor performance; although a low inflation rate may be outside the policy target zone, just as a high inflation rate may be. New Zealand had the fourth-highest CPI inflation over that four-year period, comparing consumer prices in December 2023 with December 2019. In December 2023, consumer prices were 20.6% higher than in December 2019. The country with highest compounded inflation was Austria with 22.4%, and the lowest Switzerland with 5.5%.
New Zealand had the highest compounded interest rates for that period; it had top-ranking for high-interest. If $1,000 was ‘invested’ at the Official Cash Rate each December from December 2020, and reinvested each December for four years in total, the accumulated amount would have been $1,111. Next highest were the United States and Canada. This ranking gives a sense of the monetary policy in the four years after the 2020 covid wave; New Zealand had the tightest monetary policy for the period as a whole, meaning the strongest ‘anti-inflationary policy’. If you see Table 2 below, you will see that New Zealand had the lowest economic growth in 2024, a direct consequence of that tighter monetary policy stance.
On interest rates, we note that the countries in the Euro currency zone all experience the same monetary policy setting. It means that those Euro countries which are more aggressively anti-inflation tend to resort most to fiscal consolidation, a euphemism for government retrenchment and austerity. There is no simple measure for tight fiscal policy; the Budget deficit/surplus is often used incorrectly because government retrenchment significantly undermines government revenue.
On inflation, we note that some of those northern European countries which we normally expect to have low inflation actually had the highest inflation: Austria, Netherlands, Germany. One country similar to New Zealand on inflation and interest, and with zero growth per capita, was the United Kingdom. Australia was better than New Zealand on all three measures: growth, inflation, and interest. And much the same as New Zealand on population growth.
Table 2: Rankings for 25 Advanced Economies 2023-24
2023-24*
growth pc
inflation
interest
population
rank
rank
rank
rank
New Zealand
25
13
6
2
Austria
24
15
8
15
Canada
23
17
7
1
Finland
22
22
8
12
Ireland
21
24
8
3
Germany
20
9
8
20
Israel
19
3
2
5
Switzerland
18
25
24
4
United Kingdom
17
10
1
6
Netherlands
16
2
8
11
Belgium
15
1
8
14
Australia
14
11
5
13
Japan
13
6
25
25
Sweden
12
20
22
17
Italy
11
23
8
22
France
10
21
8
19
Portugal
9
4
8
10
Norway
8
14
2
7
Slovenia
7
19
8
18
United States
6
8
2
9
Korea
5
16
20
21
Spain
4
7
8
8
Greece
3
5
8
24
Denmark
2
18
21
16
Taiwan
1
12
23
23
*
end of year data for inflation and interest
source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025
Table 2 shows the same data items for 2024. Of particular interest is the 2024 growth and inflation rates in 2024, compared to the interest rates for the preceding four years. New Zealand, with the toughest monetary policy over a longer period certainly got the recession it asked for; and was the median country for CPI inflation in 2024, virtually bang-on the policy target. (Was the pain worth it?)
It’s important to note that many countries with significantly lower inflation than New Zealand did not have anything like the very high policy interest rates that New Zealand was subjected to; eg Sweden, Italy, France, Denmark, Slovenia. Any beneficial link from high interest rates to low inflation remains moot; and it is clear that high-interest-rate policies do much damage to the wider economy. While Japan had higher inflation in 2024 than New Zealand, we note that Japan’s overall increase in consumer prices in the half-decade was much lower than New Zealand’s. Japan’s inflationary pressures are almost entirely imported, with New Zealand’s domestically generated CPI inflation being significantly greater than Japan’s.
We should note that southern Europe was doing particularly well in 2024. Although Greece’s per capita growth is fuelled in part by substantial population losses. Spain, on the other hand, is getting its population back. Further north, the Austrian economy is looking particularly problematic; it’s no wonder the ‘far-right’ political party did so well there in elections at the end of 2024 (ten percentage points higher than the Hitler-led NSDAP party got in Germany in 1930). And Finland is not looking happy either, despite low inflation.
United States, United Kingdom and Australia continued to have above-median inflation in 2024, despite – or, more likely, because of – their continued perseverance with high-interest monetary policies.
On population growth we see that Canada has been the overall ‘winner’, presumably in the sense that it both attracts and accepts immigrants. Surprisingly, in 2024 Australia slumped in its population growth, whereas New Zealand did not. I suspect that 2025 will show more immigration in Australia than New Zealand.
Finally
All is not well in the New Zealand economy. And it’s also quite unwell in some other countries, especially the North European Euro-zone countries, and the United Kingdom. And the United States, with its tight monetary policies, seems to have only averted the fate of the United Kingdom and New Zealand (and Germany and Austria) by virtue of stimulus to its military-industrial complex. Or, strictly speaking, to its military complex. Civilian industry remains weak in the USA.
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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.
Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.
I just heard on Radio New Zealand a claim by a British commentator, Hugo Gye (Political Editor of The i Paper), that the United Kingdom (among other countries) has a major public debt crisis, and that if nothing is done about it (such as what Rachel Reeves – Chancellor of the Exchequer – is wanting to do), then in 2070 the public debt to GDP ratio would reach an ‘extreme’ level of 270% of GDP (gross domestic product). He added for good measure that no country in the world has public debt at a level anything like that. (Refer UK: Macron meets the King, RNZ, 10 July 2025.)
So I checked the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025, and found the following about Japan, the world’s fourth-largest national economy, looking at years from 2010 to 2024, with respect to government gross debt and general government financial deficit:
minimum debt206% (in 2010)
maximum debt 258% (in 2020)
average debt 234%
current debt 237% (in 2024)
projected debt 232% (in 2030)
minimum deficit 2.3% (in 2023)
maximum deficit 9.1% (in 2010)
average deficit 5.3%
current deficit 2.5% (in 2024)
projected deficit 5.3% (in 2030)
Japan does not have a ‘cost of living crisis’. Below is a list of Japan’s interest (source: tradingeconomics.com) and inflation rates (again the reference period is 2010 to 2024):
minimum interest-0.1% (in 2016-2024)
maximum interest 0.25% (in 2024)
average interest 0.0%
current interest 0.5% (in 2025)
minimum inflation -0.7% (in 2010)
maximum inflation 3.3% (in 2023)
average inflation 0.9%
current inflation 2.4% (in 2025)
projected inflation 2.0% (in 2030)
Japan is a prosperous country, with high life expectancy (85, the highest in the world for large economy nations), a very high ratio of retired people to working-age people, low inflation, and low interest rates. It was able to host the Olympic Games in 2021 without any financial fuss, and is about to host World Expo 2025. It has some of the world’s most sophisticated infrastructure.
Despite its high government debt – actually, to a large extent because of its high government debt – Japan’s is a creditor economy. Japan is not in debt to the rest of the world. Japan’s national debt is non-existent. Japan’s government debt is widely acknowledged, however, to be the world’s highest. Too many commentators – using wilful laziness – conflate national debt with government debt.
Japan’s is the world’s most successful twenty-first century large economy. It operates by Japanese savers lending much of their savings to their government at very low interest rates; those savers prefer to lend to their government rather than to pay high taxes to their government. Prosperous Japanese people are not greedy in the way that many rich westerners are. Their mantra is ‘private wealth, public wealth’; not ‘private wealth, public poverty’. Japan’s is not a zero-sum economy; in a zero-sum economy the prosperity of some comes at the expense of the impoverishment of others.
Hugo Jye was negligently dishonest – a case of wilful blindness or ignorance – in claiming that no countries had anything like 270% of GDP government debt. Western economists and financial commentators are likewise wilfully negligent in failing to alert their countries’ governments that there is an alternative – in plain sight – to our woeful policies of financial suffocation.
Note about three other economies
Within the European Union, it is rare for professional commentators to sing the praises of Spain and Italy. Spain, with 101% public debt, is enjoying a low inflation economic boom. It has a life expectancy of 83, higher than all European Union countries other than Malta and Luxembourg. Spain has had only government budget deficits since the surpluses of the years leading up to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (a crisis which hit Spain particularly badly). Despite – no, because of – these accumulated deficits, Spain’s public debt (as a percent of GDP) has been falling since 2020; the deficits stimulated GDP. Spain had one year of high inflation (8.3% in 2022; the next highest since 2020 were 3.05% in 2011 and 3.0% in 2021); it recovered very quickly from that one year. Spain’s current interest rate is 2.15%.
Italy had 135% government debt to GDP in 2024. Its people’s life expectancy is high, marginally lower than Spain’s and slightly higher than New Zealand’s; significantly higher than Germany, Netherlands and the United States. Italy’s economy has been growing faster than the European Union average. Its public debt (compared to GDP) has been falling despite government deficits.
Spain and Italy are doing relatively well despite having among the highest older-person to younger-person age ratios in Europe. Spain is pro-actively utilising immigrant labour, whereas Northern Europe is scapegoating immigrants. And Spain, unlike most of Europe, is not looking to its ‘Defence’ budget to boost future growth.
Türkiye’s public debt has fallen from a high (since 2006) of 40% in 2021 to under 30% in 2023. This is despite double-digit inflation since 2016 and an average budget deficit since 2011 of 5.3%. While high inflation has benefitted Türkiye by bringing about negative real interest rates (meaning interest payments effectively flow from richer to poorer, generally benefitting indebted Turkish businesses and households), current interest rate settings look like suffocating for Türkiye for the remainder of the 2020s. (This monetary policy of suffocation is also true for Australia in 2025, with its particularly hawkish Reserve Bank at present.)
Despite challenging geopolitical and climatic circumstances, Türkiye has, at least until 2024, managed to achieve rising living standards for a substantial majority of its people. Unlike the United Kingdom and some northern European countries, Türkiye has not been a crisis economy despite (or because of) a reputation for unsound public finance.
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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.
Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.
Capitalism is in crisis, and our species’ imagination to save ourselves is sorely lacking. There are of course understandings out there, and solutions; but they are so heavily gate-kept that conversations about saving ourselves are well-nigh impossible. It remains a puzzle why those political and intellectual leaders who would most benefit from a regime of socially inclusive capitalism have been so avid in their anti-reform gatekeeping.
The missing ingredient from the capitalism that most of us know, or know of, is ‘public equity’. Capitalism is presented to us all as a system of markets, individualism, laws, and private property rights. The crisis of capitalism can be addressed through the development of a set of public property rights, which we may call ‘public equity’. It is the establishment of public property rights that is necessary to democratise capitalism.
New Zealand’s surprising history of universal income
At the end of my Zero-Sum Fiscal Narratives (22 May 2025), I suggested that we need to promote a narrative of “public equity over pay equity as an efficient means to correct destabilising inequality”.
In global capitalism, the first real narrative of public equity – even though it wasn’t called that – belongs to the New Zealand social security reforms of 1938. And the particular policy announced in those reforms, and implemented in the 1940 financial year, was known as Universal Superannuation. This was the activation of a human right; the right of a country’s citizens, once they reached a certain age, to receive a private income in the form of a public dividend. Irrespective of race, sex, or creed.
At its initial conception, the ‘Super’ was modest; but was projected to grow, in accordance with affordability constraints and fiscal prioritisation. Most good big things start with small beginnings. An annual payment of $20 was set to commence in 1940. And it commenced in 1940. And the 1938 universal welfare state came in under budget (refer Elizabeth Hanson, The Politics of Social Security, 1980).
The concept of Universal Superannuation proved to be extremely popular; a policy from the radical centre that pleased most of the public, though – until its popularity was demonstrated in 1938 – few of the politicians and other ‘opinion leaders’. The policy came to be because Michael Joseph Savage felt that his Labour Government had to come good on its most important 1935 promise, and because the ‘left’ and ‘right’ proposals favoured by each of the two main factions of the Labour Government (fortunately) cancelled out in the political numbers game.
The universal proposal came through the middle, between left-wing attempts to radically extend redistributive measures favouring working-class families and Labour right-wing attempts to bring in an actuarial pension system based on the supposed ‘miracle’ of compound interest. The latter idea, pushed by the finance industry, was to create a contributory ‘money mountain’ from which pensions from some future date would be paid to retired working men. (This idea disclaimed the obvious reality that all spending of pension income – not just public pensions – represents a slice of present [not past] economic output.)
(On the miracle of compound interest, it is useful to imagine persons born around 1920 saving regular percentages of their salaries from early adulthood until age 65. Such persons became rich from home-ownership, not from compound interest.)
This retirement-income policy based on public equity was not successfully exported to the wider world. The war got in the way, and unconditional non-means-tested payments to citizens of a certain age never caught on internationally. The post-depression environment – a relatively sexually-egalitarian time – was displaced by a post-war environment, which favoured men. The more common post-war welfare model was, in its various guises, ‘social insurance’. And even Universal Superannuation in New Zealand came to be seen, increasingly, through a ‘social insurance lens’; recipients widely believed it was a contributory scheme.
The aim of initially Labour, and subsequently National, was to gradually raise the amount of Super paid until it would render redundant (and henceforth displace) the alternative means-tested Age Benefit. National became increasingly committed to the concept of universal income support, favouring taxable universal benefits which would in practice confer more to each low-income recipient than to each high-income recipient. In the 1950s and 1960s, income tax rates were much more heavily graduated than they have been since the 1980s. (‘Graduation’ of income tax rates means higher ‘marginal tax rates’ faced by people with higher incomes.)
By 1970, the full convergence between Universal Superannuation and the Age Benefit had still not been achieved. Retired persons would still choose either US or AB. The convergence eventually took place, in 1976.
The universality of Super was lost twice, by the same man, who came from ‘working class aristocracy’: Roger Douglas.
Douglas replaced Super with an actuarial (‘money mountain’ for men) system in 1974; a system which became ‘the election issue’ in 1975. This plan was conceived in the days before Equal Pay for women; ie conceived when ‘labour’ was still a highly male-gendered word in certain Labour circles. (Equal pay for women was legislated for in 1972, when Robert Muldoon was Finance Minister.)
Robert Muldoon won a resounding victory – like Savage in 1938 – by committing to Universal Superannuation (albeit under the name National Superannuation). Muldoon, when recreating Super, did so by retiring the Age Benefit, leaving Super as the only publicly-sourced retirement income.
About Douglas’s 1974 scheme, Margaret McLure (A Civilised Community, 1998) wrote (pp.190/91): “Douglas’ plan was rooted in early and mid-twentieth century English labour history… It drew on the 1904 ideas of Joseph Rowntree which had helped shape English social insurance, and on the English Fabian Society’s promotion of a union’s industrial pension plan of 1954… It rewarded the contribution of the fulltime long-serving male worker and provided him [and his dependent wife] with comfort and security in old age.” The full earnings-related benefit would only be payable on turning 60 to life-long workers born after 1957. It was less generous to others, and represented a backward-looking “narrow vision for the late twentieth century”. While more like the current bureaucratic Australian scheme (with its many hidden costs) than today’s New Zealand Superannuation, the Douglas scheme had inbuilt disincentives for people of ‘retirement age’ to continue in some form of paid work after becoming eligible for a pension. An older population – as in the 2030s – requires older workers with work-life flexibility.
Douglas, in the later-1980s, again removed the universality of Super by introducing a ‘tax surcharge’ on superannuitants’ privately-sourced income, an indirect way of converting Super into a means-tested Age Benefit. Douglas renamed National Superannuation ‘Guaranteed Retirement Income’. (Douglas liked the word ‘guaranteed’, using it as a label for other benefits too. ‘Guaranteed’ implies a ‘safety net – ie an income top-up – rather than an unconditional private income payable to all citizens of a certain age. Income top-ups come with poverty traps; very high [sometimes 100%] ‘effective marginal tax rates’, when increased income from one source displaces [rather than adding to] income from another source.)
Super was restored in 1997 as a universal income when Winston Peters was Treasurer in a coalition government; Peters, the heir to the universalist tradition within the National Party as it once was, has enabled Savage’s enlightened ‘public equity’ reform to survive to the present day, albeit as an international outlier.
A Right. Or a Benefit?
The presumption against universalist principles has come from Generation X, the generation born either side of 1970 who have never known any form of capitalism other than 1980s’ and post-1980s’ neoliberalism. (And noting that Roger Douglas was the poster-‘child’ in New Zealand of the neoliberal revolution which acted to restore capitalism to its neoclassical basics; markets, individualism, laws, private property, and public sector minimalism).
This week I read this from Liam Dann, journalist on all matters relating to capitalism, and very much a ‘Gen Xer’, who wrote: Inside Economics: Should you take New Zealand Superannuation if you don’t need it? 4 June 2025. Dann is trying to resolve the clear view of his parents’ generation that Super is a ‘right’, against his own view that Super is an age ‘benefit’; a benefit that should be bureaucratically ‘targeted’. (A benefit in this sense is a redistributive ‘transfer’. By contrast, an income ‘right’ is a shareholder’s equity dividend; in a public context, the word ‘shareholder’ equates to the word ‘citizen’.)
Liam Dann asks an excellent question though – “Should rich people opt out of NZ Super?” – albeit by misconstruing the opting process. New Zealand Super is in fact an ‘opt-in’ benefit, as Dann comes to realise. Much of the present opposition to Super comes from people who would rather that the money paid to the rich was instead paid to bureaucrats to stop the rich from getting it. In reality, there is probably a significant number of rich older people who don’t get Super because they never bothered applying to MSD to get it. As Dann notes, the government is remiss in not collecting data on the numbers of eligible people who do not opt in to NZS. (And journalists, before Dann, have been remiss in not asking for that data.)
We should also note that, in spite of indications that ‘first-world’ life expectancies are levelling out, and indeed falling in some countries, Denmark is looking to raise its age of eligibility for a public pension to 70. In my view, this is moving in the wrong direction. Nevertheless, it is possible to both move in the direction that I am suggesting below, while raising what might be called the age of ‘privileged retirement’, meaning the age at which older people are entitled, as of right, to a higher pension or pension-like income than other citizens.
A Universal Basic-Income has come to mean an unconditional publicly-sourced private income, available to all ‘citizens’ above a certain age, which satisfies some kind of sufficiency test. Thus, a UBI is meant to be sufficient, on its own; a ‘stand-alone income’. New Zealand Super (NZS) – the present name for Universal Superannuation (from 1940) and National Superannuation (from 1976) – is such an income, designed to meet a sufficiency test. In particular, the ‘married-rate’ Super – $24,776 for a year before tax – is a UBI in Aotearoa New Zealand, payable to people aged over 65 who meet a certain definition of ‘citizenship’; a definition that neither discriminates on the basis of sex, race, nor creed.
However, a UBI is considered, by many of its advocates, to be a sufficient adult income, not just a retirement income. Just as NZS is in practice, a UBI needs to be a complement to wages, not a substitute for wages.
Technically, it is very simple to convert the ‘married-rate’ NZS into a UBI for all adults. Just two things would need to be done: lower the age of entitlement to 18, and pay for it by removing the concessionary income tax brackets (10.5%, 17.5%, 30%). (The higher ‘non-married’ rates would continue to apply to people over 65.) Under this proposal, there would no longer be MSD benefits nor student allowances, though there would still be some benefit supplements for MSD to process, such as Accommodation Supplements and NZS ‘single-rate’ supplements.
This UBI proposal would not be fiscally neutral; though it would be less unaffordable than many people would guess. (In practice, a fiscal stimulus at present could pay for itself in increased growth-revenue in just a few years; it might even ‘return New Zealand to surplus’ sooner than realistic current projections.) For present superannuitants working part-time, it would represent a small reduction in after-tax income, given that they would be paying income tax on their wages at what is commonly known today as the “secondary tax rate”.
Other than fiscal non-neutrality, two objections to such a UBI would be these: New Zealand has too many workers who would not meet the present NZS definition of ‘citizen’; and the UBI would be too generous to young people not working and living with their parents.
So, while it might be less unworkable than many people would expect, this instant-UBI policy is not one I would favour.
SUI
SUI stands for Simple Universal-Income. Self. We note that the prefix ‘sui-‘ means ‘self’; equity rights are a development of liberal individualism, not of ‘socialism’ or ‘communism’. Some people equate public property rights with Marxian collectivism, with the ‘nationalisation of the means of production’. They couldn’t be more wrong. Collectivist schemes involve full government retention of citizens’ incomes; they are schemes of government control; completely the opposite of universal income.
A universal private income drawn as a dividend from public wealth is individualism, not collectivism. Indeed, the natural political home of reformed capitalism is the political centre-right, not the left; albeit the new centre-right, not the privileged and stale centre-right politics which New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon has so far represented. A ‘universal private income drawn from public wealth’ is different from a ‘privileged private income drawn from public wealth’.
It would be very simple to create an SUI in Aotearoa New Zealand. New Zealand’s income-tax scale has five rates: 10.5%, 17.5%, 30%, 33% and 39%. The 33% rate has formed the backbone of the New Zealand tax scale since 1988. As with the UBI example above, the SUI proposal simply eliminates the 10.5%, 17.5% and 30% rates. In return every adult economic citizen – effectively every ‘tax resident’ – would receive an annual SUI (ie dividend) of $10,122.50; that’s $195.66 per week. For all people receiving Benefits – including Superannuation, Student Allowances, Family Tax Credits – the first $195.66 per week of their benefit payments would be recategorised as their SUI dividend.
That’s it. (The dividend of $10,122.50 is simply a grossing-up of the maximum benefit accrued through those lower tax rates.) Unlike the UBI option, all existing benefits and bureaucratic infrastructure would be retained; at least until they can be reconfigured in an advantageous way. From an accounting viewpoint, existing Benefits would be split into unconditional and conditional components.
It means no change for all persons earning over $78,100 per year ($1,502 per week) before tax. And it means no change for all persons receiving total Benefit income (after tax) more than $195.66 per week. (These people could continue to be called ‘Beneficiaries’, but without stigma. Without stigma, Superannuitants can be happy to be classed as Beneficiaries.) People whose present total weekly Benefit income is currently less than $195.66 would cease to be called Beneficiaries; they would cease to be clients of the MSD, the Ministry of Social Development.
What this means is that most New Zealanders, on Day One, would see no change in their bank accounts. Nobody would receive a lower income. And for most who receive a higher income, it would be only higher by small amount.
This begs the question, if most people’s disposable incomes do not increase, or only increase by a trivial amount, then why bother? The important societal benefits would be dynamic; would be around incentives.
First, individuals (of all adult ages, male and female, regardless of their position in their households) would be incentivised to take employment risks – including self-employment risks – if they receive a core unconditional income that they do not stand to lose when risk doesn’t pay off. Labour supply is boosted; as is the economy’s ‘surge capacity’ (technically, the elasticity of labour supply increases).
Second, lower-paid individuals – many of whom are women – would have increased bargaining power (through unions and as individuals) and would not have to resort to contestable narratives such as ‘pay equity’ in order to achieve a fair wage.
Third, individuals would be better able to negotiate weekly hours of work to optimise their work-life balance. The SUI would minimise the present ‘twin evils’ of overwork and underwork.
Fourth, and especially for today’s high-income workers, the SUI represents an unconditional form of income insurance to facilitate the acquisition of basic needs during a period of what economists call ‘frictional unemployment’; being ‘between jobs’. Or a period of ‘voluntary unemployment’, such as attending to the health needs of another family member.
Fifth, the SUI would count as a democratic dividend, an acknowledgement that each society’s wealth arises from both (present and past) private and public enterprise, and that – for that reason – both private and public dividends should be part of societies’ income mix. All citizens would have both private ‘skin in the game’ and a sense of ‘public inclusion’, motivating all citizens to have an ‘us’ mentality, rather than a divisive and exclusionary ‘them and us’ mentality.
The SUI is my preferred option for New Zealand for the year 2026.
BUI
BUI stands for ‘Basic Universal-Income’. In the New Zealand context, it could be easily created by removing the 10.5%, 17.5%, and 33% income brackets. Thus, except for high-income-earners (say the five-percenters), there would be an effective flat tax set at 30% of production income. It would work much as the SUI.
I have calculated that, for New Zealand, the BUI would be $7,779.50 per year, effectively $150 per week.
To partially offset the tax cut that would be payable to people earning more than $78,100 per year, the income threshold for the 39% tax rate should come down (to $146,000, from $180,000). Tax cuts would be received by all persons earning between $78,100 and $180,000, with the maximum tax cut of just over $2,000 (just over $39 per week) being payable to someone earning $146,000.
With this BUI, compared to the SUI, there would be more day-one beneficiaries (ie more better-off people) on higher incomes, and fewer day-one beneficiaries on lower incomes. Nobody would be worse off. The dynamic benefits discussed in relation to the SUI would still apply.
This is a policy that the Act Party should embrace, given its stated commitments to liberal-democracy, individualism, enterprise, and the future of capitalism.
A wider benefit of BUI is that it could represent a small beginning to something bigger and better. Just as with Universal Superannuation, the ‘establishment fear-factor’ soon dissipated. And universal benefits came to be embraced in the 1950s by both ‘left’ and ‘right’ in Aotearoa New Zealand; a decade in which there were very few persons of working age relative to persons classifiable as ‘dependents’.
HUI
HUI represents Hybrid Universal-Income; a mix of UBI and SUI. What would happen is that the age of entitlement to New Zealand Superannuation would be lowered, but not all the way to age 18. Today the ‘threshold age’ is 65. Under a HUI, all adult tax residents under the new threshold age would receive a SUI, on the same basis as described above.
A variant of HUI would be more flexible; a flexible Hybrid Basic Income. Everyone between say 30 and 70 would be able to have a UBI for say ten years; otherwise they would have an SUI. (This might be a policy that would work well for Denmark.)
Today a large proportion of babies are born to mothers aged 30 to 40. Many of these mothers might prefer to have children while in their early thirties, but, for financial reasons, end up having their children later. If all adults could choose when to have their ten years UBI, I could imagine many women choosing their thirties, and many men choosing their forties. Thus, women would be able to leave paid work to a greater or lesser extent around when they would most like to have children, and their partners could take their UBI after the mothers of their children have returned to fulltime employment. For persons in their forties, parenting non-infant children fits with the life-stage when many people would like to be establishing their own businesses and becoming employers. This would create incentives to both working-class (and bourgeois) human reproduction, more enterprise, and more employment opportunities in the private sector for youngish and oldish workers.
A further variant of this variant could be to extend the SUI to a UBI for individuals over 60 who lose their jobs on account of redundancy. This would help the many women such as those who were caught out by the Labour Government’s barely-noticed 2020 decision to remove NZS entitlements to ‘non-qualifying-spouses’ (ie people who become redundant, mostly women, whose life-partners are already on New Zealand Superannuation). (We might also note that the Sixth Labour Government – 2017 to 2023 – cut the after-tax wages of all women [and men too] by not inflation-adjusting income-tax bracket thresholds. Looked at in full historical context, Labour governments in New Zealand have not been kind to women.)
GUI
We might note that the UBI case, first-mentioned above, would be very close to a Generous Universal-Income. In this case, only the 39% income-tax rate would be retained, and the UI would be an annual GUI dividend of $20,922.50 (ie $402.36 per week). All income would be taxed at 39% and all economic citizens would receive a weekly private (but publicly-sourced) dividend of just over $400.
Conclusion
The UI policies presented above (possibly excepting the GUI, and the UBI) reflect a liberal non-establishment centre or centre-right political perspective. The GUI and UBI, in practice, realistically reflect only future policy directions (given their clear fiscal non-neutrality), whereas the SUI, BUI, and HUI all represent changes that could be easily implemented in the May 2026 Budget.
My preference, for immediate implementation, is the SUI. In inclusive capitalist societies, public equity returns to individuals are a right. Much of societies’ capital resource is not privately owned.
As in 1938 to 1940, New Zealand can set an example for the democratic reformation of global capitalism. Unfortunately, the 1938 to 1940 reform – Universal Superannuation – was not taken up by an otherwise distracted world. (Sadly, New Zealand’s misguided 1989 monetary policy ‘reform’ – the Reserve Bank Act – was taken up by a then-attentive wider world. Unnecessarily high interest rates have caused huge grief on a global scale.)
We can choose to have a 2026 reform – a technically simple reform, that, through being promoted to the wider world as an example of how capitalism can be democratic and inclusive – which can have beneficial global consequences. Do our leaders have the intellect, imagination and courage that Michael Joseph Savage revealed in 1938? Hopefully ‘yes’, but realistically ‘no’.
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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.
Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.
The central narrative of New Zealand’s Minister of Finance, Nicola Willis, is ‘There is only so much money to go around’. (For example, her interview on RNZ on 20 May, Willis on her second Budget, price of butter. The interview also covers, in the usual subservient way our media addresses these issues, Willis’s diversionary narrative to scapegoat supermarkets.)
A false zero-sum narrative
This zero-sum narrative about money is virtually uncontested, certainly in the mainstream media. Yet it’s not only sub-standard economics, it is also sub-standard theology. It is appropriate to debate whether God-made-Man or Man-made-God; there should be no such contest about Money-made-Man versus Man-made-Money.
Money is not (or should not be) God. The one fundamental truth about money, is that it is a human creation; Man made money. Money is a social technology, not a fundamental poverty-imposing constraint. In modern capitalism, central banks supervise the money supply, and can create money at will. The creation of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 1934 was a critical component of the post-Depression recovery and expansion from 1935 to 1940.
In modern capitalism, central banks act as lenders of last resort and governments as borrowers (and insurers) of last resort. This process of central bank lending and government borrowing is the engine of global capitalism, just as the sun’s energy is the engine that makes ongoing life on Earth possible.
Japan versus Germany
It is instructive to compare the economic fortunes of Japan and Germany this century.
Japan developed the new macroeconomics during its ‘horrible decade’, the 1990s. Its economy has thrived since 2000. The basis of its success, in a country with a financially conservative middle class and low inequality, is to borrow from its large pool of savers, rather than to overtax them. Japan has a stable public debt, sitting at around 240% of GDP since before 2015. And it has a stable fiscal deficit of around 4% each year. It has had interest rates around zero for more than a decade; currently 0.5%. Inflation peaked at 4% in 2023 (in the context of a falling Yen), up from 1% in early 2022. Japan’s current unemployment rate is 2.5%, having peaked at 3% in 2020.
Germany has taken the mercantilist line, which – in essence – posits money as God. It has imposed fiscal austerity on itself since 2010, and on the European Union which it then dominated. And it’s now in a state of socio-economic crisis, with a similar economic growth profile to New Zealand. In its last election (in February), using MMP, only 45% of voters voted for the two major parties. In the more recent opinion polls that support has fallen to around 40%. In the former ‘Communist’ East Germany, support for the two major parties combined is under 25%.
Germany, like most countries in the west, has stubbornly refused to learn from Japan. Fiscal counternarratives are effectively suppressed.
Debt ceiling?
New Zealand, when Grant Robertson was Minister of Finance, decided to impose a de facto ‘debt ceiling’ of 50% of GDP. Nicola Willis – inspired by Ruth Richardson’s (now entrenched) 1994 ‘Fiscal Responsibility Act’ – is entrenching this 50% debt ceiling. Thankfully for our great-grandparents, Michael Joseph Savage (and his Finance Minister, Walter Nash) did not operate similar ‘debt ceiling’ policies.
A policy to cut-back on government spending also has the effect of cutting back government revenue. That’s very basic Keynesian macroeconomics. If we buy less, we produce less, we earn less, and we pay less tax than we otherwise would. The combination of reduced government spending and reduced government revenue is anti-growth; pushed to its limits it represents a capitalist death spiral. The western world found a way out of such a spiral in the 1930s; before World War Two (WW2), but too late to prevent that war and the megadeath which came with it.
A true zero-sum identity
In a world in which the private sector – businesses and households – collectively chooses to run financial surpluses (choosing saving at debt repayment over borrowing), then governments must run deficits. When the world is divided into two sectors – private and public – the successful achievement of a surplus by one of those two sectors must be accompanied by a deficit in the other of those two sectors. In essence, governments can only – and have only – run surpluses or ‘balanced Budgets’ when businesses are running financial deficits. For the global economy as a whole, by definition there can be neither a financial surplus nor a deficit; financial balances add to zero, as an accounting identity.
Business sector deficits were substantially the norm in the twentieth century, but not since about 1990. Government balanced budgets were possible – though not normal – for much of the previous century. Japan met its new challenge in the 1990s, at a time when Japanese businesses were forced by their creditors to run substantial financial surpluses; substantial government deficits were a mathematically necessary part of the solution.
Inequality and increased private risk
The twenty-first century is characterised by high – and often-growing – levels of inequality in the western capitalist world. It is also characterised as a period of growing private risk, including the risk that even rich people (eg the ‘ten-percenters’) will struggle to afford life-saving medications for cancer and other ills. This twenty-first century private risk-profile means that the household component of the private sector is trying to run bigger surpluses. This is a kind of insurance situation; people feel they need ever bigger amounts of contingency savings to cover personal or familial ‘rainy days’. Japanese people led the way in this respect, in the 1990s.
This drive for ever bigger private surpluses – which includes things like debt repayments and retirement savings – means that, for capitalism to survive, governments must run bigger deficits; indeed ‘structural deficits’, in the way that Japan does.
Government spending on big guns.
In one sense the capitalist world – belatedly – is saving itself in this way through fiscal expansion; though only by trying to destroy itself in another way. Hitlernomics – a form of Keynesian economics – maintained de facto or de jure debt ceilings for civilian-oriented public spending, while allowing for virtual unlimited military spending on ‘big guns’. Germany explicitly moved in this direction in March 2025, by using a voted-out ‘lame duck’ parliament to authorise the removal of the de jure debt limit on military spending (and limited ‘infrastructure’ spending).
Urgent need for contestable democratic counter-narratives
We urgently need a democratic counter-narrative, which promotes public debt at least as a stabilising force (and in some cases to take priority over private debt). And a complementary counter-narrative promoting public-equity over pay-equity as an efficient means to correct destabilising inequality, given that excessive inequality is also a deathknell of capitalism. Capitalism depends on selling wage-goods to wage-workers.
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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.
Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.
Government-owned Kiwirail is supposed to be presiding over the New Zealand Main Trunk (Railway) Line, from Auckland to Invercargill. As such it runs a ferry service (The Interislander) between New Zealand’s North and South Islands.
We are being told by Kiwirail (and see today’s report on Radio NZ) that the only rail-enabled roll-on roll-off ferry – the Aratere – will cease operations in August this year, five years before its putative successor ferries will commence operations.
There is a simple conceptual solution, which covers both the short run and the long-run.
Kiwirail could relocate the Interislander’s South Island terminus to Lyttelton, the rail-accessible port of Christchurch. Indeed this should have become policy after the dramatic 2016 Kaikoura earthquake which destroyed both railway and highway around Kaikoura, halfway between Wellington and Christchurch; both road and rail main trunk. Not only is the present route precarious, but also it is so much ‘greener’ for both road and rail traffic between the North Island and the southern 85% of the South Island (by population) to travel by sea between Wellington and Christchurch. That is, the bulk of interisland vehicle travel undertaken directly by sea is more sustainable than a journey by sea between Wellington and Picton followed by a long 340km Picton to Christchurch land journey.
The suggested solution is that The Interislander should operate out of Lyttelton from about 2030, leaving Bluebridge to service the Wellington Picton route. If that were to happen, then the Aratere could stay in service until 2030; because the new facilities suited to the new ships – at least the South Island facilities – would not have to be on the same site as Picton’s present rail-ship facilities.
Last year I wrote to MPs from all five parties, before it was too late to cancel the shipping order for the cancelled iRex project, including the Labour MP for Lyttelton. Only the Green Party bothered to reply to me. And even they were unenthusiastic about the idea of the Interislander shifting to Lyttelton; their lack of interest came across as more a matter of political priority than as an argument about economics or sustainability.
Maybe I am stupid, and I simply cannot see the obvious reasons why a shift back to Lyttelton cannot happen. But I really think we should have a national conversation about the restoration of ferry services between Wellington and Lyttelton; and with the current consciousness about the future of rail being a very important stimulus to that conversation.
After all, for over 100 years, before 1960, Wellington to Lyttelton was the essential ‘main trunk’ link between the two islands. The change-around happened around 1960 because the previous Wellington to Picton service had become so run-down that something had to be done about it. And that there just happened to be a relatively new railhead at Picton. After 1960, the Lyttelton service was doomed to fail when it became a one-ship service in 1968, after the tragic demise of the then state-of-the-art Wahine.
Why don’t we have national conversations anymore? Everything seems to happen as a fait accompli, narratives driven by unimaginative back-office accountants with short time horizons. And mainstream academics and media simply accept this under-democratic state of affairs.
We are still suffering from the infrastructure backlog that escalated in the early 1990s when Finance Minister Ruth Richardson forced many of New Zealand’s unemployed and underemployed to emigrate, especially to Australia; all in the name of ‘fiscal responsibility’. Some of those people who left for Australia just as its banking crisis was unfolding – especially their children – are drifting back to New Zealand in the 2010s and 2020s as ‘501’ deportees (see Product of Australia, Stuff December 2019, and noting in a chart that more than half of the 501s deported to New Zealand from 2015 to 2019 were aged 26 to 40).
Those young (mainly) men could have been building New Zealand; instead, too many became criminals in Australia. And the New Zealand economy regressed for the best part of ten years (from 1985), while the rest of the world was progressing. That period is the source of the now-entrenched Australia New Zealand differential in living standards.
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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.