Category: Eurozone

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: SCED begins visit to France to promote Hong Kong’s unique advantages as business and investment hub (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         The Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development, Mr Algernon Yau, began his visit to France on June 18 (France time) to promote Hong Kong’s unique advantages and vast opportunities for businesses.
     
         Mr Yau first visited Toulouse and met with the Group Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Elior Group SA, Mr Daniel Derichebourg, to learn about the company’s latest developments and exchange views on promoting closer business collaboration between Hong Kong and France. Elior Group SA is a global aeronautic services company, which is part of Derichebourg SA, a leading business in Europe.
     
         With the assistance of Invest Hong Kong, Elior Group SA has recently set up an Asian headquarters and expanded its presence in Hong Kong. The company early this year signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Airport Authority Hong Kong to explore the possibility of providing professional services such as aircraft dismantling, parts recycling and related training in Hong Kong, thereby helping Hong Kong develop into the first aircraft parts processing and trading centre in Asia.
      
         Mr Yau said that Hong Kong and France have long-standing business relations and many companies in Hong Kong with parent companies located in France are internationally renowned enterprises. With the distinct advantages under “one country, two systems”, Hong Kong is the premier destination for enterprises around the globe to set up or expand their businesses. He believes that the co-operation between the company and various stakeholders in Hong Kong will help unleash market potential and create new opportunities, leveraging Hong Kong’s advantages as a business and investment hub, and its role as a springboard to the Mainland, markets in Asia and beyond.
      
         Meanwhile, Mr Yau took the opportunity to visit the Derichebourg Aeronautics Training Center and the Airbus assembly lines respectively to learn about the latest advancements in related aeronautic training, aircraft manufacturing and sustainable aviation development.
      
         Mr Yau will proceed to Bordeaux on June 19 (France time).

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI: JLT Mobile Computers announces a generational change in marketing leadership

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Växjö, Sweden, June 24, 2025 * * * JLT Mobile Computers, a leading developer and supplier of reliable computers for demanding environments, today announced the planned generational change in its marketing leadership. This leadership transition reflects JLT’s strategic initiative to centralize and mobilize its marketing resources, reinforcing its commitment to global growth and market expansion.

    Christian Meincke, who has served as Chief Marketing Officer at JLT since 2023, is retiring. Tejal Ranjan, Vice President of Marketing, will take on global responsibility for the company’s marketing strategy, planning, and operations.

    Tejal joined JLT as VP of Marketing, USA in October 2024 and brings over 20 years of international experience in B2B technology marketing. Throughout her career, Tejal has held executive marketing positions at global technology firms, leading digital transformation efforts, building high-performing teams, and launching integrated campaigns that accelerated revenue growth and brand recognition. She is recognized for her customer-centric approach, data-driven decision-making, and her ability to closely align marketing with sales for measurable business impact.

    To learn more about JLT Mobile Computers, and the company’s products, services and solutions, visit jltmobile.com. Financial information is available on JLT’s investor page.

    About JLT Mobile Computers

    JLT Mobile Computers is a leading developer and supplier of rugged mobile computing devices and solutions for demanding environments. 30 years of development and manufacturing experience have enabled JLT to set the standard in rugged computing, combining outstanding product quality with expert service, support and solutions to ensure trouble-free business operations for customers in warehousing, transportation, manufacturing, mining, ports and agriculture. JLT operates globally from offices in Sweden, France, and the US, complemented by an extensive network of sales partners in local markets. The company was founded in 1994, and the share has been listed on the Nasdaq First North Growth Market stock exchange since 2002 under the symbol JLT. Eminova Fondkommission AB acts as Certified Adviser. Learn more at jltmobile.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: JLT Mobile Computers announces a generational change in marketing leadership

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Växjö, Sweden, June 24, 2025 * * * JLT Mobile Computers, a leading developer and supplier of reliable computers for demanding environments, today announced the planned generational change in its marketing leadership. This leadership transition reflects JLT’s strategic initiative to centralize and mobilize its marketing resources, reinforcing its commitment to global growth and market expansion.

    Christian Meincke, who has served as Chief Marketing Officer at JLT since 2023, is retiring. Tejal Ranjan, Vice President of Marketing, will take on global responsibility for the company’s marketing strategy, planning, and operations.

    Tejal joined JLT as VP of Marketing, USA in October 2024 and brings over 20 years of international experience in B2B technology marketing. Throughout her career, Tejal has held executive marketing positions at global technology firms, leading digital transformation efforts, building high-performing teams, and launching integrated campaigns that accelerated revenue growth and brand recognition. She is recognized for her customer-centric approach, data-driven decision-making, and her ability to closely align marketing with sales for measurable business impact.

    To learn more about JLT Mobile Computers, and the company’s products, services and solutions, visit jltmobile.com. Financial information is available on JLT’s investor page.

    About JLT Mobile Computers

    JLT Mobile Computers is a leading developer and supplier of rugged mobile computing devices and solutions for demanding environments. 30 years of development and manufacturing experience have enabled JLT to set the standard in rugged computing, combining outstanding product quality with expert service, support and solutions to ensure trouble-free business operations for customers in warehousing, transportation, manufacturing, mining, ports and agriculture. JLT operates globally from offices in Sweden, France, and the US, complemented by an extensive network of sales partners in local markets. The company was founded in 1994, and the share has been listed on the Nasdaq First North Growth Market stock exchange since 2002 under the symbol JLT. Eminova Fondkommission AB acts as Certified Adviser. Learn more at jltmobile.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Christine Lagarde: Strengthening economies in a stormy and fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the ninth Annual Research Conference “Economic and financial integration in a stormy and fragmenting world” organised by the National Bank of Ukraine and Narodowy Bank Polski in Kyiv, Ukraine

    Kyiv, 19 June 2025

    It is an honour to be here in Kyiv – a city that has come to symbolise resilience, dignity and the enduring spirit of freedom. Kyiv stands not only as the heart of Ukraine, but as a beacon of what it means to hold fast to democratic values in the face of immense challenge.

    As the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko once wrote, “In your own house – your own truth. Your own strength and freedom.” Ukraine’s fight today reminds all of Europe of this powerful truth: our security and prosperity rely on unity, on integration with our neighbours.

    In the face of Russia’s unjustified war of aggression, Ukrainians have demonstrated extraordinary courage and resilience in defence of their country.

    In my remarks today, and in keeping with the theme of this conference, I would like to reflect on the historical lessons we have learned about strengthening and integrating economies in an increasingly stormy and fragmented world.

    Experience shows that closer ties with the European neighbourhood can provide a strong foundation for Ukraine to rebuild and emerge stronger. And as geopolitical tensions rise and global supply chains fragment, the case for deeper regional cooperation has never been clearer.

    Europe’s own long history of integration offers valuable insights that can help guide Ukraine’s path forwards. Two key lessons stand out.

    First, while deeper integration increases the potential rewards, it also raises the risks if not managed wisely. Sound domestic policy frameworks are essential to maximise growth and safeguard stability.

    Second, the benefits of integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Maintaining them depends on continuous reform – but reforms must also deliver tangible improvements for people’s lives, and do so relatively quickly.

    The benefits of integration in a fragmenting world

    During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain fractured the European economy. Trade between East and West fell by half. This division was like imposing a 48% tariff – leading to immense welfare losses and isolating the Eastern bloc from global markets.[1]

    But the transformation since Europe’s eastern enlargement has been nothing short of remarkable. On average, countries that joined the EU in 2004 have nearly doubled their GDP per capita over the past two decades.

    Critically, this was not just about catching up from a low base. Between 2004 and 2019, the EU’s new Member States saw their GDP per capita grow 32% more than comparable non-EU countries.[2] The difference was deeper economic integration – and those that were already highly embedded in the regional economy gained the most.

    While all new members experienced gains, countries with stronger integration into regional value chains recorded nearly 10 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth compared with less integrated peers – regardless of geographic proximity.[3]

    This difference was driven mainly by technology and productivity spillovers. ECB research shows that a 10% increase in productivity among western EU firms translated into a 5% productivity gain for central and eastern European firms linked to their supply chains.[4]

    The case for regional integration is therefore clear – and in today’s increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape, it has become even more compelling.

    First, regional integration underpins growth.

    European economies are highly open, which means a world splintering into rival trading blocs poses clear risks to prosperity. Yet Europe’s most important trading partner is Europe itself: around 65% of euro area exports go to other European countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. For Ukraine too, Europe is the principal trading partner, accounting for over 50% of its goods trade in 2024.

    By deepening economic ties – more closely linking neighbouring economies – we can reduce our exposure to external shocks. Rising trade within our region can help offset losses in global markets.

    Second, regional integration strengthens resilience.

    One consequence of geopolitical fragmentation is the realignment of supply chains toward trusted partners. Nearly half of firms involved in external trade have already revised their strategies – or intend to do so – including relocating parts of their operations closer to home.[5] While this trend reduces strategic dependencies, it can also raise costs.

    Yet large integrated regions can mitigate these costs by replicating many of the benefits of globalisation at the regional level. Supply chains can be reorganised regionally, allowing each country to specialise based on its comparative advantage within regional value chains.

    Ukraine stands to benefit significantly from expanding these networks across the region – and the EU stands to benefit, too, from having Ukraine as a partner.[6]

    In the automotive sector, for example, Ukrainian firms already produce around 7% of all wire harnesses used in EU vehicles.[7] As the industry shifts towards electric vehicles, which require more complex wiring systems, Ukraine’s manufacturing base is well positioned to scale up and play a larger role in the EU value chain.

    Equally transformative is Ukraine’s drone industry, which has become one of the most advanced in the region. Drones are not only a critical component of modern warfare, but also a technology with substantial spillover effects and far-reaching dual-use applications.

    Indeed, the country’s ambitious goal of producing 4.5 million drones by 2025 has accelerated innovation in materials science, battery technology and 3D printing. These advances are already finding civilian applications in sectors such as logistics, agriculture and emergency response.

    In short, for both existing EU members and neighbouring countries like Ukraine, regional integration is both a path to prosperity and a strategic anchor in an increasingly fragmented world.

    Managing the risks of integration

    But examining the experience of countries that have used regional integration as a platform for growth and reform reveals two important lessons.

    The first is that if integration is not accompanied by appropriate reforms, it can create new vulnerabilities – especially in the financial sphere.

    Financial integration often brings volatile capital inflows, which can make it difficult to distinguish sustainable growth from unsustainable excesses in real time.

    One way this can happen is when productivity gains in tradable sectors, such as manufacturing, drive up wages in those sectors, which then spill over into higher wages in non-tradable sectors and push up overall inflation.[8]

    While this effect is a normal feature of catching-up, it can make it easy to mistake genuine convergence for economic overheating. If foreign capital is in fact driving financial imbalances – such as unsustainable real estate booms – countries may exhibit the same patterns of rising wages and inflation, masking underlying vulnerabilities.

    Another potential distortion is that capital inflows can significantly affect government fiscal positions by boosting tax revenues and creating the illusion of permanently greater fiscal space. This often leads to procyclical fiscal policies, with governments increasing spending or cutting taxes during boom periods – only to face fiscal stress when inflows reverse or growth slows.

    Both dynamics have been visible during Europe’s recent experience with regional integration.

    After the eastern enlargement, financial integration accelerated rapidly. Between 2003 and 2008, the new Member States experienced an extraordinary surge in capital inflows, averaging over 12% of GDP annually – twice the typical level for emerging markets globally.[9]

    Initially, this rapid financial integration brought clear benefits: it expanded access to credit, fuelled growth and enabled much-needed development. However, in many countries, foreign capital was disproportionately channelled into consumption and construction booms, while tax revenues rose sharply on the back of property transactions and buoyant domestic demand.[10] This led to widespread misallocation of private capital and inefficient public spending.

    Capital flows then reversed sharply when the global financial crisis struck, exposing these imbalances. Between December 2008 and May 2013, external bank liabilities in non-euro area central and eastern European countries declined by an average of 27% – with some countries experiencing drops of more than 50%.[11]

    Yet the risks associated with financial integration can be avoided. Not all countries in the region were affected equally. Those that performed better typically shared two key features.

    First, they had clear policies to channel foreign investment into productive sectors. Strong industrial strategies, a skilled workforce and integration into global supply chains helped direct capital towards manufacturing and tradable services – sectors that drive export growth and are less prone to unsustainable booms and asset bubbles.[12]

    Second, they maintained robust financial policy frameworks. Tighter capital requirements, active macroprudential measures and countercyclical buffers strengthened domestic banking sectors and curbed excessive mortgage lending. These tools enabled those countries to absorb large capital inflows without creating destabilising imbalances.[13]

    The lesson is clear: as countries integrate into the region, strong domestic policy frameworks are critical to ensuring that capital inflows support long-term growth rather than generating financial instability or inefficient allocation.

    This insight is especially relevant for Ukraine today as it charts its path towards recovery. If reconstruction proceeds as planned, the country could attract significant capital inflows over the next decade. But without the right safeguards, that capital risks being misallocated – undermining long-term productivity instead of strengthening it.

    There are encouraging signs. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area have already driven significant reforms in the financial sector. Ukraine’s banking regulation now aligns with more than 75% of EU standards, covering critical areas such as capital adequacy, governance and auditing.[14]

    The National Bank of Ukraine has adopted a risk-based supervisory model inspired by the Single Supervisory Mechanism – the system of banking supervision in Europe – markedly improving oversight. Despite extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine is also modernising its capital markets – consolidating exchanges, upgrading settlement systems and strengthening regulatory enforcement to attract long-term investors.

    These reforms are already delivering results: in 2023, Ukraine’s banking sector remained profitable and well capitalised despite the ongoing war – an outcome that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

    Still, further progress is essential, especially in fiscal governance. Strengthening public investment management will be critical to ensure that reconstruction funds are allocated transparently and efficiently.

    This is not just about meeting external standards. It is about ensuring that every euro, and every hryvnia, delivers real returns for the Ukrainian people.[15]

    Making integration sustainable

    However, reforms cannot be treated as a one-time effort.

    So, the second key lesson is that the benefits of regional integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Sustaining them requires continuous reform – and, just as importantly, it requires citizens to see visible, tangible improvements in their daily lives.

    In this context, there are two risks to watch out for.

    The first is that institutional reform momentum can fade if economic benefits do not follow quickly.

    Deeper regional integration typically begins with aligning framework conditions, such as legal systems, regulation and public administration. These areas often improve rapidly. But for the economic gains to materialise, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors must respond to the new incentives created – and this takes time.

    In the long run, evidence shows that countries with initially weaker institutions benefit the most from adopting higher standards.[16] But in the short run, if people only see the effort and not the payoff, public support for further reforms can weaken, putting long-term convergence at risk.

    The second risk is that structural shifts in the economy may weaken the link between integration and economic convergence over time.

    The integration of goods markets has traditionally driven convergence almost automatically, as foreign direct investment flows to countries with lower land and labour costs, supply chains relocate and lower-income countries benefit from technology transfers.

    As I mentioned earlier, this will remain an important mechanism even in an era of supply chain reshoring. But countries cannot rely on it as heavily as in the past. Future growth in intra-EU trade is expected to depend increasingly on services – particularly digital services.

    However, research shows that services sector activity tends to concentrate in larger, more affluent urban areas that exhibit the hallmarks of a knowledge economy: high tertiary education rates, strong technology and science sectors and robust digital infrastructure.[17]

    This means that deeper integration alone will not guarantee broad-based convergence across all regions. Over time, countries will need to invest more in education, skills and digitalisation to ensure they can build high levels of human capital.

    Maintaining the path of convergence is therefore not easy. But slowing down reform efforts is not the answer – especially in the shock-prone world we face today.

    There is a clear link between strong institutions and economic resilience. ECB research indicates that, during the pandemic, regions with lower institutional quality experienced – all else equal – an additional decline of around 4 percentage points in GDP per capita compared with the ten regions with the highest quality of government.[18]

    As our economies are increasingly buffeted by global turbulence, institutional backsliding therefore risks creating a vicious circle: repeated shocks can undermine economic convergence and further erode public confidence in the reform process.

    The best way for countries to sustain reform momentum is to recognise the importance of maintaining public support and, as far as possible, pair governance improvements with a focus on sectors where they have a clear competitive edge – and where deeper integration with the region can unlock significant and rapid growth opportunities.

    This way, the benefits of reforms will be felt more quickly and more widely.

    Ukraine is well positioned to put this into practice. Its IT sector is already relatively strong: IT services exports reached nearly USD 7 billion in 2023, making it one of the country’s leading export sectors despite the war.[19]

    Ukraine also produces around 130,000 STEM graduates each year – exceeding Germany and France[20] – and it ranks among the top five countries globally for certified IT professionals.[21] Successful IT clusters are active in several cities, and major foreign firms – including Apple, Microsoft, Boeing and Siemens – have established R&D operations in the country.

    A dynamic defence tech ecosystem is also taking shape[22], with Ukrainian start-ups attracting almost half a billion US dollars in funding in 2024 – surpassing many of their peers across central and eastern Europe.[23] Experience from countries like Israel suggests that such a foundation can enable the country to emerge as a broader technology hub in the years ahead.

    If Ukraine stays the course on institutional reform and continues to adapt its economy to new opportunities, despite the stormy environment, it can emerge as a vital engine of growth and a key contributor to the region’s future.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Ukraine stands at a pivotal moment – facing the hardships of war, the challenge of reconstruction and the opportunity of deeper regional integration.

    In a world marked by shifting geopolitical realities, such integration offers a clear path to recovery and lasting prosperity.

    The recent history of regional integration shows not only its immense benefits, but also the importance of managing transitional risks through robust policy frameworks. It also underlines the need to sustain reform over time by ensuring that people feel its benefits.

    I am confident that Ukraine will be able to fully realise its economic potential, turning the upheaval of today into the foundation for a dynamic future.

    As Ivan Franko, one of Ukraine’s greatest poets, once wrote: “even though life is but a moment and made up of moments, we carry eternity in our souls.”

    This enduring spirit captures the resilience and potential of Ukraine’s people and its economy – a spirit that will continue to drive advancement and renewal in the years ahead.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – European rules on nitrous oxide for recreational use – E-002334/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002334/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Nadine Morano (PPE)

    Several Member States have reported an increase in cases of severe poisoning and deaths related to recreational use of nitrous oxide (‘laughing gas’), especially among young people. In 2023, some 472 incidents were reported to the French CEIP-A, an organisation which assesses and monitors drug addiction, an increase of 30% compared to 2022.

    In 92% of the cases, the doses consumed were high, often from large-volume canisters, and 50% of users reported daily consumption. More than 80% of cases presented serious neurological complications, including spinal cord damage. According to Santé publique France, in 2022 some 14% of 18-24 year-olds had experimented with nitrous oxide. The rules vary greatly from one Member State to another.

    • 1.Does the Commission intend to harmonise the rules on the sale and use of nitrous oxide at European level?
    • 2.Are there plans to include nitrous oxide in the scope of the European Union Drugs Agency and in the Early Warning System?
    • 3.What information campaigns are being supported at European level to raise awareness of the neurological and respiratory risks associated with using nitrous oxide?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Nea Dimokratia Government’s announced abolishment of OPEKEPE – E-002310/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002310/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos (NI)

    The revelations at the centre of the publicity surrounding OPEKEPE, Greece’s Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid, are hardly a ‘bolt from the blue’. They are the result of the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) – which all the bourgeois parties voted for, co-shaped and implemented from government positions – and, indeed, the scandalous way in which agricultural subsidies are granted.

    The Nea Dimokratia Government bears full responsibility for the latest developments, because for at least six years it has continued to implement the ‘technical solution’ introduced by the previous Syriza Government from 2015 to 2017.

    National governments and the Commission have been – and still are – turning a deaf ear to farmers’ and livestock breeders’ demands for subsidies to be based on actual agricultural production and actual livestock count, as well as to complaints that ‘decoupled’ payments ultimately end up in the hands of non-farmers.

    In view of this, can the Commission say:

    • 1.What view does it take of the Nea Dimokratia Government’s announcement that it will abolish OPEKEPE, which comes just as it has declared that it has submitted a plan to turn the organisation around to the EU?
    • 2.How does it view the demands of the agricultural trade union movement for subsidies to be granted on the basis of actual agricultural production and actual livestock count?
    • 3.What view does it take of the need to take all the necessary measures to ensure that struggling farmers are not subject to cuts, that outstanding payments be made immediately and that the system be opened so that they can submit their declarations in good time?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Sanctioning of sham charities supporting Hamas – E-002378/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002378/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Pina Picierno (S&D)

    In October 2024, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three individuals and one sham charity that are prominent financial supporters of Hamas but also active in Italy, Germany and Austria[1].

    On 10 June 2025, OFAC sanctioned another five people and five sham charities outside the US that stand accused of financing Hamas’s military wing under the guise of conducting humanitarian work both internationally and in Gaza. Some of them operate in the EU, specifically, in Italy and the Netherlands, and are run by people already subject to sanctions[2].

    Despite those measures, the charities continue to operate undisturbed in Europe, carrying out activities for a movement that the EU has designated a terrorist organisation.

    Taking into account that the US, an important Atlantic Alliance partner in efforts to tackle international terrorism and bring stability to the Middle East, has already sanctioned those charities, will the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy apply similar sanctions at EU level with a view to curbing terrorist activities in the Member States?

    Submitted: 12.6.2025

    • [1] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2632.
    • [2] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0162.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Brussels endorses the CGT as a ‘trusted flagger’ on the Internet – E-002315/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002315/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Virginie Joron (PfE)

    The new EU Digital Services Act (DSA) now governs the moderation and removal of ‘illegal’ content online. Article 22 of the DSA requires online platforms to take the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure that notices submitted by trusted flaggers are given priority. The Commission has recently confirmed that the CGT has been granted ‘trusted flagger’ status in France (5 March 2025)[1].

    However, the CGT is not recognised for its commitment to freedom of expression or to combating fraud, nor for its political neutrality.

    • 1.Can the Commission confirm that the biggest platforms (X, Meta, Youtube, etc.)[2] must address reports and requests for removal issued by the CGT as a priority, including in times of crisis?
    • 2.Is the fact of a country granting trusted flagger status to a political entity or trade union compatible with the spirit of the DSA?
    • 3.Has the CGT indeed received nearly EUR 10 million from the European Union since 2014[3]?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    • [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/trusted-flaggers-under-dsa
    • [2] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/analysis.html A search of the Commission’s financial transparency register using the keyword ‘CGT’ reveals approximately EUR 10 million in European funding, of which EUR 9.14 million was reportedly paid to three organisations: 1) The CGT’s National Federation of Construction Workers (approximately half of the amount) 2) The CGT’s Confederation of Retired Workers and Trade Unionists 3) The CGT’s Federation of Metalworkers
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Brussels endorses the CGT as a ‘trusted flagger’ on the Internet – E-002315/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002315/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Virginie Joron (PfE)

    The new EU Digital Services Act (DSA) now governs the moderation and removal of ‘illegal’ content online. Article 22 of the DSA requires online platforms to take the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure that notices submitted by trusted flaggers are given priority. The Commission has recently confirmed that the CGT has been granted ‘trusted flagger’ status in France (5 March 2025)[1].

    However, the CGT is not recognised for its commitment to freedom of expression or to combating fraud, nor for its political neutrality.

    • 1.Can the Commission confirm that the biggest platforms (X, Meta, Youtube, etc.)[2] must address reports and requests for removal issued by the CGT as a priority, including in times of crisis?
    • 2.Is the fact of a country granting trusted flagger status to a political entity or trade union compatible with the spirit of the DSA?
    • 3.Has the CGT indeed received nearly EUR 10 million from the European Union since 2014[3]?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    • [1] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/trusted-flaggers-under-dsa
    • [2] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/list-designated-vlops-and-vloses
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/budget/financial-transparency-system/analysis.html A search of the Commission’s financial transparency register using the keyword ‘CGT’ reveals approximately EUR 10 million in European funding, of which EUR 9.14 million was reportedly paid to three organisations: 1) The CGT’s National Federation of Construction Workers (approximately half of the amount) 2) The CGT’s Confederation of Retired Workers and Trade Unionists 3) The CGT’s Federation of Metalworkers
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Ireland’s schools and UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – E-002363/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002363/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kathleen Funchion (The Left)

    In the recent Commission staff working document, entitled ‘2025 Country Report – Ireland’, which accompanies the Commission communication entitled ‘Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Ireland’ (COM(2025)0207), there is an acknowledgement that the segregated ‘special schools’ are not in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

    • 1.Could the Commission outline what supports, including financial supports, are available to Ireland to increase special classes within mainstream schools to cater for children with additional needs?
    • 2.What funding opportunities are there for targeted treatments within the school environment to assist with diagnoses, development and ongoing learning, such as speech and language therapy and additional resources teachers?
    • 3.What funding opportunities are there for other therapeutic treatments, play therapy counselling, nurture programme teachers and other related techniques?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Ireland’s schools and UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities – E-002363/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002363/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kathleen Funchion (The Left)

    In the recent Commission staff working document, entitled ‘2025 Country Report – Ireland’, which accompanies the Commission communication entitled ‘Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Ireland’ (COM(2025)0207), there is an acknowledgement that the segregated ‘special schools’ are not in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

    • 1.Could the Commission outline what supports, including financial supports, are available to Ireland to increase special classes within mainstream schools to cater for children with additional needs?
    • 2.What funding opportunities are there for targeted treatments within the school environment to assist with diagnoses, development and ongoing learning, such as speech and language therapy and additional resources teachers?
    • 3.What funding opportunities are there for other therapeutic treatments, play therapy counselling, nurture programme teachers and other related techniques?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Handling the OPEKEPE scandal – E-002308/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002308/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Galato Alexandraki (ECR)

    The extensive agricultural subsidy fraud scandal in Greece, uncovered by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, led to a EUR 283 million fine from the Commission on OPEKEPE and calls into question its accreditation as a paying agency. Following investigations into thousands of fake VAT numbers, false declarations of ownership, lack of controls and indications of political cover-up, the Greek Government launched a restructuring plan in cooperation with DG AGRI. In this context, a 12-month restructuring plan for OPEKEPE has been put into effect, which includes its abolition and transfer to the Independent Authority for Public Revenue (IAPR), the full digitalisation of procedures, the reconstitution of the Board of Directors and institutional oversight by the Ministry of Rural Development and Food.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.What is the Commission’s assessment of the progress of the OPEKEPE reconstruction plan?
    • 2.How does the Commission assess the closure of the organisation and the transfer of payments to the IAPR, and does the Commission intend to impose an alternative management regime (e.g. through the EU)?
    • 3.How is it being ensured that law-abiding farmers will not be deprived of aid during this critical transition?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Handling the OPEKEPE scandal – E-002308/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002308/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Galato Alexandraki (ECR)

    The extensive agricultural subsidy fraud scandal in Greece, uncovered by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, led to a EUR 283 million fine from the Commission on OPEKEPE and calls into question its accreditation as a paying agency. Following investigations into thousands of fake VAT numbers, false declarations of ownership, lack of controls and indications of political cover-up, the Greek Government launched a restructuring plan in cooperation with DG AGRI. In this context, a 12-month restructuring plan for OPEKEPE has been put into effect, which includes its abolition and transfer to the Independent Authority for Public Revenue (IAPR), the full digitalisation of procedures, the reconstitution of the Board of Directors and institutional oversight by the Ministry of Rural Development and Food.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.What is the Commission’s assessment of the progress of the OPEKEPE reconstruction plan?
    • 2.How does the Commission assess the closure of the organisation and the transfer of payments to the IAPR, and does the Commission intend to impose an alternative management regime (e.g. through the EU)?
    • 3.How is it being ensured that law-abiding farmers will not be deprived of aid during this critical transition?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Appointment of the national coordinators for the single digital entry point and existence of data on short-term rentals in Galicia and Spain – E-000003/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission shares the Honourable Member’s concerns about the housing situation in the EU. T he Commissioner responsible for Housing — supported by the Task Force for Housing — coordinates the different work streams and will support Member States and local authorities to address structural drivers of the housing crisis.

    The Commission will put forward a European Affordable Housing Plan in 2026 and will tackle systemic issues with short-term accommodation rentals and make proposals to tackle the inefficient use of the current housing stock.

    As the Honourable Member has indicated, the Short-Term Rental Regulation[1] provides, in its Article 11(1), that ‘Each Member State shall appoint a national coordinator.

    Those national coordinators shall act as contact points for their respective administrations for all matters relating to the single digital entry point’.

    Furthermore, ‘The national coordinator for each Member State shall be responsible for contacts with the Commission in respect of all matters relating to the single digital entry point’ and according to Article 11(2) ‘The coordination group shall be composed of the national coordinator from each Member State’.

    Spain has nominated a national coordinator from the ‘Sociedad Mercantil Estatal para la Géstion de la Innovación y las Tecnologías Turisticas’.

    The Commission is required, under Article 18(1), to evaluate the regulation and submit a report on its main findings to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.

    The Commission intends indeed to do so by the 20 May 2031 in line with the regulation. The Commission stands ready to keep the European Parliament informed of progress on implementation in the meantime.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2024/1028 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on data collection and sharing relating to short-term accommodation rental services and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Dangerous landslides in Gortynia – E-001461/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Cohesion Policy supports Greece with investments in road infrastructure through the sectoral programme ‘Transport’ and the regional programmes, provided they align with the programme’s priorities and the applicable regulatory framework.

    However, under the shared management and subsidiarity principles governing the Cohesion Policy Funds, project selection and implementation fall under the responsibility of the relevant national and regional managing authorities. According to the latest information provided by them, there is no provision for funding the project in question.

    In line with Article 73(2)(c) of the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) 2021/1060[1], the Commission considers that a cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool to determine the best relationship between the amount of support, the activities undertaken and the achievement of objectives, and thus to prioritise investments for structural mobility and safety improvements.

    Especially for larger investments, cost-benefit analysis helps the competent national authorities to define the most appropriate scope of projects, their level of EU funding and the added value for the society. This added value can include economic impact and road safety.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Delay in the implementation of the CrossBo project and impact on cross-border connectivity – E-001670/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Interreg V-A Greece-Bulgaria Programme (2014-2020) is implemented in shared management and it is therefore the managing authority who is responsible for overseeing project implementation.

    The Commission works closely with the Managing Authority to monitor Interreg V-A programmes at all stages: reviewing project selection criteria, assessing progress data, participating in Monitoring Committees, and, when needed, holding high-level annual review meetings.

    These mechanisms, as set out in the regulatory framework, ensure balanced and timely project implementation by all partners and enable corrective actions where necessary.

    Managing authorities can also subject projects to enhanced monitoring measures. This is the the case for the Aiming at Improving Cross-Border Accessibility (CrossBo) project and measures to operationalise the new crossing point have been initiated.

    In the context of the 2014-2020 programming period and in line with the closure guidelines[1], the deadline for submitting programme closure documents has been extended to 15 February 2026.

    If expenditure for non-functioning operations is included in the accounts for the final accounting year, Member States undertake to physically complete or fully implement all such non-functioning operations and ensure they contribute to the objectives of the relevant priorities not later than 15 February 2027.

    If any non-functioning operations remain incomplete by 15 February 2027, all associated financing will be considered ineligible.

    • [1] Commission notice: Guidelines on the closure of operational programmes adopted for assistance from the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund for the 2014-2020 programming period (European Commission, 14 October 2024).
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Inclusion of hydrotherapy in healthcare plans in the EU – E-002346/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002346/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Valentina Palmisano (The Left)

    Physiotherapy in water (hydrotherapy) has been excluded from the essential levels of care in Italy since 2017, but the scientific community acknowledges its beneficial effects in neuro-rehabilitation, pain management and treatment of severe disabilities, such as spinal muscular atrophy (SMA) type 1 and other neurological disorders.

    Numerous clinical studies have demonstrated better mobility, less pain, boosted circulation and improved mental and physical well-being among treated patients in all age groups, including older people and children and adolescents.

    In the light of the above:

    • 1.Does the Commission intend to promote the inclusion of hydrotherapy in the rehabilitation treatments supported at European level and in national healthcare plans?
    • 2.Are there any plans for initiatives to make the public and healthcare professionals more aware of the effectiveness of this treatment?
    • 3.Is there any EU funding available for the construction or upgrading of public hydrotherapy facilities?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Family reunification from countries where polygamy is practiced – E-002343/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002343/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mary Khan (ESN), Petra Steger (PfE)

    A current case in Austria[1], and similar cases in Germany, reveal conflicts between EU rules on family reunification and prohibitions of polygamous marriages enshrined in criminal law. A Syrian refugee applied for family reunification for his wife and eight children. However, DNA analyses showed that the children are from two different mothers. While the second wife was refused entry, all children were granted entry under family reunification. Under current law, it can be assumed that the four children of the second wife can successfully apply for family reunification for their mother. The applicable provisions of EU law, in particular Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, may, in their practical application, create situations which could be interpreted as indirect toleration of polygamous relationships. This raises significant questions as to the coherence of European legislation and national legal systems, such as the prohibition of bigamy enshrined in the national law of Austria (Section 44 of the Austrian Civil Code (ABGB) and Section 192 of the Austrian Criminal Code (StGB)) and of Germany (Section 1306 of the German Civil Code (BGB) and Section 172 of the German Criminal Code (StGB)).

    • 1.How does the Commission assess the compatibility of Directive 2003/86/EC and its implementation in practice with national prohibitions of polygamy in the context of family reunification in relation to polygamous marriages?
    • 2.What measures is the Commission considering in order to counteract the normalisation of polygamous relationships in the context of family reunification and to prevent the emergence of a right to protection under Union law for polygamous relationships?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    • [1] https://www.heute.at/s/familiennachzug-syrer-wollte-zweitfrau-ins-land-holen-120101639
    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Confiscation of the Monastery of St Catherine of Sinai by Egyptian authorities – E-002347/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002347/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Emmanouil Kefalogiannis (PPE)

    The Monastery of St Catherine on Mount Sinai, the oldest functioning Christian monastery in the world, is facing the risk of confiscation following a decision by an Egyptian court, provoking strong reactions at the international level.

    The decision essentially assigns the Monastery to the Egyptian state, depriving it of the ownership status that has been in force since the Monastery was founded, some 1 500 years ago, by the Byzantine emperor Justinian.

    In a statement, the Archbishop of Athens and All Greece Ieronymos condemned the specific decision ‘unequivocally’, expressing ‘immense sadness’ and ‘legitimate anger’ over the matter. At the same time, he has called for the mobilisation of every Greek and international authority, as ‘the property of the Monastery is being seized and confiscated, and this spiritual Beacon of Orthodoxy and Hellenism is now facing an existential threat’.

    What actions does the Commission intend to take so that the oldest Christian monastery can continue its uninterrupted spiritual function and its property is not confiscated?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Charges brought against Spain’s Prosecutor General for leaking confidential information for political reasons and Spain’s compliance with Article 2 TEU – E-002349/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002349/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Dolors Montserrat (PPE)

    Supreme Court Justice Ángel Hurtado is bringing summary proceedings against Spain’s Prosecutor General on the grounds that there is enough evidence to corroborate suspicions that he revealed confidential information.

    Hurtado’s writ states that, based on the investigation, there are grounds to believe that ‘instructions were received from the Prime Minister’s office to make use of available information for political ends.’ The Prosecutor General is accused of leaking confidential information ‘as a result of instructions received from the Prime Minister’s office… for the purposes of winning the narrative battle.’

    Though the Prosecutor General faces very serious charges – which could result in his being imprisoned and disbarred from office – he has neither resigned nor lost the support of the Spanish Government. In the light of the above:

    • 1.Does the Commission consider that this state of affairs is at odds with the rule of law principles laid down in the Treaty on European Union, in particular concerning the independence of the judiciary and the Prosecutor General’s office?
    • 2.Is the Commission not concerned about the fact that the Prosecutor General’s Office is being used by the Government to destroy a political opponent, blatantly contradicting the recommendations of the rule of law mechanism that require autonomy and neutrality?
    • 3.Will the Commission react to this incident by requesting information from the Spanish Government, or will the latter feature in the upcoming rule of law report on Spain?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Potential discrimination of traders on Amazon Marketplace – E-002348/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002348/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Pascal Arimont (PPE), Liesbet Sommen (PPE)

    On 25 March 2024, the Commission announced preliminary investigative steps under the Digital Markets Act[1] (DMA) into potential self-preferencing by Amazon on Amazon Marketplace.

    This announcement came 15 months after the Commission accepted Amazon’s commitments following an investigation’s preliminarily conclusion that Amazon had abused its dominant market position and unfairly gave preferential treatment to its own products and sellers that paid for Fulfilment by Amazon services.

    • 1.Does the Commission have any information evaluating the effectiveness and compliance with the commitments it agreed with Amazon in 2022?
    • 2.The US Federal Trade Commission has accused Amazon of enforcing price clauses via its automated systems, effectively preventing sellers from providing their products at a lower price off-Amazon. This practice is also under investigation by Germany’s Bundeskartellamt. Such practices are likely to constitute a violation of Article 5(3) DMA. Is the Commission examining Amazon’s compliance with Article 5(3) DMA?
    • 3.Amazon’s DMA compliance reports are sparse in detail, especially regarding the effectiveness of the compliance actions taken by the company. Such disclosure is fundamental to ensuring that impacted businesses, consumers and interested third parties can scrutinise DMA compliance and effectiveness. Will the Commission ensure that Amazon’s future non-confidential DMA compliance reports include more meaningful information?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    • [1] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).
    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Highlights – Shein – Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

    Source: European Parliament

    E-commerce ©BELGA_BELPRESS

    On 25 June 2025, IMCO will hold an exchange of views on the ongoing investigations against e-commerce platforms and will discuss the latest developments. On 26 May 2025, the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Network of national consumer authorities and the European Commission, following a coordinated investigation at European level, notified the online marketplace and e-retailer Shein of a number of practices on its platform that infringe EU consumer law.

    The CPC Network directed Shein to bring those practices in line with EU consumer laws. The CPC Network’s action is led by the competent national authorities of Belgium, France, Ireland and The Netherlands, under the coordination of the European Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli – RC-B10-0282/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0282/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0287/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0289/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0290/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0295/2025 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Rasa Juknevičienė, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere, Loucas Fourlas, Krzysztof Brejza
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Tobias Cremer
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Rihards Kols, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Assita Kanko, Marlena Maląg, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Kris Van Dijck
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Lena Schilling, Markéta Gregorová
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt, Per Clausen

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0282/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0282/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli

    (2025/2752(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

     having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Mzia Amaglobeli, a journalist and co-founder of Batumelebi and Netgazeti outlets, was arrested during pro-European protests on 12 January 2025 and faces four to seven years in prison for a provoked incident involving a police officer;

    B. whereas the adoption of draconian legislation – such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and amendments to the Law on Broadcasting, Code of Administrative Offences and Law on Grants – constitutes a dangerous acceleration of democratic backsliding and deliberate authoritarian strategy by Georgian Dream to silence critical voices in civil society and independent media and persecute the political opposition;

    C. whereas the authorities have virtually annihilated remaining independent media outlets in the country; whereas the public information space is fully dominated by pro-government media, spreading Russian-style propaganda and anti-European disinformation;

    D. whereas in Mzia Amaglobeli’s case, the authorities ignored procedural safeguards, imposed pre-trial detention without a clear legal basis, contested by the Public Defender, and assigned a presiding judge lacking qualifications in criminal law; whereas she is being punished for exposing corruption and reporting on election fraud during the 2024 elections;

    E. whereas she reportedly suffered inhumane treatment and undertook a 38-day hunger strike;

    F. whereas Estonia and Lithuania have imposed personal sanctions on Georgian judges and police officers linked to Mzia Amaglobeli’s case;

    1. Demands Mzia Amaglobeli’s immediate and unconditional release and the withdrawal of all charges against her, and denounces her politically motivated arrest and prosecution;

    2. Strongly condemns the Georgian Dream regime’s systemic assault on democratic institutions, political opposition, independent media, civil society and judicial independence;

    3. Expresses deep concern over arbitrary detentions and the harassment of, and violence against, journalists in Georgia, including smear campaigns, legal persecution, abuse and gender-based violence in detention; calls for independent investigations and urges the authorities to immediately end intimidation and ensure journalists’ safety and freedom;

    4. Urges the Georgian authorities to release all political prisoners and other illegally detained persons without delay, including activist Mate Devidze, opposition leaders Zurab Japaridze, Nika Melia and Nika Gvaramia, and former President Mikheil Saakashvili, and denounces the violent abduction of UNM Chair Tina Bokuchava’s husband and the reported threats to her children’s safety;

    5. Calls for the immediate repeal of all repressive legislation, the restoration of democracy, and full protection of media freedom and civil liberties;

    6. Calls for the EU to step up support for Georgia’s independent media and civil society following the entry into force of the FARA, and monitor ongoing trials;

    7. Regrets the persistent inaction of the Council, Member States and Commission and reiterates its repeated call on Member States to impose bilateral sanctions against Georgian Dream leaders and officials responsible for democratic backsliding;

    8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, President Zourabichvili, and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran – RC-B10-0284/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0284/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0285/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0296/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0299/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0300/2025 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Michał Wawrykiewicz, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Loucas Fourlas, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Daniel Attard, Chloé Ridel
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Rihards Kols, Aurelijus Veryga, Diego Solier, Nora Junco García, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Charlie Weimers, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alexandr Vondra, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Bogdan Rzońca, Assita Kanko, Marlena Maląg, Marion Maréchal, Waldemar Tomaszewski
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Abir Al‑Sahlani, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Bart Groothuis, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Alice Kuhnke
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Jonas Sjöstedt

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0284/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0284/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran

    (2025/2753(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran,

     having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Swedish-Iranian national Dr Ahmad Reza Djalali, a specialist in emergency medicine and a scholar at Belgium’s Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Italy’s Università del Piemonte Orientale, was arrested on 24 April 2016 by the Iranian security forces;

    B. whereas Djalali was sentenced to death on spurious espionage charges in October 2017 following a grossly unfair trial based on a confession extracted under torture; whereas the sentence was upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court on 17 June 2018;

    C. whereas Djalali has been denied adequate medical care despite the severe deterioration in his physical health and the risk to his life, including a recent heart attack at Evin prison; whereas Iran has continued to threaten to implement his death sentence;

    D. whereas hundreds of individuals have already been executed in 2025 and at least 972 were executed in 2024, a 14 % increase on 2023;

    E. whereas the Iranian Government refuses to recognise Djalali’s Swedish citizenship;

    F. whereas this case is part of a systematic pattern of unlawful detentions and hostage diplomacy by the Iranian regime;

    1. Calls on Iran to immediately release Dr Djalali along with all political prisoners currently being detained; calls on Iran to put a moratorium on executions and to abolish the death penalty;

    2. Strongly condemns Djalali’s sham trial and the Iranian authorities’ brutal treatment of him, amounting to torture and ill treatment, as he was subjected to months of interrogation in solitary confinement, and then sentenced to death;

    3. Urges Iran to provide Djalali, whose health is deteriorating, with immediate and unrestricted access to necessary specialised medical care at an external hospital; urges Iran, furthermore, to provide Djalali with legal representation and legal defence, and allow him regular contact with his family;

    4. Calls on the relevant Member States and the European External Action Service to intensify diplomatic efforts and adopt targeted measures in response to Iran’s continued detention of EU nationals, including Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and others, as part of its hostage diplomacy and in violation of international law;

    5. Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for taking EU nationals hostage and for mass executions of opposition voices and other human rights violations;

    6. Demands that Iran grant full access to UN human rights mechanisms, including the Special Rapporteur, and the EU’s full support and increase support for civil society organisations;

    7. Emphasises that EU-Iran engagements must be founded on tangible progress on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the release of all political prisoners;

    8. Asks the VP/HR to raise Djalali’s case publicly and in all engagements with her Iranian counterparts;

    9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government of Iran, the VP/HR, the Commission, the Member States and the United Nations.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Apollo Vredestein workers fall victim to inadequate State aid rules – P-001790/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. In 2014, the Commission approved aid to Apollo Tyres on the basis of state aid rules applicable at the time. In 2020, the Commission approved state aid schemes related to COVID-19 measures, based on which Hungary granted aid to Apollo Tyres to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy and to partially compensate the company for losses suffered because of the lockdown measures introduced by the Hungarian government. The Commission does not have any indication that either the 2014 aid measure or the 2020 schemes were not implemented in line with those decisions.

    2. Current state aid rules, where relevant, already include strict anti-relocation safeguards. The Commission does not consider that there is a need to review those provisions. They ensure that state aid cannot be used in a way that would encourage or facilitate the relocation of services or production to another Member State.

    3. The European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) can be used to support affected workers by funding reintegration pathways, training, and guidance. The ESF+ already supports Twente as one of the 35 Dutch Labour Market Regions. The Netherlands can also apply for one-off re-active assistance from EGF when redundancies cannot be avoided to finance labour market policy measures. More generally, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) contributes to enhancing competitiveness of the East Netherlands regional economy through smart and green innovation, including for energy transition and circularity, transition to clean industries, skills for the green transition and access to employment in clean and resource-efficient technologies.

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Illegal fishing of juvenile pilchards Italy – E-001559/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In 2024, the Commission received, also in the context of parliamentary Question E-000814/2024, information on possible widespread illegal fishing and commercialisation of juvenile species in Italy, including sardina pilchardus.

    Consequently, the Commission contacted the Italian authorities to obtain information on the control and enforcement of such non-compliances, including on seizures. The Commission also received recently a complaint on the same issue, which is being analysed.

    The application of the European and national rules on sanctioning, including administrative actions or criminal proceedings, is an important contribution to sustainable fishing.

    Article 89 of Regulation (EC) 1224/2009[1] requires Member States, inter alia, to ensure that sanctions are ‘capable of producing results proportionate to the seriousness of such infringements, thereby effectively discouraging further offences […].’ The Commission considers as serious issue any failure to implement the Common Fisheries Policy and would act fittingly upon evidence that sanctions do not meet the requirements set out in the legislation.

    This includes ensuring the application of the new and strengthened sanctioning rules recently introduced by Regulation (EU) 2023/2842[2] that will apply from January 2026.

    • [1]  OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 1. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2009.343.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2009%3A343%3ATOC.
    • [2] Regulation (EU) 2023/2842 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 November 2023 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, and amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1967/2006 and (EC) No 1005/2008 and Regulations (EU) 2016/1139, (EU) 2017/2403 and (EU) 2019/473 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards fisheries control.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Minutes – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg – Final edition

    Source: European Parliament

    PV-10-2025-06-18

    EN

    EN

    iPlPv_Sit

    Minutes
    Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

     Abbreviations and symbols

    + adopted
    rejected
    lapsed
    W withdrawn
    RCV roll-call votes
    EV electronic vote
    SEC secret ballot
    split split vote
    sep separate vote
    am amendment
    CA compromise amendment
    CP corresponding part
    D deleting amendment
    = identical amendments
    § paragraph

    EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

    2025 – 2026 SESSION

    Sittings of 16 to 19 June 2025

    STRASBOURG

    MINUTES

    WEDNESDAY 18 JUNE 2025

    IN THE CHAIR: Roberta METSOLA
    President

    1. Opening of the sitting

    The sitting opened at 09:02.



    2. Negotiations ahead of Parliament’s first reading (Rule 72) (action taken)

    The decision of the LIBE Committee to enter into interinstitutional negotiations had been announced on 16 June 2025 (minutes of 16.6.2025, item 12).

    As no request for a vote pursuant to Rule 72(2) had been made, the committee responsible had been able to enter into negotiations upon expiry of the deadline.



    3. Upcoming NATO summit on 24-26 June 2025 (debate)

    Commission statement: Upcoming NATO summit on 24-26 June 2025 (2025/2748(RSP))

    The President provided some clarifications on the arrangements for the conduct of the debate, for which a test format was to be used.

    Kaja Kallas (Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, on behalf of the PPE Group, Yannis Maniatis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Harald Vilimsky, on behalf of the PfE Group, Alexandr Vondra, on behalf of the ECR Group, Valérie Hayer, on behalf of the Renew Group, Bas Eickhout, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Marc Botenga, on behalf of The Left Group, René Aust, on behalf of the ESN Group, Michael Gahler, Sven Mikser, Jean-Paul Garraud, Adam Bielan, Dan Barna, Mārtiņš Staķis, Özlem Demirel, Milan Uhrík, Ruth Firmenich, Ingeborg Ter Laak and Eero Heinäluoma.

    IN THE CHAIR: Sabine VERHEYEN
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Anna Bryłka, Rasa Juknevičienė, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Petras Auštrevičius, Sebastião Bugalho, Hannah Neumann, Merja Kyllönen, Pekka Toveri, Elio Di Rupo, Roberto Vannacci, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Wouter Beke, Dan Nica, Hans Neuhoff, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Branislav Ondruš, who also answered a blue-card question from Maria Grapini, Riho Terras, Tobias Cremer, Jaak Madison, Markéta Gregorová, Michał Szczerba, Marina Mesure, Sarah Knafo, Ondřej Dostál, Angelika Niebler, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Özlem Demirel, Tonino Picula, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Massimiliano Salini, Evin Incir, Lucia Yar, Mika Aaltola, Giorgos Georgiou, Davor Ivo Stier, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Georgiana Teodorescu, Reinier Van Lanschot, Željana Zovko, Rihards Kols, Irene Montero, Eszter Lakos, Petar Volgin and Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez.

    IN THE CHAIR: Javi LÓPEZ
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: José Cepeda, Petra Steger, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Marta Wcisło, Jüri Ratas, Loucas Fourlas, Niels Fuglsang, Engin Eroglu, Miriam Lexmann, Kathleen Funchion, Ana Miguel Pedro, who also answered a blue-card question from João Oliveira, Francisco Assis, Matej Tonin, Johan Van Overtveldt, Anders Vistisen, Marta Wcisło, Ville Niinistö, Sandra Kalniete and Danilo Della Valle.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Hélder Sousa Silva, Maria Grapini, João Oliveira, Petras Gražulis, Lukas Sieper, Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Lefteris Nikolaou-Alavanos and Juan Fernando López Aguilar.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas.

    The debate closed.

    (The sitting was suspended at 11:43.)



    IN THE CHAIR: Roberta METSOLA
    President

    4. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 12:00.



    5. Voting time

    For detailed results of the votes, see also ‘Results of votes’ and ‘Results of roll-call votes’.



    5.1. Macro-financial assistance to Egypt ***I (vote)

    Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on providing macro-financial assistance to the Arab Republic of Egypt [COM(2024)0461 – C10-0009/2024 – 2024/0071(COD)] – Committee on International Trade. Rapporteur: Céline Imart (A10-0037/2025)

    An initial vote had been held on 1 April 2025 and the matter had been referred back to the committee responsible for interinstitutional negotiations under Rule 60(4) (minutes of 1.4.2025, item 6.11).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    REQUEST FROM THE LEFT GROUP TO PROCEED WITH A VOTE ON THE AMENDMENTS (Rule 60(3))

    Rejected

    PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)125)

    Parliament’s first reading thus closed.

    Detailed voting results



    5.2. Adoption by the Union of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty ***I (vote)

    Report on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adoption by the Union of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty between the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States [COM(2024)0257 – C10-0058/2024 – 2024/0148(COD)] – Committee on International Trade – Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. Rapporteurs: Anna Cavazzini and Borys Budka (A10-0009/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    COMMISSION PROPOSAL and AMENDMENTS

    Approved (P10_TA(2025)126)

    Parliament’s first reading thus closed.

    Detailed voting results

    2

    The following had spoken:

    Anna Cavazzini (rapporteur), before the vote, to make a statement on the basis of Rule 165(4).



    5.3. EU/Euratom Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty: adoption by Euratom * (vote)

    Report on the Proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by the European Atomic Energy Community of the Agreement on the interpretation and application of the Energy Charter Treaty between the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States [COM(2024)0256 – C10-0092/2024 – 2024/0146(NLE)] – Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. Rapporteur: Borys Budka (A10-0008/2025)

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    COMMISSION PROPOSAL TO THE COUNCIL

    Approved by single vote (P10_TA(2025)127)

    Detailed voting results



    5.4. Implementation report on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (vote)

    Report on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility [2024/2085(INI)] – Committee on Budgets – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. Rapporteurs: Victor Negrescu and Siegfried Mureşan (A10-0098/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 10).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)128)

    Detailed voting results



    5.5. The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report (vote)

    Report on The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report [2024/2078(INI)] – Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. Rapporteur: Ana Catarina Mendes (A10-0100/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 11).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)129)

    Detailed voting results



    5.6. 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro (vote)

    Report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro [2025/2020(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Marjan Šarec (A10-0093/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 12).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)130)

    Detailed voting results



    5.7. 2023 and 2024 reports on Moldova (vote)

    Report on 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova [2025/2025(INI)] – Committee on Foreign Affairs. Rapporteur: Sven Mikser (A10-0096/2025)

    The debate had taken place on 17 June 2025 (minutes of 17.6.2025, item 13).

    (Majority of the votes cast)

    MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

    Adopted (P10_TA(2025)131)

    Detailed voting results

    7

    (The sitting was suspended for a few moments.)



    IN THE CHAIR: Christel SCHALDEMOSE
    Vice-President

    6. Resumption of the sitting

    The sitting resumed at 12:35.



    7. Approval of the minutes of the previous sitting

    The minutes of the previous sitting were approved.



    8. Stopping the genocide in Gaza: time for EU sanctions (topical debate)

    The following spoke: Manon Aubry to open the debate proposed by the The Left Group.

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas (Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy).

    The following spoke: Hildegard Bentele, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nacho Sánchez Amor, on behalf of the S&D Group, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, on behalf of the PfE Group (the President noted that some comments needed to be checked), Sebastian Tynkkynen, on behalf of the ECR Group, Hilde Vautmans, on behalf of the Renew Group, Tineke Strik, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Hanna Gedin, on behalf of The Left Group, Marc Jongen, on behalf of the ESN Group, Seán Kelly, Evin Incir, Beatrice Timgren, Barry Andrews, Jaume Asens Llodrà, Nikos Pappas, Kateřina Konečná, Matjaž Nemec, Christophe Bay, Kristoffer Storm, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Ana Miranda Paz, Isabel Serra Sánchez, Ruth Firmenich, Francisco Assis, Abir Al-Sahlani, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Per Clausen, Cecilia Strada, Irena Joveva, Ville Niinistö, Özlem Demirel, Alex Agius Saliba, Lucia Yar, Giorgos Georgiou, Elio Di Rupo, Billy Kelleher, Estrella Galán, Ciaran Mullooly, Mimmo Lucano, Pernando Barrena Arza and Jussi Saramo (once the checks had been carried out, the President provided some clarifications).

    The following spoke: Kaja Kallas.

    The debate closed.



    9. Freedom of assembly in Hungary and the need for the Commission to act (debate)

    Commission statement: Freedom of assembly in Hungary and the need for the Commission to act (2025/2758(RSP))

    Michael McGrath (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Tomas Tobé, on behalf of the PPE Group, Iratxe García Pérez, on behalf of the S&D Group, Kinga Gál, on behalf of the PfE Group, Paolo Inselvini, on behalf of the ECR Group, Fabienne Keller, on behalf of the Renew Group, Terry Reintke, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Konstantinos Arvanitis, on behalf of The Left Group, Zsuzsanna Borvendég, on behalf of the ESN Group, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Klára Dobrev, Harald Vilimsky, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Nicolae Ştefănuță, Nicolas Bay, who also answered a blue-card question from Mélissa Camara, Dainius Žalimas, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper, Tineke Strik, Ilaria Salis, who also declined to take a blue-card question, Christine Anderson, who also declined to take a blue-card question, Judita Laššáková, Maria Walsh, Ana Catarina Mendes and Hermann Tertsch.

    IN THE CHAIR: Martin HOJSÍK
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Arkadiusz Mularczyk, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper, Moritz Körner, Mélissa Camara, who also answered a blue-card question from Jacek Ozdoba, Carolina Morace, Milan Mazurek, Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă, Arba Kokalari, Marc Angel, Paolo Borchia, Jacek Ozdoba, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Daniel Freund (the President reminded him of the rules on conduct), Li Andersson, Tomasz Froelich, Lukas Sieper, Mirosława Nykiel, Alessandro Zan, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, Tobiasz Bocheński, who also answered a blue-card question from Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Kim Van Sparrentak, Lena Düpont, Krzysztof Śmiszek, András László, who also answered a blue-card question from Michał Wawrykiewicz, Rasmus Nordqvist, who also answered a blue-card question from Tomasz Froelich, Evin Incir, Juan Fernando López Aguilar and Chloé Ridel.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Sebastian Tynkkynen and Alexander Jungbluth.

    The following spoke: Michael McGrath.

    The debate closed.



    10. Safeguarding the rule of law in Spain, ensuring an independent and autonomous prosecutor’s office to fight crime and corruption (debate)

    Commission statement: Safeguarding the rule of law in Spain, ensuring an independent and autonomous prosecutor’s office to fight crime and corruption (2025/2759(RSP))

    Michael McGrath (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Tomas Tobé, on behalf of the PPE Group, Javier Moreno Sánchez, on behalf of the S&D Group, Jorge Buxadé Villalba, on behalf of the PfE Group, Diego Solier, on behalf of the ECR Group, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, on behalf of the Renew Group, Diana Riba i Giner, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Isabel Serra Sánchez, on behalf of The Left Group, Dolors Montserrat, Evelyn Regner, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Enikő Győri, Hermann Tertsch, Nora Junco García, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Jaume Asens Llodrà, Lena Düpont, Francisco Assis, Petra Steger, Siegfried Mureşan, who also answered a blue-card question from Maria Grapini, and Sandro Ruotolo.

    IN THE CHAIR: Younous OMARJEE
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Enikő Győri, who also answered a blue-card question from Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Michał Wawrykiewicz, who also answered a blue-card question from Nicolás González Casares, Evin Incir, who also declined to take a blue-card question from François-Xavier Bellamy, Csaba Dömötör, Sebastião Bugalho, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, who also declined to take a blue-card question from François-Xavier Bellamy, Fabrice Leggeri, François-Xavier Bellamy to raise a point of order (the President cut off the speaker as his remarks did not constitute a point of order), Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez, Juan Carlos Girauta Vidal, who also accepted a blue-card question from François-Xavier Bellamy (the President cut him off and made some clarifications on the blue-card procedure), David Casa, Ana Miguel Pedro, Dirk Gotink, Andrey Kovatchev and Javier Zarzalejos.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: José Cepeda, András László, Sebastian Tynkkynen and Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Michael McGrath.

    The debate closed.



    11. Clean Industrial Deal (debate)

    Question for oral answer O-000020/2025 by Tom Berendsen, on behalf of the ITRE Committee to the Commission: Clean Industrial Deal (B10-0006/2025) (2025/2656(RSP))

    Tom Berendsen moved the question.

    Stéphane Séjourné (Executive Vice-President of the Commission) answered the question.

    The following spoke: Angelika Winzig, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nicolás González Casares, on behalf of the S&D Group, Paolo Borchia, on behalf of the PfE Group, Daniel Obajtek, on behalf of the ECR Group, Christophe Grudler, on behalf of the Renew Group, Sara Matthieu, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Per Clausen, on behalf of The Left Group, and Anja Arndt, on behalf of the ESN Group.

    The following spoke: Stéphane Séjourné.

    Motions for resolutions tabled under Rule 142(5) to wind up the debate: minutes of 19.6.2025, item I.

    The debate closed.

    Vote: 19 June 2025.



    12. Electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system (debate)

    Report on electricity grids: the backbone of the EU energy system [2025/2006(INI)] – Committee on Industry, Research and Energy. Rapporteur: Anna Stürgkh (A10-0091/2025)

    Anna Stürgkh introduced the report.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The following spoke: Seán Kelly, on behalf of the PPE Group, Bruno Tobback, on behalf of the S&D Group, András Gyürk, on behalf of the PfE Group, Ondřej Krutílek, on behalf of the ECR Group, Christophe Grudler, on behalf of the Renew Group, Kira Marie Peter-Hansen, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Dario Tamburrano, on behalf of The Left Group, Sarah Knafo, on behalf of the ESN Group, Angelika Winzig, Mohammed Chahim, Aleksandar Nikolic, Diego Solier, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Jutta Paulus, Markus Buchheit, who also answered a blue-card question from Jutta Paulus, Fernand Kartheiser, Paulo Cunha, Tsvetelina Penkova, Isabella Tovaglieri, who also declined to take a blue-card question from Dario Nardella, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Barry Andrews, Benedetta Scuderi, Marcin Sypniewski, who also answered a blue-card question from Stine Bosse, Fidias Panayiotou, Mirosława Nykiel, Yannis Maniatis and Julie Rechagneux.

    IN THE CHAIR: Antonella SBERNA
    Vice-President

    The following spoke: Ivars Ijabs, Michael Bloss, Andrea Wechsler, Dario Nardella, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Marion Maréchal, Bart Groothuis, Virgil-Daniel Popescu, Jens Geier, Nikola Bartůšek, Beatrice Timgren, Wouter Beke, Nicolás González Casares, who also answered blue-card questions from João Oliveira and Mireia Borrás Pabón, Gilles Pennelle, Hildegard Bentele, who also answered a blue-card question from Lukas Sieper, Sofie Eriksson, Niels Flemming Hansen, Jüri Ratas, Michał Szczerba, Dimitris Tsiodras, Krzysztof Hetman, Andreas Schwab, Regina Doherty and Tomislav Sokol.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Vytenis Povilas Andriukaitis, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Billy Kelleher, João Oliveira, Maria Zacharia and Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva and Anna Stürgkh.

    The debate closed.

    Vote: 19 June 2025.



    13. Composition of committees and delegations

    The ECR Group had notified the President of the following decision changing the composition of the committees and delegations:

    – ITRE Committee: Anna Zalewska

    The decision took effect as of that day.



    14. Rise in violence and the deepening humanitarian crisis in South Sudan (debate)

    Commission statement: Rise in violence and the deepening humanitarian crisis in South Sudan (2025/2751(RSP))

    Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission) made the statement.

    The following spoke: Michael Gahler, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marit Maij, on behalf of the S&D Group, György Hölvényi, on behalf of the PfE Group, Adam Bielan, on behalf of the ECR Group, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, on behalf of the Renew Group, Erik Marquardt, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Özlem Demirel, on behalf of The Left Group, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Francisco Assis, Barry Andrews, Murielle Laurent and Leire Pajín.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Alessandra Moretti, Nikos Papandreou and Sebastian Tynkkynen.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva.

    IN THE CHAIR: Roberts ZĪLE
    Vice-President

    The debate closed.



    15. Debate on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (debate)

    (For the titles and authors of the motions for resolutions, see minutes of 18.6.2025, item I.)



    15.1. Media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli

    Motions for resolutions B10-0282/2025, B10-0283/2025, B10-0287/2025, B10-0288/2025, B10-0289/2025, B10-0290/2025 and B10-0295/2025 (2025/2752(RSP))

    Rasa Juknevičienė, Tobias Cremer, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Dainius Žalimas, Lena Schilling, Danilo Della Valle and Petr Bystron introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.

    The following spoke: Liudas Mažylis, on behalf of the PPE Group, Nacho Sánchez Amor, on behalf of the S&D Group, and Thierry Mariani, on behalf of the PfE Group.

    The following spoke under the catch-the-eye procedure: Lukas Sieper.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The debate closed.

    Vote: minutes of 19.6.2025, item 5.1.



    15.2. Case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran

    Motions for resolutions B10-0280/2025, B10-0284/2025, B10-0285/2025, B10-0286/2025, B10-0296/2025, B10-0299/2025 and B10-0300/2025 (2025/2753(RSP))

    Michał Wawrykiewicz, Evin Incir, Veronika Vrecionová, Abir Al-Sahlani, Alice Kuhnke, Jonas Sjöstedt and Sebastiaan Stöteler introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.

    The following spoke: Alice Teodorescu Måwe, on behalf of the PPE Group, Francisco Assis, on behalf of the S&D Group, Gerolf Annemans, on behalf of the PfE Group, Hilde Vautmans, on behalf of the Renew Group, Wouter Beke, Daniel Attard and Danuše Nerudová.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The debate closed.

    Vote: minutes of 19.6.2025, item 5.2.



    15.3. Dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali

    Motions for resolutions B10-0281/2025, B10-0291/2025, B10-0292/2025, B10-0293/2025, B10-0294/2025, B10-0297/2025 and B10-0298/2025 (2025/2754(RSP))

    Christophe Gomart, Laura Ballarín Cereza and Catarina Vieira introduced their groups’ motions for resolutions.

    The following spoke: Ingeborg Ter Laak, on behalf of the PPE Group, Marta Temido, on behalf of the S&D Group, and Reinhold Lopatka.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The debate closed.

    Vote: minutes of 19.6.2025, item 5.3.



    16. Digital Markets, Digital Euro, Digital Identities: economical stimuli or trends toward dystopia (topical debate)

    The following spoke: Rada Laykova to open the debate proposed by the ESN Group.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva (Member of the Commission).

    The following spoke: Fernando Navarrete Rojas, on behalf of the PPE Group, Aurore Lalucq, on behalf of the S&D Group, Piotr Müller, on behalf of the ECR Group, Billy Kelleher, on behalf of the Renew Group, Sergey Lagodinsky, on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group, Jussi Saramo, on behalf of The Left Group, Siegbert Frank Droese, on behalf of the ESN Group, Lídia Pereira, Stefano Cavedagna, Katri Kulmuni, Damian Boeselager, Milan Mazurek, Fabio De Masi, Paulius Saudargas, Marlena Maląg, Diego Solier, Gheorghe Piperea, Dick Erixon and Claudiu-Richard Târziu.

    The following spoke: Ekaterina Zaharieva.

    The debate closed.



    17. Oral explanations of votes (Rule 201)

    No oral explanations of votes were made.



    18. Explanations of votes in writing (Rule 201)

    Explanations of votes given in writing would appear on the Members’ pages on Parliament’s website



    19. Agenda of the next sitting

    The next sitting would be held the following day, 19 June 2025, starting at 09:00. The agenda was available on Parliament’s website.



    20. Approval of the minutes of the sitting

    In accordance with Rule 208(3), the minutes of the sitting would be put to the House for approval at the beginning of the afternoon of the next sitting.



    21. Closure of the sitting

    The sitting closed at 21:10.



    LIST OF DOCUMENTS SERVING AS A BASIS FOR THE DEBATES AND DECISIONS OF PARLIAMENT



    I. Motions for resolutions tabled

    Media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli

    The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0282/2025)
    Lena Schilling, Mélissa Camara, Mounir Satouri, Ville Niinistö, Maria Ohisalo, Mārtiņš Staķis, Nicolae
    Ştefănuță, Markéta Gregorová
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0283/2025)
    Danilo Della Valle
    on behalf of The Left Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0287/2025)
    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas, Olivier Chastel
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0288/2025)
    Petr Bystron, Tomasz Froelich, Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell
    on behalf of the ESN Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0289/2025)
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Tobias Cremer
    on behalf of the S&D Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0290/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere, Rasa Juknevičienė
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli (2025/2752(RSP)) (B10-0295/2025)
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Reinis Pozņaks, Rihards Kols, Alexandr Vondra, Mariusz Kamiński, Veronika Vrecionová, Ondřej Krutílek, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Assita Kanko, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    Case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran

    The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0280/2025)
    Jonas Sjöstedt
    on behalf of The Left Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0284/2025)
    Alice Kuhnke, Maria Ohisalo, Mounir Satouri, Nicolae
    Ştefănuță, Mélissa Camara, Ville Niinistö, Hannah Neumann
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali’s illegal arrest and detention in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0285/2025)
    Abir Al-Sahlani, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Bart Groothuis, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0286/2025)
    Sebastiaan Stöteler, Marieke Ehlers, António Tânger Corrêa, Nikola Bartůšek, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Gerolf Annemans, Hermann Tertsch
    on behalf of the PfE Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0296/2025)
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Chloé Ridel
    on behalf of the S&D Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0299/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Željana Zovko, David McAllister, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Loucas Fourlas, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on the case of Ahmadreza Jalali in Iran (2025/2753(RSP)) (B10-0300/2025)
    Adam Bielan, Reinis Pozņaks, Rihards Kols, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Mariusz Kamiński, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alberico Gambino, Carlo Fidanza, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Assita Kanko, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Cristian Terheş, Diego Solier, Nora Junco García, Michał Dworczyk, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Marion Maréchal
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    Dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali

    The following Members or political groups had requested that a debate be held, in accordance with Rule 150, on the following motions for resolutions:

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0281/2025)
    Merja Kyllönen
    on behalf of The Left Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0291/2025)
    Nathalie Loiseau, Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Yvan Verougstraete, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0292/2025)
    Tomasz Froelich, Hans Neuhoff, Alexander Sell
    on behalf of the ESN Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0293/2025)
    Matthieu Valet, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Nikola Bartůšek
    on behalf of the PfE Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0294/2025)
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Laura Ballarín Cereza
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Catarina Vieira
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0297/2025)
    Sebastião Bugalho, Christophe Gomart, Željana Zovko, David McAllister, Isabel Wiseler-Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    on dissolution of political parties and the crackdown on the opposition in Mali (2025/2754(RSP)) (B10-0298/2025)
    Adam Bielan, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Assita Kanko, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Małgorzata Gosiewska
    on behalf of the ECR Group



    II. Delegated acts (Rule 114(2))

    Draft delegated acts forwarded to Parliament

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the identification of sub-categories within net-zero technologies and the list of specific components used for those technologies. (C(2025)02901 – 2025/2733(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 23 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ITRE
    opinion: ECON, EMPL, ENVI, IMCO, REGI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/125 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (C(2025)03066 – 2025/2727(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 21 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: INTA

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1242 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the addition of vehicle sub-groups for extra-heavy-combination lorries (C(2025)03071 – 2025/2726(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 20 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ENVI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards measures adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organisation for the monitoring, reporting and verification of aviation emissions for the purpose of implementing a global market-based measure and repealing Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/1603 (C(2025)03075 – 2025/2725(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 20 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ENVI
    opinion: ITRE

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 as regards the inclusion of the drug precursors 4-piperidone and 1-boc-4-piperidone in the list of scheduled substances (C(2025)03079 – 2025/2729(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 21 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: LIBE

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on the authorisation and organisational requirements for approved publication arrangements and approved reporting mechanisms, and on the authorisation requirements for consolidated tape providers, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/571 (C(2025)03100 – 2025/2765(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the input and output data of consolidated tapes, the synchronisation of business clocks and the revenue redistribution by the consolidated tape provider for shares and ETFs, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/574 (C(2025)03102 – 2025/2761(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on the obligation to make market data available to the public on a reasonable commercial basis (C(2025)03103 – 2025/2762(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council with detailed rules and procedures on the acceptance of air traffic controller licences and certificates issued by third countries. (C(2025)03114 – 2025/2732(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 23 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: TRAN

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 of the European Parliament and of the Council by specifying the rules on the identification of authorised oil and gas producers who are required to contribute to the objective of reaching the Union-target for available CO2 injection capacity by 2030, on the calculation of their respective contributions, and on their reporting obligations (C(2025)03218 – 2025/2730(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 21 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ITRE
    opinion: ECON, EMPL, ENVI, IMCO, REGI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation supplementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the information in an application for authorisation to offer asset-referenced tokens to the public or to seek their admission to trading (C(2025)03221 – 2025/2737(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 5 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 748/2012 as regards updating the references to the environmental protection requirements and correcting that Regulation (C(2025)03287 – 2025/2735(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 28 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: TRAN

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1241 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards geographic coordinates in Annexes VII and XIII thereto (C(2025)03293 – 2025/2734(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 28 May 2025

    referred to committee responsible: PECH

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending the Annex to Regulation (EU) No 609/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council to allow the use of monosodium salt of L-5-methyltetrahydrofolic acid as a source of folate in infant formula and follow-on formula, processed cereal-based food and baby food, total diet replacement for weight control and in food for special medical purposes (C(2025)03411 – 2025/2736(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 4 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ENVI

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as regards the assignment of Unique Device Identifiers for spectacle frames, spectacle lenses and ready-to-wear reading spectacles (C(2025)03484 – 2025/2763(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: SANT

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 of the European Parliament and of the Council to take into account regulatory developments concerning amendments to UN Regulations Nos 25, 34, 79, 100, 117, 127 and 152, and the new UN Regulations Nos 167, 169 and 171 adopted by the World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (C(2025)03502 – 2025/2738(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 5 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: IMCO

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) No 876/2013 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards changes to the functioning and management of colleges for central counterparties (C(2025)03626 – 2025/2755(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 11 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the date of application of the own funds requirements for market risk (C(2025)03643 – 2025/2764(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 3 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON

    – Commission Delegated Regulation on the implementation of the Union’s international obligations, as referred to in Article 15(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part, as regards picked dogfish (C(2025)03715 – 2025/2768(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 13 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: PECH

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list (C(2025)03815 – 2025/2740(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 1 month from the date of receipt of 10 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: ECON, LIBE

    – Commission Delegated Regulation amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/530 as regards its date of application (C(2025)03819 – 2025/2766(DEA))

    Deadline for raising objections: 2 months from the date of receipt of 12 June 2025

    referred to committee responsible: INTA



    ATTENDANCE REGISTER

    Present:

    Aaltola Mika, Abadía Jover Maravillas, Adamowicz Magdalena, Aftias Georgios, Agirregoitia Martínez Oihane, Agius Peter, Agius Saliba Alex, Alexandraki Galato, Allione Grégory, Al-Sahlani Abir, Anadiotis Nikolaos, Anderson Christine, Andersson Li, Andresen Rasmus, Andrews Barry, Andriukaitis Vytenis Povilas, Androuët Mathilde, Angel Marc, Annemans Gerolf, Annunziata Lucia, Antoci Giuseppe, Arias Echeverría Pablo, Arimont Pascal, Arłukowicz Bartosz, Arnaoutoglou Sakis, Arndt Anja, Arvanitis Konstantinos, Asens Llodrà Jaume, Assis Francisco, Attard Daniel, Aubry Manon, Auštrevičius Petras, Axinia Adrian-George, Azmani Malik, Bajada Thomas, Baljeu Jeannette, Ballarín Cereza Laura, Bardella Jordan, Barley Katarina, Barna Dan, Barrena Arza Pernando, Bartulica Stephen Nikola, Bartůšek Nikola, Bausemer Arno, Bay Nicolas, Bay Christophe, Beke Wouter, Bellamy François-Xavier, Benea Dragoş, Benjumea Benjumea Isabel, Beňová Monika, Bentele Hildegard, Berendsen Tom, Berg Sibylle, Berlato Sergio, Bernhuber Alexander, Biedroń Robert, Bielan Adam, Bischoff Gabriele, Blaha Ľuboš, Blinkevičiūtė Vilija, Blom Rachel, Bloss Michael, Bocheński Tobiasz, Boeselager Damian, Bogdan Ioan-Rareş, Bonaccini Stefano, Bonte Barbara, Borchia Paolo, Borrás Pabón Mireia, Borvendég Zsuzsanna, Borzan Biljana, Bosanac Gordan, Boßdorf Irmhild, Bosse Stine, Botenga Marc, Boyer Gilles, Brasier-Clain Marie-Luce, Braun Grzegorz, Brejza Krzysztof, Bricmont Saskia, Brnjac Nikolina, Bryłka Anna, Buchheit Markus, Buczek Tomasz, Buda Daniel, Buda Waldemar, Budka Borys, Bugalho Sebastião, Buła Andrzej, Buxadé Villalba Jorge, Bystron Petr, Bžoch Jaroslav, Camara Mélissa, Canfin Pascal, Carberry Nina, Cârciu Gheorghe, Carême Damien, Casa David, Caspary Daniel, Cassart Benoit, Castillo Laurent, del Castillo Vera Pilar, Cavazzini Anna, Cavedagna Stefano, Ceccardi Susanna, Cepeda José, Ceulemans Estelle, Chahim Mohammed, Chaibi Leila, Chastel Olivier, Christensen Asger, Ciccioli Carlo, Cifrová Ostrihoňová Veronika, Ciriani Alessandro, Cisint Anna Maria, Clausen Per, Clergeau Christophe, Cormand David, Corrado Annalisa, Costanzo Vivien, Cotrim De Figueiredo João, Cowen Barry, Cremer Tobias, Cristea Andi, Crosetto Giovanni, Cunha Paulo, Dahl Henrik, Danielsson Johan, Dauchy Marie, Dávid Dóra, David Ivan, Decaro Antonio, de la Hoz Quintano Raúl, Della Valle Danilo, Deloge Valérie, De Masi Fabio, Demirel Özlem, Deutsch Tamás, Devaux Valérie, Dibrani Adnan, Dieringer Elisabeth, Dîncu Vasile, Di Rupo Elio, Disdier Mélanie, Dobrev Klára, Doherty Regina, Doleschal Christian, Dömötör Csaba, Do Nascimento Cabral Paulo, Donazzan Elena, Dorfmann Herbert, Dostalova Klara, Dostál Ondřej, Droese Siegbert Frank, Düpont Lena, Dworczyk Michał, Ecke Matthias, Ehler Christian, Ehlers Marieke, Eriksson Sofie, Erixon Dick, Eroglu Engin, Estaràs Ferragut Rosa, Everding Sebastian, Falcă Gheorghe, Falcone Marco, Farreng Laurence, Farský Jan, Ferber Markus, Ferenc Viktória, Fernández Jonás, Fidanza Carlo, Fiocchi Pietro, Firmenich Ruth, Flanagan Luke Ming, Fourlas Loucas, Fourreau Emma, Fragkos Emmanouil, Freund Daniel, Fritzon Heléne, Froelich Tomasz, Fuglsang Niels, Funchion Kathleen, Furet Angéline, Furore Mario, Gahler Michael, Gál Kinga, Galán Estrella, Gálvez Lina, Gambino Alberico, García Hermida-Van Der Walle Raquel, Garraud Jean-Paul, Gasiuk-Pihowicz Kamila, Geadi Geadis, Gedin Hanna, Geese Alexandra, Geier Jens, Geisel Thomas, Gemma Chiara, Georgiou Giorgos, Gerbrandy Gerben-Jan, Gerzsenyi Gabriella, Geuking Niels, Gieseke Jens, Giménez Larraz Borja, Girauta Vidal Juan Carlos, Glavak Sunčana, Glucksmann Raphaël, Goerens Charles, Gomart Christophe, Gomes Isilda, Gómez López Sandra, Gonçalves Bruno, Gonçalves Sérgio, González Casares Nicolás, González Pons Esteban, Gori Giorgio, Gosiewska Małgorzata, Gotink Dirk, Gozi Sandro, Grapini Maria, Gražulis Petras, Gregorová Markéta, Grims Branko, Griset Catherine, Gronkiewicz-Waltz Hanna, Groothuis Bart, Grossmann Elisabeth, Grudler Christophe, Gualmini Elisabetta, Guarda Cristina, Guetta Bernard, Guzenina Maria, Győri Enikő, Gyürk András, Haider Roman, Halicki Andrzej, Hansen Niels Flemming, Hassan Rima, Hauser Gerald, Häusling Martin, Hava Mircea-Gheorghe, Heinäluoma Eero, Henriksson Anna-Maja, Herbst Niclas, Herranz García Esther, Hetman Krzysztof, Hojsík Martin, Holmgren Pär, Hölvényi György, Homs Ginel Alicia, Humberto Sérgio, Ijabs Ivars, Imart Céline, Incir Evin, Inselvini Paolo, Iovanovici Şoşoacă Diana, Jalloul Muro Hana, Jamet France, Jarubas Adam, Jerković Romana, Jongen Marc, Joński Dariusz, Joron Virginie, Jouvet Pierre, Joveva Irena, Juknevičienė Rasa, Junco García Nora, Jungbluth Alexander, Kabilov Taner, Kalfon François, Kaliňák Erik, Kaljurand Marina, Kalniete Sandra, Kamiński Mariusz, Kanev Radan, Kanko Assita, Karlsbro Karin, Kartheiser Fernand, Karvašová Ľubica, Katainen Elsi, Kefalogiannis Emmanouil, Kelleher Billy, Keller Fabienne, Kelly Seán, Kennes Rudi, Khan Mary, Kircher Sophia, Knafo Sarah, Knotek Ondřej, Kobosko Michał, Köhler Stefan, Kohut Łukasz, Kokalari Arba, Kolář Ondřej, Kollár Kinga, Kols Rihards, Konečná Kateřina, Kopacz Ewa, Körner Moritz, Kountoura Elena, Kovařík Ondřej, Kovatchev Andrey, Krištopans Vilis, Kruis Sebastian, Krutílek Ondřej, Kubín Tomáš, Kuhnke Alice, Kulmuni Katri, Kyllönen Merja, Kyuchyuk Ilhan, Lagodinsky Sergey, Lakos Eszter, Lalucq Aurore, Lange Bernd, Langensiepen Katrin, Laššáková Judita, László András, Latinopoulou Afroditi, Laurent Murielle, Laureti Camilla, Laykova Rada, Lazarov Ilia, Lazarus Luis-Vicențiu, Le Callennec Isabelle, Leggeri Fabrice, Lenaers Jeroen, Leonardelli Julien, Lewandowski Janusz, Lexmann Miriam, Liese Peter, Lins Norbert, Loiseau Nathalie, Løkkegaard Morten, Lopatka Reinhold, López Javi, López Aguilar Juan Fernando, López-Istúriz White Antonio, Lövin Isabella, Lucano Mimmo, Luena César, Łukacijewska Elżbieta Katarzyna, Lupo Giuseppe, McAllister David, Madison Jaak, Maestre Cristina, Magoni Lara, Magyar Péter, Maij Marit, Maląg Marlena, Mandl Lukas, Maniatis Yannis, Mantovani Mario, Maran Pierfrancesco, Marczułajtis-Walczak Jagna, Maréchal Marion, Mariani Thierry, Marino Ignazio Roberto, Marquardt Erik, Martín Frías Jorge, Martins Catarina, Martusciello Fulvio, Marzà Ibáñez Vicent, Mato Gabriel, Matthieu Sara, Mavrides Costas, Mayer Georg, Mazurek Milan, Mažylis Liudas, McNamara Michael, Mebarek Nora, Mehnert Alexandra, Meimarakis Vangelis, Meleti Eleonora, Mendes Ana Catarina, Mendia Idoia, Mertens Verena, Mesure Marina, Metsola Roberta, Metz Tilly, Mikser Sven, Milazzo Giuseppe, Millán Mon Francisco José, Minchev Nikola, Miranda Paz Ana, Molnár Csaba, Montero Irene, Montserrat Dolors, Morace Carolina, Morano Nadine, Moreira de Sá Tiago, Moreno Sánchez Javier, Moretti Alessandra, Motreanu Dan-Ştefan, Mularczyk Arkadiusz, Müller Piotr, Mullooly Ciaran, Mureşan Siegfried, Muşoiu Ştefan, Nagyová Jana, Nardella Dario, Navarrete Rojas Fernando, Negrescu Victor, Nemec Matjaž, Nerudová Danuše, Nesci Denis, Neuhoff Hans, Neumann Hannah, Nevado del Campo Elena, Nica Dan, Niebler Angelika, Niedermayer Luděk, Niinistö Ville, Nikolaou-Alavanos Lefteris, Nikolic Aleksandar, Ní Mhurchú Cynthia, Noichl Maria, Nordqvist Rasmus, Novakov Andrey, Nykiel Mirosława, Obajtek Daniel, Ódor Ľudovít, Oetjen Jan-Christoph, Oliveira João, Olivier Philippe, Omarjee Younous, Ondruš Branislav, Ó Ríordáin Aodhán, Orlando Leoluca, Ozdoba Jacek, Paet Urmas, Pajín Leire, Palmisano Valentina, Panayiotou Fidias, Papadakis Kostas, Papandreou Nikos, Pappas Nikos, Pascual de la Parte Nicolás, Paulus Jutta, Pedro Ana Miguel, Pedulla’ Gaetano, Pellerin-Carlin Thomas, Peltier Guillaume, Penkova Tsvetelina, Pennelle Gilles, Pereira Lídia, Peter-Hansen Kira Marie, Petrov Hristo, Picaro Michele, Picierno Pina, Picula Tonino, Piera Pascale, Pietikäinen Sirpa, Pimpie Pierre, Piperea Gheorghe, de la Pisa Carrión Margarita, Polato Daniele, Polfjärd Jessica, Popescu Virgil-Daniel, Pozņaks Reinis, Prebilič Vladimir, Princi Giusi, Protas Jacek, Pürner Friedrich, Rackete Carola, Radev Emil, Radtke Dennis, Rafowicz Emma, Ratas Jüri, Razza Ruggero, Rechagneux Julie, Regner Evelyn, Repasi René, Repp Sabrina, Ressler Karlo, Reuten Thijs, Riba i Giner Diana, Ricci Matteo, Ridel Chloé, Riehl Nela, Ripa Manuela, Rodrigues André, Roth Neveďalová Katarína, Rougé André, Ruissen Bert-Jan, Ruotolo Sandro, Rzońca Bogdan, Saeidi Arash, Salini Massimiliano, Salis Ilaria, Salla Aura, Sánchez Amor Nacho, Sanchez Julien, Sancho Murillo Elena, Saramo Jussi, Sardone Silvia, Šarec Marjan, Sargiacomo Eric, Satouri Mounir, Saudargas Paulius, Sbai Majdouline, Sberna Antonella, Schaldemose Christel, Schaller-Baross Ernő, Schenk Oliver, Scheuring-Wielgus Joanna, Schieder Andreas, Schilling Lena, Schneider Christine, Schnurrbusch Volker, Schwab Andreas, Scuderi Benedetta, Seekatz Ralf, Sell Alexander, Serrano Sierra Rosa, Serra Sánchez Isabel, Sidl Günther, Sienkiewicz Bartłomiej, Sieper Lukas, Singer Christine, Sinkevičius Virginijus, Sjöstedt Jonas, Śmiszek Krzysztof, Smith Anthony, Smit Sander, Sokol Tomislav, Solier Diego, Solís Pérez Susana, Sommen Liesbet, Sonneborn Martin, Sorel Malika, Sousa Silva Hélder, Søvndal Villy, Squarta Marco, Staķis Mārtiņš, Stancanelli Raffaele, Ștefănuță Nicolae, Steger Petra, Stier Davor Ivo, Storm Kristoffer, Stöteler Sebastiaan, Stoyanov Stanislav, Strada Cecilia, Streit Joachim, Strik Tineke, Strolenberg Anna, Sturdza Şerban Dimitrie, Stürgkh Anna, Sypniewski Marcin, Szczerba Michał, Szekeres Pál, Tamburrano Dario, Tânger Corrêa António, Tarquinio Marco, Tarr Zoltán, Târziu Claudiu-Richard, Tavares Carla, Tegethoff Kai, Temido Marta, Teodorescu Georgiana, Teodorescu Måwe Alice, Terheş Cristian, Ter Laak Ingeborg, Terras Riho, Tertsch Hermann, Thionnet Pierre-Romain, Timgren Beatrice, Tinagli Irene, Tobback Bruno, Tobé Tomas, Tolassy Rody, Tomac Eugen, Tomašič Zala, Tomaszewski Waldemar, Tomc Romana, Tonin Matej, Toom Jana, Topo Raffaele, Torselli Francesco, Tosi Flavio, Toussaint Marie, Tovaglieri Isabella, Toveri Pekka, Tridico Pasquale, Trochu Laurence, Tsiodras Dimitris, Tudose Mihai, Turek Filip, Tynkkynen Sebastian, Uhrík Milan, Ušakovs Nils, Vaidere Inese, Valchev Ivaylo, Vălean Adina, Valet Matthieu, Van Brempt Kathleen, Vandendriessche Tom, Van Dijck Kris, Van Lanschot Reinier, Van Leeuwen Jessika, Vannacci Roberto, Van Overtveldt Johan, Van Sparrentak Kim, Varaut Alexandre, Vasconcelos Ana, Vasile-Voiculescu Vlad, Vautmans Hilde, Vedrenne Marie-Pierre, Ventola Francesco, Verheyen Sabine, Verougstraete Yvan, Veryga Aurelijus, Vešligaj Marko, Vicsek Annamária, Vieira Catarina, Vigenin Kristian, Vilimsky Harald, Vind Marianne, Vistisen Anders, Vivaldini Mariateresa, Volgin Petar, von der Schulenburg Michael, Vondra Alexandr, Voss Axel, Vozemberg-Vrionidi Elissavet, Vrecionová Veronika, Vázquez Lázara Adrián, Waitz Thomas, Walsh Maria, Walsmann Marion, Warborn Jörgen, Warnke Jan-Peter, Wąsik Maciej, Wawrykiewicz Michał, Wcisło Marta, Wechsler Andrea, Weimers Charlie, Werbrouck Séverine, Wiezik Michal, Winkler Iuliu, Winzig Angelika, Wiseler-Lima Isabel, Wiśniewska Jadwiga, Wölken Tiemo, Wolters Lara, Yar Lucia, Yon-Courtin Stéphanie, Zacharia Maria, Zajączkowska-Hernik Ewa, Zalewska Anna, Žalimas Dainius, Zan Alessandro, Zarzalejos Javier, Zdechovský Tomáš, Zdrojewski Bogdan Andrzej, Zijlstra Auke, Zīle Roberts, Zingaretti Nicola, Złotowski Kosma, Zoido Álvarez Juan Ignacio, Zovko Željana

    Excused:

    Burkhardt Delara, Friis Sigrid, Hazekamp Anja, Kemp Martine

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Serious negligence in the protection of minors in France – E-002372/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002372/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Catherine Griset (PfE), Aleksandar Nikolic (PfE), Virginie Joron (PfE), Valérie Deloge (PfE), Marie-Luce Brasier-Clain (PfE), Mathilde Androuët (PfE), Julie Rechagneux (PfE), Jean-Paul Garraud (PfE)

    As reported in the press[1], the state of affairs in France’s juvenile detention centres in France is scandalous: girls are exposed to prostitution, boys to drug trafficking, and now Islamist networks, particularly those run by the Muslim Brotherhood, are infiltrating them:

    Despite repeated warnings, this criminal neglect of children and teenagers, who are among the most vulnerable members of society, has been completely ignored by successive French governments.

    Worse still, through their irresponsible migration policy, these governments have aggravated the security situation in juvenile detention centres, even going so far as to place children of Jihadists returning from Syria in these centres.

    Furthermore, the French authorities do not monitor the training of professionals in secularism, which allows religious rules to be imposed in the canteens of these establishments.

    • 1.Is the Commission aware of similar cases of negligence in the protection of minors in other Member States?
    • 2.Are any European agencies, such as Europol or Eurojust, monitoring Islamist or criminal tendencies in homes for minors in Europe?

    Submitted: 12.6.2025

    • [1] https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/les-islamistes-ont-infiltre-les-foyers-pour-mineurs-et-les-associations-de-protection-de-l-enfance-20250601
    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Taranto: disparities in accessing information pertaining to, and lack of public participation in, the IEP procedure for the Acciaierie d’Italia steel plant – E-002345/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002345/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Valentina Palmisano (The Left)

    Local environmental associations are complaining about the serious disparities in how the stakeholders involved in the approval process for the Acciaierie d’Italia steelworks’ integrated environmental permit (IEP) are being treated. These groups claim that they were not officially sent the final investigation opinion for the IEP (which contains 477 technical specifications), even though they are formally part of the approval procedure and had, in this capacity, previously submitted specific comments.

    The final investigation opinion was, however, sent to the plant’s operator, who was in a position to study it and propose changes, therefore exerting a clear influence on the drafting of the final opinion. The environmental associations claim that they have received neither the first nor the second PIC, nor plant management’s proposals, thus preventing them from putting forward any arguments and playing an effective role in the approval process.

    In the light of Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions and the Aarhus Convention, both of which guarantee the right to public participation and transparency in environmental proceedings:

    • 1.Is the Commission aware of the state of affairs described above?
    • 2.Does it think that the Taranto steelworks’ EIP approval procedure has been carried in accordance with EU law?
    • 3.Will the Commission check whether Italy is complying with its obligations under Directive 2010/75/EU and the Aarhus Convention?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Respect for national sovereignty in arms export control – E-002359/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002359/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mathilde Androuët (PfE)

    The Commission wants to relax national rules governing the movement of defence equipment between Member States, in order to reduce the administrative burden and speed up production of weapons in the EU[1]. Germany, Italy and Spain in particular share France’s concerns about this attempt to deregulate.

    A majority in the Council of the EU seems to be in favour, arguing that ‘EU arms deliveries to Ukraine were one of the factors to drive this review’, but reaffirmed ‘the EU’s commitment (…) to preventing diversion’[2], which poses a serious risk to the protection of critical technologies developed by our industrial firms.

    Seeking to accelerate arms production by removing national safeguards amounts to sacrificing the sovereignty of the peoples of Europe, as decisions on arms exports traditionally fall within the sovereign powers of our nations. Those decisions directly involve their diplomatic responsibility, their strategic security and their industrial autonomy.

    • 1.How will the Commission prevent this relaxation from facilitating unwanted transfers of sensitive know-how?
    • 2.Can it confirm that the Member States will retain control of their arms export policy, without any pressure or binding mechanism, in line with their freedom to make political assessments?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    • [1] “France says ‘non’ to loosening rules for arms exports in Europe”, 28 April 2025, Aurélie Pugnet, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence/news/france-launches-battle-against-looser-intra-eu-defence-export-controls/
    • [2] ‘Arms export control: Council reviews EU framework strengthening the control and accountability of international arms trade’, 14 April 2025, Council of the European Union press release, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/04/14/arms-export-control-council-reviews-eu-framework-strengthening-the-control-and-accountability-of-international-arms-trade/?
    Last updated: 19 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News