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Category: Eurozone

  • MIL-Evening Report: Australian kids BYO lunches to school. There is a healthier way to feed students

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Liesel Spencer, Associate Professor, School of Law, Western Sydney University

    Getty Images/ courtneyk

    Australian parents will be familiar with this school morning routine: hastily making sandwiches or squeezing leftovers into containers, grabbing a snack from the cupboard and a piece of fruit from the counter.

    This would be unheard of in many other countries, including Finland, Sweden, Scotland, Wales, Brazil and India, which provide free daily school meals to every child.

    Australia is one of the few high-income countries that does not provide children with a daily nutritious meal at school.

    As families increasingly face food insecurity and a cost-of-living crisis, here’s how school lunches could help.

    School lunches are important

    During the week, children get a third of their daily food intake at school. What they eat during school hours has a significant impact on their health.

    Australian children have much higher rates of obesity than children in countries with healthy lunch programs.

    As children’s diets affect physical and cognitive development, and mental health, poor diet can also affect academic performance.

    International research shows universal school meal programs – where all children are provided with a healthy meal at school each day – can improve both health and educational outcomes for students.

    The problem with BYO lunchboxes

    In Australia, children either bring a packed lunch or buy food at the school canteen. But the vast majority of these lunches don’t meet kids’ dietary needs.

    As a 2022 Flinders University report notes, more than 80% of Australian primary school lunches are of poor nutritional quality. Half of students’ school-day food intake comes from junk food and fewer than one in ten students eat enough vegetables.

    While these figures are based on 2011–2012 data, subsequent national survey data does not show significant improvements in children’s healthy diet indicators, including fruit and vegetable consumption. Time pressures on carers mean pre-packaged food can be a default lunchbox choice.

    At the same time, many families with school students are not able to provide their children with healthy lunches. Food insecurity — not having regular access to enough safe, healthy and affordable food — affects an estimated 58% of Australian households with children, and 69% of single-parent households.

    Hot weather also raises food safety concerns, as it’s hard to keep fresh food cool in schoolbags.

    School meals programs in Australia

    There are some historical examples of providing food to children at school in Australia. This includes the school milk program which ran from 1950s to 1970s. There were also wartime experiments in the 1940s. For example, the Oslo lunch (a cheese and salad sandwich on wholemeal bread, with milk and fruit) was provided at school to improve the health of children.

    Today, there is a patchwork of school food programs run by not-for-profit organisations providing breakfast and/or lunch, and various schemes, including kitchen garden and school greenhouse programs.

    There are also pilot schemes providing hot meals. For example, in Tasmania, the current pilot school lunch program feeds children in participating schools a hot lunch on some days of the week with state government support. Evaluation of the program showed strong benefits: healthier eating, calmer classrooms, better social connections from eating lunch together, and less food waste.

    The 2023 parliamentary inquiry into food security recommended the federal government work with states and territories to consider the feasibility of a school meals program.

    In May, the South Australian parliament opened an inquiry into programs in preschools and schools to ensure children and young people don’t go hungry during the day.

    What would it take to introduce school meals?

    Rolling out universal school meal programs across Australian schools would require cooperation between government and private sectors.

    It could build on what already exists – including canteens, school gardens, food relief and breakfast clubs – to create a more consistent and inclusive system.

    There’s a strong evidence base to guide this, both from Australian pilot programs and international examples.

    Decisions would have to be made about regulation and funding – whether to opt for a federally-funded and regulated scheme with federal and state cooperation, or a state-by-state scheme.

    Funding mechanisms from international models include fully government-funded, caregiver-paid (but with subsidies for disadvantaged families) and cost-sharing arrangements between government and families.

    Costs per child per day are around A$10, factoring in economies of scale. Some pilot programs report lower costs of around $5, but involve volunteer labour.

    More research is needed to determine parent and community attitudes and model these funding options, including preventative health benefits.

    Delivery models may also vary depending on each school’s size, location and infrastructure. This could include onsite food preparation, central kitchens delivering pre-prepared meals, or partnerships with not-for-profit providers.

    Ultimately, providing food at school could save parents valuable time and stress, and ensure all Australian students can access the health and education benefits of a nutritious school meal.

    Liesel Spencer has undertaken volunteer work for the Federation of Canteens in Schools (Australia).

    Miriam Williams has undertaken volunteer work for the Federation of Canteens in Schools (Australia).

    Katherine Kent does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Australian kids BYO lunches to school. There is a healthier way to feed students – https://theconversation.com/australian-kids-byo-lunches-to-school-there-is-a-healthier-way-to-feed-students-257465

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Unprecedented heat in the North Atlantic Ocean kickstarted Europe’s hellish 2023 summer. Now we know what caused it

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Matthew England, Scientia Professor and Deputy Director of the ARC Australian Centre for Excellence in Antarctic Science, UNSW Sydney

    Westend61/Getty Images

    In June 2023, a record-breaking marine heatwave swept across the North Atlantic Ocean, smashing previous temperature records.

    Soon after, deadly heatwaves broke out across large areas of Europe, and torrential rains and flash flooding devastated parts of Spain and Eastern Europe. That year Switzerland lost more than 4% of its total glacier volume, and severe bushfires broke out around the Mediterranean.

    It wasn’t just Europe that was impacted. The coral reefs of the Caribbean were bleaching under severe heat stress. And hurricanes, fuelled by ocean heat, intensified into disasters. For example, Hurricane Idalia hit Florida in August 2023 – causing 12 deaths and an estimated US$3.6 billion in damages.

    Today, in a paper published in Nature, we uncover what drove this unprecedented marine heatwave.

    A strange discovery

    In a strange twist to the global warming story, there is a region of the North Atlantic Ocean to the southeast of Greenland that has been cooling over the last 50 to 100 years.

    This so-called “cold blob” or “warming hole” has been linked to the weakening of what’s known as the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation – a system of ocean currents that conveys warm water from the equator towards the poles.

    During July 2023 we met as a team to analyse this cold blob – how deep it reaches and how robust it is as a measure of the strength of the Atlantic overturning circulation – when it became clear there was a strong reversal of the historical cooling trend. The cold blob had warmed to 2°C above average.

    But was that a sign the overturning circulation had been reinvigorated? Or was something else going on?

    A layered story

    It soon became clear the anomalous warm temperatures southeast of Greenland were part of an unprecedented marine heatwave that had developed across much of the North Atlantic Ocean. By July, basin-averaged warming in the North Atlantic reached 1.4°C above normal, almost double the previous record set in 2010.

    To uncover what was behind these record breaking temperatures, we combined estimates of the atmospheric conditions that prevailed during the heatwave, such as winds and cloud cover, with ocean observations and model simulations.

    We were especially interested in understanding what was happening in the mixed upper layer of water of the ocean, which is strongly affected by the atmosphere.

    Distinct from the deeper layer of cold water, the ocean’s surface mixed layer warms as it’s exposed to more sunlight during spring and summer. But the rate at which this warming happens depends on its thickness. If it’s thick, it will warm more gradually; if it’s thin, rapid warming can ensue.

    During summer the thickness of this surface mixed layer is largely set by winds. Winds churn up the surface ocean and the stronger they are the deeper the mixing penetrates, so strong winds create a think upper layer and weak winds generate a shallower layer.

    Sea surface temperature anomaly (°C) for the month of June 2023, relative to the 1991–2020 reference period.
    Copernicus Climate Change Service/ECMWF

    Thinning at the surface

    Our new research indicates that the primary driver of the marine heatwave was record-breaking weak winds across much of the basin. The winds were at their weakest measured levels during June and July, possibly linked to a developing El Niño in the east Pacific Ocean.

    This led to by far the shallowest upper layer on record. Data from the Argo Program – a global array of nearly 4,000 robotic floats that measure the temperature and salinity in the upper 2,000 metres of the ocean – showed in some areas this layer was only ten metres deep, compared to the usual 20 to 40 metres deep.

    This caused the sun to heat the thin surface layer far more rapidly than usual.

    In addition to these short term changes in 2023, previous research has shown long-term warming associated with anthropogenic climate change is reducing the ability of winds to mix the upper ocean, causing it to gradually thin.

    We also identified a possible secondary driver of more localised warming during the 2023 marine heatwave: above-average solar radiation hitting the ocean. This could be linked in part with the introduction of new international rules in 2020 to reduce sulfate emissions from ships.

    The aim of these rules was to reduce air pollution from ship’s exhaust systems. But sulfate aerosols also reflect solar radiation and can lead to cloud formation. The resultant clearer skies can then lead to more ocean warming.

    Early warning signs

    The extreme 2023 heatwave provides a preview of the future. Marine heatwaves are expected to worsen as Earth continues to warm due to greenhouse gas emissions, with devastating impacts on marine ecosystems such as coral reefs and fisheries. This also means more intense hurricanes – and more intense land-based heatwaves.

    Right now, although the “cold blob” to the southeast of Greenland has returned, parts of the North Atlantic remain significantly warmer than the average. There is a particularly warm patch of water off the coast of the United Kingdom, with temperatures up to 4°C above normal. And this is likely priming Europe for extreme land-based heatwaves this summer.

    Global ocean temperatures on June 2 2025. A patch of abnormally warm water is visible off the southern coast of the United Kingdom.
    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

    To better understand, forecast and plan for the impacts of marine heatwaves, long-term ocean and atmospheric data and models, including those provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the United States, are crucial. In fact, without these data and models, our new study would not have been possible.

    Despite this, NOAA faces an uncertain future. A proposed budget for the 2026 fiscal year released by the White House last month could mean devastating funding cuts of more than US$1.5 billion – mostly targeting climate-based research and data collection.

    This would be a disaster for monitoring our oceans and climate system, right at a time when change is severe, unprecedented, and proving very costly.

    Matthew England receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    Alex Sen Gupta receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    Andrew Kiss receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    Zhi Li receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    – ref. Unprecedented heat in the North Atlantic Ocean kickstarted Europe’s hellish 2023 summer. Now we know what caused it – https://theconversation.com/unprecedented-heat-in-the-north-atlantic-ocean-kickstarted-europes-hellish-2023-summer-now-we-know-what-caused-it-258061

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Israel’s new aid system is inhumane. Israel needs to end its restrictions on aid now: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Israel’s new aid system is inhumane. Israel needs to end its restrictions on aid now: UK statement at the UN Security Council

    Explanation of vote by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, following the vote on the E10 draft UN Security Council resolution on Gaza.

    The United Kingdom voted in favour of this resolution today because the intolerable situation in Gaza needs to end.

    We are determined to see an end to this war, secure the release of the hostages held by Hamas and alleviate the catastrophic humanitarian situation for Palestinians in Gaza. 

    This Israeli Government’s decisions to expand its military operations in Gaza and severely restrict aid are unjustifiable, disproportionate and counterproductive, and the UK completely opposes them.

    The Israeli Government says it has opened up aid access with its new system.

    But Palestinians, desperate to feed their families, have been killed as they try to reach the very few aid sites that have been permitted by Israel. 

    This is inhumane.

    We support the UN’s call for an immediate and independent investigation into these events and for perpetrators to be held accountable.

    Israel needs to end its restrictions on aid now: let the UN and humanitarians do their job to save lives, reduce suffering and maintain dignity.

    President, we regret that the Council was unable to reach consensus today, but we remain committed to the vision of this text.

    We will continue to strongly support the efforts led by the United States, Qatar and Egypt to secure an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. 

    A ceasefire is the best way to secure the release of all remaining hostages and achieve a long-term political solution.

    And we repeat our condemnation of the heinous attack by Hamas on 7th October and demand that it release all the hostages immediately and unconditionally. Hamas can have no role in the future governance of Gaza.

    A two-state solution is the only way to bring the long-lasting peace, stability and security that both Israelis and Palestinians deserve. 

    We welcome France and Saudi Arabia’s leadership in chairing an international conference later this month.

    Updates to this page

    Published 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: US Department of Labor and Adidas America reach settlement for $235K in penalties resolving fall hazard and unsafe ladder violations

    Source: US Department of Labor

    ALBANY, NY – The U.S. Department of Labor has entered into a settlement agreement with Adidas America Inc. that requires the company to pay $235,000 in fines and implement enhanced safety measures at multiple facilities.

    The agreement comes after the department’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration conducted a 2024 follow-up inspection at an Adidas warehouse in upstate New York. OSHA initially cited for hazards in 2021 during an inspection that found missing guardrails and an unsafe ladder.

    Inspectors returned in 2024 to find that Adidas had not corrected the hazards cited in 2021 and found an additional unsafe ladder violation. 

    The May 30, 2025, settlement requires Adidas to implement enhanced abatement measures at its facilities in New York, New Jersey, and Puerto Rico, including adopting a comprehensive Safety and Health Management program, retraining employees on fall hazards, assessing and auditing potential fall hazards at each facility, and discontinuing use of overhead storage in the facilities. 

    Adidas also agreed to pay $235,000 in penalties. 

    Adidas America Inc. is a subsidiary of Adidas AG, an athletic apparel and footwear corporation headquartered in Herzogenaurach, Bavaria, Germany.

    OSHA’s Warehousing page provides solutions to prevent injuries from hazards including forklifts, slips, trips and falls and materials handling. The agency’s stop falls website offers safety information and video presentations in English and Spanish to teach workers about fall hazards and proper safety procedures.

    Learn more about OSHA.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report – A10-0100/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report

    (2024/2078(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(1), 3(3), second subparagraph, 4(3), 5, 6, 7, 11, 19 and 49 thereof,

    – having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to the articles thereof relating to respect for and the protection and promotion of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Union, including Articles 70, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265 and 267,

    – having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

    – having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800), and the annex thereto containing recommendations for the Member States,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and its accompanying staff working documents (the Enlargement Package),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[1] (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[2] (the Common Provisions Regulation),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[3] (the Financial Regulation), in particular Article 6(3) thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014[4],

    – having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

    – having regard to the UN instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Recommendations of the UN Forum on Minority Issues, and to the recommendations and reports of the UN Universal Periodic Review, as well as the case-law of the UN treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council,

    – having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights, and the conventions, recommendations, resolutions, opinions and reports of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion, the Venice Commission and other bodies of the Council of Europe,

    – having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

    – having regard to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe,

    – having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union of 23 May 2007 and the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2025-2026,

    – having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835), issued in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU,

    – having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[5],

    – having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States[6];

    – having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland[7],

    – having regard to its resolution of 19 April 2018 on the need to establish a European Values Instrument to support civil society organisations which promote fundamental values within the European Union at local and national level[8],

    – having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded[9],

    – having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2018 on minimum standards for minorities in the EU[10],

    – having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2018 on the need for a comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[11],

    – having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights[12],

    – having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2020 on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights[13],

    – having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’[14],

    – having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092[15],

    – having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report[16],

    – having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[17],

    – having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU[18],

    – having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society[19],

    – having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas[20],

    – having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe[21],

    – having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling[22],

    – having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report[23],

    – having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF)[24],

    – having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2020 and 2021[25],

    – having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded[26],

    – having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia[27],

    – having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia[28],

    – having regard to its resolution of 10 November 2022 on racial justice, non-discrimination and anti-racism in the EU[29],

    – having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP[30],

    – having regard to its resolution of 30 March 2023 on the 2022 Rule of Law Report – the rule of law situation in the European Union[31],

    – having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2023 on the institutional relations between the EU and the Council of Europe[32],

    – having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’[33],

    – having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[34],

    – having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds[35],

    – having regard to the report of its Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) and to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware[36] ,

    – having regard to its resolution of 11 July 2023 on the electoral law, the investigative committee and the rule of law in Poland[37],

    – having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on the rule of law in Malta: six years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and the need to protect journalists[38],

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 6 December 2023 entitled ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ (COM(2023)0051),

    – having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023[39],

    – having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime[40],

    – having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications[41],

    – having regard to the conclusion of the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Poland, as announced by the Commission on 29 May 2024, following steps taken by Poland to restore compliance with EU rule of law standards;

    – having regard to Resolution 2262 (2019) of 24 January 2019 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on promoting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

    – having regard to the recommendations and reports of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and other bodies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the cooperation between the EU and the OSCE on democratisation, institution-building and human rights and to the annual OSCE hate crime report, in which participating states have committed themselves to passing legislation that provides for penalties that take into account the gravity of hate crime, to taking action to address under-reporting and to introducing or further developing capacity-building activities for law enforcement, prosecution and judicial officials to prevent, investigate and prosecute hate crimes,

    – having regard to the special reports of the European Court of Auditors of 17 December 2024 on Enforcing EU Law (28/2024), of 22 February 2024 on the Rule of Law in the EU (03/2024), and of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans (01/2022), and to its review of 28 February 2024 on the Commission’s rule of law reporting (02/2024), and to their respective recommendations,

    – having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, presented to Parliament on 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the Commission,

    – having regard to the 2024 Eurobarometer surveys on corruption, which show that corruption remains a serious concern for citizens and businesses in the EU,

    – having regard to the feedback reports, mission reports, written questions and answers of its Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG)[42],

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0100/2025),

    A. whereas the Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities – values that are common to the EU Member States and are reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas the Charter is part of EU primary law; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU;

    B. whereas it is apparent from Article 49 TEU, which provides the possibility for any European state to apply to become a member of the European Union, that the Union is composed of states which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them; whereas EU law is thus based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values; whereas that premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected[43],[44]; whereas the Member State are required to ensure that any regression in the protection of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is prevented;

    C. whereas civil society organisations (CSOs), the legal community, associations, independent media and grassroots movements remain a cornerstone of the rule of law by promoting transparency, accountability and citizen participation in democratic processes; whereas these actors have been instrumental in safeguarding judicial independence, freedom of expression and other constitutional values, often operating under increasing political and legal constraints;

    D. whereas the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU places an obligation on the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations that arise from the Treaties in full mutual respect, and on Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union; whereas Member States should refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives;

    E. whereas in a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74 % of respondents thought that the EU plays an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89 % believed that it is important for all Member States to respect the EU’s core values; whereas, in the current global economic and political context, bolstering citizens’ trust in the rule of law and the resilience of democracies at EU level is a crucial factor;

    F. whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure in which there is an assessment of whether an applicant fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in order to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market; whereas the fundamental role of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance as a Union instrument is to support the rule of law, democracy and human rights in candidate and potential candidate countries, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and CSOs, as well as progress on good governance and the fight against corruption, the promotion and protection of non-discrimination and gender equality and the strengthening of capacities for conflict prevention and resolution;

    Independence of the judiciary

    1. Underlines that fair and accessible justice is a basic rule of law principle that requires an independent judiciary; reiterates that access to justice is essential for citizens to exercise rights, challenge discrimination and hold decision makers accountable;

    2. Recalls that robust national legal systems are indispensable in Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries, given that the Commission relies on national judicial authorities to enforce EU law, and that they are fundamental to judicial cooperation across the EU and to fostering mutual trust; notes with concern that while some judicial systems may appear robust on paper, this does not always align with reality;

    3. Stresses the need for the impartiality of judges; recalls that the appointment and promotion of judges must be determined solely by their qualifications and not be influenced by political or personal considerations, as the judges   essential for safeguarding judicial independence; recalls that the criteria for nominations and appointments to high-level judicial positions must be fully transparent;

    4. Underlines the important role of the national councils of the judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence; considers it necessary to evaluate the reforms that are in the process of being adopted in different Member States and encourages the adaptation of the composition and functioning of these bodies to the standards established by the Commission and the Council of Europe, and which have been endorsed by the CJEU; calls on the Commission in its future rule of law reports to place a particular focus on the roles, structures and functioning of Member States’ national judicial councils as part of its assessment of judicial independence;

    5. Points out that the prosecution service is a key element in the capacity of a Member State to fight crime and corruption; regrets any governmental or political interference in corruption investigations and recalls that no one is above the law; condemns the misuse of the judicial system for political purposes, including the persecution of political opponents and interference in corruption investigations; stresses that both politically motivated prosecutions and amnesty laws and pardon procedures driven by political interests undermine public trust in constitutional principles and EU standards; highlights the importance of guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of the prosecution service, thereby preventing any political interference in its work, especially from the government; highlights the role of transparent appointment processes for prosecutors as a key factor in maintaining public confidence in criminal justice;

    6. Calls for disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors to be handled by independent bodies free from political influence and, where necessary, for the system of disciplinary procedures to be reformed to preclude their use by political authorities to control the judiciary;

    7. Calls on the Commission to maintain constant oversight, ensuring that judges and prosecutors remain independent of the authorities responsible for appointing or reappointing them; calls on the Commission to proactively monitor and swiftly react to risks of rule of law backsliding in areas of judicial independence and access to justice, in line with the principle of non-regression as clarified in recent CJEU case-law;

    8. Notes that the Commission has found that there are structural challenges with regard to improving the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the judiciary of some Member States[45] and of candidate and potential candidate countries; notes that the Commission has found that several Member States have allocated additional resources to strengthening the resilience of justice systems to ensure the timely resolution of cases and reduce backlogs, while in other Member States levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to shortages and vacancies; notes that underfunding and understaffing can undermine the accessibility and effectiveness of judicial systems, thus eroding trust in the rule of law; emphasises that adequate remuneration is essential to attract and retain qualified judicial personnel; strongly believes that training is a key element that guarantees the independence of judges, as well as the quality and efficiency of the judicial system; states that an important element of the state of the rule of law and fair proceedings are judicial procedures conducted in a reasonable time frame; notes, in that context, that the justice scoreboard indicates significant discrepancies across the EU legal area;

    9. Encourages the Member States to ensure training opportunities for judges; strongly believes that training should be multidisciplinary, with a particular focus on gender equality; reiterates that adequate resources, including funding, infrastructure and qualified personnel, are crucial for the efficiency and accessibility of the justice system; recognises the role of court staff, including notaries, in numerous Member States; calls on all Member States to follow up on corruption cases within a reasonable time limit so as to not foster a feeling of impunity among their citizens; invites Member States to take advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalisation to simplify procedures and processes, improve efficiency and accessibility, save time and reduce storage costs;

    10. Stresses the importance of independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid in ensuring equal access to justice; reiterates that adequate resources, including infrastructure and personnel, are crucial to improving justice systems; recommends that Member States take concrete steps to improve access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups, including adequately funded, enhanced legal aid systems and measures to address language barriers and digital divides;

    11. Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report states that serious concerns persist regarding judicial independence in Hungary and that political influence on the prosecution service remains, with the risk of undue interference in individual cases, and that the freedom of expression of judges remains under pressure and smear campaigns against judges continue in the media;

    12. Welcomes the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the EU; endorses further initiatives to enhance the resources and the capabilities of the CJEU to effectively address further challenges to the rule of law; reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 TEU and Article 267 TFEU, national courts cannot be hindered from using the possibility of a referral for preliminary ruling to the CJEU; calls on the Commission to carry out a systematic check in this regard as part of its annual rule of law report, and to start infringement proceedings in cases where national judges face obstacles in this regard;

    13. Regrets the trend whereby some Member States are selectively applying, delaying or failing to implement CJEU and ECtHR judgments and calls for their timely and effective implementation; emphasises that Member States and EU institutions must systematically integrate and implement the latest CJEU case-law to uphold the rule of law and ensure the uniform application of EU law; calls for the swift adaptation of national legislation and institutional frameworks to comply with court rulings;

    14. Reiterates its strong support for the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions at a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls the need to fully implement the orders of the International Court of Justice, which are legally binding; calls for the Union, its Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to continue to support the ICC;

    15. Urges the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to meet its responsibility for the enforcement of the Union’s basic values, including those laid down in Article 2 TEU and in the EU’s primary law, and not to rely only on citizens going to court themselves to ensure the application of EU law; stresses that the non-implementation of domestic and international judgments is violating the rule of law and risks leaving people without remedy and can create a perception among the public that judgments can be disregarded, undermining general trust in fair adjudication; underlines the fundamental role of the CJEU and the ECtHR in ensuring respect for the law and guaranteeing uniformity in its application; proposes establishing clear deadlines for the implementation of court rulings, as well as a detailed monitoring plan for the implementation of pending judgments; urges the Commission to launch infringement procedures if needed, together with motions for interim measures; calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR promptly and suggests the establishment of a monitoring unit to monitor the implementation of CJEU and ECtHR rulings relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in EU countries, and to fully integrate the monitoring unit’s findings into the annual rule of law report; recommends that the Commission, in particular, take action regarding failures to implement CJEU judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in cases of non-compliance with CJEU and ECtHR judgments where the breach identified affects or seriously risks affecting the Union budget or financial interests; stresses that systematic non-compliance with EU law must entail tangible financial penalties to ensure genuine deterrence; calls on the Commission to assess whether delays or non-compliance with such rulings warrant proceedings for failure to act under Article 258 TFEU; calls on the Commission to systematically analyse data on non-compliance with country-specific views of UN Treaty Bodies;

    16. Welcomes the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive[46] to close legal gaps, ensuring that victims can access justice and receive support; calls on the Council to include as much as possible from Parliament’s mandate, including provisions ensuring victims’ right to review decisions in criminal proceedings, on access to legal remedies and fair compensation, and on comprehensive support services, particularly for those in vulnerable situations; stresses the importance of effective data collection, of enhancing resource allocation for victim assistance and of safeguarding victims’ privacy and personal data to prevent secondary victimisation and ensure that victims, including undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, can safely report crimes; expects co-legislators to adopt solutions that are victim-centred;

    17. Recognises the essential role of law enforcement in upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate funding, training and resources for the police and law enforcement agencies; calls on the Member States to take into account the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics in this regard; emphasises that any use of force must be strictly necessary, proportionate and subject to clear safeguards; calls on the Member States to introduce guidelines for the transparent, independent and consistent selection, testing and trialling of weapons used by law enforcement agents, based on UN standards, recommendations and guiding principles; notes that this assessment should determine that such weapons are compliant with international human rights law and standards prior to their selection and deployment; calls on the Member States to thoroughly investigate any cases of excessive use of force and discriminatory treatment by law enforcement agencies;

    18. Calls on the Commission to include, as a rule of law concern, the conditions in prisons in future rule of law reports, given the serious and growing concerns across Europe regarding overcrowding, inadequate living conditions and the alarming rates of suicide within prisons;

    19. Calls on the Commission to pay special attention to analysing procedural justice with a view to identifying strengths, gaps, discrepancies and best practice in ensuring transparency, efficiency and fair treatment in strengthening administrative justice across the EU, as a means of ensuring the accountability of public authorities;

    Anti-corruption framework

    20. Stresses that the rule of law requires that persons holding public office cannot act arbitrarily or abuse their power for personal gain; underlines that governments should adopt laws in the interest of the general public and not in the interest of specific individuals;

    21. Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries; underlines that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in public institutions; deplores the fact that the 2024 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with 68 % of Europeans considering corruption to be widespread in their country, 65 % believing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and 41 % believing that the level of corruption has increased; considers this a call for the EU to step up its efforts to combat corruption;

    22. Reiterates its call on the Commission to immediately finalise negotiations on the EU’s membership of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); notes that such membership will ensure greater transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of EU funds, the legislative process and the work of the EU institutions, and demands that the annual rule of law report cover EU institutions;

    23. Reiterates its call on all Member States to adopt a code of conduct for judges following the GRECO recommendations, and taking into account the codes applicable at the ECtHR and the CJEU; calls on Member States to create independent mechanisms to investigate alleged violations of the code of conduct and other laws, to improve disclosure and transparency with regard to conflicts of interest and gifts received by the judiciary, and to address the issue of revolving doors;

    24. Calls on the Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, and the EU institutions to enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions by strengthening anti-corruption and conflict of competence legal frameworks and reporting processes to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, including high-level corruption cases (inter alia those linked to public procurement procedures and those relating to high-risk areas such as ports or land borders), reinforcing oversight mechanisms and bodies and the independence and proper functioning of existing agencies, fostering protection for whistle-blowers, improving integrity frameworks and lobbying for legislation; regrets the lack of relevant progress made and stresses that final convictions and deterrent penalties are necessary to demonstrate genuine commitment to tackling corruption; calls on Member States to ensure the transparency and accountability of lobbying activities, including the establishment or improvement of mandatory lobbying registers and ‘legislative footprint’ mechanisms for tracking the influence of lobbying activities on lawmaking processes;

    25. Acknowledges the important role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and combating corruption within the EU; encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO; endorses the reinforcement of the monitoring and coordinative powers of the EPPO with a view to strengthening its ability to combat corruption in Member States; calls on the Commission to propose, under Article 86(4) TFEU, an expansion of the mandate of the EPPO to avoid circumvention of EU restrictive measures and cross-border environmental crimes, and to accelerate the revision of the EPPO Regulation[47] and the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law[48] in order to safeguard and clarify the primary competence of the EPPO with regard to corruption offences affecting the EU’s financial interests or committed by EU officials;

    26. Urges all Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to the protection of EU funds; calls on all candidate and potential candidate countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation with the EPPO;

    27. Calls on European bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Court of Auditors, the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to improve their cooperation in the fight against corruption and fraud affecting EU finances;

    28. Calls on the Commission to enhance transparency and accountability in all of its communications, visits and meetings, especially with high-level national actors;

    29. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a directive on combating corruption which harmonises the definition of corruption offences in the public and private sector and the corresponding penalties; welcomes the inclusion of preventive measures, including on illicit political financing and training, in the directive on combating corruption, such as effective rules for the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information and effective rules regulating the interaction between the private and the public sector; calls on the Member States to also put in place effective rules to address revolving doors, establish codes of conduct for public officials, establish a public legislative footprint, and ensure transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials and political parties; appreciates that almost all Member States now have anti-corruption strategies in place; regrets, at the same time, that implementation and effectiveness vary; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to develop and implement robust and effective anti-corruption strategies with the involvement of civil society; underlines the importance of the identification, notification, representation and coordination of victims of corruption; calls on the Member States to protect victims of corruption and enable them to have their views and concerns presented and considered at appropriate stages during criminal proceedings; calls on the Member States to ensure that victims of corruption have the right to adequate and proportionate compensation;

    30. Calls on all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to strengthen their anti-corruption measures with regard to the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information, rules regulating the interaction of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the private sector, revolving doors and the code of conduct for public officials; considers that during their term of office, Members of the European Parliament should not engage in paid side activities with for-profit organisations or businesses seeking to influence EU policymaking; acknowledges the agreement on establishing the Interinstitutional Body for Ethical Standards;

    31. Recognises the crucial role that whistle-blowers play in exposing corruption and promoting transparency across both the public and private sectors; stresses the need to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation and harassment; calls for independent and autonomous whistle-blower protection authorities to be further strengthened and further integrated into broader national anti-corruption frameworks, ensuring a unified and robust approach to combating corruption throughout all Member States;

    Media pluralism and freedom

    32. Welcomes initiatives to promote free, independent and pluralistic media and a safe and enabling environment for journalists such as the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)[49] and calls for its swift implementation; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to improve transparency in the allocation of state advertising online and offline and to follow the recommendations contained in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with the necessary assistance in transposing the EMFA into national law, and to monitor its implementation, especially in certain Member States that rank poorly in freedom indices; underlines that the EMFA is a crucial milestone in safeguarding the independence, pluralism and integrity of the media landscape across the Union;

    33. Expresses deep concern over the increasing attacks on journalists and publishers, with a disproportionate impact on women; calls on the Commission and the Member States and on candidate and potential candidate countries to ensure the safety and protection of journalists, including investigative journalists and fact checkers who are particularly exposed; highlights the fact that the most common forms of threat include verbal attacks, online harassment, intimidation through social media and email, and legal threats, including cases covered by the Anti-SLAPP (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Directive[50], as well as instances of stalking and personal harassment;

    34. Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings[51], and to adopt comprehensive domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and provide support for those facing intimidation, defamation and limitations on the ability to exercise their profession; recommends that, when transposing the directive, Member States extend its application to also include national cases, since the majority of SLAPP cases occur at the national level; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals to address SLAPP cases not covered under the current Directive;

    35. Calls for the introduction of specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities;

    36. Urges the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to protect and promote media freedom and pluralism, ensure transparent allocation of public funds, prevent the concentration of media ownership, protect editorial independence and combat disinformation, particularly through robust laws, including specific provisions on media ownership transparency, and independent regulators; underlines the important role of public service media; welcomes initiatives at national level to create a media registry containing public information about ownership and advertising investment in order to ensure transparency, impartiality and verifiability; further calls on Member States to ensure adequate, sustainable and predictable funding and budgetary stability based on transparent and objective criteria for public service media; recommends the creation of a dedicated EU media freedom fund supporting independent journalism and local media outlets;

    37. Condemns the spread of hate speech, including in mainstream and social media, as it poses a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law; calls for stronger enforcement of media regulations to combat hate speech and safeguard a diverse and inclusive media landscape, in accordance with its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union; underlines the fact that prominent public figures and politicians have to lead by example and need to ensure a respectful debate; recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental value of democratic societies and should not be unjustifiably restricted; further recalls that any legislation on hate speech and hate crime should be grounded in the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that freedom of expression must be exercised within the law and in line with Article 11 of the Charter and should not be exploited as a shield for hate speech and hate crimes; 

    38. Acknowledges that citizens perceive signs of an erosion of democracy fuelled by misinformation and disinformation, and that the spread of false information through social media could lead to the erosion of general respect for the rule of law; calls on digital platforms to take immediate action by ensuring compliance with their own community standards and European laws, including the Digital Services Act[52] (DSA) and competition rules; calls on the Commission to assess such compliance regularly and take measures where necessary; recommends that Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries develop comprehensive strategies to combat disinformation and foreign interference in democratic processes, while safeguarding freedom of expression and media pluralism;

    39. Strongly condemns state control and political interference in media operations; highlights the fact that media regulators must be adequately protected by legal safeguards to ensure their independence and freedom from political pressure, with sufficient budgetary resources at their disposal; underlines the democratic importance of independent media regulators;

    40. Expresses deep concern over the abuse of spyware and the lack of sufficient safeguards against illegal surveillance of journalists; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s PEGA Inquiry Committee on banning politically motivated surveillance;

    41. Urges Member States to ensure that the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/343[53] on the presumption of innocence does not introduce restrictions on the right to report on and inform the public of matters of public interest, including judicial investigations, that are not provided for by the Directive; calls on Member States to review and, if necessary, modify existing national provisions that could limit journalistic freedoms;

    42. Calls on the Member States to ensure that the national coordinators established under the DSA are fully empowered to perform their role in facilitating information exchange and cooperation at the European level;

    Civil society organisations (CSOs)

    43. Agrees with the Commission’s assessment that CSOs, including those advocating for the rule of law and democracy, the protection of marginalised groups, environmental protection and social justice, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are essential for the checks and balances and for the protection of fundamental values and Union law that are a cornerstone of the EU; appreciates that CSOs and professional associations representing groups such as judges, prosecutors or journalists support the rule of law; underlines, in particular, the importance of local, vibrant civil societies in candidate and potential candidate countries, which play a constructive role in the EU accession processes; recognises their role as watchdogs against rule of law violations and their contribution to promoting and safeguarding democratic principles; recalls the need for a safe, supportive and enabling environment for their work;

    44. Highlights the role of civil society and independent oversight bodies in monitoring, verifying and supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the 2024 Rule of Law Report; calls for a structured civil dialogue framework to integrate civil society contributions into the annual rule of law cycle, as recommended by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)[54] and civil society networks[55]; reiterates the importance of broad consultation when drafting the report; supports the Commission’s plan to draft a strategy on space for and the protection of civil society and HRDs; recommends that the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders be fully implemented; calls on the Commission to conduct visits to Member States on-site whenever possible, rather than virtually, as on-site visits could paint a fuller and more contextual picture of the local situation;

    45. Is concerned by the growing trend of CSOs and HRDs facing further legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and attacks, which undermine freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression; notes with concern that several Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries have imposed disproportionate measures, including the excessive use of force and the detention of protesters to prevent people from participating in protests in some Member States, as well as pre-emptive bans on public gatherings on the vague grounds of security; stresses that courts have overturned such bans in multiple cases; strongly condemns the use of ‘foreign agent laws’, which stifle dissent, harass CSOs and restrict their operations, creating a chilling effect on civil society and HRDs; regrets the fact that restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression and association and the use of excessive force often disproportionately affect specific causes or groups[56];

    46. Stresses that peaceful assembly, freedom of association and expression, and freedom of the arts and sciences are fundamental rights protected by international law and are essential for democracy; condemns the increased pressure on these rights, where proven, and notes the trend of restricting them; condemns also, in this context, episodes of violence against police forces; calls on the Commission to reflect these freedoms in the annual report;

    47. Expresses deep concern about the shrinking civic space and increasing persecution of CSOs and HRDs in the EU, particularly those working on anti-racism, climate justice, LGBTIQ rights, women’s rights and migrant supports; notes that these groups face a range of threats including legal and financial restrictions, funding suspensions, smear campaigns, intimidation and criminalisation; condemns, in particular, the growing repression of climate activism in several Member States, including the misuse of anti-terrorism and organised crime laws and the classification of peaceful climate activists as members of ‘criminal organisations’; calls on the Member States to refrain from disproportionate legal action against such activists; urges the Commission to systematically monitor the situation of these organisations in its rule of law reports and to expand dedicated EU funding for civil society actors combating racism and working on other fundamental rights;

    48. Calls on the Commission to address such breaches in a dedicated pillar of the annual rule of law reports; calls on the Commission to strengthen the protection of CSOs and HRDs, by establishing early warning mechanisms, increasing the transparency of funding for all actors in the scope of the EU Transparency Register and expanding funding to support CSOs to enable them to operate freely and independently;

    49. Urges the Member States to create an enabling environment for CSOs and HRDs, adopt the Anti-SLAPP Directive, and implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 to protect CSOs from legal harassment; calls for strengthened independence of national oversight bodies, with adequate resources and safeguards against political interference; encourages support for CSOs in developing and disseminating educational initiatives to ensure broad outreach and accessibility;

    50. Considers that the Commission and the Member States should improve funding mechanisms for CSOs and initiatives that strengthen the judiciary and uphold court independence, namely through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and the Justice programme; welcomes the fact that the Commission plans to draft a strategy for protecting civil society, recalls, at the same time, that there should be a special focus on HRDs; calls on the Commission to include a rapid response mechanism to support threatened CSOs and HRDs within the Union, drawing on the model of the EU-funded ‘Protect Defenders’ mechanism, which currently has a non-EU focus only; emphasises that this mechanism could provide resources for advocacy, legal aid and awareness campaigns, while ensuring that these organisations can operate without undue restrictions or harassment; calls for the full and consistent application of the Union guidelines on HRDs in candidate and potential candidate countries; is concerned, however, by the growing trend in some Member States of CSOs and HRDs facing challenges, with new legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and physical or verbal attacks, and by the deplorable acceptance of such practices and the chilling effect thereof, including on their freedom of speech within the Member States[57] and the EU institutions; considers that CSOs and HRDs play an essential supportive role in monitoring Member States’ compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

    Equality and non-discrimination before the law

    51. Recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in judicial proceedings; stresses that the rule of law and fundamental rights are interlinked and that violations of the rule of law have an immediate impact on fundamental rights and disproportionately affect women, minorities and vulnerable groups; calls on the Commission to monitor the effect of any violations of the rule of law on fundamental rights and to ensure that equality and non-discrimination before the law for all people are protected through the use of all relevant instruments, including infringement procedures, where appropriate;

    52. Stresses the need to fight against all types of discrimination before the law; expresses its concern over the lack of progress in and implementation of equality and anti-discrimination laws in some Member States; regrets the fact that, despite existing EU legislation such as Directive 2000/78/EC[58] on equal treatment, gaps in the legal framework and in implementation persist, leaving victims without adequate legal recourse; recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in legal remedy; calls on the Commission to act in cases of non-compliance with these principles; deplores the intention of the Commission to withdraw the proposal for a horizontal equal treatment directive[59] and urges the Council to adopt the directive without further delay;

    53. Is concerned that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report noted that some Member States fail to effectively prosecute hate crimes or provide sufficient support to victims of hate crimes, undermining trust in judicial systems and perpetuating inequality before the law; calls on the Council to extend the current list of ‘EU crimes’ in Article 83(1) TFEU to include hate crimes and hate speech and calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal on hate crime and hate speech; asks the Commission to focus on hate crimes in its rule of law reports and, in this regard, to closely monitor and record hate crimes;

    54. Underlines that gender-based violence, online and offline, is a major and pervasive offence, as well as a radical violation of fundamental rights, and it violates the principle of equality before the law; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against gender-based violence, both online and offline, including violence committed through the use of digital platforms; calls for gender-based violence to be added to the list of EU crimes and for an EU legislative proposal on combating rape based on the lack of consent, also in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    55. Recalls the need for access to sexual and reproductive rights and health and calls for access to safe, legal abortion to be enshrined in the Charter;

    56. Calls on all Member States to protect LGBTIQ rights in compliance with Union law, the Charter, and CJEU and ECtHR case-law, recalls that legal barriers to recognising same-sex partnerships or parenthood across borders persist in several Member States; warns that such practices not only hinder the free movement of LGBTIQ families within the EU, but also violate the rule of law principle of non-discrimination before the law, highlighting the lack of uniform protection for LGBTIQ individuals across Member States; calls on the Member States who have not yet done so to introduce legal recognition of same-sex partnerships; calls on the Commission to recast Directive 2004/38/EC[60] in order to include an explicit cross-border recognition of private and family life rights, including parenthood for same-sex parents, in the light of the latest rulings[61] of the CJEU; stresses that all children are equal before the law and that Member States must act in the best interests of the child, increase legal certainty and reduce discrimination against the children of same-sex parents; recalls Parliament’s position supporting the recognition of parenthood across the EU, irrespective of how a child is conceived or born, or the type of family they have; urges the Commission to present a renewed LGBTIQ strategy that fully addresses the challenges throughout Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to make LGBTIQ rights a cross-cutting priority across all policy fields; calls on the Commission to put forward appropriate legislative measures to ensure respect for these principles, as well as to rely on infringement procedures against Member States; urges the Commission to present legislative proposals to combat hate crimes and hate speech on grounds of gender identity, sex characteristics and sexual orientation;

    57. Is deeply concerned about the discriminatory measures introduced in some Member States under the pretext of fighting ‘LGBTIQ propaganda’ and ‘gender ideology’ which are contributing to an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals in several Member States and have a negative impact on children, families and workers; highlights the negative impact of such measures on the freedom of expression and assembly for LGBTIQ groups and beyond; emphasises that these actions encourage discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals and contravene EU law; urges the Commission to present a proposal for a binding EU ban on conversion practices in all Member States; notes that in 2024, both the Commission and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) noted an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals and other minorities in several Member States, stresses the importance of the right to self-determination of LGBTIQ persons and reminds Member States that, in accordance with case-law, the right to self-determination is a fundamental right; therefore urges all Member States who have not done so yet to make sure that LGBTIQ individuals have access to legal gender recognition;

    58. Is deeply concerned by and strongly condemns the rising levels of anti-Semitism across the EU; is also deeply concerned and strongly condemns the rising levels of Islamophobia and all other forms of discrimination across the EU, including acts of violence, intimidation, hate speech and the display of hate symbols in public spaces; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to make sure that members of all minorities are equal before the law; calls on the Member States to review laws and policies to ensure that they do not discriminate against minorities, directly or indirectly, and to review any discriminatory legal provisions and regulations; calls for sustained efforts at both EU and national levels to monitor, prevent and prosecute related hate crimes and to protect Jewish and Muslim communities from harassment and violence;

    59. Emphasises that a lack of accountability disproportionately affects minorities’ communities, fair political representation, and economic opportunities; calls for increased transparency in public decision-making processes to ensure inclusive and equitable governance;

    60. Calls on the Member States to fully implement Directive 2024/1500[62] and Directive 2024/1499[63], which establish minimum standards for equality bodies; calls for concrete measures to guarantee their independence and ensure their effectiveness in promoting equality;

    61. Underlines that third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, regardless of their nationality or place of birth, must be treated in a non-discriminatory manner and enjoy fair and equal treatment in the areas specified by existing legislation; points out that third-country nationals, regardless of their nationality, place of birth or residence status, have the right to apply for international protection in compliance with international and EU law, of which the non-refoulement principle is an integral part; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and in implementing the legislation adopted by the co-legislators; stresses the binding nature of the judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR;

    62. Urges the Commission to ensure that the free movement of persons within the EU, the right to reside freely, and family reunification are fully respected in the EU territory and that every citizen can enjoy equal rights and fully exercise their rights;

    63. Urges the Commission to strengthen the focus in the annual rule of law report on strengthening the fight against all forms of discrimination in access to justice; calls on the Commission and the Member States to combat discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, nationality, political opinion, language, disability, age, gender, including gender identity and gender expression, and sexual orientation; urges the Council to reach an agreement on Directive 2008/0140(CNS)[64]; urges the Commission to introduce new pillars in the annual rule of law report focusing on combating all forms of hatred and discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, namely regarding crimes that target minority groups and members of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as the conditions of civil society in Member States; calls on the Commission to require Member States to collect comparable and robust disaggregated equality data to fully assess the impact of structural discrimination on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to reconsider its position on the Minority SafePack Initiative and to put forward legislative initiatives to safeguard the promotion of minority rights and language rights; reiterates its call for the EU to accede to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; calls for closer ties between the EU and the Council of Europe on minority rights, including in view of the enlargement process;

    64. Emphasises the need for Member States to address the gender gap in the judiciary and other key democratic institutions; recommends implementing targeted measures to increase women’s representation in senior judicial and public administration positions;

    65. Calls on the Member States to establish national human rights institutions, in accordance with the UN Paris Principles, to guarantee their independence and to ensure that they have the capacity to carry out their tasks effectively;

    Single market and the rule of law

    66. Highlights the importance of the rule of law in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the single market and reaffirms that well-functioning, independent judicial systems, effective anti-corruption frameworks and strong protection of media freedom are crucial for maintaining fair competition, upholding legal certainty and fostering trust among economic operators; underlines that non-compliance and circumvention of European regulations lead to enormous distortions of competition in the internal market; emphasises that reliable and stable rule of law structures are key pillars for investment and trade, which are essential for competitiveness and, therefore, for the capacity of the welfare system and the labour market in the EU;

    67. Stresses that the proper functioning of the single market depends on the effective application of the principle of mutual trust and recognition in both judicial and administrative cooperation; recalls that such trust can only be sustained where the rule of law – as also recommended by the Venice Commission in its rule of law checklist – is fully upheld; indicates that the principle of mutual recognition should be suspended in cases of systemic breaches;

    68. Underlines the negative economic impact that corruption and weak judiciary systems have on investor confidence and cross-border cooperation; is concerned that national governments and institutions which fail to uphold the rule of law may allow anti-competitive behaviour to flourish, or may even actively encourage it for political or economic gain, thereby potentially damaging the EU’s economy and undermining the fairness of its internal market;

    69. Recalls that, within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited in accordance with the Charter, and that freedom of establishment, service provision and movement of capital are fundamental to the single market; underlines that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid overt and covert discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat; recalls its condemnation of the reported systemic discriminatory, non-transparent and unfair practices against companies in some Member States;

    70. Condemns systemic discriminatory practices in Hungary, including the misuse of EU funds to benefit political allies, violations of EU competition rules, and the concentration of businesses in the hands of oligarchs with ties to the government; deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government;

    71. Highlights the importance of addressing economic inequality and social exclusion as threats to democratic participation and the rule of law;

    72. Calls on the Commission to integrate the single market dimension of the rule of law more explicitly into its monitoring mechanisms, with a stronger focus on the uniform and rapid application, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, ensuring that Member States’ adherence to rule of law principles is assessed not only from a democratic and judicial standpoint but also in terms of its economic impact on the single market and financial stability; requests that the Commission include in its 2025 rule of law report a dedicated chapter on the single market dimension; urges the Commission to use all available legal tools to address rule of law deficiencies, including launching infringement procedures and competition law enforcement powers when necessary, to preserve the functioning of the internal market;

    Rule of law toolbox

    73. Stresses the importance of embedding rule of law milestones in funding instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government, while maintaining the full impact of the measures taken;

    74. Criticises the Council’s inaction in advancing ongoing Article 7 TEU proceedings, which weakens the EU’s credibility in upholding the rule of law; urges the Council to unblock the next steps in the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Hungary, given persistent violations on judicial independence, media freedom and civil society, which necessitate immediate and decisive action; recommends that the Council ensure that hearings take place at least once per presidency during ongoing Article 7 procedures and also that new developments affecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are addressed; emphasises that there is no need for unanimity in the Council in order to identify a clear risk of a serious breach of Union values under Article 7(1) TEU, or to address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question and provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; reiterates its call on the Council to do so, underlining that any further delaying of such action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself; insists that Parliament should have a more active role in Article 7 TEU proceedings, including the ability to present reasoned proposals to the Council, attend Council hearings and be fully informed at every stage of the procedure;

    75. Welcomes the preventive tools in the rule of law toolbox, such as the annual rule of law cycle, the EU justice scoreboard, the European Semester, EU funds to support civil society, judicial networks and media freedom and the rule of law milestones in the RRF; insists that a closer link between the findings of the 2024 Rule of Law Report and the allocation of financial support under the Union budget is introduced, in terms of milestones, ensuring that EU funds are tied to the achievement of necessary reforms; calls on the Commission to further develop a direct link between preventive and reactive instruments and hence, on the basis of the findings in the annual rule of law reports, to promptly and in a coordinated manner launch infringement procedures, set further steps in applying the Article 7 TEU procedure, and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the horizontal enabling conditions related to the Charter, as well as provisions from the Financial Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to assess and report on the potential risks to the Union budget posed by weaknesses in rule of law regimes in the annual rule of law reports starting with the 2025 report; underlines that both the triggering of the reactive instruments and the closure of relevant procedures must be based on the objective criterion of compliance with the rule of law and with EU and international law as interpreted by international courts;

    76. Calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases; calls on the Commission to revise its policy, outlined in its 2022 communication on enforcing EU law[65], not to use infringement actions for ‘individual’ redress, as this policy has led to serious deprivation of rights for citizens across the EU, especially where their own governments are refusing to comply with EU law or CJEU judgments, also because most of these cases are not merely individual but address strategic and fundamental issues; asks the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the tools used against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Member States;

    77. Underlines the need for an ever more comprehensive toolbox ensuring compliance, beyond its budgetary dimension, with EU values across all Union law, including financial instruments, to prevent backsliding; urges the Commission to identify the gaps and present relevant proposals broadening the scope of this toolbox; supports stronger application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, with cross-cutting conditionality in EU funding programmes; maintains its position that frozen EU funds should only be released once meaningful reforms have been fully implemented and rule of law compliance has been verifiably achieved in practice; emphasises the need for consistency and transparency in applying the toolbox to protect Union values, without political considerations and using objective criteria to trigger reactive instruments; highlights the fact that conditionality should equally apply to candidate and potential candidate countries; insists on the importance of Parliament’s role in overseeing the use of those tools; urges the Commission to conduct systematic audits of the distribution of EU funds to prevent conflicts of interest, political instrumentalisation or opacity in fund allocation at the national level;

    78. Insists on the introduction of a performance-based instrument in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to strengthen the alignment between EU funds and the respect for Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU such as democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law; requests that the future MFF include robust rule of law safeguards applicable to all EU funds;

    79. Expresses concern that the suspension of EU funds could be misused as a political weapon against civil society and local authorities; recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation ensures that final recipients should not lose access to EU funds if sanctions are applied to their government; calls for ‘smart conditionality’ that would enable national governments undermining the rule of law to be bypassed by allocating decommitted EU funds directly to local and regional authorities and to non-governmental organisations and businesses that comply with EU law, as well as by simplifying the reallocation of funds intended for the benefit of the Member State in question to other EU programmes; proposes the establishment of a transparent system for local authorities to request EU funds when national governments block or misuse EU funds; stresses the importance of strictly applying the conditionality mechanisms as enshrined in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and in the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in a transparent manner;

    Checks and balances

    80. Underlines the importance of safeguarding the separation of powers and a stable institutional framework in every Member State; calls on the Member States to ensure that any constitutional or legislative reforms affecting the separation of powers fully comply with EU fundamental values and legal principles;

    81. Calls on the Member States to refrain from excessively using accelerated procedures that bypass stakeholder and civil society consultation, including parliamentary scrutiny or emergency powers, as these negatively impact the stability and the quality of lawmaking and democracy; calls on the Member States to set up transparent lawmaking processes following systematic and public consultation with various stakeholders and advisory bodies;

    82. Encourages national governments and parliaments to publish publicly accessible impact assessments and consultation findings for every major legislative proposal;

    83. Underlines the recommendation of the Venice Commission that complaints and appeals in the case of electoral irregularities, in particular with regard to vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and incorrect vote counting, be followed up effectively; recalls the importance of the EU legislation adopted in this regard, namely the DSA, the Digital Markets Act[66], the AI Act[67], Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising[68] and the EMFA; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement these acts and provide adequate public resources for the measures under them;

    84. Calls on the Member States to strengthen the independence of national oversight bodies in order to ensure resources and freedom from political interference; stresses the importance of civil society and HRDs in promoting accountability and protecting fundamental rights;

    85. Expresses deep concern about the rise of extremism and its corrosive effect on democratic norms and the rule of law in several Member States; notes with concern that extremist groups actively target minorities and contribute to a climate of fear, discrimination and polarisation; calls on the Commission to explicitly identify such groups as a threat to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including academic and media independence, in its annual rule of law report; urges the Member States to take decisive action to counter their influence through robust legal frameworks, education promoting democratic values, and support for CSOs countering extremism; calls for coordinated EU action to counter this threat, including through education, social inclusion programmes and, where necessary, legal measures;

    86. Expresses concern about the reported cases of the use of surveillance technologies by Member State governments against journalists, activists, opposition figures and staff of the EU institutions; recalls that the use of spyware must be strictly proportionate and necessary and urges the Commission to present a plan of measures to prevent its abuse without undue delay, making full use of all available legislative means provided by the Treaties, as recommended by the PEGA Committee;

    87. Notes with concern the increasing use of artificial intelligence for national security and law enforcement purposes across the EU, stressing the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms[69]; recalls the need to ensure robust data protection safeguards when Member States or national authorities employ surveillance software; calls for strengthened EU legislation to prevent mass surveillance and discrimination;

    88. Is concerned about foreign interference in the Member States and in candidate and potential candidate countries, including social media manipulation and disinformation by forces both inside and outside the Union to manipulate public opinion and distort democratic debate; stresses the importance of transparency in platform algorithms, independent audits and robust fact-checking mechanisms to combat disinformation and safeguard democracy; calls on major digital platforms to cooperate with national law enforcement authorities to support investigations into illegal online activities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to monitor this and to apply the DSA and the Digital Markets Act swiftly, particularly regarding very large online platforms; calls on the Commission to include greater scrutiny of online platform disinformation in Pillar 3 (Pluralism and Media Freedom) of its rule of law report;

    89. Stresses the importance of academic freedom as an integral aspect of the rule of law and urges the Member States to protect universities from political interference and ensure institutional autonomy; encourages the Member States to foster a culture of the rule of law through awareness campaigns, outreach initiatives and action promoting democratic values and principles;

    90. Invites the Commission and the Member States to consider engaging in a process focused on improving administrative procedures and practices that have an impact on the functioning of key democratic processes and the exercise of checks and balances in line with the EU’s established, shared principles;

    Horizontal recommendations

    91. Recognises the Commission’s rule of law report as a key preventive tool for monitoring the state of the rule of law across the EU, facilitating dialogue between Member States, and guiding reforms in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption, media freedom and other checks and balances;

    92. Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from Parliament’s 2016 resolution have not yet been implemented and that the Commission has not fully addressed the recommendations made by Parliament in its previous resolutions; considers that these recommendations remain valid and reiterates them; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of important missing elements of the Venice Commission’s rule of law checklist, such as prevention of the abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; asks the Commission to explore the potential release, at around the same time, of all reports related to the rule of law or fundamental rights, such as the annual reports on compliance with the Charter or the report by the FRA, in order to enable a simultaneous global debate on these issues; regrets, however, that despite the growing threats of disinformation, propaganda and information manipulation targeting European democracy, a similar peer review practice among the Member States, in support of the efforts of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, has not yet been considered;

    93. Calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the report next year; insists that the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report cover the entire scope of Article 2 TEU and include broader indicators, such as media independence, the role of civil society, fundamental rights, academic and artistic freedom, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, respect for international law, free and fair elections and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a fuller picture of rule of law standards across the EU, and in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    94. Calls on the Commission to publish the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities and other stakeholders in the process of their rule of law reporting; repeats its call on the Commission to invite the FRA to provide methodological advice and conduct comparative research in order to add detail in key areas of the annual report, given the intrinsic links between fundamental rights and the rule of law;

    95. Encourages the Commission to use clearer language and transparent assessment rules to evaluate compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; reiterates its call to the Commission to differentiate clearly between systemic and isolated breaches of the rule of law in Member States, to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law, and to make clear that when the values of Article 2 TEU are systematically, deliberately and gravely violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to meet all criteria that define a democracy; indicates that the recommendations should better reflect negative findings in the report and be more detailed; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of previous recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; invites the Commission to conduct field visits and provide assessments based on concrete and independent evidence of implementation in practice;

    96. Warns that failing to link monitoring to real consequences risks diminishing the report’s relevance in the Member States; calls for a greater focus on implementing country-specific recommendations, with timelines and measurable benchmarks, including, where relevant, reference to existing opinions of international bodies (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, UN Special Rapporteurs) or relevant court rulings (including from the ECtHR); calls on the Commission to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance, including by referring to specific instruments from the toolbox, which includes budgetary tools and funding conditionality; believes that certain breaches of the values deserve immediate enforcement action and other breaches require recommendations to be implemented urgently; urges the Member States to implement the recommendations outlined in previous reports and commends those Member States that have not only implemented the recommendations but have also exceeded the established standards;

    97. Notes that the release date of the annual rule of law report in July is not conducive to generating sufficient visibility and is contrary to the report’s intended purpose of generating a genuine public debate about its findings; urges the Commission to reconsider the publication date and undertake additional efforts to make its findings widely known in all Member States;

    98. Recalls that decisions taken or not taken by the EU institutions often influence the rule of law situation in the Member States; criticises the fact that the rule of law status at the EU institutions remains outside the scope of the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; requests that a chapter on the EU’s adherence to rule of law standards, based on an independent review mechanism, be included in the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report;

    99. Proposes a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights covering all the values set out in Article 2 TEU and involving all EU institutions, Member States and candidate countries in order to foster uniformity; reiterates the proposal to create a permanent group of eminent personalities (‘wise persons group’) composed of independent legal, academic and human rights experts, tasked with systematically monitoring rule of law developments in Member States and providing regular assessments, recommendations and early warnings to the Commission; emphasises the need to ensure full independence and objectivity in the composition and functioning of this body, while adapting its mandate specifically to address rule of law challenges;

    100. Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement; calls on the other institutions, in the meantime, to at least explore further cooperation in the context of the proposed interinstitutional pilot on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which would help build trust between the institutions in a practical way, in particular by sharing monitoring, dialogue and meeting practices; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting other institutions, such as the Venice Commission, the Human Rights Commissioner and representatives of Parliament, to its sessions; believes that the Council’s rule of law dialogue should become more interactive, with systematic provision of feedback; calls on the Member States to invest in proper preparation for this dialogue; emphasises that increased transparency would enhance the rule of law dialogue within the Union and therefore invites the Council to provide detailed public conclusions; urges the Council to engage with national parliaments to enhance democratic oversight of Member States’ compliance with EU rule of law standards; stresses that the rule of law report should be evidence-based and objective, addressing the Member States and EU institutions, and should include preventive and corrective measures;

    101. Calls on the Member States to ensure that emergency measures adopted in response to crises (such as pandemics or security threats) are subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review, and are strictly time-limited and proportionate;

    102. Considers that cooperation between the EU and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN in promoting and defending democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the rights of minorities, should be further strengthened;

    103. Encourages the Member States to develop and implement comprehensive civic education programmes that foster understanding of democratic institutions, the rule of law and fundamental rights among citizens of all ages;

    104. Deplores the fact that the Commission has not incorporated many of Parliament’s repeated requests regarding the Commission’s rule of law reports; demands that the Commission issue a communication by 31 December 2025 detailing which of the requests adopted by Parliament in relation to the Commission’s rule of law reports since 2021 the Commission will implement, which it will not, and why;

    105. Welcomes the extension of the Commission’s rule of law report to cover candidate countries, namely Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, reinforcing the fact that the EU’s fundamental values must be respected not only by current Member States but also by future members during the accession processes; encourages a close evaluation of the rule of law in all countries in an accession process; encourages the Commission to provide concrete recommendations to accession countries on the state of the rule of law, and to ensure alignment with the enlargement report; expects the Commission to include all candidate countries in its 2025 rule of law report;

    °

    ° °

    106. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council of Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Video: Palestine, Sudan, South Sudan & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (4 June 2025) | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    Senior Personnel Appointment    
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    Sudan
    South Sudan
    Libya
    Bangladesh
    Yemen
    Human Rights/Climate
    International Day
    Programming Note

    SENIOR PERSONNEL APPOINTMENT    
    The Secretary-General is appointing Major General Diodato Abagnara of Italy as Head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, known as UNIFIL. We expect him to take up his position on the 24th of June.
    Major General Abagnara succeeds Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz of Spain.  The Secretary-General extends his sincere gratitude to Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz for his dedication, for his leadership of UNIFIL during one of the mission’s most challenging periods.
    Major General Abagnara brings to the position over 36 years of military service, including extensive leadership roles within the Italian Armed Forces.  
    Most recently, he served as Commander and Chair of the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon, where he oversaw multinational coordination efforts in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces. 

    OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
    Tom Fletcher, the Emergency Relief Coordinator, today urged Israel to open all of the crossings into Gaza, let in lifesaving aid at scale from all directions, and lift the restrictions on what and how much aid we can bring in. 
    He noted that dozens of Gazans were declared dead at hospitals yesterday after Israeli forces said they had opened fire. Mr. Fletcher said this is the outcome of a series of deliberate choices that have systematically deprived two million people of the essentials they need to survive.  
    Meanwhile, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs tell us the latest figures indicate that in the past three weeks, more than 100,000 people were forced to flee in the governorates of North Gaza and Gaza. 
    UN partners working in health say that more medical facilities are suspending their operations.
    On Monday, the remaining staff and patients at the Indonesian Hospital, in North Gaza, were evacuated.
    As a result, not a single hospital remains functional in North Gaza.  
    Today in Gaza City, Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator Suzanna Tkalec visited Al Ahli hospital, which has sustained multiple attacks since the beginning of the war. Ms. Tkalec heard from staff about the challenges they are facing every day. They stressed that preventable deaths are occurring due to shortages of critical supplies, including antibiotics. The Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator called for the protection of health facilities, the unrestricted flow of assistance into Gaza, and support for our work and our partners’ work to deliver at scale to alleviate the suffering of people.
    Meanwhile, we and our partners continue to send supplies to Kerem Shalom crossing, where the Israeli authorities scan them before they can enter Gaza.
    For today, we submitted over 130 pre-cleared truckloads for a second and final Israeli clearance, but only 50 of them – which were carrying flour – were approved to enter the Israeli side of the Kerem Shalom crossing. 
    UN teams on the ground are also working hard to collect supplies from Kerem Shalom and bring them closer to the people who need them inside Gaza. But these attempts are facing major hurdles. Just yesterday, one attempt was denied access altogether and another one did manage to retrieve just over a dozen truckloads carrying flour. Overall, since the crossing reopened, we’ve been able to collect fewer than 400 truckloads, even though every day we have tried to coordinate access and secure safe routes through the Israeli-militarized zone in the south. 
    And that denied attempt to access Kerem Shalom was one of the six access denials our teams faced just yesterday across the Gaza Strip, out of a total of 13 attempts. These denials prevented our teams from carrying out interventions as critical as trucking water to those who need it. 
    Another of yesterday’s six denied access attempts was to retrieve fuel, which is so urgently needed. OCHA warns that without immediate access to fuel that is already inside Gaza but located in hard-to-reach areas that are either militarized or subject to displacement orders, more critical services will have to suspend operations soon.  
    And as you know, this afternoon at 4 p.m., the members of the Security Council of the United Nations will meet not far from here to discuss the situation in Gaza.

    Full highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=04%20June%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w7x3xY06V9s

    MIL OSI Video –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Aircraft noise around Schiphol – P-002158/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-002158/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Dirk Gotink (PPE)

    With a view to reducing aircraft noise around Schiphol, the Netherlands has followed the ‘balanced approach’ procedure. In view of this:

    • 1.Does the Commission agree that setting spatial, environmental and noise limits on the operation of national airports is a responsibility of the Member States, one which requires them to carefully balance economic and environmental interests?
    • 2.Does the Commission agree that the sole purpose of the mandatory European ‘balanced approach’ procedure when it comes to noise-related operating restrictions is to ensure that national assessments are carried out with the requisite due diligence, in particular to properly substantiate the inevitability or added value of a proposed operating restriction in the light of a noise-related target determined at national level?
    • 3.Does the Commission consider that the Dutch Government has carefully followed the ‘balanced approach’ procedure with regard to Schiphol Airport, and does it also take the view that the Dutch Government has therefore adopted a balanced package of measures to reduce noise levels for people and homes by 20 %?

    Submitted: 28.5.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Need for fair trials in Baku – E-002048/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002048/2025/rev.1
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Nicolas Bay (ECR)

    Since the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh, which saw more than 130 000 Armenians forced to flee their ancestral land, several citizens of Armenian origin have been arrested by the Azerbaijani authorities and are currently being tried in Baku. The Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Belgium stated that the trials were public and that diplomats and politicians could attend[1][2].

    With tensions high between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the peace treaty, the EU must remain vigilant as regards respect for fundamental rights, including the right to a fair trial.

    As it is engaged in strategic partnerships with these two Caucasus countries, including a controversial gas agreement with Baku, the EU has a responsibility to ensure its relations are founded on democratic principles. The European Parliament’s support for closer ties with Armenia sends a strong signal for a more balanced commitment[3].

    Is the Commission going to ask the EU Delegation in Azerbaijan to mandate an observer to attend the hearings of these trials on a daily basis to ensure that the international standards of justice and a fair procedure are being upheld?

    Submitted: 21.5.2025

    • [1] ‘The court proceedings are open, any person be it any citizen of any country, foreigner or foreign diplomat or journalist can attend this proceedings. You have your embassy in Baku, they are free to go and to provide directly to you all the information’, reply to Belgian politician Pierre Kompany, on 8 April 2025, at the hearing of Vagif Sadikov, Ambassador of Azerbaijan to the Committee on External Affairs of the Belgian Federal Parliament, on a resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh.
    • [2] ‘Political access to the political prisoners, well I already mentioned well you have excellent ambassador of Belgium in Baku Mr. Ambassador Julien De Fraipont, he is welcomed to attend the court proceedings anytime when he wants’, reply to Belgian politician Els Van Hoof in the same interview.
    • [3] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-9-2024-0166_EN.html
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Impact of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive on the availability and affordability of essential medicines – E-002108/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002108/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Christine Anderson (ESN)

    The revised[1] Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive[2] (UWWTD) may significantly increase production costs for essential, low-cost medicines such as Metformin, a key treatment for type two diabetes used by nearly three million patients in Germany[3].

    Estimates suggest that pharmaceutical and cosmetic companies are required to cover at least 80 % of the costs (Article 9) of additional treatment to remove micropollutants in order to comply with the directive. This could lead to a cost increase of up to 445 % for Metformin production. Manufacturers warn that this would make the continued EU-based production of such medicines unviable, risking market withdrawals, medicine shortages and greater dependence on non-EU imports.

    • 1.Can the Commission confirm whether the estimate of up to a 445 % cost increase for Metformin is accurate, and whether it anticipates similar effects across other Member States and medicines, particularly for low-margin generics?
    • 2.How does the Commission reconcile the provisions of the UWWTD, specifically the mandatory cost allocation under Article 9(4), with the objectives of the proposed Critical Medicines Act, which aims to strengthen EU production and supply security for essential pharmaceuticals?
    • 3.Given the risk to medicine affordability and availability, does the Commission consider a targeted revision or exemption within the UWWTD necessary in order to safeguard public health and pharmaceutical resilience?

    Submitted: 26.5.2025

    • [1] COM(2022)0541.
    • [2] Directive (EU) 2024/3019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 concerning urban wastewater treatment, OJ L, 2024/3019, 12.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/3019/oj.
    • [3] Der Spiegel, https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/diabetes-medikament-metformin-droht-das-aus-hohe-kosten-durch-eu-abwasserrichtlinie-a-25ab387e-8ef2-43c7-a9e0-7714d850aeb3.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Independence and impartiality of the UNAR (Italian equality body) – E-002106/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002106/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Pina Picierno (S&D), Alessandro Zan (S&D), Marc Angel (S&D), Lucia Yar (Renew), Irene Tinagli (S&D), Krzysztof Śmiszek (S&D), Alessandra Moretti (S&D)

    The Ufficio Nazionale Antidiscriminazioni Razziali (UNAR) is a public equality body established by the Italian Government, responsible for promoting equal treatment and eliminating discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender identity and sexual orientation.

    The UNAR falls under Directive 2000/43/EC[1] and, after its transposition into national law, Directive (EU) 2024/1500[2].

    Independence and impartiality should underpin its actions. Nevertheless, the UNAR reports to the Office of the Prime Minister and its director is appointed by the Prime Minister. Therefore, the principles of independence and impartiality are compromised and the office is subject to political influence by the government. The UNAR has been accused of delaying the financing of anti-discrimination projects and breaking off formal relations with civil society organisations and human rights defenders, specifically LGBTQIA+ related associations.

    In view of the implementation of Directive (EU) 2024/1500, in particular Articles 3 on independence and impartiality, 4 on resources, and 5 and 6 that set out the objectives, can the Commission clarify:

    • 1.if the UNAR and the Italian Government are already complying with the provisions applying to equality bodies in the context of the Directive (EU) 2024/1500;
    • 2.if it is already in contact with national authorities regarding the implementation of Directive (EU) 2024/1500;
    • 3.what would the possible actions be if Italy does not comply with the provisions of EU law?

    Submitted: 26.5.2025

    • [1] Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 22., ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/43/oj.
    • [2] Directive (EU) 2024/1500 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal opportunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, OJ L, 2024/1500, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1500/oj.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Widespread phenomenon of fir and plane trees drying out in the mountainous areas of Greece – risk to biodiversity and forest ecosystems – E-002094/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002094/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Sakis Arnaoutoglou (S&D)

    In recent years, according to the Institute of Mediterranean Forest Ecosystems, a large number of fir and plane trees have been drying out in many mountainous areas of mainland Greece, with Tzoumerka, the Acheloos valley and Agrafa being typical examples. This phenomenon is a major concern for local communities and scientists, as it affects forest ecosystems, threatens biodiversity and increases the risk of fires and desertification.

    The fact that fir and plane trees are drying out appears to be related both to the effects of climate change (prolonged droughts, extreme temperatures) and to biotic factors, such as attacks by bark-eating insects and fungi. However, to date, neither a single monitoring mechanism nor a coordinated response has been implemented at European level.

    In the light of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

    • 1.Does it monitor the widespread phenomenon of fir and plane trees drying out in EU Member States, in particular in mountainous areas such as Tzoumerka, the Acheloos valley and Agrafa?
    • 2.Are there any European funding tools that can be used to research, prevent and tackle this phenomenon in these regions?
    • 3.Does it intend to strengthen cooperation with the Member States to set up early warning and intervention mechanisms to protect forest ecosystems from the consequences of the climate crisis?

    Submitted: 26.5.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Use of NextGenerationEU funds in the bullfighting lobby – E-002066/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002066/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Estrella Galán (The Left)

    The website[1] of an association of breeders of bulls for bullfighting mentions that it is receiving funding from NextGenerationEU without clarifying what it is for. This organisation is part of the so-called ‘bullfighting lobby’, whose activities involve lobbying and influencing public authorities in order to promote or strengthen bullfighting in Spain and also in the European Union[2].

    In the light of the above:

    • 1.What funds has the Commission allocated to this group?
    • 2.Is the Commission aware that EU funds are being used for bullfighting?

    Submitted: 22.5.2025

    • [1] https://ganaderosdebravo.es/en/
    • [2] https://ganaderosdebravo.es/en/defense-and-representation-in-european-institutions-central-and-regional-administrations/
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Increase in number of attacks with explosives in the Netherlands – Need for European action – E-002111/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002111/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Tom Berendsen (PPE), Jeroen Lenaers (PPE)

    Nowhere in Europe are there as many attacks with powerful fireworks and explosives as in the Netherlands. In 2024, there were as many as 1543. In addition, we see this trend spreading further in Europe to Germany, Belgium, France and Sweden. At issue, in particular, are flash bangers (as sold under the brand name Cobra) – fireworks belonging to category F4, intended for professional use only. Flash bangers indeed fall under this category but are rarely, if ever, used professionally and mainly end up in the hands of criminals.

    Legal production and storage take place largely outside the Netherlands. Flash bangers from abroad then enter the black market through criminal networks and are then resold cheaply and easily, for example on online platforms.

    To counter the worrying developments, European action is necessary. Both trade in and production of powerful fireworks such as flash bangers need to be more strictly regulated and controlled.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.Is the Commission prepared to introduce a ban on the production of powerful, loud-bang fireworks such as flash bangers, as they are not being used for professional purposes?
    • 2.In the meantime, what action will the Commission take to prevent this type of explosive from entering the black market?

    Submitted: 27.5.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Missions – Mission report following the ECON mission to Paris, France, from 14 to 16 April 2025 – 14-04-2025 – Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    During its mission to Paris, the ECON delegation met the French Finance Minister, the Governor of the Banque de France and the Premier Président of the Cour des comptes, as well as other French government officials, regulatory agencies, businesses, economists and trade unions’ representatives.

    The ECON delegation also met with the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

    Location : Paris, France
    Mission report following the ECON mission to Paris, France, from 14 to 16 April 2025

    Source : © European Union, 2025 – EP

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Support for the Ionian Islands in relation to landslides – E-001597/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Based on their national or subnational climate risk assessments, Member States can use Cohesion Policy to support disaster risk management, particularly by financing prevention, response and resilience measures in islands or coastal areas. This may also include measures to address soil erosion.

    Specifically for Greece, over EUR 726 million in public funding is allocated to prevent and manage climate-related flood risks, including coastal and land erosion management . Under the shared management principle governing these funds, national authorities are responsible for selecting projects for funding and overseeing their implementation.

    Furthermore, Greece’s Recovery and Resilience Plan[1] invests in anti-erosion and flood protection across Greece in response to the floods and wildfires in 2023 (measure 16849). The related interventions include the construction of dams, stream stabilisation structures and rainwater retention systems, with the aim to improve soil retention, biodiversity conservation and agricultural production. By end-2025, a total area of 5 000 hectares of anti-erosion works and 175 000 square meters of flood protection works is expected to be completed.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/country-pages/greeces-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Supporting East Macedonia and Thrace in the face of the demographic crisis – E-001062/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission recognises the challenge of population decline and encourages Member States to develop integrated policies to manage demographic change.

    The Commission’s Demographic Toolbox provides a set of tools that can support Member States and regions in these efforts. As part of the Demographic Toolbox, the Talent Booster Mechanism is targeted towards EU regions that are experiencing a decline in their working-age population and that are affected by the departure of young people. The EU Long-term Vision for Rural Areas also includes strategies to address demographic decline.

    Cohesion Policy is committed to reducing disparities between regions in different Member States, including Greece, ensuring inter alia that people can effectively stay in the place they call home.

    Some EUR 639 million has been allocated to the regional programme for Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, aimed among others at fostering entrepreneurship, strengthening education and social care infrastructure, and promoting the region’s natural and cultural heritage to boost the region’s attractiveness. These investments will create jobs and upgrade public infrastructure, improving quality of life of residents.

    Additionally, the region benefits from a programme under the European Social Fund Plus aimed at boosting employment. It improves job access and activation measures for all jobseekers, focusing on youth, the long-term unemployed, disadvantaged groups in the labour market, and inactive people.

    The program also promotes self-employment and the social economy with a budget of EUR 12.75 million. Current actions include supporting enterprises in hiring highly qualified unemployed individuals and helping unemployed people start businesses.

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Statement on Concept Release on Foreign Private Issuer Eligibility

    Source: Securities and Exchange Commission

    Good afternoon.  This is an open meeting on June 4, 2025 of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under the Government in the Sunshine Act.  Commissioners Caroline Crenshaw and Mark Uyeda are here with me in Washington, D.C., and Commissioner Hester Peirce is participating remotely.

    Today, the Commission will consider a recommendation from the Division of Corporation Finance that the Commission issue a concept release seeking comment on whether to revise the definition of foreign private issuer.

    The Commission first defined foreign private issuer in 1967.[1]  Then in 1983, it developed the foundation of the current definition through a test to determine whether a foreign issuer is “essentially [a] U.S. issuer” based on percentage of U.S. ownership, nationality of the management team, and location of business operations.[2]  The world, financial markets, and corporate legal structures have significantly changed over the past forty-plus years.

    The U.S. capital markets have been and still are the envy of the world.  Foreign companies from across the globe seek new capital from U.S. investors for their businesses and seek to have their securities listed on a U.S. exchange for a variety of potential benefits, including higher valuation, greater liquidity, and enhanced reputation.

    Foreign companies that qualify as foreign private issuers receive these potential benefits while also being offered several accommodations under the federal securities laws that are not available to U.S. companies.  These include provisions such as (1) not needing to file quarterly reports, proxy statements, or Section 16 reports, (2) not being subject to Regulation FD, and (3) furnishing current reports on Form 6-K, rather than filing the more prescriptive Form 8-K.[3]

    As early as 1935, the Commission recognized that our rules should not treat foreign companies exactly the same as domestic companies,[4] likely because many aspects of their corporate operations, business and market practices, accounting standards, tax regimes, compensation and pension benefits, and organic corporate governance laws may be quite different from those in the United States.  Yet, at the same time, the Commission has always been mindful of the paramount need for the adequacy of the disclosures provided by the foreign companies to their U.S. investors whenever it considered new accommodations under the federal securities laws for these companies.  When the Commission provided foreign companies with additional regulatory relief in 1967, it noted “the improvement in the reporting of financial information by foreign issuers, resulting from changes in foreign corporate laws, stock exchange requirements, and voluntary disclosure by the companies themselves.”[5]

    Today, maintaining reasonable accommodations in the federal securities laws to attract foreign companies to U.S. markets and to provide U.S. investors with the opportunity to trade in those companies under U.S. laws and regulations remains an objective.  That objective must be balanced with other considerations, including providing investors with material information about these foreign companies, including their unique corporate structures, and ensuring that domestic companies are not competitively disadvantaged with respect to regulatory requirements.

    The first step in striking this balance is to determine which foreign companies should qualify as foreign private issuers and be able to avail themselves to the accommodations.  It has been several decades since the Commission last examined the characteristics of the foreign private issuer community.  The global markets have changed significantly in those decades.  It is therefore only prudent for the Commission to better understand the companies that are using the foreign private issuers accommodations today and determine if changes are needed to better protect U.S. investors.  Based on the latest data from 2023, for example, almost 55% of foreign private issuers are traded exclusively, or nearly-exclusively, in the United States.[6]  Among these issuers, the most common jurisdiction of incorporation is the Cayman Islands and the most common jurisdiction of headquarters is China.[7] 

    When the United States is effectively a foreign company’s exclusive or primary trading market and the company is not subject to meaningful disclosure requirements or securities law oversight in its jurisdiction of incorporation or headquarters, careful consideration should be given to whether the foreign company is eligible for accommodations under the federal securities laws that are unavailable to U.S. companies.  This analysis begins with considering whether the current definition of a foreign private issuer is appropriately tailored.  The concept release solicits public input on this issue, and I encourage market participants to submit their views and engage with my office and the other commissioners’ offices on this topic.

    Before I turn the meeting over to Cicely LaMothe, Acting Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, to discuss the recommendation, I would like to thank the following staff members for their work on this concept release.

    From the Division of Corporation Finance: Cicely LaMothe, Sebastian Gomez Abero, Ted Yu, Michael Coco, Kelsey Glover, Kateryna Kuntsevich, Mark Green, Ryan Milne, Wei Lu, Heather Rosenberger, Kayla Roberts, Anna Abramson, and John Fieldsend.

    From the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis: Lyndon Orton, Mattias Nilsson, Evan Avila, Tara Bhandari, and Timothy Dodd.  I would especially like to recognize Mattias and Evan because the data in their white paper on trends in the foreign private issuer population[8] significantly contributed to the concept release.

    From the Office of International Affairs: Kathleen Hutchinson, Matthew Greiner, Morgan Macdonald, Michael Ferrario, Jordan Spain, and Katerina Ossenova.

    From the Office of the General Counsel: Jeffrey Finnell, Bryant Morris, Johanna Losert, Mike Killoy and Cynthia Bien.

    From the Office of the Chief Accountant:  Ryan Wolfe, Shaz Niazi, Nigel James, Chauncey Martin, Mai-Khoi Nguyen-Thanh, Jill Davis, Sarah Esquivel, and Ella Karafiat.

    Now I will turn the meeting over to Cicely for the staff’s recommendation.

     


    [1] Adoption of Rules Relating to Foreign Securities, Release No. 34-8066 (Apr. 28, 1967) [32 FR 7845 (May 30, 1967)] (the “1967 Release”).

    [2] Foreign Securities, Release No. 33-6493 (Oct. 6, 1983) [48 FR 46736 (Oct. 14, 1983)].

    [4] See Release No. 34-323, Release No. 34-324, and Release No. 34-325 (July 15, 1935) and Release 34-412 (November 6, 1935).

    [5] The 1967 Release at 7846.

    [6] The Concept Release at section III.C.1.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: G7 Foreign Ministers Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Office of the Spokesperson

    G7 Foreign Ministers Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

    Media Note

    March 14, 2025

    The text of the following statement was released by the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union.

    Begin Text:

    1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, reaffirm the G7’s steadfast commitment to contribute towards a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources.
    2. Maritime security and prosperity are fundamental to global stability, economic resilience, and the well-being of all nations, and the conservation and sustainable use of ocean ecosystems is essential to all life on Earth. Over 80% of global trade is transported by sea, and 97% of global data flows through submarine cables. Disruptions to maritime routes pose a direct threat to international food security, critical minerals, energy security, global supply chains, and economic stability. We express deep concern over the growing risks to maritime security, including strategic contestation, threats to freedom of navigation and overflight, and illicit shipping activities. State behaviour in these areas has increased the risk of conflict and environmental damage, and imperils all nations’ prosperity and living standards, especially for the world’s poorest.
    3. We recognize the role of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework for governing all activities in the oceans and the seas.
    4. We recall the G7 Statements on Maritime Security adopted in Lübeck (2015) and Hiroshima (2016). We welcome related work presently underway through other G7 ministerial tracks and working groups, on a range of issues including securing undersea cable networks and combating abandoned fishing gear. We welcome, as well, G7 work relating to transnational organized crime and terrorism that touches on the maritime domain, including in relation to piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking in persons, and strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of coastal states. We acknowledge the importance of regional maritime security frameworks, to support coastal states to address collectively threats to their maritime security. We welcome existing initiatives, such as the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++ FoGG, that Canada chairs this year), which has been, the primary forum for dialogue among G7 members and partners on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

    Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

    1. Enhancing Stability: We underscore the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the high seas and the exclusive economic zones as well as to the related rights and freedoms in other maritime zones, including the rights of innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, as provided for under international law. We share a growing concern at recent, unjustifiable efforts to restrict such freedom and to expand jurisdiction through use of force and other forms of coercion, including across the Taiwan Strait, and in the South China Sea, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea. We condemn China’s illicit, provocative, coercive and dangerous actions that seek unilaterally to alter the status quo in such a way as to risk undermining the stability of regions, including through land reclamations, and building of outposts, as well as their use for military purpose. In areas pending final delimitation, we underline the importance of coastal states refraining from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment insofar as such actions jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement, as well as the importance of making every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, in those areas. We condemn, as well, dangerous vessel maneuvers, the indiscriminate attacks against commercial vessels and other maritime actions that undermine maritime order based on the rule of law and international law. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on 12 July 2016 is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties. We reaffirm that our basic policies on Taiwan remain unchanged and emphasize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to international security and prosperity. We welcome the resumption of exports from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Freedom of navigation for commercial shipping in the Black Sea must be upheld.
    2. Attempts to Change the Status Quo by Force: We oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force or coercion including in the East and South China Seas. We undertake to implement means through which to track systematically and report on attempts to change the status quo by force and by the establishment of new geographical facts, including through coercive and dangerous actions on the oceans and seas that might threaten regional and international peace and security.
    3. Protecting Critical Maritime and Undersea Infrastructure: We are seized of the fact that vital energy and telecommunications infrastructure under the oceans and seas connects our economies and is vital to our prosperity. We recall the G7 Joint Statement on Cable Connectivity for Secure and Resilient Digital Communications Networks (2024) and the New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World (2024). We share a growing concern that undersea communications cables, subsea interconnectors and other critical undersea infrastructure have been subject to critical damage through sabotage, poor seamanship or irresponsible behaviour which have resulted in potential internet or energy disruption in affected regions, delays in global data transmission, or compromised sensitive communications. We will enhance our cooperation with industry mitigate risks, reduce bottlenecks to operational tasks while strengthening repair capacities in order to improve the overall resilience of critical undersea and maritime infrastructure. In this respect, we welcome the EU Action Plan on Cable Security adopted in February 2025 by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
    4. Maritime Crime: Maritime crime, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, maritime arms trafficking and sanctions evasion, human trafficking, illegal drug trafficking and Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, continues to impede maritime security, freedom of navigation, and our economy and prosperity. We have been working together to tackle these maritime crimes, but maritime illegal activities have extended into new areas, to become an urgent issue to be addressed. We welcome the G7 Action Plan to combat migrant smuggling adopted under Italy’s 2024 G7 Presidency.
    5. Protecting Freedom of Trade: In the past year, indiscriminate Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have endangered maritime security of vessels and their crews, disturbed international trade, and exposed neighboring countries to environmental hazards. Enabled by Iran’s military, financial, and intelligence support, these illegal attacks have also contributed to increased tension in the Middle East and Yemen, with severe repercussions on the intra-Yemeni peace process. The vessel “Galaxy Leader” seized by the Houthis must be released immediately. We appreciate the efforts of all those countries that have engaged to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, protecting crucial shipping lanes and helping to restore regular flows of trade through the Suez Canal connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, we commend the efforts of EU’s maritime operation “Aspides” and U.S.-led operation “Prosperity Guardian”.

    Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security

    1. Curtailing Unsafe and Illicit Shipping Practices: The rise of unsafe and illicit shipping practices, including fraudulent registration and registries, poses a significant threat to global trade and environmental sustainability. We are concerned that unsafe and illicit shipping imposes heavy costs on industry, governments and citizens. Russia’s ability to earn revenue has been sustained through its extensive effort to circumvent the G7+ oil price cap policy through its shadow fleet of often older, underinsured, and poorly maintained ships that routinely disable their automatic identification systems or engage in “spoofing” to avoid detection and circumvent international safety, environmental, and liability rules and standards. North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and evade sanctions, particularly through its illicit maritime activities, including prohibited ship to-ship transfers of petroleum and other UN-banned commodities. Through G7 coordination, we have exposed North Korea uses of “dark” vessels – those that engage in illicit activity – to circumvent United Nations Security Council mandated sanctions. Russia and North Korea are strengthening their economic relations including through maritime routes, such as the reported transfer of petroleum products from Russia to North Korea Unregulated, “dark” vessels undertake IUU fishing, destroying marine habitats and depleting fish stocks, with negative impacts for biodiversity and food security. Unregulated, inadequately insured “dark” vessels also pose a high risk of maritime accidents, including in fragile ecosystems such as the Arctic and Antarctic. We commit to strengthen our coordination, amongst the G7 and with other partners, to prevent the use of unregistered or fraudulently registered, uninsured and substandard vessels engaged in sanctions evasion, arms transfers, illegal fishing and illicit trade. We encourage relevant International Organizations to improve maritime domain awareness by expanding satellite-based vessel tracking and establishing comprehensive data records of the movement of individual ships and of ship-to-ship transfers, as a means of identifying and tracking illicit maritime activities. We are also committed to capacity building of the countries in the region in law enforcement and Maritime Domain Awareness.
    2. Shadow Fleet Task Force: We invite members of the Nordic-Baltic 8 (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden), and possibly others, to join participating G7 members in a Shadow Fleet Task Force to enhance monitoring and detection and to otherwise constrain the use of shadow fleets engaged in illegal, unsafe or environmentally perilous activities, building on the work of others active in this area. The Task Force will constitute a response by the participating States to the call by the International Maritime Organization in its Resolution A.1192(33) of 6 December 2023 for Members States and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by shadow fleets and their flag states, including illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs, or engaging in other illegal activities.
    3. Enhancing Maritime Supply Chain Resilience and Energy and Food Security: Maritime supply chains will continue to underpin the global economy, but these face a variety of threats, both present and future, stemming from both geopolitical tensions and environmental factors. Maritime disruptions raise consumer costs, increase transit times, and can reduce demand in importing countries, which in turn means lower revenues and diminished competitiveness for producers in exporting countries. Such vulnerabilities in maritime transport can undermine energy and food security, particularly for developing nations reliant on stable shipping routes, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). We welcome maritime initiatives involving and supported by G7 partners intended to promote energy and food security, such as the Grain from Ukraine scheme, and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We invite cooperation with the African Union (pursuant to Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050) and other relevant International Organizations to identify best practices for enhancing maritime supply chain resilience and for safeguarding energy and food security, including in times of geopolitical crisis.
    4. Promoting Safe and Resilient Ports and Strategic Waterways: Port ownership and operational control matter to national security, as foreign control or influence over critical port infrastructure can create vulnerabilities in trade, in defense and security, and in economic stability. Port resilience is also crucial to economic stability and global trade and yet ports face growing risks from environmental degradation, extreme weather events and geopolitical conflicts. Strengthening port security and modernizing infrastructure are essential to maintaining safe and efficient maritime trade. Ensuring that the ownership and management of strategic waterways and key maritime choke points are not vulnerable to undue influence by potential adversaries is also essential to national security. We underscore the importance of scrutiny of ownership structures and port management and resilience within our own national jurisdictions, including with regard to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, to ensure that adversaries do not gain leverage over supply chains, military operations, or the flow of strategic resources. We will work with partners and with relevant International Organizations to encourage robust cybersecurity standards for port ICT infrastructure, to increase resilience against malicious cyber incidents on maritime logistical networks, to reduce monopolistic power over key supply chain nodes, to promote secure and transparent port ownership, to limit unsolicited or undue foreign influence over critical infrastructures and strategic waterways, and to otherwise encourage greater focus on such potential vulnerabilities.
    5. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) at sea poses a significant hazard to the marine environment, to the safety of fishermen and other users of the maritime space, and to various marine economic activities. We commit to enhancing diplomatic efforts and to exchanging best practices among national authorities, relevant international and regional organizations, and relevant industry sectors to accelerate the clean-up of UXO from the seas and ocean.

    Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources

    1. Strengthen Enforcement Against IUU Fishing: IUU fishing is a major contributor to declining fish stocks and to marine habitat destruction. It may account for a third of all fishing activity worldwide, at a cost to the global economy of more than US$23 billion per year and with negative consequences for fisheries as an enduring economic asset, including for developing countries. We welcome the Canadian-led Dark Vessel Detection System in Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and would see value in replicating the model to support other partners whose fisheries are under threat from IUU fishing. We recognize that data sharing and transparency play a key role in this fight by exposing bad actors and that technological advances can support a robust Monitoring, Control and Surveillance and enforcement landscape. We encourage further progress in addressing IUU fishing, working with and through relevant International Organizations to establish and strengthen rules to sustainably manage fish stocks on the high seas and to improve the enforcement of these measures, including through the further development of detection technologies, aircraft patrols and high seas boarding and inspection of vessels, building upon the 2022 G7 Ocean Deal.
    2. We welcome the Third UN Ocean Conference, in Nice, France, from 9 to 13 June 2025.

    PARTNERSHIPS

    1. This G7 Maritime Security and Prosperity Declaration provides a framework for cooperation with non-G7 Partners, including countries hosting major ports, large merchant fleets, or extensive flag registries as well as relevant regional and International Organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization and ASEAN. We would welcome robust cooperation with Partners to take forward the goals set out in this Declaration, consistent with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, under the efforts of the G7 countries, including a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region, to build a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, and of commitment to the sustainable development of the world’s maritime spaces.
    2. We welcome the cooperation on Coast Guard Functions, including the Global Coast Guard Forum hosted by Italy in 2025, as well as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, which could also support the objectives of this Declaration.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Senior Bureau Official for International Organization Affairs Pitt’s Travel to Switzerland, Italy, and the Holy See

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Senior Bureau Official for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs McCoy Pitt is currently in Geneva, Switzerland, where he is traveling from April 7-11 to meet with counterparts and participate in the consultative-level meeting of the Geneva Group on UN governance and management. While in Geneva, he will hold additional meetings with leadership of several UN agencies.

    From April 14-15, Senior Bureau Official Pitt will travel to Rome, Italy, to meet with officials from the Rome-based UN agencies and representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He will also engage in discussions with officials from the Holy See to discuss a number of shared priorities.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Italy National Day

    Source: United States Department of State (4)

    Marco Rubio, Secretary of State

    HomeItaly National Day

    Italy National Day

    Press Statement

    June 2, 2025

    On behalf of the United States of America, I extend our congratulations to the people of the Italian Republic on your National Day.

    Italy is a key Ally in the Euro-Atlantic region. As we confront global security challenges together, we urge all European NATO Allies to increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP. We appreciate Italy’s continued support for efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war and value our ongoing cooperation with Prime Minister Meloni to combat illegal immigration, reduce energy dependency on hostile regimes, and counter unfair trade practices. The United States welcomes Italy’s leadership in advancing critical technologies and building a resilient, mutually beneficial industrial base across Europe.

    With over 17 million Americans proudly claiming Italian heritage, our bond is rooted in both history and purpose. Together, we will continue delivering results – ensuring freedom, security, and prosperity for both our nations.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Banking: Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with the Minister of International Trade of Canada

    Source: ASEAN

    Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, met with the Minister of International Trade of Canada, H.E Maninder Sidhu, at the OECD Headquarters in Paris, France, on 4 June 2025. Their discussions explored potential opportunities to deepen ASEAN- OECD cooperation, aligned with the implementation of the OECD Southeast Asia Regional Programme (SEARP) in 2026, including specific areas to support the ASEAN Community Vision 2045.
     

    The post Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with the Minister of International Trade of Canada appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Global Banks –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Scottish Greens call for an end to complicity at Red Line for Gaza protest 

    Source: Scottish Greens

    04 Jun 2025 External Affairs

    The Labour government is on the wrong side of history and it has Palestinian blood on its hands

    More in External Affairs

    Scottish Greens MSP Maggie Chapman joined protesters outside the UK Government offices in Edinburgh as part of the Red Line for Gaza demonstration, calling for an immediate end to arms sales to Israel and demanding accountability for the UK’s role in the ongoing violence against Palestinians.

    The protest coincides with Israel’s ongoing assault on Gaza, with catastrophic impacts on civilians.

    The UK Government is currently facing a judicial review in the High Court challenging their continued supply of F-35 parts in arms exports used by Israel. Despite mounting evidence the Government lawyer’s have argued no violation of the duty to prevent genocide “can occur unless and until there is actually a genocide”.

    European countries such as Spain, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy have suspended arms sales to Israel, however, the UK Government continues to fight the case as aircraft continue to bomb Gaza.

    Ms Chapman said:

    “Gaza has been turned into rubble – hospitals, schools, homes – all destroyed. Over 90% of housing has been wiped out. Families are being displaced and forced into camps with no food, water or shelter. This is not just a humanitarian crisis – it’s a moral catastrophe and the UK Government is helping it happen. The UK Government is complicit.

    “It’s shameful that the UK refuses to act. Instead of standing up for peace, the Prime Minister came to Scotland to announce more money for war. Keir Starmer’s expects yet more UK tax money to feed the war machine and his government’s denial of genocide shows he’s more interested in retaining power than defending human rights. This Labour government is on the wrong side of history and it has Palestinian blood on its hands.

    “The UK Government is currently defending its position in a high court case, claiming there’s “no evidence” of genocide or intentional targeting of civilians in Gaza. It doesn’t require much thought to reject that argument outright: this genocide is being live-streamed for all to see. We’ve all seen the videos. We’ve seen the bodies. The world knows what’s happening in Gaza – the destruction, the killing of women and children. For the UK Government to say there’s no evidence is not only dishonest – it’s dangerous.

    “The Scottish Greens know that genuine security doesn’t come at the end of a gun or aftermath of a bomb. It comes from investing in healthcare, affordable housing and a green economy built on sustainability and compassion.

    “We have consistently called for an immediate end to arms sales to Israel, full transparency over any UK or indeed Scottish Government funding linked to Israeli military production, an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, recognition of the State of Palestine, and Israel’s suspension from international bodies, including the United Nations, until compliance with international law is restored.

    “Together, outside the UK Government offices, we gathered in protest but we also gathered in hope. Hope for the Palestinian people and hope for humanity.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Major General Diodato Abagnara of Italy – Head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

    Source: United Nations MIL-OSI 2

    nited Nations Secretary-General António Guterres announced today the appointment of Major General Diodato Abagnara of Italy as Head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

    Major General Abagnara succeeds Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz of Spain.  The Secretary-General extends his sincere gratitude to Lieutenant General Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz for his dedication and leadership of UNIFIL during one of the mission’s most challenging periods.

    Major General Abagnara brings to the position over 36 years of military service, including extensive leadership roles within the Italian Armed Forces.  Most recently, he served as Commander and Chair of the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon (MTC4L), where he oversaw multinational coordination efforts in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces.  Prior to that, he held several key appointments, including Personnel Division Chief and Adviser to the Chief of Defence Staff in the Defence General Staff, Commander of an infantry brigade, and Chief of the Officers’ Employment Office.  From 2018 to 2019, he was also UNIFIL Sector West Commander.  In addition, he chaired the Joint Gender Perspective Council within the Defence General Staff, underscoring his commitment to inclusive leadership and institutional reform.

    Major General Abagnara holds four Bachelor’s degrees:  in Political Science from the University of Turin; in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Trieste; in Business Management and Communication from the University of Teramo; and in Strategic Sciences from the University of Turin, all in Italy.  He also holds six Master’s degrees:  in Law from the University of Rome; in Strategic Sciences from the University of Turin; in International Strategic-Military Studies, Advanced Studies in Intelligence and Security, and Cybersecurity and Information Security from the University of Rome; and in Strategic Leadership and Digital Transformation from the Luiss Business School, Rome, all in Italy.  He is fluent in English and Italian, and speaks French and Spanish.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Endometriosis diagnosed prevalent cases in women to reach 2.8 million across 7MM in 2034, forecasts GlobalData

    Source: GlobalData

    Endometriosis diagnosed prevalent cases in women to reach 2.8 million across 7MM in 2034, forecasts GlobalData

    Posted in Pharma

    The diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis among women ages 12–54 years in the seven major markets (7MM*) are set to register an annual growth rate (AGR) of 0.09% from 2.77 million in 2024 to 2.8 million in 2034, forecasts GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

    GlobalData’s latest report, “Endometriosis – Epidemiology Forecast to 2034,” reveals that the US will have the highest number of diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis among the 7MM at 1.51 million cases, whereas Japan will have the lowest number at 0.09 million cases in 2034.

    Antara Bhattacharya, Associate Project Manager, Epidemiology team at GlobalData, comments: “In 2024, women in ages 30–54 years accounted for almost 92% of the diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis in the 7MM, while younger women in ages 12–29 years accounted for approximately 8% of the cases.”

    GlobalData estimates that in 2024, approximately 64% of diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis in the 7MM were laparoscopy confirmed, whereas 36% of diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis suspected cases. In 2024, approximately 28% of diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis were in stage IV, whereas 22% of diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis were in stage I.

    In the 7MM, approximately 44% of diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis were superficial peritoneal endometriosis, whereas 19% of diagnosed prevalent cases were deep infiltrating endometriosis in 2024. Approximately 44% of diagnosed prevalent cases of endometriosis were with dysmenorrhea.

    Bhattacharya concludes: “Endometriosis significantly impacts quality of life among women of reproductive age due to pain, fatigue, and other symptoms that can affect daily activities, work productivity, and relationships. This may further lead to psychological consequences. Diagnostic delay, limited capacity of health systems, and sub-optimal access to specialized surgery such as laparoscopy further exacerbate the condition, since prompt access to available treatment methods, including non-steroidal analgesics, progestin-based contraceptives, is often not achieved.

    “Addressing endometriosis through various treatments and supportive care can help improve the quality of life for those affected. Additionally, capacity development of primary healthcare providers is essential to initiate treatment for patients who could benefit from medical symptomatic management.”

    *7MM: The US, 5EU (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK), and Japan.

    MIL OSI Economics –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: How AI can support better customer experiences

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: How AI can support better customer experiences

    CRM systems have come a long way since their inception in the 1990s. What began as digital rolodexes evolved over the decades to accommodate cloud hosting, mobile access, and integrations across an organization’s tech stack. But for many businesses, the core experience of using a CRM system hasn’t kept pace with the evolving expectations of modern customers, or the realities of the people managing those relationships.

    Legacy CRM systems often rely heavily on manual data entry. They’re difficult to adapt as businesses grow and are frequently designed more for reporting than for allowing sellers, marketers, and service teams to succeed in real time. While this might have sufficed when field reps had hours between customer visits or when service agents had time to type up detailed call notes, those conditions no longer exist.

    Discover a new AI-powered CRM solution with Dynamics 365 Sales

    Today’s customers do their homework. They research independently, engage across multiple digital channels, and expect seamless, personalized experiences. Meanwhile, customer-facing teams need tools that work in the flow of their day, not ones that add friction. Companies trying to meet these demands with yesterday’s systems are feeling the strain.

    With Microsoft Dynamics 365, organizations are embracing a modern, AI-first approach that redefines productivity and customer engagement. Embedded Microsoft Copilot capabilities help sellers and customer service agents work smarter by generating content, surfacing insights, and summarizing customer interactions.

    AI agents take this a step further, automating repetitive tasks and allowing teams to focus on what truly matters—building relationships and closing deals. In the near future, legacy CRM systems will become background systems, while AI-powered workflows will take center stage.

    Together, copilots and agents can accelerate your business outcomes. For example, imagine a sales rep preparing for a big client meeting. Copilot can pull together a summary of recent customer interactions, generate a tailored pitch based on account details, and suggest case studies that may be relevant to the customer. Meanwhile, an AI agent is working in the background, logging customer inquiries, triggering follow-up tasks, and updating the sales pipeline based on real-time interactions.

    Common CRM system challenges, and how an AI-first approach solves them

    Microsoft has worked with hundreds of companies navigating CRM system modernization, and while each journey is unique, several pain points come up time and again. Here’s a look at the most common challenges, and how organizations are overcoming them with Dynamics 365.

    The challenge: Disparate systems and data silos

    Legacy CRM systems often sit apart from the tools employees use every day. Sales leaders have to jump between systems to get a full view of the customer, resulting in time lost, inconsistent data, and disconnected experiences for both employees and customers.

    The solution: A unified platform

    Dynamics 365 provides a unified platform across sales, marketing, and service. It brings together internal and external data in one place through Microsoft Dataverse and connects with the Microsoft tools people already rely on, like Microsoft Teams, Outlook, and Microsoft Power BI. That means relevant insights are available in the flow of work and updates happen in real time, which can reduce manual effort and improve accuracy.

    The challenge: Lack of innovation

    Many organizations are trying to retrofit AI into systems that weren’t built for it. As a result, they miss out on the true potential of AI to personalize engagement, suggest next steps, and automate time-consuming work.

    The solution: AI integration

    Dynamics 365 is built with AI at its core. With embedded Copilot capabilities, sellers can draft emails, generate proposals, and summarize meetings based on real-time customer data. AI agents go even further by handling complete workflows, like qualifying leads or following up on customer inquiries. With tools like Sales Agent, Sales Chat, and Sales Qualification Agent, sales teams can scale their impact and focus on high-value interactions.

    The challenge: High total cost of ownership

    Legacy CRM systems often require costly add-ons, third-party integrations, and ongoing maintenance. The systems that once seemed quick to deploy become difficult to scale or adapt and drain resources instead of delivering value.

    The solution: Business value through consolidation

    Dynamics 365 consolidates capabilities on a single platform, reducing redundancy and unlocking efficiencies. Since it uses tools that many companies already use—like Microsoft 365, Microsoft Azure, and Power BI—organizations can get more from their existing investments.

    ABN AMRO, one of the largest banks in the Netherlands, embraced Microsoft Dynamics 365 Customer Service and Microsoft Dynamics 365 Sales and has lowered total cost of ownership for its customer engagement platform by up to 40%.

    Real-world results: What an AI-first CRM system looks like in action

    Companies that have made the leap to Dynamics 365 are already seeing measurable impact, including shortened sales cycles, improved responsiveness, and greater customer satisfaction.

    For instance, Lenovo, a global leader in technology solutions, used Dynamics 365 to build a unified global view of customer activity and power its digital sales transformation.

    “We’re seeing the benefit of having one standardized system and a global view to all geographies’ activities. This is the foundation for Lenovo’s sales digital transformation—enabling better connections and an increase in sales productivity and actionable insights.”

    Wei Bi, Business Strategy Senior Manager, Lenovo

    Lexmark, a global innovator in cloud-supported printing and internet of things (IoT) solutions, migrated from Salesforce to Dynamics 365 to streamline and modernize its sales operations.

    “We’ve been on the journey with Microsoft after moving from Salesforce to Dynamics 365 Sales. We’re excited to be one of the first customers to use Sales Qualification Agent and look forward to the ability to scale our sales team with agents and provide an exceptional experience to our customers.”

    Kyle Farmer, Vice President, Global Sales and Strategy, Lexmark

    Gardens Alive replaced its legacy CRM system with Dynamics 365 Customer Service, integrating voice, chat, and email channels through third-party connectors and unified routing. The result was a more than 7% improvement in customer service delivery.

    And the momentum continues. In our Fiscal Year 2025 Third Quarter Earnings, Satya Nadella stated: “When it comes to business applications, Dynamics 365 again took share as companies like Avaya, Brunswick, SoftCat, switched to (Dynamics 365) from legacy providers. Verizon, for example, chose Dynamics 365 Sales to improve the efficiency of its sellers”.

    More than a CRM system, Microsoft is a strategic resource in your transformation journey

    For CROs and CSOs, the decision to modernize CRM systems is about more than upgrading technology. It’s about unlocking new potential. Companies want more than just a vendor; they’re looking for a strategic partner to help them navigate change, scale intelligently, and lead with data and empathy.

    With Dynamics 365, Microsoft brings not only a powerful AI-first platform, but also a global ecosystem of expertise in sales, engineering, and business transformation. The result? A CRM system that’s intuitive, connected, and future-ready, so companies can deliver standout customer experiences and drive sustainable growth. 

    Ready to explore your own AI-first CRM system journey?

    Take a guided tour, see a demo, or start a free trial.

    MIL OSI Economics –

    June 5, 2025
  • Discovery of wartime bombs prompts large-scale evacuation in Cologne, Germany

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Thousands of people were evacuated from central Cologne in western Germany on Wednesday following the discovery of three wartime bombs, in what the city authority called the largest such operation since the end of World War Two.

    An evacuation zone with a radius of 1,000 metres (1,100 yards) was cleared from 8 a.m. (0600 GMT), impacting around 20,500 residents along with many workers and hotel guests in the city’s old town and Deutz district.

    Three American bombs, each with impact fuses, were found during construction work on Monday in Deutz, a bustling area on the bank of the River Rhine.

    Bomb disposal experts plan to disarm the ordnance later on Wednesday.

    Unexploded bombs are often found in Germany, where many major cities sustained heavy damage during the war.

    The evacuation area includes one hospital, two retirement homes, nine schools, and many hotels and museums.

    “Everyone involved hopes that the defusing can be completed in the course of Wednesday. This is only possible if all those affected leave their homes or workplaces early and stay outside the evacuation area from the outset on that day,” the city authority said in a statement.

    The measures caused major transport disruptions in the city of over a million people, with Germany’s national rail operator warning that many trains would be diverted or cancelled.

    A stretch of the Rhine will be blocked off before the bomb disposal operation begins.

    The Rhine, which runs from the Swiss Alps to the North Sea via Cologne, is one of Europe’s key waterways for the transportation of commodities such as grain and coal.

    Private television station RTL, whose main office is located in the evacuation zone, interrupted its morning news programme.

    “We have to leave,” the news anchor said, grabbing his bag as the lights were turned off

    (Reuters)

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Canada: Minister Sidhu meets with United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Business and Trade and President of the Board of Trade Jonathan Reynolds

    Source: Government of Canada News

    June 4, 2025 – Paris, France – Global Affairs Canada

    The Honourable Maninder Sidhu, Minister of International Trade, met with Jonathan Reynolds, the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Business and Trade and President of the Board of Trade, on the margins of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Ministerial Council Meeting in Paris, France.

    Minister Sidhu and Secretary of State Reynolds discussed expanding trade and investment through the Canada-United Kingdom Trade Continuity Agreement. Minister Sidhu highlighted the importance of Canada continuing to work with the United Kingdom through forums such as the G7, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, and with international organizations in support of the rules-based global trading system.

    Minister Sidhu looks forward to continuing working with Secretary of State Reynolds on the Canada-UK trade relationship.

    Associated links

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: IKB Collective Launches exPricer, a Dynamic Pricing Tool for Digital Art Creators

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Nice, France, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The International Klein Blue (IKB) Collective, a global network of techno-artists federated by a community token on the Solana blockchain, today announced the launch of exPricer — an open-source pricing engine designed to transform how digital artworks are valued and sold.

    The IKB Collective introduces exPricer — an open-source pricing system redefining digital art value through scarcity and choice.

    exPricer is a dynamic pricing algorithm and checkout system that enables digital artists to control the scarcity of their works through the pricing choices of their patrons. Buyers are offered the option to pay more for greater exclusivity; in response, fewer (or no more) additional editions are ever to be released. The system includes a pricing API for developers, as well as a ready-made Stripe-powered checkout interface that can be used by artists looking to sell their work online.

    Key Features of exPricer

    • Dynamic Pricing Algorithm – Enables variable pricing based on exclusivity, allowing collectors to pay more for fewer, or even unique, copies of a limited edition.
    • Open-Source & Developer Friendly – Includes an open API for integration with other platforms or marketplaces.
    • Stripe-Powered Checkout Interface – Comes with a ready-to-use web checkout system tailored for the payment of digital media.
    • Support for Multiple Digital File Types – Best suited for images, audio, ZIP files, and other downloadable assets.
    • Using Scarcity to Better Support Artists – Aligns pricing with artistic intent of exclusivity, enabling new economic models in digital art.

    The development of exPricer draws conceptual inspiration from avant-garde movements that have historically challenged traditional notions of ownership and value in art. The system reflects the IKB Collective’s ongoing interest in exploring how scarcity, perception, and pricing can be used as creative tools in the digital realm.

    “exPricer is our way of continuing Yves Klein’s inquiry into how art is valued — not by material or medium, but by perception, context, and choice,” said a member of the IKB collective. “It’s pricing as performance.“

    Though the exPricer checkout interface prices art works in dollars, to ensure immediate applicability and easy-of-use for less tech-savvy artists, the collective is committed to the continued development of the IKB token, the collective’s blockchain-based token. Originally conceived as a decentralized reference to the iconic ultramarine pigment International Klein Blue, the token functions both as a community anchor and governance mechanism, allowing for experiments at the intersection of art and technology.

    The IKB Collective invites digital creators and developers to explore and build upon exPricer through its open-source repository.

    Explore the project on GitHub: https://github.com/ikb-token/exPricer
    Website: https://ikb-token.co

    An example of a ready-to-use checkout page for selling digital art works generated by exPricer

    About IKB token community

    A Solana blockchain community meme token based on the original meme, International Klein Blue, created more than 60 years ago. The decentralized organization was started by an international collective of like-minded techno-artists, brought together by admiration of the deep blue color of International Klein Blue as well as the thought-provoking questions asked by the french artist Yves Klein related to the valuation of modern art, in particular artistic works that are conceptual and immaterial.

    Press inquiries

    IKB token community
    https://ikb-token.co
    IKB token team
    pr@ikb-token.co

    The MIL Network –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: From sovereignty to sustainability: a brief history of ocean governance

    Source: The Conversation – France – By Kevin Parthenay, Professeur des Universités en science politique, membre de l’Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), Université de Tours

    The United Nations Ocean Conference (UNOC 3) will open in Nice, France, on June 9, 2025. It is the third conference of its kind, following events in New York in 2017 and Lisbon in 2022. Co-hosted by France and Costa Rica, the conference will bring together 150 countries and nearly 30,000 individuals to discuss the sustainable management of our planet’s oceans.

    This event is presented as a pivotal moment, but it is actually part of a significant shift in marine governance that has been going on for decades. While ocean governance was once designed to protect the marine interests of states, nowadays it must also address the numerous climate and environmental challenges facing the oceans.

    Media coverage of this “political moment” however should not overshadow the urgent need to reform the international law applicable to the oceans. Failing that, this summit will risk being nothing more than another platform for vacuous rhetoric.

    To understand what is at stake, it is helpful to begin with a brief historical overview of marine governance.

    The meaning of ocean governance

    Ocean governance changed radically over the past few decades. The focus shifted from the interests of states and the corresponding body of international law, solidified in the 1980s, to a multilateral approach initiated at the end of the Cold War, involving a wide range of actors (international organizations, NGOs, businesses, etc.).

    This governance has gradually moved from a system of obligations pertaining to different marine areas and regimes of sovereignty associated to them (territorial seas, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and the high seas) to a system that takes into consideration the “health of the oceans.” The aim of this new system is to manage the oceans in line with the sustainable development goals.

    Understanding how this shift occurred can help us grasp what is at stake in Nice. The 1990s were marked by declarations, summits and other global initiatives. However, as evidenced below, the success of these numerous initiatives has so far been limited. This explains why we are now seeing a return to an approach more firmly rooted in international law, as evidenced by the negotiations on the international treaty on plastic pollution, for example.

    The “Constitution of the Seas”

    The law of the sea emerged from the Hague Conference in 1930. However, the structure of marine governance gradually came to be defined in the 1980s, with the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982.

    UNOC 3 is a direct offshoot of this convention: discussions on sustainable ocean management stem from the limitations of this founding text, often referred to as the “Constitution of the Seas”.

    UNCLOS was adopted in December 1982 at the Montego Bay Convention in Jamaica and came into force in November 1994, following a lengthy process of international negotiations that resulted in 60 states ratifying the text. At the outset, the discussions focused on the interests of developing countries, especially those located along the coast, in the midst of a crisis in multilateralism. The United States managed to exert its influence in this arena without ever officially adopting the Convention. Since then, the convention has been a pillar of marine governance.

    It established new institutions, including the International Seabed Authority, entrusted with the responsibility of regulating the exploitation of mineral resources on the seabed in areas that fall outside the scope of national jurisdiction. UNCLOS is the source of nearly all international case law on the subject.

    Although the convention did define maritime areas and regulate their exploitation, new challenges quickly emerged: on the one hand, the Convention was essentially rendered meaningless by the eleven-year delay between its adoption and implementation. On the other hand, the text also became obsolete due to new developments in the use of the seas, particularly technological advances in fishing and seabed exploitation.

    The early 1990s marked a turning point in the traditional maritime legal order. The management of the seas and oceans came to be viewed within an environmental perspective, a process that was driven by major international conferences and declarations such as the Rio Declaration (1992), the Millennium Declaration (2005), and the Rio+20 Summit (2012). These resulted in the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the UN’s 17 goals aimed at protecting the planet (with SDG 14, “Life Below Water”, directly addressing issues related to the oceans) and the world’s population by 2030.



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    The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, or Earth Summit), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, ushered in the era of “sustainable development” and, thanks to scientific discoveries made in the previous decade, helped link environmental and maritime issues.

    From 2008 to 2015, environmental issues became more important as evidenced by the regular adoption of environmental and climate resolutions.

    A shift in UN language

    Biodiversity and the sustainable use of the oceans (SDG 14) are the two core themes that became recurring topics in the international agenda since 2015, with ocean-related issues now including items like acidification, plastic pollution and the decline of marine biodiversity.

    The United Nations General Assembly resolution on oceans and the law of the seas (LOS is a particularly useful tool to acknowledge this evolution: drafted annually since 1984, the resolution has covered all aspects of the United Nations maritime regime while reflecting new issues and concerns.

    Some environmental terms were initially absent from the text but have become more prevalent since the 2000s.

    This evolution is also reflected in the choice of words.

    While LOS resolutions from 1984 to 1995 focused mainly on the implementation of the treaty and the economic exploitation of marine resources, more recent resolutions have used terms related to sustainability, ecosystems, and maritime issues.

    Toward a new law of the oceans?

    As awareness of the issues surrounding the oceans and their link to climate change has grown, the oceans gradually became a global “final frontier” in terms of knowledge.

    The types of stakeholders involved in ocean issues have also changed. The expansion of the ocean agenda has been driven by a more “environmentalist” orientation, with scientific communities and environmental NGOs standing at the forefront of this battle. This approach, which represents a shift away from a monopoly held by international law and legal practitioners, clearly is a positive development.

    However, marine governance has so far relied mainly on non-binding declaratory measures (such as the SDGs) and remains ineffective. A cycle of legal consolidation toward a “new law of the oceans” therefore appears to be underway and the challenge is now to supplement international maritime law with a new set of measures. These include:

    • the adoption of the Agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (known as the BBNJ Agreement) aiming to protect marine resources in the high seas;

    • the negotiation of a treaty on marine plastic pollution, still in progress and not finalized yet;

    • the agreement on fisheries subsidies adopted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to preserve fish stocks, which so far has failed to be fully implemented;

    • lastly, the Seabed Authority’s Mining Code, designed to regulate seabed mining.

    Of these agreements, the BBNJ is arguably the most ambitious: since 2004, negotiators have been working toward filling the gaps of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by creating an instrument on marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.

    The agreement addresses two major concerns for states: sovereignty and the equitable distribution of resources.

    Adopted in 2023, this historic agreement has yet to enter into force. For this to happen, sixty ratifications are required and to date, only 29 states have ratified the treaty (including France in February 2025, editor’s note).

    The BBNJ process is therefore at a crossroads and the priority today is not to make new commitments or waste time on complicated high-level declarations, but to address concrete and urgent issues of ocean management, such as the frantic quest for critical minerals launched in the context of the Sino-American rivalry, and exemplified by Donald Trump’s signing of a presidential decree in April 2025 allowing seabed mining – a decision that violates the International Seabed Authority’s well established rules on the exploitation of these deep-sea resources.

    At a time when U.S. unilateralism is leading to a policy of fait accompli, the UNOC 3 should, more than anything and within the framework of multilateralism, consolidate the existing obligations regarding the protection and sustainability of the oceans.

    Kevin Parthenay is a member of the Institut Universitaire de France (IUF).

    Rafael Mesquita ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

    – ref. From sovereignty to sustainability: a brief history of ocean governance – https://theconversation.com/from-sovereignty-to-sustainability-a-brief-history-of-ocean-governance-258200

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 5, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Banking: Kevin Greenidge: Strong regulation is the foundation for financial stability

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Distinguished representatives from the Association of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas (ASBA), esteemed participants from regional supervisory authorities, valued colleagues from the Central Bank of Barbados, good morning.

    It is a pleasure for the Central Bank of Barbados to host this Bank Analysis and Examination Course in collaboration with ASBA.  And I am delighted to chat with such a highly experienced group of professionals, all committed to enhancing our collective expertise in bank supervision with a shared goal of preserving financial stability across our respective jurisdictions.

    I thank ASBA for its invaluable support and dedication in organising this training. And I commend your continued commitment to strengthening financial supervision. This training ensures that the knowledge and skills of our member jurisdictions remain relevant, dynamic, and world-class. Your contributions align with our common objective as regulators to foster a stable and sustainable financial sector. I am confident that I echo the sentiments of many in expressing our deep appreciation for this enduring partnership and the opportunities it provides.

    ASBA’s work has helped us maintain international excellence in our regulatory standards. As an associate member for over 20 years, the Central Bank of Barbados has actively engaged in ASBA’s initiatives such as training programmes, policy discussions, and knowledge sharing, all aimed at enhancing regulation and supervision across the Americas, the Caribbean, and Spain.

    In 2002 and 2011, the Central Bank of Barbados proudly hosted Bank Analysis and Examination courses, as well as a course on Consolidated Supervision in 2014, amongst others. Over the years, our officers have also participated in a range of training courses. This continued engagement has enabled our supervisory teams to sharpen their skills and ensure that our risk-based supervision techniques remain aligned with the evolving financial landscape.

    Regulation in Barbados

    Strong regulation is the foundation for financial stability. It provides the framework through which supervisory authorities can identify, assess, and contain the risks facing the financial sector. This stability is essential to ensuring that institutions continue to provide the financial services that underpin economic activity.

    As the principal financial regulator in Barbados, the Central Bank plays a central role in upholding financial stability. The Bank Supervision Department was established in 1974 in accordance with the statutory mandate given by the Central Bank Act to supervise the operations of commercial banks and other financial institutions. The department seeks to ensure that licensed institutions function in a safe and sound manner, and in so doing to contribute to a sound economic and financial environment. We’ve built our regulatory approach on a solid foundation of legislation, supervisory frameworks, and guidelines, which are supported by a diverse and capable team that is further strengthened by developmental opportunities such as this course. 

    Risk-Based Supervision

    We’ve grounded our supervisory practices in the principles established by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. These core principles inform our Risk-Based Supervision (RBS) approach – a methodology that evaluates financial institutions based on the key inherent risks within their activities, and the quality of their risk management in response to those threats. Risk-based supervision enables us to prioritise our resources effectively by focusing on the areas that matter most.

    Purpose of the Course

    Foundational training such as this is critical, especially since bank examination is a multifaceted and dynamic discipline that demands strong analytical grounding, sound judgement and the ability to adapt with the evolving risk landscape. This course aligns seamlessly with the core principles of bank supervision, which emphasises the need for forward-looking risk-based supervision, robust supervisory frameworks and continuous capacity building. These principles are refined from time to time to accommodate emerging risks and ultimately strengthening supervisory effectiveness. 

    We welcome the timely and essential integration of key financial assessment characteristics into this training, specifically through ASBA’s CAMELS rating system – a proven benchmark for evaluating the health and stability of financial institutions.

    It will equip participants with tools and techniques to conduct in-depth analyses of financial institutions, identify vulnerabilities, and assess their resilience leading to stronger and more informed supervisory decisions. 

    I note that the administration of the course will be two-fold consisting of a theoretical foundation followed by a practical simulation of a bank inspection to reinforce the concepts through real-world application. 

    Concluding Remarks

    Over the coming days, you will explore the methodology behind the CAMELS framework as applied by the U.S. Federal Reserve. The insights gained will serve to enhance your ability to conduct risk-based assessments, contributing to more prudent and forward-looking supervisory practices.

    I encourage all participants to actively engage in the discussions, share experiences, and make full use of the expertise in the room. Your dedication to strengthening financial oversight is critical to the continued resilience of our financial systems.

    Thank you once again to ASBA, our organisers, and to each of you for your commitment and participation. I wish you all a productive and rewarding training experience.

    MIL OSI Global Banks –

    June 5, 2025
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