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Category: Eurozone

  • MIL-OSI Global: How ongoing deforestation is rooted in colonialism and its management practices

    Source: The Conversation – France – By Justine Loizeau, Postdoctoral research fellow in sustainability and organization, Aalto University

    As early as 1917, the Michelin company invested in plantations to produce rubber in what is now Vietnam. Here, hevea trees are seen in Southeast Asia in 1913. W. F. de Bois Maclaren, The Rubber Tree Book.

    Half of the world’s forests were destroyed during the 20th century, with three regions mainly affected: South America, West Africa and Southeast Asia. The situation has worsened to the point that, in 2023, the European Parliament voted to ban the import of chocolate, coffee, palm oil and rubber linked to deforestation.


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    A long-standing dependence on raw materials

    These products are at the heart of our economies and consumption habits. The case of rubber is particularly emblematic. Without this material, there would be no tyres and, thus, no cars, bicycles, sealing joints or submarine communication cables. Industrial rubber production depends on extracting latex, a natural substance that rubber trees such as hevea produce. Under pressure from corporations and states, Brussels last October announced a one-year postponement of its law regulating rubber imports.

    This dependence on the rubber industry is not new. Rubber was central to the second industrial revolution, especially with the rise of automobiles and new management methods. While this history often centres on factories, citing contributions from figures such as Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford and industrial giants like Michelin, its colonial roots are less well known.

    Indeed, rubber – like the other resources mentioned above – has been and continues to be primarily produced in former colonial territories. In many cases, rubber trees are not native to the regions where they have been cultivated. Rubber seeds from South America, where latex was already extracted by picking, were transported by colonists to empires for the development of plantations. In particular, the French colonial empire, spanning Africa and Southeast Asia, saw a significant expansion of hevea plantations at the expense of primary forests. Monocultures of rubber trees replaced thousands of hectares.

    Ford in the Amazon, Michelin in present-day Vietnam

    This management model was favoured because it allowed for lower extraction costs from the coloniser’s perspective. For example, in 1928, Henry Ford negotiated an agreement with the Brazilian government granting him a 10,000 km2 concession of forest land to establish Fordlandia, a settlement designed to produce the rubber needed for his factories. However, this industrial utopia in the Amazon failed due to resistance from Indigenous people and a fungal disease that ruined the plantations.

    Business Insider reports on the Fordlandia fiasco.

    Following the same model, Michelin invested in plantations in present-day Vietnam as early as 1917. The plantation model and new management methods reduced the cost of rubber production and accelerated its global distribution. These management practices spread across the British, Dutch and French empires, becoming dominant in Southeast Asia in the early 20th century at the expense of primary forests.



    À lire aussi :
    Allowing forests to regrow and regenerate is a great way to restore habitat

    The ‘Taylorization’ of work and nature

    Rubber plantations resulted from applying Taylorism not only to workers – especially colonised workers – but also to nature. Both people and trees were subjected to a so-called “scientific” organisation of labour. In our article, L’arbre qui gâche la forêt The Tree That Spoils the Forest, published in the Revue française de gestion (French Journal of Management) in 2024, we analysed historical archives, including a variety of newspapers from 1900 to 1950, covering national, local, colonial and thematic (scientific, cultural, etc.) perspectives. We show that this organisational model is based on an accounting undervaluation of indigenous people’s labour and of nature. This undervaluation is embodied in the metric of the cost price (i.e. the total cost of production and distribution) and in the shared concern to see it lowered. “Ultimately, it’s the cost price that must determine the fate of rubber,” stated the newspaper L’Information financière, économique et politique on February 1, 1914.

    In the eyes of some, Asians who were labelled as “coolies” and Brazilian “seringueiros” comprised a low-cost labour pool, with no mention of their working conditions and despite very high mortality rates. “Coolie” is a derogatory colonial term that refers to agricultural labourers of Asian heritage, while “seringueiros” refers to workers in South American rubber plantations.

    “By the way, in the Far East, there are reservoirs of labour (Java Island, English Indies), which supply plantations with workers who, while not the most robust, provide regular work at a very advantageous cost price.” (L’Information financière, économique et politique, November 11, 1922)

    Concerning trees, only the plantation costs were considered, silencing the human and ecological costs of primary forest destruction.

    “In the first year, some 237 francs will have to be spent on the clearing itself; then the planting, with staking […] and weeding, will represent an expense of 356 francs. […] For the following years, all that remains to be done is to consider the maintenance costs, cleaning, pruning, care, supply of stakes, replacement, etc. This will result in an expenditure of 1,250 francs for the first five years.” (L’Information financière, économique et politique, January 31, 1912)

    The ‘Cheapization’ of life

    The focus on cost price leads to standardisation of management practices by aligning with what is cheapest, at the expense of ever more intense exploitation of human and non-human workers. In other words, these assumptions about the construction of accounting metrics and the circulation of these metrics play a role in the “cheapization” of human and non-human labour. We borrow the concept of “cheapization” from the environmental historian Jason W. Moore. In his view, the development of capitalism is marked by a “cheapization of Nature”, which includes, within the circuits of capitalist production and consumption, humans and non-humans whose work does not initially have a market value. Living beings are thus transformed into a commodity or factor of production: “animals, soils, forests and all kinds of extra-human nature” are being put to work.



    À lire aussi :
    What actually makes avocados bad for the environment?

    Why does this colonial past matter?

    These ways of managing people and nature continue to this day. Many industries still rely on the extraction of natural resources at low cost and in large quantities in the countries of the global south. Rubber is not the only resource whose exploitation dates to the Industrial Revolution: palm oil, sugar, coffee and cocoa have also had, and still have, an impact on the forests of the global south and are based on the work of local people. The exploitation of these resources is also often the fruit of colonial history. In 1911, the Frenchman Henri Fauconnier brought the first palm oil seeds, a plant originally from Africa, to Malaysia. More than a century later, the country remains a leading palm oil producer, a resource largely responsible for the deforestation of primary forests.

    Beyond the case of rubber alone, we question the link between the pursuit of profit in formerly colonised territories, the destruction of the environment and the exploitation of local populations on two levels. Not only are primary forests destroyed to feed short-term profits, but habituation to this mode of environmental management is a historical construct. We must remember this when looking at news from countries with colonial pasts. Whether we’re talking about preserving the Amazon rainforest, poisoning soil and human bodies with chlordecone in the Antilles, or building a pipeline in Uganda, we need to take a step back. What are the historical responsibilities? What are the links between creating economic activities here and exploiting ecosystems and local populations there? What role do management theories and tools play in realising or reproducing these exploitative situations?

    At a time when the ecological and social emergency is constantly invoked to call for the transformation of management practices and business models, the rubber example invites us to consider the colonial matrix of managerial practices and the Western historical responsibilities that led to this same emergency. And suppose we have to turn to other forms of management tomorrow: who may legitimately decide how to bring about this change? Are former colonisers best placed to define the way forward? Knowledge of colonial history should encourage us to recognise the value of the knowledge and practices of those who were and remain the first to be affected.

    The COCOLE project is supported by the French National Research Agency (ANR), which funds project-based research in France. The ANR’s mission is to support and promote the development of fundamental and applied research in all disciplines, and to strengthen dialogue between science and society. To find out more, visit the ANR website.

    Antoine Fabre has received funding from the French National Research Agency
    via the programme “Counting in a colonial situation. French Africa (1830-1962)” (ANR-21-CE41-0012, 2021-2026).

    Pierre Labardin is a professor at La Rochelle University. He has received funding from the French National Research Agency via the programme “Counting in a colonial situation. French Africa (1830-1962)” (ANR-21-CE41-0012, 2021-2026).

    Clément Boyer et Justine Loizeau ne travaillent pas, ne conseillent pas, ne possèdent pas de parts, ne reçoivent pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’ont déclaré aucune autre affiliation que leur poste universitaire.

    – ref. How ongoing deforestation is rooted in colonialism and its management practices – https://theconversation.com/how-ongoing-deforestation-is-rooted-in-colonialism-and-its-management-practices-257578

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI: FRO – Grant of synthetic options

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Frontline plc (“Frontline” or the “Company”) hereby announces that 362,284 synthetic options have today been granted to management and employees of the Company. The synthetic options will have a five-year term expiring May 27, 2030, and will vest over a three-year vesting period as follows:

    • 1/3 of the synthetic options will vest on May 27, 2026
    • 1/3 of the synthetic options will vest on May 27, 2027
    • 1/3 of the synthetic options will vest on May 27, 2028

    The  exercise price of the synthetic options  is USD 16.8 being the volume-weighted average price of the share the last 30 days prior to grant. The exercise price will further be adjusted for any distribution of dividends made before the relevant synthetic options are exercised. The synthetic options granted to the CEO and the CFO are subject to a cap on maximum annual gain equal to two times the annual base salary at the time of exercise of the synthetic options.

    The synthetic options will be settled in cash based on the difference between the market price of the Company’s shares and the exercise price on the date of exercise.

    The synthetic options have been granted according to the rules of the Company’s synthetic option scheme approved by the Board of Directors of the Company. Please see the attached forms of notification of transactions by primary insiders for the synthetic options.

    May 27, 2025

    The Board of Directors
    Frontline plc
    Limassol, Cyprus

    This notification has been publicly disclosed in accordance with Article 19 of the Market Abuse Regulation and section 5-12 of the Norwegian Securities Trading Act.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Australia could tax Google, Facebook and other tech giants with a digital services tax – but don’t hold your breath

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Fei Gao, Lecturer in Taxation, Discipline of Accounting, Governance & Regulation, The University of Sydney, University of Sydney

    Tada Images/Shutterstock

    Tech giants like Google, Facebook and Netflix make billions of dollars from Australian users every year. But most of those profits are not taxed here.

    To address this tax gap, some countries have introduced a new kind of tax called the digital services tax, or DST. It applies to revenue earned from users in a country, even if the company has no physical operations there. Some European Union member countries, the UK and Canada have all introduced such a tax.

    In Australia, it is estimated the five largest tech giants recorded A$15 billion in revenue in Australia last year, but combined they paid only $254 million in tax.

    Australia has never contemplated imposing a similar tax. New Zealand tried but backed down last week after the United States threatened to impose higher tariffs on New Zealand goods.

    So what’s holding Australia back?

    How 20th-century tax treaties create 21st-century problems

    To understand why Australia thinks its hands are tied on the taxation of the multinational tech giants, we need to step back in time.

    About 100 years ago, Australia and other developed nations decided to tax residents on all their income earned worldwide, while non-residents were taxed only on income earned locally.

    After the second world war, Australia entered into tax treaties so foreign companies selling to Australian customers would no longer be taxed here. Instead, those companies’ home countries would tax all their profits.

    As the world moved to digital products this century, it became easy for giant multinational enterprises offering advertising on social media (such as Facebook and Instagram), advertising on search platforms (Google), and streaming services (Netflix) to provide those services from abroad. Little or no activity is conducted through local branches.

    But countries where the sales are made have increasingly questioned the wisdom of having forfeited their taxing rights over income by foreign providers.

    The rise of the digital services tax

    The obvious solution would have been to renegotiate the treaties. This would restore the right of countries like Australia to tax foreign companies’ profits made from local customers or users.

    However, treaty renegotiation is slow and complex. So several European countries, beginning with France in 2019, came up with a short-cut solution.

    They introduced a discrete new tax on sales of digital services, called digital services taxes (DSTs). While the specific design varies by country, most DSTs apply a low tax rate, typically between 3% and 5%, on revenue rather than profits. They target large digital platforms that earn money from users within the taxing country, regardless of the company’s location.

    Because DSTs are levied on revenue and are structured as separate from income tax, governments argued they could be introduced without breaching income tax treaties.

    The new taxes quickly became popular and spread widely.
    In Australia, the Greens have called for a DST, but both major parties have remained steadfast in their objection to a new tax. This is due to the concern that the US may impose retaliatory tariffs on Australian goods.

    US tech bosses at the inauguration of President Trump: (from left to right) CEO of Meta Mark Zuckerberg, Lauren Sanchez, Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, CEO of Google Sundar Pichai and X CEO Elon Musk.
    Julia Demaree Nikhinson/AFP

    How big is the tax loss?

    Australians are enthusiastic consumers of digital products. Depending on which companies are included in the calculation, the annual revenues vary between $15 billion and $26 billion a year, but only a fraction of that is taxed here.

    At a time when the federal budget is forecasting deficits for the foreseeable future, Australia is foregoing potentially millions in lost revenue from these digital giants.

    While Australia has avoided a DST as a solution to the income tax loss, it has been willing to regulate and tax foreign digital companies in other ways.
    Australia collects 10% goods and services tax, or GST, on digital services provided to Australian companies, including streaming platforms and app subscriptions.

    This helps ensure foreign providers are taxed similarly to domestic ones when it comes to the GST.

    Australia has also imposed non-tax obligations on digital giants such as the requirement that digital platforms pay Australian media outlets for using their news content.



    Read more:
    Australia’s ‘coercive’ news media rules are the latest targets of US trade ire

    Serious hurdles for reform

    In February, the Trump administration described DSTs as tools used by foreign governments to “plunder American companies” and warned retaliatory tariffs would be imposed in response.

    The accompanying White House fact sheet singled out Australia and Canada, arguing the US digital economy dwarfs those countries’ entire economies. It suggested any attempt to tax US tech companies would not go unanswered.

    Six weeks later, the US imposed a 10% tariff on most Australian exports to the US and a 25% tariff on steel and aluminium exports.

    The US sees its penal tariff plans as a useful negotiating tool to pressure trading partners into retreat on a broad range of peripheral complaints, including the digital services tax.

    To date, only two countries have retreated: New Zealand and India. Other countries are standing firm.

    In Australia, the Greens have called for the adoption of a DST, but the current and previous governments remain firm in their opposition. There is concern about antagonising the US at a delicate time when our broader trade relations are under scrutiny.

    For the foreseeable future, the digital giants will continue to earn billions from Australian users. Most of those profits will remain beyond the reach of Australian tax law.

    Richard Krever receives funding from the ARC

    Fei Gao does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Australia could tax Google, Facebook and other tech giants with a digital services tax – but don’t hold your breath – https://theconversation.com/australia-could-tax-google-facebook-and-other-tech-giants-with-a-digital-services-tax-but-dont-hold-your-breath-257251

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI: UAB “Atsinaujinančios energetikos investicijos” Starts Exchange And Cash Tender Offer For Notes ISIN LT0000405938

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NOT FOR PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION OR RELEASE, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN OR INTO THE UNITED STATES (INCLUDING ITS TERRITORIES AND POSSESSIONS, ANY STATE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA), CANADA, AUSTRALIA, SOUTH AFRICA OR JAPAN, OR ANY OTHER JURISDICTION IN WHICH PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION OR RELEASE WOULD BE UNLAWFUL. OTHER RESTRICTIONS ARE APPLICABLE. PLEASE SEE THE IMPORTANT NOTICE IN THIS STOCK EXCHANGE RELEASE BELOW.

    • Under the Exchange offer, the Noteholders of Notes ISIN LT0000405938 (EUR 2021/2025 Notes) may exchange the EUR 2021/2025 Notes to new senior unsecured Notes ISIN LT0000134439 (EUR 2025/2027 Notes) to be issued at an exchange ratio of 1 to 1. These EUR 2025/2027 Notes will carry an annual interest rate of 8.0% and be issued under Final Terms and Base Prospectus approved on 27 May 2025.
    • Investors participating in the Exchange offer will receive unpaid accrued interest in cash from 14 December 2024 until 13 June 2025 (including) to be paid on 16 June 2025.
    • Under Cash Tender offer the Noteholders of EUR 2021/2025 Notes may receive a cash payment of 99 per cent of Denomination per each EUR 2021/2025 Note tendered on 13 June 2025, plus unpaid accrued interest in cash from 14 December 2024 until 13 June 2025 (including) to be paid on 16 June 2025.
    • The Exchange offer period for Noteholders of EUR 2021/2025 Notes will run from 28 May 2025 to 11 June 2025, 2:30 pm CEST/3:30 pm Vilnius time.
    • Cash Tender offer period for Noteholders of EUR 2021/2025 Notes will run from 28 May 2025 to 12 June 2025, 2:30 pm CEST/3:30 pm Vilnius time.

    Closed – End Investment Company Intended for Informed Investors UAB “Atsinaujinančios energetikos investicijos” has launched its public offering of EUR 2025/2027 Notes and an offer to exchange its EUR 2021/2025 Notes for new EUR 2025/2027 Notes, or alternatively, to tender the EUR 2021/2025 Notes (Denomination of EUR 100,000 and integral multiples of EUR 1,000) for a cash payment of EUR 99.00 per Denomination. The objective is to refinance the EUR 2021/2025 Notes and issue new EUR 2025/2027 Notes in an amount up to EUR 65 million.
    Manager of Closed – End Investment Company Intended for Informed Investors UAB “Atsinaujinančios energetikos investicijos”: “With the exchange offer, we are offering existing EUR 2021/2025 Notes investors a possibility to conveniently switch their investment maturing on December 2025 to the newly issued debt securities. As to the cash offer, since after the sale of Polish PV portfolio at the end of 2024 the company has collected excess cash proceeds, it was decided to provide an additional liquidity opportunity for existing investors to tender their notes to the Issuer. The company has allocated up to EUR 10 million for the tender offer which can be increased up to EUR 30 million subject to demand of new EUR 2025/2027 Notes.”
    Closed – End Investment Company Intended for Informed Investors UAB “Atsinaujinančios energetikos investicijos” has appointed FMĮ UAB Orion Securities to act as the Lead Manager to UAB “Atsinaujinančios energetikos investicijos” in Exchange and Cash Tender offer for EUR 2021/2025 Notes.

    EXCHANGE AND CASH OFFER
    Noteholders of the EUR 2021/2025 Notes (ISIN LT0000405938) are invited to:

    • Exchange their existing EUR 2021/2025 Notes (ISIN LT0000405938) at a 1:1 ratio for new senior unsecured EUR 2025/2027 Notes (ISIN LT0000134439) with a denomination of EUR 100,000 and integral multiples of EUR 1,000, carrying an annual interest rate of 8.0% to be issued under Final Terms and Base Prospectus approved on 27 May 2025.
    • In case there is an oversubscription of EUR 2025/2027 Notes the investors shall be satisfied and the number of EUR 2025/2027 Notes to be allocated to each investor shall be determined upon the discretion of the Issuer.

    Alternatively, the Noteholders of the EUR 2021/2025 Notes (ISIN LT0000405938) may:

    • Tender their existing EUR 2021/2025 Notes (ISIN LT0000405938) for cash payment of 99 per cent of Denomination per each EUR 2021/2025 Note tendered to be paid on 13 June 2025, plus accrued and unpaid interest from 14 December 2024 until 13 June 2025 (including) to be paid on 16 June 2025.
    • Cash offer is of minimum EUR 10 million; cash offer maximum amount of EUR 30 million is subject to demand of new EUR 2025/2027 Notes.

    The existing EUR 2021/2025 Notes not exchanged or tendered will remain outstanding and be redeemed at maturity.

    INFORMATION ON OFFERING PROCESS
    All noteholders will be notified of the offer through their depository banks. Upon instructing their custodian to participate—either by exchanging notes or tendering for cash—the respective EUR 2021/2025 Notes will be restricted from trading. Notes not instructed for participation will remain freely tradable.
    Exchange Offer Period: 28 May 2025 – 11 June 2025, closing at 2:30 pm CEST / 3:30 pm Vilnius time.
    Results Announcement: On or around 13 June 2025.

    NEW EUR 2025/2027 NOTES

    Closed – End Investment Company Intended for Informed Investors UAB “Atsinaujinančios energetikos investicijos” intends to issue new EUR 2025/2027 Notes in an amount of EUR 65 million with the following features:

    • Interest rate of 8.0% per annum.
    • Maturity of 2,5 years.
    • Terms and conditions: Final Terms and Base Prospectus. Documents are available at: https://lordslb.lt/AEI_green_bonds_2025/.
    • Listing on Nasdaq Vilnius Stock Exchange (Regulated Market).
    • Distribution period: from 28 May 2025 to 11 June 2025, 2:30 pm CEST/3:30 pm Vilnius time.

    INVESTOR PRESENTATIONS
    Manager of Closed – End Investment Company Intended for Informed Investors UAB “Atsinaujinančios energetikos investicijos” Mantas Auruškevičius will present the offer via webcast/conference call:

    • English-language session: 4 June 2025 at 13:00 CEST / 14:00 Vilnius time. Please register in advance to attend:

    https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_d32cZE8xSqyFs8tcMpwLqA#/registration

    • Lithuanian-language session: 5 June 2025 at 9:00 CEST / 10:00 Vilnius time. Please register in advance to attend:

    https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_wxUoUAWzQ9244uO9HlNX-g#/registration

    CONTACT INFORMATION

    For questions about the Exchange offer, please contact Orion Securities via email: corporateaction@orion.lt, phone: +37068758168.
    Further details and required documents are available at: https://lordslb.lt/AEI_green_bonds_2025/

    IMPORTANT INFORMATION
    The information contained herein is not for release, publication or distribution, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, in or into the United States of America, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa or any other countries or otherwise in such circumstances in which the release, publication or distribution would be unlawful. The information contained herein does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy, nor shall there be any sale of, the notes in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration, exemption from registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such jurisdiction. Persons into whose possession this announcement may come are required to inform themselves of and observe all such restrictions.
    This announcement does not constitute an offer of securities for sale in the United States of America. The notes have not been and will not be registered under the United States Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”) or under the applicable securities laws of any state of the United States of America and may not be offered or sold, directly or indirectly, within the United States of America or to, or for the account or benefit of, U.S. persons (as defined under Regulation S under the Securities Act) except pursuant to an applicable exemption from, or in a transaction not subject to, the registration requirements of the Securities Act.
    This announcement does not constitute an offer of notes to the public in the United Kingdom. No prospectus has been or will be approved in the United Kingdom in respect of the notes. Accordingly, this announcement is not being distributed to, and must not be passed on to, the general public in the United Kingdom. The communication of this announcement as a financial promotion may only be distributed to and is only directed at (i) persons who are outside the United Kingdom or (ii) investment professionals falling within Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the “Order”) or (iii) high net worth companies, and other persons to whom it may lawfully be communicated, falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) of the Order (all such persons in (i), (ii) and (iii) above together being referred to as “Relevant Persons”). Any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such securities will be engaged in only with, Relevant Persons. Any person who is not a Relevant Person should not act or rely on this announcement or any of its contents.

    Mantas Auruškevičius
    Manager of Closed – End Investment Company Intended for Informed Investors
    UAB “Atsinaujinančios energetikos investicijos”
    mantas.auruskevicius@lordslb.lt

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Philip R. Lane: Interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

    Source: European Central Bank

    Interview with Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, conducted by Christian Siedenbiedel on 20 May 2025

    27 May 2025

    Mr Lane, inflation rates in the euro area have fallen sharply since autumn 2022. Has inflation been beaten?

    As you say, inflation rates were temporarily above 10 per cent in 2022. Over the past two years, we have focused on bringing inflation back down to 2 per cent. This task has now mostly been completed. I am saying “mostly” because some final steps still need to be taken. For example, services inflation is still too high. But we expect it to decline in the coming months, as we think wage inflation is coming down. So the disinflation from the high inflation of 2022 is on track – but unfortunately new challenges are emerging.

    Over what time frame are you expecting the inflation rate to sustainably meet the ECB’s 2 per cent target?

    Recently, the inflation rate in the euro area stood at 2.2 per cent, which isn’t so far from our 2 per cent target. I believe that the inflation rate will remain in a zone close to 2 per cent in the coming months. But part of your question is about whether this will be on a sustained basis. And this is where we have to work out whether new challenges, in particular those to do with trade policy, could cause an inflation issue in either direction.

    Many people have the feeling that they are noticing inflation much more in the supermarket. What do you say to them?

    It is not unfounded. Food inflation remains well above 2 per cent – currently around 3 per cent. For unprocessed food, for example fruit and vegetables, it is even close to 5 per cent. So this perception is correct: “supermarket inflation” is higher than the general inflation rate. But this is offset by other developments, such as energy prices. Goods price inflation is also below the current headline inflation rate.

    How much is the reduction in inflation really down to the ECB – and to what extent is it simply a consequence of the sharp rise and subsequent fall in energy prices?

    This time is different from the 1970s. At that time, many central banks didn’t manage to convince people that inflation would fall again – although the Bundesbank did better than others. People expected inflation to remain high. This time around we made it clear that the ECB would deliver on price stability. Through our monetary policy, we have prevented double-digit inflation from getting entrenched. So we played our part and ensured that this period of high inflation remained temporary. Due to our intervention, fluctuations in energy prices have not led to a permanent surge in inflation.

    What impact do you expect Donald Trump’s tariffs to have on inflation in the euro area?

    This has been the subject of intense debate since the election in November. Several factors play a role: first, the exchange rate between the US dollar and the euro. Many expected that tariffs would weaken the euro. So far, however, the opposite has occurred. Second, the tariffs have an impact on global economic growth; the slowdown has pushed down oil and gas prices, and this was not in the initial discussion but is proving important. And third, with respect to trade between the United States and China, China is likely to export less to the United States and more to Europe. So there are a number of factors that could lead to lower inflation in the euro area. But we also have to keep in mind that we don’t know the outcome of the negotiations between the EU and the United States.

    At this point, is it possible to predict what’s ultimately going to happen?

    The outcome is still quite open at the moment. For the time being, there are some factors that tend to support a drop in euro area inflation. However, the picture could shift if, for example, the negotiations between the EU and the United States fail, with the United States imposing higher tariffs and the EU implementing counter tariffs. Supply chains could also be disrupted – this could drive up inflation.

    Are there differences between short-term and long-term effects?

    I would actually distinguish between three time horizons: short term, medium term and long term. In the coming months, in other words for the remainder of 2025, the inflation rate is expected to be close to target. Over the medium term, the impact of US tariffs on inflation could materialise, including through the exchange rate and energy prices. Looking further ahead to the long term, analysts and financial markets are reasonably confident that inflation will return to the ECB’s target. The main focus of the ECB’s monetary policy is on the medium-term horizon: that is to say, one or two years ahead.

    Is there any reason to be concerned that people’s inflation expectations could rise more quickly again because the experience of very high inflation is still so recent?

    As a directional statement, I agree. Before the pandemic, many were convinced inflation would stay very low. The high inflation episode was a painful reminder that inflation can arise. But such a combination of extraordinary events – the pandemic, Russia’s war in Ukraine – is very rare. The more concrete question for us is: could a world of shocks relating to structural changes – arising from challenges to globalisation, increased automation, changing demography – push inflation noticeably below or above 2 per cent, and how responsive will inflation expectations be? Part of our job will be to make sure expectations remain anchored, that people have the reassurance that if inflation moves away from 2 per cent we will bring it back.

    What impact do the current labour shortages and low unemployment have on inflation?

    There is certainly a difference compared with the pre-pandemic period. That’s why I don’t think we will return to inflation rates that are as low as they were back then. When unemployment is low, firms and employees are more likely to settle on wage increases – perhaps around 3 per cent on average in the euro area. This is a normalisation and, allowing for rising labour productivity, makes our 2 per cent target more credible. But I do not see any signs of a wage-price spiral at present, and this also applies to Germany.

    In Belgium, wages are, in part, directly bound to inflation. Has that added to inflation there?

    During the period of high inflation, wages rose rapidly in Belgium but, as inflation fell, wage growth slowed down quickly again. In Germany, there was a different pattern: it took longer for wages to go up. But there is no major difference when looking at the average over three to five years.

    Do you think it is possible that the new protectionism will lead to deglobalisation in the longer term, resulting in structurally higher inflation rates?

    It is important to differentiate between temporary and permanent effects. For many firms the business model is connected to globalisation. A phase of deglobalisation could initially dampen economic growth, which would make it more likely that inflation rates would fall. Following that transition, inflation and its volatility could increase as the offsetting effect of favourable imports fades. It could mean that, as a central bank, we have to be more active in our policy responses to return inflation to 2 per cent over the medium term.

    The Federal Reserve fears that US tariffs could lead to transitory, i.e. temporary, inflation. Would it leave inflation in the euro area unaffected if US rates rise?

    The world needs the Federal Reserve to maintain price stability for the United States. If this means high US interest rates, it can lead to a stronger dollar and thereby somewhat higher inflation for Europe in the short term. In the medium term, however, high US interest rates mostly hold back the global economy – which tends to lead to lower inflation in the euro area. There are always some spillover effects.

    What does all this mean for the ECB’s interest rate policy?

    We need to find a middle path. If we keep interest rates too high for too long, the disinflation pressure of US tariffs could cause inflation rates to fall below our target. If we cut too much and too quickly, a strengthening economy and other factors could drive inflation back up. This is why we will pay close attention to the data in our next meetings. If we see signs of further falling inflation, we will respond with further interest rate cuts – but the range of discussion is not that wide: no one is talking about dramatic rate cuts. We are in a zone of normal central banking.

    Are the key ECB interest rates now in the neutral range?

    The neutral interest rate can only be estimated and it is a long-term concept. In the long term, the neutral interest rate could be around where we are now. But the world is not in equilibrium and the appropriate interest rate may be different in the short term. I would differentiate between the three policy rate zones: a clearly restrictive one with rates say in the high twos or above; and a clearly accommodative one – for the sake of discussion, say rates below 1.5 per cent are clearly accommodative. Going there would only be appropriate in the event of more substantial downside risks to inflation, or a more significant slowdown in the economy. I do not see that at the moment. And there is a zone in between, where it is more of a question of cyclical management. We are navigating in that zone at the moment. This is the focus of the discussions at the ECB.

    Can the ECB be indifferent to exchange rate developments when there is a sharp depreciation of the dollar, like at the moment? Unlike the Bundesbank in the past, you aren’t pursuing an official exchange rate policy…

    The exchange rate is of course an important factor in the development of inflation, even if we do not pursue an explicit exchange rate policy. However, most trade in the euro area takes place between countries sharing the euro as a common currency and, therefore, the exchange rate does not play a role. Trade with the United States and other regions of the world is important but it’s not the dominant factor. At the same time, we need to look at the impact of exchange rate shifts in a situation like we have now.

    Do you think that the euro could replace the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency as a consequence of the unreliable economic policies of the United States?

    I think the question whether the euro should overtake the US dollar is not so important. I can imagine that the euro will become more important as a reserve currency in the current situation. In the first decade of the euro, there was an optimism that we would no longer live in a world with a single world currency, the dollar. Now, the United States is facing all kinds of questions about its role in the world economy. The natural second currency is the euro. It is well placed to gain a bigger share of the market. This could be supported by further European integration – to put the euro on a firmer foundation.

    In your estimation, how great is the risk that we will now see more frequent waves of inflation, like those seen recently?

    The specific circumstances of the last wave of inflation will probably not be repeated quickly. Something like that occurs at most every few decades. Nevertheless, I also consider very low inflation rates, like those before the pandemic, to be unlikely in the current circumstances where there are so many upheavals and changes. There could be more external shocks and fluctuations in inflation rates than in the past. That means that we have an important job to do at the ECB. We may need to become even more active than before in adjusting our policy to the incoming shocks.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Members agree on 2025 chairpersons for subsidiary bodies of Goods Council

    Source: World Trade Organization

    Committee on Agriculture

    Mr Diego ALFIERI (Brazil)

    Committee on Anti-dumping Practices

    Mr Hirokazu WATANABE (Japan)

    Committee on Customs Valuation

    Ms Judith Yu-ying KUO (Chinese Taipei)

    Committee on Import Licensing

    Mr Tiago SERRAS RODRIGUES (Portugal)

    Committee on Market Access

    Mr Ninad DESHPANDE (India)

    Committee on Rules of Origin

    Ms Carol TSANG (Hong Kong, China)

    Committee on Safeguards

    Mrs Milagros MIRANDA ROJAS (Peru)

    Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures

    Mrs Maria COSME (France)

    Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

    Mr Jungsoo HUR (Korea, Republic of)

    Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade

    Ms Beatriz STEVENS (United Kingdom)

    Committee on Trade Facilitation

    Mr Edem KOSSI (Togo)

    Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures

    Ms Maryam Abdulaziz ALDOSERI
    (Kingdom of Bahrain)

    Committee of Participants on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products

    Mr George Andrei RUSU (Romania)

    Working Party on State Trading Enterprises

    Mr Sokheng KONG (Cambodia)

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The population crisis in Greece and the need for a European regeneration strategy – E-002028/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002028/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Afroditi Latinopoulou (PfE)

    Greece is experiencing the fastest population decline within the EU and the third fastest worldwide after war-torn Ukraine. It is a silent but existential crisis that is eroding the country’s national continuity, social cohesion and economic prospects. Emigration and low birth rates are depriving the country of young workers, householders and taxpayers, leading to ageing and desolation. The policies implemented to date are fragmented and inadequate. Europeans are not asking for short-term benefits but for a serious, long-term strategy for demographic regeneration.

    In view of this:

    • 1.Does the Commission intend to recognise the need to boost the birth rate of native-born people as a political priority, propose an ambitious European plan to support young families and abandon, at long last, spurious policies to solve the demographic problem within the Union through the naturalisation of illegal immigrants?
    • 2.Does it intend to proceed with the establishment of a stable, long-term framework that will strengthen countries with an acute population problem such as Greece, by providing financial and tax incentives, facilitating the acquisition of a first home and offering support to start a family?
    • 3.What measures does it intend to put in place to reverse the ongoing desertion of the European periphery and promote the sustainable settlement of young families in rural and island areas, where population collapse is already a reality?

    Submitted: 20.5.2025

    Last updated: 27 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Opposition to being a region of plunder – strategic project for the exploitation of a lithium mine in Doade (Ourense) in line with the policy of European rearmament – E-001272/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission recognises the importance of ensuring public participation, transparency, and compliance with environmental and social safeguards in projects involving critical raw materials, including for the selected Strategic Project mina Doade in Galicia, Spain.

    The assessment of mina Doade project included the evaluation of environmental and social impacts, and the use of transparent business practices. The assessment concluded that the project would be implemented sustainably according to the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRM Act)[1].

    The granting of Strategic Project status requires socially responsible practices, respect for human rights and comprehensive and meaningful consultations with local communities and the granting of the permit is carried out independently by the Member States’ competent authority.

    Moreover, granting Strategic Project status does not undermine the obligation of the project promoter to comply with EU environmental legislation[2], which mandates public consultation for plans related to the environment[3] and for projects likely to have significant environmental effects.

    The implementation of the selected Strategic Projects for the EU will be monitored, and in case a Strategic Project no longer fulfils the criteria laid down in the CRM Act, the Commission may withdraw the recognition of a project as a Strategic Project, taking into account the CRM Board’s opinion.

    • [1] https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/critical-raw-materials-act_en.
    • [2] Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment. OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1-21, as amended by Directive 2014/52/EU of 16 April 2014, OJ L 124, 25.4.2014, p. 1-18. 2001/42/EC, 2011/92/EU, 2014/52/EU.
    • [3] Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention.
    Last updated: 27 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – USAID funding for projects that have shaped political developments in Europe – E-000749/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission has taken note of the executive orders of the Trump administration to terminate 83% of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) programmes.

    The impact will be immediate and felt globally with wide ranging consequences on people’s lives and on global stability and security.

    The EU continues monitoring and assessing the overall impact and possible areas where intervention may be needed, with particular emphasis on key EU interests and life-saving humanitarian assistance.

    Together with Member States, the EU already provides 42% of development aid and 28% of humanitarian aid globally and remains fully committed to the affected regions. However, the EU will not be able to fill in the gap left by the United States’ decision.

    It is not common practice for the EU to co-finance actions together with USAID. However, the EU has engaged in regular exchange of information and coordination at local level, notably through donor coordination frameworks in areas of common interest (support to democracy, civil society, media, etc.) in the Western Balkans.

    With regards to the impact of USAID funding to Cyprus[1], the USAID programme was the main assistance provided for bicommunal activities until 2006 when the EU Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot community[2] was launched and USAID withdrew.

    The Commission did not formally evaluate USAID funding to Cyprus.

    • [1] Among other things, USAID helped civil society organisations from both communities cooperate (until 2003, there were no crossing points in Cyprus), supported bicommunal activities, restored buildings in old Nicosia and formalised the bicommunal Nicosia Master Plan for the divided city, which the two Cypriot leaders had developed.
    • [2] Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006 of 27 February 2006.
    Last updated: 27 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Pan-European media project wins European Charlemagne Youth Prize

    Source: European Parliament

    A Hungarian platform on European identity, a Czech project encouraging young people’s vote and a German legal support for discriminated people were recognised in 2025.

    On Tuesday, the European Parliament and the Foundation of the International Charlemagne Prize of Aachen awarded the 2025 European Charlemagne Youth Prize in a ceremony in Aachen.

    First prize – “Forum Europaeum”, Hungary

    The first prize (€7500) went to Forum Europaeum, a pan-European think tank and media outlet which promotes European identity, values, and unity through articles, podcasts, TikTok videos, and interviews. The project’s goal is to explore European identity and societal challenges, through creating spaces for constructive debates on topics relevant to young people.

    Second prize – “Thanks That We Can Vote”, Czech Republic

    The second prize (€5000) was awarded to the Díky, že můžem volit (Thanks That We Can Vote) initiative. Launched to address the low electoral participation of young people in the Czech Republic, it targeted 18-29-old voters during the 2024 European Elections. The project sought to combat apathy, perceived political inefficacy, and fragmented engagement efforts through education, collaboration, and innovative outreach efforts.

    Third prize – Feminist Law Clinic, Germany

    The Feminist Law Clinic, a project providing free legal support, won the third prize (€2500). It deals helps those most affected by gender-based discrimination sexualised violence, and legal uncertainty—particularly women, lesbians, intersex, non-binary, trans, agender, and queer individuals.

    Background

    The European Charlemagne Youth Prize, jointly awarded by the European Parliament and the Foundation of the International Charlemagne Prize of Aachen, is open to initiatives by young people aged 16-30 involved in projects that strengthen democracy and support active participation. Since 2008, 6,500 projects have competed for the prize.

    Every year, national and European juries select a project from each EU member state. 27 national winners were invited to the award ceremony in Aachen on 27 May 2025, where the three overall EU winners were announced.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The phenomenon of telemarketing in Italy – E-001963/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001963/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Isabella Tovaglieri (PfE), Paolo Borchia (PfE), Anna Maria Cisint (PfE), Susanna Ceccardi (PfE), Silvia Sardone (PfE), Aldo Patriciello (PfE), Raffaele Stancanelli (PfE), Roberto Vannacci (PfE)

    Italy has been dogged in recent months by a state of affairs causing discomfort to millions of citizens: ceaseless calls from robots and call centres. This continues to happen despite the fact that many Italian citizens are on the ‘do not call’ register, with an average of two calls per day from call centres[1].

    The problem in this case is that the register is ineffective because the calls come from jurisdictions outside Italian law.

    At European level, this issue could have been regulated in the reform of the ePrivacy Directive, which, in Article 16, governs ‘unsolicited marketing’. Although published in 2017 it has yet to see the light of day.

    Can the Commission therefore say:

    • 1.Whether it is aware of the spread of this phenomenon in Italy?
    • 2.Whether it considers these practices to be compatible with the European legal framework on privacy and direct marketing?
    • 3.Given the deadlock on the proposed ePrivacy Directive, what measures, legislative or otherwise, does it intend to take to protect European consumers from such aggressive forms of marketing?

    Submitted: 15.5.2025

    • [1] https://www.panorama.it/attualita/cronaca/milioni-di-italiani-sono-molestati-dai-call-center-ma-la-legge-non-li-protegge.
    Last updated: 27 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: Tajikistan, Palestine & other topics – Daily Press Briefing (27 May 2025) | United Nations

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    Deputy Secretary-General
    Occupied Palestinian Territory
    UNIFIL
    Sudan
    Myanmar
    Cyprus
    Ukraine
    Briefing

    DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL
    The Deputy Secretary-General is travelling to Dushanbe, Republic of Tajikistan, later today to take part in the International Conference for Glaciers’ Preservation on behalf of the Secretary-General. At the conference, Ms. Mohammed will emphasize the need to accelerate climate action to achieve the 1.5 degree target, in order to reduce the negative impact of melting glaciers on people and planet. During the trip, the Deputy Secretary-General will also meet with senior government officials to strengthen the UN-Tajikistan partnership, youth and women’s groups and other constituencies to discuss priority action to support SDG acceleration.
    On 31 May, she will travel to Marrakech, Morocco, to attend the 2025 Ibrahim Governance Weekend where she will deliver a keynote address at the Opening Ceremony and meet with senior government officials and other stakeholders.
    The Deputy Secretary-General will then travel to Geneva, Switzerland, to deliver opening remarks at the Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025. The platform is a critical mechanism, held every two years, to identify ways to further accelerate the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. She will also meet with senior government officials of Switzerland and heads of delegation at the Global Platform.
    The Deputy Secretary-General will return to New York on 4 June.

    OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY
    Turning to the situation in Gaza. We have been watching the video coming out of Gaza around one of the distribution points set up by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, and frankly these video images are heartbreaking to say the least. As the Secretary-General noted last week, we and our partners have a detailed, principled, operationally sound plan – supported by Member States – to get aid to a desperate population. We continue to stress that a meaningful scale-up of humanitarian operations is essential to stave off famine and meet the needs of all civilians, wherever they are.
    Meanwhile, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that continued bombardment and shelling across the Strip has had horrific impacts on civilians. Today, the Ministry of Health reported dozens of people killed and over 150 injured in the past 24 hours.
    On Sunday night, a school sheltering displaced people in Ad Daraj, in eastern Gaza city, was hit, with the attack igniting a fire and reportedly killing 36 people, including women and children. Many of the bodies were reportedly severely burned.
    Amid ongoing hostilities, thousands of people continue to be displaced. Yesterday, another Israeli displacement order was issued, covering about 155 square kilometres in Rafah, Khan Younis and central Gaza and affecting more than 60 neighbourhoods.
    This represents over 40 per cent of the Gaza Strip, which overlaps with previous displacement orders.
    In North Gaza, our partners tell us that sites for internally- displaced people in Beit Hanoun, Izbat Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahiya, are nearly empty, in the wake of Israeli displacement orders issued for these areas.
    In Khan Younis, displaced people continue to live in the open, where they are exposed to the heat and elements. Many are physically exhausted and frail after having walked long distances on damaged roads with no food to sustain them.
    Since the renewed escalation of hostilities in March, our partners estimate more than 632,000 people have been forced to flee yet again. They are left to survive on very small areas of the territory, with barely anything to survive on.
    OCHA underscores that civilians must be protected, including those fleeing and forced to leave through displacement orders and those who remain despite those orders. Civilians who flee must be allowed to return as soon as circumstances allow. OCHA reiterates that civilians must be able to receive the humanitarian assistance they need, wherever they are. All of this is required by international humanitarian law. 
    Meanwhile, our partners working in health report that there are even fewer health facilities operating this week. Since last Monday, more than two dozen health centres and mobile clinics and one hospital have suspended their services because of hostilities, attacks or displacement orders in their areas.
    On the water and sanitation front, some 200 thousand litres of fuel are needed per week across Gaza to sustain those critical facilities. However, the situation in the south of Gaza is particularly concerning, as no fuel is currently available there, and only one third of the required supply was received last week. (…)

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=27%20May%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wmWsbdBUaBs

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: GAR 2025 Hazard explorations

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    Multi-hazard events

    Multi-hazard events compound and even increase losses beyond the sum of their parts. Analysis of the last century of data recorded in the Emergence Events Database (EM-DAT)  maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the Université Catholique de Louvain in Belgium shows that while only around 19% of disasters are classified as multi-hazard, these events account for almost 59% of the total economic losses.

    Multi-hazard events can also result in compounded costs, eroding coping capacity as affected households contend with multiple threats simultaneously. Understanding multi-hazard risk and building this analysis into cost-benefit analysis can improve the effectiveness of preparedness actions and infrastructure investments.  Multi-hazard integrated investments in reducing disaster risk can have cascading benefits on SDG achievement globally from enhancing food security, to improving air quality, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

    Between 2000 to 2023, five hazards triggered 90 per cent of disaster deaths: earthquakes (50%), extreme heat (18%), storms (14%), floods (8%), and droughts (2%).  Reducing the risk to these disasters can act as a powerful lever to accelerate sustainable development.

    Annual average losses

    Overall, the annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors due to these three hazards globally is USD 257.2 billion.

    There are significant regional differences in losses however, with USD 2.3 billion of losses in Africa, USD 103.7 billion in the Americas, USD 126.9 billion in Asia, USD 56.7 billion in Europe and USD 5.9 billion in Oceania. Lower USD losses in Africa do not necessarily mean less of an impact on GDP or sustainable development.

    Taking a multi-hazard approach is important for investment as it helps give a more comprehensive picture of how to better reduce the risk of recurrent disasters. For example, in 2023, North America had by far the greatest economic exposure to disasters overall, with USD 69.57 billion in direct losses. These nevertheless represent a relatively modest share (0.23%) of subregional GDP. Micronesia, on the other hand, incurred only a fraction of these net losses – USD 4.3 billion – but with a far greater relative impact (46.1%) on its subregional GDP.

    The impact of a disaster on a country’s economy also depends on its policies, investments and development levels. Disaster-related losses can fluctuate significantly from year to year, depending on conditions. In the case of North America, for instance, while the annual cost of disasters as a proportion of GDP was 0.23% in 2023, in 2005 the proportion was almost seven times higher at 1.74% as storms like Hurricane Katrina exposed vulnerable cities like New Orleans to significant losses that year. However, because many of these losses were covered by insurance, the risk was shared across the public and private sectors.

    In contrast, in small island developing states such as Micronesia, where the cost of disasters as a share of national GDP was 0.03% in 2006 and a massive 46% in 2023, risk transfer mechanisms that can share losses across the public and private sector were much less prevalent. As a result, the national economy was much more acutely affected.

    For more information see the GAR 2025 chapter 2, 4 and 5.  

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: GAR 2025 Solution explorations

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    The global cost of disasters is growing but, just as the costs of disasters have been under-estimated, so have the benefits of investing now to reduce disaster risk.

    Drawing on dozens of positive examples from around the globe, the below case studies are selected from the full GAR report and show how effective disaster risk reduction (DRR) investment can accelerate both sustainable development and economic stability at a time when catastrophic risk is increasing globally.

    The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

    Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

    Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.

    A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).

    GAR 2025 report

    As climate change continues to escalate, the number of recorded disasters and their associated costs rise correspondingly.

    Hazard explorations

    Disasters seldom come alone, which is another reason their costs are underestimated.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: African Lion 2025 concludes, showcases US ability to project power with allies and partners across Africa

    Source: United States Army

    1 / 2 Show Caption + Hide Caption – U.S. Army Spc. Austin Crider, a paratrooper assigned to 54th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 173rd Airborne Brigade, left, has his T-11 parachute inspected by 1st Lt. Corbin Hoppe, a jumpmaster assigned to the 173rd Airborne Brigade, in preparation for an airborne operation during exercise African Lion 2025 (AL25), Ben Ghilouf Training Area, April 29, 2025. AL25 is set to be the largest annual military exercise in Africa, bringing together over 40 nations, including seven NATO allies and 10,000 troops to conduct realistic, dynamic and collaborative training in an austere environment that intersects multiple geographic and functional combatant commands. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) on behalf of the U.S. Africa Command, AL25 takes place from April 14 to May 23, 2025, across Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. This large-scale exercise will enhance our ability to work together in complex, multi-domain operations—preparing forces to deploy, fight and win. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Mariah Y. Gonzalez) (Photo Credit: Sgt. Mariah Gonzalez) VIEW ORIGINAL
    2 / 2 Show Caption + Hide Caption – A U.S. Soldier assigned to the 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Utah National Guard, leads Royal Moroccan Armed Forces, Ghana Armed Forces, and Hungarian Defence Forces Special Operations soldiers during a field training exercise at African Lion 2025 (AL25), Tifnit, Morocco, May 18, 2025. AL25, the largest annual military exercise in Africa, brings together over 50 nations, including seven NATO allies and 10,000 troops to conduct realistic, dynamic and collaborative training in an austere environment that intersects multiple geographic and functional combatant commands. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) on behalf of the U.S. Africa Command, AL25 takes place from April 14 to May 23, 2025, across Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. This large-scale exercise will enhance our ability to work together in complex, multi-domain operations—preparing forces to deploy, fight and win. (Photo altered for security purposes) (U.S. Army Reserve photo by Sgt. Daniel Alejandro Luna) (Photo Credit: Sgt. Daniel Luna) VIEW ORIGINAL

    Back to

    U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF)

    AGADIR, Morocco–The 21st edition of African Lion concluded this week with over 10,000 multinational troops from more than 50 nations executing synchronized operations across four countries, marking the largest and most dynamic iteration in the exercise’s over-25-year history.

    This year’s exercise featured first-time integration of defensive cyber operations and expanded chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear (CBRN) scenarios, along with rigorous multinational academic instruction. African Lion 25 validated the United States’ commitment to building enduring partnerships, enhancing joint and combined force readiness and strengthening regional security. The exercise included HIMARS fire missions, airborne operations, amphibious landings, maritime interdiction, and planning exercises with partners from Africa, Europe, and the U.S.

    Setting the Theater, Building Trust

    “African Lion 25 was a clear demonstration that a combined approach of joint and multinational capabilities enhanced the readiness and lethality of our warfighters,” said U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Andrew C. Gainey, commanding general, U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF).

    “The integration of cutting-edge technologies alongside our partners and allies reinforced our commitment to remain ready to address the most complex strategic challenges.”

    Medical Reach with Tactical Impact

    Medical professionals treated more than 10,000 patients across Morocco, Ghana and Senegal as part of AL25’s humanitarian civic assistance (HCA) programs.

    “This has been one of the most diverse and capable teams we’ve brought to African Lion,” said U.S. Air Force Col. Micah Smith, commander of 151st Medical Group, Utah Air National Guard and HCA commander. “With members from 37 different units and expertise spanning cardiology, dermatology, pulmonology and more, we’ve been able to provide care many here wouldn’t otherwise receive.”

    “Working alongside about 180 Moroccan partners, we’ve operated 17 clinics and treated roughly 1,000 patients a day,” added Smith. “The Moroccan people have been incredibly gracious; it’s been an honor to be here with them.”

    Logistics at Scale

    Logistics efforts moved several thousand short tons of cargo across borders, validating the U.S. military’s ability to set the theater, sustain distributed operations, and integrate movement control teams across multiple entry points.

    “The African Lion Exercise gives us the opportunity to put into practice the planning we have completed to set the theater for sustainment operations.” said U.S. Army Lt. Col. Tim Dowd, lead AL25 sustainment planner for the 79th Theater Sustainment Command.

    “The complexity of moving several thousand short tons of cargo to four different countries spanning the distance of the continental United States, demonstrates that we can build, sustain, and adapt our logistical networks in support of any mission, anywhere in Africa.”

    Regional Training, Local Impact

    In Morocco, U.S. and partner forces conducted the largest array of academic instruction, including joint planning, cyber defense, and public affairs courses. CBRN response and HIMARS missions were integrated alongside a multinational planning exercise and humanitarian civic assistance missions in rural communities.

    U.S. Soldiers assigned to 3rd Battalion, 197th Field Artillery Regiment, New Hampshire National Guard, fire the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) at Cap Draa during African Lion 25 (AL25) in TanTan, Morocco, May 23, 2025. AL25, the largest annual military exercise in Africa, brings together over 50 nations, including seven NATO allies and 10,000 troops to conduct realistic, dynamic and collaborative training in an austere environment that intersects multiple geographic and functional combatant commands. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) on behalf of the U.S. Africa Command, AL25 takes place from April 14 to May 23, 2025, across Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. This large-scale exercise will enhance our ability to work together in complex, multi-domain operations—preparing forces to deploy, fight and win. (Photo by Libby Weiler, AFRICOM Public Affairs) (Photo Credit: Libby Weiler) VIEW ORIGINAL

    “African Lion enhances the United States’ interoperability with Morocco and other key partners to strengthen our collective ability to address regional security threats,” said Aimee Cutrona, Chargée d’Affaires for the U.S. Embassy in Rabat.

    “As a major non-NATO ally and historic security partner, Morocco plays a pivotal role in promoting regional stability and security.”

    “Guided by President Trump and King Mohamed VI, our bilateral cooperation benefits both Americans and Moroccans, making us safer and stronger,” added Cutrona.

    Innovation and Burden-Sharing in Tunisia

    In Tunisia, several notable firsts marked AL25’s evolution: for the first time, cyber offense training expanded beyond the usual defensive focus, enabling red-team experimentation. The 1st Battalion, 57th Air Defense Artillery Regiment employed the Avenger Weapon System, demonstrating mobile short-range air defense with Stinger missiles.

    U.S. Soldiers assigned to 1st Battalion, 57th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, operate the Avenger Air Defense System, showcasing the FIM-92 Stinger missile, as part of exercise African Lion 2025 (AL25), at Ben Ghilouf Training Area, Tunisia, April 25, 2025. AL25 is set to be the largest annual military exercise in Africa, bringing together over 40 nations, including seven NATO allies and 10,000 troops to conduct realistic, dynamic and collaborative training in an austere environment that intersects multiple geographic and functional combatant commands. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) on behalf of the U.S. Africa Command, AL25 takes place from April 14 to May 23, 2025, across Ghana, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia. This large-scale exercise will enhance our ability to work together in complex, multi-domain operations—preparing forces to deploy, fight and win. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Jose Lora) (Photo Credit: Sgt. Jose Lora) VIEW ORIGINAL

    Additionally, the 173rd Airborne Brigade received host-nation approval to deploy drone systems during maneuvers—another milestone in multilateral technological integration.

    U.S. Army paratroopers with 4th Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, conduct live-fire drills alongside Tunisian troops with a M119 howitzer as part of exercise African Lion 2025 (AL25), at Ben Ghilouf Training Area, Tunisia, April 26, 2025.

    AL25 is set to be the largest annual military exercise in Africa, bringing together over 40 nations, including seven NATO allies and 10,000 troops to conduct realistic, dynamic and collaborative training in an austere environment that intersects multiple geographic and functional combatant commands. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) on behalf of the U.S. Africa Command, AL25 takes place from April 14 to May 23, 2025, across Ghana, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia. This large-scale exercise will enhance our ability to work together in complex, multi-domain operations—preparing forces to deploy, fight and win.

    (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Jose Lora) (Photo Credit: Sgt. Jose Lora)

    VIEW ORIGINAL

    “Through African Lion, Tunisia aspires to enhance joint coordination among partner countries, exchanging knowledge to achieve desired goals,” said Tunisian Senior Col. Majid Mguidich, the host nation AL25 exercise director.

    “This training enables the Tunisian Armed Forces to increase its influence as a training and educational hub at the regional and international levels.”

    Partnering for Readiness in Ghana

    In Ghana, U.S. and partner forces conducted a multinational medical readiness exercise (MEDREX), a medical civic action program (MEDCAP) and a planning exercise (PLANEX). These engagements strengthened regional health resilience and interoperability among African and U.S. planners.

    “Exercises like African Lion are a cornerstone of our bilateral military relationship,” said U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Mary Stuever, director of trauma for Landstuhl Regional Medical Center and the officer in charge of the Ghana MEDREX.

    “Ghana continues to be one of our most capable and trusted partners in West Africa.”

    Fighting Fit in Senegal’s Extreme Conditions

    In Senegal, U.S. Soldiers trained in extreme heat exceeding 100 degrees Fahrenheit, conducting HIMARS fire coordination, airborne operations, and civil-military engagements.

    These conditions showcased the Army’s readiness to operate in austere and climate-challenged environments while validating rapid deployment and sustainment capacity.

    U.S. Army paratroopers assigned to Dog Company, 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade provide instruction on the M240B machine gun to soldiers from the Senegalese Armed Forces during live-fire training at Centre d’Entraînement Tactique 2 (CET2) in Dodji, Senegal, May 8, 2025. The training session focused on weapons handling and fire control, reinforcing tactical proficiency and multinational cooperation during African Lion 2025 (AL25). AL25, the largest annual military exercise in Africa, brings together over 50 nations, including seven NATO allies and 10,000 troops to conduct realistic, dynamic and collaborative training in an austere environment that intersects multiple geographic and functional combatant commands. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) on behalf of the U.S. Africa Command, AL25 takes place from April 14 to May 23, 2025, across Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. This large-scale exercise will enhance our ability to work together in complex, multi-domain operations—preparing forces to deploy, fight and win. (U.S. Army photo by CJay Spence) (Photo Credit: Sgt. C jay spence) VIEW ORIGINAL

    “Our primary objectives here in Senegal for African Lion are threefold,” said U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Daniel Cederman, SETAF-AF deputy commanding general for the Army Reserve. “First, to achieve lethality and readiness for all participating forces—including the United States, Senegal, the Netherlands, Mauritania and Côte d’Ivoire. Second, we’re focused on building true interoperability, so if a crisis occurs on the continent, we can fight together side by side with a shared understanding of command and control, tactics and systems.”

    “Finally, we aim to exchange best practices and culture, because every force brings something unique to the fight,” Cederman said. “Together, these efforts help us achieve peace through strength and address regional security challenges as a unified team.”

    A Message of Deterrence and Enduring Presence

    As AL25 concludes, the scale and complexity of this year’s exercise reflect more than tactical success, they demonstrate enduring strategic value. From live-fire exercises and cyber innovation to humanitarian outreach and multinational planning, the exercise reinforced trust with key partners and proved the U.S. military’s ability to project power, set the theater, and operate decisively alongside allies across the African continent.

    U.S. Marines and Soldiers from the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces pose for a group photo while F16 fighter jets pass overhead at Cap Draa during African Lion 25 (AL25) in TanTan, Morocco, May 23, 2025. AL25, the largest annual military exercise in Africa, brings together over 50 nations, including seven NATO allies and 10,000 troops to conduct realistic, dynamic and collaborative training in an austere environment that intersects multiple geographic and functional combatant commands. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) on behalf of the U.S. Africa Command, AL25 takes place from April 14 to May 23, 2025, across Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. This large-scale exercise will enhance our ability to work together in complex, multi-domain operations—preparing forces to deploy, fight and win. (Photo by Libby Weiler, AFRICOM Public Affairs) (Photo Credit: Libby Weiler) VIEW ORIGINAL

    “I want to thank Morocco for hosting African Lion and helping strengthen our collective security and readiness through rigorous, multinational training,” said U.S. Marine Corps Gen. Michael Langley, commander of U.S. Africa Command. Exercises like African Lion showcase the value of our relationships with African partners, demonstrating our readiness to confront common threats and promote peace through demonstrated military.”

    About African Lion

    AL25 is set to be the largest annual military exercise in Africa, bringing together over 50 nations, including seven NATO allies, and about 10,000 troops. Led by U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF), on behalf of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), the exercise will take place from April 14 to May 23, 2025, across Ghana, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia. AL25 is designed to restore the warrior ethos, sharpen lethality, and strengthen military readiness alongside our African partners and allies This large-scale exercise will enhance our ability to work together in complex, multi-domain operations—preparing forces to deploy, fight, and win.

    For all photos, videos and article throughout the exercise, visit the African Lion feature page on DVIDS.

    About SETAF-AF

    U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) prepares Army forces, executes crisis response, enables strategic competition and strengthens partners to achieve U.S. Army Europe and Africa and U.S. Africa Command campaign objectives.

    Follow SETAF-AF on: Facebook, X, Instagram, YouTube, LinkedIn & DVIDS.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Uninformed comments on autism are resonant of dangerous ideas about eugenics

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Cornelia Schneider, Associate Professor of Education, Mount Saint Vincent University

    Robert F. Kennedy Jr., the health and human services secretary in the United States, held a recent news conference and made uninformed comments on autism. His remarks created an uproar, especially among people with autism and other disabilities.

    The news conference was related to a new report from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) about autism.

    Among other comments, Kennedy Jr. said:

    “Autism destroys families, and more importantly, it destroys our greatest resource, which is our children. These are children who should not be
    suffering like this … And these are kids who will never pay taxes. They’ll never hold a job. They’ll never play baseball. They’ll never write a poem. They’ll never go out on a date. Many of them will never use a toilet unassisted.”

    Earlier, during a cabinet meeting, he promised to find the cause of autism by September.



    Read more:
    If Trump puts RFK Jr in charge of health, get ready for a distorted reality, where global health suffers

    We are researchers whose combined focus covers the rights of people with disabilities in educational systems and the history of disability in medical discourse. One of us is a sibling (Cornelia) and the other a parent (Martha) to people with intellectual disabilities.

    These comments were deeply worrisome for us due to their resonance of dangerous ideas espoused during the eugenics movement.

    Origins of eugenics

    Eugenics is the belief that society can and should be “improved” through selective breeding. It is based on a pseudo-scientific ranking of humans in a racist and ableist hierachy that judges non-white and disabled people to be the least desirable.

    During the height of the movement in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, eugenics was promoted by scientists, physicians, politicians and clergy, authoritative voices who encouraged the “fittest” to reproduce while recommending that those people with “undesirable” physical or intellectual traits be removed from society. Part of achieving this goal meant people with disabilities were sterilized or institutionalized.

    Eugenics was applied in its most extreme form in Nazi Germany during the 1930s and ‘40s. Six million Jews, and millions more people, including an estimated 250,000 people with disabilities, were killed.

    A formal condemnation of Nazi actions in the form of the Nuremberg Trials fostered a popular backlash to these Nazi horrors after the Second World War, resulting in a global repudiation of eugenic ideas and a gradual phasing out of practices such as sterilization and institutionalization of people with disabilities.

    ‘Eugenic logic’ seen in many places

    However, Kennedy Jr.’s comments remind us that eugenic ideas are alive and well, including, but not exclusively, amid the radical right and tech-enabled ideas about a return to “strongman” values.

    Eugenics ideas exist in the form of what bioethicist and humanities scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson calls “eugenic logic.” This is the ongoing belief that erasing disability and people with disabilities is a desirable and common-sense objective.

    The power of eugenics logic surrounds us. It shapes immigration policy that penalizes disability. It means reproductive technologies and medical practices are used to eliminate certain conditions that cause disabilities.

    For example, recently, the Québec College of Physicians called for legislation to allow the euthanasia of severely disabled infants. This also affirms the views of popular but controversial philosopher Peter Singer, who argues that babies with disabilities lack qualities of personhood and therefore could be killed.

    Linking human value to ‘productivity’

    RFK Jr.’s eugenics ideas resonate strongly today. They square politically with neoliberalism to create a form of ableism that regards the individual citizen as “an able-bodied entrepreneurial entity.”

    Neoliberal ableism links human value to their capacity to work, to what disability studies scholars Dan Goodley and Rebecca Lawthom refer to the ability to “productively contribute … bounded and cut off from others, capable, malleable and compliant.”

    People with autism, and others who cannot serve society in this way, threaten the neoliberal order and capitalism. They are seen as a detriment to society.

    Autism organizations heavily criticized Kennedy Jr. for his portrayal of autistic people as incapable.

    However, some critics unwittingly reinforced his neoliberal and eugenic framing of human value. These critics rightly contradicted Kennedy Jr. by pointing out that many people with autism have capabilities that he denied them. However, focusing on those abilities gave support to the devaluation of people with autism — and others with disabilities — who do not possess them, and who cannot be independent or will never be “productive workers.”

    The social model of disability

    Uninformed comments about autism by people in official health leadership positions threatens to undo decades of work that led to remarkable gains for people with disabilities.

    The 1970s and ‘80s saw the development of what disability activists and scholars discuss as the social model of disability. This shifted the understanding of disability away from the “problem” of individuals’ physical/intellectual conditions. Disability is seen as a mismatch of the interactions between the impairment and the barriers it faces in the (social) environment.

    This important shift in how disability is understood rejected the notion that disability is a personal fault or flaw. For the first time, it paid attention to environmental, financial and attitudinal barriers. It allowed people with disabilities unprecedented access to education and other aspects of society.

    The progress made remains fragile.

    Important to push back

    All who value human diversity and the continued expansion of the rights of people with disabilities must push back against eugenics politics.

    Political parties and broader society must commit to full participation and belonging of all people with disabilities by continuing to remove physical, attitudinal and financial barriers.

    Accessibility legislation at the federal and provincial levels must be implemented and enforced. In Canada, this includes the re-establishment of a federal minister for disabilities, a post that previously existed as minister of diversity, inclusion and persons with disabilities) but is lacking under the new Liberal government and its smaller cabinet.

    It means we need to heed the voices of disability advocates who have launched a court challenge against a key provision of Medical Assistance in Dying legislation. A recent version of this legislation accepts disability without a terminal condition as a reason to end life. As advocates recently told the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, this implies that a disabled life is not worth living.



    Read more:
    A dangerous path: Why expanding access to medical assistance in dying keeps us up at night

    Lived experiences must inform decisions

    The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (signed by the U.S.; signed and ratified by Canada) lays out the key ideas that Kennedy Jr. appears to reject: “Disability results from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers.”

    The lived experiences of the disability community must always be included in political decision-making.

    It’s our responsibility to uphold and protect the human rights of all persons with disabilities, including those who require more intensive support.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Uninformed comments on autism are resonant of dangerous ideas about eugenics – https://theconversation.com/uninformed-comments-on-autism-are-resonant-of-dangerous-ideas-about-eugenics-256762

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Highland Council’s Waste Services team supports food bank donation

    Source: Scotland – Highland Council

    Last week, representatives from The Highland Council’s Waste Services Team joined The Highland Food Bank Team in Inverness for the delivery of £500 worth of food and essential items which was kindly donated by Jett Distribution.

    Jett Distribution have been contracted by the Council to deliver wheeled bins as part of the Waste and Recycling Service Change programme and are wheeled bin distribution specialists within the UK and Germany.  Since April 2024, they have delivered approximately 115,000 new grey wheeled bins and 25,000 food waste caddies to households across the Highland region as part of the Waste Service Change roll out which has been funded by the Scottish Government’s Recycling Improvement Fund.

    Councillor Graham MacKenzie, Chair of the Communities and Place Committee, said, “I would like to thank Jett Distribution for the generous donation of much needed food and essential items to the Highland Foodbank. This is a superb example of where a contract awarded by The Highland Council has not only been delivered on time and within budget but has also provided additional community benefit for the region.”

    Jamie Humphries, Director of Jett Distribution, said: “As we near the end of a very successful roll-out of new bins for The Highland Council, we are proud to have donated £500 of food and essentials to the Trussell Trust foodbank in Inverness, as a way to say thank you to the communities across Highland. The Trussell Trust is a charity which is close to our hearts, and this is our way of supporting foodbanks which help local people in times of need.”

    Neill Prentice, Fundraising Manager (North Scotland) for Blythswood who manage the Highland Foodbanks, said: “We are so grateful to Jett Distribution for their generous donation of £500 worth of food to local families facing hardship.  Last year, Highland Foodbank provided emergency food to over 5,000 people – and support like this is what makes this possible.  Your kindness helps us feed families in crisis and on their behalf, we say thank you.”

    The final phase of the roll out of the service change will see the new waste and recycling services being delivered in Lochaber from September 2025.

    For further information on the recycling services in your area, please visit www.highland.gov.uk/recycle

    Neill Prentice (Blythswood), Luke Matheson (Foodbank Co-ordinator), Alison Boyle (Highland Council), Ellie Humphries (Jett Distribution), Jill Biss (Jett Distribution), Imogen Percy-Bell (Highland Council)

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China’s busiest seaport teams up with three European hubs to collaborate on low-carbon shipping

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    HANGZHOU, May 27 (Xinhua) — China’s Ningbo-Zhoushan Port in east China’s Zhejiang Province, the world’s busiest by cargo throughput, on Tuesday announced three initiatives with three major European ports — Hamburg and Wilhelmshaven in Germany and Valencia in Spain — to build green shipping corridors and promote China-Europe cooperation on low-carbon ports.

    The international shipping industry, which accounts for around 80% of global trade, is currently facing urgent pressure to reduce emissions. Under the above initiatives to decarbonise international shipping, participating ports will engage with shipping companies, cargo owners, energy suppliers, think tanks and other stakeholders to promote zero-carbon technologies, clean fuels and smart management systems on specific shipping routes.

    Key collaborative actions under these initiatives include the construction and use of shore power infrastructure, optimisation of cargo distribution networks, implementation of renewable energy solutions and expansion of clean fuel bunkering capacity to create zero-carbon corridors from port origin to destination.

    Currently, Ningbo-Zhoushan Port serves more than 300 marine container lines, including more than 250 international routes, which connect over 600 ports in more than 200 countries and regions around the world.

    In recent years, increasing the scale of research, development and promotion of green low-carbon technologies has been a particular focus for Ningbo-Zhoushan Port, whose clean energy utilization rate now reaches about 74%.

    “We will work closely with seaports and shipping companies associated with the Belt and Road Initiative to promote the global green transformation of ports and shipping,” said Tao Chengbo, chairman of the Ningbo-Zhoushan Port Group, the port operator. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Joins Entire WA Delegation in Letter Urging President Trump to Reconsider Denial of WA State’s Request for a Disaster Declaration for November “Bomb Cyclone”

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell
    05.27.25
    WSU Prof Joins Cantwell & Leading Scientists to Highlight Devastating Impacts of Slashing Funding for Science Research
    Trump Administration wants to gut National Science Foundation funding by 55%, would be the most severe reductions in agency’s history, overturn bipartisan consensus reached in CHIPS & Science Act; WSU Professor Kalyanaraman: Cuts will “directly undercut” AI precision agriculture and agriculture cybersecurity research
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Last Tuesday, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), ranking member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and senior member of the Senate Finance Committee, was joined by Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) and a panel of prestigious scientists to decry the devastating impacts of the Trump Administration’s proposed 55% cut to the FY 2026 budget of the National Science Foundation (NSF).
    The panel included Dr. Ananth Kalyanaraman, Professor at Washington State University, and Director of the USDA NIFA-funded AI Institute on Agricultural AI for Decision Support and Workforce Development.
    “We are in an Information Age. We are in an age where there are several areas of U.S. competitiveness that depend on continued science innovation, aerospace being one of those, certainly AI being another, quantum being a third,” Sen. Cantwell said. “And all of this is being put into jeopardy by this cut.”
    Looking at the damage to our future if these cuts are implemented, the Senator continued: “In an Information Age economy, when so much innovation is available, the last thing you should be doing is having a 55 percent cut to one of your key science R&D institutions. You should be making increases, allowing a thousand flowers to bloom across these institutions, across the United States, because you never know where the next Bill Gates or the next Bill Boeing is going to be, and the innovation they’re going to drive.”
    “WSU researchers are working on cutting edge security research across the entire computing stack, spanning hardware, software systems, and the web, and applications to precision agriculture,” said Dr. Kalyanaraman. “This research integrates AI to enhance the resilience of agricultural systems against cyber threats. We are deeply concerned about the nearly $5 billion in cuts to NSF, which will directly undercut this vital work and also our nation’s ability to remain globally competitive.”
    President Trump’s FY 2026 skinny budget proposes to cut NSF’s funding by 55.8% from $8.8 billion to $3.9 billion. This is on top of $234 million in FY 2025 funding for construction projects that the Administration has frozen. The CHIPS and Science Act, which Sen. Cantwell championed through to passage, authorized dramatically increasing NSF funding to $17.8 billion in FY2026.
    Besides recklessly proposing to slash future funding, the Trump Administration has already terminated 1,752 existing NSF grants totaling more than 1.3 billion dollars according to a list of terminated grants the Foundation released today. A large percentage of these grants are for projects and programs related to STEM education and expanding access and participation in STEM fields. Earlier this month, NSF announced it would cap indirect cost reimbursements at 15 percent for all new awards to universities and nonprofit institutions, down from negotiated rates that typically range from 30 to 60 percent. That action is on pause pending a lawsuit brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
    Other participants included: Dr. Arati Prabhakar, former Director of OSTP, DARPA, and NIST and venture capitalist; Dr. France Córdova, 14th Director of the National Science Foundation, and now President of the Science Philanthropy Alliance; Dr. Dean Chang, Chief Innovation Officer and Associate Vice President for Innovation & Entrepreneurship & Economic Development at the University of Maryland; and Dr. Marvi Matos Rodriguez, Engineering Director working in the Aerospace Industry.
    Dr. Prabhakar took the lead in debunking the idea that corporate funding could in any way replace federal investment in science, stating: “It’s been a bedrock economic understanding that corporations invest in the R&D that they can see leading to products and profits, but not in the kind that evolves across many labs over many years and forms a shared foundation for whole industries and for public missions like defense.”
    “These devastating cuts to public R&D are an embarrassing retreat from American leadership that hands the reins to the People’s Republic of China,” Dr. Prabhakar added. “And I would so much rather be here today talking about achieving our great aspirations for longer and healthier lives and for AI that extends our own human talents, for lowering our cost of living with clean energy and for restoring nature, because that is the future that America is capable of creating.”
    Dr. Córdova, who strongly agreed that private funding is no substitute for the NSF, said: “I have a good handle on what industry and philanthropy can contribute, and I can tell you, as important as their contributions are to bolstering our economy, they cannot replace government funding.”
    And Dr. Córdova decried the impacts of the cuts to STEM education that the Trump funding levels would force.
    “Especially important to universities is the funding to train our STEM workforce pipeline, without which we would have no industries of the future. Industry representatives often tell me that arguably the most important investment NSF makes is in the workforce training of STEM talent,” she said.
    In April, NSF revealed that Graduate Research Fellowships awarded in 2025 would be cut in half, from 2,000 to 1,000, the smallest cohort since 2010. NSF will also significantly reduce (from 368 to 70) the number of scientists it employs through a program that enables scientists on leave from their academic positions to work with the NSF to help choose the best research to fund.
    Dr. Chang offered an eye-opening look at where our nation would be without the National Science Foundation.
    ”It’s hard to imagine a world without NSF, but this alternate world without NSF would have none of the following: No Medtronic pacemakers or insulin pumps; no ChatGPT; no Nvidia GPU chips that power ChatGPT; no Apple; no Siri; no Amazon, Alexa; no GE MRIs for medical imaging; no Teslas and actually, no smart cruise control in any car of any kind; no Da Vinci robotic surgical systems; no early quantum computers from IBM and IonQ; and no Fortnite — the video game that swept the nation a few years ago,” Dr. Chang explained.
    “NSF celebrated its 75th anniversary this month,” Dr. Chang added. “But are we willing to relinquish our nation’s 75-year head start to other countries so they become the birthplace of the next generation of Teslas and ChatGPTs, the next generation of robotic surgeons and life saving devices? Not only must NSF continue to invest in high risk, high reward research, but NSF also must continue to invest in proven ways to shorten the decades long gestation periods.”
    Dr. Matos Rodriguez talked about her personal educational and professional story of turning her love for math and science at the University of Puerto Rico into a passion for research and STEM career engineering and the role NSF played along the way.
    “My passion for research blossomed when peers introduced me to the summer programs specifically designed to develop and enhance research skills,” Dr. Matos Rodriguez said, referring to research opportunities for undergraduates funded by the NSF that took her to California to conduct research at UC Davis and IBM.  
    “The impacts of the NSF REU program were far reaching. My journey continued at Carnegie Mellon, where I did my PhD… supported by a NASA grant. After graduate school, I worked as a postdoctoral fellow at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, funded by a grant from the National Research Council,” Dr. Matos Rodriguez continued.  “Little did I know that the product of all that research was not just the science, the discoveries or the papers, the product was me. The REU program, more than 25 years ago, was the seed for the STEM professional I am today, at a time when global competitiveness is vital, it is crucial to commit to cultivating generations of STEM professionals.”
    In the National Science Foundation for the Future Title in CHIPS and Science Act, Congress specifically called for broader participation of populations underrepresented in STEM and authorized $13 billion over five years for the NSF to allocate to STEM education. The United States can’t compete with China and others in science and innovation if we cannot close a gap in the STEM workforce that could be as large as 3 million people nationwide by 2030.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn, Blumenthal, Colleagues Introduce Bill to Aid Recovery of Nazi-Confiscated Art

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn
    AUSTIN – U.S. Senators John Cornyn (R-TX), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Thom Tillis (R-NC), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), John Fetterman (D-PA), Eric Schmitt (R-MO), and Katie Britt (R-AL) introduced the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act, which would aid in the recovery of Nazi-looted art and deliver justice for Holocaust survivors and their families:
    “The artwork wrongfully ripped from Jewish hands during the Holocaust bears witness to a chapter in history when evil persisted and the worst of humanity was on full display,” said Sen. Cornyn. “I’m proud to introduce this legislation to support the Jewish people and Holocaust survivors by helping them recover art confiscated by the Nazis that they are rightfully owed and give them the justice and restitution they deserve.”
    “The theft of art by the Nazi regime was more than a pilfering of property—it was an act of inhumanity,” said Sen. Blumenthal. “Our bipartisan effort seeks to strengthen measures to bring long overdue justice to families whose cherished art was brazenly stolen by the Nazis.”
    “This legislation helps to right a historic wrong committed during one of the darkest chapters in history,” said Sen. Tillis. “By eliminating unnecessary legal obstacles, the HEAR Act establishes a clear path to restitution for Holocaust survivors and their families, ensuring that art and cultural property stolen by the Nazis can finally be returned to their rightful owners.”
    “Despite decades’ long efforts by the United States and allies to return Nazi-looted art to Holocaust victims and their heirs, over 100,000 works of art have yet to be recovered and returned to their rightful owners,” said Sen. Booker. “I’m proud to join Senator Cornyn in introducing this important bill that updates federal law to ensure that survivors and their heirs finally regain possession of their stolen art.”
    “Hundreds of thousands of pieces of artwork were taken from the Jewish people during the Holocaust, and survivors in the United States should not be unfairly barred from claiming artwork that is theirs,” said Sen. Blackburn. “The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act would ensure Holocaust survivors and their heirs have a fair opportunity to recover artwork stolen from them by resolving claims based on merits.”
    “Eighty years after the Holocaust, we have a moral responsibility to do right by the victims of these atrocities and their families,” said Sen. Fetterman. “I’m grateful to join my colleagues from both sides of the aisle in introducing the HEAR Act to help return artwork stolen by the Nazis to its rightful owners.”
    “Stealing artwork from Jewish families during the Holocaust wasn’t just an act of thievery, it was meant to dehumanize the victims,” said Sen. Schmitt. “Decades later many families are still seeking justice, and it’s time we help Holocaust survivors and their families recover the cherished art that is rightfully theirs.”
    “The HEAR Act of 2025 empowers Holocaust survivors and their families to continue to be heard in court and to reclaim their part of history,” said Sen. Britt. “I’m proud to join this bipartisan bill that would clarify the intent of the original legislation — honoring and dignifying the families of individuals whose property was stolen or sold by the Nazi regime over 80 years ago.”
    Background:
    Nazi Germany’s campaign of annihilation and genocide against the Jewish people in the Holocaust included massive theft of property, including hundreds of thousands of works of art. Despite post-war efforts by the United States and allies to return Nazi-looted art and renewed efforts since the late 1990s, more than 100,000 works of art have not been returned to their rightful owners.
    In 2016, Congress unanimously passed the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery (HEAR) Act, spearheaded in the Senate by Senator Cornyn, to ensure Holocaust survivors and their heirs could access U.S. courts to pursue claims for the recovery of Nazi-looted art, allowing cases to be decided on their factual merits rather than dismissed on time-based technical defenses. Congress found that the circumstances of the Holocaust imposed extraordinary obstacles to survivors and heirs to locate and recover stolen art, necessitating a national six-year statute of limitations that only begins when the owner actually discovers the location of the stolen artwork.
    Unfortunately, many museums, governments, and institutions have contradicted Congress’ intent and obstructed justice by stonewalling legitimate claims, obscuring provenance, and employing aggressive legal tactics designed to exhaust and outlast survivors and their families. Rather than embracing transparency and reconciliation, too many have chosen to entrench and litigate, effectively preserving possession of stolen works rather than returning them to their rightful owners. Moreover, some court cases have interpreted the law narrowly, leaving survivors without recourse.
    The original HEAR Act includes a sunset provision and is set to expire December 31, 2026. This legislation would amend and reauthorize the original law to ensure victims of the Holocaust are not denied justice by legal loopholes, institutional intransigence, or the mere passage of time. As another insidious wave of antisemitism hits society, this legislation would reaffirm our commitment to the Jewish people and Holocaust survivors by sending a clear message that the United States will not allow looting to be legitimized, justice to be denied, or Holocaust profiteering to be tolerated.
    The HEAR Act would:
    Eliminate the sunset date, recognizing that the challenges of restitution remain urgent and unresolved;
    Clarify and strengthen procedural protections to ensure that claims are considered on their merits and not dismissed due to time-based technical defenses or other non-merits discretionary defenses;
    And fortify victims’ remedies and access to the courts.
    The legislation is endorsed by Art Ashes, Agudath Israel of America, American Jewish Committee (AJC), Anti-Defamation League (ADL), Bet Tzedek, House of Justice, Christians United for Israel (CUFI Action Fund), Creative Community for Peace (CCFP), Holocaust Survivors Foundation USA, Jewish Federations of North America (JFNA), Jewish Women International (JWI), Justice for Atrocities Clinic, LMU Loyola Law School, Simon Wiesenthal Center, StandWithUs, The 1939 Society, Weitzman National Museum of American Jewish History, and World Jewish Congress.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Regulating AI seems like an impossible task, but ethically and economically, it’s a vital one

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jun Du, Professor of Economics, Centre Director of Centre for Business Prosperity (CBP), Aston University

    AlinStock/Shutterstock

    AI has already transformed industries and the way the world works. And its development has been so rapid that it can be hard to keep up. This means that those responsible for dealing with AI’s impact on issues such as safety, privacy and ethics must be equally speedy.

    But regulating such a fast-moving and complex sector is extremely difficult.

    At a summit in France in February 2025, world leaders struggled to agree on how to govern AI in a way that would be “safe, secure and trustworthy”. But regulation is something that directly affects everyday lives – from the confidentiality of medical records to the security of financial transactions.

    One recent example which highlights the tension between technological advancement and individual privacy is the ongoing dispute between the UK government and Apple. (The government wants the tech giant to provide access to encrypted user data stored in its cloud service, but Apple says this would be a breach of customers’ privacy.)

    It’s a delicate balance for all concerned. For businesses, particularly global ones, the challenge is about navigating a fragmented regulatory landscape while staying competitive. Governments need to ensure public safety while encouraging innovation and technological progress.

    That progress could be a key part of economic growth. Research suggests that AI is igniting an economic revolution – improving the performance of entire sectors.

    In healthcare for example, AI diagnostics have drastically reduced costs and saved lives. In finance, razor-sharp algorithms cut risks and help businesses to rake in profits.

    Logistics firms have benefited from streamlined supply chains, with delivery times and expenses slashed. In manufacturing, AI-driven automation has cranked up efficiency and cut wasteful errors.

    But as AI systems become ever more deeply embedded, the risks associated with their unchecked development increase.

    Data used in recruitment algorithms for instance, can unintentionally discriminate against certain groups, perpetuating social inequality. Automated credit-scoring systems can exclude people unfairly (and remove accountability).

    Issues like these can erode trust and bring ethical risks.

    A well-designed regulatory framework must mitigate these risks while ensuring that AI remains a tool for economic growth. Over-regulation could slow development and discourage investment, but inadequate oversight may lead to misuse or exploitation.

    International intelligence

    This dilemma is being treated differently across the world. The EU for example, has introduced one of the most comprehensive regulatory frameworks, prioritising transparency and accountability, especially in areas such as healthcare and employment.

    While robust, this approach risks slowing innovation and increasing compliance costs for businesses.

    In contrast, the US has avoided sweeping federal rules, opting instead for self-regulation in specific industries. This has led to rapid AI development, particularly in areas such as autonomous vehicles and financial technology. But it also leaves regulatory gaps and inconsistent oversight.

    AI has huge potential for healthcare.
    frank60/Shutterstock

    China meanwhile uses government-led regulation, prioritising national security and economic growth. This brings major state investment, driving advances in things such as facial recognition and surveillance systems, which are used extensively in train stations, airports and public buildings.

    These varying approaches demonstrate a lack of international agreement about AI. And they also pose significant challenges for businesses operating globally.

    Companies must now comply with multiple, sometimes conflicting AI regulations, leading to increased compliance costs and uncertainty.

    This fragmentation could slow down AI adoption as firms hesitate to invest in applications that could become non-compliant in some countries. A globally coordinated regulatory framework seems increasingly necessary to ensure fairness and promote responsible innovation without excessive constraints.

    Innovation vs regulation

    But again, achieving this kind of framework would not be easy. The impact of regulation on innovation is complex and involves careful trade-offs.

    Transparency, while essential for accountability, could mean sharing new technology, potentially eroding competitive advantages. Strict compliance requirements, crucial in industries such as healthcare and finance, can be counterproductive where rapid development is vital.

    Effective AI regulation should be dynamic, adaptive and globally harmonised, balancing ethical responsibilities with economic ambition. Companies that actively align with ethical AI standards are likely to benefit from improved consumer trust.

    For now, in the absence of global agreement, the UK has chosen a flexible approach, with guidelines set by independent bodies such as the Responsible Technology Adoption Unit. This model aims to attract investment and encourage innovation by offering clarity without overly rigid constraints.

    With a robust research ecosystem, world-class universities and a skilled workforce, the UK has a solid foundation for AI-driven economic growth. Continued investment in research, infrastructure and talent are essential.

    The UK must also stay proactive in shaping international AI standards. For achieving effective AI governance that is safe and trustworthy, will be key to securing its future as an engine of economic and social transformation.

    Jun Du is a member of the British Chamber of Commerce (BCC) Economic Advisory Council, and part of BCC Global Britain Challenge Group; the Vice Chair of the Trade and Investment Panel for the International Chambers of Commerce, and advisor to the Midlands Engine Observatory Program Board and the Business Commission West Midlands Advisory Panel. Jun is a member of the Council of Experts of the UKRI-funded Innovation & Research Caucus, and part of the OECD Innovation Review Advisory Group.

    Cher Li is a member of the Council of Experts of the UKRI-funded Innovation & Research Caucus, and government Expert Peer Review Group (PRG). Her recent research projects have been funded by the ESRC and United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS).

    Xingyi Liu has received funding from the Innovation & Research Caucus for his recent research.

    – ref. Regulating AI seems like an impossible task, but ethically and economically, it’s a vital one – https://theconversation.com/regulating-ai-seems-like-an-impossible-task-but-ethically-and-economically-its-a-vital-one-250816

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Crop diversification is crucial to Canadian resilience in a changing world

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Karen K. Christensen-Dalsgaard, Assistant Professor, Department of Biological Sciences, MacEwan University

    The recent threats of tariffs and deteriorating relations with the United States have led to increasing interest from Canadian governments and the public in boosting the country’s self-reliance.

    Politicians have called on the public to “buy Canadian,” provinces have ordered American products removed from shelves and Canadian retailers have seen a surge in domestic sales. Yet the importance of agricultural adaptations for achieving greater Canadian self-reliance has largely been overlooked.

    The federal government’s plan for building a stronger agrifood sector is mainly based on financial safeguards and loan options for impacted farmers and supply-chain management of existing products. The broad topic of agricultural innovation is barely mentioned at all.

    At a time of changing geopolitical and physical environments, we must ensure the long-term resilience of Canada’s farms. An important step towards achieving this complex and multifaceted goal would be to diversify the country’s crop production.

    Low Canadian crop diversity

    Anyone browsing their supermarket’s produce section will quickly discover just how few of the products are grown in Canada. This is ironic; as most gardeners know, many imported fruits and vegetables can grow extremely well in Canada.

    Canada imports around 50 per cent of vegetables and 75 per cent of fruits from abroad, much of it from the United States.

    This has not traditionally caused concern since the agri-food sector has a net trade surplus. But among Canadian crops, just two — canola and wheat — dominate total earnings.

    Canada’s need for imports leaves it vulnerable, but so does its need for exports.

    In 2019, for instance, after the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou, China imposed harsh trade restrictions on Canadian canola. That year, canola exports to China fell by 70 per cent.

    Today, Canada faces similar issues with 100 per cent tariffs imposed by China on canola products.

    Instead of just bailing out farmers impacted by current events, governments should help those who are interested to diversify and grow crops that can be sold domestically.

    Benefits of diversifying our agriculture

    Even before the current tariffs, there were good reasons for diversifying Canadian agriculture and growing food locally.

    The nutritional value of vegetables decreases during storage and transport, suggesting that local produce may be healthier. Similarly, crop diversity can be an important tool for improving plant and soil health and so increasing yields while ensuring environmental sustainability.

    In a meta-analysis of 5,156 experiments from across the globe, researchers in France and the Netherlands showed that crop diversification typically enhanced net productivity, soil function and ecosystem services. It had the greatest effect on water quality and organism-induced damage; weed reduction, pest reduction, disease control and associated crop damages showed 33-60 per cent average improvements.

    The benefits in terms of soil health and productivity may be compounded by intercropping plant species with fungi. Preliminary results from my current research project suggest that edible saprotrophic fungi could be used as a tool for maintaining soil health while minimizing the use of environmentally problematic soil amendments.

    Diversification studies include a range of different land management techniques, some of which involve elaborate intercropping approaches that might be difficult to implement on an industrial scale. However, even relatively simple crop rotation approaches have a positive impact on soil carbon, nutrient levels, microbial activity, biodiversity and net productivity, potentially leading to increased profitability.

    The impacts of climate change

    Longstanding arguments for crop diversification have been compounded by climate-change-induced food insecurity. Increases in the frequency and severity of wildfires and droughts suggest that rely on regions like California for food imports might be poor long-term planning.

    Similarly, parts of Canada face an increased risk of weather-induced crop failure. Crop species may no longer be a good match for the current climatic conditions where they’re grown. Canola and wheat, for instance, are vulnerable to drought and heat stress during the flowering period.

    Crop diversification has long been used to minimize the impacts of climate insecurities in developing countries with less access to artificial irrigation and soil amendments. Switching to crops that can handle extreme weather events, like some beans, legumes and grains, could similarly increase Canada’s climate resilience. Additionally, using crop rotation strategies based on a greater diversity of crops grown may help maintain higher yields during adverse weather.

    How the government can help farmers

    Canada is a world leader in agricultural research. Globally, the country ranks fifth with respect to articles published, but is further behind when it comes to implementation on farms.

    Despite the high benefit-to-cost ratios of applications of agricultural research, only six per cent of Canadian farmers are willing to adopt new approaches before they have been tested at scale. Meanwhile, almost 30 per cent are reluctant to change approaches at all.

    This is hardly surprising. Change is always associated with risks. For instance, while the majority of studies show a net benefit of diversification strategies, there are huge, context-dependent variations in the outcomes. Climate, soil, crop species and microbial communities all matter in ways that can be difficult to predict.

    Most farmers do not have the resources to retool their farms for new crops and assume the risks. Many face financial struggles and rising debt. This is due in part to higher production costs and lower commodity prices caused by large corporations controlling both the sales of farm supplies and the purchase of agricultural products.

    Skilled labour shortages and issues retaining younger workers may also undermine the willingness and ability to diversify with new crops. Qualified migrant workers with agricultural backgrounds could help, but restrictive immigration policies make finding workers challenging.

    Reactive government assistance that just keeps farmers above water will not address the challenges of a changing global trade environment and climate. To sustain momentum, the government needs to proactively fund targeted, large-scale feasibility studies and provide training, recruitment and transition funding for those interested in novel crop systems.

    Agriculture is part of the foundation for our society. We have become accustomed to having access to plenty of fresh food, but this is not the global or historical norm.

    Canada’s food supply is maintained by farmers both at home and abroad who, for generations, have worked long days at low wages to feed us. If they do not receive the support required to adapt to our changing world, we might all discover how valuable food really is.

    Karen K. Christensen-Dalsgaard does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Crop diversification is crucial to Canadian resilience in a changing world – https://theconversation.com/crop-diversification-is-crucial-to-canadian-resilience-in-a-changing-world-256763

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI: First Tranche offering of UAB „Atsinaujinančios energetikos investicijos“ notes under the EUR 100 million Green Bonds Programme

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION OR RELEASE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN WHOLE OR IN PART IN OR INTO THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AUSTRALIA OR JAPAN OR ANY OTHER JURISDICTION IN WHICH THE DISTRIBUTION OR RELEASE WOULD BE UNLAWFUL. OTHER RESTRICTIONS ARE APPLICABLE. PLEASE SEE THE IMPORTANT NOTICE IN THIS STOCK EXCHANGE RELEASE BELOW.

    NEW EUR 2025/2027 NOTES

    Closed – End Investment Company Intended for Informed Investors UAB “Atsinaujinančios energetikos investicijos” (the “Company”) is launching its public offering of EUR 2025/2027 Notes (ISIN LT0000134439, the “Notes”). The Notes are being issued under the EUR 100 million Green Bond Programme. The base prospectus of the programme (the “Prospectus”) was approved by the Bank of Lithuania on 27 May 2025.
    According to the final terms of the first tranche, dated 27 May 2025 (attached), the Company is planning to issue up to EUR 65 million of nominal value Notes with maturity of 30 months to investors in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
    Summary of the main issue terms:

    • First tranche size: up to 65 000 000 EUR
    • Specified denominations: EUR 100,000 and integral multiples of EUR 1,000
    • Interest rate: 8%, paid semi-annually
    • Subscription period: from 28 May 2025 to 11 June 2025 2:30 pm CEST/3:30 pm Vilnius time
    • Settlement and issue date: 13 June 2025
    • Maturity date: 13 December 2027

    Investors wishing to submit a subscription order must contact their brokerage company.

    INVESTOR PRESENTATIONS
    Manager of Closed – End Investment Company Intended for Informed Investors UAB “Atsinaujinančios energetikos investicijos” Mantas Auruškevičius will present the offer via webcast/conference call:

    • English-language session: 4 June 2025 at 13:00 CEST / 14:00 Vilnius time. Please register in advance to attend:

    https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_d32cZE8xSqyFs8tcMpwLqA#/registration

    • Lithuanian-language session: 5 June 2025 at 9:00 CEST / 10:00 Vilnius time. Please register in advance to attend:

    https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_wxUoUAWzQ9244uO9HlNX-g#/registration

    CONTACT INFORMATION
    Mantas Auruškevičius
    Manager of Closed – End Investment Company Intended for Informed Investors
    UAB “Atsinaujinančios energetikos investicijos”
    mantas.auruskevicius@lordslb.lt

    Povilas Petručionis
    Securities trader at UAB FMĮ “Orion Securities”
    pp@orion.lt
    +37068758168

    IMPORTANT NOTICE:
    This notification is not for distribution to United States news agencies or for dissemination in the United States, Canada, Japan or Australia or elsewhere where such dissemination is not appropriate.
    Distribution of this announcement and other information in connection with the securities may be restricted by law in certain jurisdictions. Persons into whose possession this announcement or such other information should come are required to inform themselves about and to observe any such restrictions.
    No offer or invitation to acquire securities of the Company is being made by or in connection with this notification. The Prospectus is the only legally binding document containing information on the Company, the Notes and their admission to trading on the regulated market. The Prospectus is published on the website of the Company (https://lordslb.lt/AEI_green_bonds_2025/) as well as on www.nasdaqbaltic.com and www.crib.lt.
    Approval of the Prospectus shall not be understood as an endorsement of the securities admitted to trading on a regulated market. The potential investors are recommended to read the Prospectus before making an investment decision in order to fully understand the potential risks and rewards associated with the decision to invest in the securities. Furthermore, the securities referred to herein have not been and will not be registered under the US Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and may not be offered or sold in the United States or to US persons unless the securities are registered under the Securities Act, or an exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act is available. No public offering of the securities will be made in the United States.

    Further details and required documents are available at: https://lordslb.lt/AEI_green_bonds_2025/ 

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Philip R. Lane: Interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

    Source: European Central Bank

    Interview with Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, conducted by Christian Siedenbiedel on 20 May 2025

    27 May 2025

    Mr Lane, inflation rates in the euro area have fallen sharply since autumn 2022. Has inflation been beaten?

    As you say, inflation rates were temporarily above 10 per cent in 2022. Over the past two years, we have focused on bringing inflation back down to 2 per cent. This task has now mostly been completed. I am saying “mostly” because some final steps still need to be taken. For example, services inflation is still too high. But we expect it to decline in the coming months, as we think wage inflation is coming down. So the disinflation from the high inflation of 2022 is on track – but unfortunately new challenges are emerging.

    Over what time frame are you expecting the inflation rate to sustainably meet the ECB’s 2 per cent target?

    Recently, the inflation rate in the euro area stood at 2.2 per cent, which isn’t so far from our 2 per cent target. I believe that the inflation rate will remain in a zone close to 2 per cent in the coming months. But part of your question is about whether this will be on a sustained basis. And this is where we have to work out whether new challenges, in particular those to do with trade policy, could cause an inflation issue in either direction.

    Many people have the feeling that they are noticing inflation much more in the supermarket. What do you say to them?

    It is not unfounded. Food inflation remains well above 2 per cent – currently around 3 per cent. For unprocessed food, for example fruit and vegetables, it is even close to 5 per cent. So this perception is correct: “supermarket inflation” is higher than the general inflation rate. But this is offset by other developments, such as energy prices. Goods price inflation is also below the current headline inflation rate.

    How much is the reduction in inflation really down to the ECB – and to what extent is it simply a consequence of the sharp rise and subsequent fall in energy prices?

    This time is different from the 1970s. At that time, many central banks didn’t manage to convince people that inflation would fall again – although the Bundesbank did better than others. People expected inflation to remain high. This time around we made it clear that the ECB would deliver on price stability. Through our monetary policy, we have prevented double-digit inflation from getting entrenched. So we played our part and ensured that this period of high inflation remained temporary. Due to our intervention, fluctuations in energy prices have not led to a permanent surge in inflation.

    What impact do you expect Donald Trump’s tariffs to have on inflation in the euro area?

    This has been the subject of intense debate since the election in November. Several factors play a role: first, the exchange rate between the US dollar and the euro. Many expected that tariffs would weaken the euro. So far, however, the opposite has occurred. Second, the tariffs have an impact on global economic growth; the slowdown has pushed down oil and gas prices, and this was not in the initial discussion but is proving important. And third, with respect to trade between the United States and China, China is likely to export less to the United States and more to Europe. So there are a number of factors that could lead to lower inflation in the euro area. But we also have to keep in mind that we don’t know the outcome of the negotiations between the EU and the United States.

    At this point, is it possible to predict what’s ultimately going to happen?

    The outcome is still quite open at the moment. For the time being, there are some factors that tend to support a drop in euro area inflation. However, the picture could shift if, for example, the negotiations between the EU and the United States fail, with the United States imposing higher tariffs and the EU implementing counter tariffs. Supply chains could also be disrupted – this could drive up inflation.

    Are there differences between short-term and long-term effects?

    I would actually distinguish between three time horizons: short term, medium term and long term. In the coming months, in other words for the remainder of 2025, the inflation rate is expected to be close to target. Over the medium term, the impact of US tariffs on inflation could materialise, including through the exchange rate and energy prices. Looking further ahead to the long term, analysts and financial markets are reasonably confident that inflation will return to the ECB’s target. The main focus of the ECB’s monetary policy is on the medium-term horizon: that is to say, one or two years ahead.

    Is there any reason to be concerned that people’s inflation expectations could rise more quickly again because the experience of very high inflation is still so recent?

    As a directional statement, I agree. Before the pandemic, many were convinced inflation would stay very low. The high inflation episode was a painful reminder that inflation can arise. But such a combination of extraordinary events – the pandemic, Russia’s war in Ukraine – is very rare. The more concrete question for us is: could a world of shocks relating to structural changes – arising from challenges to globalisation, increased automation, changing demography – push inflation noticeably below or above 2 per cent, and how responsive will inflation expectations be? Part of our job will be to make sure expectations remain anchored, that people have the reassurance that if inflation moves away from 2 per cent we will bring it back.

    What impact do the current labour shortages and low unemployment have on inflation?

    There is certainly a difference compared with the pre-pandemic period. That’s why I don’t think we will return to inflation rates that are as low as they were back then. When unemployment is low, firms and employees are more likely to settle on wage increases – perhaps around 3 per cent on average in the euro area. This is a normalisation and, allowing for rising labour productivity, makes our 2 per cent target more credible. But I do not see any signs of a wage-price spiral at present, and this also applies to Germany.

    In Belgium, wages are, in part, directly bound to inflation. Has that added to inflation there?

    During the period of high inflation, wages rose rapidly in Belgium but, as inflation fell, wage growth slowed down quickly again. In Germany, there was a different pattern: it took longer for wages to go up. But there is no major difference when looking at the average over three to five years.

    Do you think it is possible that the new protectionism will lead to deglobalisation in the longer term, resulting in structurally higher inflation rates?

    It is important to differentiate between temporary and permanent effects. For many firms the business model is connected to globalisation. A phase of deglobalisation could initially dampen economic growth, which would make it more likely that inflation rates would fall. Following that transition, inflation and its volatility could increase as the offsetting effect of favourable imports fades. It could mean that, as a central bank, we have to be more active in our policy responses to return inflation to 2 per cent over the medium term.

    The Federal Reserve fears that US tariffs could lead to transitory, i.e. temporary, inflation. Would it leave inflation in the euro area unaffected if US rates rise?

    The world needs the Federal Reserve to maintain price stability for the United States. If this means high US interest rates, it can lead to a stronger dollar and thereby somewhat higher inflation for Europe in the short term. In the medium term, however, high US interest rates mostly hold back the global economy – which tends to lead to lower inflation in the euro area. There are always some spillover effects.

    What does all this mean for the ECB’s interest rate policy?

    We need to find a middle path. If we keep interest rates too high for too long, the disinflation pressure of US tariffs could cause inflation rates to fall below our target. If we cut too much and too quickly, a strengthening economy and other factors could drive inflation back up. This is why we will pay close attention to the data in our next meetings. If we see signs of further falling inflation, we will respond with further interest rate cuts – but the range of discussion is not that wide: no one is talking about dramatic rate cuts. We are in a zone of normal central banking.

    Are the key ECB interest rates now in the neutral range?

    The neutral interest rate can only be estimated and it is a long-term concept. In the long term, the neutral interest rate could be around where we are now. But the world is not in equilibrium and the appropriate interest rate may be different in the short term. I would differentiate between the three policy rate zones: a clearly restrictive one with rates say in the high twos or above; and a clearly accommodative one – for the sake of discussion, say rates below 1.5 per cent are clearly accommodative. Going there would only be appropriate in the event of more substantial downside risks to inflation, or a more significant slowdown in the economy. I do not see that at the moment. And there is a zone in between, where it is more of a question of cyclical management. We are navigating in that zone at the moment. This is the focus of the discussions at the ECB.

    Can the ECB be indifferent to exchange rate developments when there is a sharp depreciation of the dollar, like at the moment? Unlike the Bundesbank in the past, you aren’t pursuing an official exchange rate policy…

    The exchange rate is of course an important factor in the development of inflation, even if we do not pursue an explicit exchange rate policy. However, most trade in the euro area takes place between countries sharing the euro as a common currency and, therefore, the exchange rate does not play a role. Trade with the United States and other regions of the world is important but it’s not the dominant factor. At the same time, we need to look at the impact of exchange rate shifts in a situation like we have now.

    Do you think that the euro could replace the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency as a consequence of the unreliable economic policies of the United States?

    I think the question whether the euro should overtake the US dollar is not so important. I can imagine that the euro will become more important as a reserve currency in the current situation. In the first decade of the euro, there was an optimism that we would no longer live in a world with a single world currency, the dollar. Now, the United States is facing all kinds of questions about its role in the world economy. The natural second currency is the euro. It is well placed to gain a bigger share of the market. This could be supported by further European integration – to put the euro on a firmer foundation.

    In your estimation, how great is the risk that we will now see more frequent waves of inflation, like those seen recently?

    The specific circumstances of the last wave of inflation will probably not be repeated quickly. Something like that occurs at most every few decades. Nevertheless, I also consider very low inflation rates, like those before the pandemic, to be unlikely in the current circumstances where there are so many upheavals and changes. There could be more external shocks and fluctuations in inflation rates than in the past. That means that we have an important job to do at the ECB. We may need to become even more active than before in adjusting our policy to the incoming shocks.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Council Leader visits Derby’s twin city

    Source: City of Derby

    Councillor Peatfield reflects on a successful trip to Derby’s twin city and the long-awaited reopening of Derby’s Market Hall…

    If you’ve driven in and out of the city and paid attention to the “Welcome to Derby” signs, you may know that we are twinned with Osnabrück, a city in north west Germany. You might have thought “so what?” or wondered what that even means, but our twinning with Osnabrück is really important for us a city and holds a lot of historic significance.

    Derby and Osnabrück have been twinned since 1976, as a way of building strong links and friendships with communities in other countries following the Second World War. Since then, delegations from each city have hosted each other, sharing ideas and cultures, with a special emphasis on involving young people.

    For a long time now, I have been really keen to strengthen our link with our twin city and do more to celebrate our partnership. Early last week, I had the opportunity to do just this, taking a whistle-stop tour – fully funded by myself – to learn more about Osnabrück and represent Derby at their ‘Derby Day’. I travelled with visual arts charity Artcore and it was great to share this experience with them.

    It really was a jam-packed few days meeting with Osnabrück’s Oberburgermeister, or Lord Mayor, and visiting the Skulptur Gallerie (sculpture gallery).

    It was a privilege to also attend Derby Day at the Maiwoche Festival – an annual celebration of our city’s twinning. I joined some some Derby artists from Artcore and members of the public to create a peace-themed mural on the Platz der Stadtefreundschaften (City Partnership Square).

    Then it was time for music, and I enjoyed watching Willow Bay, Scribble Victory and Dammit Jack flying the flag for Derbyshire with live performances. The Pipes and Drums of the Royal British Legion Osnabrück were a spectacular finale.

    I received a very warm welcome from the people of Osnabrück, including many who want to come to Derby next year, which is the 50th anniversary of our twinning. I’m now more passionate than ever about strengthening the ties between our two cities and ensuring that we educate future generations not only about the history behind our twinning, but the value that our close partnership holds.

    Incidentally, 2027 will mark 50 years since Derby was granted city status, meaning we’ll have a lot to celebrate over the next few years. More on that soon.

    During my visit of Osnabrück I toured some areas of the city centre that are earmarked for regeneration, and it was interesting to see that they face many of the same challenges as we do in Derby. Empty shops and buildings are issues there too.

    However, we had a regeneration success this past weekend which deserves to be celebrated. I can’t not mention the reopening of our historic Market Hall.  A huge thank you to every single person who has played a part in lovingly restoring and allowing us to reopen our beloved Market Hall. From planning and conservation teams to those working on the operations and marketing, as well as our wonderful Derby Live and Market Hall management teams, this weekend was a celebration of all that we have achieved working in partnership, and I am so proud of Team Derby!

    If you missed out on all the fun last weekend, we have a week-long programme of live entertainment, workshops, activities for families and much, much more this week. There’s lots more information about this on the Derby Market Hall website.

    We’re on a journey to transform Derby city centre into a vibrant and welcoming place to be and the re-opening is a very momentous part of this.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI: SEALSQ Corp, a member of the WISeKey Group, Signs a Share Purchase Agreement to Acquire 100% of IC’ALPS

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SEALSQ Corp, a member of the WISeKey Group, Signs a Share Purchase Agreement to Acquire 100% of IC’ALPS

    Geneva, Switzerland – May 27, 2025 – Ad-Hoc announcement pursuant to Art. 53 of SIX Listing Rules – WISeKey International Holding Ltd (NASDAQ: WKEY / SIX: WIHN) (“WISeKey” or “the Company”), a global leader in cybersecurity, digital identity, and IoT technologies, today announced the signing of a Share Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) between SEALSQ Corp (“SEALSQ”), , a leading developer and provider of Semiconductors, PKI, and Post-Quantum technology hardware and software solutions, a member of the WISeKey Group of Companies, and the shareholders of IC’ALPS SAS (the “Sellers”)1, an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (“ASIC”) design and supply specialist based in Grenoble, France (“IC’ALPS”) for the acquisition of 100% of the share capital and voting rights of IC’ALPS(“the Acquisition”).

    The SPA is the result of a period of exclusive negotiations between SEALSQ CORP and the Sellers, announced by SEALSQ on February 27, 2025. The main terms and conditions of the SPA announced by WISeKey on May 22, 2025 remain applicable. The proposed strategic Acquisition is now solely subject to the satisfaction of certain closing conditions including among others, approval of the Acquisition by the French Ministry of the Economy in accordance with articles L.151-3 and R.151-1 et seq of the French Financial and Monetary Code (code monétaire et financier).

    The Transaction is expected to be completed in the third quarter of 2025, subject to satisfying the conditions to closing, including the necessary regulatory approval by the French Ministry of the Economy.

    About IC’ALPS:
    IC’ALPS is your one-stop-shop ASIC partner. Based in France (HQ in Grenoble, two design centers in Grenoble and Toulouse), the company provides customers with a complete offering for Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC) and Systems on Chip (SoC) development from circuit specification, mastering design in-house, up to the management of the entire production supply chain. Its 100+ engineers’ areas of expertise include analog, digital and mixed-signal circuits (sensor/MEMS interfaces, ultra-low power consumption, power management, high-resolution converters, high voltage, signal processing, ARM and RISC-V based multiprocessors architectures, hardware accelerators) on technologies from 0.18 µm down to 1.8 nm, and from multiple foundries (TSMC, Global Foundries, Tower Semiconductor, X-FAB, STMicroelectronics, Intel Foundry, etc.). The company is active worldwide in medical, industrial, automotive, IoT, IA, mil-aero, and digital identity & security sectors. IC’ALPS is ISO 9001:2015, ISO 13485:2016, EN 9100:2018, Common Criteria certified, IATF16949-ready, member of TSMC Design Center Alliance (DCA), Intel Foundry Accelerator Design Services Alliance and Value Chain Alliance (DSA & VCA), ams Osram Preferred Partner and X-FAB’s partner network.
    More information: www.icalps.com and  https://www.linkedin.com/company/ic-alps

    About SEALSQ:
    SEALSQ is a leading innovator in Post-Quantum Technology hardware and software solutions. Our technology seamlessly integrates Semiconductors, PKI (Public Key Infrastructure), and Provisioning Services, with a strategic emphasis on developing state-of-the-art Quantum Resistant Cryptography and Semiconductors designed to address the urgent security challenges posed by quantum computing. As quantum computers advance, traditional cryptographic methods like RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are increasingly vulnerable.

    SEALSQ is pioneering the development of Post-Quantum Semiconductors that provide robust, future-proof protection for sensitive data across a wide range of applications, including Multi-Factor Authentication tokens, Smart Energy, Medical and Healthcare Systems, Defense, IT Network Infrastructure, Automotive, and Industrial Automation and Control Systems. By embedding Post-Quantum Cryptography into our semiconductor solutions, SEALSQ ensures that organizations stay protected against quantum threats. Our products are engineered to safeguard critical systems, enhancing resilience and security across diverse industries.

    For more information on our Post-Quantum Semiconductors and security solutions, please visit www.sealsq.com.

    About WISeKey
    WISeKey International Holding Ltd (“WISeKey”, SIX: WIHN; Nasdaq: WKEY) is a global leader in cybersecurity, digital identity, and IoT solutions platform. It operates as a Swiss-based holding company through several operational subsidiaries, each dedicated to specific aspects of its technology portfolio. The subsidiaries include (i) SEALSQ Corp (Nasdaq: LAES), which focuses on semiconductors, PKI, and post-quantum technology products, (ii) WISeKey SA which specializes in RoT and PKI solutions for secure authentication and identification in IoT, Blockchain, and AI, (iii) WISeSat AG which focuses on space technology for secure satellite communication, specifically for IoT applications, (iv) WISe.ART Corp which focuses on trusted blockchain NFTs and operates the WISe.ART marketplace for secure NFT transactions, and (v) SEALCOIN AG which focuses on decentralized physical internet with DePIN technology and house the development of the SEALCOIN platform.

    Each subsidiary contributes to WISeKey’s mission of securing the internet while focusing on their respective areas of research and expertise. Their technologies seamlessly integrate into the comprehensive WISeKey platform. WISeKey secures digital identity ecosystems for individuals and objects using Blockchain, AI, and IoT technologies. With over 1.6 billion microchips deployed across various IoT sectors, WISeKey plays a vital role in securing the Internet of Everything. The company’s semiconductors generate valuable Big Data that, when analyzed with AI, enable predictive equipment failure prevention. Trusted by the OISTE/WISeKey cryptographic Root of Trust, WISeKey provides secure authentication and identification for IoT, Blockchain, and AI applications. The WISeKey Root of Trust ensures the integrity of online transactions between objects and people. For more information on WISeKey’s strategic direction and its subsidiary companies, please visit www.wisekey.com.

    Forward-Looking Statements
    This communication expressly or implicitly contains certain forward-looking statements concerning WISeKey International Holding Ltd and its business. Forward-looking statements include statements regarding our business strategy, financial performance, results of operations, market data, events or developments that we expect or anticipate will occur in the future, as well as any other statements which are not historical facts and can be identified by forward-looking words such as “anticipate,” “believe,” “could,” “continue,” “estimate,” “expect,” “intend,” “may,” “should,” “will” and “would” or similar words. Although we believe that the expectations reflected in such forward-looking statements are reasonable, no assurance can be given that such expectations will prove to have been correct. These statements involve known and unknown risks and are based upon a number of assumptions and estimates which are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies, many of which are beyond our control. Actual results may differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Important factors that, in our view, could cause actual results to differ materially from those discussed in the forward-looking statements include the actual adjustments that arise upon conversion of the financial information of IC’ALPS to US GAAP in relation to net sales, operating expenses and income tax income in the income statement for twelve months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, and in relation to intangible assets, current liabilities, and pension and debt liabilities in the balance sheet as at December 31, 2024 and 2023, in comparison with the French GAAP ; the entering into of definitive documents, the authorization by French regulatory authorities and the successful closing of the Acquisition; and the risks discussed in WISeKey’s filings with the SEC. Risks and uncertainties are further described in reports filed by WISeKey with the SEC.

    This press release does not constitute an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy, any securities, and it does not constitute an offering prospectus within the meaning of the Swiss Financial Services Act (“FinSA”), the FinSa’s predecessor legislation or advertising within the meaning of the FinSA. Investors must rely on their own evaluation of WISeKey and its securities, including the merits and risks involved. Nothing contained herein is, or shall be relied on as, a promise or representation as to the future performance of WISeKey.

    Press and Investor Contacts

    WISeKey International Holding Ltd
    Company Contact:  Carlos Moreira
    Chairman & CEO
    Tel: +41 22 594 3000
    info@wisekey.com    		 WISeKey Investor Relations (US) 
    The Equity Group Inc.
    Lena Cati
    Tel: +1 212 836-9611
    lcati@theequitygroup.com

    1 The Sellers are Doliam SA, Mrs. Lucille Engels and Mr. Jean-Luc Triouleyre.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Planisware – Availability of documents relating to the general meeting

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Availability of documents relating to the combined general meeting of June, 19 2025

    Paris, France, May 27, 2025 – Shareholders of Planisware, a leading B2B provider of SaaS in the rapidly growing Project Economy, are invited to attend the Annual General Meeting to be held on Thursday, June 19, 2025 at 9am CET. at Planisware’s headquarters, 200, avenue de Paris – 92320 Châtillon, France (the “Meeting”).

    The meeting notice, including the agenda and the text of the proposed resolutions, was published in the Bulletin des Annonces Légales Obligatoires (BALO) No. 57 on May 12, 2025. The procedures for participating and voting at this Meeting are set out in this notice. It will be followed by a convening notice published in the BALO and in a legal gazette within the time limits specified by applicable laws and regulations.

    These notices are also available on Planisware website at the following address: https://planisware.com (section 2025 General Meeting).

    The Meeting will be broadcasted live on Planisware website1.

    How to participate

    Shareholders may choose one of the following three methods to exercise their voting rights at the Meeting:

    • attend the Meeting;
    • proxy the Chairman of the Meeting or any other natural or legal person;
    • vote by mail or online on the VOTACCESS website.

    The terms and conditions for participation will be detailed in the convening notice, which will be posted on the Planisware website (section General Meeting 2025).

    Availability of preparatory documents

    Shareholders may from now on consult and download the information and documents provided for in Article R.22-10-23 of the French Commercial Code (including the meeting notice, the convocation brochure, and the 2024 Universal Registration Document) relating to the Meeting on the Planisware’s website at the following address: https://planisware.com (section 2025 General Meeting).

    Documents that must be made available to shareholders in connection with general meetings are available at Planisware’s registered office, located at 200, avenue de Paris – 92320 Châtillon, France, in accordance with applicable legal and regulatory provisions.

    Written questions from shareholders

    Shareholders may submit written questions to Planisware in accordance with Articles L. 225-108 and R. 225-84 of the French Commercial Code. These questions should preferably be sent by email to the following address: assembleegenerale@planisware.com (or to Planisware’s registered office by registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt) no later than the fourth business day prior to the date of the Meeting, i.e., by midnight on June 13, 2025.

    They must be accompanied by proof of registration in the account.

    Upcoming event

    • June 24, 2025:                Dividend Ex-date
    • June 26, 2025:                Dividend Pay-date
    • July 31, 2025:                 H1 2025 results publication
    • October 21, 2025:         Q3 2025 revenue publication

    Contact

    About Planisware

    Planisware is a leading business-to-business (“B2B”) provider of Software-as-a-Service (“SaaS”) in the rapidly growing Project Economy. Planisware’s mission is to provide solutions that help organizations transform how they strategize, plan and deliver their projects, project portfolios, programs and products.

    With circa 750 employees across 16 offices, Planisware operates at significant scale serving around 600 organizational clients in a wide range of verticals and functions across more than 30 countries worldwide. Planisware’s clients include large international companies, medium-sized businesses and public sector entities.

    Planisware is listed on the regulated market of Euronext Paris (Compartment A, ISIN code FR001400PFU4, ticker symbol “PLNW”).

    For more information, visit: https://planisware.com/ and connect with Planisware on LinkedIn.

    1 Unless technical reasons make this impossible or seriously disrupt the broadcast. Furthermore, it is noted that live voting via the Internet will not be possible during the broadcast of the Meeting.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: European monetary policy in times of high uncertainty | Lecture at ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

    Source: Deutsche Bundesbank in English

    Check against delivery.

    1 Certain uncertainty
    Ladies and gentlemen, 
    Thank you very much for your invitation and kind welcome. I am delighted to be with you here in Mannheim today.
    With this series of events, the ZEW has been providing a forum for political, economic and academic exchange for more than three decades now. You have set out your expectations very clearly: Pressing economic policy issues and recent developments are the focus. 
    At present, pressing issues and developments are indeed coming thick and fast. Take, for example, the numerous pivots in trade policy by the US Administration. Sometimes the issues are already outdated before you have even had a chance to address them. In any case, one thing is clear: we have a lot to discuss today. 
    Ladies and gentlemen,
    When the ZEW proposed a topic to me just over two months ago, I had no doubt in my mind: there was no chance that the chosen topic would already be outdated. And why not? As Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, once said: “Uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the defining characteristic of that landscape.”[1]
    Greenspan said this in 2003. The term “the Great Moderation” had just been coined to describe a period of exceptional macroeconomic stability.[2] Uncertainty seemed to be relatively low at that time. Nevertheless, Greenspan stressed the factor of uncertainty. And he is not alone in this. I would imagine that none of you have ever heard a central banker say that uncertainty is currently negligible. 
    From my own experience, I can confirm that, when making monetary policy decisions, we are always faced with uncertainty. It is, after all, in the nature of the matter: the decisions impact a future that cannot be precisely predicted. Dealing with uncertainty is therefore part of the job description of monetary policymakers. What is constantly changing are the causes and degree of uncertainty. And that brings us to the heart of today’s topic: European monetary policy in times of high uncertainty. 
    In my lecture today, I will address three key questions: How should monetary policy deal with uncertainty in general? What are the main causes of uncertainty at present and in the future? How is monetary policy in the euro area navigating the current period of high uncertainty?
    2 Monetary policy under uncertainty
    Let us start with the subject that we have just touched upon: the impact of monetary policy unfolds only gradually. The decisions of today affect the inflation of tomorrow. The gap between decisions and their impact necessitates a forward-looking approach. Or, to put it another way: when we are out in the monetary policy landscape, we are also looking to our more distant surroundings. 
    This means that a core part of preparing for monetary policy meetings is to assess future developments. And, unlike with the weather, for example, the current situation is not entirely clear, either. A broad set of data and diverse economic models are therefore helpful for us. Like a magnifying glass and a pair of binoculars, they make it easier for us to examine our environment as closely as possible. Following on from this, we can differentiate between two types of uncertainty: data uncertainty and model uncertainty.
    Data uncertainty arises because not all of the information is available to obtain a picture of the “true” state of the economy. There are a number of reasons for this: not all of the data that would be of interest are recorded statistically or can be recorded in their entirety. Some data are only available with a considerable time delay. Some are subject to measurement issues, so the data need to be revised later. 
    To give one example: for economic activity in the euro area, Eurostat provides a preliminary flash estimate around four weeks after the end of a quarter. This is based on a very limited dataset, and especially the figures for the third month of the quarter need to be estimated. The actual flash estimate is released two weeks later. But even this does not yet include any details or nominal data. Another two to three weeks later, it is followed by an initial estimate with a more detailed breakdown by components. However, even then, changes should still be expected, and these can sometimes be considerable. 
    This demonstrates how we have only incomplete knowledge of the present in real time. The description and assessment of the current situation are therefore already subject to uncertainty. 
    In addition to this, there is model uncertainty. In order to be able to examine macroeconomic processes, complex realities must be simplified. This simplification is achieved through models. They are confined to a small number of interrelationships that are as relevant as possible. All others are disregarded. In monetary policy, we use models, for example, to predict the development of inflation or to estimate the effects of our monetary policy measures. However, there is plenty of room for discussion on whether the simplifications in each model are always adequate. 
    But even if we were all in agreement on the model framework, other sources of uncertainty still remain. This concerns, for one thing, the parameters. These reflect the assumed strength and dynamics of the relationships within a given model. The parameters are usually estimated on the basis of past observations. The estimation results therefore also depend on the selected investigation period. Furthermore, parameters can evolve over time, for example as a result of structural change. Particularly if this happens abruptly and the structural breaks are not detected immediately, the model results can then be misleading. 
    For another thing, models often make use of variables that cannot be observed directly, such as potential output or natural interest rates. These must themselves be estimated, which entails considerable uncertainty.[3] This also shows how closely data uncertainty and model uncertainty are intertwined.
    To summarise: models arrive at different results due to uncertainties in their structure, parameters and estimation variables, which may lead us to different conclusions. Assessment by experts then often determines the final forecast picture. 
    In practice, data uncertainty and model uncertainty are especially relevant when unexpected events occur. At these times, monetary policymakers’ need for comprehensive information is, of course, particularly great. This is because the appropriate monetary policy response depends on the nature of the unexpected events in question. However, data uncertainty and model uncertainty make it difficult to definitively ascertain the exact nature and magnitude of a shock that is currently taking place. There is a relatively high risk of being wrong. What can monetary policymakers do against this?
    First of all, we draw on many different sources of information to obtain as complete a picture of the current situation as possible. For example, in 2019 and 2020, we at the Bundesbank began to regularly survey households and firms about their assessments and expectations. Since 2020, we have been measuring the activity of the German economy using a weekly index. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, models have been developed that explicitly take gas price shocks into account. 
    In addition, we are continually working on improving our forecast models even further. Artificial intelligence now offers new possibilities, such as capturing non-linear relationships, analysing large sets of data, and automating and accelerating analytical processes. We are intensively examining all of these possibilities at the Bundesbank. And we have already achieved some promising successes in this regard. I will come back to touch upon one specific prototype later on.
    Given the data uncertainty and model uncertainty, we in monetary policy are well advised to pursue a strategy that is as robust as possible. To stick with the image of Alan Greenspan: in the monetary policy landscape, you should best avoid flip-flops. Sturdy footwear is needed here. A robust strategy produces good results under various assumptions and prevents particularly costly mistakes.
    The more uncertain the setting, the greater the risk of policy errors. That is why, when uncertainty is high, monetary policymakers are also in demand as risk managers. We have to consider various scenarios, assess the likelihood that they will materialise as well as their implications, and also weigh up the costs and benefits of different monetary policy paths that lead to the inflation destination. How do these considerations affect our decisions? The short answer is: it depends.
    A gradual approach might make sense when uncertainty is high.[4] It is human nature: when the room you are entering is dark, you do not simply rush in. You proceed slowly, taking small steps. Applying this analogy to monetary policy, the costs of reversing policy following an error could outweigh the costs of acting too late. “Flip-flopping” could itself add to the uncertainty and destabilise expectations. Moreover, abruptly changing direction can precipitate greater volatility in financial markets and pose risks to financial stability. 
    That said, it will not always be the case that cautious monetary policymaking is a good response to high uncertainty. I am talking about situations in which a “wait-and-see” attitude increases the risk that the outcome will be particularly unfavourable. Going back to the dark room I mentioned just now: if the flames are right behind you, you should not edge your way forwards in small steps. A scenario where inflation expectations risk drifting off might be just such a case. Then, a vigorous response would be appropriate to protect yourself from this worst-case scenario. As you can see, it may be necessary to respond swiftly and comprehensively, precisely because uncertainty is high. 
    Clearly, monetary policymakers acting as risk managers would be well advised to take robust control approaches into account when making decisions in particularly uncertain times.[5]
    3 Drivers of uncertainty
    3.1 Trade policy flip-flopping
    Ladies and gentlemen,
    Right now, these considerations are anything but mere theory. And that is due, not least, to the White House. Since the change of administration in the United States, no little uncertainty has been rippling across the Atlantic. The waves caused by US trade policy have been particularly huge. 
    Since April, the United States has been imposing additional tariffs of at least 10 % on all its trading partners. Tariffs that are higher still apply to imports of steel and aluminium as well as to cars and automotive parts. Tit-for-tat tariff hikes by the United States and China drove tariff rates to more than 100 % at times. In mid-May, the two countries agreed to lower them significantly for a time.[6] Even so, the average effective US tariff rate has climbed by more than 13 percentage points in the year to date, reaching its highest level since the 1930s.[7] In addition, there is a risk of tariffs going higher still as of July if bilateral negotiations fail. 
    The shock waves unleashed by US trade policy are not only having an impact via the actual tariff burden. Their unpredictability and the doubts they have raised about US economic and fiscal policy are also leaving a mark, as reflected by the sometimes severe fluctuations in financial markets. The tariff hikes announced on 2 April, for example, caused implied stock market volatility to spike significantly higher. This points to a high degree of uncertainty among market participants – in the United States especially, but also in the euro area.
    Measured in terms of the number of mentions in newspaper articles, trade policy uncertainty peaked this spring.[8] And that is hardly surprising given how many questions this topic is raising: which tariffs will be put into effect, temporarily suspended or withdrawn – and when? What retaliatory measures will follow in each case? To what degree will goods flows in global trade be diverted? What will be the fallout from this? Will action be taken to curb these diversions? And, if so, by whom? You could keep going like this ad infinitum. 
    Even in times when trade policy moves in straight lines, forecasts of the economic impact of upheavals in the tariff regime would be no more than rough approximations. But we are dealing with an almost unpredictable cycle of events: tariffs are threatened, put into force, partially withdrawn, and then threatened again. 
    One example of this is the US tariff policy imposed on the EU. First, on 12 March, the United States imposed general tariffs of 25 % on steel and aluminium. A little time later, additional blanket tariffs of 25 % were imposed on cars and automotive parts as well. On 2 April 2025, President Trump also announced what he called “reciprocal” tariffs for a host of trading partners depending on the bilateral trade deficit and amounting to at least 10 %, and, in the case of the EU, 20 %. But then, with turmoil raging in financial markets, President Trump, on 9 April, suspended the tariffs for 90 days, initially in order to reach “deals”. The minimum 10 % tariff and the additional 25 % tariff on cars, steel and aluminium were left in place, though. On 23 May, President Trump threatened the EU with 50 % tariffs, starting on 1 June – a threat he withdrew two days later. This means that forecasts are based on a footing that is less stable than usual.
    As far as economic growth is concerned, at least the direction of travel seems to be clear: Germany, like the euro area as a whole, is likely to suffer marked losses as a result of US tariff policy. First, the higher tariffs will make European goods less competitive in the US market. This will probably shrink exports to the United States. Second, sluggish economic activity in the United States and other trading-partner countries will dampen demand for products from Europe. Third, the high degree of uncertainty makes longer-term planning more difficult. Enterprises could therefore postpone investment decisions in the hope of quieter times.[9] 
    The Bundesbank has simulated the impact of US tariff policy effective in mid-April, China’s retaliatory measures, and the immediate exchange rate response. The results suggest that economic output in the euro area could be just under half a percentage point lower over the medium term. 
    The direction in which the trade dispute will move inflation in the euro area, however, remains unclear. On the one hand, weaker growth tends to dampen prices. Potential diversion effects resulting from more goods from China in the European market might also leave inflation somewhat lower. On the other hand, any retaliatory tariffs imposed by the EU would fuel inflation. 
    How the exchange rate will evolve going forward remains to be seen. In theory, the expected response to the US tariffs would be a stronger dollar. If anything, this would tend to drive prices higher in the euro area. But things have played out differently so far. In the wake of the tariff discussions, trust in the US dollar has declined, at least temporarily, causing the currency to depreciate markedly since 2 April. In the euro area, this has dampened inflation.
    Thinking beyond day-to-day terms, it is conceivable that longer-term effects will materialise as well. For example, tariffs can have a particularly negative impact on trade in intermediate goods.[10] This is because they shake the calculations upon which global production networks are based. 
    Enterprises have fine-tuned their supply chains to forge highly cost-efficient production structures. However, the trade barriers are putting a spanner in the works of global value chains. Enterprises will have no option but to recalculate their supply chains and tweak some of their relationships with suppliers. They will build up new partnerships and no doubt pay particular attention to strengthening their resilience. This will not happen overnight, especially with political conditions as unsettled as they are right now.[11] In the process, they may well relinquish some of the efficiency gains they have reaped. Over the medium term, this could generally drive up their costs and, as a result, their prices as well.
    3.2 Structural change is progressing
    The reconfiguration of global value chains is working in tandem with other structural changes: among them, first and foremost, climate change and the transition to a climate-neutral economy. The ageing of society is also playing a role, with more people entering retirement and fewer people still in the workforce. And let us not forget digitalisation, which brings with it great opportunities for increased productivity but also considerable change in many professional fields, as well as the risk of giving individual big players more market power.
    All of these factors could influence the inflation environment. It is often unclear in which direction inflation is heading, and it may change over time. Overall, these structural drivers make it difficult to assess medium-term inflation developments.
    3.3 New geopolitical realities
    Alongside structural change and the almost fully unpredictable developments in the tariff dispute, there is a third factor of uncertainty. Old security policy certainties have given way to new geopolitical realities. This is creating new challenges for Europe: we will thus need to invest significantly more in our own security.
    In order to sufficiently bolster our defence capabilities, considerably greater funds are required. There is a strong case against financing such ad hoc needs in the short term solely by rebalancing budgets. The European Commission, for instance, proposes activating the national escape clause in the EU fiscal rules in order to temporarily allow countries greater scope for borrowing.[12] 
    I think this is a justifiable approach. It would allow countries to gradually adjust to higher defence spending. However, it must be clear that this would only be a transitional period. Increased deficits cannot become a permanent state of affairs. A resilient Europe that is capable of action rests on a stable foundation. This includes sound public finances whereby key items are funded in the core budget and through current revenue.
    Overall, there are signs of a more expansionary fiscal policy stance for the euro area. Whether or not greater debt also leads to greater price pressures in the euro area depends on many factors, such as what the additional money is spent on, how quickly it flows out, and how much money flows in from abroad. These uncertainties make it more difficult to forecast developments. In any case, the ECB Governing Council is keeping a close eye on risk. As stated in the account of our April meeting: A boost in defence and infrastructure spending could also lift inflation over the medium term.
    4 Monetary policy stance in the euro area
    The current high level of uncertainty is a slight dampener on the gratification brought about by positive developments: since the beginning of the year, the euro area inflation rate has fallen from 2.5 % to 2.2 % in April. This has finally brought the target within reach. We are on the right path, even if it remains rocky. The core rate has recently risen again. At 4 %, prices for services, in particular, have seen surprisingly steep growth. 
    The ECB Governing Council will continue to steer the monetary policy stance in such a way that the inflation rate stabilises at 2 % over the medium-term. You may now be asking yourselves: What exactly does that mean for the next meeting in June? Will there be another interest rate cut? Pressing as these questions are, I unfortunately cannot answer them today.
    Since July 2022, we on the ECB Governing Council have been following a data-dependent approach, making decisions on a meeting-by-meeting basis. This approach has proved successful when dealing with the heightened uncertainty of recent years, such as during the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and in the wake of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. We have stayed flexible and have continuously assessed how the incoming data change the medium-term inflation outlook. Here, we supplemented our baseline – which is the most likely outcome – with scenario analyses. This also allowed us to assess the probability of less likely but still conceivable outcomes. 
    Using this approach, I believe that we are well equipped to deal with the current high level of uncertainty, too. As I explained earlier, inflation could be higher or lower than the latest expectations, depending on how the tariff dispute develops as well as other influencing factors like the exchange rate, services prices and fiscal packages. In light of this, it seems to me more advisable than ever to make decisions meeting by meeting on the basis of the latest data. If we had not already been operating so flexibly, we would have had to start doing so now, at the latest. It would be impossible to reliably commit to a specific interest rate path at the current juncture.
    In June, the ECB Governing Council will have a fresh set of data and an up-to-date forecast. These will help us to align the monetary policy stance in a way that will bring us another step closer to our goal. Our destination is clear: we want the inflation rate to reach the target of 2 % soon and to stabilise there on a sustainable basis. Of that, there is no doubt. In doing so, we are thus providing a stable anchor for inflation expectations. 
    Anchored inflation expectations make it easier for monetary policymakers to bring inflation back to target after unexpected events. The successes in the fight against the far too high inflation rates of the past few years were achieved at relatively low economic cost.[13] This was partly attributable to the fact that inflation expectations were better anchored than before. But we cannot rest on our laurels with regard to the future, because the starting position has changed. We no longer have decades of moderate inflation rates behind us. For many people, the experience of such strong price surges was new and dramatic. The memory of this is unlikely to fade quickly.[14]
    Inflation expectations, as well the associated price and wage setting, may now respond more quickly or more strongly to future inflation shocks. We therefore need to be particularly vigilant when it comes to the evolution of inflation expectations. For instance, medium-term inflation expectations amongst euro area households and firms were recently on the rise again. Concerns about rising prices caused by tariff policy are not only on American minds, then. We will keep a close eye on this development.
    Ensuring that inflation expectations are firmly anchored is a permanent task for monetary policymakers. This can be achieved by ensuring that our commitment to stability is highly credible and that our communication is clear.
    To further improve clarity, we have since implemented AI-assisted text analysis methods, too. In this vein, the Bundesbank has developed a novel AI model that can produce detailed and transparent evaluations of monetary policy texts.[15] This allows us to assess, for example, whether certain statements are likely to send the desired signals. After all, we do not want our communication to trigger undesirable market reactions or create additional uncertainty. AI analysis does not replace human expertise. But it can help us to further improve our understanding of monetary policy communication and its impact.
    5 Conclusion
    Ladies and gentlemen, 
    If you are currently wondering whether this speech was generated by AI, or, indeed, if it will ever end, I can assure you that real people were involved in the speech-writing process, and I have now come to my closing remarks. Our AI model is currently used to evaluate texts. Incidentally, this speech was classified as “neutral” in monetary policy terms.
    Alan Greenspan would probably have pushed the model to its limits. His statements were often so cryptic that the media and financial markets took to seeking out other clues: for example, when it came to monetary policy decisions, they looked at the thickness of his briefcase. A slim briefcase was thought to indicate an uneventful meeting without interest rate changes, whilst a bulging briefcase signalled a need for discussion and an adjustment to the policy rate.[16] During his term in office, Mr Greenspan was once asked whether there was any truth to this theory. His answer: “The thickness of my briefcase depended on whether or not I had packed a sandwich.”[17] 
    Unfortunately, not all uncertainties can be so easily erased from the monetary policy landscape. But, as we can see, asking direct questions and talking to each other often contributes to greater clarity. Which makes me all the more excited for our discussion!
    Thank you very much. 
    Footnotes:

    Greenspan, A. (2003), Monetary Policy under Uncertainty, Remarks at a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 29 August 2003.
    Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (2002), Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?, NBER Working Paper No 9127.
    Nagel, J. (2025), r* in the monetary policy universe: Navigational star or dark matter?, Lecture at the London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 12 February 2025.
    Brainard, W. (1967), Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Policy, American Economic Review, Vol. 57, No 2, pp. 411‑425.
    Hansen, L. P. and T. J. Sargent (2001), Robust Control and Model Uncertainty, American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No 2.
    See Deutsche Bundesbank (2025), The potential impact of the current trade dispute between the United States and China, Monthly Report, May 2025.
    The Budget Lab at Yale (2025), State of U.S. tariffs: May 12, 2025, Yale University.
    A description of the trade policy uncertainty index can be found in Caldara, D., M. Iacoviello, P. Molligo, A. Prestipino and A. Raffo (2020), The economic effects of trade policy uncertainty, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 109. See also Deutsche Bundesbank (2025), The macroeconomic effects of heightened uncertainty, Monthly Report, May 2025.
    Deutsche Bundesbank (2018), The macroeconomic impact of uncertainty, Monthly Report, October 2018, pp. 49‑64.
    Deutsche Bundesbank (2020), Domestic economic effects of import tariffs with regard to global value chains, Monthly Report, January 2020.
    Bayoumi, T., J. Barkema and D. A. Cerdeiro (2019), The Inflexible Structure of Global Supply Chains, IMF Working Paper, No 19/193.
    See Deutsche Bundesbank (2025), EU fiscal rules: proposed activation of national escape clauses, Monthly Report, May 2025.
    Deutsche Bundesbank (2024), The global disinflation process and its costs, Monthly Report, July 2024.
    D’Acunto, F., U. Malmendier and M. Weber (2022), What Do the Data Tell Us About Inflation Expectations? NBER Working Papers, No 29825, March 2022.
    Deutsche Bundesbank (2025), Monetary policy communication according to artificial intelligence, Monthly Report, March 2025.
    Gavin, W. T. and R. J. Mandal (2000), Inside the briefcase: The art of predicting the Federal Reserve, The Regional Economist, July 2000.
    Alan Greenspan in an interview with “Stern”: “In der Badewanne hatte ich viele gute Ideen”, 30 September 2007. 

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI: Amundi General Meeting

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Amundi General Meeting
    Olivier Gavalda becomes Chairman of the Board of Directors
    All resolutions have been approved with an average approval rate of 98.34%

    Shareholders’ General Meeting of Amundi was held on Tuesday 27 May 2025. With a quorum of 92.79%, the General Meeting approved all the resolutions submitted by the Board of Directors, with an average approval rate of 98.34%.

    After approving the financial statements for 2024, the General Meeting of Amundi has notably approved the distribution of a dividend of €4.25 per share. The ex-dividend date is set at 10 June 2025 and the dividend will be paid from 12 June 2025.

    The General Meeting also approved the appointment as Director of Olivier Gavalda, who becomes Chairman of the Board of Directors, and the appointment of Jean-Christophe Mieszala as independent Director.

    The detailed results of the votes of the General Meeting will be available on the website https://about.amundi.com/ within the regulatory timeframe.

    Biographies

    Olivier Gavalda has spent his entire career at Crédit Agricole. He joined Crédit Agricole du Midi in 1988 where he successively held the positions of Organisation Project Manager, Branch Manager, Training Manager and finally Head of Marketing. In 1998, he joined Crédit Agricole Ile-de-France as Regional Director, then in 2002 he was appointed Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Crédit Agricole Sud Rhône-Alpes, in charge of Development and Human Resources. In 2007 he became Chief Executive Officer of Crédit Agricole Champagne-Bourgogne. In 2010, he joined Crédit Agricole S.A. as Head of the Regional Banks Division and then in 2015 he was appointed Deputy Chief Executive Officer in charge of the Development, Customer and Innovation Division. In 2016, he became Chief Executive Officer of Crédit Agricole Ile-de-France. In November 2022, he has been appointed Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Crédit Agricole S.A. in charge of Universal Bank. Olivier Gavalda is Chief Executive Officer of Crédit Agricole S.A. since 14 May 2025.

    Olivier Gavalda holds a master’s degree in Econometrics and a DESS (post-graduate diploma) in organisation/computing from Arts et Métiers.

    Jean-Christophe Mieszala served as a French civil servant and worked at the World Bank, until he joined McKinsey & Company in 1994. After several years in the United States, he moved to France and was elected Partner in France in 2000, then Senior Partner in 2006. He served as Managing Partner France (chief executive officer) from 2010 to 2017, then Global Chief Risk Officer from 2018 to 2024. He was also a member of McKinsey’s Global Board of Directors from 2018. He left McKinsey in September 2024. In addition to his consulting activity for companies for nearly 30 years, he has been making regular contributions to various think tanks (WEF, Institut de l’Entreprise, MGI, etc.) and market initiatives concerning the French financial system and the French industrial ecosystem.

    Jean-Christophe Mieszala is a member of the Advisory Committee of the Banque de France, a board member of Ecole des Mines ParisTech and of Allianz France.

    Former student of the Ecole Polytechnique (class of 1985), Jean-Christophe Mieszala trained at the Corps des Mines (French civil service) until 1991 and obtained his MBA with honors from INSEAD in 1994.

    ***

    About Amundi

    Amundi, the leading European asset manager, ranking among the top 10 global players1, offers its 100 million clients – retail, institutional and corporate – a complete range of savings and investment solutions in active and passive management, in traditional or real assets. This offering is enhanced with IT tools and services to cover the entire savings value chain. A subsidiary of the Crédit Agricole group and listed on the stock exchange, Amundi currently manages more than €2.2 trillion of assets2.

    With its six international investment hubs3, financial and extra-financial research capabilities and long-standing commitment to responsible investment, Amundi is a key player in the asset management landscape.

    Amundi clients benefit from the expertise and advice of 5,700 employees in 35 countries.

    Amundi, a trusted partner, working every day in the interest of its clients and society

    www.amundi.com   

    Press contacts:        
    Natacha Andermahr 
    Tel. +33 1 76 37 86 05
    natacha.andermahr@amundi.com 

    Corentin Henry
    Tel. +33 1 76 36 26 96
    corentin.henry@amundi.com

    Investor contacts:
    Cyril Meilland, CFA
    Tel. +33 1 76 32 62 67
    cyril.meilland@amundi.com 

    Thomas Lapeyre
    Tel. +33 1 76 33 70 54
    thomas.lapeyre@amundi.com 

    Annabelle Wiriath

    Tel. + 33 1 76 32 43 92

    annabelle.wiriath@amundi.com

    1Source: IPE “Top 500 Asset Managers” published in June 2024, based on assets under management as at 31/12/2023
    2Amundi data as at 31/03/2025
    3Paris, London, Dublin, Milan, Tokyo and San Antonio (via our strategic partnership with Victory Capital)

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Soitec Reports Fourth Quarter Revenue and Full-Year Results of Fiscal Year 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SOITEC REPORTS FOURTH QUARTER REVENUE AND
    FULL-YEAR RESULTS OF FISCAL YEAR 2025

    • Q4’25 revenue reached €327m, stable at constant exchange rates and perimeter compared to Q4’24
    • FY’25 revenue amounted to €891m, down 9% both on a reported basis and at constant exchange rates and perimeter, in line with revised guidance
    • Soitec accelerated diversification confirmed with POI becoming Soitec’s fourth product to generate annual revenue of around $100m or more
    • Robust FY’25 EBITDA1margin2at 33.5%, current EBIT margin at 15.2%
    • Positive FY’25 Free Cash Flow, at €26m, while maintaining strong R&D and industrial investments
    • Q1’26 revenue, impacted by the anticipated phase-out of Imager-SOI, is expected down around 20% year-on-year at constant exchange rates and perimeter (Imager-SOI Q1’25 revenue: $25m)
    • FY’26 Capex cash-out expected around €150m, down from €230m in FY’25
    • Strong technology megatrends and Soitec’s innovative engineered substrates continue to sustain Soitec addressable market growth from ~5m wafers (200mm equivalent) in 2024 to ~12m in 2030
    • Given the current reduced visibility and market uncertainties, the Group withdraws any guidance, whether related to all or part of its activities. This includes the projection of a quite limited growth for FY’26, as well as the medium-term ambition to reach a revenue target of $2bn with an EBITDA margin of approximately 40%. Going forward, the Group will only provide revenue guidance on a quarterly basis

    Bernin (Grenoble), France, May 27th, 2025 – Soitec (Euronext Paris), a world leader in designing and manufacturing innovative semiconductor materials, today announced its revenue for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2025 and its full-year results of fiscal year 2025 (ended on March 31st, 2025). The financial statements3 were approved by the Board of Directors during its meeting today.

    Pierre Barnabé, Soitec’s CEO, commented: “On the back of strong sales in the fourth quarter, we closed fiscal year 2025 in line with our revised guidance, with a high-single digit decline in full-year revenue. In this context, strict cost management enabled us to deliver a robust EBITDA margin, generate positive free cash flow, and continue investing both in innovation and in our industrial capacity – all while maintaining a very healthy balance sheet.

    In a volatile and uncertain economic environment, we are focusing on parameters within our control to strengthen our fundamentals and accelerate our diversification beyond RF-SOI and beyond Mobile Communications. With the growing adoption of our new products by industry leaders – POI becoming an industry standard for innovative smartphones and Photonics-SOI gaining traction among industry leaders to equip the next generation of AI Datacenters – we have been able to partially offset the ongoing RF-SOI inventory correction and mitigate the impact of the weakness in the automotive industry. While RF-SOI remains by far the first contributor to our revenue, three other products – FD-SOI, Power-SOI and POI – are now each generating around or above 100 million US dollars in revenue.

    This environment however provides limited visibility. We have therefore decided to suspend all previously issued guidance and to only provide revenue guidance on a quarterly basis. We expect Q1’26 to reflect the impact of the Imager-SOI phase out, which we had already anticipated and prepared for. Q1’26 revenue is hence expected to be down around 20% year on year, Imager-SOI contributing 25 million dollars in Q1’25.

    We remain confident in our solid fundamentals and in our ability to accelerate growth as soon as our end markets begin to recover. Our strong technology megatrends – 5G, Energy Efficiency and Artificial Intelligence – and our unique expertise in engineered substrates continue to support the expansion of our Addressable Market from around 5 million wafers (200-mm equivalent) in 2024 to around 12 million in 2030”, added Pierre Barnabé.

    Fourth quarter FY’25 consolidated revenue

      Q4’25 Q4’24 Q4’25/Q4’24
             
             
    (Euros millions)     change reported chg. at const. exch. rates & perimeter
             
    Mobile Communications 220 222 -1% -2%
    Automotive & Industrial 45 44 +1% 0%
    Edge & Cloud AI 63 70 -11% +2%
             
    Revenue 327 337 -3% -1%

    Soitec revenue reached 327 million Euros in Q4’25, down 3% on a reported basis compared with revenue of 337 million Euros achieved in Q4’24. This reflects a 1% year-on-year decline at constant exchange rates and perimeter, a negative scope4 effect of 3% related to the divestment of Dolphin Design’s businesses, and a positive currency impact of 1%.

    Each one of Soitec’s three divisions recorded an almost stable organic change in revenue in Q4’25 compared to the high base achieved in Q4’24. The slight organic decline in Mobile Communications revenue was partly offset by a small increase in Edge & Cloud AI revenue, while Automotive & Industrial was stable. This is however reflecting different dynamics per product, with further strong traction in POI wafers for smartphone filters and in Photonics-SOI wafers for data centers.

    Mobile Communications

    In the context of a moderately recovering smartphone market and with a progressively improving inventory situation across the supply chain, Mobile Communications revenue reached 220 million Euros in Q4’25, down 2% at constant exchange rates and perimeter year-on-year.

    On RF-SOI wafers, Soitec benefited, as expected, from a usually strong seasonal stock rebuilding at the beginning of the calendar year. Volumes of RF-SOI wafers sold were higher in Q4’25 than in Q4’24, with a slightly negative price / mix effect, thus partly mitigating a significant decrease in 200-mm RF-SOI volumes.

    Sales of POI (Piezoelectric-on-Insulator) wafers dedicated to RF filters continued to grow sequentially from one quarter to another, translating into a sharp year-on-year increase in Q4’25. The adoption of Surface Acoustic Wave (SAW) filters on POI continued to accelerate. Ten customers are in volume production, and thirteen others in qualification phase.

    Sales of FD-SOI wafers, the only solution for fully integrated 5G mmWave system-on-chip, have been slightly growing in Q4’25 compared to Q4’24.

    Automotive & Industrial

    Automotive & Industrial revenue reached 45 million Euros in Q4’25, flat at constant exchange rates and perimeter compared to Q4’24, despite the ongoing difficulties of the automotive market.

    After the particularly low level reached in Q3’25, volumes of Power-SOI wafers were significantly higher in Q4’25 than in Q4’24, although with a slightly negative price effect. Sales benefited from customer restocking at the beginning of their calendar year. Despite very low visibility, OEMs were keen to avoid stockouts in the event of a market rebound, but this most likely came at the expense of volumes in H1’26. As the Automotive market recovers, the outlook for Battery Management Systems remains strong and supports Soitec’s product roadmap towards 300-mm, further strengthening its positioning.

    Conversely, after a very strong performance in Q3’25, FD-SOI wafer sales recorded a slight year-on-year decline in Q4’25 compared to Q4’24. Automotive FD-SOI continues to be mostly driven by adoption for microcontrollers, radar and wireless connectivity, delivering superior performance and greater power efficiency compared to other existing technologies.

    Regarding SmartSiCTM, while Soitec initiated a sixth customer qualification process early Q4’25, the slower-than-expected growth of the electric vehicle market, combined with the longer than initially anticipated customers’ qualification cycles confirm the previously mentioned delay in the initially expected wafer production ramp-up.

    Edge & Cloud AI

    Edge & Cloud AI revenue reached 63 million Euros in Q4’25, up 2% at constant exchange rates and perimeter compared to Q4’24. On a reported basis revenue went down 11% as a result of the divestment of Dolphin Design’s businesses.

    Sales of Photonics-SOI wafers recorded another high sequential increase in Q4’25, as Soitec continues to benefit from a strong momentum in Cloud infrastructure investments across the Big Tech and Artificial Intelligence supply chains. On a year-on-year basis, sales were much higher than in Q4’24. As the exponential growth of AI-related computing power capabilities drives the need for more powerful and more energy-efficient data centers, Photonics-SOI has become a standard technology platform for high-speed and high bandwidth optical interconnections in data centers. Photonics-SOI are adopted in pluggable optical transceivers and used for the development of Co-Packaged Optics.

    In Q4’25 sales of FD-SOI wafers were above the level reached in Q3’25 but slightly down year-on-year compared to the high level recorded in Q4’24. This is mainly the consequence of deliveries requests put on hold by a couple of customers. FD-SOI technology is a key enabler for AI-driven consumer and industrial IoT applications due to its unique power efficiency, performance, thermal management and reliability advantages.

    Sales of Imager-SOI wafers for 3D imaging applications tapered off in Q4’25 due to the phase out of this product, as expected.

    FY’25 consolidated revenue

      FY’25 FY’24 FY’25/FY’24
             
    (Euros millions)     change reported chg. at const. exch. rates & perimeter
             
    Mobile Communications 546 611 -11% -12%
    Automotive & Industrial 129 163 -21% -22%
    Edge & Cloud AI 216 204 +6% +11%
             
    Revenue 891 978 -9% -9%

    Consolidated revenue reached 891 million Euros in FY’25, down 9% on a reported basis compared to 978 million Euros in FY’24. This reflects a 9% decline at constant exchange rates and perimeter, in line with Soitec’s latest guidance, a negative scope4 effect of 1% and a slightly positive currency impact of 1%.

    Overall, the sharp increase in sales of Photonics-SOI and POI wafers partly offset the drop in revenue recorded both in RF-SOI and in Power-SOI.

    • Mobile Communications revenue reached 546 million Euros in FY’25, down 11% on a reported basis and down 12% at constant exchange rates and perimeter year-on-year. Revenue was impacted by weaker RF-SOI volumes in connection with further inventory adjustment at customer level, especially in H1’25. RF-SOI performance was partly offset by a strong growth in POI wafer sales throughout the fiscal year and by slightly higher FD-SOI wafer sales. Mobile communications represented 61% of total revenue, almost stable vs FY’24.
    • Automotive & Industrial revenue amounted to 129 million Euros in FY’25, down 21% on a reported basis and down 22% at constant exchange rates and perimeter compared to FY’24. This revenue decline was primarily driven by lower Power-SOI volumes, reflecting weakness in the automotive market. Revenue from SmartSiC™ technology in connection with the initial phase of Soitec’s cooperation agreement with STMicroelectronics have also decreased year-on-year. This was partially offset by higher FD-SOI wafer sales. Automotive & Industrial represented 15% of total revenue against 17% in FY’24.
    • Edge & Cloud AI revenue reached 216 million Euros in FY’25, up 6% on a reported basis and up 11% at constant exchange rates and perimeter compared to FY’24. The organic increase in revenue was driven by higher sales of Photonics-SOI wafers, which benefit from sustained investment in Cloud infrastructure. Sales of FD-SOI went slightly down but remained at a high level, supported by the need for low-power computing devices and edge-AI applications. Imager-SOI sales were almost flat year-on-year despite the phase out of this product from early H2’25 onward. Edge & Cloud AI represented 24% of total revenue against 21% in FY’24.

    EBITDA1margin2maintained at a robust level

    Consolidated income statement (part 1)

    (Euros millions) FY’25 FY’24 % change
           
    Revenue 891 978 -9%
           
           
    Gross profit 286 332 -14%
    As a % of revenue 32.1% 34.0%  
           
    Net research and development expenses (85) (61) +39%
    Selling, general and administrative expenses (65) (63) +4%
           
           
    Current operating income 136 208 -35%
    As a % of revenue 15.2% 21.3%  
           
           
    EBITDA1,5 298 332 -10%
    As a % of revenue 33.5% 34.0%  

    Current operating income went down from 208 million Euros in FY’24 (21.3% of revenue) to 136 million Euros in FY’25 (15.2% of revenue). This reflects the weaker activity recorded in FY’25, but also higher R&D investment and higher depreciation expenses, as Soitec continues to invest to secure its competitiveness.

    • Gross profit reached 286 million Euros, down from 332 million Euros in FY’24. Gross margin declined by 1.9 points to 32.1% of revenue. This was essentially due to the lower sales volumes, of RF-SOI in particular, leading to a lower utilization of some of the industrial capacities, combined with an overall slightly negative price / mix effect. In addition, depreciation costs went up, reflecting the Group’s investment profile. These factors were mitigated by strong discipline in cost management, including lower purchase prices, by some agility in resource allocation between plants, and by higher subsidies.
    • Net R&D expenses increased from 61 million Euros in FY’24 (6.3% of revenue) to 85 million Euros in FY’25 (9.5% of revenue). Gross R&D expenses before capitalization went up 11% to 152°million Euros, as part of Soitec’s innovation strategy aimed at further investing in the next generation of SOI products, in compound semiconductors, as well as in new engineered substrates. In addition, Soitec booked a much lower amount of capitalized development costs in FY’25 (12 million Euros against 31 million Euros in FY’24). This was only partly offset by the recognition of higher R&D subsidies and higher prototype sales.
    • Selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses amounted to 65 million Euros in FY’25 (7.3% of revenue), up from 63 million Euros in FY’24. This slight increase is essentially due to non-recurring positive effects on labor costs recorded in FY’24 and higher depreciation expenses, notably related to recent IT investments in cybersecurity. On the other hand, lower share-based compensation and the divestment of Dolphin Design both had positive effects.

    EBITDA1,5 amounted to 298 million Euros in FY’25 compared to 332 million Euros in FY’24. EBITDA1,5 margin2 remained at a robust level, reaching 33.5%, only 50 basis points below the level of 34.0% recorded in FY’24. The combination of a lesser absorption of fixed costs due to lower volumes and higher level of R&D investments was offset by higher non-cash items, notably depreciation and amortization expenses and inventory valuation effects.

    Consolidated income statement (part 2)

    (Euros millions) FY’25 FY’24 % change
           
           
       
    Current operating income 136 208 -35%
           
           
    Other operating income / (expenses) (16) (3)  
           
           
    Operating income 119 205 -42%
           
    Net financial expense (9) (5)  
    Income tax (19) (23)  
           
           
    Net profit from continuing operations 91 178 -49%
           
    Net profit from discontinued operations 1 0  
           
           
    Net profit, Group share 92 178 -48%
           
           
    Basic earnings per share (in €) 2.57 5.00 -49%
           
    Diluted earnings per share (in €) 2.56 4.88 -48%
           
           
    Weighted average number of ordinary shares 35,670,651 35,655,679  
           
    Weighted average number of diluted ordinary shares 35,868,688 37,710,587  

    Other operating expenses amounted to 16 million Euros in FY’25, mainly reflecting a 13 million Euros loss on the divestment of Dolphin Design’s businesses.

    Consequently, the operating income stood at 119 million Euros, down from 205 million Euros in FY’24.

    The net financial result came as an expense of 9 million Euros in FY’25 compared to an expense of 5 million Euros in FY’24. Net financial expenses were 2 million Euros higher than in FY’24, reflecting new financing arrangements, while a net foreign exchange loss of 2 million Euros was recorded in FY’25 against a gain of 1 million Euros in FY’24.

    The income tax expense amounted to 19 million Euros in FY’25, down from 23 million Euros in FY’24. The effective tax rate, however, increased from 11% in FY’24 to 17% in FY’25, as a result of specific one-off items.

    In line with the decline in operating income, the net profit amounted to 92 million Euros in FY’25 (10.3% of revenue), down from 178 million Euros in FY’24 (18.2% of revenue).

    Positive Free Cash Flow generation

    Consolidated cash-flows

    (Euros millions) FY’25 FY’24
         
    Continuing operations    
         
    EBITDA1,6 298 332
         
    Inventories (38) (19)
    Trade receivables (30) (94)
    Trade payables (15) (45)
    Other receivables and liabilities 4 17
    Change in working capital requirement (79) (142)
    Tax paid (17) (25)
         
         
    Net cash generated by operating activities 202 165
         
    Net cash used in investing activities (176) (208)
         
         
    Free Cash Flow 26 (43)
         
    New loans and debt repayment (including finance leases), drawing on credit lines (36) (15)
    Financial expenses (14) (12)
    Liquidity contract and other items (1) (7)
         
         
    Net cash used in financing activities (50) (33)
         
    Impact of exchange rate fluctuations 4 (3)
         
    Net change in cash (21) (80)

    The Group generated a positive Free Cash Flow of 26 million Euros in FY’25, which represents a 69 million Euros improvement compared to the 43 million Euros negative Free Cash Flow recorded in FY’24. Despite a lower EBITDA1,5, this strong increase essentially comes as a result of a better change in working capital. It also benefited from lower tax paid and from reduced capital expenditure.

    Change in working capital remained under control with a cash outflow at 79 million Euros in FY’25, compared to a cash outflow of 142 million Euros in FY’24. FY’25 cash outflow is essentially reflecting:

    • a 38 million Euros increase in inventories as a couple of customers requested to put some deliveries on hold while some late changes in product mix also resulted in an increase in bulk material inventories,
    • a 30 million Euros increase in trade receivables, explained by a different customer mix,
      • a 15 million Euros decrease in trade payables.

    The net cash used in investing activities amounted to 176 million Euros in FY’25, compared to 209 million Euros in FY’24. It takes into account financial income from cash investment of 19 million Euros (17 million Euros in FY’24). Including new production equipment under leases (31 million Euros in FY’25 vs. 51 million Euros in FY’24), total cash out related to capital expenditure amounted to 230 million Euros as expected. It compares with 276 million Euros spent in FY’24. Capital expenditure was essentially related to industrial investments, including:

    • additional POI manufacturing tools in Bernin to increase capacity,
    • production capacity for new SOI products (RF-SOI and Photonics-SOI) in Singapore and 300-mm SOI refresh capacity in Bernin,
    • the ongoing extension of Singapore 300-mm facility (for the part already started),
    • completion of the 200-mm SmartSiCTM pilot line in Bernin.

    Capital expenditure also included IT investments as well as investments supporting the Group’s innovation strategy and its environmental policy.

    Net cash used in financing activities amounted to 50 million Euros in FY’25 (33 million Euros in FY’24) essentially reflecting a net decrease in borrowings and related interest paid.

    In total, including a 4 million Euros positive impact of exchange rate fluctuations (3 million Euros negative impact in FY’24), the net cash outflow reached 21 million Euros in FY’25 (80 million Euros in FY’24) resulting in a steady strong cash position of 688 million Euros on March 31st, 2025.

    Strong balance sheet maintained

    Soitec maintained a strong balance sheet as of March 31st, 2025.

    Shareholders’ equity stood at 1.6 billion Euros on March 31st, 2025, up 100 million Euros from March 31st, 2024.

    Financial debt on March 31st, 2025, was slightly up, at 782 million Euros against 747 million Euros on March 31st, 2024. Taking into account the 21 million Euros cash outflow recorded in FY’25, the net debt position6 was kept at a moderate level, at 94 million Euros on March 31st, 2025, up from 39 million Euros on March 31st, 2024.

    FY’26 outlook

    Given the current reduced visibility and market uncertainties, the Group withdraws any guidance, whether related to all or part of its activities. This includes the projection of a quite limited growth for FY’26, as well as the medium-term ambition to reach a revenue target of $2bn with an EBITDA margin of approximately 40%. Going forward, the Group will only provide revenue guidance on a quarterly basis.

    Q1’26 revenue, impacted by the anticipated phase-out of Imager-SOI, is expected down around 20% year-on-year (Imager-SOI Q1’25 revenue: $25m). FY’26 Capex cash-out is expected around €150m, down from €230m in FY’25.

    Operating model at scale

    Soitec continues to pursue its long-term growth strategy, supported by structural trends in its end markets and the accelerated diversification of its product portfolio.

    In this context, Soitec has defined an operating model at scale, representing the financial profile the Group could achieve when operating at a higher volume level. This model reflects the Group’s internal assessment of the efficiencies and profitability enabled by its current industrial and technological platform.

    Based on its market assessment and competitive positioning, Soitec continues to grow its manufacturing capacity, in line with market growth and customer demand. The Group anticipates investing ~€770m to scale its production capacity to enable a $2bn revenue run-rate, which should yield significant operating leverage and cash generation improvement. Given ongoing reduced visibility and market uncertainties, the Group will not guide on a specific timing, which will be influenced by external factors beyond its control.

    This operating model and the associated ambitions and financial information are not guidance and should not be interpreted as a financial objective or forecast. Actual results will depend on market dynamics, customer adoption, and execution.

    Key events of Q4 FY’25

    Divestment of Dolphin Design’s main businesses

    Dolphin Design’s mixed-signal IP activities have been acquired on October 31st, 2024, by Jolt Capital, a private equity firm specializing in European deeptech investments. Dolphin Design’s ASIC activities were sold to NanoXplore, a major player in SoC and FPGA semiconductor design, on December 30th, 2024.

    Dolphin Design, acquired by Soitec in 2018, has long been at the forefront of delivering cutting-edge semiconductor design solutions in mixed-signal IP and ASICs. The sale of Dolphin Design’s two main business activities will support Soitec’s focus on strategic development and growth opportunities in its core advanced semiconductor materials business.

    A 13 million Euros loss on the divestment of Dolphin Design’s businesses was recorded in other operating expenses in FY’25. There will be no further impact on Soitec financial statements from FY’26.

    Soitec contributes to accelerated development of integrated optical connectivity solutions for AI data centers with its silicon photonics SOI technology

    On March 19th, 2025, Soitec welcomed recent industry steps to accelerate development and commercialization of co-packaged optics (CPO) solutions for data centers. The rapidly rising data requirements of AI and high-performance computing (HPC) are driving demand for silicon photonics-based CPO architectures. For data centers, CPO adoption enables energy savings of around 30% compared with current optical transceiver-based solutions. The momentum for widespread CPO adoption is building up. Following the earlier introduction of groundbreaking CPO products and demonstrators by Broadcom, Intel, and Marvell, NVIDIA unveiled its first CPO products, Spectrum-X and Quantum-X. Soitec is at the forefront of the transition from electrical to optical interconnects. CPO components are reliant on specialist silicon-on-insulator (Photonics-SOI) substrates, in which Soitec is a leader. The coming shift to CPO-based data center architectures is a major opportunity for Soitec.

    Soitec joins the SEMI Silicon Photonics industry alliance

    Soitec also announced on March 19th, 2025, that it has joined the SEMI Silicon Photonics Industry Alliance (SEMI SiPhIA), a group of more than 100 semiconductor industry partners, with TSMC and ASE serving as the alliance’s advocates. The alliance’s mission is to drive silicon photonics innovation and applications, advance industry standards, and foster knowledge-sharing, resource integration, and technical exchange. Through its membership, Soitec will contribute to strengthening supply chain partnerships and fostering international collaboration on the deployment of key next-generation technologies, including CPO.

    Soitec confirms its excellence in innovation with progress up 2024 INPI patent ranking

    On March 31st, 2025, Soitec once again demonstrated its excellence in innovation through its rise in the 2024 ranking of patent filers published by the INPI (the French National Institute of Industrial Property). This recognition highlights Soitec’s unwavering commitment to innovation and confirms its central role in the development of disruptive technologies, driven by a global strategy and a network of research centers spread across several continents. With 76 patents filed in France in 2024, compared to 62 the previous year, Soitec confirms its 1st place among the most innovative mid-sized companies, for the second consecutive year, and rises to 22nd place nationally, up three places. With approximately 400 patents filed worldwide each year, Soitec has established itself as an essential technology leader.

    # # #

    FY’25 results will be commented during an analyst and investor meeting in Paris on May 28th, 2025, at 2pm CET. The meeting will be held in English.

    The live webcast will be available on: https://channel.royalcast.com/landingpage/soitec/20250528_1/

    The investor presentation is available for download on:
    https://www.soitec.com/home/investors/full-year-results-of-fiscal-year-2024—2025

    # # #

    Annual General Meeting

    At its meeting today, the Board of Directors decided to convene the Annual General Meeting of shareholders on July 22nd, 2025. On this occasion, it decided to renew three of the four directors’ terms of office due to expire (Bpifrance Participations, CEA Investissement and Fonds Stratégique de Participations). Regarding Kai Seikku, the latter did not wish to be re-elected.

    Q1’26 revenue

    Q1’26 revenue is due to be published on July 22nd, 2025, after market close.

    # # #

    Disclaimer

    This document is provided by Soitec (the “Company”) for information purposes only.

    The Company’s business operations and financial position are described in the Company’s 2023-2024 Universal Registration Document (which notably includes the Annual Financial Report) which was filed on June 5th, 2024, with the French stock market authority (Autorité des Marchés Financiers, or AMF) under number D.24-0462, as well as in the Company’s 2024-2025 half-year financial report released on November 20th, 2024. The French versions of the 2023-2024 Universal Registration Document and the 2024-2025 half-year financial report, together with English courtesy translations for information purposes of both documents, are available for consultation on the Company’s website (www.soitec.com), in the section Company – Investors – Financial Reports.

    Your attention is drawn to the risk factors described in Chapter 2.1 (Risk factors and controls mechanism) of the Company’s 2023-2024 Universal Registration Document.

    This document contains summary information and should be read in conjunction with the 2023-2024 Universal Registration Document and the 2024-2025 half-year financial report.

    This document contains certain forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements relate to the Company’s future prospects, developments and strategy and are based on analyses of earnings forecasts and estimates of amounts not yet determinable. By their nature, forward-looking statements are subject to a variety of risks and uncertainties as they relate to future events and are dependent on circumstances that may or may not materialize in the future. Forward-looking statements are not a guarantee of the Company’s future performance. The occurrence of any of the risks described in Chapter 2.1 (Risk factors and controls mechanism) of the 2023-2024 Universal Registration Document may have an impact on these forward-looking statements.

    The Company’s actual financial position, results and cash flows, as well as the trends in the sector in which the Company operates may differ materially from those contained in this document. Furthermore, even if the Company’s financial position, results, cash-flows and the developments in the sector in which the Company operates were to conform to the forward-looking statements contained in this document, such elements cannot be construed as a reliable indication of the Company’s future results or developments.

    The Company does not undertake any obligation to update or make any correction to any forward-looking statement in order to reflect an event or circumstance that may occur after the date of this document.

    This document does not constitute or form part of an offer or a solicitation to purchase, subscribe for, or sell the Company’s securities in any country whatsoever. This document, or any part thereof, shall not form the basis of, or be relied upon in connection with, any contract, commitment or investment decision.

    Notably, this document does not constitute an offer or solicitation to purchase, subscribe for or to sell securities in the United States. Securities may not be offered or sold in the United States absent registration or an exemption from the registration under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”). The Company’s shares have not been and will not be registered under the Securities Act. Neither the Company nor any other person intends to conduct a public offering of the Company’s securities in the United States.

    # # #

    About Soitec

    Soitec (Euronext – Tech Leaders), a world leader in innovative semiconductor materials, has been developing cutting-edge products delivering both technological performance and energy efficiency for over 30 years. From its global headquarters in France, Soitec is expanding internationally with its unique solutions, and generated sales of 0.9 billion Euros in fiscal year 2024-2025. Soitec occupies a key position in the semiconductor value chain, serving three main strategic markets: Mobile Communications, Automotive and Industrial, and Edge & Cloud AI (previously Smart Devices). The company relies on the talent and diversity of its 2,200 employees, representing 50 different nationalities, working at its sites in Europe, the United States and Asia. Soitec has registered over 4,200 patents.

    Soitec, SmartSiC™ and Smart Cut™ are registered trademarks of Soitec.

    For more information: https://www.soitec.com/en/ and follow us on X: @Soitec_Official

    # # #

    # # #

    Financial information and consolidated financial statements in appendix include:

    – Consolidated revenue per quarter

    – FY’25 consolidated income statement

    – Balance sheet at March 31st, 2025

    – FY’25 consolidated cashflows

    Consolidated revenue per quarter

    Quarterly revenue Q1’24 Q2’24 Q3’24 Q4’24 Q1’25 Q2’25 Q3’25 Q4’25   FY’24 FY’25
    (Euros millions)                      
    Mobile Communications 89   169   130   222 48   124   154   220   611 546  
    Automotive & Industrial 37 38 44 44 26 33 25 45   163 129
    Edge & Cloud AI 31 37 65 70 46 61 47 63   204 216
                           
    Revenue 157   245   240   337 121   217   226   327   978   891  
    Change in quarterly revenue Q1’25/Q1’24 Q2’25/Q2’24 Q3’25/Q3’24 Q4’25/Q4’24   FY’25/FY’24
    (vs. previous year) Reported
    change    		 Organic change1 Reported
    change    		 Organic change1 Reported
    change    		 Organic change1 Reported
    change    		 Organic change1   Reported
    Change    		 Organic change1
                           
    Mobile Communications -45% -46% -27% -25% +18% +11% -1% -2%   -11% -12%
    Automotive & Industrial -29% -31% -13% -11% -43% -47% +1% 0%   -21% -22%
    Edge & Cloud AI +49% +47% +62% +66% -28% -30% -11% +2%   +6% +11%
                           
    Revenue -23% -24% -11% -9% -6% -10% -3% -1%   -9% -9%

    1         At constant exchange rates and comparable scope of consolidation:

    • there was no scope effect in Q1’25 and Q2’25 vs. Q1’24 and Q2’24
    • in Q3’25 there is a negative scope effect related to the divestment of Dolphin Design’s mixed signal IP activities (completed on October 31st, 2024)
    • in Q4’25, in addition to Dolphin Design’s mixed signal IP activities, the negative scope effect also includes the divestment of Dolphin Design’s ASIC activities (completed on December 30th, 2024).

    Consolidated financial statements for FY’25

    As previously reported, Soitec’s refocus on Electronics operations decided in January 2015 was nearly completed on March 31st, 2016. Consequently, the FY’25 residual income and expenses relating to Solar and Other activities are reported under ‘Net result from discontinued operations’, below the ‘Operating income’ line, meaning that down to the line ‘Net result after tax from continuing operations’, the consolidated income statement fully and exclusively reflects the Electronics activity as well as the Group’s corporate functions expenses. This was already the case in FY’24 financial statements.

    Consolidated income statement

      FY’25 FY’24
    (Euros millions) (ended

    March 31st, 2025)

    		 (ended

    March 31st, 2024)
    Revenue 891 978
    Cost of sales (605) (646)
         
    Gross profit 286 332
    Research and development expenses (85) (61)
    General, sales and administrative expenses (65) (63)
    Current operating income 136 208
    Other operating expenses (16) (3)
    Operating income 119 205
    Financial income 19 21
    Financial expenses (28) (25)
    Net financial expense (9) (5)
    Profit before tax 110 201
    Income tax (19) (23)
    Net profit from continuing operations 91 178
    Net profit from discontinued operations 1 0
    Consolidated net profit 92 178
    Net profit, Group share 92 178
    Basic earnings per share (in €) 2.57 5.00
    Diluted earnings per share (in €) 2.56 4.88
    Weighted average number of ordinary shares 35,670,651 35,655,679
    Weighted average number of diluted ordinary shares 35,868,688 37,710,587

    Balance sheet

    Assets March 31st, 2025 March 31st, 2024
    (Euros millions)    
         
    Non-current assets    
    Intangible assets 130 156
    Property, plant and equipment 1,003 913
    Non-current financial assets 30 19
    Other non-current assets 73 70
    Deferred tax assets 59 62
    Total non-current assets 1,295 1,220
         
    Current assets    
    Inventories 231 209
    Trade receivables 463 448
    Other current assets 124 101
    Current financial assets 7 7
    Cash and cash equivalents 688 708
    Total current assets 1,512 1,472
         
    Total assets 2,807 2,692
    Equity and liabilities March 31st, 2025 March 31st, 2024
    (Euros millions)    
         
    Equity    
    Share capital 71 71
    Share premium 228 228
    Reserves and retained earnings 1,280 1,180
    Other reserves 15 15
    Equity-Group share 1,595 1,495
    Total equity 1,595 1,495
         
    Non-current liabilities    
    Non-current financial debt 375 669
    Provisions and other non-current liabilities 94 79
    Total non-current liabilities 469 748
         
    Current liabilities    
    Current financial debt 406 78
    Trade payables 153 169
    Provisions and other current liabilities 185 202
         
    Total current liabilities 743 449
         
    Total equity and liabilities 2,807 2,692

    Consolidated cash flows

      FY’25 FY’24
    (Euros millions) (ended
    March 31st, 2025)    		 (ended
    March 31st, 2024)
    Consolidated net profit 92 178
    of which continuing operations 91 178
    Depreciation and amortization expense 140 126
    Provision expense/(reversals), net 6 4
    Provisions expense / (reversals) for retirement benefit obligations, net 0 0
    (Gains)/losses on disposals of assets 15 0
    Income tax 19 23
    Net financial expense 9 5
    Share-based payments 11 14
    Other non-cash items 7 (17)
    Non-cash items related to discontinued operations (1) (1)
    EBITDA1 298 332
    of which continuing operations 298 332
    Inventories (38) (19)
    Trade receivables (30) (94)
    Trade payables (15) (45)
    Other receivables and payables 4 17
    Income tax paid (17) (25)
    Changes in working capital requirement and income tax paid related to discontinued operations (0) (0)
    Change in working capital requirement and income tax paid (96) (167)
    of which continuing operations (96) (167)
    Net cash generated by operating activities 201 165
    of which continuing operations 202 166
      FY’25 FY’24
    (Euros millions) (ended
    March 31st, 2025)    		 (ended
    March 31st, 2024)
    Net cash generated by operating activities 201 165
    of which continuing operations 202 166
    Purchases of intangible assets (27) (48)
    Purchases of property, plant and equipment (172) (177)
    Interest received 19 17
    Disposals/(acquisitions) of financial assets 4 (1)
    Divestment flows related to discontinued operations 1 0
    Net cash used in investing activities (1) (176) (208)
    of which continuing operations (1) (176) (209)
    Loans and drawdowns on credit lines 45 55
    Repayment of borrowings and lease liabilities (81) (70)
    Interest paid (14) (12)
    Liquidity agreement – (8)
    Change in interest in subsidiaries without change of control (1) (0)
    Other financing flows – 2
    Financing flows related to discontinued operations (0) (0)
    Net cash used in financing activities (50) (33)
    of which continuing operations (50) (33)
    Effects of exchange rate fluctuations 4 (3)
    Net change in cash (21) (80)
    of which continuing operations (21) (80)
    Cash at beginning of the period 708 788
    Cash at end of the period 688 708

    (1) Net cash used in investing activities is net of leases and interest received. Total cash out related to capital expenditure amounted to 230 million Euros in FY’25 compared to 276 million Euros in FY’24.

    1 The EBITDA represents operating income before depreciation, amortization, impairment of non-current assets, non-cash items relating to share-based payments, provisions for impairment of current assets and for contingencies and expenses, and disposals gains and losses. EBITDA is not a financial indicator defined by IFRS and may not be comparable to EBITDA as reported by other groups. It represents additional information and should not be considered as a substitute for operating income or net cash generated by operating activities.

    2 EBITDA margin = EBITDA from continuing operations / Revenue.

    3 Audit procedures were completed and the audit report is in the process of being issued.

    4 The scope effect is related to the divestment of Dolphin Design’s mixed-signal IP activities (completed on October 31st, 2024) and that of Dolphin Design’s ASIC activities (completed on December 30th, 2024)

    5 EBITDA from continuing operations.
    6 Financial debt less cash and cash equivalents

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –