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Category: The Conversation

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Waiting for Godot has been translated into Afrikaans: what took so long

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rick de Villiers, Associate professor, University of the Free State

    At last, the most infamous latecomer in all of literature has arrived – not in the flesh, but in South Africa’s Afrikaans language. Irish playwright Samuel Beckett’s best-known drama, Waiting for Godot, now also lives as Ons Wag vir Godot.

    Published and staged in 2024, the translation was inspired by the official centenary of Afrikaans in 2025.

    As a Beckett scholar, I think it’s worth asking why Afrikaans is so late on the scene – and why it matters.

    Godot in many tongues

    First written in French, En attendant Godot was published in 1952 and debuted on stage the next year.

    The action involves two tramps, Vladimir and Estragon, who have a series of absurd conversations and encounters as they wait for a man called Godot who never arrives. Beckett would self-translate the drama into English in 1954, calling it “a tragicomedy in two acts”.

    Since then, translations of the play have exploded. By 1969 – the year of Beckett’s Nobel Prize for Literature – Waiting for Godot could already be read in dozens of languages, including Albanian, Marathi, and even Icelandic.

    Samuel Beckett and South Africa

    Beckett’s connections with South Africa are surprisingly varied. As a young man, he unsuccessfully applied for a lectureship at the University of Cape Town. His 1951 novel, Molloy, was translated from French into English with the help of a South African student, Patrick Bowles. And in 1968, Beckett made a donation to the then-banned resistance party, the African National Congress, in the form of a manuscript for auction.

    This gesture was unprecedented for the Irish writer, who was wary of political causes. Yet not only did Beckett feel strongly enough about apartheid’s injustices to make this donation, he also refused to let anyone perform his plays before South Africa’s racially segregated audiences.



    Read more:
    The case of the acclaimed South African novel that ‘borrows’ from Samuel Beckett

    Already in 1963 Beckett had signed the petition Playwrights Against Apartheid. He would continue to refuse performance rights in South Africa until 1980, when the Baxter Theatre was allowed to stage Waiting for Godot with a racially integrated cast.

    Nevertheless, unauthorised Godots materialised before this. Athol Fugard, the South African playwright whose own dramas were influenced by Beckett, directed one of the earliest South African productions in 1962. Featuring an all-black cast, it testified to the play’s political charge, which Fugard emphasised:

    Vladimir and Estragon … were at Sharpeville or the first in at Auschwitz.

    It’s reasonable to think that Beckett would have supported this protest performance. But he would probably have denounced the first and unofficial Afrikaans version, Afspraak met Godot, translated by Suseth Brits and performed in 1970 at the Potchefstroom University College (now North-West University) behind closed doors.

    For different reasons, Beckett would also have frowned on the substantial “borrowings” in Afrikaans novelist Willem Anker’s 2014 novel, Buys.

    Domesticating a European classic

    Fully sanctioned by Beckett’s estate and beautifully translated (from the French and English) by now-retired professor of French at the University of the Free State Naòmi Morgan, Ons Wag vir Godot arrives at a different moment altogether.

    The translation retains the gallows humour of the original while adding local flavour. For instance, where Vladimir originally names the Eiffel Tower as a picturesque site to commit suicide, his Afrikaans counterpart nominates Van Stadensbrug, a bridge over a ravine in the Eastern Cape. The slave-like Lucky once entertained his master with European dances: “the farandole, the fling, the brawl, the jig, the fandango”. These now become a South African mix: “volkspele, die riel, die pantsula, selfs die horrelpyp” (folk games, riel dance, pantsula dance, a hiding).

    In translation-speak, Ons Wag vir Godot is therefore fully “domesticated”: the play’s universality comes through even though – and perhaps even more so because – it’s anchored in a particular place and time.

    This struck me when I attended the play’s limited-run production, expertly directed by Dion van Niekerk, at the 2024 Vrystaat Kunstefees (Free State arts festival). Its set managed to thread together subtle South African roadside details: a toppled rubbish bin, pylons on the horizon, a (broken) picnic bench.

    In the text itself, we encounter familiar place names, sayings and cultural clues. Consider how Beckett’s abstract phrase “the essential doesn’t change” is grounded in African mythology: “Jakkals verander van hare, maar nie van streke nie” (The leopard doesn’t change its spots). Then there’s the charming touch of the dog in Vladimir’s song snatching “’n stukkie wors” (a piece of sausage particular to South Africa) rather than a measly “bone”.

    Godot and the Afrikaans canon

    Ons Wag vir Godot achieves its most profound tribute to Beckett and Afrikaans through its intertextual richness. Both the French and English originals are highly allusive texts: they invoke other works of literature to increase their range of meaning and subtlety. Morgan is attuned to this subtlety and to the parallels to be found in Afrikaans literature. There are references to works by canonical Afrikaans writers like Eugène Marais, Totius and C.J. Langenhoven, each adding its own resonance.



    Read more:
    Koos Prinsloo: the cult Afrikaans writer has been translated to English – here’s a review

    Yet the dilemma any translator faces is not so much in bringing in the new, but in striking a balance with the old. Consider the judicious swapping of a line from Percy Bysshe Shelley for a line from C. Louis Leipoldt.

    In the English version, Estragon looks up forlornly at the moon and half-quotes the English Romantic poet: “Pale for weariness … Of climbing heaven and staring on the likes of us.” In the Afrikaans, he gives us a fragment from the wistful poem, Die Moormansgat: “ek kyk na die lig van die volle silwermaan” (I behold the light of the full silver moon). At face value, this lacks the detached, woeful quality of Shelley’s line. But read in the context of Leipoldt’s poem, it is every bit as poignant.

    The virtue of waiting

    “Vladimir would agree,” Morgan concludes in the preface to her translation, “that a century is a decent amount of time to hone a language for the translation of one of the best-known dramas in world literature”.



    Read more:
    Animal Farm has been translated into Shona – why a group of Zimbabwean writers undertook the task

    And indeed, the riches of the Afrikaans language are on display in this sensitive, witty and allusive rendering of Beckett’s European classic. But it’s also true that a certain amount of political baggage had to be shaken off before such a feat could be realised – not just in the right words, but in the right spirit. Of course, if Beckett’s play teaches us anything, it’s the virtue of waiting.

    Rick de Villiers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Waiting for Godot has been translated into Afrikaans: what took so long – https://theconversation.com/waiting-for-godot-has-been-translated-into-afrikaans-what-took-so-long-257345

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Highways to hell: west Africa’s road networks are the preferred battleground for terror groups

    Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Olivier Walther, Associate Professor in Geography, University of Florida

    What’s the connection between roads and conflict in west Africa? This may seem like an odd question. But a study we conducted shows a close relationship between the two.

    We are researchers of transnational political violence. We analysed 58,000 violent events in west Africa between 2000 to 2024. Our focus was on identifying patterns of violence in relation to transport infrastructure.

    Anecdotal evidence suggests that roads, bridges, pipelines and other transport systems are increasingly attacked across west Africa, but little is known about the factors that explain when, where and by whom.

    Violence in west Africa involves a complex mix of political, economic and social factors. Weak governance, corruption, urban-rural inequalities and marginalised populations have been exploited by numerous armed groups, including transnational criminal networks and religious extremists.

    West Africa has been one of the world’s most violent regions since the mid 2010s. In 2024 alone, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data initiative recorded over 10,600 events of political violence in the region. These ranged from battles between armed groups, explosions and other forms of remote violence, to attacks on unarmed civilians. An estimated 25,600 people were killed. This has been the status quo in the region for nearly a decade.

    The results of our study show that 65% of all the attacks, explosions, and violence against civilians recorded between 2000 and 2024 were located within one kilometre of a road.

    Only 4% of all events were located further than 10km from a road. This pattern was consistent across all road types but most pronounced near highways and primary roads.

    We think the reason for this pattern is that there is fierce competition between state and non-state actors for access to and use of roads.

    Governments need well-developed road networks for a host of reasons, including the ability to govern, enabling economic activity, and security. Roads enable military mobility and reduce potential safe havens for insurgents in remote regions.

    Insurgent groups also see transport networks as prime targets. They create opportunities to blockade cities, ambush convoys, kidnap travellers, employ landmines, and destroy key infrastructure.

    Our research is part of a long line of work that explored the role of infrastructure in relation to security in west Africa. Our latest research reinforces earlier findings linking the two. Transport networks have become battlegrounds for extremist groups seeking to destabilise states, isolate communities and expand their influence.

    The network

    The west African road network is vast, estimated at over 709,000km of roads by the Global Roads Inventory Project. It compares unfavourably with other African regions. For example, paved roads remain relatively scarce in west Africa (17% of the regional network) when compared with north Africa (83%).

    Poorly maintained roads impose costs on west African countries. They increase transport time of perishable goods, shorten the operational life of trucks, cause more accidents, and reduce social interactions between communities.

    Still, significant variations in road quality are found across the region. The percentage of paved roads ranges from a high of 37% in Senegal to just over 7% in Mali. Nigeria has the largest road network in west Africa with an estimated 195,000km, but much of it has deteriorated because of poor maintenance.

    Road-related violence is on the rise

    We found that road-related attacks have been on the rise since jihadist groups emerged in the mid-2010s. Only 31 ambushes against convoys were reported in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger from 2000-2015, against 497 from 2016-2023.

    Attacks frequently occur along the same road segments, such as around Boni in the Gourma Mounts, where Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) conducted nine attacks against Malian forces and Wagner mercenaries between 2019 and 2024.

    Violence was the most clustered near roads in 2011, with 87% of all violent events located within 1km of a road. Our analysis shows that, though still high, there’s been a decline post-2000: 59% in 2022 and 60% in 2024. This evolution reflects the ruralisation of conflict in west Africa. As jihadist insurgents target rural areas and small towns more and more, an increasing share of violent events also occurs far away from roads.

    We’ve studied the root causes of west Africa’s violence for nearly a decade, documenting the ever-intensifying costs paid by its people. In the process, we’ve uncovered overlooked aspects of the turmoil, including the centrality of the road networks to an understanding of where the violence is happening.

    The most dangerous roads of west Africa

    Our findings show that violence against transport infrastructure is very unevenly distributed in west Africa and that specific road segments have been repeatedly targeted. This was particularly the case in the Central Sahel, Lake Chad basin, and western Cameroon.

    For example, the 350km ring road linking Bamenda to Kumbo and Wum in Cameroon is the most violent road in west Africa, with 757 events since 2018, due to the conflict between the government and the Ambazonian separatists.

    The longest segments of dangerous roads are in Nigeria, particularly those connecting Maiduguri in Borno State to Damaturu, Potiskum, Biu and Bama.

    In the central Sahel, the road between Mopti/Sévaré and Gao is by far the most violent transport axis, with 433 events since the beginning of the civil war in Mali in 2012. South of Gao, National Road 17 leading to the Nigerien border, and National Road 20 heading east toward Ménaka have experienced 177 and 139 events respectively since the Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISSP) intensified its activities in the region in 2017.

    In Burkina Faso, all the roads leading to Djibo near the border with Mali have experienced high levels of violence since the early 2020s.

    Building transport infrastructure to promote peace

    Roads are an important part of state counterinsurgency strategies and a strategic target for local militants. Yes, as our work highlights, transport infrastructure is largely ignored in debates that emphasise more state interventions as a means of combating insecurity. Sixty years after the independence of many west African countries, road accessibility remains elusive in the region.

    Peripheral cities such as Bardaï, Bilma, Kidal and Timbuktu, where rebel movements have historically developed, are still not connected to the national network by tarmac roads.

    The duality of the transport infrastructure, as both a facilitator and target of violence, has put government forces at a disadvantage. Regular forces are heavily constrained by the sparsity and poor conditions of the road network, which makes them vulnerable to attacks without necessarily allowing them to project their military power over long distances.

    Rather than building transport infrastructure, states have focused on strengthening security by investing in military bases. The military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have further reinforced this trend, with the creation of a joint force by the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States.

    Strengthening security has taken precedence over developmental support for peripheral communities, who experience the worst of the violence.

    Olivier Walther receives funding from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

    Alexander John Thurston receives funding from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

    Steven Radil receives funding from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

    – ref. Highways to hell: west Africa’s road networks are the preferred battleground for terror groups – https://theconversation.com/highways-to-hell-west-africas-road-networks-are-the-preferred-battleground-for-terror-groups-258517

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: There is no loneliness epidemic – so why do we keep talking as if there is?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Brendan Kelly, Professor of Psychiatry, Trinity College Dublin

    fran_kie/Shutterstock.com

    Most people experience periods of loneliness, isolation or solitude in their lives. But these are different things, and the proportion of people feeling lonely is stable over time. So why do we keep talking about an epidemic of loneliness?

    Before the COVID pandemic, several studies showed that rates of loneliness were stable in England, the US, Finland, Sweden and Germany, among other places, over recent decades.

    While COVID changed many things, loneliness levels quickly returned to pre-pandemic levels. In 2018, 34% of US adults aged 50 to 80 years reported a lack of companionship “some of the time” or “often”. That proportion rose to 42% during the pandemic but fell to 33% in 2024.

    That’s a lot of lonely people, but it is not an epidemic. In some countries, such as Sweden, loneliness is in decline – at least among older adults.

    Despite these statistics, the idea that loneliness is increasing is pervasive. For example in 2023, the US surgeon general warned about an “epidemic of loneliness and isolation”. The UK even has a government minister with an explicit responsibility for addressing loneliness.

    Loneliness is a problem, even if it is not an epidemic. Social connection is important for physical and mental health. Many people feel lonely in a crowd or feel crowded when alone. In 2023, the World Health Organization announced a “Commission on Social Connection”. The WHO is right: we need to reduce loneliness in our families, communities and societies.

    But the idea that loneliness is an “epidemic” is misleading and it draws us away from sustainable solutions, rather than towards them. It suggests that loneliness is a new problem (it is not), that it is increasing (it is not), that it is beyond our control (it is not), and that the only appropriate reaction is an emergency one (it is not).

    In the short term, loneliness is an undesirable psychological state. In the long term, it is a risk factor for chronic ill health.

    Loneliness is not a sudden crisis that needs a short-term fix. It is a long-term challenge that requires a sustained response. An emergency reaction is not appropriate – a measured response is. Initiatives by the US surgeon general and WHO are welcome, but they should be long-term responses to an enduring problem, not emergency reactions to an “epidemic”.

    Vivek Murthy, the former US surgeon general warned about an epidemic of loneliness in America.
    lev radin/Shutterstock

    Medicalising normal human experience

    Conceptual clarity is essential if true loneliness is to be addressed. Pathologising all instances of being alone risks medicalising normal human experiences such as solitude. Some people feel alive only in crowds, but others were born lighthouse keepers. In a hyper-connected world, loneliness should be solvable, but solitude must be treasured.

    So, if there is no loneliness epidemic, why do we keep talking as if there is? Media framing of the issue and the human tendency to panic reinforce each other. We click into news stories based on subjective resonance rather than objective evidence.

    Human behaviour is shaped primarily by feelings, not facts. We dramatise, panic, and overstate negative trends. If trends are positive, we focus on minor counter-trends, ignore statistics and make things up.

    In the case of loneliness, the problem is real, even if the “epidemic” is not. Loneliness is part of the human condition, but alleviating each other’s loneliness is also part of who we are – or who we can become.

    Addressing loneliness is not about solving a short-term problem or halting an “epidemic”. It means learning to live with each other in new, more integrated ways that meet our emotional needs. Loneliness is not the problem. It is a consequence of living in societies that are often disconnected and fragmented.

    The solution? We cannot change the essentials of human nature – and nor should we try. But we can be a little kinder to ourselves, speak to each other a little more, and cultivate compassion for ourselves and other people.

    We need to connect with each other better and more. We can. We should. We will.

    Brendan Kelly does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. There is no loneliness epidemic – so why do we keep talking as if there is? – https://theconversation.com/there-is-no-loneliness-epidemic-so-why-do-we-keep-talking-as-if-there-is-259072

    MIL OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Choosing to be an orphan: for some Kenyan families it’s a strategy for survival

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Andreana Prichard, Associate Professor of Honors and African History, University of Oklahoma

    In the world of international child development and orphan care, it’s not uncommon for children with families to declare themselves orphans. In fact, this practice can be traced back to precolonial times in Kenya.

    Andreana Prichard has done research on the practice in Kenya. We asked her to share her insights into it.

    Why do some people in Kenya assume the identity of ‘orphan’?

    We often think of “orphans” as children who have lost both parents and who lack kin networks. One might ask why someone would “opt in” to orphan status when they do not fall within the classical definition of the term.

    In my paper I look at the issue of orphanhood over the last 160 years. Case studies from Kenya I examine illustrate that the practice I define as “opting in” to orphanhood has precolonial roots. I define “opting in” as choosing to take on the label of being an orphan. This can be done by parents, relatives or even, in some instances, the child. This is because the label “orphan” has come to confer unique opportunities.

    The practice became increasingly popular in the mid-1990s, when parents in eastern and southern Africa who had contracted HIV began to die in large numbers. Activists feared many children would be left without caregivers.

    In response, the number of orphanages proliferated as humanitarian actors, churches and states inundated east Africa with orphan-focused NGOs.

    In 2020, officials in Kenya estimated that there were at least 910 residential institutions for children in the country (of which 581 were registered), housing between 26,198 and 85,733 Kenyan children.

    The predicted “orphan crisis” never materialised, partly because families and communities stepped in to care for newly parentless children. But the idea of an “orphan crisis” remained, and so did the funding and infrastructure.

    This phenomenon occurred across the continent, not just in Kenya. However, its effects were felt particularly acutely in eastern and southern Africa where HIV/Aids prevalence rates were higher and where there was more western tourism.

    Today, many African families see orphan-focused NGOs as a path to access education and improve their lives. My research shows that children themselves sometimes affiliate with an institution that provides shelter, food and schooling. Children facing abuse from caregivers may also prefer the relative anonymity and safety of an institution.

    In some cases, receiving orphan services actually raises the status of the “orphan” child above that of other children. They have access to more material resources than they might have had in their villages or at home. They might have more leisure time and less work. They may have access to better bedding, shoes and clothing. They are also likely able to attend school more consistently and have a real opportunity to attend university.

    Does ‘opting in’ have a long history?

    Yes, it does.

    In the precolonial period, most parentless or vulnerable children were cared for through lasting community support systems. Orphanhood, as it exists today as a child lacking support, protection, or care from kin, was largely avoided.

    However, the late 19th to mid-20th centuries brought new actors to the east African region. The practice of “opting in” became a strategic, temporary option used by families to access services from western humanitarians.

    The earliest example of this shift I found in my research is from the 1890s. Fearing their children would be caught in the Indian Ocean slave trade, African parents sometimes chose to send their children to British missions until the region was safe. They knew the missionaries opposed the slave trade and knew they offered food and medical care.

    African parents thought they were making temporary arrangements to keep their children safe. Missionaries, however, understood parents to have abandoned their children. When parents returned to repay the debt – with agricultural produce or trade goods – and to reclaim their children, missionaries refused them.

    In another example from Kenya in the 1950s, the British colonial government opened “reform schools” for young men. The Wamumu Approved School was renowned for the relative quality of education it provided. But the state admitted only the “most vulnerable” for a free education. Feeling they had no way to access Wamumu, students claimed to be orphans.

    What have been the negative effects of Kenya’s orphan system?

    There are several problems with creating a situation in which people present themselves as vulnerable just to gain safety or improve their social and economic standing.

    First, research has shown that building orphanages in poor communities incentivises parents to abandon their children if they’re not also given the help to remain together.

    Second, research shows that children are often put at risk in these institutions. Institutionalisation exposes children to risks such as sexual abuse, gender-based violence and neglect.

    Third, orphanages have become so lucrative that African orphanage owners will go to great lengths to fit African children into the categories westerners wish to fund. The phenomenon of “paper orphans” is a prime example. “Paper orphans” are children who are recruited from their homes by proprietors (or middlemen/brokers) of orphanages and residential-care facilities. Fraudulent documentation is created for them – often including false death certificates of parents and new identity registration documents – rendering them orphans on paper, and vulnerable in practice.

    What should be done?

    Governments in Europe, Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean are trying to phase out orphanages, as are some African countries.

    Based on my research I believe that working with families to support vulnerable children in their homes of origin or with extended families is a better option. This can be done through assistance programmes for vulnerable families as well as child welfare programmes. These allow families to remain intact when experiencing hardship.

    Kenya is taking steps to do this by replacing orphanages and other forms of residential children’s homes with family-based, foster and community-based care and other forms of assistance. Family strengthening approaches include positive parenting instruction, life skills training, and income-generating activities, as well as supportive supervision.

    In addition to this, missionary and voluntourism trips to orphanages and residential care facilities should be banned or limited.

    Andreana Prichard received funding from the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Grant.

    – ref. Choosing to be an orphan: for some Kenyan families it’s a strategy for survival – https://theconversation.com/choosing-to-be-an-orphan-for-some-kenyan-families-its-a-strategy-for-survival-247371

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Kenya’s peacebuilding efforts hold valuable lessons for the rest of the world, but gaps remain

    Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Leonor Oliveira Toscano, PhD Candidate in Political Science, University of Oslo

    Kenya has been praised as a “model for the world” when it comes to peacebuilding efforts to manage outbreaks of violence within its borders. The country has systematically put in place a peacebuilding architecture rooted in a history of local peace initiatives. These date back to the early 1990s.

    Over this period, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee emerged in the country’s north-eastern region. The committee successfully addressed decades of inter-clan violence in Wajir, an arid county bordering Somalia. It also inspired the emergence of numerous local peace committees across the country.

    These committees have been set up in some other African countries – like Ghana, South Africa, Sierra Leone and Burundi – and continue to contribute informally to local peacebuilding in these states.



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    In Kenya, the committees became institutionalised after post-election violence in 2007-08 and a mediation process led by former UN secretary general Kofi Annan. They now form part of the national peacebuilding architecture.

    Violence triggered by the contested 2007 presidential election outcome resulted in the killing of more than 1,000 people. The mediation process led to a power-sharing agreement signed by the presidential contenders Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga.

    The country’s peacebuilding architecture is now supported by several policies and frameworks. These include the constitution of 2010. The system that’s been built has the capacity to connect a wide variety of peacebuilding actors – both state and non-state, formal and informal – at all levels of society. This helps resolve conflict and build resilience.

    The Kenyan government initiated a review of the peacebuilding architecture in 2023. It involved a lengthy consultation process and high levels of participation among Kenyans. The National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management led the way, assisted by an independent panel of 13 peacebuilding experts.

    Released at the end of 2024, the review looked at the strengths and weaknesses of the architecture.

    It offers a vision for building a robust peacebuilding system, along with an actionable roadmap. One lesson is that Kenya can use the capacities and unique approaches of different peacebuilding actors. At the local level, peace committees showed that they made contributions to early warning systems and building confidence in communities.

    However, insufficient resources and a consistent focus on electoral violence prevent the system from addressing other drivers of conflict.

    The strengths

    Local peace committees, with membership typically drawn from ordinary citizens, religious groups or local civil society organisations, play a crucial role. They support dialogue around conflict issues. They promote trust and understanding, and can build a constructive environment for conflict resolution.

    Their information gathering feeds into the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s Conflict Early Warning and Response System (CEWARN) to prevent election violence. Local peace committees have contributed to negotiating local disputes. They have also helped de-polarise ethnic identities and facilitated local peace agreements. One example was the Modogashe Declaration. It sets ground rules to solve conflict and local disputes over pasture, water access and cattle rustling.



    Read more:
    Kenya violence: 5 key drivers of the decades-long conflict in the north and what to do about them

    We are researchers in Norway on a project focusing on civilian agency, local peace and resilience building. Our own interviews with committee members in Nakuru – a county greatly affected by the violence in 2007-08 – found that peace committee members continued to work together and share conflict-sensitive information with local stakeholders. These include administration officers and religious leaders, and covered periods during and after the 2022 elections.

    Further, local peace committees can offer women valuable opportunities for participation in conflict management. This contributes to their protection, for example from sexual violence.

    The weaknesses

    Despite these successes, Kenya’s peacebuilding architecture faces pressing challenges.

    First, local peace committees aren’t perfect. They can be manipulated by politicians seeking to build local support. They can also compete with traditional actors such as elders in conflict resolution.

    Kenya’s institutionalisation of local peacebuilding strengthened information flow across all levels. But it also threatens to undermine local peacebuilding agency and autonomy. Formalising local peace committees can spur an unhealthy monetisation of peacebuilding, with some members joining for financial gain. This threatens to erode the voluntary character of peacebuilding as a common good and undermine genuine priorities for peace.



    Read more:
    How women in Kenya mobilised for peace after surviving violence

    Second, elite-level politics in Kenya creates the persistent risk of electoral violence. This diverts attention and resources away from other long-standing causes of conflict. The drivers of violence in Kenya are varied and region specific. They include disputes over access to land, and marginalisation of ethnic and religious communities. Climate change threatens to worsen competition and conflict between pastoralists and farming communities.

    Our analysis of event data from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data shows that communal violence is the deadliest form of political violence in Kenya. For their part, fatalities related to election violence have decreased. This underscores the urgent need to consistently invest in prevention and local peacebuilding beyond narrow electoral periods.

    Fatalities in Kenya by type of armed violence: 2010-2023

    Electoral competition can escalate violence between pastoralists and farmers, but it’s the persistence of communal conflicts that represents a serious threat. Communal violence particularly affects Kenya’s arid and semi-arid areas in the Rift Valley, eastern and north-eastern regions.

    What next

    Our interviews with local peace committee members show that funding for their activities diminishes outside election years. This hampers their capacity to address conflict outside these periods.

    Yet research has shown that local peacebuilding can build social resilience against recurrent communal violence. Peacebuilding interventions grounded in local realities are also vital for countering insurgent violence. This is especially important as counterterrorism operations by state forces often trigger cycles of violence rather than resolving underlying issues.



    Read more:
    Drivers of electoral violence in Kenya: red flags to watch out for

    Our research finds that Kenyans place significant trust in local peacebuilders, such as community leaders, elders and women. The review of the country’s peacebuilding architecture proposes a 40% quota for women, youth and people with disabilities in local peace committees.

    However, quotas alone may not be sufficient to address the political and cultural challenges that entrench inequality.

    Ultimately, political elites need to transform Kenya’s “win at all costs” politics. This way, the country’s mediators and peacebuilders can address the deep social and economic grievances that underpin cycles of violence.

    Leonor Toscano’s doctoral research is supported by the grant from the European Research Council’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program (852816; PI: Jana Krause). Leonor Toscano conducted interviews with LPC members in Kenya.

    Jana Krause received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under grant number 852816 (ResilienceBuilding).

    Marika Miner’s post-doctoral research is also supported by the grant from the European Research Council’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program (852816; PI: Jana Krause).

    – ref. Kenya’s peacebuilding efforts hold valuable lessons for the rest of the world, but gaps remain – https://theconversation.com/kenyas-peacebuilding-efforts-hold-valuable-lessons-for-the-rest-of-the-world-but-gaps-remain-257761

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Why evolution can explain human testicle size but not our unique chins

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Max Telford, Jodrell Professor of Zoology and Comparative Anatomy, UCL

    neurobit/Shutterstock

    The human body is a machine whose many parts – from the microscopic details of our cells to our limbs, eyes, liver and brain – have been assembled in fits and starts over the 4 billion years of our history.

    But scientists are still puzzling over why we evolved into this particular form. Why do humans uniquely have a chin, for example? And why, relative to body weight, is a human testicle triple the size of a gorilla’s but a fifth of that of a chimpanzee? As I show in my new book, The Tree of Life, we are still searching for the answers to many of these “why” questions. But we are starting to find answers to some of them.

    The story of evolution tells us how, starting from simple beginnings, each species was built – when each of the components that make a living creature was added to its blueprint. If we climb the evolutionary tree of life, we can follow a twisting path that visits the increasingly specialised branches that a species belongs to. We humans, for example, were animals before we became vertebrates; mammals before evolving into primates and so on.

    The groups of species we share each of these branches with reveal the order our body parts appeared in. A body and a gut (inventions of the animal branch) must have come before backbone and limbs (vertebrate branch); milk and hair (mammals) came before fingernails (primates).

    There is a way we can study the separate problem of just why we evolved each of these body parts, but it only works if the feature in question has evolved more than once on separate branches of the tree of life. This repeated evolution is called convergence. It can be a source of frustration for biologists because it confuses us as to how species are related. Swallows and swifts, for example, were once classified as sister species. We now know from both DNA and comparisons of their skeletons that swallows are really closer relatives of owls than swifts.

    Size matters when it comes to evolution

    But convergent evolution becomes something useful when we think of it as a kind of natural experiment. The size of primate testicles gives us a classic example. Abyssinian black and white colobus monkey and bonnet macaque adult males are roughly the same size. But, like chimps, humans and gorillas, these similar monkeys have vastly dissimilar testicles. Colobus testicles weigh just 3 grams. The testicles of the macaques, in contrast, are a whopping 48 grams.

    Bonnet macaques are no monogamists.
    SHAJI C/Shutterstock

    You could come up with several believable explanations for their different testicle sizes. Large testicles might be the equivalent of the peacock’s tail, not useful per se but attractive to females. But perhaps the most plausible explanation relates to the way they mate. A male colobus monkey competes ferociously for access to a harem of females who will mate exclusively with him. Macaques, on the other hand live in peaceful mixed troops of about 30 monkeys and have a different approach to love where everyone mates with everyone else: males with multiple females (polygamy) and females with multiple males (polyandry).

    The colobus with his harem can get away with producing a bare minimum of sperm – if a droplet is enough to produce a baby, then why make more? For a male macaque the competition to reproduce happens in a battle between his sperm and the sperm of other males who mated before or after. A male macaque with large testicles should make more sperm, giving him a higher chance of passing on his genes. It’s a sensible explanation for their different testicle sizes, but is it true? This is where convergent evolution helps.

    If we look across the whole of the mammal branch of the tree of life we find there are many groups of mammals that have evolved testicles of all different sizes. In almost all these separate cases, larger testicles are consistently found in promiscuous species and smaller in monogamous.

    A small-testicled, silverback male gorilla has sole access to a harem. Big-testicled chimps and bonobos are indeed highly promiscuous. Dolphins, meanwhile, may have the biggest mammalian testicles of all, making up as much as 4% of their body weight (equivalent to human testicles weighing roughly 3 kilos). Although wild dolphin sex lives are naturally hard to study, spinner dolphins at least fit our expectations, engaging in mass mating events called wuzzles.

    It was thanks to the multiple observations provided by convergent evolution that we were able to discover this consistent correlation between testicle size and sex life right across the mammals. And as for humans, we have testicle size somewhere in the middle, you can make of this what you want!

    But what of the human chin?

    The human chin has been fertile ground for arguments between scientists over its purpose. As with testicles, there are half a dozen plausible ideas to explain the evolution of the human chin. It could have evolved to strengthen the jaw of a battling caveman. Maybe the chin evolved to exaggerate the magnificence of a manly beard. It might even be a by-product of the invention of cooking and the softer food it produced – a functionless facial promontory left behind by the receding tide of a weakening jaw.

    Intriguingly, however, a chin can be found in no other mammal, not even our closest cousins the Neanderthals. Thanks to the uniqueness of the Homo sapiens chin, while we have a rich set of possible explanations for its evolutionary purpose, in the absence of convergent evolution, we have no sensible way of testing them.

    Some parts of human nature may be destined to remain a mystery.

    This article includes links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something from bookshop.org The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

    Max Telford does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Why evolution can explain human testicle size but not our unique chins – https://theconversation.com/why-evolution-can-explain-human-testicle-size-but-not-our-unique-chins-259419

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Mbare Art Space: a colonial beer hall in Zimbabwe has become a vibrant arts centre

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Research Associate, University of Oxford

    In southern Africa townships were built as segregated urban zones for black people. They were created under colonial and white minority rule policies that controlled movement, confined opportunity, and kept people apart.

    I grew up in a different historic black township in Zimbabwe, but Mbare was the first of its kind. It holds a unique place in the nation’s imagination.

    Mbare was originally named Harare. But in 1982 that name was reassigned to the capital city that houses it. In its storied past, it was once the heartbeat of black urban life. At its centre is Rufaro Stadium, where Bob Marley and the Wailers famously performed at Zimbabwe’s independence celebrations.

    The township was a hub of cultural energy, sports, and political activism, and the community beer hall served as a vital gathering point. Today, many of these beer halls stand derelict.

    These once-thriving communal spaces reflect a broader neglect of civic infrastructure in post-independence Zimbabwe. Yet out of these ruins, new life is taking shape.

    One of the most influential figures in Zimbabwe’s artist-run spaces movement, Moffat Takadiwa, has transformed one of these former beer halls into the Mbare Art Space. The dynamic arts hub reclaims the building’s original spirit of gathering, creativity and public engagement.

    Operating under a long lease from the Harare City Council, this nonprofit initiative is part of a wider urban renewal and adaptive reuse project aimed at reimagining the city’s cultural infrastructure.

    My ongoing work in archival research includes mapping and visiting historical and cultural spaces like this. Here Takadiwa saw the potential for not just studios and an exhibition venue, but also for dialogue and community regeneration.

    Transforming spaces

    Beer halls were established by British colonial authorities in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) as part of a strategy of social control over the African urban population. They were designed to regulate leisure, restrict political organising and generate revenue through the sale of alcohol. By centralising drinking in state-run facilities, colonial administrators aimed to monitor and contain African social life while profiting from it.

    Situated in a repurposed colonial-era beer garden, Mbare Art Space turns a former site of segregation into a vibrant centre of artistic and communal revival. It redefines a legacy of constraint and control as one of creative freedom and empowerment. The place is now an artists’ haven with studios, office space, an exhibition hall and a digital hub.

    Takadiwa’s vision is informed by global precedents, notably inspired by US artist Theaster Gates, whose work includes the transformation of a derelict bank on Chicago’s South Side. It became the Stony Island Arts Bank – a hybrid space for art, archives and community engagement.

    Takadiwa opened Mbare Art Space in 2019 with a vision to support emerging artists through mentorship and access to resources. True to his artistic philosophy – resurrecting abandoned, often overlooked materials suffering the effects of urban decay – he revitalised a neglected site. Most of the artists working from this space follow his lead, upcycling and recycling found materials into compelling visual forms that speak to both history and possibility.

    When I arrive, Takadiwa is on his way out, but offers me a quick tour of his studio, where works in progress for his upcoming participation in the São Paulo Biennale are taking shape.

    Known for his lush, densely layered sculptures and tapestry-like works made from found objects – computer keyboards, bottle tops, toothbrushes, and toothpaste tubes – Takadiwa has garnered international acclaim. His works are collected by US rapper Jay-Z and major institutions like the Centre National d’Art Plastique in Paris, the European Parliament’s art collection in Brussels, and the National Gallery of Zimbabwe in Harare.

    Collaboration

    What Takadiwa is building is not just an arts centre – it’s a new model space rooted in history and responsive to the present. The site itself becomes an ongoing installation, activated by the artists, curators and community members who inhabit it.

    Tafadzwa Chimbumu, the operations manager, takes over the tour, guiding me through the rest of the precinct. The site retains the bones of its beer hall architecture, but it bursts with new life. Colourful murals adorn the walls. Tents draped over smaller buildings animate the exposed brickwork.

    Plans are underway to establish a library here, a resource where researchers and artists can engage with Zimbabwe’s under-documented art history. Much of this history is scattered across archives and unpublished dissertations, rather than in widely available books. The aim is to bring these materials together and make them more accessible to the public.

    Mbare Art Space is also becoming an exciting hub for collaboration and education. Community workshops, for example, are led by resident artists. Local schools take part in art education initiatives. Through community outreach and educational programming, the centre is extending its impact beyond its immediate geography.

    As it looks to the future, Mbare Art Space is focused on expanding its artist-in-residence programme, inviting both local and international artists to immerse themselves in the context of Mbare and Zimbabwe.

    Ultimately, what the space offers is something intangible – a feeling, a memory, a vision of what is possible when history and imagination meet in a shared place.

    Tinashe Mushakavanhu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Mbare Art Space: a colonial beer hall in Zimbabwe has become a vibrant arts centre – https://theconversation.com/mbare-art-space-a-colonial-beer-hall-in-zimbabwe-has-become-a-vibrant-arts-centre-256528

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: China’s support for Mali’s military carries risks: researcher outlines what they are

    Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah, Postdoctoral Fellow, Dublin City University

    Mali, a landlocked Sahelian nation of 25 million people, has faced significant instability since 2012, marked by terrorism, state neglect and armed conflicts.

    That year a Tuareg rebellion started in northern Mali and President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a military coup. Constitutional rule was suspended. Rebels in northern Mali went on to seize cities like Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, declaring an independent Islamic State of Azawad and imposing sharia law.

    They also destroyed cultural heritage sites, including 14 of Timbuktu’s 16 Unesco-listed mausoleums. The crisis prompted international intervention, including a UN authorised mission, which retook northern cities within weeks. Islamist rebels retreated into civilian populations and remote areas.

    Despite these efforts, violence against civilians by extremist groups and community militias has continued. By 2023, 8.8 million Malians needed humanitarian assistance. Over 375,500 were internally displaced, primarily women and children.

    Meanwhile, the former French colony had turned to China for military assistance. Between 2012 and 2013, China provided €5 million (about US$5.8 million) in logistical equipment to improve the Malian army’s mobility.



    Read more:
    China’s interests in Africa are being shaped by the race for renewable energy

    In August 2013, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army gave the Malian army military supplies totalling 1.6 billion CFA francs (about US$2.8 million). China made similar donations between 2014 and 2023.

    I am an international security and global governance researcher. My recent research explored the impact of China’s security sector assistance on Mali’s fragility.

    China’s assistance to Mali aims to equip the country to address terrorism and insurgency. But I argue that it may have unintended consequences and cause further damage to the country.

    The heavy reliance on Chinese supply exposes Mali to vulnerabilities, including supply disruptions, diminished bargaining power, and limited strategic flexibility. This could destabilise security even more should China face manufacturing issues or supply chain disruptions leading to delays or shortages in the production of weapons.

    It also raises concerns about the potential influence of China on Mali’s defence policies and decision-making processes. In turn this could entrench the Malian military government’s position. China takes a hands-off approach to the governance structures of the countries it engages with. Hopes of democratisation in the country could be affected.



    Read more:
    US trade wars with China – and how they play out in Africa

    Rich in resources

    Mali has significant natural resources, including 800 tons of gold reserves (it’s Africa’s fourth-largest producer), iron ore, manganese, lithium, and potential uranium and hydrocarbon deposits.

    In 2019, gold production generated US$734 million, or 9.7% of Mali’s GDP, supporting over 10% of the population.

    Chinese firms, such as Ganfeng Lithium and China National Nuclear Corporation, have invested heavily in Mali’s mining sector. They are involved in a US$130 million lithium project and uranium exploration in the Kidal and Falea regions.

    Despite security risks, including attacks on Chinese personnel in 2015 and 2021, China remains committed due to Mali’s resource potential.

    Beyond mining, China has invested in Mali’s infrastructure. A US$2.7 billion railway modernisation project connects Bamako to Dakar, facilitating resource exports like iron ore and bauxite.

    The total of Mali’s external debt to China is not explicitly stated. But the 2014 loan agreement of US$11 billion and the 2016 loan of US$2.7 billion alone suggest Mali’s debt to China could be at least US$13 billion. This is without including loans for projects like the Bamako-Ségou expressway, and bridges in Bamako.

    This has often been criticised as “debt trap diplomacy”, increasing recipient countries’ dependence on Beijing. In Mali, I believe this risks entrenching economic vulnerability and giving China geopolitical leverage.



    Read more:
    China reaps most of the benefits of its relationship with Africa: what’s behind the imbalance

    China’s security sector assistance to Mali

    Historically, Mali relied on France. More recently, it’s used Russia’s expeditionary corps, formerly known as Wagner Group, for security support.

    In 2011, China provided US$11.4 million in grants, US$8.1 million in zero-interest loans, and a US$100.8 million concessional loan to foster bilateral cooperation.

    China’s participation in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali, starting in 2013 with 395 personnel, marked a shift in its security engagement.

    Chinese peacekeepers, including engineers, medical personnel and security guards, repaired infrastructure, provided medical aid and supported Mali’s 2013 elections.

    Their professionalism earned praise from the UN special envoy Albert Gerard Koenders for helping to ensure a smooth election.

    China’s involvement in Mali challenged traditional European approaches to peacekeeping, particularly France’s military-heavy strategy.



    Read more:
    China-Africa relations: new priorities have driven major shifts over the last 24 years – 5 essential reads

    How China’s assistance contributes to Mali’s fragility

    In spite of the positives, China’s security sector assistance contributes to Mali’s fragility in several ways.

    First, its no-strings-attached nature allows Mali’s military junta to consolidate power without making democratic or governance reforms.

    This lack of accountability enables corrupt military factions to operate unchecked. Governance weaknesses and authoritarianism can continue.

    Second, the heavy reliance on Chinese supply raises concerns about the potential influence of China on Mali’s defence decisions.

    This over-reliance on military solutions risks escalating conflicts and could lead to human rights abuses by security forces, as seen in increased violence against civilians. It doesn’t address root causes of conflict like social cohesion or local governance.

    Third, Mali’s growing dependence on Chinese aid — both military and economic — makes it vulnerable to disruptions from geopolitical tensions, supply chain issues, or changes in China’s foreign policy. This limits Mali’s ability to diversify its military capabilities or respond to evolving threats.

    Finally, China’s infrastructure investments, such as the US$1.48 billion (750 billion CFA francs) Bamako-Dakar railway loan, creates “debt trap diplomacy”.

    This pattern deepens economic dependence and reduces policy autonomy, further weakening state resilience.



    Read more:
    Maps showing China’s growing influence in Africa distort reality – but some risks are real

    The way forward

    To mitigate the risks of Chinese security sector assistance and promote sustainable stability, Mali must adopt a multifaceted strategy.

    First, it should collaborate with China to align security sector assistance with civilian-led security approaches.

    Second, Mali should diversify security and economic partnerships with donors like the US, the UK, and the EU.

    Third, transparent guidelines, developed through consultation with stakeholders, should assess the impacts of assistance to avoid deepening dependence.

    Fourth, engaging civil society and publishing regular reports on security sector assistance use and outcomes will foster public trust.

    Finally, promoting regional economic integration and ties with global powers will bolster Mali’s economic resilience.

    Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. China’s support for Mali’s military carries risks: researcher outlines what they are – https://theconversation.com/chinas-support-for-malis-military-carries-risks-researcher-outlines-what-they-are-257738

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Why bending over backwards to agree with Donald Trump is a perilous strategy

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Andrew Gawthorpe, Lecturer in History and International Studies, Leiden University

    Donald Trump is a difficult figure to deal with, both for foreign leaders and figures closer to home who find themselves in his crosshairs. The US president is unpredictable, sensitive and willing to break the rules to get his way.

    But in Trump’s second term, a variety of different leaders and institutions seem to have settled on a way to handle him. The key, they seem to think, is flattery. The most obvious example came at the recently concluded Nato summit in The Hague, Netherlands, where world leaders got together to discuss the future of the alliance.

    Previous summits with Trump have descended into recrimination and backbiting. The organisers were determined to avoid a repeat – and decided the best way to do it was to make Trump feel really, really good about himself.

    Even before the summit began, Nato secretary-general Mark Rutte had texted Trump to thank him for his “decisive action” in bombing Iran. This, he said, was something “no one else dared to do”.

    Then, when discussing Trump’s role in ending the war between Israel and Iran, Rutte referred to Trump as “daddy” – a name the White House has already transformed into a meme.

    The summit itself was light on the sort of contentious and detailed policy discussions that have historically bored and angered Trump.

    Instead, it was reduced to a series of photo opportunities and speeches in which other leaders lavished praise on Trump. Lithuania’s president, Gitanas Nausėda, even suggested the alliance ought to copy Trump’s political movement by adopting the phrase “make Nato great again”.

    Nato leaders aren’t the only ones trying this trick. British prime minister Keir Starmer has had a go at it too. Starmer has made sure that Trump will be the first US president to make a second state visit to the UK. He described the honour in Trump-like terms: “This has never happened before. It’s so incredible. It will be historic.”

    After Trump announced global trade tariffs earlier in the year, Starmer was the first leader to give Trump a much-needed victory by reaching a framework trade agreement. But it worked both ways, with Starmer able to land a political victory too.

    In his first term, flattery was also seen as a tool to be used to get Trump onside. Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky tried it in phone conversations with the US president, calling him a “great teacher” from whom he learned “skills and knowledge”.

    Flattery and compliance clearly have their uses. Trump is extremely sensitive to criticism and susceptible to praise, however hyperbolic and transparent it might be. Buttering him up may be an effective way to get him to back off.

    But it doesn’t achieve much else. At the Nato summit, an opportunity was missed to make progress on issues of real importance, such as how to better support Ukraine in its war against Russia or to better coordinate European defence spending.

    A summit dedicated to the sole aim of making Trump feel good is one with very limited aims indeed. All it does is push the difficult decisions forward for another day.

    A missed opportunity

    Individual decisions to bow down to Trump also mean missing the opportunity to mount collective resistance. One country might not be able to stand up to the president, but the odds of doing so would be greatly improved if leaders banded together.

    For example, Trump’s trade tariffs will damage the US economy as well as those of its trading partners. That is especially the case if those partners impose tariffs of their own on US goods.

    If each country instead follows Britain’s lead in the hope of getting the best deal for itself, they will have missed the opportunity to force the president to feel some discomfort of his own – and possibly change course.

    But perhaps the greatest danger of flattering Trump is that it teaches him that he can get away with doing pretty much whatever he likes. For a president who has threatened to annex the territory of Nato allies Denmark and Canada to nevertheless be feted at a Nato summit sends a message of impunity.

    That’s a dangerous lesson for Trump to learn. He has spent much of his second term undermining democratic and liberal norms at home and key tenets of US foreign policy abroad, such as hostility to Russia. He is attempting to undermine all traditional sources of authority and expertise and instead make the world dance to his own tune.

    Given the expansive scope of his aims, which many experts already think is leading to a constitutional crisis that threatens democracy, the willingness to suck up to Trump normalises him in a menacing way.

    When his targets roll over, it sends a message to others that Trump is unstoppable and resistance is futile. It encourages not just the next presidential abuse of power, but also the next surrender from those he chooses to attack.

    Perhaps the best that can be said for this strategy is that maybe it will appease Trump enough to prevent him from doing too much actual harm. But when dealing with such an unpredictable and vindictive president, that is a thin reed of hope.

    It is much more likely to encourage him to press on – until the harm becomes too severe to ignore.

    Andrew Gawthorpe does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Why bending over backwards to agree with Donald Trump is a perilous strategy – https://theconversation.com/why-bending-over-backwards-to-agree-with-donald-trump-is-a-perilous-strategy-259936

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: African prisoners made sound recordings in German camps in WW1: this is what they had to say

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Anette Hoffmann, Senior Researcher at the Institute for African Studies and Egyptology, University of Cologne

    During the first world war (1914-1918) thousands of African men enlisted to fight for France and Britain were captured and held as prisoners in Germany. Their stories and songs were recorded and archived by German linguists, who often didn’t understand a thing they were saying.

    Now a recent book called Knowing by Ear listens to these recordings alongside written sources, photographs and artworks to reveal the lives and political views of these colonised Africans from present-day Senegal, Somalia, Togo and Congo.

    Anette Hoffmann is a historian whose research and curatorial work engages with historical sound archives. We asked her about her book.

    How did these men come to be recorded?

    About 450 recordings with African speakers were made with linguists of the so-called Royal Prussian Phonographic Commission. Their project was opportunistic. They made use of the presence of prisoners of war to further their research.

    In many cases these researchers didn’t understand what was being said. The recordings were archived as language samples, yet most were never used, translated, or even listened to for decades.

    The many wonderful translators I have worked with over the years are often the first listeners who actually understood what was being said by these men a century before.

    What did they talk about?

    The European prisoners the linguists recorded were often asked to tell the same Bible story (the parable of the prodigal son). But because of language barriers, African prisoners were often simply asked to speak, tell a story or sing a song.

    We can hear some men repeating monotonous word lists or counting, but mostly they spoke of the war, of imprisonment and of the families they hadn’t seen for years.

    Abdoulaye Niang from Senegal sings in Wolof.
    Courtesy Lautarchiv, Berlin275 KB (download)

    In the process we hear speakers offer commentary. Senegalese prisoner Abdoulaye Niang, for example, calls Europe’s battlefields an abattoir for the soldiers from Africa. Others sang of the war of the whites, or speak of other forms of colonial exploitation.

    When I began working on colonial-era sound archives about 20 years ago, I was stunned by what I heard from African speakers, especially the critique and the alternative versions of colonial history. Often aired during times of duress, such accounts seldom surface in written sources.

    Joseph Ntwanumbi from South Africa chants in isiXhosa.
    Courtesy Lautarchiv, Berlin673 KB (download)

    Clearly, many speakers felt safe to say things because they knew that researchers couldn’t understand them. The words and songs have travelled decades through time yet still sound fresh and provocative.

    Can you highlight some of their stories?

    The book is arranged around the speakers. Many of them fought in the French army in Europe after being conscripted or recruited in former French colonies, like Abdoulaye Niang. Other African men got caught up in the war and were interned as civilian prisoners, like Mohamed Nur from Somalia, who had lived in Germany from 1911. Joseph Ntwanumbi from South Africa was a stoker on a ship that had docked in Hamburg soon after the war started.

    In chapter one Niang sings a song about the French army’s recruitment campaign in Dakar and also informs the linguists that the inmates of the camp in Wünsdorf, near Berlin, do not wish to be deported to another camp.

    An archive search reveals he was later deported and also that Austrian anthropologists measured his body for racial studies.

    His recorded voice speaking in Wolof travelled back home in 2024, as a sound installation I created for the Théodore Monod African Art Museum in Dakar.

    Chapter two listens to Mohamed Nur from Somalia. In 1910 he went to Germany to work as a teacher to the children of performers in a so-called Völkerschau (an ethnic show; sometimes called a human zoo, where “primitive” cultures were displayed).

    After refusing to perform on stage, he found himself stranded in Germany without a passport or money. He worked as a model for a German artist and later as a teacher of Somali at the University of Hamburg. Nur left a rich audio-visual trace in Germany, which speaks of the exploitation of men of colour in German academia as well as by artists. One of his songs comments on the poor treatment of travellers and gives a plea for more hospitality to strangers.

    Stephan Bischoff, who grew up in a German mission station in Togo and was working in a shoe shop in Berlin when the war began, appears in the third chapter. His recordings criticise the practices of the Christian colonial evangelising mission. He recalls the destruction of an indigenous shrine in Ghana by German military in 1913.

    Also in chapter three is Albert Kudjabo, who fought in the Belgian army before he was imprisoned in Germany. He mainly recorded drum language, a drummed code based on a tonal language from the Democratic Republic of Congo that German linguists were keen to study. He speaks of the massive socio-cultural changes that mining brought to his home region, which may have caused him to migrate.

    Together these songs, stories and accounts speak of a practice of extracting knowledge in prisoner of war camps. But they offer insights and commentary far beyond the “example sentences” that the recordings were meant to be.

    Why do these sound archives matter?

    As sources of colonial history, the majority of the collections in European sound archives are still untapped, despite the growing scholarly and artistic interest in them in the last decade. This interest is led by decolonial approaches to archives and knowledge production.

    Sound collections diversify what’s available as historical texts, they increase the variety of languages and genres that speak of the histories of colonisation. They present alternative accounts and interpretations of history to offer a more balanced view of the past.

    Anette Hoffmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. African prisoners made sound recordings in German camps in WW1: this is what they had to say – https://theconversation.com/african-prisoners-made-sound-recordings-in-german-camps-in-ww1-this-is-what-they-had-to-say-254127

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: One year on: South Africa’s coalition government boosted optimism, but will it last?

    Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Matthias Krönke, Lecturer, University of Reading

    For the first time since the end of apartheid in 1994, the ruling African National Congress lost its parliamentary majority in 2024. After 30 years in power, it had to form a coalition with 10 other political parties to govern the country. The creation of the “government of national unity” marked a turning point in the country’s democracy.

    This development appears to have rekindled hope and positive sentiment among South Africans about the country’s future and its democratic processes.

    The period leading up to the 2024 elections was characterised by widespread pessimism. Years of economic stagnation, high unemployment, severe electricity shortages, and high-level corruption cases had taken their toll on public trust and satisfaction with the ANC’s governance. Previous analyses by Afrobarometer (a research network that conducts public attitude surveys) had consistently shown declining satisfaction with the country’s direction and the functioning of democracy.

    We are political scientists who have worked with public opinion data in South Africa for almost a decade. We analysed data from a special Afrobarometer survey just before and after the country’s 2024 election. The results show a sharp turnaround in attitudes on three issues: the direction of the country, government performance, and views on democracy.

    One of the most significant findings is the shift in citizens’ perceptions about the general direction of the country. Before the election, a mere 14% of South Africans believed the country was heading in the right direction. Post-election, this figure surged to 39%.

    South Africans’ renewed optimism after the formation of the unity government underscores the importance of electoral processes in shaping citizen perceptions of democracy and governance. Whether these sentiments are sustained will depend on a few things, including the coalition government’s ability to meet citizen expectations and address their most pressing concerns.

    The post-election optimism boost

    Afrobarometer interviewed the same group of adult South Africans before (April/May 2024) and after (August/September 2024) the election. This allowed us to track which respondents changed their views and in which direction. Here, we focus on citizens’ views of the overall direction of the country (optimism), government performance, and views on democracy.

    A surge in optimism: The data show that 35% of the population became more positive in their outlook after the election. This was consistent across gender, age, and education levels. At the same time, 4% of the population maintained their positive outlook on the country’s trajectory.

    About half (48%) continued to say that South Africa was going in the wrong direction after the election. A further 10% moved towards a negative outlook.

    Renewed faith in democratic processes: Beyond general optimism, there was a resurgence in pro-democratic attitudes. The proportion of South Africans who believe democracy is preferable to any other form of government increased from 45% before the election to 55% after. Satisfaction with the way democracy works in South Africa jumped from 36% to 59%. These levels of support for and satisfaction with democracy were the highest recorded by Afrobarometer in South Africa since 2018 and 2011, respectively.

    We found that three in 10 (29%) respondents were newly in favour of democracy after the elections. About four in 10 (39%) shifted from dissatisfaction or a neutral opinion before the election to stating they were “fairly” or “very” satisfied with the country’s democracy afterwards.

    Where are the sore losers?: In both the case of support for and satisfaction with democracy, we found that a greater proportion of poorer citizens shifted their opinions, compared to their wealthier counterparts. In contrast, there were no clear patterns of opinion change by respondents’ gender, age, level of education, or race.

    When examining the same question by party affiliation, the outcome was interesting. The share of partisans who preferred democracy increased among supporters of the ANC, the Economic Freedom Fighters and the MK Party after the election. A majority of supporters from the four major parties were satisfied with how democracy worked in the country.

    Even ANC supporters remained largely satisfied with democracy despite the party’s electoral losses. Collectively, these findings suggest a post-electoral vote of confidence in multiparty competition.

    Expectations of the new government: Citizens also appeared more hopeful about the new coalition government’s ability to tackle some of the nation’s most pressing issues. Pre-election evaluations of government performance on key services were overwhelmingly negative. The post-election wave showed some modest increases in optimism.

    Two-thirds (67%) of South Africans felt the government of national unity would be more effective in the critical area of electricity provision. There was also hope for progress in other areas; 42% expected the new government to be more effective in creating jobs. Another 41% believed it would be more successful in fighting corruption.

    Over the past year, the government seems to have met citizens’ expectations. South Africa has not experienced prolonged periods of power cuts over the past 12 months. However, the unemployment rate has remained unchanged, at 32.9%.

    Looking ahead

    The 2024 elections in South Africa seem to have served as an inflection point. It is contributing to a revival of optimism and pro-democratic sentiment. The shift from pre-election pessimism to post-election hope was palpable. Maintaining renewed public confidence, however, relies on a government’s ability to meet citizens’ expectations and deliver tangible improvements on their concerns.

    The ongoing skirmishes between the ANC and the Democratic Alliance illustrate the coalition government’s difficulty in translating agreement on a broad agenda into specific outcomes.

    The coming months and years will tell whether the unity government’s infighting ultimately squanders citizens’ goodwill.

    Matthias Krönke works for the University of Reading and consults for Afrobarometer.

    Rorisang Lekalake is affiliated with Afrobarometer.

    – ref. One year on: South Africa’s coalition government boosted optimism, but will it last? – https://theconversation.com/one-year-on-south-africas-coalition-government-boosted-optimism-but-will-it-last-258497

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: How Macau’s second world war experience shaped the territory

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Helena F. S. Lopes, Lecturer in Modern Asian History, Cardiff University

    Macau’s giant casinos and malls have earned the territory its nickname: the ‘Las Vegas of the east’. Sanga Park / Shutterstock

    This year marks the 80th anniversary of the end of the second world war, a conflict that left few corners of the globe untouched. In east Asia, the small Portuguese-administrated territory of Macau in southern China stood out as a rare neutral territory. But, despite its neutrality, Macau could not escape the war’s far-reaching impact.

    In fact, Macau saw its population treble in the period between 1937 and the end of the second world war, reaching around half a million people. The newcomers, most of whom had fled the Japanese occupation of China, exceeded the existing residents and influenced all facets of life in Macau.

    Some went on to shape the territory well beyond the end of the second world war, helping Macau earn its later status as one of the leading gambling hubs in the world. These people included the late Stanley Ho, the “casino tycoon” in Macau and one of the key architects of its post-war economy.

    In his testimony for the 1999 book, Macao Remembers, Ho noted how Macau’s wartime atmosphere had inspired him. “Macao was tiny, and yet a bit like Casablanca – all the secret intelligence, the murders, the gambling – it was a very exciting place”, he said.

    Ho was referring to the fictional version of the French-controlled wartime city of Casablanca in the 1942 Hollywood film, also called Casablanca. As a neutral enclave, Macau was a site of multinational refuge, smuggling of goods and people, espionage, danger and opportunities.

    Macau is located on the south coast of China, across the Pearl River estuary from Hong Kong.
    Sémhur / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-NC-ND

    Site of refuge

    Japan’s invasion of China began in the 1930s. As Japanese forces took control of most of the eastern coast from 1937 onward, the Chinese nationalist government moved inland to resist from its relocated capitals, first Wuhan and then Chongqing. By the end of 1940, the most important political, economic, educational and cultural urban centres in China had been occupied.

    Surrounded by occupied areas, territories under foreign rule in China such as the Shanghai foreign concessions, Macau and Hong Kong became “lone islands”. Their neutral status attracted many thousands of refugees, resistance activists and relocated businesses. Lone islands became supply lifelines for the Chinese resistance and propaganda battlegrounds for opposing sides.

    They experienced periods of economic boom fuelled by the influx of refugees. And they were prime locations for the transfer of information and funds, as well as intelligence collection. Lone islands were also sites of humanitarian relief, connected to diaspora networks and organisations designed to support the Chinese war effort.

    By the end of 1941, these spaces of neutrality were disappearing. The Shanghai foreign concessions were taken over by Japan and later handed over to a Chinese collaborationist administration, and the British colony of Hong Kong was occupied and placed under Japanese military rule. French-ruled Guangzhouwan, also in south China, was under de facto Japanese control by 1943.

    Macau, which remained neutral throughout the war, stood as the last lone island – if always subject to Japanese influence. Macau’s neutrality drew many from opposing camps.

    In the late 1930s, most refugees to Macau had come from Shanghai and Guangdong province. The occupation of Hong Kong in late 1941 then brought another wave of displaced persons to Macau.

    Stanley Ho was among the refugees who arrived in Macau from the neighbouring British colony. He joined his uncle Robert Ho Tung, a renowned businessman who also relocated to Macau during the occupation of Hong Kong.

    According to Ho’s own accounts, his wartime activities were the foundation of a fortune. Several other figures who would become important economic players in Macau’s post-war economy, such as businessman Ho Yin, also cut their teeth during the second world war’s climate of contingency and opportunity.

    Working for the Macau Co-operative Company, established by the Japanese to manage trade between Japan and the government in Macau, Ho was involved in bartering materials in exchange for food supplies with Japanese interlocutors. He also had an English-Japanese language exchange with the Japanese intelligence chief in Macau, Colonel Sawa.

    Through these activities, Ho made important contacts among the different communities who found themselves in Macau during the war. This included powerful intermediaries such as Pedro José Lobo, the head of the economic services in Macau. These connections exposed Ho to the popularity of gambling in Macau and the potential to take it to a different level.

    Gambling had been legal in Macau since the mid-19th century. But it was during the war that we would see the origins of the casino-hotel model that is now prevalent in the territory.

    The leading hotels of 1940s Macau, such as Hotel Central and Grande Hotel Kuoc Chai, offered employment to refugee musicians and dancers and were sites of entertainment for those with funds to spend.

    Hotel Central, one of the leading hotels in 1940s Macau.
    stefangde / Shutterstock

    After the end of the second world war, Ho set up a company called Sociedade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau (STDM) with partners including Henry Fok, Teddy Yip and Yip Hon. These were businessmen with links to Hong Kong, mainland China and Indonesia.

    In 1962, the same year STDM was founded, it earned the exclusive licence to run casinos in Macau, replacing pre-existing magnates who were more prominent during the second world war.

    One of the key innovations brought by their company’s casinos was the popularisation of western-style games. They were also involved in philanthropic activities, much like the wartime gambling tycoons had been, with Macau again seeing the arrival of many destitute displaced persons during the cold war.

    Gambling has been liberalised in Macau since the early 2000s, and the territory has now surpassed Las Vegas to become the largest casino market in the world.

    Helena F. S. Lopes received doctoral and postdoctoral research funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council, the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology and the Leverhulme Trust for projects relating to Macau during the Second World War and the post-war period.

    – ref. How Macau’s second world war experience shaped the territory – https://theconversation.com/how-macaus-second-world-war-experience-shaped-the-territory-246650

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Kenya’s police still kill with impunity – what needs to be done to stop them

    Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Kamau Wairuri, Lecturer in criminology, Edinburgh Napier University

    Days ahead of the first anniversary in Kenya of the Gen Z-led anti-government protests that resulted in at least 60 deaths and displays of police brutality, news broke that Albert Ojwang, a young Kenyan blogger, had died in police detention. Kamau Wairuri who has studied the politics of policing in Kenya, sets out why these events aren’t outliers, what efforts have been made to reform Kenya’s security forces, and what still needs to be done.

    When did this all begin?

    Recent events are part of a long history of police brutality in Kenya that can be traced back to colonial times.

    Historians (colonial and post-colonial Kenya) such as David Anderson and Caroline Elkins present gruesome details of how state authorities brutalised indigenous Africans during colonial times.

    The colonial origins of the police – largely modelled along the approaches of the Royal Ulster Constabulary known for its brutality in Ireland – partly explains why Kenya’s policing is the way it is. The police force was never designed for service. It was designed to safeguard the interests of the white minority ruling elite.

    While there have been important changes in the architecture of policing since independence, subsequent post-colonial Kenyan regimes have adopted the same brutal approaches to stay in power. My previous work demonstrates this use of state security apparatuses to enhance the capacity of incumbents to crack down on opposition protests.

    The brutal policing experienced under the current Kenya Kwanza regime falls within this broader historical trajectory.

    The ruling elite see and use the police as their last line of defence against challenges to their misrule.

    But police brutality goes beyond the policing of politics to everyday crime control. Police violence is a common occurrence, especially against poor young men.

    What’s changed

    Kenya’s history has been marked by strong agitation for justice and reform. Again, this goes back to colonial times.

    There have been important legal and institutional changes since independence. The most important was the disbandment of the Special Branch in 1998, an intelligence unit of the police responsible for political repression. It was replaced by the National Security Intelligence Service. This then became the National Intelligence Service.

    The most important changes came about through the constitutional reform of 2010. This saw a change in the architecture of the police, including:

    Internal Affairs, a unit within the police service, is supposed to investigate police misconduct. The policing oversight agency is a civilian-led institutions with a similar mandate. Ideally, the two institutions should work together in executing crucial investigations. Internal affairs should provide access to information from within the police service that would be difficult for outsiders to access.

    The National Police Service Commission was set up to handle the management of personnel. It’s mandated to address the challenges of corruption, nepotism and negative ethnicity that have characterised recruitment into the police service.

    But it’s clear from the continued police brutality that these institutions aren’t achieving the intended effect. This means that police officers can expect to continue acting with relative impunity despite the control measures in place.

    What still needs to be done

    Policing is often imagined as the investigation of crimes, arresting suspects, and presenting them to court for prosecution and punishment if guilty. In Kenya, the actions of the police often appear to substitute for the entire criminal justice system.

    In many cases, officers go beyond the metaphor of judge, jury and executioner to also become the complainant, mortician and undertaker. For instance, Mbaraka Karanja died in police custody in 1987 and officers proceeded to incinerate his body.

    In my view, the brutality won’t end until the following steps have been taken.

    First, the National Police Service Commission needs to reclaim its mandate. It seems to have completely abdicated duty, transferring crucial responsibilities back to the inspector general of the police service. As the human resource unit of the police, the commission has an important role of professionalising the service and maintaining discipline. It’s presently not doing so.

    Second, the Internal Affairs Unit needs to be strengthened and given more autonomy. So far, it has been difficult to assess the effectiveness the unit given the secrecy that characterises the police service. A better-resourced unit will enhance investigations of police misconduct. It would unearth obscure squads within the police service and reveal evidence to help identify perpetrators.

    Third, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority needs to defend its independence and develop popular legitimacy. With its limited success in prosecuting police officers – despite the prevalence of police abuse – many Kenyans have lost confidence in it. Crucially, the authority has failed in it’s deterrence role.

    Fourth, the independence of the National Police Service needs to be safeguarded. The police service leadership continues to serve at the pleasure of the prevailing regime. This in turn shapes the priorities of the service. Inspectors-general have been forced to resign. President William Ruto confessed to having fired the director of criminal investigations when he took power. Ruto had initially claimed that the director had resigned.

    Crucially, and in fifth place, there needs to be a change in policing culture alongside broader governance culture in Kenya. Impunity is rampant across the public service. Kenya won’t have a highly accountable police force while other agencies and senior officials are operating with significant impunity.

    Identifying the levers of cultural change isn’t easy. There are many proposals to alter policing culture. These include a complete redesign of Kenya’s Penal Code to dislodge its colonial roots, transforming the training of police officers, and strengthening the policing oversight authority’s capacity to investigate cases.

    But, in my mind, a crucial starting point is citizen agitation and demand for accountability. The light that Gen Z protesters, the media and civil society organisations are shining on police abuses should be encouraged. A clear signal that Kenyans will no longer tolerate police abuse is crucial for culture change within the service and among the political elite.

    However, this needs to be understood within the reality that many Kenyans support police violence, believing it to be the most effective way of dealing with crime as my earlier research demonstrates. In another study, I note how police abuse is endorsed by politicians and religious leaders as a way of responding to crime and punishing groups of people they don’t like.

    Combined with ineffective accountability mechanisms, this popular support for police violence, both tacit and explicit, gives the police the belief that they are the thin blue line between order and chaos. That they have the popular mandate to use any means they consider necessary – often brutal violence – to keep society safe.

    In other words, the conversation on police reform requires a fundamental reframing to kick start the journey towards democratic policing. At present, we’re not only way off the mark, we seem to be heading in the wrong direction.

    Kamau Wairuri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Kenya’s police still kill with impunity – what needs to be done to stop them – https://theconversation.com/kenyas-police-still-kill-with-impunity-what-needs-to-be-done-to-stop-them-259326

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Why flattering Donald Trump could be dangerous

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jonathan Este, Senior International Affairs Editor, Associate Editor

    This article was first published in The Conversation UK’s World Affairs Briefing email newsletter. Sign up to receive weekly analysis of the latest developments in international relations, direct to your inbox.

    Once again Donald Trump and his senior team are unhappy with their press coverage. Here’s the US president, fresh from his triumph in The Hague, having persuaded Nato’s leaders to open their wallets and agree to up their defence spending to 5% of GDP (apart from Spain, that is, which can expect to hear of triple-digit tariffs coming its way in the near future) – and do the media focus on Trump’s tour de force? Do they hell. Instead they focus on whether his strikes against Iran had been as successful as he claimed.

    As you can imagine, this would have been irksome in the extreme for the president, who might reasonably have expected that the story of the day would be his victory in getting pledges from virtually all Nato’s members to pull their weight in terms of their own defence. Certainly the Nato secretary-general, Mark Rutte, could appreciate the scale of his achievement. Even before the summit, Rutte was talking it up.

    “Donald, you have driven us to a really, really important moment for America and Europe, and the world,” he wrote in a message to Trump as the US president prepared to fly to The Netherlands. “You will achieve something NO American president in decades could get done.”

    The fact that Trump promptly posted this message to his TruthSocial website suggests how important praise is to the the US president. It’s something that many world leaders (including Benjamin Netanyahu and Vladimir Putin who have become past-masters at pouring honey in the president’s ear) have recognised and are willing to use as a diplomatic tool when dealing with the man Rutte calls “Daddy”.

    Sign up to receive our weekly World Affairs Briefing newsletter from The Conversation UK. Every Thursday we’ll bring you expert analysis of the big stories in international relations.

    But while flattery as a tactic seems to be effective with the US president, Andrew Gawthorpe, a political historian from Leiden University, cautions that flattery, appeasement and compliance are a flawed approach when dealing with a man like Trump. For a start, he writes it means that not much actually gets done and that problems are often merely avoided rather than solved.

    But more worryingly, simply capitulating in the face of Trumpian pressure or ire risks giving this US president the idea that he can do anything he wants. “When his targets roll over, it sends a message to others that Trump is unstoppable and resistance is futile,” writes Gawthorpe. It encourages not just the next presidential abuse of power, but also the next surrender from its victims.



    Read more:
    Why bending over backwards to agree with Donald Trump is a perilous strategy

    We got a taste of what the US president’s anger at being defied sounds like as he prepared to fly to The Netherlands for the Nato summit. Asked about the ceasefire he had negotiated between Israel and Iran, he lashed out at both countries who had breached the peace within hours of agreeing to stop firing missiles at each other. “We basically have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard that they don’t know what the fuck they’re doing,” he told reporters as he walked to the presidential helicopter.

    Psychologist Geoff Beattie, of Edge Hill University, believes this was no accidental verbal slip. Trump wanted to let the world know how angry he was and chose to use the “f-bomb” as a way of showing it. Beattie looks at what this can tell us about the character of the US president – and how it might reflect a tendency to make rapid decisions based on emotional reactions.



    Read more:
    Trump’s f-bomb: a psychologist explains why the president makes fast and furious statements

    And so to Nato

    What was remarkable about the Nato summit was that it was condensed to one fairly short session which focused solely on the issue of Nato members’ defence budgets. Usually there’s a much broader agenda. Over the past couple of years the issue of Ukraine has been fairly high on the list, but this time – perhaps to avoid any potential divisions – it was relegated to a side issue.

    Perhaps the biggest success for Nato, writes Stefan Wolff, is that they managed to get Trump to the summit and keep him in the room. After all, less than a fortnight previously he walked out of the G7 leaders’ meeting in Canada a day early before authorising the bombing raids on Iran’s nuclear installations (of which more later).

    Wolff, an expert in international security from the University of Birmingham (and a regular contributor to this newsletter) believes that the non-US members realised they had little choice but to comply – or at least to be seen to be complying. There’s a significant capability deficit: “European states also lack most of the so-called critical enablers, the military hardware and technology required to prevail in a potential war with Russia.”

    So keeping the US president onside – and inside Nato with a remaining commitment to America’s article 5 mutual defence pledge – was top of the list this year and something they appear to have pulled off.



    Read more:
    At June’s Nato summit, just keeping Donald Trump in the room will be seen as a victory

    The fact is, writes Andrew Corbett, a defence expert at King’s College London, that Europe and the US have different enemies these days. Europe is still focused on the foe it faced across the Iron Curtain after 1945, against which Nato was designed as a defensive bulwark.

    The US is now far more focused on the threat from China. This means it will increasingly shift the bulk of its naval assets to the Pacific (although the Middle East seems to be delaying this shift at present). This inevitably means downgrading its presence in Europe, something of which European leaders are all-too aware.

    The importance of continuing US involvement in European defence via Nato was underlined, as Corbett highlights, by a frisson of unease when it appeared that the US president might be preparing to reinterpret article 5, which requires that members come to the aid of another member if they are attacked.

    So there was relief all round when the US president reaffirmed America’s commitment to the principle of collective defence. But one feels Rutte will need to use all his diplomatic wiles to keep things that way.



    Read more:
    How Nato summit shows Europe and US no longer have a common enemy

    The trouble with Iran

    Rutte, who has the nickname “Trump whisperer”, is clever enough to know that emollient words will have been just what the US president was looking for given the stress of the past couple of weeks. The decision to launch strikes against Iran was controversial even within his own base as we noted last week.

    But by directly engaging in hostility against Iran, Trump risked embroiling the US in the “forever war” that he always promised his supporters he would avoid. The move was freighted with risk. Nobody knew how Iran might retaliate or how the situation could escalate. There was (and remains) the chance that an angry Iran could try to shut down the Strait of Hormuz. This is one of the world’s most important waterways though which 20% of the world’s oil transits. This would have huge ramifications for the global economy, seriously damaging Iran’s Gulf neighbours and angering China, which gets much of its oil from the region.



    Read more:
    Iran is considering closing the strait of Hormuz – why this would be a major escalation

    For now it appears that Iran has contented itself with performative strikes against US bases in Iraq and Qatar, having given advance warning. This token retaliation was made shortly before the ceasefire was negotiated. Despite a defiant message from Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran is reported to be making noises about coming to the negotiating table. A deal to restore calm to the region would be an achievement indeed.

    But legal questions remain about the US decision to launch strikes. For a start, Article 2(4) of the UN charter strictly forbids the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or “in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”.

    But, as Caleb Wheeler, an expert in international law from the University of Cardiff writes, it’s a rule that has rarely been either observed or enforced. He points out that the Korean War, when following a resolution of the UN security council, a number of countries went to war with North Korea to defend its southern neighbour which had been attacked in violation of article 2(4), was the high watermark of compliance with the UN on conflict.

    In most other international conflicts since, the use of vetoes by one or another of the permanent members of the security council has effectively prevented the UN acting the way it was supposed to.

    Now, writes Wheeler, there can be little doubt the US has violated article 2(4) by bombing Iran, particularly as Trump expressed his opinion that a regime change might be appropriate. Given that the US is one of the leading lights of the UN, Wheeler thinks you could reasonably expect a degree of condemnation from other world leaders. He worries that the absence of criticism could seriously lower the bar for aggression in the future.



    Read more:
    Bombing Iran: has the UN charter failed?

    And if, as remains unclear at present, Iran’s nuclear programme was not set back by years, as the US claims, but merely by months, then you could expect Tehran to redouble its efforts to acquire a bomb. The Islamic Republic will be mindful of the fact that there has been little talk of bombing North Korea in recent years, for example. Possession of a nuclear deterrent means exactly what it says.

    So, conclude David Dunn and Nicholas Wheeler, these strikes which were conducted on what they feel was the false premise of defence against an “imminent” threat from a nuclear Iran, could actually have the opposite effect of encouraging Iran to rapidly develop its own bomb.



    Read more:
    US attack on Iran lacks legal justification and could lead to more nuclear proliferation

    Elon Musk’s geopolitical eye in the sky

    After Israel began its latest campaign of airstrikes against Iran earlier this month, the government moved to restrict internet access around the country to discourage criticism of the regime and make it difficult for protesters to organise. But in June 14 in response to a plea over social media, Elon Musk announced, appropriately on X, that he would open up access to his Starlink satellite system.

    Joscha Abels, a political scientist at the University of Tübingen, recalls that Starlink became very popular in Iran during the protests that followed the killing of Mahsa Amini in 2022, and which really rocked the regime to its core. He also points to the use of Starlink by Ukraine as a vital communications tool in its defence against Russia over the past three years.

    But Abels warns that what is given is also too easily switched off, as Musk did in Ukraine in 2023. At the time a senior Starlink executive warned that the tool was “never intended to be weaponized”. The concern is that such an important tool, which can make or break a regime or cripple a country’s defence, could be a risk in the hands of a private individual.



    Read more:
    In the sky over Iran, Elon Musk and Starlink step into geopolitics – not for the first time

    World Affairs Briefing from The Conversation UK is available as a weekly email newsletter. Click here to get updates directly in your inbox.

    – ref. Why flattering Donald Trump could be dangerous – https://theconversation.com/why-flattering-donald-trump-could-be-dangerous-259940

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: What Danish climate migration drama, Families Like Ours, gets wrong about rising sea levels

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Florian Steig, DPhil Student, Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford

    In the Danish TV drama Families Like Ours, one melancholic line from high-school student Laura captures the emotional toll of climate displacement: “Soon we will vanish like bubbles in a creek.” This seven-part series imagines a near future in which Denmark is being evacuated due to rising sea levels – a government-mandated relocation of an entire population.

    The series challenges the fantasy that wealthy western countries are immune to the far-reaching effects of climate change. Rather than focusing on catastrophic storylines, Families Like Ours portrays the mundane, bureaucratic and affective aspects of relocating a population in anticipation of a creeping crisis: the scramble for visas, the fractures that appear between families, and the inequalities in social and economic capital that shape people’s chances for a new life.

    Yet, the idea that Denmark could soon get submerged is not grounded in science. More worryingly, the narrative of the unavoidable uninhabitability of entire nations and millions of international migrants flooding Europe is misleading, dangerous, and sidelines deeply political questions about adaptation to sea level rise that should be dealt with now.

    The trailer for Families Like Ours.

    Sea levels are rising by a few millimetres a year. That pace is accelerating. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that, by 2100, sea levels could rise by up to one metre on average. Beyond 2100, sea levels could rise by several metres, although these long-term scenarios are highly uncertain.

    Even in extreme scenarios, these developments would unfold over several decades and centuries. It’s unlikely that permanent submergence of large areas of land will make Denmark uninhabitable.

    Still, sea level rise poses a serious risk to the livelihoods of millions of people living in coastal zones. In the UK, many homes in Norfolk and Fairbourne, Wales, are already at risk from coastal erosion, for instance.

    These changes are subtle. They do not warrant the evacuation of an entire nation, but degrade coastal livelihoods over time. Houses in high-risk areas like these may become uninsurable, devalued or too risky to live in. This will force people to move.

    In addition, sea level rise makes coastal flooding more likely. In European high-income countries, including Denmark, rising waters already threaten coastal communities. Without adaptation, hundreds of thousands of homes in cities such as Copenhagen could be at risk.

    The danger of mass migration narratives

    However, depicting climate change as a driver of uncontrolled mass migration is misleading. Sea level rise will contribute to coastal migration, and state-led relocation is already a reality especially in Africa and Asia. But climate migration predominantly occurs within countries or regions. International migration from climate change impacts is the exception, not the norm.

    To capture these complexities, some researchers prefer the term “climate mobility”. Mobility can be forced or voluntary, permanent or temporary, even seasonal. Some communities and people resist relocation plans and stay put.

    Families Like Ours reinforces longstanding narratives that frame certain parts of the world as destined to become uninhabitable. Even UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned of a “mass exodus of entire populations on a biblical scale” due to sea level rise.

    As a researcher working on climate adaptation, I notice that sea level rise and climate migration are increasingly discussed at the global level. Discussions focus, for example, on the protection of affected populations and continued statehood of nations after their potential submergence. A new global alliance of cities and regions tackling sea level rise called the Ocean Rise & Coastal Resilience Coalition considers a “managed retreat” not only as inevitable but as a rational and desirable adaptation pathway for many cities and regions.

    Scientists have warned that creative storylines highlighting the “uninhabitability” of low-lying countries and regions, such as the Pacific, are not helpful. The mass migration narrative can be used by governments to justify extreme protectionist action and sideline urgent adaptation debates.

    States are not helpless in the face of sea level rise and submergence is not inevitable. As geographer Carol Farbotko and colleagues suggest, “habitability is mediated by human actions and is not a direct consequence of environmental change”. People often develop their own ways of living with rising waters, resisting narratives of submergence. State-led adaptation is possible, but depends on finance, which is unequally distributed.

    People’s migration decisions can seldomly be attributed to just climate impact. A community’s capacity to respond hinges on social, political, economic and demographic factors. Adaptation measures are costly. This raises deeply political questions over who gets to be protected, who is left behind, and how managed retreat can benefit the most affected people and places in a fair way. We need to overcome mass migration myths and start a serious and justice-focused debate about the future of our shorelines.

    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.

    Florian Steig receives funding from the German Academic Scholarship Foundation (Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes).

    – ref. What Danish climate migration drama, Families Like Ours, gets wrong about rising sea levels – https://theconversation.com/what-danish-climate-migration-drama-families-like-ours-gets-wrong-about-rising-sea-levels-259234

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Back to the Future at 40: the trilogy has never been remade – let’s hope that doesn’t change

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Daniel O’Brien, Lecturer, Department of Literature Film and Theatre Studies, University of Essex

    It has now been four decades since Marty McFly first hit 88 miles per hour in a time-travelling DeLorean. Robert Zemeckis’s sci-fi adventure blockbuster didn’t just navigate the space-time continuum onscreen (thanks to the flux capacitor). It also found a lasting place in the hearts of its audience.

    Personally, I don’t think I’ve ever heard anyone speak badly about the Back to the Future trilogy (aside from certain cast members, which I’ll touch on later). It has thankfully avoided the common traps of remakes and the sprawling expanded universe trend, which has diluted so many other beloved franchises (yes, Star Wars, Indiana Jones and The Lord of the Rings, I’m talking to you).

    Naturally, the success of Back to the Future has inspired a range of adaptations, including a computer game, an immersive Secret Cinema event, as well as a more recent West End stage musical. But each version stays true to the spirit of the original, reinforcing what feels like an unspoken rule in Hollywood: Back to the Future is off-limits to a cinematic or televised remake.

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    Zemeckis and Bob Gale, who co-wrote the screenplay for all three films, have repeatedly shut down the idea of a fourth instalment, declaring that the trilogy is complete. In fact, aside from a few delightful Back to the Future references in other shows made by the original stars themselves, the only remake you’re likely to come across is BBTF Project 85. It’s a multi-fan-made, shot-for-shot collaboration and true labour of love, created not for profit but out of pure admiration for the original.

    The success of the Back to the Future trilogy can be attributed to several factors, not least the undeniable charisma and chemistry between Michael J. Fox and Christopher Lloyd. The wholesome, inter-generational friendship of their characters is never explicitly explained, but also doesn’t need to be. It simply works. The dynamic between Doc and Marty captures a timeless, heartfelt bond between two generations who respect and learn from each other, much like the relationship between Daniel LaRusso and Mr. Miyagi in The Karate Kid (another trilogy that has since found itself in the rebooted camp).

    The original trailer for Back to the Future.

    Michael J. Fox was the original choice for Marty McFly but due to scheduling conflicts with his role on sitcom Family Ties, production began with Eric Stoltz in the role. Over half the film was shot before Zemeckis made the difficult decision to recast.

    As Stoltz later said in an interview, the change came because he “wasn’t giving the performance [Zemeckis] wanted for his film”. Stoltz, a talented performer, brought a darker, moodier and more intense interpretation to Marty, a version that was replaced by Fox’s lighter, more comedic approach, channelled through his effortless charm.

    Stoltz wasn’t the only cast member to leave Back to the Future with a sense of disappointment. Crispin Glover, who played George McFly, also famously fell out with Zemeckis and Gale over creative differences. One of which was Glover’s objection to the film’s ending that presented Marty’s family being financially wealthier in comparison to the start. Glover felt this idea sent a negative message of money equating to happiness. This artistic clash (and ironically, dispute over salary) ultimately led to him being recast in Back to the Future Parts II and III, with actor Jeffrey Weissman stepping in.

    In the sequels, Weissman wears a facial prosthetic designed from Glover’s likeness from the first film (where George is made to look older). This enraged Glover further, who responded by filing a lawsuit, arguing that the use of his image without consent was illegal.

    He has since been openly critical of Weissman’s “bad performance” and has expressed ongoing frustration that many viewers still mistakenly assume the “bad acting” to be his own. As he notes, this explicitly contrasts with the more obvious recasting of Jennifer Parker (Marty’s girlfriend) performed by Claudia Wells in the first film and later replaced by Elisabeth Shue in the sequels.

    The recasting reflects the first film’s unexpected success. Back to the Future was never intended to have a sequel, but the overwhelming popularity of the original prompted the rapid development of two back-to-back follow-ups released in 1989 and 1990.

    Once again, the film’s success can be credited to the electric chemistry between its leads and the unforgettable music, from Huey Lewis’s Power of Love to Chuck Berry’s “new sound” in Johnny B. Goode, and Alan Silvestri’s hauntingly triumphant score. Silvestri’s music seems to capture the spirit of wide-eyed adventure, nostalgia and wisdom all at once, like a journey through time, composed entirely for the ears, affording the trilogy a sense of timelessness.

    Back to printed media

    Another charm of the Back to the Future trilogy (which stood out to me in a more recent viewing) lies in its use of printed media, which inspired me to create my video essay, Back to Printed Media.

    Back to Printed Media.

    As indicated in the video, Back to the Future begins with the sound and image of clocks before panning to a framed newspaper article, a fitting introduction to how all three instalments use print to convey plot, emotion and shifts across timelines.

    Beyond newspapers, the trilogy gives prominence to photographs, handwritten letters, phone books, a sports almanac, transparent receipts of the future, and even printed faxes (in the future of 2015). This tactile world of ink and paper evokes a deep nostalgia, underscoring the emotional weight of physical communication, something that has steadily faded with the rise of digital screens and indeed the loss of physical touch.

    Doc even comments in the third instalment (when reading a letter from his future self) that he never knew he could write anything so touching.

    In an era where glowing rectangles dominate both our lives and our storytelling, Back to the Future offers a refreshing contrast. It reminds us of the human connection and the need to be with others, packaged in a blockbuster narrative about one of the most universal cinematic themes: finding your way back home.

    As a trilogy, Back to the Future has stood the test of time for four decades, and I’m confident it will continue to resonate with both new and nostalgic audiences well into the future.

    Daniel O’Brien does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Back to the Future at 40: the trilogy has never been remade – let’s hope that doesn’t change – https://theconversation.com/back-to-the-future-at-40-the-trilogy-has-never-been-remade-lets-hope-that-doesnt-change-259725

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Palestine Action: what it means to proscribe a group, and what the effects could be

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Brian J. Phillips, Reader (Associate Professor) in International Relations, University of Essex

    The UK’s home secretary, Yvette Cooper, plans to proscribe the protest group Palestine Action under anti-terror law. This move, if approved by parliament, would criminalise the group’s existence, making it a crime to be a member of the group or to support it in any way.

    Palestine Action emerged in 2020, first drawing attention when its members broke into and spray painted red the UK headquarters of Elbit Systems, an Israeli defence contractor. In the years since, the group has sprayed paint, blockaded or otherwise vandalised a number of institutions it sees as complicit in Israeli military actions, such as a Lockheed Martin facility and two Barclays branches.

    The group’s website describes it as a “direct action movement committed to ending global participation in Israel’s genocidal and apartheid regime”.

    The term “direct action” has historically been used for tactics ranging from legal protest to traffic obstruction and property damage, such as animal rights activists smashing laboratory equipment used for experiments on animals. Or, more recently, the roadblocks carried out by Extinction Rebellion.

    Palestine Action’s campaign has caused substantial property damage. Five activists were jailed after a 2022 protest at a Glasgow weapons equipment factory that caused more than an estimated £1 million in damage due to pyrotechnics thrown inside the building.

    Activists are also accused of causing £1 million in damages to Elbit property near Bristol in 2024. Eighteen face charges of aggravated burglary and criminal damage, 16 of whom also face a charge of violent disorder. Nine have pleaded not guilty, while others have not yet entered a plea. During the Bristol attack, one person was accused of assaulting police officers with a sledgehammer, and has pleaded not guilty to causing grievous bodily harm with intent.

    The group’s recent spray-painting of two military jets at RAF Brize Norton – reportedly causing millions of pounds in damage, combined with the military nature of the target – seems to have been the breaking point for the home secretary.

    The question is whether all this makes the group a terrorist organisation.

    The terrorist list criteria

    The UK’s list of proscribed groups currently contains 81 organisations, from radical Islamists such as al-Qaida to neo-Nazis such as the Base.

    The legislation behind the list, the Terrorism Act 2000, imposes serious punishments for proscribed organisations’ members or supporters, from a fine to a maximum sentence of 14 years in prison. Even wearing clothing or publishing an image supporting a proscribed group can be punished by up to six months in prison or a fine of up to £5,000.

    For a group to be proscribed, it needs to be determined by the secretary of state to be “concerned in terrorism”, basically meaning committing or planning terrorist acts. The definition of terrorism is long and legalistic, but is, essentially, the politically-motivated use or threat of actions to intimidate the government or public through violence or destruction, including “serious damage to property”.

    This latter justification, serious property damage, has been invoked by the home secretary in discussing Palestine Action’s planned proscription. So, technically, Palestine Action appears to meet the criteria.

    But there are a variety of groups carrying out serious property damage that have not (yet) been proscribed under anti-terrorism law. Following the same logic, the government could theoretically proscribe Extinction Rebellion and other groups that might not be widely thought of as terrorist organisations.

    Whether it makes sense to proscribe the group, however, is a matter of debate. Proscribing Palestine Action on the basis of its alleged property damage would set a precedent in legally declaring that this type of direct action – vandalism – is considered significant enough to invoke the Terrorism Act in this way.

    Palestine Action is different in an important way from currently proscribed terrorist organisations.

    In Palestine Action’s five years of attacks, it has never killed anyone, or apparently attempted to do so. There have, though, been several injuries allegedly associated with the group. Two people were charged with assaulting an emergency worker at a protest – after the intention to proscribe the group was announced. At some of the group’s actions, members have been charged with assaulting security guards.

    In her statement to parliament, Cooper cited the group’s “impact on innocent members of the public fleeing for safety and subjected to violence”. But the primary focus of the government’s intention to proscribe the group seems to be around serious damage to property, particularly related to national security.

    Many currently proscribed groups have killed thousands of people, from al-Qaida on September 11 or 7/7 to groups like Hamas or Hezbollah attacking Israelis or Boko Haram’s killing sprees in Nigeria.

    There are some less violent proscribed groups. For example, UK-based Islamist group al-Ghurabaa (and the related Saved Sect, also known as al-Muhajiroun) have not been clearly linked to actual violence, although the group is accused of glorifying violence, for example celebrating the 9/11 attacks. It has also apparently inspired terrorist attacks.

    The government’s choice to start using serious property damage as sufficient criteria for terrorist designation would be a substantial change in how anti-terrorism law is applied.

    What happens next?

    If Palestine Action were to be proscribed, the consequences could be substantial.

    Since any support of the group would be a crime, a protest in support of the group – like the one that happened June 23 – could lead to thousands of arrests. If supporters failed to turn out, and the members stopped participating out of fear, it could lead to the end of the group.

    Or the group might shift to strictly legal or less damaging direct actions, like permitted marches or blockades. This would be a clear victory for the government.

    An ultimate goal of proscription is to keep dissident groups protesting legally. It sometimes works. Al-Muhajiroun and other local groups seemingly often tried to walk the fine line of being as extreme as possible, while staying “just within the law”.

    It is also possible that current Palestine Action members form renamed groups and carry on with criminal direct actions. Fragmenting and renaming groups is a common response to proscription, as we have seen with al-Ghurabaa, and with armed groups abroad like Lashkar-e-Taiba, as my own research with my colleague Muhammad Feyyaz has shown.

    This results in counter-terrorism officials playing Whac-A-Mole, frequently updating legislation with aliases and chasing many smaller groups or a broader movement instead of one organisation.

    Overall, the government might be legally justified to proscribe Palestine Action. What parliament must decide, however, is if the group poses enough of a threat to warrant this change to precedent. And officials should think about whether the action is likely to bring about the desired consequences, or if it could radicalise supporters into more violent action.

    Brian J. Phillips works on a research project that receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council.

    – ref. Palestine Action: what it means to proscribe a group, and what the effects could be – https://theconversation.com/palestine-action-what-it-means-to-proscribe-a-group-and-what-the-effects-could-be-259619

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Labour’s disability cuts rebellion: a former government whip asks, how did Keir Starmer not see this coming?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tony McNulty, Lecturer/Teaching Fellow, British Politics and Public Policy, Queen Mary University of London

    Under pressure. Flickr/UK Parliament, CC BY-NC-ND

    The government has promised to make major concessions to its universal credit and personal independence payment bill after a large-scale and very public rebellion by Labour MPs threatened to derail a vote due on July 1.

    The Commons order paper published on June 26 revealed that 126 Labour MPs had signed an amendment opposing a second reading for the bill, which proposes restricting disability benefits to levels they find unacceptable. Cleverly, the amendment stated that they accept “the need for the reform of the social security system” but they then listed a plethora of reasons as to why they declined to give the bill a second reading when it is due for a vote on July 1.

    Many of these reasons related to the government’s own assessment of the impact of the bill. It openly admits, for example, that an estimated 250,000 people, including 50,000 children, would be pushed into poverty by the changes being made to the social security system.

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    Faced with the possibility of losing a vote to his own MP in the week marking the first anniversary of his arrival in Downing Street, prime minister Keir Starmer is promising to make concessions. These reportedly include exempting people currently receiving disability benefits from the changes.

    But whether or not this is enough to stop the rebellion, significant damage has been done. Securing the second reading on half-promised and lukewarm concessions that cannot be sustained simply stores up future strife.

    Collision course

    How did the government reach a position where it was at risk of losing a vote on one of its key bills in the week in which it celebrates a year in office? Why has it been pushing a bill so obviously lacking in support among its own MPs? Why has no-one rolled with the political pitch and controlled the narrative?

    This is not a muscle flexing exercise of the kind seen in December 1997, when Labour sought to show how tough it could be by cutting benefits for lone parents. It is not a macho attempt to see off a resurgent left flank, because effectively there isn’t one. The troublesome hard left is now tiny. Nor is it a putative rebellion that can be dismissed as dominated by the usual suspects. It is a rebellion of the mainstream core of the backbench parliamentary Labour party (PLP). Among the 126 MPs openly speaking out against the bill, 11 are Labour select committee chairs and 62 of them were only elected last year. In short, these are not the usual suspects. Their complaints cannot be readily dismissed.

    There were allegedly noises off from some whips suggesting this might be a confidence issue – implying that the government could be in trouble so pressure is being piled on rebels to withdraw or risk bringing down the government. I was a government whip from 1999 to 2002, and I can attest that no whip should be running around declaring this a potential “confidence vote”. And no MP should believe that it is. It is not. Were there to be any truth in these rumours then it indicates a whips’ office either vastly inexperienced, overconfident and arrogant, or simply grossly incompetent and panicked. Both the chief whip and the No.10 political operation will come under intense scrutiny whatever happens now. How did they not see this coming?

    The truth is that the only serious option at this point should be to bury the bill. It should be pulled before the vote and resurrected in the context of developing an anti-poverty strategy, including a child poverty alleviation plan. It might be that a sufficient number of “rebel signatories” are persuaded to let the second reading happen with a promise of further changes building on the concessions already announced, but this does not mean a safe passage later in the process. Many of the signatories will have already been disheartened and worried by the scrapping of the winter fuel allowance and the continuation of two-child benefit limit. They may have acquiesced on the latter and pocketed the change in policy on the former, but their disquiet and anger has not gone away.

    The government should never have been in a position of seriously considering pushing the bill through hoping it will secure Conservative support for its second reading. To do so would seriously threaten if not Starmer’s position, then certainly the position of the work and pensions secretary Liz Kendall – and even perhaps that of the chancellor, Rachel Reeves. All three will still emerge from this week damaged in some fashion.

    Rebellions such as this can take on a dynamic and life of their own and are likely to grow rather than diminish. Some 106 Labour MPs signed the amendment initially – only to be joined by more in short order. Backbenchers will have been worried about being asked “what did you do in the war?” by their grassroots members had they not enlisted their support.

    There is also a danger that once blooded by rebellion, some of the 120 plus MPs will get a taste for it – and that spells a real danger for the government, even one with a majority of 165.

    Either way, the government, which was relying on the bill to make £5bn worth of savings that would supposedly obviate the need for tax rises in the autumn, is going to have to somehow salvage both its economic and its political strategy in the wake of this crisis – and start to take its backbenchers more seriously.

    It’s not how anyone would have wanted to mark a year in office. Happy birthday, one and all.

    This article includes links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something from bookshop.org The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

    Tony McNulty is member of the Labour Party

    – ref. Labour’s disability cuts rebellion: a former government whip asks, how did Keir Starmer not see this coming? – https://theconversation.com/labours-disability-cuts-rebellion-a-former-government-whip-asks-how-did-keir-starmer-not-see-this-coming-259856

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Could the first images from the Vera Rubin telescope change how we view space for good?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Professor Manda Banerji, Professor of Astrophysics, School of Physics & Astronomy, University of Southampton

    We are entering a new era of cosmic exploration. The new Vera C Rubin Observatory in Chile will transform astronomy with its extraordinary ability to map the universe in breathtaking detail. It is set to reveal secrets previously beyond our grasp. Here, we delve into the first images taken by Rubin’s telescope and what they are already showing us.

    These images vividly showcase the unprecedented power that Rubin will use to
    revolutionise astronomy and our understanding of the Universe. Rubin is truly transformative, thanks to its unique combination of sensitivity, vast sky area coverage and exceptional image quality.

    These pictures powerfully demonstrate those attributes. They reveal not only bright objects in exquisite detail but also faint structures, both near and far, across a large area of sky.

    Cosmic nurseries – nebulae in detail

    The stunning pink and blue clouds in this image are the Lagoon (lower left) and Trifid (upper right) nebulae. The word nebula comes from the Latin for cloud, and these giant clouds are truly enormous – so vast it takes light decades to travel across them. They are stellar nurseries, the very birth sites for the next generation of stars and planets in our Milky Way galaxy.

    The intense radiation from hot, young stars energises the gas particles, causing
    them to glow pink. Further from these nascent stars, colder regions consist of
    microscopic dust grains. These reflect starlight (a process known in astronomy as
    “scattering”), much like our atmosphere, creating the beautiful blue hues. Darker filaments within are much denser regions of dust, obscuring all but the brightest background stars.

    To detect these colours, astronomers use filters over their instruments, allowing only certain wavelengths of light onto the detectors. Rubin has six such filters, spanning from short ultraviolet (UV) wavelengths through the visible spectrum to longer near-infrared light. Combining information from these different filters enables detailed measurements of the properties of stars and gas, such as their temperature and size.

    Rubin’s speed – its ability to take an image with one filter and then quickly move to the next – combined with the sheer area of sky it can see at any one time, is what makes it so unique and so exciting. The level of detail, revealing the finest and faintest structures, will enable it to map the substructure and satellite galaxies of the Milky Way like never before.

    Mapping galaxies across billions of light years

    This image captures a small section of NSF–DOE Vera C. Rubin Observatory’s view of the Virgo Cluster, offering a vivid glimpse of the variety in the cosmos.
    Credit: NSF–DOE Vera C. Rubin Observatory

    The images of galaxies powerfully demonstrate the scale at which the Rubin
    observatory will map the universe beyond our own Milky Way. The large galaxies
    visible here (such as the two bright spiral shaped galaxies visible in the lower right quarter of the picture) belong to the Virgo cluster, a giant structure containing more than 1,000 galaxies, each holding billions to trillions of stars.

    This image beautifully showcases the huge diversity of shapes, sizes and colours of galaxies in our universe revealed by Rubin in their full technicolour glory. Inside these galaxies, bright dots are visible – these are star-forming regions, just like the Lagoon and Trifid nebulae, but remarkably, these are millions of light years away from us.

    The still image captures just 2% of the area of a full Rubin image revealing a universe that is teeming with celestial bodies. The full image, which contains around ten million galaxies, would need several hundred ultra high-definition TV screens to display in all its detail. By the end of its ten-year survey, Rubin will catalogue the properties of some 20 billion galaxies, their colours and locations on the sky containing information about even more mysterious components of our universe such as dark matter and dark energy. Dark matter makes up most of the matter in the cosmos, but does not reflect or emit light. Dark energy seems to be responsible for the accelerating expansion of the universe.

    The UK’s role

    These unfathomable numbers demand data processing on a whole new scale.
    Uncovering new discoveries from this data requires a giant collaborative effort, in which UK astronomy is playing a major role. The UK will process around 1.5 million Rubin images and hosts one of three international data access centres for the project, providing scientists across the globe with access to the vast Rubin data. Here at the University of Southampton, we are leading two critical software
    development contributions to Rubin.

    First of these is the capability to combine the Rubin images with those at longer infrared wavelengths. This extends the colours that Rubin sees, providing key diagnostic information about the properties of stars and galaxies. Second is the software that will link Rubin observations to another new instrument called 4MOST, soon to be installed at the Vista telescope in Chile.

    Part of 4MOST’s job will be to snap up and classify rapidly changing “sources”, or objects, in the sky that have been discovered by Rubin. One such type of rapidly changing source is a stellar explosion known as a supernova. We expect to have catalogued more supernova explosions within just two years than have ever been made previously. Our contributions to the Rubin project will therefore lead to a totally new understanding of how the stars and galaxies in our universe live and die, offering an unprecedented glimpse into the grand cosmic cycle.

    The Rubin observatory isn’t just a new telescope – it’s a new pair of eyes on the
    universe, revealing the cosmos in unprecedented detail. A treasure trove of
    discoveries await, but most interesting among them will be the hidden secrets of the universe that we are yet to contemplate. The first images from Rubin have been a spectacular demonstration of the vastness of the universe. What might we find in
    this gargantuan dataset of the cosmos as the ultimate timelapse movie of our
    universe unfolds?

    Professor Manda Banerji receives funding from the Royal Society and the Science and Technology Facilities Council.

    Dr Philip Wiseman receives funding from the Science and Technology Facilities Council

    – ref. Could the first images from the Vera Rubin telescope change how we view space for good? – https://theconversation.com/could-the-first-images-from-the-vera-rubin-telescope-change-how-we-view-space-for-good-259857

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Killer dolls and Brexit zombies – what to watch and do this week

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Anna Walker, Senior Arts + Culture Editor

    Part of the appeal of the 2023 horror flick, M3gan, was that its titular antagonist managed to be two of the scariest villains of the genre in one – a killer robot, and a child’s doll come to life.

    After nine-year-old Cady (Violet McGraw) tragically lost her parents, her roboticist aunt Gemma (Allison Williams of Get Out fame) brought M3gan home to help her niece with the traumatic transition. M3gan was to be Cady’s teacher, playmate and above all, protector. In classic horror style, she soon embarked on a murderous rampage in the name of “protecting” her ward.

    The film was an instant cult hit, dubbed a “camp classic” thanks to M3gan’s TikTok dance moves and determination to destroy the nuclear family.

    In M3gan 2, in cinemas from today, the filmmakers have leaned into that campiness even more. But, as horror expert Adam Daniel explains that doesn’t completely neutralise the terror. Instead, it reformulates it, offering a cathartic release that makes the subject matter more digestible.



    Read more:
    From HAL 9000 to M3GAN: what film’s evil robots tell us about contemporary tech fears

    The trailer for M3gan 2.0.

    If you’re looking for more traditional jump scares, 28 Years Later has you covered. Danny Boyle has returned to the franchise with this instant-classic of the zombie genre, which muses on both post-Brexit Britain and our collective experiences of the COVID pandemic. In this film, Europe has contained a “rage virus” to Britain. There are French boats on quarantine patrols, Swedish soldiers mocking remaining mainlanders and St George’s flags burning.

    For COVID storytelling expert Lucyl Harrison: “The film ushers in a new age of ‘Vi-Fi’” (that’s virus fiction) “without succumbing to pulpy pandemic storytelling”. Ralph Fiennes offers a typically strong performance as the “mad” Dr Kelson, the only person determined to commemorate the virus’s ever-mounting dead.



    Read more:
    The spectacular frenzy of 28 Years Later offers a new breed of pandemic storytelling

    The trailer for 28 Years Later.

    I confess, I’m a bit of a baby when it comes to horror. So, I’ll need to follow up any zombie fare with something a little more comforting. My choice for this week is The Ballad of Wallis Island, which romcom giant Richard Curtis has dubbed “one of the great British films of all time”.

    It takes place on the fictional Wallis Island, home to millionaire Charles (Tim Key), an almost obsessive fan of former folk-rock duo played by Tom Basden and Carey Mulligan. Invited to the island to play a private gig, they must face their musical and romantic past, all under the gaze of an ecstatic Charles.

    The film was made in just 18 days on a tight budget in a typical Welsh summer – a doctor was on hand to stop the actors getting hypothermia when they filmed in the sea. It reminded our reviewer of another British comedy classic, Victoria Wood’s sitcom Dinnerladies, with its breadcrumb trail of slipped in details that provide laughter in the moment but which return to make the audience think twice.



    Read more:
    The Ballad of Wallis Island is a masterpiece of the extraordinary made ordinary

    The trailer for The Ballad of Wallis Island.

    When Poor Things won the Golden Globe for best picture last year, director Yorgos Lanthimos thanked everybody, from the cast and crew to his hero Bruce Springsteen. But one person who didn’t get a mention was Alasdair Gray, the Scottish artist and writer who wrote the novel the film was based on.

    Now Gray is rightly being celebrated at Glasgow’s Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum. The unseen paintings in the new show Alasdair Gray: Works from the Morag McAlpine Bequest come from a donation of works he made after the death of his wife in 2014.

    Highlights of the show include his original artwork for his novel Poor Things and the streetscape Gray called “my best big oil painting”, depicting Cowcaddens in Glasgow.



    Read more:
    Alasdair Gray: unseen artworks offer insight into a profoundly creative and original artist

    Pride month is coming to an end, but you can enjoy the movies in our Hidden Gems of Queer Cinema series year round. These articles highlight brilliant films that should be more widely known and firmly part of the canon of queer cinema. I’d particularly recommend Saving Face (2004), complicated romcom that tenderly depicts the experiences of queer Asian people.



    Read more:
    Hidden gems of LGBTQ+ cinema: Saving Face is a complicated romcom that tenderly depicts the experiences of queer Asians

    Looking for something good? Cut through the noise with a carefully curated selection of the latest releases, live events and exhibitions, straight to your inbox every fortnight, on Fridays. Sign up here.

    – ref. Killer dolls and Brexit zombies – what to watch and do this week – https://theconversation.com/killer-dolls-and-brexit-zombies-what-to-watch-and-do-this-week-259923

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Africa’s new credit rating agency could change the rules of the game. Here’s how

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Daniel Cash, Reader in Law, Aston University

    For governments, a credit rating is more than a financial signal. It is a verdict that can influence the cost of borrowing, access to markets and, ultimately, the ability to provide for their citizens.

    Rating decisions are made behind closed doors in a private process that isn’t open to assessment or scrutiny.

    For African countries, this opacity can be especially damaging. When rating decisions lack transparency, it’s impossible to challenge potential biases or inconsistencies in methodology that put developing economies at a disadvantage. The result is higher borrowing costs that drain resources from healthcare, education and infrastructure investment.

    Africa’s new credit rating agency has the chance to change this. The African Credit Rating Agency is an initiative under development by the African Union and its partners. It is more than a new entrant; it is an attempt to rethink how financial authority is earned, exercised and scrutinised. The new agency plans to introduce transparent governance structures that could revolutionise rating methodology.

    As a researcher who has looked closely at the working of rating agencies, I believe this opportunity to bring transparency to financial governance isn’t just about better ratings. It’s a step towards economic sovereignty.

    Success for the African Credit Rating Agency shouldn’t be measured by whether it displaces the “big three” rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch). The real question isn’t whether an African agency can compete, but rather whether it can show the world how to rate credit differently.

    A flawed process

    The three big agencies do publish their methodologies – their criteria and risk models. This creates an illusion of transparency. Yet the final judgments emerge from committee meetings that produce no public record, no accountability, and no right of meaningful appeal.

    These rating committees typically comprise five to 10 analysts who meet in closed sessions to make each sovereign rating decision. S&P, Moody’s and Fitch each operate internal rating committees for every sovereign rating decision. The deliberations, dissenting views, and specific reasoning behind final votes remain confidential. Only a brief summary is provided with a rating decision.

    Research has shown that credit rating agencies are more accurate at assessing the creditworthiness of advanced economies than developing economies. There have also been studies on the discrepancy between what is expected when the public methodologies are applied and what the agencies actually rate. These studies have been done for economies like Hong Kong and China, but no equivalent research has yet been undertaken for African sovereigns.

    This discrepancy exposes an accountability void. When methodology-based predictions miss the mark, we must question what happens in those committee rooms. Especially when African nations are being assessed by analysts stationed continents away, with limited understanding of local economic and political realities.

    The African Credit Rating Agency could make three changes to the way ratings are done:

    • through public deliberations

    • by forming hybrid committees

    • with technological intervention.

    First, it could release committee transcripts within 30 days of each decision. This would give markets and governments unprecedented insight into rating rationales. This isn’t radical – central banks already publish meeting minutes, and courts publish opinions with dissenting views.

    Second, it could pioneer panels that include not only rating analysts, but regional economists, sectoral specialists, and even civil society observers. All with recorded votes. This diversified expertise would disrupt “group think” while capturing nuances of African economies that traditional agencies overlook.

    I have examined this idea from the perspective of injecting climate and sustainability-related expertise into credit rating committees. I believe this is a crucial step to take to evolve the concept of the credit rating committee.

    Third, the agency could use artificial intelligence to analyse patterns across committee discussions, flagging potential regional biases or inconsistent methodology application. It might be able to use secure digital ledgers to create unchangeable records of decisions.

    Why the big three keep it closed

    The industry thrives on privacy – protecting proprietary methodologies and shielding decisions from external challenge. And the natural oligopoly (a market dominated by a few large players due to high entry barriers, reinforced by market preference for predictability) helps it stay that way.

    The sovereign credit ratings of the three big agencies are built on quantitative and qualitative factors. But research shows that sovereign ratings are subjected to qualitative understandings. This puts developing economies at a disadvantage when agencies demonstrate pro-western biases because they lack data or knowledge.

    The impact of a credit rating downgrade for a sovereign borrower is usually multifaceted. Research shows that a single-notch downgrade can raise borrowing costs by more than 100 basis points, equivalent to an extra US$100 million annually on a US$10 billion bond.

    Investors prefer fewer, stronger signals rather than many competing views. So there’s little incentive for established players to change. The African Credit Rating Agency, as a new entrant, can offer something the incumbents won’t: governance innovation that serves both markets and nations.

    Radical openness will shake markets, at least at first. Committee members might face political pressure. Transparency alone doesn’t guarantee fair outcomes.

    But the world already demands transparency from central banks and constitutional courts. Why accept anything less from institutions that shape sovereign destiny?

    Next steps

    By 2050, one in four people on Earth will be African. The financial architecture serving them must evolve towards systems that recognise the continent’s unique strengths.

    Opening the rating committee to view represents more than technical reform – it’s about shifting who holds power in global finance. If it does this, the African agency won’t just deliver better ratings; it will model how global finance can be governed more justly.

    Daniel Cash does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Africa’s new credit rating agency could change the rules of the game. Here’s how – https://theconversation.com/africas-new-credit-rating-agency-could-change-the-rules-of-the-game-heres-how-257138

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: The US’s asbestos U-turn: why the Environmental Protection Agency is reconsidering its ban

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Allen Haddrell, Research Fellow, School of Chemistry, University of Bristol

    Once asbestos enters the lungs, it doesn’t leave. Its sharp, microscopic fibres scar tissues, trigger inflammation and can cause deadly diseases like mesothelioma, lung cancer and laryngeal cancer. That’s why over 60 countries have banned it – and why the US mostly phased it out.

    In 2024, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) moved to ban all industrial uses. But on June 17, the agency said it would revisit the Biden‑era ban.

    Asbestos is a naturally occurring silicate mineral made of thin, fibrous crystals. It is fire-resistant, durable, lightweight, flexible and insulating. This unique blend of properties resulted in its widespread use over millennia. Indeed, asbestos fibres have been found woven into pottery and textiles from 2500BC.

    Its resistance to friction and electricity made it desirable during the Industrial Revolution for use in boilers and steam engines. In the 20th century, the useful mix of physical properties resulted in asbestos becoming ubiquitous in the construction and automotive industries, peaking in the 1970s.

    Although the properties of asbestos at the macroscopic level are beneficial, at the microscopic level it’s anything but. When dust from asbestos (0.1 to tens of microns) is inhaled, it deposits throughout the respiratory system, causing inflammation and scarring of lung tissue.

    While the adverse health effects associated with asbestos exposure were observed in ancient Rome, it wasn’t until the 20th century that the full extent of harm was realised. Specifically, asbestos exposure is linked to numerous respiratory diseases, including mesothelioma, lung cancer and asbestosis.

    It took a long time for people to understand how dangerous asbestos really is. The main reason is that the illnesses it causes often don’t show up for decades. This long delay makes it very hard to link exposure to the disease it causes.

    Making this connection is also made more difficult when those most familiar with it, including manufacturers such as Johns-Manville and industry groups such as the Asbestos Information Association (AIA) were actively denying the connection, and suppressing reports demonstrating the link.

    By the 1970s, the volume of evidence showing the harms of asbestos had become overwhelming. The AIA evolved its argument, claiming that the practices in the industry had changed and that the risks were from a bygone era “when the dust control equipment in use was not as efficient or as sophisticated”. Although the association never explicitly admitted that asbestos caused harm.

    Since it can take decades for the health effects of asbestos exposure to fully manifest, the full extent of the damage caused by asbestos exposure from the 1970s and onward, an era where the dust control equipment was claimed to be “efficient and sophisticated”.

    The Asbestos Information Association, once a key industry group promoting the safe use of asbestos, quietly disbanded in the early 2000s as litigation and public health evidence mounted.

    History of asbestos.

    What type of asbestos is the US considering unbanning?

    The EPA is considering unbanning chrysotile asbestos, also called white asbestos. This type of asbestos is often used in things like brake pads, gaskets and industrial equipment. In March 2024 the EPA banned it, stopping new uses and imports. The ban also included a gradual phase-out plan.

    Who is pushing for the unbanning and why now?

    From the outset, industry groups such as the American Chemistry Council (ACC) raised concerns about the EPA’s ban, warning that “a prohibition of an estimated 52% of annual production volume … that rapidly, could have substantial supply chain impacts”, particularly if manufacturers were bound by existing contracts or chose to cease production entirely.

    As for why now, one factor is the re-election of Donald Trump, who put his views on record some time ago downplaying the dangers of asbestos. In 1997, he wrote in his book Trump: The Art of the Comeback that asbestos is “100 percent safe, once applied”. A point not supported by the best available science.

    Why is the EPA considering unbanning it?

    According to former ACC employee and current senior official in EPA’s Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention Lynn Ann Dekleva, they want to consider if the ban “went beyond what is necessary to eliminate the unreasonable risk and whether alternative measures — such as requiring permanent workplace protection measures – would eliminate the unreasonable risk”.

    What industries still want to use this type of asbestos?

    The largest push appears to be coming from the chlor-alkali industry where they use it to produce chlorine and sodium hydroxide.

    Is this type of asbestos dangerous?

    Yes. There is no safe level of exposure.

    How many people could this affect?

    Each year, around 40,000 deaths in the US and about 5,000 in the UK are attributed to asbestos exposure. If lifted, it’s possible that the number in the US could increase over the coming decades while those in the UK will continue to fall.

    Does this mean asbestos could make a comeback elsewhere too?

    Unlikely. While global consensus moves toward stricter regulation, the US now finds itself at a crossroads, between scientific evidence and pressure from industry.

    Allen Haddrell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. The US’s asbestos U-turn: why the Environmental Protection Agency is reconsidering its ban – https://theconversation.com/the-uss-asbestos-u-turn-why-the-environmental-protection-agency-is-reconsidering-its-ban-259597

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Development finance in a post-aid world: the case for country platforms

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Richard Calland, Emeritus Associate Professor in Public Law, UCT. Visiting Adjunct Professor, WITS School of Governance; Director, Africa Programme, University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, University of Cambridge

    With the Trump administration slashing US Agency for International Development budgets and European nations shifting overseas development aid budgets to bolster defence spending, the world has entered a “post-aid era”.

    But there is an opportunity to recast development finance as strategic investment: “country platforms”.

    Country platforms are government-led, nationally owned mechanisms that bring together a country’s climate priorities, investment needs and reform agenda, and align them with the interests of development partners, private investors and implementing agencies. They function as a strategic hub: convening actors, coordinating funding, and curating pipelines of projects for investment.

    Think of them as the opposite of donor-driven fragmentation. Instead of dozens of disconnected projects driven by external priorities, a country platform enables governments to set the agenda and direct finance to where it is needed most. That could be renewable energy, climate-smart agriculture, resilient infrastructure, or nature-based solutions.

    Country platforms are a current fad. They were the talk of the town at the 2025 Spring meetings of multilateral development banks in Washington DC. Will they quickly fade as the next big new idea comes into view? Or can they escape the limitations and failings of the finance and development aid ecosystem?

    The Independent High Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, on which I serve, is striving to find new ways to ramp up finance – both public and private – in quality and quantity. I agree with those who argue that country platforms could be the innovation that unlocks the capital urgently needed to tackle climate overshoot and buttress economic development.

    The model is already being tested. More than ten countries have launched their platforms, and more are in the pipeline.

    For African countries, the opportunity could not be more timely. African governments are racing to deliver their Nationally Determined Contributions. These are the commitments they’ve made to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions as part of climate change mitigation targets set out in the Paris Agreement. Implementing these plans is often being done under severe fiscal constraints.

    At the same time global capital is looking for investment opportunities. But it needs to be convinced that the rewards will outweigh the risks.

    Where it’s being tested

    In Africa, South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Partnership has demonstrated both the potential and the complexity of a country platform. Egypt and Senegal also have country platforms at different stages of implementation. Kenya and Nigeria are exploring similar mechanisms. The African Union’s Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy calls for country platforms across the continent.

    New entrants can learn from countries that started first.

    But country platforms come in different shapes and sizes according to the context.

    Another promising example is emerging through Mission 300, an initiative of the World Bank and African Development Bank, working with partners like The Rockefeller Foundation, Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet, and Sustainable Energy for All. It aims to connect 300 million people to clean electricity by 2030.

    Central to this initiative are Compact Delivery and Monitoring Units. These are essentially country platforms anchored in electrification. They reflect how a well-structured country platform can make an impact. Twelve African countries are already moving in this direction. All announced their Mission 300 compacts at the Africa Heads of State Summit in Tanzania.

    This growing cohort reflects a continental commitment to putting energy-driven country platforms at the heart of Africa’s development architecture.

    Why now – and why Africa?

    A well-functioning country platform can help in a number of ways.

    Firstly, it can give the political and economic leadership a clear goal. The platform can survive elections and show stability, certainty and transparency to the investment world.

    Secondly, national ownership and strategic alignment can reduce risk and build confidence. That would encourage investment.

    Thirdly, it builds trust among development partners and investors through clear priorities, transparency, and national ownership.

    Fourthly, it moves beyond isolated pilot projects to system-level transformation – meaning structural change. The transition in one sector, energy for example, creates new value chains that create more, better and safer jobs. Country platforms put African governments in charge of their own economic development, not as passive recipients of climate finance.

    The country sets its investment priorities and then the match-making with international climate finance can begin.

    Making it work: what’s needed

    Developing the data on which a country bases its investment and development plans, and blending those with the fiscal, climate and nature data, is complex. For this reason country platforms require investment in institutional capacity, cross-ministerial collaboration, and strong coordination between finance ministries, environment agencies and economic planners. And especially, in leadership capability.

    African countries must take charge of this capacity and capability acceleration.

    Second, development partners can respond by providing money as well as supporting African leadership, aligning with national strategies, and being willing to co-design mechanisms that meet both investor expectations and local realities.

    Capacity is especially crucial given the scale of Africa’s needs. According to the African Development Bank, Africa will require over US$200 billion annually by 2030 to meet its climate goals. Donor aid will provide only a fraction of this. It will require smart, coordinated investment and careful debt management. Country platforms provide the structure to govern the process.

    Seizing the opportunity

    Country platforms represent one of the most promising innovations in climate and development finance architecture. Properly designed and led, they offer African countries the opportunity to take ownership of their climate and development futures – on their own terms.

    Country platforms could be the “buckle” that finally enables the supply and demand sides of climate finance to come together. It will require commitment, strategic and technical capability, and, above all, smart leadership.

    Richard Calland works for the University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership. He is also an Emeritus Associate Professor at the University of Cape Town and an Adjunct Visiting Professor at the University of Witwatersrand School of Governance. He serves on the Advisory Council of the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution, Chairs of the Board of Sustainability Education and is a member of the Board of Chapter Zero Southern Africa.

    – ref. Development finance in a post-aid world: the case for country platforms – https://theconversation.com/development-finance-in-a-post-aid-world-the-case-for-country-platforms-257994

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: South Africa’s frogs and reptiles get their own list of names in local languages

    Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Fortunate Mafeta Phaka, Senior Postdoctoral Researcher of herptile-human interactions, North-West University

    Naming all the creatures and plants in nature is no small task. Fortunate Phaka is a zoologist who has conducted the first comprehensive analysis of naming and classification of frogs and reptiles in nine South African cultures. The list includes 136 frog and 407 reptile species that have been scientifically described. He explains why it’s important to record all the species names that people use in their own languages.

    Why did you study the indigenous names of frogs and reptiles?

    I am interested in the interactions between wildlife and people. These interactions include, for example, how people use wildlife in figures of speech, harvesting of wildlife for consumption, and of course how animals are assigned names.

    If everyone’s names for things are known and shared, the ideas behind the names can also be shared, appreciated and valued.

    Conservation planning is improved by consideration of different wildlife perspectives, which is revealed partly by the names that different people give wildlife.

    Knowing local names can provide assurance that people from different cultural backgrounds are talking about the same species.

    In South Africa, for example, there are 11 official spoken languages and scientists use Latin names for species. Most people aren’t familiar with the scientific names.

    That’s why we extended the list of scientific, Afrikaans and English names of South African frogs and reptiles to include names in the country’s other nine official languages.

    How did you go about it, and what did you find?

    The project started as a pilot study in 2016, carried out in the Zululand area of South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province, where frog biodiversity is high and Indigenous cultural practices are still part of everyday life. Results of the pilot were published as a book in 2017 and as a scientific publication in 2019.

    Following the success of the pilot study, I collected responses from 287 South African Indigenous language speakers (aged between 25 and 57) using an online questionnaire and in-person interviews while on field trips, and reviewed 18 scientific articles, dissertations and books to study naming practices even further.

    The study shed light on the way people group animals (folk taxonomy) and how that compares with the way scientists group them (scientific taxonomy).

    It became clear that Indigenous language names were often assigned based on unique features of frogs or reptiles, such as the sound they make, how they move or where they are found. Most of these names group several species together based on their similarities. This meant most frog and reptile species did not have Indigenous language names that were unique to them. For example, zoologists have named eight different Reed Frog species from South Africa but these eight species were assigned one Indigenous name that groups them together.

    Male Painted Reed Frog (Umgqagqa opendiwe in IsiZulu) calling.
    Fortunate Phaka, Author provided (no reuse)918 KB (download)

    The organised way of assigning Indigenous names to animals has some similarities to how scientists assign names that are unique to each species. For example, the Grass Frog species are grouped together under the scientific genus Ptychadena, and in IsiZulu the same species are grouped under the name Uvete. These similarities meant we could combine scientific naming practices with Indigenous naming practices to give each species a unique name in multiple languages.

    To ensure the unique Indigenous names remained familiar to speakers of respective languages, we added descriptive terms to the existing general Indigenous names to make them specific, instead of coining an entirely new name. For example in IsiZulu the general name Umgqagqa (used for all Reed Frogs) became Umgqagqa opendiwe (specific name for the Painted Reed Frog). And several other descriptive terms were added to Umgqagqa to distinguish between the eight Reed Frog species of South Africa.

    Why does it matter to record the Indigenous names of species?

    Conservation hasn’t been doing a good job of being inclusive. Knowing Indigenous names and the local perspectives behind those names is a good way to start being aware of the multiple other perspectives. Conservation should ultimately be to everyone’s benefit.

    For a long time wildlife guidebooks have had very few Indigenous language names in them. With increased recording of Indigenous names, any South African would be able to open a wildlife guide and read a name in any of our 11 official spoken languages. Hopefully one day we can have more books like the Bilingual Guide to the Frogs of Zululand (IsiZulu version: Isiqondiso Sasefilidini Esindimimbili Ngamaxoxo AkwelaKwaZulu) that make it possible for you to read about your favourite wildlife in your preferred language.

    Has this been done for other groups of animals or plants?

    Birds and plants are two groups that have received this kind of attention.

    A recent scientific publication has worked on IsiZulu names for all South African birds and another publication studied the morphology of IsiZulu bird names. There has also been work on IsiXhosa insect names, and there has been a SeSotho animal word list published online. Indigenous names for African wildlife have received sporadic attention in the past, but with the recent increases in calls for consideration of Indigenous knowledge there has been increasing focus on understanding these names and using them.

    Do you have some favourite names?

    I have a lot of favourites but there are some names that stand out, like Senana (Sepedi general name for Rain Frogs) and Lebololo (Sepedi name for Puff adder). These names have the same root word or sound throughout most of the Indigenous South African languages and I am curious about how this happened. Rain Frogs are also called Senanatswidi in Sepedi and tswidi is an onomatopoeic reference to the whistling sound that Rain Frogs make.

    Fortunate Mafeta Phaka receives funding from National Research Foundation/South African Institute for Aquatic Biodiversity.

    – ref. South Africa’s frogs and reptiles get their own list of names in local languages – https://theconversation.com/south-africas-frogs-and-reptiles-get-their-own-list-of-names-in-local-languages-254643

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Nato leaders pledge increased defence spending – is this really the price for peace and prosperity?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Damian Tobin, Lecturer in International Business, University College Cork

    Kev Gregory / Shutterstock

    Nato leaders agreed to ramp up defence spending to 5% of their countries’ economic output by 2035 at a summit in The Hague, Netherlands, on June 25. US president Donald Trump, who has spent months saying Europe should take more responsibility for its own security, described the pledge as “a monumental win for the US” and a “big win” for western civilisation.

    A few months earlier, in March, the EU also launched its long-awaited white paper on defence. This provides a blueprint for improving Europe’s readiness to respond to military threats by 2030. On top of the fact that global military spending has surged in the past ten years, these developments indicate that the world’s largest nations now prioritise military over economic diplomacy.

    One of the main ideas behind military diplomacy is that increased defence spending acts as a deterrent to future conflicts. The nuclear arms race between the US and Soviet Union during the cold war provides some support for this argument. The prospect of mutual destruction was so great that it acted as a deterrent to nuclear war.

    But is increased defence spending really the necessary price for greater peace and prosperity? My research on interactions between firms, geopolitics and the political economy of defence indicates that this is no “big win” for society or economic productivity.

    A convoy of naval ships in the Pacific Ocean.
    Rawpixel.com / Shutterstock

    Deterrence requires a level of brinkmanship if it is to work. But as American economist Thomas Schelling pointed out in his 1960 book, The Strategy of Conflict, the problem with brinkmanship is that it relies on deliberately allowing a situation to get somewhat out of hand, with the intention of forcing the other party to back down.

    This can result in strategic blunders. Efforts by the former US president, Richard Nixon, to engineer such a situation in 1969 by threatening to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam failed to gain credibility with the Soviets and North Vietnamese. This undoubtedly helped convince North Vietnam that it could survive the war and locked the US into a much longer conflict.

    The recent confrontation between Israel and Iran also showed that brinkmanship can produce situations where there are significant casualties and no clear long-term resolution. Iran has long recognised that keeping itself near the threshold of nuclear weapons capability would offer a deterrent against external threats.

    But this strategy created many opportunities for error. Israel claimed that Iran was too close to building a nuclear weapon and, alongside the US, launched strikes that they say inflicted significant damage on Iranian nuclear enrichment capabilities and military leadership.



    Read more:
    Israeli aggression and Iranian nuclear brinkmanship made this confrontation all but inevitable

    Beyond this, it is unclear just how much military spending is needed to deter aggression. Nato allies have now committed to a big increase in defence spending – thanks largely to pressure from Trump.

    However, even Nato’s previous objective that countries commit 2% of their national income to defence has proved unattractive for many governments. This has even been the case in post-conflict areas such as the Balkans, where Nato has had a heavy involvement.

    A costly alternative

    Boosting defence spending falls short on delivering economic prosperity, too. Analysing US military spending in the Vietnam war, economist Les Fishman noted in 1967 that military diplomacy was far more costly than its economic equivalent.

    Military production requires continuously high levels of investment to maintain technological progress. This sucks public investment from other parts of the economy.

    That’s not to say defence spending has an entirely negative effect on the economy. Studies have found evidence that US federal funding of military research and development results in significant increases in private business research in sectors such as chemicals and aerospace.

    And, over the past decade, the value of venture capital deals in the US defence industry has grown 18-fold. This far outstrips sectors such as energy and healthcare. But such investment in military-related research and development is also often acknowledged as inefficient and not necessarily the best way to boost productivity.

    Fishman pointed out that the Marshall Plan, which provided substantial economic aid to western Europe after the second world war, had a far higher return for the US.

    Economic stabilisation kept the Soviet Union at bay for relatively small outlay compared to the Vietnam war, where casualties were of such a magnitude that it made any cost-benefit analysis meaningless.

    The Vietnam war proved extremely costly for the US.
    Department of the Army Special Photo Office / Wikimedia Commons

    Boosting defence spending also represents a lost opportunity to invest in more socially beneficial projects. This will worsen the climate crisis.

    According to a study shared with the Guardian in May, the initial rearmament planned by Nato alone could have increased greenhouse gas emissions by almost 200 million tonnes a year. The expanded defence commitment will only increase this further.

    Unlike defence, where the repurposing of civilian technologies for military uses carries a cost to society, many green investments involve beneficial substitutions that reduce the cost of a green transition.

    The substitution of conventional fossil fuel heating and transport systems with heat pumps and electric vehicles, for example, is far more socially beneficial than repurposing civilian satellites for missile systems.

    A final point is that military diplomacy is itself geopolitically destabilising. US efforts to contain communism in Asia during the 1950s and 1960s are a good example. Not only did such efforts see China align its trade with other communist states, it also ensured that self-reliance became a cornerstone of China’s economic strategy.

    This all suggests that the current drive for deterrence-based military spending carries with it a huge cost for society that could ultimately prove economically wasteful and geopolitically destabilising.

    Damian Tobin does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Nato leaders pledge increased defence spending – is this really the price for peace and prosperity? – https://theconversation.com/nato-leaders-pledge-increased-defence-spending-is-this-really-the-price-for-peace-and-prosperity-255989

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Kenya’s ride-hailing drivers say their jobs offer dignity despite the challenges

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Julie Zollmann, Digital Planet Fellow, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

    Many argue that gig work involves exploitation, as research and media coverage have highlighted. But that doesn’t seem to deter ride hailing drivers on platforms like Uber and Bolt.

    In Kenya, in fact, many new drivers continued to join platforms even as fares were slashed starting in 2016.

    As a PhD student studying the role of digitalisation in development, I spent several years trying to understand how digital drivers experienced the quality of their work. My research found that in 2019, a typical digital driver in Nairobi worked about 58 hours a week and earned well below the minimum wage on an hourly basis. What made this work attractive? Why did drivers stay?

    In a new paper, I draw on a 2019 survey of 450 drivers in Nairobi and 38 subsequent qualitative interviews in Nairobi and Kenya’s second largest ride hailing market, Mombasa, in 2021 that explored drivers’ experiences in detail.

    In addition to measuring working hours and incomes, my survey team asked drivers if they considered their work “dignified”. Nearly eight in ten (78%) of our survey participants said yes. While that specific share of drivers may have changed since then, the underlying reasons drivers found the work dignified remain unchanged.

    In the global north, scholars have rung alarm bells about what “gig work” means for the erosion of standard jobs with legal protections around working hours, minimum wage and other benefits. But the drivers my team and I spoke with in Kenya felt that digital driving was a step towards formalisation rather than a drift away from an ideal formal job. Driving had diginity in contrast to the indignities of low-wage work and the vast informal sector, which was their realistic alternative for making a living.

    My findings highlight that workers’ experiences on global platforms like Uber are not universal and that digitisation may deliver some improvements in work quality relative to informal work in African contexts.

    How did digital work deliver dignity?

    Drivers explained that app companies imposed rules and structure that provided “discipline” in a transport sector more broadly associated with rudeness, unruliness, and disrespect towards passengers. Requirements for things like driving licences, proof of insurance, and ratings seemed to make drivers feel more professional and make passengers see them as such.

    Drivers felt proud to be part of a driver community that behaved professionally under these conditions. A 38-year-old male driver in Nairobi who had been working on the platforms for three years told us:

    We are very respected … Everyone trusts you to carry them. It’s not like the old days, when the taxi driver might rob you and dump you or even kill you. We are getting attraction from the society, even in the slums. They know you are an app driver, and they trust you because app drivers are good people. They know you can deliver, that you will be honest.



    Read more:
    Zimbabwe’s economy crashed — so how do citizens still cling to myths of urban and economic success?

    On platforms, drivers were matched digitally with riders. Respondents said this brought dignity by ensuring drivers would receive a fairly steady stream of clients. This meant that a driver could rest assured he would earn money every day.

    The alternative was to “hustle” in the informal economy to shake loose opportunities and constantly solicit those who might use their labour and beg for payment after a job was done. Constant solicitation and bargaining were exhausting and degrading.

    One driver explained:

    Most of us are poor. I have never walked out every morning sure that I would do a job. But now I know that if my car has been serviced and my phone is charged and working, I am going to work and not to some charity job. I used to wait at the base all day without getting a customer. Now, ….. at least two, three days are going to be good for you.

    Digital matchmaking also meant that drivers were not limited to serving the few clients they already knew or who happened to pass them at a fixed base. They found themselves serving new parts of the city and carrying important people, including business people, celebrities and local politicians. Serving these high-end customers made them feel proud and important. Wealthy neighbourhoods, luxury hotels and high-end restaurants felt more open to them in otherwise exclusionary and segregated cities.

    Some drivers felt that digitalisation had removed barriers to entry for taxi driving, like paying to join a parking base and building a client list.

    The app did away with parking bases, and about half of drivers joined the system through a “partner”, paying a fixed weekly fee to rent their car instead of buying it themselves.

    In efforts to make rides cheaper, in 2018 app companies in Kenya allowed smaller, less expensive cars on their platforms, lowering costs of ownership. Drivers in our survey showed that both formal and informal financiers were willing to offer loans to digital drivers, knowing they would have regular revenue to service their debt.

    Buying a car was seen as a huge, dignifying accomplishment. One driver in the survey told us:

    Growing up, I thought vehicles were owned only by the rich, but now digital driving has provided a means for me to own one and earn the respect of society.

    David Muteru, then chairman of the Digital Taxi Association of Kenya, echoed this sentiment: “Owning a vehicle, that’s an asset”.

    Dignity not always guaranteed

    The dignifying value of order was only possible when app companies enforced their own rules and did so fairly. Drivers preferred the stringent rule enforcement of one major app over the lax enforcement of another, which made for more stressful and undignified interactions with riders.

    When the rules were enforced, drivers could be sure that the app company would help if a rider refused to pay or if there was a dispute with the client. Drivers felt the stricter environment kept bad actors out.

    Over time, though, app companies slashed prices, competing for market share. Drivers felt less respected by riders who saw them as desperate for money. Low fares pressed drivers to negotiate with riders for offline trips and higher rates, reintroducing the indignity of haggling.

    Lessons for the future

    Digitally mediated work raises many questions about labour standards.

    This research shows how important it is to keep local context in mind. Digital driving is not the same experience for drivers in every context. Where people suffer indignities and deprivations in the informal sector, digitalisation may offer gains. But this potential depends on rule enforcement and pay. Material and subjective dignity are intertwined.

    Julie Zollmann received funding from Mastercard Foundation.

    – ref. Kenya’s ride-hailing drivers say their jobs offer dignity despite the challenges – https://theconversation.com/kenyas-ride-hailing-drivers-say-their-jobs-offer-dignity-despite-the-challenges-257845

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Marine fossil found in South Africa is one of a kind, thanks to unusual preservation

    Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Sarah Gabbott, Professor of Palaeontology, University of Leicester

    A fossilised creature found in a South African roadside quarry 25 years ago has finally got an official name. The small, segmented, crustacean-like creature, dated to 444 million years ago, can now be introduced as Keurbos susanae. It belongs to the arthropod group of animals, which accounts for about 84% of all known species that exist today, including insects, spiders and crabs.

    Palaeontologist Sarah Gabbott explains what’s so unusual about her discovery, which she named as part of the process of describing it scientifically.

    What can you tell us about this creature and the environment it lived in?

    The fossil is about 50cm long and has 46 almost identical segments. Projecting from each is a delicate, gill-like structure. It would probably have looked like a bit like a horseshoe crab and the gills would have been for absorbing oxygen from the water it lived in. Its insides are exquisitely well-preserved, which is very unusual for fossils – normally only the hard, more decay-resistant external features would be preserved. You can see bundles of muscle fibres that would have powered the limbs, tendons and an internal scaffold structure that gave the animal rigidity.

    We think it would have spent most of its life living on, or more likely just above, the seafloor, probably walking and swimming in an undulatory (waving) motion.

    It lived in the immediate aftermath of the end Ordovician extinction event more than 440 million years ago, caused by glaciations (the spread of icy conditions) across vast swaths of the planet. This extinction wiped out about 85% of Earth’s species. The marine basin that Keurbos susanae inhabited was probably very cold and at times covered with sea ice.

    It was a relatively hostile environment in other ways too. Our analyses of the chemistry of the shales – the sediments on the sea bed where this animal and others lived, now turned to rock – shows that they were deposited under anoxic conditions (that is, there was no oxygen circulating freely in the water). And at times free hydrogen sulfide occurred in the sediment porewaters (the water in tiny spaces between grains of sediment) and even above the seafloor. Not much could live in these conditions and this was critical to this fossil’s amazing preservation.

    It meant the carcass was not scavenged by other animals after it died. Also, the chemistry was important in the process whereby the soft tissues, which should usually rot away rapidly, became mineralised quickly after death. This turned the animal’s anatomy to mineral which survived for hundreds of millions of years until it was discovered.

    It is preserved “inside out”.

    Keurbos susanae is a new genus and species which we are still trying to place among other early arthropods. The fact that its insides are better preserved than its outside makes it difficult to compare with other fossils that are preserved the “other way round”.

    How did you find the fossil and what else has been found in that area?

    The site is in the Cedarberg mountains, north of Cape Town. To collect fossils in this area you need a permit granted by the Council for Geoscience. Fossil-bearing rocks are protected by law because of their heritage and scientific value.

    Fossil hunting in these rocks takes a lot of hard work and patience, splitting open the shales with a hammer and chisel. These shale rocks are what’s left of layers of silt that were once on the sea floor. The fossils here are super rare: you can dig and split shale for days and not find a single fossil! But we know there are some in there because of discoveries made previously.

    I found two specimens. The first one is complete but the second one only has the middle part of the body preserved.

    In the same rocks we have found some of the earliest vertebrate fossils with mineralised teeth, called conodonts. They were eel shaped and predatory. Also eurypterids (sea scorpions), arthropods with powerful swimming appendages, which would have cruised through the frigid waters. There are also orthocones – a type of chambered cephalopod – like the mollusc fossils called ammonites, which have been found in large numbers, but with a straight shell instead of coiled.

    Why has it taken 25 years to describe Keurbos susanae scientifically?

    Two reasons really.

    First, because of the nature of preservation, where all the insides are perfectly preserved but the outside (the carapace or body covering) is absent, it is just difficult to interpret and compare to other fossils. And secondly because the specimen’s head and legs are missing and these are key characteristics that palaeontologists would use to help them to understand the evolutionary relationships of such fossils.

    If more specimens were to be found, with their heads and legs, we could be more certain about where this fossil fitted in the scheme of life. But the site where I found it has been covered in a lot of rock from quarrying activity. So we decided to describe what we had in the meantime, and not wait for more examples.

    The fossil’s name, Keurbos susanae, refers to the place where I found it and to my mother, Sue, who encouraged me to follow a career that made me happy, whatever that might be.

    Sarah Gabbott receives funding from Natural Environmental Research Council; National Geographic. She is affiliated with Green Circle Nature Regeneration CIC a not for profit Environmental Community Interest Company in the UK

    – ref. Marine fossil found in South Africa is one of a kind, thanks to unusual preservation – https://theconversation.com/marine-fossil-found-in-south-africa-is-one-of-a-kind-thanks-to-unusual-preservation-255256

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: African countries are bad at issuing bonds, so debt costs more than it should: what needs to change

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town

    Over the past two decades, African countries have increasingly turned to international capital markets to meet their development financing needs. For example, Kenya and Benin raised a combined US$2.5 billion through bond issuances during the first half of 2025. Proceeds were used to repay maturing bonds. This means new bonds, with unfavourable terms, are being issued to pay previous lenders.

    Yet African bonds are substantially mispriced, resulting in excessively high yields that are not justified by fundamentals – based on economic, fiscal and institutional strengths. Mispricing occurs when a country has high economic growth, stable institutions that support government policy implementation, rule of law and accountability, yet its bonds trade at higher yields than those of its peers. In other words, there will be every reason for investors to trust that the country will repay what it owes, but they still expect a higher return. This is happening because of lack of information and biases perpetuated by global entities that are facilitating bond sells in Africa.

    Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal have strong growth (5% to 6.5%), yet they face high yields on their bonds (7.8% to 8.2%) compared to Namibia and Morocco with approximately 3% growth and bond interest of 6%.

    This mispricing imposes a heavy debt servicing burden on already constrained public budgets.

    At the same time African countries face a puzzling paradox: while they’re paying more for the debt they’re raising, the demand for these bonds is much higher (oversubscribed). All bond issuances in Africa are subscribed by as much as over five times. This has only been common in Africa. It is puzzling why governments are not leveraging on the high demand to bargain for lower interest rates.

    In my view, based on my bond pricing modelling expertise, I believe that mispricing of Eurobonds in Africa – debt instruments issued by a country in a currency different from its own – is not a market anomaly. It shows internal capacity failures in African countries, structural market biases and insufficient understanding of the complex mechanics of global debt markets.

    Oversubscription of Eurobonds should be a source of power for African governments, not a missed opportunity. African countries can move from being price takers to price negotiators. They should be able to reduce debt costs, freeing up resources for development.

    But to get there African countries need to address the power imbalance in the markets.

    Governments need to invest in bond pricing expertise to increase their negotiating power.

    The false success signal of oversubscription

    There are several reasons why African bonds remain mispriced at a higher interest despite the oversubscriptions.

    Firstly, a lack of technical expertise in primary bond issuance in the debt management offices of the majority of African governments. Very few on the continent have intelligence systems for gathering information on financial markets and formal investor relations programmes. Neither do they have in-house quantitative analysts or pricing specialists capable of engaging investment banks on an equal footing during roadshows and negotiations.

    The debt management offices are unable to engage confidently and critically with financial intermediaries to challenge assumptions, simulate pricing scenarios and conduct their own comparative market analysis.

    After initial public offers, most governments don’t engage with holders of their bonds on the secondary market. Nor do they monitor bond post-issuance performance. The lack of interest in the secondary market has created a feedback loop where poor market intelligence has contributed to high coupons on new issuances.

    Secondly, advanced economies engage investors regularly through briefings, roadshows and timely reports. Communication by African governments is often ad hoc and usually limited to the period around a new bond issuance.

    This prevents investors from forming informed, long-term views. It leads to a default risk premium in pricing.

    Thirdly, debt issuance by African governments is often politically driven rather than strategically timed. Often this leads to rushed or ill-prepared entries.

    Sometimes it’s done when the cost of debt is rising globally, close to election cycles, or because governments are facing a financial crunch caused by falling reserves.



    Read more:
    African governments have developed a taste for Eurobonds: why it’s dangerous

    Fourth, African sovereigns often approach the Eurobond market with weak negotiating power. They are heavily reliant on a small pool of western investment banks as technical advisors to manage the bond issuance. These banks tend to be more inclined towards their own global investment client networks. Their incentives are not aligned with achieving the lowest possible yield for the issuers.

    African issuers often accept the initial price guidance from advisors and agree to high yields even in oversubscribed situations. Even when demand could support a lower yield, African issuers fail to negotiate pricing downwards. Issuing syndicates have no incentive to push for optimal pricing for the issuer as they receive transaction-based fees.



    Read more:
    African countries aren’t borrowing too much: they’re paying too much for debt

    The role of bond issuing syndicates is a major factor in the mispricing. In bond issuance, a syndicate is a group of financial institutions that structures the bond, price and market (also known bookbuilding), underwrite the unsold portion of the bond, sell the bond to their investors, and ensure compliance and documentation. These syndicates set coupon rates higher than necessary as a conservative hedge against perceived investor scepticism.

    African governments have become passive participants rather than active price-setters. African-based bond syndicates are systematically bypassed despite growing regional capacity and distribution networks. Bond issues are also allocated to offshore buyers, sidelining local institutional investors.

    Breaking the cycle of mispricing

    To correct the systemic Eurobond mispricing and reduce debt servicing costs, African countries must undertake reforms.

    First, governments should invest in debt management capacity.

    Second, they must actively monitor secondary market trading to identify opportunities such as bond buybacks and exchanges that could improve the debt profile. Real-time analytics on bond trading performance should inform future issuance terms and investor communication strategies.

    Third, governments must build institutional routines for submitting data, and proactively engage investors and rating agencies. This will challenge and influence risk assumptions. Investors need consistent assurances, especially on the ability to easily exit positions.

    Fourth, African countries need to maintain and monitor up-to-date benchmarks from peers with comparable pricing data. Without accurate comparisons, it is difficult to know whether the proposed bond pricing by syndicates is fair and accurate. They must stop solely relying on what investment banks recommends.

    Lastly, African governments should involve at least one African-based syndicate member, prioritise allocation to African institutional investors and promote regional arrangements with international banks to ensure knowledge transfer and equitable participation.

    Misheck Mutize is affiliated with the African Union as a Lead Expert on Credit Ratings

    – ref. African countries are bad at issuing bonds, so debt costs more than it should: what needs to change – https://theconversation.com/african-countries-are-bad-at-issuing-bonds-so-debt-costs-more-than-it-should-what-needs-to-change-257128

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: How to tell if a photo’s fake? You probably can’t. That’s why new rules are needed

    Source: The Conversation – Africa (2) – By Martin Bekker, Computational Social Scientist, University of the Witwatersrand

    The problem is simple: it’s hard to know whether a photo’s real or not anymore. Photo manipulation tools are so good, so common and easy to use, that a picture’s truthfulness is no longer guaranteed.

    The situation got trickier with the uptake of generative artificial intelligence. Anyone with an internet connection can cook up just about any image, plausible or fantasy, with photorealistic quality, and present it as real. This affects our ability to discern truth in a world increasingly influenced by images.



    Read more:
    Can you tell the difference between real and fake news photos? Take the quiz to find out

    I teach and research the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI), including how we use and understand digital images.

    Many people ask how we can tell if an image has been changed, but that’s fast becoming too difficult. Instead, here I suggest a system where creators and users of images openly state what changes they’ve made. Any similar system will do, but new rules are needed if AI images are to be deployed ethically – at least among those who want to be trusted, especially media.

    Doing nothing isn’t an option, because what we believe about media affects how much we trust each other and our institutions. There are several ways forward. Clear labelling of photos is one of them.

    Deepfakes and fake news

    Photo manipulation was once the preserve of government propaganda teams, and later, expert users of Photoshop, the popular software for editing, altering or creating digital images.

    Today, digital photos are automatically subjected to colour-correcting filters on phones and cameras. Some social media tools automatically “prettify” users’ pictures of faces. Is a photo taken of oneself by oneself even real anymore?



    Read more:
    The use of deepfakes can sow doubt, creating confusion and distrust in viewers

    The basis of shared social understanding and consensus – trust regarding what one sees – is being eroded. This is accompanied by the apparent rise of untrustworthy (and often malicious) news reporting. We have new language for the situation: fake news (false reporting in general) and deepfakes (deliberately manipulated images, whether for waging war or garnering more social media followers).

    Misinformation campaigns using manipulated images can sway elections, deepen divisions, even incite violence. Scepticism towards trustworthy media has untethered ordinary people from fact-based accounting of events, and has fuelled conspiracy theories and fringe groups.

    Ethical questions

    A further problem for producers of images (personal or professional) is the difficulty of knowing what’s permissable. In a world of doctored images, is it acceptable to prettify yourself? How about editing an ex-partner out of a picture and posting it online?

    Would it matter if a well-respected western newspaper published a photo of Russian president Vladimir Putin pulling his face in disgust (an expression that he surely has made at some point, but of which no actual image has been captured, say) using AI?

    The ethical boundaries blur further in highly charged contexts. Does it matter if opposition political ads against then-presidential candidate Barack Obama in the US deliberately darkened his skin?

    Would generated images of dead bodies in Gaza be more palatable, perhaps more moral, than actual photographs of dead humans? Is a magazine cover showing a model digitally altered to unattainable beauty standards, while not declaring the level of photo manipulation, unethical?

    A fix

    Part of the solution to this social problem demands two simple and clear actions. First, declare that photo manipulation has taken place. Second, disclose what kind of photo manipulation was carried out.

    The first step is straightforward: in the same way pictures are published with author credits, a clear and unobtrusive “enhancement acknowledgement” or EA should be added to caption lines.



    Read more:
    AI isn’t what we should be worried about – it’s the humans controlling it

    The second is about how an image has been altered. Here I call for five “categories of manipulation” (not unlike a film rating). Accountability and clarity create an ethical foundation.

    The five categories could be:

    C – Corrected

    Edits that preserve the essence of the original photo while refining its overall clarity or aesthetic appeal – like colour balance (such as contrast) or lens distortion. Such corrections are often automated (for instance by smartphone cameras) but can be performed manually.

    E – Enhanced

    Alterations that are mainly about colour or tone adjustments. This extends to slight cosmetic retouching, like the removal of minor blemishes (such as acne) or the artificial addition of makeup, provided the edits don’t reshape physical features or objects. This includes all filters involving colour changes.

    B – Body manipulated

    This is flagged when a physical feature is altered. Changes in body shape, like slimming arms or enlarging shoulders, or the altering of skin or hair colour, fall under this category.

    O – Object manipulated

    This declares that the physical position of an object has been changed. A finger or limb moved, a vase added, a person edited out, a background element added or removed.

    G – Generated

    Entirely fabricated yet photorealistic depictions, such as a scene that never existed, must be flagged here. So, all images created digitally, including by generative AI, but limited to photographic depictions. (An AI-generated cartoon of the pope would be excluded, but a photo-like picture of the pontiff in a puffer jacket is rated G.)

    The suggested categories are value-blind: they are (or ought to be) triggered simply by the occurrence of any manipulation. So, colour filters applied to an image of a politician trigger an E category, whether the alteration makes the person appear friendlier or scarier. A critical feature for accepting a rating system like this is that it is transparent and unbiased.

    The CEBOG categories above aren’t fixed, there may be overlap: B (Body manipulated) might often imply E (Enhanced), for example.

    Feasibility

    Responsible photo manipulation software may automatically indicate to users the class of photo manipulation carried out. If needed it could watermark it, or it could simply capture it in the picture’s metadata (as with data about the source, owner or photographer). Automation could very well ensure ease of use, and perhaps reduce human error, encouraging consistent application across platforms.



    Read more:
    Can you spot a financial fake? How AI is raising our risks of billing fraud

    Of course, displaying the rating will ultimately be an editorial decision, and good users, like good editors, will do this responsibly, hopefully maintaining or improving the reputation of their images and publications. While one would hope that social media would buy into this kind of editorial ideal and encourage labelled images, much room for ambiguity and deception remains.

    The success of an initiative like this hinges on technology developers, media organisations and policymakers collaborating to create a shared commitment to transparency in digital media.

    Martin Bekker receives funding from the National Research Foundation in South Africa.

    – ref. How to tell if a photo’s fake? You probably can’t. That’s why new rules are needed – https://theconversation.com/how-to-tell-if-a-photos-fake-you-probably-cant-thats-why-new-rules-are-needed-252645

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  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Johannesburg’s problems can be solved – but it’s a long journey to fix South Africa’s economic powerhouse

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Philip Harrison, Professor School of Architecture and Planning, University of the Witwatersrand

    Joburg skyline. South African Tourism/Flickr, CC BY

    South African president Cyril Ramaphosa met senior leaders of Johannesburg and Gauteng, the province it’s located in, in March 2025 to discuss ways to arrest the steep decline in South Africa’s largest city.

    Ramaphosa announced a two-year-long presidential intervention to tackle some of the city’s most pressing issues. It is to be led by the Presidential Johannesburg Working Group with eight cross-governmental and multi-stakeholder workstreams.

    Johannesburg was established 130 years ago, where the world’s largest-ever gold deposits were discovered. It grew rapidly in the early 20th century and became the country’s economic heartland and largest population centre. Like all South African cities, it was deeply scarred by apartheid policies. People were divided by racially defined groups. Good services and a strong economy benefited a minority, and a black majority were pushed into impoverished ghettos.

    But, for about the first two decades of post-apartheid rule from 1994, Johannesburg led the country with innovation and progressive change. It pioneered the new local government system, institutional reforms, new practice on city strategy and planning, pro-poor service delivery, and modern transport infrastructure.

    Today, however, the city is in a dire state. Over the past decade, roughly coinciding with the arrival of messy coalition governance in 2016, sound political leadership, administrative stability and financial management have crumbled. Underinvestment in infrastructure maintenance has led to collapsing services. Public trust is deteriorating among increasingly frustrated communities. This was evident in local election results. It also shows up in recent data released by the Gauteng City-Region Observatory on public trust in local government.

    The local economy has stagnated. The city’s official unemployment rate of 34.3% is higher than the national average of 32.9%. Mounting joblessness and dwindling incomes have intertwined with depleted trust to knock levels of payment for property rates and service charges. In turn this has deepened the financial and service maintenance crisis.

    Corruption in many parts of the city is an endemic complicating factor.

    The presidential intervention is designed to address this complex interplay between embedded legacies and failings post-apartheid. The workstreams involving city officials and concerned stakeholders are generating ideas for priority actions. There is also a new energy in the city government, with the executive mayor and members of his mayoral committee making turnaround promises.

    This long overdue attention is heartening. But some caution is called for. While some “quick wins” are needed, there will be no easy turnaround. The best prospect is likely to be a process of recovery that will require patience and methodical attention over the long term. A city cannot be repaired in the way an automobile can. A city has a trillion moving parts and is in a constant state of makeover, as dynamics of economy, technology, demography, environment, society, politics, and more, interact and produce change.

    The question is not whether a city is fixed – it can never finally be – but rather what trajectory it is on. For Johannesburg, the question is how to exit the downward spiral and begin the process of reconstruction.

    We are a group who previously worked in the City of Johannesburg as officials, who are now academics with decades of experience observing local governance trends and dynamics, or scholars engaged in civil society coalitions or communities mobilising around the crisis. Some of us have been involved in the Presidential Johannesburg Working Group over the last few months.

    Our view is that there are four areas needing urgent but sustained attention.

    Focus areas

    The first is the need for a joint effort across national, provincial and municipal government to resolve the crisis. We are pleased that this has begun. The political leadership in the city (and of the province) failed to grasp the opportunity provided by the post-2024 election national compromises to put together a broad-based government of local unity to lead reconstruction. There is no option now but to pursue an inter-governmental initiative led by national government with the committed involvement of the other spheres.

    Only genuine collaboration will succeed.

    In this respect, the Presidential Johannesburg Working Group holds promise. But what will be needed is careful, concerted work focused first on short-term priorities. Then, over years, on key structural challenges facing the city.

    Second, the city needs civil society in all its forms to hold a careful balance between keeping up the pressure on municipal government, constantly holding it accountable to its residents, and working with government to help it solve problems. The Joburg Crisis Alliance, Jozi-my-Jozi, WaterCAN and similar initiatives are claiming well-recognised and respected voice in the affairs of the municipality.

    Johannesburg needs a city government that is open to this scrutiny, accepting the need for transparency, and open to the help that civil society can offer.

    To raise the level of accountability and collaboration, a clear programme of restoration has to be communicated openly to the public. Milestones and expenditure requirements need to be set that allow for constant monitoring. There must be open council meetings, and regular online and in-person briefings.

    Also required are new mechanisms for citizen-based monitoring. These may include trained citizen monitors reporting on service delivery. Alternatively, the establishment of a sort of “Citizen’s Council” which meets regularly to receive reports from these monitors and the city administration.

    International examples include the Bürgerrat model. This is now fully institutionalised in parts of Germany and Austria to strengthen local democracy and accountability. In this model, citizens are randomly selected to sit on a council which monitors performance of local government and provides new ideas.

    Another approach could be for civil society organisations to be invited to a Citizen’s Council that would act in support of the oversight processes of the elected Municipal Council.

    Third, there has to be a solution to unstable coalition governments. These seem to be structured to facilitate separate political fiefdoms where spoils can be divided in the allocation of portfolios. At minimum, the presidential intervention must provide for a check and balance on processes where bureaucratic appointments and budgetary allocations may serve the interests of cronyism. For example, there should be transparency and rigour in appointments to the boards of Johannesburg’s municipally owned companies.

    Regulatory reforms are required in the political arena. This should include rules for the distribution of seats on the municipal executive and the election of mayors. Between January 2023 and August 2024 a tiny minority party held the mayoralty because the larger parties could not agree on a mayoral selection or, more cynically, to ensure that the executive mayor could not call large parties to account.

    More importantly, though, there has to be a change in political culture. This is a longer-term process.

    Fourth, the problems run far deeper than what bureaucratic reorganisation can achieve.

    The longer-term project is to build a capable administration with clear political direction and oversight but insulated from personal agendas and factional battles. The administration became confused and demoralised because of the political instability over an extended period. There are, however, still many capable and committed public servants in the city bureaucracy. The focus should be on working with them to rebuild the administration, making it a place where talent and initiative are recognised and rewarded.

    Restored political leadership and a rejuvenated administration is needed for a long term process, extending far beyond the quick wins. This process will involve refurbishing the decaying network infrastructure, restoring financial stability, reestablishing social trust and returning confidence to the city’s economy.

    2025 marks 30 years since the first democratic local elections. National government is looking seriously at sweeping municipal reforms. And the next municipal election – likely to be held at the end of 2026 – is an opportunity to make a deep transformation effort. Citizens can ensure that parties contesting the election place Johannesburg’s recovery at the heart of their agenda.

    Philip Harrison has received funding from South Africa’s National Research Foundation in support of the South African Research Chair in Spatial Analysis and City Planning.

    The Gauteng City-Region Observatory receives core grant funding from the Gauteng Provincial Government.

    Lorena Nunez Carrasco received funding from the National Research Foundation in support of research on the South African response on COVID-19

    Rashid Seedat receives funding from Gauteng Provincial Government for the Gauteng City-Region Observatory. He is affiliated with the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation as a member of the Board of Trustees.

    – ref. Johannesburg’s problems can be solved – but it’s a long journey to fix South Africa’s economic powerhouse – https://theconversation.com/johannesburgs-problems-can-be-solved-but-its-a-long-journey-to-fix-south-africas-economic-powerhouse-256013

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