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Category: Trumpism

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – US tariffs on cinema – E-001965/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001965/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Catherine Griset (PfE)

    Donald Trump has announced that he wants to introduce 100 % tariffs on foreign-made films shown in the US.

    However, as these are services rather than goods, it is unclear how the US intends to apply the tariffs.

    Member States that encourage filmmakers from third countries to film in that Member State, using various means to do so (such as tax credits or quotas on European works), could see these tariffs affect our film industry. This is occurring in a context where European cinema accounts for only 34 % of cinema admissions and 30 % of streaming views in Europe.

    Finally, films are sometimes wrongly classified as European when one of the producers is established in Europe. With the new US tariffs, this classification could come back to bite those who have such arrangements.

    • 1.Does the Commission have any information on the new tariffs?
    • 2.Is it considering ways to protect our film industry, including through retaliatory measures?
    • 3.Does it agree that there is now an urgent need for a clearer definition of what qualifies as a European work?

    Submitted: 15.5.2025

    Last updated: 22 May 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, May 22, 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    May 22, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone and welcome to this IMF Press Briefing.  It is wonderful to see you all today on this rainy Washington morning, especially those of you here in person and of course also those of you joining us online.  My name is Julie Kozak.  I’m the Director of Communications at the IMF.  As usual, this press briefing will be embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  And as usual, I will start with a few announcements and then I’ll take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.  

    So first, our Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva, and our First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, are currently attending the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting taking place in Canada right now.  Second, on May 29th through 30th, the Managing Director will travel to Dubrovnik, Croatia to attend a joint IMF Croatia National Bank Conference focused on promoting growth and resilience in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.  The Managing Director will participate in the opening panel and will hold meetings with regional counterparts.  

    On June 2nd, the Managing Director will travel to Sofia, Bulgaria to attend the 30th Anniversary celebration of the National Trust Ecofund.  During her visit, she will also hold several bilateral meetings with the Bulgarian authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, will travel to Paraguay, Brazil, and the Netherlands next month.  On June 6th, he will launch the IMF’s new regional training program for South America and Mexico, which will be hosted in Asuncion by the Central Bank of Paraguay.  From there, he will travel to Brasilia to deliver a keynote speech on June 10th during the Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Development Bank.  He will also then travel to the Netherlands on June 12th to 13th to participate in the 2025 Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Symposium and to meet with the Dutch authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Kenji Okamura, will be in Japan from June 11th to 12th for the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum to discuss fiscal frameworks and GovTech in the Asia Pacific region.  

    And finally, on a kind of housekeeping or scheduling issue, the Article IV Consultation for the United States will be undertaken on a later timetable this year, with discussions to be held in November.  

    And with those rather extensive announcements, I will now open the floor to your questions.  For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  All right, let’s open up.  Daniel.

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks for taking my question.  I just wonder if the IMF has any reaction to the passage of last night in the House of Representatives of the One Big, Beautiful bill.  And a related question, how concerned are you by the increase in yields on long-dated U.S. treasuries?  What do you think it says about the market’s view of U.S. debt going into the future and sort of any possible spillovers for IMF borrowers as well?  MS. KOZACK: On the first question, what I can say is we take note of the passing of the legislation in the House of Representatives earlier this morning.  What we will do is we will look to assess a final bill once it has passed through the Senate and also once it’s been enacted.  And, of course, we will have opportunities to share our assessment over time in the various products where we normally would convey our fulsome views.  

    On your second question, which was on the bond market.   What I can say there is that we know that the U.S. government bonds are a safe haven asset, and the U.S. dollar, of course, plays a key role as the world’s reserve currency.  The U.S. bond market plays a critical role, of course, in finance and in safe assets.  And this is underpinned by the liquidity and depth of the U.S. market and also the sound institutions in the U.S.  We don’t see any changes in those functions.  And, of course, what we can also say is that although there has been some volatility in markets, market functioning, including in the U.S. Treasury market, has so far been orderly.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Ukraine.  Two topics particularly.  So, the first one, when is the next review of the Ukraine’s EFF is going to be completed, and what amount of money would be disbursed to Kyiv?  And could you please outline the total sum that is remaining within the current program?  And the second part, it’s about debt level.  What is the IMF assessment of current Ukraine’s government debt level?  Is it stable?  Do you see any vulnerabilities and any risks for Ukraine?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine?  Does anyone online want to come in on Ukraine?  Okay, I don’t see anyone.  

    What I can say on Ukraine is that just two days ago, our Staff team started policy discussions with the Ukrainian authorities on the eighth review under the eff.  So, the team is on the ground now.  The discussions are taking place in Kiev and the team will provide an update on the progress at the end of the mission.

    In terms of the potential disbursement, I’m just looking here; that’s the seventh disbursement.  We will come back to you on the size of the disbursement, but it should show in the Staff report for the Seventh Review what would be expected for the Eighth Review.  And it would also show the remaining size of the program.  But we’ll come back to you bilaterally with those exact answers.  

    And what I can then say on the debt side is at the time of the Seventh Review under the program, we assessed debt, Ukraine’s debt to be sustainable on a forward-looking basis and as with every review that the team of course, will update its assessment as part of the eighth review discussion.  We’ll have more to say on the debt as the eighth review continues.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just one more thing on Ukraine.  Does it make sense for them to consider using the euro as a defense currency for their currency, given the shifting geopolitical sense and what we are seeing with the dollar? MS. KOZACK: So right now, under the program, Ukraine has an inflation targeting regime, and that is where what the program is focused on, our program with Ukraine. So, they have an inflation targeting regime.  They are very much focused on ensuring the stability of that monetary policy regime that Ukraine has.  And, of course, that involves a floating exchange rate.  And I don’t have anything beyond that to say on the currency market.

     

    QUESTIONER: The agreement with the IMF established a target for the Central Bank Reserve to meet by June.  According to the technical projection, does the IMF believe Argentina will meet this target?  And if it’s not met, is it possible that we will grant a waiver in the future?

    MS. KOZACK: anything else on Argentina?  

    QUESTIONER: About Argentina, what is your assessment of the progress of the program agreed with Argentina more than a month after its announcement in last April?  

     

    QUESTIONER: The government is about to announce a measure to gain access to voluntarily, of course, but to the dollars that are “under the mattress”, as we call them, undeclared funds to probably meet these targets that Roman was asking about.  I was wondering if this measure has been discussed with the IMF.  And also, you mentioned Georgieva visiting Paraguay and Brazil, if you there’s any plan to visit Argentina as well?  

    QUESTIONER: President Milei is about to announce, you know, Minister Caputo, in a few minutes that there is a measure to use similar to attacks Amnesty.  Is the IMF concerned that this could violate its regulations against illicit financial flows? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, with respect to Argentina, on April 11th, I think, as you know, our Executive Board approved a new four-year EFF arrangement for Argentina.  It was for $20 billion.  It contained an initial disbursement of $12 billion.  And that the aim of that program is to support Argentina’s transition to the next phase of its stabilization program and reforms.  

    President Milei’s administration’s policies continued to deliver impressive results.  These include the rollout of the new FX regime, which has been smooth, a decline in monthly inflation to 2.8 percent in April, another fiscal surplus in April, and reaching a cumulative fiscal surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP for the year, and efforts to continue to open up the economy.  At the same time, the economy is now expanding, real wages are recovering, and poverty continues to fall in Argentina.  

    The Fund continues to support the authorities in their efforts to create a more stable and prosperous Argentina.  Our close engagement continues, including in the context of the upcoming discussions for the First Review of the program.  This First Review will allow us to assess progress and to consider policies to build on the strong momentum and to secure lasting stability and growth in Argentina.  And in this regard, there is a shared recognition with the authorities about the importance of strengthening external buffers and securing a timely re-access to international capital markets.  

    What I can say on the question about the announcements on that — the question on the undeclared assets.  All I can say right now is that we’re following developments very closely on this, and of course, the team will be ready to provide an assessment in due course.  

    On the second part of that question, I do want to also note, and this is included in our Staff report, that the authorities have committed to strengthening financial transparency and also to aligning Argentina’s AML CFT, the Anti-Money Laundering framework, with international standards, as well as to deregulating the economy to encourage its formalization.  So, any new measures, including those that may be aimed at encouraging the use of undeclared assets, should be, of course, consistent with these important commitments.  

    And on your question about Paraguay and Brazil, I just want to clarify that it is our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, who will be traveling to Brazil and Paraguay, not the Managing Director.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Two questions on Syria.  With the U.S. and EU announcing the lifting of sanctions recently, how does this affect any sort of timeline with providing economic assistance?  And secondly, the Managing Director has said that the Fund has to first define data.  Can you just walk through what that entails?  

    MS. KOZACK: Can you just repeat what you said?  The Managing Director has said?

     

    QUESTIONER: The need to define data.  Just sort of a similar question.  I’m just wondering, following the World Bank statement last week about, you know, Syria now being eligible to borrow from the bank, what sort of discussions the Fund has had with the Syrian authorities since the end of the Spring Meetings and, you know, any update you can give us around possible discussions around an Article IV.  

     

    QUESTIONER: About the relationship and if there’s any missed planned virtual or on the ground? 

    MS. KOZACK: Let me step back and give a little bit of an overview on Syria. So, first, you know, we’re, of course, monitoring developments in Syria very closely.  Our Staff are preparing to support the international community’s efforts to help with Syria’s economic rehabilitation as conditions allow.  We have had useful discussions with the new Economic Team who took office in late March, including during the Spring Meetings.  And, of course, you will perhaps have seen the press release regarding the roundtable that was held during the Spring Meetings.  IMF Staff have already started to work to rebuild its understanding of the Syrian economy.  We’ve been doing this through interactions with the authorities and also through coordination with other IFIs. And just to remind everyone, our last Article IV with Syria was in 2009.  So, it’s been quite some time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria.  Syria will need significant assistance to rebuild its economic institutions.  We stand ready to provide advice and targeted and well-prioritized technical assistance in our areas of expertise. I think this goes a little bit to your question on, like, what do we mean by defining data.  I think what the Managing Director was really referring to there is since it has been such a long time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria, the last Article IV, as I said, was in 2009.  I think there, what she’s really referring to is the need to really work with the Syrian authorities to rebuild basic economic institutions, including the ability to produce economic statistics, right, so that we — so that we and the authorities and the international community of course, can conduct the necessary economic analysis so that we can best support the reconstruction and recovery efforts.  

    With respect to the lifting of sanctions, what I can say there is that, of course, the lifting of sanctions and the lifting of sanctions are a matter between member states of the IMF.  What we can say in serious cases that the lifting of sanctions could support Syria’s efforts to overcome its economic challenges and help advance its reconstruction and economic development.  Syria, of course, is an IMF member, and as we’ve just said, you know, we are, of course, engaged closely with the Syrians to explore how, within our mandate, we can best support them.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is on Russia.  In what ways is the IMF monitoring Russia’s economy under the current sanctions and conflict conditions, and have regular Article IV Consultations or other surveillance activities with Russia resumed to track its economic developments?  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say with respect to Russia is that we are, our Staff, are analyzing data and economic indicators that are reported by the Russian authorities.  We are also looking at counterparty data that is provided to us by other countries, and this is particularly true for cross-border transactions, as well as data from third-party sources. So, this data collection using official and other sources does allow us to put together a picture of the Russian economy.  

    We did provide an assessment in the 2025 April WEO, the one that we just released about a month ago.  In this WEO, we assess Russia’s growth at — we expect Russia to grow at 1.5 percent in 2025, 0.9 percent in 2026, and we expect inflation to come down to 8.2 percent in 2025 and 4.4 percent in 2026.  And I don’t have a timetable for the Article IV at this time.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I’d like to ask about Deputy Management Director Okamura’s visits to Japan.  So, my question is, what economic topics will be on the agenda during his stay?  Could you tell me a bit more in detail?  

    MS. KOZACK: Deputy Managing Director Okamura will travel to Japan, as I said, from June 11th to 12th, and he will be attending the Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  So, this will be the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  It’s an annual conference that we co-host in Japan every year and the focus is on issues of fiscal policy. In this particular one, Deputy Managing Director Okamura will be discussing fiscal frameworks. It’s very important for all countries to have sound fiscal frameworks so they can implement sound fiscal policy.  He will also be discussing GovTech not only in Japan but in the Asia Pacific region.  And of course, GovTech is very important for countries because it’s a way of modernizing and making government both provision of services in some cases but also potentially collection of revenue more effective and more efficient.  So, those will be the focus of his discussions in Tokyo.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on the recent bailout package by IMF to Pakistan.  The Indian government has expressed a lot of displeasure with Pakistan planning to use this package to build — rebuild — areas that allegedly support cross-border terrorism.  Does the IMF have any assessment of this?  Secondly, I also have another question.  Could you please provide information on the majority vote that was received in approving this bailout package for Pakistan on May 9th?  If you can disclose the information.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Pakistan?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just adding to that, do you have an update on the implications of the escalation of facilities in that border between Pakistan and India on both economies.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks a lot.  I guess the only spin I would put on is generally what safeguards does the IMF have that its funds won’t be used for military or in support of military actions, not only there but as a general matter.  And I also, if you’re able to, there was some controversy about the termination of India’s Executive Director of the IMF, K.V. Subramanian.  Do you have any insight into–there are reports there–what it was about but what do you say it’s about?  Thanks a lot.  

    MS. KOZACK: With respect to the Indian Executive Director who had been at the Fund, all I can say on this is that the appointment of Executive Directors is a member for the — is a matter for the member country.  It’s not a matter for the Fund, and it’s completely up to the country authorities to determine who represents them at the Fund.  

    With respect to Pakistan and the conflict with India, I want to start here by first expressing our regrets and sympathies for the loss of life and for the human toll from the recent conflict.  We do hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.  

    Now, turning to some of the specific questions about the Board approval of Pakistan’s program, I’m going to step back a minute and provide a little bit of the chronology and timeframe.  The IMF Executive Board approved Pakistan’s EFF program in September of 2024.  And the First review at that time was planned for the first quarter of 2025.  And consistent with that timeline, on March 25th of 2025, the IMF Staff and the Pakistani authorities reached a Staff-Level Agreement on the First Review for the EFF.  That agreement, that Staff-Level Agreement, was then presented to our Executive Board, and our Executive Board completed the review on May 9th.  As a result of the completion of that review, Pakistan received the disbursement at that time.  

    What I want to emphasize here is that it is part of a standard procedure under programs that our Executive Board conducts periodic reviews of lending programs to assess their progress.  And they particularly look at whether the program is on track, whether the conditions under the program have been met, and whether any policy changes are needed to bring the program back on track.  And in the case of Pakistan, our Board found that Pakistan had indeed met all of the targets.  It had made progress on some of the reforms, and for that reason, the Board went ahead and approved the program.  

    With respect to the voting or the decision-making at our Board, we do not disclose that publicly.  In general, Fund Board decisions are taken by consensus, and in this case, there was a sufficient consensus at the Board to allow us to move forward or for the Board to decide to move forward and complete Pakistan’s review.  

    And with respect to the question on safeguards, I do want to make three points here.  The first is that IMF financing is provided to members for the purpose of resolving balance of payments problems.  

    In the case of Pakistan, and this is my second point, the EFF disbursements, all of the disbursements received under the EFF, are allocated to the reserves of the central bank.  So, those disbursements are at the central bank, and under the program, those resources are not part of budget financing.  They are not transferred to the government to support the budget. 

    And the third point is that the program provides additional safeguards through our conditionality.  And these include, for example, targets on the accumulation of international reserves.  It includes a zero target, meaning no lending from the central bank to the government.  And the program also includes substantial structural conditionality around improving fiscal management.  And these conditions are all available in the program documents if you wanted to do a deeper dive.  And, of course, any deviation from the established program conditions would impact future reviews under the Pakistan program.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on Egypt.  There is a mission in Egypt for the First Review of the EFF loan program.  So, can you please update us on the ongoing discussions, especially since the Prime Minister of Egypt announced yesterday that the program could be concluded in 2027 rather than 2026?  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Egypt?  I have a question from the Press Center on Egypt, which I will read aloud.  The question is when will the Fifth Review currently underway with the Egyptian government be concluded, and when will the Executive Board approve this review?  And how much money will Egypt receive once the review is approved?  

    So, here’s what I can share on Egypt.  First, let me start here.  So first, I just want to say that the Fund remains committed to supporting Egypt in building its economic resilience and fostering higher private sector-led growth.  Egypt has made clear progress on its macroeconomic reform program, with notable improvements in inflation and foreign exchange reserves.  For the past few weeks, IMF Staff has had productive discussions with the Egyptian authorities on economic performance and policies under the EFF.  As Egypt’s macroeconomic stabilization is taking hold, efforts must now focus on accelerating and deepening reforms that will reduce the footprint of the state in the Egyptian economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment.  Discussions will continue between the IMF and the Egyptian authorities on the remaining policies and reforms that could support the completion of the Fifth Review.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Sri Lanka.  Sri Lanka’s program is subject to IMF Board approval.  The review is subject to IMF Board approval, but we still haven’t got any word on when that would be.  Is there any delay in this?  And is this delay attributed to the pending electricity adjustments, tariff adjustments, that the Sri Lankan government has committed to?  

    MS. KOZACK: So just stepping back for a minute.  On April 25th, IMF Staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached Staff-Level Agreement on the Fourth Review of Sri Lanka’s program under the EFF.  And once the review is approved by our Executive Board, Sri Lanka will have access to about $344 million in financing.  Completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board, and we expect that Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  

    The precise timing of the Board meeting is contingent on two things.  The first is implementation of prior actions, and the main prior actions are relating to restoring electricity, cost recovery pricing and ensuring proper function of the automatic electricity price adjustment mechanism.  And the second contingency is completion of the Financing Assurances Review, which will focus on confirming multilateral partners, committed financing contributions to Sri Lanka and whether adequate progress has been made in debt restructuring.  So, in a nutshell, completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board.  We expect the Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  And it’s contingent on the two matters that I just mentioned.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thank you for having my questions on Ecuador.  Since the IMF is still completing the second review under the EFF program for Ecuador, do you think it’s going to be time to change the program, the goals, or maybe the amount of the program?  Because Ecuador is now facing different challenges compared to 2024.  The oil prices are falling, so that is going to affect the fiscal situation for Ecuador.  And also, I would like to know if Ecuador is still looking for a new program under the RSF.  And the last one, I would like to know if, do you think that Ecuador is going to need to make some important changes this year on oil subsidies and a tax reform?  I think, as I said, Ecuador now is facing some important challenges in the fiscal situation, so do you think it’s going to be possible because of, you know, all the social protests and all that kind of stuff?  Do you think it’s going to be possible to do that in Ecuador?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Is there a request, an official request, in place to modify the program?  And if there is, of course, details of the new one, you can share.  

    MS. KOZACK: And then I have one question online from the Press Center regarding Ecuador.  Is the sovereign negotiating new targets, given their fiscal position deteriorated compared to last year?  Our understanding is that $410 million was not dispersed under the First Review.?

    So let me share what I can on Ecuador.  So, right now, representatives from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank are in Quito this week to meet with the authorities and discuss the strengthening of financial and technical support to the country.  As part of this tripartite visit, we have a new IMF Mission Chief who is participating, and she is also using that opportunity to have courtesy meetings with the authorities and to continue discussions and advance toward a Second Review under Ecuador’s EFF.  

    What else I can add, just as background, is that the Executive Board in December approved the First Review of Ecuador’s 48-month EFF.  About $500 million was disbursed after the approval of that Frist Review.  And at that time, the Executive Board also concluded the Article IV Consultation.

    I can also say that the authorities have made excellent progress in the implementation of their economic program under the EFF.  And regarding the precise timing of the Second Review, we will provide an update on the next steps in due course and when we’re able to do so.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just a quick question on tariffs.  I’m just wondering if the IMF has a response to the U.S.-China deal that was struck in Geneva earlier this month.  You know, if the deal holds, I appreciate it’s a 90-day pause, but if the deal holds, how would you foresee that changing the Fund’s current economic forecast for the U.S. and China and for the global economy?  Thanks.  

    MS. KOZACK: As you noted, earlier in May, China and the U.S. announced a 90-day rollback of most of the bilateral tariffs imposed since April 2nd, and they established a mechanism to discuss economic and trade relations.  The two sides reduced their tariff from peak levels, leaving in place 10 percent additional tariffs.  So, the additional tariffs before this agreement were 125 percent.  Now, the additional tariff has agreed to be 10 percent, you know, for the 90 days.  This is obviously a positive step for the world’s two largest economies.

    What I can also add is that for the U.S., you may recall, during the Spring Meetings, we talked a lot about the overall effective tariff rate for the U.S.  At that time, we assessed it at 25.5 percent.  This announcement and the reduction in tariffs will bring the U.S. effective tariff rate down to a bit over 14 percent.  

    Now, with respect to the impact, what I can say is that the reduction in tariffs and the easing of tensions does provide some upside risk to our global growth forecast.  We will be updating that global growth forecast as part of our July WEO.  And so that will give us an opportunity to provide a full assessment.  All of this said, of course, the outlook, the global outlook in general does remain one of high uncertainty.  And so that uncertainty is still with us.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a broad question regarding the following – at the IMF World Bank Spring Meeting, the recent one,  the Treasury Secretary Bessent called for the IMF and the World Bank to refocus on their core mission on macroeconomic stability and development.  Did the IMF start any discussion on this topic with the U.S. administration?  And my second question, do you foresee any changes to your lending programs to take into account the views of the Trump Administration regarding issues like climate change and international development?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say on this is the U.S. is our largest shareholder, and we greatly value the voice of the United States.  We have a constructive engagement with the U.S. authorities, and we very much appreciate Secretary Bessent’s reiteration of the United States’ commitment to the Fund and to our role.  The IMF has a clearly defined mandate to support economic and financial stability globally.  Our Management Team and our entire Staff are focused exactly on this mandate, helping our 191 members tackle their economic challenges and their balance of payments risks.  

    What I can also add is that at the most recent Spring Meetings, the ones we just had in April, our membership identified two areas where they’ve asked the IMF to deepen our work.  And the first is on external imbalances, and the second is on our monitoring of the financial sector.  So they’re looking for us to really deepen our work in these two areas.  

    As far as taking that work forward, we will continue working with our Executive Board on these areas, as well as to carry out some important policy reviews.  And I think the Managing Director referred to these during the Spring Meetings.  The first is the Comprehensive Surveillance Review, which will set out our surveillance priorities for the next five years.  And the second is the review of program design and conditionality.  And that will carefully consider how our lending can best help countries address low growth challenges and durably resolve their balance of payments weaknesses.  

    I have a slight update for you on Ukraine, which says — so the eighth — so if we look at the documents that were published at the time of the Seventh Review program, the one that was approved by the Executive Board a little while ago, based on that, the Eighth Review disbursement would be about $520 million.  And, the discussions of the Eighth Review are ongoing, and any disbursement, as always, is subject to approval by our Executive Board. 

    And with that, I will bring this press briefing to a close.  So first, let me thank you all for your participation today.  As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  As always, a transcript will be made available later on IMF.org.  In case of any clarifications or additional queries, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at media@imf.org.  This concludes our press briefing, and I wish everyone a wonderful day.  I look forward to seeing you next time.  Thanks very much.

     

      

    *  *  *  *  *

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/22/tr-05222025-com-regular-press-briefing-may-22-2025

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warner and Kaine Statement on the House GOP Bill to Gut Medicaid to Pay for Tax Cuts for Ultra-wealthy

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine (both D-VA) issued the following statement after Republicans in the House of Representatives voted in the dead of night to approve legislation to cut taxes for the ultra-wealthy while slashing Medicaid and nutrition assistance, raising taxes on working families, and exploding the national debt:  
    “This bill would do real harm to Virginia families, workers, and communities. It would raise taxes on working families and rip health care away from more than 262,000 people in Virginia in order to give tax breaks to Donald Trump and his billionaire friends. Virginians deserve better, and we will oppose this bill with everything we’ve got as it comes to the Senate. “
    Warner and Kaine have been sounding the alarm about the effects of the GOP plan on Virginia if Republicans in Congress continue to insist on gutting vital programs in order to pay for tax breaks for the richest Americans, noting that the GOP bill would strip health insurance from more than 262,000 Virginians; rip nutrition assistance away from at least 204,000 Virginians, including children; raiseenergy costs for Virginia households; jeopardize more than 20,000 Virginia jobs; and raise taxes on minimum wage workers while giving the richest 0.1% a $188,000 tax cut.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Murkowski Highlights Opportunities, Challenges with Interior Budget Request

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Alaska Lisa Murkowski
    05.22.25
    Washington, DC – Yesterday, U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Chair of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies, hosted the Secretary of the Interior in subcommittee to discuss the Department’s budget request. The Senator reinforced her appreciation for the administration’s approach to resource development in Alaska, while also addressing staffing concerns, public land sales, and other avenues of potential for the department.
    Watch the Senator’s opening statement here.
    Read the Senator’s full opening statement below.
    FULL TRANSCRIPT
    Senator Murkowski: Good to have you here to discuss the President’s Fiscal Year 2026 Budget Request for the Department of the Interior. I’m pleased to have the opportunity today to talk about the important work that the Department does, including its leading role in supporting America’s energy agenda, empowering Indian country and Tribal nations, providing recreational opportunities to tens of millions of Americans, and generating billions of dollars in economic output.
    It’s been a real pleasure, I have appreciated the meetings that we’ve had, the conversations that we’ve had by phone, and it’s been great to meet the various Assistant Secretary nominees from the Department. I’ve enjoyed our conversations there. I’m impressed by their understanding of the issues that they focus on, and their commitment to public service.
    You’re building out quite the team. It was great to be able to talk to Kate MacGregor. She has a little bit of history with the Department, and comes with a lot of knowledge and understanding, certainly on Alaska–related issues, so we were glad to get her confirmed and to work as well as some of the other nominees. As the Chairman of the Indian Affairs Committee, we’re anxious to have a nominee for the [Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs] as well.
    So, I want to thank you, I want to thank President Trump for recognizing Alaska’s amazing natural resource potential. This was very significant in the day-one executive order: everything from the Ambler Road to the NPR-A, to non-wilderness Coastal Plain, Alaska
    LNG. There’s been very swift, very early, and decisive action in this space. It’s welcome both here in Washington, DC, and certainly in my state. So, I’m looking forward to working with you to further facilitate the development of Alaska’s resources.
    I know you are looking forward to going to Alaska in just a couple weeks. Hopefully, it’s going to be a great trip, lots of good information, good feedback, and good weather. I’m hopeful that Denali will be out in all of its majesty and splendor and you’ll be reminded why Alaskans prefer the Koyukon-Athabascan name, “Denali,” meaning ‘the Great One.’
    The President and you have set out an ambitious agenda, particularly with respect to the focus on energy and economic development. I’m very supportive of this endeavor, and know that I want to be your partner in achieving so many of the goals.
    Beyond resource development, the Department of the Interior can be an economic force for good in many different ways. One of the most important economic drivers that we see up in Alaska, aside from the resource end of things, within the Department is the National Parks System. The National Parks in the home states of the members on this subcommittee generate a collective $7.4 billion of economic output annually. That’s more than the gross domestic product of 40 different countries. But it’s not just the economic output that makes parks so important, it’s the experiences of traveling to parks, seeing the wildlife, having an adventure that creates a lifetime of memories. And, we’ve had discussions about some of your early years and the significance of that.
    Back home in Alaska, we’ve already had about 150,000 people come through on cruise ships this year. That might not surprise other people, but this is early for us. We estimate a total of 1.65 million visitors for the tourism season – that’s about double the population of our state. So, when we see a skinny budget that proposes to cut $1.2 billion or 35% from the Park Service, it’s hard to square it with the claims that DOI is focused on fostering the American economy, again recognizing that our economy is more than just our natural resource development.
    Another area of concern that I will address in my questions within the National Park Service budget proposal is the concept of turning over management of National Parks to the states. I’m trying to figure out exactly how this would work, and I’m kind of thinking it’s like me putting my kids in charge of the upkeep for the house that I own. In some instances, it might make good sense, but as a wholesale best practice I worry about how that might impact the parks or our people. So, should this concept be included in the full budget request, I’d hope that we have a really thorough conversation with you to better understand the justification for the proposal.
    I am concerned about what the skinny budget proposes for the BIA and the BIE. Cutting nearly $1 billion from Indian Affairs would hurt the federal government’s ability to meet its trust responsibility to Native people. In some of our conversations, I’ve shared some of the areas where I think the Department has failed Indian Country, and this is in areas like probate, where we have an extraordinary backlog, public safety and justice, missing and murdered indigenous people, as well as the education of Native American children.
    While I appreciate that the skinny budget alleges that proposed cuts would enable Tribes to focus on law enforcement, I’m not sure how reducing BIA law enforcement funding by $107 million is treating the program as a core priority of Tribes. I know, because I hear Tribes have been requesting more support for this program to address a serious lack of policing, so I worry that cuts of this magnitude can’t be made up for by directing Tribes to apply for grants at DOJ as the skinny budget suggests.
    I want to end my opening comments this morning by talking about what I consider to be, and I know that you put equal priority to, and that’s the men and women of the Department. The people who actually make things happen.
    We’ve talked about a lot of good ideas for using new systems, IT systems, artificial intelligence, how we can make the Department more efficient. These are good goals, worthy goals, and I hope to see that detailed more in the budget. But I think we know when we’re talking about management of our public lands, if you don’t have the necessary staff, whether out in the field or in the headquarters, all the investments that we want to make become less efficient.
    When I think about the Executive Order as it relates specifically to Alaska, we’ve got some good things that we want to do up north when it comes to resource development, but scientific and ecological assessments that are provided by USGS are relied upon by not just federal land management agencies, but by the industry as well. USGS science helps avoid polar bear dens, identify permafrost, map caribou migration patterns. So, when we see cuts to USGS, but also BLM, BOEM, BSSE, and OSMRE, it causes me to wonder, are we going to be able to accomplish what we’re all seeking to accomplish together?
    I think it’s important also that people have expertise and knowledge about the places that they serve. I had this conversation with folks in the Forest Service. You just can’t take somebody who maybe comes from Indianapolis, a good Forest Service person, but you put them out at the Mendenhall Glacier Visitors Center where their job is bear management and they don’t have a clue about bear management.
    We want to make sure that we’re making good and smart decisions. I know you’re probably going to get a lot of questions today about staffing cuts, and how that is going to impact the operations of the Department not just here in Washington, but around the country. I do wish that the Acting Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management, and Budget, Mr. Hassan, [was] here today to answer some of these questions because he seems to be in charge of making a lot of the decisions about the staffing and the [reorganization]. I’m hoping that he is going to be in a position to be more responsive to my staff about some of the questions that we have raised. But ultimately, and you know, you’ve been a governor you know the buck stops with you. He can be responsible for certain things, but ultimately it is you that is accountable.
    So, getting the answers to questions about the reorganizations, the impacts of RIFs, how the Department will operate National Parks, protect reserves, and implement the President’s energy agenda. Getting this channel of communication going back and forth in a good and a constructive way, I think is going to be important. But, my bottom line to you this morning is [that] I’m I pleased with your nomination, I’m excited that you are there at the Department.
    I’m really excited about the shift that we’re seeing in Alaska where the Department has really gone from being a problem to being a partner in so many different areas. So, [I’m] looking forward to what we’re going to be able to do together.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warner and Kaine on House GOP Bill to Gut Medicaid to Pay for Tax Cuts for the Ultra-Wealthy

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Commonwealth of Virginia Mark R Warner
    WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Sens. Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine (D-VA) issued the following statement after Republicans in the House of Representatives voted in the dead of night to approve legislation to cut taxes for the ultra-wealthy while slashing Medicaid and nutrition assistance, raising taxes on working families, and exploding the national debt:  
    “This bill would do real harm to Virginia families, workers, and communities. It would raise taxes on working families and rip health care away from more than 262,000 people in Virginia in order to give tax breaks to Donald Trump and his billionaire friends. Virginians deserve better, and we will oppose this bill with everything we’ve got as it comes to the Senate. “
    Warner and Kaine have been sounding the alarm about the effects of the GOP plan on Virginia if Republicans in Congress continue to insist on gutting vital programs in order to pay for tax breaks for the richest Americans, noting that the GOP bill would strip health insurance from more than 262,000 Virginians; rip nutrition assistance away from at least 204,000 Virginians, including children; raise energy costs for Virginia households; jeopardize more than 20,000 Virginia jobs; and raise taxes on minimum wage workers while giving the richest 0.1% a $188,000 tax cut.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Kean Applauds Passage of the House Reconciliation Package

    Source: US Representative Tom Kean, Jr. (NJ-07)

    (May 22, 2025) WASHINGTON, D.C. — Today, Congressman Tom Kean, Jr. (NJ-07) released the following statement after the House passed its reconciliation package, a historic piece of legislation that delivers middle-class tax relief, unleashes American energy and innovation, and roots out waste, fraud, and abuse.

    Kean said, “We did it. The House just passed the Reconciliation package, a major step forward that delivers important wins for New Jerseyans and all Americans. I stood up for New Jersey every step of the way, even when it meant standing alone or standing against my own party’s leadership. I led the fight to restore our property tax deduction, and we won. The House bill restores the full SALT deduction for middle-class families, providing up to $40,000 in deductibility.

    “On healthcare, we protected Medicaid for every intended beneficiary in New Jersey and across the country and stopped illegal immigrants from stealing taxpayer-funded benefits. By rooting out waste, fraud, and abuse, we can ensure that this vital program is there for current and future generations of Americans. We also boosted the Child Tax Credit to $2,500, giving young families a much-needed return at a time when they need it most. We secured critical relief for Somerset and Morris Counties and the whole state of New Jersey by providing tens of millions of dollars for local and state law enforcement, ensuring they are supported while protecting President Trump over the next four years. We continued delivering for the American people by voting to secure our borders, unleash American energy and innovation, and invest in national security, all while cutting wasteful spending and making the federal government more efficient, accountable, and effective.

    “This bill lays the foundation for a stronger, more affordable America for middle-class families in the Seventh District, but the fight doesn’t stop here. I will continue advocating for the hardworking taxpayers in New Jersey until this bill reaches the President’s desk.”

     

    Key Wins in the House Reconciliation Package for New Jersey and the Nation:

    • SALT Deduction Raised: Raises the cap on the State and Local Tax deduction to $40,000, providing major relief for all middle-class families.

     

    • Medicaid Integrity Restored: Ensures benefits go only to eligible recipients and that those who are able to contribute to their community are doing so in order to receive Medicaid benefits. Preserves funding for New Jersey’s hospitals, nursing homes, and other providers.

     

    • Secret Service Reimbursement Secured: Secures vital federal support for local and state law-enforcement who provide protection when President Trump is at his home in Bedminster.

     

    • Border Security Strengthened: Provides resources to support border patrol agents, detect illegal drug smuggling, and secure our southern border.

     

    • American Energy Independence Advanced: Unleashes American energy production to help us meet our growing energy needs.

     

    • Child Tax Credit Boosted: Increased to $2,500, offering direct support for families after years of rising costs.

     

    • PBM Reform Achieved: Cracks down on abusive middlemen in the prescription drug market to lower costs for Medicare and consumers.

     

    • “Doc Fix” Enacted: Addresses long-standing Medicare physician payment issues to ensure that New Jersey’s doctors receive fair reimbursement for their important services.

     

    • Orphan Cures Act Passed: Eliminates a misguided law that slowed the development of drugs for patients with rare diseases. Many of these treatments are developed by New Jersey’s unparalleled biotech innovation industry.

     

    • Air Traffic Control Modernized: Delivers a $12.5 billion investment to overhaul, modernize, and staff our air traffic control system.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: FEMA Resumes In-Person Trainings at National Schoolhouses to Strengthen State and Local Government’s Ability to Respond to Disasters

    Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

    Headline: FEMA Resumes In-Person Trainings at National Schoolhouses to Strengthen State and Local Government’s Ability to Respond to Disasters

    FEMA Resumes In-Person Trainings at National Schoolhouses to Strengthen State and Local Government’s Ability to Respond to Disasters

    WASHINGTON — FEMA announced today that in-person training will resume at three national schoolhouses in early June—the Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) in Anniston, Ala

    , the National Fire Academy (NFA) and the National Disaster and Emergency Management University (NDEMU) in Emmitsburg, Md

     In-person training was paused in March of 2025 following President Trump’s Executive Order 14222, Implementing the President’s “Department of Government Efficiency” Cost Efficiency Initiative to ensure alignment with the Administration’s priority of good use of taxpayer funds

        Following a comprehensive review by FEMA and the U

    S

    Fire Administration (USFA), it was determined certain courses provide effective training to enhance national readiness for state, local, tribal and territorial emergency managers, first responders and local leaders

    FEMA’s principles for emergency management assert that disasters are best managed when they’re federally supported, state managed and locally executed

     
    amy

    ashbridge
    Thu, 05/22/2025 – 15:16

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: ‘Make America Smoggy Again:’ Governor Newsom responds to illegal Senate vote aiming to undo state’s clean air policies

    Source: US State of California 2

    May 22, 2025

    What you need to know: Governor Newsom announced California will fight the U.S. Senate’s illegal vote aiming to undo key parts of the state’s clean vehicles program in court.

    SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom and Attorney General Rob Bonta announced today the state will file a lawsuit as Republicans in the U.S. Senate target California’s clean vehicles program – a move that will “Make America Smoggy Again.”

    The Republican-controlled Senate is illegally using the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to attempt to revoke California’s Clean Air Act waivers, which authorize California’s clean cars and trucks program. This defies decades of precedent of these waivers not being subject to the CRA, and contradicts the non-partisan Government Accountability Office and Senate Parliamentarian, who both ruled that the CRA’s short-circuited process does not apply to the waivers.

    “This Senate vote is illegal. Republicans went around their own parliamentarian to defy decades of precedent. We won’t stand by as Trump Republicans make America smoggy again — undoing work that goes back to the days of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan — all while ceding our economic future to China. We’re going to fight this unconstitutional attack on California in court.”

    Governor Gavin Newsom

    The state’s efforts to clean its air ramped up under then-Governor Ronald Reagan when he established the California Air Resources Board. California’s Clean Air Act waivers date back to the Nixon Administration – allowing the state to set standards necessary for cleaning up some of the worst air pollution in the country. 

    “With these votes, Senate Republicans are bending the knee to President Trump once again,” said Attorney General Rob Bonta. “The weaponization of the Congressional Review Act to attack California’s waivers is just another part of the continuous, partisan campaign against California’s efforts to protect the public and the planet from harmful pollution. As we have said before, this reckless misuse of the Congressional Review Act is unlawful, and California will not stand idly by. We need to hold the line on strong emissions standards and keep the waivers in place, and we will sue to defend California’s waivers.”

    California’s clean air authority

    Since the Clean Air Act was adopted in 1970, the U.S. EPA has granted California more than 100 waivers for its clean air and climate efforts. California has consistently demonstrated that its standards are feasible, and that manufacturers have enough lead time to develop the technology to meet them. It has done so for every waiver it has submitted. 

    Although California standards have dramatically improved air quality, the state’s conditions, including its unique geography means air quality goals still require continued progress on vehicle emissions. Five of the ten cities with the worst air pollution nationwide are in California. Ten million Californians in the San Joaquin Valley and Los Angeles air basins currently live under what is known as “severe nonattainment” conditions for ozone. People in these areas suffer unusually high rates of asthma and cardiopulmonary disease. Zero-emission vehicles are a critical part of the plan to protect Californians.

    If upheld, the Republican rollback of these three regulations – against the rulings of the Senate Parliamentarian and GAO – would cost Californian taxpayers an estimated $45 billion in health care costs. 

    Making driving less affordable

    With today’s efforts by Congressional Republicans, not only are they trying to make clean air a thing of the past, they’re making driving a car more expensive. Zero-emission vehicles are often less expensive than their gas counterparts due to avoiding the need to pay for gasoline at the pump and smaller costs associated with maintenance and repair over the years. The regulations would provide $91 billion in cumulative net relief and economic benefits to Californians between next year and 2040.

    Giving the keys to China

    Despite being home to the technologies that have pioneered the clean car industry, the U.S. is rapidly ceding its dominance to China. 

    In the first quarter of this year, global electric vehicle sales rose by 35%, primarily driven by the growing affordability of electric models. China is the world’s EV manufacturing hub, responsible for more than 70% of global production, with Chinese imports making up three-quarters of the increase in EV sales across all emerging economies outside of China in 2024. Meanwhile, the U.S. is a net importer of electric vehicles.

    California’s climate leadership

    Pollution is down and the economy is up. Greenhouse gas emissions in California are down 20% since 2000 – even as the state’s GDP increased 78% in that same time period.

    The state continues to set clean energy records. Last year, California ran on 100% clean electricity for the equivalent of 51 days – with the grid running on 100% clean energy for some period two out of every three days. Since the beginning of the Newsom Administration, battery storage is up to over 15,000 megawatts – a 1,900%+ increase.

    Press releases, Recent news

    Recent news

    May 22, 2025

    News What you need to know: The Pacific Coast Highway, which was closed following the Palisades Fire, will reopen to public travel ahead of schedule this Friday in advance of Memorial Day Holiday.  LOS ANGELES – Following through on his commitment to reopen a critical…

    May 22, 2025

    News Sacramento, California – Governor Gavin Newsom today issued a proclamation declaring May 22, 2025, as “Harvey Milk Day.”The text of the proclamation and a copy can be found below: PROCLAMATIONToday, we honor Harvey Milk – a hero for not just his own community,…

    May 21, 2025

    News SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom today announced the following appointments:Armen Meyer, of San Francisco, has been appointed Senior Deputy Commissioner for the Division of Consumer Financial Protection at the California Department of Financial Protection and…

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Meeting of 16-17 April 2025

    Source: European Central Bank

    Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Frankfurt am Main on Wednesday and Thursday, 16-17 April 2025

    22 May 2025

    1. Review of financial, economic and monetary developments and policy options

    Financial market developments

    Ms Schnabel recalled that President Trump’s announcement on 2 April 2025 of unexpectedly high tariffs had sparked a sharp sell-off in global equity markets and in US bond markets, leading to a surge in financial market volatility. The severity of the tariffs and the manner in which they had been introduced had led to a breakdown of standard cross-market correlations, with a sell-off of US equities occurring at the same time as a sell-off of Treasuries in the context of a marked depreciation of the US dollar against major currencies.

    Movements in euro area risk-free rates reflected the opposing impacts of the historic German fiscal package and the global trade conflict. At the long end of the yield curve, the expected positive growth impulse from fiscal policy, as well as expectations of tighter monetary policy in the future, had been the dominant factors, pulling up nominal and real interest rates. At the short end of the yield curve, the decline in inflation compensation, driven mainly by falling inflation risk premia, had been larger than the rise in real yields, leading to a decline in nominal rates. These developments reflected both the negative fallout from tariffs and lower commodity prices. Investors expected the ECB to react to the evolving situation by lowering rates more than had previously been anticipated, but to start raising them again in the coming year. Amid the market turbulence, euro area bond markets had continued to function smoothly, and the bond supply had been absorbed well in the context of strong investor demand and well-functioning dealer intermediation. On the back of the sharp correction in stock prices and the marked appreciation of the euro exchange rate, financial conditions in the euro area had tightened, despite lower nominal short-term rates.

    Turning to market developments since the previous Governing Council meeting, President Trump’s announcement on 2 April 2025 had led the VIX volatility index to temporarily reach levels not seen since the COVID-19 pandemic. Within a few days the S&P 500 index had dropped by 12%, triggering sharp corrections in stock markets around the world, including in the euro area. Despite a rebound after the pausing of “reciprocal” tariffs on 9 April 2025, the US benchmark equity index had lost 8% in the year to date while euro area stock markets were almost back to the levels seen at the start of the year. Stocks in trade-sensitive US sectors had been hit much harder than other stocks, and they had also dropped by much more than their euro area counterparts.

    The market turbulence had spilled over to government bond markets, but the reaction had differed markedly between the euro area and the United States. US government bond yields had risen at the same time as the US equity sell-off, which was highly unusual because Treasury bonds normally benefited from safe-haven flows. US ten-year asset swap spreads had likewise risen sharply, which was also unusual. Meanwhile, Bund yields had declined and the spread between the Bund and overnight index swap (OIS) rates had narrowed substantially as German government bonds had continued to perform their role as a safe-haven asset.

    The risk-off sentiment had also affected the dynamics of the US dollar exchange rate, but this too had reacted differently from what would normally have been expected. In January 2025 the EUR/USD exchange rate had hit a low of 1.02, but the euro’s downward trend had been reversed around the time of the announcement in early March 2025 of the reform of the German debt brake, with a positive growth narrative for Europe emerging in light of higher defence and infrastructure spending. The euro exchange rate had received a second major boost after the 2 April tariff announcement in the United States. This strong upward move had not been driven, as was usually the case, by changes in the yield differential, which had moved in the opposite direction, but by US dollar weakness as investors had revised down their US growth expectations. Over recent weeks the US dollar had thus not benefited from the widespread risk-off mood.

    Recent developments had been reflected in global portfolio flows. The March 2025 round of the Bank of America Fund Manager Survey had recorded the strongest shift out of US equities on record, with 45% of managers reporting that they had reduced their positions. At the same time, a significant share of fund managers had reported that they had changed their positioning in favour of euro area equities. This marked a significant shift of perspectives away from US exceptionalism towards Europe being seen as the bright spot among major economies, given the expected fiscal boost in Germany and the pick-up in European defence spending.

    Dynamics in risk-free bond markets illustrated the opposing impacts of the German fiscal package and the tariff announcements over recent weeks. In the euro area, the overall increase in longer-term nominal interest rates had been driven by a rise in real rates, indicating that market participants viewed the German fiscal package as fostering long-term growth. Real rates had kept rising during the tariff tensions, as investors had continued to expect, on balance, an improved growth outlook for the euro area. By contrast, inflation compensation had decreased across the yield curve after increasing only briefly in response to the German fiscal package.

    Ms Schnabel then turned to the drivers of developments in euro area inflation compensation. On the one hand, bond market investors were pricing in higher inflation compensation owing to the expansionary German fiscal measures to be implemented over the next decade. On the other hand, concerns about the trade war had pulled inflation compensation lower, more than compensating for the impact of the German fiscal package on short to medium-term maturities. One important driver of the downward revision had been the sharp drop in oil prices in the wake of the tariff announcements and rising fears of a global recession.

    Market participants currently expected the ECB to implement a faster and deeper easing cycle towards a terminal rate of around 1.7% in May 2026. However, the ECB was expected to start raising rates again in 2026 in a J-curve pattern, with rate expectations picking up notably over longer horizons.

    In corporate bond markets, credit spreads had increased globally in response to the risk-off sentiment and the sharp sell-off in risk asset markets. However, the surge in US investment-grade corporate bond spreads had been more pronounced compared with developments in their euro area counterparts.

    Sovereign spreads had remained resilient over the past few weeks. The marked rise in the Bund yield after the announcement of the German fiscal package in March 2025 had not translated into an increase in sovereign spreads, which had even declined slightly at that time. The benign reaction of euro area government bond markets over recent weeks could be explained by expectations of positive economic spillovers from Germany to the rest of the euro area, possible prospects of increased European unity and, in the case of Italy, positive rating action.

    Government bond issuance in the euro area had continued to be absorbed well as investor demand had remained robust, with primary and secondary markets continuing to function smoothly. Higher volatility in government bond markets had not led to a meaningful deterioration in liquidity conditions, unlike in previous stress episodes. Hence, the turbulence in US Treasury markets had not had repercussions for the functioning of euro area sovereign bond markets.

    Ms Schnabel concluded by considering the implications of recent market developments for overall financial conditions. Since the March monetary policy meeting financial conditions had tightened, mainly owing to lower equity prices and a stronger nominal effective exchange rate of the euro, which had more than compensated for the easing impulse stemming from lower nominal short-term interest rates. Real rates had gradually shifted up across the yield curve. Overall, recent market developments might not only be a reflection of short-term market disturbances but also of a broader shift in global financial markets, with the euro area being one potential beneficiary.

    The global environment and economic and monetary developments in the euro area

    Starting with inflation in the euro area, Mr Lane stated that the disinflation process was well on track. Inflation had continued to develop as expected, with both headline inflation in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) and core inflation (HICP inflation excluding energy and food) declining in March. Headline inflation had declined to 2.2% in March, from 2.3% in February. Energy inflation had decreased to -1.0%, in part owing to a sharper than expected decline in oil prices, while food inflation had increased to 2.9% on the back of higher unprocessed food prices. Core inflation had declined to 2.4% in March, from 2.6% in February. While goods inflation remained stable at 0.6%, there had been a marked downward adjustment in services inflation, which had dropped to 3.5% in March from 3.7% in February, confirming the more muted repricing momentum in some services that had been expected.

    Most exclusion-based measures of underlying inflation had eased further in March. The Persistent and Common Component of Inflation (PCCI), which had the best predictive power for future headline inflation, had decreased to 2.2% in March from 2.3% in February. Domestic inflation was unchanged in March after declining to 3.9% in February, down from 4.0% in January. The differential between domestic inflation and services inflation reflected the significant deceleration of inflation in the traded services segment seen in the recent data.

    Wage growth was moderating. The annual growth rate of compensation per employee had declined to 4.1% in the fourth quarter of 2024, down from 4.5% in the third quarter and below the March 2025 projection of 4.3%. Negotiated wage growth had also come in at 4.1% in the fourth quarter of 2024. According to the April round of the Corporate Telephone Survey, leading non-financial corporations in the euro area had reduced their wage growth expectations for 2025 to 3.0%, down from 3.6% in the previous survey round. Respondents to the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises had marked down their wage growth expectations for the next 12 months to 3.0%, from 3.3% in the last survey round. Looking ahead, the ECB wage tracker also pointed to a substantial decrease in annual growth of negotiated wages between 2024 and 2025, with one-off payments becoming a less dominant component of salary increases. Wage expectations reported in the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Consensus Economics survey also signalled an easing of labour cost growth in 2025 compared with last year (between 0.7 and 1.0 percentage point), which was broadly in line with the March projections.

    Looking ahead, inflation was expected to hover close to the inflation target of 2% for the remainder of the year. Core inflation, and in particular services inflation, was expected to decline until mid-2025 as the effects from lagged repricing faded out, wage pressures receded, and past monetary policy tightening continued to feed through. Surveys confirmed this overall picture, while longer-term inflation expectations had remained well anchored around the 2% target. At the same time, market participants had markedly revised down their expectations for inflation over shorter horizons, with the one-year forward inflation-linked swap rates one year ahead, two years ahead and four years ahead declining by around 20 basis points to 1.6%, 1.7% and 1.9% respectively.

    Global growth was expected to have maintained its momentum in the first quarter of the year, with the global composite output Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) released on 3 April averaging 52.0. The manufacturing PMI had been recovering and stood above the threshold indicating expansion, while the services PMI had lost some momentum in advanced economies. However, global growth was likely to be negatively affected by the US-initiated increases in tariffs and the resulting financial market turmoil, which had come against the backdrop of already elevated geopolitical tensions.

    Triggered by concerns about global demand, oil and gas prices, along with other commodity prices, had declined sharply since 2 April. Compared with the assumption for the March projections, Brent crude oil prices were now approximately 10% lower in US dollar terms and 18.3% lower in euro terms. Gas prices stood 37% below the value embedded in the March projections. The euro had strengthened over recent weeks as investor sentiment had proven more resilient towards the euro area than towards other economies, with the EUR/USD exchange rate up 9.6% and the nominal effective exchange rate up 5.5% compared with the assumptions for the March projections.

    Euro area economic growth had slowed to 0.2%, quarter on quarter, in the fourth quarter of 2024, down from 0.4% in the third quarter. This figure was 0.1 percentage points higher than had been foreseen in the March projections. As projected, growth had been entirely driven by domestic demand. The economy was also likely to have grown in the first quarter of the year, and manufacturing had shown signs of stabilisation. The initial tariff announcements by the United States in early 2025 had so far seemed not to have materially dampened economic sentiment and might even have led to some frontloading of trade. However, some more recent surveys indicated a decline in sentiment. These included the latest Consumer Expectations Survey, the ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment and the Sentix Economic index.

    The labour market remained resilient. The unemployment rate had edged down to 6.1% in February. At the same time, labour demand was cooling. The job vacancy rate had remained unchanged at 2.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and now stood 0.8 percentage points below its peak in the second quarter of 2022. Total job postings and new postings were 16% and 26% lower respectively compared with a year ago. Additionally, fewer firms had reported that labour was a limiting factor for production. The employment PMI had remained broadly neutral in March at 50.4, pointing to stable employment conditions in the first quarter of 2025.

    Fiscal policies were identified as another potential source of resilience. Newly announced government measures were expected to have a relatively limited impact on the fiscal stance of the euro area compared with the assessment included in the March projections. But the scope for infrastructure investment and climate transition investment, as well as spending on defence in the largest euro area economy, had been substantially increased as a result of the loosening of the German debt brake, together with enhanced flexibility for greater spending on defence across euro area countries as a result of EU initiatives.

    The economic outlook was clouded by exceptional uncertainty, however. Downside risks to economic growth had increased. The major escalation in global trade tensions and the associated uncertainty were likely to lower euro area growth by dampening exports and investment. Deteriorating financial market sentiment could lead to tighter financing conditions and increased risk aversion, and could make firms and households less willing to invest and consume. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, also remained a major source of uncertainty. At the same time, an increase in defence and infrastructure spending would add to growth.

    Increasing global trade disruptions were adding more uncertainty to the outlook for euro area inflation. Falling global energy prices and the appreciation of the euro could put further downward pressure on inflation. This could be reinforced by lower demand for euro area exports owing to higher tariffs and by a re-routing of exports into the euro area from countries with overcapacity. Adverse financial market reactions to the trade tensions could weigh on domestic demand and thereby also lead to lower inflation. By contrast, a fragmentation of global supply chains could raise inflation by pushing up import prices. A boost in defence and infrastructure spending could also raise inflation over the medium term. Extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected.

    Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, risk-free interest rates had declined in response to the escalating trade tensions. However, the risk-free ten-year OIS rate was about 20 basis points higher than at the cut-off date for the March projections. Bank bond spreads had increased by nearly 30 basis points. Credit spreads had increased by 23 basis points for investment-grade corporate bonds and by as much as 95 basis points for the high-yield segment. The Eurostoxx index had fallen by around 4.8% since the cut-off date for the March projections, while indicators of market volatility had increased.

    The latest information on the availability and cost of credit for the broader economy predated the market tensions but continued to indicate a gradual normalisation in credit conditions, though with some mixed evidence. The interest rate on new loans to firms had declined by 15 basis points in February, to 4.1%, which was about 120 basis points below its October 2023 peak. However, interest rates on new mortgages had increased by 8 basis points in February, to 3.3%, which was around 70 basis points below their November 2023 peak. Loan growth was picking up at a moderate pace. Annual growth in bank lending to firms had increased to 2.2% in February, from 2.0% in January, amid marked month-on-month volatility. Corporate debt issuance had been weak in February, but the annual growth rate had stabilised at 3.2%. Lending to households had edged up further to 1.5% on an annual basis in February, from 1.3% in January, led by mortgages. According to the latest bank lending survey for the euro area, which had been conducted between 10 and 25 March 2025, credit standards had tightened slightly further for loans to firms and consumer credit in the first quarter, while there had been an easing of credit standards for mortgages. This evidence resonated with the results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, which also showed almost unchanged availability of bank loans to firms in the first quarter, owing to concerns about the economic outlook and borrower creditworthiness, compounded by high uncertainty.

    Monetary policy considerations and policy options

    In summary, the incoming data confirmed that the disinflation process remained well on track. Both headline and core inflation in March had come in as expected. In particular, the projected drop in services inflation in March had been confirmed in the data and underpinned confidence in the underlying downward trajectory. The more forward-looking indicators of underlying inflation remained consistent with inflation settling at around the target in a sustained manner, with domestic inflation also coming down on the back of lower labour cost growth, which was decelerating somewhat faster than had been expected. The euro area economy had been building up some resilience against global shocks, but the outlook for growth had deteriorated materially owing to rising trade tensions. Increased uncertainty was likely to reduce confidence among households and firms, and the adverse and volatile market response to the recent trade tensions was likely to have a tightening impact on financing conditions and thereby further weigh on the euro area economic outlook.

    Based on this assessment, Mr Lane proposed lowering the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, lowering the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steered the monetary policy stance – was rooted in its updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. A further cut at the present meeting was important in ensuring that inflation stabilised at the target in a sustainable manner, while also avoiding the possibility that external adverse shocks to the economic outlook could be exacerbated by too high a level of the policy rate.

    Looking ahead, it remained more important than ever to maintain agility in adjusting the stance as appropriate on a meeting-by-meeting basis and to not pre-commit to any particular rate path.

    2. Governing Council’s discussion and monetary policy decisions

    Economic, monetary and financial analyses

    Regarding global conditions, members stressed that the outlook for global growth was highly uncertain. In reaction to the frequent – and often contradictory – tariff announcements and retaliation over the last few weeks, the International Monetary Fund was currently revising its World Economic Outlook. Since the Governing Council’s last monetary policy meeting the euro had appreciated by 4.2% in nominal effective terms and by 6.4% against the US dollar, driven by market expectations of a narrowing growth differential between the euro area and the United States and possibly by a broad-based investor reassessment of the risk attached to exposures to the United States. Energy and food commodity prices had also declined sharply owing to growth concerns as the trade war intensified. The combined effect of a weakening dollar and declining oil and gas prices meant that, in euro terms, oil prices had fallen by 18.3% and gas prices by 37% since the March Governing Council meeting. Macroeconomic data did not yet reflect fully the ongoing trade war, which would only show through more clearly in the data during the second quarter of 2025. The composite output PMI for global activity excluding the euro area had remained broadly stable in March.

    Global trade was expected to slow significantly. This reflected lower imports primarily from the United States, China, Mexico and Canada – all countries with sizeable reciprocal trade relations. In the first quarter trade had still been strong owing to a rebound at the beginning of the year, in part driven by a frontloading of imports in anticipation of future tariffs. However, high-frequency and more timely data (based on vessel movements) had already started weakening, in particular for US imports. Private sector forecasts for US growth in 2025 had started trending down in the run-up to the 2 April tariff announcement. However, that event, together with the deterioration in financial conditions that followed, had led to a further downward revision to US GDP growth prospects for this year, as the high uncertainty around US policies was expected to hold back investment and economic activity. In this context the impact of the confidence channel was regarded as particularly important. While most economists had assumed that with higher tariffs and a trade war the US dollar would appreciate, the latest developments pointed to adverse confidence effects and the self-defeating nature of tariffs weakening the dollar. Private sector forecasts for Chinese growth in 2025 had also been revised down since early April, as the contribution from net exports – a key source of support for Chinese growth in 2024 – was expected to decline significantly this year. The Chinese Government’s announcement of additional fiscal support to boost consumption was seen as likely to only partially offset the loss of international trade.

    In general, protectionism and policy unpredictability were seen as the ultimate sources of distress. This raised the question of whether the impact of these factors could unwind when the policy approach that had generated them might reverse. Indeed, the view was expressed that mutually beneficial trade agreements could be reached, leading to a much more benign outcome. At the same time, it was argued that, first, a complete unwinding of the 2 April tariff policy announcement was unlikely and, second, even in the event of a complete policy turnaround, it was questionable whether the world economy could return to its previous status quo.

    The recent strong appreciation of the euro was largely explained by portfolio rebalancing due to growing concerns among investors about US economic policies and the risks that these posed to large exposures to the United States. Overall, the current state of the world economy was not regarded as being at an equilibrium, and it might take several years before the global economy reached a new equilibrium. For a long time the world had been in a configuration centred on the United States running large current account deficits, with optimistic consumers, high private sector investment rates and a large fiscal deficit.

    Looking ahead, two polar scenarios could be seen. One was a stabilisation of the situation, whereby the US current account deficit was structural and largely financed by capital inflows. In this situation, the ongoing portfolio rebalancing across currencies would eventually reverse in favour of the United States, leading to a renewed real appreciation of the US dollar, partly driven by relative price adjustments. However, recent events had eroded trust in the US system, and it was challenging to envisage how it might be restored.

    The other possible direction that the global order could take was a continuation of current rebalancing trends. Such a situation could lead temporarily to much higher US inflation as a result of the combined effects of tariffs and a potentially weaker exchange rate. More generally, the new equilibrium could entail high tariffs, an increase in home bias – for trade balance or security reasons – and a more fragmented world. This more fragmented environment was likely to be characterised by stronger inflationary pressures. In addition, the move to a new equilibrium would involve costly adjustment dynamics, as firms, households and governments would have to re-optimise in light of the new constellation, but also owing to the high levels of uncertainty in the transition period. In the meantime, the erosion of confidence in the US economy and in the global order of international trade and finance was expected to result in a higher global cost structure arising from protectionist policies and a higher risk premium arising from unpredictability. An intermediate scenario was also possible, in which the euro would become increasingly attractive, thus expanding its international role as a reserve currency.

    Overall, even if it was known with certainty where the new equilibrium lay, there would still be major adjustment dynamics along the way. In addition, as global supply chains had been shaped over the years to best adapt to the old equilibrium, they would need to adjust to the new one, with a likely loss of market value for those firms that had been most engaged in the old global order. Throughout this process there would be path dependence in the dynamics of the economy.

    With regard to economic activity in the euro area, members concurred that the economic outlook was clouded by exceptional uncertainty. Euro area exporters faced new barriers to trade, although the scope and nature of those barriers remained unclear. Disruptions to international commerce, financial market tensions and geopolitical uncertainty were weighing on business investment. As consumers became more cautious about the future, they might hold back from spending, thus delaying further the more robust consumption-led recovery that the staff projections had been foreseeing for a number of projection rounds.

    At the same time, the euro area economy had been building up some resilience against the global shocks. Domestic demand had contributed significantly to euro area growth in the fourth quarter of 2024, with business investment and private consumption growing robustly in spite of the already high uncertainty. The manufacturing output PMI had risen above 50 in March for the first time in two years, while the services business activity PMI had remained in expansionary territory, with relatively solid industrial production numbers confirming information from the soft indicators. While the trade conflict was a significant drag on foreign demand, the expected fiscal spending would counter some of those effects. The economy was likely to have grown in the first quarter of the year, and manufacturing had shown signs of stabilisation. Unemployment had fallen to 6.1% in February, its lowest level since the launch of the euro. Looking ahead, a strong labour market, higher real incomes and the impact of an easier monetary policy stance should underpin spending.

    For the near term, it was argued that the likely slump in trade and the surge in uncertainty were hitting the euro area at a critical juncture, when the recovery was still weak and fragile. It was seen as becoming increasingly clear that the impact of the trade shock might be very strong in terms of activity in the United States, with potentially substantial spillovers to the euro area. Even with the additional spending on defence and infrastructure, it was likely that, on balance, euro area growth would be worse in 2025 than previously expected. Incorporating the impact from the most recent escalation of trade tensions, potential retaliatory measures from the EU and the financial market turbulence of recent weeks could weaken activity in 2025 significantly. As a result, it was suggested that the probability of a recession over the next four quarters in the euro area and the United States had increased measurably.

    However, it was also argued that, while complicated, the situation still had upside potential. First, the strong market reaction might impose some discipline on the US Administration. Second, there was room for mutually beneficial trade agreements which would de-escalate the severity of the tariff increase threatened in the 2 April announcement. Regarding the fallout for growth, the ultimate effects of the new trade frictions would crucially depend on the substitutability of items imported by the United States. The bulk of exports from the euro area to the United States comprised pharmaceuticals, machinery, vehicles and chemicals, and these were highly differentiated products which were difficult to substitute away from in the short run. This rigidity would limit the drag on the euro area’s foreign demand. Moreover, the almost prohibitive tariffs between China and the United States were seen as likely to redirect demand towards euro area firms.

    A further factor that could attenuate the repercussions of trade frictions and uncertainty was the announcement of the German fiscal package and the step-up in European defence spending, which would raise domestic demand. This new factor was seen as unmitigated good news, as it would help to revive the European growth narrative and foster confidence in the euro area. What mattered was not only the direct effects of fiscal spending on demand and activity, but also the expected crowding-in of private investment in anticipation of the future fiscal stimulus. In the Corporate Telephone Survey, firms were already reporting that they were planning to enhance capacity in view of the defence and infrastructure initiatives. The Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises also pointed to greater optimism among firms on investment. Construction was set to recover further. It was therefore argued that the negative impact of tariffs could be seen as more or less the same size as the positive impact coming from the fiscal expansion in Germany. Of course, the time profiles of the impacts of the two major shocks – tariff increases and fiscal stimulus – were different. In the short term the negative effects on demand would dominate, as additional investment in defence and infrastructure would take time to come on stream and support growth.

    At the same time, the view was expressed that even in the medium term defence spending would not be a clear game changer, because it would not only materialise with a delay, but would likely lift euro area GDP growth by at most a couple of tenths of a percentage point. In any case, the fiscal stimulus was still uncertain in terms of its scale and modalities of implementation. In this context, it was noted that the reaction of the markets to the fiscal announcement from Germany suggested that the euro area economy was likely to respond to the new fiscal impulse with an increase in GDP and only a very mild increase in inflation. This demonstrated that the euro area economy was not seen as constrained by structural problems.

    Overall, members assessed that downside risks to economic growth had increased. The major escalation in global trade tensions and associated uncertainties would likely lower euro area growth by dampening exports, and it might drag down investment and consumption. Deteriorating financial market sentiment could lead to tighter financing conditions, increase risk aversion and make firms and households less willing to invest and consume. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, also remained a major source of uncertainty. At the same time, an increase in defence and infrastructure spending would add to growth.

    In view of all the uncertainties surrounding the outlook, the view was expressed that for the coming meetings of the Governing Council it was important to develop alternative scenarios. These should factor in the prevailing very high level of uncertainty and assist in identifying the relevant channels and quantifying the impact on growth, jobs and inflation. In addition to scenario analysis, it was important to use high-frequency and unconventional sources of information to better understand the direction the economy was taking. There was also a need to broaden the set of indicators to be monitored, given the challenges in interpreting some of the standard statistics which were influenced and distorted by special factors such as the frontloading of orders and the associated build-up of inventories.

    A silver lining in the turbulent situation that Europe was facing was a strong impetus for European policymakers to swiftly implement the structural reforms set out in the reports by Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta. If effective, such concrete action had the potential to become a major tailwind for the euro area economy in the future, amplifying the stimulating effect of the additional fiscal spending that was planned in Germany. At the same time, it was cautioned that, to reap all the benefits from reform, Europe had to act quickly and on an ambitious scale.

    The important policy initiatives that had been launched at the national and EU levels to increase defence spending and infrastructure investment could be expected to bolster manufacturing, which was also reflected in recent surveys. In the present geopolitical environment, it was even more urgent for fiscal and structural policies to make the euro area economy more productive, competitive and resilient. The European Commission’s Competitiveness Compass provided a concrete roadmap for action, and its proposals, including on simplification, should be swiftly adopted. This included completing the savings and investment union, following a clear and ambitious timetable, which should help savers benefit from more opportunities to invest and improve firms’ access to finance, especially risk capital. It was also important to rapidly establish the legislative framework to prepare the ground for the potential introduction of a digital euro. Governments should ensure sustainable public finances in line with the EU’s economic governance framework and prioritise essential growth-enhancing structural reforms and strategic investment.

    With regard to price developments, members concurred with the assessment presented by Mr Lane. In spite of all remaining uncertainties, the recent inflation data releases had been broadly in line with the March ECB staff projections, with respect to both headline and core inflation. This suggested that inflation was on course for the 2% target, with long-term inflation expectations also remaining well anchored. Taking the February and March inflation data together, there was now much more confidence that the baseline scenario for inflation in the March projections was materialising. This held even without the appreciation of the euro or the decline in oil prices and commodity prices that had taken place since the finalisation of the projections.

    Looking ahead, it was argued that inflation would likely be lower in 2025 than foreseen in the March projections if the exchange rate and energy prices remained around their current levels. Recent market-based measures of inflation expectations also indicated that inflation might be falling faster than previously assumed. Inflation fixings now implied that investors expected inflation (excluding tobacco) to remain just below 2% in 2025 and to decline to around 1.2% in early 2026, before returning to around 1.6% by mid-2026. This signalled that risks to price stability might now be tilted to the downside, especially in the near term. The latest information also suggested that wage growth was moderating at a slightly faster pace than previously expected. Over a longer horizon, the tighter financial conditions, including the appreciation of the euro, the sharp drop in oil and gas prices and the headwinds from weaker economic activity, were seen as important new factors dampening inflation. There was now a risk that inflation could fall well below 2% at least over the remainder of the current year. Trade diversion and price concessions by Chinese exporters could also compound the ongoing depreciation of the renminbi and exert further downward effects on inflation, if not countered by measures by the European Commission. If there were to be retaliation against the tariffs imposed on US imports from the euro area, the direct inflationary impact could be counterbalanced by other factors, including the exchange rate, weaker raw material prices or possibly tighter financial conditions. Over the short term, the countervailing effects from increased fiscal spending were, moreover, unlikely to offset the further disinflationary pressures emanating from the international environment.

    At the same time, it was underlined that upside risks had not vanished. The rising momentum that had been detected in the PCCI indicators of underlying inflation warranted monitoring to confirm whether this increase was temporary and related to repricing early in the year in line with previous seasonal patterns. Although market-based measures of inflation compensation had fallen significantly, owing to lower inflation risk premia, genuine inflation expectations had been revised to a much lesser extent, and analysts’ inflation expectations were mostly well above inflation fixings. It also had to be considered that the likely re-flattening of the Phillips curve, which reflected among other things less frequent price adjustments, implied that meaningful downward deviations of inflation from target were unlikely in the absence of a deep and protracted recession. But such an event had a low probability in light of the expected fiscal impulse. In addition, the precise impact of the stronger euro was uncertain, especially given that one of the reasons behind the appreciation was a positive confidence shock as Europe offered stability in turbulent times. Moreover, successful trade negotiations and the resolution of trade disputes could give a boost to energy prices, changing the inflation picture very quickly. Finally, while the newly announced fiscal stimulus was unlikely to cause inflationary pressure over the short term in view of the underutilised capacities, the economy was likely to bump up against capacity constraints over the medium term, especially in the labour market. Indeed, inflation expectations reported in the Consumer Expectations Survey, the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises and the Survey of Professional Forecasters remained tilted to the upside over longer horizons. It was argued that, taken as a whole, the current environment posed some downside risks to inflation over the short run, but notable upside risks over the medium term. If retaliation against US tariffs affected products that were hard to substitute, such as intermediate goods, the inflationary impact could be sizeable and persistent as higher input costs from tariffs would be gradually passed on to consumers. This could more than offset the disinflationary pressure from reduced foreign demand. The closely interconnected global trade system implied that tariffs might be passed along entire supply chains. The need to absorb tariffs in profit margins at a time when these were already squeezed because of high wage growth would increase the probability and strength of the pass-through. Upside risks to inflation over the medium term were seen to hold especially in a scenario in which the trade war led to a permanently more fragmented global economy, owing to a less efficient allocation of resources, more fragile supply chains and less elastic global supply.

    Overall, increasing global trade disruptions were adding more uncertainty to the outlook for euro area inflation. Falling global energy prices and an appreciation of the euro could put further downward pressure on inflation. This could be reinforced by lower demand for euro area exports owing to higher tariffs and by a re-routing of exports into the euro area from countries with overcapacity. Adverse financial market reactions to the trade tensions could weigh on domestic demand and thereby also lead to lower inflation. By contrast, a fragmentation of global supply chains could increase inflation by pushing up import prices. A boost in defence and infrastructure spending could also lift inflation over the medium term. Extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected.

    Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, members highlighted that the period since the 5-6 March meeting had been characterised by exceptional financial market volatility. This had led to some financial data indicating sizeable daily moves that were several standard deviations away from their mean. Risk-free interest rates had declined since the March meeting in response to the escalating trade tensions, although long-term risk-free rates were still higher than at the cut-off date for the March staff projections. Equity prices had fallen amid high volatility and corporate bond spreads had widened around the globe. Partly in response to the turmoil, financial markets were now fully pricing in the expectation of a 25 basis point rate cut at the current meeting.

    The euro had strengthened considerably over recent weeks as investor sentiment proved more resilient towards the euro area than towards other economies. While the appreciation of the euro had been sizeable, since the inception of the euro the bilateral EUR/USD exchange rate had fluctuated in a relatively wide band, with the rate currently somewhere in the middle of the range. The recent adjustment across asset prices was atypical, as the financial market turbulence had come together with a rebalancing of international portfolios away from US assets towards exposures to other regions, such as the euro area. One explanation, which was supported by the coincidental weakening of the US dollar and by some initial market intelligence, was that domestic and foreign investors had moved out of US assets, possibly reflecting a loss of confidence in US fiscal and trade policies.

    Turning to broader financing conditions, the latest official statistics on corporate borrowing, which predated the market tensions, continued to indicate that past interest rate cuts had made it less expensive for firms to borrow. The average interest rate on new loans to firms had declined to 4.1% in February, from 4.3% in January. The cost to firms of issuing market-based debt had declined to 3.5% in February but there had been some upward pressure more recently. Moreover, growth in lending to firms had picked up again in February, to 2.2%, while debt securities issuance by firms had grown at an unchanged rate of 3.2%. At the same time, credit standards for business loans had tightened slightly again in the first quarter of 2025, as reported in the April round of the bank lending survey. This was mainly because banks were becoming more concerned about the economic risks faced by their customers. Demand for loans to firms had decreased slightly in the first quarter, after a modest recovery in previous quarters.

    The average rate on new mortgages, at 3.3% in February, had risen on the back of earlier increases in longer-term market rates. Mortgage lending had continued to strengthen in February, albeit at a still subdued annual rate of 1.5%, as banks had eased their credit standards and households’ demand for loans had continued to increase strongly.

    Monetary policy stance and policy considerations

    Turning to the monetary policy stance, members assessed the data that had become available since the last monetary policy meeting in accordance with the three main elements that the Governing Council had communicated in 2023 as shaping its reaction function. These comprised (i) the implications of the incoming economic and financial data for the inflation outlook, (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation, and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    Starting with the inflation outlook, members widely agreed that the latest data, including the HICP inflation figures for February and March and recent outturns for services inflation, provided further evidence that the disinflationary process was well on track. They thus expressed increased confidence that inflation would return to target in line with the March baseline projections.

    However, the March baseline projections had not incorporated the latest US policy announcements, which had increased downside risks to growth and inflation over the short term. The most recent forces at play, such as the negative demand shock linked to the tariff proposals and the related pervasive uncertainty, the appreciation of the euro and the decline in oil and gas prices, would further dampen the inflation outlook in the near term.

    Over the medium term the picture for inflation remained more mixed, as the effects of fiscal spending, retaliatory tariffs and the disruption of value chains might point in different directions, with each shock having an impact on growth and inflation with a different time profile. It was pointed out that the inflationary effects of tariffs might outweigh the disinflationary pressure from reduced foreign demand over the medium term, especially if the European Union retaliated by imposing tariffs on products that were not easily substitutable, such as intermediate goods. As a result, firms might suffer from rising input costs that would, over time, be passed on to consumers as the erosion of profit margins made cost absorption difficult. If this occurred at the same time as the support to economic activity from fiscal policy kicked in, there would be a significant risk of higher inflation. Overall, it was too early to draw firm conclusions at a time when many trade policy options were still on the table.

    Turning to underlying inflation, members concurred that most indicators were pointing to a sustained return of inflation to the 2% medium-term target. Wage growth had been slowing further – slightly faster than expected. In view of the high uncertainty, companies were also likely to be cautious about accepting high wage demands. Domestic inflation had remained unchanged, after falling slightly in February. This suggested that inflation had been quite stubborn despite the marked decline in services inflation, although progress had also been seen in this indicator when looking back over the past six months. The PCCI, which had the best leading indicator properties for inflation and still showed rising momentum, warranted further monitoring.

    Finally, incoming data confirmed that the transmission of monetary tightening remained largely as intended. Bank credit growth was overall on a gradual, slow recovery path, although from quite subdued levels. Nevertheless, it was increasing somewhat more strongly than had previously been expected for both non-financial corporations and households. There had been an easing of credit standards and strong demand for housing loans, which could foreshadow a pick-up in construction activity. At the same time, market-based indicators pointed to a tightening of financial conditions and, despite recent interest rate cuts, the latest round of the bank lending survey pointed to tighter credit standards for both firms and consumer credit. This was due to anticipated higher default risks against a background of weaker growth. Moreover, uncertainty had been very high and, in the presence of high uncertainty, the response of intermediaries to lower risk-free rates and, more generally, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, were seen as more sluggish.

    Monetary policy decisions and communication

    Against this background, all members agreed with the proposal by Mr Lane to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, lowering the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steered the monetary policy stance – was justified by the updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. Members expressed increased confidence that inflation would return to target over the medium term and that the fight against the inflation shock was nearly over.

    Some members indicated that, before the US tariff announcement on 2 April, they had considered a pause to rate cuts at the current meeting to be appropriate, preferring to wait for the next round of projections for greater clarity on the medium-term inflation outlook. These members attached a higher probability to the possibility that the trade shock would be inflationary beyond the short term, in view of the destructive effects of breaking up global value chains. While the inflationary effects of the proposed tariffs might differ for the United States and Europe, the pandemic experience had shown that, despite different weights attached to demand versus supply factors, in the end inflation developments in the two economies had been quite synchronous, and the same might occur again this time. Overall, this pointed to upside risks to inflation in the medium to long term that counterbalanced the downside risks stemming from weaker economic activity. However, recent events had convinced these members that cutting interest rates at the current meeting provided some insurance against negative outcomes and avoided contributing to additional uncertainty in times of financial market volatility. In addition, a cut at the present meeting could be seen as frontloading a possible cut at the June meeting, which underlined the need to retain full optionality for the upcoming meetings.

    At the same time, it was felt that the tariff tensions did not seem to come with the inflationary effects that many members had previously associated with such an event, at least not over the short to medium-term horizons. In part, this was because the euro was seemingly turning into more of a safe-haven currency and was subject to revaluation pressures. Disinflationary forces were thus likely to dominate in the short term. In addition, the growth outlook had weakened, with tariffs, related uncertainty and geopolitical tensions acting as a drag. In this regard, it was argued that a 25 basis point rate cut would lean against the substantial risks to growth in the short term and the tightening of financial conditions that had resulted from the tariff events, without the risk of fuelling inflation further down the line.

    In these turbulent times, members stressed the need to be a beacon of stability, thus instilling confidence and not causing more surprises in an already volatile environment, which might amplify market turbulence. This spoke in favour of a 25 basis point cut.

    A standard 25 basis point rate reduction was seen as consistent with the fact that, while very uncertain, the range of potential outcomes from the current situation still entailed some upside risks to inflation for the euro area economy. On the one hand, countervailing forces that would bring the US Administration to change course could eventually emerge. One such force had been the observed outflows from the US Treasuries market, which might have contributed to the 90-day pause applied to most US tariffs. On the other hand, there had been – and could be further – mitigating factors in the euro area. These included a more growth-supportive fiscal outlook as well as an opportunity to make swift progress on other European policy initiatives. Another factor potentially protecting against more adverse scenarios could be a stronger commitment by the Chinese Government to domestic demand-led growth in China. In addition, a possible structural increase in international demand for the euro, while entailing downside risks to inflation, was also a symptom of a largely positive development, namely a shift into European assets. A portfolio shift could lower long-term interest rates in the euro area and lead to cheaper financing for planned investment projects. Finally, the appreciation of the euro would further reduce the price of energy imports in euro terms, which could counterbalance some of the negative effects of the tariffs and the exchange rate on energy-intensive exporters.

    These arguments notwithstanding, a few members noted that they could have felt comfortable with a 50 basis point rate cut. These members attached more weight to the change in the balance of risks since the Governing Council’s March meeting, pointing out that downside risks to growth had increased and, even in the event of a relatively mild trade conflict, uncertainty was already discouraging consumption and investment. In this context, they emphasised that downside risks to inflation had clearly increased. The same members also argued that a larger interest rate cut could have offset more of the recent tightening of financial conditions, including higher corporate bond spreads and lower equity prices, which had weakened the transmission of past monetary policy decisions. In this respect it was argued that surprising the markets should not be excluded, and it was recalled that there had been previous cases in which the Governing Council had not shied away from surprises when appropriate.

    At the same time, it was argued that the optimal monetary policy response depended on the outcome of tariff negotiations, including the scope of the tariffs and the extent of potential retaliation, and on how tariffs fed through global supply chains. The view was also expressed that a forward-looking central bank should only act forcefully to the tariff shock if it expected a sharp deterioration in labour market conditions or an unanchoring of inflation expectations to the downside. However, the initial conditions, featuring a still resilient labour market and elevated momentum in underlying inflation and services inflation, made such a scenario unlikely. Moreover, the economy was coming out of a high-inflation period with consumers’ and firms’ inflation expectations one year ahead still standing at almost 3%. In such a situation, an unanchoring of inflation expectations to the downside was highly unlikely, while the higher than expected food and services inflation in March and rising momentum in services underlined the continued need to monitor inflation developments. If the decline in economic activity turned out to be short-lived, an accommodative response of monetary policy might, given transmission lags, exert its peak impact when the economy was already recovering and inflation was rising, and would therefore be misguided. It could also coincide with when fiscal policy was starting to boost domestic demand, although anticipation channels could lead to some of the impact of infrastructure and defence spending on inflation being smoothed out and dampened in the medium term. Finally, it was argued that cutting interest rates further could no longer be justified by the intention to return to neutral territory since, by various measures, monetary policy was no longer restrictive. Bank lending was recovering, domestic demand was expanding and the level of interest rates was contributing measurably to demand for all types of loan, as shown in the most recent bank lending survey.

    Looking ahead, members stressed that maintaining a data-dependent approach with full optionality at every meeting was warranted more than ever in view of the high uncertainty. Keeping a cautious approach and a firm commitment to price stability had contributed to the success so far, with inflation back on track despite unprecedented challenges. However, agility might be required in the present environment, with the need for the Governing Council to be ready to react quickly if necessary.

    Turning to communication aspects, members noted that it was time to remove the phrase “our monetary policy is becoming meaningfully less restrictive” from the monetary policy statement. Reference to a restrictive policy stance, in various formulations, had proven useful over past phases in which inflation had still been high, providing a clear message that monetary policy was contributing to disinflation. Such a signal was no longer needed. In the present conditions, dropping the sentence avoided the perception that the neutral level of interest rates was the end point of the current cycle, which was not necessarily the case. However, dropping the sentence did not imply that monetary policy had necessarily left restrictive territory. At the current juncture, there was no need to take a stand on whether monetary policy was still restrictive, already neutral or even moving into accommodative territory. Such a categorisation, especially in the current turbulent context, was very hard to provide. Instead, the change in wording was seen as consistent with an approach that was not guided by interest rate benchmarks but by the need to always determine the policy stance that was appropriate. In other words, policy would be set so as to provide the strongest assurance that inflation would be anchored sustainably at the medium-term target, given the set of initial conditions and the shocks that the Governing Council had to tackle at any given time.

    Members reiterated that the Governing Council remained determined to ensure that inflation would stabilise sustainably at its 2% medium-term target. Its interest rate decisions would continue to be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. While noting that markets were functioning in an orderly manner, it was seen as helpful to reiterate that the Governing Council stood ready to adjust all instruments within the ECB’s mandate to ensure that inflation stabilised sustainably at the medium-term target and to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission.

    Taking into account the foregoing discussion among the members, upon a proposal by the President, the Governing Council took the monetary policy decisions as set out in the monetary policy press release. The members of the Governing Council subsequently finalised the monetary policy statement, which the President and the Vice-President would, as usual, deliver at the press conference following the Governing Council meeting.

    Monetary policy statement

    Monetary policy statement for the press conference of 17 April 2025

    Press release

    Monetary policy decisions

    Meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council, 16-17 April 2025

    Members

    • Ms Lagarde, President
    • Mr de Guindos, Vice-President
    • Mr Centeno*
    • Mr Cipollone
    • Mr Demarco, temporarily replacing Mr Scicluna*
    • Mr Dolenc, Deputy Governor of Banka Slovenije
    • Mr Elderson
    • Mr Escrivá
    • Mr Holzmann*
    • Mr Kazāks
    • Mr Kažimír
    • Mr Knot*
    • Mr Lane
    • Mr Makhlouf
    • Mr Müller
    • Mr Nagel
    • Mr Panetta
    • Mr Patsalides
    • Mr Rehn
    • Mr Reinesch*
    • Ms Schnabel
    • Mr Šimkus
    • Mr Stournaras
    • Mr Villeroy de Galhau
    • Mr Vujčić
    • Mr Wunsch

    * Members not holding a voting right in April 2025 under Article 10.2 of the ESCB Statute.

    Other attendees

    • Mr Dombrovskis, Commissioner**
    • Ms Senkovic, Secretary, Director General Secretariat
    • Mr Rostagno, Secretary for monetary policy, Director General Monetary Policy
    • Mr Winkler, Deputy Secretary for monetary policy, Senior Adviser, DG Monetary Policy

    ** In accordance with Article 284 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

    Accompanying persons

    • Mr Arpa
    • Ms Bénassy-Quéré
    • Mr Debrun
    • Mr Gavilán
    • Mr Kaasik
    • Mr Kelly
    • Mr Koukoularides
    • Mr Kroes
    • Mr Lünnemann
    • Ms Mauderer
    • Mr Martin
    • Mr Nicoletti Altimari
    • Mr Novo
    • Mr Rutkaste
    • Ms Schembri
    • Mr Šiaudinis
    • Mr Šošić
    • Mr Välimäki
    • Ms Žumer Šujica

    Other ECB staff

    • Mr Proissl, Director General Communications
    • Mr Straub, Counsellor to the President
    • Ms Rahmouni-Rousseau, Director General Market Operations
    • Mr Arce, Director General Economics
    • Mr Sousa, Deputy Director General Economics

    Release of the next monetary policy account foreseen on 3 July 2025.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI USA: LaMalfa Applauds House Passage of Budget Reconciliation Package

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Doug LaMalfa 1st District of California

    Washington, D.C.—Congressman Doug LaMalfa (R-Richvale) released the following statement after the House passed the budget reconciliation package.

    “This bill is the course correction we desperately needed. For years, taxpayers have been footing the bill for wasteful programs, unchecked spending, and handouts to people gaming the system,” said Rep. LaMalfa. “It delivers a significant tax cut, providing relief for working families and much needed reforms to government spending. It starts the process of eliminating fraud in programs like Medicaid and SNAP. It also includes major wins for folks in the West, allocating $2 billion to expand water storage, and much needed funding for the Secure Rural Schools program. It’s a big win across the board, and I’m happy to see the House pass this crucial piece of legislation.”

    Background:

    • Tax Relief for Working Americans: Delivers significant tax cuts, cutting tax bills by about 15% for Americans earning $30,000–$80,000. No tax on tips or overtime.
    • Medicaid and SNAP Reform: Ends benefits for 1.4 million illegal immigrants and restores work requirements for able-bodied adults receiving assistance.
    • Support for Farmers: Strengthens crop insurance and conservation tools without adding red tape.
    • Water Storage Expansion: Includes $2 billion to upgrade and expand Bureau of Reclamation surface water storage, helping the West store more water in wet years.
    • Secure Rural Schools: Provides a 3-year reauthorization of SRS to support education in rural areas with large amounts of federal land.
    • Energy and Resource Development: Repeals Green New Deal-style handouts and boosts American oil, gas, and mineral production.
    • Border Security and Immigration Enforcement: Fully funds Trump’s border wall, ramps up deportations, and hires thousands of new ICE and Border Patrol agents.

    Congressman Doug LaMalfa is Chairman of the Congressional Western Caucus and a lifelong farmer representing California’s First Congressional District, including Butte, Colusa, Glenn, Lassen, Modoc, Shasta, Siskiyou, Sutter, Tehama and Yuba Counties.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: U.S. Attorneys for Southwestern Border Districts Charge More than 1100 Illegal Aliens with Immigration-Related Crimes During the Third Week in May as part of Operation Take Back America

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    Since the inauguration of President Trump, the Department of Justice is playing a critical role in Operation Take back America, a nationwide initiative to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    Last week, the U.S. Attorneys for Arizona, Southern California, New Mexico, Southern Texas, and Western Texas charged more than 1100 defendants with Criminal violations of U.S. immigration laws.

    The Southern District of Texas filed a total of 209 cases in immigration and border security-related matters from May 9-15. As part of the cases, 78 face allegations of illegally reentering the country. The majority have prior felony convictions for narcotics, violent crime, sexual offenses, prior immigration crimes and more. A total of 124 people face charges of illegally entering the country, while seven cases allege various instances of human smuggling.

    The Western District of Texas filed 295 new immigration and immigration-related criminal cases from May 9 through May 15. Among the new cases, Mexican nationals Juan Jose Medrano-Escobedo and Rosendo Dominguez-Morales were arrested after allegedly entering the U.S. illegally through the Texas National Defense Area (Tx-NDA) less than half a mile west of the Paso Del Norte Port of Entry in El Paso. Medrano-Escobedo has been previously removed from the U.S. to Mexico twice, most recently July 30, 2024. He has been convicted of three felonies, including evading arrest in 2017 and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in November 2023. Dominguez-Morales was last removed on Aug. 20, 2024, following an Aug. 18, 2024 felony conviction for assault while displaying a dangerous weapon. Medrano-Escobedo and Dominguez-Morales are each charged with two counts related to violating defense property security regulation and one count of illegal re-entry.

    The District of Arizona brought immigration-related criminal charges against 310 individuals. Specifically, the United States filed 125 cases in which aliens illegally re-entered the United States, and the United States also charged 170 aliens for illegally entering the United States. In its ongoing effort to deter unlawful immigration, the United States charged 15 individuals responsible for smuggling illegal aliens into and within the District of Arizona.

    The Southern District of California filed 153 border-related cases this week, including charges of assault on a federal officer, bringing in aliens for financial gain, reentering the U.S. after deportation, and importation of controlled substances. One of these cases included a man who was arrested and charged with illegal importation of cocaine. According to a complaint, Luque applied for entry through the Calexico, California East Port of Entry in a Kenworth truck towing a car hauler. Upon inspection of the trailer, Customs and Border Protection officers found 92.18kg (203.22 pounds) of cocaine concealed in the frame of the trailer.

    The District of New Mexico filed 212 criminal charges related to immigration and border security-related matters. 68 individuals were charged with Illegal Reentry After Deportation (8 U.S.C. 1326). 8 individuals were charged with Alien Smuggling (8 U.S.C. 1324). Three individuals were charged with Illegal Entry (8 U.S.C. 1325). And 133 individuals were charged with Illegal Entry (8 U.S.C. 1325) and 50 U.S.C. 797, violation of a military security regulation, arising from the newly established National Defense Area in New Mexico. Many of the defendants charged pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1326 had prior criminal convictions for alien smuggling, drug possession, and DUI.

    We are grateful for the hard work of our border prosecutors in bringing these cases and helping to make our border safe again.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, May 22, 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    May 22, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone and welcome to this IMF Press Briefing.  It is wonderful to see you all today on this rainy Washington morning, especially those of you here in person and of course also those of you joining us online.  My name is Julie Kozak.  I’m the Director of Communications at the IMF.  As usual, this press briefing will be embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  And as usual, I will start with a few announcements and then I’ll take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.  

    So first, our Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva, and our First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, are currently attending the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting taking place in Canada right now.  Second, on May 29th through 30th, the Managing Director will travel to Dubrovnik, Croatia to attend a joint IMF Croatia National Bank Conference focused on promoting growth and resilience in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.  The Managing Director will participate in the opening panel and will hold meetings with regional counterparts.  

    On June 2nd, the Managing Director will travel to Sofia, Bulgaria to attend the 30th Anniversary celebration of the National Trust Ecofund.  During her visit, she will also hold several bilateral meetings with the Bulgarian authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, will travel to Paraguay, Brazil, and the Netherlands next month.  On June 6th, he will launch the IMF’s new regional training program for South America and Mexico, which will be hosted in Asuncion by the Central Bank of Paraguay.  From there, he will travel to Brasilia to deliver a keynote speech on June 10th during the Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Development Bank.  He will also then travel to the Netherlands on June 12th to 13th to participate in the 2025 Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Symposium and to meet with the Dutch authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Kenji Okamura, will be in Japan from June 11th to 12th for the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum to discuss fiscal frameworks and GovTech in the Asia Pacific region.  

    And finally, on a kind of housekeeping or scheduling issue, the Article IV Consultation for the United States will be undertaken on a later timetable this year, with discussions to be held in November.  

    And with those rather extensive announcements, I will now open the floor to your questions.  For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  All right, let’s open up.  Daniel.

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks for taking my question.  I just wonder if the IMF has any reaction to the passage of last night in the House of Representatives of the One Big, Beautiful bill.  And a related question, how concerned are you by the increase in yields on long-dated U.S. treasuries?  What do you think it says about the market’s view of U.S. debt going into the future and sort of any possible spillovers for IMF borrowers as well?  MS. KOZACK: On the first question, what I can say is we take note of the passing of the legislation in the House of Representatives earlier this morning.  What we will do is we will look to assess a final bill once it has passed through the Senate and also once it’s been enacted.  And, of course, we will have opportunities to share our assessment over time in the various products where we normally would convey our fulsome views.  

    On your second question, which was on the bond market.   What I can say there is that we know that the U.S. government bonds are a safe haven asset, and the U.S. dollar, of course, plays a key role as the world’s reserve currency.  The U.S. bond market plays a critical role, of course, in finance and in safe assets.  And this is underpinned by the liquidity and depth of the U.S. market and also the sound institutions in the U.S.  We don’t see any changes in those functions.  And, of course, what we can also say is that although there has been some volatility in markets, market functioning, including in the U.S. Treasury market, has so far been orderly.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Ukraine.  Two topics particularly.  So, the first one, when is the next review of the Ukraine’s EFF is going to be completed, and what amount of money would be disbursed to Kyiv?  And could you please outline the total sum that is remaining within the current program?  And the second part, it’s about debt level.  What is the IMF assessment of current Ukraine’s government debt level?  Is it stable?  Do you see any vulnerabilities and any risks for Ukraine?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine?  Does anyone online want to come in on Ukraine?  Okay, I don’t see anyone.  

    What I can say on Ukraine is that just two days ago, our Staff team started policy discussions with the Ukrainian authorities on the eighth review under the eff.  So, the team is on the ground now.  The discussions are taking place in Kiev and the team will provide an update on the progress at the end of the mission.

    In terms of the potential disbursement, I’m just looking here; that’s the seventh disbursement.  We will come back to you on the size of the disbursement, but it should show in the Staff report for the Seventh Review what would be expected for the Eighth Review.  And it would also show the remaining size of the program.  But we’ll come back to you bilaterally with those exact answers.  

    And what I can then say on the debt side is at the time of the Seventh Review under the program, we assessed debt, Ukraine’s debt to be sustainable on a forward-looking basis and as with every review that the team of course, will update its assessment as part of the eighth review discussion.  We’ll have more to say on the debt as the eighth review continues.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just one more thing on Ukraine.  Does it make sense for them to consider using the euro as a defense currency for their currency, given the shifting geopolitical sense and what we are seeing with the dollar? MS. KOZACK: So right now, under the program, Ukraine has an inflation targeting regime, and that is where what the program is focused on, our program with Ukraine. So, they have an inflation targeting regime.  They are very much focused on ensuring the stability of that monetary policy regime that Ukraine has.  And, of course, that involves a floating exchange rate.  And I don’t have anything beyond that to say on the currency market.

     

    QUESTIONER: The agreement with the IMF established a target for the Central Bank Reserve to meet by June.  According to the technical projection, does the IMF believe Argentina will meet this target?  And if it’s not met, is it possible that we will grant a waiver in the future?

    MS. KOZACK: anything else on Argentina?  

    QUESTIONER: About Argentina, what is your assessment of the progress of the program agreed with Argentina more than a month after its announcement in last April?  

     

    QUESTIONER: The government is about to announce a measure to gain access to voluntarily, of course, but to the dollars that are “under the mattress”, as we call them, undeclared funds to probably meet these targets that Roman was asking about.  I was wondering if this measure has been discussed with the IMF.  And also, you mentioned Georgieva visiting Paraguay and Brazil, if you there’s any plan to visit Argentina as well?  

    QUESTIONER: President Milei is about to announce, you know, Minister Caputo, in a few minutes that there is a measure to use similar to attacks Amnesty.  Is the IMF concerned that this could violate its regulations against illicit financial flows? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, with respect to Argentina, on April 11th, I think, as you know, our Executive Board approved a new four-year EFF arrangement for Argentina.  It was for $20 billion.  It contained an initial disbursement of $12 billion.  And that the aim of that program is to support Argentina’s transition to the next phase of its stabilization program and reforms.  

    President Milei’s administration’s policies continued to deliver impressive results.  These include the rollout of the new FX regime, which has been smooth, a decline in monthly inflation to 2.8 percent in April, another fiscal surplus in April, and reaching a cumulative fiscal surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP for the year, and efforts to continue to open up the economy.  At the same time, the economy is now expanding, real wages are recovering, and poverty continues to fall in Argentina.  

    The Fund continues to support the authorities in their efforts to create a more stable and prosperous Argentina.  Our close engagement continues, including in the context of the upcoming discussions for the First Review of the program.  This First Review will allow us to assess progress and to consider policies to build on the strong momentum and to secure lasting stability and growth in Argentina.  And in this regard, there is a shared recognition with the authorities about the importance of strengthening external buffers and securing a timely re-access to international capital markets.  

    What I can say on the question about the announcements on that — the question on the undeclared assets.  All I can say right now is that we’re following developments very closely on this, and of course, the team will be ready to provide an assessment in due course.  

    On the second part of that question, I do want to also note, and this is included in our Staff report, that the authorities have committed to strengthening financial transparency and also to aligning Argentina’s AML CFT, the Anti-Money Laundering framework, with international standards, as well as to deregulating the economy to encourage its formalization.  So, any new measures, including those that may be aimed at encouraging the use of undeclared assets, should be, of course, consistent with these important commitments.  

    And on your question about Paraguay and Brazil, I just want to clarify that it is our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, who will be traveling to Brazil and Paraguay, not the Managing Director.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Two questions on Syria.  With the U.S. and EU announcing the lifting of sanctions recently, how does this affect any sort of timeline with providing economic assistance?  And secondly, the Managing Director has said that the Fund has to first define data.  Can you just walk through what that entails?  

    MS. KOZACK: Can you just repeat what you said?  The Managing Director has said?

     

    QUESTIONER: The need to define data.  Just sort of a similar question.  I’m just wondering, following the World Bank statement last week about, you know, Syria now being eligible to borrow from the bank, what sort of discussions the Fund has had with the Syrian authorities since the end of the Spring Meetings and, you know, any update you can give us around possible discussions around an Article IV.  

     

    QUESTIONER: About the relationship and if there’s any missed planned virtual or on the ground? 

    MS. KOZACK: Let me step back and give a little bit of an overview on Syria. So, first, you know, we’re, of course, monitoring developments in Syria very closely.  Our Staff are preparing to support the international community’s efforts to help with Syria’s economic rehabilitation as conditions allow.  We have had useful discussions with the new Economic Team who took office in late March, including during the Spring Meetings.  And, of course, you will perhaps have seen the press release regarding the roundtable that was held during the Spring Meetings.  IMF Staff have already started to work to rebuild its understanding of the Syrian economy.  We’ve been doing this through interactions with the authorities and also through coordination with other IFIs. And just to remind everyone, our last Article IV with Syria was in 2009.  So, it’s been quite some time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria.  Syria will need significant assistance to rebuild its economic institutions.  We stand ready to provide advice and targeted and well-prioritized technical assistance in our areas of expertise. I think this goes a little bit to your question on, like, what do we mean by defining data.  I think what the Managing Director was really referring to there is since it has been such a long time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria, the last Article IV, as I said, was in 2009.  I think there, what she’s really referring to is the need to really work with the Syrian authorities to rebuild basic economic institutions, including the ability to produce economic statistics, right, so that we — so that we and the authorities and the international community of course, can conduct the necessary economic analysis so that we can best support the reconstruction and recovery efforts.  

    With respect to the lifting of sanctions, what I can say there is that, of course, the lifting of sanctions and the lifting of sanctions are a matter between member states of the IMF.  What we can say in serious cases that the lifting of sanctions could support Syria’s efforts to overcome its economic challenges and help advance its reconstruction and economic development.  Syria, of course, is an IMF member, and as we’ve just said, you know, we are, of course, engaged closely with the Syrians to explore how, within our mandate, we can best support them.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is on Russia.  In what ways is the IMF monitoring Russia’s economy under the current sanctions and conflict conditions, and have regular Article IV Consultations or other surveillance activities with Russia resumed to track its economic developments?  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say with respect to Russia is that we are, our Staff, are analyzing data and economic indicators that are reported by the Russian authorities.  We are also looking at counterparty data that is provided to us by other countries, and this is particularly true for cross-border transactions, as well as data from third-party sources. So, this data collection using official and other sources does allow us to put together a picture of the Russian economy.  

    We did provide an assessment in the 2025 April WEO, the one that we just released about a month ago.  In this WEO, we assess Russia’s growth at — we expect Russia to grow at 1.5 percent in 2025, 0.9 percent in 2026, and we expect inflation to come down to 8.2 percent in 2025 and 4.4 percent in 2026.  And I don’t have a timetable for the Article IV at this time.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I’d like to ask about Deputy Management Director Okamura’s visits to Japan.  So, my question is, what economic topics will be on the agenda during his stay?  Could you tell me a bit more in detail?  

    MS. KOZACK: Deputy Managing Director Okamura will travel to Japan, as I said, from June 11th to 12th, and he will be attending the Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  So, this will be the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  It’s an annual conference that we co-host in Japan every year and the focus is on issues of fiscal policy. In this particular one, Deputy Managing Director Okamura will be discussing fiscal frameworks. It’s very important for all countries to have sound fiscal frameworks so they can implement sound fiscal policy.  He will also be discussing GovTech not only in Japan but in the Asia Pacific region.  And of course, GovTech is very important for countries because it’s a way of modernizing and making government both provision of services in some cases but also potentially collection of revenue more effective and more efficient.  So, those will be the focus of his discussions in Tokyo.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on the recent bailout package by IMF to Pakistan.  The Indian government has expressed a lot of displeasure with Pakistan planning to use this package to build — rebuild — areas that allegedly support cross-border terrorism.  Does the IMF have any assessment of this?  Secondly, I also have another question.  Could you please provide information on the majority vote that was received in approving this bailout package for Pakistan on May 9th?  If you can disclose the information.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Pakistan?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just adding to that, do you have an update on the implications of the escalation of facilities in that border between Pakistan and India on both economies.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks a lot.  I guess the only spin I would put on is generally what safeguards does the IMF have that its funds won’t be used for military or in support of military actions, not only there but as a general matter.  And I also, if you’re able to, there was some controversy about the termination of India’s Executive Director of the IMF, K.V. Subramanian.  Do you have any insight into–there are reports there–what it was about but what do you say it’s about?  Thanks a lot.  

    MS. KOZACK: With respect to the Indian Executive Director who had been at the Fund, all I can say on this is that the appointment of Executive Directors is a member for the — is a matter for the member country.  It’s not a matter for the Fund, and it’s completely up to the country authorities to determine who represents them at the Fund.  

    With respect to Pakistan and the conflict with India, I want to start here by first expressing our regrets and sympathies for the loss of life and for the human toll from the recent conflict.  We do hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.  

    Now, turning to some of the specific questions about the Board approval of Pakistan’s program, I’m going to step back a minute and provide a little bit of the chronology and timeframe.  The IMF Executive Board approved Pakistan’s EFF program in September of 2024.  And the First review at that time was planned for the first quarter of 2025.  And consistent with that timeline, on March 25th of 2025, the IMF Staff and the Pakistani authorities reached a Staff-Level Agreement on the First Review for the EFF.  That agreement, that Staff-Level Agreement, was then presented to our Executive Board, and our Executive Board completed the review on May 9th.  As a result of the completion of that review, Pakistan received the disbursement at that time.  

    What I want to emphasize here is that it is part of a standard procedure under programs that our Executive Board conducts periodic reviews of lending programs to assess their progress.  And they particularly look at whether the program is on track, whether the conditions under the program have been met, and whether any policy changes are needed to bring the program back on track.  And in the case of Pakistan, our Board found that Pakistan had indeed met all of the targets.  It had made progress on some of the reforms, and for that reason, the Board went ahead and approved the program.  

    With respect to the voting or the decision-making at our Board, we do not disclose that publicly.  In general, Fund Board decisions are taken by consensus, and in this case, there was a sufficient consensus at the Board to allow us to move forward or for the Board to decide to move forward and complete Pakistan’s review.  

    And with respect to the question on safeguards, I do want to make three points here.  The first is that IMF financing is provided to members for the purpose of resolving balance of payments problems.  

    In the case of Pakistan, and this is my second point, the EFF disbursements, all of the disbursements received under the EFF, are allocated to the reserves of the central bank.  So, those disbursements are at the central bank, and under the program, those resources are not part of budget financing.  They are not transferred to the government to support the budget. 

    And the third point is that the program provides additional safeguards through our conditionality.  And these include, for example, targets on the accumulation of international reserves.  It includes a zero target, meaning no lending from the central bank to the government.  And the program also includes substantial structural conditionality around improving fiscal management.  And these conditions are all available in the program documents if you wanted to do a deeper dive.  And, of course, any deviation from the established program conditions would impact future reviews under the Pakistan program.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on Egypt.  There is a mission in Egypt for the First Review of the EFF loan program.  So, can you please update us on the ongoing discussions, especially since the Prime Minister of Egypt announced yesterday that the program could be concluded in 2027 rather than 2026?  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Egypt?  I have a question from the Press Center on Egypt, which I will read aloud.  The question is when will the Fifth Review currently underway with the Egyptian government be concluded, and when will the Executive Board approve this review?  And how much money will Egypt receive once the review is approved?  

    So, here’s what I can share on Egypt.  First, let me start here.  So first, I just want to say that the Fund remains committed to supporting Egypt in building its economic resilience and fostering higher private sector-led growth.  Egypt has made clear progress on its macroeconomic reform program, with notable improvements in inflation and foreign exchange reserves.  For the past few weeks, IMF Staff has had productive discussions with the Egyptian authorities on economic performance and policies under the EFF.  As Egypt’s macroeconomic stabilization is taking hold, efforts must now focus on accelerating and deepening reforms that will reduce the footprint of the state in the Egyptian economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment.  Discussions will continue between the IMF and the Egyptian authorities on the remaining policies and reforms that could support the completion of the Fifth Review.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Sri Lanka.  Sri Lanka’s program is subject to IMF Board approval.  The review is subject to IMF Board approval, but we still haven’t got any word on when that would be.  Is there any delay in this?  And is this delay attributed to the pending electricity adjustments, tariff adjustments, that the Sri Lankan government has committed to?  

    MS. KOZACK: So just stepping back for a minute.  On April 25th, IMF Staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached Staff-Level Agreement on the Fourth Review of Sri Lanka’s program under the EFF.  And once the review is approved by our Executive Board, Sri Lanka will have access to about $344 million in financing.  Completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board, and we expect that Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  

    The precise timing of the Board meeting is contingent on two things.  The first is implementation of prior actions, and the main prior actions are relating to restoring electricity, cost recovery pricing and ensuring proper function of the automatic electricity price adjustment mechanism.  And the second contingency is completion of the Financing Assurances Review, which will focus on confirming multilateral partners, committed financing contributions to Sri Lanka and whether adequate progress has been made in debt restructuring.  So, in a nutshell, completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board.  We expect the Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  And it’s contingent on the two matters that I just mentioned.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thank you for having my questions on Ecuador.  Since the IMF is still completing the second review under the EFF program for Ecuador, do you think it’s going to be time to change the program, the goals, or maybe the amount of the program?  Because Ecuador is now facing different challenges compared to 2024.  The oil prices are falling, so that is going to affect the fiscal situation for Ecuador.  And also, I would like to know if Ecuador is still looking for a new program under the RSF.  And the last one, I would like to know if, do you think that Ecuador is going to need to make some important changes this year on oil subsidies and a tax reform?  I think, as I said, Ecuador now is facing some important challenges in the fiscal situation, so do you think it’s going to be possible because of, you know, all the social protests and all that kind of stuff?  Do you think it’s going to be possible to do that in Ecuador?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Is there a request, an official request, in place to modify the program?  And if there is, of course, details of the new one, you can share.  

    MS. KOZACK: And then I have one question online from the Press Center regarding Ecuador.  Is the sovereign negotiating new targets, given their fiscal position deteriorated compared to last year?  Our understanding is that $410 million was not dispersed under the First Review.?

    So let me share what I can on Ecuador.  So, right now, representatives from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank are in Quito this week to meet with the authorities and discuss the strengthening of financial and technical support to the country.  As part of this tripartite visit, we have a new IMF Mission Chief who is participating, and she is also using that opportunity to have courtesy meetings with the authorities and to continue discussions and advance toward a Second Review under Ecuador’s EFF.  

    What else I can add, just as background, is that the Executive Board in December approved the First Review of Ecuador’s 48-month EFF.  About $500 million was disbursed after the approval of that Frist Review.  And at that time, the Executive Board also concluded the Article IV Consultation.

    I can also say that the authorities have made excellent progress in the implementation of their economic program under the EFF.  And regarding the precise timing of the Second Review, we will provide an update on the next steps in due course and when we’re able to do so.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just a quick question on tariffs.  I’m just wondering if the IMF has a response to the U.S.-China deal that was struck in Geneva earlier this month.  You know, if the deal holds, I appreciate it’s a 90-day pause, but if the deal holds, how would you foresee that changing the Fund’s current economic forecast for the U.S. and China and for the global economy?  Thanks.  

    MS. KOZACK: As you noted, earlier in May, China and the U.S. announced a 90-day rollback of most of the bilateral tariffs imposed since April 2nd, and they established a mechanism to discuss economic and trade relations.  The two sides reduced their tariff from peak levels, leaving in place 10 percent additional tariffs.  So, the additional tariffs before this agreement were 125 percent.  Now, the additional tariff has agreed to be 10 percent, you know, for the 90 days.  This is obviously a positive step for the world’s two largest economies.

    What I can also add is that for the U.S., you may recall, during the Spring Meetings, we talked a lot about the overall effective tariff rate for the U.S.  At that time, we assessed it at 25.5 percent.  This announcement and the reduction in tariffs will bring the U.S. effective tariff rate down to a bit over 14 percent.  

    Now, with respect to the impact, what I can say is that the reduction in tariffs and the easing of tensions does provide some upside risk to our global growth forecast.  We will be updating that global growth forecast as part of our July WEO.  And so that will give us an opportunity to provide a full assessment.  All of this said, of course, the outlook, the global outlook in general does remain one of high uncertainty.  And so that uncertainty is still with us.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a broad question regarding the following – at the IMF World Bank Spring Meeting, the recent one,  the Treasury Secretary Bessent called for the IMF and the World Bank to refocus on their core mission on macroeconomic stability and development.  Did the IMF start any discussion on this topic with the U.S. administration?  And my second question, do you foresee any changes to your lending programs to take into account the views of the Trump Administration regarding issues like climate change and international development?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say on this is the U.S. is our largest shareholder, and we greatly value the voice of the United States.  We have a constructive engagement with the U.S. authorities, and we very much appreciate Secretary Bessent’s reiteration of the United States’ commitment to the Fund and to our role.  The IMF has a clearly defined mandate to support economic and financial stability globally.  Our Management Team and our entire Staff are focused exactly on this mandate, helping our 191 members tackle their economic challenges and their balance of payments risks.  

    What I can also add is that at the most recent Spring Meetings, the ones we just had in April, our membership identified two areas where they’ve asked the IMF to deepen our work.  And the first is on external imbalances, and the second is on our monitoring of the financial sector.  So they’re looking for us to really deepen our work in these two areas.  

    As far as taking that work forward, we will continue working with our Executive Board on these areas, as well as to carry out some important policy reviews.  And I think the Managing Director referred to these during the Spring Meetings.  The first is the Comprehensive Surveillance Review, which will set out our surveillance priorities for the next five years.  And the second is the review of program design and conditionality.  And that will carefully consider how our lending can best help countries address low growth challenges and durably resolve their balance of payments weaknesses.  

    I have a slight update for you on Ukraine, which says — so the eighth — so if we look at the documents that were published at the time of the Seventh Review program, the one that was approved by the Executive Board a little while ago, based on that, the Eighth Review disbursement would be about $520 million.  And, the discussions of the Eighth Review are ongoing, and any disbursement, as always, is subject to approval by our Executive Board. 

    And with that, I will bring this press briefing to a close.  So first, let me thank you all for your participation today.  As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  As always, a transcript will be made available later on IMF.org.  In case of any clarifications or additional queries, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at media@imf.org.  This concludes our press briefing, and I wish everyone a wonderful day.  I look forward to seeing you next time.  Thanks very much.

     

      

    *  *  *  *  *

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn Provision for Texas Border Security Reimbursement Included in House ‘One Big Beautiful Bill Act’

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) released the following statement after the U.S. House of Representatives passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which includes $12 billion in funding to reimburse states like Texas for stepping up during the Biden administration to secure the border due to President Biden’s dereliction of duty:
    “The State of Texas spent more than $11 billion taxpayer dollars to protect and defend the southern border in the Biden administration’s absence, and I commend the House for passing language that serves as a good starting point in the One Big Beautiful Bill to secure billions in critical funding for Texas, which did the job of the federal government amidst the Biden border crisis,” said Sen. Cornyn. “I will continue to spearhead the fight in the Senate for border security reimbursement funding and strengthen the language to ensure that Texas will be rightfully repaid for Operation Lone Star. I thank Congressman Chip Roy and all Texas Republicans in the House for making this reimbursement funding a priority and look forward to working with my Senate colleagues to send the One Big Beautiful Bill Act with these funds included to President Trump’s desk.”
    Background:
    Senator Cornyn has led the fight in Washington to secure federal reimbursement for Texas by:

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warren on Federal Judge Blocking Trump’s Attempt to Dismantle the Department of Education

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts – Elizabeth Warren
    May 22, 2025
    Washington, D.C. – Today, in response to the news that a federal judge issued a preliminary injunction blocking Trump’s attempts to dismantle the Department of Education., U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) released the following statement:
    “Firing over 1,300 federal education workers was all part of Trump’s illegal scheme to dismantle the Education Department. But Donald Trump is not a king, and his attempts to dismantle the Department of Education are illegal. This court ruling is a win for students with disabilities, for working-class students trying to afford college, and for teachers in under-resourced schools.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Maine Delegation calls on Admin. to release rural connectivity funds

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Chellie Pingree (1st District of Maine)

    In a letter to the Commerce Department leadership, Maine’s Congressional delegation last night urged the Trump Administration to reverse its decision to freeze nearly $35 million of federal funds designed to close the digital divide between rural and urban communities in the state. 

    “As one of the most rural states in the nation, Maine is especially affected by this decision, which will have an outsized impact on Maine families, small businesses, and communities. The programs created by the grants would ensure access across Maine to the necessary technology and skills to participate in the digital economy,” the delegation wrote in a letter to Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and Acting Administrator Adam Cassady.

    The funding, part of the Digital Equity Act program, was approved by Congress through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law in 2021. Maine was set to receive $35 million through the program for digital skills training, workforce development and expanded telehealth and educational services through libraries, educational institutions and community organizations.

    President Trump announced earlier this month via social media that he was “ending” the program, even as Maine awaited the vast majority of its approved funds. 

    Terminating these funds will increase the difficulties for individuals and families to use the internet to improve their lives and fully participate in an increasingly digital world,” the delegation wrote. “We urge the Department of Commerce to reverse this decision immediately and restore funding for this vital program.”

    The full text of the letter can be found below. 

    +++

    Wednesday, May 21, 2025 

    Dear Secretary Lutnick and Acting Administrator Cassady:

    We write to share our opposition to the recent announcement to terminate Digital Equity Act grant programs. As one of the most rural states in the nation, Maine is especially affected by this decision, which will have an outsized impact on Maine families, small businesses, and communities. The programs created by the grants would ensure access across Maine to the necessary technology and skills to participate in the digital economy.

    Passed by Congress and signed into law under the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, the grants provide a one-time infusion of $2.75 billion to close the digital divide between rural and urban communities, support telemedicine and education programs, strengthen connections between loved ones, and allow people to participate in the digital world regardless of their ZIP Code. This funding is essential in our state, where more than half of older residents, small businesses, veterans, low-income households, tribal communities, and students are in rural areas.

    This funding would serve more than 40,000 Mainers throughout the state who continue to face significant challenges in securing and maintaining internet connectivity. With the administration’s termination announcement, Maine expects to lose the majority of the $35 million it had been awarded to support digital skills and cybersecurity training, expand workforce development, and increase the capacity of the state’s libraries and other community organizations to provide telehealth and educational services.

    The funding is a smart investment that provides safe internet access for rural Mainers. Terminating these funds will increase the difficulties for individuals and families to use the internet to improve their lives and fully participate in an increasingly digital world. We urge the Department of Commerce to reverse this decision immediately and restore funding for this vital program.

    We appreciate your attention to this important matter.

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    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Brad Sherman Hosts +5,000 in Telephone Town Hall before Voting Against Trump’s “Big Ugly” Bill in the Dead of Night

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Brad Sherman (D-CA)

    SHERMAN OAKS, CALIFORNIA – Last night, Congressman Brad Sherman (CA-32)hosted more than 5,000 constituentsin a liveTelephone Town Hall just before casting his vote against President Donald Trump’s “Big Bill” — a massive Republican budget plan loaded with tax breaks for the ultra-wealthy and deep cuts to vital healthcare and nutrition assistance programs for American families. 

    “The energy during last night’s Town Hall meeting made it clear: people are alert, informed, and demanding leadership that’s willing to stand up to this administration’s outrageous corruption and brazen abuses of power,” said Congressman Sherman.

    Congressman Sherman used the Town Hall to brief constituents on his efforts to push back against what he called “a coordinated assault on working families, democracy, and ethics” tied to Trump’s policy comeback and personal profiteering.

    At the start of the event, Congressman Sherman broke down the contents of the Republican budget reconciliation bill, which slashes Medicaid funding, repeals key climate initiatives, and includes major tax breaks for the wealthy. He explained why he would be voting no right after the Town Hall: “This big, ugly bill epitomizes the true nature of Trump’s entire policy agenda — one that favors billionaires over everyday Americans.”

    The Congressman also addressed recent corruption schemes surrounding Trump’s business dealings:

    -The Qatari government’s offering Trump a luxury jet while lobbying his allies in Washington;

    -China’s state-affiliated entities purchasing large stakes in a Trump-branded cryptocurrency initiative, raising red flags about foreign influence and national security;

    -A $2 million investment from Abu Dhabi into Trump’s so-called “stablecoin” crypto venture, which Sherman characterized as “yet another pay-to-play scheme cloaked in blockchain buzzwords.”

    “These aren’t isolated incidents — they form a pattern of transactional politics and foreign entanglements that put personal gain over public duty in a way that’s dangerously unprecedented,” Sherman told constituents.

    He also laid out broader Democratic efforts to resist Trump’s broader agenda, including fighting attempts to roll back voting rights, immigrant protections, safeguards for consumers and more. 

    Constituents brought forward their own concerns, ranging from the future of reproductive rights, the health of our economy amid Trump’s tariffs, to the safeguarding of our democracy in the face of rising extremism — areas where Sherman said Congress must act with urgency and resolve.

    Shortly before heading to the Capitol to cast his vote against Trump’s massive and extremist budget bill, the Congressman concluded the Town Hall meeting by encouraging constituents to stay engaged and continue raising their voices against the on-going assault on our democratic norms.

    During the Town Hall, Sherman requested input from residents by asking a series of survey questions about their thoughts and concerns.

    The results of the survey questions are as follows:

    1. Do you approve of President Trump’s performance as President so far?
    • Approve: 7%
    • Disapprove: 90%
    • Unsure: 2%
    1. Should your Member of Congress vote for legislation that they think is good for the country, or should they vote NO on everything that Republican Speaker Johnson is willing to propose and Trump is willing to sign?
    • Obstruction & Resistance: Vote NO on all of Speaker Johnson and President Trump’s legislation: 38%
    • Negotiate with Republicans but only vote for a bill Democrats think is good: 55%
    • Vote with Republicans: 3%
    • Unsure: 4%
    1. Should I vote for the Republican reconciliation bill that provides a tax cut of $82,000 to those who make over $1 million per year, takes away healthcare from 14 million Americans, and increases the U.S. debt by over $5 trillion?
    • Yes, vote for the Republican bill: 4%
    • No / Hell No, don’t vote for the Republican bill: 91%
    • Unsure: 4%

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: U.S. Attorneys for Southwestern Border Districts Charge More than 1100 Illegal Aliens with Immigration-Related Crimes During the Third Week in May as part of Operation Take Back America

    Source: US Justice – Antitrust Division

    Headline: U.S. Attorneys for Southwestern Border Districts Charge More than 1100 Illegal Aliens with Immigration-Related Crimes During the Third Week in May as part of Operation Take Back America

    Since the inauguration of President Trump, the Department of Justice is playing a critical role in Operation Take back America, a nationwide initiative to repel the invasion of illegal immigration, achieve total elimination of cartels and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and protect our communities from perpetrators of violent crime. Operation Take Back America streamlines efforts and resources from the Department’s Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETFs) and Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN).

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Lawler Celebrates Big, Beautiful Bill That Quadruples SALT Cap For The Next Ten Years

    Source: US Congressman Mike Lawler (R, NY-17)

    Washington, D.C. – 5/22/2025… Today, Congressman Mike Lawler released the following statement after securing a deal and voting for legislation that will quadruple the state and local tax deduction up to $40,000 for the next ten years. This will provide immediate relief to millions of New Yorkers who have suffered under the yoke of Governor Kathy Hochul’s runaway spending.

    “The taxpayers of New York State will soon receive huge relief thanks to the deal the SALT Caucus brokered with Speaker Johnson and President Trump,” said Congressman Lawler. “With President Trump’s support, the bipartisan SALT Caucus succeeded in quadrupling the SALT deduction, which will be a massive lift to millions of New Yorkers.”

    “This was my number one focus in Washington from Day One of being here, and I’m thrilled that we find ourselves here today,” concluded Lawler. “Now, it’s on New York State and Governor Hochul to rein in the reckless spending we’ve seen – and if that requires a change of leadership in the Governor’s mansion in 2026, so be it.”

    Congressman Lawler is one of the most bipartisan members of Congress and represents New York’s 17th Congressional District, which is just north of New York City and contains all or parts of Rockland, Putnam, Dutchess, and Westchester Counties. He was rated the most effective freshman lawmaker in the 118th Congress, 8th overall, surpassing dozens of committee chairs.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Sara Jacobs Calls Out Trump Administration For Failing to Prioritize Sudan

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Sara Jacobs (D-CA-53)

    May 22, 2025

    Rep. Sara Jacobs (CA-51), Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, today called out the Trump Administration for failing to prioritize Sudan and helping to bring an end to the war and genocide in Sudan.

    Watch Rep. Sara Jacobs’ Opening Remarks Here

    Rep. Sara Jacobs said:

    “Thank you, Chairman Smith, and thank you to all of our witnesses joining us today to testify and bring attention to the ongoing catastrophe in Sudan. Last month marked two years since the outbreak of war in Sudan. It is now the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. Nearly 25 million people – half of Sudan’s population – are facing acute hunger, and more than half a million people are facing famine. More than 13 million Sudanese have been displaced from their homes since the conflict began, including nearly four million people forced to flee across Sudan’s borders as refugees. I have seen this suffering firsthand when I traveled to Chad and met with Sudanese refugees last year.

    “And let’s be clear: this is a war of choice. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and allied militias have waged this war, committing war crimes and holding the Sudanese people captive for their own selfish interests. And their external backers, particularly the United Arab Emirates with their support to the RSF, in addition to Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia, have turned this war into a regional proxy war by supporting and arming either side, risking further regional destabilization.

    “But despite this, the Trump Administration is nowhere to be found. In fact, the Administration’s actions have only worsened the suffering of the Sudanese people. The Trump Administration’s sham “foreign assistance review” was really just a pretext to end most foreign assistance – like food aid, disaster relief, global health programs, development and economic aid, and more. In Sudan, it’s meant cancelling millions of dollars in U.S.-funded life-saving aid. For instance, before it was illegally dismantled, USAID was supporting the heroic efforts of the Sudanese Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) to open community kitchens and provide basic meals to Sudanese civilians throughout the country. Following the massive cuts to U.S. foreign assistance, which included USAID support to the ERRs, more than 80% of the roughly 1500 community kitchens across Sudan have been forced to close their doors – cutting off vulnerable Sudanese civilians from life-saving food assistance. 

    “And the Administration hasn’t stopped there. Yesterday, they announced over $87 million worth of cancelled humanitarian programs, including $30 million for emergency nutrition, water, and food aid in Darfur. The SAF and the RSF continue to commit atrocities against the Sudanese people, and the people of Darfur are facing a second genocide in 20 years at the hands of the RSF. Yet despite the clear need for the United States to play an active role in negotiations to end this brutal conflict, the Trump Administration has failed to dedicate the resources necessary to do so. 

    “More than four months into President Trump’s term, the Administration has still failed to nominate an Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department, an NSC Senior Director for Africa, or a Special Envoy for Sudan – a position the Administration is required by law to fill. And just yesterday, during Secretary Rubio’s testimony, he actually refused to say the word genocide and reaffirm his previous statements that the RSF is in fact committing a genocide.

    “These actions – or lack thereof – show that Sudan is not a priority for the Trump Administration. And while the Administration ignores the conflict and its human consequences, it chooses instead to provide weapons to the UAE – a country that is arming the RSF, fueling the war and facilitating a genocide in Darfur. There is widespread and credible reporting that the UAE continues to funnel arms to the RSF, even though the UAE continues to deny this publicly. But instead of pressuring the UAE to stop arming the RSF forces currently carrying out a genocide, the Trump Administration has chosen to blow through a Congressional hold by Ranking Member Meeks and proceed with arms sales worth more than $1 billion. 

    “Just as I did under the Biden Administration, I believe that the United States needs to use its significant leverage with the UAE to pressure them to finally end their support to the RSF. That is why I, along with Ranking Member Meeks, introduced Joint Resolutions of Disapproval last week to block the Administration’s arms sales to the UAE. If the United States wanted to, we could take tangible actions and make sensible policy decisions that would help bring an end to the war in Sudan and a sustainable peace agreement that ends military rule, establishes a civilian government, and provides a clear roadmap to democratic elections. Instead, this Administration seems to be ignoring the problem and selling weapons that are fueling genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. 

    “The Sudanese people have suffered enough. It is time for the United States and the international community to step up and focus on bringing an end to this war so that the Sudanese people can finally rebuild their country. Thank you, Chairman Smith, and with that, I yield back.”

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: May 22nd, 2025 Heinrich Joins Colleagues in Call to Protect ENERGY STAR

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Mexico Martin Heinrich

    WASHINGTON — U.S. Senator Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.), Ranking Member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, this week joined his colleagues in urging the Trump Administration to immediately reverse course on its plan to illegally and unilaterally terminate the ENERGY STAR program. In the letter, Heinrich highlighted the cost-saving benefits of the program, which would save the average American household $450 on utility bills each year simply by choosing ENERGY STAR certified products.

    Since 1992, ENERGY STAR has reduced energy costs for American families and businesses by $500 billion, including $42 billion worth of savings in 2020 alone. For every federal dollar spent on ENERGY STAR, Americans have seen $350 in savings.

    “For over three decades, the ENERGY STAR program has lowered Americans’ energy bills by informing consumers about energy efficient products. The program has enjoyed bipartisan support since its creation under authority of Section 103 of the Clean Air Act, most recently receiving $35.7 million in fiscal year 2025 appropriations,” wrote the senators. “Reporting has indicated, however, that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) plans to eliminate ENERGY STAR without Congressional approval. Not only is the program protected under federal statute and thus illegal for the Administration to terminate unilaterally, but this decision also lacks basic economic sense. We write to urge you to immediately reverse course.”

    The senators continued: “ENERGY STAR is the epitome of an effective public-private partnership. As the program’s administrators, EPA and the Department of Energy set qualifying energy efficiency standards for products. EPA also protects the integrity of the ENERGY STAR brand, ensuring it remains well-known, trusted, and indicative of a quality product. Appliance manufacturers then voluntarily display the ENERGY STAR label, notifying consumers that a product will reduce their energy consumption and lower utility bills. The program strengthens consumer choice by sharing critical product information.”

    “Eliminating the ENERGY STAR program will not only raise energy costs for American families and businesses, but also inflict far-reaching economic harms, threatening industry jobs and the reliability of the grid at a time of growing demand. We again urge you to immediately reconsider eliminating this popular and effective Congressionally authorized program,” the senators concluded.

    Administered by the EPA and Department of Energy, ENERGY STAR is a voluntary, market-based program that has saved consumers billions of dollars annually. The ENERGY STAR program has cumulatively reduced four billion metric tons of harmful emissions and currently supports more than 790,000 American jobs manufacturing and installing ENERGY STAR products.

    ENERGY STAR is strongly supported by a wide array of manufacturers, homebuilders, housing organizations, building owners, small businesses, and other organizations. In April, the U.S. Real Estate Industry sent a letter to the Trump Administration expressing its strong support for the ENERGY STAR program. Additionally, the U.S. Green Buildings Council partnered with the Alliance to Save Energy in leading over 1,000 organizations in urging the Trump Administration to protect the program and maintain full funding and staffing levels.

    The letter was authored by U.S. Senators Peter Welch (D-Vt.) and Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.). In addition to Heinrich, it was signed by U.S. Senators Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), John Fetterman (D-Pa.), Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii), Angus King (I-Maine), Chris Coons (D-Del.), Ed Markey (D-Mass.), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii), Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-Del.), Tina Smith (D-Minn.), Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), Michael Bennet (D-Colo.), and Cory Booker (D-N.J.).

    Read and download the full letter here.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: May 22nd, 2025 Heinrich, Luján Introduce Legislation to Expand Medicare Drug Price Negotiation and Lower Costs for New Mexicans

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Mexico Martin Heinrich

    WASHGINTON — U.S. Senators Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) and Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.) introduced the Strengthening Medicare and Reducing Taxpayer (SMART) Prices Act, legislation that will expand Medicare negotiation of drug prices to lower drug costs for consumers, reduce federal spending, and give the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) stronger tools to negotiate lower drug prices in Medicare Part B and Part D.

    According to preliminary estimates from a model by West Health and Verdant Research, if the SMART Prices Act is enacted by 2026, it would save 33 percent more by 2030 than current law. It would also allow Medicare to begin negotiations earlier and bring down the price of more expensive drugs.

    The legislation builds on provisions passed into law by Heinrich and Luján in 2022 that empowered Medicare to negotiate prescription drug prices for the first time. The SMART Prices Act extends this progress by more than doubling the number of prescription drugs Medicare must negotiate to a minimum of 50 per year, allowing the most costly prescription drugs and biologics to have negotiated prices five years after approval by the Food and Drug Administration, and by increasing the discount that Medicare is allowed to negotiate.

    “While the Trump Administration and Congressional Republicans work to gut Medicare to give massive tax handouts to billionaires like Elon Musk, I’m fighting to protect and strengthen Medicare for New Mexicans,” said Heinrich. “I’m proud to co-sponsor legislation that will lower health care costs by making more prescription drugs affordable for New Mexico’s seniors enrolled in Medicare.”

    “No one should have to choose between paying for life-saving medication and putting food on the table. At a time when President Trump’s tariffs threaten to raise prices on everyday goods and medicine, the SMART Prices Act is more important than ever for New Mexican families,” said Luján. “That’s why I’m proud to join my colleagues in introducing this legislation to lower prescription drug costs by strengthening Medicare’s ability to negotiate prices, helping Americans afford the medications they rely on.”

    The SMART Prices Act is led by U.S. Senators Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) and Peter Welch (D-Vt.). Alongside Heinrich and Luján, the legislation is co-sponsored by U.S. Senators Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.), Michael Bennet (D-Colo.), Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), Cory Booker (D-N.J.), Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.), Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), John Fetterman (D-Pa.), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), Maggie Hassan (D-N.H.), Angus King (I-Maine), Ed Markey (D-Mass.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), Patty Murray (D-Wash.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), Elissa Slotkin (D-Minn.), Tina Smith (D-Minn.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.).

    The bill is endorsed by Center for American Progress, FamiliesUSA, Patients For Affordable Drugs NOW, Protect Our Care, and Public Citizen.

    As Republicans tank the economy, Heinrich and Luján are putting New Mexico families first and fighting against Trump and Musk’s budget, which includes cuts to Medicaid to fund massive tax handouts to billionaires.

    Earlier this month, Heinrich and Luján (D-N.M.) released a joint statement slamming President Trump’s Fiscal Year 2026 (FY26) preliminary budget request. In their joint statement, the senators wrote, “Donald Trump and Elon Musk’s budget will further tank the economy and throw working families under the bus. As New Mexico’s senators, we’ll fight back.”

    Last month, Heinrich and Luján stood up for New Mexico families by voting against Senate Republicans’ budget resolution. This was after Heinrich and Luján pushed to amend Republicans’ resolution by repeatedly voting for amendments to lower costs for families — particularly as Trump’s tariffs push America to the brink of a recession. Heinrich and Luján also worked to block cuts to Medicaid, extend the tax credits for health care premiums, and prevent millions of Americans from losing health insurance, protect Social Security, and reverse cuts to the Social Security Administration, including cuts by Elon Musk’s DOGE.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICE San Antonio, federal partners lead to Treasury sanctions of high-tanking members of Cartel del Noreste, a foreign terrorist organization

    Source: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

    WASHINGTON — The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned two high-ranking members of the Mexico-based Cartel del Noreste, formerly known as Los Zetas, May 21. CDN, one of Mexico’s most violent drug trafficking organizations and a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, has significant influence over the border region, particularly near the Laredo/Nuevo Laredo entry point. These sanctions emphasize the commitment to targeting CDN and other violent cartels involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms trafficking, and other crimes that endanger the American people. The investigation is being conducted by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s San Antonio office, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ San Antonio office, and the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Houston Division. The action was closely coordinated with Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit, Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera. The sanctions were imposed under Executive Order 14059, which targets the proliferation of illicit drugs and their production, and Executive Order 13224, as amended, which targets terrorists and their supporters.

    “In working toward the total elimination of cartels to Make America Safe Again, the Trump Administration will hold these terrorists accountable for their criminal activities and abhorrent acts of violence,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “CDN and its leaders have carried out a violent campaign of intimidation, kidnapping, and terrorism, threatening communities on both sides of our southern border. We will continue to cut off the cartels’ ability to obtain the drugs, money, and guns that enable their violent activities.”

    Cartel del Noreste

    CDN is a terrorist organization primarily based in the Mexican states of Tamaulipas, Coahuila, and Nuevo Leon. The group has been involved in narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, arms trafficking, money laundering, vehicle theft, and oil theft. They have also engaged in terrorist activities to intimidate American citizens and local communities in Mexico, including extortion, kidnapping, and murder.

    In March 2022, CDN fired guns and threw grenades at the U.S. Consulate in Nuevo Laredo following the arrest of a CDN member wanted in Mexico for terrorism, homicide, and extortion. The consulate was closed for nearly a month due to the attack, which was seen as a retaliatory act aimed at intimidating American diplomats serving abroad.

    On Feb. 20, the U.S. Department of State identified CDN as an FTO and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Prior to this designation, CDN, then known as Los Zetas, was labeled by the United States as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker on April 15, 2009, under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act for its involvement in international narcotics trafficking. On July 24, 2011, Los Zetas was named a transnational criminal organization in the annex to Executive Order 13581. On Dec. 15, 2021, the Office of Foreign Assets Control designated CDN under Executive Order 14059.

    Sanctioning key members of Cartel del Noreste

    Firearms acquired by CDN affiliates have been smuggled into Mexico. Miguel Angel de Anda Ledezma (De Anda), a high-ranking member of CDN residing in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, oversees the procurement of guns and ammunition for the group. In this role, De Anda has facilitated payments to U.S. straw purchasers and organized firearm deliveries to Nuevo Laredo. Some of these weapons were used in terrorist activities, including one recovered after CDN attacked Mexico’s army during a patrol in March 2024.

    Ricardo Gonzalez Sauceda, who lived in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, was the second-in-command of CDN until his February 2025 arrest by Mexican authorities. He led an armed enforcement wing of the group and benefited from trafficked firearms in attacks on Mexican police and military, as well as drug trafficking activities. Gonzalez was arrested on Feb. 3, in connection with a CDN attack on the Mexican military in August 2024, which killed two soldiers and injured five. At the time of his arrest, Gonzalez was in possession of a rifle, a handgun, 300 grams of methamphetamine, and 1,500 fentanyl pills.

    The designations of De Anda and Gonzalez resulted from strong coordination between ICE Homeland Security Investigations, ATF, and DEA.

    Both De Anda and Gonzalez are sanctioned under Executive Orders 14059 and 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by CDN or acting on its behalf.

    Santions Implications

    As a result of this sanction, all property, and interests in property of the designated individuals listed above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Additionally, any entities owned 50 percent or more, directly or indirectly, by one or more blocked individuals are also blocked.

    Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the U.S. that involve property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.

    Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in civil or criminal penalties for U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding its enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. Financial institutions and other individuals may also risk sanctions for engaging in certain transactions with designated or blocked persons.

    Engaging in certain transactions with the individuals designated May 21 also poses a risk of secondary sanctions under Executive Order 13224, as amended. Under this authority, OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on the opening or maintenance of a correspondent or payable-through account in the U.S. for any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitated significant transactions on behalf of a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.

    Exports, reexports, or transfers of items subject to U.S. export controls involving individuals on the SDN List under Executive Order 13224, as amended, may face additional restrictions from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security. See 15 C.F.R. section 744.8 for more details.

    The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions come not only from its ability to designate and add individuals to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove individuals from the list in accordance with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to encourage positive changes in behavior. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Washington State Wins Court Order Stopping Dismantling of Department of Education

    Source: Washington State News

    SEATTLE — Attorney General Nick Brown and a coalition of 20 other state attorneys general today won a court order stopping the Trump administration’s attempts to dismantle the Department of Education.

    On March 13, the coalition of attorneys general filed a lawsuit against the Trump administration for its plans to cut 50 percent of Department of Education’s s workforce. Following a March 20 Executive Order directing the closure of the Department and President Trump’s March 21 announcement that, in addition to implementing layoffs, the Department must “immediately” transfer student loan management and special education services outside of the Department, Attorney General Brown and the coalition sought a preliminary injunction to immediately stop the mass layoffs and transfer of services.

    Today the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted the preliminary injunction, halting the administration’s policies that would dismantle the Department of Education and ordering all employees who were fired as part of the layoffs to be reinstated.

    “Today’s injunction supports the rule of law, and students and educators around the country,” Brown said. “Our office will fight illegal and unconstitutional executive orders. And we will continue to win.”

    The coalition of attorneys general argued in their lawsuit and motion for a preliminary injunction that the Trump administration’s attacks on the Department of Education are illegal and unconstitutional. It is an executive agency authorized by Congress, with numerous laws creating its programs and funding streams. The lawsuit asserts that the executive branch does not have the legal authority to unilaterally dismantle it without an act of Congress. In addition, the coalition argued that Department of Education’s mass layoffs violate the Administrative Procedures Act.

    Joining the Washington State Attorney General’s Office in filing the lawsuit are the attorneys general of Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Vermont, and the District of Columbia.

    The court order can be found here.

    -30-

    Washington’s Attorney General serves the people and the state of Washington. As the state’s largest law firm, the Attorney General’s Office provides legal representation to every state agency, board, and commission in Washington. Additionally, the Office serves the people directly by enforcing consumer protection, civil rights, and environmental protection laws. The Office also prosecutes elder abuse, Medicaid fraud, and handles sexually violent predator cases in 38 of Washington’s 39 counties. Visit www.atg.wa.gov to learn more.

    Media Contact:

    Email: press@atg.wa.gov

    Phone: (360) 753-2727

    General contacts: Click here

    Media Resource Guide & Attorney General’s Office FAQ

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: President Trump Vows Action as Make America Healthy Again Report Reveals Childhood Health Crisis

    Source: United States of America – The White House (video statements)

    “I created the Presidential Commission to Make America Healthy Again, and today, the Commission officially delivers its first report on childhood health…. Something’s wrong, and we will not stop until we defeat the chronic disease epidemic in America.” –President Donald J. Trump

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oVG62r5rIkw

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Pocan, Bipartisan Colleagues Relaunch Biofuels Caucus, Announce New Co-Chairs

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Mark Pocan (2nd District of Wisconsin)

    Washington, DC —Today, Congressional Biofuels Caucus Co-chairs Mark Pocan (D-WI), Adrian Smith (R-NE), Angie Craig (D-MN), Ashley Hinson (R-IA), Julie Fedorchak (R-ND), and Nikki Budzinski (D-IL) released the following statements celebrating the launch of the caucus for the 119th Congress and welcoming new Co-chairs Hinson, Fedorchak, and Budzinski. 

    “I am glad to join my colleagues in the Congressional Biofuels Caucus,” said Co-chair Pocan. “Corn growers in Wisconsin deserve to have an even playing field in the market dominated by the oil and gas industry. This Caucus will showcase how biofuels can help us reach our emissions reduction goals while investing in rural jobs and infrastructure.” 

    “American biofuel producers have an untapped ability to power the future of liquid fuels, whether ethanol blends, biodiesel, or sustainable aviation fuel,” said Co-chair Smith. “Advancing sound policy can unlock billions of dollars in savings at the pump and hundreds of thousands of added jobs for the American people. I thank Co-chairs Craig and Pocan and congratulate Co-chairs Hinson, Fedorchak, and Budzinski for joining me to strengthen this bipartisan caucus and continue working to inform our colleagues in the House of the value of biofuels for American energy abundance.” 

    “Increasing the production and availability of homegrown biofuels is a critical piece of the puzzle when it comes to the all-of-the-above energy policy we need to stay ahead,” said Co-chair Craig. “I’m proud to be relaunching the Biofuels Caucus alongside my bipartisan colleagues this Congress so we can continue our work to lower prices at the pump, create opportunities for local producers and strengthen our energy security.” 

    “Biofuels are key to Iowa’s economy and key to American energy dominance,” said Co-chair Hinson. “Since coming to Congress, I have worked tirelessly to expand access to Iowa biofuels and support Iowa’s biofuels producers by fighting to secure permanent year-round E15, increase biofuels blending targets, and replace foreign energy with homegrown biofuels. I’m honored to co-lead the biofuels caucus and will continue working with President Trump and other caucus members to increase domestic energy production and support Iowa agriculture.” 

    “Biofuels are a growing part of America’s energy strategy and another way North Dakota is helping fuel the world,” said Co-chair Fedorchak. “It’s an honor to serve as a co-chair of this bipartisan caucus to advance policies that will help expand domestic energy production, empower rural America, and deliver practical solutions for North Dakotans.” 

    “I came to Congress to be a strong voice for the people of Central and Southern Illinois—especially our hardworking farmers. Few issues are more critical to their success than strengthening the biofuels industry and expanding market opportunities,” said Co-chair Budzinski. “That’s why promoting the use of homegrown, sustainable biofuels has been a central focus of my work in Congress, and I’m looking forward to continuing that commitment as co-chair of this bipartisan caucus.

    The Congressional Biofuels Caucus advocates for policies which reflect the capacity of American biofuels producers to meet the demand for reliable and affordable liquid fuels while growing rural economies, high-paying jobs, and value-added markets for agricultural commodities. The caucus recognizes biofuels are key to American energy independence and responsible stewardship of our resources. 

    Additional members of the caucus include: Reps. Dusty Johnson (R-SD), Darin LaHood (R-IL), Jim Baird (R-IN), Scott Peters (D-CA), Tom Emmer (R-MN), Andre Carson (D-IN), Ann Wagner (R-MO), Emanuel Cleaver (D-MO), James Comer (R-KY), Brett Guthrie (R-KY), Marcy Kaptur (D-OH), Suzanne Bonamici (D-OR), Sam Graves (R-MO), Don Bacon (R-NE), Mike Bost (R-IL), Pete Stauber (R-MN), Michelle Fischbach (R-MN), Randy Feenstra (R-IA), Marianette Miller Meeks (R-IA), Zach Nunn (R-IA), Mike Flood (R-NE), Eric Sorensen (D-IL), Brad Finstad (R-MN), Tracey Mann (R-KS), Derrick Van Orden (R-WI), Mark Alford (R-MO), Sharice Davids (D-KS), Kristen McDonald Rivet (D-MI), Brian Jack (R-GA), and Mark Messmer (R-IN). 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Pocan Slams “Big, Beautiful Bill for Billionaires”

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Mark Pocan (2nd District of Wisconsin)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Representative Mark Pocan (WI-02) released the following statement after voting against House Republicans’ budget bill:

    “While most Americans were asleep, House Republicans voted to rip healthcare away from 13.7 million people on Medicaid, cut $500 billion from Medicare, and take food away from hungry people—all to give a tax break to their billionaire buddies, like Donald Trump & Elon Musk. According to the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office, this will add trillions to the national debt, shutter hospitals, and leave farmers out to dry.”

    “From forcing debate and procedural votes in the dark of night, the entire process has been an attempt to keep this from the public. Even Republican leadership told their members not to hold town halls, they know just how unpopular this bill is with the American public. It must not be allowed to become law and must be stopped by the Senate.”

    Additional background information:

    • CBO confirmed the Republican bill would take from the poorest Americans to hand even more tax breaks to the wealthiest.
    • CBO also found the bill could trigger over $500 billion in automatic cuts to Medicare, under the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) law—cuts that many Republicans would be happy to see happen behind closed doors.
    • District-level information on the consequences of the Republican budget bill is available here.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senate Passes Capito Resolution to End California’s EV Mandate

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for West Virginia Shelley Moore Capito
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.), Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works (EPW) Committee, issued the following statement after the Senate passed her joint resolution of disapproval under the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to repeal California’s EV mandate through their “Advanced Clean Cars II” regulation that prohibits the sale of new gas-powered light-duty vehicles by 2035. Chairman Capito introduced the CRA last month, and pledged to end the EV mandate in December 2024.
    “Today, the Senate voted to end California’s EV mandate and send my joint resolution of disapproval under the CRA to President Trump’s desk. The Biden administration and Congressional Democrats tried to block the will of the American people from this attempt by extreme unelected California and Biden EPA bureaucrats to ban gas-powered cars throughout the country, but Congress has now spoken and soundly rejected this rule. The impact of the California’s waiver would have been felt across the country, harming multiple sectors of our economy and costing hundreds of thousands of jobs in the process. I’m proud to have led this effort to protect American workers and consumers from this radical and drastic policy,” Chairman Capito said.
    Yesterday, Chairman Capito spoke on the Senate floor outlining the importance of ending California’s EV mandate, and the Congressional Review Act process she led to repeal California’s waiver. The Chairman’s full floor speech is available here.
    TIMELINE OF SENATOR CAPITO’S EFFORTS:
    February 28, 2024: Senator Capito joined Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-Wash.-05), Senator Markwayne Mullin (R-Okla.), and Rep. John Joyce (R-Pa.-13), in a bicameral letter to EPA Administrator Michael Regan warning of the legal and economic consequences of granting a Clean Air Act waiver request from the state of California, which would enable the state to require 35 percent of automobile sales to be zero-emission vehicles in model year 2026, and finally, 100 percent of them by 2035.
    December 18, 2024: Senator Capito pledged to work to reverse the Biden administration’s lame duck action of approving California’s waiver to implement its “Advanced Clean Cars II” regulation.
    April 4, 2025: Senator Capito joined Senators Deb Fischer (R-Neb.), and Markwayne Mullin (R-Okla.) to introduce joint resolutions of disapproval under the Congressional Review Act to repeal California’s EV waivers that prohibit the sale of new gas-powered light-duty vehicles by 2035 and set unrealistic and stringent requirements for heavy-duty trucks and heavy-duty diesel engines.
    May 1, 2025: Senator Capito applauded the House of Representatives’ passage of joint resolutions of disapproval under the Congressional Review Act to repeal California’s EV waivers.
    May 21, 2025: Senator Capito spoke on the Senate floor outlining the importance of ending California’s EV mandate, and the Congressional Review Act process she led to repeal California’s waiver. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: VIDEO: Capito Opening Statement at Hearing to Review Labor Budget Request

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for West Virginia Shelley Moore Capito

    [embedded content]

    Click here or on the image above to watch Chairman Capito’s opening remarks from the hearing. 

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies (Labor-HHS), chaired a hearing with U.S. Department of Labor Secretary Lori Chavez-DeRemer to consider the president’s Fiscal Year 2026 budget request.  

    Below is the opening statement of Chairman Capito as prepared for delivery: 

    “Good morning. Secretary Chavez-DeRemer, thank you for being here today to testify to the President’s fiscal year 2026 budget request for the Department of Labor. 

    “I am pleased to be joined by Senator Baldwin, the ranking member of the subcommittee. I am also happy to have the chair of the full committee, Senator Susan Collins, with us today. Thank you, Senator Collins, for your strong leadership and your tireless efforts to get us back to regular order. 

    “Following four years of reckless spending under the Biden administration, President Trump is taking steps to rein in our bloated bureaucracy and ensure that taxpayer dollars are being well spent. 

    “The department’s request proposes to reduce funding for the agency by $4.6 billion, a decrease of nearly 35%. We look forward to hearing your testimony and discussing in greater detail your priorities, new proposals, and programs you think we should consider scaling back.  

    “This month, we continued to receive good news about the strength of the American economy. Our economy has added jobs every month since President Trump took office and the unemployment rate remained steady this past month at 4.2%. However, millions of Americans are still underemployed or have stopped looking for work altogether.

    “We need to make sure that Americans have access to training programs – especially those that provide on-the-job training and those focused on in-demand jobs, which in West Virginia includes important industries like coal mining and healthcare. I’d like to see the department take innovative approaches to expand apprenticeship opportunities to new programs and fields as a lot of worthy apprenticeship opportunities don’t fit the current registered apprenticeship model. I’m interested in hearing more about how the Make America Skilled Again grant program will increase flexibility and improve outcomes for workers looking to upskill and advance in their careers. 

    “I’ve also been a long-time champion of expanding and strengthening the early childhood education workforce through apprenticeships. Giving our educators a clear pathway to successful careers opens the door to higher quality and better coverage of care, helping both families and childcare workers in West Virginia. 

    “Having a highly-skilled workforce is critical, but it is only half of the equation. We must also continue advancing common-sense solutions to create an economic environment where businesses can thrive and create good, well-paying jobs. I have been pleased to see this administration take steps to rein in unnecessary regulatory burdens that make it harder for businesses to create jobs.

    “Earlier this month, the Department of Labor announced it will no longer enforce the Biden administration’s misguided independent contractor rule, which jeopardized the ability of as many as 70 million freelancers, rideshare drivers, and other independent workers to earn a living in a way that best fits their needs and schedules.  

    “This rule would take away the freedom for West Virginia real estate agents, truck drivers, freelance writers, and other self-employed workers to choose their own hours and work around other life priorities — like going back to school or raising children.

    “I hope to see this administration continue to remove bureaucratic red tape to allow companies to expand their workforce, grow their businesses, and show their employees how much they’re valued in a growing economy. 

    “However, to be clear, not all regulations are bad. It is important to have appropriate protections in place to keep hard-working West Virginians, including our miners, safe. West Virginia is the second largest producer of coal in the country. For generations, coal miners in West Virginia have helped keep the lights on across the country. But doing so has sometimes come at a great price. In the last couple decades, West Virginia has experienced major mining tragedies at the Upper Big Branch Mine and Sago Mine, which claimed 29 and 12 lives, respectively.

    “I hope to hear more about the administration’s plans to ensure our workplaces are safe so that our workers are able to return home to their loved ones at the end of each day.  

    “Secretary Chavez-DeRemer, as the Fiscal Year 26 appropriations process moves forward, I know we will continue to work together to identify priorities and find common ground on how best to responsibly allocate taxpayers’ resources. Thank you again for being here today.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cotton Introduces Bill to Incentivize Domestic Production of Lifesaving Medicines

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Arkansas Tom Cotton

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
    Contact: Caroline Tabler or Patrick McCann (202) 224-2353
    May 22, 2025

    Cotton Introduces Bill to Incentivize Domestic Production of Lifesaving Medicines

    Washington, D.C. — Senator Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas) today introduced the Producing Incentives for Long-term production of Lifesaving Supply of medicine (PILLS) Act, legislation that would incentivize domestic manufacturing of lifesaving medicines.

    “America’s overreliance on foreign-made medicines is a national security issue with the potential to impact nearly every household in our country. This bill will ensure that our supply chains for lifesaving drugs remains stable while promoting President Trump’s made in America agenda,” said Senator Cotton.

    Full text of the bill may be found here.

    The PILLS Act would establish the following:

    • A production-based tax credit (PBTC) of 35% for final manufacturers of APIs and finished drug products and 30% for all other components.
    • A proportional domestic content bonus tax credit of up to 20% for 100% domestic content in the drug’s constituent materials.
    • Optional election of an investment tax credit equal to 25% of the qualified investment to offset costs of creating new production capacity (in lieu of PBTC).
    • Disallowance of tax credits to any entity which, at any time during the taxable year, was a foreign entity of concern.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Smith, Bipartisan Colleagues Relaunch Biofuels Caucus, Announce New Co-Chairs

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Adrian Smith (R-NE)

    Washington, DC —Today Congressional Biofuels Caucus Co-chairs Adrian Smith (R-NE), Angie Craig (D-MN), Ashley Hinson (R-IA), Mark Pocan (D-WI), Julie Fedorchak (R-ND), and Nikki Budzinski (D-IL) released the following statements celebrating the launch of the caucus for the 119th Congress and welcoming new Co-chairs Hinson, Fedorchak, and Budzinski.

    “American biofuel producers have an untapped ability to power the future of liquid fuels, whether ethanol blends, biodiesel, or sustainable aviation fuel,” said Co-chair Smith. “Advancing sound policy can unlock billions of dollars in savings at the pump and hundreds of thousands of added jobs for the American people. I thank Co-chairs Craig and Pocan and congratulate Co-chairs Hinson, Fedorchak, and Budzinski for joining me to strengthen this bipartisan caucus and continue working to inform our colleagues in the House of the value of biofuels for American energy abundance.”

    “Increasing the production and availability of homegrown biofuels is a critical piece of the puzzle when it comes to the all-of-the-above energy policy we need to stay ahead,” said Co-chair Craig. “I’m proud to be relaunching the Biofuels Caucus alongside my bipartisan colleagues this Congress so we can continue our work to lower prices at the pump, create opportunities for local producers and strengthen our energy security.”

    “Biofuels are key to Iowa’s economy and key to American energy dominance,” said Co-chair Hinson. “Since coming to Congress, I have worked tirelessly to expand access to Iowa biofuels and support Iowa’s biofuels producers by fighting to secure permanent year-round E15, increase biofuels blending targets, and replace foreign energy with homegrown biofuels. I’m honored to co-lead the biofuels caucus and will continue working with President Trump and other caucus members to increase domestic energy production and support Iowa agriculture.”

    “I am glad to join my colleagues in the Congressional Biofuels Caucus,” said Co-chair Pocan. “Corn growers in Wisconsin deserve to have an even playing field in the market dominated by the oil and gas industry. This Caucus will showcase how biofuels can help us reach our emissions reduction goals while investing in rural jobs and infrastructure.”

    “Biofuels are a growing part of America’s energy strategy and another way North Dakota is helping fuel the world,” said Co-chair Fedorchak. “It’s an honor to serve as a co-chair of this bipartisan caucus to advance policies that will help expand domestic energy production, empower rural America, and deliver practical solutions for North Dakotans.”

    “I came to Congress to be a strong voice for the people of Central and Southern Illinois—especially our hardworking farmers. Few issues are more critical to their success than strengthening the biofuels industry and expanding market opportunities,” said Co-chair Budzinski. “That’s why promoting the use of homegrown, sustainable biofuels has been a central focus of my work in Congress, and I’m looking forward to continuing that commitment as co-chair of this bipartisan caucus.

    The Congressional Biofuels Caucus advocates for policies which reflect the capacity of American biofuels producers to meet the demand for reliable and affordable liquid fuels while growing rural economies, high-paying jobs, and value-added markets for agricultural commodities. The caucus recognizes biofuels are key to American energy independence and responsible stewardship of our resources.

    Additional members of the caucus include: Reps. Dusty Johnson (R-SD), Darin LaHood (R-IL), Jim Baird (R-IN), Scott Peters (D-CA), Tom Emmer (R-MN), Andre Carson (D-IN), Ann Wagner (R-MO), Emanuel Cleaver (D-MO), James Comer (R-KY), Brett Guthrie (R-KY), Marcy Kaptur (D-OH), Suzanne Bonamici (D-OR), Sam Graves (R-MO), Don Bacon (R-NE), Mike Bost (R-IL), Pete Stauber (R-MN), Michelle Fischbach (R-MN), Randy Feenstra (R-IA), Marianette Miller Meeks (R-IA), Zach Nunn (R-IA), Mike Flood (R-NE), Eric Sorensen (D-IL), Brad Finstad (R-MN), Tracey Mann (R-KS), Derrick Van Orden (R-WI), Mark Alford (R-MO), Sharice Davids (D-KS), Kristen McDonald Rivet (D-MI), Brian Jack (R-GA), and Mark Messmer (R-IN).

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –