Category: United States of America

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia – A10-0110/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia

(2025/2024(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0697),

– having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part [1],

– having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,

– having regard to the final report of 20 December 2024 of the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,– having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 June 2024 on Georgia and of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0110/2025),

A. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 and primarily relating to reforms in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights would be taken;

B. whereas the situation in Georgia has deteriorated significantly since the publication of the 2024 Commission report on the country on 30 October 2024, particularly as a result of the actions of the Georgian Government;

C. whereas Georgia has been experiencing democratic backsliding in recent years and in particular since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which failed to meet international democratic standards and comply with Georgia’s OSCE commitments, and resulted in an illegitimate parliament composed of only one political party, Georgian Dream; whereas Russia has systematically interfered in democratic processes in Georgia; whereas the fraudulent elections included voter intimidation, vote buying and harassment of election observers;

D. whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations, which have the strong support of the Georgian people;

E. whereas concerns over the direction in which the country is heading and the decision to pause the efforts to start accession negotiations sparked large-scale protests across the country, with protesters demanding new, free and fair elections, the return of the country to its European path, an end to political violence and repression, investigations into and accountability for the serious human rights violations committed against protesters by law enforcement agencies, and the release of political prisoners; whereas protests have been taking place every day without interruption since 28 November 2024; whereas pro-EU protests have significantly increased across Georgia in 2025, with tens of thousands of citizens demonstrating against the government’s perceived shift away from EU integration; whereas these self-organised and spontaneous protests involving all segments of Georgian society underscore the Georgian people’s strong commitment to European values and democratic governance;

F. whereas in response to the peaceful protests, the Georgian authorities began an unprecedented violent crackdown on demonstrations, accompanied by the unlawful use of force, torture and other ill-treatment by the de facto authorities; whereas since November 2024, at least 62 people have been criminally charged in connection with their participation in pro-European protests and 54 remain in pre-trial detention; whereas more than 500 people have been detained under administrative procedures, some 300 of whom have reportedly been subjected to torture or other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and at least 157 of whom have suffered visible signs of serious physical injury;

G. whereas the de facto Georgian Dream authorities systematically subject civil society and independent media to pressure, legal restrictions and physical violence; whereas at least 138 incidents of media freedom violations have been documented in the context of pro-European protests or related events since November 2024, and a total of 174 media professionals have been the target of state repression; whereas at least 30 reporters have suffered repeated violations, including physical assaults, damage to professional equipment, administrative fines, criminal charges and judicial harassment; whereas journalist Mzia Amaglobeli is currently in pre-trial detention on trumped-up charges;

H. whereas the Georgian authorities have been restructuring or eliminating structures within the Georgian civil service responsible for pro-European reforms and dismissing professionals and civil servants en masse, in particular those who have criticised government policies, expressed pro-European views and condemned violence against peaceful demonstrators;

I. whereas the illegitimate Georgian parliament has established the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission on the Activities of the Regime and Political Figures of 2003-2012, which was the period when President Mikheil Saakashvili was at the helm and paving the way for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions; whereas this commission is a tool for the further persecution of political opponents, especially leaders of opposition movements; whereas on 22 May 2025, Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze, the leader of the Girchi – More Freedom party and one of the leaders of the Coalition for Change, was arrested for refusing to appear before this politically motivated commission created and controlled by Georgian Dream, whose long-term ambition is to eradicate political opposition in Georgia; whereas on 29 May 2025, Nika Melia, another leader of the Coalition for Change, was arrested one day before he was due to appear in court for refusing to appear before the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission;

J. whereas, in order to maintain and further increase its grip on power, the ruling Georgian Dream party has unilaterally and without consultation adopted changes to the municipal electoral system for the elections to the city councils in October 2025; whereas the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has recommended repealing these changes and the leaders of the main opposition parties have announced that their parties will not participate in those elections; whereas reforms to the formation process of the Central Election Commission further compromise election integrity, limit citizen participation and restrict the ability of observers and media to effectively monitor the electoral process;

K. whereas despite progress towards a more equal and inclusive society, deep-rooted inequalities and stereotypes persist, resulting in high levels of gender-based violence, severe restrictions for persons with disabilities and violence and harassment against the LGBTI community; whereas due to insecurity at home, many LGBTI people choose to flee the country; whereas Georgia’s legal definition of rape does not comply with the standards set in the Istanbul Convention;

Suspension of Georgia’s EU integration

1. Reiterates its solidarity with the Georgian people and its unwavering support for their legitimate European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, as expressed in mass protests that continue despite brutal crackdowns by the authorities; remains ready to assist the Georgian people in achieving these goals; strongly condemns the violent repression, arbitrary and politically motivated detention without sufficient legal grounds and the reported systemic torture of peaceful protesters, civil society actors, political opponents and media representatives; demands that the Georgian authorities refrain from using force, respect the freedoms of assembly and of expression and annul the recently adopted draconian legislation aimed at stifling popular protests, notably through extortionate fines; expresses its particular concern regarding the growing number of political prisoners and reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all of them; calls for all acts of violence to be effectively and credibly investigated and for those responsible to be held accountable; expresses concern about the lack of independence within the judiciary, with high-placed judges with links to the Georgian Dream overseeing politically motivated court proceedings against peaceful protesters and government critics;

2. Expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party failed to use the historic opportunity granted to Georgia, as a candidate country, to progress on its European integration path, noting that European integration continues to be supported by an overwhelming majority of the population; recalls that candidate status was granted to Georgia with the benefit of the doubt, despite the already concerning trajectory of the Georgian Dream government’s actions, which were increasingly at odds with European values and democratic principles; underlines that Georgia under Georgian Dream’s rule has not moved forward, and has in fact even regressed, on the key provisions of the nine steps indicated by the Commission, despite the authorities’ claims to the contrary; stresses that Georgia’s EU integration process has effectively been suspended as a result of the continued democratic backsliding in the country and the rigged October 2024 parliamentary elections amounting to a clear turning point towards an authoritarian regime, the ensuing illicit capture of the state institutions and democratic safeguards, and the adoption of a series of anti-democratic legislative acts that run counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action jeopardises Georgia’s EU path and urges the Georgian Dream to return to the course of democratic reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration;

3. Deplores the dismissal of approximately 700 civil servants since December 2024 due to their participation in or support for pro-European protests; stresses that such retaliation erodes public trust in democratic institutions, violates freedom of expression and association, and contributes to the deepening authoritarian tendencies of the current regime; calls on the Georgian authorities to abide by labour law standards and to allow civil servants to register a trade union in order to protect them from the unjustified restriction of their labour rights; expresses its concern about the growing politicisation of civil service appointments, and calls for a repeal of the amendments to the Law on Public Service adopted in December 2024 that remove the competition rule for the appointment of civil servants and instead grant direct appointment powers to the heads of public institutions; reiterates that these amendments constitute worrying backsliding from the successful public service reform that was implemented by Georgia under the EU-Georgian Association Agreement and calls for their repeal; 4. Stresses the need for an immediate and comprehensive audit of the EU’s policy towards Georgia given the ongoing democratic backsliding and the increasingly repressive political and legislative environment that constitutes a regression for many of Georgia’s democratic achievements and successful EU reforms, fundamentally weakens democratic institutions and further consolidates power in the hands of the ruling party; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to review the implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the blatant breach of Georgia’s obligations regarding the general principles laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms; reiterates that non-fulfilment of these obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and the privileges afforded by the Agreement;

5. Deplores the fact that high-level ruling party officials, members of parliament and government-affiliated media regularly spread manipulative narratives, disinformation and conspiracy theories about the EU, its Member States, leaders and politicians, as well as European integration; stresses that the ruling party’s regime continues its purposefully deceitful and ambiguous discourse, fuelling the false belief among parts of the Georgian public that it remains in favour of European integration; regrets the fact that the media and information environment is being suppressed and dominated by TV and media outlets supported by Georgian Dream, which spread false narratives about EU integration, thereby emulating and playing into Russian-inspired propaganda and facilitating polarisation in society;

6. Underlines the responsibility of Bidzina Ivanishvili and other officials and political leaders, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze, and the former Georgian Dream chair Irakli Garibashvili, for the deterioration of the political process in Georgia by enabling democratic backsliding resulting in the autocratic consolidation of power and by acting against the country’s constitutional objective of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls, therefore, for immediate and targeted personal sanctions to be imposed against Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family members and his companies and calls for the EU, in cooperation with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom, to freeze his financial assets; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on the imposition of sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia; condemns the unilateral actions by the Hungarian Government seeking to legitimise Georgian Dream;

Continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law and the autocratic consolidation of power

7. Reiterates its position that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections, which should be held in the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international and independent domestic observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process that would reflect the true will of the people;

8. Stresses that it does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities established by the Georgian Dream party following the rigged parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 and that it considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; consequentially rejects any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country, such as the rushed adoption of amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations; regrets the fact that the parliament of Georgia is a one-party parliament formed on the basis of fraudulent elections, which is incompatible with a pluralistic parliamentary democracy and the standards expected from an EU candidate country; welcomes the rejection of Georgian Dream’s credentials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Georgian delegation;

9. Deplores the continued attempts by the ruling Georgian Dream party to persecute political opponents, including through their illegal arrest and detention, threats and physical attacks; reiterates its calls for an end to politically motivated hostilities, an improvement to the political environment and the building of trust and cross-party dialogue;

10. Condemns the unlawful prosecution of political opponents by the investigative committee of the de facto Georgian parliament under the leadership of the Georgian Dream party, which disproportionately targets the actions of the government that ended its mandate more than twelve years ago; highlights the political nature of the ‘investigation’, noting that the Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 but launched the investigative committee in parallel with its attempts to ban genuine opposition parties; notes with concern the statements by the chair of the investigative committee, Tea Tsulukiani, spreading Russian narratives; strongly condemns the arrest of Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze and Nika Melia, and the threats to arrest other politicians, and considers these individuals to be political prisoners;

11. Expresses deep concern over recent declarations by leaders of the ruling Georgian Dream party indicating their intention to declare opposition parties – primarily the United National Movement – unconstitutional; recalls that the United National Movement played a pivotal role in initiating and advancing Georgia’s European integration process; notes the parallels between the conduct of the Georgian Dream de facto authorities and the current Kremlin regime, which cemented its rule by outlawing opposition parties; condemns the draft amendment to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens and to the Law on the Constitutional Court adopted on 13 May 2025, which would empower the Constitutional Court to effectively and arbitrarily ban all opposition parties;

12. Strongly reiterates its demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of seeking the necessary medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the Georgian authorities bear full responsibility for his health and well-being and must be held accountable for any harm that befalls him; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili;

13. Underlines that the policy of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the one-party parliament and the president appointed by it should continue until there is a tangible change in the political course of Georgia and new free and fair parliamentary elections are held; calls for the EU’s and the Member States’ representatives and members of parliament to refrain from meetings with representatives of the regime, starting with the current de facto president; continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

14. Points out that the upcoming municipal elections in autumn 2025 present yet another test for the resilience of Georgia’s democracy and political pluralism; calls on the opposition to seize the opportunity presented by these elections to reflect the unity of the Georgian people in favour of democracy and the rule of law, as already demonstrated in the peaceful protests against the manipulation of the parliamentary elections and repression; calls for the municipal elections to be held in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process;

15. Is deeply concerned, in this context, by the further deterioration of the electoral system and the overall democratic environment ahead of the municipal elections, in particular the fast-tracked adoption of new amendments to Georgia’s Organic Law and to the Election Code in December 2024 that undermine the principle of equal suffrage and aim to solidify the ruling party’s dominance at all levels of governance; recalls that these amendments have been criticised by the Venice Commission and calls for them to be repealed; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consider imposing additional individual sanctions against Georgian officials if the upcoming municipal elections fail to meet the criteria for fair and free elections;

16. Strongly condemns the continuing and deliberate destruction of the environment for Georgia’s vibrant civil society, with the adoption of several pieces of restrictive Russian-style legislation, including on the transparency of foreign influence, threats, and stigmatisation by the authorities; strongly denounces the new legislative initiative that requires the registration of all civil society organisation grants with the government and that obliges foreign donors to obtain executive approval to disburse grants to local organisations; regrets the recent decision by the authorities to freeze the bank accounts of crowdfunding initiatives and campaigns in support of political prisoners and their families; calls on the authorities to immediately cease the intimidation, threats, politically motivated prosecutions and physical assaults against civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists, journalists and media workers in Georgia; condemns the arbitrary and unjustified refusal of several European journalists’ entry to Georgia;

17. Condemns the recent adoption, without due public consultation, of legislation that enables further political persecution, limits the right of assembly, and further shrinks the space for civil society, independent media and the opposition to operate freely, including the Russian-style foreign agent law, the amendments to the Law on Public Service, the amendments to the Law on Grants, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, as well as new restrictive amendments to the Broadcasting Law; calls for the Georgian authorities to repeal these legislative changes; stresses that Georgian Dream’s political conduct, including its strategic alignment with the Russian Federation and the accelerated adoption of tools characteristic of authoritarian regimes, mirrors such developments within Russia itself;

18. Commends the work of Georgia’s civil society in the past months, providing free legal aid, documenting serious human rights violations and taking the lead on domestic and international litigation to seek justice and accountability against a background of continued attacks, the criminalisation of civic space, and disinformation campaigns against the work of civil society;

19. Stresses the urgent need to support Georgia’s civil society and independent media in the light of the growing repression and the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore asks the Commission to increase financial support and disburse it without any further delay; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment and for funds to be reallocated to directly support civil society organisations, independent media and human rights defenders; stresses further, in this regard, that the Member States should be ready to receive and support Georgian civil society organisations and independent media outlets so that they can continue their work in exile;

20. Stresses that beyond Georgian Dream’s rejection of Georgia’s EU integration, it rejects more generally international human rights law and democratic standards, while speedily moving along the negative trajectory previously witnessed in Russia; is deeply concerned, specifically, that this will have further trickle-down effects on the rights and well-being of women, minorities, migrants, persons with disabilities, LGBTI people, people living below the poverty line, and other vulnerable or at-risk groups; strongly condemns the adoption of anti-LGBTI legislation by the Georgian parliament in October 2024, which mirrors authoritarian, Russian-style policies and violates the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and calls for it to be repealed; calls for the reinstatement of gender quotas that were abolished by the parliament of Georgia in April 2024; calls on the EU Member States, when assessing asylum applications, to adequately take into account the fact that Georgia now has one of the most repressive anti-LGBTI laws in Europe; is concerned about the lack of protection of ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia;

21. Reiterates that the measures taken by the EU so far in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments do not reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and its consequences across the region; regrets the lack of proactive measures taken and the generally limited and delayed reaction by the Council and the Commission; stresses that the absence of unanimity among the Member States should not prevent those willing to take appropriate and effective measures from doing so; calls on the EU’s leadership to urgently rally like-minded Member States to take coordinated action and thereby surmount the political obstacles to adopting EU-wide sanctions;

22. Calls for the EU and its Member States to introduce, on a bilateral and coordinated basis, personal sanctions against key Georgian Dream political leaders, officials and the regime’s enablers in the administration, business, media, justice system, law enforcement agencies and the electoral commission who are responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists; further calls for sanctions to extend to mid- and lower-level public officials responsible for implementing repressive measures against the regime’s opponents and to maintain them until Georgian democracy is adequately restored; welcomes the imposition of bilateral sanctions by Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Czechia, Germany and Poland, as well as by like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ukraine, and invites other EU Member States to follow suit; calls for the consideration of further restrictive measures, such as SWIFT cut-off or sectoral sanctions, aimed at cutting off the financial flows and sources of income of the Georgian Dream regime;

23. Welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials as a first step in response to the persistent negative developments in Georgia; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspending it if the relevant benchmarks and standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not met because of the ruling party’s actions; stresses that Georgian Dream is fully responsible for any consequences stemming from the possible suspension of the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens; stresses the importance of visa-free travel for Georgian civil society actors, human rights activists and journalists, among others, both for travelling to the EU to inform European actors of developments in Georgia, but also for enabling them to quickly leave the country, as many face political persecution by the authorities;

Alignment on foreign policy matters

24. Deplores the fact that Georgian Dream is undoing decades of progress towards democracy, the rule of law and Euro-Atlantic integration and is alienating its allies, which had supported it throughout the process; regrets that Georgia has made no progress on implementing the EU’s recommendations on foreign, security and defence policy and that the level of Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains remarkably low, at 49 %, demonstrating its lack of commitment to European integration; emphasises that progress in the EU accession process requires full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in line with the expectations for all candidate countries; regrets the fact that Georgia does not participate in the EU’s crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; regrets the fact that misalignment of Georgia’s foreign policy is leading to self-isolation and that Georgian Dream’s repressive regime is worsening the instability in the South Caucasus region and the Black Sea;

25. Notes that Georgia, under the current government, is moving in a direction that puts it at risk of becoming a Russian vassal state like Belarus; regrets the fact that, at a time when the democratic world is standing in strong support of Ukraine against the Russian Federation’s unprovoked war of aggression, the current Georgian authorities are increasingly aligning themselves with Kremlin policies and rhetoric, thereby contributing to historical revisionism; notes that Georgia has not aligned with the vast majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran, but has claimed that it has cooperated with the EU to prevent sanctions circumvention; expresses its concern, however, over reports alleging Georgia’s role in facilitating the evasion of EU sanctions against Russia; calls, therefore, on the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation into such allegations;

26. Notes also with concern the recent strategic turn by the Georgian Dream government towards China and its increasing cooperation with Iran; notes the Georgian Dream’s public support for Chinese geostrategic initiatives and strengthened bilateral economic relations, including the award of the Anaklia deep-sea port construction project to a Chinese-led consortium; emphasises that such a move contradicts Georgia’s stated commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration; underscores that the Anaklia project now risks becoming a vehicle for increasing Chinese political, financial and economic leverage in the region, thereby further distancing Georgia from its strategic partners in the West; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to review and, if necessary, suspend or redirect funding for regional connectivity projects; expresses serious concern about Georgia’s increased multifaceted cooperation with Teheran, which can lead to Georgia’s further isolation;

27. Warns that Georgia’s ongoing turn towards authoritarianism and increasing alignment with Russia constitutes a growing threat to European security, particularly in view of Georgia’s strategic location and access to the Black Sea, which is critical to Russia projecting power in the region; underlines that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s strategy may be replicated elsewhere as a playbook for hybrid state capture; is concerned about regional repercussions and warns that the credibility of European action in the wider South Caucasus is at stake, especially in anticipation of the forthcoming EU Black Sea strategy;

28. Is deeply concerned about Georgian Dream’s collaboration, rapprochement and ideological convergence with Russia and other authoritarian regimes, despite Russia’s creeping occupation of Georgia’s territory; denounces Georgian Dream’s promotion of and participation in Russian disinformation and manipulation, including the weaponisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine as a propaganda tool, which are at odds with the undiminished and extraordinarily high public support for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; regrets the lack of cooperation with the EU in the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

29. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s ongoing occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the continued ‘borderisation’ process, which constitutes a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Georgian government to maintain a clear and consistent position on Russian aggression and calls for the EU to remain actively engaged in conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and support for affected communities;

30. Recommends the reinforcement of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) with increased resources and a broader mandate to monitor foreign interference and border destabilisation; urges the Member States to ensure adequate funding and personnel for the EUMM to respond to the current political and security crisis;

31. Notes that support from the European Peace Facility, worth EUR 30 million, was rightfully suspended in 2024 in response to the democratic backsliding in Georgia and that no support is planned for 2025; highlights that this suspension will have detrimental consequences on the national stability and security of Georgia; reiterates that any future financial support can only be authorised with the stipulation that the self-declared Georgian regime step down and fair and impartial elections be held;

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32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part – A10-0111/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part

(10724/22 – C10‑0057/2024 – 2022/0184M(NLE))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (10724/22),

– having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council on 27 June 2024 in accordance with Articles 207 and 209, in conjunction with Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0057/2024),

– having regard to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part [1] (EPCA),

– having regard to the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia of 23 October 2023,

– having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 May 2019 entitled ‘The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership’ (JOIN(2019)0009),

– having regard to the Commission’s assessment reports on the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) with Kyrgyzstan,

– having regard to the first EU-Central Asia summit on 4 April 2025,

– having regard to the 11th High-Level Political and Security Dialogue between the European Union and the countries of Central Asia, held in Brussels on 5 June 2024,

– having regard to the joint press statement of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Sadyr Zhaparov, and the then President of the European Council, Charles Michel, published on 3 June 2023,

– having regard to the 14th Human Rights Dialogue, held in Bishkek on 25 June 2024,

– having regard to the 19th meeting of the EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council, held in Brussels on 15 November 2022,

– having regard to the opinions of the Venice Commission on recent legal amendments abridging the freedom of the press and hampering the work of non-governmental organisations in Kyrgyzstan,

– having regard to reports on Kyrgyzstan published by human rights organisations, such as the 2022, 2023 and 2024 annual world reports by Human Rights Watch,

– having regard to the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) briefing on the protection of fundamental freedoms and civic space in Kyrgyzstan, published in February 2025,

– having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the EU strategy on Central Asia [2],

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Kyrgyzstan, notably that of 19 December 2024 on the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov [3],

– having regard to the visit of the delegation of its Subcommittee on Human Rights to Kyrgyzstan from 25 to27 February 2025,

– having regard to the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, following his official visit to Kyrgyzstan from 19 to 20 March 2025,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

– having regard to its legislative resolution of […] on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part,

– having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0111/2025),

A. whereas Kyrgyzstan occupies an important position in Central Asia, a region of increasing geopolitical significance that the EU has recognised as a key partner with which it engaged in structured dialogue at the first EU-Central Asia summit;

B. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have been partners since the country gained independence in 1991, and have established a comprehensive legal framework for their cooperation through the EU-Kyrgyzstan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1999;

C. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have recently agreed to deepen their partnership by signing an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), which represents a modern and ambitious framework for strengthening dialogue and cooperation in key areas such as trade and investment, sustainable development and connectivity, research and innovation, education, the environment and climate change, as well as the rule of law, human rights and civil society;

D. whereas the EPCA could also facilitate stronger cooperation on foreign and security policy, including conflict prevention and crisis management, risk reduction, cybersecurity, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and arms export control;

E. whereas the EPCA, which enhances the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, was signed on 25 June 2024; whereas the EPCA requires Parliament’s consent for it to enter into force;

F. whereas Kyrgyzstan has benefited from unilateral and preferential access to the EU market through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) since 2016; whereas Kyrgyzstan has acceded to 27 international conventions related to labour and human rights, environmental and climate protection, and good governance in order to be able to benefit from this scheme;

G. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 98 million to support governance and digital transformation, human development and a green and climate-resilient economy in Kyrgyzstan over the 2021-2027 period, aligning with the National Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic;

H. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 12 million to enhance the quality of legislation and increase the efficiency, independence, professionalism and capacities of the judiciary and services of the justice sector in Kyrgyzstan, thereby signalling its willingness to invest in stable growth that is consistent with the rule of law; whereas concerns over the independence of the judiciary persist, with politically motivated cases that target individuals critical of the government; whereas the 2021 reform of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic has reintroduced the heavily criticised 1997 version of the Code, which gives greater power to law enforcement while reducing citizens’ rights;

I. whereas the EPCA stipulates that the EU and Kyrgyzstan shall cooperate to strengthen civil society and its role in the economic, social and political development of an open democratic society;

J. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 100th in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, and has been classified as a country with ‘no impact’ of terrorism;

K. whereas, despite the Government of Kyrgyzstan repeatedly expressing its commitment to the principles of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law, human rights organisations have called attention to democratic backsliding and hardening authoritarian practices and persecution of civil society organisations in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, including during the negotiation of the EPCA and since its signing, with Transparency International and Freedom House finding that Kyrgyzstan has turned from a bastion of democracy with a vibrant civil society to a consolidated authoritarian regime that uses its justice system to target critics and whose authorities further undermine the balance of power and the system of checks and balances;

L. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 146 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index; whereas, at President Japarov’s initiative, the law on public procurement was amended to allow state-owned enterprises to circumvent tendering procedures; whereas there is no proper oversight of public spending due to a lack of access to such information; whereas state funds and national resources are used by the ruling elites to consolidate their power, silence dissent and resist reform;

M. whereas human rights defender, investigative journalist and founder of the Temirov Live media outlet, Bolot Temirov, has been stripped of his Kyrgyz citizenship and forced to leave the country in retaliation for his work investigating widespread corruption; whereas at least 11 of his colleagues were arrested in January 2024, including Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov;

N. whereas in March 2025, independent journalist and activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova was arrested and remains in detention in retaliation for her social media posts critical of the government;

O. whereas Kyrgyz Government propaganda has used false narratives to discredit independent media in the eyes of society and to portray them as ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘slaves of the West’;

P. whereas in recent years, democratic standards and human rights have deteriorated alarmingly in Kyrgyzstan; whereas Kyrgyzstan has fallen from 72nd to 144th place in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; whereas it ranks as the country that has had the sharpest decline in press freedom leading up to 2025;

Q. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities seek to shut down Aprel TV; whereas, as stated by the Committee to Protect Journalists, the prosecutors’ filing indicates that the authorities seek to shut down the media outlet on the basis of allegations that the outlet’s critical reporting portrays the authorities ‘in an unfavourable light’ and ‘undermines the authority of the government’;

R. whereas Parliament expressed its concern about the persecution of opposition parties and independent media in its resolutions of 13 July 2023 [4] and of 19 December 2024; whereas the persecution of members of the Social Democrats party (SDK) persists, despite repeated calls to ensure free and fair elections; whereas the leader of the SDK, Temirlan Sultanbekov, and two other members, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever, remain in detention; whereas there is cause for concern about Temirlan Sultanbekov’s medical condition following his prolonged hunger strike;

S. whereas the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, adopted by the Kyrgyz Parliament in March 2024, which requires non-profits that receive funding from abroad and engage in broadly defined political activity to register as ‘foreign representatives’, discriminates against and stigmatises journalists, human rights activists and other non-profit workers and subjects them to intrusive oversight, burdensome reporting requirements and excessive fines; whereas this law mimics repressive legislation in other authoritarian regimes and can be considered a precursor to further attempts to suppress independent civil society and media;

T. whereas the crackdown on human rights has targeted LGBTIQ+ people in particular; whereas Kyrgyzstan’s new legislative landscape, along with the broader political shift and repression, has effectively decimated the work of LGBTIQ+ rights organisations and activists, with key organisations completely shut down; whereas on 14 August 2023, Kyrgyzstan enacted discriminatory provisions against the LGBTIQ+ community under the pretext of protecting minors from ‘harmful information’; whereas the anti-discrimination bill recently considered by the Kyrgyzstan Supreme Council failed to include sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories;

U. whereas the law adopted on 6 October 2023 giving the President of Kyrgyzstan the power to overturn rulings of the Constitutional Court if they conflict with his own interpretation of ‘moral values’ fundamentally weakens the separation of powers – a foundational element of the rule of law – and constitutes a hollowing out of judicial independence in Kyrgyzstan;

V. whereas Kyrgyzstan is increasingly investing in the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment, particularly through key national frameworks such as the National Strategy on Gender Equality until 2030; whereas Kyrgyzstan still faces high rates of domestic violence, over 20 % of marriages in Kyrgyzstan occur through ‘ala kachuu’ (bride kidnapping) and women hold only 22 % of parliamentary seats despite existing gender quotas; whereas, on average, women earn 25 % less than men, as they are predominantly employed in low-paying sectors such as education, healthcare and social services;

W. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have engaged in actions that limit freedom of speech in the country and have arrested, put in long pre-trial detention or imprisoned journalists, bloggers, poets and regular social media users for criticising the country’s leadership or the situation in the country, and have also closed down an award-winning investigative media outlet;

X. whereas Kyrgyzstan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2014; whereas tentative steps have been taken towards improving accessibility for persons with disabilities and introducing the concept of inclusive education, though challenges remain, in particular concerning the institutionalisation of persons with disabilities;

Y. whereas the law on ‘false information’, enacted on 24 August 2021, has been used to target independent media and individuals critical of the government; whereas on 10 April 2025, the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan approved amendments to the law that provide for administrative sanctions for the dissemination of ‘false information’ on social media;

Z. whereas the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan is currently considering the re-criminalisation of the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, which has previously been misused against peaceful religious practitioners, and which, on account of the bill’s vague wording, could be used to silence legitimate political speech;

AA. whereas two new laws on freedom of religion came into force on 1 January 2025; whereas these laws maintain the ban on all unregistered exercise of freedom of religion or belief and make it impossible for communities with fewer than 500 adult members to gain legal status;

AB. whereas the negligence of the Kyrgyz law enforcement authorities in response to a campaign of intimidation and harassment has forced journalists and human rights workers to flee the country;

AC. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have silenced, arrested, detained and extradited refugees fleeing Russia for protesting against the war in Ukraine, contravening Kyrgyzstan’s obligation under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees not to return people to countries where their life or freedom is under threat on account of their political views, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to serious human rights violations such as torture or other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;

AD. whereas the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a border demarcation agreement on 13 March 2025, which legally recognises the borders between the two countries and allows for the development of interstate roads and energy infrastructure, contributing to regional stability and opportunities for enhanced cross-border cooperation on energy, transport and trade; whereas the border agreement itself has not been made public or open to public consultations;

AE. whereas the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship on 31 March 2025;

AF. whereas the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, has drawn attention to the concerning signs of democratic backsliding in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, with particular emphasis on the increasing restrictions on civil society and independent journalism;

AG. whereas Central Asia has yet to create horizontal regional frameworks free from the dominance of external actors pursuing their own geopolitical gains;

AH. whereas Kyrgyzstan has historically close and intertwined relations with Russia, with both being members of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States; whereas in October 2023, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bishkek during Putin’s first foreign trip since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him; whereas Kyrgyzstan, along with other Central Asian countries, has become a transit point for circumventing sanctions imposed on Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas exports of advanced technology and dual-use items to Kyrgyzstan – which are then exported to Russia – have significantly increased; whereas Kyrgyzstan has either abstained from voting or sided with Russia on votes on numerous UN resolutions on human rights and, in particular, on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

AI. whereas OJSC Keremet Bank, based in Kyrgyzstan, was involved in a sanctions evasion scheme with Russian state-owned defence bank Promsvyazbank Public Joint-Stock Company (PSB), where it facilitated cross-border transfers on behalf of PSB; whereas in 2024, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance sold a controlling stake in Keremet Bank to a Russian oligarch with ties to the Russian Government; whereas the United States has imposed sanctions on Keremet Bank;

EU-Kyrgyzstan EPCA

1. Despite the shared interests in strengthening the EU-Kyrgyzstan important political and trade relations, is concerned by the deteriorating situation of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the context of the completion of negotiations and the signing of the EPCA; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities, in this context, to respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular media freedom and freedom of expression, and to foster an environment of cooperation and involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; underlines the importance of Parliament’s close involvement in monitoring the implementation of all parts of the EPCA; calls for an effective evaluation by both parties to the agreement, to be conducted within three years, of the implementation of its essential elements, with clear human rights benchmarks and time frames; calls on the Commission to present to Parliament the outcome of such evaluations; expects that, given the recent backsliding on these fronts and ahead of the EPCA vote in the European Parliament and its subsequent implementation, the Kyrgyz Government will take some concrete steps towards addressing the pressing concerns outlined in this report, such as releasing political prisoners and repealing recently adopted repressive legislation; considers that a negative assessment of the implementation of these essential elements could lead to Article 316 of the EPCA being triggered;

EU-Kyrgyzstan relations

2. Welcomes the long-standing and strategic relations between the EU and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the increasing cooperation and exchanges; recalls that Kyrgyzstan is the EU’s third-largest trading partner in Central Asia; reiterates its commitment to work together with the country and with its partners in Central Asia to ensure peace, security, stability, prosperity, democracy and sustainable development;

3. Welcomes the outcomes of the first EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand on 4 April 2025; welcomes their commitment to regional and global stability, to the promotion and protection of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to addressing climate action, connectivity and education; notes also the 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting held in Ashgabat on 27 March 2025;

4. Highlights the need for cooperation in promoting green initiatives based on a sustainable market economy, private sector innovation, and long-term environmental stewardship, early warning systems for natural disasters, low-carbon development and the transition to renewable energy sources; highlights Kyrgyzstan’s initiatives to promote the mountain agenda on global platforms, including the preservation of mountain ecosystems, the protection of the environment and the development of sustainable tourism and mountain communities; stresses that investments in Kyrgyzstan’s green energy goals would significantly contribute to reducing the country’s regional energy dependence and to tackling environmental challenges; commends the Kyrgyz Republic’s involvement in the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy and Climate Change;

5. Supports Kyrgyzstan’s efforts towards sustainable development, aligning its initiatives with the country’s National Development strategy for 2018-2040, alongside the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and the EU strategy for Central Asia; recalls that the EU-Kyrgyzpartnership prioritises governance and digital transformation in order to enhance transparency and efficiency in public administration;

6. Welcomes Team Europe initiatives seeking to build a green and climate-resilient economy in order to address environmental challenges and promote sustainable growth; highlights the recent signing of the agreement between the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which will strengthen the Kyrgyz Climate-Resilient Water Services Programme;

7. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to continue promoting joint cooperation initiatives in strategic areas such as energy infrastructure, in particular the hydropower sector, sustainable development and culture, while also building on the positive experiences of the Member States already active in the region;

8. Highlights the importance of enhancing cooperation on critical raw materials, which have been identified as strategically important for ensuring secure, sustainable and diversified supply chains; takes note of the endorsement of the EU-Central Asia Joint Declaration of Intent on Critical Raw Materials at the first EU-Central Asia summit, and of Kyrgyzstan’s proposal to establish a partnership with the EU for the development of critical raw materials;

9. Notes that the Erasmus+ programme has been instrumental in facilitating academic exchanges; welcomes the EU’s support for digitalisation and education in the country, and calls for the creation of a programme for the exchange of entrepreneurs in the field of digital transformation and the green transition; stresses the importance of fostering convergence and coordinated reforms in higher education, such as by aligning the Kyrgyz National Qualifications Framework with the European Qualifications Framework; highlights the need to foster academic and cultural exchanges between Kyrgyzstan and the EU Member States and the active involvement of Kyrgyz young people in non-formal education and civil society programmes; underlines the importance of strengthening academic and vocational exchanges, building on the 2024 education agreement;

10. Welcomes the EU’s increased support for young people, gender equality and human rights in Kyrgyzstan, with the aim of empowering youth and women’s organisations, strengthening the country’s Ombudsman’s Office and enhancing the capabilities of its National Centre for the Prevention of Torture; expresses serious concern about attempts to dissolve the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture;

11. Recalls that the EU has already allocated EUR 12 million to support the reform of Kyrgyzstan’s judicial system, confirming the EU’s commitment to the country’s institutional development; stresses the importance of continuing to invest in institution building, transparency and the independence of the judiciary;

12. Expresses its concern, in view of the widespread corruption in Kyrgyzstan, about the transparent and efficient use of the EUR 98 million in EU assistance for the 2021-2027 period; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to publish detailed reports on the use of EU funds and to strengthen cooperation with international anti-fraud bodies, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), in order to uphold global fund management standards and implement robust anti-fraud measures that protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission and other relevant EU institutions to ensure the highest possible level of oversight of the use of EU funds and to consider allocating additional resources to strengthen the financial and operational capacity of Kyrgyz agencies involved in their management;

13. Stresses the importance of enhanced information exchange on terrorist threats, full compliance with international counterterrorism financing standards and the implementation of robust measures to prevent the acquisition, transfer and use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials for terrorist purposes;

14. Underlines the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, facilitating cooperation between competent agencies and bringing national laws in line with international transparency standards in order to investigate financial crimes and promote good corporate governance; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in eradicating corruption and not to use the fight against it as an excuse for cracking down on civil society and government critics;

15. Calls on the Kyrgyz Republic to review its technical regulations and strengthen collaboration on standards, metrology, market surveillance, accreditation and conformity assessment procedures to facilitate mutual market access, deepen bilateral trade with the EU and ensure fair treatment of investors; urges Kyrgyzstan to avoid restrictive measures that could disadvantage EU investors;

Regional cooperation and global challenges

16. Considers Central Asia to be a region of strategic interest for the EU in terms of security, connectivity, energy diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral, rules-based international order, especially in a historical moment marked by profound geopolitical change; encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia on political, economic and security matters in line with the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law that underpin EU external action; highlights that any further EU cooperation with Central Asian countries cannot be achieved at the expense of these values; emphasises the need for increased dialogue and collaboration on foreign and security policy issues, including cybersecurity, regional stability, crisis management, disarmament and arms control, in line with the principles of international law and the UN Charter;

17. Underlines that the EU and Central Asia are facing profound global and regional geopolitical shifts and challenges; stresses, in this regard, the need to work towards long-term, structured and mutually beneficial cooperation on matters of common interest; strongly encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia, given the region’s geostrategic importance, and to promote a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries by expanding cooperation at political and economic level; welcomes the increased high-level contact between the EU and Central Asia;

18. Highlights the growing momentous challenges to multilateralism and a rules-based order for both the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic, such as Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, with concern, the neutral stance of Kyrgyzstan and other countries in the region towards the conflict, and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold international norms and contribute to regional efforts to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity; notes Russia’s influence in the region despite efforts by Central Asian countries to diversify their foreign relations; regrets that Kyrgyzstan has not condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine;

19. Deplores the active role of Kyrgyz companies and banks, such as Keremet Bank, in helping Russia to evade sanctions and obtain technology and dual-use goods for its war effort against Ukraine; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to take further measures to stop the transit of sanctioned goods to Russia through Kyrgyz territory, such as enforcing stricter licensing requirements and conducting due diligence on companies involved in the trade of dual-use goods; highlights that failure to address the export of dual-use technologies could lead to secondary sanctions; calls on the Commission to assess the current level of sanctions evasion by Russia with the help of actors in Central Asian countries, and to propose concrete solutions for addressing this; recommends the establishment of a working group focused on monitoring and tracking the trade of dual-use goods;

20. Regrets that, despite its stated commitment to respect democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as agreed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, Kyrgyzstan does not align its positions with those of democratic countries, in particular the EU Member States, when voting at the UN General Assembly;

21. Deplores the fact that the Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity was granted observer status by the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and was present at the OTS summit in Bishkek; reiterates that, as part of the Joint Declaration following the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, the Central Asian states, including the Kyrgyz Republic, are committed to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions – 541 (1983) and 550 (1984);

22. Recognises the need to strengthen relations to foster deeper, closer and values-based cooperation in facing common threats and achieving shared goals worldwide;

23. Welcomes initiatives aimed at strengthening the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and takes note of the Coordination Platform for the Corridor;

24. Highlights the EU’s role as an important donor of aid to the region; stresses the need to increase the EU’s efforts in its support for development cooperation in Central Asia, in particular in Kyrgyzstan under the newly signed EPCA;

25. Welcomes the border agreement reached between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and its recent ratification; urges both parties to take the necessary steps to implement the agreement, including by triggering consultations with the local populations, and to adopt measures to strengthen cross-border cooperation and support the border communities that have been hit hardest by the recent cross-border conflict; welcomes the EU’s financial support for the construction of facilities in the Sughd region of Tajikistan, which borders Kyrgyzstan; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to investigate the serious crimes, documented by independent observers, that took place during the September 2022 armed conflict and to hold those responsible to account;

26. Welcomes the first trilateral summit bringing together Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan without mediation by external actors; welcomes Central Asian aspirations to strengthen their regional ties and set up a horizontal cooperation architecture in the region without the assertive involvement of external powers;

Human rights, democracy and the rule of law

27. Stresses that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law strengthens stability, sustainable development and security, as they establish legal certainty, predictability and strong institutions; recalls that strong democratic legal frameworks and institutions foster innovation, trade, investments and economic expansion, while ensuring inclusive development and equal access to social and economic rights, and reducing social inequalities, and are indispensable in building resilient societies capable of resisting authoritarian influence and external destabilisation;

28. Encourages Kyrgyzstan to enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that includes sexual orientation, gender, disability and ethnicity as protected categories; stresses that the protection of minorities in Kyrgyzstan requires a multifaceted strategy that addresses the root causes of discrimination, including existing obstacles in accessing justice;

29. Welcomes the legislative acts to enhance protection against domestic, sexual and gender-based violence; calls on the Kyrgyz Government to ensure that the law is consistently enforced and perpetrators are formally charged with the relevant crimes, and to maintain efforts towards eliminating gender-based and domestic violence;

30. Is concerned about the entry into force of new legislation restricting freedom of religion or belief in Kyrgyzstan, as it increases state surveillance and control over religious groups by creating a state registry for religious entities and buildings, introduces fines for wearing certain religious attire, such as the niqab, in state institutions and public places, and increases oversight of religious education; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure freedom of religion or belief is protected in the country, in line with international human rights standards and commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

31. Encourages the Kyrgyz Government to develop a national action plan for human rights with the involvement of civil society, in line with the recommendations made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

32. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to unconditionally release all wrongfully imprisoned or detained journalists, bloggers and activists, including Kanyshai Mamyrkulova and those affiliated with Temirov Live, such as Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, and Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov, and to drop all charges against them, as well as to restore Bolot Temirov’s citizenship and refrain from other unlawful practices; condemns the sentencing in October 2024 of journalists Azamat Ishenbekov and Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, from the Temirov Live platform known for its investigations into corruption, to five and six years in prison respectively; highlights the opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recognising the detention of Temirov Live’s journalists as arbitrary; welcomes the pardoning of journalist and Temirov Live employee Azamat Ishenbekov, and of activist Zarina Torokulova, who were convicted on charges of ‘inciting mass unrest’;

33. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to ensure adherence to the principles of free and fair elections by safeguarding the rights to contest and campaign, while maintaining administrative neutrality towards all political parties throughout the current election cycle, in line with international standards; strongly condemns the Kyrgyz Government’s campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, particularly the SDK, which was removed by the Kyrgyz authorities from the November 2024 local elections in Bishkek; notes that discussions on electoral reform have taken place in the Kyrgyz Parliament;

34. Strongly deplores the detention of Temirlan Sultanbekov, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever on 13 November 2024, and calls on the Kyrgyz Government to urgently end their politically motivated prosecution by dropping all restrictions imposed on their respective sentences; condemns the fact that the proceedings against them have been marred by dubious practices, a lack of legal protections since the start and the violation of their right to due process; recalls that an audio recording of unknown origin, serving as the primary evidence and lacking judicial authorisation, is what initiated the investigation; laments that their trials have been held in a closed-door format without any audio or video recordings; denounces the fact that the conditions for their release on probation are disproportionate and violate their right to participate in public affairs;

35. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from pursuing politically motivated prosecutions or exerting undue pressure on political opposition and dissenting voices, such as the SDK; emphasises that political pluralism is a necessary component of any modern democracy and must be respected to maintain long-term legitimacy and stability;

36. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure the right to peaceful assembly by lifting the ban on protests in Bishkek city centre, which was initiated in response to a request from the Russian embassy to end anti-war protests outside its premises in 2022;

37. Welcomes the acquittal of Klara Sooronkulova, Gulnara Dzhurabayeva, Asya Sasykbayeva and other members of the Committee for the Protection of the Kempir-Abad Water Reservoir; urges the Kyrgyz Government to drop its appeal of the decision of the court of first instance, and bring the politically motivated prosecution to an end;

38. Strongly condemns, and urges the Kyrgyz authorities to end, the recent crackdown on civil society and to foster an environment of cooperation, with the involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; deplores, in particular, the politically motivated detention of human rights activist Rita Karasartova, and calls for her urgent release; deplores further the seizure of the house of imprisoned human rights activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova; expresses its admiration for Kyrgyz civil society and independent media which, despite the persecution and at great personal risk, remains one of the most vibrant civil societies in Central Asia;

39. Calls on the EU Member States and the EU institutions to support Kyrgyz civil society organisations, human rights defenders and lawyers, LGBTIQ+ and environmental activists, independent media and bloggers, to express their grave concern over the deterioration of human rights in the country in all their exchanges with the authorities of Kyrgyzstan, and to reassess the country’s GSP+ benefits and adopt appropriate measures, including sanctions under the EU’s global human rights sanctions regime (‘EU Magnitsky Act’) as a last resort, if Kyrgyzstan continues to disregard its commitments to international conventions;

40. Deplores several recent cases of individuals critical of the Kyrgyz Government living outside of Kyrgyzstan facing the threat of extradition to Kyrgyzstan, where they risk politically motivated arrest, imprisonment and torture in retaliation for their criticism; denounces the case of exiled activist Tilekmat Kurenov who was recently extradited from the United Arab Emirates to Kyrgyzstan, where he had previously been subjected to politically motivated imprisonment, torture and threats because of his activism;

41. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to revoke the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, which severely impairs the ability of civil society to carry out legitimate public interest work and operate without undue interference and harassment while ensuring a safe working environment, and which contradicts Kyrgyzstan’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its commitments as an EU partner under the EPCA; urges the Commission to ensure that the EU’s programmes and initiatives are not compromised by the proposed laws, which may limit freedom of expression and curtail the activities of non-governmental organisations;

42. Urges Kyrgyzstan to respect and protect media freedom and pluralism, which are fundamental conditions for democracy, refraining from forcibly closing independent media outlets, as in the case of Kloop, or levelling unsubstantiated allegations against them due to their investigative and critical reporting; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to allow independent media professionals to carry out their work, to guarantee journalists and reporters will not face retaliatory persecution for their professional activities, including investigative journalism, and to provide adequate protection to reporters that might be harassed for their reporting; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to ensure the continued operation of the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty service;

43. Calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan to conduct active public diplomacy and address false narratives spread by the Kyrgyz authorities, in particular those that misrepresent EU values and policies with the aim of discrediting independent media and civil society; urges EU and Member State diplomats in Kyrgyzstan to attend politically motivated trials and to provide support to the unjustly persecuted individuals and their families;

44. Condemns the Kyrgyz authorities’ attempts to shut down Aprel TV by revoking its broadcasting license and terminating its social media operations on the basis of an investigation by Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security; laments these actions in a context of shuttering media outlets on illegitimate grounds;

45. Expresses concern about the re-criminalisation of libel and insult laws and calls on the Kyrgyz Government not to abuse these provisions to target journalists and legitimate political opposition; invites the authorities to review this legislation in accordance with the Venice Commission’s recommendations;

46. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to revoke the law on ‘false information’ and the law prohibiting ‘LGBT propaganda’, which contravene Kyrgyzstan’s obligations under international law and have been systematically used to silence critical voices, including journalists and civil society actors; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure that the mass media law is fully in line with international standards and does not result in violations of the freedoms of media or expression;

47. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to protect journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and activists from intimidation and harassment, including those facing death threats and other threats to their safety while in prison, and calls on the EU Delegation to closely monitor such threats and report regularly on the situation of at-risk individuals; deplores the government raids, blocking of news sites and prosecution of journalists and bloggers; condemns the court’s closure of the organisation behind the Kloop investigative platform over its alleged ‘negative’ coverage; regrets President Japarov’s call for the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to be shut down, accusing the Kyrgyz service of spreading misinformation;

48. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from criminalising the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, as human rights watchdogs have warned that this could lead to the further deterioration of freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan, given the potential for abuse of the law, and to maintain clear legal safeguards to prevent the misuse of laws that penalise public incitements of extremist activity; urges Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Council to uphold the right to freedom of expression and recalls that countering ‘false information’ cannot lead to a crackdown on independent media, the opposition and others critical of the government;

49. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to strengthen the rule of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in line with international standards, to establish processes to measure judicial performance, improve public oversight and increase transparency within the judiciary, and to enhance the engagement of the judiciary with civil society and other branches of government; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in guaranteeing equal access to justice, the right to a fair trial and the fulfilment of the right to due process;

50. Is concerned by the high number of pre-trial detention cases, which has been highlighted by the Kyrgyz Ombudsperson Dzhamilia Dzhamanbaeva, and echoes the Ombudsperson’s call on Kyrgyz law enforcement and judiciary bodies to adhere to international standards, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures;

51. Notes the penitentiary system reforms carried out in recent years, mainly comprising the development of probation, the digitalisation of different processes and the introduction of alternative preventive measures; regrets, however, cases of mistreatment of prisoners and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to take all necessary steps to ensure that prisoners do not experience inhuman or degrading treatment or conditions, and receive adequate healthcare in safe and secure conditions;

52. Underlines the need to develop new legislation in the field of administrative law and justice, including the reform of public administration and alternative dispute resolution, and to strengthen the professional capacities of public administration and judiciary representatives, which could be partly achieved by adopting e-governance systems;

53. Asks the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold the independence of the legal profession and ensure that lawyers are not subjected to interference or harassment as a result of fulfilling their professional duties, including the defence of their clients in politically sensitive cases;

54. Commends Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the Central Asia Rule of Law Programme, which supported national efforts to prevent and fight corruption and money laundering, and raised awareness about human rights standards among legal professionals, among other matters;

55. Notes the return of the controversial Land Code to the Kyrgyz Parliament by President Japarov, following public protests against it;

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56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Kyrgyz Republic.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: RECOMMENDATION on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark – A10-0099/2025

Source: European Parliament

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark

(COM(2024)0479 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE))

(Consent)

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the draft Council decision (14652/2024),

– having regard to the Protocol on the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, of the other part (2025-2030) (14781/24),

– having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 43(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0227/2024),

– having regard to its non-legislative resolution of …[1] on the draft decision,

– having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

– having regard to Rule 107(1) and (4) and Rule 117(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Fisheries (A10-0099/2025),

1. Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

2. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States, of the one part, and of Greenland and Denmark, of the other part.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

At the end of 2024, Greenland and the European Union signed a new Protocol on the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) (2025-2030). This is a mixed agreement that allows the European Union’s vessels to fish species such as cod, Greenland halibut, redfish and Northern prawn. In return, the European Union pays a financial contribution of EUR 17 296 857 per annum, comprising EUR 14 096 857 for access rights and EUR 3 200 000 for support and implementation of Greenland’s fisheries policy, plus the fees paid by vessel owners. In recent years, the fisheries agreement has allowed around 10 of the European Union’s vessels to operate in the autonomous territory’s waters. The new Protocol provides details of the rules and provisions governing this access.

Fisheries in Greenland

The fisheries sector is of central importance for Greenland in socio-economic and cultural terms. It accounts for 15% of the territory’s jobs and over 90% of its exports. Inshore fishing mainly involves small boats (dinghies), and sustains a local economy and jobs. Many remote Inuit communities rely on subsistence fishing. The territory also has a developed offshore fishing fleet and has fisheries agreements in force that allow foreign vessels to fish in the offshore area. Greenland’s fisheries are suffering the effects of climate change on a vulnerable Arctic marine environment, with particular impacts on the species caught. Greenland has put measures in place to limit the impact of fisheries on the marine environment; these include a ban on discards, a plan for the management of bycatch, etc.

New Protocol implementing the SFPA

The new Protocol that has been signed has a term of six years, providing stability and visibility for stakeholders. It contains provisions aimed at providing a framework for access to waters by European vessels and cooperation with Greenland: fishing opportunities, bycatch, scientific cooperation, monitoring, controls, surveillance, fishing areas, observers etc.

A specific characteristic of the agreement is that catches are regulated on the basis of fishing opportunities that are set annually. Your rapporteur is concerned about the fact that, according to the ex-post evaluation, the TACs for several of the targeted species exceed the limits set on the basis of scientific advice. These proven cases of overfishing, or of uncertainty owing to a lack of data, pose a threat to fish populations and the sustainability of fisheries, as in the case of the Northern prawn. Several indicative fishing opportunities have been reduced. The second noteworthy point is linked to the need for additional data regarding the targeted species and marine ecosystems.

The programming of sectoral support will be adopted in the three months following the application of the Protocol. The sectoral support allocated in recent years has made it possible to support research and scientific assessments, the administration of Greenland’s fisheries, controls and also small-scale coastal fisheries. This is assessed positively in the evaluation of the last Protocol.

Conclusions and recommendations

In the context of current diplomatic tensions with the United States and the climate crisis in the Arctic, your rapporteur recalls the importance of the SFPA and relations between Greenland and the European Union in the area of fisheries. Through its sectoral support, the fisheries agreement offers assistance that is welcomed by the authorities and a number of civil society actors in Greenland. Positive developments include the increase in the financial contribution paid by the European Union, in the amount of sectoral support and in the fees paid by vessel owners.

Your rapporteur invites the European Union to provide increased support to coastal fishing communities, with respect for the rights of the indigenous peoples and the FAO’s Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries. It is advisable to ensure that these peoples, as well as NGOs, are involved in the agreement. Another positive development is the European Union’s support in areas such as controls, the fight against IUU fishing, the collection of data and scientific research.

Your rapporteur underlines the environmental challenges associated with the agreement. As already requested by Parliament in 2021, it is essential to continue efforts in relation to data collection and the fight against overfishing, by following the scientific advice for setting TACs in Greenland and allocating annual fishing opportunities to the European Union. Even though it fishes smaller quantities, the European Union must follow the precautionary principle. The definition of the surplus is controversial in certain cases. The fishing carried out by the European Union’s vessels furthermore has an impact on seabed ecosystems and the emphasis must be on identifying and protecting vulnerable marine ecosystems, with the sector’s help.

Finally, your rapporteur asks for this fisheries agreement to be repositioned in the context of regional fisheries governance. Quota exchanges mean that post-Brexit relations with coastal countries, including Norway, are closely linked to the agreement. The European Union and Greenland must strengthen cooperation and transparency within the RFMOs and the agreements between coastal states. More broadly, the European Union must do more to protect species and the marine environment in the Arctic.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report:

Entity and/or person

Delegation of France to the European Union

Delegation of Germany to the European Union

Delegation of Denmark to the European Union

Greenland Ministry of Fisheries

Oceana

Europêche

DG MARE (Commission)

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (19.2.2025)

for the Committee on Fisheries

on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Protocol implementing the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other hand

(COM(2024)0479 – C10‑0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE))

Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

A. whereas the previous 4-year Implementing Protocol to the Agreement will expire on 21 April 2025;

B. whereas the financial contribution for the entire duration of the new Implementing Protocol is EUR 103 781 000, based on:

(a) an annual amount for access to fishery resources for the categories provided for in the Protocol, set at EUR 14 096 857 for the duration of the Protocol;

(b) support for the development of Greenland’s sectoral fisheries policy amounting to EUR 3 200 000 per year for the duration of the Protocol;

C. whereas the implementation of the Protocol requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below:

DG MARE		Year N	Year N+1	Year N+2	Year N+3	Year N+4	Year N+5	TOTAL
□ Operational appropriations
Budget line 08 05 01	Commitments	17.296	17.296	17.296	17.296	17.296	17.296	103.781
Budget line 08 05 01	Payments	17.296	17.296	17.296	17.296	17.296	17.296	103.781

EUR million (to three decimal places)

D. whereas on 21 November 2024, Parliament approved DEC 15/2024 submitted by the Commission on 25 October 2024, which makes available the necessary appropriations on operational line 08 05 01 to honour the 2024 financial obligations resulting from the new Implementing Protocol;

E. whereas the Protocol with Greenland and Denmark was signed and entered into provisional application on 12 December 2024;

1. Notes that the support allocated to the Protocol should meet the objectives of enabling Union vessels to fish in Greenland’s fishing zone, enabling the Union and Greenland to work closely together to further promote the development of a sustainable fisheries policy and the responsible exploitation of fishery resources in Greenland’s fishing zone, and ensuring that the Union and Greenland cooperate to contribute to decent working conditions in the fisheries sector; considers that there should be thorough scrutiny to ensure that the support meets those objectives effectively during the implementation of the Protocol;

2. Recommends that, for future agreements, an impact assessment of the added value and socio-economic benefits derived from the previous agreement be taken into account; considers that this assessment should guide the negotiation and renewal of subsequent agreements to ensure that they align with the objectives of sustainable development and efficient use of the Union’s financial resources;

3. Notes that the transfer of appropriations for an amount of EUR 16 992 434 in commitment appropriations, as submitted by the Commission in DEC 15/2024, was approved by the budgetary authority in the time limit provided for in the Financial Regulation; regrets that the decision on this budgetary matter is disconnected from, and had to be taken prior to, the decision on the consent to be given by Parliament to the new Implementing Protocol; underlines that decisions on the agreement itself and related budgetary matters are inextricably linked, and fears, therefore, that the disconnect risks de facto pre-empting the decision on consent and creating a fait accompli;

4. Calls on the Commission to explain the need for the provisional application of the Implementing Protocol in question, since the existing Implementing Protocol remains in force until April 2025, thus allowing time for the agreement to be finalised without any risk of a gap; calls on the Commission to provide further information about the budgetary implications of the provisional application of the new Implementing Protocol as of 12 December 2024, given the fact that the current Implementing Protocol is still in force;

5. Takes note that DEC 15/2024 does not include any transfer of payment appropriations to the operational line for 2024 on the basis that, according to the Commission, the first access payment linked to this Implementing Protocol will be due by 30 June 2025; asks the Commission to clarify the lack of synchronisation between commitment and payment appropriations;

6. Notes that the 2025 budget as voted on in plenary on 27 November 2024 includes amounts of EUR 150 560 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 135 300 000 in payment appropriations on line 08 05 01, as well as amounts of EUR 59 970 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 41 620 000 in payment appropriations for fishing activities on reserve line 30 02 02; regrets that the amounts are cumulative and not broken down by fisheries agreements, thus making it difficult for Parliament to scrutinise budget implementation in this field;

7. Stresses that the financial programming of line 08 05 01 needs to be sufficient to cater for the financial obligations in the years 2026-2027 subject to the decision of the budgetary authority in the annual budgetary procedures; calls for scrutiny regarding the financial programming of line 08 05 01 in the annual budgets of 2026 and 2027;

8. Concludes that the Committee on Budgets is in a position to advise the Committee on Fisheries, as the committee responsible, to recommend approval of the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Protocol implementing the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other hand.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

The rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

Title	Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark
References	14652/2024 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE)
Committee(s) responsible	PECH
Date announced in plenary	BUDG 10.2.2025
Rapporteur for budgetary assessment Date appointed	Isabel Benjumea Benjumea 12.12.2024
Discussed in committee	16.1.2025
Date adopted	19.2.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	23 0 5
Members present for the final vote	Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Tobiasz Bocheński, Tomasz Buczek, Angéline Furet, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Andrzej Halicki, Alexander Jungbluth, Fabienne Keller, Janusz Lewandowski, Giuseppe Lupo, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Victor Negrescu, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Lucia Yar
Substitutes present for the final vote	Moritz Körner, Tiago Moreira de Sá
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Hildegard Bentele

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

23	+
ECR	Tobiasz Bocheński, Bogdan Rzońca
NI	Thomas Geisel
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Hildegard Bentele, Andrzej Halicki, Janusz Lewandowski, Danuše Nerudová, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva
Renew	Fabienne Keller, Moritz Körner, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar
S&D	Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Giuseppe Lupo, Victor Negrescu, Matjaž Nemec, Carla Tavares
Verts/ALE	Rasmus Andresen, Ignazio Roberto Marino

5	0
ESN	Alexander Jungbluth
PfE	Tomasz Buczek, Angéline Furet, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Julien Sanchez

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Title	Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark
References	14652/2024 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE)
Date of consultation or request for consent	18.12.2024
Committee(s) responsible	PECH
Committees asked for opinions Date announced in plenary	BUDG 10.2.2025
Rapporteurs Date appointed	Emma Fourreau 18.12.2024
Discussed in committee	27.1.2025	18.3.2025
Date adopted	20.5.2025
Budgetary assessment Date of budgetary assessment	BUDG 19.2.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	24 1 2
Members present for the final vote	Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Thomas Bajada, Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Ton Diepeveen, Siegbert Frank Droese, Emma Fourreau, Nicolás González Casares, France Jamet, Nora Junco García, Isabelle Le Callennec, Isabella Lövin, Giuseppe Lupo, Giuseppe Milazzo, Francisco José Millán Mon, Jessica Polfjärd, André Rodrigues, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Sander Smit, António Tânger Corrêa, Emma Wiesner, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Substitutes present for the final vote	Sebastian Everding, Marco Falcone, Karin Karlsbro, Rasmus Nordqvist
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Hélder Sousa Silva
Date tabled	28.5.2025

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

24	+
ECR	Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Nora Junco García, Giuseppe Milazzo, Bert-Jan Ruissen
PPE	Carmen Crespo Díaz, Marco Falcone, Isabelle Le Callennec, Francisco José Millán Mon, Jessica Polfjärd, Sander Smit, Hélder Sousa Silva
PfE	Ton Diepeveen, António Tânger Corrêa
Renew	Karin Karlsbro, Emma Wiesner, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
S&D	Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Thomas Bajada, Nicolás González Casares, Giuseppe Lupo, André Rodrigues
The Left	Emma Fourreau
Verts/ALE	Isabella Lövin, Rasmus Nordqvist

1	–
ESN	Siegbert Frank Droese

2	0
PfE	France Jamet
The Left	Sebastian Everding

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure – A10-0107/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure

(2025/2007(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 173, 179 and 190 thereof,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025: Moving forward together: A Bolder, Simpler, Faster Union’ (COM(2025)0045),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem [1] (the Chips Act),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union [2] (NIS 2 Directive),

– having regard to the detailed report by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) entitled ‘Foresight Cybersecurity Threats For 2030 – Update 2024’, published in March 2024,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements [3] (the Cyber Resilience Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 [4] (the Cybersecurity Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats and incidents [5] (the Cyber Solidarity Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/37 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/881 as regards managed security services [6],

– having regard to the Commission White Paper of 21 February 2024 entitled ‘How to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs?’ (COM(2024)0081),

– having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 2 July 2024 entitled ‘State of the Digital Decade 2024’ (COM(2024)0260),

– having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 [7],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/903 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 laying down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union [8] (the Interoperable Europe Act),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information (recast)[9],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241 [10],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 [11] (the Data Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1309 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying gigabit electronic communications networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and repealing Directive 2014/61/EU [12] (the Gigabit Infrastructure Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence [13] (the Artificial Intelligence Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014 [14],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240 [15],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013 [16],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme [17],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2023 establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027 [18],

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014 [19],

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488 [20],

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1732 of 17 June 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 as regards a EuroHPC initiative for start-ups in order to boost European leadership in trustworthy artificial intelligence [21],

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (recast)[22],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework [23],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 to the European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ (JOIN(2025)0009),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2020 entitled ‘Secure 5G deployment in the EU – Implementing the EU toolbox’ (COM(2020)0050),

– having regard to the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, which commits ‘to promote a European way for the digital transformation, putting people at the centre’,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 December 2021 entitled ‘Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market of State aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest’ (IPCEIs) (COM(2021)8481),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0107/2025),

A. whereas technological sovereignty should be seen as the whole value chain from excellence in research to creating better competition and achieving greater European sovereignty;

B. whereas the EU relies on non-EU countries for over 80 % of digital products, services, infrastructure and intellectual property;

C. whereas a few technological companies hold concentrated power over key digital markets and control over underlying internet infrastructure, including operating systems, computing, artificial intelligence (AI), search engines, social media capacity, digital advertising and payment services;

D. whereas our technological sovereignty will greatly depend on Europe’s ability to create the market conditions needed for European companies to flourish and compete with each other, thereby increasing the quality of their products;

E. whereas the EU is at risk of failing to meet its digital decade targets and objectives, including the adoption of cloud, big data and AI;

F. whereas European firms contribute a minor share to global research and development (R&D) in software, internet technologies and electronics, while the United States and China lead in these sectors;

G. whereas the Commission’s Digital Compass, Digital Decade Policy Programme, and Competitiveness Compass are essential frameworks for strengthening Europe’s digital ecosystem, securing technological leadership and ensuring long-term economic resilience;

H. whereas digital infrastructure is composed of hardware elements related to connectivity, including fibre, 5G and 6G, submarine cables, satellites and spectrum, and computing, including semiconductors, data centres, HPC and quantum technologies, and of software elements including identity solutions, the Internet of Things, and cloud and AI systems, as well as the intermediary layer including advertising, search engines, payments and communication systems;

I. whereas the EU’s competitiveness will increasingly depend on the digitalisation of all sectors, supported by resilient, safe and trustworthy digital infrastructure; notes, in this context, that the digital single market is a vital asset as it can enable companies to grow and scale up;

J. whereas the full potential of the digital single market remains untapped, with intra-EU trade in digital services representing just 8 % of GDP, which is significantly lower than the 25 % for trade in digital goods;

K. whereas the availability of eID schemes and digital public services and access to e-Health records are increasing, but there are still significant gaps in the provision of privacy preserving, fully user-centric, accessible and sovereign digital public services among Member States due to differences in the adoption of eID;

L. whereas eID is currently available to 93 % of the EU’s population, but achieving 100 % of digital public services for citizens and businesses by 2030 remains challenging;

M. whereas interoperability and interconnectedness would enhance the competitiveness of the European economy and might benefit from policies such as open-source first and public money, public code, and the implementation of common and open standards;

N. whereas digital infrastructure is of key importance for EU industry, including the automotive industry and the possible development of connected and autonomous vehicles; whereas robust data and communications infrastructure is needed to support a secure ecosystem for connected and autonomous vehicles;

O. whereas fibre-optic networks form one of the backbones of the EU’s digital infrastructure, enabling high-speed internet, 5G networks and future technological improvements;

P. whereas the EU is behind on the roll-out of 5G to meet its 2030 targets, with still limited fibre coverage of only about 64 % of European households being included;

Q. whereas investment needs in state-of-the-art connectivity in the EU are immense;

R. whereas resolving challenges related to access to land and grids is key to the successful deployment of digital infrastructure;

S. whereas the EU GOVSATCOM initiative aims to ensure the long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

T. whereas chips play a crucial role in increasing the technological competitiveness and resilience of Europe;

U. whereas the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass, the Clean Industrial Deal and the 2025 Commission Work Programme make little to no mention of semiconductor technologies despite their critical importance for the EU’s industrial ambition;

V. whereas the Chips Act was an ad hoc adaptation mechanism aimed at addressing certain challenges regarding semiconductor shortages; whereas its areas of action are mostly limited to advanced semiconductors; whereas EU engagement on legacy semiconductors is insufficient; whereas the revision of the Chips Act is expected in September 2026;

W. whereas the existing European regional clusters in the semiconductor sector have a role to play and should be further strengthened;

X. whereas processors, memory technologies, graphics processing units (GPUs), and quantum chips are critical to Europe’s digital infrastructure and supply chain security;

Y. whereas cloud services are fundamental to a wide range of computational activities and computing services that have become an essential enabler of competitiveness;

Z. whereas federated models could enhance the competitiveness of the EU market by facilitating the emergence of significant European alternatives, building on local market expertise and presence;

AA. whereas large-scale AI infrastructure, such as AI gigafactories, is essential for enabling open and collaborative development of the most complex AI models;

AB. whereas the AI value chain is still under development and tackling the development of AI models is only part of it; whereas European AI solutions may be developed using Europe’s public and private computing infrastructure, driving innovation, and start-ups and small companies should be in particular beneficiaries of access to public computing infrastructure;

AC. whereas AI models that can be run on widely available hardware at moderate costs allow a greater number of actors to shape how AI systems are created and used, providing more immediate value in applications and enabling a more democratic use of AI;

AD. whereas at the moment, the roll-out, marketing and deployment of AI is often shaped by a small number of big tech companies; whereas some AI features are not being rolled out in the EU at the same time as in non-EU countries, creating a competitive disadvantage for European businesses and consumers;

AE. whereas data centres are an essential part of an advanced digital society, as enablers of distributed processing and effective data storage;

AF. whereas trusted capacity and availability of data storage is essential for European resilience and development; whereas most data centres in Europe are not owned by European companies;

AG. whereas building and operating large-scale data centres requires substantial investment;

AH. whereas around 9 % of global electricity consumption results from data centres, cloud services and connectivity;

AI. whereas submarine cables are critical infrastructure for global connectivity, economic stability and security, carrying over 99 % of international communications through them, and they remain vulnerable to physical damage, cyberthreats and geopolitical risks;

AJ. whereas secure and resilient digital infrastructure is crucial, particularly considering the increasing number of cyberattacks against the EU, its Member States and its industry and society;

AK. whereas the EU toolbox for 5G security is important for preventing cyberespionage and strengthening the resilience of supply chains in the EU’s digital infrastructure;

AL. whereas 21 % of businesses cite compliance and legal uncertainties as a barrier to digital investment;

AM. whereas the ‘one in, one out’ approach ensures that all burdens introduced by Commission initiatives are considered and that administrative burdens are offset by removing burdens of equivalent value in the same policy area;

AN. whereas the energy consumption challenges in AI, cloud and quantum computing, as well as data centres, require the integration of sustainability into digital infrastructure strategies;

AO. whereas data centre power consumption is projected to nearly triple by the end of this decade, increasing from approximately 62 terawatt-hours (TWh) today to more than 150 TWh, thus escalating from 2 % to 5 % of total European power consumption;

AP. whereas the digital skills gap remains a major concern, with only 54 % of European citizens possessing at least basic digital skills – well below the 80 % target set in the digital decade policy programme;

AQ. whereas the shortage of ICT professionals in the EU is projected to reach 12 million by 2030, falling significantly short of the EU’s target of 20 million skilled workers;

AR. whereas the 2024 State of the Digital Decade report and the Draghi report both stress the urgent need to invest in digital and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) skills to preserve Europe’s technological capabilities and global competitiveness;

AS. whereas 60 % of EU companies report difficulties in recruiting skilled workers in areas such as AI, cybersecurity and clean technologies, posing a significant barrier to innovation, competitiveness and the green and digital transitions;

AT. whereas current labour market developments, including global lay-offs and political instability outside the EU, create an opportunity to attract high-skilled digital talent to the EU;

AU. whereas increasing competitiveness and resilience require appropriate funding; whereas public funding can act as a catalyst and private investment and competitive market forces are key for the long-term development of digital infrastructure;

AV. whereas a robust, agile and excellence-driven research and innovation (R&I) ecosystem is essential to ensure the EU’s global competitiveness and leadership in strategic technologies, such as quantum and AI;

AW. whereas standardisation is at the core of genuine European digital and technological sovereignty; whereas the importance of standards is growing due to increasing technological competition across the world, particularly with the United States and China;

AX. whereas the EU is committed to negotiating comprehensive digital trade agreements (DTAs) to promote secure, resilient and competitive digital infrastructure development with partner countries;

AY. whereas the Commission has announced landmark DTAs with South Korea and Singapore, setting an important precedent for future agreements;

AZ. whereas Parliament and the Council have agreed on the ‘EU horizontal provisions on Cross-border data flows and protection of personal data and privacy in the Digital Trade Title of EU trade agreements’, which was endorsed by the Commission and remains an important tool in relation to digital trade and the establishment of new DTAs;

General introduction

1. Underlines that European sovereignty is the ability to build capacity, resilience and security by reducing strategic dependencies, preventing reliance on foreign actors and single service providers, and safeguarding critical technologies and infrastructure; calls for the development of a comprehensive risk assessment framework to monitor and address dependencies across the digital value chain; underlines that such a framework should serve as a basis for ensuring EU preparedness and resilience by enhancing European industrial policy and boosting domestic R&D and manufacturing capabilities in strategic technologies;

2. Believes that technological sovereignty is the capacity to design, develop and scale up digital technologies needed for the competitiveness of our economy, the welfare of our citizens and the EU’s open strategic autonomy in a globalised world; believes that this includes ensuring the EU’s ability to make autonomous decisions, engaging with trusted non-EU countries and entities, diversifying and strengthening supply chains and promoting the concept of openness and interoperability to ensure that Europe remains an attractive hub for investment;

3. Recognises the increasing concentration of power in non-EU companies, which constrains Europe’s ability to innovate, compete and maintain control over its digital economy, society and democracy; is concerned by excessive dependencies on non-EU actors in critical areas such as cloud infrastructure, semiconductors, AI and cybersecurity – where market concentration and foreign control threaten to undermine Europe’s competitiveness, democratic resilience and security;

4. Believes that the EU’s industrial tech ambitions should focus on the key strategic technologies of the future, such as semiconductor technologies or quantum, that contribute to the EU’s open strategic autonomy and are essential for our green, digital and defence transitions;

5. Recognises the shift in the geopolitical landscape and the resulting opportunity for market demand for European products and services; sees this as a window of opportunity to position Europe as a global leader in trusted and secure digital solutions;

6. Underlines the need to foster a supportive regulatory environment that encourages innovation, investment and the development of cutting-edge technologies in Europe, while protecting EU end users from the consequences of extraterritoriality;

7. Recognises the need for a comprehensive European industrial policy for the digital ecosystem, integrating all relevant policy domains such as market access, standardisation, R&D, investment, trade and international cooperation; calls on the Commission to develop this comprehensive policy with the aim of reducing harmful strategic dependencies, strengthening domestic value chains and ensuring a secure, trustworthy and innovation-driven digital ecosystem that adheres to European values;

8. Recalls that the high-tech product and digital services markets depend heavily on external supply chains, posing risks to sovereignty and resilience; stresses the importance of boosting industrial capacity and technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies to support the EU’s open strategic autonomy;

9. Emphasises that boosting Europe’s technological sovereignty in the era of rapid technological development requires enhancing innovation and commercialisation in order to build the necessary capabilities; highlights that Europe must transform itself into a globally attractive and agile business environment by reducing bureaucracy, enhancing regulatory predictability and fostering entrepreneurship and risk-taking;

10. Recognises that open strategic autonomy and democratic resilience must be at the core of the Commission’s agenda and that a comprehensive approach must integrate procurement, funding and long-term institutional frameworks to establish sovereign digital infrastructure in critical domains;

11. Calls on the Commission to analyse and establish a comprehensive list of critical dependencies in digital infrastructure and technologies, assessing, at minimum, storage services, identity and payment systems, communication platforms, as well as the software, protocols and standards that support them, and to propose measures to promote market access for products and services with a strong positive impact on the EU’s technological sovereignty, resilience and sustainability; believes, in that regard, that the use of specific award criteria in public procurement may be promoted in areas where such critical dependencies exist; believes that such criteria can help incentivise competition and strengthen European technological sovereignty by facilitating the procurement of European digital products and services, where possible;

Digital public infrastructure

12. Strongly believes that digital infrastructure is the backbone of our economy and that there should therefore be a base layer of digital public infrastructure (DPI) that ensures sovereignty and a competition-friendly market environment; observes that the market has not developed this base layer in many important areas, which has resulted in monopolies and reliance on foreign actors; underlines that in order to fill this gap, the EU should take the lead in creating a strong foundation for DPI by creating layers of digital technologies consisting of semiconductors, connectivity solutions, cloud infrastructure, software, data and AI; believes that European DPI should be founded on fair and competitive economic models and also use governance models where neither private companies nor governments maintain centralised control; is of the opinion that it should be built on common and open standards, embrace interoperability and interconnectedness, so as to prevent user and vendor ‘lock-ins’, and spur innovation by facilitating new market entrants, and that it should also ensure privacy and security by default;

13. Believes that the deployment of DPI should be focused on areas where critical dependencies exist, as identified in the Commission’s comprehensive list; calls on the Commission to prepare a detailed and comprehensive plan for establishing European DPI by identifying technologies that are best suited to European action, and urges the Commission and the Member States to dedicate appropriate resources to deploying European DPI;

14. Stresses that European DPI should be stimulated by coordinated action at EU level to ensure the presence and competitiveness of European providers as well as a competitive market environment; underlines that these objectives will not be achieved through regulation alone and will require significant public investment; recognises that the forthcoming multiannual financial framework (MFF) should therefore include additional funding for this purpose, focusing on EU added value and financing the base layer of European DPI;

15. Recognises that as part of the forthcoming MFF, the EU must commit to increased spending to achieve technological sovereignty; underlines that this should include a dedicated envelope for the development and deployment of the DPI layers identified in the Commission’s comprehensive list, as well as additional funds to ensure a competition-friendly market environment in other digital areas;

16. Believes that the funding under the forthcoming MFF should prioritise active capacity-building in key hardware, software and service areas, including high-performance computing, quantum computing, encryption and communication, connectivity, cloud, data, web and AI ecosystems, and digital libraries;

17. Is of the opinion that European DPI should be based on EU values and remain open to like-minded non-EU partners; calls on the Commission and the Member States to sustain their efforts and add more impetus to the process with the UN Development Programme on DPI;

18. Recognises e-government services as a key enabler of efficient, secure and accessible public service delivery, which should be designed to facilitate digital identification, government data sharing and public sector payments without distorting markets or undermining existing private sector solutions; emphasises that the EU’s approach to e-government services should focus on strengthening digital government-to-citizen and government-to-business interactions, while ensuring trust, interoperability and accessibility; believes, therefore, that secure and seamless access to public services requires a trustworthy e-identification framework and welcomes the announcement of a ‘business wallet’ aimed at significantly simplifying the interconnection between businesses and public authorities;

19. Calls on the Commission to further develop public interest data platforms, enabling secure cross-border data sharing between public and private entities for use cases, in particular, in healthcare, urban planning and environmental monitoring; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to promote interoperability between public interest and industry-specific data platforms, ensuring the seamless flow of data while minimising administrative burdens; notes that this could be achieved by leveraging existing market-driven solutions that foster innovation, maintain trust and uphold privacy and security standards;

20. Recognises that under the current legal framework, European citizens have the right to control their personal data and that data generated within the EU must be processed in accordance with EU law; stresses that safeguarding privacy and personal data is essential for building trust in the digital economy, allowing European consumers to engage with confidence, regardless of where their data is processed; highlights that European companies – particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – must be able to make use of data in a lawful, ethical and secure manner to drive sustainable growth and competitiveness;

Digital infrastructure

21. Highlights that digital infrastructure is the backbone of Europe’s economy and society and that its importance will continue to grow; calls on the Commission to include in the requested list of critical dependencies a comprehensive assessment of the composition of European digital infrastructure in order to adequately analyse the state of play, assess risks and coordinate action;

22. Believes that in order to strengthen digital infrastructure, it is essential to implement capacity-building initiatives in critical areas at EU level; considers that these initiatives should focus on developing a base layer of public infrastructure, such as a network of AI gigafactories and a European web index model; is of the opinion that this base layer will empower companies to develop their business models and boost technological sovereignty; points to the digital solutions created by the EU, such as the EU digital identity, that can offer innovative infrastructure for the EU’s digital economy;

23. Recognises the strategic importance of critical digital infrastructure and the need to strengthen their security and resilience; understands that critical digital infrastructure includes, but is not limited to, cables (terrestrial and submarine), cellular network towers, satellite communication systems, spectrum and radio equipment, cloud servers that contain sensitive information and data centres that process sensitive information, as well as certain software elements, including security software that protects critical networks and data centres;

24. Highlights the need to ensure that this infrastructure falls under EU jurisdiction, meaning that it fully adheres to EU law; stresses the importance of privacy and security-by-design; calls on the Commission. therefore, to introduce legislation to mitigate risks posed by high-risk vendors from non-EU countries, including risks posed by foreign-controlled energy resource providers;

25. Calls on the Commission, while preparing future legislative proposals and the forthcoming MFF, to concentrate efforts on deepening the single market, in line with the recommendations made in Enrico Letta’s report entitled ‘Much more than a market’ and in Mario Draghi’s report on ‘The future of European competitiveness’, with the aim of unlocking the potential of the digital single market;

26. Takes note of the recommendations laid down in these two reports that the EU needs a paradigm shift from promoting connectivity in the EU to establishing a single market for electronic communications and connectivity; supports a simplified, harmonised and innovation-friendly telecommunications framework that ensures fair competition and the accessibility of infrastructure;

27. Welcomes the Commission’s white paper on how to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs, which outlines three pillars: creating the ‘3C Network’ – ‘Connected Collaborative Computing’, completing the digital single market, and secure and resilient digital infrastructure for Europe;

28. Views the white paper and the subsequent consultation process as part of the preparation of the legislative initiatives planned for this term, including the Digital Networks Act; calls on the Commission to take a more holistic view of digital infrastructure throughout this process and to acknowledge that digital infrastructure comprises many elements beyond mere connectivity; underlines the need to accompany any new digital policy measure with an impact assessment;

29. Urges the Commission to simplify and harmonise telecommunications rules as part of the forthcoming Digital Networks Act and the broader Digital Package;

30. Calls on the Commission to introduce an EU cloud and AI development act to strengthen European data infrastructure and the promotion of European cloud providers; underlines that this act should aim to actively build a European single market for cloud and AI;

31. Acknowledges that deploying cutting-edge digital infrastructure across the EU requires substantial investment and recognises that both public and private funding are essential for achieving this goal; expresses concern over the persistent shortage of venture capital and investment financing in Europe, which undermines technological sovereignty; calls on the Commission to significantly scale up public-private investment instruments, including venture capital, strategic platforms and dedicated funding tools for start-ups and scale-ups in critical technology sectors; highlights the importance of leveraging public procurement to support the deployment and scaling of open and interoperable digital solutions and of ensuring that private capital, competition and innovation become the main drivers of Europe’s digital transformation over the medium and long term;

High-speed connectivity

32. Is of the opinion that the upcoming Digital Networks Act must support the objective of providing all EU consumers with high-quality connectivity by 2030, especially in remote and rural areas, as well as removing administrative barriers for the roll-out of 5G, 6G and secure, high-speed broadband;

33. Recognises the increasing convergence of telecommunications infrastructure with cloud and edge technologies, and sees the potential of open radio access networks to deliver advanced technological solutions, reduce costs and enhance the interoperability of connectivity; believes that the future of connectivity lies in the complementarity of diverse technologies such as 5G/6G, Wi-Fi and satellite, where seamless integration benefits both businesses and consumers;

34. Recognises that with cloud and edge services at the core of their transformation, connectivity networks are evolving rapidly into platforms for innovation and will increasingly depend on cloud computing, AI, virtualisation and other technologies;

35. Calls for ambitious targets in the development and innovation of wireless communication networks, acknowledging the need for a broad-based approach that includes cloud computing, AI, edge computing and quantum computing; emphasises that the innovation ecosystem for electronic communications, especially for vertically integrated telecoms, should remain market-driven, and insists that future regulatory measures be based on thorough, knowledge-based impact assessments of existing regulations;

36. Recognises that competition between operators of all sizes remains a key driver of investment in connectivity networks; calls on the Member States to ensure that copper networks are switched off progressively in favour of fibre-optic or 5G technologies, in particular where regular maintenance or updates of the network are needed, thus ensuring that the shift is carried out in an attainable manner and allowing providers to plan logistically and financially in advance;

37. Stresses that all consumers in the EU should have access to adequate quality, reliable and affordable connectivity, thus contributing to increased demand for connectivity services; calls on the Commission and the Member States to expand and upgrade digital networks, especially in rural areas, and to support public-private investments in broadband and 5G/6G deployment, while maintaining cybersecurity standards and secure-by-design principles;

38. Is convinced that, as digital connectivity infrastructure such as fibre, 5G and 6G will be crucial for future industrial competitiveness, the forthcoming MFF should include funds for the large-scale deployment of network infrastructure, bridging the existing deployment gap to achieve the 2030 Digital Decade targets, creating pan-European 5G coverage for citizens’ use and ensuring the successful deployment of Industry 4.0 tools;

Fibre

39. Stresses the importance of accelerating the deployment of fibre-optic networks and modern wireless communications systems that can deliver fast, secure and reliable digital services;

40. Recognises that the need to prioritise direct fibre connections for homes, businesses and public institutions is crucial to ensure ultra-fast and reliable connectivity, in addition to network roll-outs with public works, such as roads, water and electricity, to streamline fibre roll-out;

41. Welcomes the introduction of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act, which responds to the growing needs for faster, reliable and data-intensive connectivity; recognises the importance of the shared use of ducts and poles for deploying very high capacity networks to optimise resources and reduce costs; urges the Member States to streamline permitting processes and harmonise regulations to lower financial and administrative barriers to the expansion of fibre infrastructure;

5G and 6G

42. Believes that private investments are essential for deployment of electronic communication networks, 5G and 6G that are advanced enough in terms of transmission, speed, storage capacity, edge computing power and interoperability;

43. Stresses that the enforcement and implementation of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act is further necessary for the creation of a one-stop shop for permits and a centralised digital permitting process to reduce delays in infrastructure deployment and to ensure uniform rules for infrastructure access, pricing and environmental impact assessments; calls, in this regard, for strong efforts in this area;

44. Takes the view that the EU needs strong cybersecurity protection in all critical infrastructure sectors, with stricter measures to de-risk high-risk vendors in 5G and 6G networks, ensuring dense deployment of small cells and macro towers, particularly in urban and rural areas with inconsistent coverage, and ensuring the sustainability and energy efficiency of the infrastructure so as to support Europe’s global competitiveness in the digital economy;

Spectrum

45. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to work towards enhanced coordination of spectrum allocations, in particular through earlier identification and the harmonisation of the release of new frequencies, starting with 6 GHz frequencies; calls for a radio spectrum policy that promotes investment in Europe, including through the harmonisation of spectrum assignment policies across the Member States to accelerate 5G deployment based on best practices, the promotion of longer license durations and access to new spectrum such as the upper 6 GHz band in order to meet future demand and enable 6G; believes that a shared effort from public and private entities is necessary in order to increase the competitiveness of Europe and not lag behind the fastest growing networks in the world, i.e. in China and South Korea;

Satellites and satellite communication systems

46. Underlines the importance of satellite-based communications in developing EU digital infrastructure, increasing its resilience, strengthening the capabilities of EU actors, and reducing dependence on non-EU providers, particularly in the area of defence; highlights the need to provide alternative connectivity solutions for consumers in remote and rural areas;

47. Highlights the strategic role of the EU space programme, as one of the pillars of EU sovereignty, in providing state-of-the-art and secure positioning, navigation and timing services for Galileo and EGNOS and cost-effective satellite communication services for GOVSATCOM; notes that this allows the EU and its Member States to have greater sovereignty in their satellite capabilities, including geopositioning, earth observation, space surveillance and connectivity; welcomes, in particular, the EU GOVSATCOM and IRIS2 programmes, which aim to ensure the short- and long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

48. Deplores the strong dependence on non-EU data for the tracking and surveillance of space objects; stresses the need for Europe to urgently reinforce its own capabilities and infrastructure in space situational awareness (SSA) to ensure open strategic autonomy and security; calls on the Commission and the Member States to significantly increase investment in EU-owned surveillance and tracking assets, and to develop effective mechanisms for information-sharing among the Member States, enabling Europe to independently monitor and protect its critical space infrastructure;

49. Stresses the importance of private sector involvement in launcher technologies to further accelerate the deployment of IRIS2; stresses the importance of fostering a robust and competitive European space launch sector through greater private sector involvement and support for upstream and downstream industries; calls on the Commission to promote a European space industrial policy that strengthens sovereignty in space technologies and services by reducing strategic dependencies and improving the operational governance of European space programmes;

50. Calls, to this end, for concrete measures to facilitate the provision of satellite services throughout Europe, including by defining common procedures and conditions; calls, in parallel, for fair competition, with clear and enforceable rules for all satellite constellations accessing the EU market;

51. Notes that there are currently several issues with latency in satellite networks and recognises that the integration of satellite networks with 5G and, in the future, 6G technologies is pivotal in extending the reach and reliability of terrestrial networks;

High-performance computing (HPC) systems

52. Recognises the progress made in recent years in enhancing HPC; calls on the Commission to continuously integrate and enhance the computing power at EU HPC centres, in particular, enhancing the training of AI models and preparing for future advancements in supercomputing;

53. Calls on the Commission to develop a coordinated strategy to bridge the gap between Europe’s cutting-edge HPC technology and its practical, scalable deployment across industries, including by creating a public network for supercomputing; notes that this strategy should foster collaboration between public institutions and private sector partners, including SMEs, to ensure that Europe’s HPC capabilities become a key driver of economic competitiveness and technological sovereignty;

54. Highlights that HPC centres must ensure accessibility for developers and deployers of AI foundation models, generative AI and applied AI; notes that EuroHPC Centres should be available for these use cases and particularly for SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups; emphasises that this must be seamlessly complemented by initiatives to enable the development and deployment of AI in the EU;

55. Welcomes the creation of new AI factories; underlines that AI factories will upgrade EuroHPC supercomputers to deliver computing capacity for AI and support start-ups and scale-ups in the training and large-scale development of general-purpose and trustworthy AI models;

Hardware for computing: semiconductors, chips and quantum chips

56. Believes that urgent action is needed to boost EU domestic semiconductor manufacturing, improving supply chain resilience by forming strategic global partnerships, encouraging start-ups and innovation, fostering cross-border collaboration in advanced semiconductor development and providing financial incentives, regulatory support and market access;

57. Emphasises the need for legal certainty to support semiconductor development, ensuring secure supply chains for critical raw materials and avoiding disruptions caused by investment uncertainties;

58. Urges to give utmost political importance to ensuring a sufficient supply of AI chips in the EU and to make it a focal point of EU digital industry policies; notes the increase in demand for AI chips driven by expanding applications in cloud computing, edge devices, autonomous systems and generative AI;

59. Calls on the Commission to react to the new geopolitical realities and the use of digital supply chains as pressure tools; urges the Commission to find a negotiated solution to the US ban on the export of AI chips to 16 EU Member States;

60. Calls on the Commission to put advanced AI chips, including their design and production, at the core of the revision of the Chips Act; calls on the Commission to present the revision this year, featuring a long-term strategy rooted in current geopolitical realities that builds European strategic indispensability through technological leadership, adequate production capabilities and a strong R&D ecosystem, which will be essential to secure European sovereignty in increasingly troubled times; believes that it is crucial to strengthen the interactions among research, training, suppliers and robust public infrastructure to accelerate the path from research, development, testing and finally full-load production;

61. Believes that the EU should enhance its efforts on quantum chip development if it intends to accelerate the time-to-market for EU industrial innovation in quantum technology;

62. Calls on the Commission to support the manufacturing within the EU of widely used chips e.g., for electronic devices and cars; calls for support for the development of chips that reduce the energy consumption of the digital sector;

63. Underlines the need to support the performance of the circular economy and recalls that information and communications technology products and other electronics are part of the priority product groups in the working plan to be adopted by April 2025 under Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 [24];

64. Believes that additional funding under the forthcoming MFF must be allocated to the development of semiconductor production capacities and other next-generation semiconductor technologies and processes (e.g. photonic chips, wide-bandgap chips, as well as design, manufacturing, testing, assembly and advanced packaging) within the EU;

Cloud services

65. Recognises that there is a market need for sovereign solutions that offer enhanced levels of control over data for certain categories of sensitive data and acknowledges the risks associated with reliance on single dominant providers; calls for a strategy for reducing reliance on foreign cloud providers, while fostering European alternatives;

66. Notes that the discussions on the EU Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services have not brought any results; points out that there are sovereignty considerations, in particular related to the extraterritoriality of binding legal regimes, that cannot be solved through technical discussions; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned cloud and AI development act;

67. Notes the need to secure data storage and computational power, and distributed computing infrastructure; calls on the Commission to ensure that cloud users have the ability to choose solutions that meet their needs by urgently removing barriers to switching and diversifying providers through multi-cloud strategies, and by fostering a competitive European cloud market, thereby reducing reliance on single providers and enhancing digital sovereignty;

68. Calls on the Commission to leverage initiatives such as 8ra and IPCEI CIS to advance decentralised cloud and edge infrastructure, which are enablers of sovereignty and contribute to reducing reliance on foreign providers and ensuring resilience while enhancing operational flexibility within Europe;

AI systems

69. Welcomes the InvestAI initiative, including the AI gigafactories; emphasises the need for Europe to position itself as a global leader in AI model training, scientific research and quantum computing advancements; is committed to further supporting AI development by launching initiatives such as AI factories to provide computing power for start-ups, scale-ups and researchers;

70. Calls on the Commission to further support the design and development of European AI and to adopt policies and measures that will enable European industrial sectors to benefit from their data and AI deployment;

71. Emphasises that the delayed deployment of AI-driven innovations hinders technological progress, market competitiveness and digital transformation within the EU;

72. Expects that the public-private financing model will unlock unprecedented private investment in AI that will open up access to supercomputers for start-ups and industry to supercomputers;

Quantum

73. Recognises the urgent need to define a clear roadmap for quantum technology development, including quantum computing and quantum encryption, ensuring that public and private investments lead to tangible commercial applications;

74. Calls on the Commission to conduct an assessment of existing national quantum sandbox frameworks and how existing legislation applies to them in order to prevent market fragmentation; welcomes the announcement of the Quantum Strategy and Quantum Act in the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass;

75. Urges the Commission to ensure that the Quantum Act, accompanied by an impact assessment, positions Europe as the leading region for quantum excellence and innovation by investing in R&D and innovation, mobilising funding to scale up the European quantum ecosystem, capabilities and production, and ensuring Europe’s leading quantum research is commercialised in Europe; underlines that it should deliver tangible technological applications by fostering policies that accelerate technological maturity and facilitate the transition from research to commercial success;

76. Calls for targeted investments, industry collaboration and regulatory frameworks that support the development, scaling and market adoption of quantum technologies across key sectors;

77. Calls for a coordinated EU strategy for post-quantum cryptography to protect data from future cyberthreats;

Data centres

78. Calls on the Commission to support ecosystems for sharing industry-specific data within industrial sectors, fostering collaboration and driving innovation, while maintaining data sovereignty and ensuring compliance with EU regulations, as outlined in the Data Act; urges the Commission for strong enforcement to ensure that dominant market players do not impose unfair terms on SMEs and mid-sized enterprises when accessing and sharing data;

79. Believes that there is a need to ensure interconnected infrastructure that would allow data centres to work together efficiently under common standards with high-speed connectivity, while flexibility, security and scalability would be maintained; believes this interconnected system would help in ensuring distributed redundancy so that data and services remain available even in the event of a data centre failure;

80. Calls on the Commission to prioritise interoperability across platforms, enabling the seamless integration of data across businesses and sectors, in alignment with the requirements of the Data Act, which mandate data portability and interoperability obligations for cloud and edge services; stresses the need for the robust enforcement of these provisions to prevent vendor lock-in and ensure that European industrial ecosystems can leverage data-driven innovation without technical or contractual barriers;

81. Recalls the Commission’s plan to make data centres climate-neutral and highly energy efficient by 2030; sees the need to improve the integration of data centres with the energy system, focusing on heat reuse and providing flexibility services to the electricity grid needs; recognises the need to incentivise research for cooling and energy-efficient processors, while special attention should be given to supporting EU data centres; urges the Commission to ensure clear and consistent implementation of existing legal requirements for data centre operators across EU legislation and the Member States;

82. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase and target public investment and to incentivise private investment in digital infrastructure to enable the growth and modernisation of data centres;

Submarine cables

83. Calls on the Commission to take coordinated action to protect submarine cables and reinforce cable security and repair capabilities; stresses the need for continued investment in the construction of new submarine cables to ensure redundancy; welcomes the EU’s role in co-financing such projects to enhance digital infrastructure and connectivity across the Member States; calls on the Commission to explore potential synergies between the maintenance of undersea digital and energy infrastructure;

84. Emphasises the importance of improving EU and Member State repair capabilities and response mechanisms to handle submarine cable disruptions, which are essential for maintaining secure and uninterrupted communications; underlines the importance of international cooperation in repairing sabotaged cables and facilitating the necessary investments, and calls for the establishment of an EU-based rapid-response repair fleet to ensure swift recovery and operational continuity in the event of disruptions; calls on the Commission to carry out an assessment of regulatory measures to ensure fair access and security, regardless of whether the infrastructure is privately or publicly owned;

85. Welcomes the adoption of the action plan on cable security, which will be organised around four pillars: prevention, detection, response and repair, and deterrence; highlights the importance of its full and timely implementation; urges, in the current geopolitical context, increased investment in technologies to strengthen the security and resilience of subsea and offshore infrastructure;

86. Calls on the Commission to promote R&I to enable advanced technological innovations in cable security, including early warning systems and AI-driven threat assessments;

87. Urges the Commission to review available instruments designed to better leverage private investments in support of Cable Projects of European Interest (CPEIs); calls on the Commission to include submarine cable projects in the list of IPCEIs; recognises the need to streamline and simplify the application and administrative process governing IPCEIs;

Cybersecurity

88. Recalls the legislative work carried out over the previous legislative term aimed at significantly improving cybersecurity in the EU; welcomes, in particular, the adoption of the Cyber Resilience Act, the Cyber Solidarity Act and the NIS2 Directive; stresses the need for the harmonised and timely implementation and enforcement of these measures;

89. Calls on the Commission to present an evaluation report on the Cybersecurity Act and to propose a legislative act to review it in order to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity framework, with a particular focus on the interplay between sovereignty and security; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to enhance the protection of strategic and critical infrastructure and prevent foreign interference from entities subject to extraterritorial legislation, as well as accelerating the adoption process for EU cybersecurity certification schemes; calls for ENISA’s mandate to be strengthened to coordinate crisis response, oversee cybersecurity certification for critical infrastructure and ensure uniform implementation of cybersecurity standards across the single market;

90. Emphasises the importance of the upcoming European internal security strategy in strengthening cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection;

91. Notes with concern that, according to the second report on Member States’ progress in implementing the EU toolbox on 5G cybersecurity, 14 Member States have yet to implement any restrictions on high-risk suppliers, posing significant security vulnerabilities; calls for the full implementation of the EU toolbox for 5G security in order to reduce reliance on high-risk vendors; calls on the Commission to make the toolbox binding, specifically with regard to high-risk vendors in critical infrastructure;

Simplification

92. Notes that to achieve true technological sovereignty, the EU must have viable commercial alternatives; stresses that the EU must urgently pursue a comprehensive agenda of simplification and bureaucracy reduction to foster an innovation-friendly environment capable of supporting competitive European alternatives to dominant global digital players; underlines that excessive administrative burdens, fragmented regulatory frameworks, an incomplete digital single market and overly complex compliance procedures disproportionately impact European start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs, limiting their capacity to compete at global level; recognises that the EU should therefore prioritise regulatory streamlining and the deepening of the digital single market, ensuring that legislation is proportionate, innovation-driven and does not stifle the development of European technological solutions;

93. Emphasises the need for new legislative proposals to be aligned with better regulation principles, ensuring that any new digital policy measure that affects competitiveness is accompanied by an impact assessment, including a competitiveness, SME and small mid-cap check that evaluates whether a given legislative instrument is necessary, proportionate and does not create unnecessary burdens for businesses, especially SMEs, and thus its effects on competitiveness, investment prospects and consumer welfare;

94. Highlights that the simplification of EU legislation must not endanger any of the fundamental rights of citizens and businesses and thus jeopardise regulatory certainty; believes that any simplification proposal should not be rushed or proposed without proper consideration, consultation and an impact assessment;

95. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to fully implement the principle of burden reduction for companies in EU legislation; calls on the Commission, therefore, to enhance its efforts by aiming to remove more cost and administrative burdens for businesses compared to the benefits that would be derived from any new regulatory requirements introduced at EU level in the same policy area, so that barriers to market entry are removed to help European companies to scale and grow;

96. Calls on the Commission to ensure consistent simplification, implementation and enforcement of EU digital legislation through the Digital Package, streamlining definitions and reporting procedures, assessing ways to alleviate reporting obligations and reducing the gap between industry and government;

97. Believes that supporting companies and innovators to stay in Europe by developing the EU as an attractive and agile business environment is key to enhancing technological sovereignty; emphasises, in that regard, that excessive regulation and administrative burdens should be avoided and that EU rules should be clear, consistent, predictable, proportionate and technologically neutral, thus maintaining a globally competitive regulatory environment; believes that new public procurement methods and the development of regulatory sandboxes and test beds should also contribute to an innovation-friendly framework;

98. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal of a 28th legal regime, recognising that a single, harmonised set of EU-wide rules will be a game changer for digital investment and innovation; believes that reducing regulatory fragmentation across 27 national legal regimes will boost private investment, lower compliance costs and accelerate the deployment of next-generation digital infrastructure, products and services; encourages the Commission to ensure that this framework specifically addresses regulatory barriers in the digital sector, such as permitting and cross-border data flows, in order to create a true digital single market;

99. Urges the Commission to create a single point of contact to simplify the application process for private-sector access to EU funding mechanisms, ensuring that private companies, SMEs and start-ups can more easily participate in digital investment programmes;

Energy

100. Emphasises that data centres will put additional pressure on electricity grids, making it imperative to reinforce them through anticipatory investments; stresses that data centres can also help stabilise the grid by participating in demand-side flexibility; calls for measures to incentivise such contributions based on the implementation of the revision of the European electricity market reform;

101. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to propose and implement instruments that ensure orderly planning of the escalating energy demand from data centres, facilitating their strategic placement near available energy sources and thus minimising reliance on the broader grid infrastructure;

102. Recognises that fibre is more energy efficient than traditional copper networks; acknowledges the importance of reducing energy consumption in data transmission and ensuring long-term stability and efficiency;

103. Calls on the Commission to ensure a reliable and sufficient clean energy and net-zero technology supply to support the digital infrastructure of the future;

Skills

104. Recognises the urgent need for more skilled professionals in digital fields to meet the EU’s strategic objectives; calls on the Member States to develop national strategies and incentives to retain European talent and attract the world’s best digital professionals, thereby strengthening the EU’s innovation capacity and technological leadership;

105. Stresses the importance of closing the digital and STEM skills gap to enhance technological resilience, innovation capacity and open strategic autonomy; calls on the Member States to strengthen investments in digital education, upskilling and reskilling, particularly in areas essential for the green and digital transitions; supports prioritising investments that address digital skills shortages, particularly in AI, cybersecurity, data analysis and clean technologies, in order to support innovation and technological sovereignty;

106. Calls for coordinated strategies at national level to improve access to high-quality STEM education, promote lifelong learning and attract talent to ICT and related fields; encourages partnerships between public institutions, industry and educational providers to ensure alignment between curricula and evolving market needs;

107. Calls for intensified efforts to improve digital literacy and skills across all demographics, focusing on early STEM education, vocational education and training, and lifelong learning in digital technologies; recommends aligning national education and training strategies with the EU Digital Decade goal of 80 % of the population possessing basic digital skills by 2030, with a focus on gender-inclusive policies to increase women’s participation in ICT and STEM fields; calls on the EU institutions to take concrete steps to uphold the commitments referred to in the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, both within the EU framework as in the Union’s cooperation with third countries;

108. Supports the establishment of a common EU certification framework for digital and technical skills to improve the recognition and portability of qualifications among the Member States;

109. Encourages the European Investment Bank and national development institutions to support digital talent retention by co-investing in European deep-tech start-ups, ensuring that EU-funded innovation remains within the region and contributes to Europe’s technological sovereignty;

Research and innovation

110. Recognises the importance of bridging the gap between research and commercialisation and calls on the Commission to enhance the valorisation of innovation within the EU;

111. Believes that Europe’s ability to transform research into market-ready solutions is critical for building necessary capabilities and reducing reliance on non-EU technologies;

112. Emphasises that funding needs to be strategically allocated to accelerate the development and market introduction of solutions that strengthen Europe’s technological resilience and drive innovation; underlines the importance of a more agile, excellence-based funding structure, particularly in improving the translation of research into industrial applications; calls for increased investment in R&I to strengthen Europe’s knowledge and technological capabilities and insists that EU research, development and innovation (RDI) funding be based on open competition and excellence;

113. Highlights the need for policies that support industrial innovation, including targeted investment in key strategic technologies where Europe can lead globally, such as quantum computing, in order to build an innovation ecosystem;

114. Believes that private investment in RDI is of utmost importance and calls for the EU to create incentives that effectively leverage private funding for the development of critical technologies, including through public-private partnerships;

115. Stresses the urgent need for stronger incentives to mobilise private sector capital for technology-driven innovation; encourages the Member States to introduce targeted fiscal incentives, regulatory simplification and risk-sharing instruments designed to attract private equity to the technology and digital sectors; highlights the need to streamline cross-border capital flows within the single market to facilitate access to finance for innovative European start-ups;

Standards

116. Strongly believes that promoting interoperability and EU standards is paramount to fostering competitiveness in the technology sector, as it ensures that products can be connected and work with each other, thus fostering innovation and open markets; recalls that both interoperability and common technological standards pave the way for the functioning of the single market;

117. Underlines that the Commission must increase its engagement in existing global standardisation structures and focus on the international uptake of European standards through a bottom-up approach, avoiding centralisation;

Partnerships

118. Welcomes the EU’s commitment to negotiating DTAs that facilitate secure and competitive digital infrastructure development with partner countries; encourages the Commission to increase efforts in negotiating DTAs with additional partner countries;

119. Calls on the Commission to accelerate technical cooperation in multilateral forums such as the G7, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Trade Organization (WTO) so as to develop global standards for digital governance, AI regulation, cross-border data flows and emerging technologies;

120. Urges the Commission to advance negotiations on a permanent solution to the WTO moratorium on e-commerce to prevent the introduction of digital tariffs, ensuring international digital trade remains open, predictable and conducive to innovation;

°

° °

121. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: S. 1780, Mexico Security Assistance Accountability Act

Source: US Congressional Budget Office

S. 1780 would require the Department of State to develop a strategy and report to the Congress on U.S. security assistance to Mexico. It also would require the department to brief the Congress within one year of submitting the report on the implementation of the strategy.

On the basis of information about similar reporting requirements, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost less than $500,000 over the 2025-2030 period. Such spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is David Rafferty. The estimate was reviewed by Christina Hawley Anthony, Deputy Director of Budget Analysis.

Phillip L. Swagel

Director, Congressional Budget Office

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Convicted Felon From Hyannis Sentenced To 10 Years In Prison For Unlawfully Possessing Firearms

Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

BOSTON – A Hyannis man was sentenced yesterday in federal court in Boston for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Donnell Pina, 52, was sentenced by U.S. Senior District Judge William G. Young to 10 years in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release. In March 2025, Pina pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. In November 2022, Pina, along with co-defendant Ryan Diefenbach, was indicted by a federal grand jury.

In September 2021, Pina and Diefenbach possessed a Chinese SKS .762 caliber rifle. In September 2021, Pina sold two firearms – the Chinese SKS .762 caliber rifle and a Walther Colt M4 Carbine .22LR caliber semi-automatic rifle – to a confidential informant working with federal law enforcement in two separate transactions on Cape Cod.

Due to prior felony convictions, both Pina and Diefenbach are prohibited from possessing firearms. In October 2024, Diefenbach was sentenced to six years in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release.

United States Attorney Leah B. Foley and Scott Riordan, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, Boston Field Division made the announcement today. Assistant United States Attorney Elianna J. Nuzum of the Criminal Division prosecuted the case.

This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce gun violence and other violent crime, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results. For more information about Project Safe Neighborhoods, please visit Justice.gov/PSN.

MIL Security OSI –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Convicted Felon From Hyannis Sentenced To 10 Years In Prison For Unlawfully Possessing Firearms

Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

BOSTON – A Hyannis man was sentenced yesterday in federal court in Boston for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Donnell Pina, 52, was sentenced by U.S. Senior District Judge William G. Young to 10 years in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release. In March 2025, Pina pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. In November 2022, Pina, along with co-defendant Ryan Diefenbach, was indicted by a federal grand jury.

In September 2021, Pina and Diefenbach possessed a Chinese SKS .762 caliber rifle. In September 2021, Pina sold two firearms – the Chinese SKS .762 caliber rifle and a Walther Colt M4 Carbine .22LR caliber semi-automatic rifle – to a confidential informant working with federal law enforcement in two separate transactions on Cape Cod.

Due to prior felony convictions, both Pina and Diefenbach are prohibited from possessing firearms. In October 2024, Diefenbach was sentenced to six years in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release.

United States Attorney Leah B. Foley and Scott Riordan, Acting Special Agent in Charge of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, Boston Field Division made the announcement today. Assistant United States Attorney Elianna J. Nuzum of the Criminal Division prosecuted the case.

This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce gun violence and other violent crime, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results. For more information about Project Safe Neighborhoods, please visit Justice.gov/PSN.

MIL Security OSI –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: State of Utah Renews 5-Year Electronics Recycling Contract with Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR), Taking Advantage of Increased Discounts and Services
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

SALT LAKE CITY, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR) is proud to announce it has been awarded a second consecutive 5-year statewide contract (MA 4483) to provide Electronics Recycling and Secure Data Destruction services for the State of Utah, including all departments, agencies, institutions, and political subdivisions.

This new contract, effective through May 2029, reinforces ATR’s position as the State’s premier choice for responsible, secure, and cost-effective management of end-of-life electronics and IT assets.

“We’re honored to renew our partnership with the State of Utah and excited to expand our services to both local government and private sector clients throughout the region,” said Pete Swavely, National Business Development Manager at ATR. “Whether you’re a public agency or an enterprise looking to improve your IT asset management strategy, ATR offers proven performance, unbeatable value, and personalized lifecycle management solutions.”

Contract Award Highlights
- Top-ranked vendor: ATR once again earned the highest score on the State’s competitive scoring algorithm, maintaining its leading position from the 2019–2024 contract period.
- Second consecutive win: This marks ATR’s second successful contract term, reinforcing a strong performance history with the State of Utah.
- Cost-efficient provider: ATR outscored the other two qualifying vendors by a wide margin in the cost evaluation, demonstrating unmatched value and affordability.
- Best-in-class service: Selection criteria also prioritized logistics, compliance, service capabilities, and regulatory performance—areas where ATR continues to excel.
- Strategic West Coast expansion: Services will be supported by ATR’s upgraded Salt Lake City facility; part of a broader expansion aimed at strengthening logistics and asset management coverage across the Western U.S.
Why Advanced Technology Recycling Was the Clear Winner

The State of Utah’s Evaluation Committee—comprised of subject matter experts from the Department of Government Operations, Department of Agriculture, and Jordan School District—conducted a rigorous, multi-phase scoring process following the Utah Procurement Code (Part 7), with oversight from the Division of State Purchasing.

Out of 1,000 possible points, ATR earned the highest total score across all evaluated categories, securing its place as the top-ranked and most cost-effective vendor.

Final Total Scores (out of 1,000 points)

Vendor Technical Score Cost Score Total

Advanced Technology Recycling 597.50 262.71 860.21

Vendor #2 570.00 104.58 674.58

Vendor #3 577.50 59.02 636.52

Key Takeaways
- ATR led in both technical and cost categories.
- ATR outscored the second-place vendor by nearly 200 points.
- ATR’s pricing model received full cost points, showing exceptional value.
- ATR met or exceeded top scores in data destruction, security, and surplus resale categories critical to State and agency compliance.
What Makes ATR Different?

At Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR), we recognize the complex challenges facing today’s IT industry, particularly in implementing sustainable Information Technology Asset Disposition (ITAD) strategies that reduce risk and drive measurable value. Our ability to support your organization’s triple bottom line —people, planet, and profit —is what truly sets us apart.

ATR’s proprietary asset management database enables our team to create a fully customized Statement of Work (SOW) for each customer, with individual asset-level tracking from pickup through final disposition. This powerful system ensures end-to-end transparency and compliance for every project, regardless of scale.

Through our secure web-based portal, customers gain 24/7 access to real-time reports, scheduling tools, audit trails, and downloadable compliance documentation. This centralized platform is currently managing millions of assets and is trusted by an expanding list of Fortune 100 and 500 companies across the United States.

Designed for scalability, ATR’s technology and services adapt to meet the needs of both small enterprises and large, distributed organizations. Our nationwide infrastructure, advanced security standards, and commitment to innovation make us the ideal partner for companies seeking to transform their IT lifecycle management while meeting sustainability and regulatory goals.

About Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR)

Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR) is a nationally recognized, multi-certified IT Asset Disposition (ITAD) and electronics recycling provider, proudly serving Utah since 2016. We are fully ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) registered and GSA Schedule approved, delivering secure and scalable solutions for data centers, enterprises, and government clients across the United States.

With over 30 years of industry expertise since our founding in 1992, ATR has remained at the forefront of innovation in electronics lifecycle management. Our seasoned team of technology professionals leverages advanced tools and best practices to design tailored, cost-effective strategies that help clients optimize IT infrastructure, enhance data security, and meet or exceed sustainability objectives.

As part of our continued national growth, ATR has opened a new, state-of-the-art facility located within the Salt Lake City retail district at:

Advanced Technology Recycling
1967 South 300 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84115

This facility expands our operational footprint in the western U.S. It enhances our capacity to support government agencies, educational institutions, and commercial organizations with streamlined logistics, rapid response times, and full regulatory compliance.

At ATR, we are committed to providing secure, transparent, and environmentally responsible electronics recycling and ITAD services—because protecting your data and the planet shouldn’t be a compromise.

The MIL Network –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Senator Marshall: The Reconciliation Bill Will Give Us More Prosperity and Security

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Kansas Roger Marshall

Senator Marshall Joins Newsmax to Discuss the Iran and Israel Conflict and the Reconciliation Package in the Senate.
Washington – On Tuesday night, U.S. Senator Roger Marshall, M.D. (R-Kansas), joined Ed Henry on Newsmax’s The Briefing to discuss the President’s handling of the Iran and Israel conflict, the President’s push for peace worldwide, and what the Senate is doing to pass the reconciliation package.

Click HERE or on the image above to watch Senator Marshall’s full remarks.
On CNN’s Iran Aftermath Report
“I think it’s more lies from fake news. But you know, the proof will be in the pudding, and we’ll see what the pictures are in a week or two. I think it would take a year just to remove the rubble to get to where this facility once was. I just can’t imagine. …14 bombs we dropped, these were all a direct strike, the likes of which we’ve never seen. These are 30,000 pounds each – I’m going to bet on the United States Air Force. They know what they’re doing. It was a direct strike. I bet we got our mission done. We’ll wait for the final pictures here.”
On President Trump being the ‘Peace President’:
“President Trump is the most transparent President in history. This morning, we knew exactly where he was. He didn’t have to send an aide to go tell Bibi to knock it off – he told him in front of the whole world, and that’s who President Trump is.
“I think that the regime in Iran is more worried about regime change than they are about nuclear weapons in the future. I think that’s what their big fear is. They’re trying to save face as well. And here’s President Trump offering another olive branch. He wants peace. He cares about the Iranian people who have been tortured and murdered by their government for decades as well. So, I think it’s another master class in negotiations by President Trump.
“Look, we’re tired of the killing. That’s all I can say, we’re tired of the killing here. We’re tired of the killing in Gaza. We’re tired of the killing in Ukraine. President Trump wants to end all that, and when that happens, the economy, the world economy, will improve if we can get all these wars back under control.”
On Democrats’ hypocrisy on foreign precision strikes:
“And this is what I was talking about earlier, going from Trump obsession to Trump psychosis. And this is what you have, that they are dissociated from truth, from reality. The President has a constitutional duty to protect this nation. Iran was one week away from having a nuclear warhead – they had enough 60% enriched uranium to build 10 atomic bombs. The President had a duty to protect us. That’s what he did.
“You pointed this out early, the hypocrisy of Obama, who did similar things. Clinton did similar things. President Nixon, of course, as well. So, this is psychosis. Thank God for President Trump that this is not phasing him, it’s not slowing him down. He’s going to do the right thing. I even saw some polling recently, 90% of Republicans support how President Trump has handled all this – I think he’s growing stronger, more popular. The United States is respected more. This is what peace through strength looks like.”
On the next steps in the reconciliation process:
“Like you said, President Trump’s done his job. Now it’s time for us to do our job. This bill is not perfect, but it’s going to prevent the largest tax increase for hard-working, middle-income families in the history of our country. It’s going to build 2000 miles of barrier. It’s going to give us border security funding for four years – we’re going to run out of funding very soon to secure the border. It’s going to give our military pay raises, make the military stronger for the next four years as well.
“You know, some things that people aren’t talking about out there that I think are very important… this is going to defund Planned Parenthood. It’s going to allow us to purchase short-barreled rifles again. It’s going to give more flexibility with 529 education plans and with Pell Grants as well. … There are so many good things in this. It’s going to increase your Child Tax Credits to $2200 – If we don’t do this, it would be $1,000. So, there are so many great things in this bill. It’s going to be a rising tide that floats all boats. It’s going to give us more prosperity and security. We don’t have a choice – we need to get it done.”

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Senator Marshall Leads Fight for Federal Disaster Aid for Kansas Communities

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Kansas Roger Marshall

WICHITA – Following multiple rounds of severe weather in May 2025, U.S. Senator Roger Marshall, M.D. (R-KS) joined by U.S. Senator Jerry Moran (R-KS), and U.S. Congressmen Tracey Mann (R-KS-01), Derek Schmidt (R-KS-02), and Ron Estes (R-KS-04) have sent a letter to President Trump in support of the state’s request for a federal disaster declaration. If approved, the Federal government would be able to provide much-needed public assistance funding to ensure necessary repairs and the rebuilding of public infrastructure.
In their letter, Kansas’ Republican Congressional Delegation wrote:
“This devastating weather event included at least seven EF3 tornadoes, which caused widespread destruction, leveling entire towns and inflicting significant property loss across dozens of Kansas communities. Critical transportation routes, including Interstate 70, were closed due to storm damage, and widespread devastation affected utilities, public infrastructure, and private property.”
If approved, the following Kansas counties would be eligible for public assistance: Bourbon, Cheyenne, Edwards, Gove, Kiowa, Logan, Pratt, Reno, Scott, Sheridan, and Stafford.
Communities across Kansas sustained damage, with Plevna and Grinnell seeing near-total destruction. Upon approval of the disaster declaration, local governments and public utility providers would be eligible to submit storm-related expenses to FEMA for reimbursement.
Click HERE to read the full text of the letter.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Senator Marshall Leads Fight for Federal Disaster Aid for Kansas Communities

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Kansas Roger Marshall

WICHITA – Following multiple rounds of severe weather in May 2025, U.S. Senator Roger Marshall, M.D. (R-KS) joined by U.S. Senator Jerry Moran (R-KS), and U.S. Congressmen Tracey Mann (R-KS-01), Derek Schmidt (R-KS-02), and Ron Estes (R-KS-04) have sent a letter to President Trump in support of the state’s request for a federal disaster declaration. If approved, the Federal government would be able to provide much-needed public assistance funding to ensure necessary repairs and the rebuilding of public infrastructure.
In their letter, Kansas’ Republican Congressional Delegation wrote:
“This devastating weather event included at least seven EF3 tornadoes, which caused widespread destruction, leveling entire towns and inflicting significant property loss across dozens of Kansas communities. Critical transportation routes, including Interstate 70, were closed due to storm damage, and widespread devastation affected utilities, public infrastructure, and private property.”
If approved, the following Kansas counties would be eligible for public assistance: Bourbon, Cheyenne, Edwards, Gove, Kiowa, Logan, Pratt, Reno, Scott, Sheridan, and Stafford.
Communities across Kansas sustained damage, with Plevna and Grinnell seeing near-total destruction. Upon approval of the disaster declaration, local governments and public utility providers would be eligible to submit storm-related expenses to FEMA for reimbursement.
Click HERE to read the full text of the letter.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Cassidy Releases Statement After Google Endorses His Children and Teens’ Online Privacy Bill

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Louisiana Bill Cassidy

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Bill Cassidy, M.D. (R-LA) today announced that Google has endorsed the Children and Teens’ Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA 2.0). The legislation would update online data privacy rules for the 21st century and ensure children and teenagers are protected online. The U.S. Senate Commerce Committee is scheduled to take up COPPA 2.0 at its markup today.
“COPPA 2.0 is a common-sense tool to keep kids safe online—and Google agrees,” said Dr. Cassidy. “Today’s kids are growing up with phones and tablets. We need to make sure they can do it safely.”
Cassidy was joined by U.S. Senator Edward Markey (D-MA) in introducing the legislation.
Specifically, COPPA 2.0 would:

Ban targeted advertising to children and teens;
Create an “Eraser Button” by requiring companies to permit users to delete personal information collected from a child or teen;
Establish data minimization rules to prohibit the excessive collection of children and teens’ data;
Revise the current “actual knowledge” standard to close the loophole that allows platforms to ignore kids and teens on their site; and
Prohibit internet companies from collecting personal information from users who are 13 to 16 years old without their consent.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Governor Newsom announces $135 million available for new wildfire projects amid Trump’s assault on resources protecting communities

Source: US State of California Governor

Jun 25, 2025

What you need to know: Governor Newsom announced $135 million is available for wildfire prevention grants – protecting communities from catastrophic wildfire at the same time as President Trump adds new strain to firefighting resources.

SACRAMENTO – As President Trump continues straining firefighting and prevention resources in California, Governor Gavin Newsom today announced the state has $135 million available for new and ongoing projects to protect communities from catastrophic wildfire.

Grant applications are now open for CAL FIRE’s Wildfire Prevention Grants Program. It funds local projects that focus on increasing the protection of people, structures, and communities. Activities include hazardous fuels reduction, wildfire prevention planning, and wildfire prevention education.

The funding builds on $72 million the Governor announced last month for forest health projects across the state – part of $2.5 billion in investments in wildfire prevention work that have more than doubled since the Governor took office.

Today’s announcement comes as the California National Guard’s (CalGuard) critical firefighting crews – known as Task Force Rattlesnake – are operating at just 40% capacity due to President Trump’s illegal militarization of Los Angeles. The National Guard impact is on top of the Trump administration’s dangerous cuts to the U.S. Forest Service, which also threatens the safety of communities across the state.

We won’t let Trump stand in the way of protecting Californians from catastrophic wildfire. We’re making millions more available to fund projects that are proven to keep communities safe.

Governor Gavin Newsom

CAL FIRE’s Wildfire Prevention Grants are effective. Local projects like proactive vegetation management, defensible space creation and structure hardening helped preserve historical structures and homes in Los Angeles County in 2025. In 2024 in Sonoma County, over 300 acres of shaded fuel breaks, created by clearing brush and small trees along roads, helped reduce flammable vegetation and slowed a fire’s spread. Residents were able to evacuate safely, and firefighters were able to stop the spread of fire quickly.

“These examples demonstrate how grant funds are effectively helping to improve wildfire resilience in California communities through thoughtful planning and preventative work funded through CAL FIRE grants,” said Chief Daniel Berlant, California State Fire Marshal. “Over the last five years, over $500 million has been awarded to over 490 projects across the state.”

California’s unprecedented wildfire readiness

Despite the strain caused by President Trump, California stands ready to protect communities. As part of the state’s ongoing investment in wildfire resilience and emergency response, CAL FIRE has significantly expanded its workforce over the past five years by adding an average of 1,800 full-time and 600 seasonal positions annually – nearly double that from the previous administration. Over the next four years and beyond, CAL FIRE will be hiring thousands of additional firefighters, natural resource professionals, and support personnel to meet the state’s growing demands.

Late last month, the Governor announced $72 million for projects across the state that help reduce catastrophic wildfire risk. Additionally, 20 new vegetation management projects spanning nearly 8,000 acres have already been approved for fast-tracking under the Governor’s new streamlining initiative.

This builds on consecutive years of intensive and focused work by California to confront the severe ongoing risk of catastrophic wildfires, and Governor Newsom’s emergency proclamation signed in March to fast-track forest and vegetation management projects throughout the state. Additionally, to bolster the state’s ability to respond to fires, Governor Newsom recently announced that the state’s second C-130 Hercules airtanker is ready for firefighting operations, adding to the largest aerial firefighting fleet in the world.

New, bold moves to streamline state-level regulatory processes builds long-term efforts already underway in California to increase wildfire response and forest management in the face of a hotter, drier climate. A full list of California’s progress on wildfire resilience is available here.

Press releases, Recent news

Recent news

Jun 25, 2025

News What you need to know: As part of California Jobs First, the state is awarding $15 million through the Regional Investment Initiative to support California Native American tribal partners in creating jobs and developing high-paying and fulfilling careers….

Jun 25, 2025

News What you need to know: The First Partner launched her annual Book Club today, which features great kids’ reads curated by librarians across California, as well as investments to support library community programming. SACRAMENTO – California First Partner Jennifer…

Jun 25, 2025

News What you need to know: Today marked the start of the final phase of work on the Wallis Annenberg Wildlife Crossing – a monumental wildlife preservation effort in Southern California. LOS ANGELES – Governor Gavin Newsom announced today that the final phase of the…

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Congresswoman Tenney Reintroduces the Fairness in Vineyard Data Act to Support NY-24 Grape Growers

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Claudia Tenney (NY-22)

Washington, DC – Congresswoman Claudia Tenney (NY-24) today reintroduced the Fairness in Vineyard Data Act to expand the federal government’s vineyard data collection to better reflect the needs of grape growers in New York and other top-producing states.

Congressman Joe Morelle (NY-25) joined Rep. Tenney in reintroducing this legislation.

Currently, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) only collects comprehensive vineyard data from the top two grape-producing states, leaving out key grape-producing regions. This bill expands data collection on vineyard production to include the top five grape-growing states, including New York, giving grape growers better insight into industry trends. This data will help them adapt their cultivation practices and improve wine production.

“New York’s grape growers and winemakers are a vital part of our economy, especially in NY-24, home to the renowned Finger Lakes wine region. By expanding federal vineyard data collection, the Fairness in Vineyard Data Act ensures our growers have access to more information when it comes to trends, pricing, and production forecasts. This bill promotes fairness, transparency, and gives our NY-24 grape growers the tools they need to thrive in a competitive marketplace,” said Congresswoman Tenney.

“New York’s wine grapes are a vital part of our region’s culture and economy, supporting good-paying jobs and agritourism. Our farmers need—and deserve—the best data to stay competitive. I’m proud to work across the aisle with Congresswoman Tenney on our Fairness in Vineyard Data Act and look forward to getting it passed into law,” said Congressman Morelle.

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MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Delivers Opening Statement In Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing On Five Judicial Nomimations

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin

June 25, 2025

Today’s hearing includes the nomination of Emil Bove to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, today delivered an opening statement at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the judicial nominations of Emil J. Bove III, to be a United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit; Edward L. Artau, to be a United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida; Kyle Christopher Dudek, to be a United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida; Jordan Emery Pratt, to be a United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida; and Anne-Leigh Gaylord Moe, to be a United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida.

In his opening statement, Durbin outlined how Mr. Bove, a former personal defense attorney of President Trump, is unfit to serve as a federal judge with a lifetime appointment.

Key Quotes:

“For the last four years, before this one, I was Chairman of this Committee. We considered 235 judicial nominees that were sent to us by the White House. Those nominees were all approved by this Committee and by the United States Senate. Eighty percent of the nominees received bipartisan roll call support. So, I want to make that record very clear.”

“Over the years—especially during the first Trump Administration—I have disagreed with many nominees who appeared before this Committee on matters of constitutional interpretation. President Trump’s judicial picks during his first term were largely legal conservatives. This nominee is in a category all of his own.”

“A former personal defense attorney of President Trump, Mr. Bove has led the effort to weaponize the Department of Justice against the President’s enemies. Having earned his stripes as a loyalist to this President, he’s been rewarded with this lifetime nomination.”

“Mr. Bove has fired dozens of career federal prosecutors who worked on cases related to the January 6 insurrection, the cases that were assigned to them… Mr. Bove also ordered the FBI to compile a list of all current and former FBI employees who were assigned ‘at any time’ to a January 6 investigation ‘to determine whether any additional personnel actions are necessary.’”

“Mr. Bove personally intervened to strike a corrupt bargain with the New York City Mayor, Eric Adams… he wanted to drop the prosecution of Mayor Adams in exchange for Adams’s promise to cooperate with President’s immigration policies. In response, several professional prosecutors resigned, including the U.S. Attorney herself, a staunch conservative who clerked for Justice Scalia and was appointed by President Trump.”

“And according to a whistleblower complaint the Committee received yesterday, Mr. Bove has suggested that the Justice Department might need to say ‘F*** you’ to federal courts and ignore federal court orders with which this Administration disagrees… this gets to the heart of our democracy and the rule of law… These serious allegations against Mr. Bove came not from the ACLU, but from a career Justice Department lawyer who was promoted by the Trump Administration and is best known for defending the first Trump Administration’s immigration policies in court.”

“In addition to Mr. Bove’s unethical conduct, there are serious questions about his temperament. According to public reporting, Mr. Bove was the subject of an internal investigation over his ‘abusive,’ ‘bellicose’ management style while serving as a federal prosecutor in the Southern District of New York. Just what we need in a federal judge with a lifetime appointment. His fellow prosecutors noted that Mr. Bove has a quick temper and he belittled his coworkers.”

“I would also like to address the process by which Mr. Bove was selected for this New Jersey seat. The White House engaged with Senator Booker and Senator Kim on this vacancy for only three months before announcing Mr. Bove’s nomination. And notably, the White House did not indicate it was considering Mr. Bove until two months into that process. Compare that to the Biden White House’s approach with Republican members of the Committee. The Biden White House discussed two Sixth Circuit vacancies and a Fourth Circuit vacancy with home state Senators for seven months, nine months, and six months, respectively, before making a selection.”

“Notably, Mr. Bove hardly has ties to New Jersey for this New Jersey-based seat. Don’t take my word for it. His formal nomination before this Committee identifies him as ‘Emil J. Bove III, of Pennsylvania.’ He is not even admitted to practice before the court to which he has been nominated.”

“With Mr. Bove, we see a sign of what is to come. President Trump cares little about statutory interpretation and the original meaning of the Constitution. He’s looking for loyalty. He’s looking for fierce retribution. He’s looking for someone who will instill fear in his opponents. It seems he has found such a nominee in Mr. Bove.”

Video of Durbin’s opening statement is available here.

Audio of Durbin’s opening statement is available here.

Footage of Durbin’s opening statement is available here for TV Stations.

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MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Bentz Participates in the Natural Resources Committee’s Markup of His Bill Which Would Facilitate Expansion of the City of The Dalles’ Drinking Water Supply

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Cliff Bentz (R-Ontario)

Washington, D.C.— This week in the Natural Resources Committee, Congressman Cliff Bentz’s (R-OR) bill, The Dalles Watershed Development Act, was included in the full committee markup. This critical legislation, if enacted, would transfer 150 acres of U.S. Forest Service land within The Dalles’ municipal watershed to city ownership.

Said Congressman Bentz: “On April 29, 2025, my bill H.R. 655, was included in the Federal Lands Subcommittee hearing marking the critical first step in the legislative process. The bill received support among the subcommittee as well as the acknowledgement of the United States Forest Service that a land transfer would greatly benefit the community. The bill has now moved to the second step which is today’s “markup”. It was voted out of committee and will now move to the floor. If passed across the floor, it will move to the Senate.”

The City of The Dalles has long relied on its municipal watershed for 80% of its annual water supply. Protecting this watershed is essential to maintaining water quality, meeting future demand, and ensuring public safety. This bill would allow the city to expand the size of its reservoir and allow much less red tape in taking action to protect city water infrastructure works and the city’s watershed.

“The City of The Dalles has maintained a great working relationship with the Forest Service, but the need for expansion of the reservoir, on land owned by the federal government, would be unnecessarily burdened by lengthy federally required administrative reviews.” said Congressman Bentz. “To afford to expand its water storage capacity, avoiding unnecessary costs is absolutely crucial. This transfer of land would help avoid costs. Water security is a top priority, and this legislation will provide the land needed to meet the city’s future growth.”

Congressman Bentz will continue to work with the Natural Resources Committee, House Leadership, local leaders and federal agencies to advance this legislation.

Read the bill text, here.

Watch the hearing here.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Bentz Statement on Public Lands

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Cliff Bentz (R-Ontario)

WASHINGTON, D.C.– To be clear – I do support and encourage sale or exchange of parcels of federal land when there is a clear economic or social demand for such disposition, and when that disposition follows appropriate procedure and is generally supported by those affected. I include congressional action as an appropriate procedure. I do not support a mandated disposition of millions of acres of federal land, the amount of which was arbitrarily established, the primary goal not being to respond to demand, but instead being the removal of land from federal ownership.

A policy to permanently dispose of massive amounts of land currently owned and managed for multiple use by the federal government should not be included in a reconciliation package where debate, by design, is truncated or completely avoided. A decision to irreversibly divest the nation of federally owned land is an important policy issue that must be carefully discussed with and designed by those of us representing states impacted by this policy.

Of particular concern in making any decision to sell public land is the sale’s impact on those who have rights in the land or currently have some type of use of the land. Indian Tribes, neighbors, grazing permittees, those utilizing public access across the land, hunters, watershed function, holders of easements, and environmental impact are some of the issues that must be taken into account in making a decision to alter ownership. These realities make the process used in selecting parcels of federal land offered for sale extremely important.

Some might argue that the abject failure of the federal government to adequately manage BLM and Forest Service land justifies its sale. But sale of this land to someone else is no way to assure it’s proper management. The best way to protect this land is to identify and correct the reasons these agencies are failing in their mission. The easiest observation to make is that environmental organizations, using the ESA, CWA, CAA, and other environmental laws, compliant federal judges, and the Access to Justice Act, (an act that pays the attorney fees of plaintiffs who successfully sue the federal government) through protracted and expensive litigation, make a mockery of agency’s attempts to craft management plans. If our nation is to be a landowner (and it is), it must take care of that land. This means that the laws that are being perverted to line the pockets of environmental organizations at the expense of the taxpayer and our forests and rangelands, must be changed so that such perversion is stopped.

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MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Harshbarger, Sherrill Reintroduce Bipartisan Legislation to Digitize Prescription Information, Improve Patient Safety

Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Diana Harshbarger (R-TN)

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Representative Diana Harshbarger (R-TN), a practicing pharmacist before being elected to Congress, and U.S. Representative Mikie Sherrill (D-NJ) reintroduced the bipartisan Prescription Information Modernization Act. This legislation would allow the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to move forward with a proposed rule allowing drug manufacturers to transmit prescribing information electronically to doctors and pharmacists, as opposed to printed copy, as currently required.

“Pharmacists and physicians deserve timely, accurate data when making decisions that impact patient health, not pages of printed material that often arrive late and are immediately discarded,” said Rep. Harshbarger. “This bipartisan bill is a practical update that empowers healthcare professionals with real-time digital access, cuts waste, and ensures patients are receiving the most up-to-date information. Thank you to my colleague, Representative Sherrill for working with me to bring prescribing information into the 21st century.”

“I’m focused on improving our healthcare system to ensure healthcare providers are able to provide the best possible care to patients. Under outdated rules, providers are prohibited from receiving prescribing information for medications digitally. This legislation would finally modernize our system, allowing pharmacists to access real-time updates on prescription medications that will ensure they can dispense medicines to patients safely while reducing waste at the same time.” said Rep. Sherrill.

Under the current policy, which has not been updated since 1962, prescribing information sent to providers that contain important information related to a specific drug must be printed, running an average of 45 pages per prescription. This information is not intended for patients but rather contains the drug’s chemical makeup and information that informs a healthcare professional on the drug’s interaction with other drugs. In 2014, the FDA proposed a rule that would allow the electronic distribution of prescribing information. Since then, Congress has used the appropriations process to prevent the agency from finalizing that rule, requiring the bulky paper labels to be printed and distributed, even though many are immediately discarded by healthcare professionals for being outdated.

The Harshbarger-Sherrill legislation would give healthcare professionals the option to choose how they receive prescribing information. In most cases, healthcare professionals choose to receive the information digitally because the information is available in real-time. Printed information takes approximately 8-12 months from printing to shipment, and information is often outdated by the time it reaches the recipient.

This legislation has drawn support from leading pharmacy and healthcare advocacy organizations, including the Alliance to Modernize Prescribing Information (AMPI) and the following groups: Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy (AMCP), Allergy & Asthma Network, American Pharmacists Association, AmGen, Asthma and Allergy Foundation of America, Association for Accessible Medicines, Beyond Type 1, Biotechnology Innovation Organization, BioNJ, BioUtah, Boomer Esiason Foundation, Environmental Paper Network, Georgia Bio, Healthcare Distribution Alliance, HealthCare Institute of New Jersey, LUNGevity Foundation, Lupin, Maryland Tech Council, MassBio, McKesson, National Association of Chain Drug Stores, National Consumers League, National Grange, NewYorkBIO, North Carolina Biosciences Organization, Texas Healthcare and Biosciences Institute, and Zero Cancer.

Additional sponsors of this legislation include Reps. David Valadao (R-CA), Don Davis (D-NC), Ken Calvert (R-CA), Scott Peters (D-CA), Julia Letlow (R-LA), Deborah Ross (D-NC), Brad Schneider (D-IL), Steve Womack (R-AR), and Paul Tonko (D-NY).

You can read the full bill text HERE.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Lummis Leads Digital Asset Subcommittee Hearing Highlighting Need for Clear Regulations for Digital Assets

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Wyoming Cynthia Lummis

June 25, 2025

Washington, D.C.— Senate Banking Subcommittee on Digital Assets Chair Cynthia Lummis (R-WY) led the Digital Asset Subcommittee Hearing entitled “Exploring Bipartisan Legislative Frameworks for Digital Asset Market Structure” highlighting the need to clearly allocate jurisdiction among regulators in order to maintain the United States’ leadership in financial innovation.

“The days of America sitting on the sidelines while the digital asset industry moves overseas are over,” said Lummis. “For the first time in our nation’s history, we have the most pro-digital asset president in U.S. history, and we have a chairman at the helm of the Banking Committee who sees the immense value in the United States leading on digital assets. We must work to immediately pass comprehensive market structure legislation to secure our financial future for generations to come. Digital assets are the future, and we must ensure the United States leads the way.”

Senator Lummis’ full remarks can be found here.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: LEADER JEFFRIES: “THE FACT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO RUN AWAY FROM CONFRONTING THESE SITUATIONS ON CAPITOL HILL IS VERY PROBLEMATIC”

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Hakeem Jeffries (8th District of New York)

Today, Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries appeared on MSNBC’s Morning Joe where he emphasized that Iran is a sworn enemy of the United States and the Trump administration must follow the Constitution and stop hiding its actions in the Middle East from Congress and the American people.

JOE SCARBOROUGH: Leader Jeffries, thanks so much for being with us. I’m wondering, do you consider his win last night in New York City, do you think it provides a roadmap for Democrats running in 2026 on how to energize the base?

LEADER JEFFRIES: I think what’s clear is that the relentless focus on affordability had great appeal all across the City of New York. He also clearly out-worked, out-organized and out-communicated the opposition. And when someone is successful in being able to do all three things at the same time, it’s usually going to work out for them.

JOE SCARBOROUGH: Yeah, The New York Times editorialized that he was not qualified to be mayor. Of course, The Wall Street Journal and others say that he is far too extreme on economic issues and even issues involving Israel. I’m curious what your thoughts are on him ideologically. Is that—does he have an ideology that you would want your candidates in 2026 to have?

LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, from the standpoint of House Democrats and what our focus has been, clearly, we have an affordability crisis in the United States of America, and our focus will continue to be on driving down the high cost of living in this country. Donald Trump promised to lower costs on day one. Costs haven’t gone down. They’re going up. He’s crashing the economy in real time, his tariffs are going to impose thousands of dollars in additional cost on everyday Americans per year and he may even be driving us toward a recession. That’s the reason why Donald Trump has become so unpopular, it’s because he’s failed the country on the economy. And so, our vision is going to be for an affordable America—work hard, play by the rules, live the good life, provide a comfortable living for yourself and for your family. That means being able to actually afford a home, educate your children, have access to healthcare, go on vacation with your children and your family every now and then and, of course, Joe, one day retire with grace and dignity.

JOE SCARBOROUGH: Democrats look at Donald Trump’s approval ratings and you have a lot of other Democrats and people on media asking the question, why is the Democratic Party’s approval ratings, why are they lower than Donald Trump’s? I take it that’s something that you all grapple with every day. Why has the Democratic Party over the past year found itself at sort of its lowest ebb in recent history? And how do Democrats get out of that?

LEADER JEFFRIES: Yeah, no, it’s a very important question and, listen, institutions are unpopular right now in the United States of America and that includes, of course, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. The dynamics that we have to work through, of course, one, Donald Trump and Republicans have given the American people every reason to run away from them, and it’s going to be important for us to continue to make clear why this administration failed on the economy, failed foreign policy, trying to take away healthcare from tens of millions of Americans, ripping food out of the mouths of children and seniors and veterans. Of course, all of that is problematic, all of that is unpopular. That’s why the One Big Ugly Bill has such a high disapproval rate in the United States of America. We also recognize, as Democrats, that it’s going to be important for us to articulate our affirmative agenda, what we stand for, this principle of working hard and playing by the rules, being able to live the good life, an affordable life for hardworking American taxpayers. And that is something that we’re going to have to lean into. The other thing I’d note, Joe, as you know, perhaps the most important thing in terms of a midterm election dynamic, is what’s the generic ballot say to us? Every single significant generic ballot poll has House Democrats beating House Republicans consistently, including a recent Fox News poll that had us up by about eight points. And so, at the end of the day, yes, we have to lean into improving the Democratic brand. But at the end of the day, what will be most significant, most important is how our vision contrasts with the management of this President, which has been a failure in the United States of America.

JONATHAN LEMIRE: Leader Jeffries, let’s turn you now to the situation in Iran. We played some sound from you earlier in the show, expressing unhappiness that the administration briefing was postponed. The White House saying it’s well, it’s so Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense can be part of it later this week. Is that acceptable to you, and do you have concerns that the administration is not being fully forthcoming as to what actually transpired in Iran over the weekend?

LEADER JEFFRIES: Yes, there’s every reason to be concerned. There was this briefing that had been scheduled to take place in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. There was absolutely no reason that we’ve been provided that it should have been canceled in terms of the important questions that need to be asked and answered by the Trump administration. What was the imminent threat to the safety and security of the United States of America that justified this strike without seeking the congressional authorization required by the Constitution? What is the assessment of the damage that was done to Iran’s nuclear program? Was it completely and totally decimated? No evidence to date has been provided to suggest that that representation made by Donald Trump is accurate. What is the plan to avoid another costly failed war in the Middle East? Why was aggressive diplomacy abandoned by the Trump administration, notwithstanding the success that had taken place under President Obama’s administration in actually pushing back Iran’s nuclear aspirations. These are questions that need to be answered by the administration. And the fact that they continue to run away from confronting these situations on Capitol Hill is very problematic.

JONATHAN LEMIRE: So, Leader Jeffries, to that point, you and many people who have had your position in the decades before this, have expressed frustration when presidents don’t seek congressional authority for military action like this. Do you feel like that a greater good was achieved here if Iran’s program was, if not destroyed, but at least significantly delayed? What should be the next steps for this administration in this process?

LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, to be clear, Iran can never be allowed to become a nuclear-capable power. Iran is a sworn enemy of the United States, of Israel, of Jordan, of our allies in the Middle East, a sworn enemy of the free world. But the question, of course, is, was this strike successful in meaningfully pushing back Iran’s nuclear aspirations, or is it going to complicate things in the Middle East in ways that put our men and women in uniform, American troops and America in harm’s way? That’s simply the reason that having an all-Member briefing on Capitol Hill sooner rather than later is important so these answers can be obtained for the American people, the representatives of the American People, in the United States Congress. That is the reason, fundamentally, why it’s been Congress that was given the power to declare war, to authorize military force and when administrations act differently, they have an obligation and a responsibility to provide the facts, the evidence and the truth, justifying their actions to the American people.

JOE SCARBOROUGH: Well, this has been the debate, and we talked about it yesterday with another Member of Congress. This has been a debate going back 30, 40, 50 years. Obviously Republicans were saying this after Barack Obama attacked Libya. Republicans were saying this with Bill Clinton in the 1990s on Kosovo. But if you’re going to have a surprise attack with B-2 bombers that are going to be going over to Iran, striking their nuclear facilities. Do you think it’s a good idea to inform 535 members of Congress before that operation takes off?

LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, the key here is what was the imminent nature of the threat that justified immediate military action and surprise military action—

JOE SCARBOROUGH: Right—

LEADER JEFFRIES: If there was no imminent threat—

JOE SCARBOROUGH: Well, the United Nations, I’m curious if you’re concerned, like the United Nation’s nuclear agency, the IAEA had said that Iran had already enriched uranium up to 60 percent, and as you know, the jump from 60 to 100 percent is negligible, and had enough enriched uranium for several weapons. Would you consider that to be considerable enough? A considerable enough threat to strike Iran under those circumstances?

LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, certainly it’s a challenging situation, but one of the reasons why we need a briefing, Joe, is to have an understanding, was that enriched uranium even damaged or was it removed by the Iranians prior to the strike? We don’t know the answers to that question. It certainly is something that should be talked about, and the American people should be informed about the reality of whether it was a successful strike or not. In terms of the Iranian nuclear threat, I think we’ve all been clear that Iran can never be permitted to become nuclear capable. But the constitution is not a mere inconvenience, it’s the reality and if members of the executive branch, if hawkish individuals across the country want to change things, there’s Article I, Section 8, Clause 11. They can put forward a constitutional amendment but the framers of this country saw fit to vest this authority within the House and the Senate, not the executive branch.

JOE SCARBOROUGH: Right. And at what point should that be triggered? Should it be triggered by every strike, like, for instance, Barack Obama in 2011 in Libya, or countless strikes by the Bush administration and the Obama administration after September the 11th? Is it every strike or is it when you are going in sending troops in? When do you think that action is triggered?

LEADER JEFFRIES: Seems to me, and it’s a great question, Joe, that it has to relate to whether the step that was taken, one, is in response to an imminent threat to American interests, and two, whether it’s an act of war. And part of the reason why, after the fact, it’s important for Members of Congress to be able to have a briefing with the administration that is comprehensive and that gives Members the opportunity to ask questions so we can provide these answers to the American people who clearly do not want another failed, costly, deadly war in the Middle East.

JOE SCARBOROUGH: All right. Leader Hakeem Jeffries, thank you so much for being with us.

Full interview can be watched here.

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MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Griffith Announces $1.29 Million HHS Grant to STEP Inc.

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Morgan Griffith (R-VA)

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has awarded STEP Inc., located in Franklin County, Virginia, a $1,296,059 grant. The funding supports head start and early head start projects. U.S. Congressman Morgan Griffith (R-VA) issued the following statement:

“Solutions that Empower People (STEP) serves communities in Franklin and Patrick Counties.

“This grant for nearly $1.3 million helps STEP support its head start and early head start programs.”

BACKGROUND

According to its website, Solutions That Empower People (STEP), Inc. is a dynamic community action agency that provides services at significant milestones throughout life. Programs are designed to partner with individuals and families to help them overcome adversity and enhance their quality of life through community, economic, personal, and family development.

In a recent Health Subcommittee hearing with Congressman Griffith present, Secretary Kennedy noted President Trump’s Budget request recommends Head Start continue to receive funding equal to the FY 2025 enacted level.

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MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Griffith Discusses SWVA Electric Grid Challenges, Votes to Strengthen Electric Grid and Advance Power Plant Reliability Act of 2025

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Morgan Griffith (R-VA)

Congressman Morgan Griffith (R-VA), member of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, participated in a markup hearing to advance several energy-related measures. His bill to help keep baseload power plants online, H.R. 3632 the Power Plant Reliability Act of 2025, was favorably reported by the Committee.

Congressman Griffith’s remarks on his bill can be found here or below.

BACKGROUND

The Power Plant Reliability Act of 2025 amends Section 207 of the Federal Power Act to allow a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) or a state Public Utility Commission to petition the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to issue an order to keep a power plant open and allocate costs for fixing a reliability issue.

Congressman Griffith has long held concerns about the early retirement of Virginia’s and regional electric power plants, including the impacts on electric bills in Southwest Virginia.

Congressman Griffith’s recent e-newsletter on blackouts and brownouts can be found here.

In the 119^th Congress, Congressman Griffith is serving his first term as chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Environment.

Following the Environmental Protection Agency’s June announcement proposing rollbacks of power plant rules, Congressman Griffith issued his support in a statement.

Congressman Griffith serves as Co-Chair of the Congressional Coal Caucus.

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MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Reps. Allen and McBath Lead Effort to Increase Access to Care for Energy Workers

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Rick Allen (R-GA-12)

Today, Congressman Rick W. Allen (GA-12), Chairman of the Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions (HELP), and Congresswoman Lucy McBath (GA-06), introduced the Health Care for Energy Workers Act to increase access to care for current and former energy workers.

Specifically, this bipartisan, bicameral legislation would update the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) to allow nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician assistants (PAs) to order care for current and former Department of Energy (DOE) workers who receive health care under this Department of Labor (DOL) program. The EEOICPA provides compensation and medical benefits to employees who work or have worked in the nuclear weapons industry. Under current EEOICPA regulations, NPs and PAs are unable to order home health care services for patients, creating unnecessary barriers to care, especially for patients in rural communities.

Upon introducing the bill, Congressman Allen issued the following statement:

“Georgia’s 12th District is home to thousands of energy workers employed at Plant Vogtle and the Savannah River Site, many of whom qualify under the EEOICPA for their health care needs. However, those who live in rural areas are often hours away from the nearest physician, highlighting the need for greater flexibility to ensure these beneficiaries receive the care they deserve. I am proud to lead this bill with Congresswoman McBath to cut unnecessary red tape and improve access to care for energy workers in Georgia and nationwide,” said Congressman Allen.

“America’s workers deserve access to the health care that will help them lead full lives,” said Rep. McBath. “Too often, necessary treatments might not be available in rural communities. This bill represents an important next step in ensuring more frontline workers have access to quality and efficient care as they serve our communities.”

NOTE: The Health Care for Energy Workers Act would benefit over 7,000 Georgia energy workers, including many employed at Plant Vogtle and the Savannah River Site. A Senate companion bill has been introduced by U.S. Senators Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), and Patty Murray (D-WA).

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Alleged Perpetrator of Terror Attack in Colorado Charged with Hate Crimes

Source: US Justice – Antitrust Division

Headline: Alleged Perpetrator of Terror Attack in Colorado Charged with Hate Crimes

An indictment was unsealed today in Denver charging Mohamed Sabry Soliman with 12 hate crime counts, including nine counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 249 and three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), for using Molotov cocktails to attack members of the group “Run for Their Lives” and others who had gathered in the park in front of the Boulder County Courthouse on June 1. Soliman had previously been charged by complaint with a federal hate crime offense on June 2.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: The Justice Department Files Complaint Challenging Minnesota Laws Providing In-State Tuition Benefits for Illegal Aliens

Source: US Justice – Antitrust Division

Headline: The Justice Department Files Complaint Challenging Minnesota Laws Providing In-State Tuition Benefits for Illegal Aliens

Today the United States is challenging laws in Minnesota that provide reduced in-state tuition — and in some cases, free tuition — for illegal aliens. These laws unconstitutionally discriminate against U.S. citizens, who are not afforded the same privileges, in direct conflict with federal law. The Department of Justice has filed the complaint in the District of Minnesota. This challenge builds upon a recently successful lawsuit against the state of Texas on a similar law.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Government Technology recognizes 2024 Oregon Summer EBT for best practices

Source: US State of Oregon

he Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) was recognized in a national Government Technology Case Study for its excellence in the use of smart technology in rolling out the Summer EBT program. As a result, more than 362,000 children were able to get more food during summer 2024.

About Summer EBT

Thousands of children in Oregon rely on free or reduced-price school meals. But what happens in the summer months when these meals are gone? This is called the summer hunger gap. To address this gap, the federal government last year rolled out a new program to provide food to school-aged children during the summer months.

Oregon was one of 35 states to pick up on the federal Summer Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) program, which provided a total of $120 in nutrition benefits for each eligible child when school is out.

Summer EBT qualification is based on income. For families to qualify, the household income needs to be under 185 percent of the federal poverty level.

“The majority of the people we served are working. It could be part time or they’re just starting off – they are bringing in income but it’s just not enough. The Summer EBT helps supplement their food budget for their children,” Singer said.

A tight timeline

It was go-time for ODHS in early 2024. There was only 16 weeks to set up a new program, bring in community partners, identify and reach out to eligible families, create communication plans and products, and establish the innovative technology needed to accomplish this task. ODHS is the lead agency and administers this program in partnership with the Oregon Department of Education (ODE).

“It was a very short amount of time to build an entire system. The challenge was to quickly build a system to deliver quality services not only for this year but next year also,” Nate Singer, ODHS Oregon Eligibility Partnership (OEP) Director, said. OEP is responsible for determining eligibility for people applying for benefits and processing applications to deliver those benefits.

Goal setting

Initial estimates in 2024 projected that Oregon would provide Summer EBT to at least 294,000 children.

“The one thing I wanted for the project was to exceed that expectation because that would mean we would be providing more services for families and we could increase our outreach for all the of the services ODHS offers,” said Christine Doody, Self-Sufficiency Programs Policy Business Manager and Program Manager for Summer EBT.

The expectation was exceeded about 68,000, meaning more than 362,000 children were able to get food benefits last summer.

Innovation in action

To identify eligible children, OEP used data from ODHS and ODE. Most children who received the benefit were “automatically eligible” because they receive other benefits. These families didn’t need to apply, and the benefit was automatically added to their Oregon EBT card.

Other families needed to apply. ODHS brought in contractors Amazon Web Services and Deloitte Consulting to help with the technology and planning to make applying easy.

“We tried to make it simple as possible. People could apply with a paper application or online. The online application could be done on a mobile phone. If someone had questions about whether they needed to apply or needed help to apply, they could call the Summer EBT Call Center to talk to someone. The call wait time was below five minutes. People could hear right then, on the phone, they would get their benefits if they applied. It took minutes,” Singer said.

The Oregon Summer EBT Call Center included an Interactive Voice Response system offering self-service options for supported languages: English, Spanish, Russian, Vietnamese, Somali, Mandarin, Cantonese, Arabic, Ukrainian, and Chuukese. For other languages, or for other assistance, the calls could be routed to help.

“This gave families the ability to take control of their case. They could use voice activation to say, ‘I want text messages’ from us, or they could change their demographic information or ask for a new card. The family could do that on their own,” Doody said.

This population of customers – families with children in school – are used to getting texts and email from their schools, so they were already familiar with getting information this way. In fact, 99 percent of families that needed to apply chose to use the online application rather than a paper application. Those that used the online caption reported a 96 percent satisfaction rating.

Communications and community engagement

There was also communications and community engagement support, as well as an effective feedback loop. A workgroup with community representatives, such as the Oregon Food Bank and Partners for a Hunger Free Oregon, was in place. The community partners advised on all communication products such as news releases, the application design and social media kits.

“We worked together to get the information as far out to communities as we could. We were also able to get good data from the Call Center to let us know how we were doing. We had a strong feedback loop that we responded to quickly,” Christy Sinatra, ODHS Senior Communications Advisor, said.

For example, people asked if children in charter, private schools, or home schools could be included in Summer EBT. The answer was, yes, if they are found to be eligible. It was also important to communicate to people that the Summer EBT benefits expired after 122 days – so it was important to use them before then.

“We are trying to increase equity and access. There’s not just one approach. We pushed many communications and engagement levers – technology, in-person outreach, digital communications, community partnerships, media exposure. All those things working together to make the program successful and making sure every eligible kid gets this,” Sinatra said.

“The Oregon Summer EBT program demonstrated the strength of cross-agency collaboration and intentional program design. Staff were equipped with thoughtful tools and invited to shape how the program would operate, ensuring that those on the ground had a voice in critical decisions. That partnership—from planning to implementation—meant that families and children not only received meaningful support but also felt seen, heard, and cared for. The feedback from the community speaks volumes about the impact of that collective effort,” Singer said.

“The project was just overwhelmingly amazing. I just hope that people read this and apply for this summer,” Doody said.

2025 Summer EBT began May 22

The 2025 Summer EBT launched Thursday, May 22, 2025. Applications will be accepted through Wednesday, September 3, 2025.

ODHS will be running the whole program this summer – setting a goal of serving 375,000 children.

“We will be doing additional outreach, based on data and staff feedback, and providing new ways to engage with people such as going out to more schools and community events,” Doody said.

The program is set to: expand tactics to better reach people and communities that data showed were underserved; help schools connect families to Summer EBT; and increase strategic partnerships that serve priority audiences.

Resources:

Learn more about Summer EBT including how to apply for this benefit for your children: https://www.oregon.gov/odhs/food/pages/sebt.aspx.

Double Up Food Bucks Oregon: Visit https://doubleuporegon.org/ to learn how to double your SNAP and Summer EBT dollars at farmer’s markets, produce stands, community supported agriculture programs and grocery stores.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Alleged Perpetrator of Terror Attack in Colorado Charged with Hate Crimes

Source: United States Attorneys General

An indictment was unsealed today in Denver charging Mohamed Sabry Soliman with 12 hate crime counts, including nine counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 249 and three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), for using Molotov cocktails to attack members of the group “Run for Their Lives” and others who had gathered in the park in front of the Boulder County Courthouse on June 1. Soliman had previously been charged by complaint with a federal hate crime offense on June 2.

According to the indictment, on June 1, Soliman entered the park carrying both a backpack weed sprayer that contained a flammable liquid and a black plastic container that held at least 18 glass bottles and jars, all of which contained a flammable liquid and several of which had red rags stuffed through the top to act as wicks (commonly referred to as Molotov cocktails).

At approximately 1:30 p.m., Soliman approached the Run for Their Lives group and threw two Molotov cocktails that he had ignited. When throwing one of the Molotov cocktails, he shouted, “Free Palestine!”

A handwritten document was later recovered from the vehicle driven by Soliman. The document included the following statements: “Zionism is our enemies untill [sic] Jerusalem is liberated and they are expelled from our land,” and further described Israel as a “cancer entity.”

The indictment further alleges that during an interview with law enforcement, Soliman stated, among other things, that he viewed “anyone supporting the exist [sic] of Israel on our land” to be “Zionist.” The defendant stated that he “decide[d] to take [his] revenge from these people” and “search[ed] the internet looking for any Zionist event.” Soliman stated that he learned of the Run for Their Lives group through internet searches for “Zionist” events and that he identified the “Zionist” group when he saw the flags and signs they carried at the courthouse.

The case is being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Boulder Police Department.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado and the Civil Rights Division’s Criminal Section are prosecuting the case.

An indictment is merely an allegation. All individuals are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.

MIL Security OSI –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: The Justice Department Files Complaint Challenging Minnesota Laws Providing In-State Tuition Benefits for Illegal Aliens

Source: United States Attorneys General

Today the United States is challenging laws in Minnesota that provide reduced in-state tuition — and in some cases, free tuition — for illegal aliens. These laws unconstitutionally discriminate against U.S. citizens, who are not afforded the same privileges, in direct conflict with federal law. The Department of Justice has filed the complaint in the District of Minnesota. This challenge builds upon a recently successful lawsuit against the state of Texas on a similar law.

“No state can be allowed to treat Americans like second-class citizens in their own country by offering financial benefits to illegal aliens,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “The Department of Justice just won on this exact issue in Texas, and we look forward to taking this fight to Minnesota in order to protect the rights of American citizens first.”

In the complaint, the United States seeks to enjoin enforcement of Minnesota laws that require public colleges and universities to provide in-state tuition rates (and free tuition under certain circumstances, including if they meet a certain income threshold) for illegal aliens who maintain state residency, regardless of whether those aliens are lawfully present in the United States. Federal law prohibits institutions of higher education from providing postsecondary education benefits to aliens that are not offered to U.S. citizens. These laws blatantly conflict with federal law and thus are unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

This lawsuit follows two executive orders recently signed by President Trump that seek to ensure illegal aliens are not obtaining taxpayer benefits or preferential treatment.

Read the complaint here.

MIL Security OSI –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Alasdair Gray: unseen artworks offer insight into a profoundly creative and original artist

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Blane Savage, Lecturer in MA Creative Media Practice and BA(Hons) Graphic Art & Moving Image, University of the West of Scotland

Artist, writer, playwright, illustrator – and the man who made the Oscar-winning film Poor Things possible – Alasdair Gray was one of Scotland’s great creative polymaths and eccentrics, now celebrated every year on “Gray Day” (February 25). A new exhibition at the Kelvingrove Art Gallery in Glasgow has opened to reveal a selection of nine previously unseen artworks from The Morag McAlpine Bequest.

This is the first time works have been on display from the bequest gifted by him to Glasgow Life Museums following the death of his wife in 2014, which comprises artworks he created for her on anniversaries, birthdays and Christmas.

A small show like this cannot fully do justice to the vibrancy and volume of Gray’s output, but these nine pieces give a broad flavour of the artist’s working style and idiosyncratic idea development.

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Gray was a graduate of Glasgow School of Art where he specialised in murals and stained glass. In addition to being a talented artist and writer, he was also a professor of creative writing at Glasgow University.

His landmark novel Lanark: A Life in Four Books (1981), a story within a story of adolescence, with the mythical Unthank standing in for Glasgow, has been praised as a modern classic.

His influence on the Scottish art and literary scene was a powerful one. Regarded as the father figure of the Scottish Renaissance in art and literature, Gray’s postmodern work was a merging of realism, fantasy and science fiction, interwoven with his socialist political views. This was supported by his own book illustrations and typography. He inspired many young Scottish writers, including Irvine Welsh and Iain Banks.

Gray was also a strong Scottish nationalist. Inspired by a poem by Dennis Lee, Gray’s epigram, “Work as if you live in the early days of a better nation” was inscribed on the wall of the new Scottish Parliament building when it opened in 2004.

His creative works are deeply embedded in the psyche of the west end of Glasgow. Several of his murals are on display there, such as the one at the top of the escalators in Hillhead subway station, the surreal collages in The Ubiquitous Chip restaurant and the extraordinary night-sky ceiling fresco in Òran Mór, a church-turned-bar. These murals are a hybrid of styles, often black and white linear illustrations filled with colour, traditional painting and printmaking techniques.

These “new” artworks on display show different aspects, stages and details of Gray’s creative practice when designing artwork for print, such as the Tippex-infused works that allowed him to merge disparate elements of his cut-out collages.

The highlights of the show include the original artwork for his novel Poor Things, a subversive post-modern rewrite of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, set in and around Glasgow, and adapted by filmmaker Yorgos Lanthimos in 2023.

Read more:
Poor Things: meet the radical Scottish visionary behind the new hit film

The illustration features the anti-hero Godwin Baxter hugging two smaller figures – the reanimated Bella Baxter and Archibald McCandless MD, the primary narrator of the novel. They are surrounded by anatomical illustrations of body parts and in the centre a woman’s head has been cut open revealing her brain. Gray’s illustrative style utilises bold ink outlines, watercolour washes and solid blocks of colour.

The front cover illustration of Agnes Owen’s A Working Mother (1994) with black line work and solid acrylic colour washes, reflects Gray’s interest in everyday life and how alcohol smooths over the cracks. Hung beside it are two versions of working class figurative character sketches for People Like That (1996), in a similar style.

A black and white illustrated jacket design for Old Negatives (1989), Gray’s four-verse sequence describing aspects of love in its “absences and reverses”, has been designed using solid blocks of black with repeating motifs engraved within them.

Also included is a self-portrait of Gray as playwright, together with a series of 12 small black-and-white portraits of the performers of his play in Working Legs: A Play for Those Without Them (1997) performed by the Bird of Paradise Theatre Company. Set in a world of wheelchair users, those who can walk are monitored by the welfare state.

Gray was known for illustrating friends and family as revealed in his artwork Simon Berry and Bill MacLellan, Glasgow Publishers, Jim Taylor, Australian Writer and Printer, Shelley Killen, USA artist, where are all the figures of the title are roughly drawn with pencil and ink. The solid blue background is painted in acrylic, overlaid with Gray’s inked observations of each.

On the ground floor is what Gray called “my best big oil painting”, of a Cowcaddens streetscape in the 1950s which is by far the strongest piece on display here. Gray takes a wide-angled, almost fish-eye lens perspective to capture a famous Glasgow neighbourhood that was partially demolished and modernised in postwar development.

St Aloysius Church in Garnethill and Speir’s Wharf at Port Dundas can still be clearly seen, connecting us to the Glasgow of the present day. Gray’s narrative-driven imagery of daily life plays out, with local characters, playing children and besuited pals going out for the evening, all framed by street lamps and tenements immersed in a dark foreboding industrialised landscape.

Gray’s illustrations and artworks resonate not only with a celebration of Glasgow’s places, characters and life, they also give us insights into the intensely personal psyche of a creative genius. It’s a shame that more of this particular bequest could not have been displayed, but an opportunity to see these previously unseen works is most welcome.

Alasdair Gray: Works from the Morag McAlpine Bequest will be on show at the Fragile Gallery, Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum, Glasgow until June 2026

This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something, The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

Blane Savage does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Alasdair Gray: unseen artworks offer insight into a profoundly creative and original artist – https://theconversation.com/alasdair-gray-unseen-artworks-offer-insight-into-a-profoundly-creative-and-original-artist-259470

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Statement on Continued Lee Efforts to Sell Off America’s Public Lands: “The Latest Lee Proposal Is Just One More Attempt To See If Congress Blinks”

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell

06.25.25

Cantwell Statement on Continued Lee Efforts to Sell Off America’s Public Lands: “The Latest Lee Proposal Is Just One More Attempt To See If Congress Blinks”

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), senior member of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, released the following statement in response to the latest proposal from U.S. Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) to sell off America’s public lands to the highest bidder.

Lee’s most recent draft comes after the Senate Parliamentarian rejected his opening gambit because it fails to meet strict Senate rules governing the budget process that Senate Republicans are relying on to circumvent the Senate filibuster, which normally curtails divisive partisan proposals. It is expected that Lee will continue to modify his controversial land sales proposal to pass muster with the parliamentarian until right up to the Senate votes on the measure later this week as part of the larger reconciliation bill. After the Senate Parliamentarian rejected Lee’s opening gambit — deeming the proposal ineligible under budget reconciliation process rules — Lee responded, “I’m doing everything I can to support President Trump and move this forward.” He promised, “We’re just getting started.”

“Republicans seem hell bent on trying to sell public lands. Members need to stand up and stop this giveaway of our natural heritage. The latest Lee proposal is just one more attempt to see if Congress blinks. A massive change to our public land policy should not be included in a budget bill. We need climbers, hikers, hunters, gateway communities, and everyone who loves the outdoors to call their elected representatives right away to say our public lands are not for sale,” Sen. Cantwell said.

Lee’s revised language would require the Secretary of Interior to sell between 0.25 percent and 0.50 percent of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land in the 11 Western states, minus Montana. It would also allow for the nominations of BLM land to be sold. The land would have to be in a 5-mile radius of the border of a population center.

Yesterday, Sen. Cantwell hosted a virtual press conference to push back on Lee’s proposal. She was joined by Boise Mayor Lauren McLean, professional athletes and outdoorsmen Tommy Caldwell and Graham Zimmerman, REI leader Susan Viscon, and Backcountry Hunters & Anglers spokesperson Kaden McArthur.

READ MORE:

The Associated Press: GOP plan to sell more than 3,200 square miles of federal lands is found to violate Senate rules

The Seattle Times: Pitch to sell public lands hits snag. What does that mean for WA?

The Spokesman Review: Public land sales provision would violate Senate rule, but its backer pledges to try again

The Tri-City Herald: What public lands near Tri-Cities could be sold under new Trump tax plan?

Video of yesterday’s virtual press conference is available HERE; a transcript of Sen. Cantwell’s opening remarks is HERE.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025

Vendor	Technical Score	Cost Score	Total
Advanced Technology Recycling	597.50	262.71	860.21
Vendor #2	570.00	104.58	674.58
Vendor #3	577.50	59.02	636.52

Category: United States of America

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (19.2.2025)

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

California’s unprecedented wildfire readiness

Recent news

Today’s hearing includes the nomination of Emil Bove to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

About Summer EBT

A tight timeline

Goal setting

Innovation in action

Communications and community engagement

2025 Summer EBT began May 22

Resources:

Cantwell Statement on Continued Lee Efforts to Sell Off America’s Public Lands: “The Latest Lee Proposal Is Just One More Attempt To See If Congress Blinks”