Category: United States of America

  • MIL-OSI: Eos Energy Successfully Closed $336M in Concurrent Offerings of Common Stock and Convertible Senior Notes, Strengthening its Balance Sheet and Creating Enhanced Financial Flexibility

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Simplified capital structure bolsters ability to rapidly meet customer demand, reduce interest expense, and increase liquidity

    Continues to scale operations with order for its second state-of-the-art battery module manufacturing line

    EDISON, N.J., June 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Eos Energy Enterprises, Inc. (NASDAQ: EOSE) (“Eos” or the “Company”), America’s leading innovator in the design, sourcing, and manufacturing of zinc-based long duration energy storage (LDES) systems, manufactured in the United States, announced the closing of the full exercise of the initial purchasers’ option to purchase additional notes in connection with its convertible senior notes due 2030 offering. Following the exercise of the option, $250 million aggregate principal amount of convertible senior notes due 2030 were outstanding. This announcement follows the Company’s successful closing of its concurrent offerings of common stock (including a full exercise of the underwriters’ option to purchase additional shares) and convertible senior notes due 2030.

    These transformative transactions mark a critical inflection point that unlocks the financial flexibility required to scale operations to meet long duration energy storage global demand. The offerings were significantly oversubscribed, demonstrating strong investor confidence in Eos’ market potential and progress against its strategic plan.

    “We proactively capitalized on favorable market conditions to strengthen our financial position and play offense on long term growth,” said Nathan Kroeker, Eos Chief Commercial Officer and Interim Chief Financial Officer. “Amid this opportunity, we strategically repurchased the maturing 2026 convertible note, lowered our cost of capital on the Cerberus term loan, and enhanced liquidity, putting us in an ideal position to capture the growing demand for long duration energy storage.”

    The capital infusion strengthens Eos’ ability to execute its growth strategy and increases strategic flexibility by reducing the weighting at the top of its capital stack. It also allowed the Company to restructure key portions of its debt, materially lowering its cost of capital while strengthening its balance sheet, with the overall transaction resulting in approximately $400 million in savings over the terms of the Company’s debt.

    “This was more than a capital raise – it strategically positions the Company to achieve our long-term objectives,” said Joe Mastrangelo, Chief Executive Officer of Eos. “Improving our capital structure provides the tools required to operationally position the Company for growth. A stronger balance sheet combined with an improved capital cost structure, allows Eos to deliver for its customers, and build long-term shareholder value.”

    Use of Proceeds and Strategic Debt Restructuring

    Proceeds from the transactions were used to:

    • Fully repurchase the Company’s $125.9 million 5%/6% Convertible Senior PIK Toggle Note due 2026 for $131 million, saving Eos $8.3 million in incremental interest that would have been owed upon maturity. Pursuant to the terms of the repurchase agreement, the Company subsequently received a $5 million reimbursement of the purchase price from the holder.
    • Prepay $50 million of outstanding borrowings due under the Company’s Delayed Draw Term Loan (DDTL) between Eos and an affiliate of Cerberus Capital Management LP (“Cerberus”), and
    • Add approximately $139 million in cash to the balance sheet net of purchaser discounts, prior to the deduction of expenses.

    The $50 million prepayment on the DDTL resulted in key benefits:

    • Reduced the interest rate on the remaining DDTL from 15% to 7%, significantly lowering the Company’s cost of capital.
    • Deferred the EBITDA and revenue financial covenants on the DDTL and DOE to begin March 31, 2027, allowing the Company to focus on scaled growth.
    • Extended the lock-up period on Cerberus held securities by one year to June 21, 2026, further aligning long-term shareholder interests.
    • Waived call protection provisions, saving the Company $28.7 million in prepayment expense.

    Eos is currently working to obtain approval from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office (DOE) for the next funding advance under tranche 1 of its DOE guaranteed loan.

    Operational Momentum and Manufacturing Expansion

    Eos recently submitted the purchase order for its second state-of-the-art manufacturing line that is expected to be operational in the first half of 2026. This marks a pivotal milestone in the Company’s plan to scale domestic production in response to strong U.S. and international demand. In parallel, Eos is in the process of installing and commissioning its first bi-polar sub-assembly, an automation enhancement expected to drive significant improvements in throughput and production efficiency.

    Year-to-date, Eos has shipped more energy storage cubes than in all of 2024, with Q2 shipments surpassing Q1, reflecting strong manufacturing execution. This momentum is expected to continue throughout the remainder of the year, supported by meaningful output gains as the Company brings all its terminal and bi-polar sub-assembly automation fully online during the third quarter.

    System Performance and Field Integration

    As production capacity increases, Eos continues to invest in the innovation engine driving its technology roadmap. At its R&D facility in Edison, New Jersey, Francis Richey, Chief Technology Officer, and Pranesh Rao, Senior Vice President Storage Systems Engineering, and team are pioneering advancements that are reshaping long duration energy storage.

    Introduced during the Company’s December 2023 strategic outlook call, Eos has made substantial progress on two foundational components of its Z3 energy storage system: its proprietary American-made Battery Management System (BMS) and its modular inline cube architecture. The custom electronics and advanced software in the BMS have improved availability and shown round trip efficiency above 80% with some longer duration applications surpassing 90%. Developed and maintained in the United States, the BMS ensures critical data privacy and cybersecurity protections, key to enhancing the resilience and security of the U.S. power grid.

    The Company’s inline cube, engineered to simplify field deployment and reduce system level costs, has also demonstrated measurable field efficiencies. In a recent Z3 project, Eos proved the ability to cold commission 75 cubes in just 7 days, resulting in approximately 96% lower installation costs versus prior system designs. Faster installation times and lower costs allow the Eos system to rapidly-scale and meet customer demand for accelerating grid integration.

    Building on these operational and technological advancements, Eos has partnered with PA Consulting Group – energy market and policy advisor and industry leader in forecasting and analytics – to quantify the near and long-term value of its technology. Despite higher upfront costs, compared to incumbent technologies, PA’s independent modeling for ERCOT-based customers showed 30-50% higher revenues over the life of a project for 4+ hour systems. This is a testament to the differentiated performance of the domestically manufactured Z3 technology, and the benefits Eos can provide to customers across North America.

    As power systems adapt to the growing demands of electrification and increased renewable penetration, energy storage has become essential to ensuring grid reliability, flexibility, and resilience. Eos is well-positioned to meet this need with secure, scalable, American-made solutions offering customers not just technology, but long-term value and performance that support the evolving energy landscape.

    Upon the closing of the offerings (including the option to purchase additional notes), the Company is no longer subject to quiet period restrictions until the regularly scheduled period at the end of the second quarter until earnings.

    About Eos
    Eos Energy Enterprises, Inc. is accelerating the shift to American energy independence with positively ingenious solutions that transform how the world stores power. Our breakthrough Znyth™ aqueous zinc battery was designed to overcome the limitations of conventional lithium-ion technology. Safe, scalable, efficient, sustainable—and manufactured in the U.S—it is the core of our innovative systems that today provide utility, industrial, and commercial customers with a proven, reliable energy storage alternative for 3-to 12-hour applications. Eos was founded in 2008 and is headquartered in Edison, New Jersey. For more information about Eos (NASDAQ: EOSE), visit eose.com.

    Contacts  
    Investors:  ir@eose.com
    Media:       media@eose.com

    Forward Looking Statements

    Except for the historical information contained herein, the matters set forth in this press release are forward-looking statements within the meaning of the “safe harbor” provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements regarding our expected revenue, for the fiscal years December 31, 2025, our path to profitability and strategic outlook, statements regarding orders backlog and opportunity pipeline, statements regarding our expectation that we can continue to increase product volume on our state-of-the-art manufacturing line, statements regarding our future expansion and its impact on our ability to scale up operations, statements regarding our expectation that we can continue to strengthen our overall supply chain, statements regarding our expectation that our new comprehensive insurance program will provide increased operational and economic certainty, statements that refer to the delayed draw term loan with Cerberus, milestones thereunder and the anticipated use of proceeds, statements that refer to outlook, projections, forecasts or other characterizations of future events or circumstances, including any underlying assumptions. The words “anticipate,” “believe,” “continue,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “intends,” “may,” “might,” “plan,” “possible,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “should,” “would” and similar expressions may identify forward-looking statements, but the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. Forward-looking statements are based on our management’s beliefs, as well as assumptions made by, and the information currently available to, them. Because such statements are based on expectations as to future financial and operating results and are not statements of fact, actual results may differ materially from those projected.

    Factors which may cause actual results to differ materially from current expectations include, but are not limited to: changes adversely affecting the business in which we are engaged; our ability to forecast trends accurately; our ability to generate cash, service indebtedness and incur additional indebtedness; our ability to achieve the operational milestones on the delayed draw term loan; our ability to raise financing in the future; risks associated with the DDTL with Cerberus, including risks of default, dilution of outstanding Common Stock, consequences for failure to meet milestones and contractual lockup of shares; our customers’ ability to secure project financing; the amount of final tax credits available to our customers or to Eos pursuant to the Inflation Reduction Act; the timing and availability of future funding under the Department of Energy Loan Facility; our ability to continue to develop efficient manufacturing processes to scale and to forecast related costs and efficiencies accurately; fluctuations in our revenue and operating results; competition from existing or new competitors; our ability to convert firm order backlog and pipeline to revenue; risks associated with security breaches in our information technology systems; risks related to legal proceedings or claims; risks associated with evolving energy policies in the United States and other countries and the potential costs of regulatory compliance; risks associated with changes to the U.S. trade environment; our ability to maintain the listing of our shares of common stock on NASDAQ; our ability to grow our business and manage growth profitably, maintain relationships with customers and suppliers and retain our management and key employees; risks related to the adverse changes in general economic conditions, including inflationary pressures and increased interest rates; risk from supply chain disruptions and other impacts of geopolitical conflict; changes in applicable laws or regulations; the possibility that Eos may be adversely affected by other economic, business, and/or competitive factors; other factors beyond our control; risks related to adverse changes in general economic conditions; and other risks and uncertainties.

    The forward-looking statements contained in this press release are also subject to additional risks, uncertainties, and factors, including those more fully described in the Company’s most recent filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including the Company’s most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K and subsequent reports on Forms 10-Q and 8-K. Further information on potential risks that could affect actual results will be included in the subsequent periodic and current reports and other filings that the Company makes with the Securities and Exchange Commission from time to time. Moreover, the Company operates in a very competitive and rapidly changing environment, and new risks and uncertainties may emerge that could have an impact on the forward-looking statements contained in this press release.

    Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. Readers are cautioned not to put undue reliance on forward-looking statements, and, except as required by law, the Company assumes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise these forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: D. Trump vetoes Israeli plan to assassinate Iran’s supreme leader – media

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    WASHINGTON, June 16 (Xinhua) — U.S. President Donald Trump has vetoed an Israeli plan to assassinate Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, media reported Sunday.

    As CBS News reported, citing an American official, Israel had the opportunity to kill A. Khamenei, and D. Trump told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that “it’s not a very good idea.”

    But when asked about the assassination plan in an interview on Fox News Sunday, Netanyahu said: “There are so many false reports about conversations that never happened, and I’m not going to go into detail.”

    Senior US officials have been in constant contact with Israeli officials in the days following Israel’s massive attack on Iran on Friday, Reuters reported.

    D. Trump said Sunday that while the United States is not currently involved in Israel’s military strikes on Iran, future involvement remains a possibility.

    “We’re not involved in that. Maybe we could be involved. But we’re not involved at this point,” the president told ABC News in an interview.

    Since the Israeli strikes on Iran, Trump has repeatedly called on Tehran to make a deal. In an interview with ABC News, the president said he had given Iran a “60-day ultimatum” to “make a deal,” but he was not setting a new deadline.

    Later Sunday, before leaving the White House for the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Canada, the US president reiterated his view that he sees a “good chance” for a nuclear deal amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: D. Trump vetoes Israeli plan to assassinate Iran’s supreme leader – media

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    WASHINGTON, June 16 (Xinhua) — U.S. President Donald Trump has vetoed an Israeli plan to assassinate Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, media reported Sunday.

    As CBS News reported, citing an American official, Israel had the opportunity to kill A. Khamenei, and D. Trump told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that “it’s not a very good idea.”

    But when asked about the assassination plan in an interview on Fox News Sunday, Netanyahu said: “There are so many false reports about conversations that never happened, and I’m not going to go into detail.”

    Senior US officials have been in constant contact with Israeli officials in the days following Israel’s massive attack on Iran on Friday, Reuters reported.

    D. Trump said Sunday that while the United States is not currently involved in Israel’s military strikes on Iran, future involvement remains a possibility.

    “We’re not involved in that. Maybe we could be involved. But we’re not involved at this point,” the president told ABC News in an interview.

    Since the Israeli strikes on Iran, Trump has repeatedly called on Tehran to make a deal. In an interview with ABC News, the president said he had given Iran a “60-day ultimatum” to “make a deal,” but he was not setting a new deadline.

    Later Sunday, before leaving the White House for the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Canada, the US president reiterated his view that he sees a “good chance” for a nuclear deal amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI: T1 Energy Advances $850 Million Planned 5 GW Solar Cell Plant

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    AUSTIN, Texas and NEW YORK, June 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — T1 Energy Inc. (NYSE: TE) (“T1,” “T1 Energy,” or the “Company”) announced the selection of Yates Construction as contractor for preconstruction services and site preparations for its planned $850 million, G2_Austin 5 GW Solar Cell Facility. The project is enabled by the Trump Administration’s tariffs and other policies supporting American advanced manufacturing, jobs and energy dominance.

    The commissioners of Milam County, Texas, also unanimously voted to provide T1 Energy with a long-term tax abatement package, subject to the Company meeting or exceeding employment and investment thresholds at the facility. The facility is expected to begin producing cells by the end of 2026, and create up to 1,800 full-time jobs.

    G2_Austin is a key part of T1’s strategy to build a domestic solar and battery supply chain to provide America with scalable, reliable and low-cost energy. In combination with the Company’s fully operational G1_Dallas 5 GW Solar Module Facility, T1 plans to address unmet customer demand for U.S. solar cells and modules using TOPCon technology.

    “Solar energy is a foundational part of American power grids. Our facilities will manufacture solar cells and modules to invigorate our economy with abundant energy. We’re excited to work with Yates and Milam County to bring American advanced manufacturing to the heart of Texas and to unlock our most scalable energy resources,” said T1 Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer Daniel Barcelo.

    “We look forward to working with T1 Energy and leveraging our extensive experience in advanced manufacturing facility construction,” said William G. Yates III, President and CEO of Yates Construction. “This is an exciting project, and Yates Construction is committed to being a collaborative partner throughout the execution of the project.” Yates Construction is part of The Yates Companies, Inc., one of the country’s top builders of complex construction projects.

    “We’re thrilled to welcome T1 Energy to Milam County—this partnership brings not just innovation, but the kind of high-quality, good-paying jobs that empower our local families and strengthen our community. It’s a powerful step toward a future of sustainable growth and opportunity, right here at home,” said Milam County Judge Bill Whitmire.

    T1 Energy has engaged Yates to provide preconstruction services for G2_Austin and anticipates finalizing commercial terms with the company as General Contractor. Yates joins SSOE Group which has been providing project engineering for G2_Austin since December 2024.

    About T1 Energy

    T1 Energy Inc. (NYSE: TE) is an energy solutions provider building an integrated U.S. supply chain for solar and batteries. In December 2024, T1 completed a transformative transaction, positioning the Company as one of the leading solar manufacturing companies in the United States, with a complementary solar and battery storage strategy. Based in the United States with plans to expand its operations in America, the Company is also exploring value optimization opportunities across its portfolio of assets in Europe.

    To learn more about T1, please visit www.T1energy.com and follow us on social media.

    Investor contact:

    Jeffrey Spittel
    EVP, Investor Relations and Corporate Development
    jeffrey.spittel@T1energy.com
    Tel: +1 409 599 5706

    Media contact:

    Russell Gold
    EVP, Strategic Communications
    russell.gold@T1energy.com
    Tel: +1 214 616 9715

    Cautionary Statement Concerning Forward-Looking Statements:

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. All statements contained in this press release that do not relate to matters of historical fact should be considered forward-looking statements, including without limitation with respect to: the success and timeline of the construction of G2_Austin and T1’s ability to manufacture solar cells and modules; any anticipated benefits of the Trump Administration’s tariffs and other policies; the ability of T1 Energy to meet the required threshold for the long-term tax abatement from Milam County, Texas; the timeline for commencement of cell production at G2_Austin and the creation of jobs in connection therewith; T1 Energy’s strategy to build a domestic solar and battery supply chain to provide America with energy; T1 Energy’s plans to address unmet customer demand for U.S. solar cells and modules and unlock the United States’ energy resources; T1 Energy’s vision and ability to bring American advanced manufacturing to the heart of Texas and to invigorate the United States’ economy with abundant energy, and bring sustainable growth and opportunity to Milam County; and finalizing the commercial terms of engagement with Yates. These forward-looking statements are based on management’s current expectations. These statements are neither promises nor guarantees, but involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other important factors that may cause actual future events, results, or achievements to be materially different from the Company’s expectations and projections expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements. Important factors include, but are not limited to, those discussed under the caption “Risk Factors” in (i) T1’s annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on March 31, 2025, as amended and supplemented by Amendment No. 1 on Form 10-K/A filed with the SEC on April 30, 2025, and T1’s quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2025 filed with the SEC on May 15, 2025, (ii) T1’s post-effective Amendment No. 1 to the Registration Statement on Form S-3 filed with the SEC on January 4, 2024, and (iii) T1’s Registration Statement on Form S-4 filed with the SEC on September 8, 2023 and subsequent amendments thereto filed on October 13, 2023, October 19, 2023 and October 31, 2023. All of the above referenced filings are available on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this press release and are based on information available to the Company as of the date of this press release, and the Company assumes no obligation to update such forward-looking statements, all of which are expressly qualified by the statements in this section, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by law.

    T1 intends to use its website as a channel of distribution to disclose information which may be of interest or material to investors and to communicate with investors and the public. Such disclosures will be included on T1’s website in the ‘Investor Relations’ section. T1, and its CEO and Chairman of the Board, Daniel Barcelo, also intend to use certain social media channels, including, but not limited to, X, LinkedIn and Instagram, as means of communicating with the public and investors about T1, its progress, products, and other matters. While not all the information that T1 or Daniel Barcelo post to their respective digital platforms may be deemed to be of a material nature, some information may be. As a result, T1 encourages investors and others interested to review the information that it and Daniel Barcelo posts and to monitor such portions of T1’s website and social media channels on a regular basis, in addition to following T1’s press releases, SEC filings, and public conference calls and webcasts. The contents of T1’s website and its and Daniel Barcelo’s social media channels shall not be deemed incorporated by reference in any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: T1 Energy Advances $850 Million Planned 5 GW Solar Cell Plant

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    AUSTIN, Texas and NEW YORK, June 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — T1 Energy Inc. (NYSE: TE) (“T1,” “T1 Energy,” or the “Company”) announced the selection of Yates Construction as contractor for preconstruction services and site preparations for its planned $850 million, G2_Austin 5 GW Solar Cell Facility. The project is enabled by the Trump Administration’s tariffs and other policies supporting American advanced manufacturing, jobs and energy dominance.

    The commissioners of Milam County, Texas, also unanimously voted to provide T1 Energy with a long-term tax abatement package, subject to the Company meeting or exceeding employment and investment thresholds at the facility. The facility is expected to begin producing cells by the end of 2026, and create up to 1,800 full-time jobs.

    G2_Austin is a key part of T1’s strategy to build a domestic solar and battery supply chain to provide America with scalable, reliable and low-cost energy. In combination with the Company’s fully operational G1_Dallas 5 GW Solar Module Facility, T1 plans to address unmet customer demand for U.S. solar cells and modules using TOPCon technology.

    “Solar energy is a foundational part of American power grids. Our facilities will manufacture solar cells and modules to invigorate our economy with abundant energy. We’re excited to work with Yates and Milam County to bring American advanced manufacturing to the heart of Texas and to unlock our most scalable energy resources,” said T1 Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer Daniel Barcelo.

    “We look forward to working with T1 Energy and leveraging our extensive experience in advanced manufacturing facility construction,” said William G. Yates III, President and CEO of Yates Construction. “This is an exciting project, and Yates Construction is committed to being a collaborative partner throughout the execution of the project.” Yates Construction is part of The Yates Companies, Inc., one of the country’s top builders of complex construction projects.

    “We’re thrilled to welcome T1 Energy to Milam County—this partnership brings not just innovation, but the kind of high-quality, good-paying jobs that empower our local families and strengthen our community. It’s a powerful step toward a future of sustainable growth and opportunity, right here at home,” said Milam County Judge Bill Whitmire.

    T1 Energy has engaged Yates to provide preconstruction services for G2_Austin and anticipates finalizing commercial terms with the company as General Contractor. Yates joins SSOE Group which has been providing project engineering for G2_Austin since December 2024.

    About T1 Energy

    T1 Energy Inc. (NYSE: TE) is an energy solutions provider building an integrated U.S. supply chain for solar and batteries. In December 2024, T1 completed a transformative transaction, positioning the Company as one of the leading solar manufacturing companies in the United States, with a complementary solar and battery storage strategy. Based in the United States with plans to expand its operations in America, the Company is also exploring value optimization opportunities across its portfolio of assets in Europe.

    To learn more about T1, please visit www.T1energy.com and follow us on social media.

    Investor contact:

    Jeffrey Spittel
    EVP, Investor Relations and Corporate Development
    jeffrey.spittel@T1energy.com
    Tel: +1 409 599 5706

    Media contact:

    Russell Gold
    EVP, Strategic Communications
    russell.gold@T1energy.com
    Tel: +1 214 616 9715

    Cautionary Statement Concerning Forward-Looking Statements:

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. All statements contained in this press release that do not relate to matters of historical fact should be considered forward-looking statements, including without limitation with respect to: the success and timeline of the construction of G2_Austin and T1’s ability to manufacture solar cells and modules; any anticipated benefits of the Trump Administration’s tariffs and other policies; the ability of T1 Energy to meet the required threshold for the long-term tax abatement from Milam County, Texas; the timeline for commencement of cell production at G2_Austin and the creation of jobs in connection therewith; T1 Energy’s strategy to build a domestic solar and battery supply chain to provide America with energy; T1 Energy’s plans to address unmet customer demand for U.S. solar cells and modules and unlock the United States’ energy resources; T1 Energy’s vision and ability to bring American advanced manufacturing to the heart of Texas and to invigorate the United States’ economy with abundant energy, and bring sustainable growth and opportunity to Milam County; and finalizing the commercial terms of engagement with Yates. These forward-looking statements are based on management’s current expectations. These statements are neither promises nor guarantees, but involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other important factors that may cause actual future events, results, or achievements to be materially different from the Company’s expectations and projections expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements. Important factors include, but are not limited to, those discussed under the caption “Risk Factors” in (i) T1’s annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on March 31, 2025, as amended and supplemented by Amendment No. 1 on Form 10-K/A filed with the SEC on April 30, 2025, and T1’s quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2025 filed with the SEC on May 15, 2025, (ii) T1’s post-effective Amendment No. 1 to the Registration Statement on Form S-3 filed with the SEC on January 4, 2024, and (iii) T1’s Registration Statement on Form S-4 filed with the SEC on September 8, 2023 and subsequent amendments thereto filed on October 13, 2023, October 19, 2023 and October 31, 2023. All of the above referenced filings are available on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this press release and are based on information available to the Company as of the date of this press release, and the Company assumes no obligation to update such forward-looking statements, all of which are expressly qualified by the statements in this section, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by law.

    T1 intends to use its website as a channel of distribution to disclose information which may be of interest or material to investors and to communicate with investors and the public. Such disclosures will be included on T1’s website in the ‘Investor Relations’ section. T1, and its CEO and Chairman of the Board, Daniel Barcelo, also intend to use certain social media channels, including, but not limited to, X, LinkedIn and Instagram, as means of communicating with the public and investors about T1, its progress, products, and other matters. While not all the information that T1 or Daniel Barcelo post to their respective digital platforms may be deemed to be of a material nature, some information may be. As a result, T1 encourages investors and others interested to review the information that it and Daniel Barcelo posts and to monitor such portions of T1’s website and social media channels on a regular basis, in addition to following T1’s press releases, SEC filings, and public conference calls and webcasts. The contents of T1’s website and its and Daniel Barcelo’s social media channels shall not be deemed incorporated by reference in any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Africa: President in Canada for G7 Leaders’ Summit

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    President Cyril Ramaphosa has arrived in Canada to participate in the G7 Summit Outreach Session, scheduled to take place on the margins of the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada on Monday.  

    The Group of Seven consists of the largest advanced economies namely: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The European Union also participates in G7 Summits.  

    Canada assumed the Presidency of the G7 on 01 January 2025 and its Presidency seeks to address global challenges and opportunities, including international peace and security, global economic stability and growth, and the digital transition.

    According to the Presidency, the Outreach Session aims “to explore leadership and collaboration in driving a comprehensive approach to energy security with a focus on technology and innovation; diversification and strengthening critical mineral supply chains; and infrastructure and investment”.

    The Presidency said this resonated with South Africa’s national interests and priorities of South Africa’s G20 Presidency.  

    “The Outreach Sessions of the G7 in which President Ramaphosa will participate have been a feature of the group over the years, with the aim to strengthen unity among G7 members and like-minded countries to deliberate on and address some of the world’s most pressing issues.

    “Reflecting the outward looking approach of recent Presidencies, guest leaders are invited to join Outreach Sessions within the Summit agenda,” it said.

    The cooperation between South Africa and Canada has strengthened this year as it relates to G20 and G7.

    Under South Africa’s G20 Presidency, enhanced efforts have been undertaken to align objectives and support the agenda of the G7 to that of the G20.

    Several engagements have taken place between South Africa and Canada at various levels, including at Sherpa and Ministerial levels.

    South Africa is currently the only African country invited to this year’s G7 Summit Outreach Session.

    The Presidency said the G7 Summit will provide President Ramaphosa with an opportunity to meet Heads of State and Government of G7 countries, who are also G20 members, and other outreach guest countries.

    “The President will use this platform as an opportunity to engage with various leaders on areas of common interest in bilateral relations and multilateral cooperation – including the G20 Presidency ahead of the G20 Leaders’ Summit in November 2025.”

    President Ramaphosa’s participation at the G7 Leaders Summit presents an opportunity for South Africa to pursue strategic alignment within the framework of G7-G20 cooperation, where necessary, the Presidency added.

    The President is accompanied by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Ronald Lamola. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai meets delegation led by Representative Bera, co-chair of US Congressional Taiwan Caucus

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    Details
    2025-06-13
    President Lai meets delegation led by French National Assembly Taiwan Friendship Group Chair Marie-Noëlle Battistel
    On the morning of June 12, President Lai Ching-te met a delegation led by Marie-Noëlle Battistel, chair of the French National Assembly’s Taiwan Friendship Group. In remarks, President Lai thanked the National Assembly for its long-term support for Taiwan’s international participation and for upholding security in the Taiwan Strait, helping make France the first major country in the world to enact legislation to uphold freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait. The president also said that exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and France are becoming more frequent, and that he hopes this visit by the Taiwan Friendship Group will inject new momentum into Taiwan-France relations and help build closer partnerships in the economy, trade, energy, and digital security.  A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: First, I would like to welcome Chair Battistel, who is once again leading a visiting delegation. Last year, Chair Battistel co-led a delegation to attend the inauguration ceremony for myself and Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao. This is her fourth visit, and first as chair of the Taiwan Friendship Group, which makes it especially meaningful. This delegation’s visit demonstrates strong support for Taiwan, and on behalf of the people of Taiwan, I want to express my sincerest welcome and thanks. France is a pioneer in promoting free and democratic values. These are values that Taiwan cherishes and is working hard to defend. I want to express gratitude to the French Parliament for their long-term support for Taiwan’s international participation, and for upholding security in the Taiwan Strait. The French Parliament’s two chambers have continued to strongly support Taiwan, with the passage of a resolution supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations in 2021, as well as the passage of the seven-year Military Programming Law in 2023. This has made France the first major country in the world to enact legislation to uphold freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait. Through it all, the Taiwan Friendship Group has played a key role, and I want to thank all of our distinguished guests for their efforts. Over the past few years, Taiwan and France have continued to deepen cooperation in areas including the economy, technology, culture, and sports. At the Choose France summit held in Paris last month, Taiwanese and French enterprises also announced they will launch cooperation in the semiconductor and satellite fields. The VivaTech startup exhibition, now being held in France, also has many Taiwanese vendors participating. Exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and France, whether official or people-to-people, are becoming more and more frequent. I hope that this visit by the Taiwan Friendship Group will inject new momentum into Taiwan-France relations, building closer partnerships in the economy, trade, energy, and digital security.  To address current geopolitical and economic challenges, Taiwan will continue to join forces with France and other like-minded countries to jointly safeguard peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, and contribute our concerted efforts to global prosperity and development. Once again, I want to welcome our visitors to Taiwan. I hope to continue our joint efforts to create a more prosperous future for both Taiwan and France.   Chair Battistel then delivered remarks, thanking President Lai for extending this invitation. Last year on May 20, she said, she and her delegation attended the presidential inauguration ceremony, so she was delighted to visit Taiwan once again with the French National Assembly’s Taiwan Friendship Group and bear witness to their friendship with Taiwan. Chair Battistel noted that this visit has given them an opportunity to strengthen Taiwan-France relations in areas including the economy, culture, the humanities, and diplomacy, and conduct exchanges with numerous heads of government agencies and research institutes. It has also been an opportunity, she said, to witness the importance of exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan in areas including energy, semiconductors, youth, and culture, and the impact created by important issues of mutual concern, including AI and disinformation, on the security of many countries. Chair Battistel praised Taiwan for its youth development efforts, and said that under the Taiwan Global Pathfinders Initiative, 30 Taiwanese young people have embarked on a visit to France, with itineraries including the United Nations Ocean Conference and the VivaTech exhibition, as well as the city of Toulouse, which is strategically important for the aerospace industry. Members of the group are also conducting exchanges at the French National Assembly, she said.  Chair Battistel stated that the Taiwan-France partnership is growing closer, and that she hopes to continue to strengthen bilateral exchanges and cooperation, as supporting peace for Taiwan supports peace around the world.  The delegation also included Taiwan Friendship Group Vice Chair Éric Martineau, as well as National Assembly Committee on Foreign Affairs Vice Chair Laetitia Saint-Paul and Deputies Marie-José Allemand and Claudia Rouaux. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by French Office in Taipei Deputy Director Cléa Le Cardeur.

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    2025-06-05
    President Lai hosts state banquet for President Bernardo Arévalo of Republic of Guatemala  
    At noon on June 5, President Lai Ching-te hosted a state banquet at the Presidential Office for President Bernardo Arévalo of the Republic of Guatemala and his wife. In his remarks, President Lai noted that Taiwan and Guatemala have both undergone an arduous democratization process, and therefore, in face of the continuous expansion of authoritarian influence, must join hands in brotherhood and come together in solidarity to safeguard our hard-earned freedom and democracy. President Lai also expressed hope that both countries will work together and continue to deepen various exchanges and cooperation, taking a friendship that has lasted over 90 years to new heights. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: Once again, I would like to offer a warm welcome to President Arévalo and First Lady Lucrecia Peinado, who are leading this delegation to Taiwan. President Arévalo’s previous visit to Taiwan was 31 years ago. Back then, Taiwan did not have direct presidential elections, and the nation was continuing to make progress toward democratization. Today, 31 years later, Taiwan has conducted direct presidential elections eight times, with three transfers of power between political parties. On this visit, I am sure that President Arévalo will gain a deep appreciation for Taiwan’s free and democratic atmosphere.  Taiwan and Guatemala have both undergone an arduous democratization process. A little over 200 years ago, the people of Guatemala took a stand against colonial oppression, seeking national dignity and the freedom of its people. Eighty-one years ago, President Arévalo’s father, Juan José Arévalo, became Guatemala’s first democratically elected president, establishing an important foundation for subsequent democratic development.  Our two peoples have democracy in their blood. Both know the value of freedom and democracy and are willing to take a stand for those values. Therefore, in face of the continuous expansion of authoritarian influence, our two countries must join hands in brotherhood to respond to threats and challenges, and come together in solidarity to safeguard our hard-earned freedom and democracy. I hope that both countries will work together to continue to deepen various exchanges and cooperation, taking a friendship that has lasted over 90 years to new heights. I hope that on this visit, in addition to gaining a deeper understanding of Taiwan’s political, economic, and social development, President Arévalo can also reacquaint himself with the democratic vitality and cultural diversity of Taiwan by sampling various gourmet delicacies and once again experiencing the beauty of our scenery and warmth of our people. Guatemala is a very beautiful country. In the future, I hope to have a chance to personally experience that beauty, explore Mayan civilization, and savor local Guatemalan coffee. In closing, I wish the visiting delegation a smooth and successful trip, and beautiful, unforgettable memories. May President Arévalo enjoy the best of health, and may the diplomatic friendship between our two countries endure. President Arévalo then delivered remarks, stating that at different times and by different means, the people of Taiwan and Guatemala have relentlessly sought to defend freedom and democracy. We share the same expectations, he said, and are walking the right path amid today’s complex international circumstances.  President Arévalo stated that Taiwan and Guatemala are true democratic nations, where the government’s goal is to serve all the people. He noted that this is far from easy under current circumstances, as many authoritarian regimes use their long-term hold on power to safeguard the interests of select groups and neglect the wellbeing of the population as a whole. President Arévalo said that last week Guatemala commemorated the 40th anniversary of its constitution, which was enacted in 1985 and is Guatemala’s ultimate guide, setting the foundation for democracy and clearly outlining the path ahead. He said that over the past 40 years, Guatemala has continued to follow the democratic blueprint established by the constitution and end the civil war so that the nation could make the transition to real democracy. Although more than a few ambitious people have attempted to destroy that process from within, he noted, the people of Guatemala have never given up the pursuit of democracy as an ideal. President Arévalo stated that our two sides’ coming together here is due to such shared values as freedom and democracy as well as the idea of serving all the people. He underlined that the governments of both countries will continue to work hard and provide mutual support to smooth out each other’s path of democracy, freedom, and justice. President Arévalo emphasized that the government of Guatemala will always be Taiwan’s ally, and that he firmly believes Taiwan is Guatemala’s most reliable partner on the path of democracy and economic prosperity and development. The president said he hopes this visit will be the first step towards setting a new course for the governments and peoples of both countries. Also in attendance at the banquet were Guatemala Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos Ramiro Martínez, Minister of the Economy Gabriela García, and Guatemala Ambassador Luis Raúl Estévez López.  

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    2025-06-05
    President Lai welcomes President Bernardo Arévalo of Republic of Guatemala with military honors  
    On the morning of June 5, President Lai Ching-te welcomed with full military honors President Bernardo Arévalo of the Republic of Guatemala and his wife, who are leading a delegation of cabinet members visiting Taiwan for the first time, demonstrating the deep and enduring alliance between our nations. In remarks, President Lai noted that over the past few years, bilateral cooperation between Taiwan and Guatemala has grown closer and more diverse, and said that moving forward, based on a foundation of mutual assistance for mutual benefit, we will continue to promote programs in line with international trends, spurring prosperity and development in both our nations. The military honors ceremony began at 10:30 a.m. in the Entrance Hall of the Presidential Office. After a 21-gun salute and the playing of the two countries’ national anthems, President Lai and President Arévalo each delivered remarks. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: Today, President Arévalo and First Lady Lucrecia Peinado are leading a delegation of cabinet members visiting Taiwan for the first time, demonstrating the deep and enduring alliance between our nations. On behalf of the people and government of the Republic of China (Taiwan), I want to extend my sincerest welcome. Last year, our two countries celebrated the 90th anniversary of diplomatic ties, providing mutual support all along the way. Especially over the past few years, bilateral cooperation has grown closer and more diverse. We have a long record of remarkable results, whether in terms of medicine and public health, education and culture, technological cooperation, or economic and trade exchanges. Moving forward, based on a foundation of mutual assistance for mutual benefit, Taiwan and Guatemala will continue to promote programs in line with international trends. We will continue to strengthen exchange and cooperation for young people, as well as scholarship programs, and actively cultivate high-tech and information and communications technology industry talent, spurring prosperity and development in both our nations. Although separated by a great distance, the peoples of both countries are closely connected by their ideals and values. I am confident that with President Arévalo’s support, bilateral exchanges and cooperation will become closer and more diverse, beginning a very promising new chapter. I wish the visiting delegation a smooth and successful trip. President Arévalo then delivered remarks, saying that on behalf of the government and people of Guatemala, he is honored to visit the Republic of China (Taiwan), this beautiful nation, and to receive full military honors, which reflects the mutual respect between our two nations as well as our solid friendship. Especially as this state visit comes as we celebrate 90 years of formal diplomatic ties, he said, he has brought the foreign minister, economics minister, private secretary to the president, and social communication secretary as members of his delegation, in the hope of our ties embarking on a new chapter. President Arévalo said that Guatemala-Taiwan ties have in recent years been growing steadily on a foundation of mutual understanding and cooperation, making significant progress, and that our peoples have also cultivated sincere friendships and cooperative relationships across many fields. Our nations are especially promoting public health, education, agricultural technology, and infrastructure, he said, key fields which are conducive to economic and social development. He expressed his hope that on such good foundations of the past, we can further strengthen our bilateral ties for the future. President Arévalo stated that through this state visit they not only want to reaffirm the good bilateral ties between our nations, but that they also hope to define a trajectory for the future of our cooperation in the direction of expanding economic cooperation, building economic and trade alliances, and facilitating investment to foster a Taiwan-Guatemala relationship that benefits both peoples. He then expressed gratitude to the people of Taiwan for helping Guatemala over the past 90 years and reaffirmed the unwavering support of Guatemala for the Republic of China (Taiwan). On the occasion of this visit, he said, he hopes to extend a friendly hand to the people of Taiwan, adding that he looks forward to our nations continuing to take major steps forward on the road of mutual assistance and prosperity. Also in attendance at the welcome ceremony were Dean of the Diplomatic Corps and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Ambassador Andrea Clare Bowman, and members of the foreign diplomatic corps in Taiwan.  

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    2025-06-03
    President Lai confers decoration on President Hilda C. Heine of Republic of the Marshall Islands, hosts state banquet  
    At noon on June 3, President Lai Ching-te, accompanied by Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao, conferred a decoration upon President Hilda C. Heine of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and hosted a state banquet for President Heine and her husband at the Presidential Office. In remarks, President Lai thanked President Heine for her commitment to deepening the diplomatic partnership between our nations and speaking up for Taiwan in the international arena. He also expressed hope for Taiwan and the Marshall Islands to work together to address various challenges through an even greater diversity of exchanges, and that together, we can contribute even more to peace, stability, and development throughout the Pacific region. At the decoration ceremony, President Lai personally conferred the Order of Brilliant Jade with Grand Cordon on President Heine before delivering remarks, a translation of which follows:  The Marshall Islands was the first Pacific ally that I visited after taking office as president. When I arrived there, I was immediately drawn to its beautiful scenery. And I received a very warm welcome from the local people. This gesture showed the profound friendship between our two nations. I was truly touched. I also remember trying your nation’s special Bob Whisky for the first time. The flavor was as unique and impressive as the landscape of the Marshall Islands.  In addition to welcoming our distinguished guests today, we also presented President Heine with the Order of Brilliant Jade with Grand Cordon. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I want to thank President Heine for her commitment to deepening the diplomatic partnership between our nations, and for staunchly speaking up for Taiwan in the international arena. Both I and the people of Taiwan are profoundly grateful to President Heine for her friendship and support. Over the past few years, cooperation between Taiwan and the Marshall Islands has grown ever closer. And this visit by our distinguished guests will allow our two countries to further expand areas of bilateral exchange. I have always believed that only through mutual assistance and trust can two countries build a longstanding and steadfast partnership. I once again convey my sincere aspiration that Taiwan and the Marshall Islands work together to address various challenges through an even greater diversity of exchanges. Together, we can contribute even more to peace, stability, and development throughout the Pacific region. In closing, I want to thank President Heine and First Gentleman Thomas Kijiner, Jr. for leading this delegation to Taiwan, which deepens the foundations of our bilateral relationship. May our two nations enjoy a long and enduring friendship. President Heine then delivered remarks, stating that she felt especially privileged to receive the Order of Brilliant Jade with Grand Cordon of the Republic of China (Taiwan), and humbly accepted the honor with the utmost gratitude, humility, and deep responsibility. This is a deep responsibility, she said, because she understands that since its inception in 1933, this order has been bestowed upon a select few. She then thanked President Lai for this great honor. President Heine stated that the banquet was not just a celebration of our bilateral friendship, but a true reflection of the generosity of the Taiwan spirit and a testament to the enduring ties between our nations, founded on shared values and aspirations, including a respect for the rule of law, the preservation of human dignity, and a deep commitment to democracy. President Heine stated that the Taiwan-Marshall Islands partnership continues to evolve through practical cooperation and mutual support. In recent years, she said, our countries have worked hand in hand across a range of vital sectors, including the recent opening of the Majuro Hospital AI and Telehealth Center and the ongoing and successful Taiwan Health Center, various technical training and scholarship programs, and various climate change adaptation projects in renewable energy, coastal resilience, and sustainable agriculture.   President Heine emphasized that the Marshall Islands continues to be a proud and vocal supporter of Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the United Nations system and other international organizations. Taiwan’s exclusion from these platforms, she said, is not only unjust, but is bad for the world, and the global community needs Taiwan’s voice and expertise.  President Heine also expressed sincere appreciation to all of the Taiwanese friends who have contributed their efforts to deepening bilateral relations, including government officials, healthcare workers, teachers, engineers, and volunteers. The people of the Marshall Islands, she said, deeply appreciate and value everyone’s efforts and service. President Heine said that as we celebrate our partnership, let us look to the future with hope and determination, continue to work together, learn from one another, and support one another to champion a world where all nations can chart their own course based on peace and international law. Also attending the state banquet were Marshall Islands Council of Iroij Chairman Lanny Kabua, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Kalani R. Kaneko, Minister of Finance David Paul, Nitijela Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade Chairperson Joe Bejang, and Charge d’Affaires a.i. Anjanette Davis-Anjel of the Embassy of the Republic of the Marshall Islands.  

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    2025-06-03
    President Lai and President Hilda C. Heine of Marshall Islands hold bilateral talks and witness signing of agreements
    On the morning of June 3, President Lai Ching-te, accompanied by Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao, held bilateral talks with President Hilda C. Heine of the Republic of the Marshall Islands at the Presidential Office following a welcome ceremony with military honors for her and her husband. The leaders also jointly witnessed the signing of a letter of intent for sports exchanges and a memorandum of understanding regarding the Presidents’ Scholarship Fund. President Lai then presided over a launch ceremony for a loan program to purchase aircraft. In remarks, President Lai thanked the government and the Nitijela (parliament) of the Marshall Islands for their longstanding support for Taiwan’s international participation and for voicing staunch support for Taiwan at numerous international venues. President Lai said that Taiwan looks forward to continuing to deepen its diplomatic partnership with the Marshall Islands and build an even closer cooperative relationship across a range of fields, engaging in mutual assistance for mutual benefits and helping each other achieve joint and prosperous development to yield even greater well-being for our peoples. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I once again warmly welcome President Heine, First Gentleman Thomas Kijiner, Jr., and our guests to Taiwan. During my visit to the Marshall Islands last year, I said that Taiwan and the Marshall Islands are truly a family. When Vice President Hsiao and I took office last year, President Heine led a delegation to Taiwan. It is now one year since our inauguration, and I am delighted to see President Heine once again, just as if I were seeing family arrive from afar. Through my visit to the Marshall Islands, I gained a profound sense of the friendship between the peoples of our two nations, well-demonstrated by bilateral exchanges in such areas as healthcare, agriculture, and education. And it is thanks to President Heine’s longstanding support for Taiwan that our countries have been able to further advance collaboration on even more issues, including women’s empowerment and climate change. In recent years, the geopolitical and economic landscape has changed rapidly. We look forward to Taiwan and the Marshall Islands continuing to deepen our partnership and build an even closer cooperative relationship. In just a few moments, President Heine and I will witness the signing of several documents, including a memorandum of understanding and a letter of intent, to expand bilateral cooperation in such fields as sports, education, and transportation. Taiwan will take concrete action to work with the Marshall Islands and advance mutual prosperity and development, writing a new chapter in our diplomatic partnership. I would also like to take this opportunity to express gratitude to the government and Nitijela of the Marshall Islands. In recent years, the Nitijela has passed annual resolutions backing Taiwan’s international participation, and President Heine and Marshallese cabinet members have been some of the strongest advocates for Taiwan’s international participation, voicing staunch support for Taiwan at numerous international venues. Building on the pillars of democracy, peace, and prosperity, Taiwan will continue to work with the Marshall Islands and other like-minded countries to deepen our partnerships, engage in mutual assistance for mutual benefits, and help one another achieve joint and prosperous development. I have every confidence that the combined efforts of our two nations will yield even greater well-being for our peoples and see us make even more contributions to the world. President Heine then delivered remarks, and began by conveying warm greetings of iokwe from the people and government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to the people and government of the Republic of China (Taiwan). She said she was deeply honored to be in Taiwan for an official visit, and extended appreciation to President Lai and his government for their gracious invitation and warm welcome. President Heine stated that this year marks 27 years of diplomatic ties between our two nations, and that they are proud of this enduring friendship. This special and enduring relationship, she said, is grounded in our shared Austronesian heritage, and strengthened by mutual respect for each other’s democratic systems and our steadfast commitment to the core values of freedom, justice, and the rule of law. President Heine stated that Taiwan’s continued support has been invaluable to the people and national development of the Marshall Islands, particularly in the areas of health, education, agriculture, and climate change. She also expressed deep appreciation to Taiwan for providing Marshallese students with opportunities to study in Taiwan, and for the care extended to Marshallese who travel here for medical treatment. President Heine also announced that she would be presenting a copy of a resolution by the people and government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands reiterating their appreciation for the support provided by the people and government of the Republic of China (Taiwan), and calling on the United Nations to take immediate action to resolve the inappropriate exclusion of Taiwan’s 23 million people from the UN system. She added that she looked forward to the bilateral discussions later that day, and to continuing the important work that both countries carry out together. After the bilateral talks, President Lai and President Heine witnessed the signing of a letter of intent regarding sports exchanges and a memorandum of understanding regarding the Presidents’ Scholarship Fund by Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) and Marshallese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Kalani R. Kaneko. President Lai then presided over a launch ceremony for a loan program to purchase aircraft, marking the formal beginning of Taiwan-Marshall Islands air transport cooperation. The visiting delegation also included Council of Iroij Chairman Lanny Kabua, Minister of Finance David Paul, and Nitijela Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade Chair Joe Bejang. They were accompanied to the Presidential Office by Charge d’Affaires a.i. Anjanette Davis-Anjel of the Embassy of the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

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    2025-05-20
    President Lai interviewed by Nippon Television and Yomiuri TV
    In a recent interview on Nippon Television’s news zero program, President Lai Ching-te responded to questions from host Mr. Sakurai Sho and Yomiuri TV Shanghai Bureau Chief Watanabe Masayo on topics including reflections on his first year in office, cross-strait relations, China’s military threats, Taiwan-United States relations, and Taiwan-Japan relations. The interview was broadcast on the evening of May 19. During the interview, President Lai stated that China intends to change the world’s rules-based international order, and that if Taiwan were invaded, global supply chains would be disrupted. Therefore, he said, Taiwan will strengthen its national defense, prevent war by preparing for war, and achieve the goal of peace. The president also noted that Taiwan’s purpose for developing drones is based on national security and industrial needs, and that Taiwan hopes to collaborate with Japan. He then reiterated that China’s threats are an international problem, and expressed hope to work together with the US, Japan, and others in the global democratic community to prevent China from starting a war. Following is the text of the questions and the president’s responses: Q: How do you feel as you are about to round out your first year in office? President Lai: When I was young, I was determined to practice medicine and save lives. When I left medicine to go into politics, I was determined to transform Taiwan. And when I was sworn in as president on May 20 last year, I was determined to strengthen the nation. Time flies, and it has already been a year. Although the process has been very challenging, I am deeply honored to be a part of it. I am also profoundly grateful to our citizens for allowing me the opportunity to give back to our country. The future will certainly be full of more challenges, but I will do everything I can to unite the people and continue strengthening the nation. That is how I am feeling now. Q: We are now coming up on the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, and over this period, we have often heard that conflict between Taiwan and the mainland is imminent. Do you personally believe that a cross-strait conflict could happen? President Lai: The international community is very much aware that China intends to replace the US and change the world’s rules-based international order, and annexing Taiwan is just the first step. So, as China’s military power grows stronger, some members of the international community are naturally on edge about whether a cross-strait conflict will break out. The international community must certainly do everything in its power to avoid a conflict in the Taiwan Strait; there is too great a cost. Besides causing direct disasters to both Taiwan and China, the impact on the global economy would be even greater, with estimated losses of US$10 trillion from war alone – that is roughly 10 percent of the global GDP. Additionally, 20 percent of global shipping passes through the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters, so if a conflict breaks out in the strait, other countries including Japan and Korea would suffer a grave impact. For Japan and Korea, a quarter of external transit passes through the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters, and a third of the various energy resources and minerals shipped back from other countries pass through said areas. If Taiwan were invaded, global supply chains would be disrupted, and therefore conflict in the Taiwan Strait must be avoided. Such a conflict is indeed avoidable. I am very thankful to Prime Minister of Japan Ishiba Shigeru and former Prime Ministers Abe Shinzo, Suga Yoshihide, and Kishida Fumio, as well as US President Donald Trump and former President Joe Biden, and the other G7 leaders, for continuing to emphasize at international venues that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are essential components for global security and prosperity. When everyone in the global democratic community works together, stacking up enough strength to make China’s objectives unattainable or to make the cost of invading Taiwan too high for it to bear, a conflict in the strait can naturally be avoided. Q: As you said, President Lai, maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is also very important for other countries. How can war be avoided? What sort of countermeasures is Taiwan prepared to take to prevent war? President Lai: As Mr. Sakurai mentioned earlier, we are coming up on the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII. There are many lessons we can take from that war. First is that peace is priceless, and war has no winners. From the tragedies of WWII, there are lessons that humanity should learn. We must pursue peace, and not start wars blindly, as that would be a major disaster for humanity. In other words, we must be determined to safeguard peace. The second lesson is that we cannot be complacent toward authoritarian powers. If you give them an inch, they will take a mile. They will keep growing, and eventually, not only will peace be unattainable, but war will be inevitable. The third lesson is why WWII ended: It ended because different groups joined together in solidarity. Taiwan, Japan, and the Indo-Pacific region are all directly subjected to China’s threats, so we hope to be able to join together in cooperation. This is why we proposed the Four Pillars of Peace action plan. First, we will strengthen our national defense. Second, we will strengthen economic resilience. Third is standing shoulder to shoulder with the democratic community to demonstrate the strength of deterrence. Fourth is that as long as China treats Taiwan with parity and dignity, Taiwan is willing to conduct exchanges and cooperate with China, and seek peace and mutual prosperity. These four pillars can help us avoid war and achieve peace. That is to say, Taiwan hopes to achieve peace through strength, prevent war by preparing for war, keeping war from happening and pursuing the goal of peace. Q: Regarding drones, everyone knows that recently, Taiwan has been actively researching, developing, and introducing drones. Why do you need to actively research, develop, and introduce new drones at this time? President Lai: This is for two purposes. The first is to meet national security needs. The second is to meet industrial development needs. Because Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines are all part of the first island chain, and we are all democratic nations, we cannot be like an authoritarian country like China, which has an unlimited national defense budget. In this kind of situation, island nations such as Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines should leverage their own technologies to develop national defense methods that are asymmetric and utilize unmanned vehicles. In particular, from the Russo-Ukrainian War, we see that Ukraine has successfully utilized unmanned vehicles to protect itself and prevent Russia from unlimited invasion. In other words, the Russo-Ukrainian War has already proven the importance of drones. Therefore, the first purpose of developing drones is based on national security needs. Second, the world has already entered the era of smart technology. Whether generative, agentic, or physical, AI will continue to develop. In the future, cars and ships will also evolve into unmanned vehicles and unmanned boats, and there will be unmanned factories. Drones will even be able to assist with postal deliveries, or services like Uber, Uber Eats, and foodpanda, or agricultural irrigation and pesticide spraying. Therefore, in the future era of comprehensive smart technology, developing unmanned vehicles is a necessity. Taiwan, based on industrial needs, is actively planning the development of drones and unmanned vehicles. I would like to take this opportunity to express Taiwan’s hope to collaborate with Japan in the unmanned vehicle industry. Just as we do in the semiconductor industry, where Japan has raw materials, equipment, and technology, and Taiwan has wafer manufacturing, our two countries can cooperate. Japan is a technological power, and Taiwan also has significant technological strengths. If Taiwan and Japan work together, we will not only be able to safeguard peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and security in the Indo-Pacific region, but it will also be very helpful for the industrial development of both countries. Q: The drones you just described probably include examples from the Russo-Ukrainian War. Taiwan and China are separated by the Taiwan Strait. Do our drones need to have cross-sea flight capabilities? President Lai: Taiwan does not intend to counterattack the mainland, and does not intend to invade any country. Taiwan’s drones are meant to protect our own nation and territory. Q: Former President Biden previously stated that US forces would assist Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack. President Trump, however, has yet to clearly state that the US would help defend Taiwan. Do you think that in such an event, the US would help defend Taiwan? Or is Taiwan now trying to persuade the US? President Lai: Former President Biden and President Trump have answered questions from reporters. Although their responses were different, strong cooperation with Taiwan under the Biden administration has continued under the Trump administration; there has been no change. During President Trump’s first term, cooperation with Taiwan was broader and deeper compared to former President Barack Obama’s terms. After former President Biden took office, cooperation with Taiwan increased compared to President Trump’s first term. Now, during President Trump’s second term, cooperation with Taiwan is even greater than under former President Biden. Taiwan-US cooperation continues to grow stronger, and has not changed just because President Trump and former President Biden gave different responses to reporters. Furthermore, the Trump administration publicly stated that in the future, the US will shift its strategic focus from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. The US secretary of defense even publicly stated that the primary mission of the US is to prevent China from invading Taiwan, maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific, and thus maintain world peace. There is a saying in Taiwan that goes, “Help comes most to those who help themselves.” Before asking friends and allies for assistance in facing threats from China, Taiwan must first be determined and prepared to defend itself. This is Taiwan’s principle, and we are working in this direction, making all the necessary preparations to safeguard the nation. Q: I would like to ask you a question about Taiwan-Japan relations. After the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, you made an appeal to give Japan a great deal of assistance and care. In particular, you visited Sendai to offer condolences. Later, you also expressed condolences and concern after the earthquakes in Aomori and Kumamoto. What are your expectations for future Taiwan-Japan exchanges and development? President Lai: I come from Tainan, and my constituency is in Tainan. Tainan has very deep ties with Japan, and of course, Taiwan also has deep ties with Japan. However, among Taiwan’s 22 counties and cities, Tainan has the deepest relationship with Japan. I sincerely hope that both of you and your teams will have an opportunity to visit Tainan. I will introduce Tainan’s scenery, including architecture from the era of Japanese rule, Tainan’s cuisine, and unique aspects of Tainan society, and you can also see lifestyles and culture from the Showa era.  The Wushantou Reservoir in Tainan was completed by engineer Mr. Hatta Yoichi from Kanazawa, Japan and the team he led to Tainan after he graduated from then-Tokyo Imperial University. It has nearly a century of history and is still in use today. This reservoir, along with the 16,000-km-long Chianan Canal, transformed the 150,000-hectare Chianan Plain into Taiwan’s premier rice-growing area. It was that foundation in agriculture that enabled Taiwan to develop industry and the technology sector of today. The reservoir continues to supply water to Tainan Science Park. It is used by residents of Tainan, the agricultural sector, and industry, and even the technology sector in Xinshi Industrial Park, as well as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. Because of this, the people of Tainan are deeply grateful for Mr. Hatta and very friendly toward the people of Japan. A major earthquake, the largest in 50 years, struck Tainan on February 6, 2016, resulting in significant casualties. As mayor of Tainan at the time, I was extremely grateful to then-Prime Minister Abe, who sent five Japanese officials to the disaster site in Tainan the day after the earthquake. They were very thoughtful and asked what kind of assistance we needed from the Japanese government. They offered to provide help based on what we needed. I was deeply moved, as former Prime Minister Abe showed such care, going beyond the formality of just sending supplies that we may or may not have actually needed. Instead, the officials asked what we needed and then provided assistance based on those needs, which really moved me. Similarly, when the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 or the later Kumamoto earthquakes struck, the people of Tainan, under my leadership, naturally and dutifully expressed their support. Even earlier, when central Taiwan was hit by a major earthquake in 1999, Japan was the first country to deploy a rescue team to the disaster area. On February 6, 2018, after a major earthquake in Hualien, former Prime Minister Abe appeared in a video holding up a message of encouragement he had written in calligraphy saying “Remain strong, Taiwan.” All of Taiwan was deeply moved. Over the years, Taiwan and Japan have supported each other when earthquakes struck, and have forged bonds that are family-like, not just neighborly. This is truly valuable. In the future, I hope Taiwan and Japan can be like brothers, and that the peoples of Taiwan and Japan can treat one another like family. If Taiwan has a problem, then Japan has a problem; if Japan has a problem, then Taiwan has a problem. By caring for and helping each other, we can face various challenges and difficulties, and pursue a brighter future. Q: President Lai, you just used the phrase “If Taiwan has a problem, then Japan has a problem.” In the event that China attempts to invade Taiwan by force, what kind of response measures would you hope the US military and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces take? President Lai: As I just mentioned, annexing Taiwan is only China’s first step. Its ultimate objective is to change the rules-based international order. That being the case, China’s threats are an international problem. So, I would very much hope to work together with the US, Japan, and others in the global democratic community to prevent China from starting a war – prevention, after all, is more important than cure.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Volume and price statistics of external merchandise trade in April 2025

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Volume and price statistics of external merchandise trade in April 2025 
         In April 2025, the volume of Hong Kong’s total exports of goods and imports of goods increased by 12.3% and 13.4% respectively over April 2024.
     
         Comparing the first four months of 2025 with the same period in 2024, the volume of Hong Kong’s total exports of goods and imports of goods increased by 9.6% and 8.9% respectively.
     
         Comparing the three-month period ending April 2025 with the preceding three months on a seasonally adjusted basis, the volume of total exports of goods and imports of goods increased by 10.4% and 10.3% respectively.
     
         Changes in volume of external merchandise trade are derived from changes in external merchandise trade value with the effect of price changes discounted.
     
         Comparing April 2025 with April 2024, the prices of total exports of goods and imports of goods increased by 2.2% and 2.1% respectively.
     
         As regards price changes in the first four months of 2025 over the same period in 2024, the prices of total exports of goods and imports of goods both increased by 2.0%.
     
         Price changes in external merchandise trade are reflected by changes in unit value indices of external merchandise trade, which are compiled based on average unit values or, for certain commodities, specific price data.
     
         The terms of trade index is derived from the ratio of price index of total exports of goods to that of imports of goods. Compared with the same periods in 2024, the index increased by 0.1% in April 2025, whereas it remained virtually unchanged in the first four months of 2025.
     
         Changes in the unit value and volume of total exports of goods by main destination are shown in Table 1.
     
         Comparing April 2025 with April 2024, increases were recorded for the total export volume to all main destinations: Vietnam (45.3%), India (23.2%), the mainland of China (the Mainland) (20.2%), Taiwan (18.2%) and the USA (0.3%).
     
         Over the same period of comparison, the total export prices to Taiwan (4.8%), the Mainland (2.3%), Vietnam (2.0%) and the USA (0.9%) increased. On the other hand, the total export prices to India decreased by 1.2%.
     
         Changes in the unit value and volume of imports of goods by main supplier are shown in Table 2.
     
         Comparing April 2025 with April 2024, increases were recorded for the import volume from Vietnam (93.6%), Taiwan (41.8%), the Mainland (14.5%) and Singapore (5.0%). On the other hand, the import volume from Korea decreased by 25.8%.
     
         Over the same period of comparison, the import prices from all main suppliers increased: Korea (5.3%), Taiwan (5.2%), Singapore (2.4%), Vietnam (0.7%) and the Mainland (0.6%).
     
    Further information
     
         Details of the above statistics are published in the April 2025 issue of “Hong Kong Merchandise Trade Index Numbers”. Users can browse and download the report at the website of the C&SD (www.censtatd.gov.hk/en/EIndexbySubject.html?pcode=B1020006&scode=230 
         Enquiries on merchandise trade indices may be directed to the Trade Analysis Section of the C&SD (Tel: 2582 4918).
    Issued at HKT 16:30

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI: AIXA Miner Launches AI-Powered Cloud Mining Services After Securing FinCEN MSB License

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Image by AIXA Miner

    NEW YORK, June 16, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — AIXA MINER CLOUD MINING INVESTMENT LTD (“AIXA Miner”), a U.S.-based cryptocurrency mining platform, has launched the next phase of its AI-powered cloud mining services for Bitcoin (BTC), Litecoin (LTC), and Dogecoin (DOGE) following its recent registration as a Money Services Business (MSB) under the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).

    With this approval, AIXA Miner complies with national anti-money laundering (AML) standards and international financial regulatory frameworks. The designation strengthens the platform’s position as a legally recognized participant in the digital asset economy.

    Founded in 2020 and headquartered in the United States, AIXA Miner operates over 100 data centers across North America, Europe, and Asia. These facilities are powered entirely by renewable energy sources, including wind and solar, supporting the platform’s long-term environmental commitments.

    The cloud mining service allows users to allocate computing power through short-term contract packages. Mining operations are executed on high-performance GPU and ASIC infrastructure, with earnings automatically calculated and processed. The system eliminates the need for hardware ownership or technical setup, focusing on user accessibility and operational efficiency.

    AIXA Miner Potential Earnings

    AIXA Miner has recently integrated artificial intelligence to further optimize resource distribution and power allocation across its network. Enhanced algorithms improve processing speed, reduce energy waste, and increase overall system resilience.

    Security protocols include offline cold wallet storage, McAfee® SECURE compliance, and Cloudflare® network protection to ensure secure data handling and fund transfers.

    “The FinCEN MSB license reflects our commitment to regulatory transparency and operational integrity,” said a company spokesperson. “We aim to provide scalable, legally compliant infrastructure for cloud mining built on renewable energy and AI innovation.”

    About AIXA Miner
    AIXA Miner is a legally registered cloud mining platform that leverages AI-powered mining technologies and a global renewable energy infrastructure to deliver secure and sustainable access to cloud mining services. Its operations are guided by regulatory standards, cybersecurity practices, and environmental responsibility.

    Media Contact:
    like.Mikkelsen
    AIXA Miner Cloud Mining Investment Ltd
    like.Mikkelsen@aixaminer.com
    https://aixaminer.com/

    Photos accompanying this announcement are available at: 

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/601038eb-4c89-453d-a182-b85bd19b4d7a

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/4457b653-2cb4-499c-9775-85a4b1a66df1

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Lufthansa Group Airlines optimize the travel experience through digital functions

    Source: Lufthansa Group

    Just in time for the summer, Lufthansa Group Airlines has further optimized the travel experience for its passengers with additional digital functions. The Lufthansa Group app, which has been named the best airline app worldwide, serves as a digital companion throughout the entire journey, from booking to arrival and beyond.

     “We are there for our customers and provide them with an all-round service throughout their flight – supported by digital functions. For example, our guests can now plan their trip even more easily and flexibly and count on comprehensive support in the event of last-minute changes,” emphasizes Dieter Vranckx, Chief Commercial Officer of the Lufthansa Group. “I particularly recommend that our passengers create a Travel ID profile. This offers them many advantages and helps to make their journey even more comfortable. With the new digital services, we offer them an optimized travel experience and support them at every stage of their journey.”

     

    The digital innovations at a glance:

    Lufthansa Group app receives further functions

    The Lufthansa Group app now includes even more functions that increase the travel comfort of all passengers. Lufthansa Group customers can now enjoy new, innovative tools, especially when preparing for their trip, starting with a significantly faster flight search and a smoother booking experience.

    In this context, customers are recommended to install the Lufthansa Group Airlines app and create a Travel ID profile. The Travel ID helps to make travel easier: among other things, it is possible to integrate travel documents and save personal data for future and past bookings. Further services will follow gradually. In addition, the Travel ID provides travelers with personalized information and suggested solutions should their original travel plans change unexpectedly. More than 15 million customers have already created a digital profile.

    To make traveling to the USA even more relaxed, the ESTA travel authorization is now already checked during online check-in – and the app’s passport scan has also been further improved. In addition, the passport is simply and conveniently loaded into the app during check-in. This data is also checked in the process. The website also offers a new service with information on entry guidelines and passport or visa requirements for international travel, stored in the Travel ID.

    Status, Business and First Class guests can use the app to quickly and conveniently find their preferred Lufthansa Group lounge nearby – whether in Frankfurt, New York, or Rio de Janeiro. In addition, digital menu cards and e-journals are available to travelers before the flight. Finally, the booking confirmation has also been revised and now appears in a new look.

     

    If something changes

    With the introduction of innovative self-service options, travelers can now adjust their plans more easily and flexibly. Guests whose travel plans have changed can easily and conveniently rebook themselves (in accordance with the fare conditions) on the familiar digital channels such as the Lufthansa Group app – even if they have an existing seat reservation. Passengers who have booked a seat in the new Allegris First and Business Class cabins will automatically receive a refund of the reservation fee in the event of an aircraft change if the selected seat category is no longer available.

    Also practical and available as a service in the app since March: Passengers can cancel the ticket for a single person from a booking for several people and have the individual booking refunded in accordance with the fare conditions. The website also offers a new service with information on entry regulations and passport or visa requirements for international travel. In addition, sports baggage and pets in the cabin can now also be booked quickly and conveniently online.

     

    In the event of flight irregularities and delayed baggage

    Passengers whose seat reservation cannot be maintained due to a change of aircraft will be actively rebooked to a new seat and informed of the seat change. Customers can then change their seat online. From the summer, passengers who have to spend a night in a hotel due to a flight irregularity will also automatically receive a taxi voucher by email or in the app.

    In addition, travelers with an AirTag can now use AirTag Location to securely share the location of their baggage with the baggage tracing system via the familiar digital channels, thereby speeding up delivery in the event of baggage delays. This expands the baggage status information options already available to Lufthansa Group guests in the airline apps.

    If passengers wish to submit suggestions or a compensation claim, Lufthansa Group Airlines is now offering new and improved online forms that automatically check the entries for any discrepancies and thus enable faster processing.

     

    Help Center advises travelers with service requests

    The Help Center, which via the mark symbol can be accessed on the Lufthansa Group websites and airline apps, provides travelers with targeted advice on their service requests and now offers holistic, individualized solutions with the help of artificial intelligence. Passengers with urgent requests, such as a flight within the next eight hours, are given priority support in the personal Service Center. The AI chat assistant, which can resolve many service requests, is available in German, English, Italian, French and Spanish.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI: 21Shares Expands Nasdaq Stockholm Offering with Five New Crypto ETP Listings

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    New listings reflect growing demand for regulated crypto investment products in the Nordic region

    Zurich, 16 June 2025 – 21Shares AG, one of the world’s largest issuers of cryptocurrency exchange-traded products (ETPs), today announced the crosslisting of five additional products on Nasdaq Stockholm, further solidifying its presence in the Nordic region and reinforcing its commitment to providing investors with regulated, transparent, and simple access to digital assets.

    The newly listed products include:

    • 21Shares Uniswap ETP (Ticker: AUNI)
    • 21Shares Avalanche ETP (Ticker: AVAX)
    • 21Shares Bitcoin Gold ETP (Ticker: BOLD)
    • 21Shares Solana Core Staking ETP (Ticker: CSOL)
    • 21Shares Ethereum Core ETP (Ticker: ETHC)

    These products join an existing suite of 21Shares products already available on Nasdaq Stockholm: the 21Shares Bitcoin ETP (ABTC), 21Shares Ethereum ETP (AETH), 21Shares Solana ETP (ASOL), 21Shares XRP ETP (AXRP), and 21Shares Bitcoin Core ETP (CBTC).

    “Our continued expansion in the Nordic region reflects the increasing demand from both retail and institutional investors for diversified and cost-effective crypto exposure,” said Mandy Chiu, Head of Financial Product Development at 21Shares. “By offering a broader selection of single-asset and thematic crypto ETPs, we’re empowering investors to build more customised and resilient portfolios through a familiar exchange environment.”

    “We are pleased to welcome the expansion of 21Shares’ product suite on Nasdaq Stockholm. These newly listed ETPs reflect the kind of innovation that is shaping the future of financial markets. As the ETP market continues to grow, we remain committed to modernising access to investment opportunities and supporting greater transparency,” said Helena Wedin, Head of ETF & ETP, Nasdaq European Markets.

    With this expansion, 21Shares now offers 10 ETPs on Nasdaq Stockholm, spanning large-cap cryptocurrencies, innovative index strategies, and staking-enabled products. All products are fully collateralised and traded in a regulated, liquid format, providing an easy gateway to digital assets without the need to manage wallets or custody directly. With annual fees ranging from 0.21% to 2.50%, these products are some of the most cost-efficient in the market.

    With listings across Europe that include Euronext Paris, Euronext Amsterdam, London Stock Exchange, and SIX Swiss Exchange, 21Shares is the largest and most diversified crypto ETP provider in the region.

    For more information on 21Shares’ full product suite, visit www.21shares.com.

    Notes to editors

    About 21Shares

    21Shares is one of the world’s leading cryptocurrency exchange traded product providers and offers the largest suite of crypto ETPs in the market. The company was founded to make cryptocurrency more accessible to investors, and to bridge the gap between traditional finance and decentralized finance. 21Shares listed the world’s first physically-backed crypto ETP in 2018, building a seven-year track record of creating crypto exchange-traded funds that are listed on some of the biggest, most liquid securities exchanges globally. Backed by a specialized research team, proprietary technology, and deep capital markets expertise, 21Shares delivers innovative, simple and cost-efficient investment solutions.

    21Shares is a member of 21.co, a global leader in decentralized finance. For more information, please visit www.21Shares.com.

    Media Contact
    Matteo Valli
    matteo.valli@21shares.com

    DISCLAIMER

    This document is not an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy or subscribe for securities of 21Shares AG in any jurisdiction. Neither this document nor anything contained herein shall form the basis of, or be relied upon in connection with, any offer or commitment whatsoever or for any other purpose in any jurisdiction. Nothing in this document should be considered investment advice.

    This document and the information contained herein are not for distribution in or into (directly or indirectly) the United States, Canada, Australia or Japan or any other jurisdiction in which the distribution or release would be unlawful.

    This document does not constitute an offer of securities for sale in or into the United States, Canada, Australia or Japan. The securities of 21Shares AG to which these materials relate have not been and will not be registered under the United States Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and may not be offered or sold in the United States absent registration or an applicable exemption from, or in a transaction not subject to, the registration requirements of the Securities Act. There will not be a public offering of securities in the United States. Neither the US Securities and Exchange Commission nor any securities regulatory authority of any state or other jurisdiction of the United States has approved or disapproved of an investment in the securities or passed on the accuracy or adequacy of the contents of this presentation. Any representation to the contrary is a criminal offence in the United States.

    Within the United Kingdom, this document is only being distributed to and is only directed at: (i) to investment professionals falling within Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the “Order”); or (ii) high net worth entities, and other persons to whom it may lawfully be communicated, falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) of the Order (all such persons together being referred to as “relevant persons”); or (iii) persons who fall within Article 43(2) of the Order, including existing members and creditors of the Company or (iv) any other persons to whom this document can be lawfully distributed in circumstances where section 21(1) of the FSMA does not apply. The securities are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such securities will be engaged in only with, relevant persons. Any person who is not a relevant person should not act or rely on this document or any of its contents.

    Exclusively for potential investors in any EEA Member State that has implemented the Prospectus Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 the Issuer’s Base Prospectus (EU) is made available on the Issuer’s website under www.21Shares.com.

    The approval of the Issuer’s Base Prospectus (EU) should not be understood as an endorsement by the SFSA of the securities offered or admitted to trading on a regulated market. Eligible potential investors should read the Issuer’s Base Prospectus (EU) and the relevant Final Terms before making an investment decision in order to understand the potential risks associated with the decision to invest in the securities. You are about to purchase a product that is not simple and may be difficult to understand.

    This document constitutes advertisement within the meaning of the Prospectus Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 and the Swiss Financial Services Act (the “FinSA”) and not a prospectus. The 2024 Base Prospectus of 21Shares AG has been deposited pursuant to article 54(2) FinSA with BX Swiss AG in its function as Swiss prospectus review body within the meaning of article 52 FinSA. The 2024 Base Prospectus and the key information document for any products may be obtained at 21Shares AG’s website (https://21shares.com/ir/prospectus or https://21shares.com/ir/kids).

    ###

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: 21Shares Expands Nasdaq Stockholm Offering with Five New Crypto ETP Listings

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    New listings reflect growing demand for regulated crypto investment products in the Nordic region

    Zurich, 16 June 2025 – 21Shares AG, one of the world’s largest issuers of cryptocurrency exchange-traded products (ETPs), today announced the crosslisting of five additional products on Nasdaq Stockholm, further solidifying its presence in the Nordic region and reinforcing its commitment to providing investors with regulated, transparent, and simple access to digital assets.

    The newly listed products include:

    • 21Shares Uniswap ETP (Ticker: AUNI)
    • 21Shares Avalanche ETP (Ticker: AVAX)
    • 21Shares Bitcoin Gold ETP (Ticker: BOLD)
    • 21Shares Solana Core Staking ETP (Ticker: CSOL)
    • 21Shares Ethereum Core ETP (Ticker: ETHC)

    These products join an existing suite of 21Shares products already available on Nasdaq Stockholm: the 21Shares Bitcoin ETP (ABTC), 21Shares Ethereum ETP (AETH), 21Shares Solana ETP (ASOL), 21Shares XRP ETP (AXRP), and 21Shares Bitcoin Core ETP (CBTC).

    “Our continued expansion in the Nordic region reflects the increasing demand from both retail and institutional investors for diversified and cost-effective crypto exposure,” said Mandy Chiu, Head of Financial Product Development at 21Shares. “By offering a broader selection of single-asset and thematic crypto ETPs, we’re empowering investors to build more customised and resilient portfolios through a familiar exchange environment.”

    “We are pleased to welcome the expansion of 21Shares’ product suite on Nasdaq Stockholm. These newly listed ETPs reflect the kind of innovation that is shaping the future of financial markets. As the ETP market continues to grow, we remain committed to modernising access to investment opportunities and supporting greater transparency,” said Helena Wedin, Head of ETF & ETP, Nasdaq European Markets.

    With this expansion, 21Shares now offers 10 ETPs on Nasdaq Stockholm, spanning large-cap cryptocurrencies, innovative index strategies, and staking-enabled products. All products are fully collateralised and traded in a regulated, liquid format, providing an easy gateway to digital assets without the need to manage wallets or custody directly. With annual fees ranging from 0.21% to 2.50%, these products are some of the most cost-efficient in the market.

    With listings across Europe that include Euronext Paris, Euronext Amsterdam, London Stock Exchange, and SIX Swiss Exchange, 21Shares is the largest and most diversified crypto ETP provider in the region.

    For more information on 21Shares’ full product suite, visit www.21shares.com.

    Notes to editors

    About 21Shares

    21Shares is one of the world’s leading cryptocurrency exchange traded product providers and offers the largest suite of crypto ETPs in the market. The company was founded to make cryptocurrency more accessible to investors, and to bridge the gap between traditional finance and decentralized finance. 21Shares listed the world’s first physically-backed crypto ETP in 2018, building a seven-year track record of creating crypto exchange-traded funds that are listed on some of the biggest, most liquid securities exchanges globally. Backed by a specialized research team, proprietary technology, and deep capital markets expertise, 21Shares delivers innovative, simple and cost-efficient investment solutions.

    21Shares is a member of 21.co, a global leader in decentralized finance. For more information, please visit www.21Shares.com.

    Media Contact
    Matteo Valli
    matteo.valli@21shares.com

    DISCLAIMER

    This document is not an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy or subscribe for securities of 21Shares AG in any jurisdiction. Neither this document nor anything contained herein shall form the basis of, or be relied upon in connection with, any offer or commitment whatsoever or for any other purpose in any jurisdiction. Nothing in this document should be considered investment advice.

    This document and the information contained herein are not for distribution in or into (directly or indirectly) the United States, Canada, Australia or Japan or any other jurisdiction in which the distribution or release would be unlawful.

    This document does not constitute an offer of securities for sale in or into the United States, Canada, Australia or Japan. The securities of 21Shares AG to which these materials relate have not been and will not be registered under the United States Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and may not be offered or sold in the United States absent registration or an applicable exemption from, or in a transaction not subject to, the registration requirements of the Securities Act. There will not be a public offering of securities in the United States. Neither the US Securities and Exchange Commission nor any securities regulatory authority of any state or other jurisdiction of the United States has approved or disapproved of an investment in the securities or passed on the accuracy or adequacy of the contents of this presentation. Any representation to the contrary is a criminal offence in the United States.

    Within the United Kingdom, this document is only being distributed to and is only directed at: (i) to investment professionals falling within Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the “Order”); or (ii) high net worth entities, and other persons to whom it may lawfully be communicated, falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) of the Order (all such persons together being referred to as “relevant persons”); or (iii) persons who fall within Article 43(2) of the Order, including existing members and creditors of the Company or (iv) any other persons to whom this document can be lawfully distributed in circumstances where section 21(1) of the FSMA does not apply. The securities are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such securities will be engaged in only with, relevant persons. Any person who is not a relevant person should not act or rely on this document or any of its contents.

    Exclusively for potential investors in any EEA Member State that has implemented the Prospectus Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 the Issuer’s Base Prospectus (EU) is made available on the Issuer’s website under www.21Shares.com.

    The approval of the Issuer’s Base Prospectus (EU) should not be understood as an endorsement by the SFSA of the securities offered or admitted to trading on a regulated market. Eligible potential investors should read the Issuer’s Base Prospectus (EU) and the relevant Final Terms before making an investment decision in order to understand the potential risks associated with the decision to invest in the securities. You are about to purchase a product that is not simple and may be difficult to understand.

    This document constitutes advertisement within the meaning of the Prospectus Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 and the Swiss Financial Services Act (the “FinSA”) and not a prospectus. The 2024 Base Prospectus of 21Shares AG has been deposited pursuant to article 54(2) FinSA with BX Swiss AG in its function as Swiss prospectus review body within the meaning of article 52 FinSA. The 2024 Base Prospectus and the key information document for any products may be obtained at 21Shares AG’s website (https://21shares.com/ir/prospectus or https://21shares.com/ir/kids).

    ###

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd. – Another Stellar IP30 Flow Test Result in the Beetaloo

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd (“Falcon”).

    Another Stellar IP30 Flow Test Result in the Beetaloo

    16 June 2025 – Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd. (TSXV: FO, AIM: FOG) is pleased to announce that Shenandoah S2-2H ST1 (“SS-2H ST1”) achieved an average 30-day initial production (“IP30”) flow rate of 7.2 million cubic feet per day (“MMcf/d”) over 1,671-metres (5,483-foot) across a 35 stage stimulated length within the Amungee Member B-Shale in the Beetaloo Sub-basin, Northern Territory, Australia, making it the highest IP30 result in the Beetaloo to date.

    Points to note:

    • The normalized flow rate of 13.2 MMcf/d over an extrapolated 10,000-foot horizontal section is in-line with the average of more than 11,000 wells in the Marcellus Shale dry gas area on production over a 12-month period. The results demonstrate the commercial deliverability of gas from the Amungee Member B-Shale in the Australian East Coast gas market that typically sells at a premium to Henry Hub in the United States and under long term CPI-linked contracts.
    • The exit rate trajectory continues a steady, low-declining curve at 6.7 MMcf/d (normalized at 12.2 MMcf/d per 10,000-feet) with a flowing wellhead pressure of ~910 psi. The steady state decline curve on SS-2H ST1 is consistent with that achieved from the Shenandoah South 1H well (“SS-1H”).
    • For further details on the SS-2H ST1 flow test including a table, and charts please refer to Appendix A.

    Development activity

    • The Shenandoah South drilling campaign is planned to commence in July 2025, targeting up to three 10,000-foot horizontal wells and completed with up to 60 stimulation stages from the SS2 well pad. As previously announced, Falcon Oil & Gas Australia Limited (“Falcon Australia”) has opted to reduce its participating interest in the three wells to 0%.
    • Once completed, the five wells on the SS2 pad are planned to be tied into the Sturt Plateau Compression Facility (“SPCF”) to feed into a 40 MMcf/d take-or-pay Gas Sales Agreement (“GSA”) with the Northern Territory Government. Production remains on track to commence in mid-2026, subject to standard regulatory and stakeholder approvals and favourable weather conditions.
    • The Shenandoah South 4H (“SS-4H”) well is planned to be completed and flow tested by the end of 2025, with the remaining wells drilled in the 2025 campaign to be completed during 1H 2026.
    • Completion of the remaining four wells will incorporate lessons from the SS-1H and SS-2H ST1 wells.
    • The five wells are expected to deliver the required 40 MMcf/d volume under a binding take-or-pay agreement with the Northern Territory Government.

    Philip O’Quigley, CEO of Falcon commented:

    “The IP30 flow rate results announced today of 7.2 MMcf/d, are truly stellar and marks another major data point in the Beetaloo Sub-basin again demonstrating that it compares to the best shale wells in the United States. Not only did the results exceed Falcon’s pre-drill commercial threshold of a normalised flow rate of 3 MMcf/d per 1,000 metres but had similar flow rates and pressures to SS-1H and SS-2H ST1, which all point towards the significant resource potential of the Beetaloo.

    Falcon looks forward to the planned completion and testing of SS-4H by the end of 2025 and also to observing the results from the next three wells of the Shenandoah South drilling program and the additional milestones they will establish.

    As further results become available, we look forward to updating the market further”

    Ends.

    CONTACT DETAILS:

    Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd.          +353 1 676 8702
    Philip O’Quigley, CEO +353 87 814 7042
    Anne Flynn, CFO +353 1 676 9162
     
    Cavendish Capital Markets Limited (NOMAD & Broker)
    Neil McDonald / Adam Rae +44 131 220 9771

     

    This announcement has been reviewed by Dr. Gábor Bada, Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd’s Technical Advisor. Dr. Bada obtained his geology degree at the Eötvös L. University in Budapest, Hungary and his PhD at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He is a member of AAPG.

    About Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd.
    Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd is an international oil & gas company engaged in the exploration and development of unconventional oil and gas assets, with the current portfolio focused in Australia. Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd is incorporated in British Columbia, Canada and headquartered in Dublin, Ireland.

    Falcon Oil & Gas Australia Limited is a c. 98% subsidiary of Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd.

    For further information on Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd. Please visit www.falconoilandgas.com

    About Beetaloo Joint Venture (EP 76, 98 and 117)   

    Company Interest
    Falcon Oil & Gas Australia Limited (Falcon Australia) 22.5%
    Tamboran (B2) Pty Limited (“Tamboran”) 77.5%
    Total 100.0%

    Shenandoah South Pilot Project -2 Drilling Space Units – 46,080 acres1

    Company Interest
    Falcon Oil & Gas Australia Limited (Falcon Australia) 5.0%
    Tamboran (B2) Pty Limited 95.0%
    Total 100.0%

    1Subject to the completion of SS4H wells on the Shenandoah South pad 2.

    About Tamboran (B2) Pty Limited
    Tamboran (B1) Pty Limited (“Tamboran B1”) is the 100% holder of Tamboran (B2) Pty Limited, with Tamboran B1 being a 50:50 joint venture between Tamboran Resources Corporation and Daly Waters Energy, LP.

    Tamboran Resources Corporation is a natural gas company listed on the NYSE (TBN) and ASX (TBN). Tamboran is focused on playing a constructive role in the global energy transition towards a lower carbon future, by developing the significant low CO2 gas resource within the Beetaloo Sub-basin through cutting-edge drilling and completion design technology as well as management’s experience in successfully commercialising unconventional shale in North America.

    Bryan Sheffield of Daly Waters Energy, LP is a highly successful investor and has made significant returns in the US unconventional energy sector in the past. He was Founder of Parsley Energy Inc. (“PE”), an independent unconventional oil and gas producer in the Permian Basin, Texas and previously served as its Chairman and CEO. PE was acquired for over US$7 billion by Pioneer Natural Resources Company.

    Appendix A – SS-2H ST1 Flow Test Details

    Note to reader: Please refer to the PDF attachment included at the end of this press release for further details including a table and charts related to the SS-2H ST1 flow test results

    Advisory regarding forward-looking statements
    Certain information in this press release may constitute forward-looking information. Any statements that are contained in this news release that are not statements of historical fact may be deemed to be forward-looking information. Forward-looking information typically contains statements with words such as “may”, “will”, “should”, “expect”, “intend”, “plan”, “anticipate”, “believe”, “estimate”, “projects”, “dependent”, “consider” “potential”, “scheduled”, “forecast”, “anticipated”, “outlook”, “budget”, “hope”, “suggest”, “support” “planned”, “approximately”, “potential” or the negative of those terms or similar words suggesting future outcomes. In particular, forward-looking information in this press release includes, details on the IP30 flow test results of SS-2H ST1 including assumptions that the results are in line with average of more than 11,000 wells in the Marcellus Shale dry gas area on production over a 12-month period and that they demonstrate the commercial deliverability of gas from the Amungee Member B-Shale in the Australian East Coast gas market that typically sells at a premium to Henry Hub in the United States and under long term CPI-linked contracts; consistency of the results of SS-2H ST1 with SS-1H; details on the planned three well drilling campaign including the plan to commence in July 2025 and to continue into 1H 2026; the plan to tie the wells to the SPCF under a GSA with the Northern Territory Government in mid-2026; the plan that SS-4H will be completed and flow tested by the end of 2025; the five wells drilled are expected to deliver the required 40 MMcf/d under a GSA with the Northern Territory Government;

    This information is based on current expectations that are subject to significant risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict. The risks, assumptions and other factors that could influence actual results include risks associated with fluctuations in market prices for shale gas; risks related to the exploration, development and production of shale gas reserves; general economic, market and business conditions; substantial capital requirements; uncertainties inherent in estimating quantities of reserves and resources; extent of, and cost of compliance with, government laws and regulations and the effect of changes in such laws and regulations; the need to obtain regulatory approvals before development commences; environmental risks and hazards and the cost of compliance with environmental regulations; aboriginal claims; inherent risks and hazards with operations such as mechanical or pipe failure, cratering and other dangerous conditions; potential cost overruns, drilling wells is speculative, often involving significant costs that may be more than estimated and may not result in any discoveries; variations in foreign exchange rates; competition for capital, equipment, new leases, pipeline capacity and skilled personnel; the failure of the holder of licenses, leases and permits to meet requirements of such; changes in royalty regimes; failure to accurately estimate abandonment and reclamation costs; inaccurate estimates and assumptions by management and/or their joint venture partners; effectiveness of internal controls; the potential lack of available drilling equipment; failure to obtain or keep key personnel; title deficiencies; geo-political risks; and risk of litigation.

    Readers are cautioned that the foregoing list of important factors is not exhaustive and that these factors and risks are difficult to predict. Actual results might differ materially from results suggested in any forward-looking statements. Falcon assumes no obligation to update the forward-looking statements, or to update the reasons why actual results could differ from those reflected in the forward-looking statements unless and until required by securities laws applicable to Falcon. Additional information identifying risks and uncertainties is contained in Falcon’s filings with the Canadian securities regulators, which filings are available at www.sedarplus.com, including under “Risk Factors” in the Annual Information Form.

    Any references in this news release to initial production rates are useful in confirming the presence of hydrocarbons; however, such rates are not determinative of the rates at which such wells will continue production and decline thereafter and are not necessarily indicative of long-term performance or ultimate recovery. While encouraging, readers are cautioned not to place reliance on such rates in calculating the aggregate production for Falcon. Such rates are based on field estimates and may be based on limited data available at this time.

    Neither the TSX Venture Exchange nor its Regulation Services Provider (as that term is defined in the policies of the TSX Venture Exchange) accepts responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of this release.

    The information communicated within this announcement is deemed to constitute inside information as stipulated under the Market Abuse Regulations (EU) No 596/2014 which is part of UK law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. Upon publication of this announcement, this inside information is now considered to be in the public domain.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd. – Another Stellar IP30 Flow Test Result in the Beetaloo

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd (“Falcon”).

    Another Stellar IP30 Flow Test Result in the Beetaloo

    16 June 2025 – Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd. (TSXV: FO, AIM: FOG) is pleased to announce that Shenandoah S2-2H ST1 (“SS-2H ST1”) achieved an average 30-day initial production (“IP30”) flow rate of 7.2 million cubic feet per day (“MMcf/d”) over 1,671-metres (5,483-foot) across a 35 stage stimulated length within the Amungee Member B-Shale in the Beetaloo Sub-basin, Northern Territory, Australia, making it the highest IP30 result in the Beetaloo to date.

    Points to note:

    • The normalized flow rate of 13.2 MMcf/d over an extrapolated 10,000-foot horizontal section is in-line with the average of more than 11,000 wells in the Marcellus Shale dry gas area on production over a 12-month period. The results demonstrate the commercial deliverability of gas from the Amungee Member B-Shale in the Australian East Coast gas market that typically sells at a premium to Henry Hub in the United States and under long term CPI-linked contracts.
    • The exit rate trajectory continues a steady, low-declining curve at 6.7 MMcf/d (normalized at 12.2 MMcf/d per 10,000-feet) with a flowing wellhead pressure of ~910 psi. The steady state decline curve on SS-2H ST1 is consistent with that achieved from the Shenandoah South 1H well (“SS-1H”).
    • For further details on the SS-2H ST1 flow test including a table, and charts please refer to Appendix A.

    Development activity

    • The Shenandoah South drilling campaign is planned to commence in July 2025, targeting up to three 10,000-foot horizontal wells and completed with up to 60 stimulation stages from the SS2 well pad. As previously announced, Falcon Oil & Gas Australia Limited (“Falcon Australia”) has opted to reduce its participating interest in the three wells to 0%.
    • Once completed, the five wells on the SS2 pad are planned to be tied into the Sturt Plateau Compression Facility (“SPCF”) to feed into a 40 MMcf/d take-or-pay Gas Sales Agreement (“GSA”) with the Northern Territory Government. Production remains on track to commence in mid-2026, subject to standard regulatory and stakeholder approvals and favourable weather conditions.
    • The Shenandoah South 4H (“SS-4H”) well is planned to be completed and flow tested by the end of 2025, with the remaining wells drilled in the 2025 campaign to be completed during 1H 2026.
    • Completion of the remaining four wells will incorporate lessons from the SS-1H and SS-2H ST1 wells.
    • The five wells are expected to deliver the required 40 MMcf/d volume under a binding take-or-pay agreement with the Northern Territory Government.

    Philip O’Quigley, CEO of Falcon commented:

    “The IP30 flow rate results announced today of 7.2 MMcf/d, are truly stellar and marks another major data point in the Beetaloo Sub-basin again demonstrating that it compares to the best shale wells in the United States. Not only did the results exceed Falcon’s pre-drill commercial threshold of a normalised flow rate of 3 MMcf/d per 1,000 metres but had similar flow rates and pressures to SS-1H and SS-2H ST1, which all point towards the significant resource potential of the Beetaloo.

    Falcon looks forward to the planned completion and testing of SS-4H by the end of 2025 and also to observing the results from the next three wells of the Shenandoah South drilling program and the additional milestones they will establish.

    As further results become available, we look forward to updating the market further”

    Ends.

    CONTACT DETAILS:

    Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd.          +353 1 676 8702
    Philip O’Quigley, CEO +353 87 814 7042
    Anne Flynn, CFO +353 1 676 9162
     
    Cavendish Capital Markets Limited (NOMAD & Broker)
    Neil McDonald / Adam Rae +44 131 220 9771

     

    This announcement has been reviewed by Dr. Gábor Bada, Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd’s Technical Advisor. Dr. Bada obtained his geology degree at the Eötvös L. University in Budapest, Hungary and his PhD at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He is a member of AAPG.

    About Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd.
    Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd is an international oil & gas company engaged in the exploration and development of unconventional oil and gas assets, with the current portfolio focused in Australia. Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd is incorporated in British Columbia, Canada and headquartered in Dublin, Ireland.

    Falcon Oil & Gas Australia Limited is a c. 98% subsidiary of Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd.

    For further information on Falcon Oil & Gas Ltd. Please visit www.falconoilandgas.com

    About Beetaloo Joint Venture (EP 76, 98 and 117)   

    Company Interest
    Falcon Oil & Gas Australia Limited (Falcon Australia) 22.5%
    Tamboran (B2) Pty Limited (“Tamboran”) 77.5%
    Total 100.0%

    Shenandoah South Pilot Project -2 Drilling Space Units – 46,080 acres1

    Company Interest
    Falcon Oil & Gas Australia Limited (Falcon Australia) 5.0%
    Tamboran (B2) Pty Limited 95.0%
    Total 100.0%

    1Subject to the completion of SS4H wells on the Shenandoah South pad 2.

    About Tamboran (B2) Pty Limited
    Tamboran (B1) Pty Limited (“Tamboran B1”) is the 100% holder of Tamboran (B2) Pty Limited, with Tamboran B1 being a 50:50 joint venture between Tamboran Resources Corporation and Daly Waters Energy, LP.

    Tamboran Resources Corporation is a natural gas company listed on the NYSE (TBN) and ASX (TBN). Tamboran is focused on playing a constructive role in the global energy transition towards a lower carbon future, by developing the significant low CO2 gas resource within the Beetaloo Sub-basin through cutting-edge drilling and completion design technology as well as management’s experience in successfully commercialising unconventional shale in North America.

    Bryan Sheffield of Daly Waters Energy, LP is a highly successful investor and has made significant returns in the US unconventional energy sector in the past. He was Founder of Parsley Energy Inc. (“PE”), an independent unconventional oil and gas producer in the Permian Basin, Texas and previously served as its Chairman and CEO. PE was acquired for over US$7 billion by Pioneer Natural Resources Company.

    Appendix A – SS-2H ST1 Flow Test Details

    Note to reader: Please refer to the PDF attachment included at the end of this press release for further details including a table and charts related to the SS-2H ST1 flow test results

    Advisory regarding forward-looking statements
    Certain information in this press release may constitute forward-looking information. Any statements that are contained in this news release that are not statements of historical fact may be deemed to be forward-looking information. Forward-looking information typically contains statements with words such as “may”, “will”, “should”, “expect”, “intend”, “plan”, “anticipate”, “believe”, “estimate”, “projects”, “dependent”, “consider” “potential”, “scheduled”, “forecast”, “anticipated”, “outlook”, “budget”, “hope”, “suggest”, “support” “planned”, “approximately”, “potential” or the negative of those terms or similar words suggesting future outcomes. In particular, forward-looking information in this press release includes, details on the IP30 flow test results of SS-2H ST1 including assumptions that the results are in line with average of more than 11,000 wells in the Marcellus Shale dry gas area on production over a 12-month period and that they demonstrate the commercial deliverability of gas from the Amungee Member B-Shale in the Australian East Coast gas market that typically sells at a premium to Henry Hub in the United States and under long term CPI-linked contracts; consistency of the results of SS-2H ST1 with SS-1H; details on the planned three well drilling campaign including the plan to commence in July 2025 and to continue into 1H 2026; the plan to tie the wells to the SPCF under a GSA with the Northern Territory Government in mid-2026; the plan that SS-4H will be completed and flow tested by the end of 2025; the five wells drilled are expected to deliver the required 40 MMcf/d under a GSA with the Northern Territory Government;

    This information is based on current expectations that are subject to significant risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict. The risks, assumptions and other factors that could influence actual results include risks associated with fluctuations in market prices for shale gas; risks related to the exploration, development and production of shale gas reserves; general economic, market and business conditions; substantial capital requirements; uncertainties inherent in estimating quantities of reserves and resources; extent of, and cost of compliance with, government laws and regulations and the effect of changes in such laws and regulations; the need to obtain regulatory approvals before development commences; environmental risks and hazards and the cost of compliance with environmental regulations; aboriginal claims; inherent risks and hazards with operations such as mechanical or pipe failure, cratering and other dangerous conditions; potential cost overruns, drilling wells is speculative, often involving significant costs that may be more than estimated and may not result in any discoveries; variations in foreign exchange rates; competition for capital, equipment, new leases, pipeline capacity and skilled personnel; the failure of the holder of licenses, leases and permits to meet requirements of such; changes in royalty regimes; failure to accurately estimate abandonment and reclamation costs; inaccurate estimates and assumptions by management and/or their joint venture partners; effectiveness of internal controls; the potential lack of available drilling equipment; failure to obtain or keep key personnel; title deficiencies; geo-political risks; and risk of litigation.

    Readers are cautioned that the foregoing list of important factors is not exhaustive and that these factors and risks are difficult to predict. Actual results might differ materially from results suggested in any forward-looking statements. Falcon assumes no obligation to update the forward-looking statements, or to update the reasons why actual results could differ from those reflected in the forward-looking statements unless and until required by securities laws applicable to Falcon. Additional information identifying risks and uncertainties is contained in Falcon’s filings with the Canadian securities regulators, which filings are available at www.sedarplus.com, including under “Risk Factors” in the Annual Information Form.

    Any references in this news release to initial production rates are useful in confirming the presence of hydrocarbons; however, such rates are not determinative of the rates at which such wells will continue production and decline thereafter and are not necessarily indicative of long-term performance or ultimate recovery. While encouraging, readers are cautioned not to place reliance on such rates in calculating the aggregate production for Falcon. Such rates are based on field estimates and may be based on limited data available at this time.

    Neither the TSX Venture Exchange nor its Regulation Services Provider (as that term is defined in the policies of the TSX Venture Exchange) accepts responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of this release.

    The information communicated within this announcement is deemed to constitute inside information as stipulated under the Market Abuse Regulations (EU) No 596/2014 which is part of UK law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. Upon publication of this announcement, this inside information is now considered to be in the public domain.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Luis de Guindos: Interview with Reuters

    Source: European Central Bank

    Interview with Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB, conducted by Balázs Korányi and Francesco Cánepa on 12 June 2025

    16 June 2025

    President Lagarde said the ECB was in a good place now. Investors and ECB watchers took that to mean a pause in rate cuts is appropriate. Was that the correct interpretation?

    The projections provide the key to understanding our policy decision. It’s almost a cliché now but the level of uncertainty is huge. So much so, we published alternative scenarios. The key differences in the scenarios relate to trade policy. In the baseline, we assume no retaliation and a 10% tariff. In the adverse scenario, we assume higher tariffs and retaliation.

    The final outcome in trade negotiations is by far the most relevant factor of uncertainty that we considered in our projections, which are the basis for our monetary policy decisions. Nobody knows the final outcome of the trade negotiations and the impact it may have on the outlook for growth and inflation.

    Having said that, markets have understood perfectly well what the President said about being in a good position. Even in this context of huge uncertainty, I think that markets believe and discount that we are very close to our target of sustainable 2% inflation over the medium term.

    Your projections incorporate interest rate futures, which still price in one more rate cut. So, if the baseline materialises, we can still expect a cut?

    We incorporate market expectations for interest rates into the underlying assumptions of our projection framework. But I think that, in this case, this assumption is not important compared with the consideration we give to trade issues in the June exercise. Trade has a greater magnitude of relevance in influencing our projections.

    Would you say that risks to the inflation outlook are to the upside or the downside?

    This is quite an important question. A tariff is a tax on imported goods. So the first impact is inflationary. But tariffs simultaneously depress demand, which can more than compensate for the initial inflationary impact. So, in the medium term, tariffs reduce both growth and inflation.

    But there is another factor that is more difficult to calibrate. A fully fledged trade war could give rise to fragmentation in the global economy and distortions in the global supply chain. And that would be inflationary in the longer term.

    So, with all these nuances, over the next two years tariffs would reduce both growth and inflation. But, if you look further out, you have to consider the potential impact that fragmentation could have. That goes beyond our projection horizon, but it is something that we will have to take into consideration in the future.

    You now project inflation dipping below target and then coming back to 2%. We’ve seen such a scenario before, when the longer-term projection always points to 2%, partly because of mean reversion. So, how much weight do you attach to the 2027 projection? And do you give a lot of thought to this notion of mean reversion as a feature at the back of the projection?

    When it comes to 2026, there are two key issues: the appreciation of the euro and the evolution of prices of raw materials, particularly energy. For 2027 a similar appreciation of the currency and a fall in energy prices is not expected to take place, and that is the reason why we expect inflation to come back up to 2%. But, of course, the level of uncertainty is huge. So, even though we are convinced that inflation will converge to our target, we need to stay data-dependent and decide meeting by meeting. Also, bear in mind that we have already reduced interest rates by 200 basis points – from 4% to 2%.

    The risk of undershooting in any year is that it influences wage-setting and could perpetuate low inflation. In the first quarter of next year, you see inflation at 1.4%. Do you consider undershooting a significant risk?

    I think inflation is going in the right direction. There is a clear deceleration, also confirmed by the latest data. But I don’t think that inflation hovering around 1.4% in the first quarter of 2026 is going to be enough to unanchor inflation expectations and modify the wage bargaining process. We clearly see that wage dynamics are cooling. But, even when you take all these factors into consideration, compensation per employee will be around 3% over time. So, the risk of undershooting is very limited in my view.

    Our assessment is that risks for inflation are balanced. Clearly, 1.4% is below target. But we look at the medium term, and in the medium term there are other factors that can compensate for the short-term elements that can temporarily bring inflation down.

    Europe is expected to spend more on defence. Do you think that greater military expenditure should come at the expense of other spending, or should it be financed from debt?

    A lot of uncertainty still surrounds our fiscal policy assumptions and projections. Trade is prominently in the news, but fiscal policy is often overlooked.

    First of all, fiscal policy in the United States is important. The new tax bill is going to increase the deficit, and the US fiscal position is already challenging. The debt ratio is over 100% and the fiscal deficit between 6% and 7%. So, markets are likely to start paying more attention to fiscal policy in the United States, which could give rise to increasing yields. I think this will catch the eye of markets more and more in the future.

    In the case of Europe, we have seen a degree of decoupling in terms of yields with respect to the United States. But developments have been much more moderate.

    Nevertheless, fiscal policy is relevant because there is an additional need to increase spending on defence, which is going to demand more resources. The starting point for some EU countries is not good. The EU does not have much fiscal space, so we have to look for social and political space in order to expand it.

    We will need to have more support from the people of Europe, and governments will have to explain clearly the necessity for higher spending on defence, because it’s a question of independence and autonomy.

    This extra spending may take some time to ramp up. Do you think ECB watchers or the ECB’s own projections overestimate how much fiscal support is coming?

    There are different fiscal multipliers, and much will depend on the kind of fiscal spending that countries are going to pursue. This kind of expenditure takes time to be implemented, so the impact on inflation and growth is not going to be material in the short term.

    Do you think the ECB can play a role in helping that defence spending, like with the targeted QE, targeted TLTRO, or some other tool?

    I can assure you that this is something that we have not discussed.

    We saw in the minutes of the Federal Reserve System’s May meeting that it had extended the swap line with the ECB. Nevertheless, given the political turmoil in the United States, do you think it would be a good exercise to look at scenarios in which US dollar funding dries up? Should the ECB be preparing the financial sector for such a scenario?

    We believe that swap lines with the Federal Reserve are a good instrument in terms of financial stability for both the euro area and the United States. We are fully convinced that the swap lines will be maintained over time because they are positive for both sides and for global financial stability.

    But markets are starting to openly doubt the status of the US dollar as the world’s leading reserve currency. And some central banks are even building up reserves in gold. Do you think it would be prudent for the ECB, and the Eurosystem more generally, also to start building up more gold reserves or reserves in assets other than US dollar-denominated assets?

    The weight of gold in our reserves has been on the increase clearly because of rising gold prices. Central banks use gold as an instrument to diversify in moments of geopolitical risk, and that is understandable. Some are even looking at silver or platinum to diversify.

    But the role of the US dollar as a reserve currency in the short term is not going to be challenged, in my opinion.

    The role of the euro as a reserve currency in the global arena will depend on actions taken in Europe. If we can achieve a much more integrated goods and services market, then the capital markets union and the banking union will come about much more easily. It’s very difficult to make progress in the capital markets union or the banking union if you do not advance in the integration of the goods and services market.

    You put out a report on the role of the euro last week, which covers basically to the end of last year. Can you provide us with a bit of insight on what’s been happening since 2 April. There’s been a lot of movement on financial markets. Have euro assets really benefited from capital leaving the US dollar, or is it mostly gold that has benefited?

    If you look at market developments, we had a big decline and a risk-off movement at the beginning of April. And now market valuations have fully recovered – apart from the US dollar and commodity prices.

    The policies of the new US Administration cover not only tariffs, but also fiscal policy and the regulatory frameworks for banks – in terms of the implementation of Basel III – and non-banks, and even for crypto assets. At the end of the day, this is a sort of change of paradigm. There have even been some doubts about how engaged the new US Administration is going to be with multilateral institutions.

    Even though markets have recovered, setting aside the US dollar and commodities, there is something that is quite obvious. The correlation of asset prices has changed quite a lot since April. If you look at developments in stock and bond prices, the correlation has been different from the ones we had in the past.

    Even in the case of yields on US Treasuries, we have seen ups and downs. But I think that the main element that indicates some doubts about the new US policies is the evolution of the US dollar. That’s quite clear.

    The flipside of that is that the euro has become stronger. Is it becoming an issue for growth and for exporters? Can the euro zone even afford reserve currency status given the currency strength that comes with it?

    I think that, at USD 1.15, the euro’s exchange rate is not going to be a big obstacle. And the question of the reserve status of the euro in the global arena is not going to have a significant impact in the short term.

    In the short term, the status of the US dollar is not going to be challenged. In the medium term, the factor that is going to be key is the kind of policy that we implement in Europe. If we are able to become more independent, more autonomous in defence, and we start to do what we have to do for the integration of markets… gradually, over the medium to long term, the euro will gain market share. But, in the short term, a big jump in market share is out of the question.

    So you don’t seem to be terribly concerned about USD 1.15 for the real economy. Accepting that you have no exchange rate target, what is the point where you become concerned that the exchange rate has a detrimental impact on the real economy?

    Much more than a specific level, I think that we have to look at the speed of developments, how rapid the appreciation or depreciation is. And if there is a clear overshooting of the exchange rate, that is something we should analyse.

    So far, the evolution has been quite controlled. Perhaps the surprise has been that, at the beginning of the year, most market participants believed that we could go to parity. And instead we have gone to the current level. I would not say that the exchange rate has been extremely volatile so far, or that we have seen a very rapid appreciation .

    We take the exchange rate into consideration in our projections. The perception of the ECB is that the appreciation of the euro has so far been positive in terms of achieving our target for inflation. That’s one of the reasons why we have revised our inflation projections down for 2026.

    A recent paper by Blanchard and Ubide has relaunched the idea of a European safe asset. You were on the other side of the fence when you were once a finance minister. Do you see growing chances of more joint issuance happening?

    Ideas coming from the academic sphere are very good. The one you mentioned is a very interesting proposal for a EU safe asset in a very liquid and deep market. That is something we have to take into consideration.

    But I think we have to do a lot of things before that. We need a much more integrated single market, and to make much more progress towards the capital markets union and the completion of the banking union. Simultaneously – and I feel we have made some progress here – we need the fiscal positions of euro area countries to be closer and disparities to be reduced.

    So it’s an interesting proposal from an academic standpoint. But I think that, from a practical viewpoint, there are other necessary conditions before we get there and these are not yet in place.

    Do you think it could be prudent for the ECB and the Eurosystem’s national central banks to bring back some of the gold reserves they store in New York?

    There is no doubt in my mind that they are totally safe.

    Even when a new Federal Reserve Chair will be appointed next year?

    Well, I don’t know who the next Chair is going to be, but I expect it will be a competent and sensible person.

    Fair enough. But has there been a discussion about this or didn’t it even come up?

    Even the possibility of it didn’t come up.

    Over the past few years, the ECB has learned some lessons, such as that you also have to react forcefully to inflation when it’s too high. This didn’t seem to be a problem a few years ago, yet all of a sudden it was. So, with that in mind, how would you like the new strategy document to reflect that?

    As you have said, the framework for inflation was totally different five years ago. And now we have had a period of high inflation, which was an important change.

    This is going to be a reassessment of our strategy review. In my view, we are not going to see modications in the definition of price stability. With respect to the toolkit, I think that all the instruments are going to remain available for use in the future.

    Simultaneously, we have learned much more about side effects, and we are going to pay more attention to financial stability considerations. QE, for instance, was a new instrument added to the toolkit in 2015. What is important is that when you use an instrument, you can gauge its real impact. Sometimes it’s much easier to start using the instrument than to withdraw it — that’s something we have learned as well. And finally, the framework of the global economy is going to be very different from the one we had in 2021. In one sense, I think we are going to have a much more fragmented world.

    In 2021, we didn’t have any discussions about trade. Deflation, or low inflation, was the main point of our review, and how close we were to the lower bound. At the same time, some academics raised the issue of the natural interest rate. This is interesting from a conceptual and an academic standpoint, but not for actual monetary policy decision-making.

    What should we expect from the new strategy statement?

    I would not expect big surprises. This is about evolution, not revolution. It is just a reassessment. It will be much more focused on how the framework for central banks and for the ECB has changed over the last five years.

    In a multipolar world, what role can China play for the ECB as a partner, and the People’s of Bank of China particularly?

    China is an important player. It’s the world’s second largest economy. We have some monetary arrangements with the central bank, like our swap lines.

    Sometimes when we talk about trade policies, we look only at bilateral tariffs. But we need to have a holistic approach. In the case, for instance, of the negotiations between the United States and Europe, what is going to be key is not only the final outcome in terms of bilateral tariffs, but the potential impact of trade diversion. You need to be holistic with respect to trade, because otherwise, perhaps, you are missing the real impact that these trade negotiations are going to have.

    Do you see that as a big risk, trade diversion? Your colleague Isabel Schnabel seemed to suggest this was not a major risk.

    Well, I don’t know whether it’s going to be a big risk, but undoubtedly this is something that we have to monitor and take into consideration.

    Could the ECB work with the People’s Bank of China, for example in the field of payments? China has its own digital currency.

    We are fully behind a digital euro. We believe that it’s something that is going to be very important in Europe.

    There will be new legislation in the United States about stablecoins. They are going to become a means of payment and most projects are going to come from the United States. My reading of the digital euro project is digital public money: it will be a means of payment, it’s not going to pay an interest rate, and it will not replace cash. We are going to take financial stability implications into consideration too.

    People, at the end of the day, both in the analogue and digital context, always want to have public money. For them, that’s real money. And if people doubt whether they can transform their current account balance into banknotes, then a bank run can take place. The digital euro is going to play a similar role in a digital world.

    If the case for a digital euro is so clear, why does the legislator not see it? Brussels has been dragging its feet. Why is that, and do you expect a change?

    I hope that we will be able to convince the legislators, but you have to ask them why they have so many doubts. From our standpoint, it’s quite clear that a digital euro is something that is extremely relevant and useful in the payment context in Europe. And I think that eventually, they will be convinced of the clear advantages of a digital euro.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Afreximbank acts as global coordinator and mandated lead arranger for $1.6bn facility for Suriname’s Staatsolie


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    African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) (www.Afreximbank.com) has acted as global coordinator and joint mandated lead arranger for a senior secured term loan facility amounting to US$1.6 billion, in favour of Staatsolie Maatschappij Suriname N.V. (Staatsolie), Suriname’s state-owned energy company, in a major boost to the country’s GranMorgu upstream offshore oil project.

    Afreximbank, Banco Latinoamericano de Comercio Exterior, S.A. (Bladex), along with another major international bank and Staatsolie signed the agreement on the 14th of May 2025. Perella Weinberg acted as an advisor to Staatsolie on the transaction.

    According to the terms of the agreement, the proceeds of the facility will support Staatsolie in partially refinancing existing debt and funding its 20 per cent working interest in the GranMorgu upstream offshore oil project.

    The transaction, the first syndicated loan for which Afreximbank has been mandated on in the Caribbean region, also represents the largest project financing transaction in Suriname’s history and paves the way for the country’s initial offshore oil production by mid-2028.

    Capital investments in the project are expected to exceed US$12 billion, with Staatsolie contributing 20 per cent, or US$2.4 billion. The expected revenue generation, depending on oil price, is projected at over US$26 billion for Staatsolie and the Government of Suriname over the operational life, significantly boosting economic development.

    The project, which stands out for its low-carbon design, featuring a fully electric floating production, storage, and offloading unit with a production capacity of 220,000 barrels per day, will more than double Staatsolie´s production, providing Suriname with royalties and dividends.

    Commenting on the transaction, Prof. Benedict Oramah, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Afreximbank, said that it will significantly transform the Surinamese economy. “Afreximbank is most pleased to have played a pivotal role in arranging this financing for Suriname’s Staatsolie. It marks a significant milestone in the Bank’s interventions in the Caribbean and a firm statement of intent by the Bank to support investments in strategic programmes/projects that are consequential to the transformation of the Surinamese economy. Beyond this investment, the Bank is supporting initiatives that will catalyse local participation in the country’s oil and gas sector with the aim of ensuring maximum benefits from the natural resource accrue to the indigenes of Suriname and the larger Caribbean.”

    Staatsolie is engaged in exploration, production, refining, retail fuel distribution and power generation. Staatsolie also has a working interest in two gold projects in Suriname. It seeks to develop energy resources to maximise the long-term value for Staatsolie and Suriname, energizing a bright future for Suriname

    Annand Jagesar, Managing Director of Staatsolie said: “We have built a solid foundation for Staatsolie to participate in GranMorgu and possible future projects and are embarking on a new phase of transformational growth for the company and the country.”

    BLADEX, a multinational bank founded in 1979, provides financial solutions to companies and investors doing business in Latin America. It is headquartered in Panama City and has five offices in Latin America and the United States.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Afreximbank.

    Media Contact:
    Vincent Musumba
    Communications and Events Manager (Media Relations)
    Email: press@afreximbank.com

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    About Afreximbank:
    African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) is a Pan-African multilateral financial institution mandated to finance and promote intra- and extra-African trade. For over 30 years, the Bank has been deploying innovative structures to deliver financing solutions that support the transformation of the structure of Africa’s trade, accelerating industrialisation and intra-regional trade, thereby boosting economic expansion in Africa. A stalwart supporter of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), Afreximbank has launched a Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) that was adopted by the African Union (AU) as the payment and settlement platform to underpin the implementation of the AfCFTA. Working with the AfCFTA Secretariat and the AU, the Bank has set up a US$10 billion Adjustment Fund to support countries effectively participating in the AfCFTA. At the end of December 2024, Afreximbank’s total assets and contingencies stood at over US$40.1 billion, and its shareholder funds amounted to US$7.2 billion. Afreximbank has investment grade ratings assigned by GCR (international scale) (A), Moody’s (Baa1), China Chengxin International Credit Rating Co., Ltd (CCXI) (AAA), Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR) (A-) and Fitch (BBB). Afreximbank has evolved into a group entity comprising the Bank, its equity impact fund subsidiary called the Fund for Export Development Africa (FEDA), and its insurance management subsidiary, AfrexInsure (together, “the Group”). The Bank is headquartered in Cairo, Egypt.

    For more information, visit: www.Afreximbank.com

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Security: Montréal — Collecteur Project: a vast money laundering network dismantled

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    UPDATE 2020-10-01

    On September 28, 2020, Victor Vargotskii was arrested in Argentina on an international arrest warrant. Francisco Javier Jimenez Guerrero was arrested on October 24, 2019 in Spain.

    Yesterday, RCMP police officers arrested 17 individuals involved in a vast international money laundering network. This major investigation targeted a criminal organization in Montréal and Toronto. The raid mobilized more than 300 police officers and partners.

    The investigation was led by the Integrated Proceeds of Crime unit, in cooperation with RCMP investigators from Ontario and the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). The investigation was conducted from 2016 to 2018 following information received from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

    An elaborate money‑laundering scheme

    The network’s members facilitated the collection of money from criminal groups in Montréal and then laundered the results of their illegal business. In particular, the network offered a money transfer service to drug exporting countries.

    The network moved money that was collected in Montréal through various individuals and currency exchange offices in Toronto. The network used an informal value transfer system (IVTS) with connections in Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, the United States and China. The funds were then returned to drug exporting countries, such as Colombia and Mexico.

    This procedure allowed for the laundering of significant amounts of money originating from illegal activities, including drug trafficking. The criminal organizations could thus import drugs through this network.

    The scheme set up by the network for criminal purposes was identified and dismantled.

    Proceeds of crime seized

    During the investigation and the searches, police officers seized significant quantities of drugs, such as cannabis, cocaine, hashish and methamphetamine, for a market value of close to $2.2 million. Bank accounts and money in Canadian and foreign currencies was also seized, for a value of $8.7 million. The CRA also proceeded with the restraint of six properties, of an estimated value of $15 million. The RCMP also seized a considered offence-related property of an estimated value of $7 million. To date, the estimated value of the assets that were seized or restrained is more than $32.8 million.

    Individuals accused

    Charges were laid against 17 individuals, including the two individuals who are the network’s alleged leaders, Nader Gramian-Nik, 56 years old, from Vaughan (Ontario cell) and Mohamad Jaber, 51 years old, from Laval (Quebec cell).

    Quebec cell

    • Mohamad Jaber, 51 years old, Laval
    • Kamel Ghaddar, 39 years old, Laval
    • Eric Bradette, 36 years old, L’Assomption
    • Sergio Violetta Galvez, 43 years old, Laval
    • Alexei Parasenco, 26 years old, Montréal
    • Victor Vargotskii, 56 years old, Montréal
    • Mario Maratta 64, years old, Sainte-Sophie
    • Sorin Ehrlich, 62 years old, Montréal
    • Gary Maybee, 57 years old, Austin
    • Francisco Javier Jimenez Guerrero, 35 years old, address unknown

    Ontario cell

    • Nader Gramian-Nik, 56 years old, Vaughan
    • Tania Geramian-Nik, 28 years old, Vaughan
    • Frederick Rayman, 71 years old, Unionville
    • Sahar Shojaei, 45 years old, Thornhill
    • Thomas Hsueh, 47 years old, Thornhill
    • Mohammadreza Sheikhhassani, 55 years old, Richmond Hill
    • Shabnam Mansouri, 38 years old, Maple

    These individuals are facing a number of charges:

    • conspiracy
    • possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking
    • instructing the commission of an offence for a criminal organization
    • commission of offence for criminal organization
    • trafficking in property obtained by crime
    • laundering proceeds of crime

    Three individuals arrested during yesterday’s operations were also interrogated and released without charges.

    Fighting organized crime

    This operation conducted by the RCMP and its partners disrupted the activities of criminal organizations that import drugs. It cut them off their money transferring network and allowed for the confiscation of significant sums.

    Public appeal

    Do you have information about the illegal activities of individuals or groups of individuals? Contact the RCMP at 514-939-8300 / 1-800-771-5401 or your local police department.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: SPC Severe Thunderstorm Watch 422

    Source: US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

    Note:  The expiration time in the watch graphic is amended if the watch is replaced, cancelled or extended.Note: Click for Watch Status Reports.
    SEL2

    URGENT – IMMEDIATE BROADCAST REQUESTED
    Severe Thunderstorm Watch Number 422
    NWS Storm Prediction Center Norman OK
    955 PM MDT Sun Jun 15 2025

    The NWS Storm Prediction Center has issued a

    * Severe Thunderstorm Watch for portions of
    Western into Central North Dakota

    * Effective this Sunday night and Monday morning from 955 PM
    until 400 AM MDT.

    * Primary threats include…
    Scattered damaging winds and isolated significant gusts to 85
    mph likely
    Isolated large hail events to 1.5 inches in diameter possible

    SUMMARY…Clusters of severe thunderstorms are forecast to move east
    into the Watch tonight from eastern Montana. A couple of supercells
    may pose a threat for large hail, but the primary hazard will be
    severe gusts with linear bands and clusters of thunderstorms.
    Severe gusts peaking into the 75-85 mph range are possible with the
    more intense outflow surges and thunderstorm downdrafts.

    The severe thunderstorm watch area is approximately along and 75
    statute miles east and west of a line from 65 miles northwest of
    Minot ND to 10 miles east southeast of Lemmon SD. For a complete
    depiction of the watch see the associated watch outline update
    (WOUS64 KWNS WOU2).

    PRECAUTIONARY/PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS…

    REMEMBER…A Severe Thunderstorm Watch means conditions are
    favorable for severe thunderstorms in and close to the watch area.
    Persons in these areas should be on the lookout for threatening
    weather conditions and listen for later statements and possible
    warnings. Severe thunderstorms can and occasionally do produce
    tornadoes.

    &&

    OTHER WATCH INFORMATION…CONTINUE…WW 418…WW 419…WW
    420…WW 421…

    AVIATION…A few severe thunderstorms with hail surface and aloft to
    1.5 inches. Extreme turbulence and surface wind gusts to 75 knots. A
    few cumulonimbi with maximum tops to 500. Mean storm motion vector
    27045.

    …Smith

    SEL2

    URGENT – IMMEDIATE BROADCAST REQUESTED
    Severe Thunderstorm Watch Number 422
    NWS Storm Prediction Center Norman OK
    955 PM MDT Sun Jun 15 2025

    The NWS Storm Prediction Center has issued a

    * Severe Thunderstorm Watch for portions of
    Western into Central North Dakota

    * Effective this Sunday night and Monday morning from 955 PM
    until 400 AM MDT.

    * Primary threats include…
    Scattered damaging winds and isolated significant gusts to 85
    mph likely
    Isolated large hail events to 1.5 inches in diameter possible

    SUMMARY…Clusters of severe thunderstorms are forecast to move east
    into the Watch tonight from eastern Montana. A couple of supercells
    may pose a threat for large hail, but the primary hazard will be
    severe gusts with linear bands and clusters of thunderstorms.
    Severe gusts peaking into the 75-85 mph range are possible with the
    more intense outflow surges and thunderstorm downdrafts.

    The severe thunderstorm watch area is approximately along and 75
    statute miles east and west of a line from 65 miles northwest of
    Minot ND to 10 miles east southeast of Lemmon SD. For a complete
    depiction of the watch see the associated watch outline update
    (WOUS64 KWNS WOU2).

    PRECAUTIONARY/PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS…

    REMEMBER…A Severe Thunderstorm Watch means conditions are
    favorable for severe thunderstorms in and close to the watch area.
    Persons in these areas should be on the lookout for threatening
    weather conditions and listen for later statements and possible
    warnings. Severe thunderstorms can and occasionally do produce
    tornadoes.

    &&

    OTHER WATCH INFORMATION…CONTINUE…WW 418…WW 419…WW
    420…WW 421…

    AVIATION…A few severe thunderstorms with hail surface and aloft to
    1.5 inches. Extreme turbulence and surface wind gusts to 75 knots. A
    few cumulonimbi with maximum tops to 500. Mean storm motion vector
    27045.

    …Smith

    Note: The Aviation Watch (SAW) product is an approximation to the watch area. The actual watch is depicted by the shaded areas.
    SAW2
    WW 422 SEVERE TSTM ND 160355Z – 161000Z
    AXIS..75 STATUTE MILES EAST AND WEST OF LINE..
    65NW MOT/MINOT ND/ – 10ESE Y22/LEMMON SD/
    ..AVIATION COORDS.. 65NM E/W /57NW MOT – 49NNW DPR/
    HAIL SURFACE AND ALOFT..1.5 INCHES. WIND GUSTS..75 KNOTS.
    MAX TOPS TO 500. MEAN STORM MOTION VECTOR 27045.

    LAT…LON 48920064 45860042 45860354 48920394

    THIS IS AN APPROXIMATION TO THE WATCH AREA. FOR A
    COMPLETE DEPICTION OF THE WATCH SEE WOUS64 KWNS
    FOR WOU2.

    Watch 422 Status Report Message has not been issued yet.

    Note:  Click for Complete Product Text.Tornadoes

    Probability of 2 or more tornadoes

    Low (10%)

    Probability of 1 or more strong (EF2-EF5) tornadoes

    Low ( 65 knots

    Mod (60%)

    Hail

    Probability of 10 or more severe hail events

    Low (20%)

    Probability of 1 or more hailstones > 2 inches

    Low (20%)

    Combined Severe Hail/Wind

    Probability of 6 or more combined severe hail/wind events

    High (90%)

    For each watch, probabilities for particular events inside the watch (listed above in each table) are determined by the issuing forecaster. The “Low” category contains probability values ranging from less than 2% to 20% (EF2-EF5 tornadoes), less than 5% to 20% (all other probabilities), “Moderate” from 30% to 60%, and “High” from 70% to greater than 95%. High values are bolded and lighter in color to provide awareness of an increased threat for a particular event.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Israel’s attacks on Iran are already hurting global oil prices, and the impact is set to worsen

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Joaquin Vespignani, Associate Professor of Economics and Finance, University of Tasmania

    The weekend attacks on Iran’s oil facilities – widely seen as part of escalating hostilities between Israel and Iran – represent a dangerous moment for global energy security.

    While the physical damage to Iran’s production facilities is still being assessed, the broader strategic implications are already rippling through global oil markets. There is widespread concern about supply security and the inflationary consequences for both advanced and emerging economies.

    The global impact

    Iran, which holds about 9% of the world’s proven oil reserves, currently exports between 1.5 and 2 million barrels per day, primarily to China, despite long-standing United States sanctions.

    While its oil output is not as globally integrated as that of Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, any disruption to Iranian production or export routes – especially the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world’s oil supply flows – poses a systemic risk.

    Markets have already reacted. Brent crude prices rose more than US 6%, while West Texas Intermediate price increased by over US 5% immediately after the attacks.

    These price movements reflect not only short-term supply concerns but also the addition of a geopolitical risk premium due to fears of broader regional conflict.

    International oil prices may increase further as the conflict continues. Analysts expect that Australian petrol prices will increase in the next few weeks, as domestic fuel costs respond to international benchmarks with a lag.

    Escalation and strategic intentions

    There is growing concern this conflict could escalate further. In particular, Israel may intensify its targeting of Iranian oil facilities, as part of a broader strategy to weaken Iran’s economic capacity and deter further proxy activities.

    Should this occur, it would put even more upward pressure on global oil prices. Unlike isolated sabotage events, a sustained campaign against Iranian energy infrastructure would likely lead to tighter global supply conditions. This would be a near certainty if Iranian retaliatory actions disrupt shipping routes or neighbouring producers.

    Countries most affected

    Countries reliant on oil imports – especially in Asia – are the most exposed to such shocks in the short term.

    India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh rely heavily on Middle Eastern oil and are particularly vulnerable to both supply interruptions and price increases. These economies typically have limited strategic petroleum reserves and face external balance pressures when oil prices rise.

    China, despite being Iran’s largest oil customer, has greater insulation due to its diversified suppliers and substantial reserves.

    However, sustained instability in the Persian Gulf would raise freight and insurance costs even for Chinese refiners, especially if the Strait of Hormuz becomes a contested zone. The strait, between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, provides the only sea access from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean.

    Australia’s exposure

    Australia does not import oil directly from Iran. Most of its crude and refined products are sourced from countries including South Korea, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates and Singapore.

    However, because Australian fuel prices are pegged to international benchmarks such as Brent and Singapore Mogas, domestic prices will rise in response to the global increase in oil prices, regardless of whether Australian refineries process Iranian oil.

    These price increases will have flow-on effects, raising transport and freight costs across the economy. Industries such as agriculture, logistics, aviation and construction will feel the pinch, and higher operating costs are likely to be passed on to consumers.

    Broader economic impacts

    The conflict could also disrupt global shipping routes, particularly if Iran retaliates through its proxies by targeting vessels in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, or Hormuz Strait.

    Any such disruption could drive up shipping insurance, delay delivery times, and compound existing global supply chain vulnerabilities. More broadly, this supply shock could rekindle inflationary pressures in many countries.

    For Australia, it could delay monetary easing by the Reserve Bank of Australia and reduce consumer confidence if household fuel costs rise significantly. Globally, central banks may adopt a more cautious approach to rate cuts if oil-driven inflation proves persistent.

    The attacks on Iran’s oil fields, and the likelihood of further escalation, present a renewed threat to global energy stability. Even though Australia does not import Iranian oil, it remains exposed through price transmission, supply chain effects and inflationary pressures.

    A sustained campaign targeting Iran’s energy infrastructure by Israel could amplify these risks, leading to a broader energy shock that would affect oil-importing economies worldwide.

    Strategic reserve management and diplomatic engagement will be essential to contain the fallout.

    Joaquin Vespignani is affiliated with the Centre for Australian Macroeconomic Analysis, Australian National University.

    ref. Israel’s attacks on Iran are already hurting global oil prices, and the impact is set to worsen – https://theconversation.com/israels-attacks-on-iran-are-already-hurting-global-oil-prices-and-the-impact-is-set-to-worsen-259013

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: As war breaks out with Israel, Iran has run out of good options

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Ali Mamouri, Research Fellow, Middle East Studies, Deakin University

    The scale of Israel’s strikes on multiple, sensitive Iranian military and nuclear sites on Friday was unprecedented. It was the biggest attack on Iran since the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s.

    As expected, Iran responded swiftly, even as Israeli attacks on its territory continued. The unfolding conflict is reshaping regional dynamics, and Iran now finds itself with no easy path forward.

    Strikes come at a delicate time

    The timing of the Israeli strikes was highly significant. They came at a critical point in the high-stakes negotiations between Iran and the United States over Tehran’s nuclear program that began earlier this year.

    Last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued a report accusing Tehran of stockpiling highly enriched uranium at levels dangerously close to weaponisation.

    According to the report, Iran has accumulated around 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity. If this uranium is further enriched to 90% purity, it would be enough to build nine to ten bombs.

    The day before Israel’s attack, the IAEA board of governors also declared Iran to be in breach of its non-proliferation obligations for the first time in two decades.

    The nuclear talks recently hit a stumbling block over a major issue – the US refusal to allow Iran to enrich any uranium at all for a civilian nuclear program.

    Iran has previously agreed to cap its enrichment at 3.67% under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a nuclear deal between Iran, the US and other global powers agreed to in 2015 (and abandoned by the first Trump administration in 2018). But it has refused to relinquish its right to enrichment altogether.

    US President Donald Trump reportedly urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to attack Iran last week, believing he was close to a deal.

    But after the attack, Trump ramped up his threats on Iran again, urging it to agree to a deal “before there is nothing left”. He called the Israeli strikes “excellent” and suggested there was “more to come”.

    Given this context, it is understandable why Iran does not view the US as an impartial mediator. In response, Iran suspended its negotiations with the US, announcing it would skip the sixth round of talks scheduled for Sunday.

    Rather than compelling Iran to agree to a deal, the excessive pressure could risk pushing Iran towards a more extreme stance instead.

    While Iranian officials have denied any intention to develop a military nuclear program, they have warned that continued Israeli attacks and US pressure might force Tehran to reconsider as a deterrence mechanism.




    Read more:
    As its conflict with Israel escalates, could Iran now acquire a nuclear bomb?


    Why surrender could spell the regime’s end

    On several occasions, Trump has insisted he is not seeking “regime change” in Iran. He has repeatedly claimed he wants to see Iran be “successful” – the only requirement is for it to accept a US deal.

    However, in Iran’s view, the US proposal is not viewed as a peace offer, but as a blueprint for surrender. And the fear is this would ultimately pave the way for regime change under the guise of diplomacy.

    Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei responded to the latest US proposal by insisting that uranium enrichment remains a “red line” for Iran. Abandoning this right from the Iranian perspective would only embolden its adversaries to escalate their pressure on the regime and make further demands – such as dismantling Iran’s missile program.

    The fear in Tehran is this could push the country into a defenceless state without a way to deter future Israeli strikes.

    Furthermore, capitulating to the US terms could ignite domestic backlash on two fronts: from an already growing opposition movement, and from the regime’s base of loyal supporters, who would see any retreat as a betrayal.

    In this context, many in Iran’s leadership believe that giving in to Trump’s terms would not avert regime change – it would hasten it.

    What options remain for Iran now?

    Caught between escalating pressure and existential threats, Iran finds itself with few viable options other than to project strength. It has already begun to pursue this strategy by launching retaliatory missile strikes at Israeli cities.

    This response has been much stronger than the relatively contained tit-for-tat strikes Israel and Iran engaged in last year. Iran’s strikes have caused considerable damage to government and residential areas in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

    Iran sees no alternative but to push forward, having already been drawn into open confrontation. Any sign of weakness would severely undermine the regime’s legitimacy at home and embolden its adversaries abroad.

    Moreover, Tehran is betting on Trump’s aversion to foreign wars. Iranian leaders believe the US is neither prepared nor willing to enter another costly conflict in the region – one that could disrupt global trade and jeopardise Trump’s recent economic partnerships with Persian Gulf states.

    Therefore, Iran’s leadership likely believes that by standing firm now, the conflict will be limited, so long as the US stays on the sidelines. And then, Iran’s leaders would try to return to the negotiating table, in their view, from a position of strength.

    Ali Mamouri does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. As war breaks out with Israel, Iran has run out of good options – https://theconversation.com/as-war-breaks-out-with-israel-iran-has-run-out-of-good-options-258916

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: ‘No kings!’: like the LA protesters, the early Romans hated kings, too

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Peter Edwell, Associate Professor in Ancient History, Macquarie University

    Protesters across the United States have brandished placards declaring “no kings!” in recent days, keen to send a message one-man rule is not acceptable.

    The defeat of the forces of King George III in the United States’ revolutionary war of 1775–83 saw the end of royal rule in the US. Touting itself as the world’s leading democracy, kings have not been welcome in America for 250 years. But for many, Donald Trump is increasingly behaving as one and now is the time to stop him.

    Having studied ancient Roman politics for years, America’s rejection of kingship reminds me vividly of the strong aversion to it in the Roman republic.

    Early Romans too, sought a society with “no kings!” – up until, that is, the period following the assassination of Julius Caesar, when everything changed.

    The seven kings of Rome

    Seven kings ruled Rome, one after the other, after the city was founded in 753 BCE. The first was Romulus who, according to some legends, gave the city its name.

    When the last of the kings of Rome was driven from the city in 509 BCE, his key opponent, Lucius Junius Brutus, vowed:

    I will pursue Lucius Tarquinius Superbus and his wicked wife and all his children, with sword, with fire, with whatever violence I may; and I will suffer neither him nor anyone else to be king in Rome!

    Tarquinius Superbus (meaning “the proud”) had ruled Rome for 25 years. He began his reign by executing uncooperative Senators.

    When Tarquinius’ son raped a noblewoman named Lucretia, the Roman population rebelled against the king’s long-running tyranny. The hubris of the king and his family was finally too much. They were driven from Rome and never allowed to return.

    A new system of government was ushered in: the republic.

    The rise of the Roman republic

    In the new system, power was shared among elected officials – including two consuls, who were elected annually.

    The consuls were the most powerful officials in the republic and were given power to wage war.

    The Senate, which represented the wealthiest sections of society (initially the patrician class), held power in some key areas, including foreign policy.

    Less affluent citizens elected tribunes of the plebs who had various powers, including the right to veto laws.

    In the republican system, the term king (rex in Latin) quickly became anathema.

    “No kings” would effectively remain the watchword through the Roman republic’s entire history. “Rex” was a word the Romans hated. It was short-hand for “tyranny”.

    The rise and fall of Julius Caesar

    Over time, powerful figures emerged who threatened the republic’s tight power-sharing rules.

    Figures such as the general Pompey (106–48 BCE) broke all the rules and behaved in suspiciously kingly ways. With military success and vast wealth, he was a populist who broke the mould. Pompey even staged a three-day military parade, known as a triumph, to coincide with his birthday in 61 BCE.

    But the ultimate populist was Julius Caesar.

    Born to a noble family claiming lineage from the goddess Venus, Caesar became fabulously wealthy.

    He also scored major military victories, including subduing the Gauls (across modern France and Belgium) from 58–50 BCE.

    In the 40s BCE, Caesar began taking offices over extended time frames – much longer periods than the rules technically allowed.

    Early in 44 BCE he gave himself the formal title “dictator for life” (Dictator Perpetuo), having been appointed dictator two years earlier. The dictatorship was only meant to be held in times of emergency for a period of six months.

    When Caesar was preparing a war against Parthia (in modern day Iran), some tried to hail him as king.

    Soon after, an angry group of 23 senators stabbed him to death in a vain attempt to save the republic. They were led by Marcus Junius Brutus, a descendant of the Brutus who killed the last Roman king, Tarquinius Superbus.

    The Roman republic was beyond saving despite Caesar’s death.
    duncan1890/Getty Images

    However, the Roman republic was beyond saving despite Caesar’s death. His great nephew Octavian eventually emerged as leader and became known as Augustus (27 BCE – 14 CE). With Augustus, an age of emperors was born.

    Emperors were kings in all but name. The strong aversion to kingship in Rome ensured their complete avoidance of the term rex.

    ‘No kings!’

    American protesters waving placards shouting “no kings!” are expressing clear concerns that their beloved democracy is under threat.

    Donald Trump has already declared eight national emergencies and issued 161 executive orders in his second term.

    When asked if he needs to uphold the Constitution, Trump declares “I don’t know.” He has joked about running for a third term as president, in breach of the longstanding limit of two terms.

    Like Caesar, is Donald Trump becoming a king in all but name? Is he setting a precedent for his successors to behave increasingly like emperors?

    The American aversion to “king” likely ensures the term will never return. But when protesters and others shout “no kings!”, they know the very meaning of the term “president” is changing before their eyes.

    Peter Edwell receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    ref. ‘No kings!’: like the LA protesters, the early Romans hated kings, too – https://theconversation.com/no-kings-like-the-la-protesters-the-early-romans-hated-kings-too-259011

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Seabed mining is becoming an environmental flashpoint – NZ will have to pick a side soon

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Myra Williamson, Senior Lecturer in Law, Auckland University of Technology

    Getty Images

    Seabed mining could become one of the defining environmental battles of 2025. Around the world, governments are weighing up whether to allow mining of the ocean floor for metal ores and minerals. New Zealand is among them.

    The stakes are high. Deep-sea mining is highly controversial, with evidence showing mining activity can cause lasting damage to fragile marine ecosystems. One area off the east coast of the United States, mined as an experiment 50 years ago, still bears scars and shows little sign of recovery.

    With the world facing competing pressures – climate action and conservation versus demand for resources – New Zealand must now decide whether to fast-track mining, regulate it tightly, or pause it entirely.

    Who controls international seabed mining?

    A major flashpoint is governance in international waters. Under international law, seabed mining beyond national jurisdiction is managed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), created by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

    But the US has never ratified UNCLOS. In April this year, President Donald Trump issued an executive order to bypass the ISA and allow companies to begin mining in international waters.

    The ISA has pushed back, warning unilateral action breaches international law. However, the declaration from the recently concluded UN Ocean Conference in France does not urge countries to adopt a precautionary approach, nor does it ban deep seabed mining.

    The declaration does “reiterate the need to increase scientific knowledge on deep sea ecosystems” and recognises the role of the ISA in setting “robust rules, regulations and procedures for exploitation of resources” in international waters.

    So, while the international community supports multilateralism and international law, deep-sea mining in the near future remains a real possibility.

    Fast-track approvals

    In the Pacific, some countries have already made up their minds about which way they will go. Nauru recently updated its agreement with Canadian-based The Metals Company to begin mining in the nearby Clarion Clipperton Zone. The deal favours the US’s go-it-alone approach over the ISA model.

    By contrast, in 2022, New Zealand’s Labour government backed the ISA’s moratorium and committed to a holistic ocean management strategy. Whether that position still holds is unclear, given the current government’s policies.

    The list of applications under the Fast-track Approvals Act 2024described by Regional Development Minister Shane Jones as “arguably the most permissive regime” in Australasia – includes two controversial seabed mining proposals in Bream Bay and off the Taranaki coast:

    • Trans-Tasman Resources’ proposal to extract up to 50 million tonnes of Taranaki seabed material annually to recover heavy mineral sands that contain iron ore as well as rare metal elements titanium and vanadium.

    • McCallum Brothers Ltd’s Bream Bay proposal to dredge up to 150,000 cubic metres of sand yearly for three years, and up to 250,000 cubic metres after that.

    Legal landscape changing

    Māori and environmental groups have opposed the fast-track policy, and the Treaty of Waitangi has so far been a powerful safeguard in seabed mining cases.

    Provisions referencing Treaty principles appear in key laws, including the Crown Minerals Act and the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act.

    In 2021, the Supreme Court cited these obligations when it rejected a 2016 marine discharge application by Trans-Tasman Resources to mine the seabed in the Taranaki Bight. The court ruled Treaty clauses must be interpreted in a “broad and generous” way, recognising tikanga Māori and customary marine rights.

    But that legal landscape could soon change. The Regulatory Standards Bill, now before parliament, would give priority to property rights over environmental or Indigenous protections in the formulation of new laws and regulations.

    The bill also allows for the review of existing legislation. In theory, if the Regulatory Standards Bill becomes law, it could result in the removal of Treaty principles clauses from legislation.

    This in turn could deny courts the tools they’ve previously used to uphold environmental and Treaty-based protections to block seabed mining applications. That would make it easier to approve fast-tracked projects such as the Bream Bay and Taranaki projects.

    Setting a precedent

    Meanwhile, Hawai’i has gone in a different direction. In 2024, the US state passed a law banning seabed mining in state waters – joining California (2022), Washington (2021) and Oregon (1991).

    Under the Hawai’i Seabed Mining Prevention Act, mining is banned except in rare cases such as beach restoration. The law cites the public’s right to a clean and healthy environment.

    As global conflict brews over seabed governance, New Zealand’s eventual position could set a precedent.

    Choosing to prohibit seabed mining in New Zealand waters, as Hawai’i has done, would send a strong message that environmental stewardship and Indigenous rights matter more than short-term resource extraction interests.

    If New Zealand does decide to go ahead with seabed mining, however, it could trigger a cascade of mining efforts across New Zealand and the Pacific. A crucial decision is fast approaching.

    Myra Williamson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Seabed mining is becoming an environmental flashpoint – NZ will have to pick a side soon – https://theconversation.com/seabed-mining-is-becoming-an-environmental-flashpoint-nz-will-have-to-pick-a-side-soon-258908

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • Iran and Israel Exchange Fresh Strikes as Global Leaders Push for Ceasefire

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The war between Iran and Israel is in its fourth day of direct hostilities as international diplomatic activity is in full swing to prevent the conflict from engulfing broader West Asia. While ongoing military operations have killed dozens of people and caused widespread destruction, a complex matrix of behind-the-scenes negotiations is underway among world powers and regional actors desperately trying to contain the crisis.

    Iran launched missile strikes on Israeli cities , with rockets striking Haifa and injuring at least 15 in Israel’s National Emergency Service. The attacks were launched as residents in Tehran reported shaking explosions throughout the capital city, with Iranian officials confirming missile strikes in the Niavaran and Tajrish neighborhoods in the northern part of the city, as well as in and around central Valiasr and Hafte Tir squares.

    Israeli forces have expanded their campaign beyond Tehran to cities including Shiraz and Isfahan, where a Defense Ministry military base was hit. The Israeli military announced it had conducted its longest-range strike since the fighting began, striking an aerial refueling aircraft at Mashhad Airport in eastern Iran. Well over 250 Iranian targets have been hit in the expanding military campaign, including what Israel identifies as nuclear command and control centers and key energy targets. The situation is still complex and fraught with difficulties. Now, Iranian officials refer to negotiations with USA as unjustifiable amid current Israeli aggression, and Iran has stopped attending nuclear negotiations that were supposed to be carried out in Oman.

    Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi has indicated readiness for nuclear agreements that ensure Iran does not pursue weapons development, but insists the country will not accept any deal that deprives it of nuclear rights.

    Behind closed doors, Iran has approached Qatar and Oman requesting them to act as intermediaries with the United States to facilitate ceasefire negotiations, while Saudi Arabia is reportedly involved in diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the situation. US President Donald Trump has expressed optimism about peace prospects, stating he anticipates a deal soon through ongoing calls and meetings to broker an agreement. International diplomatic efforts have accelerated as global leaders warn of the urgent need to prevent the conflict from spilling over to the rest of the Middle East, with multiple regional powers working frantically to halt what they describe as a spiral of violence causing irreparable economic and civil damage to both sides.

    The United Nations Security Council convened an emergency session where both nations presented diametrically opposing positions. Iran labeled Israel’s strike a declaration of war, while Israel justified its attack as legitimate self-defense after failed diplomacy. The session failed to produce a binding resolution, which was indicative of the failure of the international community to agree on anything.

    European leaders have called for diplomatic solutions but appear to have limited influence in the conflict, with analysts saying Europe is on the sidelines. Cyprus has played a minor role, with its president reportedly having carried messages between Israel and Iran through indirect intermediaries.

    Israel remains extremely skeptical of Iranian intentions and has continued its military push despite diplomatic progress. Israeli leaders have warned Iran to vacate nuclear facilities while calling for the United States to assist efforts at abandoning Iran’s nuclear program entirely. The Israeli government has shown little desire to stop activities without concrete Iranian concessions.

    Stakes have also increased as Iran threatened that Western assistance to Israel in downing missiles can result in targeting US, UK, and French military assets throughout the region. The threat has complicated diplomacy as Washington has already provided defensive assistance to Israel while publicly urging restraint.

    In spite of active diplomatic contacts with various regional mediators and ongoing US engagement, prospects for an immediate ceasefire are uncertain.

  • Iran and Israel Exchange Fresh Strikes as Global Leaders Push for Ceasefire

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The war between Iran and Israel is in its fourth day of direct hostilities as international diplomatic activity is in full swing to prevent the conflict from engulfing broader West Asia. While ongoing military operations have killed dozens of people and caused widespread destruction, a complex matrix of behind-the-scenes negotiations is underway among world powers and regional actors desperately trying to contain the crisis.

    Iran launched missile strikes on Israeli cities , with rockets striking Haifa and injuring at least 15 in Israel’s National Emergency Service. The attacks were launched as residents in Tehran reported shaking explosions throughout the capital city, with Iranian officials confirming missile strikes in the Niavaran and Tajrish neighborhoods in the northern part of the city, as well as in and around central Valiasr and Hafte Tir squares.

    Israeli forces have expanded their campaign beyond Tehran to cities including Shiraz and Isfahan, where a Defense Ministry military base was hit. The Israeli military announced it had conducted its longest-range strike since the fighting began, striking an aerial refueling aircraft at Mashhad Airport in eastern Iran. Well over 250 Iranian targets have been hit in the expanding military campaign, including what Israel identifies as nuclear command and control centers and key energy targets. The situation is still complex and fraught with difficulties. Now, Iranian officials refer to negotiations with USA as unjustifiable amid current Israeli aggression, and Iran has stopped attending nuclear negotiations that were supposed to be carried out in Oman.

    Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi has indicated readiness for nuclear agreements that ensure Iran does not pursue weapons development, but insists the country will not accept any deal that deprives it of nuclear rights.

    Behind closed doors, Iran has approached Qatar and Oman requesting them to act as intermediaries with the United States to facilitate ceasefire negotiations, while Saudi Arabia is reportedly involved in diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the situation. US President Donald Trump has expressed optimism about peace prospects, stating he anticipates a deal soon through ongoing calls and meetings to broker an agreement. International diplomatic efforts have accelerated as global leaders warn of the urgent need to prevent the conflict from spilling over to the rest of the Middle East, with multiple regional powers working frantically to halt what they describe as a spiral of violence causing irreparable economic and civil damage to both sides.

    The United Nations Security Council convened an emergency session where both nations presented diametrically opposing positions. Iran labeled Israel’s strike a declaration of war, while Israel justified its attack as legitimate self-defense after failed diplomacy. The session failed to produce a binding resolution, which was indicative of the failure of the international community to agree on anything.

    European leaders have called for diplomatic solutions but appear to have limited influence in the conflict, with analysts saying Europe is on the sidelines. Cyprus has played a minor role, with its president reportedly having carried messages between Israel and Iran through indirect intermediaries.

    Israel remains extremely skeptical of Iranian intentions and has continued its military push despite diplomatic progress. Israeli leaders have warned Iran to vacate nuclear facilities while calling for the United States to assist efforts at abandoning Iran’s nuclear program entirely. The Israeli government has shown little desire to stop activities without concrete Iranian concessions.

    Stakes have also increased as Iran threatened that Western assistance to Israel in downing missiles can result in targeting US, UK, and French military assets throughout the region. The threat has complicated diplomacy as Washington has already provided defensive assistance to Israel while publicly urging restraint.

    In spite of active diplomatic contacts with various regional mediators and ongoing US engagement, prospects for an immediate ceasefire are uncertain.

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: Information on securities accepted as collateral for Bank of Russia loans as of 16.06.2025

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Central Bank of Russia (2) –

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Categories24-7, Central Bank of Russia, Mil-SOSI, Russian Banks, Russian Economy, Russian Finance, Russian Language, Russian economy, Russian banks

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    State registration number of the issue Issuer Price (as a percentage of the par value) of one security The cost of one security, determined in the manner established by the Bank of Russia (rubles) Correction coefficient established by the Bank of Russia Isin Maturity date* Mechanism **
    Bonds issued on behalf of the Russian Federation
    12840061V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 96.6266 15 267 543.90896 0.98 XS0767473852 03.04.2042 OM
    12840069V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 85.5000 13,509,478.8 0.98 XS0971721963 09/15/2043 OM
    12840077V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 99,5909 15 735 919,90904 0.98 RU000A0JWHA4 05/26/2026 OM
    12840078V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 94,1554 14 877 080.47024 0.98 RU000A0JXTS9 06/22/2027 OM
    12840079V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 74,7400 11,809,338,544 0.98 RU000A0JXU14 06/21/2047 OM
    12840080V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 90.8750 14 358 758, I. 0.98 RU000a0zyn4 03/20/2029 OM
    12840086V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 82.5310 13 040 360,1736 0.98 RU000A1006S9 03/27/2035 OM
    12840108V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 100.0975 15,815,965,546 0.98 RU000A10A810 05/22/2026 OM
    12840109V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 98,6538 15 587 852,86128 0.98 RU000A10A851 06/18/2027 OM
    12840111V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 119,6718 94 544.0728104 0.98 RU000A10A869 06/21/2028 OM
    12840112V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 93,7560 14 813 973.0336 0.98 RU000A10A8A6 03/16/2029 OM
    12840113V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 106.7837 4,21810564718 0.98 RU000A10A8E8 09/25/2025 OM
    12840115V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 84.6652 13 377 575.72512 0.98 RU000A10A7Y8 03/23/2035 OM
    12840117V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 83,4831 13 190 797,30536 0.98 RU000A10A802 01.04.2042 OM
    12840118V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 85.5951 13 524 505,13256 0.98 RU000A10A877 09/11/2043 OM
    12840119V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 77,4803 12 242 321,28968 0.98 RU000A10A844 06/19/2047 OM
    12978082V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 99,4737 8 953 309,42116 0.98 RU000A0ZZVE6 01.12.2025 OM
    12978087V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 82,1667 7 395 561.73356 0.98 RU000A102CK5 11/19/2027 OM
    12978088V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 64,8750 5 839 191.15 0.98 RU000A102CL3 11/19/2032 OM
    12978104V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 52,4382 4 719 794,57976 0.98 RU000A1034K8 05/26/2036 OM
    12978107V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 98,0275 8 823 141.587 0.98 RU000A10A885 01.12.2025 OM
    12978110V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 90.3750 8 134 364.55 0.98 RU000A10A828 11/17/2027 OM
    12978114V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 70.3200 6 329 278,176 0.98 RU000A10A836 11/17/2032 OM
    12978116V MINISTRY OF FINANCE 66,2923 5 966 ​​757.78764 0.98 RU000A10A893 05/22/2036 OM
    25085RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 94.5000 945 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A103BQ2 09/23/2025 OM
    26207RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 89,8520 898.52 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JS3W6 02.02.2027 OM
    26212RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 83,9600 839.6 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JTK38 01/18/2028 OM
    26218RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 75.9010 759.01 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JVW48 09/16/2031 OM
    26219RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 91,2980 912.98 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JWM07 09/15/2026 OM
    26221RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 68,5400 685.4 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JXFM1 03/22/2033 OM
    26224RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 77.9910 779.91 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0ZYUA9 05/22/2029 OM
    26225RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 64,4580 644.58 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0ZYub7 08.05.2034 OM
    26226RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 90.8170 908.17 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0zzyw2 06.10.2026 OM
    26228RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 76.9920 769.92 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A100A82 09.04.2030 OM
    26229RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 96.0190 960.19 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A100EG3 11.11.2025 OM
    26230RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 60,1760 601.76 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A100EF5 03/15/2039 OM
    26232RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 82,7960 827.96 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1014N4 05.10.2027 OM
    26233RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 55.8450 558.45 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A101F94 07/17/2035 OM
    26234RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 98,7730 987.73 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A101QE0 07/15/2025 OM
    26235RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 67,4740 674.74 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1028E3 03/11/2031 OM
    26236RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 79,7720 797.72 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A102BT8 05/16/2028 OM
    26237RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 78,1930 781.93 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1038Z7 03/13/2029 OM
    26238RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 55.5510 555.51 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1038V6 05/14/2041 OM
    26239RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 70.1930 701.93 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A103901 07/22/2031 OM
    26240RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 59.7060 597.06 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A103BR0 07/29/2036 OM
    26241RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 77.7060 777.06 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A105FZ9 11/16/2032 OM
    26242RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 83,2250 832.25 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A105RV3 08/28/2029 OM
    26243RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 71.8960 718.96 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A106E90 05/18/2038 OM
    26244RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 83,8740 838.74 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1074G2 03/14/2034 OM
    26245RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 84,9730 849.73 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A108EG6 09.25.2035 OM
    26246RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 85.0330 850.33 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A108EE1 03/11/2036 OM
    26247RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 85.0230 850.23 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A108EF8 05/10/2039 OM
    26248RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 84,9430 849.43 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A108EH4 05/15/2040 OM
    29007RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 102.6380 1,026.38 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JV4M0 02.03.2027 OM
    29008RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 104.6950 1,046.95 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JV4P3 02.10.2029 OM
    29009RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 107,3380 1,073.38 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JV4N8 04/04/2032 OM
    29010RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 106.6730 1,066.73 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JV4Q1 05.12.2034 OM
    29013RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 96.5260 965.26 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A101KT1 09/17/2030 OM
    29014RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 99,6220 996.22 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A101N52 03/24/2026 OM
    29015RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 97.9010 979.01 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1025A7 10/17/2028 OM
    29016RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 98,990 989.99 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1025B5 12/22/2026 OM
    29017RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 96,7530 967.53 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1028D5 08.24.2032 OM
    29018RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 97.0320 970.32 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A102A31 11/25/2031 OM
    29019RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 97,6400 976.4 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A102A49 07/17/2029 OM
    29020RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 98,1760 981.76 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A102BV4 09/21/2027 OM
    29021RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 96.9180 969.18 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A105B11 11/26/2030 OM
    29022RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 97,1680 971.68 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A105G16 07/19/2033 OM
    29023RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 97,1150 971.15 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A105L19 08/22/2034 OM
    29024RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 94,5320 945.32 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A1066D5 04/17/2035 OM
    29025RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 94,1990 941.99 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A106Z61 08/11/2037 OM
    29026RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 96,9970 969.97 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A10A7D2 03/03/2038 OM
    29027RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 95,4860 954.86 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A10AA93 09/10/2036 OM
    46011RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 491,7170 1,475,151 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU0002867854 08/19/2025 OM
    46012RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 99,3760 944.072 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU0002868001 09/08/2026 OM
    46020RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 60.9150 609.15 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0GN9A7 08.08.2034 OM
    46023RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 93,1810 93,181 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0JRTL6 07/22/2026 OM
    52002RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 81,1080 1 337,1383772 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A0ZYZ26 01.02.2028 OM
    52003RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 71,9120 1,077.8673944 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A102069 07/16/2030 OM
    52004RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 68,1900 960.885747 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A103MX5 03/16/2032 OM
    52005RMFS MINISTRY OF FINANCE 66,4120 802.8347444 1 for VDK/OVN; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days; 1 for OM Loans from 2 to 30 days (rollover); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day; 0.98 for Loans (SME OFZ); 1 for OM Loans for 1 day (rollover); 1 for Irrevocable credit line; RU000A105XV1 05/10/2033 OM
    MK -0-CM-119 MINISTRY OF FINANCE 119,5185 94 422,961518 0.98 XS0088543193 06.06.2028 OM
    SK -0-CM-128 MINISTRY OF FINANCE 105.6721 4,17419589094 0.98 XS0114288789 09/25/2025 OM
    Bonds of subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities
    RU34016BEL0 BELGOROD REGION 96,6700 58.002 0.93 RU000A1025F6 09/17/2025 DM
    Ru34003kra1 CITY OF KRASNODAR 94,7400 189.48 0.9 RU000A102KT9 12/22/2025 DM
    RU34013KRN1 CITY OF KRASNOYARSK 96.0000 240 0.9 RU000A1029G6 10.10.2025 DM
    RU35002GSP0 CITY OF SAINT PETERSBURG 91,7300 458.65 0.96 RU000A0ZYKJ1 04.12.2025 OM
    RU35003GSP0 CITY OF SAINT PETERSBURG 88,6700 620.69 0.96 RU000A102A15 10/13/2025 OM
    RU35003KND0 KRASNODAR REGION 90.0300 630.21 0.93 RU000A1011B5 05.11.2025 OM
    RU35016KNA0 KRASNOYARSK REGION 97.8600 97,86 0.93 RU000A0ZZM87 09/11/2025 DM
    RU35001kur0 KURSK REGION 96,5900 144,885 0.9 RU000A0ZYCD1 10.10.2025 DM
    RU34012LIP0 LIPETSK REGION 96,6400 193.28 0.93 RU000A102598 09/15/2025 DM
    RU35010LIP0 LIPETSK REGION 96,3700 144,555 0.93 RU000A0ZZR33 10/20/2025 DM
    RU34014MOO0 MOSCOW REGION 99,1900 396.76 0.96 RU000A101WL3 07.07.2025 DM
    RU35015MOO0 MOSCOW REGION 86,9600 260.88 0.96 RU000A102CR0 09.11.2026 DM
    RU35016MOO0 MOSCOW REGION 89,3400 268.02 0.96 RU000A102G35 01.06.2026 DM
    RU35015NJG0 NIZHNY NOVGOROD REGION 93,0800 651.56 0.9 RU000A102DS6 08/18/2025 DM
    RU35016NJG0 NIZHNY NOVGOROD REGION 92,0200 920.2 0.9 RU000A1043K9 11/17/2025 DM
    Ru34021ano0 NOVOSIBIRSK REGION 96,1800 288.54 0.93 RU000A102895 10/13/2025 DM
    RU34024ANO0 NOVOSIBIRSK REGION 101,8700 1,018.7 0.93 RU000A1099S4 10.10.2026 DM
    RU34026ano0 NOVOSIBIRSK REGION 104,4600 1,044.6 0.93 RU000A10ABC2 06/06/2026 DM
    RU35023ANO0 NOVOSIBIRSK REGION 92,3600 923.6 0.93 RU000A107B19 04/16/2027 DM
    RU35003AOR0 ORENBURG REGION 99,6700 199.34 0.93 RU000A0JVM81 02.07.2025 DM
    RU35004AOR0 ORENBURG REGION 90,4500 904.5 0.93 RU000A0ZYKH5 03/03/2025 DM
    RU25073MOS0 GOVERNMENT OF MOSCOW 92,5400 925.4 0.96 RU000A1030T7 04/20/2026 OM
    RU26074MOS0 GOVERNMENT OF MOSCOW 81.4000 814 0.96 RU000A1033Z8 05/17/2028 OM
    RU34011BAS0 REPUBLIC OF BASHKORTOSTAN 96.8000 387.2 0.93 RU000A1026B3 09/23/2025 DM
    RU34012BAS0 REPUBLIC OF BASHKORTOSTAN 94,2200 659.54 0.93 RU000A103DN5 07.07.2025 DM
    RU34013BAS0 REPUBLIC OF BASHKORTOSTAN 93,5500 935.5 0.93 RU000A106FT0 12/29/2025 DM
    RU34014BAS0 REPUBLIC OF BASHKORTOSTAN 111,7100 1 117.1 0.93 RU000A10AC91 11.12.2025 DM
    RU35011RSY0 REPUBLIC OF SAKHA (YAKUTIA) 97,3700 146,055 0.9 RU000A0ZZNJ2 09/23/2025 DM
    RU35012RSY0 REPUBLIC OF SAKHA (YAKUTIA) 94,7200 378.88 0.9 RU000A100CN3 08/12/2025 DM
    RU35013RSY0 REPUBLIC OF SAKHA (YAKUTIA) 91,8700 459.35 0.9 RU000A1010D3 01.08.2025 DM
    RU35014RSY0 REPUBLIC OF SAKHA (YAKUTIA) 87,2700 436.35 0.9 RU000A101P27 09/11/2025 DM
    RU35015RSY0 REPUBLIC OF SAKHA (YAKUTIA) 86.1000 688.8 0.9 RU000A1033B9 08.08.2025 DM
    RU35016RSY0 REPUBLIC OF SAKHA (YAKUTIA) 99,2200 992.2 0.9 RU000A109L72 05.06.2026 DM
    RU35014SAM0 SAMARA REGION 91,0600 136.59 0.93 RU000A0ZZ9P8 06.06.2026 DM
    RU35015SAM0 SAMARA REGION 91,7600 367.04 0.93 RU000A1020L5 03.11.2025 DM
    RU34007SVS0 SVERDLOVSK REGION 99.5000 248.75 0.93 RU000A101UG7 06/27/2025 OM
    RU35004SVS0 SVERDLOVSK REGION 96,5400 193.08 0.93 RU000A0ZYDU3 10/21/2025 OM
    RU35005SVS0 SVERDLOVSK REGION 91.9700 91,97 0.93 RU000A0ZZQH9 12.12.2025 OM
    RU35006SVS0 SVERDLOVSK REGION 89,3300 446.65 0.93 RU000A1016N9 08.12.2025 OM
    RU35008SVS0 SVERDLOVSK REGION 90.5500 905.5 0.93 RU000A101Z17 07/23/2025 OM
    RU35009SVS0 SVERDLOVSK REGION 86,9200 521.52 0.93 RU000A102CT6 11.11.2025 OM
    RU35004STV0 STAVROPOL REGION 89,5700 447.85 0.9 RU000A102H34 08.09.2025 DM
    RU35001CLB0 CHELYABINSK REGION 87.0100 522.06 0.93 RU000A102FV5 01.09.2025 DM
    RU35015YRS0 YAROSLAVL REGION 92,2200 576,375 0.9 RU000A0JXS83 07/21/2025 DM
    Mortgage-backed bonds
    4-01-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 94,8963 53,26529319 0.9 RU000A0JX3M0 06/27/2025 DM
    4-01-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 87.6582 121,46796774 0.9 RU000A0JXRM6 06/27/2025 DM
    4-02-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 98,1600 48,206376 0.9 RU000A0ZYJT2 07/25/2025 DM
    4-03-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 90.6327 62,85377745 0.9 RU000A0ZYLX0 07/25/2025 DM
    4-03-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 96,9918 49,55311062 0.9 RU000A0ZYL89 07/25/2025 DM
    4-04-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 78.3070 156,4965395 0.9 RU000A1019A0 08/27/2025 DM
    4-04-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 83,0340 93,0562038 0.9 RU000A0ZZNW5 06/27/2025 DM
    4-05-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 75,7300 190,241333 0.9 RU000A101JD7 07/25/2025 DM
    4-05-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 79,2447 116,4500865 0.9 RU000A0ZZCH9 07/25/2025 DM
    4-06-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 86.5800 98,017218 0.9 RU000A0ZZV86 08/27/2025 DM
    4-07-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 80.0570 171,2018945 0.9 RU000A0ZZZ58 06/27/2025 DM
    4-08-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 85,0987 114.61943903 0.9 RU000A0ZZZ09 06/27/2025 DM
    4-09-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 82,7500 126,2765 0.9 RU000A100DQ4 04.07.2025 DM
    4-10-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 82,4200 160.96626 0.9 RU000A100ZB9 06/27/2025 DM
    4-11-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 79,7483 175.61373143 0.9 RU000A100Y4 07/25/2025 DM
    4-12-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 81,9254 200,13555966 0.9 RU000A1016B4 07/25/2025 DM
    4-13-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 80,1900 162,072009 0.9 RU000A1018T2 04.07.2025 DM
    4-14-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 76.6866 205,0983117 0.9 RU000A101U95 08/27/2025 DM
    4-15-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 75,8700 170,229519 0.9 RU000A101TD6 08/27/2025 DM
    4-17-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 72,9163 233,43424282 0.9 RU000A102AP8 08/27/2025 DM
    4-18-00307-R-002p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 72,9100 239,88482 0.9 RU000A102D46 08/27/2025 DM
    4B02-01-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 72,3656 283,8178832 0.9 RU000A102GV3 07/25/2025 DM
    4B02-02-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 73,6600 256.660904 0.9 RU000A102JB9 08/27/2025 DM
    4B02-03-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 75,3770 217,9752086 0.9 RU000A102GD1 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-04-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 78,8800 249,978608 0.9 RU000A102K13 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-05-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 74,4803 258.72966614 0.9 RU000A102L87 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-06-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 79,0870 284,2070432 0.9 RU000A102L53 08/27/2025 DM
    4B02-07-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 78,2113 278,01770811 0.9 RU000A103125 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-08-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 82.6426 362,31342266 0.9 RU000A1031K4 07/25/2025 DM
    4b02-09-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 77,3500 373,376185 0.9 RU000A103N43 08/27/2025 DM
    4b02-10-00307-r-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 74,5474 416,4590501 0.9 RU000A103W42 07/25/2025 DM
    4b02-11-00307-r-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 72,8980 403.8622098 0.9 RU000A103YG5 07/25/2025 DM
    4b02-12-00307-r-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 71,8300 356,039761 0.9 RU000A103YK7 08/27/2025 DM
    4B02-13-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 96,8800 531,251168 0.9 RU000A1041Q0 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-14-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 78,9275 399,72832375 0.9 RU000A104511 08/27/2025 DM
    4b02-15-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 79.1000 421,42107 0.9 RU000A104B79 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-16-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 74.7110 406.2261203 0.9 RU000A104AM1 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-17-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 77,2819 469.30979413 0.9 RU000A104C45 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-18-00307-r-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 95,8500 640.843515 0.9 RU000A104UV0 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-19-00307-r-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 98,4800 662,218912 0.9 RU000a104x32 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-20-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 78,1335 471,3168987 0.9 RU000A105344 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-21-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 69,8600 485,058938 0.9 RU000A105898 07/25/2025 DM
    4b02-22-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 95,8900 703.027124 0.9 RU000A1058R2 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-23-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 80.0655 567.8885784 0.9 RU000A105AV9 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-24-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 77,3133 549,04813128 0.9 RU000A105CB7 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-25-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 73,4500 419,67861 0.9 RU000A105H23 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-26-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 96,7935 746.3166024 0.9 RU000A105JF3 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-27-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 78,2448 512.35477488 0.9 RU000A105LN3 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-28-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 100.9900 686.63101 0.9 RU000A105NN9 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-29-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 79,5938 487,09017786 0.9 RU000A105NY6 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-30-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 87.5735 578,27409255 0.9 RU000A105NP4 07/25/2025 DM
    4B02-31-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 96,7300 728.638071 0.9 RU000A105NZ3 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-32-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 72,9700 475,757103 0.9 RU000A105P72 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-33-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 80.7492 568.52281752 0.9 RU000A1065R7 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-34-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 98,4500 823,08138 0.9 RU000A106FM5 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-35-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 79,8800 549,127072 0.9 RU000A106HE8 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-37-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 74,3754 600.75241842 0.9 RU000A1074A5 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-38-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 100.8700 836.797346 0.9 RU000A107G55 06/27/2025 DM
    4B02-39-00307-R-001P LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 83,9500 658,982315 0.9 RU000A107GL3 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-40-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 80.6063 632,87230382 0.9 RU000A107EQ7 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-41-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 74,3800 605.914356 0.9 RU000A107GM1 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-42-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 87,5800 720.336742 0.9 RU000A107SY1 08/27/2025 DM
    4b02-44-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 83.8070 657,8765693 0.9 RU000A1093G2 08/27/2025 DM
    4b02-46-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 100.8100 933.772787 0.9 RU000A109NH3 06/27/2025 DM
    4b02-49-00307-R-001p LLC “DOM.RF MORTGAGE AGENT” 79,8400 717.64184 0.9 RU000A109NJ9 06/27/2025 DM
    Bonds of legal entities – residents of the Russian Federation
    4-24-40046-n JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ALROSA” (PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY) 93,7748 74 084.7176944 0.91 RU000A108TV3 06.24.2027 OM
    4b02-01-40046-n-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ALROSA” (PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY) 98,9400 989.4 0.96 RU000A109L49 09/01/2028 OM
    4b02-02-40046-n-001p JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “ALROSA” (PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY) 100.0000 1,000 0.96 RU000A109SH2 06.04.2026 OM
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    4B02-05-36400-R-001P OOO GAZPROM CAPITAL 89,1800 891.8 0.96 RU000A106672 04/19/2028 OM
    4b02-06-36400-R-001p OOO GAZPROM CAPITAL 86,9300 869.3 0.96 RU000a106at1 05/22/2028 OM
    4b02-07-36400-r-001p OOO GAZPROM CAPITAL 96,2500 962.5 0.96 RU000A105GE2 11/12/2025 OM
    4b02-08-36400-r-001p OOO GAZPROM CAPITAL 94,5600 945.6 0.96 RU000A105U00 05.02.2026 OM
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    4b02-10-36400-r-002p OOO GAZPROM CAPITAL 96,5500 965.5 0.96 RU000A107084 03.04.2028 OM
    4b02-11-36400-R-002p OOO GAZPROM CAPITAL 96,3600 963.6 0.96 RU000a107et1 12/13/2027 OM
    4b02-12-36400-R-002p OOO GAZPROM CAPITAL 95,4700 954.7 0.96 RU000A107T27 09.02.2029 OM
    4b02-14-36400-R-002p OOO GAZPROM CAPITAL 97.2000 972 0.96 RU000A1087J8 03/13/2029 OM
    4B02-01-36241-R-003P LLC “ICS 5 FINANCE” 101,3900 1,013.9 0.96 RU000A109JH1 10/27/2034 OM
    4B02-02-36241-R-003P LLC “ICS 5 FINANCE” 99,7500 997.5 0.96 RU000A1075S4 10.10.2026 OM
    4B02-03-36241-R-003P LLC “ICS 5 FINANCE” 95.8000 958 0.96 RU000A107AJ0 11/21/2033 OM
    4B02-04-36241-R-003P LLC “ICS 5 FINANCE” 99,6500 996.5 0.96 RU000A107WL0 02.27.2034 OM
    4B02-05-36241-R-003P LLC “ICS 5 FINANCE” 98,7500 987.5 0.96 RU000A108LU2 05/25/2034 OM
    4B02-07-36241-R-003P LLC “ICS 5 FINANCE” 101,4200 1,014.2 0.96 RU000a10aha3 01.12.2034 OM
    4B02-08-36241-R-003P LLC “ICS 5 FINANCE” 103,2600 1,032.6 0.96 RU000A10AP21 12/29/2034 OM
    4B02-09-36241-R-003P LLC “ICS 5 FINANCE” 100.2800 1,002.8 0.96 RU000a10at19 01/18/2035 OM
    4B02-10-36241-R-003P LLC “ICS 5 FINANCE” 106,4700 1,064.7 0.96 RU000a10at27 05.02.2035 OM
    4B02-11-36241-R-003P LLC “ICS 5 FINANCE” 103,0800 1,030.8 0.96 RU000A10at35 01.03.2035 OM
    4B02-03-36393-R-001P LLC “SUEK – FINANCE” 99,1600 991.6 0.9 RU000A100VG7 09/12/2029 DM
    4B02-05-36393-R-001P LLC “SUEK – FINANCE” 101,2600 1,012.6 0.9 RU000A101CQ4 01/15/2030 DM
    4B02-06-36393-R-001P LLC “SUEK – FINANCE” 94,6400 946.4 0.9 RU000A102986 09.10.2030 DM
    4b02-01-36160-r-002p OOO “SETL GROUP” 97,9700 979.7 0.9 RU000A1053A9 08/12/2025 DM
    4b02-02-36160-r-002p LLC “SETL GROUP” 93,3800 933.8 0.9 RU000A105x64 04.03.2026 DM
    4-02-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 88,9800 889.8 0.93 RU000A101Y18 12/30/999 OM
    4-04-65045-D-002p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 96,7600 96 760 0.96 RU000A1089T3 03.10.2025 OM
    4-06-65045-D-002p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 80.5500 80 550 0.96 RU000a1089x5 01.03.2028 OM
    4-07-65045-D-002p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 85,8669 412 635,5346225 0.91 RU000A1089W7 31.03.2028 OM
    4-08-65045-D-002p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 78,0600 78 060 0.96 RU000A1089U1 09/15/2028 OM
    4-28-65045-D OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 103,2800 1,032.8 0.96 RU000A0JTU85 03/20/2028 OM
    4-30-65045-D OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 101,1500 1,011.5 0.96 RU000A0JUAH8 03.11.2028 OM
    4-32-65045-D OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 92,0700 920.7 0.96 RU000A0JSGV0 06.24.2032 OM
    4-33-65045-D OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 97,0875 970.875 0.96 RU000A0JVB19 02.27.2040 OM
    4-34-65045-D OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 97,0875 970.875 0.96 RU000A0JVB27 02.27.2040 OM
    4-35-65045-D OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 93,3771 933,771 0.96 RU000A0JVKH5 05/29/2040 OM
    4-36-65045-D OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 92,0875 920.875 0.96 RU000A0JVY04 10/12/2040 OM
    4-41-65045-D OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 109,0500 1,090.5 0.96 RU000A0JX1S1 11/26/2031 OM
    4b02-01-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 104,2100 1,042.1 0.96 RU000A0JXN05 05/17/2032 OM
    4b02-02-65045-D OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 100.6900 1,006.9 0.96 RU000A0JVW71 07.10.2025 OM
    4b02-02-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 92.8000 928 0.96 RU000A0JXQ44 01.04.2037 OM
    4b02-03-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 104,3800 1,043.8 0.96 RU000A0JXR84 04/22/2037 OM
    4b02-04-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 98,3500 983.5 0.96 RU000A0JXZB2 07/28/2032 OM
    4b02-05-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 93,3700 933,7 0.96 RU000A0ZYU05 31.01.2033 OM
    4b02-06-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 103,4800 1,034.8 0.96 RU000A0ZZ4P9 01.04.2033 OM
    4b02-07-65045-D OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 92,5400 925.4 0.96 RU000A0JWC82 03/16/2026 OM
    4b02-07-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 102,9900 1,029.9 0.96 RU000A0ZZ9R4 05/25/2033 OM
    4B02-08-65045-D-001P OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 93,8600 938.6 0.96 RU000A0ZZGT5 02.08.2028 OM
    4b02-09-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 99,4800 994.8 0.96 RU000A0ZZRY2 13.10.2033 OM
    4b02-13-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 83,5100 835.1 0.96 RU000A1007Z2 03/16/2029 OM
    4b02-14-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 81,8400 818.4 0.96 RU000A1008D7 03/03/2029 OM
    4b02-15-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 93,9700 939.7 0.96 RU000A1009L8 06.04.2027 OM
    4b02-16-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 91,0400 910.4 0.96 RU000A100HY9 06.24.2026 OM
    4b02-17-65045-D OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 75,5100 755.1 0.96 RU000A0JWHU2 04/25/2041 OM
    4b02-17-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 95,7900 957.9 0.96 RU000A1010M4 01.11.2025 OM
    4b02-18-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 92,7300 927.3 0.96 RU000A101H84 02/19/2030 OM
    4b02-20-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 85,8500 858.5 0.96 RU000A101M04 03/12/2027 OM
    4b02-21-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 85,5300 855.3 0.96 RU000A102QP4 06/10/2027 OM
    4b02-24-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 92,8900 928.9 0.96 RU000A104SX0 04/29/2027 OM
    4b02-26-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 98,8300 988,3 0.96 RU000A106K43 07/18/2028 OM
    4b02-27-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 100.4700 1,004.7 0.96 RU000A106VV3 09/08/2027 OM
    4b02-28-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 96,1800 961.8 0.96 RU000A106ZL5 09/19/2030 OM
    4b02-29-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 102,1300 1,021.3 0.96 RU000A107936 11/14/2030 OM
    4b02-32-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 97,4700 974.7 0.96 RU000A108Z85 08/17/2029 OM
    4b02-33-65045-D-001p OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY “RUSSIAN RAILWAYS” 100.7200 1,007.2 0.96 RU000A109PF2 10/27/2028 OM
    4b02-01-00207-a-001p PJSC “AKRON” 82,6300 826.3 0.93 RU000A0JWV89 09/23/2026 OM
    4b02-02-00207-a-001p PJSC “AKRON” 75,6400 756.4 0.93 RU000A0JXSS1 05.24.2027 OM
    4b02-04-00207-a-001p PJSC “AKRON” 102,4950 11 204,445915 0.88 RU000A108JH3 11/20/2025 OM
    4b02-05-00207-a-001p PJSC “AKRON” 100.0000 1,000 0.93 RU000A109XR1 04/21/2026 OM
    4b02-06-00207-a-001p PJSC “AKRON” 103,8700 1,038.7 0.93 RU000A10AA28 31.07.2026 OM
    4b02-07-00207-a-001p PJSC “AKRON” 104,8427 11 461,0894359 0.88 RU000A10B347 05.08.2026 OM
    4B02-01-00010-A-001P PJSC AEROFLOT 91,6200 916.2 0.93 RU000a103943 06/10/2026 OM
    4B02-02-00146-A-003P PJSC GAZPROM NEFT 74.7000 747 0.96 RU000A1017J5 06.12.2029 OM
    4B02-05-00146-A-003P PJSC GAZPROM NEFT 96.2000 962 0.96 RU000A105KP0 01.12.2025 OM
    4B02-06-00146-A-003P PJSC GAZPROM NEFT 98,8200 988.2 0.96 RU000A106565 04/13/2028 OM
    4B02-07-00146-A-003P PJSC GAZPROM NEFT 97,0200 970.2 0.96 RU000A107605 01.11.2027 OM
    4B02-08-00146-A-003P PJSC GAZPROM NEFT 99,6200 996.2 0.96 RU000A107HG1 11.12.2026 OM
    4B02-09-00146-A-003P PJSC GAZPROM NEFT 96,7500 967.5 0.96 RU000A107HH9 12/22/2027 OM
    4b02-10-00146-a-003p PJSC GAZPROM NEFT 99,0300 990.3 0.96 RU000A107UW1 02/11/2027 OM
    4b02-11-00146-a-003p PJSC GAZPROM NEFT 98,8500 988.5 0.96 RU000A107UX9 02/22/2027 OM
    4b02-12-00146-a-003p PJSC GAZPROM NEFT 103,1828 11 279,6341476 0.91 RU000A108PZ2 11.12.2026 OM
    4B02-13-00146-A-003P PJSC GAZPROM NEFT 98,0700 980.7 0.96 RU000A109B33 08.02.2028 OM
    4b02-22-00028-a PJSC GAZPROM 98.5000 985 0.96 RU000A0ZZES2 06/10/2048 OM
    4b02-23-00028-a PJSC GAZPROM 98,6500 986.5 0.96 RU000A0ZZET0 06/10/2048 OM
    4-05-40155-F PJSC “MMC “NORILSK NICKEL” 99,1238 78 310.5774664 0.91 RU000A107BL4 09/10/2025 OM
    4-06-40155-F PJSC “MMC “NORILSK NICKEL” 97,2996 76 869,408388 0.91 RU000A107C67 10/26/2026 OM
    4B02-02-40155-F-001P PJSC “MMC “NORILSK NICKEL” 97,0900 970.9 0.96 RU000A105A61 04.10.2027 OM
    4b02-05-40155-F-001p PJSC “MMC “NORILSK NICKEL” 100.3141 10,966.0364697 0.91 RU000A105ML5 12.12.2025 OM
    4b02-06-40155-F-001p PJSC “MMC “NORILSK NICKEL” 97,8176 10 693,1265792 0.91 RU000A105NL3 06/17/2026 OM
    4b02-07-40155-F-001p PJSC “MMC “NORILSK NICKEL” 98,1200 981.2 0.96 RU000A1083A6 02/27/2029 OM
    4b02-08-40155-F-001p PJSC “MMC “NORILSK NICKEL” 101.6087 8 027,37180436 0.91 RU000A10B4K3 02/22/2030 OM
    4b02-09-40155-F PJSC “MMC “NORILSK NICKEL” 97.5000 975 0.96 RU000A1069N8 05/16/2028 OM
    4b02-10-40155-F PJSC “MMC “NORILSK NICKEL” 98,1600 981.6 0.96 RU000A109TW9 09.25.2029 OM
    4B02-06-32432-H-001P PJSC “STATE TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY” 93,6600 551.788524 0.93 RU000A0ZYAP9 09.09.2025 OM
    4B02-16-32432-H-001P PJSC “STATE TRANSPORT LEASING COMPANY” 82,6700 310.0125 0.93 RU000A101GD3 02/18/2026 OM
    4B02-01-60525-P-004P PJSC “MAGNIT” 95,9400 959.4 0.96 RU000A105KQ8 01.12.2025 OM
    4B02-01-60525-P-005P PJSC “MAGNIT” 103,5200 1,035.2 0.96 RU000A10ANZ8 04/17/2026 OM
    4B02-02-60525-P-004P PJSC “MAGNIT” 94,6800 946.8 0.96 RU000A105TP1 02.02.2028 OM
    4B02-02-60525-P-005P PJSC “MAGNIT” 106.5000 1,065 0.96 RU000A10AXH5 09/10/2026 OM
    4B02-03-60525-P-005P PJSC “MAGNIT” 100.7600 1,007.6 0.96 RU000A10B0A2 08/26/2026 OM
    4B02-05-60525-P-004P PJSC “MAGNIT” 104,7900 1,047.9 0.96 RU000A10A9Z1 11/12/2029 OM
    4B02-06-60525-P-004P PJSC “MAGNIT” 100,1400 1,001.4 0.96 RU000A1090K0 07/10/2026 OM
    4b02-04-00822-j-002p PJSC “MEGAFON” 99.1000 991 0.96 RU000A108QA3 12/14/2026 OM
    4b02-05-00822-j-002p PJSC “MEGAFON” 98,3200 983.2 0.96 RU000A108Q94 02/12/2027 OM
    4b02-06-00822-j-002p PJSC “MEGAFON” 98,8200 988.2 0.96 RU000A1094E5 07/27/2026 OM
    4b02-07-00822-j-002p PJSC “MEGAFON” 99.3000 993 0.96 RU000A109SZ4 04/14/2027 OM
    4B02-03-55039-E-001P PJSC “MOEK” 101,3100 1,013.1 0.96 RU000A101228 06.11.2025 OM
    4B02-04-55039-E-001P PJSC “MOEK” 98,8800 988.8 0.96 RU000A101XS6 07/14/2026 OM
    4B02-05-55039-E-001P PJSC “MOEK” 94.9000 949 0.96 RU000A105NK5 12/13/2028 OM
    4b02-01-00096-a-001p PJSC “NIZHNEKAMSKNEFTEKHIM” 94,9500 949.5 0.96 RU000A0ZZZ17 06.12.2028 OM
    4b02-02-00096-a-001p PJSC “NIZHNEKAMSKNEFTEKHIM” 87,0500 870.5 0.96 RU000A103QQ0 09/12/2028 OM
    4b02-03-00096-a-001p PJSC “NIZHNEKAMSKNEFTEKHIM” 97,9600 979.6 0.96 RU000A109KW8 08/14/2031 OM
    4-12-00102-a PJSC NLMK 96,4146 86 779,6961928 0.91 RU000A108PR9 01.06.2026 OM
    4-13-00102-a PJSC NLMK 99,7086 78 772.5858408 0.91 RU000A107L8 05/29/2026 OM
    4b02-02-55052-E-002p PJSC “NOVABEV GROUP” 94,7800 473.9 0.93 RU000A102GU5 04.12.2025 DM
    4b02-03-55052-E-002p PJSC “NOVABEV GROUP” 90.7000 907 0.93 RU000A104Y15 06.07.2026 DM
    4B02-04-55052-E-002P PJSC “NOVABEV GROUP” 98,5800 985.8 0.93 RU000A108CA3 04/15/2026 DM
    4b02-05-55052-E-002p PJSC “NOVABEV GROUP” 99,8100 998.1 0.93 RU000A1099A2 08.08.2027 DM
    4-01-55192-E PJSC “POLYUS” 90.7587 71 701,9142436 0.91 RU000A108P79 10/13/2028 OM
    4b02-01-55192-E-001p PJSC “POLYUS” 100.5800 1,005.8 0.96 RU000A100XC2 09/28/2029 OM
    4b02-02-55192-E-001p PJSC “POLYUS” 96,7396 10,575.2828532 0.91 RU000A1054W1 08/23/2027 OM
    4b02-03-55192-E-001p PJSC “POLYUS” 89,5300 895.3 0.96 RU000A105VC5 02.02.2028 OM
    4B02-04-55192-E-001P PJSC “POLYUS” 100.3947 7 931,46240516 0.91 RU000A108L81 08.05.2029 OM
    4B02-01-00073-A-001P PJSC “ROSSETI LENENERGO” 98,3300 983.3 0.96 RU000A107EC7 11/26/2027 DM
    4b02-04-32501-D PJSC “ROSSETI URAL” 94,2100 942.1 0.93 RU000A100ZD5 10.10.2029 OM
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    4b02-03-55038-E-002p PJSC RUSHYDRO 105,4900 1,054.9 0.96 RU000A10A6C6 05/21/2026 OM
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    4B02-06-55038-E-001P PJSC RUSHYDRO 90.8800 908.8 0.96 RU000A1057P8 09/14/2026 OM
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    4B02-09-55038-E-001P PJSC RUSHYDRO 94,4600 944.6 0.96 RU000A105SL2 01/27/2026 OM
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    4b02-01-65134-D-001p PJSC “SIBUR HOLDING” 95.0000 950 0.96 RU000A104XW2 01/19/2026 OM
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    4b02-11-16493-a-001p PJSC “GC “SAMOLET” 99,3400 993.4 0.9 RU000A104JQ3 07.02.2028 DM
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    4b02-04-65018-D PJSC “ROSSETI” 101,9400 1,019.4 0.96 RU000A0ZYJ91 10/22/2052 OM
    4b02-04-65018-D-001p PJSC “ROSSETI” 70.6100 706.1 0.96 RU000A101CL5 12/29/2034 OM
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    4b02-07-65018-D-001p PJSC “ROSSETI” 99,4100 994.1 0.96 RU000A105PH6 07.12.2037 OM
    4b02-08-65018-D-001p PJSC “ROSSETI” 100.4000 1,004 0.96 RU000A105VQ5 01.02.2038 OM
    4b02-11-65018-D-001p PJSC “ROSSETI” 96,1100 961.1 0.96 RU000A107CG2 07.12.2029 OM
    4b02-13-65018-D-001p PJSC “ROSSETI” 98,8500 988.5 0.96 RU000a109528 07/16/2027 OM
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    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Seabed mining is becoming an environmental flashpoint – NZ will have to pick a side soon

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Myra Williamson, Senior Lecturer in Law, Auckland University of Technology

    Getty Images

    Seabed mining could become one of the defining environmental battles of 2025. Around the world, governments are weighing up whether to allow mining of the ocean floor for metal ores and minerals. New Zealand is among them.

    The stakes are high. Deep-sea mining is highly controversial, with evidence showing mining activity can cause lasting damage to fragile marine ecosystems. One area off the east coast of the United States, mined as an experiment 50 years ago, still bears scars and shows little sign of recovery.

    With the world facing competing pressures – climate action and conservation versus demand for resources – New Zealand must now decide whether to fast-track mining, regulate it tightly, or pause it entirely.

    Who controls international seabed mining?

    A major flashpoint is governance in international waters. Under international law, seabed mining beyond national jurisdiction is managed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), created by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

    But the US has never ratified UNCLOS. In April this year, President Donald Trump issued an executive order to bypass the ISA and allow companies to begin mining in international waters.

    The ISA has pushed back, warning unilateral action breaches international law. However, the declaration from the recently concluded UN Ocean Conference in France does not urge countries to adopt a precautionary approach, nor does it ban deep seabed mining.

    The declaration does “reiterate the need to increase scientific knowledge on deep sea ecosystems” and recognises the role of the ISA in setting “robust rules, regulations and procedures for exploitation of resources” in international waters.

    So, while the international community supports multilateralism and international law, deep-sea mining in the near future remains a real possibility.

    Fast-track approvals

    In the Pacific, some countries have already made up their minds about which way they will go. Nauru recently updated its agreement with Canadian-based The Metals Company to begin mining in the nearby Clarion Clipperton Zone. The deal favours the US’s go-it-alone approach over the ISA model.

    By contrast, in 2022, New Zealand’s Labour government backed the ISA’s moratorium and committed to a holistic ocean management strategy. Whether that position still holds is unclear, given the current government’s policies.

    The list of applications under the Fast-track Approvals Act 2024described by Regional Development Minister Shane Jones as “arguably the most permissive regime” in Australasia – includes two controversial seabed mining proposals in Bream Bay and off the Taranaki coast:

    • Trans-Tasman Resources’ proposal to extract up to 50 million tonnes of Taranaki seabed material annually to recover heavy mineral sands that contain iron ore as well as rare metal elements titanium and vanadium.

    • McCallum Brothers Ltd’s Bream Bay proposal to dredge up to 150,000 cubic metres of sand yearly for three years, and up to 250,000 cubic metres after that.

    Legal landscape changing

    Māori and environmental groups have opposed the fast-track policy, and the Treaty of Waitangi has so far been a powerful safeguard in seabed mining cases.

    Provisions referencing Treaty principles appear in key laws, including the Crown Minerals Act and the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act.

    In 2021, the Supreme Court cited these obligations when it rejected a 2016 marine discharge application by Trans-Tasman Resources to mine the seabed in the Taranaki Bight. The court ruled Treaty clauses must be interpreted in a “broad and generous” way, recognising tikanga Māori and customary marine rights.

    But that legal landscape could soon change. The Regulatory Standards Bill, now before parliament, would give priority to property rights over environmental or Indigenous protections in the formulation of new laws and regulations.

    The bill also allows for the review of existing legislation. In theory, if the Regulatory Standards Bill becomes law, it could result in the removal of Treaty principles clauses from legislation.

    This in turn could deny courts the tools they’ve previously used to uphold environmental and Treaty-based protections to block seabed mining applications. That would make it easier to approve fast-tracked projects such as the Bream Bay and Taranaki projects.

    Setting a precedent

    Meanwhile, Hawai’i has gone in a different direction. In 2024, the US state passed a law banning seabed mining in state waters – joining California (2022), Washington (2021) and Oregon (1991).

    Under the Hawai’i Seabed Mining Prevention Act, mining is banned except in rare cases such as beach restoration. The law cites the public’s right to a clean and healthy environment.

    As global conflict brews over seabed governance, New Zealand’s eventual position could set a precedent.

    Choosing to prohibit seabed mining in New Zealand waters, as Hawai’i has done, would send a strong message that environmental stewardship and Indigenous rights matter more than short-term resource extraction interests.

    If New Zealand does decide to go ahead with seabed mining, however, it could trigger a cascade of mining efforts across New Zealand and the Pacific. A crucial decision is fast approaching.

    Myra Williamson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Seabed mining is becoming an environmental flashpoint – NZ will have to pick a side soon – https://theconversation.com/seabed-mining-is-becoming-an-environmental-flashpoint-nz-will-have-to-pick-a-side-soon-258908

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: ER Report: A Roundup of Significant Articles on EveningReport.nz for June 16, 2025

    ER Report: Here is a summary of significant articles published on EveningReport.nz on June 16, 2025.

    ‘No kings!’: like the LA protesters, the early Romans hated kings, too
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Peter Edwell, Associate Professor in Ancient History, Macquarie University Protesters across the United States have brandished placards declaring “no kings!” in recent days, keen to send a message one-man rule is not acceptable. The defeat of the forces of King George III in the United States’ revolutionary

    Keith Rankin Analysis – Clio: Whose side is ‘History’ on?
    Analysis by Keith Rankin. Is history binary? A judge of past behaviour with just two available options: thumbs-up, or thumbs-down? If you are not on the ‘right side’ of history, are you therefore on the ‘wrong side’? Can there be a ‘right side of history’? Given the contexts that we now proclaim to be the

    Millions rally against authoritarianism, while the White House portrays protests as threats – a political scientist explains
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Jeremy Pressman, Professor of Political Science, University of Connecticut Protesters parade through the Marigny neighborhood of New Orleans as part of the nationwide No Kings protest against President Donald Trump, on June 14, 2025. Patt Little/Anadolu via Getty Images At the end of a week when President

    A 3-tonne, $1.5 billion satellite to watch Earth’s every move is set to launch this week
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Steve Petrie, Earth Observation Researcher, Swinburne University of Technology Artist’s concept of the NISAR satellite in orbit over Earth. NASA/JPL-Caltech In a few days, a new satellite that can detect changes on Earth’s surface down to the centimetre, in almost real time and no matter the time

    Decades on from the Royal Commission, why are Indigenous people still dying in custody?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Thalia Anthony, Professor of Law, University of Technology Sydney Rose Marinelli/Shutterstock Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander readers are advised that this article contains the name of an Indigenous person who has died. The recent deaths in custody of two Indigenous men in the Northern Territory have provoked

    Need to see a specialist? You might have to choose between high costs and a long wait. Here’s what needs to change
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Peter Breadon, Program Director, Health and Aged Care, Grattan Institute If you have cancer, a disease such as diabetes or dementia, or need to manage other complex health conditions, you often need expert care from a specialist doctor. But as our new Grattan Institute report shows, too

    Small businesses are an innovation powerhouse. For many, it’s still too hard to raise the funds they need
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Colette Southam, Associate Professor of Finance, Bond University The federal government wants to boost Australia’s productivity levels – as a matter of national priority. It’s impossible to have that conversation without also talking about innovation. We can be proud of (and perhaps a little surprised by) some

    A solar panel recycling scheme would help reduce waste, but please repair and reuse first
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Deepika Mathur, Senior Research Fellow, Northern Institute, Charles Darwin University tolobalaguer.com, Shutterstock Australia’s rooftop solar industry has renewed calls for a mandatory recycling scheme to deal with the growing problem of solar panel waste. Only about 10% of panels are currently recycled. The rest are stockpiled, sent

    Why Israel’s shock and awe has proven its power but lost the war
    COMMENTARY: By Antony Loewenstein War is good for business and geopolitical posturing. Before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arrived in Washington in early February for his first visit to the US following President Donald Trump’s inauguration, he issued a bold statement on the strategic position of Israel. “The decisions we made in the war [since

    Netanyahu has two war aims: destroying Iran’s nuclear program and regime change. Are either achievable?
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ian Parmeter, Research Scholar, Middle East Studies, Australian National University Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities could last for at least two weeks. His timing seems precise for a reason. The Israel Defence Forces and the country’s intelligence agencies have

    Israel’s attacks on Iran are already hurting global oil prices, and the impact is set to worsen
    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Joaquin Vespignani, Associate Professor of Economics and Finance, University of Tasmania The weekend attacks on Iran’s oil facilities – widely seen as part of escalating hostilities between Israel and Iran – represent a dangerous moment for global energy security. While the physical damage to Iran’s production facilities

    Vehicle issued to Fiji assistant minister involved in fatal accident – driver’s son implicated
    By Anish Chand in Suva The son of a Fiji assistant minister is under investigation for allegedly driving a government vehicle without authority and causing an accident that killed two men. The accident took place along Bau Road, Nausori, last night. The vehicle involved in the accident was the official government vehicle issued for the

    Caitlin Johnstone: We are, of course, being lied to about Iran
    Report by Dr David Robie – Café Pacific. – COMMENTARY: By Caitlin Johnstone Iran and Israel are at war, with the US already intimately involved and likely to become more so. Which of course means we’ll be spending the foreseeable future getting bashed in the face with lies from the most powerful people in the

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: WATCH: Padilla Condemns Trump’s Militarization of Los Angeles, Extreme Immigration Enforcement on Face the Nation, State of the Union

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Alex Padilla (D-Calif.)

    WATCH: Padilla Condemns Trump’s Militarization of Los Angeles, Extreme Immigration Enforcement on Face the Nation, State of the Union

    Padilla speaks out on rise in political violence and Trump’s polarizing rhetoric

    Watch the full Face the Nation Interview here.
     
    Watch the full State of the Union interview here.

    WASHINGTON, D.C. — In case you missed it, U.S. Senator Alex Padilla (D-Calif.), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Immigration Subcommittee, joined CBS’ “Face the Nation” and CNN’s “State of the Union” to discuss the unprecedented militarization of Los Angeles and his forcible removal from Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem’s press conference, where he was thrown to the ground and handcuffed after simply trying to ask a question. Padilla condemned the Trump Administration’s cruel immigration enforcement operations in Los Angeles, utilizing unnecessary and excessive actions to repeatedly escalate tensions across the region.

    Senator Padilla set the record straight against blatant Republican disinformation on his forcible removal, highlighting that he was already in the high-security building for a scheduled oversight meeting with the general in charge of the military presence in Los Angeles and was escorted into the briefing room by law enforcement.  

    Key Excerpts — CBS’ “Face the Nation”:

    On his attempt to ask Secretary Noem a question:

    • “The reason I was at the press conference, I was at a scheduled briefing with representatives of Northern Command just a couple doors down the hall in the same federal building when I learned of the press conference, my briefing delayed because the folks I was supposed to meet with were at that press conference. So I asked if we could listen in. I was escorted over, and that’s what I was doing.”
    • “Why? Because for months and months, whether it’s in committee, the Secretary herself testifying and not providing substantive answers to questions, other representatives of the department, formal letters and inquiries that we’ve submitted, doing my job as a Senator to get information as part of our oversight and accountability responsibility. So to be able to ask a question of the Secretary directly when they offered the meeting after the incident, I took it, but sadly, no, nothing substantive, nothing informative.”
    • “When I had the audacity to try to ask a question, as a Senator, of a cabinet secretary, that’s what happened. And you saw the response, everybody’s seen the video. It wasn’t about me, right? If that’s how this Administration responds to a Senator with a question, don’t just imagine what they’re capable of, but what they are doing when the cameras are not there, to people without a title like United States Senator, that cruel disrespectful treatment of so many people who deserve much better.”

    On the unprecedented deployment of military personnel to Los Angeles and the Trump Administration’s broken promise to target violent criminals:

    • “Among other things, their justification for the federalization of the National Guard, not only not necessary, but counterproductive as we’ve seen this last week in Los Angeles.”
    • “And also just truth. You know, for all the talk about the focus and targeting of violent criminals, if that’s all the Trump Administration was doing, there would be no debate. There is no disagreement on that. But as you’re hearing more and more stories of undocumented, long-term residents of the United States who are otherwise law abiding, working hard, paying taxes, raising families and, frankly, working in jobs that under the first Trump Administration, when the COVID pandemic hit, were deemed essential. Workers in restaurants, in agricultural fields, in health care, construction, etc. — that’s who’s being targeted now, and that’s why there’s so much fear and terror in communities, not just in Los Angeles, but throughout the country.”

    On Trump’s sudden order to reduce ICE enforcement and what broader immigration reform looks like:

    • “Let’s hope there’s more to follow because they’re responding to what I and others have been saying for months, and what’s frankly, years, going back to the first Trump Administration.”
    • “The State of California, the most populous state in the nation, the most diverse state in the nation, home to more immigrants than any state in the nation, mostly documented, some undocumented. This is the same California that is the largest economy of any state in the nation, fourth largest economy in the world, not despite the immigrant population, but thanks to the contributions of so many immigrants as a workforce, as consumers, and as entrepreneurs.”
    • “So again, focus on the dangerous, violent criminals. No disagreement there, but the folks who are otherwise law abiding, taxpaying, and enriching communities. There’s got to be a better way, a pathway towards legalization, a pathway to citizenship for Dreamers, farm workers, and others.”

    On the Trump Administration’s harmful rhetoric and rising political violence, including the tragic Minnesota killings:

    • “Look a lot of questions, a lot of concerns. I work directly with both the U.S. Capitol Police and the Senate Sergeant at Arms, and they’re doing what they need to do to ensure the safety of members of Congress.”
    • “But I also think it’s more than appropriate to step back and say, why are tensions so high, not just in Los Angeles, but throughout the country? And I can’t help but point to the beginning of not just the first Trump term, but the beginning of the campaign, the tone with which the President launched his first campaign for president, served throughout his first term, and continues in this term. For a cabinet secretary, during a press conference, to not be able or be willing to de-escalate a situation when I was trying to ask a question — that’s just indicative of the tone of this [Administration].”

    Video of Senator Padilla’s full “Face the Nation” interview is available here.

    Key Excerpts — CNN’s “State of the Union”:

    On why he felt the need to speak up:

    • “Surprise, surprise, no substance came from that press conference, just political attacks. You know, when I heard the Secretary, not for the first time in that press conference, talk about the needing to liberate the people of Los Angeles from their duly elected Mayor and Governor, it was at that moment that I chose to try to ask a question.”
    • “If all the Trump Administration was doing was truly focusing on dangerous, violent criminals, as they suggest, there would be no debate. There would be no disagreement. But we’ve seen story after story after story of hardworking women and men, maybe undocumented, but otherwise law abiding, good people being subject to the terror that the … immigration enforcement operations is subjecting the people to, I needed to speak up. I needed to try to get the information from the Secretary that they’ve refused to provide in hearing after hearing.”

    On Republican disinformation that Sen. Padilla tried to “manufacture a viral moment” and that nobody knew who he was at the press conference:

    • “Nothing could be further from the truth. Again, what are the odds? I was in a federal building a couple of doors down awaiting a briefing from Northern Command, because I still believe the federalization of the National Guard troops and deployment in Los Angeles was not only unlawful, unjustified, but counterproductive. It’s what’s escalated the tensions in Los Angeles.”
    • “I was escorted during my entire time in that building, from showing up in the building, going through security screening, escorted by an FBI agent and a National Guard member to the conference room where I was awaiting a briefing. … They escorted me over to the press conference. They opened the door for me, and they stood next to me while I was listening for the entire time. And then, of course, once I was forcibly removed and handcuffed.”

    On Secretary Noem and President Trump’s failed leadership:

    • “I do think there’s some serious questions, how does the Cabinet Secretary not know the Senator from California when she steps foot into Los Angeles? She came through the Senate for confirmation at one point. And certainly, how does the Secretary of Homeland Security not know how to de-escalate a situation? It’s because she can’t, or because they don’t want to, and it sets the tone — Donald Trump and Secretary Noem have set the tone for the Department of Homeland Security and the entire Administration in terms of escalation and extreme enforcement actions.”

    Video of Senator Padilla’s full “State of the Union” interview is available here.

    Senator Padilla has been outspoken in calling out the ICE raids in Los Angeles and Trump’s misguided deployment of the National Guard and U.S. Marine Corps. Yesterday, Padilla led the entire Senate Democratic Caucus in demanding that President Trump immediately withdraw all military forces from Los Angeles and cease all threats to deploy the National Guard or active-duty servicemembers to American cities. Earlier this week, Padilla and Schiff demanded answers regarding the Trump Administration’s decision to deploy approximately 700 Marines to Los Angeles. Padilla has spoken at a spotlight hearing and on the Senate floormultiple times to blast President Trump for manufacturing a crisis by launching indiscriminate ICE raids across Los Angeles and deploying the National Guard and active-duty servicemembers to the region.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘No kings!’: like the LA protesters, the early Romans hated kings, too

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Peter Edwell, Associate Professor in Ancient History, Macquarie University

    Protesters across the United States have brandished placards declaring “no kings!” in recent days, keen to send a message one-man rule is not acceptable.

    The defeat of the forces of King George III in the United States’ revolutionary war of 1775–83 saw the end of royal rule in the US. Touting itself as the world’s leading democracy, kings have not been welcome in America for 250 years. But for many, Donald Trump is increasingly behaving as one and now is the time to stop him.

    Having studied ancient Roman politics for years, America’s rejection of kingship reminds me vividly of the strong aversion to it in the Roman republic.

    Early Romans too, sought a society with “no kings!” – up until, that is, the period following the assassination of Julius Caesar, when everything changed.

    The seven kings of Rome

    Seven kings ruled Rome, one after the other, after the city was founded in 753 BCE. The first was Romulus who, according to some legends, gave the city its name.

    When the last of the kings of Rome was driven from the city in 509 BCE, his key opponent, Lucius Junius Brutus, vowed:

    I will pursue Lucius Tarquinius Superbus and his wicked wife and all his children, with sword, with fire, with whatever violence I may; and I will suffer neither him nor anyone else to be king in Rome!

    Tarquinius Superbus (meaning “the proud”) had ruled Rome for 25 years. He began his reign by executing uncooperative Senators.

    When Tarquinius’ son raped a noblewoman named Lucretia, the Roman population rebelled against the king’s long-running tyranny. The hubris of the king and his family was finally too much. They were driven from Rome and never allowed to return.

    A new system of government was ushered in: the republic.

    The rise of the Roman republic

    In the new system, power was shared among elected officials – including two consuls, who were elected annually.

    The consuls were the most powerful officials in the republic and were given power to wage war.

    The Senate, which represented the wealthiest sections of society (initially the patrician class), held power in some key areas, including foreign policy.

    Less affluent citizens elected tribunes of the plebs who had various powers, including the right to veto laws.

    In the republican system, the term king (rex in Latin) quickly became anathema.

    “No kings” would effectively remain the watchword through the Roman republic’s entire history. “Rex” was a word the Romans hated. It was short-hand for “tyranny”.

    The rise and fall of Julius Caesar

    Over time, powerful figures emerged who threatened the republic’s tight power-sharing rules.

    Figures such as the general Pompey (106–48 BCE) broke all the rules and behaved in suspiciously kingly ways. With military success and vast wealth, he was a populist who broke the mould. Pompey even staged a three-day military parade, known as a triumph, to coincide with his birthday in 61 BCE.

    But the ultimate populist was Julius Caesar.

    Born to a noble family claiming lineage from the goddess Venus, Caesar became fabulously wealthy.

    He also scored major military victories, including subduing the Gauls (across modern France and Belgium) from 58–50 BCE.

    In the 40s BCE, Caesar began taking offices over extended time frames – much longer periods than the rules technically allowed.

    Early in 44 BCE he gave himself the formal title “dictator for life” (Dictator Perpetuo), having been appointed dictator two years earlier. The dictatorship was only meant to be held in times of emergency for a period of six months.

    When Caesar was preparing a war against Parthia (in modern day Iran), some tried to hail him as king.

    Soon after, an angry group of 23 senators stabbed him to death in a vain attempt to save the republic. They were led by Marcus Junius Brutus, a descendant of the Brutus who killed the last Roman king, Tarquinius Superbus.

    The Roman republic was beyond saving despite Caesar’s death.
    duncan1890/Getty Images

    However, the Roman republic was beyond saving despite Caesar’s death. His great nephew Octavian eventually emerged as leader and became known as Augustus (27 BCE – 14 CE). With Augustus, an age of emperors was born.

    Emperors were kings in all but name. The strong aversion to kingship in Rome ensured their complete avoidance of the term rex.

    ‘No kings!’

    American protesters waving placards shouting “no kings!” are expressing clear concerns that their beloved democracy is under threat.

    Donald Trump has already declared eight national emergencies and issued 161 executive orders in his second term.

    When asked if he needs to uphold the Constitution, Trump declares “I don’t know.” He has joked about running for a third term as president, in breach of the longstanding limit of two terms.

    Like Caesar, is Donald Trump becoming a king in all but name? Is he setting a precedent for his successors to behave increasingly like emperors?

    The American aversion to “king” likely ensures the term will never return. But when protesters and others shout “no kings!”, they know the very meaning of the term “president” is changing before their eyes.

    Peter Edwell receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    ref. ‘No kings!’: like the LA protesters, the early Romans hated kings, too – https://theconversation.com/no-kings-like-the-la-protesters-the-early-romans-hated-kings-too-259011

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Banking: ‘Coral in Focus’ Premieres at the United Nations Ocean Conference, Spotlighting Innovation and Urgency in Reef Restoration

    Source: Samsung

    At the United Nations Ocean Conference 2025 (UNOC)1 in Nice, held to mark World Oceans Day on June 8, Samsung Electronics hosted a premiere event for “Coral in Focus,” a new documentary that brings the global coral crisis into sharp relief. The event, held at Ocean House, featured a screening of the film followed by a panel discussion with leading voices in marine science, conservation and technology.
     
    Directed by award-winning filmmaker Quentin van den Bossche, “Coral in Focus” follows scientists, engineers and local conservationists as they confront the urgent threats facing coral reefs — ecosystems that support up to a billion people and a quarter of all marine life. This work is part of a broader effort announced at Galaxy Unpacked in January 2025, where Samsung unveiled its partnership with Seatrees to support the restoration of coastal ecosystems with communities in Fiji, Indonesia and the United States, leveraging Galaxy camera technology to document and aid in the recovery of marine environments.
     

     
    The documentary spotlights the urgent threats facing coral reefs and showcases how innovative technology and global collaboration can drive meaningful impact for marine ecosystems.
     
     
    A Crisis Hidden Beneath the Surface
    As ocean temperatures shattered records, more than 80% of the world’s reefs have suffered from mass bleaching. When corals bleach, they lose not just their color but their lifeblood — the algae that feed them. This crisis, largely invisible to the public, threatens biodiversity, food security and coastal resilience. Long-term climate action is crucial to safeguarding coral reefs, while short-term restoration efforts — informed and supported by innovative technology — can help them withstand rising ocean temperatures.
     
     
    A Galaxy Smartphone That Sees Beneath the Waves
    Samsung collaborated with Seatrees, a nonprofit dedicated to restoring marine ecosystems, and the Scripps Institution of Oceanography at the University of California, San Diego, a global leader in reef research, to pioneer a new frontier in coral restoration by exploring new, innovative solutions. Ocean Mode,2 a specialized camera feature created specifically for this partnership, was developed, introduced and validated in real-world conditions in Indonesia and Fiji. This process has created a credible foundation for broader scientific use while improving the overall accessibility of this new technology.
     
    By enabling more scientists, conservationists and even citizen scientists with the ability to photograph, map and monitor reefs, Ocean Mode can help restoration efforts scale, and make it possible for anyone to protect more reefs, in more places, with greater impact.
     
     
    Innovation With Measurable Impact
    Ocean Mode transforms the Galaxy S24 Ultra into a mobile marine research tool, enabling vivid, high-resolution image capture even in challenging underwater conditions. It corrects the excessive blue and green hues typical of underwater photography, allowing for a more accurate representation of coral health and diversity.
     
    The camera adjusts shutter speed and leverages multi-frame image processing to reduce motion blur caused by water movement or diver activity, ensuring sharp, detailed images. With its interval shooting capability, the device can automatically capture thousands of images in a single dive, dramatically improving both efficiency and consistency. These images can then be used to generate 3D models of coral reefs using technology known as photogrammetry, giving researchers a powerful way to visualize and study the drivers of the structure and health of reefs over time.
     
    Over the past year, the project has delivered extraordinary results. With these coral restoration initiatives, 17 3D models of coral reefs have been made with the help of scientists and Samsung to analyze the impact of coral restoration efforts and validate the precision of Galaxy devices for photogrammetry. In total, Seatrees project partners planted more than 14,046 coral fragments to restore 10,705 square meters of coral reef habitat.
     
     
    A Premiere With Purpose
    The “Coral in Focus” premiere at Ocean House, in partnership with Project Everyone, brought together scientists, storytellers and sustainability leaders for a powerful conversation on the role that technology and global collaboration play in the future of coral reefs.
     
    ▲ (From left) Alex Heath, Cassie Smith, Dr. Daniel Wangpraseurt, Michael Stewart and Quentin van den Bossche
     
    ▲ “Ocean Mode became its own character in the documentary,” said Quentin van den Bossche, director of “Coral in Focus.” “This helped us illustrate some of the complex, specific challenges that reef conservationists encounter. And showing the difference between photos taken with and without Ocean Mode helped ground the technology in something visual and even emotional. This is where the impact of partnerships among companies, research institutes and nonprofits truly comes to life.”
     
    ▲ Michael Stewart, co-founder of Seatrees, holds a Galaxy S24 Ultra to show Ocean Mode Year 1 impact metrics — about 14,046 coral fragments planted across three restoration sites.
     
    “A key focus of the coral restoration efforts is being able to monitor what’s working and what’s not. And that starts with capturing high-quality images of our supported reefs,” said Michael Stewart, co-founder of Seatrees. “Our local partners have really appreciated Ocean Mode because it has improved their ability to capture higher-quality images with Galaxy phones to make the 3D models created by the scientists at Scripps more accurate.”
     

     
    “Mobile technology is a powerful way to connect communities with ecosystems they may never physically encounter but are deeply tied to through climate, biodiversity and cultural heritage,” said Daniel Wangpraseurt, Ph.D., associate research scientist at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography. “Smartphones are now capable of taking high-resolution imagery to help generate more accurate 3D models. They also hold unique potential to increase the pace at which we share this information with people around the world who may never get to experience a coral reef themselves.”
     
    ▲ “Through our partnership with Seatrees, we saw how Galaxy technology could play a role not just in responsible sourcing but in supporting coral reef restoration,” said Cassie Smith, Senior Manager, Corporate Sustainability and U.S. Public Affairs at Samsung Electronics America. “The documentary tells that story beautifully — showing what happens when like-minded partners, engineers, scientists and local communities come together with shared purpose and the right tools.”
     
    ▲ Attendees of the “Coral in Focus” documentary premiere included Swati Thiyagarajan, award-winning documentary filmmaker, environmental journalist with the Sea Change Project and associate producer and production manager of the Academy Award-winning “My Octopus Teacher”; Titouan Bernicot, founder and CEO of Coral Gardeners and National Geographic Explorer; and Beverly Camhe, writer, producer and entertainment executive.
     
    “It’s essential for the private sector to be involved and help get impactful solutions off the ground,” said Lefteris Arapakis, co-founder of Enaleia. “We need all parties working together to protect and scale ocean conservation efforts. I’m especially excited about Ocean Mode — tools like this make our work more efficient and help us create greater impact.”
     
    “It was a beautiful film, and I love how it left us with a sense of hope and something we could do about the problem,” said Dana Habib, associate at the Institute for Integrated Transitions.
     
    ▲ Panelists and attendees discuss the “Coral in Focus” film and project.
     
    The discussion was moderated by Alex Heath, Managing Director, U.S. Head of Social Impact & Sustainability at Edelman. The event also featured 3D reef models generated from photogrammetry data created with Galaxy S24 Ultras used in the field.
     
     
    Exploring Ocean Conservation at UNOC
    In addition to the premiere of “Coral in Focus,” Samsung representatives spoke on two panels hosted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO-IOC) at the UNESCO-IOC “Beyond Borders: Ocean Futures” pavilion. First, Generation17 Young Leader José Francisco Ochoa spoke about the importance of digital technology and community partnership during the panel “Showcasing the Diversity of Ocean Literacy Practices Around the World,” where he shared insights on how Generation17 elevates his work to advance ocean literacy.
     
    Samsung also participated in a panel discussion titled “The Role of Corals in Unlocking the Secrets of Biodiversity,” highlighting its commitment to marine conservation. Cassie Smith, Senior Manager of Corporate Sustainability and U.S. Public Affairs at Samsung Electronics, presented how Galaxy technology, including Ocean Mode, serves as a tool to support marine ecosystem protection through environmental monitoring, data collection and community engagement. The panel was part of a full day of programming held during UNOC that promotes ocean literacy and awareness of ocean preservation.
     
     
    A Continued Commitment to Ocean Health
    The collaboration with Seatrees builds on Samsung’s broader commitment to ocean health. Since 2022, the company has incorporated over 150 tonnes of recycled fishing nets into Galaxy devices. Now, with Ocean Mode, Samsung is redefining the role of mobile technology in climate action — expanding research capabilities, raising awareness and making the invisible visible.
     
    To watch the full documentary and access more information about the initiative, visit the Samsung x Seatrees partnership landing page.
     
     
    1 Held every three to five years, UNOC serves as a global platform uniting governments, scientists, businesses and civil society to promote ocean action and implement Sustainable Development Goal 14: Life Below Water. The 2025 conference in Nice emphasizes scaling science-based solutions to protect marine ecosystems and ensure a sustainable future for the world’s oceans.
    2 Ocean Mode was exclusively developed for this project and is only available to participating partners.

    MIL OSI Global Banks