Category: Military Intelligence

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: NZ’s partnership with United Kingdom reinforced

    Source: New Zealand Government

    Prime Minister Christopher Luxon has completed a successful three-day visit to the United Kingdom, where he met with His Majesty King Charles III and Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer.

    “The UK is one of New Zealand’s most trusted partners, and I had a hugely productive day with Prime Minister Starmer,” Mr Luxon says. 

    The two leaders released a Joint Statement in which they pledged to do more to ensure the partnership remains robust in a rapidly changing world.

    “Prime Minister Starmer and I underlined our commitment to the international rules-based system. We also talked about boosting bilateral trade and investment, especially while the global economy is under such extreme pressure.”

    “Export growth will be critical to improving our economic prospects in the coming years so our businesses can create more jobs and lift incomes for Kiwis. 

    “Our free trade agreement provides New Zealand business with certainty of access to the high-value UK market where we have enjoyed export growth of more than 20 per cent in the last year.”

    Mr Luxon also hosted an investment roundtable with British business leaders to promote New Zealand as open for business.

    “Building on the success of our international investment summit earlier in the year, I continued to make the case for New Zealand as a place to invest, so we can get infrastructure built and grow our businesses to put more money in Kiwis’ pockets.

    “During my visit to London I also witnessed a number of commercial deals between UK and New Zealand companies, worth more than $120 million.”  

    The Prime Ministers agreed to refresh the Joint Statement on Defence Cooperation to ensure the partnership can respond to today’s global challenges. 

    Mr Luxon also announced New Zealand will extend the deployment of NZDF personnel to the UK and Europe to train Ukrainian soldiers until December 2026. 

    Mr Luxon visited some of those soldiers, met with representatives of the UK Government, the Leader of the Opposition and New Zealand and UK businesses. 

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Why AUKUS remains the right strategy for the future defence of Australia

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Jennifer Parker, Adjunct Fellow, Naval Studies at UNSW Canberra, and Expert Associate, National Security College, Australian National University

    Australian strategic thinking has long struggled to move beyond a narrow view of defence that focuses solely on protecting our shores. However, in today’s world, our economy could be crippled without an enemy boot stepping foot on Australian soil.

    Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS marks a shift in this mindset.

    It is not a strategy in itself, but a structural pivot: a recognition that our vital interests lie far beyond the coastline, and that defending them requires Australia to project its maritime power.

    Protecting our vital sea lanes

    Over a century ago, US naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan observed that “wars are won by the economic strangulation of the enemy from the sea”.

    While not universally true, this maxim is directly relevant to an island nation like Australia – 99% of our international trade moves by sea.

    But not just any trade – our critical supplies of fuel, fertiliser and ammunition all come by sea. Australia’s economy and defences would be crippled if these things were stopped at sea.

    These vulnerabilities are compounded by our growing dependence on undersea cables for communications.

    Strategic concepts that rely on making Australia’s territory a hard target, such as the “strategic defensive”, fail to grapple with this reality, perpetuating a flawed understanding of how to defend Australia.

    Viewing Australia’s interests solely through the lens of avoiding or defeating a territorial attack overlooks the reality that an adversary could cripple the nation far more easily through the maritime, space or cyber domains.

    The ability to project power in the seas and oceans far from Australia’s shores is critical to protecting these seaborne supply lines and sustaining the national economy. This is where AUKUS comes in – the endurance and range of nuclear-powered submarines are a key element.

    Developing a future maritime strategy

    Australia’s future nuclear-powered submarines would make adversary naval task groups vulnerable if they threatened our maritime trade routes.

    Much more is needed, however, to deliver a coherent maritime strategy. This includes:

    • expanding our surface combatant fleet

    • addressing the vulnerability of Australia’s limited number of resupply, mine warfare and hydrographic vessels

    • and resolving longstanding issues around our strategic fleet (commercial ships that could be requisitioned in a time of crisis).

    We must also expand our flagged merchant shipping fleet by reforming the Australian International Shipping Register. And we must strengthen our domestic maritime security through the establishment of a national coastguard.

    But AUKUS, as the centrepiece of our future undersea capability, is a good start.

    AUKUS’ critics

    AUKUS has attracted plenty of criticism — particularly following the new Trump administration’s moves away from the US’ traditional allies in Europe.

    Yet, despite claims the three-phase AUKUS submarine plan is failing, it remains remarkably on track.

    Like any complex defence acquisition, it carries risks. These risks include the continued political will to keep the deal on track, as well as the workforce, delivery schedule and cost pressures that come with building the submarines.

    But the relevant question is not whether risks exist — if that were the test, most defence programs wouldn’t proceed. The question is whether the risks around AUKUS are being effectively mitigated.

    And as the three phases of the AUKUS deal progress, these risks will continue to evolve. Australia must remain focussed on addressing them.

    Political will is firm

    The political risk has been most salient recently, given the Trump administration’s actions on Europe, Ukraine, foreign aid and tariffs. But while these disruptions are significant, they were largely foreshadowed.

    By contrast, the political signals coming out of Washington around AUKUS have been overwhelmingly positive. This is because AUKUS is in the US’ strategic interests as much as it is in Australia’s interests.

    Importantly, the political commitment to AUKUS in Canberra, Washington and London has already been demonstrated.

    The “optimal pathway” to guide the agreement into the 2030s was signed within 18 months of AUKUS’ launch in September 2021. And the AUKUS treaty that enables the US and UK to transfer nuclear submarine technology and equipment to Australia has since been signed and entered into force among all three partners.

    In Australia, bipartisan support has held for over three years, with no sign of weakening.

    Australia’s importance to the US

    Many critics have also focused on the risks posed by the US submarine industrial base and its ability to build nuclear-powered submarines quickly enough.

    The US would need to increase its production rate to two Virginia-class submarines per year by 2028 – and subsequently to 2.33 submarines per year – in order to reach the target US fleet of 66 submarines by 2054.

    But this does not preclude the sale of three Virginia-class submarines to Australia in the early 2030s. Australia is not just a recipient of submarines from the US — it will help enable the US’ undersea operations in the region.

    Our role as a rotational hub for US submarines and the longstanding support we can offer the US fleet through facilities such as the Harold E. Holt submarine communications station makes our contribution far more valuable than the notional loss of three submarines on paper.

    Could this change in the future? Like all international arrangements, of course it could. But there is no indication at present that it will.

    The defence of Australia is not simply about protecting our continent from attack — it is about safeguarding vital national interests. For an island nation, that means securing maritime trade routes and undersea infrastructure.

    Even for those concerned about the extremely unlikely prospect of invasion, a robust maritime strategy also enables threats to be defeated well before they reach our shores.

    Through its emphasis on maritime power projection, AUKUS reflects a fundamental shift in how we think about defending Australia in the decades ahead.


    This is the final part of a series on the future of defence in Australia. Read the other stories here.

    Jennifer Parker is a 20-year veteran of the Royal Australian Navy.

    ref. Why AUKUS remains the right strategy for the future defence of Australia – https://theconversation.com/why-aukus-remains-the-right-strategy-for-the-future-defence-of-australia-254985

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: “Devastating Loss”: Senator Murray Slams Trump Gutting Women’s Health Initiative—WHI is the Largest and Most Influential National Study of Women’s Health & Based out of Fred Hutch in Seattle

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray
    ICYMI from Science: “NIH guts its first and largest study centered on women”
    ICYMI: In Senate Forum on NIH Research, Senator Murray Highlights How Trump and Elon’s Devastating Funding Cuts and Mass Layoffs are Putting Lifesaving Research At Risk
    Washington, D.C. — Today, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), a senior member and former Chairof the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee and former Chair of the Senate Appropriations Labor-HHS-Education & Related Agencies Subcommittee released the following statement on the Trump administration gutting the historic Women’s Health Initiative (WHI), the largest National Institutes of Health (NIH) effort studying the health needs of women. WHI has enrolled more than 160,000 participants in clinical trials and tracked the health of many thousands more over more than three decades since its inception in the early 1990s. There are currently over 42,000 participants that are actively involved. WHI’s findings have had a major influence on women’s health care, reducing rates of cancer and other diseases, and influencing clinical guidelines for multiple health factors.
    Yesterday, WHI investigators were informed that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will terminate WHI Regional Center (RC) contracts at the end of their current fiscal year, September 2025. According to the WHI Funding Announcement issued yesterday, the WHI Clinical Coordinating Center, which is based at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center in Seattle, will continue operations until January 2026, after which time its funding remains uncertain. “The full implications of these funding cuts are still being determined, but these contract terminations will significantly impact ongoing research and data collection—especially the detailed participant health event data collected by RC staff. The loss of this critical data stream would severely limit WHI’s ability to generate new insights into the health of older women, one of the fastest-growing segments of our population,” the notice read.
    “This is a devastating loss for women’s health research. It’s unacceptable and truly tragic that the Trump administration has decided to pull the plug on one of the most influential studies in the world and one that has led to enormous breakthroughs in preventing chronic disease—a stated goal of HHS leadership—and helping women everywhere live healthier and longer lives.
    “The Women’s Health Initiative has not only led to major advancements in our understanding of women’s health issues, especially in older women, but it has paved the way for a generation of researchers focused on women’s health—which has long been overlooked and underfunded. Now, Trump, Elon, and our pro-disease Health Secretary RFK Jr. are taking an axe to a study that has helped millions of Americans live healthier lives and have better treatment options—yet another example of how this administration is hell-bent on cutting health research to the bone without a clue and without a care for the consequences.
    “Destroying the Women’s Health Initiative is an unbelievably shortsighted move that will have an immense long-term cost for our country—in undiscovered treatments and cures, the loss of vast amounts of data to improve women’s health, and a less healthy population overall.
    “This is an unconscionable loss—and I am calling on every one of my colleagues, especially my Republican colleagues who understand the importance of supporting research into women’s health, to join me in demanding that the Trump administration immediately reverse course.”
    Senator Murray has been leading the charge against the Trump administration’s efforts to gut lifesaving research at NIH and fire en masse more than 1,300 skilled scientists and grants administrators at the agency. When the Trump administration attempted to illegally cap indirect cost rates at 15 percent, Senator Murray immediately and forcefully condemned the move, led the entire Senate Democratic caucus in a letter decrying the proposed change, and introduced amendments to Senate Republicans’ budget resolution to reverse it, which Republicans blocked.
    As a longtime appropriator and former Chair of the Senate HELP Committee, Senator Murray has always championed women’s health care and fought to boost investments in women’s health care research in particular. As the former Chair of the Senate Appropriations Labor-HHS-Education & Related Agencies Subcommittee, Senator Murray has fought for increases in women’s health research programs across NIH, including the Implementing a Maternal Health and Pregnancy Outcomes Vision for Everyone (IMPROVE) Initiative and the Office of Research on Women’s Health. As the top Democrat on the Senate HELP Committee, Murray led negotiations and passage of the 21st Century Cures Act in 2016, bipartisan legislation that provided $4.8 billion over the next 10 years to invests in a wide range of health priorities including with regards to women’s health care. Murray leads and has repeatedly introduced the Jeanette Acosta Invest in Women’s Health Act, which would increase women’s access to preventive and lifesaving cancer screenings. Murray has also been a strong advocate for women veterans’ health care—transforming the VA over decades to meet the needs of women veterans, whether by authoring and passing the Women Veterans Health Care Improvement Act in 2010, helping to pass the Deborah Sampson Act and MAMMO Act to address gender disparities at VA and expand access to breast cancer screening and treatment at VA, or by delivering annual funding as an appropriator to help VA provide the necessary care for women veterans.
    Last year as Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Murray delivered a record $900 million investment in women veterans’ health care, as well as a $300 million funding boost for NIH. Senator Murray also leads landmark bipartisan legislation endorsed by Halle Berry to boost menopause research and, for the first time, coordinate the federal government’s existing programs related to menopause and mid-life women’s health. Earlier this month, Senator Murray introduced separate bipartisan legislation to require VA and the Department of Defense (DoD) to research and study the effects of menopause on women servicemembers and women veterans
    Over her years as a senior member of the Appropriations Committee, Senator Murray secured billions of dollars in increases for biomedical research at the National Institutes of Health, and during her time as Chair of the HELP Committee, she established the new ARPA-H research agency as part of her PREVENT Pandemics Act to advance some of the most cutting-edge research in the field.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: ANZAC Day – ‘Never Again’ Anzac Day Peace Picnic

    Source: Peace Action Wellington

    Friday 25 April 2025 – An Anzac Day Peace Picnic with the theme of ‘Never Again’ will be held at Pukeahu National War Memorial on Friday 25 April from 12:30pm-2pm. This is a family-friendly peace event operating under the tikanga of mana whenua, Te Kotahitanga o Taranaki Whanui ki te Upoko o te Ika.

    “’Never again’ means no genocide,” said Valerie Morse, member of Peace Action Wellington.

    “‘Never again’ is a phrase or slogan which is associated with the lessons of the Holocaust and other genocides. The slogan was used by liberated prisoners at Buchenwald concentration camp to denounce fascism.”

    “We are coming together to stand against war, against fascism and to demand that we meet the aspirations of our ancestors who survived World War 1 and World War 2 for global peace and freedom,” said Valerie Morse, member of Peace Action Wellington.

    “Anzac Day is portrayed as a day where the country can reflect on the horrors of war, the costs in human lives and commit collectively to never again allowing genocidal mass murder. We have to ask, is that really happening?” said Morse.

    “In 2025 the Western world is actively funding a campaign of complete annihilation against Palestinians. Two million men, women and children are daily being shot, bombed from above, burned alive, bulldozed with tanks and held hostage inside a giant concentration camp called Gaza. This is paid for and provided by the US. Meanwhile, across the West fascism and far right political parties are gaining power with campaigns of hatred, exclusion, war, austerity and visions of armageddon.”

    “The NZ government has failed to provide any humanitarian path for Palestinian refugees fleeing the bloodbath. It has been silent about Israel’s crimes. What’s worse is the government is now aiming to spend billions on new weapons of war and committing to fighting alongside the fascist USA in its endless wars. The new Defence Capability Plan clearly aligns NZ to the US and the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. This is incredibly dangerous for the peace and security of Aotearoa NZ and the wider Pacific,” said Morse.

    The Anzac Day event is organised by Peace Action Wellington, Pōneke Anti-Fascist Coalition, VUW Socialists, Justice for Palestine, Students for Justice in Palestine, Falastin Tea Collective and Alternative Jewish Voices.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai delivers remarks at International Holocaust Remembrance Day event

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    Details
    2025-04-23
    President Lai pays respects to Pope Francis  
    On the morning of April 23, President Lai Ching-te visited the Taipei Archdiocesan Curia to pay respects in a memorial ceremony for His Holiness Pope Francis. As officiant of the ceremony, President Lai burned incense and presented flowers, fruits, and wine to pay his respects to Pope Francis. At the direction of the master of ceremonies, the president then bowed three times in front of Pope Francis’s memorial portrait, conveying his grief and deep respect for the late pope. After hearing of Pope Francis’s passing on April 21, President Lai promptly requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to express sincere condolences from the people and government of Taiwan to the Vatican. The president also instructed Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) to convey condolences to the Holy See’s Apostolic Nunciature in Taiwan.  

    Details
    2025-04-23
    President Lai meets US CNAS NextGen fellows
    On the morning of April 23, President Lai Ching-te met with fellows from the Shawn Brimley Next Generation National Security Leaders Program (NextGen) run by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). In remarks, President Lai thanked the government of the United States for continuing its arms sales to Taiwan over the years, supporting Taiwan’s efforts to enhance its national defense capabilities and jointly maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The president pointed out that we will promote our “Taiwan plus one” policy, that is, new arrangements for Taiwan plus the US, and form a “Taiwan investment in the US team” to expand investment and bring about even closer Taiwan-US trade cooperation, allowing us to reduce the trade deficit and generate development that benefits both sides. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: Ms. Michèle Flournoy, chair of the CNAS Board of Directors, is a good friend of Taiwan, and she has made major contributions to Taiwan-US relations through her long-time efforts on various aspects of our cooperation. I am happy to welcome Chair Flournoy, who is once again leading a NextGen Fellowship delegation to Taiwan. CNAS is a prominent think tank focusing on US national security and defense policy based in Washington, DC. Its NextGen Fellowship has fostered talented individuals in the fields of national security and foreign affairs. This year’s delegation is significantly larger than those of the past, demonstrating the increased importance that the next generation of US leaders attach to Taiwan. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I extend my sincerest welcome to you all. The Taiwan Strait, an issue of importance for our guests, has become a global issue. There is a high degree of international consensus that peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait are indispensable elements in global security and prosperity. Facing military threats from China, Taiwan proposed the Four Pillars of Peace action plan. First, we are actively implementing military reforms, enhancing whole-of-society defense resilience, and working to increase our defense budget to more than 3 percent of GDP. Second, we are strengthening our economic resilience. As Taiwan’s economy must keep advancing, we can no longer put all our eggs in one basket. We are taking action to remain firmly rooted in Taiwan while expanding our global presence and marketing worldwide. In these efforts, we are already seeing results. Third, we are standing side-by-side with other democratic countries to demonstrate the strength of deterrence and achieve our goal of peace through strength. And fourth, Taiwan is willing, under the principles of parity and dignity, to conduct exchanges and cooperate with China towards achieving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. This April 10 marked the 46th anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act. We thank the US government for continuing its arms sales to Taiwan over the years, supporting Taiwan’s efforts to enhance its national defense capabilities and jointly maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. We look forward to Taiwan and the US continuing to strengthen collaboration on the development of both our defense industries as well as the building of non-red supply chains. This will yield even more results and further deepen our economic and trade partnership. The US is now the main destination for outbound investment from Taiwan. Moving forward, we will promote our “Taiwan plus one” policy, that is, new arrangements for Taiwan plus the US. And our government will form a “Taiwan investment in the US team” to expand investment. We hope this will bring Taiwan-US economic and trade cooperation even closer and, through mutually beneficial assistance, allow us to generate development that benefits both our sides while reducing our trade deficit. In closing, thank you once again for visiting Taiwan. We hope your trip is fruitful and leaves you with a deep impression of Taiwan. We also hope that going forward you continue supporting Taiwan and advancing even greater development for Taiwan-US ties.  Chair Flournoy then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for making time to receive their delegation. Referring to President Lai’s earlier remarks, she said that it is quite an impressive group, as past members of this program have gone on to become members of the US Congress, leading government experts, and leaders in the think-tank world and in the private sector. She remarked that investing in this group is a wonderful privilege for her and that they appreciate President Lai’s agreeing to take the time to engage in exchange with them. Chair Flournoy emphasized that they are visiting Taiwan at a critical moment, when there is so much change and volatility in the geostrategic environment, a lot of uncertainty, and a lot of unpredictability. She stated that given our shared values, our shared passion for democracy and human rights, and our shared interests in peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, this is an important time for dialogue, collaboration, and looking for additional opportunities where we can work together towards regional peace and stability.

    Details
    2025-04-18
    President Lai meets US delegation from Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific
    On the afternoon of April 18, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Senator Pete Ricketts, chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy. In remarks, President Lai said we hope to promote our Taiwan plus one policy, that is, new industrial arrangements for Taiwan plus the US, to leverage the strengths of both sides and reinforce our links in such areas as the economy, trade, and technological innovation. The president said that by deepening cooperation, Taiwan and the US will be better positioned to work together on building non-red supply chains. He said a more secure and sustainable economic and trade partnership will allow us to address the challenges posed by geopolitics, climate change, and the restructuring of global supply chains. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I warmly welcome you all to Taiwan. I want to take this opportunity to especially thank Chairman Pete Ricketts and Ranking Member Chris Coons for their high regard and support for Taiwan. Chairman Ricketts has elected to visit Taiwan on his first overseas trip since taking up his new position in January. Ranking Member Coons made a dedicated trip to Taiwan in 2021 to announce a donation of COVID-19 vaccines on behalf of the US government. He also visited last May, soon after my inauguration, continuing to deepen Taiwan-US exchanges. Thanks to support from Chairman Ricketts and Ranking Member Coons, the US Congress has continued to introduce many concrete initiatives and resources to assist Taiwan through the National Defense Authorization Act and Consolidated Appropriations Act, bringing the Taiwan-US partnership even closer. For this, I want to again express my gratitude. There has long been bipartisan support in the US Congress for maintaining security in the Taiwan Strait. Faced with China’s persistent political and military intimidation, Taiwan will endeavor to reform national defense and enhance whole-of-society defense resilience. We will also make special budget allocations to ensure that our defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP, up from the current 2.5 percent, so as to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities. We look forward to Taiwan and the US continuing to work together to maintain peace and stability in the region. We will also promote our Taiwan plus one policy, that is, new industrial arrangements for Taiwan plus the US. We hope to leverage the strengths of both sides and reinforce our links in such areas as the economy, trade, and technological innovation, jointly promoting prosperity and development. We believe that by deepening cooperation through the Taiwan plus one policy, Taiwan and the US will be better positioned to work together on building non-red supply chains. A more secure and sustainable economic and trade partnership will allow us to address the challenges posed by geopolitics, climate change, and the restructuring of global supply chains. In closing, I wish Chairman Ricketts and Ranking Member Coons a smooth and successful visit. Chairman Ricketts then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for his hospitality. He said that he and his delegation have had a wonderful time meeting with government officials, industry representatives, and the team at the American Institute in Taiwan. Highlighting that Taiwan has long been a friend and partner of the US, he said their bipartisan delegation to Taiwan emphasizes long-time bipartisan support in the US Congress for Taiwan, and though administrations change, that bipartisan support remains. Chairman Ricketts stated that the US is committed to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and that they want to see peace across the Taiwan Strait. He also stated that the US opposes any unilateral change in the status of Taiwan and that they expect any differences between Taiwan and China to be resolved peacefully without coercion or the threat of force. To that end, he said, the US will continue to assist Taiwan in its self-defense and will also step up by bolstering its own defense capabilities, noting that there is broad consensus on this in the US Congress. Chairman Ricketts stated that they want to see Taiwan participate in international organizations and memberships where appropriate, and encourage Taiwan to reach out to current and past diplomatic allies to strengthen those bilateral relationships. He pointed out that the long economic relationship between the US and Taiwan is important for our as well as the entire world’s security and prosperity. He also noted that there are many opportunities for us to continue to grow the economic relationship that will help create more prosperity for our respective peoples and ensure that we are more secure in the world. Chairman Ricketts emphasized that they made this trip early on in the new US administration to work with Taiwan to develop three points: security, diplomatic relations, and the economy. He stated that in the face of rising aggression from communist China, the US will provide commensurate help to Taiwan in self-defense and that they will continue to provide the services and tools needed. In closing, Chairman Ricketts once again thanked President Lai for the hospitality and said he looks forward to dialogue on how we can continue these relationships. Ranking Member Coons then delivered remarks. Mentioning that their delegation also visited the Philippines on this trip, he said that there and in Taiwan, they have been focused on peace, stability, and security, and the ways for deepening and strengthening economic and security relations. He noted that 46 years ago, the US Senate passed the Taiwan Relations Act, adding that it was strongly bipartisan when enacted and that support for it is still strongly bipartisan today. Its core commitment, he said, is that the US will be engaged and will be a partner in ensuring that any dispute or challenge across the strait will be resolved peacefully, and that Taiwan will have the resources it needs for its self-defense. Ranking Member Coons said that between people, friendships are deepest and most enduring when they are based not just on interests but on values, and that the same is true between the US and Taiwan. Free press, free enterprise, free societies, democracy – these core shared values, he said, anchor our friendship and partnership, making them deeper. He remarked that they are grateful for the significant investment in the US being made by companies from Taiwan, but what anchors our partnership, in addition to these important investments and investments being made by Taiwan in its own security, are the values that mobilize our free-enterprise spirit and our commitment to free societies. In Europe in recent years, Ranking Member Coons said, an aggressive nation has tried to change boundaries and change history by force. He said that the US and dozens of countries committed to freedom have come to the aid of Ukraine to defend it, help it stabilize, and secure its future. So too in this region of the world, he added, the US and a bipartisan group in the US Senate are committed to stable, secure, peaceful relations and to deterring any unilateral effort to change the status quo by force. In closing, he said he is grateful for a chance to return to Taiwan after the pandemic and that he looks forward to our conversation, our partnership, and the important work we have in front of us. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by American Institute in Taiwan Taipei Office Director Raymond Greene.

    Details
    2025-04-17
    President Lai meets New Zealand delegation from All-Party Parliamentary Group on Taiwan  
    On the morning of April 17, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation from New Zealand’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Taiwan. In remarks, President Lai thanked the government of New Zealand for reiterating the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait on multiple occasions since last year. He also stated that this year, the Taiwan-New Zealand economic cooperation agreement (ANZTEC) is being implemented in its complete form. The president expressed hope that deeper collaboration in such fields as smart agriculture, food manufacturing, biomedicine, the digital economy, and clean energy, as well as exchanges among our indigenous peoples, will allow our economies and industries to continue evolving as they adapt to the challenges arising from global changes. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I extend a warm welcome to all of our guests. New Zealand’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Taiwan was established in 2023, marking a significant milestone in the deepening of Taiwan-New Zealand relations. I would like to thank Members of Parliament Stuart Smith and Tangi Utikere for leading this delegation, and thank all our guests for demonstrating support for Taiwan through action. We currently face a rapidly changing international landscape. Authoritarian regimes continue to converge and expand. Democracies must actively cooperate and jointly safeguard peace, stability, and the prosperous development of the Indo-Pacific region. Since last year, the government of New Zealand has on multiple occasions reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I would like to express our sincere gratitude for these statements and demonstrations of support. This year, ANZTEC is being implemented in its complete form. We look forward to exploring even more diverse markets with New Zealand. Deeper collaboration in such fields as smart agriculture, food manufacturing, biomedicine, the digital economy, and clean energy, as well as exchanges among indigenous peoples, will allow our economies and industries to continue evolving as they adapt to the challenges arising from global changes. Taiwan and New Zealand share the universal values of democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights, and parliamentary diplomacy is a tradition practiced by democracies around the world. Looking ahead, our parliamentary exchanges and mutual visits are bound to become more frequent. This will enable us to explore even more opportunities for cooperation and further deepen and solidify the democratic partnership between Taiwan and New Zealand. Thank you once again for making the long journey to visit us. I wish you a fruitful and successful trip. I also hope that everyone can take time to see more of Taiwan, try our local cuisine, and learn more about our culture. I hope our guests will fall in love with Taiwan. MP Smith then delivered remarks, saying that it is a great pleasure and an honor to be received by President Lai. The MP, noting that President Lai already covered many of the points he planned to make, went on to say that New Zealand and Taiwan share many values. He indicated that both are trading nations that rely on easy access for imports and exports, and that is why freedom of navigation is so important. That is why New Zealand had a naval vessel sail through the Taiwan Strait, he said, to underline the importance of freedom of navigation and our mutual security. MP Smith said that they look forward to building stronger relationships and enhancing the trade between our two nations. He added that New Zealand has much to offer in the field of geothermal energy to assist Taiwan, and mentioned that New Zealand is third largest in terms of the number of rocket launchers for satellites, which could assist Taiwan with communications in the future. New Zealand has other products as well, he said, but looks for assistance from Taiwan’s technology and technological sector. Lastly, MP Smith stated that he looks forward to a long and prosperous relationship between Taiwan and New Zealand. MP Utikere then delivered remarks, indicating that like Taiwan, New Zealand is a nation that is surrounded by ocean, which means that they rely on strong partnerships with communities of interest all around the globe. He said that the all-party parliamentary friendship group that was established and that they are a part of goes a long way in ensuring that a secure relationship between our two parliaments can continue to prosper. The MP also thanked Taiwan’s Representative to New Zealand Joanne Ou (歐江安) and her team for their work, which has ensured the success of the delegation’s visit. He said that the delegation experienced meetings with ministers in Taiwan’s government, members of the legislature, and those from the non-government organization sector as well. He also said that they enjoyed the opportunity to visit Wulai, and that the strength of the connections between the indigenous peoples of Taiwan and the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand is something that certainly landed with members of the delegation. MP Utikere noted that he will take up President Lai’s offer on experiencing more of Taiwan, and will spend a few extra days in Tainan, which he understands has a very special place in the president’s heart, adding that he looks forward to his time and experiences there. The MP concluded his remarks by saying that this will be a relationship that continues to go from strength to strength. After their remarks, the New Zealand delegation sang the Māori song “Tutira Mai Nga Iwi” to extend best wishes to Taiwan. Also in attendance at the meeting were New Zealand Members of Parliament Jamie Arbuckle, Greg Fleming, Hamish Campbell, Cameron Luxton, and Helen White.  

    Details
    2025-04-15
    President Lai meets delegation led by Tuvalu Deputy Prime Minister Panapasi Nelesone 
    On the afternoon of April 15, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Tuvalu Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Economic Development Panapasi Nelesone and his wife. In remarks, President Lai thanked Tuvalu for its staunch and long-term backing of Taiwan’s international participation. The president said he looks forward to our nations deepening bilateral ties in such areas as agriculture, medicine, education, and information and communications technology and working together toward greater peace, prosperity, and development in the Pacific region. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I extend a very warm welcome to Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone and Madame Corinna Ituaso Laafai as they lead this delegation to Taiwan. Our distinguished guests are the first delegation from Tuvalu that I have received at the Presidential Office this year. During my visit to Tuvalu last year, I met and exchanged views with Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone and the ministers present. I am delighted to meet you again today and thank you once again for the hospitality you accorded my delegation. The culture of Tuvalu and the warmth of its people are not easily forgotten. Tuvalu’s support for Taiwan has also touched us deeply. I want to take this opportunity to thank Tuvalu for staunchly backing Taiwan’s international participation over the past several decades. Our two countries have supported each other like family and have together made contributions in the international arena. Last Tuesday, I received the credentials of Ambassador Lily Tangisia Faavae and expressed my hope for Taiwan and Tuvalu continuing to deepen bilateral relations. This visit by Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone is an important step in that regard. Our two countries will be signing a labor cooperation agreement and an agreement concerning the recognition of training and certification of seafarers. This will expand bilateral cooperation at multiple levels and bring our relations even closer. Taiwan and Tuvalu are maritime nations and share the values of democracy and freedom. Our two countries have stood shoulder to shoulder to protect marine resources and address the challenges posed by climate change and authoritarianism, and we aspire to work toward greater peace, prosperity, and development in the Pacific region. Our nations have produced fruitful results in such areas as agriculture, medicine, education, and information and communications technology. I anticipate that, with the support of Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone and our distinguished guests, we can continue to employ a more diverse range of strategies to begin a new chapter in our diplomatic partnership. Together, we can make even greater and more concrete contributions to regional development. Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone then delivered remarks, first thanking President Lai for his kind words of welcome and the warm hospitality extended to his delegation. On behalf of the government and people of Tuvalu, he conveyed their gratitude to the president and the people of Taiwan for the generous support, as well as for the enduring friendship we share. He said that Taiwan’s steadfast commitment to our bilateral relationship has been instrumental in advancing our shared values of democracy, resilience, and sustainable development. From vital development assistance to cooperation in health, education, and climate change resilience, he added, Taiwan’s contributions have made a significant impact on the lives of the people of Tuvalu.  For Taiwan’s recent generous donation of shoes for Tuvaluan primary school students, Deputy Prime Minister Nelesone expressed thanks to President Lai. He commented that these gifts, which underscore a deep commitment to the welfare of their youth, transcend mere material support; they are symbols of care, friendship, and hope for the future generations. Noting that our bilateral relationship is built on mutual respect, shared values, and a common vision for sustainable development in the Pacific, he expressed confidence that this partnership will continue to flourish and will serve as a beacon of cooperation and solidarity within our region.  The delegation also included Tuvalu Minister of Foreign Affairs, Labour, and Trade Paulson Panapa; Minister of Public Works, Infrastructure Development and Water Ampelosa Tehulu, and was accompanied to the Presidential Office by Tuvalu Ambassador Faavae.

    Details
    2025-04-06
    President Lai delivers remarks on US tariff policy response
    On April 6, President Lai Ching-te delivered recorded remarks regarding the impact of the 32 percent tariff that the United States government recently imposed on imports from Taiwan in the name of reciprocity. In his remarks, President Lai explained that the government will adopt five response strategies, including making every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations, adopting a support plan for affected domestic industries, adopting medium- and long-term economic development plans, forming new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements, and launching industry listening tours. The president emphasized that as we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and expressed hope that all parties, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: My fellow citizens, good evening. The US government recently announced higher tariffs on countries around the world in the name of reciprocity, including imposing a 32 percent tariff on imports from Taiwan. This is bound to have a major impact on our nation. Various countries have already responded, and some have even adopted retaliatory measures. Tremendous changes in the global economy are expected. Taiwan is an export-led economy, and in facing future challenges there will inevitably be difficulties, so we must proceed carefully to turn danger into safety. During this time, I want to express gratitude to all sectors of society for providing valuable opinions, which the government regards highly, and will use as a reference to make policy decisions.  However, if we calmly and carefully analyze Taiwan’s trade with the US, we find that last year Taiwan’s exports to the US were valued at US$111.4 billion, accounting for 23.4 percent of total export value, with the other 75-plus percent of products sold worldwide to countries other than the US. Of products sold to the US, competitive ICT products and electronic components accounted for 65.4 percent. This shows that Taiwan’s economy does still have considerable resilience. As long as our response strategies are appropriate, and the public and private sectors join forces, we can reduce impacts. Please do not panic. To address the reciprocal tariffs by the US, Taiwan has no plans to adopt retaliatory tariffs. There will be no change in corporate investment commitments to the US, as long as they are consistent with national interests. But we must ensure the US clearly understands Taiwan’s contributions to US economic development. More importantly, we must actively seek to understand changes in the global economic situation, strengthen Taiwan-US industry cooperation, elevate the status of Taiwan industries in global supply chains, and with safeguarding the continued development of Taiwan’s economy as our goal, adopt the following five strategies to respond. Strategy one: Make every effort to improve reciprocal tariff rates through negotiations using the following five methods:  1. Taiwan has already formed a negotiation team led by Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun (鄭麗君). The team includes members from the National Security Council, the Office of Trade Negotiations, and relevant Executive Yuan ministries and agencies, as well as academia and industry. Like the US-Mexico-Canada free trade agreement, negotiations on tariffs can start from Taiwan-US bilateral zero-tariff treatment. 2. To expand purchases from the US and thereby reduce the trade deficit, the Executive Yuan has already completed an inventory regarding large-scale procurement plans for agricultural, industrial, petroleum, and natural gas products, and the Ministry of National Defense has also proposed a military procurement list. All procurement plans will be actively pursued. 3. Expand investments in the US. Taiwan’s cumulative investment in the US already exceeds US$100 billion, creating approximately 400,000 jobs. In the future, in addition to increased investment in the US by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, other industries such as electronics, ICT, petrochemicals, and natural gas can all increase their US investments, deepening Taiwan-US industry cooperation. Taiwan’s government has helped form a “Taiwan investment in the US” team, and hopes that the US will reciprocate by forming a “US investment in Taiwan” team to bring about closer Taiwan-US trade cooperation, jointly creating a future economic golden age.  4. We must eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade. Non-tariff barriers are an indicator by which the US assesses whether a trading partner is trading fairly with the US. Therefore, we will proactively resolve longstanding non-tariff barriers so that negotiations can proceed more smoothly. 5. We must resolve two issues that have been matters of longstanding concern to the US. One regards high-tech export controls, and the other regards illegal transshipment of dumped goods, otherwise referred to as “origin washing.” Strategy two: We must adopt a plan for supporting our industries. For industries that will be affected by the tariffs, and especially traditional industries as well as micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises, we will provide timely and needed support and assistance. Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) and his administrative team recently announced a package of 20 specific measures designed to address nine areas. Moving forward, the support we provide to different industries will depend on how they are affected by the tariffs, will take into account the particular features of each industry, and will help each industry innovate, upgrade, and transform. Strategy three: We must adopt medium- and long-term economic development plans. At this point in time, our government must simultaneously adopt new strategies for economic and industrial development. This is also the fundamental path to solutions for future economic challenges. The government will proactively cooperate with friends and allies, develop a diverse range of markets, and achieve closer integration of entities in the upper, middle, and lower reaches of industrial supply chains. This course of action will make Taiwan’s industrial ecosystem more complete, and will help Taiwanese industries upgrade and transform. We must also make good use of the competitive advantages we possess in such areas as semiconductor manufacturing, integrated chip design, ICT, and smart manufacturing to build Taiwan into an AI island, and promote relevant applications for food, clothing, housing, and transportation, as well as military, security and surveillance, next-generation communications, and the medical and health and wellness industries as we advance toward a smarter, more sustainable, and more prosperous new Taiwan. Strategy four: “Taiwan plus one,” i.e., new “Taiwan plus the US” arrangements: While staying firmly rooted in Taiwan, our enterprises are expanding their global presence and marketing worldwide. This has been our national economic development strategy, and the most important aspect is maintaining a solid base here in Taiwan. We absolutely must maintain a solid footing, and cannot allow the present strife to cause us to waver. Therefore, our government will incentivize investments, carry out deregulation, and continue to improve Taiwan’s investment climate by actively resolving problems involving access to water, electricity, land, human resources, and professional talent. This will enable corporations to stay in Taiwan and continue investing here. In addition, we must also help the overseas manufacturing facilities of offshore Taiwanese businesses to make necessary adjustments to support our “Taiwan plus one” policy, in that our national economic development strategy will be adjusted as follows: to stay firmly rooted in Taiwan while expanding our global presence, strengthening US ties, and marketing worldwide. We intend to make use of the new state of supply chains to strengthen cooperation between Taiwanese and US industries, and gain further access to US markets. Strategy five: Launch industry listening tours: All industrial firms, regardless of sector or size, will be affected to some degree once the US reciprocal tariffs go into effect. The administrative teams led by myself and Premier Cho will hear out industry concerns so that we can quickly resolve problems and make sure policies meet actual needs. My fellow citizens, over the past half-century and more, Taiwan has been through two energy crises, the Asian financial crisis, the global financial crisis, and pandemics. We have been able to not only withstand one test after another, but even turn crises into opportunities. The Taiwanese economy has emerged from these crises stronger and more resilient than ever. As we face this latest challenge, the government and civil society will work hand in hand, and I hope that all parties in the legislature, both ruling and opposition, will support the measures that the Executive Yuan will take to open up a broader path for Taiwan’s economy. Let us join together and give it our all. Thank you.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: First cohort graduates from global initiative shaping the future of defence and space

    Source:

    24 April 2025

    Global Executive MBA in Defence and Space graduate Glen Gallagher in Washington, DC.

    The first hand-picked cohort from a specialist global program tailored to meet the pressing challenges facing the defence and space sectors graduated from the University of South Australia this week.

    Students from UniSA’s Global Executive MBA in Defence and Space have completed the customised 18-month program, a world-first to help build a global pipeline of talent for the two sectors, specifically benefitting international alliances such as AUKUS.

    The graduates, who include executives and uniformed personnel from defence and space organisations operating in Australia, the US, UK and Europe, will help address critical skills gaps in cyber security, space systems, geopolitics and defence procurement and build the innovation and leadership capabilities required across the sectors.

    UniSA partnered with the University of Exeter (UK) and Carnegie Mellon University (US) to deliver the program, with students undertaking online study and intensive in-person residentials in each of the three AUKUS countries.

    Professor Lan Snell, Dean of Programs (Postgraduate), UniSA Business, says the value of the program lies in its global structure.

    “Throughout the program students develop global experiences, networks and competencies in the defence and space sectors that other Executive MBA programs can’t match. That is not only attractive to SA locals, but to potential recruits and their employers nationally and internationally,” she says.

    Professor Snell says the 2025 graduates are well equipped to tackle the complexities associated with the multi-decade projects that will make up the AUKUS arrangement.

    “Our graduates have built on a range of skills and capabilities ranging from technical skills through to project management and leadership capabilities,” she says. “We now have heightened technical understandings and better developed future-focused capabilities such as communication, teamwork and problem solving.”

    Global Executive MBA in Defence and Space graduate Glen Gallagher says the program directly influenced his career progression over the past two years as he transitioned from Operations Manager at Boeing Defence Australia to Director, Advanced Systems at South Australian Government agency, Defence SA.

    “I think taking part in the program did influence my career path in terms of my confidence, skills and ability to tackle a senior executive role. If I hadn’t been undertaking the Global Executive MBA in Defence and Space, I might not have backed myself or had the necessary attributes to be successful in my current role,” he says.

    “The value of the program is also in the establishment of multiple networks with peers, colleagues and industry professionals from around the world that you wouldn’t typically be exposed to unless you take up a lot of international travel.”

    Gallagher says highlights of the program included the two-week residentials in the US and UK, particularly travelling to Washington, DC, in the lead up to the US election in November 2024.

    “Part of the program was held near Capitol Hill and that was amazing to witness in terms of the build-up in geopolitics at that time. It was an experience that can’t ever be beaten.”

    The next Global Executive MBA in Defence and Space cohort will commence at Adelaide University in 2026.

    …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
    Media contact: Melissa Keogh, UniSA Media M: +61 403 659 154 E: Melissa.Keogh@unisa.edu.au

    Other articles you may be interested in

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference takes place at Hillsborough Castle

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Press release

    British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference takes place at Hillsborough Castle

    The conference is due to take place today, Thursday 24 April

    The British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIGC) will take place at Hillsborough Castle today (Thursday 24th April), the first time the Conference has been held in Northern Ireland since 2006. 

    Established under the Good Friday Agreement, the BIIGC is a bilateral forum  which meets regularly, aiming “to bring together the British and Irish Governments to promote cooperation at all levels on all matters of mutual interest within the competence of both Governments”. 

    Today’s meeting will be chaired by Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Hilary Benn and Tánaiste, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Minister for Defence Simon Harris. The meeting will also be attended by the Parliamentary under-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Fleur Anderson MP and the Minister for Justice Jim O’Callaghan TD. 

    It follows the UK-Ireland summit in March when the two governments pledged to work closely to deliver security, investment and growth

    This new era of co-operation with Ireland is a key part of the UK Government’s Plan for Change to put more money in working people’s pockets across the country through a future of greater national security and renewal.

    At today’s BIIGC meeting, the two Governments are expected to discuss ongoing efforts to find a way forward regarding the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland. They will also cover political stability, security, and other areas of bilateral cooperation.

    Secretary of State Hilary Benn said:

    This will be an important meeting in developing the strong and close relationship between the UK and the Irish Governments as we continue to work together on a range of issues.

    Tánaiste Simon Harris said:

    I am looking forward to this significant meeting of the British Irish Intergovernmental Conference and to continuing the intensive discussions with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the challenging but essential work of dealing with the legacy of the past.

    Updates to this page

    Published 24 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Reinstating Common Sense School Discipline Policies

    Source: The White House

    class=”has-text-align-left”>By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and to ensure safety and order in American classrooms, it is hereby ordered:

    Section 1.  Purpose and Policy.  The Federal Government will no longer tolerate known risks to children’s safety and well-being in the classroom that result from the application of school discipline based on discriminatory and unlawful “equity” ideology.

     In January 2014, the Department of Education and the Department of Justice jointly issued a “Dear Colleague” letter regarding school discipline.  In that letter, the Department of Education and the Department of Justice explained that schools could be found to violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 — and therefore could lose Federal funding — if their disciplinary decisions ran afoul of a newly imposed disparate-impact framework under which race-neutral disciplinary policies, applied in an even-handed manner, may be improper if members of any racial groups are suspended, expelled, or referred to law enforcement at higher rates than others.  The letter effectively required schools to discriminate on the basis of race by imposing discipline based on racial characteristics, rather than on objective behavior alone. 

    The consequences harmed students and schools.  A 2018 report from the Federal Commission on School Safety (Commission) noted evidence that, because of the 2014 letter, “schools ignored or covered up — rather than disciplined — student misconduct in order to avoid any purported racial disparity in discipline numbers that might catch the eye of the federal government.”  As a result, students who should have been suspended or expelled for dangerous behavior remained in the classroom, making all students less safe. 

    As the Commission found:  “When school leaders focus on aggregate school discipline numbers rather than the specific circumstances and conduct that underlie each matter, schools become less safe,” and “[r]esearch clearly indicates that the failure of schools to appropriately discipline disruptive students has consequences for overall student achievement.”  The Commission’s seemingly obvious conclusion was that “disciplinary decisions are best left in the hands of classroom teachers and administrators” and should be based on student behavior, rather than racial statistics.

    Following the Commission’s report on December 18, 2018, the 2014 Dear Colleague letter was rescinded.  In 2023, however, the previous administration’s Department of Education and Department of Justice issued new guidance noting that statistical racial disparities in student discipline may indicate violations of law, and encouraging schools to collect, analyze, and adjust their disciplinary policies in light of racial disciplinary data.  The 2023 guidance thus effectively reinstated the practice of weaponizing Title VI to promote an approach to school discipline based on discriminatory equity ideology.  As a consequence of these policies, teachers and students are suffering increased levels of classroom disorder and school violence.

    Sec. 2.  Definitions.  As used herein:
    (a)  The definitions in the Executive Order of January 29, 2025 (Ending Radical Indoctrination in K-12 Schooling), shall apply to this order.
    (b)  “Behavior Modification Techniques” means any school discipline policies or practices that incorporate or are based on discriminatory equity ideology.

    Sec. 3.  Ensuring Commonsense School Discipline Policies.      (a)  Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Education, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall issue new guidance to local educational agencies (LEAs) and State educational agencies (SEAs) regarding school discipline and their obligations not to engage in racial discrimination under Title VI in all contexts, including school discipline.
    (b)  The Secretary of Education shall take appropriate action with respect to LEAs and SEAs that fail to comply with Title VI protections against racial discrimination in the application of school discipline.
    (c)  Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Education and the Attorney General shall initiate coordination with Governors and State Attorneys General regarding the prevention of racial discrimination in the application of school discipline.
    (d)  Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense shall issue a revised school discipline code that appropriately protects and enhances the education of the children of America’s military-service families.
    (e)  Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Education shall, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, regarding the status of discriminatory-equity-ideology-based school discipline and behavior modification techniques in American public education .  The report shall include:
              (i)    an inventory and analysis of the nature and consequences of all Title VI discipline-related investigations since 2009;
              (ii)   an assessment of the role of non-profit organizations that are Federal grant recipients in promoting discriminatory-equity-ideology-based discipline and behavior modification techniques, and recommendations to ensure that Federal taxpayer funds do not flow to programs or activities, including those of non-profit organizations, that promote discriminatory-equity-ideology-based discipline and behavior modification techniques;
             (iii)  an assessment of discipline-related policies and curricular options that do not promote discriminatory equity ideology; and
              (iv)   model school discipline policies that promote common sense, protect the safety and educational environment of students, do not promote unlawful discrimination, and are rooted in American values and traditional virtues.

         Sec. 4.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
              (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
              (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
    (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
    (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

                                  DONALD J. TRUMP

    THE WHITE HOUSE,
        April 23, 2025.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Chula Vista Towing Company Agrees to Settle Allegations That It Illegally Auctioned a Servicemember’s Car During Deployment

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    SAN DIEGO – Tony’s Auto Center, a towing company in Chula Vista, California, has agreed to a settlement to resolve allegations that it violated the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) when it auctioned a car owned by an active-duty servicemember while he was deployed at sea.

    According to the United States’ complaint, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Jonathan Liongson was deployed in November 2022 aboard the USS Bunker Hill. Before leaving for deployment, Lieutenant Liongson had placed personal items in his 2011 Mazda 6 and parked the car at a friend’s house.

    While Lieutenant Liongson was at sea, the Chula Vista Police Department impounded the car because of an expired registration, and Tony’s Auto Center towed the car to its facility. About two months later, Tony’s Auto Center, through its agent, sold Lieutenant Liongson’s car at auction without first obtaining a court order authorizing the sale, as is required by the SCRA. In March 2023, the Lieutenant returned home from deployment to find that his car had been towed. He then contacted Tony’s Auto Center and learned that they had sold his car.

    The SCRA is a federal law that provides legal and financial protections to military members and their families while they are in military service. One of the SCRA’s protections requires anyone holding a lien on the property of a servicemember to obtain a court order prior to auctioning off, selling or otherwise disposing of that property.

    “The SCRA protects the rights of the men and women who serve in our Armed Forces, which allows them to devote their full attention to defending our country,” said U.S. Attorney Adam Gordon. “While Lieutenant Liongson was at sea, he understood that his ship’s mission and the duration of their deployment could change at any moment. He accepted that reality in the fulfillment of his solemn oath. In turn, the SCRA provides grace and understanding about certain personal affairs. Lieutenant Liongson’s car should not have been auctioned off in his absence. We hope this settlement encourages all towing companies to review and improve their policies and ensure that the rights of all servicemembers are honored and respected.”

    “Members of our armed forces should not have to worry about their cars being auctioned off while they are deployed on missions defending our freedoms, liberties and rights,” said Assistant Attorney General Harmeet K. Dhillon of the Civil Rights Division. “This settlement should send a strong message to other towing companies that they should not take advantage of our servicemembers while they are keeping Americans safe.”

    Under the settlement agreement, Lieutenant Liongson will receive $7,500 in damages. The United States will also receive a $2,000 civil penalty, and Tony’s Auto Center must implement new policies to prevent future violations of the SCRA.

    The Civil Rights Division’s Housing and Civil Enforcement Section and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California jointly handled this case. Since 2011, the Justice Department has obtained more than $481 million in monetary relief for more than 147,000 servicemembers through its enforcement of the SCRA. For more information about the department’s SCRA enforcement efforts, please visit https://www.justice.gov/servicemembers.

    Servicemembers and their dependents who believe that their rights under the SCRA have been violated should contact the nearest Armed Forces Legal Assistance Program Office. Office locations can be found at https://legalassistance.law.af.mil/.

    This case was handled by Assistant U.S. Attorney Kelly A. Reis.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Mike Levin Reintroduces Legislation to Ban Drilling Off of Southern California

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Mike Levin (CA-49)

    April 22, 2025

    Washington, D.C. – Today, Rep. Mike Levin (CA-49) reintroduced the Southern California Coast and Ocean Protection Act, which would prohibit offshore drilling along the Southern California coast, as a part of a larger initiative to ban offshore drilling in sensitive areas and protect our vibrant coastal communities.

    Rep. Levin’s bill, The Southern California Coast and Ocean Protection Act, would prevent new leasing for the exploration, development, or production of oil or natural gas along the Southern California coast, from San Diego to the northern border of San Luis Obispo County.

    Rep. Levin introduced this bill along with:

    • Rep. Huffman’s (D-CA) West Coast Ocean Protection Act
    • Rep. Pallone’s (D-NJ) Clean Ocean and Safe Tourism (COAST) Anti-Drilling Act
    • Rep. Castor’s (D-FL) Florida Coast Protection Act
    • Rep. Carbajal’s (D-CA) California Clean Coast Act
    • Rep. Panetta’s (D-CA) Central Coast of California Conservation Act of 2025
    • Rep. Magaziner’s (D-RI) New England Coastal Protection Act of 2025
    • Rep. Ross’ (D-NC) Defend our Coast Act

    These bills would prohibit the Secretary of the Interior from issuing any oil and gas lease leases or any other authorizations along the entire coast of California and in other coastal areas across the country. Together, these bills will protect valuable ecosystems and the economic viability of communities concerned about oil spills.

    “I’m joining my colleagues to permanently protect our beautiful coasts and put a stop to offshore drilling in sensitive areas,” said Rep. Mike Levin. “These bills take a vitally important step in protecting our communities from the consequences of offshore drilling, especially as the Trump Administration attempts to unleash drilling on our coastline in San Diego and Orange County. The Administration wants to risk disastrous environmental impacts on our beaches, threatening our coastal economy and way of life to line the pockets of oil executives. I’m proud to join my colleagues in the California Delegation and across the country in taking a stand against offshore drilling nationwide.”

    Rep. Levin has advocated extensively for a ban on offshore drilling. In November 2024, Rep. Levin sent a letter to the Biden Administration that resulted in the withdrawal of future oil and natural gas leasing in sensitive coastal areas across the country, including in Southern California. In January 2025, the Trump Administration once again opened these areas to drilling and has taken measures to expand offshore drilling and roll back environmental regulations
                              

    “The Southern California Coast and Ocean Protection Act will protect our environment, economy, climate, and way of life from the harmful effects of offshore oil and gas development. The 2021 Amplify Energy Oil Spill off Orange County showed the damage that offshore drilling can inflict on coastal ecosystems and marine wildlife and triggered beach and fishery closures that disrupted southern California’s tourism-based economy. The Surfrider Foundation urges members of Congress to support these and other bills to permanently prohibit new offshore drilling in U.S. waters,” said Pete Stauffer, Ocean Protection Manager, Surfrider Foundation.

    “Southern California’s coastal communities depend on thriving oceans and wildlife, and they know all too well the devastating costs of offshore spills, busted pipelines, and oil-covered beaches,” said Joseph Gordon, Oceana Campaign Director. “Oceana commends Congressman Levin for reintroducing this important legislation that would permanently protect the Golden State’s beloved southern coast from the dangers of oil and gas drilling and spilling. This bill is part of a state and national movement to safeguard our multi-billion-dollar coastal economies from dirty and dangerous offshore drilling.” 

    “The Surf Industry Members Association is proud to support the Southern California Coast and Ocean Protection Act. Our coastline is not just a vital economic engine—it’s the heart of our culture and way of life for millions across the region. Prohibiting new offshore oil and gas leasing in Southern California is a critical step to protect our waves, our marine ecosystems, and the communities that depend on them. We urge Congress to pass it to ensure a clean, thriving ocean for generations to come,” said Vipe Desai, Executive Director, Surf Industry Members Association

    “This administration is determined to sell off our oceans to pad Big Oil pockets. Permanently protecting the waters off southern California puts coastal communities and wildlife above polluters and brings us closer to a world where our waters are free from oil spills, endangered whale populations are free from seismic blasting, and ecosystems have a chance to thrive,” said Taryn Kiekow Heimer, Director of Ocean Energy at NRDC (Natural Resources Defense Council).  “Now more than ever, we need leadership from Congress to set us back on track to tackle climate change and protect our ocean from an industry that only cares about its bottom line.”

    This legislation is endorsed by organizations including: Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Earthjustice, Oceana, Sierra Club, Surfrider Foundation, League of Conservation Voters, Futureswell, Ocean Conservancy, Environment America, WILDCOAST, Surf Industry Members Association, Food & Water Watch, Peace Boat US, Defenders of Wildlife, Ocean Defense Initiative, Center for Biological Diversity, The Ocean Project, Business Alliance to Protect the Pacific Coast, Animal Welfare Institute, U.S. Climate Action Network, American Bird Conservancy, Hispanic Access Foundation

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: D.C. Man Admits to 2023 Killing at Navy Yard Metro Station

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    WASHINGTON – Tyriq Williams, 31, of the District of Columbia, pleaded guilty today to second-degree murder for the 2023 shooting murder of Terry Clark, announced U.S. Attorney Edward R. Martin Jr. and Chief Pamela Smith of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). 

    Superior Court Judge Todd E. Edelman accepted the factual basis for the plea and scheduled sentencing for July 19, 2025. The guilty plea, which is contingent upon the Court’s approval at sentencing, called for an agreed-upon prison sentence of between 14 and 18 years, followed by a period of supervised release. 

    On January 7, 2023, the defendant and his girlfriend encountered Mr. Clark on an escalator leaving the Navy Yard Metro Station. The defendant and Mr. Clark did not know each other. After both men left the station, Williams turned around and shot Mr. Clark one time, causing his death. The defendant then went back into the station and took the train to Congress Heights Metro Station, where he took a bus to his place of employment. Williams told a friend that he needed a ride, and his friend picked the defendant up and drove him to the bus stop, where Williams got back on the same bus that he previously rode. The shooting was not captured on video, but law enforcement located the defendant on other video surveillance, including Washington Metro Area Transit Authority surveillance around the metro station and on the bus.  After an investigation, Williams was apprehended, and detectives found, pursuant to a search warrant of the defendant’s home, distinctive clothing that he wore on the night of the shooting.

    Williams has been in custody since his arrest on January 20, 2023.

    This case is being investigated by detectives and other personnel of the Metropolitan Police Department and Metro Transit Police Department. 

    This case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Molly K. Smith and Jamie Carter. This case was investigated by former Assistant U.S. Attorney John Interrante. 

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Video: Marine Aviators At Work 💪🏼

    Source: United States Department of Defense (video statements)

    —————
    @marines participate in a seven-week Weapons and Tactics Instructors Course at Libby Army Airfield, Sierra Vista, Ariz., while integrating the six functions of Marine Corps aviation: assault support, antiair warfare, offensive air support, electronic warfare, control of aircraft and missiles, and aerial reconnaissance.

    For more on the Department of Defense, visit: http://www.defense.gov
    —————
    Keep up with the Department of Defense on social media!

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    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Security: Former U.S. Army Intelligence Analyst Sentenced for Selling Sensitive Military Information to Individual Tied to Chinese Government

    Source: United States Attorneys General 1

    A former U.S. Army intelligence analyst was sentenced today to 84 months in prison for conspiring to collect and transmit national defense information, including sensitive, non-public U.S. military information, to an individual he believed was affiliated with the Chinese government.

    Korbein Schultz, 25, of Wills Point, Texas, pleaded guilty in August 2024 to conspiring to collect and transmit national defense information, unlawfully exporting controlled information to China, and accepting bribes in exchange of sensitive, non-public U.S. government information.

    “This defendant swore an oath to defend the United States — instead, he betrayed it for a payout and put America’s military and service members at risk,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “The Justice Department remains vigilant against China’s efforts to target our military and will ensure that those who leak military secrets spend years behind bars.”

    “This sentencing is a stark warning to those who betray our country: you will pay a steep price for it,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “The People’s Republic of China is relentless in its efforts to steal our national defense information, and service members are a prime target. The FBI and our partners will continue to root out espionage and hold those accountable who abandon their obligation to safeguard defense information from hostile foreign governments.”

    “Those who collaborate with America’s foreign adversaries put our country, and those who defend it, at grave risk and we will do whatever it takes to hold them accountable for their crimes,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Robert E. McGuire for the Middle District of Tennessee. “We will proudly stand in support of our men and women in uniform and work diligently to protect them from people like the defendant who would sell them out for a few bucks.”

    “Protecting classified information is paramount to our national security, and this sentencing reflects the ramifications when there is a breach of that trust,” said Brigadier General Rhett R. Cox, Commanding General of the Army Counterintelligence Command. “This Soldier’s actions put Army personnel at risk placing individual gain above personal honor. Army Counterintelligence Command, in close collaboration with the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Intelligence Community, remains steadfast in our commitment to safeguarding our nation’s secrets and urges all current and former Army personnel to report any suspicious contact immediately.”

    According to court documents, between May 2022 until his arrest in March 2024, Schultz engaged in an ongoing conspiracy to provide dozens of sensitive U.S. military documents — many containing export-controlled tactical and technical information — directly to a foreign national residing in the People’s Republic of China. Despite clear indications that this individual, who is referenced in the Indictment as Conspirator A, was likely connected to the Chinese government, the defendant continued the relationship in exchange for financial compensation. In exchange for approximately $42,000, Schultz provided documents and data related to U.S. military capabilities, including:

    • His Army unit’s operational order before it was deployed to Eastern Europe in support of NATO operations;
    • Lessons learned by the U.S. Army from the Ukraine/Russia conflict applicable to Taiwan’s defense;
    • Technical manuals for the HH-60 helicopter, F-22A fighter aircraft, and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile systems;
    • Information on Chinese military tactics and the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force;
    • Details on U.S. military exercises in the Republic of Korea and the Philippines;
    • Documents concerning U.S. military satellites and missile defense systems like the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).
    • Tactics for countering unmanned aerial systems in large-scale combat operations.

    Conspirator A first contacted the defendant through a freelance web-based work platform shortly after the defendant received his Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) clearance. Masquerading as a client from a geopolitical consulting firm, Conspirator A solicited the defendant to produce detailed analyses on U.S. military capabilities and planning, particularly in relation to Taiwan and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

    As the relationship progressed, Conspirator A’s demands grew increasingly specific and sensitive — requesting technical manuals, operational procedures, and intelligence assessments. Conspirator A made explicit his interest in materials that were not publicly available and encouraged the defendant to seek out higher levels of classification, emphasizing “exclusiveness” and “CUI and better.”  Schultz agreed to obtain higher levels of classified information for Conspirator A in exchange for money.

    The defendant, fully aware of the grave national security implications, used his position and access to restricted databases — including closed U.S. government computer networks — to download and transmit at least 92 sensitive U.S. military documents.

    The case also revealed attempts by the defendant to recruit his friend and fellow Army intelligence analyst into the conspiracy. At the time, Schultz’s friend was assigned to the U.S. Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), which is the combatant command that covers China and its regional areas of influence. Schultz and Conspirator A discussed the need to recruit another person into their scheme who had better access to classified material. They agreed that such recruitment needed to be done in a “nice and slow fashion.”

    The FBI’s Nashville Field Office investigated the case, with valuable assistance from the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Command and the Department of Defense.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Josh Kurtzman for the Middle District of Tennessee and Trial Attorneys Adam Barry and Christopher Cook of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section prosecuted the case.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: April Federal Grand Jury 2024-B Indictments Announced

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    United States Attorney Clint Johnson today announced the results of the April Federal Grand Jury 2024-B Indictments.

    The following individuals have been charged with violations of United States law in indictments returned by the Grand Jury. The return of an indictment is a method of informing a defendant of alleged violations of federal law, which must be proven in a court of law beyond a reasonable doubt to overcome a defendant’s presumption of innocence.

    Jose Alvizo-Ramirez. Unlawful Reentry of a Removed Alien; Failure to Register as a Sex Offender. Alvizo-Ramirez, 38, a Mexican national, is charged with unlawfully reentering the United States after having been previously removed in May 2022. He is further charged with knowingly failing to register as a sex offender from January 6, 2025, to on or about March 26, 2025. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Dallas Field Office is the investigative agency. Assistant U.S. Attorney William Dill is prosecuting the case. 25-CR-143

    Richard Glenn Bexfield. Drug Conspiracy; Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition; Destruction and Removal of Property to Prevent Seizure; Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime. Bexfield, 32, of Tulsa, is charged with conspiring to distribute methamphetamine from Jan. 2025 through Apr. 2025. He knowingly destroyed and disposed of property in an effort to prevent law enforcement from seizing the property. Further, Bexfield is charged with possessing a firearm and ammunition, knowing he was previously convicted of felonies and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The Drug Enforcement Administration Tulsa Resident Office, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, and the Tulsa Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorney Attila Bogdan is prosecuting the case. 25-CR-136

    Cesar Castorena-Dondiego. Unlawful Reentry of a Removed Alien. Castorena-Dondiego, 44, a Mexican national, is charged with unlawfully reentering the United States after having been previously removed in Sep. 2018. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Dallas Field Office is the investigative agency. Assistant U.S. Attorney Tara Heign is prosecuting the case. 25-CR-145

    Clint Allen Hubble. Attempted Coercion and Enticement of a Minor. Hubble, 46, of Afton, is charged with attempting to persuade and entice a minor child to engage in sexually explicit activity. The Homeland Security Investigations and the Owasso Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorney Kate Brandon is prosecuting the case. 25-CR-146

    Wilber Martinez-Bonilla. Unlawful Reentry of a Removed Alien. Martinez-Bonilla, 39, a Mexican national, is charged with unlawfully reentering the United States after having been previously removed in May 2014. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Dallas Field Office is the investigative agency. Assistant U.S. Attorney Augustus Forster is prosecuting the case. 
    25-CR-147

    Paul Eugene McClain. Felon in Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition. McClain, 56, of Tulsa, is charged with possessing a firearm and ammunition, knowing he was previously convicted of several felonies. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and the Tulsa Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephanie Ihler is prosecuting the case. 25-CR-148

    Aaron Wilkie Murphy; Hong Thoa Thi Nguyen; Joshua Clay Murphy; Toymeka Louise Shackleford. Continuing Criminal Enterprise (Count 1); Drug Conspiracy (Count 2); Possession of Fentanyl with Intent to Distribute (Count 3); Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute (Count 4); Maintaining a Drug-Involved Premises (Counts 5 & 6); International Travel to Promote, Manage, Establish, Carry On, and Facilitate Drug Conspiracy (Count 7) (superseding). Aaron Murphy, 51, of Broken Arrow, is charged with organizing, leading, and profiting from the distribution of methamphetamine and fentanyl. He knowingly conspired with several others to possess and distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl, while maintaining a residence for the purpose of drug distribution, and traveled to Mexico to manage and further promote his enterprise drug conspiracy. Nguyen, 45, of Tulsa, Joshua Murphy, 47, of Milfay, Shackleford, 49, of Tulsa, are charged with conspiring to possess and distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl from Mar. 2022 through Feb. 2025. Nguyen is additionally charged with maintaining a residence for the purpose of narcotics distribution. The Drug Enforcement Administration Tulsa Resident Office, the U.S. Marshal Service Tulsa Field Office, and the Tulsa Police Department are investigating the case. The DEA Mexico City Country Office, along with the Hermosillo Mexico Resident Office, the U.S. Marshal Service Mexico City Field Office, Mexican Marines, and the Mexico Federal Police, assisted in the arrest and return of Aaron Murphy and Nguyen. Assistant U.S. Attorney Adam Bailey is prosecuting the case. 23-CR-199

    Roberto Perez-Cruz. Unlawful Reentry of a Removed Alien. Perez-Cruz, 21, a Mexican national, is charged with unlawfully reentering the United States after having been previously removed in Oct. 2021. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Dallas Field Office is the investigative agency. Assistant U.S. Attorney Tyson McCoy is prosecuting the case. 25-CR-149

    Carlos Alberto Vazquez Parra. Possession of Fentanyl with Intent to Distribute. Vazquez Parra, 33, of Tulsa, is charged with knowingly possessing more than 40 grams of fentanyl with intent to distribute. The Drug Enforcement Administration Tulsa Resident Office and the Tulsa Police Department are the investigative agencies. Assistant U.S. Attorney Tyson McCoy is prosecuting the case. 25-CR-150

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-Evening Report: The origin story of the Anzac biscuit is largely myth – but that shouldn’t obscure the history of women during the war

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Garritt C. Van Dyk, Senior Lecturer in History, University of Waikato

    Australian Comforts Fund buffet in Longueval, France, 1916. Australian War Memorial

    The Anzac biscuit is a cultural icon, infused with mythical value, representing the connection between women on the home front and soldiers serving overseas during the first world war.

    A baked good developed to survive the trip to the trenches and lift the spirits of the troops has the seductive appeal of folklore specific to Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand.

    There is another story linked to the myth, however, about women who worked to provide necessities and small comforts to those serving in the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

    The Anzac biscuit myth

    Soldiers at the front had biscuits, of a sort, in their rations but these were more like 18th century “ship’s biscuit”, or hard tack, called “tile”, “wafers”, or “army biscuits”.

    Made from flour, water and dry milk, tile was nonperishable and didn’t get mouldy, but it was so hard it had to be soaked before eating to avoid cracking a tooth. Soldiers would sometimes grate the moistened biscuit and cook it with water for an improvised porridge.

    The biscuits were so tough that soldiers even used them as stationery.

    Cakes and biscuits in sealed tins were requested as donations from the public, but had to meet requirements to ensure they would not spoil by the time they arrived.

    It is unlikely Anzac biscuits made according to today’s recipe were packed in tins by mothers, wives and girlfriends and shipped overseas to soldiers. As a matter of practicality, shredded coconut included in the recipe would have probably become rancid in transit.

    Australia soldiers at Ribemont, France, opening parcels from the Australian Comforts Fund, March 1917.
    Australian War Memorial

    The idea of our modern Anzac biscuits being sent to the front line is most likely an invented tradition, created after the fact. The first thing we would recognise as our current recipe did not appear until 1927.

    But women were sending biscuits, and more, to their men on the front lines in the crucial role of providing creature comforts.

    The War Chest Cookery Book

    The Australian Comforts Fund was a national group founded in 1916 to coordinate state volunteer organisations, run mainly by women.

    The War Chest Cookery Book, published in 1917.
    Trove

    In 1917, the New South Wales branch printed the The War Chest Cookery Book. Paid advertisements on every page allowed the fund to donate all proceeds from the sale of the cookbook “to substantially augment the funds of the War Chest”.

    In this book we find the first printed recipe for a biscuit with “Anzac” in the title. The recipe bears no resemblance to today’s version, except for the name. Neither oats nor coconut were included. Instead, the recipe called for eggs, rice flour, cinnamon and mixed spice, and the baked biscuits were sandwiched together with jam and topped with icing.

    The motto of the Australian Comforts Fund, “keep the fit man fit”, differentiated their mission from the lifesaving supplies delivered by the Red Cross.

    The war chest allowed the distribution of nonessential items that included necessities like such as socks, mittens and singlets, but also comforts of home like such as pyjamas, razor blades and tobacco.

    Special shipments included morale boosters like such as Christmas hampers with plum puddings, gramophones, sporting goods, postcards and pencils.

    Women from the Australian Comforts Fund distributing packages to soldiers in Abbassieh, Egypt, during the first world war.
    State Library Victoria

    Women in the fund also ran canteens near the front serving soup, coffee, tea, and cocoa. The fund provided twelve million mugs of hot drinks between January 1917 and June 1918 alone.

    A soldier’s memoir from the winter of 1916 in the Somme recalled how the promise of the kitchen kept him going:

    We desire to acknowledge our debt to the Australian Comforts Fund. Their soup kitchen was the goal to which even the weariest man persevered during the dreadful outward journeys from the line.

    A dubious debut: not your Nan’s Anzac biscuit

    Today, Anzac biscuits baked for commercial production and sale must adhere to the Australian Department of Veteran Affairs Guidelines, established in 1994, which regulate the use of the word Anzac (and prohibit the use of the word “cookie” to describe them).

    This first iteration of Anzac biscuits would most certainly not comply with the guidelines as they “substantially deviate from the accepted recipe” which features ingredients including oats, golden syrup and coconut.

    Two other recipes in the War Chest Cookbook for rolled oat biscuits are closer, and omit eggs, but they lack the binding power of golden syrup and the characteristic crunch of desiccated coconut.

    The combination of oats and golden syrup first appears in the Melbourne newspaper The Argus on September 15 1920 when Josephine, from East Brunswick, contributed her recipe for “ANZAC Biscuits or Crispies”.

    A recipe for Anzac biscuits with “cocoanut” was not published until the late 1920s, in the Brisbane Sunday Mail on June 26 1927.

    This late introduction of the full recipe is a reminder that while biscuits got sent overseas, they were not the “official” Anzac biscuits we know today.

    A recipe for Anzac biscuits with ‘cocoanut’ was not published until the late 1920s.
    May Lawrence/Unsplash

    The story behind the biscuit

    Defining and preserving the identity of the Anzac biscuit affirms a tangible symbol of national identity. While the recipe may have been invented after the fact, a consistent standard encourages the continuity of remembrance through the uniformity of a shared tradition.

    Women packing food for the Australian Comfort Fund’s war chests.
    Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales

    The myth of domestic bakers dispatching this specific recipe to soldiers, however, should not eclipse the efforts of the Australian Comforts Fund, fundraising on a national scale, and running makeshift canteens in a war zone.

    Women weren’t just baking in their kitchens: they were organising and delivering resources at home and overseas, benefiting soldiers at the front lines.

    Garritt C. Van Dyk has received funding from the Getty Research Institute.

    ref. The origin story of the Anzac biscuit is largely myth – but that shouldn’t obscure the history of women during the war – https://theconversation.com/the-origin-story-of-the-anzac-biscuit-is-largely-myth-but-that-shouldnt-obscure-the-history-of-women-during-the-war-252039

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: Former U.S. Army Intelligence Analyst Sentenced for Selling Sensitive Military Information to Individual Tied to Chinese Government

    Source: US State of North Dakota

    A former U.S. Army intelligence analyst was sentenced today to 84 months in prison for conspiring to collect and transmit national defense information, including sensitive, non-public U.S. military information, to an individual he believed was affiliated with the Chinese government.

    Korbein Schultz, 25, of Wills Point, Texas, pleaded guilty in August 2024 to conspiring to collect and transmit national defense information, unlawfully exporting controlled information to China, and accepting bribes in exchange of sensitive, non-public U.S. government information.

    “This defendant swore an oath to defend the United States — instead, he betrayed it for a payout and put America’s military and service members at risk,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “The Justice Department remains vigilant against China’s efforts to target our military and will ensure that those who leak military secrets spend years behind bars.”

    “This sentencing is a stark warning to those who betray our country: you will pay a steep price for it,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “The People’s Republic of China is relentless in its efforts to steal our national defense information, and service members are a prime target. The FBI and our partners will continue to root out espionage and hold those accountable who abandon their obligation to safeguard defense information from hostile foreign governments.”

    “Those who collaborate with America’s foreign adversaries put our country, and those who defend it, at grave risk and we will do whatever it takes to hold them accountable for their crimes,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Robert E. McGuire for the Middle District of Tennessee. “We will proudly stand in support of our men and women in uniform and work diligently to protect them from people like the defendant who would sell them out for a few bucks.”

    “Protecting classified information is paramount to our national security, and this sentencing reflects the ramifications when there is a breach of that trust,” said Brigadier General Rhett R. Cox, Commanding General of the Army Counterintelligence Command. “This Soldier’s actions put Army personnel at risk placing individual gain above personal honor. Army Counterintelligence Command, in close collaboration with the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Intelligence Community, remains steadfast in our commitment to safeguarding our nation’s secrets and urges all current and former Army personnel to report any suspicious contact immediately.”

    According to court documents, between May 2022 until his arrest in March 2024, Schultz engaged in an ongoing conspiracy to provide dozens of sensitive U.S. military documents — many containing export-controlled tactical and technical information — directly to a foreign national residing in the People’s Republic of China. Despite clear indications that this individual, who is referenced in the Indictment as Conspirator A, was likely connected to the Chinese government, the defendant continued the relationship in exchange for financial compensation. In exchange for approximately $42,000, Schultz provided documents and data related to U.S. military capabilities, including:

    • His Army unit’s operational order before it was deployed to Eastern Europe in support of NATO operations;
    • Lessons learned by the U.S. Army from the Ukraine/Russia conflict applicable to Taiwan’s defense;
    • Technical manuals for the HH-60 helicopter, F-22A fighter aircraft, and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile systems;
    • Information on Chinese military tactics and the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force;
    • Details on U.S. military exercises in the Republic of Korea and the Philippines;
    • Documents concerning U.S. military satellites and missile defense systems like the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).
    • Tactics for countering unmanned aerial systems in large-scale combat operations.

    Conspirator A first contacted the defendant through a freelance web-based work platform shortly after the defendant received his Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) clearance. Masquerading as a client from a geopolitical consulting firm, Conspirator A solicited the defendant to produce detailed analyses on U.S. military capabilities and planning, particularly in relation to Taiwan and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

    As the relationship progressed, Conspirator A’s demands grew increasingly specific and sensitive — requesting technical manuals, operational procedures, and intelligence assessments. Conspirator A made explicit his interest in materials that were not publicly available and encouraged the defendant to seek out higher levels of classification, emphasizing “exclusiveness” and “CUI and better.”  Schultz agreed to obtain higher levels of classified information for Conspirator A in exchange for money.

    The defendant, fully aware of the grave national security implications, used his position and access to restricted databases — including closed U.S. government computer networks — to download and transmit at least 92 sensitive U.S. military documents.

    The case also revealed attempts by the defendant to recruit his friend and fellow Army intelligence analyst into the conspiracy. At the time, Schultz’s friend was assigned to the U.S. Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), which is the combatant command that covers China and its regional areas of influence. Schultz and Conspirator A discussed the need to recruit another person into their scheme who had better access to classified material. They agreed that such recruitment needed to be done in a “nice and slow fashion.”

    The FBI’s Nashville Field Office investigated the case, with valuable assistance from the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Command and the Department of Defense.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Josh Kurtzman for the Middle District of Tennessee and Trial Attorneys Adam Barry and Christopher Cook of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section prosecuted the case.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission Reports on Kosovo – A10-0075/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission Reports on Kosovo

    (2025/2019(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and Kosovo, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 April 2016,

     having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2022,

     having regard to Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe of 12 May 2022,

     having regard to the framework agreement between the European Union and Kosovo on the general principles for the participation of Kosovo in Union programmes[2], in force since 1 August 2017,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[3],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[4],

     having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans Summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia, of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb, of 6 October 2021 in Brdo pri Kranju, of 6 December 2022 in Tirana, of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

     having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0692),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Kosovo 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0692),

     having regard to the general summary and the country assessments by the Commission, dated 31 May 2023 and 13 June 2024, on Kosovo’s economic reform programme,

     having regard to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye, adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

     having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion of 22 July 2010 on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, and to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/298 of 9 September 2010, which acknowledged the content of the ICJ opinion and welcomed the EU’s readiness to facilitate dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo,

     having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

     having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and to the implementation annex thereto,

     having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1095 of 5 June 2023 amending Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo)[5], which extended the mission’s mandate until 14 June 2025,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/850 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 April 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (Kosovo)[6],

     having regard to the final report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2021 municipal elections in Kosovo,

     having regard to the preliminary report of the European Union Election Observation Mission on the 2025 parliamentary elections in Kosovo,

     having regard to the fourth meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Council between the European Union and Kosovo held in Brussels on 7 December 2021,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Kosovo,

     having regard to the joint recommendations adopted at the 12th meeting of the EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 9 December 2024,

     having regard to the 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International,

     having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders,

     having regard to the Democracy Report 2024 of March 2024 by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0075/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement policy is one of the most effective EU foreign policy instruments and one of the most successful policies to incentivise and encourage fundamental reforms, and is a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B. whereas democracy, human rights and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    C. whereas the EU enlargement process is a strategic tool for strengthening stability, democracy and economic development in Europe, and each enlargement country is judged on its own merits and whereas it is the implementation of the necessary reforms and compliance with the set of criteria and common European values that determines the timetable and progress of accession; whereas Kosovo’s path towards EU membership also depends on the normalisation of relations with Serbia;

    D. whereas the EU is the largest provider of financial support to Kosovo;

    E. whereas Kosovo has been subjected to foreign interference and disinformation campaigns, particularly from Russia, especially through Serbian nationalist outlets, and China, through soft power, aiming to destabilise its democratic institutions, jeopardise societal cohesion, and incite ethnic violence; whereas the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023 was followed by a massive spread of disinformation that further exacerbated tensions; whereas Kosovo authorities adopted the Law on the Independent Media Commission (IMC) in July 2024; whereas, in May 2024, the Council of Europe published a legal opinion on the draft law on the IMC expressing concerns related to certain aspects of the at-that-time draft law, and providing recommendations on how to address these concerns; whereas the final text of the Law on the IMC did not reflect most of the recommendations made;

    F. whereas the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, also known as EULEX, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the common security and defence policy of the European Union;

    G. whereas in 2018 and 2023, petitions were signed by over 500 people who historically self-identify as Bulgarian;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Commends Kosovo’s commitment to EU accession, which reflects a clear strategic geopolitical choice, and the continued strong support of its citizens for Kosovo’s European path; reiterates that Kosovo has been consistent in its efforts to integrate into the European Union;

    2. Reiterates its firm belief that Kosovo’s future lies in the EU and that all efforts to bring Kosovo out of the ‘grey zone’ are in the interest of the people of both Kosovo and the EU, especially in the context of the current geopolitical dynamics in the region, rapid major shifts in world politics and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

    3. Supports Kosovo’s application for EU membership, which reflects the overwhelming cross-party consensus on EU integration and a clear geopolitical strategic choice; reiterates its call on the Member States in the Council to mandate the Commission to present its questionnaire and to submit its opinion on the merits of the country’s application; calls on the five non-recognising Member States that have not yet recognised Kosovo’s independence to do so without delay and thus allow Kosovo to progress on its EU path on an equal footing with the other candidate countries;  recalls the advisory opinion of the ICJ dated 22 July 2010, which states that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence does not violate general international law;

    4. Recalls that membership of the European Union is based on a merit-based process, conditional on the rigorous implementation of reforms aligned with the highest European standards, in particular compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and the rule of law, and ensures the effective application of laws in practice; encourages Kosovo to continue its efforts in this regard, by further strengthening its commitment to the values ​​and standards of the Union; stresses that enlargement also implies thorough preparation of potential new members, while respecting the economic stability of the internal market, social and environmental standards and the proper functioning of the European institutions;

    5. Welcomes the visa liberalisation, adopted in April 2023 and in place since 1 January 2024, as a tangible result of Kosovo’s ever-closer relations with the EU and as evidence of Kosovo’s efforts on the path of European integration; welcomes Kosovo’s decision to unilaterally abolish visa requirements for citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina; welcomes the decision of Spain to recognise ordinary passports issued by Kosovo as valid travel documents as of January 2024;

    6. Notes the tangible progress in the areas of justice, freedom and security, the fight against organised crime and a functioning market economy; regrets the limited progress and calls for an acceleration of reforms in the area of rule of law; welcomes Kosovo’s ambition to advance the implementation of reforms, which remains the country’s priority; regrets the lack of a decision-making quorum in the Kosovo National Assembly, caused by the boycott of the Assembly work by political parties ahead of parliamentary elections;

    7. Regrets the politicisation of institutions such as the Central Election Commission and the IMC;

    8. Commends Kosovo’s ongoing alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, in particular its firm condemnation of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and its implementation of the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus, aligning with the Union’s foreign policy, and its support through humanitarian aid and military assistance packages to Ukraine, which confirm that Kosovo is a reliable and valuable partner committed to EU integration and confirms its clear geopolitical orientation, firmly anchored in the European and transatlantic alliance;

    9. Calls for the immediate lifting of the EU measures against Kosovo, which are no longer justified as Kosovo has fulfilled the EU requirements and as the measures also stand in gross contradiction to Kosovo’s demonstrated commitment to European values and alignment with EU policies, limiting the impact of the EU’s partnership with Kosovo and hindering the resumption of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in good faith;

    10. Reiterates its full support for Kosovo’s application for membership of the Council of Europe and for the country’s strategic orientation plan to join the NATO Partnership for Peace programme and its bids to join other international organisations; calls on the relevant organisations and the Member States to proactively support Kosovo’s respective bids; calls on the Commission and the EU Office in Kosovo to step up their efforts in enhancing visibility and promoting the role, efforts and benefits of the closer partnership between the EU and Kosovo;

    11. Welcomes the fact that Kosovo reduced administrative burden by simplifying procedures through the implementation of the related program for 2022-2027; notes that the strategic framework for public administration is in place, but not efficiently implemented; regrets the fact that delays in public administration reform have left EU funding management weak and that accountability in the public sector is insufficient; calls on Kosovo to improve public administration and the merit-based civil service system by amending and adopting the Law on public officials and the Law on the independent oversight board of civil service;

    12. Regrets that the Kosovo Constitutional Court ruling on the Law on salaries, which unifies the current system of remuneration for public officials, is not yet functional; calls on the Kosovo Government to revise its legislation on public financial management to meet international standards and to incorporate the public investment methodology into the revised legislation;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13. Welcomes the important and positive progress on addressing many of the EU Election Observation Mission’s (EU EOM) long-standing recommendations and on presenting a consensual law on general elections; notes that this provides an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections, in line with international and regional standards; notes that in response to an invitation by the president of Kosovo, the European Union deployed an EU EOM, including an observer delegation of Members of the European Parliament, to observe the parliamentary elections in Kosovo on 9 February 2025; welcomes the conclusions of the EU EOM confirming the conduct of peaceful, free and fair elections on 9 February 2025 with the participation of all communities in Kosovo; regrets the harsh rhetoric of the political parties during the campaign; takes note of the technical problems encountered during the counting process and encourages the Kosovo authorities to increase their efforts to improve the organisation of the next elections; notes the lack of genuine political pluralism within the Kosovo Serb community at the parliamentary elections, despite multiple Kosovo Serb electoral lists; is concerned by reports of continuous pressure on voters from the Serbian community exercised by Belgrade; condemns the repeated interference in the electoral campaign by US Special Envoy Richard Grenell;

    14. Notes with concern that the Law on Local Elections and the Law on General Elections are still not implemented and harmonised with the Law on Gender Equality, which mandates 50 % equal representation of women and men; regrets that women continue to be underrepresented;

    15. Welcomes the adoption of the law on the Special Prosecution Office and the progress in adjudicating corruption cases; commends the active work of the Special Prosecution Office for solving seven war crime cases; calls for further clarification of the division of jurisdiction between the Special Prosecution Office and the Basic Prosecution in handling investigations and prosecutions; calls on Kosovo to continue strengthening the Special Prosecution Office by enhancing its capacity to investigate and prosecute high-profile organised crime cases; calls on the police and Special Prosecution Office to work closely together to develop strategies for conducting investigations more effectively, with a clear division of responsibility;

    16. Takes note of the progress in Kosovo’s ranking in the Corruption Perceptions Index, as it has moved upward 10 places since last year, considering it to be a positive development while acknowledging that this is attributable both to decreases in other countries’ scores and, more significantly, to the adoption of qualitative legislation, but that it still remains largely unsatisfactory; emphasises that gaining people’s trust requires not only legislative reforms but also visible results in investigating, prosecuting and convicting cases of corruption at all levels; regrets that Kosovo has lacked an anti-corruption strategy since 2019 and urges for more efforts to finalise it as a matter of priority; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption; reiterates that strong political commitment is necessary to establish a solid track record in fighting high-level corruption;

    17. Expresses serious concern about systemic vulnerabilities in Kosovo’s judiciary, particularly regarding the independence of the justice system and respect for separation of powers; reiterates its concern about delays to trials and continued criticism by government officials of judicial decisions in individual cases; notes with concern that despite EU advice, the government failed to consult the Venice Commission on judicial reforms, negatively affecting their quality and alignment with European standards; calls on Kosovo to ensure that legislation governing the integrity and accountability of the judiciary is consistent with European standards and Venice Commission recommendations; calls on the Government of Kosovo to allocate adequate budget for the judicial system; welcomes the establishment of the Commercial Court, progress in the recruitment of new judges and prosecutors in a merit-based and transparent process, and an overall increase of transparency;

    18. Welcomes the participation of Kosovo Serbs in the parliamentary elections and encourages their elected representatives to play an active role within the Kosovo legislative framework, in support of Kosovo’s European future; regrets, however, the boycott of parties representing Kosovo Serbs during the local elections in April 2023 and the withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions; expresses concern over Serbia’s interference in the parliamentary elections through Srpska Lista (SL);

    19. Welcomes the implementation of the 2016 judgement of the Constitutional Court on the Visoki Dečani/Deçani Monastery land ownership by registering the monastery as the owner, in March 2024;

    20. Welcomes the steady increase in organised crime sentences and the fact that the legal framework on the fight against organised crime is aligned with the EU acquis; emphasises the need for prosecution services and police to strengthen their joint action against criminal groups and networks; expresses concern about the security challenges in the north of Kosovo, particularly following the Banjska/Banjskë attack in September 2023, which demanded significant police resources; emphasises the need to deepen cooperation in the field of combating drug trafficking; calls for further alignment regarding the fight against terrorism;

    21. Welcomes the adoption of the strategy and action plan on control of small arms light weapons and explosives, as well as the high level of compliance with the rules of the UN Firearms Protocol;

    22. Remains concerned over the slow implementation of the rule of law strategy and action plan;

    23. Reaffirms its commitment to maintaining and strengthening its cooperation with the Kosovo Assembly and its members in support of democratic processes related to Kosovo’s European path by using Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives; believes that this partnership can be revitalised and further reinforced following the democratic elections held on 9 February 2025; encourages the active involvement and collaboration of all elected members of the newly formed Kosovo Assembly;

    24. Condemns the serious security incidents in the north of Kosovo in late November 2024, the gravest act occurring near the village of Vragë in Zubin Potok, where explosive devices damaged critical infrastructure by targeting the main channel of the Ibër Lepenc system; expresses its support for Kosovo’s institutions in conducting a full investigation of these criminal actions so that the perpetrators will be brought to justice;

    25. Commends the work of EULEX, which has been assisting Kosovo authorities in establishing sustainable and independent rule of law institutions;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    26. Notes that Kosovo has the necessary institutional set-up for the promotion and protection of human rights; welcomes the adoption of the strategy for the protection and promotion of the rights of communities; emphasises, however, that human rights protection remains weak owing to the lack of legislative implementation, political will and limited human and financial resources and calls for strengthened enforcement and accountability mechanisms;

    27. Acknowledges that Kosovo’s constitution is very progressive in terms of protection of minority rights; notes with regret that the petition signed by nearly 500 people who have historically self-identified as Bulgarian, which was registered at the Assembly of Kosovo in January 2023, has still not been considered and recommends that those rights be enshrined in law and ensured in practice; calls on Kosovo to ensure that all minorities recognised under the Law on protection of minority rights and members of their communities, are fully incorporated into the country’s constitution; calls on the Kosovo authorities to step up efforts to protect the rights of all minorities, including national communities, in particular vulnerable national communities, and to provide them equal opportunities and adequate representation in political and cultural life, public media, the administration and the judiciary, as well as prevent their assimilation and promote their integration into Kosovo’s society and strengthen activities to eliminate social and economic challenges of these national minorities;

    28. Welcomes the increase in funding to shelters for victims of domestic violence and trafficking; notes that domestic violence remains the most common form of gender-based violence; expresses concerns that the system continues to fail in ensuring the effective prevention of domestic violence;

    29. Regrets that the adoption of the draft Civil Code of Kosovo remains pending; highlights that the draft Civil Code addresses several important issues related to gender equality as a fundamental EU value, including enabling an equal share of joint marital property among women and men spouses; stresses the importance of ensuring rights for all people in Kosovo in the Civil Code to safeguard respect for constitutional rights and opportunities for the LGBTIQ community; expresses concern that women remain under-represented in senior political positions, specifically related to security and the dialogue, and emphasises the urgent need for their involvement in peacemaking and reconciliation processes, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; calls for more efforts to be made to improve the place of women in society;

    30. Notes that the prison system broadly follows UN Standard Minimum Rules and calls for the better protection of the rights of prisoners, particularly female, minority and mentally ill prisoners; remains concerned that discriminatory language against women and LGBTIQ people persists, and calls on the authorities to create and implement a national gender strategy for research fields, such as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics; commends the participation of women in high-quality business and management training programmes, as well as in ICT related domains, facilitated by the instrument for pre-accession assistance funds; regrets that women from minority groups, particularly the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, face numerous forms of discrimination, particularly in education, employment and access to healthcare; expresses concerns that the central administration does not adequately represent minority communities, and the number of women in senior positions is low;

    31. Regrets that the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has not yet been adopted; expresses concerns that there is insufficient alignment between Kosovo’s legislation and the EU acquis on the rights of people with disabilities, who face discrimination and barriers to accessing social services;

    32. Welcomes Kosovo’s consistent improvement in its position in the 2024 Liberal Democracy Index and Electoral Democracy Index, as prepared by the Varieties of Democracy Institute, which measures the rule of law, checks and balances, civil liberties, and free and fair elections;

    33. Takes note of Kosovo’s pluralistic media environment while awaiting the decision of the Constitutional Court on the main media law and underlines the role of the IMC, whose independence in decision-making needs to be strictly ensured and full functioning restored; regrets, however, the decline in Kosovo’s media freedom, as evidenced by its drop from the 56th to the 75th place in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; reaffirms that media pluralism and transparency are prerequisites for EU accession; calls for greater transparency on media ownership and financing with a view to enhancing media independence and pluralism; emphasises the need for robust measures to protect journalists from harassment and intimidation, and to ensure the independence of media regulatory bodies; notes the concerns raised by civil society about the allegedly politically motivated election of the Chair of the IMC; urges the Kosovo authorities to further revise the Law on the IMC in order to include the recommendations made by the Council of Europe, thus aligning the national law with EU standards and practices; recommends increased support for independent media outlets and fact-checking organisations in Kosovo, recognising their crucial role in countering disinformation and providing accurate information to the public; encourages the EU to provide technical and financial assistance to these entities; encourages the Kosovo authorities to request tailor-made Technical Assistance and Information Exchange expert missions bodies; calls for the adoption of the law on Radio Television of Kosovo and the law on the protection of journalists’ sources;

    34. Expresses concern over the recent cyberattack targeting Kosovo’s digital infrastructure; urges the Kosovo Government to reinforce its capacities to combat foreign interference and disinformation, particularly those originating from Serbian nationalist outlets and Russia, aimed at destabilising the region and undermining the European integration of the Western Balkans, by developing comprehensive strategies that include public awareness campaigns also combating disinformation undermining women’s participation in public life, strengthening cybersecurity and related infrastructure, fostering collaboration with international partners, most notably the European Union, to protect its digital economy, public services and national security, and addressing disinformation campaigns and hybrid threats that aim to destabilise the country and undermine its European perspective; encourages the integration of media literacy programs into Kosovo’s educational curriculum to equip citizens with the skills necessary to identify and counteract disinformation;

    35. Commends the fact that Kosovo provided shelter and asylum to journalists from Ukraine and Afghanistan;

    36. Expresses serious concern about the significant increase in attacks against journalists and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP cases), including by government officials; calls on the authorities to advance their work on anti-SLAPP legislation in line with the new EU Directive 2024/1069[7]; calls on Kosovo to work actively to secure the ability of journalists to carry out their work and to ensure full freedom for the media to operate independently; underlines the need to stop all forms of violence;

    37. Welcomes Kosovo’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a very crucial and positive role in the reform process; encourages the Kosovo Government to enhance its cooperation with civil society, in particular with women’s rights organisations, on decision-making and to make more use of the Government Council for Cooperation with Civil Society for building collaborative relationships and genuinely implicating civil society in a transparent legislative process from an early stage onwards; stresses the importance of increasing accountability and transparency in relation to public funding for civil society organisations; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress;

    38. Regrets the lack of a clear plan for engaging Kosovo Serbs in the north and that initiatives to involve the Serb community in Kosovo’s political, social and economic structures remain very limited; reiterates its call to improve the internal dialogue and genuinely and directly engage with the independent civil society organisations of Kosovo Serbs, in particular in the north, with the aim of building trust, facilitating the daily life of Kosovo Serbs and successfully integrating them;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    39. Commends Kosovo’s engagement in a number of regional cooperation initiatives and encourages it to enhance its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes; commends Kosovo on its constructive approach and active engagement in regional cooperation and trade facilitation that led to the unblocking of the Central European Free Trade Agreement;

    40. Calls on Serbia to open all wartime archives and grant access to the former Yugoslav Secret Service (UDBA) and Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service (KOS) files, ensuring their return to respective governments upon request; emphasises the need to open these archives region-wide to investigate communist-era crimes and strengthen democracy, accountability and institutions in the Western Balkans;

    41. Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    42. Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Kosovo and Serbia in order to achieve a comprehensive legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    43. Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    44. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    45. Condemns all actions that endanger stability and jeopardise the reconciliation process, including the tensions in the north of Kosovo and provocations by Serbian state-sponsored groups and illegal armed formations, and urges the European Union to take a stronger stance against external interference in Kosovo’s internal affairs; emphasises that both sides must fully implement all agreements reached and avoid unilateral actions that could escalate tensions; calls on the Kosovo police to ensure that they fully abide by all rule of law and human rights requirements, and to guarantee that a multi-ethnic and inclusive police force, fully in line with legal requirements, is deployed in the north of Kosovo; recalls the shared responsibility of all political representatives and all communities in Kosovo for upholding peace, security and the rule of law;

    46. Welcomes the establishment of the Joint Commission on Missing Persons in December 2024 and calls for swift progress in implementing the May 2023 Political Declaration on Missing Persons; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to refrain from politicising this humanitarian issue and to step up their efforts in implementing the declaration as part of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and to establish cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia;

    47. Welcomes the recent agreements in the framework of the Berlin Process;

    48. Welcomes Kosovo’s decision to remove restrictions on the entry of Serbian finished products at the Merdare border crossing;

    49. Welcomes the presence of the Kosovo Force and its role in building and maintaining a safe and secure environment and in developing a stable and peaceful Kosovo on the path towards Euro-Atlantic integration; recalls the importance of the mission for the ongoing development of the Kosovo Security Force through the provision of advice, training and capacity building;

    Socio-economic reforms

    50. Welcomes Kosovo’s active engagement in the implementation of the new growth plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to deepen EU-related reforms and reduce the socio-economic gap between EU Member States and the Western Balkan countries; welcomes the adoption of Kosovo’s Reform Agenda and recalls that Kosovo (as well as Serbia) needs to show improved commitment to the EU-facilitated Dialogue in order to access the resources;

    51. Welcomes the progress achieved by Kosovo in developing a functioning market economy and encourages Kosovo to implement the necessary structural reforms to address fiscal challenges, while ensuring adequate labour protection, fair wages, and improved working conditions in line with EU legislation;

    52. Reiterates its calls on the Commission to develop a regional strategy to address the persistent youth unemployment and brain drain by tackling the skills mismatch between the education system and the labour market, improving the quality of teaching, and ensuring adequate funding for active labour market measures and vocational training schemes, along with adequate childcare and pre-school education facilities;

    53. Welcomes the fact that Kosovo’s cybercrime legislation is broadly aligned with the EU acquis; notes Kosovo’s limited progress in the digital transformation of public services; emphasises the need for it to align with EU digital legislation as well as with the needs of its people, specifically with the European Electronic Communications Code, the EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2)[8], the EU toolbox for 5G security, and the Digital Services Act[9] and the Digital Markets Act[10]; notes that Kosovo’s economy remains highly dependent on imports and stresses the need for economic diversification to enhance competitiveness and sustainability, particularly in the context of deeper integration into EU markets;

    54. Regrets that the draft law on textbooks, presented in 2022, is still pending final adoption in the Kosovo Assembly; calls on Kosovo to finalise the implementation of the new curricular framework for basic education, complete the revision of current textbooks, provide sustainable training to teachers, and systematically apply quality assurance mechanisms at all education levels;

    55. Urges Kosovo to ensure better access to quality healthcare services; notes that healthcare expenditure remains the second lowest in the region, and calls for a comprehensive healthcare reform to address the needs of all citizens, especially in rural and underserved areas;

    56. Notes with concern that access to social services, particularly for vulnerable groups, worsened with the government’s closure of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, which was done without transparent consultation with civil society and other stakeholders and contributed to significant confusion; calls for better, evidence-based budgeting to improve social services, particularly for survivors of gender-based violence in accordance with the new legal framework;

    57. Calls on Kosovo to provide equal and non-discriminatory state education in minority languages;

    58. Reiterates the need to reach out to young people from the Serb majority municipalities and to integrate them in the socio-economic structures of the country;

    Energy, environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    59. Notes that Kosovo has made some progress on the security of energy supply but remains heavily reliant on outdated, highly polluting power plants, posing serious health and environmental risks; notes that Kosovo needs to ensure the time-efficient implementation of its energy programme for 2022-2025 to meet its ambitious targets and reduce its dependence on fossil fuels; calls for the EU to step up and prioritise its efforts to help Kosovo overcome its air pollution problems; notes that Kosovo’s new energy strategy does not promote the construction of hydropower plants due to their harmful environmental impact, in particular because of the water scarcity in the country;

    60. Highlights the need for comprehensive infrastructure development in Kosovo to facilitate the reduction of emissions from public transport and the expansion of electrified transport; stresses that improving accessibility and ensuring compatibility with the EU transport network must remain a priority;

    61. Welcomes the agreement at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of data roaming charges and further reductions leading to prices close to domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entrance into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    62. Urges Kosovo to enhance compliance with emission ceilings, improve the integration of environmental considerations into sectoral policies and adopt necessary measures for pollution, soil and water contamination control and waste management, in line with EU and international standards and commitments; urges Kosovo to improve comprehensive environmental impact assessments and to integrate sustainability measures into infrastructure planning; calls on Kosovo to increase the protected areas in the country and to improve instruments and measures for their protection with a view to safeguarding biodiversity, including key habitats of the critically endangered Balkan lynx; encourages Kosovo to intensify and speed up collaborative efforts with its neighbouring countries to designate transboundary protected areas and establish coherent transboundary management plans;

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    63. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Kosovo.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA Airborne Sensor’s Wildfire Data Helps Firefighters Take Action

    Source: NASA

    Data from the AVIRIS-3 sensor was recently used to create detailed fire maps in minutes, enabling firefighters in Alabama to limit the spread of wildfires and save buildings.
    A NASA sensor recently brought a new approach to battling wildfire, providing real-time data that helped firefighters in the field contain a blaze in Alabama. Called AVIRIS-3, which is short for Airborne Visible Infrared Imaging Spectrometer 3, the instrument detected a 120-acre fire on March 19 that had not yet been reported to officials.
    As AVIRIS-3 flew aboard a King Air B200 research plane over the fire about 3 miles (5 kilometers) east of Castleberry, Alabama, a scientist on the plane analyzed the data in real time and identified where the blaze was burning most intensely. The information was then sent via satellite internet to fire officials and researchers on the ground, who distributed images showing the fire’s perimeter to firefighters’ phones in the field.
    All told, the process from detection during the flyover to alert on handheld devices took a few minutes. In addition to pinpointing the location and extent of the fire, the data showed firefighters its perimeter, helping them gauge whether it was likely to spread and decide where to add personnel and equipment.

    “This is very agile science,” said Robert Green, the AVIRIS program’s principal investigator and a senior research scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Southern California, noting AVIRIS-3 mapped the burn scar left near JPL by the Eaton Fire in January.
    Observing the ground from about 9,000 feet (3,000 meters) in altitude, AVIRIS-3 flew aboard several test flights over Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, and Texas for a NASA 2025 FireSense Airborne Campaign. Researchers flew in the second half of March to prepare for prescribed burn experiments that took place in the Geneva State Forest in Alabama on March 28 and at Fort Stewart-Hunter Army Airfield in Georgia from April 14 to 20. During the March span, the AVIRIS-3 team mapped at least 13 wildfires and prescribed burns, as well as dozens of small hot spots (places where heat is especially intense) — all in real time.

    Data from imaging spectrometers like AVIRIS-3 typically takes days or weeks to be processed into highly detailed, multilayer image products used for research. By simplifying the calibration algorithms, researchers were able to process data on a computer aboard the plane in a fraction of the time it otherwise would have taken. Airborne satellite internet connectivity enabled the images to be distributed almost immediately, while the plane was still in flight, rather than after it landed.
    The AVIRIS team generated its first real-time products during a February campaign covering parts of Panama and Costa Rica, and they have continued to improve the process, automating the mapping steps aboard the plane.
    ‘Fan Favorite’
    The AVIRIS-3 sensor belongs to a line of imaging spectrometers built at JPL since 1986. The instruments have been used to study a wide range of phenomena — including fire — by measuring sunlight reflecting from the planet’s surface.
    During the March flights, researchers created three types of maps. One, called the Fire Quicklook, combines brightness measurements at three wavelengths of infrared light, which is invisible to the human eye, to identify the relative intensity of burning. Orange and red areas on the Fire Quicklook map show cooler-burning areas, while yellow indicates the most intense flames. Previously burned areas show up as dark red or brown.
    Another map type, the Fire 2400 nm Quicklook, looks solely at infrared light at a wavelength of 2,400 nanometers. The images are particularly useful for seeing hot spots and the perimeters of fires, which show brightly against a red background.
    A third type of map, called just Quicklook, shows burned areas and smoke.
    The Fire 2400 nm Quicklook was the “fan favorite” among the fire crews, said Ethan Barrett, fire analyst for the Forest Protection Division of the Alabama Forestry Commission. Seeing the outline of a wildfire from above helped Alabama Forestry Commission firefighters determine where to send bulldozers to stop the spread. 
    Additionally, FireSense personnel analyzed the AVIRIS-3 imagery to create digitized perimeters of the fires. This provided firefighters fast, comprehensive intelligence of the situation on the ground.
    That’s what happened with the Castleberry Fire. Having a clear picture of where it was burning most intensely enabled firefighters to focus on where they could make a difference — on the northeastern edge. 
    Then, two days after identifying Castleberry Fire hot spots, the sensor spotted a fire about 4 miles (2.5 kilometers) southwest of Perdido, Alabama. As forestry officials worked to prevent flames from reaching six nearby buildings, they noticed that the fire’s main hot spot was inside the perimeter and contained. With that intelligence, they decided to shift some resources to fires 25 miles (40 kilometers) away near Mount Vernon, Alabama.
    To combat one of the Mount Vernon fires, crews used AVIRIS-3 maps to determine where to establish fire breaks beyond the northwestern end of the fire. They ultimately cut the blaze off within about 100 feet (30 meters) of four buildings. 
    “Fire moves a lot faster than a bulldozer, so we have to try to get around it before it overtakes us. These maps show us the hot spots,” Barrett said. “When I get out of the truck, I can say, ‘OK, here’s the perimeter.’ That puts me light-years ahead.”
    AVIRIS and the Firesense Airborne Campaign are part of NASA’s work to leverage its expertise to combat wildfires using solutions including airborne technologies. The agency also recently demonstrated a prototype from its Advanced Capabilities for Emergency Response Operations project that will provide reliable airspace management for drones and other aircraft operating in the air above wildfires.

    News Media Contacts
    Andrew Wang / Jane J. LeeJet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, Calif.626-379-6874 / 818-354-0307andrew.wang@jpl.nasa.gov / jane.j.lee@jpl.nasa.gov
    2025-058

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: CISA, DHS S&T, INL, LSU Help Energy Industry Partners Strengthen Incident Response and OT Cybersecurity

    News In Brief – Source: US Computer Emergency Readiness Team

    WASHINGTON – The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) hosted Louisiana State University (LSU) and several energy industry and critical infrastructure partners to train against simulated, high-impact cyberattacks on operational technology (OT) and traditional information technology (IT) at CISA’s Control Environment Laboratory Resource (CELR) in Idaho Falls, Idaho, last week. LSU is the first university in the U.S. invited to participate in the CELR exercise, as part of CISA and INL’s efforts to strengthen cyber talent development and research partnerships.

    Cybersecurity threats exploit the increased complexity and connectivity of critical infrastructure systems. The potential incapacitation or destruction of assets, systems and networks, whether physical or virtual, could have a debilitating effect on national security, economic security and on public health and safety. As the nation’s cyber defense agency, CISA is committed to growing operational and strategic partnerships to increase collaboration across the OT and industrial control systems (ICS) community.

    On April 15-17, energy industry partners and the CISA-INL-LSU team used the CELR chemical processing platform, located at and operated by INL on behalf of CISA. CELR platforms are benchtop models of critical infrastructure with integrated industrial processes to represent how real-world components and facilities might be compromised through cyber-physical attacks. The participants were positioned in a live environment with IT and OT traffic and attacked by a technical team posing as a sophisticated adversary. The training participants’ mission was to detect and respond to kinetic cyberattacks through ICS elements, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, human-machine interfaces (HMIs), programmable logic controllers (PLCs), OT and IT systems and other key components widely used in industrial facilities.

    “Collaborating with LSU and industry partners is extremely beneficial in strengthening the nation’s cybersecurity knowledge and ability to respond to threats. This training is another step in our shared vision to expand the opportunity for critical infrastructure entities to strengthen their cybersecurity using CELR,” said Matt Hartman, CISA Deputy Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity. “Malicious cyber actors and nation-state adversaries are a persistent, highly capable threat to critical infrastructure operations, functionality and safety. CELR is a valuable resource for critical infrastructure owners and operators seeking to improve the security of their ICS/OT networks.”

    “INL’s Controls Laboratory hosts five CISA-sponsored ICS testbeds, offering immersive environments for partners to experience realistic cyberattack scenarios against critical infrastructure,” said Tim Huddleston, INL’s Cybersecurity Program Manager. “We were proud to host industry partners and academia in this exercise, helping them improve their skills in cyber hunting and incident response, which reduces the risk from malicious cyber actors.”

    INL leverages scientific expertise and unique controls environments to support the departments of Energy, Defense and Homeland Security in national security challenges, including critical infrastructure protection. Last week’s training is part of an ongoing collaborative effort by CISA, DHS S&T, INL and LSU to equip energy industry cyber defenders to protect ICS environments and develop deeply technical cyber talent for critical infrastructure. Under CISA and S&T oversight, INL is currently developing the first university-based CELR platform. DHS S&T and CISA plan to deliver an Oil and Natural Gas CELR platform to LSU by fall of this year.

    Through a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement, LSU will operate and maintain the Oil and Natural Gas platform and host similar trainings for energy sector partners, state cyber defenders, and LSU faculty, staff and students. This agreement will provide government and industry security professionals in the Louisiana gulf region an extremely valuable, local opportunity to hone their OT/ICS cybersecurity skills.

    “This partnership is a wonderful example of DHS S&T’s role in enabling effective, efficient, and secure operations by applying scientific, engineering, analytic, and innovative approaches to deliver timely solutions. The CELR platforms help ensure critical infrastructure is better positioned to detect, mitigate, or prevent cyber-attacks in the real world. By positioning a platform in close proximity to critical infrastructure owners and operators, as well as making it accessible to the next generation of oil refinery workforce through the university, DHS S&T and CISA are ensuring our nation’s oil supply remains secure and available to consumers,” said Jonathan McEntee,Acting Executive Director for S&T Office of Mission and Capability Support.

    “As a leading energy and chemical manufacturing state, Louisiana’s cybersecurity posture around its critical infrastructure has national implications,” said Greg Trahan, director of economic development at LSU and special advisor to LSU President William F. Tate IV on cyber initiatives. “The invitation by CISA and INL to participate in this exercise underscores what we know: LSU has emerged as one of the most important and consequential cybersecurity schools in the country. The opportunity to be joined by our close industry partners means we can bring these skills and agency relationships home to support and protect Louisiana—that is the LSU Scholarship First Agenda and flagship mission in action.”

    Another outcome from this collaborative effort, LSU and Battelle Energy Alliance, the company that manages INL, recently signed a memorandum of understanding to formalize their partnership in areas of mutual interest, including cybersecurity and advanced nuclear technology. Over the past year, INL has hosted six LSU cybersecurity interns and successfully hired two LSU graduates. This collaboration exemplifies INL’s commitment to expanding partnerships with other industry and academic entities, fostering an environment to develop cyber resilience skills.

    For more information on ICS security, visit the CISA Industrial Control Systems webpage.

    Control Environment Laboratory Exercise (CELR) Exersice

    Government, industry and academia partners gather to view Control Environment Laboratory Resource (CELR) exercise

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Nine Finalists Advance in NASA’s Power to Explore Challenge

    Source: NASA

    NASA has named nine finalists out of the 45 semifinalist student essays in the Power to Explore Challenge, a national writing competition for K-12 students featuring the enabling power of radioisotopes. Contestants were challenged to explore how NASA has powered some of its most famous science missions, and to dream up how their personal “superpowers” would energize their success on their own radioisotope-powered science mission.

    I am always so impressed by quality of the essays and the creativity of the ideas that the students submit to NASA’s Power to Explore Challenge.

    Carl Sandifer II
    Program Manager, NASA Radioisotope Power Systems Program

    The competition asked students to learn about NASA’s radioisotope power systems (RPS), likened to a “nuclear battery” that the agency uses to explore some of the most extreme destinations in our solar system and beyond. Long before the early days of Apollo, our Moon has inspired explorers of all ages to push beyond known limits to realize impossible dreams. These systems have enabled NASA to discover “moonquakes” on Earth’s Moon and study some of the most extreme moons of the solar system, which have active volcanoes, methane lakes, and ice glaciers. As of March 25, NASA has discovered over 891 moons, each with secrets ready to be unlocked.
    Students were challenged to pick any moon in our solar system’s exploration could be enabled by this space power systems. In 275 words or less, they dreamed up a unique exploration mission of this moon and described their own power to achieve their mission goals.
    The Power to Explore Challenge offered students the opportunity to learn more about these reliable power systems, celebrate their own strengths, and interact with NASA’s diverse workforce. This year’s contest received 2,051 submitted entries from all 50 states, U.S. territories, and the Department of Defense Education Activity overseas.
    “I am always so impressed by quality of the essays and the creativity of the ideas that the students submit to NASA’s Power to Explore Challenge.” said Carl Sandifer, program manager of the Radioisotope Power Systems Program at NASA’s Glenn Research Center in Cleveland. “I’m looking forward to welcoming the winners to NASA’s Glenn this summer.”
    Entries were split into three categories: grades K-4, 5-8, and 9-12. Every student who submitted an entry received a digital certificate and an invitation to the Power Up virtual event held on March 21 that announced the semifinalists. Students learned about what powers the NASA workforce to dream big and work together to explore.
    Three national finalists in each grade category (nine finalists total) have been selected. In addition to receiving a NASA RPS prize pack, these participants will be invited to an exclusive virtual meeting with a NASA engineer or scientist to talk about their missions and have their space exploration questions answered. Winners will be announced on May 7.
    Grades K-4

    Mini M, Ann Arbor, Michigan

    Zachary Tolchin, Guilford, Connecticut

    Terry Xu, Arcadia, California

    Grades 5-8

    Lilah Coyan, Spokane, Washington

    Maggie Hou, Snohomish, Washington

    Sarabhesh Saravanakumar, Bothell, Washington

    Grades 9-12

    Faiz Karim, Jericho, New York

    Kairat Otorov, Trumbull, Connecticut
    Saanvi Shah, Bothell, Washington

    About the Challenge
    The challenge is funded by the Radioisotope Power Systems Program Office in NASA’s Science Mission Directorate and administered by Future Engineers under a Small Business Innovation Research phase III contract. This task is managed by the NASA Tournament Lab, a part of the Prizes, Challenges, and Crowdsourcing Program in NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate.

    Kristin JansenNASA’s Glenn Research Center

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Those behind the cowardly terror attack in Pahalgam will soon get a befitting reply, Govt will take all necessary steps: Raksha Mantri

    Source: Government of India

    Those behind the cowardly terror attack in Pahalgam will soon get a befitting reply, Govt will take all necessary steps: Raksha Mantri

    “Every Indian is united, we can never be intimidated by such terror activities”

    Govt equipping Armed Forces to tackle challenges emanating from a fluid international order, says Shri Rajnath Singh

    “Aim is to establish IAF as a dominant power & achieve defence sovereignty”

    Posted On: 23 APR 2025 5:21PM by PIB Delhi

                Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh has assured the people that those responsible for the cowardly terrorist attack on innocent citizens in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir will soon get a befitting reply to their nefarious acts on Indian soil. Delivering a memorial lecture on the Marshal of the Indian Air Force (IAF) Arjan Singh in New Delhi on April 23, 2025, Raksha Mantri reiterated India’s firm resolve of zero tolerance against terrorism and stated that the Government, led by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi, will take every necessary and appropriate step.

                “India is an old civilisation and such a big country can never be intimidated by any such terror activities. Every Indian is united against this cowardly act. Not just those who perpetrated the attack, but even those who conspired from behind the scenes to commit such nefarious acts on the Indian soil will soon get an appropriate response,” said Shri Rajnath Singh

                In the context of cross-border-supported terrorist incidents, Raksha Mantri said “History is witness to the withering away of nations not due to the action of the adversary, but due to the result of their own misdeeds. I hope people across the border look at lessons of history more closely”.

                Shri Rajnath Singh expressed deepest condolences to the families who lost their loved ones in the terror attack at Pahalgam. “Our country has lost many innocent citizens in a cowardly attack by terrorists targeting religion. This extremely inhuman act has left us in deep pain. In this hour of grief, I pray for peace to the departed souls,” he said.

                Later, Raksha Mantri paid rich tributes to the Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh, terming his leadership, vision and dedication as incredible. “He was a visionary military leader who, even today, inspires the youth. If today IAF is one of the world’s strongest air forces, it is because of the vision and ethos of military leaders like Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh,” he said.

                Shri Rajnath Singh described the journey of IAF as an aspiring, inspirational, and transformational epic, which is not just about touching the sky, but also turning the dreams of national security into reality. He stated that, despite challenges, IAF has grown stronger post-independence, and is today contributing significantly to national security as a strong pillar.

                Raksha Mantri emphasised that the Government’s focus is on transforming the Armed Forces on the back of a self-reliant defence ecosystem. He reiterated the commitment towards establishing IAF as a dominant power in the region, stating that the journey towards Aatmanirbharta is a shared responsibility. Commitment, collaboration and unified vision is the need of the hour, he said. He added that India’s national security will further strengthen if IAF is well-equipped and highly technology-oriented.

                Shri Rajnath Singh stressed that national security cannot be ensured through import dependency, and the Government is working relentlessly towards achieving defence sovereignty. He stated that emphasis is being laid on manufacturing defence equipment within the country and the efforts of Ministry of Defence are yielding positive results. He termed Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas, Advanced Light Helicopter Dhruv, Light Utility Helicopter Prachand, Akash & BrahMos Air Defence weapons as shining examples of the capability of Indian designers, engineers and scientists.

                “Today, not only has there been unparalleled growth in defence manufacturing in the public sector, the private sector is also participating with great enthusiasm. As the field of defence production is becoming technology-oriented, the role of start-ups and MSMEs is also increasing rapidly. These are proving to be the backbone of defence innovation. In the times to come, the role of the private sector, start-ups and MSMEs in high-tech warfare is going to increase even more,” said Raksha Mantri.

                Terming aero-engine development as a priority area of the Government in view of the needs of IAF, Shri Rajnath Singh stated that the effort is to make the engine in India on the model of co-development and co-production with full intellectual property rights. He added that special attention is being paid to the development of fifth generation fighter aircraft and LCA Mark-2. He further highlighted that self-reliance has been achieved to a large extent on many air defence systems, including Astra Mark-2, Pralay, SMART, anti-field weapon, NG Anti-radiation missile, and Very Short Range Air Defence System, and these are at various stages of production and development.

                Raksha Mantri emphasised that due to the shift of power dynamics to Asia in the 21st century, the Indo-Pacific region has emerged as the most important region strategically, and the Government is leaving no stone unturned to address the complex challenges emanating from a fluid international order and technological revolution. He pointed out that the revolutionary breakthrough in the field of technology, including the growing use of Artificial Intelligence, Hypersonic Directed Energy weapons, Quantum Computing, drones, cyber & space tech, have brought unpredictability and lethality in modern-day warfare, making it unconventional & even more uncertain. He voiced Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi-led Government’s commitment to tackle these challenges and uncertainties.

    Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Dinesh K Tripathi, Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, Chief of the senior civil & military officials and serving and retired IAF personnel were among those present on the occasion.

    *****

    VK/Savvy

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI USA: U.S. Army celebrates women’s contributions and service

    Source: United States Army

    U.S. Army Pfc. Tess Sandoval assigned to 2nd Squadron, 6th Calvary Regiment, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade is one of two female attack helicopter repairers in the squadron located on Wheeler Army Airfield, Hawaii, Aug. 25, 2019. Women make up about six percent of all attack helicopter repairers in the U.S. Army. (Photo Credit: 1st Lt. Ryan DeBooy) VIEW ORIGINAL

    WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army extends its gratitude to the women who have served, and continue to serve, in its ranks. Women have played vital roles in the U.S. Army since the Revolutionary War, and today’s women — Soldiers, veterans, family members and civilian employees — are critical members of the Army team.

    “More than 181,000 women serve in the Army today, from enlisted personnel to general officers,” said Ryan McCarthy, Secretary of the Army. “The Army is proud of our women Soldiers, who serve with distinction as role models as they exemplify our highest values.”

    Women Soldiers make up 18 percent of the regular Army, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, and 36 percent of the Army’s civilian workforce is female.

    Today’s women serve in every career field in the Army. Nearly 1,500 female Soldiers have accessed into infantry, armor, and fire-support occupations; forty-two women have graduated from Ranger School, and five have been assigned to the Ranger Regiment; and last June, Brig. Gen. Laura Yeager became the first woman to command an Army infantry division.

    The Army continues to integrate female Soldiers into all units and occupations, and has adopted gender-neutral standards for all occupational specialties. Female and male Soldiers undergo the same training and must pass course requirements to be awarded a military occupational specialty in any career field.

    “The Army is people and the incredible contributions and achievements of our female Soldiers contribute significantly to the strength of America’s Army,” said Gen. James McConville, Chief of Staff of the Army. “Our diversity and commitment to selecting the best-qualified people, regardless of gender, for each job in the Army makes the all-volunteer force the most-ready and powerful in the world.”

    From the 21,000 women who served in the Army Nurse Corps during WWI, to the 150,000 who served in the Women’s Army Corps during WWII, to the 181,000 who proudly serve today — the Army salutes our women Soldiers.

    ###

    Related Links

    Army.mil: Women in the U.S. Army

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section X – European External Action Service – A10-0069/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    2. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section X – European External Action Service

    (2024/2024(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section X – European External Action Service,

     having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0069/2025),

    A. whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

    B. whereas the European External Action Service (the ‘EEAS’) is responsible for the management of the administrative expenditure of its Headquarters in Brussels and for the network of the 144 Union delegations and offices;

    C. whereas the EEAS’ responsibility has been extended to cover the administrative management of the Commission staff in the delegations through a series of Service Level Arrangements (SLAs);

    D. whereas the role of the delegations is to represent the Union and its citizens around the world by building networks and partnerships, and to promote the values of the Union;

    E. whereas the peculiarity of the EEAS remains in its nature and origin, as it was when it was formed by the merging of staff belonging to the former external relation departments of the Council and of the Commission, into which diplomats from the Member States have been integrated;

    F. whereas under the EEAS Internal Rules, the Secretary-General of the EEAS acts as authorising officer by delegation for the institution and the director-general for resource management has the role of principal sub-delegated authorising officer;

    G. whereas the powers conferred by the Staff Regulations on the Appointing Authority are exercised by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President (‘HR/VP’) in respect of staff of the EEAS;

    H. whereas the implementation of the budget is governed by the Financial Regulation and by the Internal Rules of implementation of the Budget of the EEAS;

    1. Notes that the budget of the EEAS falls under MFF heading 7, ‘European public administration’, which amounted to EUR 12,3 billion in 2023 (representing 6,4 % of the total Union budget); notes that the EEAS budget of approximately EUR 1,1 billion represents approximately 9,2 % of the total administrative expenditure of the Union;

    2. Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its annual report for the financial year 2023 examined a sample of 70 transactions under administration, 10 more than were examined in 2022; further notes that the Court writes that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on human resources, including expenditure on pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and expenditure on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology, and that its work over many years indicates that, overall, this spending is low risk;

    3. Notes that 21 (30 %) of the 70 transactions contained errors but that the Court, based on the five errors which were quantified, estimates the level of error to be below the materiality threshold;

    4. Notes with concern that the Court, in its annual report for the financial year 2023, found a quantifiable error in one of the 13 payments examined and raised six non-quantifiable findings concerning the EEAS; notes that the quantifiable error concerned the absence of a valid procurement procedure before a rental contract was signed for a Union delegation; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS took measures to address the two quantifiable errors found by the Court in its 2022 annual report and took measures to avoid such issues in the future;

    Budgetary and financial management

    5. Notes that the final EEAS budget for 2023 was EUR 821 900 280, representing an increase of 4,45 % compared to 2022; notes that the EEAS also disposed of an amount of EUR 259,7 million (including assigned revenues and carried over amounts) from the Commission to cover the administrative costs of Commission staff working in Union delegations; notes further that the EEAS received additional fixed-amount contributions to cover common costs of European Development Fund staff in delegations and co-locations, as well as other amounts received under co-location and other agreements; notes that the total budgetary amount managed by the EEAS in 2023 therefore amounted to EUR 1 198,2 million (commitment appropriations), which represented an increase of 4,8 % compared to the previous year;

    6. Notes that, in 2023, the budgetary implementation rate of commitment appropriations stood at 100 %, whereas the implementation rate for payments was 91,9 % compared to 90,6 % in 2022; notes that the average time for payment was 13,57 days but notes nevertheless that 8,63 % of the total amount was paid late, which led to EUR 50 253,91 in late interest payments in 2023; urges the EEAS to pay its commitments on time; urges the EEAS to continue its efforts in improving the number of electronic payments and the digitalisation of workflows, in particular in delegations;

    7. Notes that the EEAS informed the budgetary authority of two budgetary transfers in accordance with Article 29(1) of the Financial Regulation and made 11 autonomous transfers in accordance with Article 29(4), for an overall value of EUR 55,7 million; notes that the main purpose of the transfers was to increase budget line 3003 on buildings and associate costs in delegations by EUR 18,97 million and budget lines 3001 on External Staff and outside services in delegations by EUR 5,6 million; notes that further to the transfers, the final budget for the EEAS headquarters amounted to EUR 327,8 million and the final budget for delegations amounted to EUR 494,1 million;

    8. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS has faced growing political and financial challenges, as well as challenges with respect to Human Rights and the Rule of Law; notes that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its geopolitical consequences continued to be a key issue in 2023, leading the EEAS to ensure wide-range support for Ukraine, exert pressure on Russia and continue its global outreach to address the wider consequences of the war, including the implementation of the Action Plan on the geopolitical consequences of Russian aggression against Ukraine; acknowledges the EEAS’s role in gathering evidence against EU-sanctioned Russian state-backed outlets and individuals involved in spreading disinformation and manipulating information to justify Russia’s war of aggression; underlines the need to provide adequate resources to the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the EEAS to effectively combat disinformation campaigns deployed as strategic tools by authoritarian and illiberal regimes; calls on the EEAS to reinforce the Union Delegations in the Eastern Partnership countries to support those countries heavily affected by Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine; notes that the financial ceiling of the European Peace Facility managed under the authority of the HR/VP was increased from EUR 5,6 million to more than EUR 12 million in 2023; calls on the EEAS to collaborate with DG ENEST to ensure effective oversight and monitoring of the projects funded by the Facility; notes that the reignited Israel-Palestine conflict following the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 required the EEAS to engage in intense diplomatic efforts, encourage Union institutions to urge regional de-escalation, respond to humanitarian needs and support regional peace efforts; emphasises that Union and EEAS assistance must align with broader human rights and peace objectives in the region, with strong safeguards in place to ensure that the funds do not, either directly or indirectly, support terrorist or violent activities; emphasises that Union funding for the reconstruction of Gaza should only commence once all hostages taken by Hamas have been released; emphasises the importance of transparency in the allocation of financial resources in third countries to ensure accountability in the use of the Union budget and the new financial instruments;

     

    9. Urges the EEAS to work closely with the Commission to ensure that the complete restitution of the Romanian National Treasure, along with the national heritage of other Member States, is on the agenda of any potential future actions regarding the Russian Federation;

    10. Recalls that there have been allegations regarding the involvement of UNRWA employees in Gaza in the terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that in response to these allegations, nine staff members had their employment formally terminated by the UNRWA; underlines that the Commission has been working with the UNRWA to improve control systems, in line with recommendations from the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), including the screening of staff and the strengthening of internal investigative and ethical frameworks; stresses that following the concerns repeatedly raised by Parliament regarding the misuse of Union funding, any Union aid should not under any circumstances be financing terrorism; urges continued vigilance in ensuring that the taxpayer money is not misused; stresses the importance of controls to ensure compliance with Union rules and international law by beneficiaries of Union funds, as well as the need for enhanced measures to prevent misuse of Union financial support; encourages the EEAS to reinforce efforts to safeguard Union funding, and to monitor the implementation of the milestones outlined in the agreement between Commissioner Várhelyi and the UNRWA Commissioner General Lazzarini in April 2024, which includes provisions for conducting Union audits and reinforcing internal oversight at the UNRWA; underlines the need for the Palestinian Authority to align all educational materials with UNESCO standards, particularly removing any content that includes antisemitism or incitement to violence; stresses that Union financial support for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that these standards are met; encourages the EEAS to support diplomatic efforts for a comprehensive and sustainable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to keep Parliament informed about any developments in Union cooperation with the Palestinian Authority;

    11. Notes that, for 2023, the EEAS reported significant budgetary constraints, leading to drastic cuts and budget optimisation in order to cope with inflation in third countries, fluctuations in local currencies, an increase in prices, in particular the cost of renting office space, IT, security and energy prices, which exposed the EEAS to much higher running costs in foreign countries, thus affecting its ability to function effectively and to fulfil its duty of care towards the staff posted in delegations; regrets that, as a result of the budgetary pressures, the EEAS postponed infrastructure maintenance, set aside or cancelled security expenditures in delegations and made cuts to budget posts, such as cuts to the mission and representation budget, office supplies and training courses; deplores that, for budgetary reasons, the EEAS had to prioritise staff participation in election observation missions over other types of missions, such as follow-up missions; emphasises the necessity of establishing an EU diplomatic service;

    12. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS, both at the EEAS headquarters and in delegations, launched a total of 28 open public procurement procedures, 27 competitive procedures with negotiations, 14 negotiated procedures without prior publication of a contract notice, 6 restricted procedures and 2 negotiated procedures for middle-value works contracts, which were successful and led to the award of a contract in 52 % of cases on average; notes that the high standards and complexity of Union procurement rules might be one of the reasons for the relatively high number of failed procurement procedures, as the application of those rules might be challenging for tenderers, especially in third countries; requests the EEAS to investigate the reasons behind the relatively high number of failed procurement procedures and to propose solutions to ensure their effective implementation while maintaining the standards set by the Union; regrets that, for external actions, procurement rules have been simplified in the recast of the Financial Regulation; underlines that procurement rules are intended to ensure that funded projects maintain high standards and are not prone to fraud; calls on the EEAS to always strive for the highest possible level of scrutiny in any tender process; believes that a lack of familiarity in third countries with the high standards of Union procurement rules should never be a pretext or excuse to lower the bar;

    13. Welcomes that the number of co-locations with Member States and other Union partners in Union delegations was 138 at the end of 2023, 12 more than in 2022; notes that, out of the total number of co-locations in 2023, 42 were concluded with Member States and Partner Countries, 91 with other Union partners and five were reverse co-locations; notes that, in 2023, co-locations represented 8 % of the total office surface in Union delegations and involved more than half of the Union delegations (75), which can be seen as an example of successful optimisation of the EEAS building management, but also as an indicator of the increased interest of partners in sharing premises in third countries and the relevance of co-location in diplomatic affairs;

    14. Notes that the budget for missions was EUR 18 948 650 in 2023, representing a limited increase of 1,46 % compared to the previous year, the aim of which was to compensate the increase in costs due to inflation, but was insufficient when compared with the actual rise in travel costs in 2023; regrets that the EEAS does not have a separate budget line for missions and travel for the HR/VP and that the missions and travel costs for the HR/VP are shared between the EEAS and the Commission depending on the purpose of the mission; notes finally that for 2023, the EEAS had costs of EUR 2 995,14 on 6 missions for the HR/VP and air-taxi costs of EUR 288 145, corresponding to a decrease of 51% compared to 2022 when air-taxi costs were EUR 588 103; underlines that the leaders of the Union’s institutions should act as good examples to the public and citizens, especially when using Union resources in the performance of their duties; stresses that the flight options should be chosen on the basis of sound financial management criteria, provided that such alternatives are available and in line with the agenda and venue of meetings; stresses that transparency and sound financial management in using the Union’s public funds must remain a core principle for all Union institutions;

    15. Underlines the negative impact cuts may have on the implementation of the external affairs instruments, such as Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe) and Global Gateway; underlines the need to provide adequate resources to the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the EEAS to continue to effectively combat disinformation campaigns deployed as strategic tools by authoritarian and illiberal regimes; welcomes in this regard the announcement of the creation of the Task Force for Strategic Communication and Countering Information Manipulation in DG COMM of the Commission;

    16. Insists on the budgetary increase for Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) actions and other appropriate peace, conflict and crisis response instruments, as well as IT and security protocols, in order to fully match the Union’s activities and capabilities with current challenges and conflicts worldwide;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    17. Notes that, following an internal reorganisation, the EEAS created a new Corporate Governance Service in October 2023, composed of three divisions in charge of inspections, internal audit and planning, reporting and compliance, to enable the EEAS to achieve greater accountability, better management and better monitoring of activities; welcomes that a Corporate Governance Board was also established to ensure coherence on corporate management issues in the EEAS; notes furthermore that the EEAS created the Managing Directorate for Peace, Security and Defence (MD PSD), the Peace, Partnership and Crisis Management Directorate and two new Divisions dedicated to “Hybrid Threats and Cyber” and “Maritime Security” in order to better support the Union’s work in security and defence matters;

    18. Notes that, in 2023, the Corporate Governance Service performed a fitness check on governance processes and policies; welcomes that, as part of that process, the EEAS updated the Audit Progress Committee charter, revised its internal control framework, its annual management plan and its risk management framework;

    19. Notes that, in line with the EEAS Audit Plan for 2023, three audits were finalised in 2023, namely an audit on the management of the registry of exceptions and non-compliance and two audits on the management of local agents’ salaries and the recruitment and management of local agents and equivalent local staff; notes furthermore with great concern that, due to an organisational restructuring and corresponding staff turnover in the internal audit function, a planned audit on security could not be launched in 2023 and that such audit will be reassessed in the framework of the preparation of the 2025-27 multiannual strategic internal audit plan; stresses the importance of conducting internal audits diligently and regularly; deeply regrets that 4 critical and 49 very important audit recommendations related to finalised audits remained open in 2023; requests that the Parliament be informed on the implementation of the recommendations;

    20. Notes that, in December 2023, the Court adopted its final report following its audit on the coordination role of the EEAS, the scope of which was to assess whether the coordination, in particular with regard to information management, staffing and reporting, both internally and with the Commission and Council, was effective; notes that, in 2023, some of the audit recommendations had already been covered by ongoing initiatives, such as the sending of mission letters to the newly appointed Ambassadors before taking up duty and the efforts made by the EEAS since 2019 to implement its Information Management Strategy; calls on the EEAS to fully implement the ECA’s report recommendations to address identified weaknesses in information management, both within its headquarters and EU delegations in non-EU countries, as well as within the High Representative/Vice-President’s private office; asks that Parliament be kept informed on the follow-up of the Court’s recommendations;

    21. Notes that, based on the 26 inspections carried out in delegations in 2023, security, buildings and administrative burden were identified as the main challenges for delegations; notes that the EEAS has put in place security risk management measures in delegations based on international standards and best practices; notes that, in 2023, five critical recommendations were formulated by the EEAS inspection service, all related to the management of three delegations; notes that in all cases, the recommendations were addressed through increased oversight and support from the EEAS headquarters; welcomes the toolbox developed by the EEAS to respond to internal management situations;

    22. Notes that, in 2023, three EU Delegations (Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, and Syria) submitted reservations in their Declarations of Assurance, primarily concerning operational budget lines managed by the European Commission; highlights that these reservations did not have a substantial financial impact on the administrative budget under the responsibility of the EEAS;

    23. Calls on the EEAS and on the Commission to closely collaborate with the EPLO office in Washington, D.C., and the EU delegation in the United States to identify, fund, and implement initiatives aimed at strengthening the Transatlantic Relationship, including exchange programs for professionals working in public institutions in both the EU and the U.S.;

    24. Calls on the EEAS and Union delegations to intensify monitoring of the state of democracy in various countries and to enhance logistical and technological support for human rights defenders and indigenous individuals, with a particular focus on women;

    25. Recalls that is crucial to further strengthen our support to human rights, democracy and development in third countries through the NDICI – Global Europe, as a world of democracies is a safer world; underlines that resources to the EU’s Digital Diplomacy should be further increased given the current context of rapid technological advancements and geopolitical competition; insists that “green diplomacy” and the green transition, as one of the Union’s priorities, should be enhanced towards third countries through the Union’s External Action; emphasises the need for EEAS to play a central role in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East, to increase funding to ensure humanitarian aid in Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, and to strengthen human rights monitoring; highlights financial support for the EEAS delegations deployed in the Middle East, Gulf countries, and Africa to ensure they can continue implementing the Union’s External Action in the region;

    26. Notes that the Special Report 14/2023 of the Court found deficiencies in the methodologies used by the Commission and the EEAS for allocating funding to partner countries and in the setup of the monitoring framework and recommended that the Commission and the EEAS notably improve the methodology for allocating funding and the assessment of the impact of Union support, focus the scope of the programming process and simplify and consistently use the indicators in the multiannual indicative programmes.

    27. Welcomes the appointment of the first EU Special Representative for the Gulf region;

    28. Highlights that recent events, notably Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its hostile attempts to influence democratic processes in Europe as well as growing instability in the Middle East, have brought Union foreign policy and its implementation to the forefront of concerns among the Member States and institutions; underlines the central role played by the EEAS and its delegations in conducting the Union’s external policy and in fighting foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); stresses the importance of the EEAS for the Union’s relations with the 25 to 30 million Union citizens living outside the Union; acknowledges that the EEAS budget, already structurally underfunded, was disproportionately affected in comparison to other Union institutions by the higher inflation rates and subsequent energy crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, and is concerned of these negative consequences for the EEAS and the performance of the Union institutions and the lack of action to rectify the current budgetary situation that can severely impact the Union’s relations with third countries;

    29. Welcomes the steadfast support provided to Ukraine, including through the civilian EU Advisory Mission (EUAM Ukraine) and the training of Ukrainian soldiers under the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM);

    30. Underlines that the Union must increase funding to reinforce the dedicated budget line within the Union’s foreign policy actions specifically for gender equality and the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, in order to ensure consistent financing for initiatives that promote gender-responsive leadership, protect women’s rights, and combat sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in conflict and post-conflict settings; stresses that such funding is essential to support local civil society organisations, provide survivor-centred support, and integrate gender perspectives into Union diplomatic and security efforts.

    31. Stresses that the Gender Action Plan (GAP) III dictates that 85% of new Union actions must contribute to gender equality and women and girls’ empowerment; calls on the EEAS to accelerate the progress towards the goals of GAP III by meaningfully focusing in its every day work on the GAP III’s key areas of engagement, including ending gender-based violence, promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights, economic and social rights and empowerment, equal participation and leadership; notes that GAP III will expire in 2027 and urges the EEAS, to this end, to develop a more ambitious GAP IV that will ensure a stronger connection between women’s rights and empowerment and the Union’s foreign and security policy, ready for implementation as of 2028;

    32. Underlines the extremely vulnerable situation of children in the world, specifically in armed conflict; expresses serious concern about the tens of thousands of children that were affected by armed conflict across the globe and suffered abhorrent abuses and violations of their most basic rights in 2023; calls on the EEAS to put children’s rights at the centre of their efforts;

    33. Recalls the dire situation of women’s rights and LGBTQI+ rights in many parts of the world; stresses the urgent need to better protect these rights; highlights the central role of the EEAS in advancing human rights around the world; calls on the EEAS to enhance their efforts in this regard;

    34. Sees electoral observation mission as a practical and effective foreign policy instrument that remains central to the Union’s democracy support policies and strategies; calls on the Union to ensure adequate resources to the EU electoral observation missions, in view also of extending them to elections in candidate and neighbouring countries;

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    35. Notes that, at the end 2023, the occupation rate of the establishment plan was at 96,7 %; notes that the EEAS was employing a total of 2 812 members of staff, including 1 245 officials, 450 temporary agents, 603 contract agents and 514 seconded national experts (SNEs); notes that out of the total number of officials and temporary agents employed by the EEAS, either in its headquarters or in delegations, 62,5 % was made up of administrators, 32,8 % was made up of assistants and 4,8 % was made up of secretaries;

    36. Notes that 5 252 people in total were working in the EEAS at the end of 2023, employed either directly by the EEAS or through external contractors, from which 46,2 % were working in the EEAS headquarters and 53,8 % in delegations; notes that out of the total number of people working in the EEAS, 46,5 % were non-statutory staff or external contractors; notes that the largest number of external staff employed by an external contractor but working in the premises of the EEAS provide services in the areas of information technology, security and safety and medical care;

    37. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS received 36 full-time equivalents from the budgetary authority, including 31 contract agents and five cost-shared SNEs; notes that the additional resources were allocated to crisis management functions, to the implementation of the Strategic Compass and to other EEAS priorities; notes that, at the end of 2023, the EEAS received an additional 20 cost-free SNEs for the Military Planning and Conduct Capability structures;

    38. Notes that, by the end of 2023, the EEAS statutory population comprised 52,7% men and 47,3% women, reflecting a slight increase in female representation compared to 2022, when 46,8% of staff were women; welcomes the modest progress in gender balance within senior management, where the representation of women increased from 6,3% in 2022 to 7,6% in 2023, and in middle management, where it rose from 30,1% in 2022 to 30,4% in 2023; calls on the EEAS to intensify efforts to achieve a more substantial and visible gender balance across all levels of the organisation;

    39. Welcomes the publication of the mid-term report on the implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP III) by the HR/VP and the Commission at the end of 2023, as well as the decision to extend its timeline to 2027 to align with the multiannual financial framework (MFF); acknowledges GAP III’s significance in promoting gender equality as a strategic priority in EU external action and enhancing its role in this area; welcomes the organisation of the first executive trainings on Gender-Responsive Leadership (GRL) for senior managers in late 2023 by the team of the Ambassador for Gender and Diversity;

    40. Welcomes the first EEAS report on FIMI activities targeting LGBTIQA+ individuals, aimed at enhancing understanding of FIMI tactics and fostering cooperation, including with ENISA, to protect the LGBTIQA+ community; expresses concern about the global status of LGBTIQ+ rights and the increasing resistance to gender equality, women’s rights, and sexual and reproductive health and rights in developing countries; calls on the Commission and the EEAS to address these setbacks and prioritise targeted support for civil society organisations advocating for these rights;

    41. Notes that, in its decision adopted in July 2023, the HR/VP clarified that the maximum duration of the engagement by the EEAS of temporary and contract staff was 8 years in a reference period of 13 years or, in exceptional circumstances and in the interests of the service, 10 years in a reference period of 15 years and that the minimum lapse of time between successive engagements for temporary agents seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States was 2 years from the termination of their last contract;

    42. Notes that at the end of 2023, out of 1695 officials and temporary agents, 863 (51 %) were men and 832 (49 %) were women, which represents a slight increase from 2022; notes that among contract agents 57,4% were women , which is a slight increase from 2022; however regrets that women are still notably underrepresented in senior positions, both in headquarters and in delegations, and overrepresented mainly in AST positions; calls on the EEAS to publish a gender and nationality breakdown of middle and senior management positions; asks the EEAS to address this issue, while at the same time respecting the competences and merits of the candidates; welcomes that the 2023 rotation exercise offered 42 management posts in Delegations and resulted in a 12% increase in the number of women Ambassadors, whereas in 2023 35,50 % of them were women (up from 31,70 %), which, nevertheless, is still an underrepresentation;

    43. Observes that although all Member States are represented in the EEAS staff, significant imbalances persist with Belgium being the most overrepresented Member State making up 12,1 % of total staff employed by the EEAS; points out that a significant geographical imbalance is also concentrated between Western and Eastern Member States; notes also that among managers, Italy is the most overrepresented Member State, with 15 % of all managerial positions being occupied by Italians; notes that out of 141 Union Ambassadors, three Member States still do not occupy any Ambassador posts (Hungary, Luxembourg and Malta), whereas the Member States with most Ambassadors are France with 22, Spain and Italy with 16, Germany with 12 and Belgium with 10, meaning that these five countries occupy 54 % of all Ambassador posts; strongly reiterates its call on the EEAS to continue to ensure a sound geographical balance throughout its organisation and on all levels; also reiterates its concern about gender balance; notes that women are notably under-represented in senior positions, while in AST positions in particular, they are overrepresented; calls on the EEAS to publish a gender and nationality breakdown of middle and senior management positions; asks the EEAS to address this issue, while at the same time respecting the competences and merits of the candidates;

    44. Notes that a major rotation exercise of 52 management posts in delegations was organised in 2023; welcomes the efforts deployed by the EEAS to raise the awareness of Member States in relation to the need to attract a wide range of candidates to the published posts and to propose qualified candidates for the Union Ambassador posts;

    45. Notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, the EEAS adopted its Agenda for Diversity and Inclusion 2023-2025, a detailed action plan to promote a safe and respectful working environment and a zero tolerance approach towards harassment; notes that staff representatives, staff associations and the Joint Committee for Equal Opportunities, which was renamed as the Joint Committee on Diversity and Inclusion, were consulted on both documents; notes that the action plan contains anti-harassment preventive measures, such as a mandatory e-learning training course for all staff on “Recognising and addressing harassment at work” and a mandatory management training on “How to create an harassment free work environment”; calls on the EEAS to continue to regularly train managerial and non-managerial staff on issues regarding diversity, equity, inclusion, and belonging;

    46. Notes with concern that, in 2023, the EEAS received three requests for assistance for allegations of psychological harassment involving two officials which led to two administrative enquiries, one of which is still ongoing and the other was closed with a disciplinary sanction; notes that, under the informal procedure, the EEAS mediation service dealt with 28 cases involving allegations of psychological harassment and 10 cases of sexual harassment and that the Confidential Counsellors dealt with 21 cases of allegations of psychological harassment and 6 cases of sexual harassment in 2023; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS prepared a decision on anti-harassment for local staff in delegations, which was adopted in June 2024; acknowledges the efforts made by the EEAS to strengthen its anti-harassment policies, including the introduction of mandatory e-learning modules to raise awareness and the establishment of an ‘Istanbul Convention Task Force’ aimed at identifying measures to ensure a safer workplace for all; however, expresses serious concern about the persistently high number of harassment cases; calls on the EEAS to implement stronger prevention, victim support, strict disciplinary measures to ensure zero tolerance for harassment and a safe working environment;

    47. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS took several measures to ensure the physical and mental wellbeing of its staff, including a systematic health check for all staff before being posted to a delegation, psychological support and awareness-raising actions; notes that, in October 2023, two decisions on working time and flexible working arrangements were adopted, following which flexitime became the default working time regime in the EEAS headquarters and in delegations for all staff, except managers; notes furthermore that the decisions authorise teleworking for up to two days per week in the EEAS headquarters, one day per week in delegations and 10 days per year away from the place of employment for all; notes that, exceptional teleworking for a longer period has remained possible in the event of crises, for medical or other imperative reasons;

    48. Is concerned that the EEAS members of staff on long-term sick leave for more than 50 days increased from 111 members of staff in 2022 to 171 members of staff in 2023, equivalent to an increase of 54 %; notes that the medical service implemented several measures to prevent the risk of burnout, such as the recruitment of a psychiatrist in December 2023 and a more systematic follow-up of sick leave by the medical service, psychological support and guidance to both staff and managers, awareness-raising activities and the creation of a mental health first aiders network; stresses the need for managers to ensure fair task allocation and implement guidance and flexible working arrangements; calls on the EEAS to take a proactive approach to prevent long-term sickness and burnout, prioritising the mental wellbeing of its staff through effective support measures;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    49. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS improved its ethical framework by issuing new instructions to prohibit or limit the missions with costs partially or totally paid by external sources to avoid risks of conflicts of interest by sending a reminder on ethics to all staff; notes that the EEAS also focused on organising specific training courses on ethics, conflicts of interest, internal control and anti-fraud targeted at and adapted to different audiences in the EEAS headquarters and in delegations; notes furthermore that the 16 ‘principles of professional behaviour’ adopted in 2022 continued to be distributed to newcomers and promoted widely, in particular during the ‘Ethics and integrity’ and ‘Anti-harassment policy’ courses; asks that Parliament be kept informed by the EEAS of any further development of its ethical framework; calls on the EEAS to provide regular mandatory trainings on ethics, including ethical usage of AI, and accountability;

    50. Welcomes that, in October 2023, the EEAS adopted a new Anti-Fraud Strategy, applicable to all staff in the EEAS headquarters and in delegations, which resulted from a thorough review process of fraud-related risks and was formally endorsed by OLAF; welcomes that the EEAS devoted particular efforts to staff training and guidance, in particular through the anti-fraud cell established in December 2022; notes that the EEAS staff posted in Union delegations actively participated in a series of workshops and seminars on fraud awareness and prevention, that staff newly assigned to a Union delegation systematically received training on these issues prior to taking up posts and that the intranet page related to anti-fraud was further revamped with the aim of facilitating the reporting of potential fraud cases and providing a wider range of options for anti-fraud training; asks the EEAS to conduct mandatory regular fraud awareness and prevention trainings for all staff;

    51. Notes that the EEAS did not receive any whistleblowing cases in 2023; notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, the EEAS started to develop a dedicated whistleblower protection policy in line with the new Anti-Fraud Strategy; asks that Parliament be kept informed about its adoption, scheduled for 2025, and its implementation across the service;

    52. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS received five declarations of conflicts of interest, which were handled in accordance with the applicable rules; notes that, in a case related to a member of an evaluation committee in a procurement procedure, the authorising officer by subdelegation concluded that there was a potential conflict of interest and relieved the member of staff from the duty of member of the evaluation committee;

    53. Notes with concern that OLAF opened eight investigations in 2023, which are still ongoing, concerning potential misconduct in the context of procurement procedures and implementation of contracts, grant agreements or potential irregularities related to human-resource matters; notes that the open cases in 2023 concerned officials, temporary agents and local agents both in the EEAS headquarters and in delegations; asks that Parliament be kept informed regarding the follow-up to those investigations; notes that eight older cases involving former and current staff were closed, with recommendations to take further action in five cases; notes that the EEAS is in regular contact with OLAF through its anti-fraud cell and ensures the timely follow-up of OLAF recommendations; asks that the Parliament is kept informed on the implementation of the recommendations;

    54. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS handled ten requests from the Ombudsman, nine of which related to administrative files and one to a request for access to documents; notes that the Ombudsman found no instances of maladministration or partial maladministration and did not issue any recommendation to the EEAS;

    55. Takes note of all activities undertaken to raise awareness on outside activities; reminds the Parliament’s request to adopt self-standing implementation provisions on outside activities and assignments, in order to protect the image and reputation of the Union in particular in case of Heads of Delegations;

    56. Notes that, in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission, the HR/VP is bound by the rules of the Transparency Register; stresses that while the EEAS is not an Institution within the meaning of Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union and does not have a direct role in Union law, it does, however, have an important role in Union law with regard to decisions concerning sanctions and the negotiation of international trade agreements, which have a considerable regulatory impact; notes that it would be of great relevance for the EEAS to adopt transparency measures, notify them to the management board of the Transparency Register and join the Register; invites the EEAS to publish all meetings with all types of lobby organisations, including those of Heads of Union Delegations, in order to improve transparency; asks that Parliament be kept informed of any new initiative taken by the EEAS to improve transparency; reiterates the importance of further strengthening the democratic scrutiny of the Union and of upholding high standards of accountability and transparency when engaging with civil society organisations; asks Union delegations to ensure that Union funds awarded to civil society organisations and social partners in third countries are used in line with the Union values, policies, and financial rules;

    57. Urges the EEAS to join the EU Transparency Register to align its practices with the European Parliament and Commission, ensuring full disclosure of lobbying activities and financial interests related to defense and diplomatic matters;

    Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

    58. Notes that the expenditures for IT projects, equipment and cybersecurity increased from EUR 19,7 million in 2022 to EUR 29,9 million in 2023, corresponding to an increase of 52 %; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS launched important digitalisation projects, such as its collaborative platform ‘HIVE’ for all users at headquarters and delegations and deployed its Corporate Classified Communications and Information System (EC3IS) at the EEAS headquarters, before its progressive rolling out in sensitive delegations and interconnecting it with the corresponding systems at the Commission and at the Council;

    59. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS started to host and control an AI environment so that a complete AI governance model could be put in place; notes that this technical step established the grounds for the adoption of guidelines on the use of generative AI and of an AI Strategy in 2024, as well as running proofs of concept; asks that the Parliament be kept informed of the development of the AI Strategy;

    60. Notes that, as part of the implementation of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence adopted in 2022, the EEAS was involved in the adoption of major policy documents and toolboxes related inter alia to cyber defence, cyber diplomacy, hybrid threats, foreign interference and information manipulation; notes that, internally, the EEAS continued to improve its cybersecurity capabilities via the recruitment of specialised staff and to provide cyber-awareness activities to different audiences including the Security Management Team, members of the delegations, newcomers and managers; asks that the EEAS provides regular mandatory cybersecurity training to all staff; calls further for enhanced Union support for Moldova in combating disinformation, hybrid threats, and cyberattacks; calls on the EU Delegation to Moldova to enhance its efforts to promote a more proactive and effective communication strategy regarding the European perspective, including outreach in the Russian language;

    61. Welcomes the establishment of EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova); highlights the essential role of the EUPM Moldova and calls the EU and its Member States to extend the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025 while increasing resources to enhance its effectiveness;

    62. Notes with concern that, in 2023, the EEAS recorded over 29 623 cyber alerts via the Security Incident and Event Monitoring – SIEM, out of which 92 incidents were confirmed as cyberattacks; notes that four cyberattacks had an impact on EEAS operations and only one had significant consequences; warns that the EEAS is a highly likely target for well-resourced actors, including those sponsored by foreign states, seeking to disrupt Union Institutions; notes that the EEAS Security Operations Centre (SOC) is a key actor in dealing with real time threat monitoring and identification of system vulnerabilities; requests the EEAS to continue to consider the need for users’ cyber discipline and cyber awareness as key elements in its cyber security framework; emphasises the importance of the EEAS continuing to prioritise cybersecurity and hybrid threat mitigation while collaborating closely with other Union Institutions and Member States to identify and counter such threats;

    63. Notes that the EEAS followed up on one European Data Protection Supervisor enquiry in 2023, following a request from a member of staff concerning the publication of his/her personal data on the EU online directory; notes that a case pending since 2018 was dealt with in 2023 and closed in 2024 with a positive outcome for the EEAS; notes the awareness-raising activities and guidance issued by the EEAS to ensure a level playing field in the area of data protection across its network, notably the Joint Guide on the use of third party AI tools from the double perspective of data protection and cybersecurity;

    64. Notes that the fight against FIMI remained a priority for the EEAS in 2023; welcomes that the FIMI toolbox was endorsed by the European Council in December 2023 based on the pillars of situational awareness, resilience building, disruption and diplomatic responses; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS scaled up its analytical capacity to collect FIMI evidence and build responses to the increasing number of incidents and threats, in particular in the run up to the 2024 European elections; notes that the EEAS also launched new flagship projects to raise awareness and counter Russian disinformation, such as the EUvsDisinfo initiative which reached approximately 20,3 million people in 2023, and to create sustainable partnerships to counter FIMI globally; calls on the EEAS, together with the Commission to dedicate adequate resources to effectively combat FIMI; supports the pledged establishment of a “European Democracy Shield” to detect, track and delete deceitful online content, hereby strengthening the Union’s ability to counter FIMI and enhancing its support for protecting democracies in third countries, especially within the Union’s neighbourhood; calls on the EEAS and EU Delegations in third countries to further strengthen their respective capacities in fighting and countering disinformation and propaganda linked to the Union’s CFSP and; calls on the EEAS to scale up its efforts to empower citizens from across the Union to fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

    Buildings and security

    65. Notes that, in the course of 2023, the budget line 3003 on buildings and associated costs was reinforced by EUR 19 million but that important maintenance works were nevertheless deferred; is deeply concerned that the accumulation of maintenance and security needs poses significant challenges to the EEAS with regard to how to operate the delegations’ network safely and effectively, and ensure the duty of care towards delegations staff; requests the EEAS to develop multi-annual contingency plans for buildings maintenance and security;

    66. Notes that the EEAS occupies and manages real estate covering about 87 618 sqm in the EEAS headquarters and 379 300 sqm around the world with 174 office buildings and 152 residences for Ambassadors; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS presented a working document outlining its purchase policy to the budgetary authority, which currently stands at 22 % of office buildings and 20 % of residences for Ambassadors, thereby achieving the best value for money;

    67. Notes that the purchase policy of real estate for Union delegations of April 2023 and the working document on the real estate policy of the EEAS for 2024 aims to achieve the most advantageous long term solution for the Union budget; highlights that none of these documents include any ideas with regard to reducing the number of delegations or creating regional hubs; urges the EEAS to keep Parliament informed of any possible future developments in that direction;

    68. Invites the EEAS to maintain its important network of Delegations around the world with sufficient staff in order to improve its ability to reach out to third countries;

    69. Notes with concern that these budgetary constraints could lead to excessive closures of EU embassies and postponing security installations in a number of EU Delegations hampering the EEAS’ ability to fulfil its mandate and defend EU values and properly ensure the duty of care to all staff in Delegations; urges the Members States to provide enough financing to the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that the EU maintains its network of Delegations untouched as a signal of its global engagement;

    70. Notes that, since 2020, the EEAS has been developing its office management policy towards collaborative and flexible office concepts both at the EEAS headquarters and in delegations; notes that the EEAS started to renovate the Schuman building complex, starting with the 6th and 7th floors, with a view to achieving more efficient use of office space; notes furthermore that the EEAS crisis response centre in the Schuman building was finalised in 2023; notes that, in delegations, the collaborative space concept was implemented in the new premises of 6 delegations;

    71. Welcomes that the EEAS is focused on ensuring that its buildings are accessible to people with disabilities and reduced mobility; notes that the Belmont building in Brussels already fulfils the legal requirements for barrier-free buildings and that the refurbishment of the NEO building complex also accommodates the needs of users with disabilities and reduced mobility; welcomes that, for delegations, the EEAS selection procedures envisage barrier-free construction as a key selection criteria for new office buildings;

    Environment and sustainability

    72. Welcomes that, in 2023, the EEAS continued to implement the Eco-management and Audit Scheme (EMAS/EMS), notably by setting up an Environment Steering Committee and by adopting an Environmental Policy and a relevant communication strategy highlighting the EEAS commitment to environmental sustainability in real estate management; notes that the EMAS Steering Committee worked on new objectives in 2023, the aim of which is to further reduce its carbon footprint by 2030; notes that the measures approved include the reduction of the use of natural gas by 35 %, the reduction of the use of paper, water and waste production by half, an increase in the share of short to medium distance flights for missions in economic class and the better use of green public procurement;

    73. Welcomes that the EEAS started to introduce sustainability clauses in the new co-location agreements, including both compulsory actions and voluntary practices; notes that, as regards the co-location agreements already in force, instead of including explicit environmental sustainability clauses, such agreements mention as an overarching principle that any co-location hosted partners adhere to procedures and practices applicable within the local context of Union office premises;

    74. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS continued to work on the implementation of a policy towards greener commuting and more sustainable travel for staff, which led to the adoption of important measures in 2024, such as the increase of the reimbursement rate for public transport subscriptions to 90 % for all staff relinquishing parking access and the objective of at least 60 % of the kilometres travelled by plane during missions should be in economy class;

    75. Stresses the importance of strong political engagement, bilateral leverage, public and cultural diplomacy to promote Union values and combat disinformation; emphasises the need for a robust and resilient external service with clear political leadership to address current challenges and ensure coherence in the Union’s foreign policy; urges Union delegations to strengthen support for genuine democratic actors and civil society in the Western Balkans, while firmly and publicly condemning actions by illiberal and undemocratic actors that undermine the Union’s interests, and to ensure that IPA III funding is implemented in line with the Union’s objectives; calls on the EU Delegations in the region to apply a more credible and merit-based approach based on the Copenhagen criteria, notably on the rule of law, democracy and the protection of human rights, especially given the limited progress made by some countries in the Western Balkans;

    76. Welcomes the EEAS’s excellent cooperation with bodies such as OLAF, the EPPO, the Court, and the EDPS, reflected in regular meetings and exchanges of information; notes the conclusion of dedicated working arrangements in June 2024; calls nevertheless on the EEAS to institutionalise structured cooperation with those bodies, ensuring systematic fraud detection mechanisms for the Union’s external action funding, particularly in high-risk conflict zones and fragile states;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    77. Notes that, in 2023, the Parliament, the Council and the EEAS continued their technical discussions regarding the replacement of the 2002 Institutional Agreement between Parliament and the Council in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy; regrets that a single technical meeting took place in 2023 following which the Council was not able to find an agreement on the compromise solutions put forward;

    78. Notes that, in 2023, the EEAS opened the negotiation process for a working arrangement with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which was signed in 2024; notes that the working arrangement take into account the special context in which the EEAS operates, putting emphasis on the protection of information, the confidentiality of information and the protection of immunity of staff;

    79. Notes that, in its 2023 budget, the EEAS earmarked EUR 990,5 million for a pilot project to launch the European Diplomatic Academy, whereby 50 junior diplomats from Member States and the Union institutions are trained on Union foreign and security policies with the aim of building a true European Diplomatic corps to promote Union foreign policy and external interest; encourages this initiative as a step towards fostering a cohesive and well-trained European diplomatic corps that can effectively represent and defend the Union’s values and interests on the global stage; underlines the necessity to improve the visibility of the European Diplomatic Academy across all Member States and to strengthen its role and capacities;

    80. Welcomes that the EEAS scaled up its cooperation with the European Ombudsman in 2023 to improve awareness amongst its staff of the principles of good administration; notes that the new layer of cooperation involves inviting the European Ombudsman Office to present their work at the EEAS pre-posting seminars and in the EEAS annual staff seminars;

    Communication

    81. Notes that the EEAS has a budget allocation of EUR 22,2 million, spread over different budget lines covering publications, events, strategic communication, outreach activities and press; welcomes that standing up for democracy and the rule of law remained a priority for the EEAS, also by targeting Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference via strengthened policies and instruments;

    82. Points to the rise in the number of violations of freedom of religion worldwide; calls on the EEAS to adequately equip its staff in view of this in countries where there is no religious freedom or where religious freedom is under pressure (including by means of training courses); with a view to entering into discussions on this topic with the relevant authorities at all levels in countries where freedom of religion is being violated; and make this a key focus of its external action;

    83. Notes that, as part of its communication activities, the EEAS reaches out to the general public via public events, open days and the reception of visitors’ groups; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS launched several thematic communication campaigns across different channels on the support to Ukraine, the consequences of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the respect for Union values; welcomes that Ukraine remained a top priority for the EEAS; notes that, in 2023, the EEAS consolidated its presence on social media and increased the number of its followers by 41,5 % on LinkedIn, by 13,8 % on Instagram, by 5,4 % on Twitter and by 4,7 % on Facebook; urges the EEAS to enhance its communication of Union policies to citizens in third countries and to strengthen coordination efforts aimed at increasing the visibility of Union-funded projects, particularly in candidate countries, in order to counter the attempts of malicious actors to undermine the Union’s efforts;

    84. Welcomes the involvement of the EEAS in the institutional communication campaign of Parliament for the 2024 European elections, in particular the information campaign targeting the 25 to 30 million European citizens living in third countries on the possible ways to vote in the European elections, in particular via the delegation’ network; notes that this campaign reached out to 11 million recipients, via 26 video campaigns and over 2 000 posts on social media;

    85. Highlights the EEAS’s contribution to the Union’s overarching efforts to demonstrate steadfast support for Ukraine with initiatives like the #StandWithUkraine campaign and targeted communication projects such as Faces of Ukraine, Art vs War, and Share Your Light;

    86. Continues to encourage Union Delegations to promote and engage with local actors, civil society organisations and social partners in third countries to stimulate social dialogue and dialogue regarding the rule of law, fundamental rights and the fight against corruption; notes that, in 2023, under the thematic programme for civil society organisations, based on which Union partnerships are concluded with accountable and transparent organisations, EUR 50 million was allocated to the Union System for an Enabling Environment for Civil Society, which monitors and promotes civic space in 86 partner countries.

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (31.1.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgetary Control

    on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section X – European External Action Service

    (2024/2024(DEC))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Michael Gahler

     

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgetary Control, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Highlights that recent events, notably Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the former’s hostile attempts to influence democratic processes in Europe as well as growing instability in the Middle East, have brought EU foreign policy and its implementation to the forefront of concerns among the EU Member States and institutions; underlines the central role played by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and its delegations in conducting the Union’s external policy and in fighting foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI); stresses the importance of the EEAS for the EU’s relations with the 25 to 30 million EU citizens living outside the Union; acknowledges that the EEAS budget, already structurally underfunded, was disproportionately affected in comparison to other EU institutions by the higher inflation rates and subsequent energy crisis caused by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, and is concerned of these negative consequences for the EEAS and the performance of the EU institutions and the lack of action to rectify the current budgetary situation that can severely impact the EU’s relations with third countries;

    2. Emphasises the need for the European External Action Service (EEAS) to play a central role in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East, to increase funding to ensure humanitarian aid in Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, and to strengthen human rights monitoring.

    3. Highlight financial support for the European External Action Service (EEAS) delegations deployed in the Middle East, Gulf countries, and Africa to ensure they can continue implementing the EU’s External Action in the region.

    4. Insists on the budgetary increase for CFSP actions and other appropriate peace, conflict and crisis response instruments, as well as IT and security protocols, in order to fully match EU’s activities and capabilities with current challenges and conflicts worldwide;

    5. Highlights the EEAS’s contribution to the EU’s overarching efforts to demonstrate steadfast support for Ukraine with initiatives like the #StandWithUkraine campaign and targeted communication projects such as Faces of Ukraine, Art vs War, and Share Your Light;

    6. Reminds that is crucial to further strengthening our support to human rights, democracy and development in third countries through the NDICI – Global Europe, as a world of democracies is a safer world; underlines that resources to the EU’s Digital Diplomacy should be further increased given the current context of rapid technological advancements and geopolitical competition; insists that “green diplomacy” and the green transition, as one of the EU’s priorities, should be enhanced towards third countries through the EU’s External Action;

    7. Acknowledges the EEAS’s role in gathering evidence against EU-sanctioned Russian state-backed outlets and individuals involved in spreading disinformation and manipulating information to justify Russia’s war of aggression;

    8. Regrets that the European Court of Auditors in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023 observes that they found quantifiable error in one of the 13 payments examined, concerning the absence of a valid procurement procedure and six non-quantifiable findings concerning procurement at EU Delegations, including weaknesses in the methodology for selecting tenderers and evaluating tenders, as well as entering into a legal commitment before making the budgetary commitment;

    9. Notes that the Special Report 14/2023 of the European Court of Auditors found deficiencies in the methodologies used by the Commission and the EEAS for allocating funding to partner countries and in the setup of the monitoring framework and recommended that the Commission and the EEAS notably improve the methodology for allocating funding and the assessment of the impact of EU support, focus the scope of the programming process and simplify and consistently use the indicators in the multiannual indicative programmes.

    10. Welcomes the Court of Auditors’ Special Report regarding the coordination role of the EEAS and its conclusions that coordination is mostly effective, allowing the service to properly support the High Representative/Vice-President to deliver their mandate; notes that nevertheless some weaknesses in information management, staffing and reporting remain; calls on the EEAS to prioritise the implementation of the recommendations of the Special Report by the deadline in 2025 as timely action is important in reinforcing its operational capacity and enhancing its contribution to the EU foreign policy objectives.

    11. Notes that that the EEAS is committed to make itself more cost-effective while continuing to face significant budgetary constraints in 2023 despite increasing geopolitical challenges; acknowledges that the EEAS has substantially cut its mission and representation budget, which impacts the core functions of a Diplomatic service, and has reduced non-compulsory expenditure and freezing and postponing building maintenance, infrastructure and IT projects; notes with concern that these budgetary constraints could lead to excessive closures of EU embassies and postponing security installations in a number of EU Delegations hampering the EEAS’ ability to fulfil its mandate and defend EU values and properly ensure the duty of care to all staff in Delegations; urges the Members States to provide enough financing to the EEAS and the Commission to ensure that the EU maintains its network of Delegations untouched as a signal of its global engagement; underlines the negative impact cuts may have on the implementation of the external affairs instruments, such as NDICI and Global Gateway; underlines the need to provide adequate resources to the Strategic Communication and Foresight division of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to continue to effectively combat disinformation campaigns deployed as strategic tools by authoritarian and illiberal regimes; welcomes in this regard the announcement of the creation of the Task Force for Strategic Communication and Countering Information Manipulation in DG COMM of the Commission;

    12. Welcomes the steadfast support provided to Ukraine, including through the civilian EU Advisory Mission (EUAM Ukraine) and the training of Ukrainian soldiers under the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM);

    13. Welcomes the appointment of the first EU Special Representative for the Gulf region;

    14. Underlines that the EU must increase funding to reinforce the dedicated budget line within EU foreign policy actions specifically for gender equality and the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, in order to ensure consistent financing for initiatives that promote gender-responsive leadership, protect women’s rights, and combat sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in conflict and post-conflict settings; stresses that such funding is essential to support local civil society organisations, provide survivor-centered support, and integrate gender perspectives into EU diplomatic and security efforts.

    15. Stresses that the Gender Action Plan (GAP) III dictates that 85% of new EU actions must contribute to gender equality and women and girls’ empowerment; calls on the EEAS to accelerate the progress towards the goals of GAP III by meaningfully focusing in its every day work on the GAP III’s key areas of engagement, including ending gender-based violence, promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights, economic and social rights and empowerment, equal participation and leadership; notes that GAP III will expire in 2027 and urges the EEAS to this end to develop a more ambitious GAP IV that will ensure a stronger connection between women’s rights and empowerment and the EU’s foreign and security policy, ready for implementation as of 2028;

    16. Underlines the extremely vulnerable situation of children in the world, specifically in armed conflict; expresses serious concern about the tens of thousands of children that were affected by armed conflict across the globe and suffered abhorrent abuses and violations of their most basic rights in 2023; calls on the EEAS to put children’s rights at the centre of their efforts;

    17. Continues to encourage the EEAS and Union delegations to promote and engage with local actors and civil society organisations in third countries to stimulate dialogue about the rule of law, fundamental human rights and the fight against corruption and the misuse of EU funds;

    18. Calls on the EU Delegations to enhance support to genuine democratic actors and civil society in the Western Balkans, go strongly and publicly denounce actions by illiberal and undemocratic actors that go against the Union’s interest and to ensure that the implementation of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) III funding is in line with the EU’s objectives; calls on the EU Delegations in the region to apply a more credible and merit-based approach based on the Copenhagen criteria, notably on the rule of law, democracy and the protection of human rights, especially given the limited progress made by some countries in the Western Balkans;

    19. Calls for enhanced EU support for Moldova in combating disinformation, hybrid threats, and cyberattacks; calls the EU Delegation to Moldova to enhance its efforts to promote a more proactive and effective communication strategy regarding the European perspective, including outreach in the Russian language;

    20. Recalls the dire situation of women’s rights and LGBTQI+ rights in many parts of the world; stresses the urgent need to better protect these rights; highlights the central role of the EEAS in advancing human rights around the world; calls on the EEAS to enhance their efforts in this regard;

    21. Sees electoral observation mission as a practical and effective foreign policy instrument that remains central to the EU’s democracy support policies and strategies; calls on the EU to ensure adequate resources to the EU electoral observation missions, in view also of extending them to elections in candidate and neighbouring countries.

    22. Welcomes the establishment of EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova); highlights the essential role of the EUPM Moldova and calls the EU and its Member States to extend the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025 while increasing resources to enhance its effectiveness;

    23. Urges the EEAS and the EU Delegations to closely monitor the state of democracy in the different countries and to provide logistical and technological support to human rights defenders and indigenous persons, in particular women;

    24. Emphasises that freedom of religion and belief is a fundamental value of the free world and the European Union; urges the European External Action Service to incorporate faith diplomacy into its actions, recognising religion as a part of the solution to global challenges; underlines that this approach should include actively safeguarding the rights of Christians and other religious groups especially in countries where they are a minority, as well as promoting tolerance, and ensuring that religious freedom is part of all relevant external engagements and policies of the EU;

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR THE OPINION HAS RECEIVED INPUT

     

    The rapporteur for opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023 – A10-0068/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2023

    (2024/2052(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the European Investment Bank Group (‘EIB Group’) 2023 activity report of 1 February 2024 entitled ‘A Blueprint for Sustainable Living’, and to the EIB Group document of 2 February 2023 entitled ‘EIB Group Operational Plan 2023-2025’,–  having regard to the European Investment Bank (‘EIB’, ‘the Bank’) Investment Report 2023/2024 entitled ‘Transforming for competitiveness’, published on 7 February 2024,

     having regard to the EIB document of 8 May 2023 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the EIB Energy Lending Policy’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report on the implementation of the EIB Group Transparency Policy in 2023, published on 1 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Group document of 27 November 2023 entitled ‘The EIB Group PATH Framework – Version 1.2 of November 2023 – Supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement’,

     having regard to the EIB Group and EIB documents of 21 June 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap’ and of 29 November 2023 entitled ‘EIB Global Strategic Roadmap’,

     having regard to the EIB Group Sustainability Report 2023, published on 25 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB information note of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘The European Investment Bank’s approach to human rights’,

     having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Report 2023, published on 10 June 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Group document of 14 October 2024 entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’,

     having regard to the EIB publication of 23 September 2024 entitled ‘EIB Audit Committee Annual Reports for the year 2023’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report of 15 July 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions 2023’,–  having regard to the EIB report of 19 October 2023 entitled ‘EIB Investment Survey 2023 – European Union overview’,

      having regard to the EIB Group report of 26 June 2024 entitled ‘EIB Group support for EU businesses: Evidence of impact in addressing market failures’,

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

     having regard to European Court of Auditors Special Report 22/2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget’,

     having regard to the EIB Group report of 29 December 2023 entitled ‘European Investment Bank Group Risk Management Disclosure Report – June 2023’,

     having regard to the joint communication of 19 March 2025 from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy entitled ‘Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0068/2025),

    A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB stands as the world’s largest multilateral development bank; whereas the EIB is treaty-bound to contribute to EU integration; whereas the EIB’s key priorities include providing funding for projects to foster European integration and social cohesion; whereas the EIF acts as a dedicated body for supporting the European Union’s policy objectives in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion;

    B. whereas, as a bank owned by the EU Member States, the EIB is governed by a Board of Governors, a Board of Directors and a Management Committee, and it maintains robust internal mechanisms for accountability, governance and audit; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (60 %), the EU (30 %) and financial institutions (10 %) from the Member States, the UK and Türkiye, and is managed by the General Meeting of EIF shareholders, the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive, with independent internal mechanisms for accountability, governance and audit, some of which are shared at the Group level;

    C. whereas both the EIB and the EIF operate within a competitive market but are held to high standards of transparency and stakeholder engagement as EU bodies;

    D. whereas the EIB Group promotes EU policies both within and outside the EU and collaborates closely with other EU and national institutions, aligning its financing with the EU’s political priorities; whereas the EIB Group outlined eight strategic priorities in its Strategic Roadmap for 2024-2027: climate action, digital transformation, defence, cohesion, agriculture, social infrastructure, external financing and promoting the Capital Markets Union;

    E. whereas the EIB is also tasked with securing resources through borrowing activities, which are crucial for implementing the EU’s policies;

    F. whereas the European Council’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029 envisages an enhanced role for the EIB Group as a driver of EU defence and security, and emphasises the need to boost EU competitiveness and improve citizens’ economic and social well-being through significant collective investment efforts, leveraging both public and private funding;

    G. whereas the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness[1] proposed numerous ways to expand the EIB’s role in financing EU policies and to enable the EIB to assume more risk;

    H. whereas the EIB Group’s core mission is to bolster Europe’s potential for job creation and economic growth; whereas its investments should tackle inequalities by improving access to jobs, training opportunities, housing and education in order to address poverty and unemployment; whereas it is crucial to overcome barriers to financing for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps; whereas public lending and guarantee schemes serve as vital countercyclical policy tools, especially during economic downturns, and help mitigate structural market failures;

    I. whereas the EIB is a cornerstone of the European financial architecture for development and the largest multilateral lender in the EU’s neighbouring regions, including the Eastern Neighbourhood countries, the Western Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa; whereas the EIB is expected to help close the gap in productive investment between Europe and its main competitors by increasing investment in innovation, communication technology and intellectual property;

    J. whereas the success of the EU’s policy objectives and their effective implementation increasingly depend on the EIB Group; whereas the depth and quality of Parliament’s oversight of the EIB’s financial operations should therefore be in line with the intensity of EIB-Commission cooperation, which has become very significant;

    K. whereas the EIB’s business model requires the highest standards of integrity, accountability and transparency, and robust measures must be implemented and regularly updated to combat financial fraud, corruption, money laundering, terrorism, organised crime and both tax evasion and avoidance; whereas the EIB Group has a control framework aimed at preventing and mitigating sanctions risks;

    L. whereas the EIB Group adheres to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s definition of compliance risk, with the aim of preventing the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial loss, or damage to reputation; whereas the Bank takes appropriate measures to mitigate such risks by ensuring strict compliance with legal and regulatory frameworks, both at EU and international level;

    Financial operations and performance

    1. Acknowledges that the EIB has operated effectively and efficiently in a landscape marked by significant global challenges, including geopolitical tensions, climate change impacts and other factors influencing the global economy; suggests exploring both the EIB’s effectiveness and efficiency through thoughtful analysis, particularly focusing on the impact on competitiveness and growth;

    2. Recognises that EIB financing is becoming increasingly crucial in the context of high interest rates and constrained public finances; expects the EIB, in the context of a challenging economic outlook and increased global competition, to address constraints to EU competitiveness, such as volatile energy prices, skills shortages in key sectors and insufficient investments in innovation and new technologies;

    3. Notes that the EIB Group achieved strong consolidated results amounting to EUR 2.272 billion in 2023 under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), compared to EUR 2.327 billion in 2022, reflecting a year-on-year decrease of 2.4 %; calls for a detailed analysis of the factors contributing to this decrease, especially since the period was marked by steady economic growth; observes that EIB reserves reached over EUR 56 billion in 2023, up from EUR 53.9 billion in 2022 and EUR 36 billion in 2014;

    4. Notes that the EIB’s total liquidity ratio remained well within internal limits to the end of 2023 and that the EIB’s Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio stood at 33.1 % in 2023, significantly higher than the average ratio of significant institutions supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) at that time; emphasises that maintaining the EIB’s AAA rating with a ‘stable’ outlook is crucial for securing favourable market financing at preferential rates and should be preserved; underlines that the EIB’s high credit standing is key to its successful business model;

    5. Calls on the EIB to maintain its strong capital position and consistently high profits, but notes that the Bank has potential to absorb potential fluctuations in returns without compromising shareholder capital or its credit rating, has the capacity to take on more risk in strategic investments and is well-equipped to invest more in higher-risk innovative projects where private capital remains hesitant;

    6. Highlights that the EIB’s total disbursements reached EUR 54.4 billion in 2023, with EUR 53.4 billion from its own resources, compared to EUR 54.3 billion (EUR 53.3 billion from its own resources) in 2022; observes that the EIF’s disbursements on private equity investments amounted to EUR 139.7 million in 2023, compared to EUR 113.7 million in 2022; notes that, according to an economic model developed jointly by the EIB’s Economics Department and the Commission’s Joint Research Centre, the EIB Group’s overall investment within the EU in 2023 is expected to create around 1 460 000 new jobs in the EU-27 by 2027 and boost the EU’s GDP by 1.03 percentage points; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments to maximise their impact across all EU regions, promoting cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the Union, with particular attention to under-represented and less developed areas;

    7. Recalls that the EIB’s Statute mandates geographical balance among its staff and that the selection of staff members must be based on merit, while also considering fair representation of nationals from all Member States; encourages the Bank to continuously monitor geographical balance among its staff and to adjust the recruitment process accordingly, if needed;

    8. Welcomes the fact that the EIB Group upholds a rigorous policy against tax fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and terrorism financing;

    InvestEU, the simplification of the multiannual financial framework, and the Recovery and Resilience Facility

    9. Welcomes the adoption, on 13 December 2023, of the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026, which outlines the priorities and activities for implementing the EIB Group’s strategy over the next three years; calls for adjustments to new market conditions, including simplification and a reduction of bureaucracy to remove barriers to financing for SMEs, which must be significantly increased; acknowledges that increasing higher-risk activities and mandates is crucial for providing effective support to high value-added and innovative sectors;

    10. Recalls that the EIB Group has been allocated 75 % (EUR 19.6 billion) of the EU budgetary guarantee under the InvestEU Regulation[2]; highlights that, in 2023 alone, the EIB approved 30 operations under InvestEU totalling EUR 9.1 billion; believes that in order to stay competitive, significant investments are needed, primarily from the private sector; believes that focusing on innovative projects, start-ups and scale-ups would enhance European competitiveness and growth; notes that this requires mobilising private investments; calls, therefore, on the EIB to play a more significant role in strategic de-risking through guarantees, thereby encouraging private capital investment;

    11. Stresses that, within the current 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, the EIB manages 87 mandates from the Commission, increasing to about 130 if those relating to shared management and assigned by local governments and the Member States are included, and notes that the EIB produces no fewer than 457 reports a year for these; points out that de-bureaucratisation and simplification are deemed necessary to enable better use of resources;

    12. Emphasises that the EIB is managing six Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) mandates in four Member States, signed in 2021 (Greece and Italy), 2022 (Romania) and 2024 (Spain), totalling EUR 8.7 billion; acknowledges that the adoption of ‘financing not linked to costs’ instruments, which have significantly expanded with the RRF, inherently raises the risk of errors and double funding; expresses its concern about the transparency, auditing and monitoring of the implementation of the RRF; calls on the EIB to cooperate with Member States to address government capacity constraints and the lack of technical skills so as to ensure that RRF resources are managed as effectively as possible, in alignment with national structures and complying with all RRF reporting requirements, especially in the implementation of investment projects and reforms; urges the Commission and the EIB, in its advisory role, to refrain from proposing new financing mechanisms based on the RRF model without taking corrective measures, including in the upcoming post-2027 multiannual financial framework; stresses that, while the EIB seeks simplification, it must not compromise the soundness of EU resource management or the ability to maintain oversight and accountability, as mandated by the Treaties;

    Energy security

    13. Notes the EIB’s continued support for security of supply, which mainly takes the form of reinforcing electricity grids and cross-border infrastructure, of reducing energy demand through energy efficiency projects and of fostering low-carbon power generation; commends the fact that the EIB has supported new dimensions of energy security, such as demand response and energy storage, and has promoted the development of a sustainable supply of critical raw materials (CRM) needed for the energy transition; calls for an urgent analysis of the real impact of these projects implemented to date, especially of their impact on the availability and cost of energy and thus on the general competitiveness of European companies;

    14. Reiterates the need to address energy poverty and emphasises the need for a fair and inclusive energy transition; recalls that the energy crisis is exacerbating inflation, increasing food insecurity and straining household budgets; encourages the EIB to leverage the Just Transition Mechanism and the Modernisation Fund to support regions and populations most affected by the energy transition; stresses the importance of using the Just Transition Mechanism to support workers and regions affected by the phase out of fossil fuels, ensuring access to retraining and quality jobs; recognises that numerous sectors are grappling with challenges stemming from the combined effects of adaption to European Green Deal objectives and the repercussions of the energy crisis and inflation; stresses that accelerating the deployment of innovative low-carbon technologies requires bringing their costs to a level that is competitive with fossil fuels and adjusting to the ongoing reform of the green policies;

    15. Acknowledges that the REPowerEU plan is a crucial new element in the EU policy response to the energy crisis; notes that, in July 2023, the EIB Group increased the financing targets of the October 2022 commitment from EUR 30.0 billion until 2027 to EUR 45.0 billion (REPowerEU+), in order to scale up its efforts to support the EU’s energy security; calls for a clear overview of potential double funding of energy projects;

    16. Underlines that in 2023, the EIB provided approximately EUR 21.4 billion in financing for energy-related projects, of which around EUR 19.8 billion in the EU and EUR 1.6 billion outside the EU; considers it necessary to increase not only the volume of financing for energy-related projects, but also the efficiency of the investments; underlines, in this regard, the importance of the EIB’s combined offer of competent technical assistance and innovative financial support, and encourages the Bank to expand the range of innovative financing products offered to economic operators, going beyond the standard market offer;

    17. Believes that hydrogen and its derivatives, particularly when sourced from renewable energy, can significantly contribute to the EU’s decarbonisation goals and reduce dependence on fossil fuels; urges the EIB to take a leading role in mobilising private investments, which are essential for scaling up hydrogen production across the EU, while ensuring technological neutrality and supporting a diverse range of innovative solutions for decarbonisation, including further scientific research aimed at enhancing and stabilising the efficiency of hydrogen technology; encourages the Bank to consider the cost-effectiveness of such projects from the perspective of their total life cycle;

    Defence and security policy

    18. Welcomes the significant role that the EIB Group plays in supporting the EU’s defence and security policy by providing funding and leveraging private investment to enhance the Union’s strategic autonomy and resilience; stresses the importance of the EIB’s investment capabilities, supporting initiatives that contribute to strengthening the EU’s defence industry, advancing cybersecurity infrastructure and promoting innovation in critical defence technologies;

    19. Appreciates that security and defence is set as one of the Bank’s core priorities in its Strategic Roadmap for 2024-2027; highlights that in May 2024, the EIB’s Board of Directors approved the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan, which follows the EIB Group 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative aimed at supporting innovation in dual-use technology, in order to enhance support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes, with satisfaction, that EIB Group support is provided to SMEs and innovative start-ups within the security and defence sector under the ‘dual-use’ principle, upholding the ‘credible civil use’ criterion, but waiving the revenue test; welcomes the decision of the EIB Board of Directors of 21 March 2025 to expand the Bank’s eligibilities for financing Europe’s security and defence industry and infrastructure, by ensuring that excluded activities are as limited as possible in scope;

    20. Welcomes the EIB’s targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure and emphasises the need for strategic investment in technologies that serve both civilian and defence purposes, in line with the EU’s broader goals of promoting innovation and enhancing the Union’s security; calls on the EIB Group to conduct a review of the impact of the extension of its new dual-use goods policy;

    21. Stresses the importance of SMEs, start-ups and mid-caps in the security and defence industry and in developing a common European market for defence; believes that smaller actors play a crucial role in strengthening the Union’s capacity and autonomy to develop innovative defence products; encourages the EIB to further support cross-border research and development (R&D) cooperation, particularly by paving the way for smaller actors to take part in the defence supply chains; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage investment by commercial banks in the same area and considers it necessary to increase the flexibility of lending to SMEs in this regard;

    22. Notes that the resources allocated to support the defence and security sector mainly come from the European Defence Fund (EDF) (EUR 8 billion), the EIB Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) (EUR 8 billion) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) (EUR 1.5 billion); calls for a dedicated capital allocation on defence and the further adjustment of the scope of eligible investments in order to meet the ambitious role of contributing to Europe’s peace and security set by the White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030 for the EIB Group; welcomes the integration of the EIB’s existing EUR 8 billion SESI into a cross-cutting and permanent public policy goal and the removal of a predefined ceiling for financing in this area; believes that these measures will allow the Bank to respond to the investment needs in security and defence, while safeguarding its operations and strong financial position; believes that the decision by the Board of Governors in June 2024 to increase the gearing ratio of the Bank will enable increased investments in areas of strategic importance, including in security and defence;

    23. Underlines the added value of the innovative measures that the EIB has adopted to accelerate investments in security and defence, and of the ‘one-stop shop’ that acts as the single point of entry for clients and external stakeholders, to whom it offers expert assistance to streamline access and speed up deployment of financing available under the SESI; encourages the EIB to continue developing and implementing agreed upon measures that simplify client procedures and further accelerate investment processes, while ensuring that the AAA rating is preserved;

    24. Notes, with appreciation, that in June 2023, the EIB approved an increase in SESI for security investments in the EU from EUR 6.0 billion to EUR 8.0 billion for the period from 2022 to 2027, also including the space and cybersecurity sectors; encourages the EIB to strengthen institutional partnerships with the EU Agency for the Space Programme and other potentially relevant partners, in accordance with EU competition rules;

    25. Commends the EIB’s cooperation with all relevant stakeholders, including Member State governments, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the NATO Innovation Fund; appreciates, in particular, the EIB Group’s cooperation with the EDA and welcomes the signing of an update to the memorandum of understanding between the two bodies on 3 October 2024, which will allow them to strengthen strategic partnerships and jointly identify financing needs to better support research, development and innovation (RDI) in the area of security and defence in the Union;

    26. Invites the EIB to further strengthen such collaboration with key stakeholders with a view to increasing impact, synergies and complementarity with EU defence programmes, ensuring that its investments complement broader EU defence policy goals and contribute to achieving economies of scale in European defence capabilities; asks the EIB to enhance regional security and resilience, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean through the creation of infrastructure that supports regional security and fosters greater cooperation between EU Member States on defence matters; stresses, furthermore, the importance of exploring cooperation with the NATO Innovation Fund in order to improve access to financing for technology start-ups, in parallel to the deployment of the EIF Defence Equity Facility;

    Social infrastructure and housing

    27. Asks the EIB to increase risk-taking for projects providing essential services with long-term clear and measurable benefits; welcomes, in this vein, the EIB Group’s actions and measures in the area of housing and social infrastructure that contribute to affordable housing, social inclusion and regional development, while also supporting sustainability and innovation; calls on the EIB to prioritise its investments towards these goals in order to achieve better economic growth, social inclusion and regional cohesion, while also supporting the EU’s sustainability objectives; invites the Bank to focus on sustainable urban development and inclusive growth by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, more cohesive and prosperous Europe;

    28. Emphasises that housing purchase and rental costs have surged significantly in recent years, reducing the affordability of many metropolitan areas in the EU and limiting access to housing; stresses that the EIB must play a stronger role in addressing the housing crisis; welcomes the inclusion of support for social infrastructure in the EIB Group’s eight strategic priorities for 2024-2027 and agrees that investments in energy-efficient, sustainable and accessible housing, and education within easy reach are crucial for boosting productivity and fostering strong and resilient societies; encourages the EIB to prioritise investments in housing cooperatives, energy-efficient social housing and renovation projects targeting low-income households; believes that addressing the EU’s major housing investment gaps requires overcoming both financial and non-financial investment barriers and the large-scale mobilisation of resources and capacities;

    29. Welcomes that the EIB, in collaboration with the Commission, has initiated a pan-European investment platform aimed at promoting affordable and sustainable housing, combining advisory services and financing, and encourages the participants to continue this initiative;

    30. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to easing the pressure on housing markets in Europe; stresses that housing purchase and rental prices have increased significantly in recent years, reducing the affordability of many metropolitan areas in the EU and compromising access to these; emphasises that EIB analysis shows that the EU needs about 1.5 million new housing units per year to cope with demand, and that about 75 % of the EU’s building stock needs to be renovated, representing an additional 5 million units per year; welcomes the fact that the EIB supports the reconstruction of existing housing and the construction of new social and affordable accommodation; encourages the EIB to mobilise more funding for affordable housing projects among the Member States;

    31. Calls for the strengthening of technical assistance and financial expertise in support of local and regional authorities, especially in areas with low investment capacity, in order to improve access to EIB funding; believes that cooperation with local authorities, local governments and civil society representatives should foster the development of social housing suitable for all, and especially for the most vulnerable citizens of the concerned Member State; is aware that the effectiveness of the EIB’s action in the housing and social infrastructure sector also depends on the removal of policy and regulatory hurdles;

    32. Notes that, in 2023, the EIB signed EUR 8.3 billion in financial support for energy efficiency operations, of which 65 % was for energy efficiency in buildings; invites the EIB to prioritise long-term affordable and accessible solutions, and sustainable investments, such as energy-efficient renovations and the reuse of vacant buildings;

    33. Believes that the related investments should ensure sufficient durability before any change of destination or use is authorised;

    34. Invites the EIB to build on its long-standing experience as an accelerator of European investments and to also deploy its potential in the education and training and healthcare sectors, including through advisory services; calls on the Bank to strengthen support for healthcare capacities, both within and outside the EU, thus  ensuring a stronger role for Europe in the world;

    Support for SMEs, mid-caps, start-ups, scale-ups and businesses in rural and remote areas, the Capital Markets Union and the role of the EIF

    35. Highlights that SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups are vital for the EU’s economy; notes that these businesses encounter significant hurdles in accessing financing, markets and talent, which constrains their growth; asserts that business growth, dynamism and public investment are essential for fostering innovation, competitiveness and productivity; encourages the EIB Group to continue addressing these challenges, notably in the current geopolitical context, through customised financial programmes, risk-sharing mechanisms and targeted financial instruments, while ensuring the additionality of public resources for these purposes and avoiding the crowding out of private capital; notes that different instruments to support lending to businesses can be combined depending on the context, and that different EIB Group instruments target different market failures and firm types; stresses the need to provide technical assistance to SMEs before project approval, in order to improve access to EIB funding;

    36. Notes that the development of a well-functioning securitisation market can be a key first step towards establishing a strong Capital Markets Union (CMU); believes that the CMU will benefit consumers and SMEs by offering high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy and will eventually boost the venture capital market by improving access to diversified funding sources; believes that financing European scale-ups with European capital should be a priority, as exemplified by the European Tech Champions Initiative, which was launched in February 2023 to finance promising European tech companies and prevent the sale of businesses to foreign investors because of the lack of European investment; encourages the EIF to explore establishing the second generation of this initiative; observes that the European Tech Champions Initiative is complemented by the European Scale-up Initiative, which aims to provide crucial financing for Europe’s high-tech companies in their late-stage development; notes that these investments should be in line with policy actions at EU and national level; is aware of the comparative weaknesses of the European venture capital market in respect of other competitors’ markets, and that European start-ups and scale-ups are often obliged to relocate or search for foreign buyers or rely on sources of financing other than venture capital, hence less suited to high-growth;

    37. Acknowledges the mission of the EIF to support access to financing for European micro, small and medium-sized enterprises; believes that the EIF should significantly step up its activities for the development of the European venture capital ecosystem, while maintaining a geographical balance; calls for the EIF’s activities to be strengthened, enabling increased investment in high-growth sectors, enhancing risk-sharing between public and private investors, and promoting innovation throughout Europe; considers it necessary to monitor the rate of increase in support for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises;

    38. Encourages the EIF to further develop its monitoring tools to better track the long-term performance of venture capital funds and SME financing operations, especially in terms of job creation, innovation diffusion and regional impact; stresses also the critical role of large European companies in Europe’s economic structure, particularly those operating in essential sectors such as energy, defence and infrastructure; calls for a balanced approach that ensures the EIB continues to support large European companies in securing investment capital for major projects and research and development initiatives, thereby enhancing Europe’s global competitiveness;

    39. Praises the support provided by the EIB Group to about 400 000 SMEs and mid-caps in 2023 alone, with EUR 31.1 billion in financing, including loans and guarantees for businesses (of which EUR 14.9 billion was deployed by the EIF), resulting in the mobilisation of over EUR 134 billion, and notes that it teamed up with almost 300 partner institutions across Europe to this end; encourages the EIB to continue its role in improving access to financing for SMEs, which often face barriers to funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and thrive; welcomes and calls for the constant expansion of the number of partner institutions to reach a wide geographical and sectoral coverage;

    40. Recalls that the deployment of the European Guarantee Fund ended in 2023 and that its disbursements to help SMEs to recover from the adverse impact of the pandemic reached approximately 200 000 SMEs across the EU; recalls the concerns expressed in previous resolutions about the transparency of the decision-making processes and information about final recipients;

    41. Welcomes that EIF measures on anti-money-laundering, countering the financing of terrorism and tax avoidance encompass risk assessments for products and transactions, thorough due diligence on counterparties and screening the ownership structures and key individuals against sanctions and adverse media; welcomes the introduction of mandatory staff training and the conclusion of an agreement with the Financial Intelligence Unit of Luxembourg on the reporting of and follow-up on any suspicious transactions detected;

    Key policy areas of cohesion, climate action and environmental sustainability, and digitalisation

    42. Appreciates that in its 2021-2027 Cohesion Orientation, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions; notes that, in 2023, such financing amounted to EUR 29.8 billion, equivalent to 45 % of the Bank’s total signatures in the EU; underlines that the share of EIB financing allocated to less developed regions increased from 24 % in 2022 to 26 % in 2023, totalling EUR 17.2 billion, well above the 21 % target set in the EIB Cohesion Orientation for 2023; reiterates the call for the EIB to continue monitoring, analysing and addressing the shortcomings that prevent certain regions or countries from fully benefiting from the EIB’s financial support and assistance;

    43. Acknowledges the role played by the EIF in contributing to economic and social cohesion in the Union through a wide range of financial instruments; notes that EIF commitments to credit guarantees, venture capital and private equity investments for cohesion regions in 2023 stood at EUR 6.8 billion, representing 48 % of total EIF commitments in the EU; notes that in 2023, the EIF was especially active in Central and Eastern Europe;

    44. Notes that the EIB Environmental and Social Sustainability Framework includes revised environmental and social policy and standards promoting an integrated approach to impact and risk assessment and management;

    45. Acknowledges that over the past 15 years, EIB Advisory has supported over 1 000 projects in cohesion regions; calls on the Bank to actively promote financing opportunities in less developed and transition regions, including by boosting the presence of advisory services in EIB local offices; considers it necessary to also take into account the geographical distribution of EIB support for increasing social cohesion;

    46. Highlights the EIB’s initiatives in cohesion regions to support the healthcare sector, including the HERA Invest programme, a EUR 100 million guarantee established with the Commission to support research and development in addressing pressing cross-border health threats; encourages the EIB to promote targeted investments in key systemic enablers such as healthcare, education, social housing, digital connectivity and local financing for cities and regions, ensuring a better geographical balance, either through direct lending or financial instruments, and to leverage synergies between EU grants and EIB loans to enhance cross-border rail connectivity, which is crucial for better integration within the EU single market;

    47. Acknowledges the EIB’s strategic orientation since 2019 to be the EU Climate Bank; emphasises that in 2023 alone, the EIB signed EUR 41.8 billion in financing for climate action and EUR 25.1 billion for environmental sustainability (EUR 35.1 billion and EUR 15.9 billion respectively in 2022); notes that EIB financing for climate change adaptation totalled EUR 2.7 billion in 2023, corresponding to 6.4 % of its total climate action (compared to EUR 1.9 billion, or 5.4 %, in 2022); welcomes that climate action and environmental sustainability financing, as a whole, accounted for 60 % of EIB financing in 2023; calls for maintaining technological neutrality in its investment strategy in climate and sustainable financing;

    48. Recalls that the EIB Energy Lending Policy (ELP), adopted in 2019, established a ‘phase out support to energy projects reliant on unabated fossil fuels’ and introduced a transition period during which the Bank could continue to approve projects already under appraisal, but the Board of Directors did not approve any such project after the end of 2021; remarks that, in 2022, the EIB Group introduced a temporary and exceptional extension of the exemptions to the Paris Alignment for Counterparties Framework (so-called PATH) in support of REPowerEU, to cover projects with high innovative content and renewable energy projects and electric vehicle charging infrastructure in the EU; observes that, in 2023, the EIB Group decided to apply the same temporary and exceptional extension also for projects in the spirit of REPowerEU outside the EU; notes that such temporary and exceptional extensions are expected to run until 2027, subject to a Climate Bank roadmap review expected in 2025; recalls its previous resolution[3] and maintains that PATH offers the appropriate framework for supporting counterparties on their pathways to align with the Paris Agreement objectives; emphasises that the EIB is expected to intensify its engagement with all of its clients to foster the development of their decarbonisation plans;

    49. Notes the EIB Group Climate Bank Roadmap mid-term review, approved in 2023, which includes a simplified Paris Alignment framework for microenterprises, the revision of the PATH framework’s disclosure requirements for financial intermediaries and a temporary extension of the list of countries in which the EIB can act as a sole financier of climate adaptation projects due to their particular vulnerability to climate change;

    50. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities, but notes that agriculture, fisheries and forestry received only 1.1 % of the EIB’s lending stock in 2023; considers it important for the EIB to programme significant amounts for financing the agricultural sector and through simplified procedures;

    51. Underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas; acknowledges the increasing challenges faced by the agricultural sector and the need for EU farmers to adapt to the European Green Deal objectives, cope with the energy crisis and manage rising inflation; calls on the EIB Group to enhance support and foster innovation for this vital sector, which plays a significant role in ensuring food security, leveraging the EU’s One Health approach by integrating human, animal, plant and environmental health to create sustainable, resilient and productive agri-food systems; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young and small operators, noting that farmers and the enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing;

    52. Stresses that EIB support should have a just transition approach in order to achieve sustainable agriculture that protects the environment, human health and animal welfare, while improving farmers’ livelihoods, in particular for small and medium-sized farms; maintains that supporting rural areas is essential for promoting balanced and inclusive development, generational renewal and equal access to financial opportunities for women and men; reiterates its call on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

    53. Appreciates that the EIB Group is one of the key supporters of digitalisation in the EU, particularly in financing digital infrastructure and supporting innovative digital start-ups; encourages the EIB to enhance its support for digital networks strengthening the EU’s technological autonomy and innovation in key technologies;

    54. Believes that reducing digital inequality and preventing social exclusion requires significant public investment in telecommunications infrastructure, particularly in rural areas; encourages the EIB to support European citizens in acquiring adequate digital literacy to fully participate in society, with a special focus on the elderly and those with disabilities;

    55. Recognises the critical role of the cybersecurity sector in protecting businesses and governments from advanced digital threats and foreign influence; welcomes the increase in security investments from EUR 6 billion to EUR 8 billion, financed through the SESI to address security challenges, including those in the New Space industry;

    56. Welcomes the EIB’s focus on gender equality and women’s economic empowerment, resulting in a total of EUR 5.8 billion in investment in this field in 2023 (compared to EUR 5.1 billion in 2022); believes that the EIB could further increase microfinance loans to women-led businesses, which still face discrimination in access to financing;

    57. Highlights that the security of supply of critical raw materials is crucial for both the green and digital transitions, as well as for the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; calls on the EIB to increase investments in the CRM sector to help diversify the supply of both primary and secondary raw materials and to develop circular economy solutions, in particular R&D for alternative materials, such as bio-based materials; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption on 21 March 2025 of a new CRM strategic initiative, with an expected EUR 2 billion in financing for CRM investment in 2025, a new CRM Task Force and a dedicated one-stop shop to build and manage a pipeline of CRM operations and advisory activities and increased technical expertise and partnerships;

    The EIB’s activities outside the EU

    58. Underlines that in EIB Global’s second year of existence, it provided financing amounting to EUR 8.4 billion (compared to EUR 9.1 billion in 2022); notes that, as EIB Global financing is limited to 50 % of the total cost of a project, investment co-financing with development finance institutions and multilateral development banks is recurring; calls on the EIB and the Commission to invest in internal audit and independent control functions to guarantee the integrity and soundness of all operations;

    59. Recalls that EIB Global is among the key implementing actors of the European Global Gateway and, as such, is expected to apply the highest standards of transparency and accountability;

    60. Notes the adoption by the EIB Board of Directors of the EIB Global Strategic Roadmap and its commitment to respect and promote human rights and the rule of law in the projects it supports;

    61. Highlights the importance of ensuring that the EIB Group’s interventions in Ukraine are guided by the priorities for the country’s reconstruction agreed with the EU, and are consistent with the methods and frameworks laid out in the Ukraine Plan and with the provisions of the EU Treaties; notes that the EIB is further enhancing its efforts to address fraud and corruption in relation to the EIB Group projects implemented in Ukraine; calls for the continued application of appropriate conditionality on the financial assistance provided to Ukraine, with a focus on ensuring effective oversight mechanisms, such as access to information and premises, and the monitoring of visits, and calls for conditionality to be extended to all non-EU countries for which it provides financing;

    62. Urges the strengthening of the administrative and audit capacity of Ukrainian authorities responsible for implementing, monitoring, controlling and supervising funded actions, in particular for the prevention of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities; reiterates that the EIB should have clear and unrestricted oversight at all times;

    63. Believes that a greater role for the EIB will bring added value for both the reconstruction of Ukraine and the enlargement process and for prospective partnerships under the EU’s Global Gateway agenda and neighbourhood policy and in support of the Sustainable Development Goals; encourages the Commission to maximise cooperation with the EIB to leverage the EU’s strategic autonomy, particularly on energy and raw materials;

    64. Welcomes the adoption, in 2024, of the Ukraine Facility, which follows the EIB’s EU for Ukraine (EU4U) initiative and establishes a support mechanism based on EU budget resources; encourages the Member States to ensure that solid support continues to be provided to the country, in line with its needs;

    65. Stresses that, in order to support Ukraine, the EIB has built up a loan portfolio of over EUR 7 billion since the beginning of the conflict with Russia in 2014; underlines that, as of 31 December 2023, the EIB’s exposure (disbursed and not yet disbursed) amounted to EUR 5.750 billion, predominantly covered by EU guarantees under the External Lending Mandate; notes that, in addition, the Bank also granted financial guarantees on exposures to counterparties located in Ukraine, fully covered by EU Comprehensive Guarantees, for a signed amount of EUR 388.7 million at the end of 2023 (compared to EUR 478.8 million at the end of 2022);

    66. Notes the growing financial engagement of the EIB in Ukraine; calls on the Bank to provide regular, detailed updates to the budgetary authority and relevant audit bodies regarding the disbursement and implementation of funds covered by EU guarantees;

    67. Underlines the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern EU regions bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly redirect public funds towards security, defence and preparedness, while dealing with severely reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes; calls on the EIB to take this into account in its financing decisions;

    68. Welcomes the significant investments made in Moldova to support economic resilience, improving energy security, enhancing infrastructure and aiding the country’s progress towards EU integration; acknowledges that in the Western Balkans, EIB Global invested EUR 1.2 billion in 2023, plus an additional EUR 700 million to enhance road safety and improve railway networks; welcomes the adoption of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in 2024 and the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova approved by the European Parliament;

    69. Recognises the role played by the EIB in supporting the Western Balkans on their path to Union membership, in line with the EU’s enlargement policy; observes that EIB Global invested EUR 1.2 billion in the Western Balkans in 2023, mobilising a total of over EUR 6 billion in investments; notes that the majority of the financing was allocated to sustainable connectivity, followed by credit lines for SMEs, infrastructure projects in the healthcare, education and skills sectors, and water supply and sanitation;

    70. Asks the EIB to collaborate with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring added value and long-term, positive impacts;

    EIB accountability architecture

    71. Recalls that internal oversight at the EIB is headed by the Inspectorate General (IG), which comprises three accountability-related divisions – operations evaluation, the complaints mechanism and fraud investigation – that hold complementary roles, contributing to the consistent handling of allegations and complaints;

    72. Observes that the EIB Complaints Mechanism (EIB-CM) handled a total of 104 cases in 2023 (97 in 2022); notes that 60 new complaints were received in 2023 (54 in 2022), of which 44 were considered admissible and 29 were related to EIB-financed projects, of which 27 were located outside Europe;

    73. Notes that the EIB Procurement Complaints Committee is the independent EIB committee handling complaints about project procurement procedures relating to EIB-financed projects outside the EU;

    74. Welcomes the efforts of the Investigative Division (IG/IN) to cooperate and coordinate efforts with the other components of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture, in particular the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which received 37 % of the referrals made for investigations in 2023 (27 cases out of 74); encourages the IG/IN to strengthen its cooperation with all components of the EU’s anti-fraud architecture;

    75. Notes that the IG/IN carries out proactive fraud detection activities using the Fraud and Integrity Risk Scoring Tool and the Corruption Risk In Procurement robot and that, in 2023, 24 reviews identified targets for three full and in-depth proactive integrity reviews; invites the Bank to assess how these digital tools could be further enhanced to support transparency and financial accountability;

    76. Regrets the fact that, despite repeated calls by Parliament, the IG/IN annual report does not provide adequate information about the financial magnitude of the cases it handles, the funds or mandates affected, the kinds of projects concerned, the mitigating measures adopted, the role of the EIB services and of the intermediaries or partners in the cases, or even the Member States concerned; invites the representatives of the IG/IN to increase the level of engagement, interactions and transparency with Parliament, especially regarding the control of the financial activities; reiterates its call to the IG/IN to go beyond providing a mere narrative description of a few case studies, and to periodically report valuable insights into the extent to which financial interests are safeguarded; suggests that the IG/IN adopt a reporting model similar to those used by other investigative bodies, such as EPPO and OLAF, where a proper balance between transparency and duty of confidentiality or of professional secrecy is pursued;

    77. Is aware that the EIB Exclusion Policy provides for an autonomous exclusion process that is not fully equivalent to the Commission’s Early Detection and Exclusion System in terms of decision-making standards, results and remedies; reiterates its call on the EIB Group and the Commission to cooperate in identifying the potential gaps and proposing remedies, including an expedited procedure to enforce EIB exclusion decisions via the Early Detection and Exclusion System; observes that in 2023, exclusion proceedings based on IG/IN findings excluded five companies from participating in any EIB-financed activity for a period of five years;

    78. Welcomes the approval, in 2023, of the EIB Group’s Internal Control Framework Policy; acknowledges the results of the group alignment process between the EIB and the EIF insofar as they reflect the different business models and governance structures of the two entities; refers, in particular, to the Audit Committee’s remarks that both internal audit and the internal control framework should evolve to become group functions;

    79. Notes that the EIB’s independent external auditor is the third line of defence; points out that the regular rotation of auditors and assignments allows fresh perspectives, and therefore observes that the EIB external auditor should be rotated periodically, yet its mandate was extended until 2027 and it has been the auditor of the EIB Group since 2009;

    80. Appreciates that the EIB Group Risk Management Framework and EIB Group’s semi-annual Risk Management Disclosure Reports are effective and are aligned with the requirements and technical standards of the European Banking Authority;

    81. Stresses that, in 2023, despite difficult market conditions, the EIB’s portfolio continued to exhibit very low levels of non-performing exposures (NPEs); takes the view that even if a significant portion of the Bank’s loan portfolio benefits from credit enhancements or from EU Member State guarantees, the high quality of the EIB’s portfolio results from the diligent implementation of very effective EIB lending policies;

    82. Highlights that the EIB does not fall within the scope of application of the EU’s legislation applicable to credit institutions, in particular the Capital Requirements Regulation[4] and Directive[5] (CRR, CRD), thus the Bank is entitled to determine its capital and liquidity requirements in a manner that is adequate and appropriate to its activities, its mission and the market conditions; points out that the EIB Group is committed to conform to the best banking and market practices and can determine their applicability in line with the proportionality principle; stresses that the implementation of these norms should not create unwarranted burden; welcomes the fact that the EIB Group voluntarily performed the Review and Evaluation Process; points out that this should be in line with the EIB’s governance structure and mission;

    83. Understands that, in line with the EU’s evolving needs, the EU institutions approved, in 2024, the change in statute proposed by the EIB Board of Governors by amending the statutory limit on its gearing ratio[6] and raising it from 250 % to 290 %, to enable the EIB to invest more without increasing its equity base;

    84. Notes that the amended gearing ratio paves the way for increased risk-taking; acknowledges that investments in renewable energy, sustainable infrastructure and innovative technologies are crucial for the EU’s competitiveness, but often carry greater risk because of the uncertainty of returns; points out that increased risk-taking may increase the volatility of the EIB’s returns, but observes that the EIB maintains capital buffers that would support expanded risk activities;

    85. Is alarmed by the situation of Northvolt AB, a battery manufacturer considered pivotal in the green transition; stresses that Northvolt has benefited from a substantial EIB lending package of slightly over EUR 942.6 million as part of the debt financing to expand a gigafactory site; notes that Northvolt filed for bankruptcy in March 2025; calls on the EIB to provide details about the evaluation and decision-making process to fund Northvolt AB and the causes that led to the failure of the project;

    86. Stresses that the expansion of the gigafactory site was expected to increase the annual output capacity for battery production and was of strategic importance for global competitiveness and was consistent with the EU’s strategies in the sector;

    87. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Board of Directors to launch an in-depth internal review without undue delay to verify the financial damage, the reasons for and the background to the failure of this flagship project and to learn from this experience in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar situation or enable the early detection thereof;

    88. Maintains that the greatest added value of EU support lies in fostering higher-risk investments in innovative projects, scaling up EU strategic goals and enabling long-term transition projects that cannot get funding from the private sector; believes that to effectively pursue its targets in innovation and competitiveness, the InvestEU programme should focus on financing higher-risk and more scale-up investment and that the EIB Group should take on more and larger high-risk projects, which should involve primarily and preferentially European investors, combining a more risk-absorption-oriented deployment of InvestEU resources with an equivalent orientation in the use of the EIB Group’s own financial resources; urges the EIB to introduce stricter conditions to prevent EU public financing from being used to subsidise companies relocating production outside Europe, ensuring that all EIB-funded projects contribute to long-term European industrial resilience;

    89. Is aware that members of the EIB’s Management Committee are often civil servants in their countries of origin before beginning their terms at the EIB, which typically last for two to six years, and that they are therefore entitled to pursue professional development opportunities subject to certain conditions during the cooling-off period (which has been extended to a period of 24 months after the end of their term at the EIB); notes that Management Committee members are asked to inform the Ethics and Compliance Committee and seek approval as soon as possible for any negotiations regarding prospective employment;

    90. Strongly echoes Parliament’s repeated calls to strengthen the mechanism to prevent conflicts of interest within the EIB and to improve the handling of such cases, and to better define the terms under which EIB vice-presidents can participate in decisions about operations in their countries of origin, and insists that these matters be addressed in a future revision of the Management Committee code of conduct;

    91. Highlights that on 31 October 2023, the European Ombudsman ruled in Case 611/2022/KR that a former vice-president had participated in approving financing agreements between the EIB and a national promotional bank[7] in his country of origin just weeks before becoming the Chief Executive Officer of that national promotional bank, despite the EIB’s Chief Compliance Officer advising against such actions during the appointment process; understands that this case predates the entry into force of the current Management Committee code of conduct, which now includes specific provisions regarding the prospective employment of its members; notes that, in the future review of the rules applicable to its Ethics and Compliance Committee, the EIB has committed to consider the European Ombudsman recommendation to make public the Committee’s decisions;

    92. Observes that mitigating measures, such as ring-fencing and cooling-off periods, are the most common precautionary clauses to be used when handling a revolving-doors case and understands that such measures are implemented and are complied with by the members of the Management Committee, including those recently reported on in the media;

    93. Shares the view of the European Ombudsman that the role of the EIB Ethics and Compliance Committee should be strengthened when it comes to overseeing the intended new jobs of Management Committee members and that it should be able to impose and enforce risk-mitigating measures; understands that the role of the Ethics and Compliance Committee has become more prominent in recent years and that internal discussions are ongoing on how to enhance its efficiency;

    94. Invites the Bank to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the Bank to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility for European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

    95. Reiterates its call on the EIB to ensure proper geographical representation, including at middle and senior management levels, and calls on it to publish an annual breakdown of the gender and nationality for middle and senior management positions;

    Scrutiny, transparency and oversight

    96.  Strongly regrets the fact that the European Court of Auditors (ECA) still lacks full access to all data relating to EIB operations; acknowledges that not all the activities of the EIB are directly financed by the EU and, therefore, not all activities are automatically accessible to the ECA; insists that the ECA should have access to the necessary information to comprehensively and exhaustively assess all EIB operations involving EU funds, including those conducted through financial intermediaries, designed to implement EU policies; calls on the ECA to fully scrutinise, to the best of its abilities, all operations involving the EU budget to any degree;

    97. Observes that the main relevant audit tasks are entrusted to the EIB Audit Committee, which is a fully independent body; believes that the participation of qualified external representatives in specific Audit Committee tasks could enhance the objectivity of the Audit Committee’s analyses;

    98. Notes that the EIB’s Transparency Policy strikes a compromise between the principle of openness and the need to safeguard sensitive information; observes that the policy indicates what information should be published proactively and when – stipulating, for instance, that project summaries should be published at least three weeks before the project’s financing is considered for approval by the EIB Board of Directors – and sets out the relevant derogations; calls for these summaries to provide meaningful information to stakeholders;

    99. Notes that in 2023, 449 projects were approved by the EIB Board of Directors and that almost all (94 %) of the project summaries were published, in the majority (57 %) of cases before approval; observes that all EIB operations conducted through financial intermediaries are published on the EIB’s website and that the EIB provides details on request;

    100. Recalls that all EIB documents are accessible to the public in line with the presumption in favour of disclosure; emphasises that all applicants should be informed in advance about public access to documents, and any refusals should be based solely on specified exceptions; stresses that the EIB should consider publishing, in a timely manner, information regarding the rationale and context for projects and the explanation of their alignment with and contribution to EU policy goals; calls on the EIB to systematically publish audit results of its largest financial operations, ensuring independent scrutiny of its risk management and impact assessments; expects the EIB to limit non-disclosure to the applicable exceptions listed in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001[8] and Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006[9]; calls for the full implementation of the Ombudsman’s recommendations issued following its inquiries into EIB disclosure policy and related requests for access to documents;

    101. Recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that final recipients comply with the visibility criteria of the EU’s financial support;

    102. Highlights that the Bank is working to reduce the time needed to bring a product from conception to market availability (time to market) by fully digitising its project cycles; calls for the Bank to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

    103 Reiterates its call on the EIB to strengthen and fully implement its policy on tax fraud, evasion and avoidance, including by refraining from funding beneficiaries or financial intermediaries which have been found to be, or are at high risk of being, involved in such practices;

    104. Reiterates that more structured dialogue between Parliament and the EIB would be enhanced by the adoption of a memorandum of cooperation; praises, in this connection, the EIB’s unprecedented cooperation with Parliament for the preparation of this resolution, noting that it is a tangible expression of openness and transparency;

    Follow-up on Parliament’s recommendations

    105. Urges the EIB to continue reporting on the status of previous recommendations issued by Parliament, particularly regarding the outcomes achieved and the impact of the actions taken to implement its priorities and the EU’s policies, especially as regards:

    (a) impact (economic, environmental and social) of its investment strategy and results achieved in contributing to the balanced and steady development of the internal market in the interests of the Union;

    (b) actions adopted to enhance the prevention and countering of conflicts of interest, fraud, corruption and other potential forms of misconduct;

    (c) new measures to strengthen transparency;

    (d) measures to strengthen support for SMEs and eligible economic operators during the implementation of EU policies;

    (e) follow-up on the calls and requests adopted via the present resolution;

    °

    ° °

    106. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, and asks that the Council and the EIB Board of Directors hold a debate on Parliament’s positions presented herein.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia – A10-0072/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Serbia

    (2025/2022(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 September 2013,

     having regard to Serbia’s application for membership of the EU of 19 December 2009,

     having regard to the Commission opinion of 12 October 2011 on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2011)0668), the European Council’s decision of 1 March 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 28 June 2013 to open EU accession negotiations with Serbia,

     having regard to the Brussels Agreement of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and the Implementation Annex thereto,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 17 May 2018 in Sofia and of 6 May 2020 in Zagreb,

     having regard to its resolutions on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation,

     having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to the first agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 19 April 2013, to the agreements of 25 August 2015, and to the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations,

     having regard to the agreement on free movement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo of 27 August 2022, to the agreement on licence plates of 23 November 2022, and to the Energy Agreements’ Implementation Roadmap in the EU-facilitated Dialogue of 21 June 2022,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0695),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Serbia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0695),

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 on the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina,

     having regard to Article 14 of the Serbian Constitution on the protection of national minorities,

     having regard to the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Serbia in 2001 and the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ratified by Serbia in 2006,

     

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 26 and 27 October 2023 on Kosovo and Serbia,

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

     having regard to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) election observation mission on the early parliamentary and presidential elections of 3 April 2022 in Serbia, published on 19 August 2022,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of December 2006, to the Council conclusions of March 2020 and to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen criteria,

     having regard to the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the early parliamentary elections of 17 December 2023 in Serbia, published on 28 February 2024,

     having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, signed on 19 July 2024,

     having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[4],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Serbia, in particular that of 19 October 2023 on the recent developments in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern municipalities in Kosovo[5], and that of 8 February 2024 on the situation in Serbia following the elections[6],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0072/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is one of the most successful EU foreign policy instruments and a strategic geopolitical investment in long-term peace, stability and security throughout the continent;

    B. whereas according to the Copenhagen criteria, candidate countries must adhere to the values of the Union in order to be able to join it;

    C. whereas democracy and the rule of law are the fundamental values on which the EU is founded;

    D. whereas in recent years, political rights and civil liberties have been steadily eroded, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition and civil society organisations;

    E. whereas the Fourth Opinion on Serbia of the Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, adopted on 26 June 2019, criticised Serbia’s delays in fully implementing education rights for minorities;

    F. whereas freedom of religion is a core European value and a fundamental human right and Serbia is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee this freedom for all individuals residing within its territory, in accordance with its international commitments and human rights obligations;

    G. whereas in line with Chapter 23 of the acquis, Serbia must demonstrate real improvements in the effective exercise of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

    H. whereas each candidate country for enlargement is judged on its own merits, including their respect for and unwavering commitment to shared European rights and values and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy;

    I. whereas Serbia has not imposed sanctions against Russia following the Russian aggression in Ukraine; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) has been steadily declining since 2021; whereas Serbia supports the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, and has clearly condemned the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and voted alongside the EU in the UN, even though it has not imposed sanctions against Russia; whereas Serbia’s rate of alignment with the CFSP dropped from 54 % in 2023 to 51 % in 2024 while other candidate countries in the region – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia – achieved 100 % alignment;

    J. whereas Serbia remains a critical battleground for foreign disinformation campaigns, notably by Russia and China, which seek to create an anti-Western rhetoric; whereas the final report of the OSCE/ODHIR on the early parliamentary elections held on 17 December 2023 pointed out several procedural deficiencies, as well as the use of harsh rhetoric and the presence of consistent bias in the media that gave an unbalanced advantage to the ruling party; whereas the issues identified in that report need to be assessed thoroughly and promptly; whereas as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia adopted the Strategy for Combating Cybercrime 2019-2023 and the relevant action plans in September 2018; whereas the strategy and the relevant action plans were not renewed after December 2023; whereas Serbia did not align with the EU’s restrictive measures in reaction to cyberattacks in 2023 and 2024;

    K. whereas the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a precondition for the progression of both countries towards EU membership;

    L. whereas accession to the EU inevitably requires full alignment with the foreign policy objectives of the Union;

    M. whereas Serbia recognises the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimean peninsula and the Donbas region;

    N. whereas the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, accounting for 59.7 % of Serbia’s total trade;

    O. whereas Russia is using its influence in Serbia to try to destabilise, interfere in and threaten neighbouring sovereign states and undermine Serbia’s European future; whereas Russian propaganda outlets such as RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik operate freely in Serbia and exert significant influence in shaping anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives; whereas disinformation often originates from a false or misleading statement by a political figure, which is then reported by state-owned media and subsequently amplified on social media, often with an intention to undermine political opponents and democratic principles;

    P. whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of political leaders from Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Notes Serbia’s stated commitment to EU membership as its strategic goal and its ambition to align fully with the EU acquis by the end of 2026; urges Serbia to deliver quickly and decisively on essential reforms, especially in cluster 1, for this very ambitious commitment to be perceived as realistic, genuine and meaningful; stresses the need for Serbia to seriously and categorically demonstrate that it is strategically oriented towards the EU, by showing strong political will and consistency in the implementation of EU-related reforms and by communicating objectively and unambiguously with its citizens about the EU, Serbia’s European path and the required reforms;

    2. Reiterates the strategic importance of the Western Balkans in the current geopolitical context and for the security and stability of the EU as a whole; outlines that, owing to its geopolitical position, the country has a direct impact on the overall stability of the region; condemns, therefore, Serbia’s attempts to establish a sphere of influence undermining the sovereignty of neighbouring countries;

    3. Acknowledges Serbia’s good level of preparation with regard to macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline and the Commission’s assessment that cluster 3 is technically ready for opening but notes with concern that there has been limited or no overall progress in meeting the benchmarks for EU membership across negotiating chapters, with particular shortcomings in critical areas such as the rule of law, media freedom, public administration reform, and alignment with EU policies, particularly the EU’s foreign policy;

    4. Regrets the fact that no substantial progress has been made on Chapter 31, as Serbia’s pattern of alignment with EU foreign policy positions has remained largely unchanged, mainly due to Serbia’s close relations with Russia; recalls that Serbia remains a notable exception in the Western Balkans regarding CFSP alignment; calls on Serbia to reverse this trend and to demonstrate positive steps towards full alignment; notes that Serbia’s rate of compliance with EU statements and declarations is increasing but remains at only 61 %; welcomes Serbia’s continued active participation in and positive contribution to EU military crisis management missions and operations;

    5. Welcomes Serbia’s humanitarian support for Ukraine and takes note of the sale of ammunition to the value of EUR 800 million for use by Ukraine in a mutually beneficial agreement; notes that Serbia has aligned with some of the EU’s positions regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; regrets, however, that Serbia still does not align with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia; calls on the EU to reconsider the extent of the financial assistance provided by the EU to Serbia in the event of continued support for anti-democratic ideologies and non-alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures and the CFSP; calls on Serbia to swiftly align with the EU’s restrictive measures and general policy towards Russia and Belarus, systematically and without delay;

    6. Stresses the importance of implementing sanctions against Russia for the security of Europe as a whole; deplores Serbia’s continued close relations with Russia, raising concerns about its strategic orientation; reiterates its calls on the Serbian authorities to enhance transparency regarding the role and activities of the so-called Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Nis and to immediately terminate all military cooperation with Russia; notes Serbia’s decision to support the UN resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine three years after the full-scale invasion; regrets President Vučić’s immediate verbal retraction of Serbia’s UN vote, calling it a ‘mistake’; considers that maintaining privileged relations with the Kremlin regime undermines not only Serbia’s credibility as a candidate country but also the trust of its European partners and the future of EU-Serbia relations;

    7. Regrets the continued decline in public support for EU membership in Serbia and the growing support for the Putin regime, which is the result of a long-standing anti-EU and pro-Russian rhetoric from the government-controlled media as well as some government officials; calls on the Serbian authorities to foster a fact-based and open discussion on accession to the EU;

    8. Deplores the continued spread of disinformation, including about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; condemns the spillover effects of these actions in other countries in the region; calls on the Serbian authorities to combat disinformation and calls for the EU to enhance cooperation with Serbia to strengthen democratic resilience and counter hybrid threats;

    9. Notes Serbia’s progress on aligning with EU visa policy and calls for full alignment, in particular with regard to those non-EU countries presenting a security threat to the EU, including the threat of cyberattacks; welcomes the agreement signed on 25 June 2024 between the EU and Serbia on operational cooperation on border management with Frontex, highlighting the need to act in line with fundamental rights and international standards;

    10. Reiterates that the overall pace of the accession negotiations should depend on tangible progress on the fundamentals, the rule of law and a commitment to the shared European rights and values as well as to the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue, which is to be conducted in good faith so that it results in a legally binding agreement based on mutual recognition, as well as alignment with the EU’s CFSP; reiterates its position that accession negotiations with Serbia should only advance if the country aligns with EU sanctions against Russia and makes significant progress on its EU-related reforms, in particular in the area of the fundamentals;

    11. Repeats its concern regarding the appeasing approach of the Commission towards Serbia against the backdrop of the country’s year-long rollback on the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, as well as its destabilising influence on the whole region; urges the Commission to use clearer language, including on the highest level, towards Serbia, consistently addressing significant shortcomings, lack of progress and even backsliding, thus upholding the EU’s fundamental values;

    12.  Calls on the Serbian Government to promote the role and benefits of EU accession and EU-funded projects and reforms among the Serbian population;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    13. Notes the ongoing challenges in ensuring judicial independence, including undue influence and political pressure on the judiciary; expresses concern about the failure to implement safeguards preventing political interference in judicial appointments and disciplinary actions against judges and prosecutors; calls on Serbia to ensure that the High Judicial Council, the High Prosecutorial Council and the Government and Parliament of Serbia effectively and proactively defend judicial independence and prosecutorial autonomy;

    14. Stresses the importance of adopting the Law on the Judicial Academy and the Venice Commission opinion and making necessary judicial appointments to reduce existing vacancies and improve the overall effectiveness of the judicial system; notes that the delay in adopting this law has stalled key judicial reforms necessary for alignment with EU standards; calls for the draft law to be amended following transparent consultation with all relevant stakeholders, with a view to ensuring the independence and control mechanisms of the institution in order to contribute to overall judicial independence;

    15. Notes that limited progress has been made in the fight against corruption despite the adoption of a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; calls on Serbia to adopt and begin implementing the accompanying anti-corruption action plan and to establish an effective monitoring and coordination mechanism to track progress, in line with international standards; expresses concern that corruption is still prevalent in many areas, particularly related to ‘projects of interests for the Republic of Serbia’, and that strong political will is required to effectively address corruption as well as to mount a robust criminal justice response to high-level corruption; notes that Serbia ranks 105th in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2024, well below the EU average; considers that the level of corruption in Serbia is a significant obstacle to its EU accession process; notes with concern that results have still not been delivered in cases of high public interest, after several years, such as in the long-standing cases of Krušik, Jovanjica, Savamala and Belivuk; calls on Serbia to strengthen the independence of its anti-corruption institutions by ensuring that they are adequately resourced and protected from political interference; calls on the Government of Serbia to sign the Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and to fully align its legal framework on police cooperation and organised crime with that of the EU;

    16. Welcomes the more pluralistic composition of the new parliament, with a broader representation of political parties, including parties of national minorities; notes that the early election and the corresponding break in the functioning of the government and parliament have impeded progress on reforms; notes the frequent pattern of early elections, a permanent campaign mode and long delays in forming governments, as well as the disrupted work of the national parliament, including the absence of government question-time sessions, the lack of discussion on the reports of independent institutions, and the more frequent use of urgent procedures, which lead to a lack of parliamentary legislative oversight and legitimacy and do not contribute to the effective democratic governance of the country;

    17. Takes note of the resignation of Prime Minister Miloš Vučević on 28 January 2025, which was confirmed by the National Assembly on 19 March 2025; takes note of the resumption of the work of the National Assembly on 4 March 2025, after a pause of three months, and condemns all the acts of violence that occurred on this occasion;

    18. Reiterates its readiness to support the National Assembly and the members thereof in the democratic processes related to Serbia’s European path, including the proper functioning of the parliament in accordance with its rules of procedure, by using the European Parliament’s existing democracy support tools and initiatives and by supporting increased parliamentary oversight of the EU accession process and reforms;

    19. Takes note, with deep concern, of the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission on the December 2023 elections; notes that in April 2024, the National Assembly formed a working group for the improvement of the election process but that, by the end of the year, it had not agreed on any legal measures to improve the election process; notes that two out of three representatives of civil society left the working group in February 2025; notes that steps were taken in the first months of 2025 on amending the Law on Unified Voter Registry but that there is no consensus among political and civil society actors on the content; calls on all parliamentary groups in the National Assembly to decide on the implementation of ODIHR recommendations, with the agreement of all groups; calls for equal treatment of all members of parliament in the work of the National Assembly, consistent and effective implementation of the parliamentary Code of Conduct and the impartial sanctioning of breaches of parliamentary integrity;

    20. Is concerned about the increasing role of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and foreign cyber operations and interference in Serbia’s democratic election processes;

    21. Stresses the critical importance of ensuring the independence of key institutions, including media regulators such as the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM); regrets the delay in the election of the new members; regrets the irregularities in the nomination process; notes the withdrawal of several candidates from the selection in February 2025, who justified their decision on the basis of these irregularities; deeply regrets the fact that the REM neglected its legal obligations to scrutinise the conduct of the 2023 election campaign in the media in a timely manner, to report on its findings and to sanction media outlets that breached the law, spread hate speech or violated journalistic standards; notes, with concern, the absence of pluralistic political views in the nationwide media; notes that the REM should actively promote media pluralism and transparency regarding the ownership structures of media outlets and independence from foreign actors;

    22. Notes that the REM awarded four national frequencies to channels that have a history of violating journalistic standards, including using hate speech and misleading the public, not complying with warnings issued by the REM, spreading disinformation and supporting the Kremlin’s narrative on Russia’s war in Ukraine; deeply regrets the fact that REM has not issued the fifth national licence and calls for it to be awarded through a transparent and impartial process without unnecessary delay and in compliance with international media freedom standards as soon as a new REM council is elected; calls for the Serbian Government to scrap and re-start the process of electing new members, in line with Serbian law and international media freedom standards;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    23. Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the 15 victims who lost their lives and to those who were injured following the collapse of the canopy of Novi Sad train station on 1 November 2024; calls for full and transparent legal proceedings following the investigation by the authorities, to bring those responsible to justice; underlines the need to examine more broadly to what extent corruption led to the lowering of safety standards and contributed to this tragedy;

    24. Regrets the delayed response and accountability of the Serbian authorities, the slow investigation process and the lack of transparency in the aftermath of the tragedy, which were partially addressed in the face of escalating public pressure;

    25. Expresses deep concern about the systemic issues highlighted by the student protests and various other protests in Serbia, such as issues relating to civil liberties, separation of powers, corruption, environmental protection, institutional and financial transparency, especially in relation to infrastructure projects, and accountability; regrets the fact that the government missed the opportunity to meet the demands of the students and of the citizens who support the students in good faith; affirms that the students’ demands align with reforms that Serbia is expected to implement on its European path;

    26. Underlines the importance of freedom of speech and assembly; calls on the authorities of Serbia to ensure the protection of those participating in the peaceful protests; takes note of the mass protests on 15 March 2025, the largest in the modern history of Serbia; calls for an impartial investigation of the claims that unlawful technology of crowd control was used against the protesters, causing injuries to a number of them;

    27. Condemns, in the strongest terms, the misuse of personal data from public registries to retaliate against peaceful protesters; calls on the prosecution office in Serbia to file charges against all persons who physically attacked and incited violence against the participants of the demonstrations; is deeply concerned about any act of violence; is carefully following developments as regards arrests of protesters and legal proceedings that have been opened against them; is concerned about the reports that the security services were involved in intimidation and surveillance of the protesters; condemns the language used by the Serbian authorities inciting violence against students and other protesters; notes that student activists have faced legal harassment, intimidation and excessive use of force by the authorities; calls for a thorough, impartial and speedy investigation into allegations of violence used against demonstrators and police misconduct during protests; urges the diplomatic missions of the EU and the Member States to continue to monitor closely the ongoing legal cases relating to the protests;

    28.  Is deeply alarmed that the Serbian authorities have engaged in widespread illegal surveillance practices using spyware against activists, journalists and members of civil society, as indicated in the recent reports by Amnesty International and the SHARE Foundation; urges the Government of Serbia to immediately cease the use of advanced surveillance technology against activists, journalists and human rights defenders, and calls on the competent state authorities to conduct a thorough investigation into all existing cases of unlawful surveillance and use of spyware and to initiate appropriate proceedings against those responsible; calls on the European Commission, in the light of this, to follow up on these incidents, address these issues with the Serbian authorities and insist on a thorough investigation into these matters;

    29. Rejects allegations that the EU and some of its Member States were involved in organising the student protests with a view to triggering a ‘colour revolution’; strongly condemns, in that context, the unlawful arrests and expulsions of EU citizens and the public disclosure, by convicted war criminals, of the personal data of EU citizens, as well as hate speech against national minorities; expresses concern about the rising number of detention cases involving EU citizens at Serbia’s border; notes that anti-EU narratives are being manifested in decreasing support for EU integration in Serbian society and in a strengthening of the presence of foreign autocratic actors in the country;

    30. Calls on the Serbian authorities to restore citizens’ confidence in state institutions by granting transparency and accountability; encourages all political and social actors to engage in an inclusive, substantive dialogue aimed at fulfilling EU-related reforms;

    31. Notes that media freedom in Serbia has deteriorated further, as evidenced by Serbia’s drop to 98th place in the 2024 Reporter Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; urges Serbia to improve and protect media professionalism, diversity and media pluralism, and to promote quality investigative journalism, the highest ethical journalistic standards, through respecting journalistic codes of conduct, and media literacy; recalls the importance of the plurality and transparency of the media, including on aspects related to ownership and state financing, most notably through better involvement of the REM; recalls that the concentration of media ownership can have adverse effects on the freedom of the media and the professionalism of reporting; reaffirms that, as part of the accession negotiations, Serbia needs to align with the EU in matters of strategic importance, such as countering FIMI; calls on Serbia to align with EU policies in countering foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by implementing concrete regulatory measures in line with EU standards, such as the provisions included in the Digital Services Act[7] and Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising[8]; encourages cooperation between Serbia, the European External Action Service and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in tackling disinformation; expects the authorities to investigate and prosecute all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists;

    32. Expresses its deep concerns about reported cases of abusive attacks, digital surveillance and harassment against journalists, human rights activists and civil society organisations, most recently a police raid on 25 February 2025 on four leading civil society organisations, ostensibly regarding their misuse of US Agency for International Development funds; strongly condemns persistent smear campaigns and intimidation against civil society in Serbia, including false allegations about plots to overthrow the government with foreign support;

    33. Expresses concern that civil society organisations in Serbia face increasing challenges, including restrictive conditions, funding constraints, police raids and other forms of intimidation from state authorities; underlines the importance of a framework that enables local, vibrant civil society organisations to operate freely and participate in policymaking, including EU integration processes, in inclusive and meaningful ways; regrets that Serbia currently does not provide a framework that enables its lively and pluralistic civil society organisations, particularly those engaged in democracy support and electoral observation, to operate freely and participate in policymaking in inclusive and meaningful ways; expresses concern about recent raids of the offices of civil society organisations; calls for investigations into all attacks and smear campaigns against civil society organisations and for the improved transparency of public funding;

    34. Urges the Serbian authorities to expand the availability of public broadcasting services in all minority languages across the country, ensuring equal access to media for all communities, while drawing on the best practice of the region of Vojvodina;

    35. Expresses its deep concern about the draft law submitted to the Serbian Parliament on 29 November 2024, which proposes the establishment of a Russian-style foreign agents law; reminds Serbian legislators that civil society organisations and journalists play a key role in a healthy democratic society; reiterates that such legislation is incompatible with the values of the EU; notes that multiple civil society organisations suspended their cooperation with the legislative and executive branches of the government in February 2025;

    36. Expresses grave concern about the increasing political interference in heritage protection in Serbia, including the removal of protected status from cultural monuments and the disregard for legal procedures governing their preservation, as in the case of the Generalštab Modernist Complex;

    37. Calls on Serbia to fight disinformation, including manipulative anti-EU narratives and, in particular, to end its own state-sponsored disinformation campaigns; condemns the opening of an RT office in Belgrade, the launch of RT’s online news service in Serbian and the continued operation of the Russian online news service Sputnik Srbija, which is used to propagate pro-Russian narratives and misinformation across the Western Balkans region; urges the Serbian authorities to counter hybrid threats and fully align with the Council’s decision on the suspension of the broadcasting activities of Sputnik and RT; is deeply concerned about the spread of disinformation about the Russian aggression against Ukraine; calls on Serbia and the Commission to bolster infrastructure to fight disinformation and other hybrid threats; condemns the increasing influence of Russian and Chinese state-sponsored disinformation in Serbia, including the dissemination of anti-EU and anti-democratic narratives;

    38. Takes note of the adoption of the national strategy for equality and the strategy for prevention of and protection against discrimination, and calls for their full implementation and for further alignment with European standards; urges the Serbian authorities to address the recommendations of the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), with a view to improving compliance with the Istanbul Convention ratified by Serbia; notes with concern the temporary suspension of the implementation of the Law on Gender Equality by the Constitutional Court; expresses concern about the persistent lack of adequate support for organisations promoting women’s rights and gender equality;

    39.  Stresses that the Serbian authorities must take concrete measures to uphold and strengthen the respect for the rights of the child in the country, including by ratifying the third Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopting a national action plan for the rights of the child, adopting a new strategy on violence against children, given the expiry of the previous framework, and establishing a national framework to protect children from abuse and neglect;

    40. Welcomes the fact that Belgrade Pride 2024 parade, the biggest in Serbia so far, passed off peacefully, though being protected by a high-profile police presence;

    41. Highlights the need for strong commitment to safeguarding the rights of national minorities, ensuring their full representation at all levels of government, preserving their cultural identity through the use of their respective languages and by meeting their educational needs, freedom of expression and access to information, and to actively pursuing investigations into hate-motivated crimes as an irreplaceable part of common European values; regrets the fact that almost all national minorities are protected only formally; expresses concerns about the practice of pro forma representation of national minorities who are under government control; calls on Serbia to protect and promote the cultural heritage and traditions of its national minorities, in particular to create a positive atmosphere for education in minority languages, including by providing sufficient numbers of teachers, textbooks and additional materials, and deplores the violation of minority rights in this area; calls on Serbia to refrain from exploiting the national identities of national minorities that create division within these communities, and strongly condemns recorded cases of hate speech against some of them; notes the considerable delay in drafting a new action plan for the realisation of national minority rights and stresses the urgent need for Serbia to finalise and implement it promptly; highlights the need for the new action plan to fully incorporate the findings and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;

    42. Expresses concerns about the significant decline in the population of certain minority groups, including the Bulgarian minority; calls on Serbia to ensure the right to use names and language specific to minority groups, including women within the Bulgarian community; notes with concern that not all school textbooks have been translated into Bulgarian; calls on the Serbian Government to ensure reciprocal equal rights for the Croatian minority in Serbia as the Serbian minority enjoys in Croatia, in particular with regard to ensuring their reciprocal representation at all levels of government, including regional and local levels; reiterates its concern regarding the restrictive and arbitrary enforcement of the Law on Permanent and Temporary Residence related to the passivation of address of thousands of Albanians in the south of Serbia; emphasises the situation of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia, which is not officially recognised by the state as a traditional church;

    43. Regrets the attempts by the Serbian authorities to undermine the national identity of communities within the country; expresses concern, in this context, about the promotion of narratives such as that of the ‘Shopi nation’, which seek to erase the existence of the Bulgarian community and deny its historical roots and cultural heritage; regrets the searches carried out by the Serbian authorities at the Bosilegrad Cultural Centre and the initiation of pre-trial proceedings for ‘ethnic hatred’ against activists from non-governmental organisations;

    44. Calls on Serbia to refrain from distorting historical events, such as the narrative surrounding the so-called Surdulica massacre, which only serve to spread division and hatred against minorities and neighbouring countries, which is incompatible with EU membership;

    Reconciliation and good neighbourly relations

    45. Reiterates that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation remain essential elements of the enlargement process; calls on Serbia to stop restrictions on entry for regional civil society activists and artists as such practices undermine regional dialogue and cooperation; reaffirms, furthermore, the importance of the stability of south-eastern European countries and their resilience against foreign interference in internal democratic processes; stresses the importance of Serbia developing good neighbourly relations, implementing bilateral agreements and resolving outstanding bilateral issues with its neighbours; notes Serbia’s participation in regional initiatives and its active involvement in the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and the Common Regional Market; underlines the fact that respect for national minority rights is an essential condition of Serbia’s advancement along its European path;

    46. Calls for historical reconciliation and the overcoming of discrimination and prejudices from the past; deplores the recent inflammatory rhetoric by the government, targeting neighbouring states that did not support the opening of cluster 3 for Serbia;

    47. Reiterates that Serbia must refrain from influencing the domestic politics of its neighbouring Western Balkan countries, including regarding the unconstitutional celebration of Republika Srpska Day in Bosnia and Herzegovina and questioning Bosnia and Herzegovina’s court decisions;

    48. Urges Serbia to step up its reconciliation efforts and seek solutions to past disputes, in particular when it comes to missing persons, who account for 1 782 people in Croatia, 7 608 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1 595 people in Kosovo; calls on the Serbian authorities to achieve justice for victims by recognising and respecting court verdicts on war crimes, fighting against impunity for wartime crimes, investigating cases of missing persons, investigating grave sites, and supporting domestic prosecutors in bringing perpetrators to justice, which requires the cooperation of other parties too; strongly condemns the widespread public denials of international verdicts for war crimes, including the denial of the Srebrenica genocide;

    49. Calls on the judicial authorities in Serbia to ensure compliance with the standards of fair trial and satisfaction of justice for victims in all war crime cases; calls for the denial of war crimes and the glorification of war criminals to be included in the Criminal Code, with a view to prosecuting any form of denial of war crimes determined by the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice;

    50. Reiterates its position on the importance of opening and publishing wartime archives, and reiterates its call for the former Yugoslav archives to be opened and, in particular, for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav secret service (UDBA) and the Yugoslav People’s Army Counterintelligence Service (KOS), and for the files to be returned to the respective governments if they so request;

    51. Reiterates its full support for the EU-facilitated dialogue and welcomes the appointment of Peter Sørensen as the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue;

    52. Reiterates the importance of constructive engagement on the part of the authorities of both Serbia and Kosovo in order to achieve a comprehensive, legally binding normalisation agreement, based on mutual recognition and in accordance with international law; calls on both Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Brussels and Ohrid Agreements, including the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb-majority municipalities, and the lifting of Serbia’s opposition of Kosovo’s membership in regional and international organisations, and to avoid unilateral actions that could undermine the dialogue process;

    53. Expects Kosovo and Serbia to fully cooperate and take all the necessary measures to apprehend and swiftly bring to justice the perpetrators of the 2023 terrorist attack in Banjska; deplores the fact that Serbia still has not prosecuted the culprits, most notably Milan Radoičić, the Vice-President of Srpska Lista; reiterates that the perpetrators of the terrorist attack in Zubin Potok must also be held accountable and must face justice without delay;

    54. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and on the Commission to take a more proactive role in leading the dialogue process; calls for an enhanced role for the European Parliament in facilitating the dialogue through regular joint parliamentary assembly meetings;

    Socio-economic reforms

    55. Welcomes Serbia’s steady progress towards developing a functioning market economy with positive GDP growth and increased foreign investment in some sectors; takes note of that fact that Serbia received its first-ever investment-grade credit rating; underlines the fact that the EU is Serbia’s main trading partner, the largest source of foreign direct investment and by far the largest donor; reiterates that the financial assistance, which is of great benefit to Serbia, is conditional on the strengthening of democratic principles and alignment with the CFSP and other EU policies; reiterates the need for more substantial reforms in the labour market, education and public administration, including to address social inequalities; expresses concern about the scale and scope of intergovernmental contracts awarded that are exempt from the current legislative framework on public procurement; regrets, however, the fact that public debt as a percentage of GDP remains well above the eastern European average;

    56. Is concerned about the investment in Serbia by Russia and China and their growing influence on the political and economic processes in the region;

    57. Calls on Serbia to intensify efforts and increase investment in the socio-economic development of its border regions to address depopulation and ensure that the residents have access to essential services, including professional opportunities, healthcare and education; underlines the potential of the IPA III cross-border cooperation programmes as a key tool to promote long-term sustainable regional growth;

    58. Welcomes Serbia’s active engagement in the implementation of the new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans; takes note of the fact that Serbia adopted its Reform Agenda on 3 October 2024; believes that embracing the opportunities of the growth plan would further enhance the Serbian economy, which over the past three years benefited from more than EUR 586 million in financial and technical assistance under IPA III; believes that the EU funding should better support the democratic reforms of the country; calls, in that context, for the relevant EU funding, including from the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures, as well as towards independent media and civil society organisations, in order to support their critical work, in particular in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US donors; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and its Western Balkan counterparts in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its power on IPA III and Western Balkan Facility funds in the recipient countries; urges the Serbian authorities to step up efforts to communicate clearly to citizens the benefits of the EU funds and to improve their visibility;

    59. Regrets the lack of public consultation during the adoption of the Serbian Reform Agenda; calls for more effective oversight of the EU funding programmes and projects;

    60. Advocates increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; emphasises the role of the EU in facilitating such collaborative efforts; calls for the continuation and further reinforcement of the IPA regional cybersecurity programme;

    61. Recognises the important role of Serbia’s business community in advancing economic convergence with the EU, including through the opportunities offered by and in the implementation of the growth plan as a sustainable alternative to Russian and Chinese investment in the country; welcomes the business community’s contribution to advancing socio-economic relations in the Western Balkans;

    62. Takes note of Serbia’s business community’s efforts in advocating for the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU’s single market as a concrete step towards full EU membership; calls for clear, measurable actions and well-defined roles and responsibilities for the implementation of the Common Regional Market action plan, as a key driver for the region’s successful accession to the EU’s single market;

    Energy, the environment, sustainable development and connectivity

    63. Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the transposition of relevant environmental and climate acquis and to ensure the proper application of environmental protection standards, including by significantly enhancing its administrative and technical capacities at all levels of government, notably on waste management legislation and the adoption of the Climate Change Adaptation Programme and the National Energy and Climate Plan; urges the Serbian authorities to improve the transparency and environmental impact assessment of all investment, including from China and Russia;

    64. Reiterates its regret regarding the lack of action on the pollution of the Dragovishtitsa river by mines operating in the region and the detrimental effect on the health of the local people and the environment;

    65. Calls on Serbia to increase its efforts towards the decarbonisation of its energy system and to enable effective enforcement of pollution reduction regulations related to thermal power plants;

    66. Emphasises the need for further progress in transboundary cooperation with neighbouring countries, especially with regard to transboundary road infrastructure; urges Serbia to begin implementing the activities outlined in the memorandum of understanding on environmental protection cooperation with Bulgaria;

    67. Takes note of the EU-Serbia memorandum of understanding launching a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains and electric vehicles, in view of the European energy transition and in line with the highest environmental standards; recalls that dialogue with the affected populations, the scientific community and civil society should be at the centre of any such strategic partnership;

    68. Welcomes the agreement reached at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on reduced roaming costs; calls, in this respect, on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to facilitate reaching the agreed targets to achieve a substantial reduction of roaming charges for data and further reductions leading to prices close to the domestic prices between the Western Balkans and the EU by 2027; welcomes the entering into force of the first phase of implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    69. Reiterates that it is important for Serbia to continue diversifying its energy supply, to be able to break away from its dependency on Russia; takes note of the sanctions announced by the United States against Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), a subsidiary of the Russian Gazprom; welcomes the completion of the gas interconnector between Serbia and Bulgaria (IBS) in December 2023; regrets the postponement of the launching of the IBS’s commercial operation; calls for the swift finalisation of the permitting process to ensure its full operability in compliance with the energy community acquis; notes that Serbia is taking steps to introduce a carbon tax by 2027 as a step towards aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    70. Notes that all chapters in cluster 4 on the green agenda and sustainable connectivity have been opened; notes the adoption of the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment as a positive step towards environmental protection in Serbia, while expressing its regret that the new law fails to align fully with the relevant EU Directive 2014/52/EU[9], since it still leaves the opportunity for significant projects to advance without comprehensive environmental scrutiny; reiterates the need to designate and rigorously manage protected areas, particularly those identified as Important Bird and Biodiversity Areas (IBAs); calls for special attention to be given to critical sites where enforcement against poaching needs to be improved;

    °

    ° °

    71. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the President, Government and National Assembly of Serbia.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Ukraine peace talks: E3 statement, 23 April 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Ukraine peace talks: E3 statement, 23 April 2025

    A statement on behalf of E3 members, the UK, France and Germany, following today’s meeting with the US and Ukraine in London.

    An FCDO spokesperson said:

    Representatives of the UK, France, Germany and the US met today in London with a Ukrainian delegation led by Head of Office of the President of Ukraine Yermak, Foreign Minister Sybiha, and Defence Minister Umerov, for another round of intensive talks following up on the meeting in Paris last week.

    All parties reiterated their strong support for President Tump’s commitment to stopping the killing and achieving a just and lasting peace.

    The talks today were productive and successful, and significant progress was made on reaching a common position on next steps. All agreed to continue their close coordination and looked forward to further talks soon.

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

    Updates to this page

    Published 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: Gov. Pillen, NDVA Continue Celebrating 80 Years of Victory Through WWII Recognition Program

    Source: US State of Nebraska

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    Gov. Pillen, NDVA Continue Celebrating 80 Years of Victory Through WWII Recognition Program

     

    Gov. Pillen and NDVA Director John Hilgert present World War II medal to members of the Central Nebraska Veterans’ Home at the first World War II recognition ceremony. A collection of photos from various presentations can be found here.

     

     

    LINCOLN, NE  — A deadline is fast approaching for World War II veterans who wish to receive their medal and certificate at a special ceremony in the State Capitol Rotunda on May 8. That event will recognize Victory in Europe Day. Applications must be submitted by Thursday, May 1.

    Last May, Governor Jim Pillen and the Nebraska Department of Veterans’ Affairs (NDVA) announced the state’s World War II Veteran Recognition Program to honor living World War II veterans with specially minted medals. The program officially kicked off in 2025 to coincide with the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. To date, over 125 applications have been submitted and nearly 100 veterans have been presented with a medal at over 30 events and ceremonies held throughout the state.

    “Being able to honor these heroes from the Greatest Generation has been an incredible privilege,” said Gov. Pillen. “The response we’ve received from the veterans, their family members, friends and neighbors, has been tremendous. The stories they tell are hard to fathom. Some of these veterans are lucky to be with us today. We are blessed that we can show our heartfelt appreciation for their service to our state and our nation.”

     

    Image of the front side of the medal, ribbon bar, and box.

     

    The medal was designed by NDVA. On the front is the slogan of the initiative: Celebrating 80 Years of Victory. It includes Nebraska’s famous Sower in front of the state and surrounded by a laurel wreath, a symbol of triumph. The backside of the medal features the words “On Behalf of a Grateful State, Thank You for Your Service” emblazoned above the personification of Victory standing in front of the 48-star flag of 1946. The design of the ribbon pays homage to the U.S. Military’s World War II Victory Medal, which is itself a doubling of the pattern on the World War I Victory Medal. 

    The medal is available to living veterans who served in the U.S. Armed Forces between December 1, 1941, and December 31, 1946; are legal residents of Nebraska or can demonstrate Nebraska residency at the time they entered the service; and discharged under conditions other than dishonorable. The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) estimates there are around 250 living World War II veterans in Nebraska. While there is a deadline to apply to receive the medal during the May 8 ceremony, the recognition program will remain open, and medals will continue to be presented to eligible veterans as applications are submitted.

    “Our goal is to recognize every living World War II veteran in Nebraska for their role in, literally, saving the world,” said NDVA Director John Hilgert. “The other component of this initiative is to shine a light on these veterans’ stories and highlight how the entire nation came together for a common cause. It was an incredible time in history with stories and lessons we want to keep alive today and into the future.”

     

    Hometown Heroes

    A second component called ‘Hometown Heroes’ was added to the program to recognize the many Nebraskans who helped support war efforts back home as civilians. Certificates are available for those who engaged in activities such as joining the wartime workforce at munitions, weapons, or vehicle manufacturing plants; serving as members of the Crop Corps or growing Victory Gardens; or providing nourishment to soldiers at a Canteen, like the ones in North Platte and Norfolk.

    The first Hometown Heroes certificates were presented on March 31 to sisters Margy Dietz and Marcy Lackovic for their work at the Glenn L. Martin Bomber Plant in Bellevue. At the ceremony, the sisters were joined by family, including their great-grandchildren, and told stories of providing secretarial support and inspecting planes at the plant.

    Gov. Pillen recognizes sisters Margy Dietz (left) and Marcy Lackovic (right) at the first Hometown Heroes event, held at Heritage Ridge in Bellevue.  

     

    Victory in Europe Day Ceremony

    On May 8, 2025, Victory in Europe Day, Gov. Pillen and NDVA will host a medal presentation ceremony in the State Capitol Rotunda at 1 p.m. In addition to presenting medals to several World War II veterans, there will be a proclamation signing, patriotic music, the laying of a wreath in memory of Nebraska’s World War II veterans who have passed away, and more.

    All applicants who will attend the May 8 ceremony will need to RSVP in advance with NDVA to ensure adequate seating. Information on the World War II veteran and Hometown Heroes recognition programs, including eligibility, applications, and event details, is available at veterans.nebraska.gov/ww2.

    NDVA’s mission is to honor Nebraska veterans and their families by providing excellent service, assistance, and care. Its state service office helps veterans identify and access federal benefits, such as disability compensation and healthcare through the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, and state benefits, such as Nebraska Veterans Aid funds, tuition waivers, and more. Its four state veterans’ homes offer high quality assisted living and skilled nursing care to veterans and eligible family members across the state. And its cemetery system ensures eligible veterans receive an honorable final resting place maintained to the highest national standards. To learn more about NDVA and how it serves Nebraska’s veterans and their families, please visit veterans.nebraska.gov.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Baldwin, Colleagues Condemn Trump Admin’s Trans Military Ban, Demand Answers

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Wisconsin Tammy Baldwin
    WASHINGTON, D.C. — U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) joined her colleagues in condemning the Trump Administration’s unconstitutional ban for transgender Americans to serve in the military, which violates servicemembers’ civil rights and weakens our national security. The lawmakers demanded answers from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth on whether the Administration is complying with the nationwide injunctions that halted the ban, and that the Administration disclose whether any trans servicemembers have been wrongfully dismissed as a result of Trump’s executive order despite the courts’ injunctions.
    “This policy insults the service of brave Americans who believe that all people, regardless of differences, are equal and have a right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” wrote the lawmakers in a letter to Secretary Hegseth. “As the Joint Force faces a recruiting crisis amid a staggering attrition rate for new troops (nearly a quarter of Army recruits have failed to complete their initial contracts since 2022), our Nation cannot afford to expel several thousand troops serving honorably on a baseless, hateful whim.”
    The lawmakers derided Trump’s trans military service ban for not only being discriminatory and based on false pretenses, but also for hurting our military readiness and exacerbating the ongoing military recruiting crisis in service of continuing hateful attacks against transgender Americans.
    “The United States military became the greatest fighting force in the world by pioneering the integration of diverse groups,” the lawmakers continued. “We have triumphed over our enemies because military effectiveness and lethality are strengthened by a broad range of skills, experiences and backgrounds. Naysayers who have derided the U.S. military as lacking the discipline, intelligence and ability to achieve unit cohesion among Americans of different classes, races, ethnicities, religions and yes, genders, have been proven wrong again and again.”
    The letter is led by Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) and also co-signed by U.S. Senators Cory Booker (D-NJ), John Fetterman (D-PA), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Mazie K. Hirono (D-HI), Andy Kim (D-NJ), Ed Markey (D-MA), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) and Ron Wyden (D-WA).
    The full letter is available here and below. 
    Dear Secretary Hegseth:
    We write to express our expectation that the Department of Defense (Department) adhere to recent U.S. District Court injunctions halting terminations of transgender servicemembers and provide all servicemembers with equal protection under the law by protecting the constitutional and legal rights of our Nation’s transgender troops. Our extreme concern over the demonstrably false and propaganda-laden claims in President Donald Trump’s January 27, 2025 Executive Order “Prioritizing Military Excellence and Readiness” (EO) is rooted in our commitment to military recruiting and readiness.
    Fewer than one percent of the American people—approximately 0.4 percent—choose to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces.  Given the unwillingness or inability of 99.6 percent of the U.S. population to serve in our military, the last thing our Nation should be doing is rejecting patriotic Americans who are ready and willing to serve our country in uniform and bravely accept the risk of making the ultimate sacrifice.
    The United States military became the greatest fighting force in the world by pioneering the integration of diverse groups.  In fields where performance is the top priority, effective leaders recruit from the widest pool of applicants, understanding that arbitrarily restricting eligibility on a discriminatory basis betrays the very concept of meritocracy. We have triumphed over our enemies because military effectiveness and lethality are strengthened by a broad range of skills, experiences and backgrounds.  Naysayers who have derided the U.S. military as lacking the discipline, intelligence and ability to achieve unit cohesion among Americans of different classes, races, ethnicities, religions and yes, genders, have been proven wrong again and again.
    This should not be a controversial issue: most Americans support transgender individuals serving in the military, and a 2020 study found that transgender servicemembers reported above-average physical health and few risk behaviors.  As the Joint Force faces a recruiting crisis amid a staggering attrition rate for new troops (nearly a quarter of Army recruits have failed to complete their initial contracts since 2022), our Nation cannot afford to expel several thousand troops serving honorably on a baseless, hateful whim.
    The Trump administration’s repeated attacks on the transgender community reveal an ideological obsession rooted in a poor understanding of science. Transgender identities are valid, and respecting someone’s gender identity while minding your own business harms no one.  All servicemembers—cisgender and transgender—benefit from investing in unit cohesion, contrary to the false claims in the EO.  This policy insults the service of brave Americans who believe that all people, regardless of differences, are equal and have a right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Contrary to the low opinion you and the President seem to have of our servicemembers’ professionalism and commitment to mission accomplishment, we believe that our troops can serve together cohesively in pursuit of military effectiveness and excellence, regardless of their differences in identity. Fox News television personalities—not military units—are the ones bothered by transgender people faithfully serving their country.
    This EO establishes a dangerous precedent, allowing the President to arbitrarily decide that an entire group of people is harmful to an undefined ideal of “unit cohesion” and purge them from the Joint Force—without producing any meaningful evidence. You have already personally questioned women’s fitness to serve and erased public records of accomplishments by American military heroes from minority backgrounds.  Who will be targeted next?
    Nearly 20 percent of the transgender community are current servicemembers or Veterans, a significantly higher rate than the approximately seven percent of all U.S. adults fitting these categories.  In return for this patriotism, the administration denies transgender servicemembers not only the ability to serve, but also the resulting benefits they have earned.  The EO and ensuing Department policy proposals specifically target transgender individuals who have accessed gender-affirming care, even though such care continues to be accepted as evidence-based, medically necessary and highly effective by all major medical and behavioral health professional organizations, including the American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association.
    On March 18, 2025, U.S. District Court Judge Ana Reyes issued a nationwide preliminary injunction in Talbott v. Trump (1:25-cv-00240, (D.D.C.)), blocking implementation of the EO. Judge Reyes stated that the ban undermines national security, is likely unconstitutional and is “soaked with animus and dripping with pretext.”  10 days later, U.S. District Court Judge Benjamin Hale Settle, a former JAG officer appointed by President George W. Bush, issued a second nationwide injunction against the transgender military ban in Shilling v. Trump (2:25-cv-00241 (W.D. Wash.)).  These injunctions were timely, as the Department was scheduled to begin implementing the ban on March 28, 2025, despite several military experts and former leaders characterizing this rapid timeframe as “rushed,” “alarming” and “brutal.”  We could not agree more.
    As the Secretary of Defense, you are ultimately responsible for ensuring the United States maintains a strong and capable fighting force that will keep Americans safe. This harmful EO negatively impacts national security and undermines your oath of office. Given the recent legal developments concerning the order, we request that you respond to the following questions in writing by April 25, 2025:
    Do you commit to following the nationwide injunctions from Talbott v. Trump and Shilling v Trump regarding implementation of President Trump’s transgender servicemember ban? Please explain the steps taken to comply with these injunctions.
    How many taxpayer dollars will be spent to implement this policy?
    As of the date of this letter, how much has been spent on the government’s defense in the aforementioned lawsuits and any other legal challenges related to this EO?
    Approximately how many taxpayer dollars have been spent on training, continuing education, fitness testing, boarding and other related expenses on the transgender troops you are seeking to expel from the Joint Force?
    What is the estimated cost for administrative time spent scouring records to identify transgender servicemembers, pursuing the administrative separation process, providing transition services and implementing associated lifetime benefit payouts to forcibly remove honorably serving, fit transgender troops from service?
    Were any servicemembers prematurely dismissed due to the EO and planned policy implementations? What assistance was provided to help these individuals transition back to civilian life?
    Please provide a detailed reintegration plan for any servicemembers prematurely separated or who began the separation process, outlining how the Department is working to undo the harm already done.
    Do you commit to consulting with professional organizations, such as the American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association, to ensure that our Nation’s transgender servicemembers receive the medically necessary, evidence-based healthcare they earned in service to our country?
    How will you ensure that transgender servicemembers can continue to serve without facing stigma or backlash resulting from the Trump administration’s targeted attacks against them?
    The ban on transgender service members will have long-term consequences on military morale and recruitment. Addressing these issues promptly is crucial to prevent negative impacts on the Armed Forces. As the Secretary, you have the opportunity to help reverse the Trump administration’s anti-science, ideologically driven agenda. Swift corrective action will help preserve the military’s integrity and ensure it continues to attract and retain the best talent. Denying any servicemember who has met the qualifications to serve our Nation the right to serve based on ideological grounds is inherently un-American and jeopardizes our national security. This administration’s animus towards transgender heroes prioritizes a manufactured culture war over military excellence and readiness and is a purge of brave servicemembers who protect our freedoms.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: What They’re Saying: Support Grows for Hickenlooper’s Bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Colorado John Hickenlooper

    Hickenlooper’s Fix Our Forests Act will help reduce wildfire risk for Colorado communities and speed up mitigation projects while maintaining environmental safeguards and encouraging local involvement

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators John Hickenlooper, John Curtis, Alex Padilla, and Tim Sheehy announced growing support from state officials, community leaders, and environmental organizations for the bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act. The bill works to strengthen wildfire resilience by improving forest management, supporting fire-safe communities, and streamlining approvals for projects that protect communities and ecosystems from extreme wildfires.

    The comprehensive bill reflects months of bipartisan negotiations to find consensus on how to accelerate forest management projects, promote safe and responsible prescribed fire treatments, expand public input in assessments of wildfire resilience needs, and enhance collaboration between federal agencies, states, tribes, and stakeholders.

    The Fix Our Forests Act is supported by Colorado Governor Jared Polis, Utah Governor Spencer Cox, California Governor Gavin Newsom, Colorado Department of Natural Resources, Colorado State Forest Service, ColoradoDivision of Fire Prevention and Control, The Nature Conservancy, Environmental Defense Fund, National Wildlife Federation, National Audubon Society, Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership, Bipartisan Policy Center Action, International Association of Fire Chiefs, Alliance for Wildfire Resilience, Citizens’ Climate Lobby, Federation of American Scientists, American Property Casualty Insurance Association (APCIA), Association of Firetech Innovation (AFI), Hispanics Enjoying Camping, Hunting, and the Outdoors (HECHO), Wildfire Alliance, Tall Timbers, Rural Voices for Conservation Coalition, The Stewardship Project, Megafire Action, Property and Environment Research Center (PERC), National Association of State Foresters (NASF), Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation, Arnold Ventures, Berkshire Hathaway Energy, American Forests, National Wild Turkey Federation (NWTF), Utah Department of Natural Resources, California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE), Utah Farm Bureau Federation, California Natural Resources Agency, and Climate & Wildfire Institute.

    WHAT THEY’RE SAYING:

    “I applaud the bipartisan work and leadership of the Senate sponsors of this bill, including Colorado’s Senator Hickenlooper, in crafting a bill that will make Colorado communities safer amidst the urgent and growing wildfire crisis in the West. From supporting responsible and expedited on-the-ground fuel reductions, to bolstering the use and development of the latest wildfire satellite monitoring technology which compliments Colorado’s national leadership in the aerospace sector, and to investing in stewardship practices for local communities to be better prepared for wildfires and reforestation efforts with the state nursery to improve our ability to recover – this bill makes major strides in addressing the country’s wildfire risk and will support Colorado’s continued leadership in wildfire preparedness, response and recovery,” said Colorado Governor Jared Polis.

    “Extreme risk of catastrophic wildfires across the West demands urgent action,” said California Governor Gavin Newsom. “In California, we’re fast-tracking projects by streamlining state requirements and using more fuel breaks and prescribed fire. The Fix Our Forests Act is a step forward that will build on this progress — enabling good projects to happen faster on federal lands. I’m appreciative of Senator Padilla and the bipartisan team of Senators who crafted a balanced solution that will both protect communities and improve the health of our forests.”

    “A century of fire suppression and decades of reduced forest management have left us with overgrown, unhealthy forests that are more vulnerable to disease and catastrophic wildfire,” said Utah Governor Spencer Cox. “The Fix Our Forest Act, along with the tools provided by President Trump’s executive order, will help us actively manage our forests—protecting our watersheds, improving wildlife habitat, reducing wildfire risk, and providing the timber we need to build strong homes and neighborhoods.”

    “We applaud the efforts made by Senator Hickenlooper in the Fix Our Forests Act to provide federal, state, and local partners with the tools needed to address wildfire mitigation in the most vulnerable areas in Colorado. Wildfires do not abide by our political boundaries. But here in Colorado we have built strong coordination among federal, state, local land managers and stakeholders to help reduce the impact of wildfires on our critical infrastructure and landscapes,” said Dan Gibbs, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Natural Resources. “We appreciate that this legislation builds upon this important collaboration and draws on existing agreements, such as Shared Stewardship, which will help strengthen our intergovernmental partnerships as we prepare for the next Colorado mega-fire.”

    “Forests are central to our way of life in Colorado. They support world-class outdoor recreation and a vital water supply that more than 40 million Americans rely upon. I am grateful to Senator John Hickenlooper for his work on the bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act,” said Matt McCombs, Colorado State Forester and Director of the Colorado State Forest Service. “This critical legislation will bolster our shared stewardship ethic in Colorado and enhance our ability as a state to improve forest health, protect lives, communities and water supplies from wildfire, and ensure that the forests that define Colorado endure for generations to come.”

    “First of all, thanks to Senators Hickenlooper, Curtis, Sheehy, and Padilla for their leadership in moving all this forward! Having spent so many hours working on the Wildfire Mitigation and Management Commission, it is refreshing to see so many of the recommendations moving forward!” said Mike Morgan, Director of the Colorado Division of Fire Prevention and Control.“Colorado has taken a very aggressive approach in addressing the wildfire challenges we face and we are pleased to see these efforts at the federal level taking a more holistic look at the challenges we all face and in support of the Commission’s recommendations. This bipartisan effort will serve Colorado and America well! I fully support this effort and I am happy to help in any way that would be helpful.”

    “TNC appreciates the serious undertaking of Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Sheehy, and Padilla to build on legislation targeted at preventing more catastrophic wildfires through improved forest and fuels management and expanded use of prescribed fire. TNC has been working to restore beneficial fire and improve the resilience of forest systems on the ground for more than 60 years. Every year, wildfires continue to grow deadlier and more devastating to communities and the environment, and we remain concerned that the significant cuts to the Forest Service workforce will impede work to protect people and nature from these wildfire risks.  We support this legislative effort aimed at improving the forest management process to better address catastrophic wildfires,” said Kameran Onley, managing director of North America policy and government relations, The Nature Conservancy.

    “For many Americans, catastrophic wildfires are a very real and growing threat to their homes and lives,” said Environmental Defense Fund Executive Director Amanda Leland. “The U.S. Forest Service needs new tools and more resources now to prevent and control these wildfires, and with the right funding, this bipartisan proposal will help. Protecting people and nature from catastrophic wildfire requires both a robust, science-based plan of forest management and the resources to implement it.”

    “As the megafire crisis grows larger and more severe with each fire season, we need policy solutions that reflect the urgency and scale of the problem. Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Padilla and Sheehy have negotiated a Senate companion to the Fix Our Forests Act that will move the federal government towards a science-based, strategic approach to addressing megafires. We look forward to working with the sponsors to advance this bill and enact the most transformative wildfire and land management law in a generation—since the Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 2003, if not the National Forest Management Act of 1976,” said Matt Weiner, CEO of Megafire Action.

    “We are thrilled to see the Fix Our Forests Act introduced in the Senate through a bipartisan cooperation between Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Padilla, and Sheehy. The bill greatly expands upon the version that passed the House, adding critical details to support wildfire risk reduction in the built environment and provisions for mitigating the health impacts of smoke to communities while promoting expanded use of prescribed fire,”said Annie Schmidt and Tyson Bertone-Riggs, Managing Directors, Alliance for Wildfire Resilience. “Covering a third of the recommendations of the Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission, this bill is a significant step forward in wildfire policy and, coupled with sufficient funding and staffing to realize the proposed tools and programs, will make a real difference in our nation’s experience with wildfire.”

    “I thank Senators Hickenlooper, Padilla, Curtis, and Sheehy for introducing this bipartisan legislation,” said Fire Chief Josh Waldo, President and Board Chair of the International Association of Fire Chiefs. “As we saw in January’s fires in Los Angeles, the nation faces a serious and growing risk from fires in the wildland urban interface (WUI). This legislation will enact many of the recommendations of the Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission. It also will improve coordination of federal wildland fire preparedness efforts; promote the use of prescribed fires and other preventative measures to prevent WUI fires; and promote the development of new technologies to help local fire departments. We look forward to working with the bill’s sponsors to pass this legislation.”

    “Our national forests provide essential wildlife habitat, store carbon, and supply communities across the nation with clean air and water. These vital landscapes are under threat and must be proactively stewarded if they are to survive the changing climate, rapidly intensifying wildfires, and past management missteps. The bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act will help increase the pace and scale of evidence-backed forest management, including the use of beneficial prescribed fire and the restoration of white oak forests. But we must have a robust and talented federal workforce in place for it to succeed,” said Abby Tinsley, vice president for conservation policy at the National Wildlife Federation. “We will work with Senators Hickenlooper, Padilla, Sheehy, Curtis, and Chairman Westerman in the House to strengthen and advance this important conversation.”

    “The health of our nation’s forests is dependent on the rivers, streams, and wetlands that sustain them. Actively conserving and restoring these critical aquatic resources is an important tool that can be used to mitigate the impacts of wildfire and drought, among other threats,” said Alicia Marrs, director of western water for the National Wildlife Federation. “We’re encouraged to see language in the bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act that recognizes the wildfire benefits of aquatic restoration. We look forward to continuing to work with leaders from both sides of the aisle to elevate these common sense and cost-effective approaches to forest and water management for all Americans.”

    “Wildfires grow more intense and destructive each year, leaving behind immense devastation for our forests, wildlife, and communities,” said Marshall Johnson, chief conservation officer at the National Audubon Society.“The bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act represents an important step in reducing wildfire risks across forested landscapes. Audubon thanks Senators Hickenlooper, Curtis, Padilla, and Sheehy for working together to craft a bill that sets the stage for improved forest management, and we urge Congress to dedicate the resources necessary to ensure federal agencies are well-equipped to reduce wildfire risks, steward our forestlands, and protect wildlife habitat.”

    “The growing frequency and severity of wildfires pose a tremendous threat to the health of our forests and the safety of countless communities. The Fix Our Forests Act takes important steps to mitigate wildfires, improve forest health, and protect local communities. We appreciate this thoughtful, bipartisan effort led by Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Sheehy, and Padilla to advance this important legislation,” said Jennifer Tyler, VP of Government Affairs at Citizens’ Climate Lobby.

    “The declining health of our National Forests and the fish and wildlife habitat that they provide is a concern for America’s hunters and anglers,”said Joel Pedersen, president and CEO of the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership. “TRCP applauds the leadership of Senators Curtis, Sheehy, Hickenlooper, and Padilla for introducing the bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act in the Senate and urges Congress to advance these important forest management provisions and to accompany them with adequate resources and capacity to carry out on-the-ground work.”   

    “HECHO enthusiastically applauds the impressive bipartisan leadership behind the Senate’s Fix Our Forests Act. At a time when cooperation is more important than ever, these Senators are putting forward real, thoughtful solutions to reduce wildfire risk while engaging local and rural communities. This legislation is a critical step toward actively managing our forests to protect public lands, watersheds, and the communities that depend on them. By expediting emergency authorities in high-risk firesheds —and through the creation of the Wildfire Intelligence Center—this effort has the potential to significantly reduce catastrophic wildfires and strengthen prediction and response, particularly in fire-prone states like Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, and Utah. It’s a shining example of the kind of balanced, forward-looking leadership we need to protect our natural landscapes and communities,” said Camilla Simon, Executive Director of Hispanics Enjoying Camping, Hunting, and the Outdoors (HECHO).

    “BPC Action applauds the bipartisan leadership of Sens. Curtis (R-UT), Hickenlooper (D-CO), Sheehy (R-MT), and Padilla (D-CA) on the introduction of the Fix Our Forests Act. By streamlining and improving forest and hazardous fuels management activities on public and Tribal lands, this legislation will help reduce wildfire risks, improve forest health, and protect communities in fire-prone areas. The Fix Our Forests Act also delivers substantial economic and environmental benefits by addressing critical needs to enhance the domestic supply chain of seeds and advance biochar commercialization,” said Michele Stockwell, President of Bipartisan Policy Center Action (BPC Action).

    “The Senate’s bipartisan Fix Our Forest Act is a critical step toward restoring forest health and reducing catastrophic wildfire risk. This bipartisan legislation tackles the root causes of catastrophic wildfires by fixing the Cottonwood decision, reforming litigation standards, expanding categorical exclusions up to 10,000 acres, and boosting restoration capacity through long-term stewardship contracts and extended Good Neighbor Authority. Healthy forests require active stewardship—not bureaucratic delay. We thank Senators Hickenlooper, Sheehy, Padilla, and Curtis for bringing forward this bill, and we urge swift passage of this much-needed legislation,” said Brian Yabolnski, CEO of The Property and Environment Research Center (PERC).

    “Wildfires continue to ravage communities igniting homes, businesses, and infrastructure. APCIA commends Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Sheehy, and Padilla for their bipartisan leadership of the Fix Our Forests Act. The bill would improve fire assessment and prediction for wildland areas and communities to improve response, reduce hazardous fuels, enable greater vegetation management by utilities in federal rights-of-way to prevent fires, and create a community wildfire risk reduction program to support fire-resistant building methods, codes, and standards, promote ignition-resistant materials, defensible space, and other measures to reduce risk,” said David A. Sampson, President & CEO of APCIA

    “The Fix Our Forests Act streamlines collaboration between the National Wild Turkey Federation, the USDA Forest Service, and other partners, cutting red tape to accelerate urgent forest restoration and management on federal lands,” said Matt Lindler, NWTF Director of Government Affairs. “This bill ensures we can better manage and conserve vital natural resources for wildlife, hunters and anglers. We are grateful to see the Senate introduce this critical piece of legislation and await the signature from the president.”   

    “There is no time to waste in restoring and reforesting the forests that work every day to be the lungs of our nation,” said Brian Kittler, Chief Program Officer-Resilient Forests. “More than ever before successful and timely forest restoration will require strengthened coordination across federal, state, and tribal governments together with non-profit organizations. This bill prioritizes a complementary series of actions that will accelerate wildfire resilience and community resilience including ensuring post-fire reforestation is implemented quickly and with the best available science.”

    “The science is clear: tackling the wildfire crisis requires better forest management, increasing the use of prescribed fire, and investing in and deploying the next generation of wildfire technologies. The Fix Our Forests Act will get this urgently needed work done. Now is the time for the Senate to build on the bipartisan leadership demonstrated by the sponsors and pass this bill,” said James Campbell, Wildfire Policy Specialist at the Federation of American Scientists.

    “CWI commends Senator Curtis, Senator Hickenlooper, Senator Sheehy, and Senator Padilla for their bipartisan efforts to meaningfully address the wildfire crisis. The Fix Our Forests Act is an important step towards accelerating proven solutions to reduce catastrophic fire risk, improve forest and ecosystem health, and safeguard our local communities,” said Marissa Christiansen, Executive Director at the Climate and Wildfire Institute.“We are pleased to see many recommendations from the Wildland Fire Mitigation and Management Commission Report included in the updated legislation, including a directive to establish the Wildfire Intelligence Center to serve as the national hub for wildfire data, prediction, and response. We look forward to working with the bill’s sponsors to help accelerate solutions to the wildfire crisis by incorporating the best available science, data, and management principles into commonsense policy reform and decision-making.”

    “AFI supports the Fix Our Forests Act and calls on the United States Senate to pass it with the urgency the $100 billion a year wildfire crisis warrants from our elected officials,” said Bill Clerico, Founding Chair of AFI and Managing Partner of Convective Capital. “AFI is particularly supportive of the legislation’s inclusion of a Wildfire Intelligence Center, a long-overdue step to better integrate and coordinate wildfire response efforts and invest in cutting-edge technology. Our country’s wildfire response efforts are antiquated and are leaving us ill-prepared for this growing crisis. FOFA is a critical step to refining our wildfire response efforts and protecting our communities.”

    “State forestry agencies play a lead role not only in managing and protecting over 550 million acres of state and private forests, but also working to improve the health and resiliency of federal lands through cross-boundary partnerships nationwide. State Foresters are also responsible for wildfire protection on more than 1.5 billion acres and, in collaboration with local fire departments, responding to 80 percent of the nation’s wildland fires,” said Jay Farrell, Executive Director of the NASF. “NASF applauds the bipartisan work of Senators Sheehy, Curtis, Hickenlooper, and Padilla to chart a path forward to greatly enhance wildfire management and recovery efforts and stem the tide of disastrous wildfires that threaten our nation’s forests and the livelihood of communities that depend on them. We recognize that many of the improvements made in the Fix Our Forests Act are nuanced and look forward to continuing our work with Congress to ensure its landmark reforms become law.”

    “The poor health of our federal forests exacerbates the wildfires that negatively impact wildlife habitat, sportsmen’s access, and communities across the country, and comprehensive reforms are needed to actively treat hazardous fuels efficiently and at scale to increase forest resiliency to severe wildfires, insects, and disease,” said John Culclasure, Senior Director of Forest Policy at the Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation. “We are grateful for the bipartisan leadership of Congressional Sportsmen’s Caucus Members Senators Curtis, Hickenlooper, Padilla, and Sheehy for introducing the Fix Our Forests Act to improve forest management through strengthened authorities, collaborative tools, and improved processes. We look forward to working with the bill sponsors to advance the legislation quickly as we approach wildfire season.”

    “Arnold Ventures praises the bipartisan introduction of the Fix Our Forests Act, an evidence-based, constructive proposal to cut red tape and prevent catastrophic forest fires. We applaud Senators John Curtis (R‑UT), John Hickenlooper (D‑CO), Tim Sheehy (R‑MT), and Alex Padilla (D‑CA) for their work to craft and introduce this important and necessary legislation. We encourage all Senators to support and ultimately pass the Fix Our Forests Act,” said Charlie Anderson, Executive Vice President for infrastructure at Arnold Ventures. “AV also thanks Reps. Bruce Westerman (R‑AR) and Scott Peters (D‑CA) for championing this vital work in the House of Representatives. We are heartened by the collaborative work across party lines in both chambers to support thoughtful, bipartisan policy that will save lives and property.”

    “Berkshire Hathaway Energy applauds the Senate introduction of the Fix Our Forests Act and thanks the bipartisan group of Senators who worked together to move it forward. The bill’s provisions would improve forest management activities on federal and tribal lands in common-sense ways, improving their resilience to wildfire,” said Scott Thon, President and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway Energy. “Passage and enactment of these provisions would be a step to help prevent catastrophic wildfires and lessen their environmental damage. Berkshire Hathaway Energy recognizes the growing threat of wildfires affects everyone and requires holistic solutions with businesses, governments and key stakeholders working together to design and implement constructive, enduring solutions.”

    Our forests face serious threats, and this bipartisan bill is a vital step forward in addressing complex forest health challenges,” said Joel Ferry, Executive Director of the Utah Department of Natural Resources. “It gives land managers the tools to proactively reduce wildfire risk, protect critical watersheds, and restore forest ecosystems through stronger collaboration.”

    “The bipartisan Fix Our Forests Act provides much-needed tools that will move the needle and improve our work to mitigate wildfires,” said CAL FIRE Director and Fire Chief Joe Tyler. “This bill will bring California’s use of cutting-edge technology to the rest of the country. The proposed Wildfire Intelligence Center will advance the kind of predictive services, monitoring, and early detection work already happening at California’s Wildfire Forecast and Threat Intelligence Integration Center.”

    “Utah’s farmers and ranchers applaud Senator Curtis’ sponsorship of the ‘Fix Our Forests Act’, which will enhance forest health, reduce wildfire risks, and protect vital watersheds. We are particularly encouraged by provisions promoting locally-led restoration efforts, targeted grazing as a wildfire mitigation tool, and watershed protection strategies,” said ValJay Rigby, Utah Farm Bureau Federation President. “The Utah Farm Bureau appreciates the bill’s emphasis on active forest management and increasing the pace and scale of treatment projects to address catastrophic wildfire risks. The ‘Fix Our Forests Act’ represents a significant step toward healthier forests and safer communities.”

    BACKGROUND:

    The West has long been prone to wildfires, but climate change, prolonged drought, and the buildup of dry fuels have increasingly intensified these fires and extended fire seasons. Wildfires today are more catastrophic – growing larger, spreading faster, and burning more land than ever before.

    Colorado has seen four of the five largest fires in our state’s history since 2018. The 2021 Marshall fire was Colorado’s most destructive on record, burning over 1,000 homes. The Cameron Peak and East Troublesome fires in 2020 together burned more than 400,000 acres, the two largest fires in the state’s history. Nationwide, total acres burned rose from 2.7 million in 2023 to nearly 9 million in 2024, a 231% increase.

    Forest health challenges are also increasing in frequency and severity due to climate stressors like drought and fire, and biological threats like invasive species – all of which the West is particularly vulnerable to. From 2001 to 2019, total U.S. forest area declined by 2.3%, with the Intermountain West experiencing the largest losses by area.

    To address these challenges, the Fix Our Forests Act would:

    • Establish new and updated programs to reduce wildfire risks across large, high-priority “firesheds,” with an emphasis on cross-boundary collaboration.
    • Streamline and expand tools for forest health projects (e.g., stewardship contracting, Good Neighbor Agreements) and provide faster processes for certain hazardous fuels treatments.
    • Create a single interagency program to help communities in the wildland-urban interface build and retrofit with wildfire-resistant measures, while simplifying and consolidating grant applications.
    • Boost reforestation with the inclusion of Hickenlooper’s Reforestation, Nurseries, and Genetic Resources (RNGR) Support Act to support reforestation capacity of state, tribal, and private nurseries.
    • Strengthen coordination efforts across agencies through a new Wildfire Intelligence Center with the inclusion of Hickenlooper’s bipartisan Wildfire Intelligence Collaboration and Coordination Act of 2025, which would streamline federal response and create a whole-of-government approach to combating wildfires.
    • Support prescribed fire activities on both federal and non-federal lands – prioritizing large, cross-boundary projects, strengthening the prescribed fire workforce, and facilitating coordination on air quality protections.
    • Expand research and demonstration initiatives – including biochar projects and the Community Wildfire Defense Research Program – to test and deploy cutting-edge wildfire prevention, detection, and mitigation technologies.
    • Enable watershed protection and restoration projects to include adjacent non-federal lands; establish new programs for white oak restoration; and clarify policies to reduce wildfire-related litigation and expedite forest health treatments.

    A one-pager can be found here, and a section-by-section can be found here.

    The Fix Our Forests Act was originally introduced in the House of Representatives by Representatives Bruce Westerman and Scott Peters.

    Hickenlooper has been an active supporter of wildfire resilience, including sponsorship of legislation to restore land management agency staffing and pushback on the firings of the federal employees that support wildfire resilience on our public lands. The Fix Our Forests Act provides the tools necessary to accelerate wildfire resilience, which will work alongside Hickenlooper’s sustained efforts for the funding and staffing necessary for land management efforts.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Merkley, Wyden, Colleagues Condemn Trump and Hegseth’s Trans Military Service Ban

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Ron Wyden (D-Ore)

    April 23, 2025

    Washington, D.C. – Oregon’s U.S. Senators Jeff Merkley and Ron Wyden joined colleagues in condemning President Trump’s un-American and unconstitutional transgender military service ban, calling it a blatant violation of our brave servicemembers’ civil rights and a threat to national security.

    The lawmakers demanded answers from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth on whether the Administration is complying with the nationwide injunctions that halted the unconstitutional ban, and asked the Administration to disclose whether any trans servicemembers have been wrongfully dismissed as a result of Trump’s executive order, despite the courts’ injunctions.

    “This policy insults the service of brave Americans who believe that all people, regardless of differences, are equal and have a right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” Merkley, Wyden and the other lawmakers wrote in a letter to Secretary Hegseth. “As the Joint Force faces a recruiting crisis amid a staggering attrition rate for new troops (nearly a quarter of Army recruits have failed to complete their initial contracts since 2022), our Nation cannot afford to expel several thousand troops serving honorably on a baseless, hateful whim.”

    The lawmakers criticized Trump’s trans military service ban for not only being discriminatory and based on false pretenses, but also for hurting our military readiness and exacerbating the ongoing military recruiting crisis in service of continuing hateful attacks against transgender Americans.

    “The United States military became the greatest fighting force in the world by pioneering the integration of diverse groups,” the lawmakers continued. “We have triumphed over our enemies because military effectiveness and lethality are strengthened by a broad range of skills, experiences, and backgrounds. Naysayers who have derided the U.S. military as lacking the discipline, intelligence, and ability to achieve unit cohesion among Americans of different classes, races, ethnicities, religions, and yes, genders, have been proven wrong again and again.”

    In addition to Merkley and Wyden, the letter was led by Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) and co-signed by U.S. Senators Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Cory Booker (D-NJ), John Fetterman (D-PA), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Mazie K. Hirono (D-HI), Andy Kim (D-NJ), Ed Markey (D-MA), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI).

    The full text of the letter is available here.

    MIL OSI USA News