Category: Military Intelligence

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements – A10-0117/2025

Source: European Parliament

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements

(COM(2025)0084 – C10‑0036/2025 – 2025/0040(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0084),

– having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 172 and 173, Article 175, third paragraph, Article 182(1), Article 188, second paragraph, and Articles 183 and 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0036/2025),

– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 29 April 2025 [1],

– after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

– having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0117/2025),

1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Amendment 1

AMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT [*]

to the Commission proposal

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2025/0040 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 172 and Article 173, Article 175, third paragraph, Article 182(1), Article 188, second paragraph, Article 183 and Article 194 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 29 April 2025 [2],

After consulting the Committee of the Regions▌,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1) The Union faces massive financing needs to deliver on its objectives in the areas of innovation, the green and digital transition, and social investment and skills, while a complex backdrop affecting the Union’s competitiveness and industrial base characterised by changing global dynamics, slow economic growth, accelerated climate change and environmental degradation, technological competition and rising geopolitical tensions needs to be addressed. In that context, enhancing the Union’s autonomy, in particular in the area of energy, by supporting investments that strengthen a renewable-based and clean energy system, is essential to reduce dependencies and safeguard economic and political stability.

(1a) Additionality and the leveraging effect of the EU guarantee are the foundation of both the EFSI and the InvestEU Programme, enabling especially the scaling up of new and innovative technologies and companies as well as de-risking investment for private investors. It is necessary for the European Parliament to have better oversight over the InvestEU Programme to ensure that the EU guarantee is used in accordance with the programme’s objectives, such as fostering sustainable growth and competitiveness, with genuine additionality compared to private investors.

(2) The Draghi report assesses the combined additional investment needs in Europe at EUR 750-800 billion per year by 2030, with EUR 450 billion needed for the energy transition alone. This includes a substantial amount for the green and digital transition. Ensuring sufficient public and private investment is critical to boost productivity growth and achieve Union’s goals, leverage private investments with the objective to decarbonise industry, accelerate the production, storage and deployment of clean energy and electrification, strengthen interconnections and grids, advance sustainable and circular business models, foster sustainable building renovation, develop clean tech manufacturing as well as digital technologies and their diffusion across economic sectors.

(2a) Europe is experiencing an acute housing crisis which consists in two market failures: a shortage of affordable and social housing, and a failure to bridge the energy efficiency gap, with 46 million Europeans living in energy poverty. According to an analysis by the EIB Group, an estimated annual investment of EUR 300 to 400 billion is needed for construction and renovation only. In that regard, the Commission is planning to present a first-ever European Affordable Housing Plan and is partnering with the EIB Group, national promotional banks and international financial institutions to develop a European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing. Increasing the amount available under the social investment and skills policy window would allow greater support from InvestEU for that key priority. In particular, it is necessary for the Commission and implementing partners to enhance the visibility and accessibility of financing instruments in relation to housing. This would contribute to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights.

(2b) In the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, increased national and European spending is required to enhance European defence capabilities and to support the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). On 19 March 2025, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented a White Paper for European Defence –Readiness 2030 containing a plan to significantly step up Europe’s spending on security and defence. InvestEU enables financing and investment operations to develop the Union defence industry and military mobility, including financial support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps. Increasing the amount available under the relevant windows would allow greater support from InvestEU for this key priority. In particular, it is necessary for the Commission and implementing partners to enhance the visibility and accessibility of financing instruments for SMEs, mid-caps, and start-ups in the defence supply chain.

(2c) In 2024, the Commission launched, together with the European Investment Fund, an export credit guarantee facility under InvestEU with a view to encouraging Union SMEs to strengthen economic ties with Ukraine and revitalise trade, thereby contributing to Ukraine’s economic recovery and improving the competitiveness of SMEs. It is important that as many European export credit agencies as possible participate in this facility.

(2d) The Letta and Draghi reports underline the importance of well-functioning transport networks and services to ensure a transition towards a green economy while strengthening the Union’s competitiveness. In that regard, massive strategic investments are needed to complete missing links and to modernise transport infrastructure, where major gaps exist in public and private financing.

(3) The InvestEU Fund is the main EU-level tool to leverage public and private funding to support a broad range of Union policy priorities. Through its comprehensive network of implementing partners, including the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Investment Fund (EIF), other international financial institutions and national promotional banks and institutions, the InvestEU Fund is delivering much-needed financing through its risk-sharing capacity. The InvestEU interim evaluation highlighted that budgetary guarantees are inherently efficient for the EU budget and confirmed that the programme is well on track to mobilise investment, with a notable expected impact on the real economy. However, approvals of financing and investment operation under InvestEU were heavily frontloaded, and as a result, if no action is taken to address the issue, new approvals for some financial products may cease after 2025.

(4) The financial capacity of InvestEU Fund should be increased and used even more efficiently in combination with resources that will become available under the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and other legacy instruments (CEF Debt Instrument and InnovFin Debt Facility) implemented by the EIB Group. These combinations potentially reduce the budget revenues from legacy instruments. However, they would also create the possibility for an increased volume of guarantee cover to be provided for strategic investments in key Union priority areas for an additional investment of around EUR 25 billion that can be expected to be mobilised and by leading to an increased diversification of risks and thus not substantially increasing the risks for the Union budget.

(5) With the EUR 4,5 billion increase of the EU guarantee underpinned by ▌additional reflows of EUR 1,8 billion, and the efficiency measures implemented by combining the capacities of the legacy instruments with the InvestEU Fund, it is expected that around EUR 70 billion in additional investment could be mobilised. The financial contribution of the EIB Group should be proportionally adjusted to the share of the increased EU guarantee allocated to them. The indicative distribution of the EU guarantee between the four policy windows should be increased proportionally to the increase of the EU guarantee.

(5a) InvestEU advisory services play an important role in the development of a pipeline of projects. Those advisory services are particularly useful in complex areas, such as affordable social housing and defence. It would therefore be appropriate to use EUR 200 million in reflows to increase the amount made available for such services. Furthermore, it is necessary to enhance the interaction between the various components of the InvestEU Programme, in particular between the InvestEU Advisory Hub and the InvestEU Portal.

(5b) The Commission estimates the amount of provisioning required to cover future life-time losses from the operations supported under the InvestEU Fund with a 95 % confidence level of the value at risk. Taking into account the positive experience with the InvestEU Programme to date and in order to maximise budgetary efficiency while preserving a suitable level of risk management, it would be appropriate for the Commission to assess whether to reduce that level to 90 %, which would be in line with risk-related methodologies in Union external policies and would enable a high volume of financing and investment operations in support of the Union’s strategic priorities.

(6) In order to enhance the attractiveness of the Member State compartment under the InvestEU Fund, it should be made possible for Member States to contribute also in a fully funded manner through an InvestEU financial instrument in addition to the existing option of contributing to the EU guarantee. The support from InvestEU financial instrument should, to the extent possible, be implemented following the same principles as those of the EU guarantee. Through the InvestEU financial instrument, non-euro Member States could benefit from the InvestEU programme financially more efficiently in their own currency. The InvestEU financial instrument should also provide a further incentive for responsibly increasing the risk appetite of the implementing partners thereby contributing to the crowding-in of private capital.

(6a) It is possible to combine amounts allocated to the Member State compartment with resources under the EU compartment in a layered structure to achieve a better risk coverage, in particular with a first loss tranche covered by national resources. Member States should further explore that possibility to mobilise more investments in strategic areas. To ensure coherence with the objectives of the InvestEU Programme, such combinations should respect the principles of EU value-added, fair competition, and the integrity of the internal market, and should support cross-border cooperation where relevant.

(7) In line with an overall objective of simplification so as to alleviate the administrative burden for final recipients, financial intermediaries and implementing partners, reporting requirements, including those relating to key performance and monitoring indicators, should be reduced, where appropriate, in particular those that affect small businesses and small-size operations. Without prejudice to the definition of an SME for the purposes of other Union acts and any future programmes and funds, the application of the definition of an SME for the purposes of the InvestEU Programme should be adjusted to remove complexities to the extent possible, taking account of the possibility for implementing partners to request information on the ownership structure of SMEs for the purpose of calculating the headcount. In that regard, and as noted in Recital 14 of Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC [3], enterprises should be permitted to use solemn declarations to certify specific characteristics relevant to their SME status, such as the autonomy of their ownership structures. Specific attention should be paid to social economy enterprises and micro finance institutions.

(7a) It is appropriate for the Commission to take further non-legislative simplification measures in order to complement this amending Regulation, such as reducing the frequency of progress reports to be submitted by implementing partners. However, it is important that such measures do not compromise the effectiveness of auditing and monitoring mechanisms necessary to ensure alignment with the Union’s policy objectives.

(7b) It is important that State aid procedures applicable to operations supported under the InvestEU Fund be proportionate, predictable, and streamlined. In that context, it is also important that the Commission explore all available means to simplify and accelerate State aid assessments. This could include making greater use of the principle of market conformity. Furthermore, it is necessary that, where appropriate, the Commission provide timely guidance and further clarify and simplify the application of State aid rules to national financial instruments.

(8) The frequency and scope of reports should also be reduced for the InvestEU programme and its predecessor, the EFSI programme.

(9) For the Commission’s accounting, implementing partners should provide for combinations audited financial statements in line with Article 212(4) of the Financial Regulation, clearly delineating the amounts related to the different legal basis.

(10) Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 should be amended to allow for combinations of support under those Regulations and the EU guarantee under this Regulation.

(10a) On 18 April 2019, the Commission declared that ‘without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Council in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), one-off contributions by Member States, either by a Member State or by national promotional banks classified in the general government sector or acting on behalf of a Member State, into thematic or multi-country investment platforms should in principle qualify as one-off measures within the meaning of Articles 5(1) and 9(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (13) and Article 3(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (14). In addition, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Council in the implementation of the SGP, the Commission will consider to what extent the same treatment as for the EFSI in the context of the Commission communication on flexibility can be applied to the InvestEU Programme as the successor instrument to the EFSI with regard to one-off contributions provided by Member States in cash to finance an additional amount of the EU guarantee for the purposes of the Member State compartment’. Since then, the economic governance framework has changed. In light of this, Member State contributions should still be considered as one-off measures.

(11) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to address Union-wide and Member State specific market failures and the investment gap within the Union, to accelerate the Union’s green and digital transition, enhance its competitiveness and strengthen its industrial base cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.

(11a) In order to support the European Parliament in exercising its institutional role in overseeing Union funds and ensuring alignment with agreed policy objectives, the independent final evaluation report on the InvestEU Programme referred to in Article 29(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/523 should assess the effectiveness and impact of the derogations introduced by this amending Regulation, in particular their role in facilitating access to finance for target groups such as SMEs. It should also consider the overall functioning of the InvestEU Programme in the light of the principles of transparency, accountability and performance monitoring, including an examination of the relevance of financial thresholds applicable to SMEs in the light of economic developments.

(11b) With a view to reducing administrative complexity and legal uncertainty, the independent final evaluation report on the InvestEU Programme referred to in Article 29(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/523 should also take into account any regulatory adjustments arising from the projected legislative proposal on a small mid-cap enterprise category. Due attention should be given to the effectiveness of measures aimed at facilitating enterprise development,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 [InvestEU Regulation]

Regulation (EU) 2021/523 is amended as follows:

(1) In Article 1, the first paragraph is replaced by the following:

‘This Regulation establishes the InvestEU Fund, which shall provide for an EU guarantee and an InvestEU financial instrument to support financing and investment operations carried out by the implementing partners that contribute to objectives of the Union’s internal policies.’;

(2) Article 2 is amended as follows:

(a) points (3), (4) and (5) are replaced by the following:

‘(3) ‘policy window’ means a targeted area for support by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument as laid down in Article 8(1);’

(4) ‘compartment’ means a part of the support provided under the InvestEU Fund defined in terms of the origin of the resources backing it;’

(5) ‘blending operation’ means, under the EU compartment, an operation supported by the Union budget that combines non-repayable forms of support, repayable forms of support, or both, from the Union budget with repayable forms of support from development or other public finance institutions, or from commercial finance institutions and investors; for the purposes of this definition, Union programmes financed from sources other than the Union budget, such as the EU ETS Innovation Fund, may be assimilated to Union programmes financed by the Union budget;’;

(b) point (8) is replaced by the following:

‘(8) ‘contribution agreement’ means a legal instrument whereby the Commission and one or more Member States specify the conditions for the implementation of the contribution under the Member State compartment, as laid down in Articles 10 and 10a, respectively;’;

(c) points (10) and (11) are replaced by the following:

‘(10) ‘financing and investment operations’ or ‘financing or investment operations’ means operations to provide finance directly or indirectly to final recipients through financial products:

(a) in the context of the EU guarantee, carried out by an implementing partner in its own name, provided by the implementing partner in accordance with its internal rules, policies and procedures and accounted for in the implementing partner’s financial statements or, where applicable, disclosed in the notes to those financial statements;

(b) in the context of the InvestEU financial instrument, carried out by the implementing partner in its own name or in its own name but on behalf of the Commission, as applicable;

(11) ‘funds under shared management’ means funds that provide for the possibility of allocating a portion of those funds to the provisioning for a budgetary guarantee or to a financial instrument under the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund, namely the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council [4], the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council [5] (the ‘ESF+ Regulation for 2021-2027’), the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council [6] and the European Agriculture Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council [7] (the ‘CAP Strategic Plans Regulation’);’;

(d) point 12 is replaced by the following:

‘(12) ‘guarantee agreement’ means a legal instrument whereby the Commission and an implementing partner specify the conditions for proposing financing and investment operations in order for them to be granted the benefit of the EU guarantee and/or of the InvestEU financial instrument, for providing the EU guarantee or support through the InvestEU financial instrument for those operations and for implementing them in accordance with this Regulation;’;

(e) point 21 is replaced by the following:

‘(21) ‘small and medium-sized enterprise’ (‘SME’) means (a) in case of financial products not conferring advantage in State aid terms, an enterprise which, according to its last annual or consolidated accounts, employs an average number of employees during the financial year of less than 250 and which has an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million and where information relating to the autonomy of its ownership structure for the purpose of calculating those thresholds may be made by way of a solemn declaration by the enterprise, or (b) in case of other types of financial products, a micro, small or medium-sized enterprise within the meaning of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC [8] or as otherwise defined in the guarantee agreement;’;

(f) the following point 24 is added:

‘(24) ‘InvestEU financial instrument’ means a measure defined in Article 2, point (30), of the Financial Regulation to be implemented under the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund.’;

(3) Article 4 is amended as follows:

(a) paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

(i) in the first subparagraph, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘The EU guarantee for the purposes of the EU compartment referred to in point (a) of Article 9(1) shall be EUR 30 652 310 073 in current prices.’;

(ii) the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘An additional amount of the EU guarantee may be provided for the purposes of the Member State compartment referred to in point (b) of Article 9(1) of this Regulation, subject to the allocation by Member States, pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council [9] (the ‘Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027’) and Article 81 of the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, of the corresponding amounts.’;

(b) in paragraph 2, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘An amount of EUR 15 827 310 073 in current prices of the amount referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be allocated for the objectives referred to in Article 3(2).’;

(ba) paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:

‘3. The financial envelope for the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII shall be EUR 630 000 000 in current prices.’

(4) in Article 6(1), the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘The EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument shall be implemented in indirect management with the bodies referred to in points (c)(ii), (c)(iii), (c)(v) and (c)(vi) of Article 62(1) of the Financial Regulation.’;

(5) Article 7 is amended as follows:

(a) The title is replaced by the following:

‘Combinations’

(b) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘Support from the EU guarantee under this Regulation, Union support provided through the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 and Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 may be combined to support financial products or portfolios implemented or to be implemented by the EIB or the EIF under this Regulation.’;

(c) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

‘Support from the EU guarantee under this Regulation, Union support provided through the guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 and released from the operations approved under these instruments and Union support provided through the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 and released from operations approved under that EU guarantee may be combined to support financial products or portfolios containing exclusively financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation, implemented or to be implemented by the EIB or the EIF under this Regulation.’;

(d) the following paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are added:

‘5. By derogation from Article 212(3), second subparagraph of the Financial Regulation, the released guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 may be used for covering financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation for the purpose of the combination referred to in paragraph 4.

6. By derogation from Article 216(4), point (a) of the Financial Regulation, the provisioning corresponding to the released guarantee under the Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 may not be taken into account for the purpose of operations referred to in Article 216(4) of the Financial Regulation and may be used for covering financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation for the purpose of the combination referred to in paragraph 4.

7. The release of the guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020, the transfer of corresponding assets from fiduciary accounts to Common Provisioning Fund and the release of the guarantee under the Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 referred to in paragraph 4 shall take place by an amendment of the relevant agreements signed between the Commission and the EIB or the EIF.

The conditions of the use of the released guarantees referred to in the first subparagraph, to cover financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation, and where relevant, the transfer of corresponding assets from fiduciary accounts to the Common Provisioning Fund, shall be set out in the guarantee agreement referred to in Article 17.

The terms and conditions of the financial products referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 of this Article and of the portfolios concerned, including the respective pro rata shares of losses, revenues, repayments and recoveries or the respective non pro rata shares in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 3, shall be set out in the guarantee agreement referred to in Article 17.’;

(6) In Article 8(8), the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Commission, together with implementing partners, shall seek to ensure that the part of the EU guarantee under the EU compartment used for the sustainable infrastructure policy window is distributed with the aim of achieving a balance between the different areas referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1.’;

(7) In Article 9(1), point (b) is replaced by the following:

‘(b) the Member State compartment shall address specific market failures or suboptimal investment situations in one or several regions or Member States to deliver the policy objectives of the contributing funds under shared management or of the additional amount provided by a Member State under Article 4(1), third subparagraph, or under Article 10a(1), second subparagraph, in particular to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion in the Union by addressing imbalances between its regions.’;

(8) Article 10 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Specific provisions applicable to the EU Guarantee implemented under the Member State compartment’;

(b) in paragraph 2, the fourth subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Member State and the Commission shall conclude a contribution agreement or an amendment to it following the Commission Decision approving the Partnership Agreement pursuant to the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or the CAP Strategic Plan under the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation or simultaneously to the Commission Decision amending a programme in accordance with the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or a CAP Strategic Plan in accordance with the provisions on the amendment to the CAP Strategic Plan laid down in the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation.’;

(c) in paragraph 3, point (b) is replaced by the following:

‘(b) the Member State strategy, consisting of the type of financing, the target leverage, the geographical coverage, including regional coverage if necessary, types of projects, the investment period and, where applicable, the categories of final recipients and of eligible intermediaries;’;

(9) The following Article 10a is inserted:

‘Article 10a

Specific provisions applicable to the InvestEU financial instrument implemented under the Member State compartment

1. A Member State may contribute amounts from the funds under shared management to the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund in view of deploying them through the InvestEU financial instrument.

Member States may also provide additional amounts for the purposes of the InvestEU financial instrument. Such amounts shall constitute an external assigned revenue in accordance with Article 21(5), second sentence of the Financial Regulation.

Amounts allocated by a Member State on a voluntary basis pursuant to the first and second subparagraph shall be used for supporting financing and investment operations in the Member State concerned. Those amounts shall be used to contribute to the achievement of the policy objectives specified in the Partnership Agreement referred to in Article 11(1)(a) of the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027, in the programmes or in the CAP Strategic Plan which contribute to the InvestEU Programme, in order to implement relevant measures set out in the recovery and resilience plans in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241 or, in other cases, for the purposes laid down in the contribution agreement, depending on the origin of the amount contributed.

2. Contribution to the InvestEU financial instrument shall be subject to the conclusion of a contribution agreement between a Member State and the Commission, which for the contributions from funds under shared management shall be done in accordance with Article 10(2), fourth subparagraph.

Two or more Member States may conclude a joint contribution agreement with the Commission.

3. The contribution agreement shall at least contain the amount of the contribution by the Member State and the currency of the financing and investment operations, provisions on the Union remuneration for the InvestEU financial instrument, the elements set out in points (b) to (e) and (g) of Article 10(3) and the treatment of resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument.

4. The contribution agreements shall be implemented through guarantee agreements concluded in accordance with Article 10(4), first subparagraph.

Where no guarantee agreement has been concluded within 12 months from the conclusion of the contribution agreement, the contribution agreement shall be terminated or prolonged by mutual agreement. Where the amount of a contribution agreement has not been fully committed under one or more guarantee agreements within 12 months from the conclusion of the contribution agreement, that amount shall be amended accordingly. The unused amount of a contribution from funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The unused amount of a contribution by a Member State under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

Where a guarantee agreement has not been duly implemented within the period specified in Article 14(6) of the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or Article 81(6) of the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, or, in the case of a guarantee agreement related to amounts provided in accordance with paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article, in the relevant contribution agreement, the contribution agreement shall be amended. The unused amounts allocated by Member States pursuant to the provisions on the use of the funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The unused amount of an InvestEU financial instrument attributable to the contribution by a Member State under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

Resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument pursuant to the provisions on the use of the funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

5. Contracts implementing the InvestEU financial instrument between the implementing partner and the final recipient or the financial intermediary or other entity referred to in Article 16(1), point (a), shall be signed by 31 December 2028.’;

(9a) In Article 11(1), point (d)(i) is replaced by the following:

‘(i) be allocated an amount of up to EUR 450 000 000 from the financial envelope referred to in Article 4(3) for the advisory initiatives referred to in Article 25 and the operational tasks referred to in point (ii) of this point;’;

(10) the title of Chapter IV is replaced by the following:

‘EU guarantee and InvestEU financial instrument’;

(11) in Article 13(4), the first two sentences are replaced by the following:

‘75 % of the EU guarantee under the EU compartment as referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(1), amounting to EUR 22 989 232 555, shall be granted to the EIB Group. The EIB Group shall provide an aggregate financial contribution amounting to EUR 5 747 308 139.’;

(12) Article 16 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 1, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The InvestEU financial instrument may be used to provide funding to the implementing partners for the types of financing referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph provided by the implementing partners.

In order to be covered by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument, the financing referred to in the first and second subparagraph shall be granted, acquired or issued for the benefit of financing and investment operations referred to in Article 14(1), where the financing by the implementing partner was granted in accordance with a financing agreement or transaction signed or entered into by the implementing partner after the signature of the guarantee agreement and that has not expired or been cancelled.’;

(b) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘Financing and investment operations through funds or other intermediate structures shall be supported by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument in accordance with the provisions laid down in the investment guidelines, as applicable, even if such structures invest a minority of their invested amounts outside the Union and in third countries referred to Article 14(2) or invest a minority of their invested amounts into assets other than those eligible under this Regulation.’;

(13) Article 17 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 1, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Commission shall conclude a guarantee agreement with each implementing partner on the granting of the EU guarantee up to an amount to be determined by the Commission or on providing support under the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

(b) paragraph 2 is amended as follows:

(i) point (c) is replaced by the following:

‘(c) detailed rules on the provision of the EU guarantee or support under the InvestEU financial instrument in accordance with Article 19, including on the coverage of financing and investment operations or portfolios of specific types of instruments and the respective events that trigger possible calls on the EU guarantee or the use of the InvestEU financial instrument;’;

(ii) point (f) is replaced by the following:

‘(f) the commitment of the implementing partner to accept the decisions by the Commission and the Investment Committee as regards the use of the EU guarantee or of the InvestEU financial instrument for the benefit of a proposed financing or investment operation, without prejudice to the decision-making of the implementing partner in respect of the proposed financing or investment operation without the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument;’;

(iii) points (h) and (i) are replaced by the following:

‘(h) financial and operational reporting and monitoring of the financing and investment operations under the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument;

(i) key performance indicators, in particular as regards the use of the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument, the fulfilment of the objectives and criteria laid down in Articles 3, 8 and 14, and the mobilisation of private capital;’;

(ba) the following paragraph is added:

‘5a. The Commission shall, upon request, provide to the European Parliament and the Council the names of the implementing partners party to the guarantee agreements and the main content of those agreements, having due regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.’;

(14) Article 18 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Requirements for the use of the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument’;

(b) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1. The granting of the EU guarantee and the support from the InvestEU financial instrument shall be subject to the entry into force of the guarantee agreement with the relevant implementing partner.’;

(c) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘Financing and investment operations shall be covered by the EU guarantee or be supported through the InvestEU financial instrument only where they fulfil the criteria laid down in this Regulation and, if applicable, in the relevant investment guidelines, and where the Investment Committee has concluded that those operations fulfil the requirements for benefiting from the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument. The implementing partners shall remain responsible for ensuring that the financing and investment operations comply with this Regulation and the relevant investment guidelines.’;

(d) paragraph 3 is amended as follows:

(i) the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘No administrative costs or fees related to the implementation of financing and investment operations under the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument shall be due to the implementing partner by the Commission unless the nature of the policy objectives targeted by the financial product to be implemented and the affordability for the targeted final recipients or the type of financing provided allow the implementing partner to duly justify to the Commission the need for an exception.’

(ii) the following second subparagraph is added:

‘Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, implementing partners are entitled to appropriate fees in relation to the management of fiduciary accounts relating to the InvestEU financial instrument.’

(e) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

‘In addition, the implementing partner may use the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument to meet the relevant share of any recovery costs in accordance with Article 17(4), unless those costs have been deducted from recovery proceeds.’;

(15) Article 19 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Coverage and terms of the EU guarantee and of the InvestEU financial instrument’;

(b) paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

(i) the second sentence of the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The remuneration for the EU guarantee or for the InvestEU financial instrument may be reduced in the duly justified cases referred to in Article 13(2).’;

(ii) the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The implementing partner shall have appropriate exposure at its own risk to financing and investment operations supported by the EU guarantee or by the InvestEU financial instrument, unless exceptionally the policy objectives targeted by the financial product to be implemented are of such nature that the implementing partner could not reasonably contribute its own risk-bearing capacity to it.’;

(c) in paragraph 2, first subparagraph, point (a), the introductory sentence is replaced by the following:

‘for debt products referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1):’;

(d) the following paragraph 2a is inserted:

‘2a. The InvestEU financial instrument shall cover:

(a) for debt products consisting of guarantees and counter-guarantees referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1):

(i) the principal and all interest and amounts due to the implementing partner but not received by it in accordance with the terms of the financing operations prior to the event of default;

(ii) restructuring losses;

(iii) losses arising from fluctuations of currencies other than the euro in markets where possibilities for long-term hedging are limited;

(b) for other eligible types of financing referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1): the amounts invested or lent by the implementing partner;

For the purposes of point (a)(i) of the first subparagraph, for subordinated debt a deferral, reduction or required exit shall be considered to be an event of default.

The Invest EU financial instrument shall cover the entire exposure of the Union with respect to the relevant financing and investment operations.’;

(16) in Article 22, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘A scoreboard of indicators (the ‘Scoreboard’) shall be established to ensure that the Investment Committee is able to carry out an independent, transparent and harmonised assessment of requests for the use of the EU guarantee or, as applicable, the InvestEU financial instrument for financing and investment operations proposed by implementing partners.’;

(17) in Article 23, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘EIB financing and investment operations that fall within the scope of this Regulation shall not be covered by the EU guarantee or benefit from the InvestEU financial instrument where the Commission delivers an unfavourable opinion within the framework of the procedure provided for in Article 19 of the EIB Statute.’;

(18) Article 24 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 1, first subparagraph is amended as follows:

(i) point (a) is replaced by the following:

‘(a) examine the proposals for financing and investment operations submitted by implementing partners for coverage under the EU guarantee or for support from the InvestEU financial instrument that have passed the policy check referred to in Article 23(1) of this Regulation or that have received a favourable opinion within the framework of the procedure provided for in Article 19 of the EIB Statute;’;

(ii) point (c) is replaced by the following:

‘(c) check whether the financing and investment operations that would benefit from the support under the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument comply with all relevant requirements.’;

(b) in paragraph 4, second subparagraph, the last sentence is replaced by the following:

‘Any project assessment conducted by an implementing partner shall not be binding on the Investment Committee for the purposes of granting a financing or investment operation coverage by the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

(c) paragraph 5 is amended as follows:

(i) in the second subparagraph, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘Conclusions of the Investment Committee approving the coverage of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument for a financing or investment operation shall be publicly accessible and shall include the rationale for the approval and information on the operation, in particular its description, the identity of the promoters or financial intermediaries, and the objectives of the operation.’;

(ii) in the fifth subparagraph, the second sentence is replaced by the following:

‘That submission shall include any decisions rejecting the use of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

(d) in paragraph 6, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘Where the Investment Committee is requested to approve the use of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument for a financing or investment operation that is a facility, programme or structure which has underlying sub-projects, that approval shall comprise those underlying sub-projects unless the Investment Committee decides to retain the right to approve them separately.’;

(19) in Article 25(2), point (c) is replaced by the following:

‘(c) where appropriate, assist project promoters in developing their projects so that they fulfil the objectives set out in Articles 3 and 8 and the eligibility criteria set out in Article 14, and facilitate the development of among others important projects of common European interest and aggregators for small-sized projects, including through investment platforms as referred to in point (f) of this paragraph, provided that such assistance does not prejudge the conclusions of the Investment Committee with respect to the coverage of the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument with respect to such projects;’;

(20) Article 28 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 2, the following second subparagraph is added:

‘Implementing partners shall be exempt from reporting on key performance and monitoring indicators laid down in Annex III, except those in points 1, 2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 5.2, 6.3 and 7.2, as far as financing or investments operations benefiting final recipients receiving financing or investment supported by the EU guarantee or by the InvestEU financial instrument from an implementing partner or a financial intermediary not exceeding EUR 300 000 are concerned.’;

(b) paragraphs 3 and 4 are replaced by the following:

‘3. The Commission shall report on the implementation of the InvestEU Programme in accordance with Articles 241 and 250 of the Financial Regulation. In accordance with Article 41(5) of the Financial Regulation, the annual report shall provide information on the level of implementation of the Programme with respect to its objectives and performance indicators. For that purpose, each implementing partner shall provide on an annual basis the information necessary to allow the Commission to comply with its reporting obligations, including information on the operation of the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument.’

4. Once a year, each implementing partner shall submit a report to the Commission on the financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation, broken down by EU compartment and Member State compartment, as appropriate. Each implementing partner shall also submit information on the Member State compartment to the Member State whose compartment it implements. The report shall include an assessment of compliance with the requirements on the use of the EU guarantee and the Invest EU financial instrument and with the key performance indicators laid down in Annex III to this Regulation. The report shall also include operational, statistical, financial and accounting data on each financing or investment operation and an estimation of expected cash flows, at the level of compartment, policy window and the InvestEU Fund. The report may also include information on barriers to investment encountered when carrying out financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation. The reports shall contain the information the implementing partners have to provide under point (a) of Article 158(1) of the Financial Regulation.’;

(21) Article 35 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Transitional and other provisions’;

(b) paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:

‘1. By way of derogation from Article 212(3), first and fourth subparagraph, of the Financial Regulation, any revenues, repayments and recoveries from financial instruments established by programmes referred to in Annex IV to this Regulation may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation, taking into account the relevant provisions concerning the budget laid down in the Public Sector Loan Facility Regulation for 2021-2027.

2. By way of derogation from Article 216(4), point (a), of the Financial Regulation, any surplus of provisions for the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation, taking into account the relevant provisions concerning the budget laid down in the Public Sector Loan Facility Regulation for 2021-2027.

▌ By way of derogation from Article 214(4)(d) of the Financial Regulation, any revenues from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 received in 2027 may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation.’;

(22) Annex I is replaced by the following:

‘ANNEX I

AMOUNTS OF EU GUARANTEE PER SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE

The indicative distribution referred to in the fourth subparagraph of Article 4(2) towards financial and investment operations shall be as follows:

(a) up to EUR 11 589 045 902 for objectives referred to in point (a) of Article 3(2);

(b) up to EUR 7 707 119 112 for objectives referred to in point (b) of Article 3(2);

(c) up to EUR 8 095 166 498 for objectives referred to in point (c) of Article 3(2);

(d) up to EUR 3 260 978 561 for objectives referred to in point (d) of Article 3(2).’;

(23) In Annex III, the following two paragraphs are added in point 1 below point 1.4:

‘By way of derogation from Article 2(40) of the Financial Regulation, when determining the leverage and multiplier effect for financing and investment operations providing performance guarantees, the amount of risk coverage shall be assimilated to the amount of reimbursable financing.

By way of derogation from Article 222(3) of the Financial Regulation, the financing and investment operations providing performance guarantees shall not be required to achieve multiplier effect.’;

(24) In Annex V, the following paragraph is added:

‘This Annex also applies to the InvestEU financial instrument.’

Article 2

Amendments to Regulation 2015/1017 [EFSI Regulation]

Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 is amended as follows:

(1) Article 11a is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Combinations’.

(b) the following second subparagraph is inserted:

‘The EU guarantee may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council for the purposes of combinations referred to in Article 7(4) of that Regulation and it may cover losses in relation to financing and investment operations covered by the combined support.’;

(2) Article 16 is amended as follows:

(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1. The EIB, in cooperation with the EIF where appropriate, shall submit once a year a report to the Commission on EIB financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation. The report shall include an assessment of compliance with the requirements on the use of the EU guarantee and with the key performance indicators referred to in Article 4(2), point (f)(iv). The report shall also include statistical, financial and accounting data on each EIB financing and investment operation and on an aggregated basis.’;

(b) paragraph 2 is deleted;

(c) in paragraph 3, the following subparagraph is added:

‘In relation to the combinations referred to in Article 11a, the EIB and the EIF, respectively, shall provide the Commission annually with the financial statements in accordance with Article 212(4) of the Financial Regulation. Such financial statements shall include accounting data about the support provided by the EU guarantee under this Regulation clearly delineated from the support provided by the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council.’;

(3) in Article 22(1), the fifth subparagraph is deleted.

Article 3

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 [CEF]

In Article 29 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1153, the following paragraph is added:

‘5. The guarantee supported by the Union budget and provided by the EIB through the CEF Debt Instrument established under Regulation (EU) 1316/2013 may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council(*) for the purpose of combination referred to in Article 7 of that Regulation and may cover losses in relation to the financing and investment operations covered by the combined support.’;

(*) Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 (OJ L 107, 26.3.2021, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/523/oj)’.

Article 4

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 [Horizon Europe]

In Article 57 of Regulation (EU) 2021/695, the following paragraph is added:

‘3. The guarantee supported by the Union budget and provided by the EIB through the InnovFin Debt Facility established under Regulations (EU) 1290/2013 and 1291/2013 may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council(*) for the purpose of combination referred to in Article 7 and may cover losses of the financial product containing the financing and investment operations and covered by the combined support.’:

(*) Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 (OJ L 107, 26.3.2021, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/523/oj)’.

Article 5

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels,

For the European Parliament For the Council

The President The President

MIL OSI Europe News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Latvia, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Welcome Law Granting Latvian Citizenship to Stateless Children, Raise Questions on Hate Crimes and Access to Elections for Minorities and Non-Citizens

Source: United Nations – Geneva

The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the fourth periodic report of Latvia on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Committee Experts welcomed the adoption of the 2020 Latvian citizenship law, which granted Latvian citizenship to children who would otherwise be stateless, while raising questions on hate crimes against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons and access to elections for minorities and non-citizens.

One Committee Expert welcomed the adoption of a 2020 law which automatically granted Latvian citizenship to children of non-citizens who were not nationals of another State, and the recent reduction in the number of non-citizens.

Another Expert commended the State party for the establishment of a special unit to investigate hate crimes, and on changes in the criminal law addressing motivations for such crimes, including sexual orientation and gender identity. How were these changes publicised? Incidents of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons remained underreported, the Expert noted; how was law enforcement trained to facilitate reporting and to recognise and support victims?

A Committee Expert said the Pre-Election Campaign Law prohibited pre-election campaign materials in any language other than Latvian, except for European Parliament elections. How did the State party ensure that this prohibition did not unduly restrict accessibility and the participation of minorities in elections? Could the State party explain why non-citizen residents, including long-term residents, were excluded from elections?

Osams Abu Meri, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, introducing the report, said the fact that Latvia was a neighbouring country of Russia, which had invaded parts of Georgia and launched a full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, must not be overlooked. According to article 89 of the Constitution, the international human rights obligations binding upon Latvia formed an integral part of the domestic legal system. Domestic courts in Latvia had referred to the general comments and opinions issued by the Committee in numerous cases.

The delegation said work had been done to raise the awareness of those individuals in charge of prosecuting hate crimes, addressing victims’ rights from a broader, human rights-focused framework. The Ministry of Justice had also disseminated a circular on the interpretation of existing legal frameworks on hate crime and targeting the members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. As this was a very hot topic for Latvian society, the public broadcaster had also addressed the issue.

The delegation also said that if someone wanted to be elected or vote in Latvia, they needed to obtain citizenship. A Constitutional Court decision issued at the beginning of the year stated that the contested legal provisions did not impose a complete ban on the use of foreign languages, and only applied to individual campaigning with voters, hence they were in conformity with the Constitution. The Court decided that restrictions on fundamental rights were proportional.

In concluding remarks, Mr. Abu Meri expressed gratitude for the open and constructive dialogue. Latvia’s experience during these challenging times, as its neighbours Russia and Belarus deployed the full arsenal of hybrid warfare, had a broader relevance. Latvia would not only withstand these threats but remain steadfast in the rule of law, the principles of human rights and a rule-based law and order.

Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, expressed gratitude to all who had contributed to the dialogue. The Committee commended the State party for progress in several areas, including access to justice and gender equality, however remained concerned about the treatment of asylum seekers and non-residents, among other issues.

The delegation of Latvia was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Welfare; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Education and Science; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Culture; the Ministry of the Interior; the Ministry for Culture on Cooperation with Non-governmental Organisations; the Ministry of Defence; the Prosecutor General’s Office; the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs; the Internal Security Bureau; the State Police; the State Border Guard; the Cadet Force Centre; and the Permanent Mission of Latvia to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025. All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage. Meeting summary releases can be found here. The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m., Wednesday 2 July to begin its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Spain (CCPR/C/ESP/7).

Report

The Committee has before it the fourth periodic report of Latvia (CCPR/C/LVA/4).

Presentation of the Report

HOSAMS ABU MERI, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, presenting the report, said the situation in Europe had changed significantly since Latvia had last reported to the Committee. The fact that Latvia was a neighbouring country of Russia which, starting from 2008, had invaded parts of Georgia and acquired military and political control over parts of Ukraine, and on 24 February 2022 launched a full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, must not be overlooked. Because of these events, Latvia increasingly had legitimate reasons to fear for its security, territorial integrity, and democratic order. These events, along with information and hybrid warfare operations directed against Latvia, had strengthened efforts to defend democracy, national security, and effectively implement the rights and freedoms protected by the Covenant.



According to Article 89 of the Constitution of Latvia, the international human rights obligations binding upon Latvia formed an integral part of the domestic legal system. To illustrate, domestic courts in Latvia had referred to the General Comments and opinions issued by the Committee in numerous cases.



The financial resources allocated to domestic courts had steadily and consistently increased. Moreover, in 2024, the Academy of Justice, a new institution for the professional development of judges, prosecutors, prosecutor assistants, and investigators, was established. The Ombudsperson’s Office of Latvia had consistently received the highest “A” status of accreditation, and continued to operate in accordance with the highest international standards concerning respect for human rights and good governance. In 2022, Latvia ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Ombudsperson had been entrusted with the function of the national preventive mechanism, and, as of October 2024, had a new Department on the Prevention of Discrimination.



Latvia had continued to support the naturalisation of non-citizens; these were not stateless persons, as they enjoyed the right to reside in Latvia, along with a set of rights and obligations that extended beyond those prescribed by the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. In recent years, Latvia had seen a gradual and steady decline in the number of non-citizens residing in the country. A significant achievement in reducing the number of non-citizens in Latvia was the enactment of the law on the discontinuation of the non-citizen status for children, which had contributed to a substantial decrease in the number of non-citizens among younger age groups. Since 2020, all children born in non-citizen families had been granted citizenship at birth.



Between 2024 and 2027, Latvia had identified three priority areas for gender equality: increasing equal rights and opportunities in the labour market and education; reducing negative gender stereotypes; and integrating the principle of gender equality into policy planning.

In respect to combating gender-based violence, Latvia had significantly strengthened legal protections, expanded victim support services, and increased awareness-raising campaigns to challenge societal norms that perpetuate violence. Between 2022 and 2024, the authorities, together with non-governmental organisations, held workshops and discussions for young people on how to build non-violent relationships, based on the principle of gender equality.



In 2024, Latvia took a significant step forward in recognising diverse family forms by introducing civil partnership legislation. This legal framework allowed both same-sex and opposite-sex couples to register their partnership, granting them a range of rights and protections previously reserved for married couples. In 2021, the Latvian Parliament enacted amendments to the Criminal Law adding to the list of aggravating circumstances motivation based on “social hatred”, which covered hatred based on sexual orientation. Additionally, awareness-raising measures were continuously implemented, and investigators, prosecutors, and judges regularly attended trainings on the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert noted the various positive developments linked to civil and political rights, asking for additional information on the legal status of the Committee’s views in the national legal framework. What steps had Latvia taken to inform the public, including persons who did not read Latvian or English, about their rights under the Covenant and the possibility of submitting cases to the Committee under the Optional Protocol?

The Committee appreciated the rating of the Ombudsman and the increasing material and financial resources allocated to it, and the Expert asked for information on proposals to amend the Ombudsman’s enabling law. Regarding the implementation of the Corruption Prevention and Combating Action Plan, what mechanisms were in place to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures? Regarding judicial integrity, were there plans to adopt additional safeguards to prevent undue political influence in the judiciary?

Another Expert commended the State party for the establishment of a special unit to investigate hate crimes and on changes in the criminal law, adding “social enmity” and “any other characteristic” to cover sexual orientation and gender identity, and asked how these changes were publicised. Incidents of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons remained underreported, the Expert noted; how was law enforcement trained to facilitate reporting and to recognize and support victims?

Could the State party be more specific about the risks to national security posed by individuals with ties to the Russian Federation? How could fluency in the Latvian language prevent such risks? The Expert also asked for the number of persons deported so far, their background and to which countries they were deported. Had there been a state of emergency in parts of the country, in particular the Belarussian border from August 2021 to August 2023, and could the delegation confirm that Latvia did not derogate from its obligations under the Covenant during that period?

Regarding the equality of women, and efforts towards narrowing the gender pay gap, another Committee Expert asked what measures had been helpful so far, and what additional measures the government intended to introduce to narrow it further? Could the State party provide statistical data on gender-based violence and femicide from the last three years? What measures was the government preparing to improve prevention of the concerning occurrence of online violence against women, including against women journalists and women in politics and other leadership positions?

Regarding the right to life, a Committee Expert asked for disaggregated data on the high numbers of deaths in all places of detention, including psychiatric facilities. Was the definition of torture in line with that of international treaties, and what measures were in place to protect persons complaining of torture in places of detention?

Responses by the Delegation

Responding to the issues raised, the delegation said concerning the status of the Covenant and awareness-raising on submitting complaints, the Constitutional Court of Latvia had explained that the views of the Committee did not have the status of a legally binding instrument. While the Committee’s decisions did carry the weight of authoritative interpretation, they were not formally binding. The Committee’s views and opinions were soft-ball instruments, but had been taken into account by the courts over the years. Regarding awareness-raising on the United Nations human rights treaties, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had published informative material on its website in various languages, including guidance on submitting complaints to various treaty bodies, and ensuring accessible and transparent information for applicants. This was how Latvia ensured that society was informed about the Committee and the possibility of submitting complaints.

On training in the armed forces, the delegation said there were education programs which included human rights. The Ombudsman was appointed after approval by the Parliament. This aimed to strengthen human rights protection and ensure public awareness of the position. This approach aligned with the spirit of the Constitution and existing practice, whilst supporting the principles of democratic governance. On the Department of Discrimination, there was an Anti-Discrimination Unit, consisting of five people. There was a separation of the powers in Latvia, the delegation said, and there was currently a discussion on the procedure of nomination of the Ombudsman. There was no influence by political parties on the Ombudsman, and the election was entirely transparent.

Regarding anti-corruption measures, the Anti-Corruption Action Plan was in place since 2023, and the main reason for lack of fulfilment of its tasks was the lack of funding. The effectiveness of the Plan itself was usually measured by assessing the percentage of accomplished tasks, as well as feedback from institutions involved in its implementation. In 2025, six persons were fined in cases relating to corruption, and 2024 data showed that corruption was effectively investigated and sent to prosecution. On the independence of investigations conducted by the Internal Security Bureau, pre-trial detentions were supervised by a prosecutor. In accordance with the law, the Minister of the Interior could only supervise the legality and justification of the Bureau’s decisions, and could revoke them if necessary. On transparency of lobbying, work continued on effective implementation of legislation in this regard, and there was no Transparency Register yet.

The delegation said work had been done to raise the awareness of those individuals in charge of prosecuting hate crimes, addressing victim’s rights from a broader, human rights-focused framework. A specific hate speech conference event had been held in October 2024, with twenty-two participants who worked on such violations. A training session was also held for judges, prosecutors and investigators, focusing on a victim-centred approach to the justice system. For the general public, there were two specific web platforms with information about hate speech, hate crime, and related issues, and these were supported by the Ministries of Culture and Education, and the Ombudsman’s Bureau. The Ministry of Justice had also disseminated a circular on the interpretation of existing legal frameworks on hate crime and targeting the members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. As this was a very hot topic for Latvian society, the public broadcaster had also addressed the issue. The legal framework, which prescribed criminal liability for social, national and ethnic hatred as an aggravating circumstance was sufficient and proportionate to existing needs.

Numbers of hate speech and hate crimes were not so large, usually fewer than 10 criminal cases per year, the delegation said, but this did not reflect the priority of the topic, as the Government was working on the issue. With regard to ethnic tensions, it was important to look at the information space, and how people used and consumed information inside the country. According to research and statistics, minorities, as well as the general population, found news and entertainment important, and consumed it at the same rates, showing that society was living in the same space. There were differences of opinion in society, as should be the case in any healthy society. Latvian society had gone through traumas, and was dealing with them, including by taking care of minorities, legally, but also practically, including through an annual festival celebrating cultural minorities.

Latvia saw its society as one which facilitated civic participation, and was working to strengthen this. Even Roma representatives and organisations were finally putting their projects forward, and they were being supported. Work was also being done on media literacy, as the current greatest threat to human rights was the great mass of information that was available, meaning critical thinking was a critical tool for building a cohesive society. Latvia had acquired a large number of refugees, including those fleeing from Ukraine, and was providing measures and support for their language acquisition and cultural and societal integration.

Latvia was working with the Roma strategy at the European Union level and had its own strategic plan for Roma integration. Unfortunately, the community was one of the most stigmatised, as it was across Europe. It was important for this stigmatisation to be approached and that communities were approached, with Roma mediators involved in the efforts to end the stigma. Hate speech had increased in the digital environment, and a plan was being put together to address it.

The delegation said the issue of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was not an ethnic issue: it was an issue of international law, colonialism, and history. This was how society and the government had treated it. The government had been very clear that this was an issue that had to unite everybody within the country, no matter the language and ethnicity of the individual. Research showed that there was an increase of differences of opinion on the issue within the country, but these were not aligned with ethnicity. The Russian minority was very vocal in its lack of support for the actions of Russia. On the declaration of a State emergency at the border, there had been a deliberate attempt by Belarus to destabilise European countries, including Latvia, in response to the imposition of sanctions on the Belarus regime. Actions to protect the external borders must be interpreted in the light of the broader geo-political context and the will to protect the system against abuse, including the instrumentalisation of migrants and refugees.

The gender pay gap had reduced further in Latvia, the delegation said, and female employment rates were relatively high, but the government needed to look into employment equality further, including encouraging women’s participation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. Latvia was one of the rare countries that admitted to having problems in its prisons, and the government had approved an action plan to implement the Committee’s recommendations in this regard, showing its determination to tackle the issue. Prison staff were instructed and trained on sensitive periods in the life of a prisoner, aiming to limit incidents of self-harm and suicide.

Questions by Committee Experts

In follow-up questions, Experts asked for figures on deaths in prisons, and the reconciliation between self-administration prisons and the official system, and whether the former was to the detriment of detainees. Did psychiatric facilities offer education and therapeutic facilities, and was there sufficient staff? Another Expert asked for clarification on training in hate crimes and hate speech, asking whether it was mandatory and country-wide, or whether people could opt out. How was disaggregated data and statistics gathered on hate speech and hate crimes? There appeared to be a tension between language groups, and the Expert wondered how promoting a culture of human rights education and speech could be of help in resolving these matters.

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the Ministry of Justice had prepared a general policy planning document to combat and reduce the effects of informal prison hierarchies in Latvian prisons. This included building a new prison, and the education of prison guards and administration, including a new education centre, among others. One of the biggest problems in Latvian prisons was the outdated prison infrastructures, and the construction of the new prison to remedy this would be concluded in September 2025, with prisoners to be relocated in 2026.

There were 26,132 persons with mental disabilities in the country in 2019, and the situation was roughly the same now. It was very important today for persons with mental disabilities to have access to independent living, and Latvia had 12 social service homes, with between 50 and 150 places to which persons could be admitted voluntarily and could leave freely. There was only one long-term facility, with approximately 200 beds, meant for persons with severe mental disorders, and this hospital was also only for voluntary treatment. Regarding treatment and rehabilitation, nowadays in all treatment centres there were muti-professional teams, and staff workers ensuring integrated healthcare. Great efforts were made to ensure there were recreational facilities at all hospitals.

There was no mandatory training for judges, except on children’s rights, and training on hate speech and hate crimes were mostly linked to the specialisation of judges. In Latvia, the media enjoyed independence, and investigative journalism thrived, holding the government and the judiciary to account. The most common form of corruption involved the use of administrative resources, the delegation said.

The delegation said amendments had been made to the Criminal Code in 2024, establishing accountability for acts of violence against immediate family or in partner relationships. The amendments introduced the punishment of imprisonment for up to three years if the perpetrator committed a violent act against a family member, spouse or former spouse. Cases of spousal rape were considered rape under the Criminal Code, and sanctions were higher if there were aggravating circumstances. It was ensured that these crimes were reviewed by the courts in a timely manner. More than 13 trainings had been conducted for judges, investigators, prosecutors and those who worked on family violence cases. Every year, at least 20 women were killed by their partner in Latvia. The State believed that, in many instances, these deaths were preventable. From 1 July, electronic monitoring of offenders could be applied in criminal proceedings, providing an opportunity to prevent both femicides and homicides.

The ratification of the Istanbul Convention was a significant step in Latvia and was a cornerstone policy for the country. Changing societal attitudes towards women and violence and shifting deeply ingrained cultural norms and stereotypes required public awareness campaigns, which took time to yield results. Real-life stories of survivors had been made accessible to the public to raise awareness of the issue and encourage others to come forward. Services were accessible and no proof was required to receive help.

In December 2023, preventive visits had been carried out to two prisons, to assess potential risks of violent behaviour. Conferences had been held in cooperation with the Ombudsman’s office and non-governmental organizations dedicated to the prevention of violent conduct, attended by representatives of the prison administration. There had been an increase in crimes committed by prison administration officials in 2025, but this was due to the mandate to increasingly investigate these kinds of crimes.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert asked why Latvia did not systematically collect and publish data on the length and frequency of pretrial detention. What steps would be taken to address this gap? Could data be provided on the use of non-custodial alternatives to detention? How was it ensued that all detainees were fully informed of their rights and access to a lawyer from the outset of detention? Would the State implement mandatory audiovisual recording of all police interviews with detained persons? How was it ensured that detainees received timely and effective assistance from qualified lawyers, including during the initial critical hours of detention?

What specific safeguards existed to prevent undue political influence in the appointment of Supreme Court judges? How did the State party address reports of politicisation and corruption in the judicial system? What measures were taken to improve trust in the justice system? What was the current operational status of the academy of justice? What specific training programmes had been implemented for judges and prosecutors since it opened? What steps had been taken to ensure timely issuance of judgements? Could information be provided on the types and lengths of sentences provided to minors? How was it ensured the detention of minors was used only as a last resort and for the shortest possible time?

Another Committee Expert said the overall national referral mechanism had not yet been established; why was this? How would the State implement the relevant European Parliament directive in time? How did the conflict in Ukraine impact trafficking in Latvia and different categories of victims, including victims of sexual exploitation and child trafficking? Were training activities organised for law enforcement in this regard? How did Latvia’s transition from a country of origin to country of transit and destination impact Government prevention efforts? What measures were being taken to promptly investigate, prosecute and punish all cases of trafficking? What remedies were provided to victims? How many cases had been raised against persons involved in human trafficking?

In mid-2024, the Ministry of Culture launched a study to ensure the safety of journalists in Latvia. What was its progress thus far? How were its recommendations being implemented? The Government informed the Committee that the criminal proceedings concerning serious bodily injuries inflicted to the journalist and publisher Leonids Jākobsons were terminated on 19 February 2025, as the authorities were unable to find the perpetrators. How often were similar cases involving infliction of serious bodily injuries terminated because of lack of success in finding perpetrators? How would the State ensure that similar incidents did not repeat, and that there was no impunity for perpetrators?

Could the delegation elaborate on the legal basis for the drastic revocation of TV Rain’s broadcasting licence on 6 December 2022, that was challenged before the Administrative Regional Court? The National Security Concept of 28 September 2023 served to prohibit the production of public television and radio content in Russian. What was the legal basis for this policy, and had there been any legal and administrative actions taken to implement it thus far?

Another Committee Expert said that in June 2023, Latvia established an enhanced border regime with restrictive measures, which had been extended to the end of 2025. Could the delegation confirm this? How did the State party justify prolonging these restrictions long after the formal state of emergency had ended? Credible reports indicated that from 2021 to 2025, the State border guard had engaged in 28,000 pushbacks to Belarus and other countries, without assessing the risks individuals would face. How did these pushbacks comply with the principle of non-refoulment? Refugees at the border were reportedly subjected to violence and abuse and left without water and food. What concrete actions had the State party taken to monitor the State border guard? How were the border guards trained to prevent ill-treatment of migrants?

How many official border crossing points were operating today? What steps were being taken to facilitate applications for persons seeking protection? What percentage of asylum seekers were detained and for how long? The Committee was concerned about the detention of children who sought asylum; would Latvia consider a policy of never detaining children for immigration reasons? The State had a good practice of providing free legal aid to refugees challenging asylum decisions, however reports stated it was not respected in practice. How did the State party uphold this commitment in practice?

The Committee welcomed the adoption of a 2020 law which automatically granted Latvian citizenship to children of non-citizens who were not nationals of another State. The Committee also welcomed the reduction in the number of non-citizens. Would the State party consider amending its citizenship law to grant nationality to all children born in Latvia who would otherwise be stateless? Was the State party considering extending political rights to non-citizens?

The Committee appreciated the measures adopted to safeguard the rights of conscientious objectors following the re-introduction of compulsory military service for men under Law 75 on the State Defence Service. The Committee also noted that the term of Alternative Civil Service was equal in length to military service, which was an improvement. Would the State consider allowing the Conscription Control Commission to operate independently of the miliary? Were conscientious objectors assigned responsibilities in alternative civil services, as opposed to non-combat roles within the military? How would the State party respect the rights of conscientious objectors during emergencies and armed conflicts?

A Committee Expert said the Committee understood that the Pre-Election Campaign Law prohibited pre-election campaign materials in any language other than Latvian, except for European Parliament elections. How did the State party ensure that this prohibition did not unduly restrict accessibility and the participation of minorities in elections?

Could the State party explain why non-citizen residents, including long-term residents, were excluded from elections? Would the State party be willing to permit their participation in elections? Where did the State party see the most need for further improvement regarding accessibility for persons with disabilities in elections? What measures had the State party taken to follow up on treaty body recommendations, including those calling on political parties to introduce quotas to promote women’s representation in political life?

The Committee had questions regarding the transition to Latvian as the exclusive language of instruction, eliminating Russian as a second language in schools and preschools. While this transition was envisaged a long time ago, its implementation had been rushed. How does the State party ensure that schools were ready within the limited timeframe, especially schools where many teachers lacked sufficient proficiency in Latvian? There were serious concerns about the lack of meaningful minority community consultation and participation during the law’s adoption. How many stakeholders were involved and how was active participation and meaningful dialogue ensured? The Committee was informed that national minority pupils at pre-school and primary education levels had a right to request education programmes on their language and cultural history. Did communities have to fund these programmes themselves? How were people made aware of these programmes and how easy was it to apply for them?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said that while not all police interviews were recorded, this did not affect police investigations. All interviews with children were recorded. All interviews were documented in written form.

Legal aid was provided by the court administration. There had been just one case where a higher court judge had not been appointed by the parliament. Reports of corruption in the court system were legally investigated. The parliament adopted a law establishing a new judicial academy in 2024. In January this year, the newly established institution officially commenced its operations. The academy had been admitted as a member of the European Judicial Network. During this year, 106 events and trainings had already been held at the academy.

Latvia remained susceptible to labour exploitation, sham marriages, forced begging, as well as sexual exploitation. This year, just one criminal investigation had been launched so far in this regard. At the beginning of the Ukrainian refugee crisis, a programme was established that strengthened the capacity of State border guards to identify possible victims of human trafficking. All unaccompanied minors had been given legal assistance. Since 2022, there had been one case of sexual exploitation of a Ukrainian woman.

Regarding the case of the grievous bodily harm reflected on the journalist Leonids Jākobsons, despite its best efforts, the State had been unable to identify the perpetrator, and the proceedings had been closed. However, should new information emerge, the criminal proceedings could be reopened, and investigations could resume. In a 2019 case involving a journalist who had been persecuted and harassed for over a year, the perpetrator was identified and sentenced to prison for two years. This emphasised that the State recognised the importance of journalists and were committed to ensuring their safety and security.

A study had been launched which looked at updating the legal definition of “the media”. Seminars were provided for journalists that helped them to protect themselves. Meetings were held with the police once a year, to help them support journalists. Materials were envisaged for judges to help them on cases involving journalists.

Latvia was a democratic State that promoted the right to a fair trial and access to justice. A case was ongoing regarding Russian propaganda channels spreading hate speech in Latvia. The Government could not assess the outcome of the case at this point.

No languages had been prohibited in Latvia. Statistics showed that only 54 per cent of Latvian youth knew Russian language. The official State language was the Latvian language.

Around 47 to 50 per cent of television programmes and 35 percent of radio programmes were available in Russian language, and 13 per cent of the printed press was in Russian language. A law was in place which obligated the public broadcaster to broadcast in minority languages. The public broadcaster independently decided on media content and in which languages it should be broadcast. Work was being done to promote the inclusion of more minorities.

The state of emergency situation at the border with Belarus had been ended, but a new “enhanced border protection regime” had been introduced and would be in force until the end of the year. During legislative amendments, the State had assessed a proportional and law-based solution, considering European Union court rulings in this field. A lot of work had been done to comply with international obligations and the principle of non-refoulment. A document had been developed to instruct personnel at the border on how to deal with these cases.

Significant training had been provided to border staff, with more than 1,000 border guards trained in 2024 on asylum rights. The State did not have information on 20 deaths registered at the border with Belarus. There had been a case in 2024 in which a dead body was found on the Latvian border. This year, there had been 63 applications for asylum so far. As a rule, asylum seekers were not detained in Latvia and were accommodated in open space centres. However, due to several circumstances, the law on asylum permitted the detention of asylum seekers, such as in the case of security threats. Each case was individually and thoroughly assessed. Minors under 14 years old were not detained; they were placed in different facilities. Efforts were taken to accommodate minors with their families when possible. State-provided legal assistance could be accessed once an asylum decision had been appealed.

Regarding conscientious objection, no one from the Ministry of Defence had interfered with the Conscription Control Commission, and changes were not considered. The State defence service law set basic criteria for alternative service. So far, just three applications had been received, including for religious and health reasons. Military service was for a fixed period and a solider could choose whether to extend their contract or not. International regulations set a two-month resignation notice for military service, which the State believed was a reasonable amount of time. A reserve solider who could not perform military service due to their beliefs could be enrolled in the national armed force reserves. The State was not considering amending paragraph five of the military law.

Latvia did not consider “non-citizens” to be stateless persons. All non-citizens had the right to naturalise. The number of Latvian non-citizens had decreased by around 77 per cent in recent years. After a change in regulations in 2020, more than 500 children had been automatically registered after birth. Several campaigns had been carried out on the possibility of acquiring Latvian citizenship.

If someone wanted to be elected or vote in Latvia, they needed to obtain citizenship. A Constitutional Court decision issued at the beginning of the year stated that the contested legal provisions did not impose a complete ban on the use of foreign languages, and only applied to individual campaigning with voters, hence they were in conformity with the Constitution. The Court decided that restrictions on fundamental rights were proportional. Russian language was still widespread in Latvia, justifying the need to strengthen the use of Latvian as the official State language. The Constitutional Court had taken article 27 of the Covenant into account, which recognised the obligation to ensure minority groups could use their mother tongue. It found amendments in the law complied with article 27.

The naturalisation procedure was fairly easy. The path for non-citizens was wide, short and easy to walk.

Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

The Committee asked follow-up questions regarding actions taken to implement the national security policy before the Constitutional Court; the permanence of the enhanced border regime; ill-treatment of migrants crossing the Belarus/Latvia border between 2021 and 2022; granting citizenship to children born in Latvia who would otherwise be stateless; providing for honourable discharges from military service; the exclusion of non-citizens from all elections; alternative programmes for minority languages in schools; and measures in place to ensure detention of minors was only implemented as a measure of last resort.

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the public broadcaster was bound by media laws. Currently Belarussian authorities at the border were refusing to cooperate with Latvian authorities. These non-cooperation issues had brought about an increase in criminal activities across the border, including organised crime. This year, there had been 186 irregular migration cases across the border. An investigation had been launched in 2021 and 2022 regarding individuals who had attempted to cross the Belarussian border, which had analysed a significant amount of information. During the investigation, it was determined that injuries to migrants were not caused by the actions of border officials, but were likely obtained during the journey to cross the border.

Reasons for terminating a military contract prior to its conclusion were not specified in national laws. An agreement simply needed to be reached.

Only persons with Latvian citizenship had the right to vote. Using languages other than Latvian during political campaigning in the election period was not prohibited. The provision about using just the official language applied only to the pre-election period. Non-citizens who chose to keep their status still had the right to receive healthcare and work in the country.

Teachers were instructed on teaching methodologies in a linguistically diverse environment, and on how to teach students whose native language was not Latvian. There were targeted grants supporting minority languages and cultures.

As of 25 June this year, there were 27 inmates who were children. Four of these children were detained, with the rest serving their sentences on probation. This illustrated that incarceration of children in Latvia was a last resort.

Closing Statements

HOSAMS ABU MERI, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, expressed gratitude for the open and constructive dialogue. A wide range of topics had been addressed, including efforts to combat hate crimes, gender equality, and matters of national security. Latvia’s experience during these challenging times, as its neighbours Russia and Belarus deployed the full arsenal of hybrid warfare, had a broader relevance. Latvia would not only withstand these threats but remain steadfast in the rule of law, the principles of human rights and a rule-based law and order. These circumstances reaffirmed Latvia’s commitment to uphold the rights enshrined in the Covenant. Latvia appreciated the engagement and interest of the Committee.

CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed gratitude to all who had contributed to the dialogue. The Committee commended the State party for progress in several areas, including access to justice and gender equality, however remained concerned about the treatment of asylum seekers and non-residents, among other issues. Mr. Soh thanked all involved in the dialogue for their engagement and commitment.

___________

Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media;
not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

CCPR25.013E

MIL OSI United Nations News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Eligible spending under ReArm Europe – E-001294/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament

The classification of the functions of government (COFOG) is a classification of transactions designed to apply to general government and its subsectors.

In the current version of the COFOG classification, which is used both globally and in Europe, there are 10 divisions, including division 02 Defence.

The classification is centred on primary purpose of government expenditure. Thus, division 02 Defence captures all government expenditure with primary purpose of supporting and developing defence capabilities, but it excludes expenditure and investment that has other primary purposes, like climate change.

The activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence[1] was justified by the exceptional circumstances created by Russia’s aggression of Ukraine and its major impact on Member States’ public finances.

The activation is framed in scope, size, and time to cater for a quick transition to a higher defence spending regime while preserving fiscal sustainability.

Member States should use the financial assistance provided under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation[2] to carry out common procurements. Eligible defence common procurement should relate to the list of priority areas identified by Article 1 of SAFE Regulation.

In addition, Article 16 sets out eligibility conditions applying to contractors, subcontractors and products participating in common procurement supported by SAFE.

Therefore, to be supported under the SAFE instrument, investments also contributing to tackling climate change need to fall into one of the areas identified in Article 1 of SAFE Regulation and be channelled through common procurement, which complies with the eligibility conditions set out in the regulation.
- [1] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a57304ce-1a98-4a2c-aed5-36485884f1a0_en?filename=Communication-on-the-national-escape-clause.pdf.
- [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU funding of Israeli companies involved in the ongoing genocide in Palestine – E-002540/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002540/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Anthony Smith (The Left), Manon Aubry (The Left), Damien Carême (The Left), Marina Mesure (The Left), Arash Saeidi (The Left), Emma Fourreau (The Left), Rima Hassan (The Left), Younous Omarjee (The Left), Leila Chaibi (The Left)

Last October, we sent the European Commission Question for written answer E-001930/2024/rev.1[1] on support from the Horizon Europe programme for Israeli companies involved in the ongoing genocide in Palestine. In response, the Commission said it was unaware of such practices and reiterated that the funded projects were closely monitored and conditional on respect for human rights in accordance with Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement.

However, a recent investigation by journalists[2] has revealed that EUR 42 million from the European Defence Fund, as well as funds from seven other European countries, have been allocated to the ACTUS project. EUR 14 million of this funding were provided to a subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries, Israel’s leading defence company, for building drones. This support is in addition to the millions of euros from the Horizon programme dedicated to military research involving Israeli ministries and military companies[3].

In light of the above:

1.Does the European Commission intend to condemn participation in the genocide in Gaza by Israeli companies receiving EU funds?

2.Does it plan to stop these companies from receiving EU financial support?

3.Will it propose suspending the EU-Israel Association Agreement to the Council, in order to fully respect human rights commitments?

Submitted: 24.6.2025

[1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2024-001930_EN.html

[2] https://disclose.ngo/fr/article/la-france-et-leurope-financent-sans-le-dire-lindustrie-militaire-israelienne.

[3] https://www.lecho.be/economie-politique/europe/general/des-fonds-europeens-de-recherche-financent-la-defense-israelienne/10609758.html.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: Hlabisa honours memory of lives lost in Eastern Cape floods

Source: South Africa News Agency

During his department’s Budget Vote presentation on Wednesday, Velenkosini Hlabisa, the Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, took a moment to honour the lives lost in the recent catastrophic disaster that occurred just two weeks ago.

This tragedy claimed the lives of approximately 102 people in the Eastern Cape.

This follows the South African Weather Service’s prediction of severe weather, including heavy rainfall, snow and strong winds, which led the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Free State, and KwaZulu-Natal to activate their disaster response plans.

However, the Eastern Cape experienced particularly devastating impacts, with torrential rains leading to unprecedented floods in districts such as Nelson Mandela Bay, Chris Hani, and OR Tambo.

“Families lost everything in a matter of hours. Sadly, over 100 South Africans – children, parents, and grandparents – lost their lives,” the Minister said.

The severe floods not only washed away homes and infrastructure, but Hlabisa said they also shattered the very fabric of families and communities, leaving thousands homeless and schools submerged.

In a moment of reflection, the Minister extended condolences to those affected: “On behalf of the Ministry and the Departments of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, we offer our deepest condolences to every grieving family and to every person who has lost not only a loved one but also a sense of stability and hope.”

As a mark of respect, the National Assembly observed a minute of silence in honour of the deceased.

Meanwhile, in response to the devastation, the Minister has since authorised the National Disaster Management Centre to officially classify the events as a National Disaster, facilitating immediate and necessary interventions.

“We are now urgently working to support the affected provinces and municipalities, not just with words but with the resources they need to recover and rebuild,” the Minister said.

Meanwhile, he announced that technical assessment teams have already been deployed, with work being coordinated through the Municipal Infrastructure Support Agent (MISA) to evaluate the damage to essential infrastructure, including roads, bridges and sanitation systems.

“This powerful partnership strengthens our rapid response and operational readiness during emergencies,” the Minister added, highlighting the collaboration with the South African National Defence Force to enhance national capacity.

In addition, the Minister said South Africa is concurrently holding the Presidency of the Group of 20 (G20), focusing specifically on disaster risk reduction.

“Through the G20, we learn from the world and share our experiences,” said the Minister.

He stressed the significance of global cooperation in addressing disaster-related challenges.

With the first G20 technical meeting having taken place earlier this year in KwaZulu-Natal, Hlabisa said attention now turns to the second meeting scheduled for next week in Johannesburg.

The working group will address critical areas such as ecosystem-based approaches and nature-based solutions for disaster risk reduction, disaster-resilient infrastructure, and strategies for disaster recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.

“These focus areas are more than just abstract policy themes; they are lifelines for the future,” the Minister stated.

“They are the answers we seek when we ask: How do we prevent the next floods from becoming a national tragedy? How do we ensure communities bounce back stronger, not just survive?”

As South Africa continues to grapple with the repercussions of this disaster, he said the country is now shifting its commitment to recovery, resilience, and international collaboration.

The Minister also announced a budget allocation for Cooperative Governance amounting to R410.9 billion over the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) period.

He said that a staggering 96.7% of this budget is earmarked for intergovernmental transfers and support to various entities that deliver tangible and measurable improvements in the lives of South Africans.

In addition to the allocations for Cooperative Governance, Hlabisa said Traditional Affairs will see an appropriated budget of R195 530 million for the fiscal year 2025/26. – SAnews.gov.za

MIL OSI Africa –

July 3, 2025
US gives India priority as key South Asia defence partner: Pete Hegseth

Source: Government of India

Source: Government of India (4)

The US gives India priority as its “key defence partner in South Asia”, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth has affirmed to Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, according to Pentagon spokesperson Colonel Chris Devine.

“When he spoke to Rajnath Singh on Tuesday, Hegseth emphasised the priority the US places on India as its key defence partner in South Asia,” Devine said.

He pointed out that both leaders reviewed the considerable progress the two countries have made toward achieving the defence goals set out in the February 2025 joint statement by President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and agreed to sign the next ten-year US-India Defence Framework when they meet later this year.

“They also discussed pending major US defence sales to India and the imperative of close defence industrial cooperation between the two countries,” he added.

After the call, Rajnath Singh posted on X that they had an excellent discussion to review ongoing and new initiatives to further deepen the India-US defence partnership and strengthen cooperation in capacity building.

He conveyed his deep appreciation for the unwavering support extended by the US to India in its fight against terrorism, and said he was looking forward to meeting Hegseth at an early date.

Rajnath Singh spoke to Hegseth before the US official met with visiting External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar at the Pentagon.

After that meeting, the Pentagon said EAM Jaishankar and Hegseth discussed participation in the next INDUS-X Summit, where the two nations will continue to build on US-India defence industrial cooperation and produce new innovations in technology and manufacturing.

The defence framework also figured in their talks.

The Pentagon said Hegseth told Jaishankar that the US and India are mutually aware of the security concerns in the region, and that both nations have the ability to counter those threats together.

Defence cooperation between India and the US is one of the most consequential pillars of the bilateral relationship, said EAM Jaishankar.

The defence framework comes under the US-India COMPACT (Catalysing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technology) for the 21st Century, which was agreed to by President Trump and PM Modi at their Washington meeting in February and covers cooperation in a wide range of areas, from defence and security to trade and space.

PM Modi and Trump announced plans for new procurements and co-production arrangements for Javelin anti-tank guided missiles and Stryker armoured vehicles, as well as the acquisition of six additional P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, according to the Pentagon.

India has already integrated various US weapons systems into its military, including the C-130J Super Hercules, C-17 Globemaster III, and P-8I Poseidon aircraft, as well as the CH-47F Chinook, MH-60R Sea Hawk, and AH-64E Apache helicopters.

It also utilises Harpoon anti-ship missiles, M777 howitzers, and MQ-9B Sky Guardians, it said.

IANS

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Ukraine must stay at the forefront of the international agenda: UK Statement to the OSCE
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Speech

Ukraine must stay at the forefront of the international agenda: UK Statement to the OSCE

UK Military Advisor, Lt Col Joby Rimmer, says amid global crises, including war in Iran, the UK urges continued focus on Ukraine.
Thank you, Madame Chair. The United Kingdom remains steadfast in our commitment to support Ukraine for as long as it takes. This unwavering support is rooted in the defence of sovereignty, international law, and the multilateral system. As Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression with resilience and determination, recent developments underscore both the urgency of sustained assistance and the growing strain on Russia’s military and economic apparatus.

On the battlefield, Ukraine continues to hold the line, and in several areas, it is pushing it back. In Sumy Oblast, Russian attempts to establish a buffer zone were reversed by Ukrainian forces in late June. On 30 June, Ukraine’s General Staff confirmed the liberation of Andriyivka and advances near Oleksiivka, halting Russia’s northern offensive. Across Kharkiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhia, Russian offensives remain stalled or inconclusive. Ukrainian counterattacks have blunted their momentum. Russia’s increasing reliance on small, dispersed assault groups, observed between 22-30 June, reflects not tactical ingenuity but strategic desperation. On 27 June, Ukraine’s Security Service and Special Operations Forces struck the Marinovka airfield in Russia’s Volgograd region, destroying two Su-34 fullback fighter jets and damaging two more.

While Russia may emphasise incremental battlefield gains, these claims frequently lack independent verification. What is verifiable reality is that Russia’s economy is buckling under the weight of its own aggression. Oil and gas revenues are falling, inflation is surging, and the rouble continues to depreciate. President Putin himself has admitted the economy is ‘overheating.’ Sanctions are biting hard, damaging Russia’s industrial base, widening the gap between military demand and production capacity, and forcing the Kremlin to rely on a dwindling National Wealth Fund to plug a ballooning deficit. Arms exports have collapsed, and production of advanced systems like the Su-57 fighter jet has been suspended due to parts shortages. This has driven Russia to search for sources elsewhere – China remains the decisive enabler of Russia’s war, and Iran has provided drones and ballistic missiles. In addition, over half of the artillery shells used by Russia since 2024 have come from North Korea. A telling sign of Moscow’s increasing dependence on foreign support.

So how does Russia respond? President Putin has escalated his campaign of terror from the skies. On June 29, Russian forces launched the largest air assault since the start of the full-scale invasion, firing over 500 aerial weapons in a single night. While most were intercepted, the attacks caused civilian casualties and widespread infrastructure damage. President Zelenskyy rightly condemned these strikes as further proof that Russia is not seeking peace, but destruction.

Finally, the Russian delegation will no doubt highlight recent NATO defence announcements as provocative. To clarify, again, in response to Russia’s increasing aggression across the Euro-Atlantic area, its illegal actions in Ukraine and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, the United Kingdom is reinforcing its own defence and deterrence posture. Our procurement of F-35A aircraft and participation in NATO’s dual-capable aircraft nuclear mission represent the most significant enhancement of our nuclear readiness in a generation. This is a strategic move to ensure NATO’s credibility and preparedness to respond to an increasingly volatile security environment.

Madame Chair, while the world faces multiple crises, from instability in the Middle East to tensions in the Indo-Pacific, we must not lose sight of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Russia’s invasion is not just a conflict against Ukraine; it is a direct assault on the principles that underpin global peace and security. Let us be clear: Russia’s aggression will not succeed. Its economy is faltering, its military is overstretched, and its international isolation is deepening. Ukraine, by contrast, stands strong, resilient, united, and supported by a global coalition of democracies. The United Kingdom reaffirms its enduring commitment to Ukraine. We will stand with the Ukrainian people for as long as it takes.

Updates to this page

Published 2 July 2025

Invasion of Ukraine

UK visa support for Ukrainian nationals

Move to the UK if you’re coming from Ukraine

Homes for Ukraine: record your interest

Find out about the UK’s response
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI: BexBack Launches 100% Deposit Bonus for Crypto Futures Traders – No KYC, Up to 100x Leverage Now Available
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

SINGAPORE, July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — BexBack, a rapidly growing cryptocurrency derivatives platform, has officially launched its limited-time 100% deposit bonus campaign, enabling new and existing users to instantly double their trading capital. With no KYC requirements, traders can start immediately and access up to 100x leverage on over 50 crypto futures contracts, including Bitcoin (BTC), Ethereum (ETH), Solana (SOL), and XRP. This timely promotion is designed to empower both novice and experienced traders to maximize their profit potential in a highly volatile market environment.

Why Use 100x Leverage for Crypto Futures Trading?

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2. Lower Entry Barriers

With traditional trading, you need a large amount of capital to participate in high-value trades. With 100x leverage, you only need a fraction of the capital, making it easier for both new and experienced traders to engage in large trades without the need for substantial upfront investments.

3. Flexibility in Market Conditions

Unlike spot trading, where profits can only be made when prices rise, 100x leverage allows you to profit from both rising and falling markets. With leverage, you can go long or short, giving you the flexibility to adapt to any market conditions and maximize returns no matter what direction the market moves.

Who Should Use 100x Leverage?

100x leverage is a great tool, but it’s not for everyone. Experienced traders who understand the risks of leverage and are comfortable with the potential for both higher returns and higher risks are ideal candidates. This type of trading is well-suited for:
- Day traders and scalpers who are looking to capitalize on small market fluctuations.
- Experienced investors who are familiar with margin trading and have a solid risk management strategy.
- Traders seeking high returns who are comfortable taking on more risk in exchange for the possibility of larger profits.
If you are new to leverage trading, it’s important to start small, practice on demo accounts, and gradually increase your exposure as you gain more confidence and understanding of the market.

Why Choose BexBack?

1. No KYC Required

BexBack is a no-KYC platform, meaning you can start trading immediately without the need for complex identity verification. This makes the trading process faster and more efficient for those who value privacy and speed.

2. 100% Deposit Bonus

BexBack offers an incredible 100% deposit bonus, which means that for every dollar you deposit, you get an additional dollar to trade with. This effectively doubles your trading capital, increasing your potential for higher profits without increasing your initial investment.

3. Advanced Trading Features

BexBack offers 100x leverage on over 50+ major cryptocurrency futures contracts, allowing you to trade Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, and many others with unparalleled flexibility. The platform also supports seamless order execution, ensuring that you can trade quickly and efficiently in a volatile market.

4. Secure and Reliable

BexBack is a trusted platform with a US MSB (Money Services Business) license. It’s backed by a strong commitment to security and customer support. With 24/7 multilingual customer service, you’re never alone when you need assistance. Whether you’re a beginner or an experienced trader, you can rely on BexBack’s robust platform to guide you through your trading journey.

Key Advantages of BexBack:
- 100x leverage on BTC, ETH, and over 50 other cryptocurrencies.
- 100% deposit bonus – Double your trading capital right from the start.
- No KYC requirements – Start trading immediately without the hassle.
- Advanced risk management tools – Perfect for both beginners and experienced traders.
- 24/7 customer support – Access help whenever you need it.
Ready to Start Trading?

Don’t miss out on the opportunity to maximize your crypto gains with 100x leverage. With BexBack, you can amplify your profits, manage risks, and take advantage of market volatility, all while enjoying a seamless, no-KYC trading experience.

Sign up today on BexBack and start trading with 100x leverage, claim your 100% deposit bonus, and $50 welcome bonus! The crypto market is full of opportunities, and BexBack is the platform to help you capitalize on them.

Get started now – Trade smarter, trade with BexBack!

Website: www.bexback.com

Contact: business@bexback.com

Contact:
Amanda
business@bexback.com

Disclaimer: This content is provided by BexBack. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice. Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed. Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility. GlobeNewswire does not endorse any content on this page.

Legal Disclaimer: This media platform provides the content of this article on an “as-is” basis, without any warranties or representations of any kind, express or implied. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies, errors, or omissions. We do not assume any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information presented herein. Any concerns, complaints, or copyright issues related to this article should be directed to the content provider mentioned above.

A photo accompanying this announcement is available at

https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/dbdb898c-108d-418d-b961-a926295cf981

https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/f7fbe704-ca91-4a9b-855c-87e83eed32b0

https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/b9c33811-fa10-4811-a09b-67d20f83921b

https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/60ab4360-afa9-40f4-9cca-302bad5eb864

The MIL Network –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI: BexBack Launches 100% Deposit Bonus for Crypto Futures Traders – No KYC, Up to 100x Leverage Now Available
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

SINGAPORE, July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — BexBack, a rapidly growing cryptocurrency derivatives platform, has officially launched its limited-time 100% deposit bonus campaign, enabling new and existing users to instantly double their trading capital. With no KYC requirements, traders can start immediately and access up to 100x leverage on over 50 crypto futures contracts, including Bitcoin (BTC), Ethereum (ETH), Solana (SOL), and XRP. This timely promotion is designed to empower both novice and experienced traders to maximize their profit potential in a highly volatile market environment.

Why Use 100x Leverage for Crypto Futures Trading?

1. Amplified Profits with Minimal Capital

Leverage is one of the most powerful tools in a trader’s arsenal. With 100x leverage, you can control a position worth 100 times your initial capital, allowing you to maximize profits from even the smallest price movements. For example, if Bitcoin is trading at $100,000 and you enter a long position with 1 BTC, after using 100x leverage, your position size is equivalent to 100 BTC. If Bitcoin’s price rises by just 1%, your profit could be up to 100% of your initial investment.

2. Lower Entry Barriers

With traditional trading, you need a large amount of capital to participate in high-value trades. With 100x leverage, you only need a fraction of the capital, making it easier for both new and experienced traders to engage in large trades without the need for substantial upfront investments.

3. Flexibility in Market Conditions

Unlike spot trading, where profits can only be made when prices rise, 100x leverage allows you to profit from both rising and falling markets. With leverage, you can go long or short, giving you the flexibility to adapt to any market conditions and maximize returns no matter what direction the market moves.

Who Should Use 100x Leverage?

100x leverage is a great tool, but it’s not for everyone. Experienced traders who understand the risks of leverage and are comfortable with the potential for both higher returns and higher risks are ideal candidates. This type of trading is well-suited for:
- Day traders and scalpers who are looking to capitalize on small market fluctuations.
- Experienced investors who are familiar with margin trading and have a solid risk management strategy.
- Traders seeking high returns who are comfortable taking on more risk in exchange for the possibility of larger profits.
If you are new to leverage trading, it’s important to start small, practice on demo accounts, and gradually increase your exposure as you gain more confidence and understanding of the market.

Why Choose BexBack?

1. No KYC Required

BexBack is a no-KYC platform, meaning you can start trading immediately without the need for complex identity verification. This makes the trading process faster and more efficient for those who value privacy and speed.

2. 100% Deposit Bonus

BexBack offers an incredible 100% deposit bonus, which means that for every dollar you deposit, you get an additional dollar to trade with. This effectively doubles your trading capital, increasing your potential for higher profits without increasing your initial investment.

3. Advanced Trading Features

BexBack offers 100x leverage on over 50+ major cryptocurrency futures contracts, allowing you to trade Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, and many others with unparalleled flexibility. The platform also supports seamless order execution, ensuring that you can trade quickly and efficiently in a volatile market.

4. Secure and Reliable

BexBack is a trusted platform with a US MSB (Money Services Business) license. It’s backed by a strong commitment to security and customer support. With 24/7 multilingual customer service, you’re never alone when you need assistance. Whether you’re a beginner or an experienced trader, you can rely on BexBack’s robust platform to guide you through your trading journey.

Key Advantages of BexBack:
- 100x leverage on BTC, ETH, and over 50 other cryptocurrencies.
- 100% deposit bonus – Double your trading capital right from the start.
- No KYC requirements – Start trading immediately without the hassle.
- Advanced risk management tools – Perfect for both beginners and experienced traders.
- 24/7 customer support – Access help whenever you need it.
Ready to Start Trading?

Don’t miss out on the opportunity to maximize your crypto gains with 100x leverage. With BexBack, you can amplify your profits, manage risks, and take advantage of market volatility, all while enjoying a seamless, no-KYC trading experience.

Sign up today on BexBack and start trading with 100x leverage, claim your 100% deposit bonus, and $50 welcome bonus! The crypto market is full of opportunities, and BexBack is the platform to help you capitalize on them.

Get started now – Trade smarter, trade with BexBack!

Website: www.bexback.com

Contact: business@bexback.com

Contact:
Amanda
business@bexback.com

Disclaimer: This content is provided by BexBack. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice. Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed. Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility. GlobeNewswire does not endorse any content on this page.

Legal Disclaimer: This media platform provides the content of this article on an “as-is” basis, without any warranties or representations of any kind, express or implied. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies, errors, or omissions. We do not assume any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information presented herein. Any concerns, complaints, or copyright issues related to this article should be directed to the content provider mentioned above.

A photo accompanying this announcement is available at

https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/dbdb898c-108d-418d-b961-a926295cf981

https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/f7fbe704-ca91-4a9b-855c-87e83eed32b0

https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/b9c33811-fa10-4811-a09b-67d20f83921b

https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/60ab4360-afa9-40f4-9cca-302bad5eb864

The MIL Network –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Duckworth, King, Collins and Budzinski Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Protect Our Troops and Strengthen Domestic Manufacturing

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Illinois Tammy Duckworth

July 02, 2025

[WASHINGTON, D.C.] – Combat Veteran and U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), U.S. Senators Angus King (I-ME) and Susan Collins (R-ME) and U.S. Representatives Nikki Budzinski (D-IL-13), Mike Bost (R-IL-12) and Jared Golden (D-ME-02) are introducing legislation to ensure our troops are wearing high quality, safe and reliable footwear as part of their uniforms all while strengthening our national security and creating good-paying jobs. The Better Outfitting Our Troops (BOOTS) Act would expand current uniform regulations to ensure the combat boots worn by our servicemembers are entirely manufactured in America and made with U.S.-sourced materials.

“Ensuring our military’s readiness means every part of our servicemembers’ uniforms must be functional, reliable and safe—and that we can surge supplies in crisis or conflict,” Duckworth said. “Mandating that all optional combat boots be American made means not only that our troops wear high-quality footwear, it also means we’re reducing our reliance on foreign supply chains, bolstering our defense industrial base and creating good-paying jobs for small and large manufacturers in communities right here at home. I’m proud to introduce this commonsense legislation.”

“Our military depends on the availability, accessibility, safety and quality of the uniforms worn by our servicemembers,” said King. “The bipartisan BOOTS Act will ensure that all combat boots and parts worn by the American military are made in the USA—both boosting our domestic economy and ensuring the safety of the boots supply chain. Thank you to my colleagues for putting our servicemembers first.”

“Requiring our servicemembers’ combat boots to be produced in the United States with American materials improves military readiness and strengthens our defense industrial base,” said Collins. “This bipartisan bill would help avoid supply disruptions in times of crisis, create more jobs and investment domestically, and better outfit our nation’s troops.”

“Belleville Boots has been crafting top-quality military footwear for our service members since World War I. But like so many American manufacturers, they’re facing unfair competition from a flood of cheap, low-quality imports—often from countries like China. This not only undercuts American jobs, it poses real risks to troop readiness and our national security,” said Budzinski. “The BOOTS Act is a strong, bipartisan response to that threat. This legislation will safeguard our service members while good-paying manufacturing jobs in Belleville and across the country.”

“As a Marine, the father of a Marine, and the grandfather of a Marine, I know firsthand how important it is that our troops have the high-quality boots required to face tough terrain,” said Bost. “This legislation will better protect our troops by ensuring their equipment is consistent, safe, and produced on American soil.”

“American warfighters should be supplied American gear, including footwear,” said Golden. “Ensuring domestic suppliers are first in line to provide equipment to our service members is good for troops, good for the jobs, and good for domestic manufacturing. I’m proud to cosponsor the BOOTs Act to provide American-made footwear to the men and women who volunteer to defend America.”

The BOOTS Act would mandate that all optional combat boots worn by U.S. military servicemembers are Berry Amendment-compliant, or 100 percent made in the United States with U.S.-sourced materials.

Currently, Department of Defense (DoD) regulations permit soldiers to purchase foreign-made boots that mimic the appearance of regulation boots but fall far short in quality and durability. This loophole has allowed for a major increase in low quality, foreign-made boots that has led to a significant decline in demand from American companies, which in turn reduces domestic manufacturing capabilities and undermines our domestic defense supply chain. In the event of a major conflict, the current clothing and textile supply chain would be too fragile to meet demand.

This legislation is endorsed by A&E, American Sole, Belleville Boot Co., Draper Knitting, Emtex Global, G-Form, Glacial Lakes Rubber and Plastics, Grassland Stamping, Hope Global Manufacturing, Mississippi TanTec, McRae Footwear, Meramec, Meridian, Milliken, New Balance Athletics, PolyLabs, Rubberlite, Signet Mills, SX Industries, Thorogood, Unifi, Vibram Corporation, W.L. Gore and Associates, Worthen Industries, YKK USA, American Apparel and Footwear Association (AAFA), National Council of Textile Organizations (NCTO), U.S. Footwear Manufacturers Association (USFMA) and Warrior Protection and Readiness Coalition (WPRC).

“The BOOTs Act closes a gap in the Berry Amendment by requiring all military footwear sold through Department of Defense exchanges to be domestically sourced. Currently, foreign-made boots undermine military readiness and disadvantage American manufacturers, weakening the U.S. supply chain. This commonsense change ensures uniform consistency, reduces confusion for servicemembers, and supports the domestic industrial base as manufacturers rebuild capacity,” said Bill McCann, Executive Director of the United States Footwear Manufactures Association.

-30-

MIL OSI USA News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Duckworth, King, Collins and Budzinski Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Protect Our Troops and Strengthen Domestic Manufacturing

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Illinois Tammy Duckworth

July 02, 2025

[WASHINGTON, D.C.] – Combat Veteran and U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), U.S. Senators Angus King (I-ME) and Susan Collins (R-ME) and U.S. Representatives Nikki Budzinski (D-IL-13), Mike Bost (R-IL-12) and Jared Golden (D-ME-02) are introducing legislation to ensure our troops are wearing high quality, safe and reliable footwear as part of their uniforms all while strengthening our national security and creating good-paying jobs. The Better Outfitting Our Troops (BOOTS) Act would expand current uniform regulations to ensure the combat boots worn by our servicemembers are entirely manufactured in America and made with U.S.-sourced materials.

“Ensuring our military’s readiness means every part of our servicemembers’ uniforms must be functional, reliable and safe—and that we can surge supplies in crisis or conflict,” Duckworth said. “Mandating that all optional combat boots be American made means not only that our troops wear high-quality footwear, it also means we’re reducing our reliance on foreign supply chains, bolstering our defense industrial base and creating good-paying jobs for small and large manufacturers in communities right here at home. I’m proud to introduce this commonsense legislation.”

“Our military depends on the availability, accessibility, safety and quality of the uniforms worn by our servicemembers,” said King. “The bipartisan BOOTS Act will ensure that all combat boots and parts worn by the American military are made in the USA—both boosting our domestic economy and ensuring the safety of the boots supply chain. Thank you to my colleagues for putting our servicemembers first.”

“Requiring our servicemembers’ combat boots to be produced in the United States with American materials improves military readiness and strengthens our defense industrial base,” said Collins. “This bipartisan bill would help avoid supply disruptions in times of crisis, create more jobs and investment domestically, and better outfit our nation’s troops.”

“Belleville Boots has been crafting top-quality military footwear for our service members since World War I. But like so many American manufacturers, they’re facing unfair competition from a flood of cheap, low-quality imports—often from countries like China. This not only undercuts American jobs, it poses real risks to troop readiness and our national security,” said Budzinski. “The BOOTS Act is a strong, bipartisan response to that threat. This legislation will safeguard our service members while good-paying manufacturing jobs in Belleville and across the country.”

“As a Marine, the father of a Marine, and the grandfather of a Marine, I know firsthand how important it is that our troops have the high-quality boots required to face tough terrain,” said Bost. “This legislation will better protect our troops by ensuring their equipment is consistent, safe, and produced on American soil.”

“American warfighters should be supplied American gear, including footwear,” said Golden. “Ensuring domestic suppliers are first in line to provide equipment to our service members is good for troops, good for the jobs, and good for domestic manufacturing. I’m proud to cosponsor the BOOTs Act to provide American-made footwear to the men and women who volunteer to defend America.”

The BOOTS Act would mandate that all optional combat boots worn by U.S. military servicemembers are Berry Amendment-compliant, or 100 percent made in the United States with U.S.-sourced materials.

Currently, Department of Defense (DoD) regulations permit soldiers to purchase foreign-made boots that mimic the appearance of regulation boots but fall far short in quality and durability. This loophole has allowed for a major increase in low quality, foreign-made boots that has led to a significant decline in demand from American companies, which in turn reduces domestic manufacturing capabilities and undermines our domestic defense supply chain. In the event of a major conflict, the current clothing and textile supply chain would be too fragile to meet demand.

This legislation is endorsed by A&E, American Sole, Belleville Boot Co., Draper Knitting, Emtex Global, G-Form, Glacial Lakes Rubber and Plastics, Grassland Stamping, Hope Global Manufacturing, Mississippi TanTec, McRae Footwear, Meramec, Meridian, Milliken, New Balance Athletics, PolyLabs, Rubberlite, Signet Mills, SX Industries, Thorogood, Unifi, Vibram Corporation, W.L. Gore and Associates, Worthen Industries, YKK USA, American Apparel and Footwear Association (AAFA), National Council of Textile Organizations (NCTO), U.S. Footwear Manufacturers Association (USFMA) and Warrior Protection and Readiness Coalition (WPRC).

“The BOOTs Act closes a gap in the Berry Amendment by requiring all military footwear sold through Department of Defense exchanges to be domestically sourced. Currently, foreign-made boots undermine military readiness and disadvantage American manufacturers, weakening the U.S. supply chain. This commonsense change ensures uniform consistency, reduces confusion for servicemembers, and supports the domestic industrial base as manufacturers rebuild capacity,” said Bill McCann, Executive Director of the United States Footwear Manufactures Association.

-30-

MIL OSI USA News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Investigation into Admiral Sir Ben Key
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Press release

Investigation into Admiral Sir Ben Key

Following a full investigation, Admiral Sir Ben Key’s behaviour has been found to have fallen far short of values and standards expected of Service Personnel.
This has resulted in termination of service and his commission.

Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Sir Tony Radakin said:

We expect the highest standards of behaviour from our Service Personnel and our Civil Servants.

We investigate all allegations of inappropriate behaviour and will take robust action against anyone found to have fallen short of our standards, regardless of their seniority.

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Updates to this page

Published 2 July 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI: StealthCores Launches StealthMACsec: Advanced IEEE 802.1AE Engine with Side-Channel Protection
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Gainesville, July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — StealthCores today announced the launch of StealthMACsec, a comprehensive IEEE 802.1AE compliant MACsec engine that brings advanced side-channel countermeasures to Ethernet network security. Building on the proven security foundation of StealthAES, StealthMACsec delivers line-rate processing up to 10 Gbps on FPGA and even faster on ASIC while maintaining the highest levels of protection against sophisticated attacks.

As Ethernet networks become increasingly critical to defense, industrial, and embedded systems, the need for link-layer security has never been greater. StealthMACsec addresses this challenge by providing complete IEEE 802.1AE-2018 compliance with scalable SA architecture supporting 1 to 512 security associations, automatic SA lifecycle management, and hardware-based replay protection.

“StealthMACsec represents a natural evolution of our security IP portfolio, extending our proven side-channel countermeasures to Ethernet networks. With the increasing sophistication of network-based attacks, organizations need MACsec solutions that protect not just against traditional threats, but also against physical and side-channel vulnerabilities.”

– Stuart Audley, President of StealthCores

Key Features and Capabilities

StealthMACsec leverages the same advanced countermeasures that have made StealthAES resistant to over 1 billion side-channel attack traces. The IP features four AXI4 Stream interfaces with configurable width (32/64/128-bit) for seamless integration into existing FPGA and ASIC designs, while supporting multi-peer network topologies through its scalable SA database.

The engine implements complete transmit and receive path processing, including frame classification, SecTAG insertion, GCM-AES-256 encryption/decryption, ICV generation and validation, and automatic packet number management. Hardware-based replay protection provides defense against replay attacks, while the scalable architecture enables deployment in everything from point-to-point links to large multi-peer networks.

Performance and Integration

StealthMACsec delivers impressive performance across multiple FPGA platforms, achieving up to 10 Gbps throughput on Xilinx UltraScale+ devices, 5 Gbps on Microchip PolarFire, and 9 Gbps on Intel Agilex 5 FPGAs. The standardized AXI4 Stream interfaces enable rapid integration, while comprehensive documentation and expert support ensure successful deployment.

“The combination of standards compliance, advanced security features, and high performance makes StealthMACsec ideal for mission-critical applications where both throughput and security are non-negotiable,” added Audley. “From defense systems requiring secure backplane communications to industrial networks protecting critical infrastructure, StealthMACsec provides the security foundation these applications demand.”

Target Applications

StealthMACsec targets a wide range of applications requiring secure Ethernet communications, including:
- Embedded systems with inter-module communications
- Defense and aerospace systems with secure backplane links and sensor fusion requirements
- Critical infrastructure protection for control systems and real-time data security
StealthMACsec is available now for FPGA and ASIC implementations. For detailed specifications, performance data, and integration support, contact the StealthCores team at info@stealthcores.com.

About StealthCores

StealthCores develops advanced security IP for FPGAs and ASICs, delivering practical, high-performance cryptographic solutions with built-in countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Backed by decades of industry experience and purpose-built IP, StealthCores enables customers to secure critical systems with confidence. Learn more at www.stealthcores.com or contact us at info@stealthcores.com.

The MIL Network –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI: StealthCores Launches StealthMACsec: Advanced IEEE 802.1AE Engine with Side-Channel Protection
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Gainesville, July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — StealthCores today announced the launch of StealthMACsec, a comprehensive IEEE 802.1AE compliant MACsec engine that brings advanced side-channel countermeasures to Ethernet network security. Building on the proven security foundation of StealthAES, StealthMACsec delivers line-rate processing up to 10 Gbps on FPGA and even faster on ASIC while maintaining the highest levels of protection against sophisticated attacks.

As Ethernet networks become increasingly critical to defense, industrial, and embedded systems, the need for link-layer security has never been greater. StealthMACsec addresses this challenge by providing complete IEEE 802.1AE-2018 compliance with scalable SA architecture supporting 1 to 512 security associations, automatic SA lifecycle management, and hardware-based replay protection.

“StealthMACsec represents a natural evolution of our security IP portfolio, extending our proven side-channel countermeasures to Ethernet networks. With the increasing sophistication of network-based attacks, organizations need MACsec solutions that protect not just against traditional threats, but also against physical and side-channel vulnerabilities.”

– Stuart Audley, President of StealthCores

Key Features and Capabilities

StealthMACsec leverages the same advanced countermeasures that have made StealthAES resistant to over 1 billion side-channel attack traces. The IP features four AXI4 Stream interfaces with configurable width (32/64/128-bit) for seamless integration into existing FPGA and ASIC designs, while supporting multi-peer network topologies through its scalable SA database.

The engine implements complete transmit and receive path processing, including frame classification, SecTAG insertion, GCM-AES-256 encryption/decryption, ICV generation and validation, and automatic packet number management. Hardware-based replay protection provides defense against replay attacks, while the scalable architecture enables deployment in everything from point-to-point links to large multi-peer networks.

Performance and Integration

StealthMACsec delivers impressive performance across multiple FPGA platforms, achieving up to 10 Gbps throughput on Xilinx UltraScale+ devices, 5 Gbps on Microchip PolarFire, and 9 Gbps on Intel Agilex 5 FPGAs. The standardized AXI4 Stream interfaces enable rapid integration, while comprehensive documentation and expert support ensure successful deployment.

“The combination of standards compliance, advanced security features, and high performance makes StealthMACsec ideal for mission-critical applications where both throughput and security are non-negotiable,” added Audley. “From defense systems requiring secure backplane communications to industrial networks protecting critical infrastructure, StealthMACsec provides the security foundation these applications demand.”

Target Applications

StealthMACsec targets a wide range of applications requiring secure Ethernet communications, including:
- Embedded systems with inter-module communications
- Defense and aerospace systems with secure backplane links and sensor fusion requirements
- Critical infrastructure protection for control systems and real-time data security
StealthMACsec is available now for FPGA and ASIC implementations. For detailed specifications, performance data, and integration support, contact the StealthCores team at info@stealthcores.com.

About StealthCores

StealthCores develops advanced security IP for FPGAs and ASICs, delivering practical, high-performance cryptographic solutions with built-in countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Backed by decades of industry experience and purpose-built IP, StealthCores enables customers to secure critical systems with confidence. Learn more at www.stealthcores.com or contact us at info@stealthcores.com.

The MIL Network –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: Ukraine has not received official messages from the US about suspension of ammunition supplies – Defense Ministry

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

Kyiv, July 2 (Xinhua) — Ukraine has not received any official notifications from the United States about the suspension or revision of the delivery schedules of previously approved military aid, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry reported on Telegram on Wednesday in response to media reports that the Pentagon had allegedly temporarily stopped supplying official Kyiv with some types of ammunition.

The Ministry of Defense noted that the department requested a telephone conversation with representatives of the United States to clarify all the details.

At the same time, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry invited the US Chargé d’Affaires in Ukraine, John Ginkel, to discuss American military aid and defense cooperation between the two countries.

During the meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine Maryana Betsa thanked Washington for the security support provided to Kyiv since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict and stressed the critical importance of continuing the delivery of previously approved military assistance.

The day before, the media reported that the Pentagon had allegedly suspended the transfer of certain types of precision-guided munitions to Ukraine due to the depletion of US stockpiles. –0–

MIL OSI Russia News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: Exercise TRIDENT FURY 2025 concludes off coast of Vancouver Island

Source: Government of Canada News (2)

July 2, 2025 – Ottawa – National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces

Exercise TRIDENT FURY 2025 (Ex TF25) concluded yesterday following two weeks of multinational training activities conducted across southern Vancouver Island. The exercise brought together over 1,000 military personnel, including five Royal Canadian Navy vessels, Royal Canadian Air Force aircrafts, Canadian Army personnel, and ships from the United States Navy, United States Coast Guard, and Mexican Navy.

Hosted by Maritime Forces Pacific, Ex TF25 focused on enhancing interoperability among allied and partner forces across a range of operations. These included anti-submarine warfare, uncrewed aircraft systems, gunnery and air defence, mine countermeasures, maritime interdiction, and defence against small boat attacks. This year’s iteration also included participation by the 4th Canadian Ranger Patrol Group, whose members contributed to surveillance training and sovereignty protection tasks.

Exercises like TRIDENT FURY are essential to sustaining the operational readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces and ensuring they remain agile and responsive in an evolving security environment. The successful completion of Ex TF25 demonstrates Canada’s commitment to advancing joint capability development and strengthening defence partnerships in support of regional and global stability.

MIL OSI Canada News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: King’s Birthday Party 2025: His Majesty’s Ambassador Alyson King’s speech

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

Speech

King’s Birthday Party 2025: His Majesty’s Ambassador Alyson King’s speech

His Majesty’s Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo Alyson King’s speech on the King’s Birthday Party delivered on 19 June.

Your Excellency the President of the Republic, represented here by his principal advisor in charge of the College of Environment, Urban Planning and Mobility, HE Ambassador Tosi Mpanu Mpanu,

Honourable Senators and Members of Parliament,

Your Excellencies, distinguished members of the national and provincial governments, and their representatives here present,

Madam SRSG and Head of MONUSCO,

Excellencies, my fellow Ambassadors and heads of international organisations,

Dear members of the diplomatic corps and international organisations,

Distinguished religious and civil authorities, members of political parties,

Dear partners,

Eminent representatives of civil society and the world of culture,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Distinguished guests,

Dear friends,

All protocol observed

Boyei malamu na moto nyonso! (Welcome to everyone!)

Thank you all for coming. Your presence helps to create a special atmosphere as we celebrate the official birthday of King Charles III. It’s also an opportunity to celebrate the links between the UK and the DRC.

The UK established its first diplomatic mission here in 1902, when a British consulate was built in the then capital, Boma.

But even though our relationship is 123 years old this year, I think we’re just getting started!

I’m going to repeat what I said last year:

We still do not know each other as well as we might. It remains my firm conviction that the more we know and understand each other, the more opportunities we will find to do good things together.

That’s enough recycling, at least for words!

The past year has been marked by undeniably negative events, and I’d like to say a few words about them before turning to more encouraging aspects.

In January, the battle for Goma began when Rwandan troops and the M23 attacked. Many civilians died, as did members of MONUSCO and SAMIDRC. Many people were forced to move – once again – and numerous human rights violations were committed by all the actors on the ground. I was forced to close our office in Goma.

A few days later, several embassies – both African and Western – and diplomatic residences in Kinshasa were attacked and looted. Perhaps the oldest principle of international public law is “don’t shoot the messenger”. Peaceful demonstration is an essential democratic right and freedom; as diplomats, we are there to understand and convey messages, particularly when the situation is difficult. But this type of violence is unacceptable and counter-productive. It delayed the international response to events in the east of the country rather than encouraging it.

Today, a record 5 million people live under occupation in the east of the DRC, under the administration of a UN-sanctioned rebel group.

I want to be very clear.

The UK Government condemns the actions of all illegal armed groups in eastern DRC, including the M23. The UK Government has expressed its deep concern about the support of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) to the M23 in offensives that violate the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo. In response, the UK Government has announced a major reassessment of its policy towards Kigali, including the suspension of the majority of its financial support.

Security Council Resolution 2773, adopted unanimously by its 15 members, calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the M23 and the RDF. It has not yet been implemented. We welcome all the efforts currently being made to find a political solution to this situation.

At a time when the international system based on norms and international law is being called into question, whether in the Middle East, Ukraine, Sudan or the DRC, leadership is required more than ever.

This leadership must be both courageous and wise, ready to take the necessary difficult measures and brave reforms.

Against this backdrop, there are many reasons to be optimistic about relations between the UK and the DRC.

You’ll see many examples of our collaboration in this garden.

I’m delighted to welcome back some of our Chevening alumni, and even more delighted to announce that we are increasing the number of scholarships available to talented young Congolese leaders to study for a Masters degree, fully funded by the UK, in the UK.

Much of the UK’s work in the country is targeted at communities in the east. For example, new UK funding will provide clean water and sanitation to around 200,000 displaced people, in partnership with UNICEF and the SAFER consortium.

On this day, International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict, I would like to underline the priority that the UK Government gives to supporting survivors of sexual violence and fighting impunity. I reiterate my congratulations to the DRC for being the first state in the world to condemn the crime of forced pregnancy. I hope we can work together to provide global leadership on these vital issues in the years ahead.

We congratulate the DRC on its election to the Security Council as of 1 January and look forward to working together on issues crucial to international peace and security.

In the field of health, our partnerships with UNICEF and the WHO are supporting the government’s response to the ongoing Mpox and cholera epidemics, and helping more than 4.4 million Congolese people. I was delighted to meet some Mpox survivors in Kinshasa recently; one young man thought he would never get out of hospital alive because he was so ill. Looking at him today, you’d never guess, he’s so healthy and cheerful.

On climate and the environment, the UK co-chairs the Donor College of the Congo Basin Forest Partnership in the Central African Forest Initiative (CAFI). Our new £90 million action programme supports local communities around the Yangambi Biosphere Reserve, improving economic livelihoods while preserving forests and nature.

And I’m proud that our programme is also building the DRC’s capacity in climate science in collaboration with British universities.

I would like to salute the work of the Head of State, for his renewed commitment to economic reform. Tangible improvements to the business climate, such as simpler and more predictable procedures and taxation, as well as greater transparency, will attract foreign direct investment and lead to the creation of well-paid jobs.

British companies have shown their interest in the economic potential of the DRC. For example, British International Investment’s investment alongside DP World in the DRC’s first deep-water container port at Banana will open up new infrastructure and international trade opportunities for the country.

As a global centre of mining expertise, trade and finance, the UK is particularly well placed to support the DRC’s ambition to develop its mining sector and bring its critical minerals, which are vital to global economies, to all Congolese.

This evening, I’m delighted that several Congolese companies with links to the UK are here, and in particular several of them have been able to contribute to this fantastic event.

I would like to thank our generous sponsors: Socimex, Rawbank, Vodacom, G4S, Helios Towers, HJ Hospital, Médecins de Nuit, Diageo, Canalbox, Manga Flore Gardening Services, Centre Médical Diamant and BAM’s Clean, without whom this evening would not have been possible.

My thanks also go to my team who work tirelessly, not just for this event, but also for their dedication on a daily basis enabling the Embassy to function well and for us make a difference.

Dear guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Democratic Republic of Congo is an important partner and friend for the United Kingdom. In recent years, the ties of friendship between our two countries have grown stronger. H.E. President Felix Tshisekedi was one of the first heads of state to meet His Majesty King Charles III after his accession to the throne.

We salute the work of H.E. Mrs Judith Suminwa, the first female Prime Minister of the DRC, and all the members of the Government present here today.

My country’s wish is to embark on the next phase of this relationship, working in collaboration with the DRC’s leaders, civil society, businesses and health and climate experts.

I sincerely hope that we’ll get to know each other better and that we’ll achieve even more great things together.

Here’s to the next 123 years of friendship!

Feti malamu (Enjoy the party!)

Updates to this page

Published 2 July 2025

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Ellzey Supports FY26 MilCon-VA Bill to Strengthen Military and Support Veterans
Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Jake Ellzey (Texas, 6)

Washington, D.C. — Congressman Jake Ellzey (TX-06) released the following statement after voting in favor of the Fiscal Year 2026 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act:

“This bill keeps faith with our veterans and military families. It fully funds veterans’ health care, invests in military housing, and strengthens the infrastructure our servicemembers rely on,” said Congressman Ellzey. “It also ensures taxpayer dollars are focused where they belong, supporting those who served.”

The FY26 MilCon-VA bill provides $453 billion in total funding, including $131.4 billion for veterans’ medical care and $2 billion for Military Family Housing. It includes over $1.2 billion to improve Guard and Reserve facilities and prohibits taxpayer funds for DEI programs, gender surgeries at the VA, or medical care for illegal aliens. It also blocks the VA from purchasing resources from China and protects veterans’ Second Amendment rights.

“Our job is simple—putting our servicemembers and veterans first,“ Ellzey said.

Key Provisions of the FY26 MilCon-VA Appropriations Act:
- $453 billion in total funding, including $152 billion in discretionary funding—$5 billion above last year.
- $131.4 billion for veterans’ medical care, fully meeting the FY26 Budget Request.
- $2 billion for Military Family Housing, focused on improving conditions for servicemembers and their families.
- Over $1.2 billion for Guard and Reserve facility construction.
- Prohibits funds for DEI programs and gender surgeries at the VA, and protects Hyde-like language.
- Supports veteran homelessness initiatives, including the Bridging Rental Assistance for Veteran Empowerment program.
- Prevents VA from reporting veterans to the FBI without a judge’s consent.
- Blocks VA medical care for illegal aliens.
- Prohibits the VA from purchasing resources from China.
- Continues investment in military infrastructure, including projects in the Indo-Pacific.
- Maintains prohibitions on closing Naval Station Guantanamo Bay or building facilities for detainees on U.S. soil.
MIL OSI USA News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Ellzey Supports FY26 MilCon-VA Bill to Strengthen Military and Support Veterans
Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Jake Ellzey (Texas, 6)

Washington, D.C. — Congressman Jake Ellzey (TX-06) released the following statement after voting in favor of the Fiscal Year 2026 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act:

“This bill keeps faith with our veterans and military families. It fully funds veterans’ health care, invests in military housing, and strengthens the infrastructure our servicemembers rely on,” said Congressman Ellzey. “It also ensures taxpayer dollars are focused where they belong, supporting those who served.”

The FY26 MilCon-VA bill provides $453 billion in total funding, including $131.4 billion for veterans’ medical care and $2 billion for Military Family Housing. It includes over $1.2 billion to improve Guard and Reserve facilities and prohibits taxpayer funds for DEI programs, gender surgeries at the VA, or medical care for illegal aliens. It also blocks the VA from purchasing resources from China and protects veterans’ Second Amendment rights.

“Our job is simple—putting our servicemembers and veterans first,“ Ellzey said.

Key Provisions of the FY26 MilCon-VA Appropriations Act:
- $453 billion in total funding, including $152 billion in discretionary funding—$5 billion above last year.
- $131.4 billion for veterans’ medical care, fully meeting the FY26 Budget Request.
- $2 billion for Military Family Housing, focused on improving conditions for servicemembers and their families.
- Over $1.2 billion for Guard and Reserve facility construction.
- Prohibits funds for DEI programs and gender surgeries at the VA, and protects Hyde-like language.
- Supports veteran homelessness initiatives, including the Bridging Rental Assistance for Veteran Empowerment program.
- Prevents VA from reporting veterans to the FBI without a judge’s consent.
- Blocks VA medical care for illegal aliens.
- Prohibits the VA from purchasing resources from China.
- Continues investment in military infrastructure, including projects in the Indo-Pacific.
- Maintains prohibitions on closing Naval Station Guantanamo Bay or building facilities for detainees on U.S. soil.
MIL OSI USA News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: LaLota Backs Border Security Bill Requiring DHS to Report on Special Interest Aliens

Source: US Representative Nick LaLota (NY-01)

Washington, D.C. — Congressman Nick LaLota (R‑Suffolk County) released the following statement after voting to pass H.R. 275 – Special Interest Alien Reporting Act of 2025, which requires the Department of Homeland Security to submit monthly reports to Congress detailing the number of foreign nationals who attempt to illegally cross the border while posing an elevated security threat, along with their most recent country of residence and the location of their encounter.

“Americans deserve to know who is coming into our country—especially when national security is at stake,” said Rep. LaLota. “As a native New Yorker who was on Active Duty in the U.S. Navy during 9/11, I know that border security is about far more than immigration—it’s about public safety. This bill ensures Congress has the data it needs to hold agencies accountable, craft smarter policy, and protect our communities. The safety of Long Island families will always come first.”

To read the full text of the bill, click HERE.

Background:

H.R. 275, the Special Interest Alien Reporting Act of 2025, would require the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to publish detailed monthly reports on encounters with “special interest aliens”—non-U.S. nationals flagged due to travel patterns or national security concerns. The reports must include the number of encounters, countries of origin or last residence, and where the encounter occurred—broken down by land, air, or sea ports of entry, between ports, or within the interior. The reporting would begin with the first full month after the bill becomes law and include a retrospective report covering January 20, 2021, through January 19, 2025. The intent is to enhance transparency and public awareness around national security-related immigration enforcement, addressing concerns that DHS has historically withheld or inconsistently disclosed this data.

Supporters argue the bill will strengthen congressional oversight and improve public accountability by ensuring regular disclosure of how many special interest aliens are encountered and from where. Recent committee findings highlighted a sharp rise in encounters with individuals from countries like China, Iran, and Russia—including an increase in apprehensions of Chinese nationals from around 350 in FY2021 to nearly 38,000 in FY2024. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of implementing the monthly reporting requirement to be less than $500,000 over five years.

###

MIL OSI USA News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: LaLota Backs Border Security Bill Requiring DHS to Report on Special Interest Aliens

Source: US Representative Nick LaLota (NY-01)

Washington, D.C. — Congressman Nick LaLota (R‑Suffolk County) released the following statement after voting to pass H.R. 275 – Special Interest Alien Reporting Act of 2025, which requires the Department of Homeland Security to submit monthly reports to Congress detailing the number of foreign nationals who attempt to illegally cross the border while posing an elevated security threat, along with their most recent country of residence and the location of their encounter.

“Americans deserve to know who is coming into our country—especially when national security is at stake,” said Rep. LaLota. “As a native New Yorker who was on Active Duty in the U.S. Navy during 9/11, I know that border security is about far more than immigration—it’s about public safety. This bill ensures Congress has the data it needs to hold agencies accountable, craft smarter policy, and protect our communities. The safety of Long Island families will always come first.”

To read the full text of the bill, click HERE.

Background:

H.R. 275, the Special Interest Alien Reporting Act of 2025, would require the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to publish detailed monthly reports on encounters with “special interest aliens”—non-U.S. nationals flagged due to travel patterns or national security concerns. The reports must include the number of encounters, countries of origin or last residence, and where the encounter occurred—broken down by land, air, or sea ports of entry, between ports, or within the interior. The reporting would begin with the first full month after the bill becomes law and include a retrospective report covering January 20, 2021, through January 19, 2025. The intent is to enhance transparency and public awareness around national security-related immigration enforcement, addressing concerns that DHS has historically withheld or inconsistently disclosed this data.

Supporters argue the bill will strengthen congressional oversight and improve public accountability by ensuring regular disclosure of how many special interest aliens are encountered and from where. Recent committee findings highlighted a sharp rise in encounters with individuals from countries like China, Iran, and Russia—including an increase in apprehensions of Chinese nationals from around 350 in FY2021 to nearly 38,000 in FY2024. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of implementing the monthly reporting requirement to be less than $500,000 over five years.

###

MIL OSI USA News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Defense News in Brief: Continuing Promise 2025 Mission Update: Ecuador

Source: United States Navy

The USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) is now scheduled to conduct its Continuing Promise 2025 mission stop in Manta, Ecuador from July 4-10, instead of the previously planned July 12-19. Adjusting the mission dates allows the USNS Comfort to maintain readiness to support U.S. Navy global operations while delivering important humanitarian assistance. The U.S. Navy is committed to working with Ecuador to promote public health, security, and prosperity.

MIL Security OSI –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) Statement on Helicopter Crash at Mogadishu Airport

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On Wednesday at around 7.30 a.m., an African Union helicopter operated by the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) contingent crash-landed just before touching down at the Aden Abdulle International Airport in Mogadishu, while enroute from the Baledogle military airbase.

Three of the eight passengers on board were immediately rescued and rushed to the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) Level II hospital in Mogadishu for medical attention.

Search and rescue operations are currently underway to retrieve the remaining crew and passengers.

Meanwhile, aviation authorities have commenced investigations to establish the cause of the accident.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).

MIL OSI Africa –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: expert reaction to wildfires in Scotland, including in the Highlands and Moray

Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

July 2, 2025

Scientists comment on wildfires in Scotland.

Prof Rory Hadden, Chair of Fire Science, University of Edinburgh, said:

“It is widely expected that the number of wildfires will increase in Scotland (and the UK) as we see more periods of extreme weather driven by climate change. The recent fine weather means that vegetation has dried out and becomes susceptible to ignition sources. Even a small heat source such as a BBQ or campfire can initiate a wildfire either by direct flame contact with vegetation, or by igniting a smouldering fire in dry vegetation and soils which will later transition to a flaming fire.

“Once vegetation is ignited, a fire will grow extremely rapidly especially if there is wind and/or dense vegetation. This is especially true given the recent weather conditions in Scotland and means that typically it will be challenging to fight without proper resources. Also a smouldering fire in soils may only transition to flaming some hours after it is ignited (and there may be no obvious signs that smouldering has been ignited). Once ignited a fire will spread rapidly through vegetation, moving fastest in the direction of the wind and up slopes. Poor access, difficult terrain and extensive vegetation coverage means that the fire can spread over large areas relatively quickly.

“The impacts of these fires are of course significant. There is a huge cost to the fire and rescue services in fighting and managing these fires – drawing resources from a wide area. There is the destruction of natural capital – the countryside provides important ecosystem services that we all rely on and these are impacted negatively by wildfires. Loss of vegetation impacts on wildlife. The smoke is harmful and can impact on people large distances away, exacerbating respiratory conditions. If the fire burns into peat soils then the loss of carbon to the atmosphere will be significant and may drive future climate change. There is also possibility of loss of property as fires move towards settlements (farms, villages, towns).

“While there is ongoing research on this topic, there is lots we do not know around the changes in risk to people, property and environment posed by wildfires in Scotland and the UK. The fire and rescue services are adapting but there is currently no national fire danger assessment tool or clear coordination at Government level in Scotland. We need to work on finding measures to manage fire risk in Scotland and the UK, including fuel load management (e.g. prescribed burning, mechanical means) as well as communications with stakeholders and the public to advise of periods of higher fire danger. This is critical because as well as climate change, we are in a period of significant changes in land use (including rewilding) across Scotland and the UK.

“It is important to note that the leading cause of wildfires is people. We all need to do our part when visiting the countryside to ensure we do not bring ignition sources – pack a picnic instead of a BBQ, and only have campfires in designated areas.”

Declared interests

Prof Rory Hadden: “Funding declaration:

US Department of Agriculture, Forest Service;

US Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology;

Funding on unrelated projects from Defence and Security Accelerator;

UKRI EPSRC.”

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Graves of three soldiers killed in Normandy identified
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

News story

Graves of three soldiers killed in Normandy identified

Three soldiers who made the ultimate sacrifice in 1944 now have named graves at Banneville-la-Campagne War Cemetery in Normandy.
David Little, the nephew of Trooper Little stands at the graveside of his uncle with his wife, daughter and the military party. MOD Crown Copyright.

The family of a soldier killed during the Battle of Normandy has visited the newly named grave of their loved one, who has now been identified after an 80-year search for closure.

Rededication services took place on 26 June at CWGC Banneville-la-Campagne War Cemetery in Normandy for Trooper Francis Dominic Kelly and Trooper Victor Terrence Little, both of 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry, and Private John Aneurin Protheroe of 2nd Battalion The Monmouthshire Regiment, all of whom died in August 1944.

The identifications were made following research by Ministry of Defence’s Joint Casualty and Compassionate Centre (JCCC), known as the ‘MOD’s War Detectives’, the National Army Museum and Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC).

Trooper Little’s nephew, David Little, attended the moving ceremonies to pay their respects. He said:

We were so wonderfully surprised when JCCC contacted us regarding our Uncle Vic as there has always been a sadness that Victor’s remains had never been found. We’ll always be grateful for the work of the JCCC War Detectives in enabling us to attend the rededication service of dear Victor on behalf of his parents and siblings.

Headshot of Tpr Francis Dominic Kelly (courtesy of the Kelly family).

Robert Gore, the grandson of Pte Protheroe could sadly not attend the service. He said:

My Grandfather was posted missing believed killed in 1944 when my mother was 13 and my aunt 3 years old. My mother has kept his memory very much alive with her stories to me and my 4 siblings.

When I was about 10 I read a novel where a soldier goes missing but eventually comes home alive. As a 10 year-old, that was always my fantastic hope that my grandfather would reappear. The identification of his grave at Banneville is the culmination of that dream even though he never came back alive and my mother is now also dead. I, my siblings and cousins are all grateful for the efforts of the MoD in this regard and we offer our heartfelt thanks.

The identifications came after a researcher submitted cases to the CWGC suggesting possible locations for their graves. Following further investigation by CWGC, the National Army Museum and the JCCC, the identities of the 3 soldiers were confirmed.

Pte John Aneurin Protheroe (courtesy of the Protheroe family).

The services were organised by the Ministry of Defence’s JCCC, known as the ‘War Detectives’, with representatives from The Royal Corps of Signals, The Royal Regiment of Artillery and The Royal Welsh in attendance.

Rosie Barron, JCCC Caseworker, said:

It has been a pleasure to work with the military party to organise these services and to have had the families of Trooper Little and Private Protheroe present. It is important that the memory of these men is honoured, and a strong reminder that the fighting in Normandy did not end on D-Day, but that the Battle of Normandy lasted until the end of August 1944 and was hard won by the Allies.

All 3 men had previously been commemorated on the Bayeux Memorial to the missing. The CWGC has now replaced their headstones with named markers and will care for them in perpetuity.

Fergus Read, Commemorations Case Officer at the CWGC, said:

It is an honour to have been involved in the research that led to the formal identification of these men. It is a privilege to play a part in establishing where these casualties of the battles in Normandy are buried. This now allows the Commission to care for their named graves, in perpetuity.

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Published 2 July 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
July 2, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Graves of four soldiers killed in 1940 identified in France
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

News story

Graves of four soldiers killed in 1940 identified in France

Four British servicemen who died during World War Two in France have been rededicated, bringing closure to families after more than 85 years.
The rededication service for Gunner Humphries attended by his great nephews. MOD Crown Copyright.

Last week’s rededication services for Private (Pte) William Falconer, Gunner (Gnr) Joseph Humphries, Signalman (Sig) Edmund Roberts and Major (Maj) Richard White-Cooper were all held at Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) Le Grand-Lucé War Cemetery near Le Mans, France, on 24 June.

The families of Gnr Humphries, Sig Roberts and Maj White-Cooper attended the rededication service, as well as serving soldiers of The Royal Corps of Signals, The Royal Regiment of Artillery and The Royal Welsh.

They were some of many British servicemen remaining in France after Operation Dynamo, which saw the mass evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) through Dunkirk. As the Germans advanced across France, fighting continued and further evacuations were made from ports along the northern and western French coasts.

Maj Richard White-Cooper (courtesy of the White-Cooper family).

All 4 men had been brought to 9th General Hospital located in the Chateau at Le Grand-Lucé either for treatment or burial. Casualties that died while in the hospital’s care were being buried at the site of Le Grand-Lucé War Cemetery close by. As they were missing, all 4 men had previously been commemorated on the Dunkirk Memorial.

The graves were recently identified after John Hawthorn, the husband of Sig Roberts’ granddaughter, submitted a case to CWGC hoping to have Sig Roberts’ final resting place confirmed. After extensive research by CWGC, the National Army Museum and JCCC, the graves of all 4 men were identified. This means that all casualties buried in Le Grand-Lucé War Cemetery have now been identified.

John Hawthorn said:

Words are not adequate to express the emotions I had when I got the email from Rosie Barron telling me that the JCCC were happy to confirm they recognise that Sig Edmund Roberts is buried in the CWGC cemetery at Le Grand Luce, France. Brian, his son and my father-in-law, was only 3 years old when Eddie died on 13 June 1940. He never knew where or how his father died, nor where his body rested.

The only commemoration was a name on the Dunkirk Memorial. Having a headstone to mark Eddie’s grave provides the family with closure, comfort, and the opportunity to visit a specific place to pay our respects. We are eternally grateful to the tireless work of CWGC and the JCCC, and especially Rosie for all she has done.

Headshot of Sig Edmund Roberts (courtesy of the Roberts family).

The services were organised by the MOD’s Joint Casualty and Compassionate Centre (JCCC), also known as the ‘War Detectives’.

JCCC Caseworker, Rosie Barron, said:

The story of what happened to those members of the BEF still left in France following the Dunkirk evacuations is rarely told. These services highlight the dangers experienced by these men in the struggle to hold the German Army back, and to evacuate from ports further west. Regrettably these men all lost their lives in the confusion of this period. It is a privilege to have met their families and to know that their stories have been concluded.

CWGC has replaced the headstones over the graves and will care for them in perpetuity, ensuring these brave servicemen are remembered with honour.

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MIL OSI United Kingdom –
July 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Russia: Xi Jinping calls on youth and student federations to deepen reform, innovate for new achievements

Translation. Region: Russian Federal

Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

BEIJING, July 2 (Xinhua) — Chinese President Xi Jinping has called on youth and student federations to adhere to the correct political orientation, deepen reform and innovation, and make new achievements under the leadership of the Party in the new campaign.

Xi Jinping, also general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, made the call in a congratulatory letter addressed to the plenary session of the 14th All-China Youth Federation Committee and the 28th National Congress of the All-China Students’ Federation, which opened in Beijing on Wednesday morning. -0-

MIL OSI Russia News –

July 2, 2025
Warm welcome for first batch of Amarnath Yatra pilgrims in Kashmir

Source: Government of India

Source: Government of India (4)

Locals in Kashmir welcomed the first batch of Amarnath Yatra pilgrims with warmth and goodwill on Wednesday as they arrived in the Valley through the Navyug Tunnel.

People from various sections of society, including members of civil society, traders, and residents of Anantnag and Kulgam districts, gathered with garlands and placards to greet the Yatris.

The spontaneous gesture highlighted the enduring spirit of communal harmony in Kashmir and the region’s longstanding support for the annual pilgrimage.

Earlier in the day, Jammu and Kashmir Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha flagged off the first batch of pilgrims from the Bhagwati Nagar Yatri Niwas in Jammu. Chanting slogans of ‘Bharat Mata Ki Jai’, ‘Bum Bum Bhole’ and ‘Har Har Mahadev’, enthusiastic devotees set out in two escorted convoys towards the Pahalgam and Baltal base camps.

The Lt Governor, who also chairs the Shri Amarnathji Shrine Board (SASB), was accompanied by senior civil and police officials during the flag-off ceremony.

According to officials, a total of 5,892 pilgrims left Jammu for the Valley on Wednesday. Of these, 3,403 are bound for the Nunwan base camp at Pahalgam, while 2,489 are heading to Baltal.

This year’s Yatra is being held under tight security arrangements, with an additional 180 companies of Central Armed Police Forces deployed following the April Pahalgam terror attack.

The 36-day pilgrimage will formally commence on Thursday and conclude on August 9, coinciding with Shravan Purnima and Raksha Bandhan.

Pilgrims undertake the journey to the holy cave shrine located at an altitude of 3,888 metres either through the traditional Pahalgam route or the shorter Baltal route. The Pahalgam route involves a 46-kilometre trek over four days, while those opting for the Baltal route complete a 14-kilometre trek and return the same day.

This year, no helicopter services are available for security reasons.

The cave shrine houses the naturally formed ice Shivling, believed by devotees to symbolise the mystical powers of Lord Shiva.

-IANS

July 2, 2025
MIL-OSI China: US halts military aid to Ukraine

Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

The Trump administration has halted part of military aid to Ukraine following a review of U.S. own stockpiles, the White House and Pentagon confirmed on Tuesday.

“This decision was made to put America’s interests first following a review of our nation’s military support and assistance to other countries across the globe,” White House spokesperson Anna Kelly said in a statement.

The move came amid concerns about U.S. military stockpiles falling too low, multiple U.S. media outlets reported, citing informative sources.

Last month U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth issued a memo ordering a review of the U.S. stockpile of munitions, in the aftermath of three years of aid to Ukraine, recent strikes on Yemen’s Houthi group and Iran.

The review determined that stocks were too low on some weapons previously pledged, according to media reports.

Elbridge Colby, the Defense Department undersecretary for policy, said the Pentagon will continue “to provide the president with robust options to continue military aid to Ukraine, consistent with his goal of bringing this tragic war to an end.”

“At the same time, the department is rigorously examining and adapting its approach to achieving this objective while also preserving U.S. forces’ readiness for Administration defense priorities,” Colby said in a statement.

After meeting with Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky during the NATO summit at The Hague last week, U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters that Ukraine is eager to get the Patriot air defense missiles from the United States.

“They do want to have the anti-missile missiles, OK, as they call them, the Patriots,” Trump said then. “And we’re going to see if we can make some available. We need them, too.”

“We’re supplying them to Israel, and they’re very effective, 100 percent effective. Hard to believe how effective. They do want that more than any other thing,” he said.

Some analysts suggest it is a signal that the Trump administration may further reduce aid to Ukraine. Hegseth skipped a meeting last month of an international group to coordinate military aid to Ukraine. It is the first time the U.S. defense secretary was not in attendance.

The United States has provided Ukraine with more than 66 billion U.S. dollars worth of weapons and military assistance since the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out in February 2022, according to an AP report.

MIL OSI China News –

July 2, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: NATO and Ukraine agree to exchange Military Police training expertise

Source: NATO

On 20 June 2025, NATO agreed to recognise the 25th Military Police Training Centre (MPTC) in Lviv, Ukraine as a NATO Partnership Training and Education Centre (PTEC).

PTECs form a global network of institutions offering courses and academic seminars to civilian and military staff from NATO Allied and partner countries. Their goal is to improve the professionalism of national personnel, increase the ability of military personnel to operate well together, and conduct education and training activities carried out within the framework of NATO partnership programmes and policies. Since the PTEC community was launched in 1999, Ukraine has been an active member, thanks to the participation of its International Peacekeeping and Security Centre (IPSC).

Despite the many challenges posed by Russia’s war against Ukraine, the 25th MPTC draws lessons learned from combat experience to refine courses and explore new training opportunities. It actively collaborates with the NATO Military Police community of interest and the NATO Military Police Centre of Excellence, based in Bydgoszcz, Poland, to develop high-quality courses. This helps to strengthen training initiatives in the discipline of Military Policing.

Cooperation with NATO will also be enhanced through the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC), also based in Bydgoszcz. The 25th MPTC will create synergies with the JATEC and add value by identifying and applying lessons learned from Russia’s war of aggression. Cooperation between NATO and Ukraine is characterised by the common objective of increasing interoperability. Ukrainian officials have highlighted that they see NATO as the right platform for their defence institutions to share their unique and state-of-the-art capabilities with Allies and like-minded partners.

Centres wishing to join the PTEC network must undergo thorough evaluation. Evaluation of the 25th MPTC in March by experts from NATO Headquarters, Allied Command Operations and other NATO and Allied entities was, exceptionally, conducted in Bydgoszcz due to Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine. Representatives of the centre and NATO experts used the facilities of the NATO Military Police Centre of Excellence. NATO experts concluded that the centre demonstrated high expertise, professionalism and familiarity with NATO standards. The MPTC in Lviv, Ukraine is now the 36th member of the network of Partnership Training and Education Centres.

MIL Security OSI –

July 2, 2025