Source: IMF – News in Russian
February 7, 2025
A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.
The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.
Washington, DC – February 7, 2025[1]:
After three decades of near-zero inflation, there are signs that Japan’s economy can sustainably converge to a new equilibrium. Inflation has surpassed the Bank of Japan’s 2-percent target for over two years and a tight labor market is delivering the strongest wage growth since the 1990s. But Japan continues to face challenges from its aging population and high public debt. Policy priorities are to re-anchor inflation expectations, rebuild fiscal buffers, and advance labor market reforms to support potential growth.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, OUTLOOK, AND RISKS
The economy contracted in the first half of 2024 due to temporary supply disruptions but gained momentum in the rest of the year. Domestic demand, private consumption in particular, has strengthened, while net external demand has been sluggish. Both headline and core inflation (excluding fresh food and energy) remain above the BoJ’s 2-percent headline inflation target. Goods inflation has been boosted by energy and food prices, while services price growth is relatively weaker and below 2 percent. Inflation expectations are becoming increasingly aligned with the inflation target, though some measures remain below that target. The yen-dollar exchange rate has experienced sizable swings, largely driven by shifts in interest rate differentials (which reflect broader macroeconomic developments), but also amplified by the build-up and subsequent unwinding of yen carry-trade positions. The pass-through to inflation is estimated to have been relatively mild so far. Wages are growing at their highest rate since the 1990s amid labor shortages and strong inflation, but they have remained lackluster in real terms.
Growth is expected to accelerate in 2025, with private consumption strengthening further, as above-inflation wage growth will boost households’ disposable income. Private investment is also expected to remain strong, supported by high corporate profits and accommodative financial conditions. The output gap is estimated to be closed, and growth is expected to converge to its potential of 0.5 percent in the medium term. Headline and core inflation are expected to converge to the BoJ’s 2-percent headline inflation target in late 2025, helped by a moderation in commodity prices for oil and food. The current account surplus is expected to moderate in 2025 as the income balance narrows, with the trade balance remaining in deficit. The external position is assessed as broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
Risks to growth are tilted to the downside. On the external side, these include a slowdown in the global economy, deepening geoeconomic fragmentation and increasing trade restrictions, and more volatile food and energy prices. On the domestic side, the main downside risk is weak consumption if real wages do not pick up. Another domestic risk to the outlook is a possible decline in confidence in fiscal sustainability that leads to a tightening of financial conditions in the context of high public debt and gross financing needs. If downside risks materialize, it could result in Japan reverting to an effective-lower-bound constrained environment given the still-low level of the policy rate.
Risks to inflation are broadly balanced. On the downside, inflation expectations may stall below the headline inflation target following Japan’s prolonged experience with low inflation. Upside risks stem from rising food and energy prices, and from stronger-than-expected wages in the upcoming spring wage negotiations. Higher barriers to trade and cost pressures in major trading partners could spill over to Japan but the impact on domestic prices would be ambiguous given lower economic activity.
ECONOMIC POLICIES
Fiscal Policy
The estimated fiscal deficit in 2024 is smaller than expected at the time of the 2024 Article IV. Tax revenues have been boosted by high corporate profits, and expenditures to support the economic recovery (such as transfers to households and SMEs) have been partly phased out. The fiscal deficit is projected to increase slightly in 2025, with additional spending planned for defense, children-related measures, and industrial policies (IP). There is a significant risk that the deficit will widen further, given the political demands on the minority government. This should be avoided as fiscal space remains limited: any expansionary measure should be offset by higher revenues or expenditure savings elsewhere in the budget.
Public debt, as a share of GDP, is expected to decline in the near term, as nominal GDP growth is projected to exceed the effective interest rate on public debt. Public debt will remain high, however, and is estimated to start rising by 2030, driven by a higher interest bill and expenditure pressures related to spending on health and long-term care for an aging population. A clear consolidation plan is needed even in the near term to fully offset these pressures, ensure debt sustainability, and increase fiscal space needed to respond to shocks (including from natural disasters). This will require elaborating concrete and credible expenditure and revenue measures in the context of a robust medium-term fiscal framework:
- The composition of public spending should be more growth-friendly, including by eliminating poorly targeted subsidies, notably energy subsidies, while preserving expenditure on high-quality public investment. Enhancing the targeting and efficiency of social security spending is critical to containing rising costs while preserving quality.
- On the revenue side, options include strengthening financial income taxation for high-income earners, lowering exemptions and broadening the taxable valuation base under the property tax, streamlining income tax deductions, and unifying and eventually increasing the consumption tax rate. The PIT reform to the income deduction limit that is currently under consideration would need to be financed by additional revenues or savings elsewhere in the budget.
- The repeated use, and incomplete execution of supplementary budgets undermines efficient resource allocation, budget transparency, and fiscal discipline. The use of supplementary budgets should be limited to responding to large, unexpected shocks that overwhelm automatic stabilizers, which would also avoid providing unwarranted stimulus in normal times. All medium-term spending commitments—including on IP and green transformation—should be incorporated into the regular budget process.
As interest rates rise, the cost of servicing the large public debt is expected to double by 2030, putting a premium on a robust debt management strategy. In the face of rising gross financing needs and a shrinking BoJ balance sheet, government bond issuance will need to rely on additional demand from foreign investors and domestic institutions.
Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies
The current accommodative monetary policy stance is appropriate and will ensure inflation expectations rise sustainably to the 2-percent inflation target. Accommodation should continue to be withdrawn gradually if the baseline forecast bears out, under which we expect the policy rate would reach a neutral level by end-2027. High domestic and external uncertainty underscore the need for the BoJ to maintain its data-dependent and flexible approach and clear communications to anchor market expectations.
The BOJ’s ongoing reduction in the size of its balance sheet has been clearly communicated, is appropriately modest in pace, and is proceeding smoothly. The BoJ should stand ready to modify the pace of its purchases should disorderly bond market conditions arise or if financial conditions become inconsistent with the desired monetary policy stance.
Japan’s large stock of outstanding government debt and sizable net international investment position provide an important transmission channel for monetary policy to spill over into asset prices abroad. Clear communication and gradualism can limit adverse asset price reactions and outward spillovers.
The authorities’ continued commitment to a flexible exchange rate regime is welcome. Exchange rate flexibility should continue to help absorb external shocks and support monetary policy’s focus on price stability. At the same time, it will also help maintain an external position in line with fundamentals.
Financial Stability
Japan’s financial system remains broadly resilient, supported by strong capital and liquidity buffers. Banks’ revenues have generally increased as credit costs remain low, the rise in interest rates has been gradual, and the yen has depreciated. Major banks continue to manage interest rate risks proactively through portfolio rebalancing and diversifying their funding sources. Financial intermediation remains stable supported by continued demand for loans from both corporate and household sectors. The insurance sector is well-capitalized and profitable, despite challenges from market volatility and demographic shifts.
While the financial system remains generally resilient, systemic risk has risen slightly since the 2024 Article IV consultation, reflecting a combination of rising macroeconomic uncertainty, risk of faster than expected interest rates increases or unrealized losses, and rising bankruptcies among SMEs. Rising global macroeconomic uncertainty could impact Japanese banks’ investments. While gradually rising interest rates have helped bank profitability, faster-than-expected increases in interest rates or sudden changes in global financial conditions could amplify financial market volatility and interact with three persisting vulnerabilities identified in the 2024 FSAP: large securities held under mark-to-market accounting, significant foreign currency exposures—particularly through US dollar funding instruments—and signs of overheating in some areas of real estate. A faster-than-expected tightening of financial conditions could also disrupt the JGB market, amplifying interest rate risks for banks with larger exposures. Less-capitalized domestic banks are more vulnerable to rate hikes, facing heightened risks from unrealized losses and higher funding costs. Corporate defaults among smaller SMEs have been increasing, albeit from a low base, and could pose risks for regional banks with high SME loan exposure.
Strengthening systemic risk monitoring and the macroprudential policy framework is needed to better mitigate risks in the financial system. Ongoing efforts to expand data collection, enhance analytical capacity, and improve coordination between the FSA and BOJ are welcome. To further enhance systemic risk analysis, closing remaining data gaps and advancing analytical tools for a more comprehensive assessment of systemic vulnerabilities, including those related to foreign currency exposure, remain key priorities. Assigning a formal mandate to the Council for Cooperation on Financial Stability would reinforce the institutional framework, while expanding the macroprudential policy toolkit with targeted borrower-based measures would help mitigate vulnerabilities in the real estate sector.
Further strengthening financial sector oversight is essential to bolster stability and resilience against emerging risks and vulnerabilities. While progress has been made in expanding staffing resources in certain areas, additional allocations are needed to reinforce financial supervision. The authorities should continue to enhance risk-based supervision to respond flexibly to an evolving banking system. Strengthening the Early Warning System with more forward-looking indicators, especially for credit and liquidity risks, and establishing minimum liquidity requirements for domestic banks would enhance stability. Supervisors should also have the authority to adjust bank capital ratios above minimum requirements based on individual risk profiles and financial conditions.
The authorities should remain prepared to address market strains as they arise. The liquidity and functioning of the JGB market have improved since April but experienced temporary deterioration in early August amid a spike in market volatility. Rising foreign market volatility could impact domestic liquidity conditions, potentially triggering spillover effects. To mitigate these risks the central bank should closely monitor liquidity conditions and funding rates in money markets, while paying particular attention to the uneven distribution of liquidity among banks as well as the growth in repo transactions driven by demand from financial dealers and foreign investors. The scope of institutions eligible to receive emergency liquidity assistance could be expanded to nonbank financial institutions, prioritizing central counterparties. Recovery and Resolution Planning should be gradually expanded to all banks that could be systemic at failure, requiring more banks to maintain a minimum amount of loss-absorbing capacity tailored to their resolvability needs.
Structural Policies
Japan’s total factor productivity growth has been slowing for a decade and has fallen further behind the United States. A steady decline in allocative efficiency since the early 2000s has been a drag on productivity, and likely reflects an increase in market frictions. In addition, Japan’s ultra-low interest rates may have allowed low-productivity firms to survive longer than they otherwise would have, delaying necessary economic restructuring. Reforms aimed at improving labor mobility across firms would help improve Japan’s allocative efficiency and boost productivity.
Japan’s labor market is expected to witness a significant transformation driven by population aging and advances in artificial intelligence (AI). Japan is aging rapidly—a trend that is expected to continue over coming decades—and has been at the forefront in labor-saving automation to alleviate labor shortages. Policies can play a crucial role in mitigating the impact of aging on labor supply and facilitating mobility needed to benefit from AI adoption:
- Thanks to government efforts, Japan’s seniors already have a relatively high labor force participation rate compared to other OECD countries. But policy frictions such as an income threshold that triggers a loss of pension benefits may be inducing seniors to work fewer hours than they otherwise would.
- Japan has made significant progress in increasing female labor force participation during the last decade. Further supporting women’s ability to fully participate in the labor force will require continuing to expand childcare resources and facilitate fathers’ contribution to home/childcare, and further encouraging the use of flexible working arrangements.
- Training programs are crucial to enhance the complementarity of AI with the labor force and improve the productivity of senior workers.
- Improving mobility and reducing barriers to job switching are essential to address labor shortages due to aging and the potential job displacement impact of AI. Subsidized training programs that are targeted to in-demand occupations could help reskill and upskill the labor force and facilitate occupational mobility.
While AI may help to address some of Japan’s labor shortages, and since upskilling/reskilling the labor force takes time, attracting foreign workers could help alleviate labor shortages. Government programs have led to a tripling of the number of foreign workers in Japan during the past decade. However, foreigners continue to play a much smaller role in the Japanese labor force than they do in other OECD economies.
Similar to other G20 economies, Japan has increased its adoption of industrial policies. Japan’s industrial policies aim to advance several objectives, including economic security, resilience, inclusive growth, and green and digital transformation (the latter including support for the semiconductor industry). Under this umbrella, multi-year envelopes of 20 trillion and 10 trillion yen have been identified for green transformation and the semiconductor/AI industries, respectively. Given Japan’s limited fiscal space and the unclear growth impact of past IP, industrial policy schemes should be subjected to a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Going forward, IP should be narrowly targeted to specific objectives when externalities or market failures exist, to minimize distortions. It should avoid favoring domestic products over imports or creating incentives that lead to a fragmentation of the global system for trade and investment, in line with Japan’s commitment to multilateral economic cooperation.
Japan remains committed to green transformation, and further progress on policies would enable reaching its targets. Notable ongoing efforts—such as the issuance of climate transition bonds to finance government green investment, and the implementation of carbon credits trading—are in line with international practices and previous staff advice. Nevertheless, without further policy changes, Japan is likely to fall short of its targets. To help meet its green commitments while boosting growth, a combination of policies is needed. Options include the removal of energy subsidies, the expansion of carbon pricing, feebates and tradable performance standards. Carbon pricing would need to be accompanied by targeted cash transfers to protect the vulnerable from adverse distributional effects.
The IMF team would like to thank the authorities and other interlocutors in Japan for the frank and open discussions.
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Table 1. Japan: Selected Economic Indicators, 2021-26
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Nominal GDP: US$ 4,213 billion (2023)
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GDP per capita: US$ 33,849 (2023)
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Population: 124 million (2023)
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Quota: SDR 30.8 billion (2023)
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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2021
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2022
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2023
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2024
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2025
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2026
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|
|
|
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|
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Est.
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Proj.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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(In percent change)
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Growth
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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Real GDP
|
2.7
|
0.9
|
1.5
|
-0.2
|
1.1
|
0.8
|
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Domestic demand
|
1.7
|
1.5
|
0.4
|
0.2
|
1.2
|
0.8
|
|
Private consumption
|
0.7
|
2.1
|
0.8
|
-0.3
|
0.9
|
0.6
|
|
Gross Private Fixed Investment
|
1.3
|
1.6
|
1.5
|
0.6
|
1.1
|
0.8
|
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Business investment
|
1.7
|
2.6
|
1.5
|
1.3
|
1.2
|
0.9
|
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Residential investment
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-0.3
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-2.7
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1.5
|
-2.4
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0.8
|
0.4
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Government consumption
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3.4
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1.4
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-0.3
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1.0
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1.3
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1.2
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Public investment
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-2.6
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-8.3
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1.5
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-1.2
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0.3
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0.0
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Stockbuilding
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0.5
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0.2
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-0.3
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0.1
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0.1
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0.0
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Net exports
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1.0
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-0.5
|
1.0
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-0.2
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0.0
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0.1
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Exports of goods and services
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11.9
|
5.5
|
3.0
|
0.7
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2.9
|
2.0
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Imports of goods and services
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5.2
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8.3
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-1.5
|
2.0
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2.9
|
1.8
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Output Gap
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-1.6
|
-0.9
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0.2
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0.1
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0.2
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0.0
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|
|
|
|
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|
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(In percent change, period average)
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Inflation
|
|
|
|
|
|
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Headline CPI
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-0.2
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2.5
|
3.2
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2.8
|
2.4
|
2.0
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GDP deflator
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-0.2
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0.4
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4.1
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3.0
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2.3
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2.1
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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(In percent of GDP)
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Government
|
|
|
|
|
|
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Revenue
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36.3
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37.5
|
36.8
|
36.9
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36.8
|
36.8
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Expenditure
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42.5
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41.8
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39.1
|
39.4
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39.4
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39.7
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Overall Balance
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-6.2
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-4.3
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-2.3
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-2.5
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-2.6
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-2.9
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Primary balance
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-5.6
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-3.9
|
-2.1
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-2.1
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-2.2
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-2.2
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Structural primary balance
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-4.9
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-3.8
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-2.2
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-2.1
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-2.3
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-2.2
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Public debt, gross
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253.7
|
248.3
|
240.0
|
237.0
|
232.7
|
230.0
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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(In percent change, end-of-period)
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Macro-financial
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|
|
|
|
|
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Base money
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8.5
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-5.6
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6.4
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-1.0
|
2.2
|
2.2
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Broad money
|
2.9
|
2.3
|
2.2
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1.1
|
2.1
|
2.1
|
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Credit to the private sector
|
2.3
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3.6
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4.2
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3.1
|
1.8
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1.6
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Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP
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157.1
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161.2
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156.7
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159.8
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160.2
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161.3
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
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(In percent)
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Interest rate
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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Overnight call rate, uncollateralized (end-of-period)
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0.0
|
0.0
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0.0
|
…
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…
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…
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10-year JGB yield (end-of-period)
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0.1
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0.4
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0.6
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…
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…
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…
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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(In billions of USD)
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Balance of payments
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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Current account balance
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196.2
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89.9
|
158.5
|
179.4
|
166.7
|
162.2
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Percent of GDP
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3.9
|
2.1
|
3.8
|
4.5
|
4.1
|
3.8
|
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Trade balance
|
16.4
|
-115.8
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-48.2
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-31.5
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-26.2
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-24.1
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Percent of GDP
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0.3
|
-2.7
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-1.1
|
-0.8
|
-0.6
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-0.6
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Exports of goods, f.o.b.
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749.2
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752.5
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713.7
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691.6
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705.5
|
720.9
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Imports of goods, f.o.b.
|
732.7
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868.3
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761.9
|
723.1
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731.7
|
745.0
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Energy imports
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127.8
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195.5
|
152.9
|
145.2
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135.9
|
122.5
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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(In percent of GDP)
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FDI, net
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3.5
|
3.0
|
4.1
|
4.8
|
4.2
|
4.1
|
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Portfolio Investment
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-3.9
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-3.3
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4.7
|
5.5
|
0.9
|
0.9
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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(In billions of USD)
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Change in reserves
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62.8
|
-47.4
|
29.8
|
-74.7
|
11.5
|
11.5
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Total reserves minus gold (in billions of US$)
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1356.2
|
1178.3
|
1238.5
|
…
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…
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…
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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(In units, period average)
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Exchange rates
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Yen/dollar rate
|
109.8
|
131.5
|
140.5
|
…
|
…
|
…
|
|
Yen/euro rate
|
129.9
|
138.6
|
152.0
|
…
|
…
|
…
|
|
Real effective exchange rate (ULC-based, 2010=100)
|
73.5
|
61.8
|
56.1
|
…
|
…
|
…
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|
Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based, 2010=100)
|
70.7
|
61.0
|
58.1
|
…
|
…
|
…
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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(In percent)
|
|
Demographic Indicators
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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Population Growth
|
-0.3
|
-0.3
|
-0.5
|
-0.5
|
-0.5
|
-0.5
|
|
Old-age dependency
|
48.7
|
48.8
|
48.9
|
49.2
|
49.7
|
50.1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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Sources: Haver Analytics; OECD; Japanese authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.
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[1] An IMF mission, led by Nada Choueiri and including Kohei Asao, Yan Carrière-Swallow, Andrea Deghi, Shujaat Khan, Gene Kindberg-Hanlon, Haruki Seitani, Danila Smirnov and Ara Stepanyan, conducted meetings in Japan during January 23-February 6, 2025. The mission met with senior officials at the Ministry of Finance, Bank of Japan, and other ministries and government agencies, along with representatives of labor unions, the business community, financial sector, and academics.
IMF Communications Department
MEDIA RELATIONS
PRESS OFFICER: Randa Elnagar
Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org
@IMFSpokesperson
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/07/mcs-020725-japan-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission
MIL OSI
