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Category: Politics

  • MIL-OSI USA: Ernst Bags Bureaucrat Swag

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Joni Ernst (R-IA)
    WASHINGTON – After a recent report estimated that Washington spends more than $1.8 billion annually on “advertising” and millions more on mascots, trinkets, and trash, U.S. Senate DOGE Caucus Chair Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) is introducing the Stop Wasteful Advertising by the Government (SWAG) Act to end unnecessary spending on government propaganda, taxpayer-funded trinkets, and mascots.
    Senator Ernst found taxpayer funds being spent on creepy bug mascots for the Department of Agriculture, graphic novels for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), coloring books featuring bird-watching ICE agents at DHS, and much more.
    “You might mistake Washington for a very expensive kid’s birthday party, with federal employees playing dress up, appearing as mascots, and making coloring books,” said Ernst. “I am going to crash the party and bag this costly swag. Misbehaving bureaucrats need to stop wasting tax dollars trying to refurbish their bad reputation, and focus on serving the American people.”
    Congressman Michael Cloud (R-Texas) is introducing companion legislation in the House of Representatives.
    “The American people demand a better return on their investment from the federal government than frivolous spending on self-promotion and propaganda,” said Cloud. “They expect transparency, fiscal responsibility, and a government focused on delivering results.  Especially as so many families are working to make ends meet, DC agencies should not squander the People’s money on mascots, trinkets, and giveaways. The SWAG Act will ensure taxpayer dollars are no longer spent on these wasteful gimmicks.”
    Click here to view the bill.
    Background:
    As chair of the Senate DOGE Caucus, Senator Ernst unveiled a $2 trillion plan, featuring the SWAG Act, to cut down federal spending, save taxpayer dollars, and downsize the government – in addition to her telework reportthat exposed an absent federal workforce.
    Her playbook has already racked up a win with the announcement of the sale of the Wilbur J. Cohen building, a 1.2 million square foot monument to waste, where just 72 of 3,341 workers were showing up to work.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Australia: Caretaker period

    Source: Government of Western Australia

    The Western Australian State Election will be held on Saturday 8 March 2025, in line with other public sector agencies, we will assume a caretaker role from 5 February 2025 and will follow the State Government’s guidelines.

    During the caretaker period, we will continue to receive and assess grant requests, however funding decisions will be deferred until after the caretaker period has ended.

    We will also take on a caretaker role for the Federal Election, and further information will be provided once the election date has been announced.

    Please continue to check our website regularly for updates and sign up to our e-newsletter. If you think your organisation may be affected by these caretaker periods, please contacts us on 133 777 or email healthway@healthway.wa.gov.au

    MIL OSI News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Investigations

    Source: Tertiary Education Commission

    Last updated 24 January 2025
    Last updated 24 January 2025

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    Investigations are a key part of monitoring the performance and compliance of the tertiary education sector.
    Investigations are a key part of monitoring the performance and compliance of the tertiary education sector.

    The Tertiary Education Commission (the TEC) has a range of powers, under the Education and Training Act 2020 and funding conditions, to conduct investigations ensuring the Government’s investment in tertiary education is used properly.
    We begin an investigation of a tertiary education organisation (TEO) if we are concerned about practices or behaviours which may put student interests or government funding at risk.
    TEO investigation guidelines
    Our monitoring system is designed to ensure both the burden on TEOs and the level of TEC effort is proportionate to the level of risk. This means investigations vary in size and complexity depending on our concerns, the size of the TEO, and a range of other factors.
    All monitoring activities (including investigations) are undertaken in accordance with our monitoring principles, which are included in the investigation guidelines below. These also include guidance on how we undertake investigations, the processes we follow, and how we deal with information supplied by TEOs under investigation.
    The Tertiary Education Commission investigation guidelines – 2020 (PDF 788 KB) 
    Outcomes of investigations
    We generally publish investigation outcomes as part of a transparent, consistent approach to monitoring. This helps provide assurance that public funds are being well managed. Publication of investigation findings is also a key way we share learnings from monitoring activities with the sector, and helps other TEOs improve their performance and compliance.
    The TEC has the discretion to not publish an investigation report or outcomes. Any such decision is made with reference to the provisions of the Official Information Act. For example, where there are no material findings, or issues identified are only minor, publishing the fact of an investigation may reduce public confidence in a TEO at a level disproportionate to the issues investigated. In such cases, the TEC would seek to share any valuable learnings from the investigation with the sector in another way, including through regular monitoring updates.
    When investigation reports or outcomes are finalised and able to be made public, they are published below.

    There were no investigations published in 2024.

    Active Institute

    Competenz

    Tai Poutini Polytechnic 

    BEST Pacific Institute of Education

    Reviews
    From 2014-2017, the TEC also conducted ‘reviews’ of smaller or less complex issues at TEOs. The TEC has updated its approach, and only conducts audits and investigations of TEOs. Historic reviews are now considered investigations.

    Quantum Education Group

    EnterpriseMIT

    College of Natural Health and Homeopathy 

    Reviews
    From 2014-2017, the TEC also conducted ‘reviews’ of smaller or less complex issues at TEOs. The TEC has updated its approach, and only conducts audits and investigations of TEOs. Historic reviews are now considered investigations.

    Lincoln University’s Telford Division

    New Zealand School of Outdoor Studies

    Reviews
    From 2014-2017, the TEC also conducted ‘reviews’ of smaller or less complex issues at TEOs. The TEC has updated its approach, and only conducts audits and investigations of TEOs. Historic reviews are now considered investigations.

    Manaakitanga Aotearoa Charitable Trust

    Agribusiness Training Ltd 

    Tectra Limited

    Taratahi Agricultural Training Centre

    Te Whare Wanānga o Awanuiārangi

    Western Institute of Technology at Taranaki (WITT)

    From 2014-2017, the TEC also conducted ‘reviews’ of smaller or less complex issues at TEOs. The TEC has updated its approach, and only conducts audits and investigations of TEOs. Historic reviews are now considered investigations.
    The six reviews below focused on TEOs that offered programmes with similar features to those found in two previous investigations at Te Whare Wānanga o Awanuiārangi and WITT. We undertook the reviews to determine whether the issues found in the two investigations were prevalent across the sector. This was found not to be the case.

    *Note: The TEC accepted the findings from an independent report commissioned by Service IQ.

    Related Content

    Monitoring performance and reporting

    read more

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Australia: Putting all Victorian public schools on a path to full and fair funding

    Source: Australian Ministers for Education

    The Albanese Labor Government and Allan Labor Government have come to an historic agreement that will put all public schools in Victoria on a path to full and fair funding.
     
    As part of the agreement, the Commonwealth will provide an additional 5 per cent of the Schooling Resource Standard (SRS) to Victorian public schools.
     
    This will lift the Commonwealth’s contribution from 20 per cent to 25 per cent of the SRS by 2034.
     
    This will see around an estimated $2.5 billion in additional Commonwealth funding to Victorian public schools over the next 10 years.
     
    This represents the biggest new investment in Victorian public schools by the Australian Government – ever.

    This includes more individualised support for students, mandating evidenced-based teaching practices and more mental health support in schools.
     
    Victoria will remove the provision put in by the former Liberal Government allowing the state to claim 4 per cent of public school funding for indirect school costs such as capital depreciation and replace it with 4 per cent of recurrent funding on eligible expenses, while also maintaining a share of 75 per cent of the SRS for public schools.
     
    This is not a blank cheque. The Agreement signed today will be followed by a Victorian Bilateral Agreement, which will tie funding to reforms already being delivered in Victorian schools that will help students catch up, keep up and finish school, such as: 

    • A Year 1 phonics check commencing this year and an early years numeracy check to identify students in the early years of school who need additional help
    • Continue the nation leading investment in initiatives that support wellbeing for learning – including access to mental health professionals in schools
    • Access to high-quality and evidence-based professional learning
    • Initiatives that improve the attraction and retention of teachers.

    In addition, the following national targets will be included: 

    • Increasing the proportion of students leaving school with a Year 12 certificate by 7.5 percentage points (nationally) by 2030
    • Reducing the proportion of students in the NAPLAN ‘Needs Additional Support’ proficiency level for reading and numeracy nationally by 10 per cent.
    • Increasing the proportion of students in the ‘Strong’ and ‘Exceeding’ proficiency levels for reading and numeracy by 10 per cent by 2030 and trend upwards for priority equity cohorts in the ‘Strong’ and ‘Exceeding’ proficiency levels nationally.
    • Increasing the Student Attendance Rate, nationally, to 91.4 per cent (2019 level) by 2030.
    • Increasing the engagement rate (completed or still enrolled) of initial teacher education students by 10 percentage points to 69.7 per cent by 2035.

    This means more help for students and more support for teachers.

    The states and territories that have signed the Better and Fairer Schools Agreement (BFSA) – Western Australia, Tasmania, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) – will also be offered additional funding from the Commonwealth, as per the no disadvantage clause included in their respective bilateral agreements. This will include similar requirements to no longer account for indirect expenditure on schools.
     
    The Albanese Government is continuing to work with remaining states to get all public schools on a path to full and fair funding.
     
    Quotes attributable to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese: 
     
    “Labor knows that education opens the doors of opportunity and we want to make sure we widen them.
     
    “Building Australia’s Future means investing in the next generation, which is why every dollar of this funding will go into helping children learn.
     
    “This gives certainty to parents and teachers, while setting our children up for the future.”
     
    Quotes attributable to Premier Jacinta Allan:
     
    “My priority is – and has always been – that every child, no matter where they live, has access to a world-class education in a Victorian government school.
     
    “By investing in our schools, we’re investing in our kids’ future – that’s why we have the largest school building program in the country and that’s why we’ve advocated for this deal.
     
    Quotes attributable to Minister for Education, Jason Clare:
     
    “This is real funding tied to real reforms to help students catch up, keep up and finish school.

    “It’s not a blank cheque. I want this money to get results.

    “That’s why funding will be directly tied to reforms that we know work.

    “It will help make sure every child gets a great start in life. What every parent wants. And what every Australian child deserves.” 
     
    Quotes attributable to Victorian Minister for Education Ben Carroll:
     
    “We have been unrelenting in our advocacy to the Commonwealth to increase its funding to 25 per cent of the SRS for Victorian Government schools to ensure that all schools in Victoria are fairly and fully funded.”

    “This is a win for Victorian students and teachers, and we are pleased to have reached agreement with the Albanese Labor Government.

    MIL OSI News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Asian Development Blog: How Can Asia Successfully Navigate New US Administration Policies?

    Source: Asia Development Bank

    Rising US tariffs and other policies of the new US presidential administration could create mixed outcomes for Asian economies, emphasizing the importance of building resilience through regional integration and open trade.

    How will new US administration policies affect economies in Asia and the Pacific, and how should they respond? 

    To gain insight into these questions, ADB recently completed two studies based on different global models—one strong on macroeconomics and one strong on trade—to estimate the magnitude of likely effects. 

    The first study examines the impact of the US imposing aggressive policies including 60% tariffs on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 10% tariffs on everyone else, reduced US immigration, and expansionary US fiscal policies. 

    The second study focuses only on the impact of tariffs. It assumes 60% tariffs on Chinese imports and examines different tariff scenarios for the rest of the world: 10% versus 20% tariffs, tariffs across the board versus exemptions for countries with free trade agreements with the US, and equal retaliatory tariffs versus no retaliation.   

    What do we learn from these exercises? 

    First, the negative effects on the Chinese economy will be relatively modest even with 60% tariffs. The first study, using a macro model, finds that growth slows by just 0.3% per year during the four years of the new administration, and the trade model predicts much smaller impacts thanks to opportunities to redirect trade to other countries and smaller impacts on global output than in the macro study. The impacts will be even less severe if the US only imposes additional tariffs of 10% as has been recently announced, even though further review of US trade imbalances could lead to more tariff increases later in the year.

    One reason for the modest impacts of high US tariffs is that the importance to the Chinese economy of exports to the US (both direct and indirect) has fallen steadily, now accounting for just 3% of the country’s GDP.

    Evidence from President Trump’s first term shows that the PRC was able to redirect exports to other countries and that the cost of US tariffs was largely borne by US consumers and firms.

    Second,  the effects on other Asian economies will be mixed, with some economies even expected to grow faster thanks to new export opportunities to the US to replace goods previously exported to the US from the PRC.

    Opportunities from trade diversion also were evident during the first trade war between the US and the PRC, benefiting export-competitive economies such as Viet Nam. 

    The recent shift observed in foreign direct investment (FDI) in strategic sectors away from the PRC and toward other Asian economies, especially in Southeast Asia, is likely to be reinforced.   

    Despite these trends, it would be a mistake to assume that US tariffs on the PRC have zero-sum impacts that hurt the PRC and help other Asian economies. This is because in recent years the Chinese economy has become increasingly linked to other economies in the region through trade and investment despite geoeconomic fragmentation globally. 

    Thus,  slower Chinese growth hurts other economies by reducing demand for imports, and reduced Chinese exports to the US hurts economies that supply capital equipment and inputs to Chinese exporters, most notably the high-tech economies in East Asia including the Republic of Korea and Japan. 

    Also, if higher US tariffs on imports from the PRC help other Asian economies to attract more FDI and increase exports to the US, Chinese firms can still share in those benefits by increasing their outbound FDI and increasing exports of intermediate inputs to those economies. Indeed, such patterns of investment and trade have already become evident, especially in Southeast Asia.

    The trade study also finds that economies with trade agreements with the US will benefit if they are exempt from US tariff increases while tariffs are imposed on their competitors without such trade agreements. Most economies in the region lack trade agreements with the US and so would be negatively affected by such a differentiated policy. 

    Finally, economies in the region should be cautious in considering whether to respond to higher US tariffs with tariffs of their own. Higher import tariffs increase the price of imports which can contribute to inflation, make goods more expensive for domestic consumers, and increase the costs of production for producers that rely on imported intermediate inputs. 

     Perhaps of greater importance for Asian economies than tariffs is the impact of the new administration’s policies on US inflation and interest rates.

    All the announced policies—to increase tariffs, reduce immigration, and extend and perhaps increase tax cuts—are likely to be inflationary, which is expected to lead to higher US interest rates for longer periods of time. These expectations are already evident in the shift in the structure of US bond yields since the US election. Despite much progress by many Asian economies to reduce reliance on US-denominated debt, financial conditions in Asia remain quite sensitive to US interest rates and to inflation news when Fed policy is data dependent as it is now. 

    Higher US rates reduce the scope for Asian central banks to lower interest rates and support growth in the region. They increase debt sustainability risks for economies with high debt levels denominated in US dollars. 

    Given higher US interest rates, our macro model predicts that currencies in the region will depreciate relative to the dollar.

    However, we do not expect weaker currencies to lead to higher inflation overall because our macro model finds that the higher interest rates and trade costs associated with US policies will reduce global GDP and demand for commodities, which will lead to lower global energy and food prices.

    In recent years, developing economies in Asia have demonstrated tremendous resilience to large shocks associated with the pandemic, commodity prices, and geoeconomic fragmentation.

    This is due to sound macroeconomic management by most governments in the region. Moreover, despite global geoeconomic fragmentation, governments have maintained their commitment to open trade and investment, which has strengthened regional economic integration.

    This impressive track record means the region is well placed to maximize opportunities for inclusive growth and remain resilient to future shocks, including unexpected policy directions of the new US administration.
     

    MIL OSI Economics –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Development Asia: Strengthening Uzbekistan’s Public Procurement Framework via Professionalization

    Source: Asia Development Bank

    Share on:             

    Published: 27 January 2025

    Develop certification frameworks, build sustainable capacity-building systems, and promote knowledge center collaboration.

    Disclaimer

    The views expressed on this website are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent. ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use. By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or by using the term “country” in this document, ADB does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.

    MIL OSI Economics –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Christine Lagarde: Central bank independence in an era of volatility

    Source: European Central Bank

    Lamfalussy Lecture by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the Lamfalussy Lectures Conference organised by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, pre-recorded in Frankfurt am Main on 15 January 2025

    Budapest, 27 January 2025

    In his later years, Alexandre Lamfalussy was once asked what his fundamental motivation in life was. He recalled the experience of his turbulent youth, surrounded by the destruction caused by the Second World War.[1] “In the aftermath of the war,” Lamfalussy said, “I decided to serve the community in the rebuilding of Europe.”[2]

    He went on to do just that. A member of the Delors Committee and the first President of the European Monetary Institute, Lamfalussy helped pave the way for Europe’s monetary union and the establishment of the ECB.

    His generation had also been scarred by the difficulties of the “Great Inflation” in the 1970s.[3] And so Lamfalussy – alongside other architects of the euro[4] – ensured that the ECB would have sufficient powers to prevent a scenario where inflationary expectations once again became embedded in the economy.

    We can see proof of this today, as advanced economies emerge from the largest inflation shock in a generation.

    As in the 1970s, a series of shocks contributed to high and persistent inflation. But unlike the 1970s, inflation has since fallen relatively fast across advanced economies – and expectations have remained firmly anchored throughout.

    This hard-won progress has been in large part due to the independence of central banks, which has given them the ability to take difficult but necessary monetary policy decisions in pursuit of stable prices.

    The rise of central bank independence

    In the late twentieth century, central bank independence spread rapidly around the world.

    A strong social consensus about its benefits – emerging from the negative experience of the 1970s – sparked what Lamfalussy would later call a “sea change” in monetary policymaking.[5]

    By one account, over 80% of the world’s central banks became operationally independent by the turn of the millennium.[6] And price stability had been adopted as the primary objective of monetary policy frameworks across almost all advanced economies and many emerging market economies.[7]

    Moreover, independent central banks both contributed to – and benefited from – a period of low macroeconomic volatility.

    In their famous paper, Alesina and Summers found a positive relationship between the degree of independence of central banks and lower and less volatile inflation outcomes.[8] At the same time, substantial structural changes were afoot in the global economy, which also helped to reduce macroeconomic volatility – an era that soon came to be known as the Great Moderation.[9]

    Globalisation led to an enormous increase in both global labour supply and production capacity, which meant that prices and wages were often little affected even in the face of strong demand. And the oil crises of the 1970s had sparked a wave of change in global energy markets, resulting in a more elastic energy supply.

    The upshot of the Great Moderation was a virtuous circle.

    An environment of low macroeconomic volatility made it easier for independent central banks to deliver on their price stability mandates. That, in turn, solidified the social consensus in support of central bank independence and helped ensure its growing adoption around the world – further contributing to lowering levels of volatility.

    The era of volatility

    The end of the Great Moderation came suddenly and unexpectedly in 2008 with the arrival of the global financial crisis. And over the last years in particular, our world has changed dramatically.

    Indeed, the two forces that fostered the spread of central bank independence – a strong social consensus and growing pools of global supply – are now coming under increasing pressure.

    While recent research suggests that de jure central bank independence has never been more prevalent than it is today[10], there is no doubt that the de facto independence of central banks is being called into question in several parts of the world.

    One study examining 118 central banks in the 2010s shows that around 10% of them faced political pressure in an average year – even those central banks with a high degree of de jure independence.[11] Another paper finds that between 2018 and 2020 alone, de facto central bank independence deteriorated for almost half of those central banks in jurisdictions accounting for 75% of global GDP.[12]

    There is evidence to suggest that political influence on central bank decisions can also contribute substantially to macroeconomic volatility. For instance, persistent political pressure on a central bank has been found to affect the level and the volatility of exchange rates, bond yields and the risk premium.[13]

    At the same time, geopolitical tensions threaten to amplify volatility by increasing the frequency of shocks hitting the global economy.

    We have already seen the impact of geopolitical tensions play out in Europe. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, average output growth volatility in the euro area surged by 60% compared with before the global financial crisis, while average inflation volatility shot up by 280%.[14]

    An environment of heightened volatility could make the task of maintaining price stability more difficult to achieve.[15] This could raise concerns that independent central banks are failing to deliver on their mandates, which could undermine the social consensus and further amplify volatility in the economy.

    So, the question that comes to the fore is: will the current era of volatility turn the virtuous circle that facilitated the rise of central bank independence into a vicious circle that leads to it being undermined?

    The benefits of central bank independence in today’s world

    All things considered, I would argue that this is unlikely to happen.

    A volatile macroeconomic environment actually makes the benefits of central bank independence all the greater. We saw this during the recent inflation shock.

    In OECD countries, average annual inflation surged to 9.6% in 2022 as they faced a variety of shocks that compounded each other.[16] In response, independent central banks sharply increased policy rates.

    These actions led to a rapid decline and convergence in the respective inflation paths of major economies – despite all these economies facing different shocks. Moreover, inflation expectations have remained firmly anchored, suggesting that the public continues to have faith in independent central banks’ commitment to price stability over the long run.[17]

    In today’s world, central bank independence offers two key advantages.

    First, it acts as a headwind to volatility in these unpredictable times.

    As we emerge from a period of very high inflation, the issue of time inconsistency is more relevant than ever.[18] Compared with the pre-pandemic era of low inflation, central banks may need to contend with lower levels of rational inattention.[19]

    In this environment, credible policy regimes become even more important for maintaining trust in central banks. Research finds that higher trust in the ECB lowers inflation expectations on average and significantly reduces uncertainty about future inflation.[20]

    Second, central bank independence also contributes to regional strength in a world increasingly defined by geopolitical rivalries.

    Price stability provides the foundation upon which other strategic goals can be achieved. Regions with stable prices tend to have more efficient resource allocation and higher levels of competitiveness, and they attract greater levels of investment. At heart, strong economic institutions are the fundamental cause of long-run economic growth and development differences between regions.[21]

    Conclusion

    Lamfalussy once described the task of launching the euro as “navigating in uncharted waters”.[22] In an era of volatility, independent central banks now also find themselves in unfamiliar waters.

    While inflation has fallen sharply, central banks are still likely to face a more volatile macroeconomic environment compared with the Great Moderation.

    It therefore remains imperative that central banks have the independence to fully deliver on their price stability mandates.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Exchange Fund Position at end-December 2024

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Exchange Fund Position at end-December 2024
    Exchange Fund Position at end-December 2024
    *******************************************

    The following is issued on behalf of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority:     The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) today (January 27) published the unaudited financial position of the Exchange Fund at end-December 2024.           The Exchange Fund recorded an investment income of HK$219.0 billion in 2024. The main components were:      

    gains on bonds of HK$135.6 billion;
    gains on Hong Kong equities of HK$21.8 billion;
    gains on other equities of HK$68.7 billion;
    negative currency translation effect of HK$35.6 billion on non-Hong Kong dollar assets (Note 1); and
    gains on other investments of HK$28.5 billion (Note 2).

          Fees on placements by the Fiscal Reserves and placements by HKSAR Government funds and statutory bodies were HK$13.2 billion (Note 3) and HK$15.7 billion respectively in 2024, with the rate of fee payment at 3.7 per cent for 2024.           The Abridged Balance Sheet shows that the total assets of the Exchange Fund increased by HK$65.9 billion, from HK$4,016.5 billion at the end of 2023 to HK$4,082.4 billion at the end of 2024. Accumulated surplus stood at HK$731.6 billion at end-December 2024.           The Exchange Fund recorded an investment return of 5.3 per cent in 2024 (Note 4). Specifically, the Investment Portfolio achieved a rate of return of 7.2 per cent and the Backing Portfolio gained 4.1 per cent. The Long-Term Growth Portfolio (LTGP) recorded an annualised internal rate of return of 11.5 per cent since its inception in 2009 up to the end of September 2024.           Commenting on the performance of the Exchange Fund in 2024, Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the HKMA, said, “Global financial markets performed broadly well in 2024. Major economies recorded stable growth, while inflation eased closer to policy targets. Major central banks progressively lowered their policy rates. This was positive to the investment environment.           Major equity markets rose notably in 2024, with US equities making strong gains in the first three quarters on the back of a generally positive economic and inflationary fundamentals, and the fervor around the artificial intelligence industry. However, markets became more volatile in the fourth quarter and retreated from their highs as investors turned more cautious amidst concerns over rising inflation and bond yields. In the Mainland and Hong Kong, investor confidence improved, following the Central Government’s announcements of a series of policy measures in the third quarter to stimulate the economy and equity market. Nevertheless, the two equity markets softened in the fourth quarter as market participants remained somewhat uncertain about the real economic growth. Meanwhile, global bond markets experienced higher volatility. Although major central banks have affirmed their general policy direction of lowering interest rates, the pace and magnitude of rate cuts have changed a few times during the year. Entering the fourth quarter, as markets began to focus on the US fiscal policy in the coming year, US Treasury yields rose sharply and weighed on bond prices. Furthermore, the US dollar strengthened against other major currencies in 2024, particularly in the fourth quarter, as a result of the interest rate movements and the relatively strong performance of the US economy. In view of these two factors, the Exchange Fund as a whole recorded some valuation loss in the fourth quarter of 2024.           For 2024 as a whole, the Exchange Fund achieved a decent investment income. The bond portfolio has benefited from substantial interest income as a result of persistently high yields. The equity portfolio has also performed well. However, the US dollar strengthened against other major currencies, leading to a negative currency translation effect on our non-Hong Kong dollar assets.”           Mr Yue said, “Looking ahead to 2025, the global financial markets remain uncertain. Interest rate policies will continue to be the focus of the markets. According to the latest projections in December, the US Fed forecasted half a percentage point of rate cut in total in 2025. This is smaller than the previous projection of one percentage point, and reflects the Fed’s more cautious stance towards inflation. Meanwhile, the new US administration’s policies on the economy, tax and trade could add uncertainties to the inflation path. This in turn affects how much room the Fed has in adjusting monetary policy.           Furthermore, any escalation in trade frictions among major economies or geopolitical situation could impact real economic activities, and may also trigger volatility in the financial markets.           Given these challenges we face, the HKMA will, as always, adhere to the principle of capital preservation first while maintaining long-term growth. We will continue to manage the Exchange Fund with prudence and flexibility, implement appropriate defensive measures, and maintain a high degree of liquidity. We will also continue to diversify our investments to strive for higher long-term returns, ensuring that the Exchange Fund remains effective in achieving its purpose of maintaining monetary and financial stability of Hong Kong.” Note 1: This is primarily the effect of translating foreign currency assets into Hong Kong dollar after deducting the portion for currency hedging.Note 2: This is the valuation change of investments held by investment holding subsidiaries of the Exchange Fund. This figure reflects the valuations at the end of September 2024. Valuation changes of these investments from October to December are not yet available.Note 3: This does not include the 2024 fee payment to the Future Fund because such amount will only be disclosed when the composite rate for 2024 is available.Note 4: This return excludes the performance of the Strategic Portfolio and only includes the performance of LTGP up to the end of September 2024. The audited full year return will be disclosed in the 2024 annual report.

     
    Ends/Monday, January 27, 2025Issued at HKT 16:30

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: BTCC Exchange Unveils Spot Trading Fiesta to Celebrate Altcoin Season

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VILNIUS, Lithuania, Jan. 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — BTCC, one of the world’s longest-serving cryptocurrency exchanges, is excited to announce the launch of its Spot Trading Fiesta, a campaign celebrating the altcoin season to come. This highly anticipated campaign allows crypto enthusiasts to earn rewards through social media giveaways, deposit rewards, and trading prizes.

    The Spot Trading Fiesta will feature one popular altcoin each week, offering users a chance to dive deeper into altcoin trading while enjoying exciting rewards. Kicking off the campaign is fan-favorite DOGE (Dogecoin), with a social media giveaway awarding DOGE to lucky participants. To join, participants can visit BTCC’s X post and enter by February 2, 2025.

    The campaign follows the success of BTCC’s OG Week, which celebrated trending meme coins like FLOKI, SHIB, and PEPE and garnered overwhelming community support. Spot Trading Fiesta aims to build on this momentum, coinciding with increasing excitement around altcoins.

    “We are thrilled to launch Spot Trading Fiesta at such a pivotal moment in the crypto space,” said Aaryn Ling, Head of Branding at BTCC Exchange. “With altcoin season potentially around the corner and Bitcoin making headlines, now is the perfect time to explore the potential of all those popular altcoins. BTCC’s growing portfolio of spot trading pairs ensures our users can access some of the most popular cryptocurrencies. We invite everyone to join this campaign, trade their favorite altcoins, and earn incredible rewards.”

    BTCC has been adding to its diverse selection of spot trading pairs, now offering over 240 cryptocurrencies to meet the growing demand for altcoin trading. This campaign reinforces BTCC’s mission to make crypto trading accessible, secure, and rewarding.

    About BTCC

    Founded in 2011, BTCC is one of the longest-standing cryptocurrency exchanges globally, trusted by millions of users. Known for its robust features and cutting-edge platform, BTCC Exchange remains committed to providing a seamless crypto trading experience for crypto traders worldwide.

    For more information on Spot Trading Fiesta, visit the campaign page: https://www.btcc.com/market-promotion/bonus2/Spot-Trading-Fiesta/en-US

    Contact: press@btcc.com

    The MIL Network –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    – DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire
    – https://theconversation.com/drc-has-created-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI Africa –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    Michel Thill is a Senior Program Officer for swisspeace, a Basel University affiliated practice and research institute dedicated to advancing effective peacebuilding. swisspeace receives funding from research funding bodies, and bilateral and multilateral organizations. Michel is also a Fellow of the Rift Valley Institute.

    Judith Verweijen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. DRC has created a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire – https://theconversation.com/drc-has-created-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: Three deposit auctions of the PPC “TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND” will take place on 27.01.2025

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https://www.moex.com/n77141

    Category24-7, MIL-AXIS, Moscow, Moskov Stotsk Exchange, Russians savings, Russians Federal, Russians Language, Russian economy

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    Archives Privations of the Police Proudly would trust WordPress

    Date of the deposit auction 01/27/2025
    Placement currency RUB
    Maximum amount of funds placed (in placement currency) 5,523,000,000.00
    Placement period, days 22
    Date of deposit 01/27/2025
    Refund date 02/18/2025
    Minimum placement interest rate, % per annum 21.00
    Conditions of imprisonment, urgent or special Urgent
    Minimum amount of funds placed for one application (in placement currency) 5,523,000,000.00
    Maximum number of applications from one Participant, pcs. 1
    Auction form, open or closed Open
    Basis of the Treaty General Agreement
     
    Schedule (Moscow time)
    Preliminary applications from 11:30 to 11:40
    Applications in competition mode from 11:40 to 11:45
    Setting a cut-off percentage or declaring the auction invalid until 11:55
       
    Additional terms  

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Hong Kong Customs detects case of illegally importing animals in third phase of “Pet Guardian” operation (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Hong Kong Customs detects case of illegally importing animals in third phase of “Pet Guardian” operation (with photos)
    Hong Kong Customs detects case of illegally importing animals in third phase of “Pet Guardian” operation (with photos)
    ******************************************************************************************

         Hong Kong Customs mounted an operation against smuggling of animals codenamed “Pet Guardian” with the Anti-Smuggling Bureau of Shenzhen Customs since November 2023. In late January this year, Hong Kong Customs launched the third phase of the operation and detected one suspected case of illegally importing animals on January 22. Four suspected illegally imported animals with an estimated market value of about $120,000 were seized.     On that day, Hong Kong Customs at Sha Tau Kok spotted a woman pushing a bike, who entered Hong Kong through the Chung Ying Street Checkpoint from the Mainland side of Chung Ying Street. The front basket of her bike carried two handbags suspected of containing animals. Customs officers then took action and found four suspected illegally imported animals, including one kitten and three puppies, inside the handbags. The 32-year-old woman was subsequently arrested.     Investigations of the case is ongoing and the four animals have been handed over to the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department for follow-up action.     Being a government department specifically responsible for tackling smuggling, Customs has long been combating various smuggling activities on all fronts. Customs will keep up its enforcement action and continue to resolutely combat all types of smuggling activities through proactive risk management and intelligence-based enforcement strategies, and carry out targeted anti-smuggling operations at suitable times to disrupt relevant crimes.     Customs reminds the public that importing animals into Hong Kong without a valid permit is an offence.     Under the Rabies Regulation, any person found guilty of illegally importing animals, carcasses or animal products is liable to a maximum fine of $50,000 and imprisonment for one year.

     
    Ends/Monday, January 27, 2025Issued at HKT 15:37

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    – DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire
    – https://theconversation.com/drc-creates-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI Africa –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Judith Verweijen, Assistant professor, Utrecht University

    After nearly three decades of warfare, armed conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) seems only to intensify. The Rwanda-backed M23 rebellion has been at the centre of attention in recent years. However, eastern DRC is home to more than 100 other armed groups, which are a major source of instability too. The question of their demobilisation has haunted the country ever since the end of the Second Congo War in 2003.

    A new chapter in this long-standing conundrum seems to have started. In 2022, the government decided to form an alliance with armed groups to fight their common enemy, the M23 and its Rwandan backers. At around the same time, it launched an initiative to create an army reserve, known as the Reserve armée de la défense (RAD). This formalised the Congolese army’s established practice of using armed groups as auxiliaries.

    The creation of the reserve army allows the government to reward armed group allies with integration while bringing them under institutionalised control. But will this actually work?

    Our past and ongoing research on army integration and demobilisation in eastern DRC casts doubt on the plan, for three reasons.

    The first risk is that armed groups will boost their numbers to gain a stronger bargaining position once integration does occur.

    Secondly, reservist forces may compete with the army over territorial control and limited resources and turn against those who created them.

    Finally, merely absorbing armed groups into a reserve force does little to address the long-standing grievances that underlie conflict in the east.

    The Wazalendo: eastern DRC’s predatory patriots

    On 9 May 2022, in a secretive meeting in the town of Pinga in North Kivu, the Congolese armed forces and several Congolese armed groups agreed to cease hostilities against each other and instead form an alliance to fight their common enemy, the M23.

    As a result, these groups became quasi-official and increasingly presented themselves as defenders of Congo’s territorial integrity. They started to call themselves Wazalendo or patriots in Kiswahili. Fuelled by President Félix Tshisekedi’s supportive rhetoric, the Wazalendo became symbols of Congolese resistance against foreign aggression. This benefited the president’s 2023 electoral campaign.

    Across North and South Kivu provinces, armed groups have rebranded themselves Wazalendo, even when not part of the coalition fighting the M23.

    As the Congolese army’s attention is on the M23, these armed groups have benefited from the lull in operations against them. Most Wazalendo groups are allowed to roam around freely and have dramatically expanded their zones of influence and violent systems of revenue generation.

    This includes taxation at markets and rapidly proliferating roadblocks, but also ransom kidnappings and contract killings. There is also evidence that Wazalendo groups are engaged in torture, sexual violence and arbitrary arrests, and frequently recruit child soldiers.

    Chequered history of integration

    A few months after the Pinga meeting, Congo’s government launched a new national defence policy that mentioned the establishment of the reserve army. Though it was passed unanimously in parliament in April 2023, MPs voiced concerns that the new army reserve risked repeating mistakes of the past.

    The army is itself the product of the painstaking integration of former belligerents after the Second Congo War (1998-2003). But rebel-military integration became an open-ended process. Armed group officers alternately integrated into and deserted from the army in the hope of gaining higher ranks and positions in a next round of integration.

    Unending rebel integration also weakened the national army. It reinforced parallel command chains, facilitated intelligence leaks and created a lopsided hierarchy.

    The first iteration of the M23 rebellion in 2012 was the result of rebel integration gone wrong. In its aftermath, the Congolese government banned the wholesale negotiated integration of armed groups into the army.

    Hurdles to integration

    The reserve army risks unleashing the same dynamics of rewarding rebellion by doling out positions to armed group leaders and granting them impunity for past violence. In April 2024, the leaders of many Wazalendo groups were flown to Kinshasa where the army reserve leadership told them to start preparing lists of their combatants ahead of their integration.

    This has prompted numerous armed groups to step up recruitment.

    The prospect of integration has also triggered fierce competition for positions between Wazalendo commanders. This risks worsening animosities between groups.

    Other hurdles, some of which have been faced before, include:

    Unity of command. Forcing smaller armed groups into a hierarchical mould doesn’t always work. Most have deep local roots, with their recruitment and influence limited to a relatively small area. Used to calling the shots in their home areas, these commanders tend to be reluctant to take orders from higher-placed outsiders.

    Ethnic competition. Armed groups may resist full integration if they feel their rank and positions in the reserve army will be lower and that this will hamper their ability to protect members of their ethnic community. Such “local security dilemmas” have obstructed army integration and demobilisation efforts in the past.

    Resources. Armed groups currently enjoy substantial income, and considerable freedom in obtaining it. Will the reserve army command allow its members to engage in illegal taxation, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and ambushes? If not, how will it compensate for their lost opportunities? In addition, the reserve army is likely to compete with the army over revenue-generating opportunities. And some of its members may leak intelligence to fellow armed groups.

    Painkiller or cure?

    The army reserve may be read as the latest attempt at solving the decades-old problem of getting rid of the many armed groups in eastern DRC, this time by bringing them into the fold of the state yet not into the army.

    However, this solution does risk unleashing many of the same detrimental dynamics as army integration. It may fuel armed mobilisation and militarisation rather than contain it.

    Wazalendo groups are currently in a comfortable position and there are no repercussions for not integrating the reserve force. To contain them, both the DRC’s army and the military justice system would need to be professionalised.

    Even if the reserve army did not have negative ripple effects, it would be an unlikely cure for armed mobilisation. That requires comprehensive, bottom-up peace efforts that tackle deep-seated grievances related to past violence and conflict over belonging, territory and local authority. Barring such efforts, the reserve force will remain a painkiller at best.

    Michel Thill is a Senior Program Officer for swisspeace, a Basel University affiliated practice and research institute dedicated to advancing effective peacebuilding. swisspeace receives funding from research funding bodies, and bilateral and multilateral organizations. Michel is also a Fellow of the Rift Valley Institute.

    Judith Verweijen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. DRC creates a reserve force to fight the M23 – why this may backfire – https://theconversation.com/drc-creates-a-reserve-force-to-fight-the-m23-why-this-may-backfire-247476

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Colombia announces tit-for-tat tariffs on US goods following Trump threat

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Colombian President Gustavo Petro on Sunday announced 25-percent tariffs on all goods from the United States in a tit-for-tat measure after U.S. President Donald Trump imposed tariffs on Colombia.

    Trump said he would impose 25 percent tariffs and various sanctions on Colombia after the South American country refused to allow the landing of two military aircraft carrying deported immigrants.

    “I order the Minister of Foreign Trade to raise tariffs on imports from the United States by 25 percent,” Petro posted on social media platform X. The president also said the government will assist in replacing those U.S. products with Colombian products.

    He said in another message that he would never allow Colombian immigrants to be transported in military aircraft handcuffed as if they were criminals.

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Vietnamese PM meets Chinese ambassador on ties

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    This photo shows a view of the Chinese part of the China-Vietnam Detian-Ban Gioc Waterfall cross-border tourism cooperation zone in Chongzuo, south China’s Guangxi Province, Dec. 15, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh has vowed to continuously solidify the foundation for building a Vietnam-China community of shared future.

    In a meeting with Chinese Ambassador to Vietnam He Wei in the Vietnamese capital, Chinh said that the traditional friendship between Vietnam and China is time-honored and unbreakable.

    The Communist Party of Vietnam and the Vietnamese government have always regarded the development of relations with China as a strategic choice and top priority, Chinh stressed.

    The Vietnamese prime minister urged both sides to fully leverage the advantages of land and sea connectivity between the two countries and step up substantive cooperation and the implementation of significant and symbolic projects.

    For his part, He said China is willing to work with Vietnam to promote the steady and long-term development of China-Vietnam friendship and contribute to regional and world peace and prosperity.

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security Council Press Statement on Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    The following Security Council press statement was issued today by Council President Amar Bendjama (Algeria):

    The members of the Security Council condemned in the strongest terms ongoing advances by the M23 in North-Kivu, including the control of Masisi centre on 4 January 2025 and of Sake on 23 January 2025, and expressed serious concerns regarding imminent threats against Goma, which are putting hundreds of thousands of civilians at heightened risk. These advances represent a serious violation of the ceasefire, exacerbate the grave humanitarian and displacement crisis in the Eastern DRC and undermine efforts to reach a lasting peaceful and political solution to the conflict through the Luanda process. The members of the Security Council echoed the statement by the Secretary-General dated 26 January 2025 and demanded that the ongoing offensive and advances towards Goma immediately stop. They further called on the M23 to reverse its territorial expansion without delay.

    The members of the Security Council reiterated their full support to MONUSCO, which is acting within its mandate and doing essential work in the DRC, including near Goma, and expressed their strong commitment to the safety and security of its peacekeepers. They paid tribute to all peacekeepers who risk their lives. They expressed their deepest condolences and sympathy to the families of the peacekeepers killed, as well as to South Africa, Malawi and Uruguay.  They also expressed their condolences to the United Nations. They wished a speedy and full recovery to the peacekeepers injured. They reiterated that attacks against peacekeepers may constitute war crimes. They stressed that involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring or conducting attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers constitutes a basis for sanctions designations pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions.

    The members of the Security Council condemned the ongoing flagrant disregard for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC, including the unauthorized presence in the Eastern DRC of external Forces as reported by the Group of Experts and demanded that these forces withdraw immediately and that the M23 put an end to the establishment of parallel administrations in the DRC territory. They urged all parties to scrupulously abide by the ceasefire. They further reiterated their condemnation of the systematic illicit exploitation of the natural resources in eastern DRC, noting that these actions fuel the conflict. 

    They urged Rwanda and the DRC to return to diplomatic talks to achieve a lasting and peaceful resolution of the protracted conflict in the region including by addressing respective issues pertaining to the presence of Rwanda Defence Forces in the Eastern DRC and DRC support to the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) respectively, as reported by the Group of Experts. The members of the Security Council reaffirmed their unwavering support for the ongoing mediation efforts between the DRC and Rwanda through the Luanda Process led by the AU -designated mediator President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço of Angola.

    The members of the Security Council are also deeply alarmed by continued occurrences of GPS jamming and spoofing activities in support of M23 operations in North Kivu, which represent imminent risk to civil aviation safety and negatively impact the delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in need. They called for an end to reported GPS jamming and spoofing and deployment of Surface to Air Missiles, which threaten the safety and security of UN peacekeepers, and impede the implementation of their Protection of Civilians mandate.

    The members of the Security Council condemned persistent violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights in the eastern part of the DRC, including sexual and gender-based violence, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, and summary killings by armed groups. The members of the Security Council called for all perpetrators to be held accountable. They urged both parties to fully and rapidly implement their commitments agreed under the Luanda process, and to fully cooperate in good faith with Angola in order to accelerate the implementation of the harmonized plan for the neutralization of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the disengagement of Forces. Council members also stressed the importance of resuming consultations under the Nairobi Process under the guidance of former President Uhuru Kenyatta to address the protracted issue of armed groups, including the M23, operating in the DRC, and to identify pathways to peace and stability in the region.

    The members of the Security Council reaffirmed their strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as all States in the region. They recalled resolution 2765 (2024) and expressed their full support to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: ADB, Ayala Sign $100 Million Financing Deal to Support Electric Mobility in the Philippines

    Source: Asia Development Bank

    MANILA, PHILIPPINES (27 January 2025) — The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has signed a financing package of up to $100 million to support Ayala Corporation’s contributions to the development of an electric mobility ecosystem in the Philippines. This funding will be used to procure and install electric vehicle charging stations (EVCS) and to purchase electric vehicles for commercial distribution.

    The package includes a concessional loan from the Canadian Climate and Nature Fund for the Private Sector in Asia (CANPA). ADB’s financing, along with the concessional loan, will be used to develop a network of EVCS in the Philippines. This blended financing features an innovative pricing structure aimed at accelerating deployment of EVCS infrastructure. A portion of the ADB financing will be allocated to procure electric vehicles from leading manufacturers for distribution across the country.

    “This project is a significant step towards a sustainable and low-carbon future for the Philippines,” said ADB Country Director for the Philippines Pavit Ramachandran. “By fostering the development of a robust electric mobility ecosystem, we are not only addressing critical environmental challenges such as air pollution, but also driving economic growth through the creation of green jobs, enhancing energy security, and promoting inclusive and resilient urban development.”

    Electric vehicle (EV) development is still nascent in the Philippines. High initial costs, limited charging infrastructure, and evolving technologies have posed significant barriers to adoption of EVs in the country. But the Philippine government’s Electric Vehicle Industry Development Act and various tax incentives are helping create a more favorable environment for the growth of the EV sector.

    The creation of an EVCS network is crucial for electric vehicles to become more popular. The EVCS to be set up with the ADB financing package will address gaps in EV charging infrastructure, thereby facilitating faster adoption of electric vehicles.

    “This innovative blended financing comes at an opportune time as Ayala, through ACMobility, continues to ramp up its electric mobility investments. As we help build a comprehensive EV ecosystem for the Philippines, we wish to thank like-minded institutional partners like ADB for helping us expand our electric mobility initiatives, accelerate our contribution to the Philippines’ climate goals, and reaffirm our purpose of building businesses that enable people to thrive,” said ACMobility’s President and CEO Jaime Alfonso Zobel de Ayala.

    Established in 2024, CANPA is a trust fund managed by ADB, supported by a commitment of Can$360 million from the Government of Canada. The fund builds on the success of the two previous funds, namely the Canadian Climate Fund for the Private Sector in Asia II (CFPS II) and its predecessor CFPS. CANPA aims to support private-sector projects in Asia and the Pacific that focus on climate and nature-based solutions, while also promoting gender equality.

    Ayala Corporation is one of the Philippines’ largest and most enduring conglomerates. With a diverse portfolio that includes real estate, banking, telecommunications, and renewable energy, the company is well-positioned to lead the development of the electric mobility ecosystem in the Philippines. Key to Ayala’s growing sustainable business portfolio is its access to innovative financing options such as blended finance, which is supported by public, private and philanthropic funds.

    ADB is committed to achieving a prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable Asia and the Pacific, while sustaining its efforts to eradicate extreme poverty. Established in 1966, it is owned by 69 members—49 from the region. 

    MIL OSI Economics –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Trump imposes 25% tariffs on Colombia after US deportation flights denied landing

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    U.S. President Donald Trump on Sunday announced 25-percent tariffs on all goods imported from Colombia after the Latin American country refused to allow the landing of two flights carrying deported immigrants.

    “I was just informed that two repatriation flights from the United States, with a large number of Illegal Criminals, were not allowed to land in Colombia,” Trump posted on his social media platform Truth Social.

    Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s rejection of these flights has “jeopardized the National Security and Public Safety of the United States,” Trump wrote, noting that he has directed his administration to immediately take “urgent and decisive retaliatory measures.”

    Trump’s retaliatory measures include: emergency 25-percent tariffs on all goods coming from Colombia, to be raised to 50 percent in one week; a travel ban and immediate visa revocations on Colombian government officials and all allies and supporters; visa sanctions on all party members, family members and supporters of the Colombian government; enhanced customs and border protection inspections of all Colombian nationals and cargo on national security grounds; International Emergency Economic Powers Act sanctions.

    Earlier Sunday, Petro posted on social media platform X, formerly known as Twitter, that his government would not accept U.S. deportation flights until a protocol is established by the Trump administration to treat migrants with dignity. He also urged the United States to use civilian planes instead of military ones.

    After Trump’s announcement, Petro posted on X that he had ordered his foreign trade minister to raise tariffs on U.S. imports by 25 percent.

    Just a few days ago, the United States sent four deportation flights carrying immigrants to Mexico. However, according to multiple U.S. media reports, at least one flight was refused entry.

    The United States also sent deportation flights to other countries, including Guatemala and Brazil. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry recently condemned the action, saying the immigrants on the deportation flights were subjected to humiliating treatment.

    During his presidential campaign, Trump promised to carry out large-scale deportations of illegal immigrants once he took office. After his inauguration on Jan. 20, deportation operations began in several parts of the United States, allegedly focusing on criminals. The White House claimed that over 1,000 illegal immigrants had been arrested on Thursday and Friday, and hundreds of them were deported via military aircraft.

    According to the Associated Press, Colombia accepted 475 deportation flights from the United States from 2020 to 2024. In 2024 alone, it accepted 124 deportation flights.

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Australia: Transcript – ABC Brisbane: Steve Austin

    Source: Australian Executive Government Ministers

    STEVE AUSTIN: Catherine King is the Federal Minister for Infrastructure in Australia. Minister, thanks for joining me this morning. 

    CATHERINE KING: Very good to be with you. 

    STEVE AUSTIN: Can you tell me this is by Infrastructure Australia? Does this mean that you as the final decision maker will bump these off the priority list yourself? 

    CATHERINE KING: No, so, it’s a bit of a beat up of a story this morning, and it seems to be a bit of confusion about what the role of Infrastructure Australia is versus the role of the Australian Government that, of course, funds through the budget infrastructure projects in Queensland, some nationally significant, those very, very large infrastructure projects that operate where there are big missing links in freight routes, where there are big missing links in electricity transmission or water transmission, right the way across the country. And so it is, at that higher level of project. And so it’s really refining its list there. It doesn’t represent the funding decisions or the totality of all of the projects that the government, the Federal Albanese Government, is investing in and Infrastructure Australia it’s not, never has been an actual funding body. So that’s sort of revising its list. What it’s doing at the moment is it’s consulting with states and territories. I have not seen its list. Obviously, states have been given a draft to comment on and to look through, and states can work their way with Infrastructure Australia to look at projects of that nationally significant scale, to put back on the list, if that’s what they what they want to do, or to make sure that they’re on the list, or that, as I said, that it’s separate to the budget process. And it does seem, I did think was a sort of passing strange story today.

    STEVE AUSTIN: So because it’s off the Infrastructure Australia list doesn’t mean it’s off the agenda of the federal government or you as the Minister?

    CATHERINE KING: Yeah, correct. And in fact, what actually they do do is where a project already has a or has a full or partial commitment infrastructure, Australia says, well, our job’s done now like that. We’ve had that major piece of work done. We’ve analysed the cost benefit in the business case that states have put to us. It’s been on the infrastructure priority list. And again, these are only for really big projects. They’re not for the suburban roads or the bridges that we’re doing or a range of those things. And then what it does is, if it’s attracted funding, it says, okay, well now we will take that off the list, and we’ll put a new priority on at that scale. And so some of the projects that you mentioned at the start of your story already have really substantial federal funding attached to them, and that’s partly why I suspect Infrastructure Australia is removing them, or has removed them from the draft list. But again, they’re working with good faith with states and territories at the moment, and if the Queensland Government wants to submit projects to do that, it needs to have done the work. It needs to have really done the work. Because, of course, this was really about making sure, with Infrastructure Australia, that the Commonwealth Government gets good independent advice which take the politics out of infrastructure investments. We make sure that we got good, proper advice in which to make investments. 

    STEVE AUSTIN: I spoke with the mayor of the Sunshine Coast earlier this morning, Rosanna Natoli, and she’s worried about what the list means, particularly for the Sunshine Coast, which is under huge development pressure from increased population there, particularly for things like some of the big roads, but also the rail project, the Beerburrum to Nambour rail upgrade. Can you state what your position is on that today, please?

    CATHERINE KING: Well, of course, in terms of many again, of the projects that were referenced, there is already significant investment being made. For local councils where they want to put their views, they need to do that via state governments. They have every opportunity to do that, and we really encourage them to do that. But again, we’re investing really significantly, whether it’s Logan to Gold Coast faster rail, the Sunshine Coast rail line, direct sunshine coast, the Coomera Connector, the Bruce Highway investments. When we came to government, there was significant underfunding. There was $18 billion committed to Queensland from the previous government. We have upped that to $28 billion including the recent announcements to fix the Bruce Highway.  No funding cuts at all to Queensland. In fact, substantial investments in Queensland. 

    STEVE AUSTIN: So does that mean that Beerburrum to Nambour rail upgraders, it will be funded for the Sunshine Coast region?

    CATHERINE KING: In terms of that particular project that already has a total of $606.7 million from the Australian government committed to it. It’s a project of a funding total of a billion dollars. It is currently, as I understand, early works are being completed in pre-construction design, so the Commonwealth is already funding that project.

    STEVE AUSTIN:  Is there anything else you want to get on the record in relation to Queensland? Given the sort of the changes in infrastructure Australia’s priority list, you’re the final person who’ll say yay or nay?

    CATHERINE KING: So I’m not the final person. So Infrastructure Australia, again, independent of the government, I don’t say what’s on the list. 

    STEVE AUSTIN: No, I know. I know you will have to say as to what gets built and what doesn’t get built. As the federal infrastructure minister.

    CATHERINE KING: Yeah, so I will through the normal budget process. We do it every year. States write to me and they say, this is what you know, they want funding for, this is where we’ve got substantial cost pressures. The new Queensland Government has just done that recently, and we through the budget process systematically go through that. I seek advice from Infrastructure Australia as to whether something is investment ready, has the cost benefit work being done? Because what we had inherited was, frankly, a lot of press releases, a lot of press releases telling me that there was money set aside for projects –  chronically underfunded, and what we’ve had to do is really make sure we’ve got a disciplined process to look at Commonwealth investments. But again, as I said, we started when we came to government, $18 billion committed to Queensland. There’s now $28, billion committed to Queensland. I think we’ll stand on our record of the substantial investments we make to improve infrastructure in Queensland.

    STEVE AUSTIN:  Minister thanks for your time. 

    CATHERINE KING: Really good to be with you.

    MIL OSI News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Senior CPC official highlights high-quality Party building in central Party, state institutions

    Source: China State Council Information Office 2

    Senior Communist Party of China (CPC) official Cai Qi on Sunday highlighted the importance of strengthening Party building to create a solid foundation for the development of various central Party and government department initiatives.
    Cai, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the Working Committee of the Central Party and State Institutions, made the remarks at a conference on Party work and discipline inspection work within central Party and state institutions.
    With a focus on promoting high-quality development through high-quality Party building, efforts should be made to deepen the reform of systems for Party-building within Party and state offices, and to ensure they assume their responsibilities, Cai said.
    The meeting underlined the need to continuously strengthen cohesion and forge the Party’s soul with the Party’s new theories, enhance the Party’s political building, and reinforce the political and organizational functions of primary-level Party organizations.
    Highlighting the importance of advancing anti-corruption work, the meeting underscored the necessity of implementing the guiding principles from the fourth plenary session of the 20th CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: President Trump is Already Securing Our Border and Deporting Criminal Aliens

    Source: US Department of Homeland Security

    Immediately after being sworn in President Trump took executive action to stop the invasion at the southern border and to empower law enforcement agents to deport criminal aliens

    “In a move fulfilling one of now-President Donald Trump’s campaign promises, the Trump administration shuttered the use of CBP One, a President Joe Biden-era app meant to help process migrants seeking to apply for asylum in the U.S.” USA Today: Trump kills Biden-era CBP One app for asylum-seekers at the border

    “The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on Monday issued memos to repeal limits on Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents imposed by former DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas…ICE agents who spoke to Fox News said they believe that rescinding the Mayorkas order is going to free them up to go after more illegal immigrants.” Fox News: Trump DHS repeals key Mayorkas memo limiting ICE agents, orders parole review

    On January 22, ICE law enforcement’s officers arrested Franz Cadet a 43-year-old citizen of Haiti. Cadet was convicted of multiple drug offenses. 

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    On January 22, ICE law enforcement’s officers arrested Franz Cadet a 43-year-old citizen of Haiti. Cadet was convicted of multiple drug offenses.  | View Original

    “Federal officers swept into sanctuary cities on President Trump’s first full day in office Tuesday, nabbing more than 300 illegal migrant criminals — including an attempted murderer and a child molester — to hold them for deportation.” The New York Post: ICE arrested 308 illegal migrants — including attempted murderer and a child molester — on Trump’s first full day in office

    “The Trump administration is attempting to amass a larger force of law-enforcement officials to help carry out deportations by granting agents across the federal government the same powers as an immigration officer, according to an internal memo.” The Wall Street Journal: Trump Gives Gun, Drug Agents Deportation Power

    “The number of Border Patrol encounters at the southern border in the first three days of the Trump administration is 35% lower than the final three days of the Biden administration, the sources said.” Fox News: Border encounters drop sharply as Trump launches crackdown on illegal immigration 

    MIL Security OSI –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Lukashenko wins Belarus presidential election

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Alexander Lukashenko has won the presidential election of Belarus, receiving 86.82 percent of the vote, according to the preliminary results released early Monday by the country’s Central Election Commission.

    Under Belarusian law, a presidential candidate who secures more than 50 percent of the vote is declared the winner.

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: President Trump is Already Securing Our Border and Deporting Criminal Aliens

    Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

    Headline: President Trump is Already Securing Our Border and Deporting Criminal Aliens

    “Federal officers swept into sanctuary cities on President Trump’s first full day in office Tuesday, nabbing more than 300 illegal migrant criminals — including an attempted murderer and a child molester — to hold them for deportation.” The New York Post: ICE arrested 308 illegal migrants — including attempted murderer and a child molester — on Trump’s first full day in office
    “The Trump administration is attempting to amass a larger force of law-enforcement officials to help carry out deportations by granting agents across the federal government the same powers as an immigration officer, according to an internal memo.” The Wall Street Journal: Trump Gives Gun, Drug Agents Deportation Power
    “The number of Border Patrol encounters at the southern border in the first three days of the Trump administration is 35% lower than the final three days of the Biden administration, the sources said.” Fox News: Border encounters drop sharply as Trump launches crackdown on illegal immigration 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Council to Assess the Federal Emergency Management Agency

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
    Section 1.  Purpose and Policy.  The Federal responses to Hurricane Helene and other recent disasters demonstrate the need to drastically improve the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (“FEMA’s) efficacy, priorities, and competence, including evaluating whether FEMA’s bureaucracy in disaster response ultimately harms the agency’s ability to successfully respond.  Despite obligating nearly $30 billion in disaster aid each of the past three years, FEMA has managed to leave vulnerable Americans without the resources or support they need when they need it most.
    There are serious concerns of political bias in FEMA.  Indeed, at least one former FEMA responder has stated that FEMA managers directed her to avoid homes of individuals supporting the campaign of Donald J. Trump for President.  And it has lost mission focus, diverting limited staff and resources to support missions beyond its scope and authority, spending well over a billion dollars to welcome illegal aliens.
    Americans deserve an immediate, effective, and impartial response to and recovery from disasters.  FEMA therefore requires a full-scale review, by individuals highly experienced at effective disaster response and recovery, who shall recommend to the President improvements or structural changes to promote the national interest and enable national resilience.
    Sec. 2.  Establishment.  (a)  There is hereby established the Federal Emergency Management Agency Review Council (“Council”).
    (b)  The Council shall be composed of not more than 20 members.  The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense shall be members of the Council.  The remaining members shall include relevant agency heads and distinguished individuals and representatives from sectors outside of the Federal Government appointed by the President.  These non-Federal members shall have diverse perspectives and expertise in disaster relief and assistance, emergency preparedness, natural disasters, Federal-State relationships, and budget management.
    (c)  The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense shall serve as Co-Chairs of the Council.  The Co-Chairs may designate up to two Vice Chairs of the Council from among the non-Federal members of the Council, to support the Co-Chairs in the leadership and organization of the Council.
    Sec. 3.  Functions.  (a)  The Council shall advise the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, on the existing ability of FEMA to capably and impartially address disasters occurring within the United States and shall advise the President on all recommended changes related to FEMA to best serve the national interest.
    (b)  The Council shall meet regularly and shall:
    (i)   respond to requests from the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, or the Co-Chairs for information, analysis, evaluation, or advice;
    (ii)  solicit information and ideas from a broad range of stakeholders, including Americans affected by natural disasters; the research community; the private sector; State, local, and Tribal governments; foundations; and nonprofit organizations;
    (c)  The Council shall produce a report for the President that includes the following:
    (i)     An assessment of the adequacy of FEMA’s response to disasters during the previous 4 years, including sufficiency of staffing;
    (ii)    A comparison of the FEMA responses with State, local, and private sector responses — including timeliness of response, supplies provided, efficacy, and services (including communications and electricity) provided — during the same period;
    (iii)   An account of the commentary and debate about the role and operation of FEMA in our Federal system and about the functioning of disaster relief, assistance, and preparedness in the United States;
    (iv)    The historical background of other periods in the Nation’s history both before FEMA was part of DHS and before FEMA existed and methods by which disaster aid and relief were then provided;
    (v)     The traditional role of States and their coordination with the Federal Government in securing the life, liberty, and property of their citizens in preparation for, during, and after disasters;
    (vi)    An evaluation of whether FEMA can serve its functions as a support agency, providing supplemental Federal assistance, to the States rather than supplanting State control of disaster relief;
    (vii)   Other recommended improvements to FEMA in the current statutory structure; and
    (viii)  An analysis of the principal arguments in the public debate for and against FEMA reform, including an appraisal of the merits and legality of particular reform proposals.
    (d)  The Council shall solicit public comment, including other expert views, to ensure that its work is informed by a broad spectrum of ideas.
    (e)  The Council shall hold its first public meeting within 90 days of the date of this order and submit its report to the President within 180 days of the date of the Council’s first public meeting.
    Sec. 4.  Administration.  (a)  The heads of executive departments and agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the Council with information concerning disaster preparedness and relief matters when requested by the Council Co-Chairs and as required for the purpose of carrying out the Council’s functions.
    (b)  In consultation with the Co-Chairs, the Council is authorized to create standing subcommittees and ad hoc groups, including technical advisory groups, to assist the Council and provide preliminary information directly to the Council.
    (c)  The Department of Homeland Security shall provide such funding and administrative and technical support as the Council may require, to the extent permitted by law and as authorized by existing appropriations.
    (d)  Members of the Council shall serve without any compensation for their work on the Council, but may receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the government service (5 U.S.C. 5701-5707).
    (e)  Insofar as the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App.), may apply to the Council, any functions of the President under that Act, except that of reporting to the Congress, shall be performed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in accordance with the guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General Services.
    Sec. 5.  Termination.  The Council shall terminate 1 year from the date of this order unless extended by the President.
    Sec. 6.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
    (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
    (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
    (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
    (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
    THE WHITE HOUSE,
        January 24, 2025.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Government to clean up communities with deposit return scheme for plastic bottles and cans

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Introduction of deposit return scheme will be a step forward in ending the throwaway society and cleaning up Britain

    The Government has today (Monday 27 January) pledged to end the throwaway society and clean up Britain, as it implements legislation for the deposit return scheme for drinks containers in England and Northern Ireland. 

    Once the scheme launches in October 2027, consumers will have a financial incentive to return empty containers to a collection point, such as at their local supermarket, so that the bottle or can will be recycled. 

    Used in more than 50 countries worldwide as a common-sense means of encouraging people to recycle more single-use bottles and cans, a DRS sees people being paid back for returning the container.  

    Countries such as Germany, Sweden and the Republic of Ireland have successfully implemented schemes, ensuring valuable materials are collected, recycled and made back into new drinks containers – a truly circular approach easily grasped by the public. The average return rate for European countries with a DRS is 90%, according to global eNGO Reloop, with Germany showing the best results at 98%. 

    Introducing such a scheme in England, Northern Ireland and Scotland is a simple yet hugely effective way of addressing problems with rubbish building up on our streets and in our rivers and oceans, while also ensuring the public gets money back on their bottle.  

    Across England, Northern Ireland and Scotland, consumers buy an estimated 30 billion single-use drinks containers each year – including 12 billion plastic drinks bottles and 13 billion drinks cans. An estimated 6.5 billion single-use drinks bottles and cans per year go to waste rather than being recycled, with many ending up littered. Research from the Marine Conservation Society shows 97% of surveyed beaches were polluted with drinks-related items in 2023. 

    Encouraging everyone to get involved in recycling, the DRS will be introduced in October 2027, with 150ml to three-litre single-use drinks containers made from plastic and metal included in the scheme. 

    Delivering these reforms and driving investment in the recycling sector delivers on the Government’s Plan for Change through kickstarting growth, ensuring economic stability, greater efficiency, and jobs fit for the future. 

    Circular Economy Minister Mary Creagh said:

    This Government will clean up Britain and end the throwaway society.  

    This is a vital step as we stop the avalanche of rubbish that is filling up our streets, rivers and oceans and protect our treasured wildlife. Turning trash into cash also delivers on our Plan for Change by kickstarting clean growth, ensuring economic stability, more resilient supply chains, and new green jobs.

    Northern Ireland’s Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs Minister Andrew Muir said:

    I have ambitious goals to protect our climate, drive green growth and reduce unnecessary waste. The creation of a Deposit Return Scheme plays a key part in delivering those goals.   

    The introduction of the new parliamentary regulations is a significant step in that process and signals our commitment to move forward together to make those ambitions a reality.

    New legislation for England and Northern Ireland has now come into force, enabling the appointment of the scheme administrator – known as the Deposit Management Organisation – in April 2025. This will be a not-for-profit, industry-led body responsible for the administration and day-to-day running of the scheme.    

    With Scotland’s own regulations also progressing, this marks a major step forward for the introduction of the scheme across the three nations.   

    The three governments will ensure the scheme is implemented effectively, working closely with businesses to provide the infrastructure and investment to make it a success.   

    Allison Ogden-Newton OBE, Chief Executive of environmental charity Keep Britain Tidy, said:

    A Deposit Return Scheme really is a silver bullet that will get plastic drinks bottles and aluminium cans out of our parks, off our streets and away from our rivers and seas.  

    Depressingly we litter, burn or bury millions of drinks containers each and every day. This legislation will end all that, save the taxpayer millions in clean-up costs and give recycling a real shot in the arm.  

    Backed and paid for by producers, this method of retrieval and recycling is tried and tested the world over so at Keep Britain Tidy we are putting out the bunting that this government is committed to make it happen, for us all.

    Stephen Moorhouse, Vice President and General Manager of Coca-Cola Europacific Partners GB Business Unit, said:

    We’ve been supportive of launching a DRS across the UK for a number of years as they are a proven way of increasing recycling, reducing waste and tackling litter. Therefore, we welcome the clarity provided by the regulation for England and Northern Ireland and are encouraged by recent developments that will ensure an aligned scheme with Scotland, despite wider challenges around a UK-wide approach. 

    Delivering to the timelines will be challenging but achievable, and now is the time for industry to roll up its sleeves to create a well-designed system that works for businesses, shoppers and the environment.

    Association of Convenience Stores chief executive James Lowman said:  

    We are pleased to have certainty on the DRS regulations so local shops can start to prepare for October 2027 and our communities can realise the benefits of reduced litter and higher quality recycled materials.  

    Now the real work begins to make the deposit return scheme a success through cross-industry partnership and a planned network of return points that work for customers.

    Sandy Luk, Chief Executive at the Marine Conservation Society, said:

    Today marks a fantastic win for our seas, as MPs voted in favour of a deposit return scheme in England and Northern Ireland. With plans already in motion in Scotland and the Welsh Government exploring an ambitious scheme to include reuse, this is a great step towards schemes starting across the UK in October 2027.  

    Last year, 97% of surveyed UK beaches were polluted with bottles and cans, posing threat to marine life like seabirds and seals. Deposit return schemes will not only boost recycling and move us towards a circular economy where nothing is thrown away but also significantly reduce this kind of beach pollution.  

    We’re excited to support governments and industry in launching these schemes as soon as possible.

    Hitting this milestone is another big step forward for the Government’s collection and packaging reforms, which together will support 21,000 new jobs and stimulate more than £10 billion of investment in recycling over the next decade. 

    The action to clean up Britain doesn’t end there – there is more to come as the Government moves to ensure the throwaway society is ended for good.  

    Legislation has been laid to ban the sale of single-use vapes from 1 June 2025 and prevent the waste of precious resources – eNGO Material Focus estimates almost five million single-use vapes were either littered or thrown away in general waste every week in 2023.  

    In December 2024, the Government moved to stop recycling rates stagnating and the reliance on the burning of household waste by announcing that new waste incinerators will only receive planning approval if they meet strict new local and environmental conditions.  

    The Government has also announced that a £15 million government fund will help deliver thousands of tonnes of food from farms which would otherwise go to waste to those who need it most.

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    Published 27 January 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Support for changing date of Australia Day softens, but remains strong among young people — new research

    ANALYSIS: By David Lowe, Deakin University; Andrew Singleton, Deakin University, and Joanna Cruickshank, Deakin University

    After many years of heated debate over whether January 26 is an appropriate date to celebrate Australia Day — with some councils and other groups shifting away from it — the tide appears to be turning among some groups.

    Some local councils, such as Geelong in Victoria, are reversing recent policy and embracing January 26 as a day to celebrate with nationalistic zeal.

    They are likely emboldened by what they perceive as an ideological shift occurring more generally in Australia and around the world.

    But what of young people? Are young Australians really becoming more conservative and nationalistic, as some are claiming? For example, the Institute for Public Affairs states that “despite relentless indoctrination taking place at schools and universities”, their recent survey showed a 10 percent increase in the proportion of 18-24 year olds who wanted to celebrate Australia Day.

    However, the best evidence suggests that claims of a shift towards conservatism among young people are unsupported.

    The statement “we should not celebrate Australia Day on January 26” was featured in the Deakin Contemporary History Survey in 2021, 2023, and 2024.

    Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement level. The Deakin survey is a repeated cross-sectional study conducted using the Life in Australia panel, managed by the Social Research Centre. This is a nationally representative online probability panel with more than 2000 respondents for each Deakin survey.

    Robust social survey
    With its large number of participants, weighting and probability selection, the Life in Australia panel is arguably Australia’s most reliable and robust social survey.

    The Deakin Contemporary History Survey consists of several questions about the role of history in contemporary society, hence our interest in whether or how Australians might want to celebrate a national day.

    Since 1938, when Aboriginal leaders first declared January 26 a “Day of Mourning”, attitudes to this day have reflected how people in Australia see the nation’s history, particularly about the historical and contemporary dispossession and oppression of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.

    In 2023, we found support for Australia Day on January 26 declined slightly from 2021, and wondered if a more significant change in community sentiment was afoot.

    With the addition of the 2024 data, we find that public opinion is solidifying — less a volatile “culture war” and more a set of established positions. Here is what we found:



    This figure shows that agreement (combining “strongly agree” and “agree”) with not celebrating Australia Day on January 26 slightly increased in 2023, but returned to the earlier level a year later.

    Likewise, disagreement with the statement (again, combining “strongly disagree” and “disagree”) slightly dipped in 2023, but in 2024 returned to levels observed in 2021. “Don’t know” and “refused” responses have consistently remained below 3 percent across all three years. Almost every Australian has a position on when we should celebrate Australia Day, if at all.

    Statistical factors
    The 2023 dip might reflect a slight shift in public opinion or be due to statistical factors, such as sampling variability. Either way, public sentiment on this issue seems established.

    As Gunai/Kurnai, Gunditjmara, Wiradjuri and Yorta Yorta writer Nayuka Gorrie and Amangu Yamatji woman associate professor Crystal McKinnon have written, the decline in support for Australia Day is the result of decades of activism by Indigenous people.

    Though conservative voices have become louder since the failure of the Voice Referendum in 2023, more than 40 percent of the population now believes Australia Day should not be celebrated on January 26.

    In addition, the claim of a significant swing towards Australia Day among younger Australians is unsupported.

    In 2024, as in earlier iterations of our survey, we found younger Australians (18–34) were more likely to agree that Australia Day should not be celebrated on January 26. More than half of respondents in that age group (53 percent) supported that change, compared to 39 percent of 35–54-year-olds, 33 percent of 55–74-year-olds, and 29 percent of those aged 75 and older.

    Conversely, disagreement increases with age. We found 69 percent of those aged 75 and older disagreed, followed by 66 percent of 55–74-year-olds, 59 percent of 35–54-year-olds, and 43 percent of 18–34-year-olds. These trends suggest a steady shift, indicating that an overall majority may favour change within the next two decades.

    What might become of Australia Day? We asked those who thought we should not celebrate Australia Day on January 26 what alternative they preferred the most.



    Among those who do not want to celebrate Australia Day on January 26, 36 percent prefer replacing it with a new national day on a different date, while 32 percent favour keeping the name but moving it to a different date.

    A further 13 percent support keeping January 26 but renaming it to reflect diverse history, and 8 percent advocate abolishing any national day entirely. Another 10 percent didn’t want these options, and less than 1 peecent were unsure.

    A lack of clarity
    If the big picture suggests a lack of clarity — with nearly 58 percent of the population wanting to keep Australia Day as it is, but 53 percent of younger Australians supporting change — then the task of finding possible alternatives to the status quo seems even more clouded.

    Gorrie and McKinnon point to the bigger issues at stake for Indigenous people: treaties, land back, deaths in custody, climate justice, reparations and the state removal of Aboriginal children.

    Yet, as our research continues to show, there are few without opinions on this question, and we should not expect it to recede as an issue that animates Australians.

    Dr David Lowe is chair in contemporary history, Deakin University; Dr Andrew Singleton is professor of sociology and social research, Deakin University; and Joanna Cruickshank is associate professor in history, Deakin University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Albanese records worst Newspoll ratings this term; Victorian Labor’s primary plunges

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Adrian Beaumont, Election Analyst (Psephologist) at The Conversation; and Honorary Associate, School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne

    A national Newspoll, conducted January 20–24 from a sample of 1,259, gave the Coalition a 51–49 lead, a one-point gain for the Coalition since the previous Newspoll in early December. Primary votes were 39% Coalition (steady), 31% Labor (down two), 12% Greens (up one), 7% One Nation (steady) and 11% for all Others (up one).

    In three of the last four Newspolls, the Coalition has had a 51–49 lead. This is the consensus of the polls at the moment, as can be seen from the graph below. The federal election is not due until May, and this position is recoverable for Labor, but they would probably lose now. I had more comments on this last Thursday.

    The worst news from Newspoll for Labor was Anthony Albanese’s ratings, which slumped six points since December to a term-low net approval of -20, with 57% dissatisfied and 37% satisfied.

    Peter Dutton’s net approval increased one point to -11. Albanese led Dutton by 44–41 as better PM (45–38 in December). This three-point margin for Albanese is a term low.

    The graph below shows Albanese’s Newspoll ratings this term. The individual polls are marked with plus signs and a smoothed line has been fitted.

    There have been five polls in January of leaders’ ratings from Freshwater, YouGov, Resolve, Essential and Newspoll. On average, Albanese is at -15 net approval and Dutton at -3.2. If not for a net zero approval from Essential, Albanese’s ratings would be worse.

    Additional Resolve questions

    I previously covered the mid-January Resolve poll for Nine newspapers that gave Dutton a 39–34 preferred PM lead over Albanese. In additional questions, by 61–24, voters supported keeping Australia’s national day on January 26 over changing to another date (47–39 in January 2023).

    The thumping defeat of the October 2023 Voice referendum has damaged the push to change the date. By 52–24, voters supported legislating so that January 26 is enshrined in law as Australia’s national day.

    By 54–9, respondents thought there had been more antisemitism over more Islamophobia in recent months (32–14 in October). By 51–24, they thought the conflict in the Middle East had made Australia a less safe place (45–26 in October).

    Victorian Resolve poll: Labor’s primary plunges to 22%

    A Victorian state Resolve poll
    for The Age, conducted with the federal December and January Resolve polls from a sample of over 1,000, gave the Coalition 42% of the primary vote (up four since November), Labor 22% (down six), the Greens 13% (steady), independents 17% (up three) and others 6% (down one).

    Resolve doesn’t usually give a two-party estimate, but The Age’s article said that on 2022 election preference flows, the Coalition would have a 55.5–44.5 lead. Independents would be unlikely to get 17% at an election, but they are on the readout everywhere in Resolve polls until after nominations close.

    In late December, Brad Battin was elected Liberal leader in a party room vote, replacing John Pesutto. From just the January sample, Battin led Labor incumbent Jacinta Allan as preferred premier by 36–27 (30–29 to Pesutto in November).

    Victorian Labor’s unpopularity is hurting federal Labor in Victoria. The Poll Bludger’s BludgerTrack has a 5.3% swing against Labor in Victoria, with swings in the other mainland states at 2% or less.

    By the November 2026 election, Labor will have governed in Victoria for 12 successive years and for 23 of the 27 years since 1999. An “it’s time” factor is probably contributing to Labor’s woes.

    State byelections will occur on February 8 in Labor-held Werribee and Greens-held Prahran. At the 2022 election, Labor won Werribee by a 60.9–39.1 margin against the Liberals, while the Greens won Prahran by 62.0–38.0 against the Liberals.

    In Prahran, which Labor is not contesting, Tony Lupton, who was the Labor MP from 2002 to 2010, is running as an independent. The Liberals and Lupton will swap preferences on their how to vote material. Voters can choose their own preferences instead of following their candidate’s recommendations, but many will follow those recommendations.

    Germany and Canada

    I covered German and Canadian electoral developments for The Poll Bludger on Saturday. The German federal election is in about four weeks, on February 23. Polls are bleak for the left, with big gains likely for the far-right AfD.

    Justin Trudeau announced he would resign as Canadian Liberal leader and PM on January 6 once a new Liberal leader had been elected, which will occur on March 9. The Conservatives had a big lead in last Monday’s update to the CBC Poll Tracker, but there’s a new poll that gives the Conservatives just a 3.8-point lead. Trudeau promised to reform Canada’s electoral system before he won the October 2015 election, but did nothing.

    Adrian Beaumont does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Albanese records worst Newspoll ratings this term; Victorian Labor’s primary plunges – https://theconversation.com/albanese-records-worst-newspoll-ratings-this-term-victorian-labors-primary-plunges-248222

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    January 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese premier holds symposium with foreign experts in China

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Chinese Premier Li Qiang holds a symposium with representatives of foreign experts who have won the 2024 Chinese Government Friendship Award and those who are working in China ahead of the Chinese New Year at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, capital of China, Jan. 26, 2025. Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang attended the symposium. [Photo/Xinhua]

    BEIJING, Jan. 26 — Chinese Premier Li Qiang on Sunday held a symposium at the Great Hall of the People with representatives of foreign experts who have won the 2024 Chinese Government Friendship Award and those who are working in China.

    Li extended Chinese Lunar New Year wishes and sincere greetings to the foreign experts, and thanked them for their long-term concern and support for China’s modernization efforts. He also listened to their opinions and suggestions on China’s reform, development and government work.

    Experts from countries including the United Kingdom, Poland, Mali, Romania, Germany and Pakistan delivered speeches on topics such as scientific and technological innovation, economic and trade cooperation, people-to-people and cultural exchanges, international communication and talent development.

    Foreign experts have made positive contributions to China’s new achievements in development in the past year, Li said. Their experiences of working and living in China exemplify the positive interaction and deep integration between China and the world, he said.

    Noting that the world needs communication and the process of globalization is irreversible, Li said China consistently advocates strengthening international dialogue and will continue to uphold openness and inclusiveness while actively promoting international exchanges in various fields.

    The premier stressed that innovation requires cooperation, and as the new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation deepens, scientific research has become increasingly complex and systematic, making open cooperation both a trend and an inevitable choice.

    China will continue to expand openness in science and technology, broaden and deepen joint research, actively participate in global technology governance, collaborate with all nations to solve practical problems and jointly address global challenges, he said.

    He said China’s doors will always remain open to talents from all countries. The Chinese government will further optimize relevant policies, enhance service guarantees, and build more international exchange and cooperation platforms, continuously creating favorable conditions for foreign talents to work in China, said the premier.

    Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang attended the symposium.

    MIL OSI China News –

    January 27, 2025
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