NewzIntel.com

Category: Politics

  • MIL-OSI Security: Murder Defendant Extradited from El Salvador for 2013 Stabbing

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

                WASHINGTON – Angel Monge, 51, of El Salvador, was transported from El Salvador to the United States by members of the Capital Area Regional Fugitive Task Force, on October 18, 2024, and placed under arrest for a September 2013 murder. Monge was presented in Superior Court in the District of Columbia the next day when the Honorable Leslie Meeke ordered him to be held without bond. The arrest and extradition were announced by U.S. Attorney Matthew M. Graves.

               According to the government’s evidence, at approximately 6:11 p.m. on September 2, 2013, the United States Park Police (USPP) received a call for an unconscious person located in Grove #6 of the park at Beach Road in Northwest D.C. Upon arrival, USPP officers found a deceased male lying on a creek bed. The Metropolitan Police Department and the D.C. Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) were notified. The OCME conducted an autopsy on the decedent, who was later identified as Matias Molina, 49, of Washington, D.C. Autopsy results showed that the cause of death was multiple sharp force wounds and the manner of death was determined to be a homicide. The case was presented before a grand jury and, in 2015, Angel Dilmar Monge was indicted on a charge of second-degree murder while armed. A bench warrant was issued and Monge was eventually located in El Salvador.   

              This case is being investigated by the Metropolitan Police Department.

              The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Dennis Clark.

              The U.S. Attorney’s Office would like to thank the members of the Capital Area Regional Fugitive Task Force. The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs worked with the Government of El Salvador to secure the arrest and extradition of Monge.

              An indictment is merely an allegation and all defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-Evening Report: View from The Hill: We have bigger issues around freedom of speech than Lidia Thorpe’s noisy protest

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

    King Charles – as the old-fashioned saying goes – didn’t come down in the last shower. He’s unlikely to have been fazed by the outburst from independent senator Lidia Thorpe, who disrupted Monday’s Parliament House reception for the royals.

    And neither, frankly, should anyone else.

    Thorpe, clad in a possum-skin cloak, shouted: “You are not our king.”

    “You destroyed our land. Give us a treaty. We want a treaty in this country. You are a genocidalist.”

    “You committed genocide against our people. Give us our land back. Give us what you stole from us – our bones, our skulls, our babies, our people.”

    The conduct of Thorpe, who used to be with the Greens and is an outspoken advocate of ‘Blak sovereignty’, was rude, albeit absolutely in character. She acts up in the parliament regularly.

    As a senator, Thorpe, who was escorted out of the Great Hall, still yelling, had the right to be at the reception. And it is not the only time a parliamentarian has created a fuss when a dignitary was visiting. In 2003, Greens senator Bob Brown shouted out during the address to the joint houses by US President George W. Bush.

    While not at all condoning Thorpe’s exhibitionism, she wasn’t inciting violence. Was she bringing our parliament into disrepute? Sadly, many parliamentarians do that all the time in less dramatic ways, as visitors to question time will tell you.

    Those muttering that perhaps there should be some parliamentary censure of Thorpe are misguided. As Senate Opposition leader Simon Birmingham pointed out on Tuesday, Thorpe “would probably revel in being censured by the Senate”. The one thing she wants is publicity.

    Thorpe pushes her right to air her views to the limit, but her antics are not at the sharp end of the current “free speech” debate in this country. There are two, very different and much more important, fronts in that debate.

    One relates to the pro-Palestine demonstrations. The other is the government’s attempt to crack down on misinformation and disinformation on digital platforms.

    Those on the political right tend to play down worries about limiting free expression when it comes to the pro-Palestinian demonstrations. On the other hand, they are worried about putting more restrictions on the internet. Those on the left tend to support the battle against misinformation and disinformation on digital platforms, and are less worried about its free speech impact.

    Increasing antisemitism has fuelled calls for the ubiquitous pro-Palestinian protests to be curbed in some way.

    Critics highlight the hate preached on occasion; they say the demonstrations make Jewish Australians feel unsafe, disrupt citizens’ weekends, and are a drag on police resources.

    What are the relevant rights here, and their comparative weights? The right to free expression and protest. The right to feel safe. The right for people to go about their business without undue inconvenience. The tradeoffs are much more complicated than any questions thrown up by Thorpe’s behaviour.

    The number and regularity of the pro-Palestine demonstrations have driven some critics to argue enough is enough. That is not convincing, and nor is the argument that these protests soak up police resources. Unfortunately, these are the costs of preserving the right to protest.

    Much more troubling is that these protests can foster hate and make people feel threatened in their own country. Here balances must be carefully struck, and that’s hard.

    Incitement laws must be enforced. Beyond that, demonstrations have to be managed, so that the protesters’ right to have their say and the safety of others, especially a vulnerable section of the population, are both preserved.

    So for example, it’s important university campuses can have protests (as they always have). But “encampments” on campuses have been properly condemned and should not be allowed.

    Even more complex in the free speech debate is how to deal with disinformation (the deliberate spread of false information) and misinformation (where the misleading is not deliberate).

    The government presently has a bill in parliament seeking to combat misinformation and disinformation on digital platforms. It is a reworked version of a much-attacked earlier draft.

    In her second reading speech on the bill last month, Communications Minister Michelle Rowland said:

    To protect freedom of speech, the bill [which does not apply to “professional news content”] sets a high threshold for the type of misinformation and disinformation that digital platforms must combat on their services – that is, it must be reasonably verifiable as false, misleading or deceptive and reasonably likely to cause or contribute to serious harm.

    The harm must have significant and far-reaching consequences for Australian society, or severe consequences for an individual in Australia.

    Among the “serious harms” in the bill is “harm to the operation or integrity of an electoral or referendum process in Australia”.

    The struggle against misinformation and disinformation on digital platforms will always be a losing one. The reach is just too vast.

    But more particularly, there is also the problem that what is “misinformation” and “disinformation” can be less clear than one might think. On occasion, what seems wrong at the time turns out to be correct later.

    Beyond those obvious points, some material so-labelled is not one or the other but disputed information.

    For example, proponents of the Voice have blamed its loss at least partly on misinformation and disinformation. However, much of this involved highly contested claims, especially about an unpredictable future.

    What this legislation does is push as much responsibility as it can, backed by a regulatory framework, onto the platforms to do the censoring of misinformation and disinformation, thus trying to avoid constitutional issues of implied freedom of political communication.

    Human rights lawyer Frank Brennan has written, “The real challenge for Minister Rowland is that debating such a detailed bill without the backstop of a constitutional or statutory bill of rights recognising the right to freedom of expression, there are no clear guard rails for getting the balance right for ‘the freedom of expression that is so fundamental to our democracy’.”

    All things considered, It is hard to see the bill clearing its obstacle course before the election.

    Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. View from The Hill: We have bigger issues around freedom of speech than Lidia Thorpe’s noisy protest – https://theconversation.com/view-from-the-hill-we-have-bigger-issues-around-freedom-of-speech-than-lidia-thorpes-noisy-protest-241906

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI: Everest Business Funding Named a 2024 Best and Brightest Company to Work For in the Nation

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, Oct. 22, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Everest Business Funding is proud to announce its inclusion on the list of 2024 Best and Brightest Companies to Work For in the Nation. This prestigious award, bestowed by the National Association for Business Resources (NABR), honors companies that excel in innovative business practices and human resource strategies. These are companies that distinguish themselves as industry leaders.

    The Best and Brightest Companies to Work For award highlights businesses across the United States that prioritize employee engagement, workforce development, and workplace culture. The award-winners were evaluated by an independent research firm on various metrics, including compensation, benefits, employee engagement, diversity and inclusion initiatives, and community involvement.

    Everest Business Funding provides revenue-based financing to entrepreneurs and business owners. The company is committed to helping those with strong entrepreneurial spirits obtain working capital in order to accelerate growth. Everest Business Funding’s leaders understand that its team members are foundational to this mission of providing hassle-free funding to eligible parties.

    The recognition from NABR reflects the company’s commitment to fostering an inclusive work environment and high-performing workforce. Everest Business Funding’s leadership team has emphasized the importance of employee well-being and engagement as critical components of the company’s success. By implementing innovative human resources practices, the team has created an environment that promotes growth and collaboration.

    Everest Business Funding is honored to receive this national recognition. The company strives to place employees at the core of everything it does and is committed to creating a positive and supportive environment where everyone can thrive. This award is a testament to the dedication and passion of Everest Business Funding’s leadership team as well as the individual commitment of each of its employees.

    With this recognition as one of the Best and Brightest Companies to Work For, Everest Business Funding reinforces its position as an industry leader that values its employees and remains committed to creating a workplace that encourages innovation, collaboration, and professional development.

    The Best and Brightest Companies to Work For award is part of a national program conducted by NABR, which has over 25 years of experience recognizing companies with exceptional workplace standards. The winners were selected based on a comprehensive review of factors such as employee retention, work-life balance, and leadership strategies.

    NABR’s comprehensive selection process adds to the prestige of the award. Only the best of the best make it onto the annual list, and Everest Business Funding is proud to have been recognized as one of the premier organizations in the country.

    About Everest Business Funding

    Everest Business Funding provides alternative finance options and revenue-based funding to small business owners. They serve a diverse pool of businesses, from healthcare to retail, to help them obtain working capital to grow, buy inventory, launch marketing campaigns, or hire staff. Everest Business Funding’s clients are treated with respect and receive high-quality guidance and service from its professionals.

    Media Contact
    Anthony Parker
    Everest Business Funding
    888-342-5709
    Info@everestbusinessfunding.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Appointment of Court of Protection general and special visitors

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    New general and special visitors supporting work delivered by the Office of the Public Guardian

    The Office of the Public Guardian (OPG) has announced the appointment of 21 new Court of Protection general visitors and 18 new special visitors.

    General visitors are public appointees who support OPG in supervising court appointed deputies. They also play a key role in OPG investigations by conducting mental capacity assessments.

    The general visitor appointments have had ministerial approval and started their tenure in February 2024, for a period of 10 years. They are:

    • Adele Ginley
    • Ashley Holderness
    • Carol Bailey
    • Emma Cox
    • Hainna Allan
    • Jacqueline Campbell
    • Jacqui James-Hunt
    • Jemma Page
    • John Gbongitta
    • Julie Cummins
    • Katherine Lees
    • Kikelomo Ananti
    • Marla Cattelona
    • Michelle Clayton
    • Michelle Gresty
    • Nicola Bodell
    • Sarah Erlacher
    • Satvinda Rai
    • Susannah Quinlan
    • Terri Warrilow
    • Victoria Buckley-Horsfied

    Four existing general visitors were also re-appointed in February 2024 for a further tenure of 10 years. They are:

    • Fiona Neave
    • Jacqueline Hawkins
    • Jenny Blackwell
    • Rachael Heeley

    Special visitors are public appointees who support OPG and the Court of Protection by providing both organisations with mental capacity assessments.

    The special visitor appointments have had ministerial approval and started their tenure in September 2024, for a period of 10 years. They are:

    • Dr Mogbeyiteran Eyeoyibo
    • Dr Christine Taylor
    • Dr Abigail Cheeseman
    • Dr Kapila Sachdev
    • Dr Malarvizhi Babu Sandilyan
    • Dr Azmath Khan
    • Dr Shabnum Ali
    • Dr Witold Skalbania
    • Dr Sam Gower
    • Dr Sam White
    • Christine Hutchinson
    • Dr Ashish Arora
    • Dr Ruth Freeman
    • Dr Abhishek Shastri
    • Dr Galina Zhinchin
    • Dr Elizabeth Pulford
    • Dr Omolaja Kassim
    • Dr Kishan Thakrar

    Five existing special visitors were re-appointed in September 2024 for a further tenure of 10 years. They are:

    • Dr Karla Greenberg
    • Dr Ola Junaid
    • Dr Sarah Constantine
    • Dr Marion Gray
    • Dr Packeerowther Saleem

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Proposing to create a UK Airspace Design Service

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Announcing a consultation on the creation of a new UK Airspace Design Service (UKADS).

    This was published under the 2022 Truss Conservative government
    Location:
    House of Commons
    Delivered on:

    Today, the Department for Transport (DfT) and Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) are launching a consultation proposing the creation of a new UK Airspace Design Service (UKADS) that would act as a single guiding mind for modernising the design of UK airspace.

    The consultation demonstrates the government’s commitment to delivering holistic and modernised UK airspace as part of the CAA’s Airspace Modernisation Strategy (AMS). The AMS vision is to provide quicker, quieter and cleaner journeys and more capacity for the benefit of those who use and are affected by UK airspace.

    Modernisation will help meet the needs of passengers, businesses and the wider economy while bringing environmental improvements that contribute towards the aviation sector achieving net zero emissions by 2050.

    UK airspace is an invisible but vital piece of our national infrastructure. Using an ageing network of ground navigation beacons, its design has remained largely unchanged since the 1950s when there were fewer than 1 million flights per year in UK airspace. This compares with 2.5 million flights in 2019 and projections of 3 million annually by 2030 (NATS (En Route) plc forecast traffic growth estimates (2026 to 2040)). In many cases, today’s aircraft still use the same outdated routes flying further than necessary at sub-optimal altitudes and speeds because the routes rely on the location of the ground navigation beacons, instead of following shorter, more efficient flight paths.

    Doing nothing is not an option. If UK airspace is not modernised, NATS (En Route) plc (NERL), the UK’s licensed provider of en route air traffic control services, estimates that by 2040, delays at a national level may increase by more than 200%, which would result in one in 5 flights experiencing disruption of more than 45 minutes (airspace change masterplan iteration 2, CAP2312b, ACOG (2022)).

    Modernised airspace will make it easier for aircraft to fly more direct routes, with better climb and descent profiles to and from energy-efficient cruising altitudes to help reduce CO2 emissions. It will also ensure that future technologies such as remotely piloted aircraft systems can operate beyond visual line of sight in the UK in a safe and efficient manner.

    The current model for airspace change requires airports and air traffic control providers to develop their own airspace designs individually. Coordinating these changes creates significant challenges, particularly for the airports in and around the complex London area where airspace designs overlap.

    The consultation proposes creating a new single guiding mind on future airspace design, to deliver much-needed modernisation at scale and at pace. This will help to instil confidence among stakeholders in the delivery of airspace changes that will facilitate overall reductions in carbon emissions, noise and delays.

    The consultation seeks views on the overall concept of a UKADS, including its responsibilities, governance and funding. Views from stakeholders will be critical to the next phase of work and we welcome responses from all interested parties.

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Strategic plan for long-term energy infrastructure

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Strategic spatial plan to provide a blueprint for Great Britain’s energy infrastructure

    Strategic spatial plan commissioned for energy infrastructure

    • new plan to provide a blueprint for Great Britain’s energy infrastructure out to 2050, providing stability for investors
    • more strategic approach will help cut grid connection waiting times, reducing overall system costs and accelerating the government’s clean energy superpower mission
    • UK, Scottish and Welsh energy ministers commission National Energy System Operator (NESO) to produce first ever spatial plan for energy in 2026

    The location for new energy infrastructure will be set out in a strategic plan to speed up the transition away from fossil fuels and accelerate the government’s clean energy superpower mission.

    Taking this more strategic approach will provide much-needed long-term certainty and stability for investors and accelerate the growth of the UK’s clean energy industries, creating more jobs and improving lives in communities across the UK.

    Building on work to deliver clean power by 2030, energy ministers in the Scottish, Welsh, and UK governments have asked the newly formed National Energy System Operator (NESO) to produce the first ever strategic spatial plan for energy out to 2050, across land and sea in Great Britain. Planning of energy infrastructure in this way will help cut grid connection waiting times, giving investors confidence on where to build and when.

    The publicly owned body will look at how to best spread new energy projects across the country in a way that takes into account other sectors, such as transport and water supply, as well as the environment. This wide-angle lens will speed up project delivery and reduce overall system costs, which could in turn bring down bills for consumers.

    The first iteration of the plan will be published in 2026 and will focus on electricity generation and storage, including hydrogen assets, from offshore wind farms to pumped storage hydro.

    Minister for Energy Michael Shanks said:

    To help drive growth and investment in our clean energy future, we need to provide investors with the long-term certainty and stability that they have been crying out for.

    That’s why we need a more strategic approach to our energy system, ensuring we can quickly scale up investment in the right infrastructure where we need it, to keep costs down and speed up our transition to clean power.

    Delivering the country’s first ever spatial plan will be a major milestone for our new public energy body.

    Welsh Government Cabinet Secretary for Economy, Energy and Planning, Rebecca Evans, said:

    We welcome this strategic approach to the energy system, which should reduce overall costs and bring certainty to communities.

    In Wales we have been developing plans to meet our energy needs at the local, regional and national level for some years and look forward to working collaboratively with the NESO and others to feed into these UK-wide plans. Getting this right will help ensure we deliver the best possible outcomes for our communities and our industries through the considered development of the clean energy they will need to power them.

    Acting Cabinet Secretary for Net Zero and Energy, Gillian Martin MSP, said:

    I am committed to working collaboratively with other governments where it can accelerate progress towards Scotland’s economic and net zero targets.  

    Key to the plan’s success will be ensuring that investor confidence is maintained throughout.

    It is also vital that it takes into account the nature of devolved policies and ambitions, delivers real benefits for the people and communities of Scotland and supports our ongoing efforts for a just transition.

    I look forward to working with the UK and Welsh governments on the plan as it develops.

    Kayte O’Neill, Chief Operating Officer, NESO said:

    We are delighted to receive this formal commission as NESO to develop this plan and bring together our expertise and that of our partners to develop this critical blueprint for Great Britain’s energy system of the future. 

    By setting out pathway options, engaging across government, the regulator, wider industry, interested parties and with communities as well as exploring the needs at a more zonal and regional level we can then identify where and what type of electricity and storage technologies we need to meet our future demand and decarbonisation ambitions.

    Alistair Phillips-Davies, Chief Executive, SSE: 

    As one of the largest investors in clean power in the UK we are very supportive of the strategic spatial energy plan. Having long-term stability through spatial plans and policy mechanisms will be critical to unlocking billions of pounds of investment across the country, supporting good jobs and building a homegrown energy system that is cleaner, more affordable and secure.

    CEO of Ofgem, Jonathan Brearley, said: 

    I warmly welcome and strongly support this commission to create the first national energy blueprint for Britain’s future energy system.

    It will be a real gamechanger in unlocking growth and investment, accelerating new infrastructure build, and speeding up innovation and technology. It will be a big stepping stone in delivering government’s mission to provide clean power by 2030 and accelerate the transition to net zero.  

    Ofgem will work closely alongside the UK, Scottish and Welsh governments, as well as NESO, to protect consumers and to deliver clean power at the lowest possible cost.

    NESO will develop several options for how the energy system could look in the future which will be presented to ministers. The chosen option will be taken forward to public consultation alongside detailed environmental assessments.

    Notes to editors

    Minister Shanks is today launching the SSEP at an event in parliament.

    NESO will publish its consultation on methodology later this year, and deliver the plan in 2026.

    See the SSEP letter and commission

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Flagship Government export initiative to be sponsored by Santander UK

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Santander UK has committed to a three-year sponsorship of a programme of Department for Business and Trade (DBT) events.

    Santander UK has committed to a three-year sponsorship of a programme of Department for Business and Trade (DBT) events, which will help UK businesses of all sizes realise the opportunities presented by global trade.

    The sponsorship will cover DBT’s flagship annual export initiative, International Trade Week, taking place from 11th to 15th November 2024, as well as the UK Export Academy and a number of international trade shows.

    Now in its fourth year, International Trade Week is a collaboration between DBT and industry featuring a variety of free activities such as masterclasses, workshops and webinars. It’s aimed at all UK businesses, whether they are looking to secure their first export contract or expand their existing international sales.
    Themes running through the week this year include digital trade, selling to Europe and exporting for the first time, although events will cover a wide range of topics. Attendees will be able to develop their exporting knowledge and skills, hear from international-trade experts and learn about the support on offer from DBT and its partners, including Santander UK.

    DBT and Santander UK share a common goal; to help UK SMEs grow through exports. This partnership demonstrates that both organisations are working hand in hand to that end.

    John Carroll, Head of International and Transactional Banking, Santander UK, said:

    “It’s an exciting time to be a UK business looking to expand globally, but it’s not without its challenges. Our Trade Barometer research shows that businesses are calling out for more support from government and the private sector, and we’re pleased to be working with DBT to play our part in helping businesses turn their international dreams into a reality.

    “Through our local connections, international teams and digital international trade platform, Santander Navigator, we’ve already helped over 1,500 companies grow internationally since 2019.  We are thrilled to be supporting International Trade Week as part of the launch of a multi-year partnership, enabling us to make a difference to the UK’s economic growth by supporting even more UK businesses in taking their next step on their export journeys.”

    Gareth Thomas, Minister for Exports, said:

    “When businesses export, they hire more staff and increase wages which all helps to grow the economy. That’s why we’re working with businesses of all sizes to cut trade barriers and open new routes to market.

    “Santander’s three-year backing of our International Trade Week is a strong endorsement of the UK’s trade and investment strategy, as we work together to get more small businesses growing and exporting around the world.”

    Businesses can register for International Trade Week at: great.gov.uk/campaign-site/itw.

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI: Gilat Satellite Networks to Attend APEX/IFSA Conference to Discuss State-of the Art In-Flight Connectivity Solutions for Aviation Markets

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    PETAH TIKVA, Israel, Oct. 22, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Gilat Satellite Networks Ltd. (Nasdaq: GILT, TASE: GILT), a worldwide leader in satellite networking technology, solutions, and services, announced today its attendance at the APEX/IFSA Global Expo in Long Beach, California, from October 28-30, 2024. Gilat is inviting participants to schedule meetings to discuss their in-flight connectivity (IFC) needs and explore how Gilat’s advanced ESA (Electronically Steered Antenna), SSPA (Solid-State Power Amplifier), KPSU (Ka/KU Power Supply Unit), and FCU (Frequency Converter Unit) solutions are transforming in-flight connectivity.

    Driving the Future of IFC with Cutting-Edge ESA Technology

    Gilat’s innovative, single LRU solution ESAs are ideal for commercial, business, and military aviation, providing robust, reliable, and seamless satellite connectivity. With the best size, weight and power in its class, these state-of-the-art solutions meet the increasing demand for high-performance IFC across the globe.

    In addition to its ESA technology, Gilat’s Wavestream subsidiary offers market-leading SSPAs (Solid-State Power Amplifiers), KPSUs (Ka/Ku-band Power Supply Units), and FCUs (Frequency Converter Units.) These components are designed to ensure optimal performance and efficiency, delivering high-speed internet services for passengers on both large commercial aircraft and private business jets.

    Meet with Us at APEX/IFSA

    Gilat invites APEX/IFSA attendees to set up meetings with its team to discuss the evolving needs of in-flight connectivity and learn more about its innovative satellite solutions. Airline and IFC service providers are encouraged to connect with Gilat to explore how its technology can enhance their in-flight connectivity offerings.

    To schedule a meeting with Gilat at the APEX/IFSA Global Expo, please contact either Timor Blau at 858-999-1036 or Raju Chandra at 909-741-0600, raju.chandra@wavestream.com.

    About Gilat

    Gilat Satellite Networks Ltd. (NASDAQ: GILT, TASE: GILT) is a leading global provider of satellite-based broadband communications. With over 35 years of experience, we create and deliver deep technology solutions for satellite, ground, and new space connectivity and provide comprehensive, secure end-to-end solutions and services for mission-critical operations, powered by our innovative technology. We believe in the right of all people to be connected and are united in our resolution to provide communication solutions to all reaches of the world.

    Our portfolio includes a diverse offering to deliver high-value solutions for multiple orbit constellations with very high throughput satellites (VHTS) and software-defined satellites (SDS). Our offering is comprised of a cloud-based platform and high-performance satellite terminals; high-performance Satellite On-the-Move (SOTM) antennas; highly efficient, high-power Solid State Power Amplifiers (SSPA) and Block Upconverters (BUC) and includes integrated ground systems for commercial and defense, field services, network management software, and cybersecurity services.

    Gilat’s comprehensive offering supports multiple applications with a full portfolio of products and tailored solutions to address key applications including broadband access, mobility, cellular backhaul, enterprise, defense, aerospace, broadcast, government, and critical infrastructure clients all while meeting the most stringent service level requirements. For more information, please visit: http://www.gilat.com

    Certain statements made herein that are not historical are forward-looking within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The words “estimate”, “project”, “intend”, “expect”, “believe” and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties. Many factors could cause the actual results, performance or achievements of Gilat to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements that may be expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements, including, among others, changes in general economic and business conditions, inability to maintain market acceptance to Gilat’s products, inability to timely develop and introduce new technologies, products and applications, rapid changes in the market for Gilat’s products, loss of market share and pressure on prices resulting from competition, introduction of competing products by other companies, inability to manage growth and expansion, loss of key OEM partners, inability to attract and retain qualified personnel, inability to protect the Company’s proprietary technology and risks associated with Gilat’s international operations and its location in Israel, including those related to the current terrorist attacks by Hamas, and the war and hostilities between Israel and Hamas, and Israel and Hezbollah and Iran; and other factors discussed under the heading “Risk Factors” in Gilat’s most recent annual report on Form 20-F filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Forward-looking statements in this release are made pursuant to the safe harbor provisions contained in the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These forward-looking statements are made only as of the date hereof, and Gilat undertakes no obligation to update or revise the forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    Contact:

    Gilat Satellite Networks
    Hagay Katz, Chief Products and Marketing Officer
    HagayK@gilat.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Polytechnic students are winners of the competition for St. Petersburg government awards

    Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

    The Diploma Project Commission summed up the results of the competition for the St. Petersburg Government Prize. For the implementation of diploma projects in the 2023/2024 academic year, 33 executive bodies of state power offered students 116 topics for work. 72 people won the competition, seven of whom are SPbPU students. All of them represent the Institute of Industrial Management, Economics and Trade.

    1. Maria Gorshenina, graduate of the Master’s program at the Higher School of Industrial Management, Energy Management program, scientific supervisor: Associate Professor at the Higher School of Industrial Management Inga Skvortsova.

    Project “Analysis and ranking of factors promoting and hindering the introduction of renewable energy sources in the engineering and energy complex of St. Petersburg”. The aim of the study was to improve the elaboration of the scientific base for assessing the feasibility of introducing renewable energy sources into a specific regional energy system by identifying and analyzing key factors that form the environment within which the operation of renewable energy sources is planned in the region.

    To be honest, this work is a story of constant improvements and refinements, as I always wanted to improve my project. The result was worth it: victory in the St. Petersburg government diploma project competition, second place in the TGK-1 competition and, most importantly, my own satisfaction with the work done, Maria shared her impressions.

    2. Leonid Alkhimovich, a graduate of the bachelor’s degree program of the Higher School of Industrial Management, international educational program “International Business”, scientific supervisor: associate professor of the Higher School of Industrial Management Ksenia Kikkas.

    The topic of the thesis is “Corporate training – gamification as a basis for effective interaction in the work process”. The choice of the topic is associated with the rapid development of technologies in the field of corporate training, digital methods of professional development and increasing employee engagement. One of the most common tools in this area is gamification.

    3. Evelina Polushkina, Bachelor of the Higher School of Administrative Management in the direction of “State and Municipal Administration”. The project “The Impact of Digitalization on the Process of State Support for Business” was developed under the supervision of HSAM Associate Professor Maxim Ivanov. During the final qualifying work, recommendations were developed for improving the provision of state support by changing the internal processes for ensuring the operation of digital services, as well as creating directions for their popularization among small and medium-sized businesses.

    Participation in the competition was a very useful and necessary experience for me. I positively evaluate the experience of communication with the executive bodies of St. Petersburg in the person of civil servants, who promptly provided the necessary information and statistics on my topic. I believe that the topic of state support for business is relevant at the moment, so I am glad that the city authorities are actively involved in its implementation and are constantly developing this industry, including with the help of digital technologies, – Evelina noted.

    4. Elizaveta Parkhomchuk, Master of the Higher School of Administrative Management in the direction of “State and Municipal Administration”. Under the supervision of HSAM Associate Professor Tamara Selentyeva, she completed the work “Development of projects for methodological assistance in supporting small and medium-sized businesses in the executive bodies of state power”, which is aimed at creating recommendations for executive bodies of state power to improve the process of providing assistance and support to small and medium-sized businesses. This work was done jointly with specialists from the Center for Development and Support of Entrepreneurship of St. Petersburg.

    5. Mikhail Kiryushatov, a graduate of the bachelor’s degree program at the Higher School of Service and Trade, majoring in “Trade Business”, scientific supervisor: associate professor at the Higher School of Service and Trade Irina Kapustina. The project was called “Analysis of the possibilities of expanding economic cooperation between St. Petersburg and cities of ASEAN countries in modern conditions.”

    The most memorable events were the off-site events in which the External Relations Committee took part. The first of these was the XXIII International Forum “Ecology of the Big City”, where a student of the Higher School of Social and Technical Studies accompanied a delegation from Myanmar headed by the Deputy Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Min Tu, and also carried out communication at a meeting with Russian partners in the field of geology, Mikhail shared.

    6. Ksenia Fisun, a graduate of the bachelor’s degree program at the Higher School of Service and Trade, majoring in “Trade Business”, scientific supervisor: Associate Professor of the Higher School of Service and Trade Vladimir Bakharev. Her project was called “Trends and Factors Influencing the Development of Small and Medium-Sized Businesses in St. Petersburg”.

    Participation in the project was a very interesting experience for me! Thanks to it, I got acquainted with the activities of government agencies from the inside, and also learned more about the sphere of small and medium entrepreneurship in our city. I am grateful to the Polytechnic University and the government of St. Petersburg for the opportunity to participate in such a project! – shared Ksenia.

    7. Karina Allahverdiyeva, graduate of the Master’s program of the Higher School of Service and Trade, the program “Quality Management at the Enterprise” under the supervision of Associate Professor of the Higher School of Service and Trade Boris Lyamin. The project work on the topic “Monitoring of food products based on the KPPIT as a promising form of quality control and product safety” consisted of identifying discrepancies in the food product monitoring process, assessing the quality control process of samples, developing recommendations for improving and optimizing the food product monitoring process in the testing laboratory of the IL “PETEKS”. It is worth noting that the results of the project work were agreed upon, approved and applied by the head of the testing laboratory.

    The winners will be awarded in November during the St. Petersburg International Scientific and Educational Salon, the city’s largest event aimed at demonstrating educational, scientific research and innovation activities.

    According to statistics, most of the winners of this competition are employed in city administrative structures. It is also worth noting that this year the prize amount has been increased from 16 thousand rubles to 30 thousand rubles for each winner.

    I am proud of our students! IPMET regularly participates and annually remains among the leaders in the number of winners. And this year is a particularly significant event for the entire institute – seven winners from the Polytechnic University and all IPMET students! Your achievements are the result of hard work, creativity and commitment to high quality work. I wish you further success in your professional activities, may your victories continue to delight us with new achievements, – shared the director of IPMET Vladimir Shchepinin.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Cameroon after Paul Biya: poverty, uncertainty and a precarious succession battle

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, University of Nottingham

    Cameroon’s President Paul Biya is 91 years old. He is Africa’s oldest head of state and only one has served longer: President Teodoro Obiang Nguema of neighbouring Equatorial Guinea, who is 82 years old.

    Biya has been Cameroon’s president since 1982. Prior to that, he was prime minister from 1975.

    In recent weeks there has been growing speculation about the nonagenarian’s health. Some rumours even suggested that he had died. This led the Cameroonian government to issue a statement banning all reports about his health.

    These cycles of rumour have recurred whenever Biya has “gone missing” for extended periods of time. Before he arrived at Yaoundé’s international airport on 21 October, Biya was last seen in public on 8 September, when he attended a China-Africa forum in Beijing.

    Cameroon has known only two presidents since independence. For 60% of the country’s youth population, Biya is the only president they have known.

    Read more: Paul Biya has been Cameroon’s president for 40 years – and he might win office yet again

    The country finds itself in a precarious situation, uncertain about what will happen after Biya, who has ruled with an iron fist.

    Long term incumbencies don’t usually end well. Examples across the continent illustrate the high potential for political instability. The most vivid cases include Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Gabon, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

    For me as an associate professor of international studies and researcher of regime transformation in Africa, Cameroon holds specific interest because of its regime resilience over the decades, when many in the region haven’t fared as well.

    My view is that Cameroon will, sooner rather than later, hit an inflection point post-Biya. Cameroon lacks strong constitutional guard rails, so succession is bound to be a very messy affair.

    Second, due to years of nepotism and tribalism institutionalised by Biya, there will be heightened potential for regional and ethnic tensions or conflict – even a general breakdown of law and order.

    Lastly, the military establishment could well make a move in the name of safeguarding the republic in times of uncertainty.

    The legacy

    Cameroon is endowed with abundant resources, including oil, gas and timber. It is also strategically located at a crossroads between west and central Africa on the Atlantic coast, an entry point to landlocked inner regions.

    Yet, according to the World Food Programme, over 55% of Cameroonians live in poverty and 37.7% are severely impoverished.

    The country’s infrastructure is in poor shape. While the Douala port has been modernised and railway regional linkages such as the Douala-Yaoundé lines have been expanded, road and railway infrastructure are barely functional.

    According to Transparency International, corruption is endemic in Cameroon. The country ranks 140th out of 180. This is despite official efforts to do something about it.

    In 1982 Biya capitalised on the anti-corruption sentiment that had been directed at the Amadou Ahidjo regime. Biya promised an anti-corruption “new deal”. Despite initial progress, by the early 1990s Cameroon was topping the world’s corruption tables.

    Critics suggest that Biya has also used his anti-corruption drive to keep his potential competitors in check.

    Nepotism and tribalism continue as Biya has established a patron-client state system. For example, the Beti people, who are the president’s ethnic kin, are reported to take up a disproportionate slice of senior positions in government and the military. Yet they account for a small percentage of the population.

    This has bred a kleptocratic system matched only by widespread communal resentment.

    Read more: Cameroon: how language plunged a country into deadly conflict with no end in sight

    There are other deep fissures in Cameroonian society. Socially, the country became a federated entity at independence in 1960. Two language groups – French and English speaking – came together for a United Republic of Cameroon.

    For a while this unity held. But increasing disenchantment with Biya’s regime, especially the marginalisation of the Anglophone south-west, developed into a rebellion in 2016. Thousands of people have been killed and tens of thousands displaced. It has also resulted in an increased crackdown by the central authority.

    Today, Cameroon is a fractured society with the south-west calling for increased autonomy and language justice and even self-determination. The creation of the Commission of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism and designating special status to the rebellious regions has done little to quell the crisis.

    Regional role

    Regionally, Cameroon has been a key partner for the US and France through tackling Boko Haram in the region. The country has been directly affected by the attacks of this Islamist group, which originated in Nigeria and has extended its reign of terror across the region.

    The anti-terror campaign has seen a close US-France-Cameroon relationship with military and intelligence strategic cooperation.

    Equally Biya can be lauded for having peacefully settled the Bakassi peninsula crisis with Nigeria, a territorial border dispute, thereby averting regional instability.

    There are not yet obvious signs that, after Biya, the Franco-Cameroon relationship would come under strain similar to other scenarios in the region.

    France has built a steady political and economic relationship with Cameroon, investing heavily in the region, providing political cover to the regime and entering into a defence pact.

    This relationship has also benefited many a political and military elite. Barring any monumental development, it is bound to be sustained in the post-Biya era.

    Read more: Cameroon spends 90% of Chinese development loans on its French region: this could deepen the country’s divisions

    Fractured political landscape

    Biya’s longevity at the helm of Cameroon politics is testament to his ability to mobilise all state resources, power and constitutional levers for his lifetime presidency. He has outmanoeuvred all political competitors.

    This has enabled him to avoid the fate of neighbouring countries such as Central African Republic, Niger, Chad and Gabon, where governments have been overthrown by military coups.

    In 1992 Biya agreed to a multiparty dispensation. But since then, he has engineered removal of term limits and he is on his seventh term of office.

    But in the evening of his years, and in the absence of a designated successor or an elite pact, there is a real possibility that various factions of the Biya regime such as that of Frank Biya, Ngoh Ngoh, Laurent Esso or even the military will jostle and fight for power.

    Without a political culture of constitutional constraint, instability seems inevitable. And the south-west rebellion might escalate its military and political pressure for better leverage with whoever comes to power post-Biya.

    Whether the next political leadership will be able to set a transformative agenda for socio-political reconciliation and national renewal will be dictated by their ability to strike a grand compromise.

    – Cameroon after Paul Biya: poverty, uncertainty and a precarious succession battle
    – https://theconversation.com/cameroon-after-paul-biya-poverty-uncertainty-and-a-precarious-succession-battle-241312

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Cameroon after Paul Biya: poverty, uncertainty and a precarious succession battle

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By David E Kiwuwa, Associate Professor of International Studies, University of Nottingham

    Cameroon’s President Paul Biya is 91 years old. He is Africa’s oldest head of state and only one has served longer: President Teodoro Obiang Nguema of neighbouring Equatorial Guinea, who is 82 years old.

    Biya has been Cameroon’s president since 1982. Prior to that, he was prime minister from 1975.

    In recent weeks there has been growing speculation about the nonagenarian’s health. Some rumours even suggested that he had died. This led the Cameroonian government to issue a statement banning all reports about his health.

    These cycles of rumour have recurred whenever Biya has “gone missing” for extended periods of time. Before he arrived at Yaoundé’s international airport on 21 October, Biya was last seen in public on 8 September, when he attended a China-Africa forum in Beijing.

    Cameroon has known only two presidents since independence. For 60% of the country’s youth population, Biya is the only president they have known.



    Read more:
    Paul Biya has been Cameroon’s president for 40 years – and he might win office yet again

    The country finds itself in a precarious situation, uncertain about what will happen after Biya, who has ruled with an iron fist.

    Long term incumbencies don’t usually end well. Examples across the continent illustrate the high potential for political instability. The most vivid cases include Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Gabon, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

    For me as an associate professor of international studies and researcher of regime transformation in Africa, Cameroon holds specific interest because of its regime resilience over the decades, when many in the region haven’t fared as well.

    My view is that Cameroon will, sooner rather than later, hit an inflection point post-Biya. Cameroon lacks strong constitutional guard rails, so succession is bound to be a very messy affair.

    Second, due to years of nepotism and tribalism institutionalised by Biya, there will be heightened potential for regional and ethnic tensions or conflict – even a general breakdown of law and order.

    Lastly, the military establishment could well make a move in the name of safeguarding the republic in times of uncertainty.

    The legacy

    Cameroon is endowed with abundant resources, including oil, gas and timber. It is also strategically located at a crossroads between west and central Africa on the Atlantic coast, an entry point to landlocked inner regions.

    Yet, according to the World Food Programme, over 55% of Cameroonians live in poverty and 37.7% are severely impoverished.

    The country’s infrastructure is in poor shape. While the Douala port has been modernised and railway regional linkages such as the Douala-Yaoundé lines have been expanded, road and railway infrastructure are barely functional.

    According to Transparency International, corruption is endemic in Cameroon. The country ranks 140th out of 180. This is despite official efforts to do something about it.

    In 1982 Biya capitalised on the anti-corruption sentiment that had been directed at the Amadou Ahidjo regime. Biya promised an anti-corruption “new deal”. Despite initial progress, by the early 1990s Cameroon was topping the world’s corruption tables.

    Critics suggest that Biya has also used his anti-corruption drive to keep his potential competitors in check.

    Nepotism and tribalism continue as Biya has established a patron-client state system. For example, the Beti people, who are the president’s ethnic kin, are reported to take up a disproportionate slice of senior positions in government and the military. Yet they account for a small percentage of the population.

    This has bred a kleptocratic system matched only by widespread communal resentment.



    Read more:
    Cameroon: how language plunged a country into deadly conflict with no end in sight

    There are other deep fissures in Cameroonian society. Socially, the country became a federated entity at independence in 1960. Two language groups – French and English speaking – came together for a United Republic of Cameroon.

    For a while this unity held. But increasing disenchantment with Biya’s regime, especially the marginalisation of the Anglophone south-west, developed into a rebellion in 2016. Thousands of people have been killed and tens of thousands displaced. It has also resulted in an increased crackdown by the central authority.

    Today, Cameroon is a fractured society with the south-west calling for increased autonomy and language justice and even self-determination. The creation of the Commission of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism and designating special status to the rebellious regions has done little to quell the crisis.

    Regional role

    Regionally, Cameroon has been a key partner for the US and France through tackling Boko Haram in the region. The country has been directly affected by the attacks of this Islamist group, which originated in Nigeria and has extended its reign of terror across the region.

    The anti-terror campaign has seen a close US-France-Cameroon relationship with military and intelligence strategic cooperation.

    Equally Biya can be lauded for having peacefully settled the Bakassi peninsula crisis with Nigeria, a territorial border dispute, thereby averting regional instability.

    There are not yet obvious signs that, after Biya, the Franco-Cameroon relationship would come under strain similar to other scenarios in the region.

    France has built a steady political and economic relationship with Cameroon, investing heavily in the region, providing political cover to the regime and entering into a defence pact.

    This relationship has also benefited many a political and military elite. Barring any monumental development, it is bound to be sustained in the post-Biya era.



    Read more:
    Cameroon spends 90% of Chinese development loans on its French region: this could deepen the country’s divisions

    Fractured political landscape

    Biya’s longevity at the helm of Cameroon politics is testament to his ability to mobilise all state resources, power and constitutional levers for his lifetime presidency. He has outmanoeuvred all political competitors.

    This has enabled him to avoid the fate of neighbouring countries such as Central African Republic, Niger, Chad and Gabon, where governments have been overthrown by military coups.

    In 1992 Biya agreed to a multiparty dispensation. But since then, he has engineered removal of term limits and he is on his seventh term of office.

    But in the evening of his years, and in the absence of a designated successor or an elite pact, there is a real possibility that various factions of the Biya regime such as that of Frank Biya, Ngoh Ngoh, Laurent Esso or even the military will jostle and fight for power.

    Without a political culture of constitutional constraint, instability seems inevitable. And the south-west rebellion might escalate its military and political pressure for better leverage with whoever comes to power post-Biya.

    Whether the next political leadership will be able to set a transformative agenda for socio-political reconciliation and national renewal will be dictated by their ability to strike a grand compromise.

    David E Kiwuwa does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Cameroon after Paul Biya: poverty, uncertainty and a precarious succession battle – https://theconversation.com/cameroon-after-paul-biya-poverty-uncertainty-and-a-precarious-succession-battle-241312

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Global Bodies – 10 actions to strengthen national climate commitments – IPU

    Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)

    Geneva, Switzerland. Tuesday 22 October 2024 – The IPU has released a new guide to help parliaments and parliamentarians enhance their oversight of national climate commitments, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

    This guide is essential for ensuring that countries meet their obligations under the Paris Agreement, which aims to limit global warming to 1.5°C.

    With the 2025 deadline for NDC submission fast approaching, the guide highlights a critical window of opportunity for parliaments to shape their countries’ climate futures.

    The guide provides detailed background information about NDCs and outlines 10 practical actions that parliaments can take to strengthen their oversight practices.

    These actions include ensuring a consultative and inclusive approach to developing the commitments, aligning NDCs with national policies, monitoring alignment with international commitments, strengthening legal and institutional frameworks, securing sufficient funding, and tracking and reporting on progress.

    The new guide is a sister product to the IPU’s 10 actions for greener parliaments (and those who work in them) published last year and designed to encourage parliaments to reduce their carbon footprint.

    Both guides are part of the IPU’s climate campaign Parliaments for the Planet which aims to mobilize parliaments to accelerate action on the climate emergency.

    Quotes

    IPU Secretary General, Martin Chungong said: “With last year shattering heat records and 2024 poised to be even hotter, it’s critical that parliaments push their governments to ramp up their climate ambitions. Parliaments are pivotal in transforming these pledges into robust policies backed by solid budgets and ensuring governments are held accountable for their promises.”

    The IPU is the global organization of national parliaments. It was founded more than 130 years ago as the first multilateral political organization in the world, encouraging cooperation and dialogue between all nations. Today, the IPU comprises 181 national Member Parliaments and 15 regional parliamentary bodies. It promotes democracy and helps parliaments develop into stronger, younger, greener, more gender-balanced and more innovative institutions. It also defends the human rights of parliamentarians through a dedicated committee made up of MPs from around the world.

    MIL OSI – Submitted News –

  • MIL-OSI: Arab Petroleum Pipelines Company “SUMED” Signs Agreement with Soukhna Refinery and Petrochemical Company “SRPC”

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    CAIRO, Oct. 22, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Mr. George Matharu, President of Elite Capital & Co. Limited “ECC” (Financial Lead Arranger of Soukhna Refinery), and His Excellency Eng. Sameh Fahmy, Chairman of Egyptian Petroleum Investments Corporation “EPI Corp.” (Founding Director and Lead Consultant of Soukhna Refinery), announced today that the Arab Petroleum Pipelines Company “SUMED” has signed a Term Sheet for handling, storing, and transferring crude oil feedstock and petroleum products with the Soukhna Refinery and Petrochemical Company “SRPC”.

    “SUMED signing the Term Sheet with Soukhna Refinery – SRPC will reduce the refinery construction cost by USD 700 Million, making the project’s capital USD 4.7 Billion, which will positively reflect on the appetite of targeted investors to enter as partners into the project, while reducing any future financing burdens and contributing to the expected financing process,” Mr. George Matharu said.

    The SUMED Pipeline (also known as the Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline) is an oil pipeline in Egypt, running from the Ain Sokhna terminal in the Gulf of Suez, the northernmost terminus of the Red Sea, to offshore Sidi Kerir port, Alexandria in the Mediterranean Sea. It provides an alternative to the Suez Canal for transporting oil from the Arabian Gulf region to the Mediterranean.

    The pipeline is owned by the Arab Petroleum Pipelines Company “SUMED”, a joint venture of Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation “EGPC” (50%, Egypt), Saudi Aramco (15%, Saudi Arabia), Mubadala Investment Company “Formerly IPIC” (15%, the United Arab Emirates), Kuwait Investment Authority “KIA” (15%, Kuwait), and QatarEnergy (5%, Qatar).

    His Excellency Eng. Sameh Fahmy, Chairman of EPI Corp (former Minister of Petroleum), added, “Soukhna Refinery and Petrochemical Company – SRPC is a promising project and will be one of the most important petroleum and petrochemical projects globally, especially since it is located in the heart of the world to serve four important markets – Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Therefore, the project’s success is inevitable, as all companies involved in this project are currently cooperating with Elite Capital & Co. Limited to provide the necessary financing to build it.”

    SRPC’s Project is a petroleum complex consisting of an oil refinery, petrochemical technology, mini hospital, and petroleum studies institute. This project is located at the heart of the Suez Canal Economic Zone, specifically in Ain Sokhna, and it is surrounded by the continents of Asia from the east, Europe from the north, and Africa from the west.

    The refining capacity of the oil refinery is 208 thousand barrels per day, which will be relied upon in selling oil derivatives and fed by petrochemical technology, and therefore the project will be one of the world scale state of the art strategic refinery project in the world in selling oil derivatives and petrochemical products.

    “Implementation of the project will support the economy of Egypt, which witnessed remarkable development in all sectors during the era of His Excellency President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and which are expected to flourish in the coming period,” Eng. Sameh Fahmy said.

    Elite Capital & Co. Limited is a Financial Management company that provides project-related services including Management, Consultancy, and Funding, particularly for large infrastructure and mega commercial projects.

    Elite Capital & Co. Limited offers a wealth of experience in Banking and Financial transactions and has a range of specialized advisory services for private clients, medium and large corporations as well as governments. It is also the exclusive manager of the Government Future Financing 2030 Program®.

    Mr. George Matharu concluded his statement by saying: “We are currently working on preliminary negotiations with international sovereign entities to enter the project as major partners representing the main source of crude oil supply to the refinery. After that, we will move to the potential financing process according to the data that will be available at the time.”

    Elite Capital & Co. – Contact Details –

    Elite Capital & Co. Limited
    33 St. James Square
    London, SW1Y4JS
    United Kingdom

    Telephone: +44 (0) 203 709 5060
    SWIFT Code: ELCTGB21
    LEI Code: 254900NNN237BBHG7S26

    Website: ec.uk.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/2ccd23ff-3956-40af-9c99-7fa85dfd3325

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The Queen Elizabeth Memorial Committee engages with experts and young people across the UK

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Since their first meeting in February this year, the Queen Elizabeth Memorial Committee have been meeting a variety of experts and sector leaders from across the UK, to help shape their recommendations.

    These meetings, which have included roundtables and visits to locations in all four nations,  have focused on various aspects of the memorialisation programme, covering both the design of the permanent memorial and broader themes for the legacy programme. Participants have included historians and academics, such as Dame Mary Beard; environmental experts such as Tony Juniper (Chair of Natural England); figures from the world of arts like Andrew Ellis (Chief Executive of Art UK); digital artists such as Doddz; and experts in heritage and the built environment such as Professor Elizabeth McKellar and Sir Charles Saumarez Smith. Dame Mary Beard shared, “It is tremendously important to create a memorial to the Queen that is appropriate, relevant and in some way makes a difference. It was fascinating and fun to be part of generating ideas, hearing what others had to say, from the feasible to the blue sky’’.

    These sessions have generated valuable insights and lively debate, and have been invaluable in helping the Committee in creating memorial projects that will resonate with people both locally and globally. Digital Artist, Doddz commented, “It was an honour to participate in such an important discussion about how digital elements can enhance Queen Elizabeth II’s memorial. The roundtable highlighted the power of digital tools to connect past, present, and future generations, creating emotional and meaningful experiences for all.”

    The Committee has also been committed to engaging closely with young people of various ages and backgrounds to ensure they have the opportunity to help shape the Committee’s recommendations. Representatives from #IWill and the National Citizen Service were invited to engagement sessions where they provided valuable input on how future generations might interact with Queen Elizabeth’s legacy. 

    Young Ambassadors from the National Citizen Service, commented, “I was honoured to participate in this significant decision-making process, and look forward to seeing its long-term impact on helping the next generation understand the legacy of Queen Elizabeth II” and that “involving young people in these conversations can help bridge the generational gap and develop something meaningful for all age groups.” 

    Lord Janvrin and the Committee will continue to meet with various groups in the coming months as they refine their ideas for commemorating Queen Elizabeth II. If you have an idea you would like to share with them, please contact the committee at queenelizabethmemorial@cabinetoffice.gov.uk

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Statutory Instrument laid in Parliament sets out first steps in delivering Medical Device Regulatory Reform and strengthening patient safety

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    The new legislation will introduce clearer and risk-proportionate requirements that improve the safety of medical devices across Great Britain and provide certainty for manufacturers ahead of introducing the wider future regulatory regime.

    The Post-market Surveillance (PMS) Statutory instrument (SI) laid in Parliament yesterday evening is the first major update to the framework of medical device regulations in Great Britain, led by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA).

    In 2021, the MHRA consulted on the ‘Future Regulation of Medical Devices in the UK’ in response to recommendations set out in the Independent Medicines and Medical Devices Safety (IMMDS) review, published in 2020.

    Responses to the consultation were strongly supportive of introducing clearer and more robust PMS requirements to improve patient and public safety and called for closer alignment with international approaches.

    Since January 2021 all medical devices have been required to be registered with the MHRA before they can be placed on the market in Great Britain a step-change in the Agency’s oversight of medical devices, allowing us to take more rapid action where safety concerns are identified.

    By introducing clear, risk-proportionate requirements, the new legislation laid yesterday evening will build on measures already introduced to improve patient safety, facilitating greater traceability of incidents and reporting trends.

    Laura Squire, MedTech Regulatory Reform Lead and Chief Officer at the MHRA, said:

    “Patient safety is our priority, and these new measures are expected to further reduce adverse incidents by ensuring manufacturers identify and address issues earlier and reduce the time for corrective actions to be taken. 

    “While the new legislation is focused on patient safety, it also benefits innovation and growth of the sector, with the collection of real-world data helping manufacturers to further improve existing products.

    “This legislation reflects the Government’s wider priority of improving patient safety and is the first part of the new regulatory framework coming in for medical devices.’’

    The explosion of innovation in health technology in recent years has the potential to bring transformative approaches to healthcare. These regulations will provide the necessary oversight to ensure that this progress is made as safely as possible.

    This regulation also ensures that we have a strong foundation for patient safety in place before we bring forward future measures such as international reliance which will allow patients to benefit more quickly from some types of medical devices that have already been approved for use in other countries. We are committed to delivering a framework of regulatory reform that encourages innovation and growth in life sciences and which, in turn, brings huge benefits to patients.

    Comprehensive guidance to support manufacturers with implementation and compliance will be published once the Parliamentary process has been concluded.

    The SI proposes a six-month implementation period once Parliamentary processes have been concluded. This regulation could, therefore, become law in Summer 2025.

    Ends

    Notes to Editors

    For media enquiries, please contact the newscentre@mhra.gov.uk, or call on 020 3080 7651.

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Applications for Policy Masterclasses are now open

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    An update on the policy training courses OIT offers academics

    The Open Innovation Team (OIT) is now welcoming enquiries from UK universities for its highly regarded Policy Masterclass programme.

    OIT has delivered bespoke policy training to academics since 2016, helping them better understand the policymaking process and how they can influence it.

    The Policy Masterclass is:

    • Tailored to attendee needs: delivered by experienced civil servants, the training can be customised to suit any skill level.
    • Interactive and practical: participants will learn how policy works in practice, how to engage with policymakers and what tactics they can use to inform the policy process, including how to ensure their voices are heard in the decision-making process.
    • Provides hands-on experience : the session includes exercises and discussions designed to help participants directly apply what they’ve learned to their own work.

    We are offering the Masterclass for group bookings from people within the same institution and can also accommodate individual participants in mixed-group courses.

    Please note that as a cost-recovery team, OIT charges a fee for this training, which varies based on the course’s duration, complexity and customisation.

    For more information about our training options, pricing, and to book, please email us at enquiries@openinnovation.gov.uk

    Follow our LinkedIn page for the latest OIT news.

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: OSCE Mission to Montenegro continues to support development of police e-learning platform

    Source: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE

    Headline: OSCE Mission to Montenegro continues to support development of police e-learning platform

    Participants of the one of the workshops the OSCE Mission to Montenegro organized for the Ministry of Interior officials to create, maintain and manage the police e-learning platform, Podgorica, October 2024. (OSCE/Miloš Uljarević) Photo details

    As part of the continuous support to the Ministry of Interior to improve its learning opportunities for police officials, in May and October 2024 the OSCE Mission to Montenegro organized three training cycles for 29 Ministry officials to create, maintain and manage the e-learning platform, developed with the Mission’s support.
    The Ministry’s e-learning platform provides online and hybrid learning opportunities on a variety of topics relevant for policing, including non-discrimination, human rights, as well as lectures on combatting stereotypes.
    In May, through the first training session, the Mission supported the Ministry’s officials who managed the e-learning platform in adapting and uploading the courses on “Safety and health at work and first aid assistance”, “Basic training course in the field of fire protection” and “English language course for police officers”. In October, two training sessions were organized for the platform’s content creators, which equipped them with skills to create and upload training content, as well as to use advanced options for video content to be inserted in the created course.
    These training courses will be followed by a six-week mentorship process with the Mission’s experts, during which each of the participants will develop a course within their own field of expertise, to be posted on the platform or further developed by the Ministry’s Directorate for police training and development.
    In 2022, the OSCE Mission provided to the Ministry of Interior the technical equipment to host the e-learning platform, while in 2023 it trained 15 officials on the platform’s use, thus reducing the government’s training and education expenses.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Sign up to hear about our events for civil servants

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Our new season of Outside:In is here!

    Outside:In, the online speaker series for civil servants organised by HM Government’s Open Innovation Team, has returned for 2024-25.

    Featuring high-profile speakers from across academia and industry, Outside:In aims to provide thought-provoking discussion relevant to policymakers and government.

    Previous speakers have included the Nobel-prize-winning economist and MIT professor Daron Acemoglu, historian Adam Tooze, Harvard professor and social scientist Shoshana Zuboff, foreign policy expert and presidential advisor Fiona Hill, governance scholar and digital innovation expert Beth Simone Noveck, and astronaut Tim Peake.

    The events are for civil servants only, and you’ll need a gov.uk (or equivalent) email address to register.

    Sign up to our mailing list

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    Updates to this page

    Published 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Global: How finance can be part of the solution to the world’s biodiversity crisis

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Emma O’Donnell, Research Assistant, Environmental Change Institute and PhD Candidate, Nature-based Solutions Initiative, University of Oxford

    Nature loss should be treated with the same urgency as climate change. NOBUHIRO ASADA/Shutterstock

    More than half of the world’s total GDP is at least moderately dependent on nature. Yet arguably, there is no economy (or life) without nature. A quarter of animal and planet species are now threatened, and 14 out of 18 key ecosystem services – including fertile soils to grow food, flood and disease control and regulation of air and water pollution – are in decline.

    These ecosystem services are essential and have no easy substitutes. Despite this, almost US$7 trillion (£5.4 trillion) per year is spent by governments and the private sector on subsidies and economic activities that have a negative impact on nature – including intensive agriculture and fossil-fuel subsidies. This compares to only US$200 billion that is spent on nature-based solutions (just a third of what is estimated to be needed).

    Although the biodiversity crisis has often been overshadowed by climate change on the global stage, the tide is turning. In 2022, the Kunming-Montreal global biodiversity framework was adopted with its overarching goal to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030.

    At the end of October 2024, the signatories of the framework will again come together at the UN’s Cop16 biodiversity conference in Cali, Colombia, to negotiate the implementation of their targets. To make progress towards these goals, Cop16 aims to align finance with the framework; effectively ensuring finance is part of the solution rather than the problem.

    To do this, the flow of finance will need to be redirected. A central lever in this is the pricing of risk. Financial institutions face significant risk, both from the degradation of ecosystem services (physical risks) and the social responses to degradation, including regulation and changing consumer demand (transition risks). Yet these risks are not fully priced into financial decisions.

    On top of this, corporations do not disclose their nature-related risks, dependencies and impacts, making it difficult for financial institutions to understand the implications of their investments. Together, this means that finance continues to flow unhindered into riskier activities.

    Central banks are now starting to highlight risks from nature to financial institutions and to explore the areas where these risks manifest in the financial system.

    The financial risks are real

    Earlier this year, we published the first study of the seriousness of nature-related financial risks.

    We found that, for the UK, nature-related shocks could cause a 6% decline in GDP by 2030 under scenarios such as soil health decline or water scarcity putting pressure on global supply chains. And there could be a drop in GDP of more than 12% in the scenario of an antimicrobial resistance or pandemic shock, driven by increased human-wildlife interaction due to habitat loss and deforestation.

    These results are equal to or even greater than the UK’s 6% decrease in GDP after the 2008 financial crisis and 9.7% during the 2020 COVID lockdowns.

    We also found that nature-related financial risks were of a similar scale to climate-related risks. Nature loss and climate change occur in parallel, amplify and compound each other. As such, it is essential that solutions look to solve both challenges simultaneously. After all, what is the point of having a cooler planet that is no longer livable?

    Of its 23 targets for 2030, the GBF includes two goals that specifically address finance. Target 18 aims to reduce incentives for financial flows that damage nature by at least US$500 billion per year and scale up incentives for nature-positive financial flows. And target 19 aims to mobilise US$200 billion per year for restoring and protecting nature, including at least US$30 billion from international finance flowing from developed to developing countries. A further target, target 15, calls for the disclosure of nature-related risks, dependencies and impacts by firms.

    COP16 gets under way in Cali, Colombia.

    So, what do we need from Cop16 to pull the financial risk lever?

    First, there must be international recognition that the long-term, widespread and often irreversible risks of the biodiversity crisis are not being priced by the financial system, despite progress on the integration of climate risks. This can cause a buildup of systemic risks and lead to financial instability; as such, there must be a global consensus that central banks play a key role in taking proactive measures to manage this.

    Second, at the individual, corporate and financial institution level, firms must manage and disclose their nature-related financial risks, alongside their climate risks.

    Third, similar to transition finance for net zero, financial institutions must begin to engage actively with clients to explore opportunities to support their transition towards more nature-positive activities and reflect this within their transition plans.

    Securing financial resilience and nature and climate goals are synonymous; and all are essential for securing economic growth and sustainable development globally.

    Emma O’Donnell receives funding from the UK Natural Science Research Council.

    Jimena Alvarez receives funding from UK Natural Environment Research Council.

    Nicola Ranger receives funding from the UK Natural Environment Research Council, Climate Arc and EU Horizon

    – ref. How finance can be part of the solution to the world’s biodiversity crisis – https://theconversation.com/how-finance-can-be-part-of-the-solution-to-the-worlds-biodiversity-crisis-241829

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Kim Jong-un sends North Korean troops to fight in Ukraine – here’s what this means for the war

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ra Mason, Lecturer in International Relations and Japanese Foreign Policy, University of East Anglia

    It is still unclear how many North Korean soldiers will find their way onto the killing fields of eastern Ukraine. What is clear is that the drive to recruit fighting forces from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is at least in part politically motivated. But is it also a tactical masterstroke that will boost the Russian war machine’s chances of a definitive victory?

    The political aspect appears straightforward. The use of foreign forces from an enemy of the United States demonstrates a clear show of opposition towards the Washington-led global order. It also deals a further blow to the myth that the Russian Federation is isolated, as an international pariah, in a world led by western powers.

    But despite boosting troop numbers, there are multiple problems with these would-be mercenaries from the far east joining Putin’s forces on the front line in Europe. North Korea is impoverished and authoritarian. This means its personnel are mostly poorly equipped, unmotivated and undernourished. Where and how they are deployed will, therefore, likely be critical.

    If sent into new theatres of war against state-of-the-art Nato-supplied weaponry, it could effectively mean waves of ill-prepared cannon fodder being thrown into the meat grinder of Donbas’ trenches. Most would surely be killed by FPV (first-person view) drones or western tank fire.

    Defections could well pose an additional risk. If commanded outside the immediate control of Korean officers in the field, some will doubtless view this as a chance to escape oppression and poverty in their homeland. Desertions en masse to the Ukrainian side might become a possibility. Even more so if identified and directed how to surrender by Ukrainian, or other, special forces on the ground.

    Considering these seemingly obvious flaws, it would be easy to assume the deliberate showcasing of training camps in eastern Russia for North Korean soldiers is little more than a political gimmick. One that is designed to strike fear into an already struggling Ukrainian army and poke its western backers in the eye. At the same time, there may be cause to think there is more to this move than pure politics.

    Rules of engagement

    The difference between supplying artillery shells for Russian guns and putting bodies on the line is stark.

    But this fundamental difference does not necessarily mean that there is no tactical value to the deployment of Korean forces on the battlefield. The key likely lies in where and how they are deployed.

    There is the immediate question of international law. Or, perhaps more importantly, how Nato countries might respond to further breaches of the established rules of engagement by Russian directed foreign forces. For sure, use of Korean mercenaries to fight in the Donbas region, which is recognised by western allies as Ukrainian territory, would constitute a gross violation.

    The response from Nato could be rapid and definitive, as it would effectively justify proportionate use of force, including foreign personnel, to counter any subsequent Russian advances. This would likely result in an own goal for Putin. Any initial advantage gained would quickly be lost as friends of Ukraine justifiably enter the fray to push back an illegal Moscow-Pyongyang alliance of aggression. Escalation thereafter would also be a serious and grave concern.

    Conversely, if deployed in a combination of technical and logistical roles, or primarily to defend Russian territory, the utility of additional manpower becomes more credible. Not least, it would seem legitimate from an international legal perspective for Russia to seek assistance from alliance partners in repelling Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk region of southwestern Russia.

    This could deal a double blow to Kyiv. On the one hand it would likely supply sufficient personnel to rapidly finish off the already threadbare Ukrainian forces holding on to captured sovereign Russian territory. At the same time, Moscow’s own military machine would be able to focus its entire attention on the already growing advances being made along the Donbas front.

    Distraction from the end game

    North Korea’s influence on the international stage has grown since the start of the war in Ukraine as its massive stockpiles of ammunition proved significant in Russia’s attritional tactics. In that respect, the addition of foreign fighters may add a further factor in Moscow’s favour if skilfully deployed and directed.

    Ultimately, however, the limited dispatch of inexperienced Korean troops to a war zone in which they have no legal or moral basis to be sent is unlikely to prove decisive. As it stands, with or without the help of forces supplied by North Korea’s despotic leader, Kim Jong-Un, Russia’s brutal military advance looks set to grind on.

    In these regards, the arrival of North Koreans to Europe’s worst war for a generation is probably little more than another bizarre episode in this cruel conflict. The real concern is how authoritarian states such as Russia and North Korea can be transformed into something resembling civilised societies that might pursue more positive foreign policy pathways.

    Ra Mason does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Kim Jong-un sends North Korean troops to fight in Ukraine – here’s what this means for the war – https://theconversation.com/kim-jong-un-sends-north-korean-troops-to-fight-in-ukraine-heres-what-this-means-for-the-war-241876

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Chris Hoy reveals that he has terminal cancer – here’s how to spot early signs of prostate cancer

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Justin Stebbing, Professor of Biomedical Sciences, Anglia Ruskin University

    Sir Chris Hoy, an inspiration to so many of us, has just revealed he has terminal prostate cancer aged just 48 years old.

    It’s easy to assume that prostate cancer is a disease that only affects older men. But it can strike at any age, including younger and middle-aged men.

    Although the average age of diagnosis is 68, about one in ten new cases are in men under 55. In fact, doctors have noticed more cases in younger men in recent years. If you’re in your 40s or 50s, it’s worth knowing about the risks and signs of prostate cancer.

    When prostate cancer does occur in younger men, it tends to be more aggressive. If you’re diagnosed at a younger age, there’s a higher chance the cancer might be at a more advanced stage. This means it could be more dangerous than prostate cancer in older men. That’s why it’s crucial to catch it early if you can.

    There are several signs that could point to prostate cancer. People affected might notice that they’re going to the bathroom more often, especially at night. Some people can have trouble starting or stopping when they pee, or their urine flow might be weak or stop and start.

    Some men see blood in their urine or semen. Problems with erections, pain when you pee, or discomfort in your pelvic area are other possible signs.

    If you notice any of these, it’s a good idea to talk to your doctor. Remember, these symptoms can be caused by lots of other conditions too, including being part of normal ageing, but it’s always best to get them checked.

    Even if you don’t have symptoms, if you’re over 50, or over 45 with prostate cancer in your family, it’s worth having a chat with your doctor about prostate cancer screening. In this case, you might have heard of the PSA test. It’s a blood test that can help diagnose prostate problems, including cancer. But it’s not offered as a routine screening test for everyone.

    Like a lot of diagnostic tests, the PSA test isn’t perfect. It can miss some cancers, and sometimes it says there might be cancer when there isn’t. This can lead to unnecessary worry and more tests. Also, it can’t tell the difference between slow-growing cancers that might never cause problems and more aggressive ones that need treatment. That’s why doctors suggest discussing it before deciding to have the test.

    Sometimes there’s a genetic element to prostate cancers in younger people. There are genes that increase the risk of prostate cancer, and the same or similar genes increase the risk of other cancers like breast cancer.

    If there are lots of men in your family affected by prostate cancer, or male relatives with breast cancer or younger people affected, it is worth having genetic tests to understand your own risk.

    Sometimes people are even considered for a prostatectomy, which means a removal of one’s prostate, to decrease the risk of cancer occurring later on. In the future, these genetic tests will happen more and more, which is good news.

    Overdiagnosis

    One of the tricky things about prostate cancer screening is something called overdiagnosis. Many prostate cancers grow so slowly that they might never cause any problems. But once they’re found, men often want to treat them.

    This can lead to side-effects that affect quality of life, even though the cancer itself might never have been harmful. That’s why doctors are careful about how they approach screening and diagnosis.

    Some research suggests that just keeping an eye on things is better for elderly people, but this really isn’t the case for younger people.

    You might be wondering about other tests for prostate cancer. The digital rectal exam, where a doctor checks your prostate with a gloved finger, used to be a common part of screening. These days, it’s not always considered necessary, especially if other tests like magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans are available.

    MRI scans where you typically go in a narrow tube are being used more and more to look for prostate cancer. They can help find suspicious areas and guide biopsies if needed.

    The first inkling Hoy had that something was wrong was when he developed shoulder pain, meaning the cancer had already spread. We do see this as oncologists, but in most cases, it’s localised to the prostate gland in the pelvis.

    If you are diagnosed with prostate cancer, there are an increasing number of treatment options available. These might include keeping a close eye on slow-growing cancers without immediate treatment, surgery to remove the prostate, radiation therapy, hormone therapy, or chemotherapy for advanced cases.

    We also have targeted drugs taken as tablets now too. The best choice depends on things like your age, how advanced the cancer is, and your overall health.

    You might have heard that more men die with prostate cancer than from it. While this is true, it doesn’t mean you should ignore any concerns you have. Early detection and treatment can be crucial, especially for more aggressive cancers.

    If you’re worried about any symptoms or about your risk of prostate cancer, don’t hesitate to talk to your doctor. Being proactive about your health is important. Remember, many men diagnosed with prostate cancer go on to live long, full lives, especially when it’s caught early.

    Justin Stebbing does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Chris Hoy reveals that he has terminal cancer – here’s how to spot early signs of prostate cancer – https://theconversation.com/chris-hoy-reveals-that-he-has-terminal-cancer-heres-how-to-spot-early-signs-of-prostate-cancer-241851

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Slough Borough Council: Ministerial response to Commissioners’ fifth report and update letter

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Letter from Jim McMahon OBE MP, Minister for Local Government and English Devolution, in response to the Commissioners’ fifth report (April 2024) and their update letter (September 2024).

    Applies to England

    Documents

    Slough Borough Council: Ministerial response to Commissioners’ fifth report and update letter

    PDF, 205 KB, 2 pages

    Details

    A copy of the letter from Jim McMahon OBE MP, Minister for Local Government and English Devolution, in response to the Commissioners’ fifth report (April 2024) and their update letter (September 2024). The letter sets out the proposal to issue new Directions under section 15 of the Local Government Act 1999 to extend the intervention until 30 November 2026.

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 October 2024

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    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Slough Borough Council: Letter to interim Chief Executive (22 October 2024)

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Letter to Slough Borough Council’s interim Chief Executive on the proposed extension to the intervention at Slough Borough Council and inviting representations.

    Applies to England

    Documents

    Slough Borough Council: Letter to interim Chief Executive (22 October 2024)

    PDF, 264 KB, 6 pages

    Details

    A copy of the letter from Max Soule, Deputy Director, Local Government Stewardship and Interventions to Will Tuckley, interim Chief Executive at Slough Borough Council, seeking representations on the proposal to issue new Directions under section 15 of the Local Government Act 1999 to extend the intervention until 30 November 2026.

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 October 2024

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    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Birmingham City Council: Ministerial response to the Commissioners’ first report

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Ministerial response from the Minister for Local Government and English Devolution, Jim McMahon OBE MP, to Max Caller CBE, Lead Commissioner at Birmingham City Council.

    Applies to England

    Documents

    Birmingham City Council: Ministerial response to the Commissioners’ first report

    PDF, 192 KB, 2 pages

    Details

    Response from the Minister for Local Government and English Devolution, Jim McMahon OBE MP, to the Lead Commissioner at Birmingham City Council, Max Caller CBE, regarding the Commissioners’ first report and the future direction of the Birmingham intervention.

    Updates to this page

    Published 22 October 2024

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    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI: Bybit Card Opens up Pre-registration in New Regions Offering Sign-up Bonus

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, Oct. 22, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Bybit, the world’s second-largest cryptocurrency exchange by trading volume, expands the global footprint of Bybit Card in collaboration with S1LKPAY, an international payment solution provider. Pre-registration is now open with a $10 bonus in addition to the multiple benefits of the Bybit Card for the first 1,000 applicants. 

    The go-to option for crypto spending for crypto-native users across the world, the Bybit Card has been on an expansion streak. Now spanning across markets including Argentina, Brazil, and the Netherlands, it is trusted for its robust security, excellent customer support, user-friendly and rewarding experience, and ease of access to the Mastercard network. 

    The latest development is led by Bybit Limited, the entity regulated by the Astana Financial Services Authority (AFSA), and marks the first branded card issuance by Bybit Limited (AFSA) in collaboration with S1LKPAY, a certified principal member of Mastercard’s payment network and a provider of Banking-as-a-Service (BaaS) and Card-as-a-Service (CaaS), to support the issuance and integration of in-app payment functions for the Bybit Mastercard prepaid card.

    “The past year has seen tremendous growth of the Bybit Card and we are pleased to be able to serve more regions and users from the EEA to South America, bridging their crypto wealth and their payment needs. Spending and growing your crypto has never been so easy with Bybit, and now it comes with a bonus until the official launch,” said Joan Han, Sales and Marketing Director at Bybit. 

    “We are thrilled to announce the launch of the first crypto prepaid card in the region and to partner with Bybit in offering this long-waited solution in its next chapter of card expansion. The partnership provides crypto holders with frictionless access to the Mastercard network anytime, anywhere,” said Gani Uzbekov, Founder and CEO of S1LKPAY.

    Offering a smooth experience for users with digital wealth in their portfolios, the Bybit Card is instrumental in making crypto spending and daily consumption more seamless. It also boasts clear and low fees, generous rewards with up to 10% cashback and 8% APY, and a wide array of tokens supported. The mainstreaming of crypto includes not only crypto as an investment asset class, but also retail use and merchant acceptance. Bybit is committed to refining its products to encourage the adoption of digital assets among everyday users.

    Bybit invites users to get a Bybit Card and enjoy its full benefits: Pre-register for the Bybit Card 

    #Bybit / #TheCryptoArk 

    About Bybit

    Bybit is the world’s second-largest cryptocurrency exchange by trading volume, serving over 50 million users. Established in 2018, Bybit provides a professional platform where crypto investors and traders can find an ultra-fast matching engine, 24/7 customer service, and multilingual community support. Bybit is a proud partner of Formula One’s reigning Constructors’ and Drivers’ champions: the Oracle Red Bull Racing team.

    For more details about Bybit, users can visit: Bybit Press 

    For media inquiries, users can contact: media@bybit.com

    For more information, users can visit: https://www.bybit.com

    For updates, users can follow: Bybit’s Communities and Social Media

    Discord | Facebook | Instagram | LinkedIn | Reddit | Telegram | TikTok | X | Youtube

    About Mastercard

    Mastercard is a global technology company in the payments industry. Our mission is to connect and power an inclusive, digital economy that benefits everyone, everywhere by making transactions safe, simple, smart and accessible. Using secure data and networks, partnerships and passion, our innovations and solutions help individuals, financial institutions, governments and businesses realize their greatest potential. Our decency quotient, or DQ, drives our culture and everything we do inside and outside of our company. With connections across more than 210 countries and territories, we are building a sustainable world that unlocks priceless possibilities for all.

    Mastercard press office in Kazakhstan

    mastercard@pressclub.kz

    Contact

    Head of PR
    Tony Au
    Bybit
    tony.au@bybit.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – B10-0139/2024

    Source: European Parliament 2

    Nathalie Loiseau, Petras Auštrevičius, Helmut Brandstätter, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Bernard Guetta, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    B10‑0139/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2890(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Azerbaijan and on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh,

    –  having regard to the relevant documents and international agreements, including but not limited to the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 21 December 1991,

    –  having regard to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the Election Observation Mission to the Early Presidential elections held on 7 February 2024 and to the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission of the Early Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan held on 1 September 2024,

    –  having regard to the report of 29 March 2023 by the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Azerbaijan and to the memorandum of 21 October 2021 by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights on the humanitarian and human rights consequences following the 2020 outbreak of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh,

    –  having regard to the orders of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 22 February 2023, of 6 July 2023 and of 17 November 2023 on the request for the indication of provisional measures for the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Armenia v Azerbaijan),

    –  having regard to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,

    –  having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the choice of Azerbaijan’s capital Baku as the venue for the 29th United Nations Climate Change conference (COP29), scheduled to take place from 11 to 22 November 2024, has sparked controversy, notably owing to Azerbaijan’s worsening human rights record, as well as recent and blatant violations of international law, including aggressive behaviour towards its neighbour Armenia; whereas in the lead-up to this major international conference, the Azerbaijani authorities have intensified their repression of civil society organisations, activists, opposition politicians and the remaining independent media through detentions and judicial harassment;

    B. whereas civil society organisations list over 300 political prisoners in Azerbaijan, including Gubad Ibadoghlu, Anar Mammadli, Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, Tofig Yagublu, Ilhamiz Guliyev, Aziz Orujov, Bahruz Samadov and Akif Gurbanov; whereas there are credible reports of violations of prisoners’ human rights, including detention in inhumane conditions, torture and refusal of adequate medical care;

    C. whereas in recent years, the Azerbaijani authorities have imposed increasingly stringent restrictions on civil society organisations; whereas activists, journalists, political opponents and others have been imprisoned on fabricated and politically motivated charges;

    D. whereas Gubad Ibadoghlu, a political economist, opposition figure and one of the finalists for the 2024 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought, was arrested by Azerbaijani authorities in July 2023 and remained in detention until 22 April 2024, when he was transferred to house arrest; whereas his health has deteriorated significantly since his arrest, as a result of torture, inhumane detention conditions and refusal of adequate medical care, thus endangering his life; whereas the health of Gubad Ibadoghlu’s wife, Irada Bayramova, continues to deteriorate as a result of the physical violence she suffered during her detention by the Azerbaijani authorities;

    E. whereas the Azerbaijani regime appears to extend its repressive actions beyond its borders; whereas, since 2020, Mahammad Mirzali, an Azerbaijani dissident blogger, has been the target of several assassination attempts in France; whereas, on 29 September 2024, Vidadi Isgandarli, a critic of the Azerbaijani regime living as a political refugee in France, was attacked in his home and succumbed to his injuries two days later; whereas the Azerbaijani authorities have also engaged in politically motivated prosecutions of EU citizens, as seen in the case of Théo Clerc, prompting at least one Member State to formally warn its citizens against travelling to Azerbaijan owing to the risk of arbitrary detention;

    F. whereas according to the Election Observation Mission led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the early presidential election held on 7 February 2024 took place in a restrictive environment and was marked by the stifling of critical voices and the absence of political alternatives; whereas Azerbaijan held early parliamentary elections on 1 September 2024 in what the OSCE/ODIHR-led International Election Observation Mission described as a restrictive political and legal environment that did not enable genuine pluralism and resulted in a contest devoid of competition; whereas in the period leading up to the parliamentary elections, several government critics were detained;

    G. whereas according to Reporters Without Borders, virtually the entire media sector in Azerbaijan is under official control, with no independent television or radio broadcasts from within the country, and all critical print newspapers shut down; whereas the authorities continue to suppress the last remaining independent media and repress journalists who reject self-censorship;

    H. whereas media legislation in Azerbaijan has become increasingly repressive, with the February 2022 media law effectively legalising censorship; whereas several other laws affecting the media also violate the country’s international obligations with regard to freedom of expression and press freedom; whereas public criticism of the authorities is subject to severe penalties;

    I. whereas in September 2023, after months of the illegal blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan launched a pre-planned, unjustified military attack on the territory, forcing over 100 000 ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia, which amounts to ethnic cleansing; whereas as a result, Nagorno-Karabakh has been almost entirely emptied of its Armenian population, who had been living there for centuries; whereas this attack represents a gross violation of human rights and international law, a clear breach of the trilateral ceasefire statement of 9 November 2020 and a failure to uphold commitments made during EU-mediated negotiations;

    J. whereas the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh lost their property and belongings while fleeing the Azerbaijani military push in 2023 and have been unable to recover them since; whereas actions amounting to ethnic cleansing have continued since then; whereas the EU has provided humanitarian aid to people displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas credible reports confirm the organised destruction of Armenian cultural and religious heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas Azerbaijani leaders and officials repeatedly use hate speech against Armenians;

    K. whereas both Azerbaijan and Armenia are bound by international humanitarian law and the Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war from all forms of torture and cruel treatment; whereas reports indicate that 23 Armenian prisoners are currently being held in Azerbaijani prisons, including eight former leaders of the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, some of whom have received long prison sentences;

    L. whereas in February 2023, the EU deployed the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) to observe developments at the international border with Azerbaijan; whereas Azerbaijan has refused to cooperate with EUMA and the mission has been the target of disinformation by Azerbaijani authorities and government-controlled media; whereas Azerbaijan occupies territories internationally recognised as Armenian;

    M. whereas Armenia and Azerbaijan have engaged in negotiations on a peace treaty, the normalisation of their relations and border delimitation, both before and after the 2023 attack on Nagorno-Karabakh; whereas, despite mediation efforts by the EU and others, no peace agreement has been signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia; whereas, although both governments have stated that they are close to an agreement, recent remarks by the Azerbaijani President indicate that Baku is not eager to conclude the negotiations;

    N. whereas the EU fully supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia and actively supports efforts towards a sustainable peace agreement between the two countries, achieved by peaceful means and respecting the rights of the population concerned;

    O. whereas since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Azerbaijan has deepened its relations with Russia, including political and economic ties, as well as increased cooperation between their intelligence services; whereas Russia has openly backed Azerbaijan in its aggressive behaviour towards Armenia; whereas there are worrying reports of Russian gas being rebranded as Azerbaijani for sale in the EU;

    P. whereas Azerbaijani leaders have engaged in anti-EU and anti-Western rhetoric; whereas Azerbaijan has intensified its disinformation campaigns targeting the EU and its Member States, with a specific focus on France; whereas Azerbaijan has actively interfered in European politics under the guise of ‘anti-colonialism’, notably in overseas countries and territories such as New Caledonia;

    1. Strongly condemns the domestic and extraterritorial repression by the Azerbaijani regime against activists, journalists, opposition leaders and others, including EU nationals, which has noticeably intensified ahead of COP29; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all persons arbitrarily detained or imprisoned on account of their political views, to drop all politically motivated charges, and to cease all forms of repression, both within and beyond Azerbaijan;

    2. Reiterates its call for the Azerbaijani authorities to lift the travel ban and drop all charges against Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu; calls on Azerbaijan to ensure that he receives an independent medical examination by a doctor of his own choosing and to allow him to receive treatment abroad;

    3. Expresses deep concern about the choice of Baku as the host city for COP29, given Azerbaijan’s flagrant violations of fundamental rights, democracy and international law; considers that Azerbaijan’s ongoing human rights abuses are incompatible with its hosting of COP29; urges the EU to use COP29 as an opportunity for the international community to remind Azerbaijan of its international obligations and to condemn and meaningfully address the country’s human rights record in their interactions with the Azerbaijani authorities;

    4. Demands that the organisers of COP29 ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enshrined and guaranteed in the Host Country Agreement; calls for the EU and its Member States to do their utmost to ensure that United Nations Climate Change Conferences are not hosted in countries with poor human rights records;

    5. Reminds the Azerbaijani authorities of their obligations to respect fundamental freedoms, and calls on them to repeal repressive legislation that drives independent non-governmental organisations and media to the margins of the law; reminds the Azerbaijani Government of its international obligations to safeguard the dignity and rights of detainees, ensuring that they receive adequate medical care, are detained in humane conditions and are protected from any mistreatment;

    6. Reiterates its call for EU sanctions to be imposed under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on Azerbaijani officials who have committed serious human rights violations;

    7. Insists that any future partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan be made conditional on the release of all political prisoners, the implementation of legal reforms, and the overall improvement of the human rights situation in the country;

    8. Calls on the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to request meetings with political prisoners in Azerbaijan;

    9. Reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Azerbaijan and Armenia; reiterates its demand for the withdrawal of Azerbaijan’s troops from the entirety of Armenia’s sovereign territory; calls on Azerbaijan to unequivocally commit to respecting Armenia’s territorial integrity;

    10. Expresses its support for the activities of the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA) and underscores the important role it plays; reiterates its concern regarding the repeated smear campaigns originating from Azerbaijan against EUMA; calls on EUMA to continue to closely monitor the evolving security situation on the ground, provide transparent reporting to Parliament and actively contribute to conflict resolution efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EUMA’s mandate, increase its size and extend its duration;

    11. Urges Azerbaijan and Armenia to promptly sign a peace treaty – before COP29 – in order to resolve their long-lasting disputes; warns Azerbaijan that any military action against Armenia would be unacceptable and would have serious consequences for the partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU;

    12. Calls for the full implementation of all orders issued by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), including the 17 November 2023 order indicating provisional measures regarding the safe, unimpeded and expeditious return of people who fled Nagorno-Karabakh; recalls that the decision to host COP29 in Baku was made after Azerbaijan failed to comply with the abovementioned ICJ order as well as those of 7 December 2021 and of 22 February 2023; reiterates its call on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh, to provide robust guarantees for the protection of their rights and to refrain from any inflammatory rhetoric that could incite discrimination against Armenians; urges the Azerbaijani authorities to release all 23 Armenian prisoners of war detained following Azerbaijan’s retaking of the Nagorno-Karabakh region;

    13. Reiterates its call for the EU institutions and the Member States to continue to offer assistance to Armenia to deal with the refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh;

    14. Expresses deep concern regarding the preservation of cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh following the massive exodus of its Armenian population; urges Azerbaijan to refrain from further destruction, neglect or alteration of the origins of cultural, religious, or historical heritage in the region;

    15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Director-General of UNESCO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the United Nations and the Council of Europe.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia – B10-0136/2024

    Source: European Parliament 2

    Yannis Maniatis, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Udo Bullmann, Raphaël Glucksmann, Francisco Assis
    on behalf of the S&D Group

    B10‑0136/2024

    European Parliament resolution on the situation in Azerbaijan, violation of human rights and international law and relations with Armenia

    (2024/2980(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Armenia and Azerbaijan, in particular those of 20 May 2021 on prisoners of war in the aftermath of the most recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan[1], of 10 March 2022 on the destruction of cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh[2], of 19 January 2023 on the humanitarian consequences of the blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh[3], of 14 September 2023 on the case of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, imprisoned in Azerbaijan[4], of 13 March 2024 on closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia[5], and of 25 April 2024 on Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev[6],

    – having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 22 April 1996 between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part,

    – having regard to the joint statement of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan of 7 December 2023,

    – having regard to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group’s 2009 Basic Principles,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas from 11 to 22 November 2024 Azerbaijan will host the 29th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29); whereas respect for fundamental human rights and civil society participation are enshrined in the host country agreement through which the Azerbaijani Government committed to uphold these rights;

    B. whereas for more than a decade and with increasing determination Azerbaijani authorities have been reducing space for civil society, arbitrarily closing down non-governmental organisations and arresting or forcing into exile civil society representatives;

    C. whereas since the announcement that Azerbaijan would host COP29, control of critical voices has increased, resulting in the arrest, arbitrary detention and prosecution of civil society activists, journalists and media workers, including foreign journalists;

    D. whereas an estimated 300 people are currently being detained on politically motivated charges, including human rights defenders, journalists, academics, peaceful protesters, lawyers and political and other activists; whereas they are being held in conditions that do not meet international human rights standards and they are often denied access to their family members, lawyers and adequate medical care;

    E. whereas the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) decided in January 2024 not to ratify the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation, noting its ‘very serious concerns as to …[Azerbaijan’s] respect for human rights’; whereas the PACE noted that its Monitoring Committee’s rapporteurs were not allowed to meet with people who had been detained on allegedly politically motivated charges, and that the Azerbaijani delegation refused to allow the rapporteur for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to visit the country;

    F. whereas Azerbaijan has implemented a systematic policy of bribing officials and elected representatives in Europe in order to downplay Azerbaijan’s human rights record and to silence critics, as part of a widely used strategy described as ‘caviar diplomacy’; whereas some cases have been investigated and some of those involved have been prosecuted and convicted by national courts in several EU Member States;

    G. whereas Azerbaijan has been actively involved in destabilisation campaigns against the national politics of Member States, as recently observed and well-documented in New Caledonia, where it has conducted disinformation operations and provided support for rioters;

    H. whereas on 3 July 2024, the Council of Europe’s European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) publicly denounced Azerbaijan’s ‘refusal to improve the situation in the light of the Committee’s recommendations’ and the ‘persistent lack of cooperation of the Azerbaijani authorities with the CPT’,

    I. whereas Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, a renowned political economist, anti-corruption activist and chairperson of the Azerbaijan Democracy and Prosperity Movement, who is due to start his visiting scholarship at Technische Universität in Dresden, was arbitrarily detained on 23 July 2023, kept in prison on dubious charges with limited contact with his family and lawyer and reportedly subjected to inhumane treatment; whereas since Parliament’s resolutions of 14 September 2023 and 25 April 2024, his health has further deteriorated due to the inadequate treatment of his serious medical condition, poor detention conditions and inhumane treatment; whereas on 22 April 2024 Dr Ibadoghlu was moved to house arrest, where he is being kept under constant police surveillance without being allowed to communicate with doctors, while his health condition still gives rise to serious concerns for his life; whereas on 17 October 2024 Dr Ibadoghlu was shortlisted for the 2024 Sakharov Prize;

    J. whereas on 4 December 2023 human rights activist Ilhamiz Guliyev was arrested on politically motivated charges a few months after he gave an anonymous interview to AbzasMedia about the alleged police practice of planting drugs on political activists;

    K. whereas charges have been brought against numerous independent journalists who remain in prison or in pre-trial detention, while independent media outlets such as AbzasMedia, Kanal 13, Toplum TV and others have been shut down after key members of their staff were arrested on politically motivated charges;

    L. whereas Dr Ibadoghlu’s research found that Azerbaijan was highly unlikely to be able to increase its natural gas production sufficiently in order to fulfil its promise to provide gas to the EU as set out in the strategic partnership for energy; whereas Azerbaijan’s increased Russian gas imports are a cause for concern as to whether Azerbaijan can replace Russia as a gas supplier, as Baku, unable to meet European demand, may relabel Russian gas as Azerbaijani for European consumption;

    M. whereas on 19 September 2023 Azerbaijan launched an unjustified attack against Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in several hundred casualties, the death of civilians, and the majority of the population fleeing from their homes; whereas this forced displacement of the population and offensive against the civilian population represent a de facto ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh and gross violations of international law and human rights, which may amount to crimes against humanity;

    N. whereas in December 2023 a joint statement of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan brought about the release of 32 Armenian prisoners of war, expressed the commitment of both countries to continue their discussions regarding the implementation of more confidence-building measures, and called on the international community to support their efforts that would contribute to building mutual trust between the two countries and positively impact the entire South Caucasus region;

    1. Urges the Azerbaijani authorities to address the deteriorating human rights situation in the country ahead of COP29 and to show its commitment to fundamental rights and to fundamental principles of democracy, justice, the rule of law and human dignity;

    2. Denounces the reported violations of the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, the reprisals against human rights defenders and journalists, the widespread violations of the right to a fair trial, and the abuse of the criminal justice system for political purposes;

    3. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all human rights defenders, activists, journalists and government critics imprisoned in retaliation for their human rights work and dissenting views; demands that freedom of the press and expression be guaranteed and that media organisations not be restricted; calls, therefore, on the Azerbaijani Government to release journalists working for AbzasMedia, including Ulvi Hasanli and Sevinj Vagifqizi, and Alasgar Mammadli who works for Toplum TV;

    4. Deplores the crackdown on civil society, as documented by Amnesty International, around major international events hosted by Azerbaijan, including Eurovision 2012 and the 2015 European Games;

    5. Takes note of the statements of the electoral observation mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, according to which Azerbaijan’s presidential and early parliamentary elections of February and September 2024 did not offer voters genuine political alternatives and took place within a legal framework that overly restricted fundamental freedoms and the media;

    6. Reiterates its grave concern over the detention of anti-corruption activist and academic Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu, who was held in pre-trial detention for almost one year despite his deteriorating health, moved to house arrest on 22 April 2024 and continues to be deprived of liberty, and who is not allowed to leave Azerbaijan to receive the medical care he requires; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and on the Member States to actively call for the release of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu; calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to drop all charges against him, release him immediately from house arrest and allow him to leave the country on humanitarian grounds to receive urgently needed medical treatment abroad;

    7. Expresses its concern over the case of Anar Mammadli, a prominent human rights defender and climate advocate, who was arrested on 29 April 2024 and placed in pre-trial detention, and who faces charges of conspiracy in apparent retaliation for his criticism of the government and his activism; calls for his release from prison;

    8. Deplores the arbitrary detention of human rights defender Ilhamiz Guliyev and opposition leader Tofig Yagublu and calls for their immediate and unconditional release;

    9. Calls for the EU and its Member States to impose targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for human rights violations and systematic repression against civil society in Azerbaijan, as well as on Azerbaijani officials responsible for the ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh;

    10. Reiterates its call for independent investigations into the abuses committed by Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh that could amount to war crimes; calls, further, on the Azerbaijani authorities to allow the safe return of the Armenian population to Nagorno-Karabakh and to offer solid promises regarding the protection of their rights and protection from intimidation and discrimination, guaranteed and monitored by an international presence;

    11. Highlights the importance of providing continuous support to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who were displaced in September 2023 and beforehand through direct humanitarian aid and budget support for the Armenian Government; calls for the EU, in this regard, to provide a new package of assistance to Armenia to help the Armenian Government address the humanitarian needs of refugees;

    12. Calls on the Azerbaijani Government to immediately and unconditionally release all remaining Armenian prisoners of war, hostages and captives, and to ensure transparency regarding the situation of detainees from Nagorno-Karabakh;

    13. Strongly condemns the destruction of Armenian cultural, religious and historical heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh; calls on Azerbaijan to refrain from destroying this heritage in the region and calls for the protection of this heritage in line with UNESCO standards, including through the authorisation of a UNESCO mission to the area;

    14. Calls for thorough investigations into serious risks of Russian gas laundering through Azerbaijan and into the Azerbaijani authorities’ facilitation of Russia’s circumvention of EU sanctions, which would severely contradict EU foreign policy objectives; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the circumvention of sanctions by non-EU states; calls on the Council to design a new horizontal sanctions regime to counter this circumvention, which will require a more general and holistically applicable instrument to target circumvention in all regimes implemented by the EU;

    15. Insists that any partnership agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan – including on energy – must have strong conditions attached on the respect of international law, fundamental rights and international obligations, in particular on Azerbaijan making substantial progress towards a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement with Armenia; calls on the Commission, consequently, to urgently assess and review the 2022 Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy and to act accordingly;

    16. Calls on the VP/HR to suspend the negotiations for a renewed partnership agreement until Azerbaijan has demonstrated its genuine readiness to faithfully engage in the negotiation of a peace agreement with Armenia and to respect the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians;

    17. Confirms its full and strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan; condemns any military aggression, use of force or hybrid threats against Armenia, as well as foreign interference and attempts to destabilise the political situation in Armenia; welcomes the assistance measures under the European Peace Facility in support of the Armenian armed forces and calls for the cooperation between Armenia and the EU to be further reinforced in security and defence; welcomes the actions undertaken by several Member States to provide defensive military support to Armenia and urges the Member States to consider similar initiatives;

    18. Urges Azerbaijan and Armenia to advance towards full normalisation of their relations on all pending issues and to promptly conclude a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement; calls on Azerbaijan to demonstrate genuine efforts to this end and invites the VP/HR to continue to support efforts towards a comprehensive peace treaty;

    19. Welcomes the joint Armenia-Azerbaijan statement of 7 December 2023 on confidence-building measures; firmly believes that such measures can benefit the overall peace process and pave the way for increased trust between the two sides; welcomes the progress made in the framework of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border delimitation process, which has led to an agreement on several sections of the border; encourages both sides to take further steps on the remaining sections;

    20. Calls on EU and Member State officials and elected representatives taking part in COP29 in Baku not to turn a blind eye to human rights violations in the country and to use the momentum of the conference to increase diplomatic pressure on the Azerbaijani regime to respect fundamental rights and freedoms, release all political prisoners and return Armenian hostages;

    21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Armenia, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Mercosur – E-002035/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    11.10.2024

    Question for written answer  E-002035/2024
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anna Bryłka (PfE)

    Negotiators of the trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur countries held another round of meetings in Brasilia from 7 to 9 October 2024. According to press reports, an agreement is expected to be ready for the G20 Leaders’ Summit in mid-November in Rio de Janeiro. In January, Mercosur negotiations were nearing the finish line, but were pushed back due to mass protests by farmers ahead of the European Parliament elections.

    The EU’s trade agreement with Mercosur is being heavily criticised by all European agricultural associations and unions. The agreement will open up the EU market, with its heavily regulated industry and agriculture, to economies not bound in any way by those regulations.

    In light of the above:

    Does the agreement contain any obligations for Mercosur countries in terms of agricultural regulation, e.g. in relation to tackling deforestation, and if so, what are they?

    Submitted: 11.10.2024

    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Cambodian Ministry of Interior’s investigation into the Center for Alliance of Labor and Human Rights (CENTRAL) – E-001984/2024

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001984/2024
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Catarina Vieira (Verts/ALE)

    On 4 June 2024, the Center for Alliance of Labor and Human Rights (CENTRAL) released its report ‘Barriers to Representation: Freedom of Association in Cambodia’[1]. The report concluded that there were widespread obstacles to freedom of association in Cambodian workplaces, including verbal intimidation, threats, harassment and blacklisting, which severely affected their ability to function. Shortly after the report was published, the Ministry of Interior, among other organisations, began to take action against CENTRAL in what Human Rights Watch has described as a ‘smear campaign’[2]. This action takes place in the context of an ongoing government crackdown on independent media, civil society organisations and political opposition, which was the subject of a European Parliament resolution in March 2023[3].

    • 1.How does the Vice-President / High Representative respond to the measures taken against CENTRAL by the Cambodian Government and how are the organisation’s basic freedoms and rights being protected?
    • 2.Will the EU’s ambassador to Cambodia put pressure on the Cambodian Government to act in response to the drastically shrinking space for civil society in the country?
    • 3.Is the Vice-President / High Representative following up on the partial withdrawal of the Everything But Arms scheme from Cambodia by making sure that the scheme’s provisions on human and workers’ rights are respected?

    Submitted: 8.10.2024

    • [1] https://central-cambodia.org/archives/6989.
    • [2] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/02/cambodia-smear-campaign-against-labor-group.
    • [3] European Parliament resolution of 16 March 2023 on Cambodia: the case of opposition leader Kem Sokha,OJ C, C/2023/408, 23.11.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/408/oj.
    Last updated: 22 October 2024

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB and Banca March sign guarantee agreement to provide up to €300 million in financing to Spanish companies with 250 to 3 000 employees

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • The agreement seeks to promote private sector investment and support the financing needs of a key segment of the Spanish economy in terms of growth, competitiveness and job creation.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) and Banca March have signed a new agreement under which Banca March will provide up to €300 million of additional financing to Spanish companies with 250 to 3 000 employees. The EIB will offer an institutional guarantee covering 50% of the total amount.

    The goal of this agreement is to promote and accelerate private sector investment and offer working capital and liquidity solutions to Spanish mid-caps – many of which are family businesses, the strategic focus area of Banca March – making it easier for them to access finance with attractive terms in a high-interest rate environment.

    At least 35% of investments are expected to be made in regions with a per capita income below the EU average, helping to improve competitiveness and cohesion between regions, which is among the EIB Group’s strategic priorities.

    “The EIB is once again joining forces with Banca March to take another step forward in developing attractive lending solutions tailored to the needs of Spanish mid-caps,” said EIB Director of Financial Institutions Gemma Feliciani. “This agreement is yet another example of cooperation between the public and private sectors to boost the competitiveness of a key business segment for economic growth and job creation in Spain.”

    The agreement is part of the EIB’s efforts to finance small and medium companies (SMEs) and mid-caps and Banca March’s commitment to provide its financing capacity, all of which is in line with EU priorities and the goal of both institutions to help improve industrial competitiveness in the European Union.

    Banca March CEO José Luis Acea added: “As a bank specialising in advising businesses, business-owning families and family businesses, this agreement reflects our ongoing commitment to make it easier for Spanish companies to access finance from top-tier European institutions, enabling them to play their role as key motors of economic and social development in their domains.”

    Background information

    EIB

    The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It finances sound investments that further EU policy objectives. EIB projects bolster competitiveness, drive innovation, promote sustainable development, enhance social and territorial cohesion, and support a just and swift transition to climate neutrality.

    The European Investment Bank Group (EIB Group), consisting of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Investment Fund (EIF), reported total financing signatures in Spain of €11.4 billion in 2023, approximately €6.8 billion of which went to climate action and environmental sustainability projects. Overall, the EIB Group signed €88 billion in new financing in 2023.

    Banca March

    Banca March is one of Spain’s leading specialised private and corporate banking institutions. It is also the only bank to be fully family-owned since it was founded in 1926. In line with its prudent and long-term management philosophy, Banca March’s business model is supported by strong financial and capital ratios. It maintains the highest CET 1 solvency ratio in the Spanish banking sector (20.93%), one of the lowest default rates in the sector in Spain (1.81% as of June 2024, compared to 3.43% on average in the sector) and liquidity ratios – liquidity coverage ratio (287.8%) and direct taxation liability (182.4%) – and coverage of non-performing risks (51.89%) among the highest in the sector. The strength of Banca March’s value proposition has been supported by the Moody’s rating agency, which has raised Banca March’s long-term rating to A2 with a positive outlook, meaning it remains one of the best-rated entities in the Spanish financial system, ahead of the government itself (which currently has a Baa1 rating). Banca March is one of the main shareholders of Corporación Financiera Alba, with major stakes in Naturgy (indirect), Acerinox, Profand, Ebro Foods, BME, Viscofan, Atlantic and Parques Reunidos, among others.

    MIL OSI Europe News –