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Category: Politics

  • MIL-OSI USA: USAID Joins PepsiCo, Unilever, Danone, McCormick & Company, and Nespresso to Launch Collaboration to Advance Women for Resilient Agricultural Supply Chains

    Source: USAID

    Today, USAID joined consumer goods multinational companies PepsiCo, Unilever, Danone, McCormick & Company, and Nespresso in launching a new public-private partnership that aims to accelerate gender equality and enhance environmental sustainability in agricultural supply chains. The new initiative, Advancing Women for Resilient Agricultural Supply Chains, aligns with the Women in the Sustainable Economy (WISE) initiative – a partnership launched by Vice President Kamala Harris in 2023 to bolster women’s economic security in sectors that address climate change. 

    With a planned, collective investment of $50 million to start – including over $11 million of USAID funding – this new agricultural supply chain initiative will help catalyze industry-level change through learning, scaling, and providing evidence on how supporting women in agricultural supply chains can help deliver environmental sustainability goals. The initiative will drive scale by bringing in new organizations and additional funds, with a total target of $90 million over the next five years. 

    In parallel, USAID also welcomed the Skoll Foundation as the newest partner to WISE through its support of the USAID-led Climate Gender Equity Fund – a public-private partnership with Amazon, Reckitt, the UPS Foundation, and the Visa Foundation that seeks to increase access to climate finance for women-led and women-benefiting organizations working at the forefront of climate action. Three of its newest grantees – Altree Capital, The Rallying Cry, and Villgro Philippines – were also announced. 

    Finally, Acumen, Germany, Heading for Change, the Republic of Cyprus, and the United Kingdom announced $339 million in new aligned commitments to advance the WISE Initiative through their independent efforts that advance WISE objectives. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, and the U.S. Department of Energy announced $289 million in additional aligned U.S. government commitments to the WISE initiative. In all, today’s announcements total $681 million in direct and aligned commitments – bringing the collective commitment of 33 governments, corporations, foundations, and civil society organizations to a total of over $2 billion towards the WISE Initiative. 

    For more information about the WISE Initiative, please visit ClimateLinks or email wise@usaid.gov.

    Advancing Women for Resilient Agricultural Supply Chains Women in the Sustainable Economy WISE

    MIL OSI USA News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI USA: Office of the Governor – News Release – Gov. Green Will Seek $45 Million in Additional Welfare Relief for Hawaiʻi Families

    Source: US State of Hawaii

    GOVERNOR
    KE KIAʻĀINA

    GOVERNOR GREEN WILL SEEK $45 MILLION IN ADDITIONAL WELFARE RELIEF FOR HAWAIʻI FAMILIES

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
    September 23, 2024

    The state of Hawai‘i will implement rule changes to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) that are expected to generate an additional $45 million in benefits for Hawai‘i’s struggling families.

    The changes — prompted by a recent study by the University of Hawai‘i Economic Research Organization (UHERO) — mean that an extra 13,000 to 14,000 households will be eligible for an average of $3,200 a year in SNAP benefits, commonly known as food stamps.

    “This is going to provide a huge relief for our working-class families who are struggling with Hawai‘i’s highest-in-the-nation cost of living,” said Governor Josh Green, M.D. “In identifying a critical opportunity for our SNAP program, UHERO’s research team is enabling us to make much-needed changes to our social welfare system so that families living from paycheck to paycheck can afford to put more food on their tables.”

    In Hawai‘i, SNAP is one of the largest welfare programs available to low-income families. Currently, a family of four can receive as much as $1,759 a month in SNAP benefits. In a typical month, the total value of SNAP benefits in Hawai‘i exceeds $60 million.

    For decades, the SNAP eligibility criteria were controlled by the federal government. Following changes to the program in 2000, states were given more flexibility to adjust the eligibility rules by establishing a program of “broad-based categorical eligibility” (BBCE). Through BBCE, states were able to eliminate asset limits, which prevented households with high savings from receiving SNAP benefits. BBCE also allows states to raise limits on the amount of income households can receive and still qualify for SNAP.

    According to UHERO, eliminating another income criteria known as the “net income limit” will expand the number of Hawaiʻi households receiving SNAP benefits by 13,000 to 14,000. (“Net income” in the SNAP program is defined as the total monthly household income after deducting certain non-food household expenses like rent, utilities, medical costs, childcare costs and others. Before BBCE, households needed to have a net income below the federal poverty line to qualify for SNAP benefits.)

    Also according to UHERO, eliminating this limit will add little overhead: The state only needs to pay half of the additional administrative costs associated with the additional SNAP cases that would result. In 2019, Hawai‘i’s share of SNAP administrative costs was only about 5.6% of the amount of SNAP benefits that the state paid out to Hawai‘i families.

    “This decision has far-reaching implications,” said Dylan Moore, a co-author of the UHERO report. “This change may further increase benefit payments by making it easier for households to understand whether they are eligible for SNAP.”

    The Hawai‘i Public Health Institute’s Social Impact Policy Manager Nate Hix co-authored the report.

    # # #

    Media Contacts:   
    Erika Engle
    Press Secretary
    Office of the Governor, State of Hawai‘i
    Phone: 808-586-0120
    Email: [email protected]

    Makana McClellan
    Director of Communications
    Office of the Governor, State of Hawaiʻi
    Cell: 808-265-0083
    Email: [email protected]

    MIL OSI USA News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Translation: Biographical notices

    MIL OSI Translation. Canadian French to English –

    Source: Government of Canada – in French 1

    Karen Mollica (BA Honours [Political Science], McMaster University, 2000; MA [International Affairs], Carleton University, 2003) joined the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2003 after completing internships in Guyana and Costa Rica.

    Karen Mollica (BA Honours [Political Science], McMaster University, 2000; MA [International Affairs], Carleton University, 2003) joined the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2003 after completing internships in Guyana and Costa Rica. Her early assignments included serving as coordinator of the Landmine Action Team and as a case officer for several West and Central African countries. She then worked at the Canadian International Development Agency, serving as First Secretary at the High Commission in South Africa and as Counsellor and Head of Cooperation at the Embassy in Jordan. Upon her return to headquarters in 2019, she was appointed Director of Policy, Planning and Operations for Latin America and the Caribbean, a position she held until 2022. Most recently, she served as Director and Senior Ministerial Advisor in the Office of the Minister of International Development and Chargé d’Affaires at the Embassy to the Holy See.

    Ajit Singh (BA [Communications], University of Winnipeg, 2003; BA Honours [Political Science], University of Winnipeg, 2004; MA [International Law], United Nations University for Peace, 2006; JD, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2012) has lived, studied and worked in a multilingual environment in 6 countries on 4 continents. He joined the Government of Canada in 2008 after working in media, education, the United Nations and civil society organizations. He then practised private law in Toronto and was called to the Ontario Bar as a barrister. In 2013, he joined the Privy Council Office in the Intergovernmental Affairs Secretariat. He subsequently worked at the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat, where he was responsible for relations with Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Latin America, as well as legal files. In 2017, he joined Global Affairs Canada as Deputy Director in the Foreign Policy Planning Division, where he led the Foreign Ministers’ Events team during Canada’s G7 Presidency in 2018. He then worked in the Conflict Prevention, Stabilization and Peacebuilding Division. In 2021, he joined the Department of National Defence as Director of Operations. He returned to the Privy Council Office in 2022, this time to become the first person to hold the position of Director of International Crisis Response.

    EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and/or sentence structure not be perfect.

    MIL Translation OSI

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI: PayMate Announces Intent to Acquire DigiAsia

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Valuing DigiAsia at US $400 Million

    Introduces PayMate in Indonesia with Immediate Market Share Expansion, Targeting 2025 Public Listing

    MUMBAI, India and NEW YORK, Sept. 24, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — PayMate India (“PayMate”), a leading provider of B2B payments and services with reputable investors such as Visa & Lightbox, today announced that it has entered into a binding term sheet (the “Proposed Transaction”) for the potential acquisition of DigiAsia Bios Pte Ltd., Singapore, a leading Fintech-as-a-Service (FaaS) company in Indonesia and a fully owned subsidiary of DigiAsia Corporation (NASDAQ: FAAS) (“DigiAsia”).

    Under the terms of the Proposed Transaction, an enterprise valuation of US $400 Million for DigiAsia’s business has been determined. Additionally, post the Proposed Transaction, PayMate intends to invest up to US $25 Million in cash, the aggregate financing structure and terms will be finalized in mutual agreement. PayMate and DigiAsia will continue joint due diligence on both entities, identification of the right transaction structure, entering into definitive agreements and the necessary corporate and regulatory approvals of PayMate and DigiAsia which is expected to take up to 60 days. Subsequent to the closing of the Proposed Transaction, PayMate intends to initiate proceedings to list the combined entity in India.

    About PayMate

    PayMate India Ltd – a leading digital B2B payments company that empowers businesses of all sizes to enhance financial efficiency and streamline B2B payments. The platform simplifies and digitizes B2B payment processes, optimizing working capital, and ensuring timely supplier payments. PayMate’s solutions encompass Accounts Payable, Accounts Receivable, Invoice Discounting, Cross Border and Embedded Finance. In FY24, PayMate processed USD 10.5 billion in transactions, serving over 522,000 customers worldwide. With a strong presence in India, CEMEA, and APAC regions, PayMate is the trusted partner for businesses seeking to streamline payment processes.

    For more information, visit https://paymate.in/ or follow us on LinkedIn.

    About DigiAsia

    DigiAsia is a leading Fintech as a Service (FaaS) provider operating a B2B2X model offering its complete Fintech solution in emerging markets. DigiAsia’s fintech architecture offers small and medium business enterprises (SMEs) comprehensive embedded finance APIs to streamline processes across the commerce value chain of distributors and customers. DigiAsia’s embedded fintech solutions equally address democratizing digital finance access that supports financial inclusion of underbanked merchants and consumers in emerging markets resulting in growth for enterprise business. The suite of B2B2X solutions provided by DigiAsia include, but are not limited to, cashless payments, digital wallets, digital banking, remittances and banking licenses. DigiAsia has recently established a strategic initiative to develop its embedded FaaS enterprise solution with AI capabilities in Southeast Asia, India, and the Middle East, with plans for global expansion. For more information, please visit DigiAsia’s Corporate website here or Investor Relations website here.

    Forward-Looking Statements:

    This press release may contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The words “believe”, “expect”, “anticipate”, “project”, “targets”, “optimistic”, “confident that”, “continue to”, “predict”, “intend”, “aim”, “will” or similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. All statements other than statements of historical fact are statements that may be deemed forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements including, but not limited to, statements concerning DigiAsia and the Company’s operations, financial performance and condition are based on current expectations, beliefs and assumptions which are subject to change at any time. DigiAsia cautions that these statements by their nature involve risks and uncertainties, and actual results may differ materially depending on a variety of important factors such as government and stock exchange regulations, competition, political, economic and social conditions around the world including those discussed in DigiAsia’s Form 20-F under the headings “Risk Factors”, “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations” and “Business Overview” and other reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission from time to time. All forward-looking statements are applicable only as of the date it is made and DigiAsia specifically disclaims any obligation to maintain or update the forward-looking information, whether of the nature contained in this release or otherwise, in the future.

    PayMate Contact DigiAsia Company Contact:
       
    Vishvanathan Subramanian Subir Lohani
       
    Wholetime Director & Chief Financial Officer Chief Financial Officer and Chief Strategy Officer
       
    91-22-2661 6178 646-480-0142
       
    Email: corporate@paymate.co.in Investor Contact:
       
      MZ North America
       
      Email: FAAS@mzgroup.us

    The MIL Network –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI: Eightco Regains Compliance with Nasdaq Listing Requirements

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Easton, PA, Sept. 24, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Eightco Holdings Inc. (NASDAQ: OCTO) (the “Company” or “Eightco”) today announced that the Company received formal notice from The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC (“Nasdaq”) that the Company has regained compliance with Nasdaq’s minimum bid price requirement (the “Bid Price Requirement”) set forth in Nasdaq Listing Rule 5550(a)(2), as well as Nasdaq’s stockholders’ equity requirement (“Equity Requirement”) set forth in Nasdaq Listing Rule 5550(b)(1).

    To regain compliance with the Bid Price Requirement, the Company’s Common Stock was required to maintain a minimum closing bid price of $1.00 or more for a minimum of 10 consecutive trading days. The Notice confirmed that the Company’s Common Stock maintained a closing bid price above $1.00 for the last 20 consecutive trading days. Accordingly, this requirement had been met.

    The notice also indicated that the Company had reported stockholders’ equity of $13,428,553 in its recently filed Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2024, which exceeded the required minimum stockholders’ equity of $2,500,000. As a result, the Company had also regained compliance with the Equity Requirement.

    The Company’s Common Stock will continue to trade on The Nasdaq Capital Market tier of Nasdaq under the symbol “OCTO”.

    About Eightco

    Eightco (NASDAQ: OCTO) is committed to growth of its subsidiaries, made up of Forever 8, an inventory capital and management platform for e-commerce sellers, and Ferguson Containers, Inc., a provider of complete manufacturing and logistical solutions for product and packaging needs, through strategic management and investment. In addition, the Company is actively seeking new opportunities to add to its portfolio of technology solutions focused on the e-commerce ecosystem through strategic acquisitions. Through a combination of innovative strategies and focused execution, Eightco aims to create significant value and growth for its portfolio companies and stockholders.

    For additional information, please visit www.8co.holdings

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. All statements in this press release other than statements of historical fact could be deemed forward looking. Words such as “plans,” “expects,” “will,” “anticipates,” “continue,” “expand,” “advance,” “develop” “believes,” “guidance,” “target,” “may,” “remain,” “project,” “outlook,” “intend,” “estimate,” “could,” “should,” and other words and terms of similar meaning and expression are intended to identify forward-looking statements, although not all forward-looking statements contain such terms. Forward-looking statements are based on management’s current beliefs and assumptions that are subject to risks and uncertainties and are not guarantees of future performance. Actual results could differ materially from those contained in any forward-looking statement as a result of various factors, including, without limitation: Eightco’s ability to maintain compliance with the Nasdaq’s continued listing requirements; unexpected costs, charges or expenses that reduce Eightco’s capital resources; Eightco’s inability to raise adequate capital to fund its business; Eightco’s inability to innovate and attract users for Eightco’s products; future legislation and rulemaking negatively impacting digital assets; and shifting public and governmental positions on digital asset mining activity. Given these risks and uncertainties, you are cautioned not to place undue reliance on such forward-looking statements. For a discussion of other risks and uncertainties, and other important factors, any of which could cause Eightco’s actual results to differ from those contained in forward-looking statements, see Eightco’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), including in its Annual Report on Form 10-K filed with the SEC on April 1, 2024. All information in this press release is as of the date of the release, and Eightco undertakes no duty to update this information or to publicly announce the results of any revisions to any of such statements to reflect future events or developments, except as required by law.

    For further information, please contact:
    Investor Relations
    investors@8co.holdings

    The MIL Network –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Reportage: BNZ warns of increased tax scams as tax time approaches

    Source: BNZ statements

    As tax time approaches, Bank of New Zealand (BNZ) is urging New Zealanders to be alert to the heightened risk of tax-related scams.

    “The end of the financial year is a prime opportunity for scammers, who take advantage of tax time to trick and defraud New Zealanders out of their money,” says Ashley Kai Fong, BNZ’s Head of Financial Crime.

    “Scammers exploit the urgency and importance of tax-related matters, creating fraudulent but realistic scenarios about tax debts or refunds that can seem both timely and credible,” he says.

    “Tax scams are particularly effective because people often have genuine interactions with the IRD during this time of year,” says Kai Fong. “Scammers exploit this familiarity to make their attempts more believable. It’s crucial to verify the authenticity of any unsolicited communication claiming to be from government agencies.

    “A recent example we’ve seen is of customers receiving an email claiming to be from the IRD. The email, which originates from an unofficial email address, contains a link that directs customers to a fraudulent IRD website, which then leads them to a fake bank login page.

    “Examples like this serve as a stark reminder of the importance of being vigilant and cautious when receiving unsolicited emails, even if they appear to be from trusted sources like the IRD or government agencies.”

    New Zealanders should always access their accounts through official websites, rather than clicking on a link which directs them to do so.

    “At this time of year, be particularly wary of emails or communications about tax refunds or debts. Verify the source thoroughly, and if in doubt, contact the IRD via the details on its official website. Remember, the IRD will never prompt you to log in to your online banking via their website or ask you to provide your banking login credentials.

    “The simplest yet most powerful defence you have is being aware. Trust your instincts and always take a sec to check before providing sensitive information.”

    In case of suspicious activity or suspected scams, BNZ encourages anyone who believes they may have been targeted by a scam to contact their bank immediately. For more information on protecting yourself from scams, visit www.getscamsavvy.co.nz.

    The post BNZ warns of increased tax scams as tax time approaches appeared first on BNZ Debrief.

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Reportage: BNZ latest big name to invest in AgriZeroNZ

    Source: BNZ statements

    Bank of New Zealand (BNZ) is the latest business to join the growing lineup of private sector companies backing AgriZeroNZ, alongside government, to get emissions reduction tools into Kiwi farmers’ hands sooner.

    Announcing the new shareholder today, Hon Todd McClay, Minister for Agriculture & Trade, confirmed the government would match BNZ’s $4 million investment, boosting AgriZeroNZ’s funds by $8milllion to total $191 million.

    BNZ joins The a2 Milk Company, ANZ Bank New Zealand, ANZCO Foods, ASB Bank, Fonterra, Rabobank, Ravensdown, Silver Fern Farms and Synlait with a combined 50% shareholding of the joint venture (JV). With the government’s increased investment, it owns the remaining half through the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI).

    AgriZeroNZ Board Chair, Sir Brian Roche KNZM, says this provides a welcome boost in funds to achieve the JV’s ambition and maintain the multibillion-dollar agricultural export trade.

    “I’m pleased more of the private sector is joining us to help get practical tools into farmers’ hands.

    “New Zealand farmers are highly efficient producers of milk and meat for the world, but global companies that pay a premium for these products – such as McDonald’s, Nestlé, Danone, Tesco and Sainsbury’s – are all pushing deep into their supply chain for emissions reduction, with ambitious scope 3 targets.

    “These customers want to see more progress and we need to act now, or we risk losing these high-end customers and potentially breaching trade agreements. Further to this, competitor markets with more intensive farms are getting access to new tools to reduce emissions so they could take our place in supplying these customers.

    “There is a very real and very disruptive risk to our agricultural sector from the need to reduce emissions but there is also an opportunity to stay among the most efficient producers in the world if we can get the right tools to our farmers.

    “We’re confident that with our ambition, expertise, and increasing reach through the private sector, we’ll have 2-3 tools in widespread use by 2030.”

    Sir Brian Roche KNZM, AgriZeroNZ Board Chair, says the JV Is confident it will have 2-3 tools in widespread use by 2030

    BNZ CEO Dan Huggins says the bank is pleased to support AgriZeroNZ and partner with government and some of the country’s largest primary sector businesses to back its farming customers by investing in tools to help reduce emissions and maintain New Zealand’s competitive advantage in agriculture.

    “BNZ has a long history of banking New Zealand farmers, and over that time we have worked alongside our farming customers as they have continually adapted and innovated to meet changing market dynamics.

    “This public-private partnership approach to addressing on farm emissions continues that tradition, helping to ensure New Zealand maintains a resilient and productive agricultural sector into the future,” he says.

    Dan Huggins, BNZ CEO, says it is investing in tools to help reduce emissions and maintain New Zealand’s competitive advantage in agriculture.

    AgriZeroNZ is a world-first public-private partnership with an ambition to ensure all farmers in Aotearoa New Zealand have equitable access to affordable, effective solutions to reduce biogenic methane and nitrous oxide emissions, supporting a 30% reduction by 2030 and drive towards ‘near zero’ by 2040.

    Since being established in February 2023, the JV has committed more than $29M across 10 high impact opportunities to bring emissions reduction solutions to market for Kiwi farmers. This includes a methane-inhibiting bolus, novel probiotics, methane vaccine development, and low emissions pasture.

    It recently raised $18million from The a2 Milk Company, ANZ Bank New Zealand and ASB Bank becoming shareholders in April, with their funding also matched by government.

    AgriZeroNZ has over 77 potential investment opportunities on its radar for review as it continues scanning the globe for solutions which could work on New Zealand farms, to invest and drive development towards a pasture-based solution. It is also working with officials to clarify the regulatory pathway in New Zealand for tools to be used on-farm.

    The post BNZ latest big name to invest in AgriZeroNZ appeared first on BNZ Debrief.

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Reportage: Money Month 2024: BNZ survey reveals retirement concerns

    Source: BNZ statements

    A BNZ survey has highlighted the importance of financial education as Sorted Money Month 2024 begins. Coordinated by Te Ara Ahunga Ora Retirement Commission, the annual campaign aims to equip New Zealanders with education, resources, and tools to better navigate their financial journey.

    The survey* uncovered some significant concerns about retirement preparedness:

    • Nearly four in ten (39%) respondents aren’t confident they’ll have saved enough for retirement
    • One quarter lacked confidence in making investment decisions, with younger people (aged 25-44), lower-income households, and non-homeowners particularly affected
    • 74% felt they can’t rely on NZ Super for their retirement, including those who believed it won’t provide sufficient income, or had concerns it may change in the future

    Anna Flower, Executive, Personal and Business Banking at BNZ, says, “These findings highlight the importance of financial education and early planning. Money Month is an opportunity for people to take that crucial first step towards financial preparedness.”

    Continuing and building on last year’s theme “Pause. Get sorted,” Money Month 2024 focuses on actions to help people grow their money and build resilience.

    “Understanding concepts like compounding interest and starting your savings journey early – even with small, regular amounts – can significantly enhance financial outcomes,” Flower says.

    The survey also highlighted KiwiSaver’s role in long-term financial health, with 89% of respondents enrolled. However, 16% revealed they aren’t making regular contributions, highlighting the need for ongoing education and engagement.

    “People think investing is for the wealthy, but investing is for everyone, and KiwiSaver is the easiest and most accessible way to get started,” Flower says.

    “For those not contributing, it’s important to understand that you could be leaving money on the table. With KiwiSaver, in addition to your own savings, you can benefit from both government and employer contributions. These additional contributions can make a real difference to your savings over time, helping put you in a much stronger position for retirement or buying your first home.”

    Supporting your goals

    While Money Month shines a spotlight on financial health, BNZ is committed to supporting financial wellbeing throughout the year.

    “Our free Banking Reviews are designed to align customers’ banking with their financial goals and enhance their overall financial health,” Flower says.

    These reviews involve building a comprehensive understanding of an individual’s financial goals and needs – from day-to-day transactions to borrowing, investments, and insurance. This holistic approach allows for tailored advice and personalised recommendations to support overall financial health.

    “Our experts are always here to discuss your savings goals, advise on home loans, or help you use our BNZ KiwiSaver Scheme Navigator to understand how to get on track with your retirement savings. These reviews ensure that banking solutions work for what’s important to customers now and in the future,” she says.

    In addition, BNZ offers a range of online tools and resources to help New Zealanders take control of their finances. The BNZ app’s Activity tab enables customers to track their spending, categorise transactions, and manage cashflow across personal accounts. For homeowners, the MyProperty tool provides insights into home loans, allowing users to explore scenarios like changing repayments or assessing the impact of different interest rates and what impact this may have on their mortgage free date. These digital tools, along with comprehensive calculators and other resources, support customers in making informed financial decisions.

    “Don’t let another year pass without taking charge of your financial future. Whether you’re just starting out or looking to optimise your investments for retirement, now is the time to act. Small steps today, like ensuring you’re making the most of your KiwiSaver or booking a Banking Review, can lead to meaningful improvements in your financial well-being tomorrow.”

    For more information on Money Month initiatives and to access financial resources, visit www.sorted.org.nz

    The post Money Month 2024: BNZ survey reveals retirement concerns appeared first on BNZ Debrief.

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Global: Know your place: what happened to class in British politics – a new podcast series from The Conversation Documentaries

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Laura Hood, Host, Know Your Place podcast, The Conversation

    Even in the 21st century, social class is a part of being British. We talk of living in a post-class era but, in reality, our backgrounds affect our life chances and even just the way we interact with each other. We have a sense of our own class and make assumptions about others with class in the back of our minds.

    In a recent documentary about their rise to fame, David and Victoria Beckham squabbled about the latter’s claim to come from a working class family. She was derided across the internet for the claim, too.

    Is Victoria Beckham working class? You may scoff at the very thought. But then consider when she stopped being working class and you start to see the problem. If a wealthy British person who owns her own business is not working class, when did she cease to be so? Are her parents still working class if she is not?

    For much of the 20th century, class identities were clearer. There was also a strong, clear relationship between class and political preference. After all, one of the two main parties was established explicitly to represent the labour movement. It was loudly and proudly a political manifestation of the working class.

    There were of course exceptions but, by and large, if someone knew your class, they could make a fairly safe guess as to how you would vote. That is no longer true.

    This is what I’m exploring in a new podcast series Know your place: what happened to class in British politics on The Conversation Documentaries. Listen to the trailer now ahead of the series launch on October 7.

    Over the course of five episodes, I’ll be speaking to leading politics experts across the UK to find out why Labour can no longer take the working class vote for granted but also why the Conservatives can’t either.

    We’ll find out the truth behind the Liberal Democrats’ “Gail’s strategy” to capture the middle classes. We’ll explore how class is even defined in the 21st century and pinpoint when it stopped being the case that your background shaped your politics.

    And as the UK ushers in ostensibly the most working-class parliament that has been seen in years, we’ll investigate what difference it makes when people from working-class backgrounds hold the levers of power.

    Follow The Conversation Documentaries to listen to Know Your Place: what happened to class in British politics from October 7. The Conversation Documentaries, formerly called The Anthill, is the home for in-depth documentary podcast series from The Conversation.

    Know Your Place: what happened to class in British politics is produced and mixed by Anouk Millet for The Conversation. It’s supported by the National Centre for Social Research.

    Newsclips in the trailer from Keir Starmer, ITV News, PoliticsJOE and Angela Rayner MP.

    Listen to The Conversation Documentaries via any of the apps listed above, download it directly via our RSS feed or find out how else to listen here.

    Know Your Place: what happened to class in British politics is supported by the National Centre for Social Research.

    – ref. Know your place: what happened to class in British politics – a new podcast series from The Conversation Documentaries – https://theconversation.com/know-your-place-what-happened-to-class-in-british-politics-a-new-podcast-series-from-the-conversation-documentaries-239451

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UN Human Rights Council 57: UK Statement on Burundi

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    UK Statement for the Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on Burundi. Delivered at the 57th HRC in Geneva.

    Thank you, Mr. President.

    We thank the Special Rapporteur for his important update, and for his valuable reporting throughout his mandate. We are concerned that Burundi continues to deny full access to the Special Rapporteur.

    Mr President, conditions for human rights defenders and civil society in Burundi remain difficult.  An active civil society where journalists can work safely and independently is essential to support democracy, and we call on the government of Burundi to strengthen protections for media workers. Ahead of next year’s elections it is important that progress is made towards ending impunity for all perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses. It is essential that Burundi engage meaningfully with this Council’s mechanisms, in line with its public commitments to continue engaging constructively with the international community. We again call upon Burundi to co-operate with all UN bodies working to improve the human rights situation, including by reopening the OHCHR country office.

    Special Rapporteur,

    Your reporting shows that this Council’s ongoing scrutiny remains necessary. How can this Council further support Burundi to engage constructively with international human rights mechanisms?

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    Published 24 September 2024

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Dominican Republic

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    September 10, 2024

    Washington, DC: On September 10, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with the Dominican Republic and considered and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting.[2]

    A track record of sound policies and institutional policy frameworks has helped the Dominican Republic achieve robust and resilient economic growth and low inflation over the last two decades. Effective policies contributed to a growth moderation that appropriately supported inflation’s rapid and sustained return to its target last year and then aided the recovery, while close monitoring of the financial sector supported macro-financial stability. Planned enhancements to policy frameworks and deepening structural reforms—in particular, comprehensive fiscal and electricity reforms—have the potential to further support stability, competitiveness, and inclusive growth.

    Following a strong post-pandemic recovery, economic growth slowed to 2.4 percent in 2023 due to tighter global and domestic financial conditions, weak export demand, and transient domestic factors, largely climate related. The growth slowdown, alongside lower commodity prices, drove inflation’s faster-than-expected convergence to its target range (4±1 percent). In response, the Central Bank of The Dominican Republic (BCRD) cautiously and appropriately reduced its key policy rate, allowing for greater exchange rate flexibility while increasing foreign exchange interventions to smooth daily exchange volatility. Fiscal policy was also prudently adjusted to support the economy. The current account deficit in 2023 narrowed markedly to 3.6 percent of GDP and was fully financed by foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. The financial sector weathered the period of tight monetary policy and slower growth and is adequately capitalized and profitable.

    Supported by sound policies and macroeconomic fundamentals, the outlook is favorable despite elevated, mostly global, uncertainty. For 2024 and over the medium term, real GDP growth is projected around its long-term trend of 5 percent, with inflation around its 4 percent target. The current account deficit is projected to gradually narrow to less than 3 percent of GDP and continue being fully financed by FDI. Near-term risks to the outlook—including tighter global financial conditions, geopolitical tensions, and volatile commodity prices—have moderated since last year but remain elevated and tilted to the downside. Over the medium-term risks are more balanced and include upside risks if key domestic reforms are implemented successfully.

    Executive Board Assessment

    In concluding the 2024 Article IV Consultation with the Dominican Republic, Executive Directors endorsed staff’s appraisal, as follows:

    A track record of sound policies and institutional policy frameworks has helped the Dominican Republic achieve robust and resilient economic growth and low inflation over the last two decades. Effective policies contributed to a growth moderation that appropriately supported inflation’s rapid and sustained return to its target in 2023. The authorities provided timely policy support to aid the recovery while monitoring closely the financial sector. The external position improved significantly in 2023 and was broadly in line with fundamentals and desirable policies.

    The outlook is favorable despite elevated—mostly global—uncertainty. Real GDP growth is projected around its long-term trend of 5 percent in 2024 and thereafter, with inflation around its (4±1 percent) target. The current account deficit, expected to be fully financed by FDI, is projected to gradually narrow over the medium term. Downside risks dominate in the near‑term term—including tighter for longer monetary policy in the U.S., intensification of regional conflicts, or extreme local weather events—but are broadly balanced over the medium term, including upside risks if reforms are successfully implemented. Existing buffers, further contingency planning, and agile sound policy making can help face adverse shocks.

    In the near term, policy priorities should remain focused on maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability, including further flexibility of the exchange rate. Monetary policy normalization can continue, given remaining economic slack and that inflation is firmly within the target range. Efforts to expedite the recapitalization of the central bank to reinforce its autonomy should remain a priority. Endeavors should continue to deepen the FX market, expand the use of hedging mechanisms and limit FXIs to large shocks that lead to destabilizing changes in hedging and financing premia to support further exchange rate flexibility, and therefore further enhance the effectiveness of the inflation targeting framework. While international reserves are broadly adequate based on traditional metrics, further reserve accumulation is necessary to increase buffers to deal with future shocks.

    Fiscal policy should remain focused on rebuilding buffers and critical spending needs. The fiscal responsibility law and its planned implementation are welcomed and are important steps to better anchor medium-term policies and further secure debt sustainability. The authorities’ planned gradual fiscal consolidation, consistent with this law, is appropriate to place debt on a firmly downward path and build fiscal buffers. An integral fiscal reform that durably raises revenues—through elimination of tax exemptions and expansion of the tax base—and improves spending efficiency—especially by reducing electricity sector subsidies and untargeted transfers—is imperative. This can provide space for needed development spending (including disaster-resilient infrastructure) to promote inclusive growth.

    The financial sector remains resilient and well capitalized, and efforts to bring the regulatory framework up to the latest international standards should continue. The sector weathered well the period of high interest rates and slower growth in 2023. Stress tests show that the banking sector can absorb a range of shocks. Continued close monitoring to contain any build‑up of vulnerabilities remains warranted amid higher for longer interest rates and past increases to credit growth. The modernization of the financial and prudential regulatory framework, alongside the expansion of the macroprudential toolkit, and closing regulatory/supervisory gaps (including for savings and loans cooperatives) will further increase financial sector resilience.

    Ongoing efforts to improve public institutions and the business climate are essential to maintaining the strong investment and growth trajectory. The fiscal policy framework, and spending and revenue efficiency can be further enhanced by continued improvements to public financial management and further strengthening of revenue administration. Reforms to education and the labor market, alongside further improvements to social outcomes and implementation of climate adaptation and mitigation policies will be critical to support inclusive and resilient growth and continue to reduce vulnerabilities. The authorities should continue in their efforts to fully implement the Electricity Pact.

    Dominican Republic: Selected Economic Indicators

    Population (millions, 2023)                                                     10.7

    GDP per capita (2023, U.S. dollars)                         11,372

    Quota                                     477.4 million SDRs / 0.10% of total

    Poverty (2021, share of population)                            23.9

    Main exports                                             tourism, gold, tobacco

    Unemployment rate (2023, percent)                             5.3

    Key export markets                                          U.S., Canada, Haiti

    Adult literacy rate (percent, 2022)                               95.5

    Projection

    2019

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    Output

    (Annual percentage change, unless otherwise stated) 

    Real GDP

    5.1

    -6.7

    12.3

    4.9

    2.4

    5.1

    5.0

    Nominal GDP (RD$ billion)

    4,562

    4,457

    5,393

    6,261

    6,820

    7,453

    8,149

    Nominal GDP (US$ billion)

    89.0

    78.9

    94.5

    113.9

    121.8

    …

    …

    Output gap (in percent of potential output)

    -0.5

    -6.3

    -1.9

    -0.8

    -1.7

    -0.8

    -0.5

    Prices

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Consumer price inflation (end of period)

    3.7

    5.6

    8.5

    7.8

    3.6

    3.7

    4.0

    Exchange Rate

    Exchange rate (RD$/US$ – period average) 1/

    51.2

    56.5

    57.1

    55.0

    56.0

    …

    …

    Exchange rate (RD$/US$ – eop) 1/

    52.9

    58.2

    57.3

    56.2

    58.0

    …

    …

    Real effective exchange rate (eop, – depreciation) 1/

    -3.2

    -8.1

    6.5

    6.3

    -1.9

    -2.9

    0.0

    Government Finances

    (In percent of GDP) 

    Consolidated public sector debt 2/

    53.3

    71.1

    62.2

    58.8

    59.3

    58.4

    57.4

    Consolidated public sector overall balance 2/

    -3.3

    -9.0

    -3.7

    -3.6

    -4.0

    -4.0

    -3.8

    Consolidated public sector primary balance

    0.5

    -4.2

    0.7

    0.0

    0.4

    0.7

    0.7

    NFPS balance

    -2.3

    -7.6

    -2.5

    -2.7

    -3.1

    -3.1

    -3.1

     Central government balance

    -3.5

    -7.9

    -2.9

    -3.2

    -3.3

    -3.1

    -3.1

    Revenues and grants

    14.4

    14.2

    15.6

    15.3

    15.7

    16.3

    15.2

    Primary spending

    15.1

    18.9

    15.4

    15.7

    15.8

    15.9

    14.8

    Interest expenditure

    2.7

    3.2

    3.1

    2.8

    3.1

    3.4

    3.5

    Rest of NFPS

    1.1

    0.3

    0.4

    0.6

    0.2

    0.0

    0.0

    Financial Sector

    (Annual percentage change; unless otherwise stated) 

    Broad money (M3)

    11.7

    21.2

    13.4

    6.3

    14.3

    11.5

    10.7

    Credit to the private sector

    11.8

    5.3

    11.6

    16.6

    19.6

    15.8

    11.5

    Net domestic assets of the banking system

    8.6

    2.5

    11.5

    9.7

    13.1

    13.5

    10.1

    Policy interest rate (in percent) 1/

    4.5

    3.0

    3.5

    8.5

    7.0

    …

    …

        Average bank deposit rate (1-year; in percent) 1/

    6.7

    3.1

    2.3

    9.9

    8.6

    …

    …

        Average bank lending rate (1-year; in percent) 1/

    12.4

    9.9

    9.2

    13.5

    13.6

    …

    …

    Balance of Payments

    (In percent of GDP) 

    Current account

    -1.3

    -1.7

    -2.8

    -5.8

    -3.6

    -3.4

    -3.4

    Goods, net

    -10.2

    -8.6

    -12.5

    -15.1

    -13.0

    -12.9

    -12.7

    Services, net

    5.7

    1.8

    3.9

    4.8

    6.0

    6.6

    6.5

    Income, net

    3.2

    5.2

    5.7

    4.5

    3.5

    2.9

    2.7

    Capital account

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Financial account 3/

    3.6

    5.3

    5.7

    6.7

    5.1

    3.5

    4.3

    Foreign direct investment, net

    3.4

    3.2

    3.4

    3.6

    3.6

    3.5

    3.5

    Portfolio investment, net

    2.4

    7.1

    2.2

    2.9

    2.0

    1.5

    1.3

    Financial derivatives, net

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Other investment, net

    -2.3

    -5.1

    0.1

    0.2

    -0.5

    -1.5

    -0.5

    Change in reserves (-increase)

    -1.3

    -2.5

    -2.4

    -1.3

    -0.9

    -0.2

    -0.9

    GIR (in millions of US dollars)

    8,782

    10,752

    12,943

    14,441

    15,464

    15,660

    16,883

    Total external debt (in percent of GDP)

    41.9

    56.3

    48.6

    40.5

    43.3

    43.5

    42.5

     of which: Consolidated public sector

    27.3

    40.3

    35.6

    33.2

    33.9

    32.9

    32.2

     

    Sources: National authorities; World Bank; and IMF staff calculations.

    1/ Latest available.

    2/ The consolidated public sector includes the budgetary central government (CG); the rest of the Non-Financial Public Sector, i.e., extra-budgetary central government institutions (decentralized and autonomous institutions), social security funds, local governments and non-financial public companies; and the quasi-fiscal central bank debt. With the dissolution of the state electricity holding company (CDEEE) in 2022, the deficit of CDEEE from 2019 was transferred to the CG.

    3/ Excluding reserves. 

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/10/pr24323-dominican-republic-imf-exec-board-concludes-2024-aiv-consult

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Botswana

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    September 10, 2024

    • Botswana’s economic growth is expected to slow to 1 percent in 2024 primarily because of a diamond market contraction, before picking up next year. Inflation has declined sharply since the peak of mid-2022 and returned to the central bank’s medium-term objective range of 3–6 percent, where it is expected to remain in the medium term.
    • The government plans a fiscal expansion in FY2024 followed by two years of substantial fiscal adjustment. Public debt is low (20 percent of GDP), but government deposits at the central bank have significantly reduced over the past decade.
    • The financial sector is sound, stable, and resilient.

    Washington, DC: On August 28, 2024, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with Botswana and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting on a lapse-of-time basis.[2]

    Botswana’s economic growth decelerated from 5.5 percent in 2022 to 2.7 percent in 2023, below the long-run potential growth of 4 percent. A sharp decline in diamond trading and mining activities was the main contributor to the slowdown, as global demand for rough diamonds decreased. Inflation has remained below the ceiling of the central bank’s medium-term objective range since July 2023. Despite lower diamond exports, FX reserves increased in 2023 supported by higher customs union receipts. The financial sector is broadly sound, stable, and resilient.

    Botswana’s economy is expected to decelerate further this year, with growth projected at
    1 percent. The continued slowdown is mainly due to a fall in diamond production, partly offset by construction projects financed by the fiscal expansion. Growth is forecast to rebound – averaging 5 percent over the next two years – due to higher prices and quantities of diamonds produced. Inflation is projected to remain within the central bank’s objective range of
    3–6 percent.

    The fiscal deficit is projected to widen further to 6 percent of GDP in FY2024, reflecting a further decline in mineral revenues and higher capital expenditure. The government plans a substantial fiscal adjustment in the following two years to reach a fiscal surplus. The external position should soften over the medium term (with FX reserves decreasing to 5 months of imports) due to weak growth in customs revenues and higher government foreign debt repayments. Risks to the outlook remain elevated due to the emergence of cheaper lab-grown diamonds, and uncertainty over the recovery of major export markets.

    Executive Board Assessment

    In concluding the 2024 Article IV consultation with Botswana, Executive Directors endorsed staff’s appraisal, as follows:

    Botswana is facing a severe slowdown from a diamond market contraction in 2023 and 2024. Growth is expected to fall to 1.0 percent this year, from 2.7 percent in 2023 and 5.5 percent in 2022. This reflects weaker global demand for diamonds and a sharp increase in inventories.

    Real GDP growth should rebound next year, although risks to the outlook remain elevated. A strong recovery is projected in 2025, driven by the rebound in diamond production and trade. But the economic outlook is highly uncertain, with the emergence of cheaper lab-grown diamonds, and the announced sale of De Beers by its UK parent company.

    In the near term, the fall in diamond revenues could be accommodated by a mix of higher fiscal deficit and reprioritization of capital expenditure. Some fiscal relaxation is warranted in light of the widening of the output gap, but staff encourages the authorities to reprioritize capital projects to limit the increase in the deficit and ensure that they achieve the highest value for money.

    Over the medium term, the authorities’ planned fiscal consolidation is critical to put a stop to the depletion of government’s financial buffers, build resilience against shocks, and preserve fiscal sustainability. Staff assesses that targeting a 1 percent of GDP fiscal surplus would generate sufficient savings to protect the budget against major economic shocks. While the authorities’ adjustment plan focuses mostly on expenditure restraint, there is also scope to increase revenues. The medium-term adjustment should be supported by institutional reforms, including a fiscal rule, more credible medium-term budgeting, and possibly a well-designed SWF.

    The monetary policy stance is appropriate. Inflation has declined since August 2022 and is projected to remain within the central bank’s objective range in the medium term. Underlying pressures, as measured by core inflation indicators, seem contained, while inflation expectations are well anchored. The 2023 external position is assessed to be broadly in line with fundamentals and desirable policies.

    The authorities’ plans to strengthen financial sector oversight, deepening, and inclusion are welcomed. The financial sector is broadly sound and stable despite the economic slowdown. Faster implementation of the 2023 FSAP recommendations will further reduce financial risks. These include moving to implement Basel III liquidity standards, enhancing risk-based supervision of banks, reinforcing the crisis management framework (ELA, bank resolution), and deploying macroprudential tools to address household debt risk.

    Accelerating growth and job creation requires a fundamental shift towards greater private sector participation, a more diversified export base, and a more efficient public sector. The authorities should prioritize SOE modernization, improved infrastructure for doing business (internet, energy, logistics), trade facilitation measures, more efficient social protection, and financial inclusion reforms that support small entrepreneurs. These goals could be enshrined in the new NDP, supported by time-bound and well-prioritized action plans.

    Botswana: Selected Economic and Social Indicators, 2020-20291
     

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029
     

    Projection

    (Annual percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

    National Income and Prices

    		                    

    Real GDP

    -8.7

    11.9

    5.5

    2.7

    1.0

    5.2

    4.8

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    Nonmineral

    -3.5

    7.9

    4.9

    2.6

    5.1

    4.1

    4.4

    4.4

    4.4

    4.5

    GDP per capita (US dollars)

    5,863

    7,244

    7,726

    7,250

    7,341

    8,003

    8,602

    9,146

    9,726

    10,437

    GNI per capita (US dollars)2

    5,872

    7,174

    7,220

    6,963

    7,150

    7,733

    8,290

    8,798

    9,344

    10,027

        Consumer prices (average)

    1.9

    6.7

    12.2

    5.1

    3.8

    4.5

    4.5

    4.5

    4.5

    4.5

    Diamond production (millions of carats)

    16.9

    22.7

    24.5

    25.1

    21.1

    23.3

    25.0

    25.5

    26.0

    26.4

    Money and Banking

    		                    

    Monetary Base

    -3.8

    -8.8

    -5.3

    33.1

    8.7

    9.7

    9.3

    9.2

    9.3

    9.3

    Broad money (M2)

    5.9

    5.0

    6.8

    9.3

    8.7

    9.7

    9.3

    9.2

    9.3

    9.3

    Credit to the private sector

    5.3

    5.4

    4.7

    5.6

    8.5

    11.0

    11.0

    11.0

    11.0

    11.0

    (Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

    Investment and Savings

    		                    

    Gross investment (including change in inventories)

    32.8

    27.4

    25.0

    30.3

    35.4

    34.1

    35.0

    35.5

    36.7

    37.5

    Public

    6.5

    5.5

    5.4

    7.1

    8.4

    7.0

    6.2

    6.0

    5.5

    5.2

    Private

    26.3

    21.9

    19.6

    23.2

    26.9

    27.1

    28.8

    29.5

    31.2

    32.3

    Gross savings

    26.6

    28.1

    24.9

    29.9

    33.4

    35.6

    36.2

    36.8

    37.3

    37.7

    Public

    -4.3

    0.7

    4.0

    3.0

    2.4

    4.2

    5.4

    6.1

    5.9

    5.5

    Private

    30.8

    27.5

    20.8

    26.9

    31.0

    31.4

    30.9

    30.7

    31.4

    32.2

    Central Government Finances3

    		                    

    Total revenue and grants

    25.6

    29.0

    29.1

    28.4

    28.2

    28.8

    28.6

    28.8

    27.6

    26.7

    SACU receipts

    9.1

    6.5

    5.5

    9.1

    9.6

    7.0

    6.4

    6.6

    6.3

    5.9

    Mineral revenue

    5.3

    10.6

    13.3

    7.4

    5.8

    9.5

    9.9

    9.8

    8.9

    8.4

    Total expenditure and net lending

    36.5

    31.4

    29.1

    33.1

    34.2

    30.6

    29.1

    28.3

    27.1

    26.2

    Overall balance (deficit –)

    -10.9

    -2.4

    0.0

    -4.7

    -6.0

    -1.7

    -0.5

    0.5

    0.5

    0.5

    Non-mineral non-SACU balance4

    -25.3

    -19.5

    -18.8

    -21.3

    -21.3

    -18.2

    -16.7

    -15.9

    -14.7

    -13.8

    Net Debt

    15.3

    12.8

    12.6

    16.9

    22.2

    21.6

    20.2

    18.2

    16.2

    14.6

    Total central government debt5

    18.7

    18.7

    18.1

    20.1

    22.6

    22.1

    20.7

    20.1

    20.0

    20.0

    Government deposits with the BoB6

    3.4

    5.9

    5.5

    3.3

    0.4

    0.4

    0.6

    1.9

    3.8

    5.5

    External Sector

    		                    

        Trade balance

    -13.2

    -3.5

    2.7

    -2.4

    -6.9

    -0.9

    0.2

    0.3

    0.0

    0.0

    Current account balance

    -10.3

    -1.7

    -1.2

    -0.6

    -2.0

    1.5

    1.2

    1.2

    0.6

    0.2

    Overall Balance

    -11.7

    -1.4

    1.8

    0.6

    -0.9

    1.3

    1.3

    1.5

    0.9

    0.5

    Nominal effective exchange rate (2018=100)7

    94.0

    94.1

    90.8

    86.4

    –

    –

    –

    –

    –

    –

    Real effective exchange rate (2018=100)7

    94.4

    97.7

    99.1

    94.7

    –

    –

    –

    –

    –

    –

    Terms of trade (2005=100)

    140.5

    178.9

    161.3

    152.7

    125.9

    162.2

    171.4

    176.6

    181.6

    186.6

    External central government debt5

    7.8

    8.4

    7.5

    8.9

    8.3

    6.7

    5.6

    4.8

    3.9

    3.5

    Gross official reserves (end of period, millions of USD)

    4,944

    4,806

    4,281

    4,757

    4,587

    4,879

    5,198

    5,600

    5,852

    6,014

    Months of imports of goods and services8

    6.4

    6.6

    7.1

    7.3

    6.3

    6.0

    5.8

    5.6

    5.4

    5.1

    Months of non-diamond imports8

    9.3

    8.7

    8.2

    8.8

    7.9

    7.8

    7.6

    7.5

    7.2

    7.1

    Percent of GDP

    31.2

    27.1

    21.8

    24.2

    23.3

    22.3

    21.5

    21.7

    20.8

    19.6

    Sources: Botswana authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

    1 This table is based on calendar years unless otherwise indicated.

    2 Based on Atlas method from the World Bank.

    3 Fiscal variables are based on fiscal years (starting on April 1).

    4 The non-mineral non-SACU balance is computed as the difference between non-mineral non-SACU revenue and total expenditure.

    5Excludes guarantees. Debt data measured at end of fiscal year.

    6Government deposits with the BoB include Government Investment Account as well as other accounts. Deposits data measured at end of fiscal year.

    7 For 2020-2023, both effective exchange rates are from IMF INS database.

    8 Based on imports of goods and services for the following year.

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Pavis Devahasadin

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/09/pr-24321-botswana-imf-executive-board-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF and Ukrainian Authorities Reach Staff Level Agreement on the Fifth Review of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement– Ukraine

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    September 10, 2024

    • International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff and the Ukrainian authorities have reached staff-level agreement (SLA) on the Fifth Review of the 4-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Arrangement. Subject to approval by the IMF Executive Board, Ukraine would have access to about US$ 1.1 billion (SDR 834.8 million).
    • Program performance remains strong. The authorities met all end-June quantitative performance criteria (QPCs) and the structural benchmark for the review. Understandings were also reached on policy settings and reforms to sustain macroeconomic stability as the war continues.
    • The economy remained resilient in the first half of 2024, but headwinds are intensifying and the outlook remains exceptionally uncertain. The continuing war will entail fresh financing needs, requiring determined policy efforts by the authorities and large-scale support from donors.

    Kyiv, Ukraine – September 10, 2024: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team led by Mr. Gavin Gray held discussions in Kyiv with the Ukrainian authorities, during September 4-10, 2024, on the Fifth Review of the country’s 4-year EFF Arrangement. Upon the conclusion of the discussions, Mr. Gray issued the following statement:

    “IMF staff and the Ukrainian authorities have reached staff-level agreement on the Fifth Review of the EFF. The agreement is subject to approval by the IMF Executive Board, with Board consideration expected in the coming weeks.

    “Ukraine’s four-year EFF Arrangement with the IMF, continues to provide a strong anchor for the authorities’ economic program in times of exceptionally high uncertainty. Performance under the program has remained strong despite the war, with all quantitative performance criteria for end-June met, as well as the structural benchmark due for this review.

    “Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to have a devastating impact on the country and its people. Skillful policymaking, the adaptability of households and firms, and robust external financing has helped support macroeconomic and financial stability. Real GDP grew by 6.5 percent y/y in the first quarter of 2024, inflation has remained low at 5.4 percent y/y in July, and gross international reserves were adequate at US$42.3 billion as of September 1.

    “However, an economic slowdown is expected in 2024H2 due to repeated attacks on energy infrastructure and the impact of the war on labor markets and confidence; growth is expected at 3 percent for 2024. Addressing the energy deficit ahead of the winter is critical, requiring coordinated efforts, including with international partners. With the war is expected to continue through 2025, real GDP growth is projected to be between 2.5-3.5 percent. Inflation is expected to rise to around 9 percent by end-2024. Risks to the outlook remain exceptionally high.

    “The 2025 Budget needs to respect financing constraints and debt sustainability objectives, and determined domestic revenue mobilization efforts are critical. Timely and predictable external financial support, on terms consistent with debt sustainability, remains indispensable for maintaining economic stability.

    “Tax revenues need to increase in 2025 and beyond to create space for critical spending, to preserve essential buffers and restore fiscal sustainability. Achieving this will require the implementation of permanent tax policy measures and relentless efforts to close existing opportunities for tax evasion, improve compliance, and combat the shadow economy, in line with the National Revenue Strategy (NRS). Legislation to reform the Customs code should confirm the central role of the Finance Ministry in overseeing customs, while robust processes should be established for selecting a permanent head of customs as well as other key leadership roles.

    “The successful treatment of Ukraine’s Eurobonds will deliver substantial debt relief, freeing up resources for priority spending areas. Attention is now shifting to the remaining external commercial claims in the restructuring perimeter, including the GDP warrants, which should be treated in line with the program’s strategy to restore debt sustainability.

    “Upside risks to inflation have reduced the scope for further easing through the end of the year, and the monetary policy stance remains appropriate and consistent with achieving the inflation target over the medium term. The exchange rate should continue to act as a shock absorber and adjust to market fundamentals, thereby helping to safeguard external stability. Appropriate monetary policy combined with the framework of managed exchange rate flexibility should help prevent excessive exchange rate volatility and the de-anchoring of FX and inflation expectations. A judicious and staged approach to FX liberalization should continue in line with the National Bank of Ukraine’s (NBU) strategy, and consistent with the overall policy mix.

    “Effective governance frameworks are critical for durable growth, levelling the playing field, and pursuing the path to EU accession. In this regard, the independence, competence, and credibility of anti-corruption and judicial institutions should continue to be enhanced. In particular, strengthening the criminal procedural code, establishing a new high administrative court, and reforming the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine are key. The inaugural external audit of the National Anti-corruption Bureau is a short-term priority. The full supervisory board of Ukrenergo should be re-established by end-December.

    “The financial sector is stable and liquid, with reforms continuing apace despite challenges under Martial Law. To preserve financial stability and enhance preparedness for potential shocks, priorities include strengthening the bank rehabilitation framework, contingency planning, and bank governance.

    “The mission met with Finance Minister Marchenko, National Bank of Ukraine Governor Pyshnyy, other government ministers, public officials and civil society. The mission thanks them and their technical staff for their close collaboration and constructive discussions.”


    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/11/pr24326-IMF-and-Ukrainian-Authorities-Reach-Staff-Level-Agreement-Fifth-Review-EFF

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Harnessing the Power of Integration: A Path to Prosperity in Central Asia

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    September 11, 2024

    Distinguished guests, I am delighted to be here in Bishkek on my first visit to the Kyrgyz Republic, in the heart of Central Asia.

    This region has been at the crossroads of civilizations for millennia. It is a mosaic of a rich cultural heritage, diverse peoples, and natural endowments that include spectacular mountains, lakes, rivers, and a rich biodiversity. It is also located very favorably at the crossroads of Asia and Europe. Needless to say, it is quite truly a unique region!

    As we gather here today to discuss the economic possibilities for the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) region, we all recognize that the world is changing rapidly, and this is a pivotal moment.

    It reminds me of another time of momentous opportunity, when the region gained independence in the 1990s. Since then, the CCA countries have made remarkable progress by unleashing their first wave of market- oriented reforms, generating higher growth and improving living standards.

    But new and unprecedented challenges have emerged. The Covid-19 pandemic and its aftermath are only just in our rear-view mirrors, as the region confronts emerging challenges from climate change to regional conflicts. The global economy has also shifted with geoeconomic fragmentation emerging as a key risk.

    The theme of my remarks today is simple: in this changing world, raising living standards in the CCA region requires bold, concerted action.

    We must strengthen stability and resilience, promote regional integration, and launch a new wave of reforms. This is how we can unleash the full economic potential of the region and its vibrant young populations, accelerate growth, create jobs and open-up opportunities for generations to come.

    Building on Macroeconomic Stability

    It is important to remind ourselves of the global context as we consider what is needed to propel the region to the next level of economic growth and prosperity.

    The world economy has shown remarkable resilience in the face of the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and an inflation surge. Global growth bottomed out at 2.3 percent in 2022 and is expected to rebound to 3.2 percent in 2024 and 3.3 percent in 2025. Initial fears of recession and uncontrolled wage-price spirals fortunately did not materialize and there is less economic scarring from the pandemic than anticipated.

    However, medium-term growth projections remain below historical averages. Persistence of inflation in parts of the world, geopolitical conflicts, and the gaps in structural reforms needed to promote efficient resource allocation remain critical challenges. Global inflation is projected to decline to 5.9 percent in 2024 and 4.5 percent in 2025, with advanced economies returning to inflation targets before emerging market and developing economies.

    The risks to the outlook are still considerable. Notably, geopolitical tensions and regional conflicts pose downside risks, potentially causing new price spikes. Other risks include rising trade protectionism, increasing inequality, and financial market volatility. At the same time, the fact that this year saw the hottest day on record for the planet serves as a stark reminder of daunting challenges due to climate change.

    Policymakers in the CCA region deserve full credit for navigating their economies through these turbulent times and maintaining macroeconomic stability. Rapid COVID virus containment, decisive policy actions, and robust international support have led to a swift recovery, with the region growing at 4.9 percent in 2023.

    Inflation fell in most CCA countries, including in the Kyrgyz Republic, amid exchange rate appreciations and a decline in commodity prices. Inflation remained more persistent in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan due to strong domestic demand, elevated inflation expectations, and energy price reforms in Kazakhstan.

    In the April Regional Economic Outlook, we projected a growth slowdown to 3.9 percent in 2024, but inflows of income, capital, and migrants from Russia, and rerouting of trade though the region have again boosted growth to impressive high single digits so far this year in oil importing CCA economies, including the Kyrgyz Republic. In Kazakhstan, on the other hand, growth is expected to slow to 3.1 percent in 2024 before picking up to 5.6 percent in 2025 as production increases from the Tengiz oil fields.

    Over the medium term, growth in the region is expected to moderate to under 4 percent and inflation stabilize in mid-single digits. Escalation of the war in Ukraine and the Gaza conflict, however, could cause commodity price volatility and a reversal of the recent trade patterns.

    Achieving macroeconomic stability is just a beginning. It is not sufficient to meet the aspirations of current and future generations.

    Now is the time for us to come together and take bold steps to unleash a new wave of reforms that will durably raise growth, create more jobs, and improve living standards. This requires reforms to increase productivity, strengthen resilience to shocks, and expand markets.

    While this is ambitious, it is within our reach as long as there is consensus to move ahead on this path. The current favorable macroeconomic conditions offer a promising window of opportunity because, as our research shows, structural reforms yield greater growth dividends during economic expansions.

    From Stability to Prosperity

    Historically, this region has been a vital link between Europe and Asia, serving as a conduit for trade, culture, and innovation.

    Today, regional integration can once again harness this potential. It can facilitate the freer movement of goods, services, capital, and people, increase market size and economic efficiency, and promote inclusive prosperity.

    Moreover, deepening ties within the region and global markets can foster stability and peace. Regional integration is therefore not just an opportunity, but an economic necessity.

    Reducing nontariff trade barriers, boosting infrastructure investment, and enhancing regulatory quality could increase trade by up to 17 percent on average in the CCA region, as our research shows. They can also improve market access and foster diversification.

    Transportation networks, such as roads, railways, and ports are essential to facilitate cross-border trade. The planned construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is an illustration of cross-country cooperation to improve connectivity between the East and the West, supporting the region’s ambition to regain its historical role. 

    You have abundant renewable energy resources in the region, including hydro, solar and wind power. Enhanced energy cooperation will help develop regional energy markets, ensure security, and create export opportunities. Collaborative projects, such as Kambarata-1, can help diversify the energy mix and reduce dependency on fossil fuels. Critically, it can also improve water availability for neighboring countries.

    Both of these investments—the railway and Kambarata-1—hold enormous potential for regional development and connectivity. Collective effort in mobilizing expertise and financing is essential for full realization of this potential while sustaining macroeconomic stability that has been a hallmark of the region’s recent achievements.

    This brings me to the importance of regional cooperation in addressing the risks of climate change, which requires immediate and resolute actions from all of us.

    A Path to a Low-Carbon Future

    The CCA region is highly vulnerable to climate change. Temperatures are rising fast, and droughts and floods have become more frequent and severe, causing immense damage to crops, infrastructure and livelihoods. We estimate that unabated climate change could cause a loss of annual output of nearly 6.5 percent in the region by 2060.

    The good news is that these losses could be substantially reduced by joint actions to cut emissions, adapt to climate change, and manage the risks of transition to a low-carbon economy.

    The region must collaborate to promote green technologies, improve energy efficiency, and manage natural resources sustainably. Scaling back energy subsidies and introducing carbon-pricing mechanisms can contribute to global mitigation efforts. In this respect, the Kyrgyz Republic’s commitment to raising electricity tariffs and gradually eliminating energy subsidies is a shining example.

    Such decisive measures can enhance resilience to climate change and create higher-paying jobs–green jobs that pay 7 percent more on average.

    Reforms for Enhanced Growth and Stability

    To fully realize the benefits of regional integration, structural reforms are essential. Our research finds that such reforms could lift output by 5-7 percent in the next 4 to 6 years.

    Let me highlight a few key areas where structural reforms can help achieve this boost:

    A vibrant private sector is the engine of growth. Strengthening governance, property rights and the rule of law, and reducing the state footprint in the economy by simplifying regulations, fostering competition, and combating corruption will build confidence and attract private investment.

    Importantly, we find that governance reforms yield the highest growth dividends and amplify the positive impacts of other reforms. The implication is clear: governance reforms should be prioritized and accompanied by other reforms.

    Prudent management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is also critical. While some SOEs serve essential public-policy objectives and should remain in public hands, it is crucial that they operate efficiently and do not crowd out the private sector.

    In most cases, however, the private sector is more efficient in delivering goods and services and creating jobs. Therefore, privatization of non-essential SOEs can lead to more dynamic and competitive markets, enhancing growth and resilience.

    Investments in education, health, and digital infrastructure are vital to boost productivity. The full potential of the region’s young and dynamic population can only be unleashed through high quality education and healthcare.

    Enhancing digital infrastructure also offers vast opportunities for productivity growth, especially in a region with young people eager to embrace new technologies.

    As the CCA starts to reap the benefits of these reforms, it is equally important to ensure that growth benefits all segments of society, and the vulnerable are shielded from the impacts of energy subsidy reforms and climate change. Well-targeted social assistance is essential for reducing poverty and inequality.

    Benefits work best when they incentivize work and are targeted and timely to support adversely affected households during economic downturns but scale back when the recovery takes hold. Empowering women and promoting gender equality can unlock significant economic potential and contribute to more inclusive growth.

    IMF’s Commitment to CCA Stability and Growth

    The IMF has been a steadfast partner of the CCA region since its initial days of independence. We provide policy advice, financing, and technical assistance to help our members in the region stabilize their economies, develop sustainable growth, and reduce poverty.

    The IMF stands by all its member countries in both prosperous and challenging times. For example, our assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic helped our membership weather the crisis and lay the groundwork for recovery.

    To better support our member in the CCA, the IMF established the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia Regional Capacity Development Center. This center provides technical assistance and training to help countries in the region build stronger institutions and implement sound economic policies. It also represents our long-term commitment to the region’s development.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude. Since its early days of independence, the CCA region has shown tremendous perseverance in laying the foundation of a prosperous, peaceful society.

    Today, you are confronting new global challenges that test the resilience and adaptability of your economies. Embracing continued market-oriented reforms is the most effective strategy to strengthen your economies. Now is the time to forge ahead with bold spirits.

    The IMF will continue to support your efforts, working in partnership for the benefit of all people in this region and beyond.

    Thank you.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100 Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/11/sp09112024-harnessing-power-integration-path-prosperity-central-asia-dmd-bo-li

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Denmark

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    September 13, 2024

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with Denmark.

    The Danish economy has continued to expand at a robust pace, driven by an exceptional surge in the pharmaceutical. In contrast, the rest of the economy has remained relatively subdued, aside from the maritime and information and communication technology industries, reflecting sluggish demand. Meanwhile, with a decline in global energy prices and lackluster domestic demand, inflationary pressures have largely dissipated in recent months.

    Growth is anticipated to gradually moderate in the near term but become more balanced across industries. Output growth is projected to moderate from 2.5 percent in 2023 to 1.9 percent in 2024 and to 1.6 percent in 2025. The growth of pharmaceutical and maritime exports will taper off, while that of the rest of the economy will be bolstered by a pickup in external demand, improved consumer purchasing power, and further easing of financial conditions. The reopening of the Tyra natural gas will also contribute to growth in 2024 and 2025. Inflation might temporarily edge up in the coming months due to the lagged effect of last year’s wage collective bargaining agreement before stabilizing at around 2 percent during the second half of 2025. The balance of risks to growth is skewed to the downside, with primary downside risks including a global slowdown, the possible escalation of the conflict in Gaza and Israel and Russia’s war in Ukraine, and deepening geoeconomic fragmentation.

    Executive Board Assessment[2]

    In concluding the 2024 Article IV consultation with Denmark, Executive Directors endorsed staff’s appraisal, as follows:

    Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They commended Denmark’s remarkable resilience amidst multiple shocks, underpinned by sound policies, strong governance, and robust institutions. Noting a positive outlook with more balanced growth and stabilizing inflation, Directors cautioned that risks—including from a global growth slowdown, geoeconomic fragmentation, and demographic pressures—are tilted to the downside. To navigate these challenges and maintain Denmark’s welfare state, they emphasized the importance of continued sound macroeconomic management, supported by structural reforms to boost productivity, and lift long‑term growth.

    Directors commended Denmark’s robust public finances. They concurred that fiscal policy should consider cyclical conditions and long‑term spending needs. In this regard, Directors agreed that fiscal policy should avoid adding to capacity pressures in the short term. They supported the slight easing of the fiscal stance for 2025 and beyond to accommodate the increases in costs related to health, climate, and defense. To safeguard long‑term fiscal sustainability, Directors encouraged the authorities to closely monitor fiscal pressures and take additional adjustment measures if necessary.

    While noting that the financial system remains sound, Directors recommended that the authorities continue to closely monitor risks, in particular, related to the commercial real estate sector. They welcomed the recent tightening of macroprudential policies and suggested considering additional borrower‑based measures to address pockets of vulnerabilities.  Continued collaboration on the Nordic‑wide bank stress tests would also be important. Directors encouraged the authorities to further strengthen AML/CFT and cybersecurity frameworks.

    Directors agreed that systemic risks arising from nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) warrant closer monitoring and enhanced customer protection. They encouraged the authorities to develop a systemic risk assessment encompassing banks and NBFIs and to finalize a supervisory order to enhance customer protection.

    Directors emphasized the importance of continued reform efforts to increase the labor supply, address skills mismatches, and better integrate migrants.  They were encouraged by the authorities’ strong commitment to further enhance digitalization, innovation, and business dynamism to boost productivity growth. Directors welcomed Denmark’s commitment to transparent free‑trade policies within the multilateral and rules‑based trading system.

    Directors commended the authorities’ ambitious climate change mitigation targets and the agreement to reduce emissions in the agriculture sector. They encouraged updating the estimates of the investment needs for climate adaptation.

    Denmark: Selected Economic Indicators

    2023

    2024

    2025

    proj.

    Output

    Real GDP growth (%)

    2.5

    1.9

    1.6

    Employment

    Unemployment rate (%)

    2.8

    2.9

    3.0

    Prices

    Inflation (%, average)

    3.4

    1.8

    2.2

    General Government Finances

    Revenue (% GDP)

    50.1

    49.6

    48.8

    Expenditures (% GDP)

    46.8

    47.8

    48.0

    Fiscal balance (% GDP)

    3.3

    1.8

    0.9

    Public debt (% GDP)

    29.7

    28.2

    27.3

    Money and Credit

    Domestic credit growth (%)

    3.2

    …

    …

    3-month interbank interest rate (%)

    3.4

    …

    …

    10-year government bond yield (%)

    2.4

    …

    …

    Balance of Payments

    Current account (% GDP)

    9.8

    9.0

    9.3

    International reserves (% change)

    1.3

    …

    …

    Exchange Rate

    ULC-based REER (% change)

    -0.4

    …

    …

    Sources: Statistics Denmark; OECD; and IMF staff calculations.

     

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Boris Balabanov

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/12/pr-24327-denmark-imf-executive-board-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation Discussions with the Kingdom of the Netherlands—Curaçao and Sint Maarten

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    September 17, 2024

    Washington, DC: On September 10, 2024, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation discussions[1] with the Kingdom of the Netherlands—Curaçao and Sint Maarten and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting on a lapse-of-time basis[2]. These consultation discussions form part of the Article IV consultation with the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

    Context. Curaçao and Sint Maarten have continued to experience a vigorous post-pandemic recovery underpinned by strong stayover tourism, which is outperforming Caribbean peers. Headline inflation has declined rapidly led by international oil price developments, notwithstanding a recent uptick, while core inflation remains elevated. In both countries, current account deficits improved markedly from pandemic years but remain high. Fiscal positions remained strong and in compliance with the fiscal rule. The landspakket, the structural reform package agreed with the Netherlands in 2020, continues to guide both countries’ reform agenda.

    Curaçao outlook. Growth is expected to accelerate in 2024 before gradually converging to its potential over the medium term. Stayover tourism supported by fiscal expansion is projected to drive economic growth at a robust 4.5 percent in 2024 due to new airlifts and further expansion in hotel capacity. Growth is then expected to moderate to reach 1.5 percent over the medium term, given subpar investment and productivity growth coupled with sustained population decline and beginning saturation in tourism flows, assuming no further reforms and diversification. Headline inflation is projected to decline mildly to 3.2 percent in 2024 from 3.5 percent in 2023, but to continue falling towards its steady state of around 2 percent by 2027 reflecting international price developments. Fiscal balances would be guided by the fiscal rule and debt would continue to decline, while surpluses narrow as investments return and social spending pressures mount. The current account deficit is expected to improve in the medium term but would remain elevated.

    Sint Maarten outlook. Growth is expected to moderate in the medium term as tourism recovery and the reconstruction taper off. Growth is expected to be 2.7 percent in 2024 and 3 percent in 2025, supported by a delayed recovery in cruise passengers towards pre-pandemic levels. However, the near-term outlook is threatened by the electricity load shedding (since June) and political instability. From 2026 onwards, growth is expected to gradually converge towards 1.8 percent as the stimulus from the reconstruction peters out, and tourism growth becomes constrained by the island’s carrying capacity and ailing infrastructure. Inflation is expected to remain broadly contained while remaining vulnerable to international price developments. Over the medium term, the government will continue to comply with the golden fiscal rule and capacity constraints will continue to weigh on public investment.

    Monetary Union. Monetary policy is appropriately targeted towards maintaining the peg. Efforts to absorb excess liquidity should continue while closely monitoring developments in core inflation driven by tourism-related services. The financial sector is sound and risks to financial stability have substantially diminished as the CBCS advances its reform agenda. Banks are highly liquid and adequately capitalized and systemic risks are contained. Building on the CBCS’s strong progress in strengthening supervisory and regulatory capacity, and the recent resolution agreement for ENNIA, staff welcomes CBCS’s continued efforts in its reform agenda, including financial stability and crisis management.

    Executive Board Assessment[3]

    Curaçao

    Curaçao’s economy successfully embraced the pivot towards tourism-led growth, giving rise to a strong near-term outlook. After losing key traditional industries, Curaçao quickly and successfully leveraged its tourism potential to grow, attract new hotels, and create jobs. While this is serving the economy well in the near term – growth is projected to accelerate to 4½ in 2024 – structural shifts have started to emerge, including a low-skilled, informal recovery of the labor market amidst low investment in non-tourist sectors. Growth is expected to moderate over the medium term given saturation in tourism flows, sustained population decline, and subpar investment. Notwithstanding the economy’s recent overperformance, inflation declined significantly and only reversed some of its gains recently on the back of higher international oil prices and unfavorable base effects. Inflation is expected to gradually converge towards its steady state rate of around 2 percent. Fiscal policy remains guided by the fiscal rule, albeit past surpluses are expected to unwind, allowing for the reversal of pandemic wage cuts and a return of public investments. The current account markedly improved thanks to lower oil prices but the deficit remains elevated.

    Risks to the outlook are broadly balanced. Growth slowdown in major economies could negatively impact tourism receipts, while positive surprises could boost foreign demand. Domestically, a successful expansion of renewable energy and faster-than-expected development of hotel capacity and yachting marinas would boost growth, while delays in public investment and more persistent core inflation could dent tourist experience and competitiveness.

    Efforts to safeguard recently created fiscal space are welcome. Overall surpluses in 2022 and 2023 helped reduce debt and granted access to favorable financing terms from the Netherlands. Safeguarding this space and avoiding procyclical impetus is warranted, including through more gradual unwinding of pandemic wage cuts in 2024, prudent liquidity management to repay a bullet loan in 2025, and general efforts to strengthen tax administration, review procurement and domestic arrears management, and streamline transfers to public entities. Ensuing room for maneuver could be used for priority investments, including for climate adaptation, guided by a medium-term fiscal framework steering towards the island’s debt anchor.

    Healthcare and pension reforms are needed to lock in a sustainable expenditure path and mitigate medium-term fiscal risks. Growing health and old-age pension deficits, exacerbated by an aging population, pose risks to the sustainability of public finances. Recent initiatives to incentivize the use of generics and raise the pension age are commendable, and more needs to be done to put the system on a sustainable path. Staff sees a broad range of efficiency gains in health spending, including lowering pharmaceuticals and laboratory costs and enhancing primary care’s gatekeeping role. Reforms on the revenue side, including broadening the contributor base and increasing co-payments, are politically more difficult.

    Sustaining the positive growth momentum in the medium term requires investments in capital and labor and resolving existing growth bottlenecks. First, moving up the value chain with high-end resorts and complementary recreational activities would help sustain valuable income growth from tourism but requires scaling up investments in infrastructure and deregulating the transportation sector. Second, further investments in electricity grid and energy storage, as well as a revised pricing strategy, are needed to accompany the ongoing energy transition and reap its vast benefits, including lower fuel imports, emissions, and electricity prices. The envisaged floating offshore wind park for hydrogen production would be a game changer for the island. Boosting public investment to achieve these objectives, however, requires ramping up capacity in planning and execution. Third, to further stimulate growth and offset the sustained population decline, formal labor markets and skills would need to be strengthened. And fourth, continued improvements in the business climate in line with the landspakket’s economic reform pillar could help overcome decade-low productivity growth.

    Important strides in reducing ML/FT vulnerabilities are welcome and could be built upon. The draft online gaming law, implementation of risk-based supervision, and a new law to address EU grey listing and enable automatic information exchange represent important strides in enhancing Curaçao’s defenses against ML/FT and related reputational risks. Curaçao can further improve upon these important accomplishments, including by passing and implementing the aforementioned legislations in a timely manner and enhancing coordination and monitoring across relevant agencies.

    Sint Maarten

    Near-term growth is strongly anchored but preserving the positive momentum hinges on investments to revamp an ailing infrastructure and improve tourism’s value added. The economic recovery is well underway, underpinned by tourism recovery and the reconstruction. GDP is expected to surpass its pre-Irma level in 2025. However, without investments to upgrade an ailing infrastructure, growth will falter as the island approaches its maximum carrying capacity. Strategies should continue to focus on enhancing tourist’s experience, differentiating from other Caribbean destinations, and improving tourism’s value added.

    A comprehensive strategy is required to durably resolve the electricity crisis. Mobile electricity generators have been leased and efforts to replace old engines are underway. Once the immediate crisis is resolved, efforts should be devoted towards developing a detailed masterplan for the energy transition with targets, projects, costing, timeline, and a comprehensive assessment of ancillary investments. The Trust Fund could receive a new mandate, beyond 2028, to operate as a public investment agency in charge of planning, securing the financing, and implementing plans for the energy transition.

    Revenue mobilization efforts are essential to ensure fiscal sustainability. Plans to lower tax rates, to make the country more competitive with neighboring islands, should be avoided as this would reduce government’s revenues and endanger fiscal sustainability. Instead, additional revenues are required to satisfy the fiscal rule, service loans with the Netherlands, raise public wages to attract and retain talent, increase transfers to cover public health costs, and clear public arrears with the SZV. Envisaged reforms to enhance the tax administration and to digitize and interface government systems should be complemented with plans to i) tax casinos’ profits, turnover, and winnings; ii) enforce the lodging tax on short-term rentals, and income and profit tax on the proceeds from such rentals; iii) update the price of land leases; and iv) institute a tourist levy at the airport.

    Without reforms, the healthcare and pensions funds are unsustainable. Health premiums and government transfers are insufficient to cover health costs, which are being cross-financed with pension savings. With unchanged policies, given population aging and rising administrative costs, both health and pensions funds will run deficits by 2027, and the SZV would deplete its liquid assets by 2027. By 2030, the government would need to transfer about 4 percent of GDP per year to sustain the system. Reforms are urgently needed to contain health costs including: i) introducing the General Health Insurance, ii) rationalizing benefits, iii) extending the use of generics, iv) optimizing referrals, v) strengthening preventing care, and vi) adopting out-of-pocket payments. Given the rapid pace of population aging, additional measures such as increasing the contribution rates and linking the retirement age to life expectancy, should also be considered.

    Strengthening the implementation of AML/CFT measures is necessary to increase effectiveness of the AML/CFT regime. Laws for an effective AML/CFT framework were approved but their implementation is lagging. UBO registration is yet to begin, while the investigation and prosecution of suspicious activities is lacking. Granting the FIU full independence to investigate and prosecute cases, and increasing its budget for recruitment and operations could strengthen the AML/CFT framework.

     

    The Monetary Union of Curaçao and Sint Maarten

    The current account deficit is expected to improve in the medium term but would remain elevated, while international reserves are expected to remain broadly stable. Large CADs in both countries are expected to improve and remain well-financed, leading to a stable and broadly adequate level of international reserves over the medium term. Curaçao’s external position is assessed to be weaker than implied by fundamentals and desired policy settings due to an elevated CAD and sustained appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, while that of Sint Maarten is considered in line with fundamentals and desired policy settings.

    Monetary policy is appropriately targeted towards maintaining the peg. In line with global monetary policy tightening, the CBCS increased its benchmark rate during 2022-23 and has kept it unchanged since September 2023. Efforts to absorb excess liquidity should continue while closely monitoring developments in core inflation driven by tourism-related services. Even though credit growth declined further and reached negative territory in real terms amidst monetary tightening, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy remains weak. Structural factors include the absence of interbank and government securities markets. The continued increase in mortgages, the only credit component to display growth, was accompanied by a broadly stable loan-to-value ratio on aggregate, albeit more granular data is needed to monitor potential vulnerabilities. Further acceleration in mortgage credit could warrant introducing a macro prudential limit below the currently by banks self-imposed ratio.

    The financial sector is sound and risks to financial stability have substantially diminished as the CBCS advances its reform agenda. Banks are highly liquid and adequately capitalized and systemic risks are contained. Near-term risks to financial stability have substantially diminished with the agreement for a controlled wind-down of ENNIA and the start of the restructuring process, as well as the CBCS’s continued improvements in supervision, regulation, and governance. Staff welcomes CBCS’s initiatives to establish a financial stability committee, further refine stress-testing, and enhance crisis management capacities, including lender of last resort and a deposit insurance scheme.

    Table 1. Curaçao: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2020–25

    (Percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)

     

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    Prel.

    Prel.

    Prel.

    Prel.

    Proj.

    Real Economy

    Real GDP (percent change)

    -18.0

    4.2

    7.9

    4.2

    4.5

    3.5

    CPI (12-month average, percent change)

    2.2

    3.8

    7.4

    3.5

    3.2

    2.4

    CPI (end of period, percent change)

    2.2

    4.8

    8.4

    3.1

    3.2

    2.4

    GDP deflator (percent change)

    2.2

    3.8

    4.0

    3.5

    3.2

    2.4

    Unemployment rate (percent) 1/

    13.1

    13.5

    7.2

    7.0

    6.9

    6.6

    Central Government Finances 2/

    Net operating (current) balance

    -15.0

    -10.6

    0.7

    0.6

    0.0

    0.5

    Primary balance

    -13.2

    -8.8

    2.0

    2.5

    2.0

    1.9

    Overall balance

    -14.5

    -10.0

    1.0

    1.3

    0.1

    0.5

    Central government debt 3/

    87.1

    90.3

    81.6

    70.8

    65.4

    61.1

    General Government Finances 2, 4/

    Overall balance

    -15.7

    -10.4

    0.3

    0.9

    -0.3

    -0.1

    Balance of Payments

    Current account

    -27.2

    -18.6

    -26.8

    -19.7

    -17.9

    -16.5

    Goods trade balance

    -37.0

    -41.6

    -47.9

    -38.3

    -40.4

    -39.9

       Exports of goods

    10.7

    12.5

    18.0

    16.9

    16.5

    16.2

       Imports of goods

    47.7

    54.1

    65.9

    55.2

    56.9

    56.1

    Service balance

    9.6

    21.7

    20.5

    18.4

    22.6

    23.7

       Exports of services

    29.3

    37.2

    48.6

    46.6

    50.3

    51.3

       Imports of services

    19.7

    15.6

    28.1

    28.2

    27.7

    27.6

    External debt

    197.3

    194.8

    180.9

    177.1

    169.1

    164.0

    Memorandum Items

    Nominal GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)

    2,534

    2,740

    3,075

    3,318

    3,578

    3,789

    Per capita GDP (U.S. dollars)

    16,492

    18,135

    20,648

    22,160

    23,775

    25,065

    Credit to non-government sectors (percent change)

    0.1

    -9.7

    3.2

    2.5

    …

    …

    Sources: The Curaçao authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

    1/ Staff understands that the unemployment rate of 7.0 percent published in the 2023 Census data is not comparable to the historically published unemployment rates from the labor force survey by the Curacao Bureau of Statistics. As such, staff estimated the unemployment rate and overall labor force for the period of 2012 to 2022. Staff understands that the Curacao Bureau of Statistics intends to revise the historical series in the near future.

    2/ Defined as balance sheet liabilities of the central government except equities. Includes central government liabilities to the social security funds.

    3/ Budgetary central government consolidated with the social security fund (SVB).

    4/ The latest available datapoint is as of 2018. Values for 2019-2023 are IMF staff estimates based on BOP flow data.

     

     

    Table 2. Sint Maarten: Selected Economic Indicators 2020–25

    (Percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)

     

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    Est.

    Est.

    Est.

    Est.

    Proj.

    Real Economy

     

    		    

    Real GDP (percent change) 1/

    -20.4

    7.1

    13.9

    3.5

    2.7

    3.0

    CPI (12-month average, percent change)

    0.7

    2.8

    3.6

    2.1

    2.5

    2.3

    Unemployment rate (percent) 2/

    16.9

    10.8

    9.9

    8.6

    8.5

    8.2
       

    Government Finances

     

    		    

    Primary balance excl. Trust Fund operations 3/

    -8.7

    -5.4

    -0.6

    1.5

    0.9

    0.9

    Current balance (Authorities’ definition) 4/

    -9.6

    -6.3

    -1.5

    0.5

    -0.1

    0.0

    Overall balance excl. TF operations

    -9.3

    -5.9

    -1.1

    1.0

    0.2

    0.2

    Central government debt 5/

    56.1

    55.3

    49.3

    49.0

    46.2

    44.1
       

    Balance of Payments

     

    		    

    Current account

    -25.5

    -24.6

    -3.9

    -7.5

    -7.8

    -3.0

    Goods trade balance

    -40.7

    -49.8

    -59.2

    -59.3

    -62.4

    -60.5

       Exports of goods

    11.8

    11.4

    14.1

    14.8

    13.1

    11.2

       Imports of goods

    52.4

    61.2

    73.2

    74.1

    75.5

    71.7

    Service balance

    20.2

    33.1

    62.8

    60.3

    62.6

    65.2

       Exports of services

    34.4

    51.0

    78.7

    81.4

    81.5

    83.9

       Imports of services

    14.3

    17.9

    15.9

    21.1

    18.9

    18.7

    External debt 6/

    274.3

    253.7

    213.6

    206.3

    200.8

    194.0
       

    Memorandum Items

    		    

    Nominal GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)

    1,141

    1,268

    1,479

    1,563

    1,645

    1,733

    Per capita GDP (U.S. dollars)

    26,796

    29,646

    34,437

    36,088

    37,570

    39,160

    Credit to non-gov. sectors (percent change)

    2.4

    1.3

    4.5

    1.0

    …

    …
               

       Sources:

    		            

       1/ Central Bank of Curacao and Sint Maarten and IMF staff estimates.

    		            

       2/ The size of the 2022 labor force reported by the 2023 Census was adjusted to ensure consistency with the reported total population.

       3/ Excludes Trust Fund (TF) grants and TF-financed special projects.

    		  

       4/ Revenue excl. grants minus interest income, current expenditure and depreciation of fixed assets.

    		  

       5/ The stock of debt in 2018 is based on financial statements. Values in subsequent years are staff’s estimates and are higher than the values under authorities’ definition in quarterly fiscal reports.

       6/ The latest available datapoint is as of 2018. Values for 2019-2022 are IMF staff estimates based on BOP flow data.

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time-procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

    [3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Reah Sy

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/17/pr-24330-curacao-and-sint-maarten-imf-board-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation-discussions

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Treats, performances and sports games: how the festival “Summer in Moscow. Everyone out on the street!” went

    MIL OSI Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    In the capital ended festival “Summer in Moscow. Everyone out on the street!”. 600 entertainment venues were organized for city residents and tourists, including at the festival sites of “Moscow Seasons”. Visitors bought 35 thousand portions of various treats and 16 thousand liters of soft drinks. During the festival, souvenir shops and shopping chalets sold about 11 thousand memorable gifts, jewelry and decorative items. This was reported by the capital’s Department of Trade and Services.

    Guests especially loved craft chocolate, hand-made ice cream and pine cone jam. At each site, you could try meat and fish dishes cooked on the grill, and national culinary delicacies from vendors from all over the country.

    From the world of gadgets to reality

    In the summer, Muscovites attended concerts and theatrical performances by groups from all over Russia. Thousands of master classes were held at the venues of the festival “Summer in Moscow. Everyone out on the street!”, where adults and children made home decor, toys, jewelry and fashion accessories, as well as culinary masterpieces with the help of experienced chefs. Young guests attended programming, English and archeology classes, and drawing lessons with professional teachers. Plein airs were very popular.

    More than 20 Moscow Seasons venues hosted fun starts, sports and board games, training sessions, as well as dance lessons, Zumba, yoga and stretching classes. In addition, Muscovites took part in transformation games that helped them return from the world of gadgets to reality, understand their goals and find ways to achieve them.

    Dancing to the gramophone and games from childhood

    At the creative evenings, visitors listened to poems and songs, discussed the works of classics, legendary plays and books, watched performances by contemporary artists. Lectures and creative classes with representatives of the fashion industry, writers and theater community were held at the Moscow Seasons venues.

    On Nikitsky Boulevard, an open-air exhibition and art market were held for 100 days. An exhibition of paintings by young artists from the Moscow Exhibition Halls association was organized for city residents and tourists, and master classes on painting techniques and handicrafts were held.

    The guests of the festival remembered the “Summer in Moscow. Everyone out on the street!” theme nights with gramophone music at the vintage market on Chistye Prudy, as well as the championship of the childhood game “Rock, Paper, Scissors”, in which residents of all Moscow districts took part.

    More information about the activities of the Department of Trade and Services is available in the official telegram channel.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please note; This information is raw content directly from the information source. It is accurate to what the source is stating and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    http://vvv.mos.ru/nevs/item/144354073/

    EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is a translation. Apologies should the grammar and or sentence structure not be perfect.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes Seventh Review Under the Extended Fund Facility Arrangement for Suriname

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    September 18, 2024

    • The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund completed the seventh review under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement for Suriname, allowing for an immediate purchase equivalent to SDR 46.7 million (about USD 63 million) of which SDR 19.1 million or about USD 25.8 million would be for budget support.
    • The authorities’ commitment to maintaining prudent macroeconomic policies and implementing difficult reforms are yielding positive results: the economy is growing, inflation is coming down, international bond spreads are at record lows, and investor confidence is returning.
    • Building on the progress made thus far under the program, the authorities should entrench fiscal discipline, particularly in the run up to the elections while protecting the poor and vulnerable. Persevering with structural reforms to strengthen institutions and address governance weaknesses is also critical.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the seventh review under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement for Suriname. The completion of the review allows the authorities to draw the equivalent of SDR 46.7 million (about USD 63 million), bringing total program disbursement to SDR 337.1 million (about USD 455 million). In completing the review, the Executive Board approved the authorities’ request for a waiver of non-observance of the end-June 2024 performance criteria on the central government primary balance based on the corrective actions the authorities have already taken.

    Suriname is implementing an ambitious economic reform agenda to restore macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability, while laying the foundations for strong and more inclusive growth. The program includes policies to restore fiscal and debt sustainability, protect the poor and vulnerable, upgrade the monetary and exchange rate policy framework, address banking sector vulnerabilities, and advance the anti-corruption and governance reform agenda. These policies are supported by the EFF arrangement, which was approved by the Executive Board on December 22, 2021 (see Press Release No. 21/400), in an amount equivalent to SDR 472.8 million (366.8 percent of quota).

    Following the Executive Board discussion on Suriname, Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

    “The authorities’ reforms under the EFF-supported program are being increasingly reflected in macroeconomic stability and improving investor confidence. The economy is growing, inflation is declining, international bond spreads have reached historic lows, and donor support is increasing.

    “The near-term priority is to reinforce the planned fiscal consolidation and protect the vulnerable from the burden of the adjustment. Phasing out electricity subsidies and strengthening tax administration will help create fiscal space for higher social assistance and infrastructure spending. Fully implementing the recently finalized social assistance reform plan will make social programs more efficient and effective. Strengthening commitment controls and addressing weaknesses in cash management will contain public spending and prevent accumulation of supplier arrears. 

    “The debt restructuring process is nearing completion. Bilateral agreements with all official creditors and most commercial creditors have been achieved. Domestic debt arrears have been cleared. 

    “A tight monetary policy is supporting disinflation. Implementing the recently-finalized plan for central bank recapitalization will strengthen the central bank’s operational and financial autonomy. The authorities’ demonstrated commitment to a flexible, market-determined exchange rate is supporting international reserve accumulation. Timely implementation of recapitalization plans for commercial banks that do not meet regulatory capital requirements will bolster financial sector resilience.

    “The authorities should persevere with their ambitious structural reform agenda to strengthen institutions, address governance weaknesses, build climate resilience, and improve data quality. This important work will continue to be supported by capacity development from the Fund and other development partners.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/18/pr-24334-suriname-imf-completes-seventh-review-under-the-eff-arrangement

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Navigating Through Financial Turbulences with Preparedness, Competence, and Confidence

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    OeNB | SUERF | Joint Vienna Institute | Yale Program on Financial Stability Conference on Building Resilience and Managing Financial Crises
    Vienna, Austria
    Tobias Adrian, IMF Financial Counsellor and Director of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department

    September 18, 2024

    It is a great pleasure to speak to you today on a policy area at the forefront of our work at the IMF in helping our members prepare for, and deal with, financial instability. I will provide a snapshot of the progress that has been made and what remains to be done to deal effectively with bank runs and bank failures. I will also explain what we are doing at the IMF to help our membership make further progress in this critical area.

    The bank failures in 2023 in the US and Switzerland presented the most significant test since the global financial crisis of the reforms taken collectively to end “too-big-to-fail.” It’s not often that policymakers get to field test plans for dealing with failing systemic banks, let alone one for a global systemically important bank (G-SIB).

    In our view, the failures of Credit Suisse in Switzerland and SVB, Signature, and First Republic in the US, showed that while significant progress has been made, further progress is still required to deliver on the too-big-to-fail reform agenda and reduce the risk that taxpayers bail out shareholders and creditors when banks fail.

    On the one hand, the actions the authorities took last year successfully avoided deeper financial turmoil. In addition, unlike many of the failures during the global financial crisis, significant losses were shared with the shareholders and some creditors of the failed banks. However, taxpayers were once again on the hook as extensive public support was used to protect more than just the insured depositors of failed banks.

    In Switzerland, amid a massive creditor run, the Credit Suisse acquisition was backed by a government guarantee and liquidity facilities nearly equal to a quarter of Swiss economic output. While the public support was ultimately recovered, it entailed very significant contingent fiscal risk, and created a larger, more systemic bank. Indeed, UBS now has the largest ratio of assets to home country GDP of any individual G-SIB.

    The use of standing resolution powers to transfer ownership of Credit Suisse, after bailing in shareholders and creditors, rather than relying on emergency legislation to effect a merger, would have fully wiped out the equity of Credit Suisse shareholders and limited the need for public support.

    What lessons have we learnt?

    Domestic and international authorities have published extensively on the lessons learnt and we share many of the conclusions. The key points I would highlight include:

    The importance of intrusive supervision and early intervention. Credit Suisse depositors lost confidence after prolonged governance and risk management failures. The banks which failed in the US pursued risky business strategies and very rapid growth with inadequate risk management. Supervisors in both jurisdictions should have acted faster and been more assertive and conclusive. Policymakers need to empower supervisors with both the ability and the will to act.

    Even relatively small banks can prove systemic. A lesson from many past crises, including the US bank failures in 2023, is that you can’t always judge in advance which banking problems will become systemic. In many countries, including the US and Switzerland, we think authorities should do more to be ready for crises affecting their medium-sized banks. Banking supervisory and resolution authorities should ensure that sufficient recovery and resolution planning takes place across the banking sector as a whole. This should include, on a proportional basis, banks that may not be systemic in all circumstances, but that could certainly be systemic in some.

    Central banks should be prepared to provide extensive liquidity support during a crisis. Banks should be familiar with the central bank’s operations and facilities and be ready to use them at short notice. Who can access central bank lending is also an important question as liquidity risks have partially moved away from the usual central bank counterparties. While widening the counterparty list could help central banks intervene more broadly in a crisis, it runs the risk of rewarding regulatory arbitrage, giving raise to difficult trade-offs and requiring careful assessment. Central banks may well have to lend against illiquid collateral in a crisis. In that context, prepositioning would help to ensure operational preparedness especially to ascertain the legal claim on the collateral and to calibrate appropriate haircuts. An open question is whether the prepositioning should be voluntary or required, and how much counterparties should preposition if required. The benefits of enhanced lending “fire power” would have to be compared with the cost that prepositioning entails for the banks and the costs to the central bank, including risks to its balance sheet. If propositioning is directly linked with risk (e.g., a percentage of uninsured deposit), the impact on intermediation and the interaction with other prudential regulation would need to be carefully assessed.

    Resolution plans and regimes need sufficient flexibility. We very much support the conclusion of the Financial Stability Board’s lessons learned report that resolution authorities need to “better operationalize a range of resolution options for different circumstances.” Every bank failure presents different challenges and resolution authorities need to be flexible enough to deal with the actual crisis that presents itself, balancing risks to financial stability with those to taxpayers. Authorities should make sure that they carefully balance rules versus discretion and detailed planning versus optionality in designing their resolution regimes. The rapid sale of Credit Suisse should prompt us to think about what would be needed for the successful sale in resolution of even the largest banking groups, at least in some circumstances.

    Strikingly, every one of the cases I mentioned from Spring 2023, involved the transfer of the failing bank’s business lines to an acquiring bank, even where this had not been the focus of prior resolution planning. Two of the US cases also involved the intermediate step of transfer to bridge banks. So, we have timely and high-profile reminders that transfer powers should be a core part of the resolution toolkit and should be duly planned for and readily implementable, including at short notice.

    Cooperation and effective implementation of resolution powers across borders is imperative. One notable feature of last year’s bank failures was the degree of international cooperation between regulators and resolution authorities in their handling of these cases. The Swiss authorities worked intensively with international counterparts to prepare for a resolution of Credit Suisse, which would have needed supportive actions from the supervisors and resolution authorities responsible for Credit Suisse’s main foreign operations, including in the US, UK, and EU. SVB’s UK subsidiary was resolved by the Bank of England, ultimately being sold to HSBC, and the FSB report highlights that the UK relied on the deep relationships built over the years with their US counterparts to help implement this. This cooperation seems to have begun earlier and worked a lot better than in similar cases during the global financial crisis, such as the failure of Lehman Brothers.

    That experience highlights how global financial stability depends on authorities being able to work together across borders and to build in peacetime the routine contacts and good understanding ex ante of what each authority would be likely to do to make that possible. However, there was a wrinkle in this otherwise positive experience, as highlighted in the Financial Stability Board’s report on the bank failures, which relates to the importance of the US securities markets to most major foreign banks. Credit Suisse and most other major banks have debt securities issued in US dollars and/or under New York law, the holders of which may incur losses in a resolution. As a recent report of the Financial Stability Board highlighted, there remain significant open questions about how disclosure and other US securities legal requirements would be applied in the circumstances where securities issued in the US are envisaged to be converted in a short period, for example, over a resolution weekend. This is an important issue where further work is needed and this is being taken forward by the Financial Stability Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and others.

    Finally, effective deposit insurance regimes are crucial. Banks typically fail when creditors lose confidence, even before their balance sheet reflects potential losses. Authorities in many countries need to strengthen deposit insurance regimes. New technology like 24/7 payments, mobile banking, and social media have accelerated deposit runs. Last year’s failures followed rapid deposit withdrawals, and deposit insurers and other authorities should be ready and able to act more quickly than many currently can.

    IMF staff are working actively to support efforts in member countries to strengthen their supervision, resolution, liquidity assistance, and deposit insurance frameworks including through FSAPs and technical assistance. In the US, we have seen lessons learned reports and policy proposals from many of the US banking authorities, several of which pick up on issues and recommendations that were discussed in the IMF’s assessment of the US financial sector (“FSAP”) in 2020. Our next FSAPs for Switzerland and the Euro Area will be published next year, and as we start work on that we will be taking a close look at the authorities’ and the FSB’s findings and will likely reiterate many of our previous findings, including on strengthening deposit insurance regimes. We are also contributing to policy formulation at the international level, including a recently announced review of the international deposit insurance standard, and by earlier this year hosting with the Financial Stability Board a workshop for policymakers on the use of transfer powers in resolution.

    The bottom line is that progress has been made, but there is still further to go in putting an end to too-big-to-fail. Most of the areas where further progress is needed are already well known; last year’s bank failures should provide the impetus for policymakers to cover the remaining ground.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER:

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/16/sp091824-navigating-through-financial-turbulences-with-preparedness-competence-and-confidence

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Bhutan

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    September 19, 2024

    Washington, DC: On September 9, 2024, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with Bhutan[1].

    During the past decade Bhutan adeptly balanced economic growth and poverty reduction with environmental sustainability. Sustained growth increased incomes, lifting living conditions and eliminating extreme monetary poverty by 2022. Bhutan has a long history of leading environmental conservation and climate change action and is committed to remaining carbon neutral. While the pandemic hindered economic development, strong policies limited its health impact.

    Growth remained subdued during 2023. Large-scale emigration and policies to curb imports hindered a more robust recovery. Inflation accelerated in the second half of 2023, driven by wage increases in the public sector. The current account deficit (CAD) widened to around 30 percent of GDP driven by a large investment in crypto assets mining and the slow recovery in tourism. The fiscal deficit narrowed but remained high and non-hydro debt nearly doubled from pre-pandemic levels.

    Boosted by hydro-power projects and grant-financed capital investment, growth is projected to accelerate over the medium term, averaging 6.3 percent of GDP, but to remain volatile. A gradual easing of inflation towards 4 percent is expected as the impact of wage increase subside. The CAD is expected to narrow, supported by higher electricity exports due to the commissioning of new hydropower plants, a continued recovery in tourism, and crypto assets exports. Securing diverse sources of growth that provide quality employment opportunities while preserving Bhutan’s commitment to environmental sustainability remains a key medium‑term challenge.

    Uncertainty remains elevated with the balance of risks tilted to the downside. Domestic risks include slippages on implementation of the goods and services tax, delays in hydropower projects, and fiscal risks from the materialization of contingent liabilities in the financial sector. External risks include volatile commodity prices—particularly of fuel—and a global slowdown that could hinder non-hydro exports. Bhutan is vulnerable to climate change, given the importance of hydroelectricity and agriculture. Crypto mining entails significant upside and downside risks given their price volatility. Overall, the large external debt and persistent CADs—while supporting growth-enhancing investments and financed by development partners—are nonetheless a source of vulnerability. On the upside, the pursuit of stronger‑than-envisaged fiscal consolidation would accelerate the pace at which fiscal and external buffers are rebuilt.

    Executive Board Assessment[2]

    Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They commended Bhutan’s significant reduction in poverty and inequality during the last decade. Directors welcomed that growth is expected to accelerate over the medium term, boosted by a large hydroproject, higher capital spending, and the slowdown of emigration. Noting downside risks to the outlook, they underscored that tighter fiscal and monetary policies are needed to support the peg, reduce domestic and external imbalances, and rebuild buffers; while carefully managing potential risks stemming from crypto assets operations is also needed. Directors called for structural reforms to foster high-quality jobs in the private sector and diversify the economy, and commended the authorities’ commitment to ecological conservation and climate change action. They noted that continued support from the Fund’s capacity development is important.

    Directors stressed that a gradual and sustained fiscal consolidation, based on revenue mobilization and spending restraint, is essential to rebuild buffers and preserve debt sustainability. They welcomed the authorities’ commitment to a timely implementation of the Goods and Services Tax and to undertaking additional tax and revenue administration measures to achieve the planned fiscal consolidation. Directors recommended strengthening public financial management, public investment management, and domestic debt management.

    Directors underscored that monetary policy needs to be tightened in tandem with fiscal policy to ease balance-of-payment pressures and rebuild reserves. They stressed the need for a well-functioning domestic liquidity management framework to support the monetary policy operation function. Directors encouraged the authorities to phase out existing exchange restrictions once conditions allow. They noted the need to address remaining financial sector vulnerabilities, particularly given the expiration of COVID-related support measures. In this context, they welcomed the new guidelines and regulations to address credit quality and the progress in moving toward risk-based supervision. Directors recommended further enhancing the AML/CFT framework. 

    Directors called for structural reforms to diversify the economy and foster the creation of private sector jobs for high-skilled workers. They recommended improving the business environment, strengthening human capital accumulation, and improving active labor market policies. Directors welcomed efforts toward a new FDI policy, which relaxes some restrictions, including access to foreign currency, local employment requirements, and caps on foreign ownership. They also welcomed the improvements in data quality and called for further progress in this area.

    Directors stressed the need to further strengthen public sector governance, including the Royal Monetary Authority’s (RMA) governance framework and independence as well as the transparency in the operations of state-owned enterprises. Noting the need to mitigate the potential risks stemming from crypto asset operations, they welcomed RMA’s efforts to strengthen its reserve management strategy and the forthcoming audited financial statements of crypto-mining operations.

    Bhutan: Selected Economic Indicators, 2018/19-2028/29

    2018/19

    2019/20

    2020/21

    2021/22

    2022/23

    2023/24

    2024/25

    2025/26

    2026/27

    2027/28

    2028/29

    Act.

    Act.

    Act.

    Act.

    		  

    Projections
                       

     

    (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

    National Accounts

    		                

    Nominal GDP (in millions of ngultrums) 1/

    184,660

    187,378

    193,386

    216,239

    		  

    237,322

    261,026

    292,837

    325,812

    357,677

    393,607

    438,906

    Real GDP growth (percent change) 1/

    4.6

    -2.5

    -3.3

    4.8

    		  

    5.0

    5.2

    7.2

    6.4

    5.2

    5.6

    7.2

     

    Prices

    Consumer prices (EoP; percent change)

    2.8

    4.5

    7.4

    6.5

    3.9

    4.8

    4.7

    4.4

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    Consumer prices (avg; percent change)

    2.8

    3.0

    8.2

    5.9

    4.6

    4.6

    4.7

    4.5

    4.2

    4.0

    4.0

    GDP deflator (percent change)

    2.2

    4.0

    6.7

    6.7

    4.5

    4.6

    4.6

    4.6

    4.4

    4.2

    4.1

     

    General Government Accounts

    Total revenue and grants

    22.8

    29.1

    30.9

    25.1

    24.2

    24.2

    28.1

    31.5

    30.1

    28.2

    27.3

    Domestic revenue

    18.8

    19.3

    18.5

    18.1

    18.9

    20.3

    19.3

    20.7

    20.7

    20.8

    22.4

    Tax revenue

    14.7

    12.2

    10.7

    12.0

    13.3

    13.4

    14.0

    14.4

    14.8

    14.8

    15.2

    Non-tax revenue

    4.1

    7.2

    7.9

    6.1

    5.6

    6.9

    5.4

    6.3

    5.9

    6.0

    7.3

    Foreign grants

    5.5

    8.5

    7.5

    6.2

    6.0

    3.9

    8.8

    10.8

    9.4

    7.4

    4.9

    Internal and other receipts

    -1.6

    1.3

    4.9

    0.9

    -0.7

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Total expenditure 2/

    24.2

    30.9

    36.6

    32.1

    29.0

    28.8

    32.5

    34.2

    33.4

    32.1

    32.2

    Current expenditure

    15.0

    19.0

    22.5

    15.9

    14.9

    17.1

    17.0

    17.8

    18.7

    18.8

    19.4

    Capital expenditure

    8.8

    11.8

    14.3

    16.1

    14.2

    11.8

    15.5

    16.4

    14.8

    13.3

    12.8

    Primary expenditure 2/

    23.4

    30.5

    35.7

    30.6

    27.3

    27.2

    30.5

    31.4

    29.9

    28.3

    27.7

    Primary balance

    -0.6

    -1.4

    -4.8

    -5.5

    -3.1

    -3.0

    -2.4

    0.1

    0.2

    -0.1

    -0.4

    Overall balance

    -1.5

    -1.8

    -5.8

    -7.0

    -4.8

    -4.6

    -4.4

    -2.7

    -3.3

    -3.9

    -4.8

    General government debt 3/

    100

    115

    123

    117

    116

    114

    109

    123

    122

    119

    130

    Domestic

    3

    1

    9

    11

    13

    14

    15

    12

    11

    13

    13

    External

    97

    114

    114

    106

    103

    100

    94

    111

    111

    106

    117
                       

    Monetary Sector

     

    		              

    Broad money (M2) growth (percent change)

    5.6

    19.3

    24.4

    9.4

    9.8

    12.6

    13.2

    12.3

    13.0

    12.2

    11.5

    Private credit growth (percent change)

    20.5

    13.3

    6.5

    10.8

    19.3

    9.1

    11.2

    11.1

    11.5

    10.0

    10.2

    Balance of Payments

    Current account balance

    -19.2

    -14.8

    -11.2

    -28.1

    -34.4

    -17.7

    -32.1

    -20.5

    -12.5

    -17.1

    -14.1

    Goods balance

    -15.3

    -12.1

    -6.4

    -21.1

    -25.7

    -12.9

    -26.9

    -15.0

    -6.1

    -10.1

    -8.8

    Hydropower exports

    6.0

    12.1

    13.5

    11.0

    8.7

    6.3

    8.2

    9.5

    9.1

    10.4

    11.9

    Non-hydropower exports

    17.3

    13.0

    13.9

    15.8

    14.9

    15.7

    15.9

    15.8

    17.1

    18.1

    18.8

    Imports of goods

    38.6

    37.1

    33.9

    47.9

    		  

    49.2

    40.2

    55.6

    52.4

    45.6

    42.1

    42.2

    Services balance

    -1.9

    -3.5

    -4.4

    -6.5

    		  

    -6.7

    -3.7

    -2.8

    -3.6

    -3.8

    -3.6

    -3.0

    Primary balance

    -8.4

    -5.7

    -5.7

    -5.5

    -5.0

    -5.6

    -4.5

    -4.2

    -4.6

    -4.9

    -4.8

    Secondary balance

    6.5

    6.6

    5.4

    5.1

    2.9

    4.5

    2.1

    2.2

    2.0

    1.6

    2.5

    Capital account balance

    8.0

    7.1

    3.8

    3.6

    4.1

    3.1

    8.2

    9.8

    8.6

    6.6

    2.9

    Financial account balance

    -4.5

    -15.1

    -9.1

    -8.2

    -10.7

    -15.9

    -24.0

    -20.2

    -19.2

    -13.6

    -13.6

    Net errors and emissions

    10.4

    5.4

    -4.8

    1.2

    11.8

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Overall balance

    3.7

    12.9

    -3.0

    -15.1

    -7.8

    1.2

    0.1

    9.4

    15.3

    3.2

    2.5

    Gross official reserves (in USD millions)

    1065

    1344

    1332

    840

    574

    606

    604

    969

    1616.3

    1758.9

    1878.7

    (In months of imports)

    12.4

    17.5

    17.9

    7.6

    4.8

    5.8

    3.7

    5.7

    10.0

    10.8

    10.3

    (In months of goods and services imports)

    10.1

    14.2

    15.6

    6.6

    3.9

    4.6

    3.2

    4.8

    8.1

    8.6

    8.4
     

    Memorandum Items

    Hydropower exports growth rate 4/

    -1.2

    105.6

    15.8

    -9.4

    -13.2

    -20.7

    46.2

    30.4

    4.5

    26.1

    27.3

    Non-hydropower exports growth rate 4/

    13.7

    -24.1

    11.0

    26.8

    3.2

    16.2

    13.5

    10.7

    18.8

    16.5

    16.0

    Hydropower good imports 4/

    -15.3

    -3.5

    -21.2

    -11.6

    14.9

    50.8

    18.4

    61.1

    14.0

    3.3

    -19.1

    Non-hydropower good imports 4/

    10.3

    -2.3

    -4.3

    63.8

    12.7

    -13.0

    58.1

    1.5

    -6.1

    1.4

    15.2

    Population in million (eop)

    0.7

    0.7

    0.8

    0.8

    0.8

    0.8

    0.8

    0.8

    0.8

    0.8

    0.8

    External financing gap in US million

    …

    …

    …

    …

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    		  

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the

    views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation

    of any qualifiers used in summing up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Pemba Sherpa

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/09/19/pr-24336-bhutan-imf-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Applications for Sale of Home Ownership Scheme Flats 2024 to commence from October 3 onwards (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Applications for Sale of Home Ownership Scheme Flats 2024 to commence from October 3 onwards (with photos)
    Applications for Sale of Home Ownership Scheme Flats 2024 to commence from October 3 onwards (with photos)
    ******************************************************************************************

    The following is issued on behalf of the Hong Kong Housing Authority:      The Hong Kong Housing Authority (HA) announced today (September 24) that the Sale of Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) Flats 2024 (HOS 2024) will open for applications for three weeks, starting from 8am on October 3 until 7pm on October 23.      “Eligible applicants may submit online applications or paper applications for HOS 2024 either in person or by post. The application fee is $290. Balloting is expected to be held in the fourth quarter this year and flat selection is expected to start from the second quarter of 2025. Flats for sale include a total of 7 132 flats in five new HOS developments at a wide variety of locations (including Kai Tak, Yau Tong, Kwun Tong, Tung Chung and Tuen Mun), providing choices of flats of various sizes with saleable areas ranging from about 17.3 square metres to about 47.4 sq m (about 186 square feet to about 510 sq ft) (Annex 1). Large flats, with saleable areas ranging from about 41.1 sq m to about 47.4 sq m (about 442 sq ft to about 510 sq ft), account for about a quarter of the total number of flats. Meanwhile, around 70 rescinded HOS flats (as at July 31, 2024) from developments sold under HOS 2020, HOS 2022 and HOS 2023 (Annex 2), and a new batch of about 350 recovered Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) flats are also included,” a spokesman for the HA said. Prices      The HA continues to price HOS flats at an affordable level. The average flat selling prices are set at a 30 per cent discount from the current assessed market values, i.e. for sale at 70 per cent of the assessed market values. The selling prices of flats in the five new HOS developments range from $1.43 million to $4.67 million with an average selling price of about $2.7 million.      “Based on the average flat selling price at about $2.7 million (saleable area of about 35 sq m or about 380 sq ft), the mortgage payment is only $11,600 per month assuming that he/she takes out a mortgage at 90 per cent of the flat price at a term of 30 years and interest rate of 4 per cent. For one to two-person flats, which we believe will be welcomed by young families and young people, the average selling price is about $1.7 million and the mortgage payment is only $7,300 per month. As some banks have just announced to adjust the mortgage interest rate downward, the mortgage payment will also be reduced,” the spokesman said.      The list prices of the unsold TPS flats in the 39 estates range from about $140,000 to $1.28 million, and the discounts range from 79 per cent to 84 per cent of assessed market values. The final price range will depend on the recovered TPS flats that will be put up for sale under in this sale exercise.               Priority for flat selection and quota      “The order of priority for flat selection by eligible applicants will be determined by the application category, quota allocation and ballot results. A quota of 2 900 flats will be set for families applying under the Priority Scheme for Families with Elderly Members and the newly introduced Families with Newborns Flat Selection Priority Scheme (Priority Newborns Scheme). Family applicants with babies born on or after October 25, 2023, will be eligible to apply for the Priority Newborns Scheme if their babies are aged 3 or below on the closing date of the application of HOS 2024. Separately, a quota of 700 flats will be set for one-person applicants,” the spokesman said. Application arrangements      Starting from tomorrow (September 25), application forms, application guides, and sales booklets for HOS flats (sales leaflets for rescinded HOS flats and recovered TPS flats) will be available on the HA/Housing Department (HD)’s designated website for HOS 2024 (www.housingauthority.gov.hk/hos/2024), while printed copies can be obtained during opening hours from the Housing Authority Customer Service Centre (HACSC) in Lok Fu, the office of the HA’s Green Form Subsidised Home Ownership Scheme Sales Unit in Kwun Tong, estate offices and District Tenancy Management Offices of the HA, rental estate offices of the Hong Kong Housing Society and the Home Affairs Enquiry Centres of the Home Affairs Department.      Sales exhibition in respect of HOS developments and TPS estates under HOS 2024 will be available for public viewing at the HACSC in Lok Fu starting from September 25 up to the end of the application period. Related information is also available on the HA/HD’s designated websites.           “Members of the public are reminded to read carefully the application guide before submission of applications. They may call the 24-hour HA Sales Hotline at 2712 8000 on matters concerning applications for the HOS 2024,” the spokesman said. Enforcement of domestic property ownership restriction      The HA reminds applicants, “Starting from HOS 2023, Green Form applicants, same as White Form applicants, should not have owned any domestic property in Hong Kong during the period from 24 months preceding the closing date for submitting the application up to the time of purchase. The HD has set up a data-matching mechanism together with the Land Registry, and over 1 100 applications of the previous HOS sale exercise were identified with records of domestic property ownership in Hong Kong. Relevant applications have been cancelled accordingly, and depending on the circumstances of individual cases, the HA will consider taking prosecution action.”

     
    Ends/Tuesday, September 24, 2024Issued at HKT 19:18

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Germany: Guardian of the culture of stability – paying tribute to Helmut Schlesinger on his 100th birthday | Guest contribution by Joachim Nagel, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, in the Börsen-Zeitung

    Source: Deutsche Bundesbank in English

    Helmut Schlesinger turns 100 on 4 September, an anniversary that adds a wholly new numerical dimension to the honorary title of former Bundesbank President. Helmut Schlesinger is certainly no stranger to accolades celebrating his milestone birthdays. The “Börsen-Zeitung”, for one, marked his 80th birthday by writing that his name is synonymous with the pursuit of monetary stability, in a reference to the Bundesbank’s particular culture of stability, in which Mr Schlesinger’s thinking and attitudes resonate to this day.
    Mr Schlesinger’s presidency marked the pinnacle of over 41 years at the Bundesbank and in pursuit of a stable currency. He is rightly regarded as one of the most influential Bundesbankers of all time. The “Börsen-Zeitung” once dubbed him a home-grown product of the Bundesbank, a description that I like a lot. It wrote that Helmut Schlesinger embodied an exceptional period of monetary history, which came to an end as it were with the transition to the euro, characterised, on balance, by the continuity of success.
    During the 1950s and 1960s, in the early days of the Deutsche Mark, Mr Schlesinger followed an unusually steep career as a Bundesbank civil servant, culminating in him heading the Economics and Statistics Department. It was a time in which West Germany was experiencing the economic miracle. Under the fixed exchange rate regime, the Bundesbank led the money and credit sector out of planning and currency reform until it was finally opened and liberalised in 1958. Over the entire period, the Bundesbank succeeded in keeping the Deutsche Mark stable.
    In 1972, Mr Schlesinger was appointed to the Bundesbank’s Directorate and became its chief economist. The circumstances of the time required a complete realignment of monetary policy: the Bretton Woods exchange rate system teetered and finally collapsed in 1973. Western Europe’s exchange rates entered a new equilibrium – first in the European exchange rate arrangement, then in the European Monetary System (EMS). In economic terms, the 1970s were dominated by oil crises and rising unemployment. The combination of high inflation and a stagnant economy led to a new term being coined: stagflation. At that time, the Bundesbank was the first central bank to introduce monetary targeting. Mr Schlesinger played a key role in translating monetarist theory into a monetary policy strategy.
    He always saw the importance of explaining monetary policy, in personal contributions and in the Bundesbank’s Monthly Report, which he edited meticulously and with a sure sense of style. Many at the Bundesbank will remember the notes he made in pencil – he preferred an HB, or medium, hardness grade. As a monetary policymaker, however, some considered him a hard pencil lead, his argumentation consistent, but never simplistic. Time and again, he demonstrated the interaction between economic analysis, theoretical monetary concepts, political decision-making and historical change.
    During the 1970s and 1980s, the Deutsche Mark proved one of the world’s most stable currencies. Mr Schlesinger, who was made Vice-President in 1980, was regarded as the “conscience of stability policy”. US Treasury Secretary James A. Baker III is once said to have accused Schlesinger of seeing inflation under every pebble. This period saw the Deutsche Mark evolve into the anchor currency of the EMS. In 1991, Schlesinger was promoted from Vice-President to President – for a tumultuous 26 months. The Bundesbank used interest rate hikes in a bid to bring down the inflation caused by German reunification. Its stubborn high-interest-rate policy met with criticism within Germany and elsewhere. Many of the EMS partner countries likewise blamed the Bundesbank for the currency crises and rounds of depreciation of 1992‑93. When the United Kingdom was forced to withdraw from the EMS in 1992, UK politicians and the British media levelled serious accusations at Mr Schlesinger. Yet he was never a narrow-minded monetary policy nationalist; he followed a clear monetary compass. When Mr Schlesinger, a passionate hillwalker, was asked on a Himalayan tour about the importance of the oldest Buddhist mantra om mani padme hum, he is said to have answered: keep the money supply tight.
    Nowadays, the monetary targeting he introduced and that proved so successful back then has a different role to play. The structure of the economy has changed fundamentally. Mr Schlesinger himself always underscored that monetary policy strategy had to be adapted to structural change if it was to maintain monetary stability. Another of Mr Schlesinger’s insights also remains as true now as it was then: Stable money not only needs stability-oriented policies from both the government and the central bank. Business, employers and trade unions, and consumers also need to behave appropriately – what you might call a culture of stability. He established this culture of stability not just within the Bundesbank, but throughout west German society and later German society as a whole. It is a culture that is an obligation to all of his successors in the office of Bundesbank President. As the fifth in this line, I am honoured to offer my felicitations: heartfelt congratulations on your 100th birthday, Helmut Schlesinger!
     

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI German News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Germany: „We’ve ridden out the big wave of inflation” | Interview with F.A.Z.

    Source: Deutsche Bundesbank in English

    The interview was conducted by Christian Siedenbiedel.Translation: Deutsche Bundesbank
    Mr Nagel, is this terrible wave of inflation finally over?
    Yes, I believe this wave of inflation is coming to an end. In its initial phase, it was very challenging, or, as you put it, “terrible”. However, we in the euro area are now well on the way to sustainably achieving our inflation target of 2 %. Based on the Eurosystem projection from June, we should hit this target at the end of 2025. In Germany, the inflation rate of 2 % in August, as measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, was a little deceptive, if only for purely technical reasons: the year-on-year rate, that is, compared with August 2023, was more favourable than in other months. We’ll be seeing somewhat higher rates again soon. But I think that we’re past the worst of it: we’ve ridden out the big wave.
    Is it still possible that inflation could get out of hand?
    I wouldn’t say so. Provided that we don’t see any more unexpected major shocks, like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, for example, then inflation should continue to trend towards 2 %. Nevertheless, we shouldn’t celebrate prematurely and start patting ourselves on the back. We haven’t quite hit our target yet. We must remain vigilant and be wary of the risks on the way back to stable prices – that is our job as a central bank.
    How seriously should we be taking the repeated upside surprises to services inflation?
    We are taking the higher inflation for services seriously. After all, services make up nearly half of the basket of consumer goods – that’s a lot. In Germany, the prices for services are still rising by around 4 % each year. Strong growth in wages is especially contributing to this. And we are expecting wage settlements in Germany to remain relatively high over the remaining course of 2024 as well. In annual terms, negotiated wages are likely to rise by around 6 %. While there is some fluctuation in the monthly figures, wage pressures in Germany will remain high overall for the time being.
    Given this state of affairs, do you think the ECB should risk lowering interest rates for a second time in September?
    On the ECB Governing Council, we have stressed that we will not pre-commit to any particular path of interest rates and that we will follow a data-dependent approach to our decisions. Following the interest rate reduction in June, it was a wise move to then wait and see in July and not cut rates any further. For this reason, I will really only be making up my mind at next week’s ECB Governing Council meeting, when I will have a full overview of all the data. As before, we are not flying on autopilot. But I’ll say one thing: I think inflation is making good progress.
    When interest rates were first cut in June, only the Governor of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Robert Holzmann, voted against the reduction. After all, the ECB had just been forced to adjust its inflation projections upward. Did you not have any concerns in cutting interest rates?
    No, I had no concerns in June. From my perspective, the interest rate step was justified by the data. They did not cast any doubt on the general direction of travel, that is, the decline in the inflation rate over a longer period of time. And our monetary policy is still tight, even after the cut in interest rates. However, I do, of course, respect the decision of my colleague Robert Holzmann.
    During his time as President, your predecessor Jens Weidmann was often the one who took on the role of the most hawkish member of the ECB Governing Council, the most strident advocate of tight monetary policy. How do you view your role on the Governing Council?
    Comparing two completely different situations is always difficult, and it should be up to others to evaluate my work. Our decisions on the Governing Council are reached as a team – one that strives to make responsible monetary policy for the euro area. I wish to seek out solutions together with my colleagues on the ECB Governing Council, which is why I focus more on the team as a whole than on individuals. I think we have done well on this score over the past two years: we have succeeded in bringing inflation down in a challenging environment.
    There are economists who fear that inflation could settle at a level noticeably above the ECB’s target of 2 % in the medium term. Do you think that the risk of there being structurally higher inflation in future can be completely ruled out?
    In this context, we must clearly distinguish between two things. First, there is the question of whether we are going to see stronger price pressures in the future. That’s something I can’t rule out. We are keeping close tabs on how certain developments are impacting on inflation – these include geopolitical developments, the green transformation and demographic developments. Some academics expect these developments to lead to pressure towards higher inflation rates. A different question altogether is whether inflation will be higher over the long term because of this. And I will be quite clear on this matter: that’s something monetary policymakers hold sway over. Our mandate is price stability.
    Would you then say that the ECB is partly to blame for inflation getting out of hand in recent years?
    I wouldn’t use the word blame in this context – I consider that to be the wrong category. Hindsight is always 20/20. What is certainly true is that at the end of 2021 – before I joined the ECB Governing Council – it was already foreseeable that the inflation rate would rise, and the ECB continued its asset purchases. In January 2022, prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we already had an inflation rate of 5 %, which was probably due in part to the coronavirus pandemic. As part of the ECB strategy review that has just begun, we will have to examine the role monetary policy measures, such as asset purchases, played during the low inflation period.
    Was it a sticking point that the ECB had committed to tapering asset purchases first before starting to raise interest rates? The economist Markus Brunnermeier mentioned this recently in a discussion with you. As a result, the central bank was unable to respond quickly enough with the interest rate hikes that inflation would have required …
    Back then, it was important to gradually ready financial markets for this reversal. This happened through a series of announcements starting from December 2021. If you look at developments in financial markets, then I’d say that the markets understood this communication and were prepared. The ECB thus succeeded in keeping the negative side effects often associated with changes in monetary policy relatively manageable.
    In your role as Bundesbank President, how do you view the economic situation in Germany at present. Is it being talked down?
    We are navigating an economic situation characterised by strong headwinds. Recent business communications make it clear that certain sectors are under pressure and need to take countermeasures. But I am very much against talking the situation down, because that stimulates exactly those developments that are being lamented.
    What do you mean by headwinds?
    As a large export economy, Germany is particularly hard hit by the geoeconomic changes happening at the moment. Let me give an example: we export especially large amounts to China, meaning that any slowdown in the economy there impacts us particularly hard. The uncertainty that we are seeing among consumers and firms is a factor as well. As a result, investment in machinery, equipment and vehicles fell by 4.1 % between the first and second quarter. Overall, economic output contracted by 0.1 % in the second quarter. That should serve as a wake-up call. We need to put growth front and centre, and that means investment needs to become a more attractive option again.
    So where might impetus to boost growth come from?
    I think the Federal Government’s growth initiative is on the right
    track: getting rid of bracket creep for taxpayers, cutting bureaucratic red tape, making improvements to depreciation on investments, but also bringing in measures to strengthen incentives to work. These are all sound steps. But, with the summer break over now, they actually need to be put into practice. Words have to be followed up with deeds. It is particularly important that politicians give a clear indication of where things are headed. If there is a dependable setting, firms will start investing more again. The debt brake could also stand to undergo moderate reform, in my view. The Bundesbank has put forward some proposals that would create a little more leeway, provided that Germany keeps to the EU’s rules on debt. But now it’s up to politicians to take action.
    How concerned are you by what has happened in Thuringia and Saxony?
    I find it very unsettling. Democracy, freedom, openness, including to people from other countries – these are core values. When these are being called into question, we at the Bundesbank cannot just look on dispassionately, either; we need to take a clear stand. A central bank also has a responsibility to society in this regard. And, as you know, we at the Bundesbank have just had renowned historians probe the history of central banking in Germany between 1924 and 1970. I worry when I read about calls for Germany to exit the European Union or leave the monetary union. That sort of thing jeopardises Germany’s position as a business location; it undermines European cohesion. And it’s harmful to our prosperity.
    The Bundesbank itself is in the midst of profound change. The plan for the new Central Office in Frankfurt was pared back, there are to be no new high-rises, and eight out of 31 branches are set to be closed. Where do things stand – is more on the way?
    Well, that’s already a fair amount that we have planned. This is about making the Bundesbank fit for the future. But it’s also about the Bundesbank’s duty to uphold cost-efficiency. Together with our staff representation committees, we have agreed to let staff work up to 60 % of their hours from home. That has allowed us to significantly downsize our construction plans for Frankfurt. In terms of office space, we can even do without new builds entirely. And we will be designing our future open-plan workspaces in a manner befitting a modern institution. We need to reduce the number of branches because of the trend decline in the use of cash. But the closures will be planned with a long lead time and carried out in a socially responsible way. And we will make sure that the cash supply throughout Germany remains fully intact at all times in future.
    So what do the Bundesbank’s staff have to say when they find out they will no longer have their own office in future under these plans?
    When the employees first set eyes on their new office environment, there’s bound to be plenty who say it is really great. Despite the success of working from home, it has also taught us how important it is to engage with others. This is tremendously helpful in fulfilling the Bundesbank’s tasks, and that often works better in open-plan workspaces than behind closed doors. It will of course still be possible to go into a quiet space for a while when concentrated individual work is required.
    You have also announced your intention to use AI to a greater extent, for example in inflation forecasts. Have there been any successes yet in this regard?
    Yes, we are already trialling quite a few things on this front, for example in the area of short-term inflation forecasting. For very complex problems, in particular – which we at the Bundesbank are often confronted with – AI delivers an initial assessment very quickly. We are also already using it to prepare for our meetings. However, for us it is important that AI remains just a tool. People continue to bear responsibility. We remain in the driving seat.
    The ECB is currently reviewing its monetary policy strategy again. What would you consider to be important here?
    One thing we need to do is to reflect on the past: what was good about the non-standard monetary policy measures, and what was bad? A critical look in the rear-view mirror is important in order to check our use of instruments going forward. Are we well equipped in this context? What topics will be relevant in future?
    Would you also want to talk about the inflation target of 2 %?
    A review of the inflation target is not on our agenda. We have fared very well with our inflation target of 2 %, also of late. I see no reason to change the target in the current situation.
    There was much debate at the time – especially in Germany – about the ECB’s multi-trillion euro asset purchases. Some central bank staff even resigned over the matter. What is your view of this now, after a few years of experience and the realisation of high operating losses at the Bundesbank?
    Obviously I would also rather announce profits, and indeed we did have profits over many years. Now, however, we will have to deal with a few years of losses – and we will manage. This is, incidentally, a topic that we communicated at a very early stage. After all, when monetary policymakers purchase assets on a large scale, it is clear that rising interest rates will impact the central bank balance sheet. And this is indeed what has happened. We had to raise interest rates sharply. As the largest central bank in the Eurosystem, the Bundesbank has to shoulder the greatest burden. In the current year, we could potentially see a magnitude similar to that of 2023. Since we have virtually exhausted our risk provisions, we will have to make use of loss carryforwards in the coming years. Nevertheless, an important aspect for me is that the Bundesbank will return to profitability in future. The Bundesbank’s balance sheet is sound as we have large revaluation reserves. For this reason, there is no need for anyone to worry – the Bundesbank does not need any additional capital.
    And what’s your takeaway for the asset purchases? Should this instrument be abolished?
    One should certainly exercise caution with regard to substantial asset purchases at the zero lower bound. When it comes to safeguarding price stability, it should remain an exceptional instrument for exceptional circumstances. I hope that such exceptional circumstances do not occur again in the foreseeable future. I at least don’t see any signs of this happening. The substantial monetary policy asset purchases were associated with numerous side effects in financial markets. In the strategy review I am calling for a clear delineation of asset purchases at the zero lower bound – we mustn’t overuse this instrument.
    © FAZ. All rights reserved.

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI German News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Speech by SJ at forum titled Hong Kong: The Common Law Gateway for Vietnamese Businesses to China and Beyond in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (English only)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         Following are the opening remarks by the Secretary for Justice, Mr Paul Lam, SC, at the forum titled Hong Kong: The Common Law Gateway for Vietnamese Businesses to China and Beyond in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, today (September 24):Vice President Vo (Vice President of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry Mr Vo Tan Thanh), distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,     Good afternoon, xin chào buổi trưa. Firstly, a very warm welcome, a very big thank you to all of you joining our forum this afternoon co-organised by the Department of Justice of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Singapore and the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The theme of today’s forum is “Hong Kong: The Common Law Gateway for Vietnamese Businesses to China and Beyond”.     In my opening remarks, I simply wish to try to answer two questions, two very obvious questions that I suppose you have in mind. Firstly, who we are; secondly, why are we here.     For the purpose of this forum, I have a very big delegation consisting not simply of government lawyers from my Department. The Department of Justice of Hong Kong is in fact quite similar to the Ministry of Justice in Vietnam. So, a lot of people would think I will be responsible for criminal prosecutions, giving advice to the Government. But perhaps not so well known is that, it is also one of my duties to promote legal services in Hong Kong to friends outside the jurisdiction. Apart from my colleagues from the Department of Justice, I am very fortunate to have the support of about 15 legal practitioners from Hong Kong. They are very experienced legal practitioners specialised in different areas. And in fact we have all together, if I recall correctly, six supporting organisations. And you can tell from the nature of the organisations to have some idea as to who these legal practitioners are representing. We have representatives from the two legal professional bodies in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Bar Association and the Law Society of Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, we still adopt the British system, we still have a divided legal profession. We have barristers who go to the courts to do advocacy work, and then we have solicitors handling all sorts of legal matters from non-contentious commercial matters to dispute resolution. So the representatives from two legal professional bodies, and then we have representatives from the main arbitration institutions in Hong Kong, including the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, HKIAC, which is the main arbitration institute in Hong Kong. We also have the South China International Arbitration Center (Hong Kong), which is also a very important institution. And then we have the AALCO, Asian African Legal Consultative Organization, with a regional arbitration centre in Hong Kong. We also have a representative from eBRAM which provides electronic services, not just for dispute resolution, but also for deal making. So from looking at the nature of these organisations, I hope you will be convinced that we have a wide spectrum of legal practitioners who are going to share their experiences and their knowledge about Hong Kong legal services to you in due course.     Having told you very briefly who we are, the second question perhaps is even more relevant and important: Why are we here? What do we aim to achieve in the next couple of hours? We have two hours for the forum. We decided to share with you some of the things about Hong Kong which you may be interested in for the two hours. And I believe many of you will join our dinner after the forum, so it will be around four hours. A lot can be achieved within four hours.     As I said earlier, I come across this question quite often. People wonder, in my capacity as the Secretary for Justice, I should be responsible for legal matters. It is not really my responsibility to promote trade and finance. I am not a minister of commerce. So what on earth am I doing here? To answer this very pertinent question, I think we should remind ourselves of the very close relationship between Vietnam and Hong Kong. I think we have to set the scene, we have to put things in context first.     As a matter of fact. I am sure you would agree that Hong Kong and Vietnam share very close ties both as a matter of history and also at present. Now we are in the beautiful city of Ho Chi Minh City. Ho Chi Minh is the founding father of Vietnam, and I am sure you would remember that Mr Ho Chi Minh actually founded the Communist Party of Vietnam in Hong Kong in the early 1930s. I had a very quick chat with Vice President Vo just a moment ago. He reminded me that in the last century, from the 60s, 70s, all the way up to 90s, a lot of trade concerning Vietnam actually went through Hong Kong for a lot of reasons. And then fast forward, what is the position as at today?     At the moment, I think there are more than 7 000 Vietnamese settling in Hong Kong, because I attended the national day celebration held by the Consul-General of Vietnam last week, so I got all the figures. There are more than 7 000 Vietnamese settling in Hong Kong. We have a lot of good Vietnam restaurants. I like the pho and banh mi. But more than that, we have roads and streets in Hong Kong named after places in Vietnam. We have the Saigon Street, Hanoi Road, so on and so forth.     Last October, the Hong Kong Government has relaxed some immigration regulations, and as a result, it is much easier and convenient for Vietnamese talent to come to work in Hong Kong. In addition, the criteria for taking multiple visas, either as tourists or on business, have also been relaxed. And a little bit closer to today, about two months ago, the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Government came to Vietnam. I think he held a forum exactly in this particular venue. On that occasion, I was told that altogether 22 co-operation agreements have been signed between business people in Ho Chi Minh City and Hong Kong, covering a wide range of areas. And you look at the figures, look at the statistics, Vietnam is Hong Kong’s second-largest trading partner within ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries. I don’t remember the exact figures, but the amount is huge. And in terms of direct investment in Vietnam, the Vice President also confirmed to me that Hong Kong ranks among the top five.     So plainly, if you put the matter in context, the relationship between Vietnam and Hong Kong has always been very close. And we look to the future. The Permanent Deputy Prime Minister of Vietnam actually paid a visit to Hong Kong about two weeks ago to attend the Belt and Road Summit. And he gave a very inspiring speech touching upon the relationship between Vietnam and Hong Kong. He mentioned the development plan of “Two Corridors, One Belt”, which is a very important development plan of Vietnam. He said he is hoping that we can connect the Vietnamese “Two Corridors, One Belt” plan with the Belt and Road Initiative proposed by China. So these two plans actually can have a sort of very good synergy. So this is the background that I would like to remind ourselves.     But still you might think, well, I haven’t answered the very pertinent question yet, because so far I did not mention the word “law” very often. So how is legal service, how are lawyers in Hong Kong relevant to what I have said to the future relationship between the jurisdictions? I think the answer must be obvious, because most of you are very successful, very influential business people in Vietnam, and most of you will be engaged in international commercial investment transactions. And you must recognise that no matter how much you hate lawyers, in particular the fees that they are charging you, lawyers are indispensable from the moment you decided to set up a business in a foreign place to the point you have to negotiate or conclude a contract with a foreign party; when it comes to how to manage your risk when you set up a business in a particular place, including: should I be concerned about the labour law there, tax or whatsoever; and in the im
    portant event that you run into dispute with your business partner or other people that clearly you will require legal service to assist you to resolve dispute. So the point that I wish to make is that, in the whole business cycle, I would use the analogy “from cradle to grave” but need to be more precise in the context from the inception of a business to the termination, to the point when you rip your profit from your joint venture, at each and every stage, legal service would be indispensable. But that still doesn’t answer the question. Assuming legal service is indispensable, obviously you have to consider who should I instruct? Legal services of which jurisdiction would be to my advantage, would serve my best interest?     Now, here comes the ultimate objective of today’s event. I am hoping that after four hours, you will be convinced that Hong Kong will be your best choice. I am not suggesting that Hong Kong is the only choice because the choice is yours, but I am assisting you to make an informed choice. We will be trying our best to persuade you that among all the options, Hong Kong is the best choice. Why? Because Hong Kong is a common law gateway for Vietnamese businesses to China and beyond.     This is my short answer. We do have a long answer, but I am afraid that the long answer is not going to be given by me. It is going to be provided by my eminent friends coming from Hong Kong. They will speak from their own area of practices, from their experiences to substantiate the point that I wish to make. And of course, after they share their experiences and what they wish to tell you, at dinner time, I am hoping that most of you would join the dinner, I will have the chance to speak to you again, just to do my closing submission. I will wait for your verdict at the end of your dinner.     On this note, I hope you all have a very enjoyable afternoon and a very fruitful afternoon. And I hope that I will be able to convince you, because the duty of a lawyer is to convince people. I will be failing my duty if I am unsuccessful in this respect. I need your support and I am very optimistic because I have very good friends with me doing the job together with me. Thank you very much.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI China: China’s manned deep-sea submersible Jiaolong arrives in Hong Kong for 1st time

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    HONG KONG, Sept. 24 — China’s research vessel Deep Sea No. 1, carrying manned submersible Jiaolong, received a warm welcome Tuesday in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), the first time they visited the city.

    The vessel is on a home-bound voyage after completing a scientific mission in the Western Pacific Ocean. During their two-day stay in Hong Kong, scientists on board will give lectures to Hong Kong students and hold a number of international seminars to share the results of this scientific expedition.

    Warner Cheuk, deputy chief secretary for administration of the HKSAR government, said that the visits ahead of the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China fully demonstrated the central government’s care and support for Hong Kong’s marine scientific research development and ecological conservation.

    It is hoped that this event will inspire more young people in Hong Kong to engage in deep-sea research and make planet Earth a better place to live in, he said.

    Wu Changbin, director of China Ocean Mineral Resources R&D Association, congratulated the successful completion of the Western Pacific international voyage scientific expedition, saying that this voyage not only enhanced China’s scientific understanding of deep-sea biodiversity and ecosystems but also contributed important scientific data to global marine scientific research.

    The scientific expedition team of Chinese and foreign scientists set sail on Aug. 10 from Qingdao, east China’s Shandong Province, and made a total of 18 dives in the Western Pacific. It was the first time that foreign scientists have carried out deep-sea scientific research on Jiaolong.

    MIL OSI China News –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Video: UK Lords committee calls for major overhaul of public inquiries

    Source: United Kingdom UK House of Lords (video statements)

    Overhaul inquiries to make them more efficient and effective, says House of Lords committee in new report.

    Public inquiries are set up to consider incidents of major public concern, such as the Grenfell Tower fire, the Post Office Horizon scandal and the Covid-19 pandemic.

    The Statutory Inquiries Committee has been considering the way these inquiries work. In its new report it found inefficiencies leading to delays and unnecessary costs. It calls on the government to conduct a major overhaul, including supporting an independent body responsible for following up on recommendations and ensuring that those accepted by the government are implemented.

    Find out more and read the report in full https://ukparliament.shorthandstories.com/statutory-inquiries-lords-report/index.html?utm_source=youtube&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=statutory-inquiries-report&utm_content=lords-youtube-channel

    #HouseOfLords #PublicInquiries

    Catch-up on House of Lords business:

    Watch live events: https://parliamentlive.tv/Lords
    Read the latest news: https://www.parliament.uk/lords/

    Stay up to date with the House of Lords on social media:

    • Twitter: https://twitter.com/UKHouseofLords
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    #HouseOfLords #UKParliament

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qn3m8XQISfg

    MIL OSI Video –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI: Tyton Partners’ Listening to Learners Data Assesses Correlation Between Student Safety and Re-enrollment Decisions at Institutions

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    BOSTON, Sept. 24, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Today, Tyton Partners, a strategy consulting and investment banking firm focused on the education sector, unveiled Listening to Learners 2024: Stay Safe, Stay Informed: How Awareness of Support Services and Safety Relate to Re-enrollment, focusing on student learning outcomes. Following its widely cited debut last year, the second annual installment dives into the student perspective, linking it to institutional practices and technologies to spotlight impactful trends supporting student success in and outside the classroom.

    With data from 3,000 higher education administrators, frontline advising staff, and students, Listening to Learners 2024 offers an in-depth analysis across six pivotal areas: Safety, Learner Awareness, Basic Needs Costs, Generative AI, Stopped-out Learners, and the Equity-Excellence Imperative. These areas are critical in understanding and bridging gaps between what students need to succeed and institutional efforts.

    • Safety Concerns: Although rarely discussed during advising sessions, students are four times more likely to want to discuss safety issues as a topic than advisors, highlighting a disconnect that impacts re-enrollment.
    • Learner Awareness: Only 54% of institutions effectively communicate available student support services, underscoring an awareness gap that could significantly boost retention and re-enrollment rates. This gap is larger for students with disabilities and online students.
    • Basic Needs Costs: 60% of students cite the cost of course materials as a crucial factor in course selection, stressing the financial burdens impacting their academic choices.
    • Generative AI: 50% of students would continue using generative AI tools even if banned, indicating robust student interest in these technologies.
    • Stopped-out Learners: FAFSA delays have had disproportional effects on re-enrolled learners’ decisions to re-enroll and potentially transfer to a different college or university
    • Equity-Excellence Imperative: Despite having a perspective on which student populations are most at risk, 54% of academic advisors don’t know if student utilization of support services is tracked by at-risk sub-populations (e.g., students who are working while in school or from rural areas), suggesting a lack of targeted support.

    “At Tyton Partners, we believe deeply in the power of data to inform actionable insights,” said Catherine Shaw, Managing Director at Tyton Partners and lead author of Listening to Learners. “Through Listening to Learners, we aim to bridge the gap between student experiences and institutional strategies, fostering environments that support all aspects of student success, both in and outside the classroom.”

    “This research underscores the urgent need for higher education to equip learners with the skills for a lifelong learning journey,” said Dr. Cristi Ford, Vice President of Academic Affairs at D2L. “As people live and work longer, the traditional three-stage model of education, employment, and retirement must transform into a continuous cycle of learning and earning.”

    This year’s research, supported by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, D2L, and Lumina Foundation, highlights the critical need for educational institutions to align more closely with student needs. By bridging this gap, we can not only enhance equity and effectiveness within the educational landscape but also pave the way for innovative practices that will shape the future of learning.

    Read Listening to Learners 2024 here.

    About Tyton Partners
    Tyton Partners is the leading provider of strategy consulting and investment banking services to the global knowledge and information services sector. With offices in Boston and New York City, the firm has an experienced team of bankers and consultants who deliver a unique spectrum of services from mergers and acquisitions and capital markets access to strategy development that helps companies, organizations, and investors navigate the complexities of the education, media, and information markets. Tyton Partners leverages a deep foundation of transactional and advisory experience and an unparalleled level of global relationships to make its clients’ aspirations a reality and to catalyze innovation in the sector. Learn more at tytonpartners.com.

    The MIL Network –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI: Aurora Information Technology joins Softlink Information Centres

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    BRISBANE, Australia, Sept. 24, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Softlink Information Centres, a Volaris Group company, has acquired Aurora Information Technology (AIT), developer of library automation software used in public and special libraries. Their flagship product, Aurora Library Management System (LMS), is based on Aurora Montage – a patron web catalogue. This year, a new, cloud-based library staff solution called Aurora Astria was introduced to the market.

    AIT was established in the late 1990s. Co-founders, Doug Coulson and Martin Fisk, designed and developed the product.

    “It took us almost one year to build Aurora software to the point of winning business. Our first customer was the Royal Blind Society (NSW) which over time became part of Vision Australia.  AIT is now providing software for Vision Australia’s major digital transformation project. With software capabilities for Libraries for the Blind, we also won business with national organisations in New Zealand and South Africa.” Doug Coulson, AIT Co-founder.

    Today, Aurora is found in large and small public libraries, predominantly in Australia. This includes the Rural Libraries Queensland network, managed by the State Library of Queensland. The solution supports the delivery of a centralised catalogue and networked library services throughout the State.

    For more than 10 years, AIT has donated Aurora LMS software, hosting and services to all indigenous knowledge centres through Queensland.  

    “The average life of a small business is less than 9 years, so to have been in business now for 28 years, still having our original customers and being able to help support indigenous library services along the way, is something for which AIT founders are very grateful.   We are pleased that Aurora has found a home at Softlink Information Centres.” Doug Coulson, AIT Co-founder.

    Sarah Thompson, General Manager of Softlink Information Centres adds: “It is exciting to include AIT as part of our wider community of software businesses across the globe that work tirelessly to provide exceptional solutions to librarians, researchers and library managers.”

    The AIT team will join Softlink Information Centres, led by Sarah Thompson.  

    About Softlink Information Centres

    Softlink Information Centres has been a leader in providing library, knowledge and research management solutions for over 40 years. Our products are trusted by hundreds of businesses worldwide, including some of the largest multi-branch law firms, parliamentary, government libraries and top management consulting firms. We combine the latest technology with ease of use and affordability, enabling our clients to adapt, grow and deliver superior services. Visit us at Softlink Information Centres [https://ic.softlinkint.com/]. 

    For further information on Softlink Information Centres, please visit ic.softlinkint.com

    About Volaris Group

    Volaris acquires, strengthens and grows vertical market technology companies. As an operating group of Constellation Software Inc., Volaris is all about strengthening businesses within the markets they compete and enabling them to grow – whether that growth comes through organic measures such as new initiatives and product development, day-to-day business, or through complementary acquisitions. Learn more at www.volarisgroup.com.

    For more information, please contact:

    Sarah Thompson
    General Manager
    Softlink Information Centres
    Sarah.Thompson@softlinkint.com

    The MIL Network –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI: Cross Keys Capital Advises Propel Engineering in Its Partnership with Traffic & Mobility Consultants

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Fort Lauderdale, Sept. 24, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Cross Keys Capital, LLC, a leading independent investment banking firm providing M&A advisory services, is pleased to announce it acted as the exclusive financial advisor to Propel Engineering, a distinguished civil engineering firm based in West Palm Beach, FL, in its partnership with Traffic & Mobility Consultants (TMC), a portfolio company of Grovecourt Capital Partners.

    Founded in 2013, Propel Engineering has built an impressive reputation for delivering high-quality civil engineering services, with a particular focus on highway design, traffic analysis, and structural design. The firm’s expertise in working with both public and private sector clients, including the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT), aligns perfectly with TMC’s growth strategy and commitment to excellence in transportation engineering.

    Traffic & Mobility Consultants is a Florida-based engineering company specializing in Transportation Planning and Traffic Engineering. Founded in 2012, TMC serves private clients and governmental agencies at the local, county, and state levels. TMC’s goal is to provide its clients with the highest quality services, offering innovative, strategic, and effective solutions for safe and efficient mobility.

    Maj Alam, Founder and President of Propel Engineering, commented, “Over the past decade, Propel Engineering has established itself as a trusted partner in Florida’s transportation infrastructure development. By joining TMC, we’re not just combining our expertise – we’re amplifying our ability to deliver innovative solutions for complex engineering challenges. This partnership will allow us to take on larger, more impactful projects and contribute even more significantly to Florida’s rapidly evolving transportation landscape. We’re excited about the enhanced value we’ll bring to our clients and the new opportunities this creates for our talented team.”

    Neil Dhruve, Director at Cross Keys Capital, shared his excitement, saying that “Working with Maj was an absolute pleasure, and we are excited to watch unfold all the incredible opportunities the combined companies are able to realize.”

    The financial terms of the acquisition were not disclosed. Greenberg Traurig acted as legal advisor to TMC. Cross Keys Capital acted as M&A advisor to Propel, and De Biase | Alvarez acted as legal advisor to Propel Engineering

    About Cross Keys Capital

    Cross Keys Capital is a leading middle-market investment bank providing a full range of investment banking merger and acquisition advisory services to a variety of businesses.

    This was Cross Keys’ 10th successful sell-side engagement completed in 2024.

    The MIL Network –

    September 29, 2024

  • MIL-OSI Africa: United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 79: African Development Bank calls on Development Finance Institution’s (DFI’s) to put peace into action to promote peace and stability in Africa

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    NEW YORK, United States of America, September 24, 2024/APO Group/ —

    The African Development Bank (www.AfDB.org) has urged Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) and other development partners to scale up innovative partnerships and initiatives to build peace and security in Africa, home to eleven of the world’s most conflict-affected states.

    Marie-Laure Akin-Olugbade, African Development Bank Vice-President for Regional Development, Integration and Business Delivery Complex led the charge during a session held September 21, on the sidelines of the 79th Assembly of the United Nations titled: Investing in Prevention: Scaling up Peace – A Call to Action for DFIs.

    Over the last 20 years, the level of global conflict has escalated, with one-fifth of Africa’s population residing in conflict affected areas, affecting the future of the world’s fastest-growing continent.

    “Our goal today is very clear. We would like to mobilise institutions to prioritise peace building and through innovative partnerships and new financial mechanisms.  This is a call for action.” Akin-Olugbade said in opening remarks.

    The New Agenda for Peace, which is at center stage of the UN’s Summit of the Future, highlights how different actors, including DFIs can serve as peace agents, and emphasises the role of partnerships, especially in the context of fragile and conflict affected countries, urging increased political and financial mobilisation to prevent conflicts.

    The effect of three decades of a devastating civil war in Mozambique are still evident, Amilcar Tivane, Mozambique’s Vice-Minister of Economy and Finance told participants, stressing the need for prevention.

    The  Mozambique government has learned innovative solutions to deal with the root causes of conflict and to address lingering security challenges in northern Mozambique such as terrorism and insurgency.  What has worked is a resilience building strategy together with partnerships, Tivane said. The country is also launching a new initiative for peace for the reconstruction of affected tourism areas

    « We have learned that prevention is critical, » he said. « Sometimes its difficult (for governments) to acknowledge that the social dimensions could have a significant impact.»

    Issa Faye, Director General of the Islamic Development Bank ( IsDB) said his institution’s blend of ordinary and concessional financing has been key to the successful  financial support for 32 fragile African countries out of the 52 they support. 

    The IsDB have aided thousands of refugees through programmes to address skills gap, training and education, combining economic empowerment and food security.

    Faye underlined Islamic financing as a concept framing a lot of the institution’s programmes and stressed the need to find alternative financing which is dedicated, responsive and resilient.

    Risk perception, another major constraint to financing peace initiatives in Africa, was the subject of Pradeep Kurukulasuriya, the Executive Secretary of the UN Capital Development Fund (UN CDF), submission. He offered a concrete example of successful de-risking of a peace initiative in Burundi.

    « UN DCRF works to de-risk so that larger streams of finance can flow from the larger and more established institutions, » he said.

    Since 2021, UNCDF has been working in collaboration with the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the Government of Burundi to address interconnected and transnational root-causes of instability and nature loss in the Kibara National Park and surrounding buffer zones. The joint initiative with several partners including UNESCO, uses a unique blended finance approach.

    Peace finance needs new a lens

    Itonde Kakoma, President of Interpeace said a new paradigm approach, which moved away from the donor focus and instead sees development partners investing in peace investment hubs and creating a pipeline of peace positive projects, is much needed.

    He said the need to connect development finance and peace building while leveraging the private sector to build peace, safety and social cohesion between communities living in complex environments, was more imperative than ever.

    « We have a conviction that the Sustainable Development Goals can be unlocked by peace finance, » Kakoma said.

    Other participants such as Elizabeth Spehar, Assistant Secretary General, United Nations Peacebuilding Support stressed the importance of inclusion and the role of DFI’s such as the African Development Bank.

    “We need the economic might of the DFI’s. We have to work on this together,” she said.

    Spehar paid tribute to the African Development Bank which emphasizes peace and security as public goods in its new Ten-year strategy (2024-2033). The Bank’s joint pilot project in Central African Republic with UNHCR has the UN “working with communities on the  peace part and the African Development Bank working on the employment part,” Spehar said.

    The Bank has been on the forefront of systematically addressing issues of fragility in Africa and has built up over 20 years of experience in building Africa’s resilience by providing intellectual leadership and dedicated financial instruments, such as the Transition Support Facility, which mobilizes additional resources for affected countries. The Bank’s Private Sector Credit Enhancement Facility allows it to do more private investments in these riskier markets.

    The audience also heard from the g7+, Asian Development Bank, Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS), the World Economic Forum (WEF), the Aswan Forum, UNHCR, and the African Union Peace Fund whose Director Dagmawit Moges spoke of the institution’s reforms and the importance of governance.

    “We’ve gone beyond theory and talk. We at the African Development Bank are interested in strengthening partnerships. We are not going to work in silos. We are looking forward to continuing this discussion at COP 29 and at the Africa Resilience Forum next year,” Akin-Olugbade said.

    MIL OSI Africa –

    September 29, 2024
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