Category: Politics

MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Brussels’ use of targeted anti-Marine Le Pen advertising during the Dutch election campaign in 2023 – E-001329/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Commission did not run corporate communication campaigns in 2024 before the European elections. In general, corporate communication campaigns conducted by the Commission are designed to inform and raise awareness among European citizens, without interfering in any electoral process.

An advertising campaign, launched by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs to communicate on the proposal for a regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse submitted in May 2022[1], ran from 15 to 28 September 2023.

The total amount spent on the advertising campaign, which ran in eight Member States, was EUR 7 496.89 with cost per view of EUR 0.008.

These advertising expenses were not declared to election authorities. This campaign was unrelated to any national or European elections.

[1] COM/2022/209 final.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Brussels’ use of targeted anti-Marine Le Pen advertising during the Dutch election campaign in 2023 – E-001329/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Commission did not run corporate communication campaigns in 2024 before the European elections. In general, corporate communication campaigns conducted by the Commission are designed to inform and raise awareness among European citizens, without interfering in any electoral process.

An advertising campaign, launched by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs to communicate on the proposal for a regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse submitted in May 2022[1], ran from 15 to 28 September 2023.

The total amount spent on the advertising campaign, which ran in eight Member States, was EUR 7 496.89 with cost per view of EUR 0.008.

These advertising expenses were not declared to election authorities. This campaign was unrelated to any national or European elections.

[1] COM/2022/209 final.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Institutional communication of the Commission and the situation in Türkiye – P-001397/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
During the High-Level Economic Dialogue between the EU and Türkiye, the Commissioner for Enlargement stressed that adhering to the rule of law and high democratic standards were essential for Türkiye as a candidate country and expressed concerns about recent political developments.

The Commissioner for Enlargement made clear that while Türkiye is a key partner of the EU and enhancing economic cooperation is a joint ambition, only a relationship based on clear commitments to democratic values and freedoms will unfold its full potential.

The EU is carefully considering engagement with Türkiye and recalibrate as necessary depending on political developments. This is in line with the November 2023 Joint Communication[1], calling for a progressive, proportionate and reversible approach, which underlines that Türkiye’s own constructive engagement will be instrumental in advancing the various areas of cooperation.

The Commissioner for Enlargement raised EU concerns bilaterally and cancelled a visit to the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, planned for 11-13 April 2025, as well as a meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister.

The Commissioner for Enlargement will continue to raise matters of concern related to the rule of law, as reconfirmed in a speech at the European Parliament’s Plenary on 6 May 2025[2].

[1] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-political-economic-and-trade-relations-0_en.

[2] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2025-05-06-ITM-014_EN.html.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Institutional communication of the Commission and the situation in Türkiye – P-001397/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
During the High-Level Economic Dialogue between the EU and Türkiye, the Commissioner for Enlargement stressed that adhering to the rule of law and high democratic standards were essential for Türkiye as a candidate country and expressed concerns about recent political developments.

The Commissioner for Enlargement made clear that while Türkiye is a key partner of the EU and enhancing economic cooperation is a joint ambition, only a relationship based on clear commitments to democratic values and freedoms will unfold its full potential.

The EU is carefully considering engagement with Türkiye and recalibrate as necessary depending on political developments. This is in line with the November 2023 Joint Communication[1], calling for a progressive, proportionate and reversible approach, which underlines that Türkiye’s own constructive engagement will be instrumental in advancing the various areas of cooperation.

The Commissioner for Enlargement raised EU concerns bilaterally and cancelled a visit to the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, planned for 11-13 April 2025, as well as a meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister.

The Commissioner for Enlargement will continue to raise matters of concern related to the rule of law, as reconfirmed in a speech at the European Parliament’s Plenary on 6 May 2025[2].

[1] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-political-economic-and-trade-relations-0_en.

[2] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2025-05-06-ITM-014_EN.html.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Institutional communication of the Commission and the situation in Türkiye – P-001397/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
During the High-Level Economic Dialogue between the EU and Türkiye, the Commissioner for Enlargement stressed that adhering to the rule of law and high democratic standards were essential for Türkiye as a candidate country and expressed concerns about recent political developments.

The Commissioner for Enlargement made clear that while Türkiye is a key partner of the EU and enhancing economic cooperation is a joint ambition, only a relationship based on clear commitments to democratic values and freedoms will unfold its full potential.

The EU is carefully considering engagement with Türkiye and recalibrate as necessary depending on political developments. This is in line with the November 2023 Joint Communication[1], calling for a progressive, proportionate and reversible approach, which underlines that Türkiye’s own constructive engagement will be instrumental in advancing the various areas of cooperation.

The Commissioner for Enlargement raised EU concerns bilaterally and cancelled a visit to the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, planned for 11-13 April 2025, as well as a meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister.

The Commissioner for Enlargement will continue to raise matters of concern related to the rule of law, as reconfirmed in a speech at the European Parliament’s Plenary on 6 May 2025[2].

[1] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-political-economic-and-trade-relations-0_en.

[2] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-10-2025-05-06-ITM-014_EN.html.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EUR 415 million fine for OPEKEPE’s administrative failures: who ultimately pays the price? – E-002554/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002554/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Galato Alexandraki (ECR)

The European Commission has fined Greece EUR 415 million for systematic administrative failures in the management of agricultural aid in the period 2009-2023. As the Ministry of Rural Development itself acknowledges, this is not a matter of producer fraud, but rather the result of inadequate checks, a lack of cross-checks with the IAPR, shortcomings in the land register, pasture maps, technical errors by private individuals and numerous years of institutional inaction.

Although the blame is being attributed to administrative or political persons, not a single charge has been initiated. Meanwhile, the fine is already set to be covered by the state budget. This means that ordinary taxpayers and honest farmers are bearing the consequences of scandals in which they had no part.

In view of this, can the Commission say:

1.How does it assess the failure of the Greek authorities to identify and punish those actually responsible?

2.Does it intend to request specific names of natural or legal persons responsible for the infringements?

3.Does it consider it fair to impose the fine on farmers and citizens who bear no responsibility for the management collapse of the competent bodies?

Submitted: 25.6.2025
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on product safety and regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports – A10-0133/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on product safety and regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports

(2025/2037(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the report of 31 March 2022 by the Wise Persons Group on the Reform of the EU Customs Union entitled ‘Putting More Union in the European Customs: Ten proposals to make the EU Customs Union fit for a Geopolitical Europe’,

– having regard to its position of 13 March 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Union Customs Code and the European Union Customs Authority, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 [1],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘A comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable e-commerce’ (COM(2025(0037),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 [2],

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859 [3],

– having regard to the report of April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market: Speed, Security, Solidarity – Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’[4],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A10-0133/2025),

A. whereas e-commerce has transformed how consumers purchase and engage with businesses worldwide, unlocking unprecedented opportunities; whereas e-commerce presents significant challenges to the EU’s competitiveness and raises concerns over consumer rights and health and safety, particularly as certain product categories raise urgent concerns regarding their impact on vulnerable consumer groups; whereas it has an environmental impact, particularly through increased waste generation and carbon emissions resulting from transportation and logistics; whereas e-commerce has an impact on retailers’ attractiveness and therefore contributes to the hollowing out of city centres; whereas e-commerce also has social implications, particularly concerning working conditions in the warehousing and delivery sector;

B. whereas over 75 % of EU consumers shop online; whereas the continued growth of e-commerce enhances consumer access, quality and price competition; whereas e-commerce lowers market entry barriers for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and entrepreneurs, fosters digital inclusion, supports underserved communities, and contributes to innovation, productivity and economic growth across the single market;

C. whereas, with the surge in e-commerce imports, mainly coming from China, non-compliant sellers evading regulatory costs and undermining law-abiding businesses through means such as counterfeiting, have intensified unfair competition; whereas there is an urgent need to re-establish a level playing field for all businesses, especially SMEs; whereas it is crucial to ensure that enforcement efforts are adequately funded and equipped at both national and EU level, while avoiding excessive delegation of enforcement responsibilities to private actors;

D. whereas European companies, namely SMEs, must comply with strict regulations and compete on an unlevel playing field with non-EU e-commerce platforms that avoid these obligations; whereas European companies dedicate material and human resources to ensure regulatory compliance, assuming significant administrative and financial burdens;

E. whereas certain non-EU companies fail to comply with European data protection regulations, which guarantee a high level of privacy for consumers, by engaging in consumer profiling practices using personal data; whereas enhanced enforcement and cooperation is required to ensure consistent privacy protections for all consumers;

F. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, in her 2024-2029 political guidelines, referred to the need to tackle challenges with online platforms to ensure that consumers and businesses alike benefit from a level playing field based on effective customs, tax and safety controls and sustainability standards, and tasked several Executive Vice-Presidents and Commissioners with fulfilling that mission;

G. whereas the process of adapting the EU acquis to the online environment began several years ago, and numerous laws on products, consumer protection and product safety now include provisions to ensure robust safeguards in the digital landscape; whereas, notwithstanding these efforts, critical shortcomings persist in empowering authorities to hold the full supply chain accountable and ensure consumer protection, which need to be urgently addressed;

H. whereas the Digital Services Act [5] (DSA), the General Product Safety Regulation [6] (GPSR), the Market Surveillance Regulation [7] (MSR) and the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation (CPC)[8] contribute to a safer and fair e-commerce environment, if well implemented and enforced; whereas, despite these laws, consumer and other organisations, as well as national authorities, have raised concerns over the large number of unsafe products detected in the EU that fail to comply with EU legislation on product safety and environmental and chemical standards; whereas better funding of and coordination among Member States’ enforcement authorities are essential to address these risks effectively;

I. whereas e-commerce may significantly impact consumers by providing them with unparalleled convenience, access to diverse products and competitive pricing; whereas e-commerce also exposes consumers to risks such as unsafe products, a lack of transparency and manipulative practices that exploit their vulnerabilities;

J. whereas the protection of consumers is essential to the functioning of the EU’s internal market, as it ensures trust and fairness in commercial practices, thereby enabling sustainable economic growth and innovation; whereas addressing these concerns is important in promoting transparency, fairness and the responsible development of digital services and e-commerce;

K. whereas people from more disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, including low-income families and children, are more exposed to the risks posed by unsafe products due to their lower prices, aggressive marketing and widespread distribution;

L. whereas concerns over the suitability of customs procedures under the current Union Customs Code [9] for e-commerce were a significant driver of the Commission’s customs reform package, including the legislative proposals on the revision of the Union Customs Code and establishing an EU Customs Authority (UCC reform), and the removal of the EUR 150 exemption threshold (de minimis) for the payment of customs duties and VAT on imported products;

M. whereas customs authorities are in need of substantial investments, particularly to ensure a sufficient number of properly trained staff to guarantee the functioning of EU customs systems, which are facing an exponential increase in demand for customs checks; whereas without the necessary investments in staff, digital solutions cannot achieve benefits in terms of efficiency and harmonisation;

N. whereas advanced screening technologies, such as artificial intelligence and blockchain, could significantly enhance the capacity of customs and market surveillance authorities to flag high-risk shipments and automate compliance checks at scale; whereas investment in such technologies remains fragmented and uneven across Member States; whereas increased EU-level funding, coordination and efforts to ensure interoperability are essential to accelerate their deployment and improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms;

O. whereas digital tools, such as artificial intelligence and the internet of things, can help track non-compliant products, but must respect consumer privacy and must not lead to the general monitoring of users;

P. whereas the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 on a comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable e-commerce, highlights that the volume of e-commerce goods bought by EU consumers on non-EU online platforms is expected to continue growing rapidly, benefiting from the current customs duty exemption for low-value consignments (up to EUR 150);

The surge in non-compliant goods in e-commerce

1. Highlights the increasingly high number of purchases being made by EU consumers on non-EU online platforms in business-to-consumer environments and in emerging manufacturer-to-consumer and direct-to-consumer environments; emphasises, as described in the Letta report on the future of the single market [10], that the circulation of harmful products in the single market is escalating and that EU consumers are wasting EUR 19.3 billion per year buying dangerous products that can lead to injuries and that are detrimental to our economies;

2. Notes that 4.6 billion e-commerce items under the EUR 150 exemption threshold were imported into the EU in 2024, 91 % of which originated from China, amounting to up to 12 million small e-commerce items per day and amounting to almost twice the number recorded in 2023 (2.4 billion) and more than triple the number in 2022 (1.4 billion); notes that this surge has exacerbated compliance challenges, especially in product safety, and that market surveillance authorities and independent investigations have reported alarming non-compliance rates;

3. Stresses that most unsafe and illegal products are shipped to the EU in large volumes of individual, and often small, parcels sold to EU consumers via online platforms from non-EU countries, in particular China; stresses that such products are difficult to control, in particular for customs authorities at the entry points, which are mostly located at major ports and logistical airports for e-commerce; emphasises that this makes it almost impossible to stop such products from entering the EU and makes it increasingly difficult for market surveillance authorities to detect and remove such products from the internal market and for consumer authorities to do so once the products reach EU consumers;

4. Stresses that the rapid growth of e-commerce has significant environmental implications due to issues such as a rise in packaging waste, the larger carbon footprint from low-quality and short life cycle products and their shipment, and problems with waste management and non-recyclable materials; underlines, in this respect, the need to ensure compliance with environmental legislation and to encourage sustainable ways of consuming;

5. Stresses that some non-EU online marketplaces are facing allegations regarding the use of forced labour; underlines, in this respect, that Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 prohibits products made with forced labour from entering the EU market, and that it must be effectively enforced after its application, including for online sales;

6. Notes that, on 1 December 2025, Regulation No 2023/2411 [11] on the protection of geographical indications for craft and industrial products will come into force; notes that, if not accompanied by adequate promotion and protection, especially with respect to the markets of non-EU countries, geographical indications risk remaining ineffective; calls, therefore, on the Commission, together with the customs authorities of the Member States, to strengthen checks aimed at intercepting products that violate the rules on geographical indications;

7. Is concerned that the prevailing business model of certain major non-EU online platforms is based on the rapid, large-scale production and distribution of fast fashion and ultra-fast fashion products, prioritising speed and low cost over sustainability, safety and quality; regrets that many such products do not comply with EU legislation, yet non-compliant sellers frequently evade meaningful enforcement or sanctions; stresses that such practices constitute a form of social and environmental dumping, resulting in a persistent and unfair competitive advantage for these non-EU platforms, exerting disproportionate pressure on European undertakings, in particular SMEs and micro-enterprises; emphasises that this hampers the development of the EU’s textile and clothing sector;

E-commerce crossroads: navigating compliance challenges

8. Recognises that the EU has established a robust compliance framework, which also applies to products sold online, but that greater efforts are still needed for the full enforcement of the compliance framework; underlines, in this respect, the importance of the DSA, the DMA, the MSR, the GPSR, consumer protection rules and various product and environmental laws; emphasises that market surveillance authorities face challenges in applying these frameworks to online platforms as evidenced by the Commission’s recently published evaluation report on the implementation of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and, in particular, in cases where large quantities of a product are sold in small consignments; considers that the thorough implementation of the DSA and other regulatory acquis is necessary to combat unsafe, non-compliant and counterfeit products;

9. Stresses the need to implement the existing compliance framework and evaluate these measures when considering new legislation, including new obligations for online marketplaces;

10. Notes that conducting physical tests is particularly impractical for small parcels sent directly to the final consumer and that customs authorities will therefore continue to rely primarily on checking the documentation, rather than inspecting the products themselves;

11. Highlights the significant enforcement gaps caused by the limited resources and insufficient level of digitalisation of customs and market surveillance authorities, the lack of human resources and harmonised and interoperable technological tools across Member States, and the insufficient data sharing and overall lack of cooperation and coordination between customs authorities, platforms and market surveillance entities; acknowledges that physical inspections are unavoidably and inherently limited given the volume of e-commerce parcels entering the EU;

12. Considers that mystery shopping exercises by market surveillance authorities, as put forward in the Commission communication on e-commerce, are an important tool to verify compliance for products sold through online platforms; stresses, however, that if sellers are based outside the EU or are not traceable and if fake addresses are used for responsible persons, there is no liable legal entity and it is impossible for market surveillance authorities to take enforcement actions;

13. Considers that EU manufacturers and retailers, particularly SMEs, face unfair competition due to non-EU platforms enabling non-EU manufacturers and their non-compliant products to easily enter the EU market, bypassing applicable regulations and standards; highlights that, while EU manufacturers must comply with strict safety, environmental and quality rules, many low-value products sold through these platforms evade customs and market surveillance checks due to the way they are shipped to the EU; raises concerns that some of these platforms and non-EU traders deliberately exploit this loophole, allowing non-compliant imports to enter the EU single market unchecked, putting European manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers at a disadvantage, weakening their competitiveness and hindering their ability to innovate, which could lead to the closure of many micro-enterprises and small enterprises;

14. Stresses that EU manufacturers are de facto subject to significantly stricter market surveillance compared to non-EU manufactures that reach EU consumers via e-commerce platforms; deeply regrets the loss of market share and jobs caused by the influx of cheaper products that do not comply with European standards, particularly on safety and quality, as well as other illegal products, shipped from non-EU countries, directly affecting EU SMEs and the strength of EU companies and their capacity to invest and maintain profitability;

15. Highlights the difference between online platforms acting as intermediaries and those acting as importers; notes, in particular, that the EU e-commerce platforms that act as importers face compliance costs that increase their retail prices up to 40 %, which has an impact on final consumers; underlines that EU-based importers face stricter obligations and higher costs, while intermediary platforms allow non-EU sellers to ship directly to EU consumers without ensuring compliance;

16. Recognises that e-commerce platforms are subject to various obligations under the DSA and the GPSR and may be held liable under the Product Liability Directive [12] (PLD) in specific circumstances; recalls, in this respect, that online platforms are liable if they do not respect their specific obligations as intermediaries; believes, however, that consumer redress must be ensured in all cases; underlines, in this respect, that where the manufacturer is established outside the EU and no importer, authorised representative, or fulfilment service provider can be identified, online marketplaces should provide adequate and proportionate remedies to consumers where they fail to comply with the DSA, particularly with Articles 30 and 31 or with Article 22 of the GPSR;

17. Emphasises that online marketplaces are requested to trace their traders (‘know your business customer’) under the DSA, which should discourage traders from selling unsafe or counterfeit goods, and are obliged to comply with the ‘compliance by design’ rules to increase overall traceability; highlights the lack of accountability of online platforms in case of untraceable sellers or sellers based outside the jurisdiction of the EU; notes the considerable level of non-compliance with the ‘know your business customer’ principle and the rise in new selling practices via social media platforms, where this obligation is not effectively applied, allowing non-EU sellers to offer non-compliant goods to EU users directly; stresses, therefore, the need for online platforms to make best efforts to ensure full traceability of sellers and products, preventing listings from appearing without verified product compliance details;

18. Highlights the fact that the information of a responsible economic operator in the EU under the GPSR, acting on behalf of a non-EU trader or platform, is often wrong or missing; notes that even when this information is available, the responsible person in the EU may not be accountable, particularly when the responsible person is an authorised representative; is concerned that market surveillance authorities report significant difficulties in contacting these non-EU traders and enforcing EU law, and that even when contact is established, enforcing penalties against them is often unfeasible;

19. Considers that creating a database of the responsible persons in the EU to enable real-time cross-checking for verification, along with establishing an accreditation procedure for them, could enhance transparency and reinforce accountability throughout the e-commerce import supply chain;

20. Supports research and enforcement actions by consumer organisations and the opening of investigations initiated by consumer authorities in the EU, as part of the CPC network, as well as under the DSA, against non-EU online platforms for potential violations of EU product safety and consumer laws; expresses concern over the slow progress of these investigations and calls for their swift conclusion; underlines the need for enforcement to be a deterrent that includes adequate sanctions to ensure compliance; underlines, in this respect, that particular attention is necessary at national and EU level to address recurrent non-compliance that may have been identified in previous controls of similar products, including via the application of interim measures; stresses that the enforcement and effectiveness of commitments received from online platforms should be closely monitored;

21. Urges the Commission and CPC authorities to initiate a structured enforcement dialogue with consumer representatives, traders and other stakeholders to identify systemic infringements requiring stronger enforcement;

22. Notes the complexity for EU authorities to enforce EU laws when the economic operators are established outside the EU; highlights the need for enhanced international cooperation agreements, particularly with major e-commerce exporters;

Strong enforcement policies to combat non-compliant e-commerce products

Urgent need for short-term measures

23. Urges the Member States to increase funding and resources for market surveillance, customs, consumer protection and digital services authorities so that they can better address the challenges posed by unsafe and illicit products; asks the Commission to support stronger cooperation, information sharing and data exchange between competent authorities, including market surveillance and customs authorities, and stresses that cooperation across different sectors should be improved; urges the Member States to ensure effective coordination among different market surveillance authorities in their territories, and to strengthen the powers of the single liaison offices; highlights that the Member States and the EU have the responsibility to ensure that market surveillance and customs authorities are properly resourced, trained and equipped to have the capacity to fulfil their mission, including proper investigative powers;

24. Calls on market surveillance authorities to invest more resources in joint or coordinated activities with other Member States or relevant authorities and, in particular, to increase the number and the frequency of coordinated enforcement actions such as sweeps, mystery-shopping exercises and peer-reviews; urges relevant authorities to actively participate in these activities and the Commission to make full use of its coordination powers;

25. Welcomes the Commission’s intention to coordinate the control of customs and market surveillance authorities under priority control areas focused on products from non-EU countries that pose significant safety hazards and a risk of non-compliance; emphasises that this initiative should generate valuable risk profile data, which could be used in further enforcement activities and penalties to non-compliant actors; calls on the Commission to strengthen cooperation within the EU Product Compliance Network and to increase EU funding for customs cooperation under the customs programme and for market surveillance operations under the single market programme; stresses that the lack of adequate resources has hindered the effective deployment of tools, such as the widespread use of mystery shopping activities by market surveillance authorities or the use of trusted flaggers under the DSA; points out to the Commission that, in addition to existing testing facilities for toys and radio equipment, more testing facilities for e-commerce goods are urgently needed, such as for batteries, textiles, cosmetics, electrical appliances and other products; asks the Member States to deploy sufficient resources to guarantee an increased capacity of testing facilities and to increase investments in equipment for the detection of unsafe and illegal goods;

26. Emphasises that for data and security reasons, Member States should restrict high-risk vendors from operating in their critical infrastructure and border security systems, including for the procurement of security screening and cargo scanning equipment used at airports and ports;

27. Highlights the fact that, under the GPSR, online marketplaces are obliged to establish a single point of contact, register with the Safety Gate Portal and indicate the information concerning their single contact point on the portal; asks the Commission to effectively enforce this and other obligations of online marketplaces and to support the Member States’ market surveillance authorities in implementing the GPSR and the MSR; notes that the GPSR introduced direct data exchanges between enforcement authorities and e-commerce platforms; believes, however, that in order for the system to work effectively, a direct link with customs authorities should be provided;

28. Notes that the current system is more reactive than preventive, as authorities intervene only after dangerous products have already been sold to consumers, rather than preventing their distribution; recalls that, under the GPSR, online marketplace providers are encouraged to check products against the Safety Gate Portal before listing them on their interfaces; underlines that random sampling testing can only be efficient if it is conducted regularly;

29. Emphasises that the swift implementation of the Digital Product Passport (DPP) for several critical products sold online is essential to strengthen the enforcement of existing legislation; urges the Commission to present the necessary secondary legislation on the DPP as soon as possible, in particular for textiles, toys, cosmetics, electronics and other products with high non-compliance rates and associated risks; calls on the Commission to continuously assess the requirements, technical design and operation of the DPP under the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation [13] (ESPR) as a priority; calls on the Commission to support businesses, in particular micro-enterprises and SMEs, in the implementation of the DPP;

30. Proposes a mandatory DPP with early compliance verification for all products imported via e-commerce, including detailed quality and compliance data, to be integrated directly into the EU customs data hub, allowing authorities to pre-screen information on products before they are placed on the single market;

31. Urges the Member States to make substantial efforts to increase customs controls and improve risk analysis, as the detection and removal of non-compliant goods can reduce the harm to EU consumers and protect the economic interests of EU businesses; underlines that the introduction in the customs risk analysis of a presumption of non-compliance for goods identical to those already found non-compliant could facilitate controls by customs authorities and improve cost efficiency; stresses the importance of reinforcing customs centres so they are better equipped to handle the large volume of small parcels that are difficult to control using traditional methods, including advanced screening technologies to identify suspicious packages at entry points; asks for more rigorous compliance checks, as well as random checks by the authorities on high-tonnage transport; urges the Member States, furthermore, to significantly increase the level of digitalisation of import procedures in customs authorities in order to implement existing legislation and accelerate customs procedures, especially in view of the high numbers of parcels;

32. Underlines that businesses, particularly SMEs, urgently require clear guidelines from the Commission for the effective implementation of the GPSR, including clarification on its interplay with overlapping legislation, such as the DSA, the MSR, the PLD, and sector-specific laws on toys, cosmetics and detergents; calls on the Commission to issue these guidelines before the end of the first half of 2025 to facilitate businesses’ compliance; considers that the evaluation report on the interaction of the DSA with other legal acts, which is due on 17 November 2025, should take into account different legislation, in particular on product compliance, the obligations of online marketplaces, enforcement rules and possible future improvements on simplification and implementation; calls on the Commission to assess all possible further actions, including the evaluation of sectoral legislation, which is necessary to ensure legal predictability and that no legal loopholes or enforcement gaps are left when it comes to direct imports from non-EU countries via online marketplaces;

33. Calls on the relevant national authorities to make full use of the existing and recently adopted enforcement toolbox, especially in relation to provisions on e-commerce set out in the MSR, GPSR and DSA, such as takedown orders, prohibition, restriction on the making available of a product on the market or its removal, recalls and sanctions as measures to counter the rise of illegal and non-compliant imports from non-EU countries;

34. Underlines that regulatory enforcement measures taken against non-compliant actors should not put disproportionate burdens on compliant actors or cause unintentional harm to the second-hand market;

35. Stresses the need to ensure the protection of intellectual property rights in the light of the increase in non-European counterfeit goods on e-commerce platforms; notes that these practices harm the competitiveness of European companies and pose risks to innovation and the incentives for research and development; calls for stronger measures against the sale of counterfeit goods online; urges the Commission to issue clear guidelines on trusted flaggers and stresses that rights holders should be recognised as eligible trusted flaggers when they meet the criteria outlined in Article 22 of the DSA;

36. Points out that the Member States should make better use of the available sets of penalties and sanctions against economic operators, as well as other available tools including interim measures, in order to create a deterrent effect to dissuade economic operators from infringing upon the applicable legislation;

37. Urges the Commission to take effective measures, including legislative measures where legal loopholes are clearly identified, without delay to ensure legal certainty and a level playing field for European companies, placing particular emphasis on SMEs;

The need for regulatory reforms

38. Calls for the removal of barriers to enforcing consumer rights, such as legal warranty claims and the right to return items; calls on the Commission to review the CPC Regulation without delay as this will be fundamental for a more effective cross-border enforcement of EU consumer law and the fight against unsafe products; asks the Commission, in this context, to provide for clear measures to further strengthen enforcement powers over non-EU traders and platforms and ensure better coordination of EU and national actions and the exchange of information among authorities, as well as with authorities in non-EU countries; highlights that the structure of the European Competition Network could be used as an example to follow for enforcement and information exchange in the case of suspected violations impacting multiple Member States, especially to combat non-compliant products effectively; stresses the importance of granting the Commission direct powers to investigate and sanction certain high impact breaches of consumer law, thus ensuring more effective, simultaneous and uniform enforcement and sanctions under EU consumer law;

39. Notes that the CPC Regulation already empowers enforcement authorities to act against non-compliant traders and even gives the possibility for Member States to impose penalties and interim measures such as restricting access to the website; acknowledges, however, that the limitation is that this action must be taken on a country-by-country basis rather than at EU level, with each country applying its own penalties, making the consequences of violations uneven;

40. Notes that enforcement in the Member States is fragmented, which leads to inefficiencies; calls for better coordination of enforcement and compliance oversight effective information exchange between Member States and for a more uniform application of the EU acquis; calls on the Commission to assess the MSR, particularly the need for an EU Market Surveillance Authority that would ensure consistency and provide operational support to the activities conducted by the relevant national market surveillance authorities and foster cooperation with the new EU Customs Authority (EUCA), as well as the implementation of Article 4 of the MSR, defining the responsible economic operators in the EU for product compliance; stresses that, to date, the designated responsible economic operator often lacks the capacity to provide redress or compensation to consumers, in particular when being an authorised representative;

41. Supports the Commission’s ambition to swiftly advance the upcoming interinstitutional negotiations with Parliament and the Council on the UCC reform and the two proposals for Council acts on removing the exemption threshold on customs duties for goods valued under EUR 150; urges, therefore, the Member States to accelerate the negotiation procedure in the Council, recognising the urgency of the customs reform for EU competitiveness and the protection of EU consumers; underlines, however, that removing the threshold is a necessary step but not a stand-alone solution, as customs authorities will still only be able to inspect a limited percentage of parcels; stresses that immediate removal of the customs duty exemption is necessary for high-risk imports from product and consumer safety perspectives; emphasises the need for the customs reform to ensure coherence across regulatory frameworks, particularly avoiding duplication or conflicts with the DSA, and highlights the essential role customs authorities play in detecting non-compliant and unsafe products;

42. Stresses that the UCC reform will provide the necessary tools for customs authorities to better supervise and control the goods entering the EU, help to strengthen the single market and customs union, improve the detection of unsafe and illicit products, and contribute to a level playing field among economic operators; welcomes, in this respect, the proposal under the UCC Regulation to establish the cooperation mechanism with market surveillance authorities that will improve the effectiveness of product controls; emphasises the importance of enhancing customs infrastructure and staffing to manage e-commerce effectively; highlights the need for simplified compliance processes tailored specifically to SMEs; calls on the Member States to introduce automated, forward-looking customs clearing systems, for instance by obliging platforms to enrol and clear customs automatically at the point of sales;

43. Is concerned that some non-EU traders are circumventing EU customs checks by clearing goods by customs at the point of origin; stresses that those non-EU trading companies often prefer to pay penalties rather than open packages upon arrival at EU customs, aiming to unload shipments and depart immediately; is deeply concerned that customs authorities find that many packages are either undeclared or incorrectly declared and are sometimes fraudulently labelled; highlights that the UCC reform should also address these aspects;

44. Takes note of the concern expressed by the ECC network regarding the drop-shipping business model, which raises challenges in consumer protection, product safety and regulatory compliance; regrets that consumers often face misleading practices, difficulties in returning products, and unexpected import duties, while a significant share of drop-shipped products fail to comply with EU safety standards; stresses that drop-shipping complicates enforcement due to untraceable businesses and cross-border complexities, while VAT and data protection compliance remain key concerns; notes that when combined with influencer marketing, drop-shipping may exacerbate transparency issues, reputational risks and inconsistent outcomes; calls on the Commission to assess how to address drop-shipping-related issues;

45. Highlights the fact that the concept of a ‘deemed importer’ aims to ensure a level playing field for both EU and non-EU online platforms; notes that, in the context of an online sale from outside the EU, this measure would relieve customers of non-EU online platforms from being considered importers, as they are under the current UCC, while a non-EU platform or trader would instead be considered the ‘deemed importer’; believes that ‘deemed importer’ responsibilities should be clearly defined and consistent with the provisions of the DSA; emphasises that platforms being responsible for ensuring that VAT and customs duties are collected at the point of sale, rather than upon entry into the EU, will reduce fraud and tax evasion;

46. Expresses concern about the optional nature of the Import One-Stop Shop (IOSS) scheme for all online operators, which deviates from the original objectives of the VAT in the digital age (ViDA) initiative; underlines the necessity of additional actions to strengthen the system’s robustness and curb potential misuse; urges the Commission to engage closely with stakeholders to establish safeguards for the IOSS against fraudulent practices; recommends that such safeguards be both comprehensive and streamlined to effectively deter fraud while avoiding excessive administrative burdens; stresses the necessity of extending the IOSS applicability to goods beyond the customs duty exemption threshold of EUR 150 to prevent undervaluation and ensure fair competition;

47. Calls for the establishment of a new EUCA in 2026 to provide expert support to the Member States’ customs authorities; underlines that the EUCA should in its coordination role also map testing and control capabilities of customs and market surveillance authorities in and across the Member States and be mandated to execute unannounced inspections to detect possible unsafe or non-compliant products and issue sanctions in case of non-compliance; notes that the new EU customs data hub will allow for enhanced cooperation between the EUCA and customs and other authorities through data exchange and the interoperability of national IT systems, and thus facilitate coordinated controls and the detection of non-compliant products; considers that it is essential to fully integrate the functionalities of the Customs Single Window into the EU customs data hub; notes in the context of the proposed EUCA, the importance of regularly consulting representatives of various stakeholders to provide early warning to the EUCA;

48. Stresses that, given the urgency, the entry into force of different obligations planned in the UCC revision should be accelerated, such as the establishment of the EU customs data hub; calls on the Commission to immediately start the preparatory work necessary for the establishment of the EU customs data hub, so as to speed up the preparation of its e-commerce functions in 2026;

49. Urges the Commission to carry out an impact assessment regarding the idea of e-commerce items being shipped to the EU in bulk and, in turn, the establishment of warehouses in the EU by non-EU traders for such goods before they are put into parcels for delivery to customers; recognises that such shipments of e-commerce items in bulk and their storage in warehouses in the EU might increase the oversight of customs and market surveillance authorities and improve their controls and detection of non-compliant goods compared to single parcel shipments; calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider all possible options to incentivise such practices, including a simplified status for trust and check traders and cost-benefit assessments for incentive schemes; further notes that bulk shipping may not be feasible for all non-EU traders, particularly those operating consumer-to-consumer (C2C) or second-hand models; emphasises that this approach should strike a balance between the compliance advantages and the practical requirements of e-commerce operators, ensuring that it avoids creating logistical bottlenecks or placing an undue burden on varying business models;

50. Acknowledges that the Commission has released a non-paper outlining the introduction of a non-discriminatory handling fee on e-commerce items, to be charged by customs authorities for goods sold in distance sales with the aim of covering the increased supervisory costs of custom authorities, namely the checking of the data, carrying out risk analysis, performing documentary and physical controls and specifically the financing of the EUCA and the data hub; insists that Member States should avoid unilateral fees to avoid a fragmentation of the customs union; underlines that the proposal suggests a flat EUR 2 rate per item delivered directly to the customer or a smaller 50 cent fee for Trust and Check Traders operating a business model of a customs warehouse for distance sales within the EU; calls on the Commission to conduct a proper evaluation of whether the proposed amount complies with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, and whether it is sufficient and proportionate to reach the objectives; insists that this handling fee not be incurred by the consumer;

51. Notes the enormous waste management and product destruction cost arising from the huge amount of non-compliant and unsafe products imported via non-EU country e-commerce; underlines that a large share of these products is non-recyclable, environmentally harmful or non-compliant with applicable chemicals legislation, further driving up environmental costs for public authorities; calls therefore on the Commission to evaluate the necessary measures to mitigate the environmental impact of non-EU countries’ e-commerce activities including the feasibility of a waste management fee on all products sold via non-EU countries’ online marketplaces to ensure that environmental costs are not supported by EU taxpayers;

52. Stresses that inconsistent penalties and different enforcement strategies for non-compliance in different Member States lead to ‘border shopping’ or ‘customs shopping’; supports the minimum harmonisation of infringements and non-criminal sanctions for non-compliance across the Member States and through the EUCA as this would avoid creating weak entry points in the EU customs territory; stresses that this should entail a common framework for minimum harmonisation to close existing loopholes and thus tackle e-commerce challenges; underlines that Member States can impose additional sanctions tailored to national contexts;

53. Notes that the Commission is scrutinising certain non-EU online marketplaces for employing manipulative practices, including dark patterns, addictive design features, deceptive influencer marketing, and the dissemination of fake or misleading online reviews; recognises that, according to the Digital Fairness Fitness Check report, unfair commercial practices cost consumers nearly EUR 8 billion annually, and that the use of unfair techniques to pressure consumers, especially vulnerable ones and children, into impulse purchases leads to overconsumption and overspending; calls on the Commission to address these issues in the upcoming Digital Fairness Act, unless they are already covered by existing legislation, with a view to effectively tackling unfair practices and closing existing legal loopholes, while staying consistent with existing legal frameworks and avoiding unnecessary regulatory burdens;

54. Emphasises the need to ensure that any new initiatives proposed by the Commission in the area of customs enforcement or compliance do not result in additional administrative burdens for European businesses, particularly SMEs;

55. Stresses the importance of the role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in the field of cross-border investigations of customs offences, which notably include fraud, for example the illicit undervaluing of the price of products in order to avoid paying the import taxes; emphasises that the large-scale circumvention of customs duties, including fraudulent e-commerce declarations and undervaluation, as well as the avoidance of controls and ‘forum shopping,’ must be effectively combated through criminal law investigations conducted by the EPPO, with the support of customs authorities; stresses that the EPPO’s robust legal framework for cross-border investigations should be leveraged to dismantle the criminal networks behind such operations;

Additional enforcement actions

56. Calls on the Commission and the national competent authorities to strongly enforce the DSA with regard to the responsibility of online marketplaces, in particular their obligations in terms of recommender systems, interface design, right to information, the compliance by design rules to increase the overall traceability, and their ‘know your business customer’ obligation; highlights that compliance with these obligations should dissuade non-compliant traders from offering their products in the EU through marketplaces or shopping services of social media falling in this category, and calls on the Commission to provide practical support in tracing traders that do not abide by EU rules; stresses the need for a DSA-based network of trusted flaggers for illegal products and e-commerce to ensure that platforms fulfil their obligations effectively;

57. Stresses that the enhancement of cooperation and coordination with national competent authorities is crucial; asks for more cooperation among all relevant authorities, such as Member State authorities, customs authorities, and consumer protection authorities, and for stronger coordination among all established expert groups; stresses that, under the DSA, the investigative actions against non-compliant online marketplaces need to yield results and lead to deterrent sanctions in order to prevent the offer of non-compliant products; emphasises the importance of these investigations in addressing systemic risks, compliance failures, illegal content dissemination, addictive design features, dark patterns and the use of influencers for manipulative advertising;

58. Calls on enforcement authorities to strengthen monitoring and enforcement actions targeting new sales channels; recommends that competent authorities be equipped with adequate resources, technological tools, and cross-border cooperation mechanisms to effectively identify and take action against non-compliant traders operating via social media and other emerging platforms;

59. Suggests that online marketplace sellers must provide a reshipping address and contact point within the EU to allow consumers to easily return non-compliant goods without undue costs and to allow authorities to inspect goods; believes that online marketplaces should be responsible for checking this and should be held accountable for enforcement;

60. Calls for an urgent in-depth evaluation of the effectiveness of the provision of the ‘responsible person for products placed on the Union market’, particularly those of non-EU traders, building on the results of the evaluation report on Article 4 of the MSR; calls on the Commission to consider among its future actions the introduction of a mandatory requirement for non-EU traders to appoint a responsible person in the EU with increased legal and financial liability;

61. Notes that postal and other delivery services are undergoing significant transformations due to the rapid growth of e-commerce; raises concerns that the Universal Postal Union’s terminal dues system in practice does not apply to e-commerce flows; notes that, as a result, Chinese e-commerce businesses, due to shipment volumes, enter into commercial agreements directly with the EU postal operators for exceptionally attractive delivery rates that are lower than those for goods manufactured within the EU, leading to deeper fragmentation of the single market for postal services; urges the Commission to evaluate the impact of e-commerce on postal services and the internal market, and to consider how postal services can contribute to strengthening the single market and benefiting consumers, and to the overall competitiveness of the EU;

62. Welcomes the approval of the ViDA reforms, which represent a significant step towards modernising VAT collection in the e-commerce sector; emphasises the importance of the Single VAT ID for online marketplaces and for European manufacturers, enabling them to compete on a level playing field by simplifying VAT compliance across the Member States; highlights that this measure can also facilitate in-bulk importation and the warehousing of goods within the EU, reducing reliance on fragmented cross-border shipments and ensuring that value-added services, such as fulfilment and logistics, take place within the single market; stresses that these reforms will enhance tax compliance, reduce administrative burdens, and improve enforcement while supporting fair competition and strengthening EU supply chains; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the effective implementation of these measures to maximise their benefits for European businesses and consumers;

63. Calls on the Commission to consider measures aimed at reducing the unnecessary regulatory and administrative compliance burden for EU manufacturers, in particular for SMEs, in order to level the playing field and enable them to better compete with global competitors operating under more efficient compliance standards;

64. Calls on the Commission to enhance international cooperation with other like-minded countries to exchange best practices, identify common challenges and risks and develop joint actions on e-commerce;

65. Welcomes, in this regard, the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce; notes that the agreement will benefit consumers and businesses by facilitating cross-border electronic transactions, reducing barriers to digital trade and promoting innovation in e-commerce; underlines, however, that the agreement is only a foundation and encourages the Commission to pursue ambitious trade agreements in negotiations with partners to ensure binding provisions on e-commerce;

Increased use of IT tools

66. Welcomes the fact that the Commission is preparing a project to streamline existing databases, including the Information and Communication System on Market Surveillance, the EU Safety Gate and the Customs Risk Management System, into a common interoperable system gathering all information on the safety of products, counterfeit product tracking and notifications of accidents and to ensure interoperability with the DPP and the future EU customs data hub; calls on the Commission to publish information regarding the implementation timeline and the resource requirements of this initiative;

67. Supports the Commission’s aim to provide market surveillance authorities with the e-Surveillance WebCrawler tool to flag reappearing dangerous products; asks the Commission to make available another web crawler for detecting new listings as soon as possible, in order to flag non-compliant products before they reach consumers;

68. Supports the responsible use of artificial intelligence, blockchain and the internet of things for scanning and analysing product listings on e-commerce platforms, automating customs and market surveillance inspections and risk identification and integrating product compliance databases for real-time checks between market surveillance and customs authorities, in line with EU and national laws; notes, however, that the high implementation costs of these technologies remain a barrier; underlines that the full uptake of these technologies will make handling more efficient, especially for low-value goods, and that the high volume of parcels containing many different items faces limited inspection capabilities;

69. Demands that the Commission and the Member States exchange best practices and find incentives to provide the necessary funding and support for national authorities in order to increase the responsible use of technological solutions; suggests that artificial intelligence, blockchain and the internet of things could be used to scan and analyse product listings on e-commerce platforms, automate inspections and risk profiling, and integrate product compliance databases for real-time checks by several authorities;

70. Underlines that Member States should reinforce customs checks in particular with low-value shipments by implementing risk-based assessment systems and digital tracking to prevent non-compliant products from bypassing customs controls; calls on the Member States to increase the level of automated processes, such as automated scans of labels when processing parcels at customs;

71. Recognises that some online marketplaces also use a number of IT tools to detect and remove unsafe and illicit products that are found on their platforms; highlights, however, the fact that online marketplaces need to further invest in and increase their use of these IT tools to effectively avoid the offer and sale of unsafe and illicit products; calls on the Commission to further incentivise the use of IT tools by online marketplaces in this regard, while ensuring full compliance with Article 8 of the DSA, which provides that there is no general obligation to monitor the information that providers of intermediary services transmit or store;

72. Suggests that, without prejudice to the principle enshrined in the DSA that providers of intermediary services online should not be subject to a monitoring obligation with respect to obligations of general nature, online intermediaries engaged in the sale, promotion or distribution of products within the EU market should consider on their own the use of risk-based digital monitoring systems to identify and prevent the presence of illegal content (presentation, description or offering for sale of illegal or dangerous products); stresses the importance of implementing swift response mechanisms to ensure the permanent removal of specific illegal content as soon as providers of intermediary services online have actual knowledge of such illegal content being presented on their interfaces, as well as the necessity for hosting service providers to take all necessary measures to prevent the reappearance of the same or equivalent illegal content on their platform;

Improvement of consumer awareness and information

73. Emphasises that EU consumers and European SMEs engaged in importing activities often lack sufficient information on the possible dangers of potentially unsafe products and the harm they can cause; stresses that consumers are increasingly targeted by traders who, despite their legal obligations, often do not inform consumers that their products are made and shipped from outside of the EU; acknowledges that there is demand among EU consumers for cheaper products, which are purchased on non-EU online marketplaces due to their much lower production costs and uncompetitive conditions for EU businesses and online platforms; stresses that online marketplaces may use manipulative design techniques (dark patterns) to influence purchasing decisions; warns against the risks associated with compulsive purchasing behaviours, financial difficulties and the accumulation of unnecessary goods; calls on the Commission and the Member States to organise information and awareness-raising campaigns on the purchase of unsafe products online and their possible health, privacy, environmental and competitiveness consequences, with a special focus on vulnerable consumers and at peak consumption times;

74. Recommends fostering second-hand consumption as a sustainable approach to addressing EU consumers’ need for affordable goods; stresses the importance of promoting and incentivising the reuse of second-hand products as an important driver for unlocking the potential of the circular economy;

75. Asks the Commission and the Member States to strictly enforce the ecodesign requirements for textiles and other products under the ESPR, as well as the provisions of the Directive on Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition [14] in order to make sure that consumers are better informed about sustainability aspects, such as environmental impacts, energy use, reparability and durability of products purchased on online marketplaces;

76. Considers that consumer authorities, organisations, industry associations and chambers of commerce should be encouraged to conduct large, coordinated awareness-raising campaigns on consumer rights, potential risks, including the possibilities for collective redress, and redress mechanisms when purchasing online, in particular on non-EU online platforms; stresses the need to also raise awareness about the environmental, health and social impacts of unsustainable business practices and to alert consumers about the role of new advertising techniques, such as influencers and digital opinion leaders, in shaping perceptions of product safety and reliability; calls on the Commission to take a coordinating role as mentioned in the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 on e-commerce and to explore possibilities to finance cross-border information campaigns developed in cooperation with researchers, civil society and other relevant stakeholders;

Trade and development considerations

77. Calls on the Commission to implement its level of ambition in agreements with international partners at the multilateral level, as unsafe products constitute not only a European, but also a global challenge; reiterates that, as set out in Parliament’s position on the UCC revision, the EUCA should establish working arrangements with the authorities of non-EU countries and international organisations; stresses that such arrangements should enable the EUCA to exchange information, including best practices, with non-EU authorities and international organisations, and to carry out joint activities; supports continued engagement in the UN Trade and Development working group on consumer product safety, which plays a crucial role in developing best practices for cross-border enforcement;

78. Calls on the Commission to step up cooperation with international partners, within forums such as the WTO, the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the G7, to counterbalance China’s influence and ensure reciprocity and rules-based trade; calls on the Commission to explicitly incorporate robust and enforceable obligations addressing forced labour when reviewing and renegotiating current trade and investment agreements; underscores the need for stronger EU-China cooperation mechanisms and transparent certification requirements to ensure compliance;

79. Highlights the need to consider service and product safety and regulatory compliance provisions when negotiating future EU trade agreements; stresses the importance of specific regulatory dialogues and cooperation through administrative arrangements, improved customs enforcement cooperation, the traceability of shipments to the highest standards and enhanced data-sharing arrangements between customs authorities to effectively tackle non-compliant imports;

80. Urges the Commission to be proactive and swiftly deploy targeted trade defence instruments, including anti-subsidy investigations, to address the adverse impacts on European businesses; emphasises that such actions must be coordinated closely with key international partners, to ensure effective global enforcement and reciprocal market fairness;

81. Encourages the Commission to enhance diplomatic efforts and cooperation within international forums, particularly the WTO, the WCO and the G7, to counterbalance China’s strategic expansion into digital governance frameworks, including its Digital Silk Road initiative; stresses the need for open, more transparent and responsible digital trade rules in international standard-setting bodies to prevent internet fragmentation and mitigate the risks posed by restrictive digital governance models;

82. Welcomes the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce as a vital step towards global digital trade rules; stresses, however, its current limitations, especially regarding customs transparency; urges the Commission to advocate stronger binding provisions to ensure its effective implementation and integration into the WTO legal framework, and to ensure enhanced global compliance standards;

83. Emphasises the need for international capacity-building initiatives to support the sustainable and compliant participation of developing countries in digital trade; calls on the Commission to collaborate closely with international organisations, especially the WTO, to enhance regulatory frameworks and technical assistance for e-commerce in developing countries;

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84. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

MIL OSI Europe News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on product safety and regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports – A10-0133/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on product safety and regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports

(2025/2037(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the report of 31 March 2022 by the Wise Persons Group on the Reform of the EU Customs Union entitled ‘Putting More Union in the European Customs: Ten proposals to make the EU Customs Union fit for a Geopolitical Europe’,

– having regard to its position of 13 March 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Union Customs Code and the European Union Customs Authority, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 [1],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘A comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable e-commerce’ (COM(2025(0037),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 [2],

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859 [3],

– having regard to the report of April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market: Speed, Security, Solidarity – Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’[4],

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A10-0133/2025),

A. whereas e-commerce has transformed how consumers purchase and engage with businesses worldwide, unlocking unprecedented opportunities; whereas e-commerce presents significant challenges to the EU’s competitiveness and raises concerns over consumer rights and health and safety, particularly as certain product categories raise urgent concerns regarding their impact on vulnerable consumer groups; whereas it has an environmental impact, particularly through increased waste generation and carbon emissions resulting from transportation and logistics; whereas e-commerce has an impact on retailers’ attractiveness and therefore contributes to the hollowing out of city centres; whereas e-commerce also has social implications, particularly concerning working conditions in the warehousing and delivery sector;

B. whereas over 75 % of EU consumers shop online; whereas the continued growth of e-commerce enhances consumer access, quality and price competition; whereas e-commerce lowers market entry barriers for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and entrepreneurs, fosters digital inclusion, supports underserved communities, and contributes to innovation, productivity and economic growth across the single market;

C. whereas, with the surge in e-commerce imports, mainly coming from China, non-compliant sellers evading regulatory costs and undermining law-abiding businesses through means such as counterfeiting, have intensified unfair competition; whereas there is an urgent need to re-establish a level playing field for all businesses, especially SMEs; whereas it is crucial to ensure that enforcement efforts are adequately funded and equipped at both national and EU level, while avoiding excessive delegation of enforcement responsibilities to private actors;

D. whereas European companies, namely SMEs, must comply with strict regulations and compete on an unlevel playing field with non-EU e-commerce platforms that avoid these obligations; whereas European companies dedicate material and human resources to ensure regulatory compliance, assuming significant administrative and financial burdens;

E. whereas certain non-EU companies fail to comply with European data protection regulations, which guarantee a high level of privacy for consumers, by engaging in consumer profiling practices using personal data; whereas enhanced enforcement and cooperation is required to ensure consistent privacy protections for all consumers;

F. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, in her 2024-2029 political guidelines, referred to the need to tackle challenges with online platforms to ensure that consumers and businesses alike benefit from a level playing field based on effective customs, tax and safety controls and sustainability standards, and tasked several Executive Vice-Presidents and Commissioners with fulfilling that mission;

G. whereas the process of adapting the EU acquis to the online environment began several years ago, and numerous laws on products, consumer protection and product safety now include provisions to ensure robust safeguards in the digital landscape; whereas, notwithstanding these efforts, critical shortcomings persist in empowering authorities to hold the full supply chain accountable and ensure consumer protection, which need to be urgently addressed;

H. whereas the Digital Services Act [5] (DSA), the General Product Safety Regulation [6] (GPSR), the Market Surveillance Regulation [7] (MSR) and the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation (CPC)[8] contribute to a safer and fair e-commerce environment, if well implemented and enforced; whereas, despite these laws, consumer and other organisations, as well as national authorities, have raised concerns over the large number of unsafe products detected in the EU that fail to comply with EU legislation on product safety and environmental and chemical standards; whereas better funding of and coordination among Member States’ enforcement authorities are essential to address these risks effectively;

I. whereas e-commerce may significantly impact consumers by providing them with unparalleled convenience, access to diverse products and competitive pricing; whereas e-commerce also exposes consumers to risks such as unsafe products, a lack of transparency and manipulative practices that exploit their vulnerabilities;

J. whereas the protection of consumers is essential to the functioning of the EU’s internal market, as it ensures trust and fairness in commercial practices, thereby enabling sustainable economic growth and innovation; whereas addressing these concerns is important in promoting transparency, fairness and the responsible development of digital services and e-commerce;

K. whereas people from more disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, including low-income families and children, are more exposed to the risks posed by unsafe products due to their lower prices, aggressive marketing and widespread distribution;

L. whereas concerns over the suitability of customs procedures under the current Union Customs Code [9] for e-commerce were a significant driver of the Commission’s customs reform package, including the legislative proposals on the revision of the Union Customs Code and establishing an EU Customs Authority (UCC reform), and the removal of the EUR 150 exemption threshold (de minimis) for the payment of customs duties and VAT on imported products;

M. whereas customs authorities are in need of substantial investments, particularly to ensure a sufficient number of properly trained staff to guarantee the functioning of EU customs systems, which are facing an exponential increase in demand for customs checks; whereas without the necessary investments in staff, digital solutions cannot achieve benefits in terms of efficiency and harmonisation;

N. whereas advanced screening technologies, such as artificial intelligence and blockchain, could significantly enhance the capacity of customs and market surveillance authorities to flag high-risk shipments and automate compliance checks at scale; whereas investment in such technologies remains fragmented and uneven across Member States; whereas increased EU-level funding, coordination and efforts to ensure interoperability are essential to accelerate their deployment and improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms;

O. whereas digital tools, such as artificial intelligence and the internet of things, can help track non-compliant products, but must respect consumer privacy and must not lead to the general monitoring of users;

P. whereas the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 on a comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable e-commerce, highlights that the volume of e-commerce goods bought by EU consumers on non-EU online platforms is expected to continue growing rapidly, benefiting from the current customs duty exemption for low-value consignments (up to EUR 150);

The surge in non-compliant goods in e-commerce

1. Highlights the increasingly high number of purchases being made by EU consumers on non-EU online platforms in business-to-consumer environments and in emerging manufacturer-to-consumer and direct-to-consumer environments; emphasises, as described in the Letta report on the future of the single market [10], that the circulation of harmful products in the single market is escalating and that EU consumers are wasting EUR 19.3 billion per year buying dangerous products that can lead to injuries and that are detrimental to our economies;

2. Notes that 4.6 billion e-commerce items under the EUR 150 exemption threshold were imported into the EU in 2024, 91 % of which originated from China, amounting to up to 12 million small e-commerce items per day and amounting to almost twice the number recorded in 2023 (2.4 billion) and more than triple the number in 2022 (1.4 billion); notes that this surge has exacerbated compliance challenges, especially in product safety, and that market surveillance authorities and independent investigations have reported alarming non-compliance rates;

3. Stresses that most unsafe and illegal products are shipped to the EU in large volumes of individual, and often small, parcels sold to EU consumers via online platforms from non-EU countries, in particular China; stresses that such products are difficult to control, in particular for customs authorities at the entry points, which are mostly located at major ports and logistical airports for e-commerce; emphasises that this makes it almost impossible to stop such products from entering the EU and makes it increasingly difficult for market surveillance authorities to detect and remove such products from the internal market and for consumer authorities to do so once the products reach EU consumers;

4. Stresses that the rapid growth of e-commerce has significant environmental implications due to issues such as a rise in packaging waste, the larger carbon footprint from low-quality and short life cycle products and their shipment, and problems with waste management and non-recyclable materials; underlines, in this respect, the need to ensure compliance with environmental legislation and to encourage sustainable ways of consuming;

5. Stresses that some non-EU online marketplaces are facing allegations regarding the use of forced labour; underlines, in this respect, that Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 prohibits products made with forced labour from entering the EU market, and that it must be effectively enforced after its application, including for online sales;

6. Notes that, on 1 December 2025, Regulation No 2023/2411 [11] on the protection of geographical indications for craft and industrial products will come into force; notes that, if not accompanied by adequate promotion and protection, especially with respect to the markets of non-EU countries, geographical indications risk remaining ineffective; calls, therefore, on the Commission, together with the customs authorities of the Member States, to strengthen checks aimed at intercepting products that violate the rules on geographical indications;

7. Is concerned that the prevailing business model of certain major non-EU online platforms is based on the rapid, large-scale production and distribution of fast fashion and ultra-fast fashion products, prioritising speed and low cost over sustainability, safety and quality; regrets that many such products do not comply with EU legislation, yet non-compliant sellers frequently evade meaningful enforcement or sanctions; stresses that such practices constitute a form of social and environmental dumping, resulting in a persistent and unfair competitive advantage for these non-EU platforms, exerting disproportionate pressure on European undertakings, in particular SMEs and micro-enterprises; emphasises that this hampers the development of the EU’s textile and clothing sector;

E-commerce crossroads: navigating compliance challenges

8. Recognises that the EU has established a robust compliance framework, which also applies to products sold online, but that greater efforts are still needed for the full enforcement of the compliance framework; underlines, in this respect, the importance of the DSA, the DMA, the MSR, the GPSR, consumer protection rules and various product and environmental laws; emphasises that market surveillance authorities face challenges in applying these frameworks to online platforms as evidenced by the Commission’s recently published evaluation report on the implementation of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and, in particular, in cases where large quantities of a product are sold in small consignments; considers that the thorough implementation of the DSA and other regulatory acquis is necessary to combat unsafe, non-compliant and counterfeit products;

9. Stresses the need to implement the existing compliance framework and evaluate these measures when considering new legislation, including new obligations for online marketplaces;

10. Notes that conducting physical tests is particularly impractical for small parcels sent directly to the final consumer and that customs authorities will therefore continue to rely primarily on checking the documentation, rather than inspecting the products themselves;

11. Highlights the significant enforcement gaps caused by the limited resources and insufficient level of digitalisation of customs and market surveillance authorities, the lack of human resources and harmonised and interoperable technological tools across Member States, and the insufficient data sharing and overall lack of cooperation and coordination between customs authorities, platforms and market surveillance entities; acknowledges that physical inspections are unavoidably and inherently limited given the volume of e-commerce parcels entering the EU;

12. Considers that mystery shopping exercises by market surveillance authorities, as put forward in the Commission communication on e-commerce, are an important tool to verify compliance for products sold through online platforms; stresses, however, that if sellers are based outside the EU or are not traceable and if fake addresses are used for responsible persons, there is no liable legal entity and it is impossible for market surveillance authorities to take enforcement actions;

13. Considers that EU manufacturers and retailers, particularly SMEs, face unfair competition due to non-EU platforms enabling non-EU manufacturers and their non-compliant products to easily enter the EU market, bypassing applicable regulations and standards; highlights that, while EU manufacturers must comply with strict safety, environmental and quality rules, many low-value products sold through these platforms evade customs and market surveillance checks due to the way they are shipped to the EU; raises concerns that some of these platforms and non-EU traders deliberately exploit this loophole, allowing non-compliant imports to enter the EU single market unchecked, putting European manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers at a disadvantage, weakening their competitiveness and hindering their ability to innovate, which could lead to the closure of many micro-enterprises and small enterprises;

14. Stresses that EU manufacturers are de facto subject to significantly stricter market surveillance compared to non-EU manufactures that reach EU consumers via e-commerce platforms; deeply regrets the loss of market share and jobs caused by the influx of cheaper products that do not comply with European standards, particularly on safety and quality, as well as other illegal products, shipped from non-EU countries, directly affecting EU SMEs and the strength of EU companies and their capacity to invest and maintain profitability;

15. Highlights the difference between online platforms acting as intermediaries and those acting as importers; notes, in particular, that the EU e-commerce platforms that act as importers face compliance costs that increase their retail prices up to 40 %, which has an impact on final consumers; underlines that EU-based importers face stricter obligations and higher costs, while intermediary platforms allow non-EU sellers to ship directly to EU consumers without ensuring compliance;

16. Recognises that e-commerce platforms are subject to various obligations under the DSA and the GPSR and may be held liable under the Product Liability Directive [12] (PLD) in specific circumstances; recalls, in this respect, that online platforms are liable if they do not respect their specific obligations as intermediaries; believes, however, that consumer redress must be ensured in all cases; underlines, in this respect, that where the manufacturer is established outside the EU and no importer, authorised representative, or fulfilment service provider can be identified, online marketplaces should provide adequate and proportionate remedies to consumers where they fail to comply with the DSA, particularly with Articles 30 and 31 or with Article 22 of the GPSR;

17. Emphasises that online marketplaces are requested to trace their traders (‘know your business customer’) under the DSA, which should discourage traders from selling unsafe or counterfeit goods, and are obliged to comply with the ‘compliance by design’ rules to increase overall traceability; highlights the lack of accountability of online platforms in case of untraceable sellers or sellers based outside the jurisdiction of the EU; notes the considerable level of non-compliance with the ‘know your business customer’ principle and the rise in new selling practices via social media platforms, where this obligation is not effectively applied, allowing non-EU sellers to offer non-compliant goods to EU users directly; stresses, therefore, the need for online platforms to make best efforts to ensure full traceability of sellers and products, preventing listings from appearing without verified product compliance details;

18. Highlights the fact that the information of a responsible economic operator in the EU under the GPSR, acting on behalf of a non-EU trader or platform, is often wrong or missing; notes that even when this information is available, the responsible person in the EU may not be accountable, particularly when the responsible person is an authorised representative; is concerned that market surveillance authorities report significant difficulties in contacting these non-EU traders and enforcing EU law, and that even when contact is established, enforcing penalties against them is often unfeasible;

19. Considers that creating a database of the responsible persons in the EU to enable real-time cross-checking for verification, along with establishing an accreditation procedure for them, could enhance transparency and reinforce accountability throughout the e-commerce import supply chain;

20. Supports research and enforcement actions by consumer organisations and the opening of investigations initiated by consumer authorities in the EU, as part of the CPC network, as well as under the DSA, against non-EU online platforms for potential violations of EU product safety and consumer laws; expresses concern over the slow progress of these investigations and calls for their swift conclusion; underlines the need for enforcement to be a deterrent that includes adequate sanctions to ensure compliance; underlines, in this respect, that particular attention is necessary at national and EU level to address recurrent non-compliance that may have been identified in previous controls of similar products, including via the application of interim measures; stresses that the enforcement and effectiveness of commitments received from online platforms should be closely monitored;

21. Urges the Commission and CPC authorities to initiate a structured enforcement dialogue with consumer representatives, traders and other stakeholders to identify systemic infringements requiring stronger enforcement;

22. Notes the complexity for EU authorities to enforce EU laws when the economic operators are established outside the EU; highlights the need for enhanced international cooperation agreements, particularly with major e-commerce exporters;

Strong enforcement policies to combat non-compliant e-commerce products

Urgent need for short-term measures

23. Urges the Member States to increase funding and resources for market surveillance, customs, consumer protection and digital services authorities so that they can better address the challenges posed by unsafe and illicit products; asks the Commission to support stronger cooperation, information sharing and data exchange between competent authorities, including market surveillance and customs authorities, and stresses that cooperation across different sectors should be improved; urges the Member States to ensure effective coordination among different market surveillance authorities in their territories, and to strengthen the powers of the single liaison offices; highlights that the Member States and the EU have the responsibility to ensure that market surveillance and customs authorities are properly resourced, trained and equipped to have the capacity to fulfil their mission, including proper investigative powers;

24. Calls on market surveillance authorities to invest more resources in joint or coordinated activities with other Member States or relevant authorities and, in particular, to increase the number and the frequency of coordinated enforcement actions such as sweeps, mystery-shopping exercises and peer-reviews; urges relevant authorities to actively participate in these activities and the Commission to make full use of its coordination powers;

25. Welcomes the Commission’s intention to coordinate the control of customs and market surveillance authorities under priority control areas focused on products from non-EU countries that pose significant safety hazards and a risk of non-compliance; emphasises that this initiative should generate valuable risk profile data, which could be used in further enforcement activities and penalties to non-compliant actors; calls on the Commission to strengthen cooperation within the EU Product Compliance Network and to increase EU funding for customs cooperation under the customs programme and for market surveillance operations under the single market programme; stresses that the lack of adequate resources has hindered the effective deployment of tools, such as the widespread use of mystery shopping activities by market surveillance authorities or the use of trusted flaggers under the DSA; points out to the Commission that, in addition to existing testing facilities for toys and radio equipment, more testing facilities for e-commerce goods are urgently needed, such as for batteries, textiles, cosmetics, electrical appliances and other products; asks the Member States to deploy sufficient resources to guarantee an increased capacity of testing facilities and to increase investments in equipment for the detection of unsafe and illegal goods;

26. Emphasises that for data and security reasons, Member States should restrict high-risk vendors from operating in their critical infrastructure and border security systems, including for the procurement of security screening and cargo scanning equipment used at airports and ports;

27. Highlights the fact that, under the GPSR, online marketplaces are obliged to establish a single point of contact, register with the Safety Gate Portal and indicate the information concerning their single contact point on the portal; asks the Commission to effectively enforce this and other obligations of online marketplaces and to support the Member States’ market surveillance authorities in implementing the GPSR and the MSR; notes that the GPSR introduced direct data exchanges between enforcement authorities and e-commerce platforms; believes, however, that in order for the system to work effectively, a direct link with customs authorities should be provided;

28. Notes that the current system is more reactive than preventive, as authorities intervene only after dangerous products have already been sold to consumers, rather than preventing their distribution; recalls that, under the GPSR, online marketplace providers are encouraged to check products against the Safety Gate Portal before listing them on their interfaces; underlines that random sampling testing can only be efficient if it is conducted regularly;

29. Emphasises that the swift implementation of the Digital Product Passport (DPP) for several critical products sold online is essential to strengthen the enforcement of existing legislation; urges the Commission to present the necessary secondary legislation on the DPP as soon as possible, in particular for textiles, toys, cosmetics, electronics and other products with high non-compliance rates and associated risks; calls on the Commission to continuously assess the requirements, technical design and operation of the DPP under the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation [13] (ESPR) as a priority; calls on the Commission to support businesses, in particular micro-enterprises and SMEs, in the implementation of the DPP;

30. Proposes a mandatory DPP with early compliance verification for all products imported via e-commerce, including detailed quality and compliance data, to be integrated directly into the EU customs data hub, allowing authorities to pre-screen information on products before they are placed on the single market;

31. Urges the Member States to make substantial efforts to increase customs controls and improve risk analysis, as the detection and removal of non-compliant goods can reduce the harm to EU consumers and protect the economic interests of EU businesses; underlines that the introduction in the customs risk analysis of a presumption of non-compliance for goods identical to those already found non-compliant could facilitate controls by customs authorities and improve cost efficiency; stresses the importance of reinforcing customs centres so they are better equipped to handle the large volume of small parcels that are difficult to control using traditional methods, including advanced screening technologies to identify suspicious packages at entry points; asks for more rigorous compliance checks, as well as random checks by the authorities on high-tonnage transport; urges the Member States, furthermore, to significantly increase the level of digitalisation of import procedures in customs authorities in order to implement existing legislation and accelerate customs procedures, especially in view of the high numbers of parcels;

32. Underlines that businesses, particularly SMEs, urgently require clear guidelines from the Commission for the effective implementation of the GPSR, including clarification on its interplay with overlapping legislation, such as the DSA, the MSR, the PLD, and sector-specific laws on toys, cosmetics and detergents; calls on the Commission to issue these guidelines before the end of the first half of 2025 to facilitate businesses’ compliance; considers that the evaluation report on the interaction of the DSA with other legal acts, which is due on 17 November 2025, should take into account different legislation, in particular on product compliance, the obligations of online marketplaces, enforcement rules and possible future improvements on simplification and implementation; calls on the Commission to assess all possible further actions, including the evaluation of sectoral legislation, which is necessary to ensure legal predictability and that no legal loopholes or enforcement gaps are left when it comes to direct imports from non-EU countries via online marketplaces;

33. Calls on the relevant national authorities to make full use of the existing and recently adopted enforcement toolbox, especially in relation to provisions on e-commerce set out in the MSR, GPSR and DSA, such as takedown orders, prohibition, restriction on the making available of a product on the market or its removal, recalls and sanctions as measures to counter the rise of illegal and non-compliant imports from non-EU countries;

34. Underlines that regulatory enforcement measures taken against non-compliant actors should not put disproportionate burdens on compliant actors or cause unintentional harm to the second-hand market;

35. Stresses the need to ensure the protection of intellectual property rights in the light of the increase in non-European counterfeit goods on e-commerce platforms; notes that these practices harm the competitiveness of European companies and pose risks to innovation and the incentives for research and development; calls for stronger measures against the sale of counterfeit goods online; urges the Commission to issue clear guidelines on trusted flaggers and stresses that rights holders should be recognised as eligible trusted flaggers when they meet the criteria outlined in Article 22 of the DSA;

36. Points out that the Member States should make better use of the available sets of penalties and sanctions against economic operators, as well as other available tools including interim measures, in order to create a deterrent effect to dissuade economic operators from infringing upon the applicable legislation;

37. Urges the Commission to take effective measures, including legislative measures where legal loopholes are clearly identified, without delay to ensure legal certainty and a level playing field for European companies, placing particular emphasis on SMEs;

The need for regulatory reforms

38. Calls for the removal of barriers to enforcing consumer rights, such as legal warranty claims and the right to return items; calls on the Commission to review the CPC Regulation without delay as this will be fundamental for a more effective cross-border enforcement of EU consumer law and the fight against unsafe products; asks the Commission, in this context, to provide for clear measures to further strengthen enforcement powers over non-EU traders and platforms and ensure better coordination of EU and national actions and the exchange of information among authorities, as well as with authorities in non-EU countries; highlights that the structure of the European Competition Network could be used as an example to follow for enforcement and information exchange in the case of suspected violations impacting multiple Member States, especially to combat non-compliant products effectively; stresses the importance of granting the Commission direct powers to investigate and sanction certain high impact breaches of consumer law, thus ensuring more effective, simultaneous and uniform enforcement and sanctions under EU consumer law;

39. Notes that the CPC Regulation already empowers enforcement authorities to act against non-compliant traders and even gives the possibility for Member States to impose penalties and interim measures such as restricting access to the website; acknowledges, however, that the limitation is that this action must be taken on a country-by-country basis rather than at EU level, with each country applying its own penalties, making the consequences of violations uneven;

40. Notes that enforcement in the Member States is fragmented, which leads to inefficiencies; calls for better coordination of enforcement and compliance oversight effective information exchange between Member States and for a more uniform application of the EU acquis; calls on the Commission to assess the MSR, particularly the need for an EU Market Surveillance Authority that would ensure consistency and provide operational support to the activities conducted by the relevant national market surveillance authorities and foster cooperation with the new EU Customs Authority (EUCA), as well as the implementation of Article 4 of the MSR, defining the responsible economic operators in the EU for product compliance; stresses that, to date, the designated responsible economic operator often lacks the capacity to provide redress or compensation to consumers, in particular when being an authorised representative;

41. Supports the Commission’s ambition to swiftly advance the upcoming interinstitutional negotiations with Parliament and the Council on the UCC reform and the two proposals for Council acts on removing the exemption threshold on customs duties for goods valued under EUR 150; urges, therefore, the Member States to accelerate the negotiation procedure in the Council, recognising the urgency of the customs reform for EU competitiveness and the protection of EU consumers; underlines, however, that removing the threshold is a necessary step but not a stand-alone solution, as customs authorities will still only be able to inspect a limited percentage of parcels; stresses that immediate removal of the customs duty exemption is necessary for high-risk imports from product and consumer safety perspectives; emphasises the need for the customs reform to ensure coherence across regulatory frameworks, particularly avoiding duplication or conflicts with the DSA, and highlights the essential role customs authorities play in detecting non-compliant and unsafe products;

42. Stresses that the UCC reform will provide the necessary tools for customs authorities to better supervise and control the goods entering the EU, help to strengthen the single market and customs union, improve the detection of unsafe and illicit products, and contribute to a level playing field among economic operators; welcomes, in this respect, the proposal under the UCC Regulation to establish the cooperation mechanism with market surveillance authorities that will improve the effectiveness of product controls; emphasises the importance of enhancing customs infrastructure and staffing to manage e-commerce effectively; highlights the need for simplified compliance processes tailored specifically to SMEs; calls on the Member States to introduce automated, forward-looking customs clearing systems, for instance by obliging platforms to enrol and clear customs automatically at the point of sales;

43. Is concerned that some non-EU traders are circumventing EU customs checks by clearing goods by customs at the point of origin; stresses that those non-EU trading companies often prefer to pay penalties rather than open packages upon arrival at EU customs, aiming to unload shipments and depart immediately; is deeply concerned that customs authorities find that many packages are either undeclared or incorrectly declared and are sometimes fraudulently labelled; highlights that the UCC reform should also address these aspects;

44. Takes note of the concern expressed by the ECC network regarding the drop-shipping business model, which raises challenges in consumer protection, product safety and regulatory compliance; regrets that consumers often face misleading practices, difficulties in returning products, and unexpected import duties, while a significant share of drop-shipped products fail to comply with EU safety standards; stresses that drop-shipping complicates enforcement due to untraceable businesses and cross-border complexities, while VAT and data protection compliance remain key concerns; notes that when combined with influencer marketing, drop-shipping may exacerbate transparency issues, reputational risks and inconsistent outcomes; calls on the Commission to assess how to address drop-shipping-related issues;

45. Highlights the fact that the concept of a ‘deemed importer’ aims to ensure a level playing field for both EU and non-EU online platforms; notes that, in the context of an online sale from outside the EU, this measure would relieve customers of non-EU online platforms from being considered importers, as they are under the current UCC, while a non-EU platform or trader would instead be considered the ‘deemed importer’; believes that ‘deemed importer’ responsibilities should be clearly defined and consistent with the provisions of the DSA; emphasises that platforms being responsible for ensuring that VAT and customs duties are collected at the point of sale, rather than upon entry into the EU, will reduce fraud and tax evasion;

46. Expresses concern about the optional nature of the Import One-Stop Shop (IOSS) scheme for all online operators, which deviates from the original objectives of the VAT in the digital age (ViDA) initiative; underlines the necessity of additional actions to strengthen the system’s robustness and curb potential misuse; urges the Commission to engage closely with stakeholders to establish safeguards for the IOSS against fraudulent practices; recommends that such safeguards be both comprehensive and streamlined to effectively deter fraud while avoiding excessive administrative burdens; stresses the necessity of extending the IOSS applicability to goods beyond the customs duty exemption threshold of EUR 150 to prevent undervaluation and ensure fair competition;

47. Calls for the establishment of a new EUCA in 2026 to provide expert support to the Member States’ customs authorities; underlines that the EUCA should in its coordination role also map testing and control capabilities of customs and market surveillance authorities in and across the Member States and be mandated to execute unannounced inspections to detect possible unsafe or non-compliant products and issue sanctions in case of non-compliance; notes that the new EU customs data hub will allow for enhanced cooperation between the EUCA and customs and other authorities through data exchange and the interoperability of national IT systems, and thus facilitate coordinated controls and the detection of non-compliant products; considers that it is essential to fully integrate the functionalities of the Customs Single Window into the EU customs data hub; notes in the context of the proposed EUCA, the importance of regularly consulting representatives of various stakeholders to provide early warning to the EUCA;

48. Stresses that, given the urgency, the entry into force of different obligations planned in the UCC revision should be accelerated, such as the establishment of the EU customs data hub; calls on the Commission to immediately start the preparatory work necessary for the establishment of the EU customs data hub, so as to speed up the preparation of its e-commerce functions in 2026;

49. Urges the Commission to carry out an impact assessment regarding the idea of e-commerce items being shipped to the EU in bulk and, in turn, the establishment of warehouses in the EU by non-EU traders for such goods before they are put into parcels for delivery to customers; recognises that such shipments of e-commerce items in bulk and their storage in warehouses in the EU might increase the oversight of customs and market surveillance authorities and improve their controls and detection of non-compliant goods compared to single parcel shipments; calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider all possible options to incentivise such practices, including a simplified status for trust and check traders and cost-benefit assessments for incentive schemes; further notes that bulk shipping may not be feasible for all non-EU traders, particularly those operating consumer-to-consumer (C2C) or second-hand models; emphasises that this approach should strike a balance between the compliance advantages and the practical requirements of e-commerce operators, ensuring that it avoids creating logistical bottlenecks or placing an undue burden on varying business models;

50. Acknowledges that the Commission has released a non-paper outlining the introduction of a non-discriminatory handling fee on e-commerce items, to be charged by customs authorities for goods sold in distance sales with the aim of covering the increased supervisory costs of custom authorities, namely the checking of the data, carrying out risk analysis, performing documentary and physical controls and specifically the financing of the EUCA and the data hub; insists that Member States should avoid unilateral fees to avoid a fragmentation of the customs union; underlines that the proposal suggests a flat EUR 2 rate per item delivered directly to the customer or a smaller 50 cent fee for Trust and Check Traders operating a business model of a customs warehouse for distance sales within the EU; calls on the Commission to conduct a proper evaluation of whether the proposed amount complies with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, and whether it is sufficient and proportionate to reach the objectives; insists that this handling fee not be incurred by the consumer;

51. Notes the enormous waste management and product destruction cost arising from the huge amount of non-compliant and unsafe products imported via non-EU country e-commerce; underlines that a large share of these products is non-recyclable, environmentally harmful or non-compliant with applicable chemicals legislation, further driving up environmental costs for public authorities; calls therefore on the Commission to evaluate the necessary measures to mitigate the environmental impact of non-EU countries’ e-commerce activities including the feasibility of a waste management fee on all products sold via non-EU countries’ online marketplaces to ensure that environmental costs are not supported by EU taxpayers;

52. Stresses that inconsistent penalties and different enforcement strategies for non-compliance in different Member States lead to ‘border shopping’ or ‘customs shopping’; supports the minimum harmonisation of infringements and non-criminal sanctions for non-compliance across the Member States and through the EUCA as this would avoid creating weak entry points in the EU customs territory; stresses that this should entail a common framework for minimum harmonisation to close existing loopholes and thus tackle e-commerce challenges; underlines that Member States can impose additional sanctions tailored to national contexts;

53. Notes that the Commission is scrutinising certain non-EU online marketplaces for employing manipulative practices, including dark patterns, addictive design features, deceptive influencer marketing, and the dissemination of fake or misleading online reviews; recognises that, according to the Digital Fairness Fitness Check report, unfair commercial practices cost consumers nearly EUR 8 billion annually, and that the use of unfair techniques to pressure consumers, especially vulnerable ones and children, into impulse purchases leads to overconsumption and overspending; calls on the Commission to address these issues in the upcoming Digital Fairness Act, unless they are already covered by existing legislation, with a view to effectively tackling unfair practices and closing existing legal loopholes, while staying consistent with existing legal frameworks and avoiding unnecessary regulatory burdens;

54. Emphasises the need to ensure that any new initiatives proposed by the Commission in the area of customs enforcement or compliance do not result in additional administrative burdens for European businesses, particularly SMEs;

55. Stresses the importance of the role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in the field of cross-border investigations of customs offences, which notably include fraud, for example the illicit undervaluing of the price of products in order to avoid paying the import taxes; emphasises that the large-scale circumvention of customs duties, including fraudulent e-commerce declarations and undervaluation, as well as the avoidance of controls and ‘forum shopping,’ must be effectively combated through criminal law investigations conducted by the EPPO, with the support of customs authorities; stresses that the EPPO’s robust legal framework for cross-border investigations should be leveraged to dismantle the criminal networks behind such operations;

Additional enforcement actions

56. Calls on the Commission and the national competent authorities to strongly enforce the DSA with regard to the responsibility of online marketplaces, in particular their obligations in terms of recommender systems, interface design, right to information, the compliance by design rules to increase the overall traceability, and their ‘know your business customer’ obligation; highlights that compliance with these obligations should dissuade non-compliant traders from offering their products in the EU through marketplaces or shopping services of social media falling in this category, and calls on the Commission to provide practical support in tracing traders that do not abide by EU rules; stresses the need for a DSA-based network of trusted flaggers for illegal products and e-commerce to ensure that platforms fulfil their obligations effectively;

57. Stresses that the enhancement of cooperation and coordination with national competent authorities is crucial; asks for more cooperation among all relevant authorities, such as Member State authorities, customs authorities, and consumer protection authorities, and for stronger coordination among all established expert groups; stresses that, under the DSA, the investigative actions against non-compliant online marketplaces need to yield results and lead to deterrent sanctions in order to prevent the offer of non-compliant products; emphasises the importance of these investigations in addressing systemic risks, compliance failures, illegal content dissemination, addictive design features, dark patterns and the use of influencers for manipulative advertising;

58. Calls on enforcement authorities to strengthen monitoring and enforcement actions targeting new sales channels; recommends that competent authorities be equipped with adequate resources, technological tools, and cross-border cooperation mechanisms to effectively identify and take action against non-compliant traders operating via social media and other emerging platforms;

59. Suggests that online marketplace sellers must provide a reshipping address and contact point within the EU to allow consumers to easily return non-compliant goods without undue costs and to allow authorities to inspect goods; believes that online marketplaces should be responsible for checking this and should be held accountable for enforcement;

60. Calls for an urgent in-depth evaluation of the effectiveness of the provision of the ‘responsible person for products placed on the Union market’, particularly those of non-EU traders, building on the results of the evaluation report on Article 4 of the MSR; calls on the Commission to consider among its future actions the introduction of a mandatory requirement for non-EU traders to appoint a responsible person in the EU with increased legal and financial liability;

61. Notes that postal and other delivery services are undergoing significant transformations due to the rapid growth of e-commerce; raises concerns that the Universal Postal Union’s terminal dues system in practice does not apply to e-commerce flows; notes that, as a result, Chinese e-commerce businesses, due to shipment volumes, enter into commercial agreements directly with the EU postal operators for exceptionally attractive delivery rates that are lower than those for goods manufactured within the EU, leading to deeper fragmentation of the single market for postal services; urges the Commission to evaluate the impact of e-commerce on postal services and the internal market, and to consider how postal services can contribute to strengthening the single market and benefiting consumers, and to the overall competitiveness of the EU;

62. Welcomes the approval of the ViDA reforms, which represent a significant step towards modernising VAT collection in the e-commerce sector; emphasises the importance of the Single VAT ID for online marketplaces and for European manufacturers, enabling them to compete on a level playing field by simplifying VAT compliance across the Member States; highlights that this measure can also facilitate in-bulk importation and the warehousing of goods within the EU, reducing reliance on fragmented cross-border shipments and ensuring that value-added services, such as fulfilment and logistics, take place within the single market; stresses that these reforms will enhance tax compliance, reduce administrative burdens, and improve enforcement while supporting fair competition and strengthening EU supply chains; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the effective implementation of these measures to maximise their benefits for European businesses and consumers;

63. Calls on the Commission to consider measures aimed at reducing the unnecessary regulatory and administrative compliance burden for EU manufacturers, in particular for SMEs, in order to level the playing field and enable them to better compete with global competitors operating under more efficient compliance standards;

64. Calls on the Commission to enhance international cooperation with other like-minded countries to exchange best practices, identify common challenges and risks and develop joint actions on e-commerce;

65. Welcomes, in this regard, the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce; notes that the agreement will benefit consumers and businesses by facilitating cross-border electronic transactions, reducing barriers to digital trade and promoting innovation in e-commerce; underlines, however, that the agreement is only a foundation and encourages the Commission to pursue ambitious trade agreements in negotiations with partners to ensure binding provisions on e-commerce;

Increased use of IT tools

66. Welcomes the fact that the Commission is preparing a project to streamline existing databases, including the Information and Communication System on Market Surveillance, the EU Safety Gate and the Customs Risk Management System, into a common interoperable system gathering all information on the safety of products, counterfeit product tracking and notifications of accidents and to ensure interoperability with the DPP and the future EU customs data hub; calls on the Commission to publish information regarding the implementation timeline and the resource requirements of this initiative;

67. Supports the Commission’s aim to provide market surveillance authorities with the e-Surveillance WebCrawler tool to flag reappearing dangerous products; asks the Commission to make available another web crawler for detecting new listings as soon as possible, in order to flag non-compliant products before they reach consumers;

68. Supports the responsible use of artificial intelligence, blockchain and the internet of things for scanning and analysing product listings on e-commerce platforms, automating customs and market surveillance inspections and risk identification and integrating product compliance databases for real-time checks between market surveillance and customs authorities, in line with EU and national laws; notes, however, that the high implementation costs of these technologies remain a barrier; underlines that the full uptake of these technologies will make handling more efficient, especially for low-value goods, and that the high volume of parcels containing many different items faces limited inspection capabilities;

69. Demands that the Commission and the Member States exchange best practices and find incentives to provide the necessary funding and support for national authorities in order to increase the responsible use of technological solutions; suggests that artificial intelligence, blockchain and the internet of things could be used to scan and analyse product listings on e-commerce platforms, automate inspections and risk profiling, and integrate product compliance databases for real-time checks by several authorities;

70. Underlines that Member States should reinforce customs checks in particular with low-value shipments by implementing risk-based assessment systems and digital tracking to prevent non-compliant products from bypassing customs controls; calls on the Member States to increase the level of automated processes, such as automated scans of labels when processing parcels at customs;

71. Recognises that some online marketplaces also use a number of IT tools to detect and remove unsafe and illicit products that are found on their platforms; highlights, however, the fact that online marketplaces need to further invest in and increase their use of these IT tools to effectively avoid the offer and sale of unsafe and illicit products; calls on the Commission to further incentivise the use of IT tools by online marketplaces in this regard, while ensuring full compliance with Article 8 of the DSA, which provides that there is no general obligation to monitor the information that providers of intermediary services transmit or store;

72. Suggests that, without prejudice to the principle enshrined in the DSA that providers of intermediary services online should not be subject to a monitoring obligation with respect to obligations of general nature, online intermediaries engaged in the sale, promotion or distribution of products within the EU market should consider on their own the use of risk-based digital monitoring systems to identify and prevent the presence of illegal content (presentation, description or offering for sale of illegal or dangerous products); stresses the importance of implementing swift response mechanisms to ensure the permanent removal of specific illegal content as soon as providers of intermediary services online have actual knowledge of such illegal content being presented on their interfaces, as well as the necessity for hosting service providers to take all necessary measures to prevent the reappearance of the same or equivalent illegal content on their platform;

Improvement of consumer awareness and information

73. Emphasises that EU consumers and European SMEs engaged in importing activities often lack sufficient information on the possible dangers of potentially unsafe products and the harm they can cause; stresses that consumers are increasingly targeted by traders who, despite their legal obligations, often do not inform consumers that their products are made and shipped from outside of the EU; acknowledges that there is demand among EU consumers for cheaper products, which are purchased on non-EU online marketplaces due to their much lower production costs and uncompetitive conditions for EU businesses and online platforms; stresses that online marketplaces may use manipulative design techniques (dark patterns) to influence purchasing decisions; warns against the risks associated with compulsive purchasing behaviours, financial difficulties and the accumulation of unnecessary goods; calls on the Commission and the Member States to organise information and awareness-raising campaigns on the purchase of unsafe products online and their possible health, privacy, environmental and competitiveness consequences, with a special focus on vulnerable consumers and at peak consumption times;

74. Recommends fostering second-hand consumption as a sustainable approach to addressing EU consumers’ need for affordable goods; stresses the importance of promoting and incentivising the reuse of second-hand products as an important driver for unlocking the potential of the circular economy;

75. Asks the Commission and the Member States to strictly enforce the ecodesign requirements for textiles and other products under the ESPR, as well as the provisions of the Directive on Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition [14] in order to make sure that consumers are better informed about sustainability aspects, such as environmental impacts, energy use, reparability and durability of products purchased on online marketplaces;

76. Considers that consumer authorities, organisations, industry associations and chambers of commerce should be encouraged to conduct large, coordinated awareness-raising campaigns on consumer rights, potential risks, including the possibilities for collective redress, and redress mechanisms when purchasing online, in particular on non-EU online platforms; stresses the need to also raise awareness about the environmental, health and social impacts of unsustainable business practices and to alert consumers about the role of new advertising techniques, such as influencers and digital opinion leaders, in shaping perceptions of product safety and reliability; calls on the Commission to take a coordinating role as mentioned in the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 on e-commerce and to explore possibilities to finance cross-border information campaigns developed in cooperation with researchers, civil society and other relevant stakeholders;

Trade and development considerations

77. Calls on the Commission to implement its level of ambition in agreements with international partners at the multilateral level, as unsafe products constitute not only a European, but also a global challenge; reiterates that, as set out in Parliament’s position on the UCC revision, the EUCA should establish working arrangements with the authorities of non-EU countries and international organisations; stresses that such arrangements should enable the EUCA to exchange information, including best practices, with non-EU authorities and international organisations, and to carry out joint activities; supports continued engagement in the UN Trade and Development working group on consumer product safety, which plays a crucial role in developing best practices for cross-border enforcement;

78. Calls on the Commission to step up cooperation with international partners, within forums such as the WTO, the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the G7, to counterbalance China’s influence and ensure reciprocity and rules-based trade; calls on the Commission to explicitly incorporate robust and enforceable obligations addressing forced labour when reviewing and renegotiating current trade and investment agreements; underscores the need for stronger EU-China cooperation mechanisms and transparent certification requirements to ensure compliance;

79. Highlights the need to consider service and product safety and regulatory compliance provisions when negotiating future EU trade agreements; stresses the importance of specific regulatory dialogues and cooperation through administrative arrangements, improved customs enforcement cooperation, the traceability of shipments to the highest standards and enhanced data-sharing arrangements between customs authorities to effectively tackle non-compliant imports;

80. Urges the Commission to be proactive and swiftly deploy targeted trade defence instruments, including anti-subsidy investigations, to address the adverse impacts on European businesses; emphasises that such actions must be coordinated closely with key international partners, to ensure effective global enforcement and reciprocal market fairness;

81. Encourages the Commission to enhance diplomatic efforts and cooperation within international forums, particularly the WTO, the WCO and the G7, to counterbalance China’s strategic expansion into digital governance frameworks, including its Digital Silk Road initiative; stresses the need for open, more transparent and responsible digital trade rules in international standard-setting bodies to prevent internet fragmentation and mitigate the risks posed by restrictive digital governance models;

82. Welcomes the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce as a vital step towards global digital trade rules; stresses, however, its current limitations, especially regarding customs transparency; urges the Commission to advocate stronger binding provisions to ensure its effective implementation and integration into the WTO legal framework, and to ensure enhanced global compliance standards;

83. Emphasises the need for international capacity-building initiatives to support the sustainable and compliant participation of developing countries in digital trade; calls on the Commission to collaborate closely with international organisations, especially the WTO, to enhance regulatory frameworks and technical assistance for e-commerce in developing countries;

°

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84. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

MIL OSI Europe News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements – A10-0117/2025

Source: European Parliament

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements

(COM(2025)0084 – C10‑0036/2025 – 2025/0040(COD))

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0084),

– having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 172 and 173, Article 175, third paragraph, Article 182(1), Article 188, second paragraph, and Articles 183 and 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0036/2025),

– having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 29 April 2025 [1],

– after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

– having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0117/2025),

1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Amendment 1

AMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT [*]

to the Commission proposal

———————————————————

2025/0040 (COD)

Proposal for a

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 172 and Article 173, Article 175, third paragraph, Article 182(1), Article 188, second paragraph, Article 183 and Article 194 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 29 April 2025 [2],

After consulting the Committee of the Regions▌,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1) The Union faces massive financing needs to deliver on its objectives in the areas of innovation, the green and digital transition, and social investment and skills, while a complex backdrop affecting the Union’s competitiveness and industrial base characterised by changing global dynamics, slow economic growth, accelerated climate change and environmental degradation, technological competition and rising geopolitical tensions needs to be addressed. In that context, enhancing the Union’s autonomy, in particular in the area of energy, by supporting investments that strengthen a renewable-based and clean energy system, is essential to reduce dependencies and safeguard economic and political stability.

(1a) Additionality and the leveraging effect of the EU guarantee are the foundation of both the EFSI and the InvestEU Programme, enabling especially the scaling up of new and innovative technologies and companies as well as de-risking investment for private investors. It is necessary for the European Parliament to have better oversight over the InvestEU Programme to ensure that the EU guarantee is used in accordance with the programme’s objectives, such as fostering sustainable growth and competitiveness, with genuine additionality compared to private investors.

(2) The Draghi report assesses the combined additional investment needs in Europe at EUR 750-800 billion per year by 2030, with EUR 450 billion needed for the energy transition alone. This includes a substantial amount for the green and digital transition. Ensuring sufficient public and private investment is critical to boost productivity growth and achieve Union’s goals, leverage private investments with the objective to decarbonise industry, accelerate the production, storage and deployment of clean energy and electrification, strengthen interconnections and grids, advance sustainable and circular business models, foster sustainable building renovation, develop clean tech manufacturing as well as digital technologies and their diffusion across economic sectors.

(2a) Europe is experiencing an acute housing crisis which consists in two market failures: a shortage of affordable and social housing, and a failure to bridge the energy efficiency gap, with 46 million Europeans living in energy poverty. According to an analysis by the EIB Group, an estimated annual investment of EUR 300 to 400 billion is needed for construction and renovation only. In that regard, the Commission is planning to present a first-ever European Affordable Housing Plan and is partnering with the EIB Group, national promotional banks and international financial institutions to develop a European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing. Increasing the amount available under the social investment and skills policy window would allow greater support from InvestEU for that key priority. In particular, it is necessary for the Commission and implementing partners to enhance the visibility and accessibility of financing instruments in relation to housing. This would contribute to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights.

(2b) In the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, increased national and European spending is required to enhance European defence capabilities and to support the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). On 19 March 2025, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented a White Paper for European Defence –Readiness 2030 containing a plan to significantly step up Europe’s spending on security and defence. InvestEU enables financing and investment operations to develop the Union defence industry and military mobility, including financial support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps. Increasing the amount available under the relevant windows would allow greater support from InvestEU for this key priority. In particular, it is necessary for the Commission and implementing partners to enhance the visibility and accessibility of financing instruments for SMEs, mid-caps, and start-ups in the defence supply chain.

(2c) In 2024, the Commission launched, together with the European Investment Fund, an export credit guarantee facility under InvestEU with a view to encouraging Union SMEs to strengthen economic ties with Ukraine and revitalise trade, thereby contributing to Ukraine’s economic recovery and improving the competitiveness of SMEs. It is important that as many European export credit agencies as possible participate in this facility.

(2d) The Letta and Draghi reports underline the importance of well-functioning transport networks and services to ensure a transition towards a green economy while strengthening the Union’s competitiveness. In that regard, massive strategic investments are needed to complete missing links and to modernise transport infrastructure, where major gaps exist in public and private financing.

(3) The InvestEU Fund is the main EU-level tool to leverage public and private funding to support a broad range of Union policy priorities. Through its comprehensive network of implementing partners, including the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Investment Fund (EIF), other international financial institutions and national promotional banks and institutions, the InvestEU Fund is delivering much-needed financing through its risk-sharing capacity. The InvestEU interim evaluation highlighted that budgetary guarantees are inherently efficient for the EU budget and confirmed that the programme is well on track to mobilise investment, with a notable expected impact on the real economy. However, approvals of financing and investment operation under InvestEU were heavily frontloaded, and as a result, if no action is taken to address the issue, new approvals for some financial products may cease after 2025.

(4) The financial capacity of InvestEU Fund should be increased and used even more efficiently in combination with resources that will become available under the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and other legacy instruments (CEF Debt Instrument and InnovFin Debt Facility) implemented by the EIB Group. These combinations potentially reduce the budget revenues from legacy instruments. However, they would also create the possibility for an increased volume of guarantee cover to be provided for strategic investments in key Union priority areas for an additional investment of around EUR 25 billion that can be expected to be mobilised and by leading to an increased diversification of risks and thus not substantially increasing the risks for the Union budget.

(5) With the EUR 4,5 billion increase of the EU guarantee underpinned by ▌additional reflows of EUR 1,8 billion, and the efficiency measures implemented by combining the capacities of the legacy instruments with the InvestEU Fund, it is expected that around EUR 70 billion in additional investment could be mobilised. The financial contribution of the EIB Group should be proportionally adjusted to the share of the increased EU guarantee allocated to them. The indicative distribution of the EU guarantee between the four policy windows should be increased proportionally to the increase of the EU guarantee.

(5a) InvestEU advisory services play an important role in the development of a pipeline of projects. Those advisory services are particularly useful in complex areas, such as affordable social housing and defence. It would therefore be appropriate to use EUR 200 million in reflows to increase the amount made available for such services. Furthermore, it is necessary to enhance the interaction between the various components of the InvestEU Programme, in particular between the InvestEU Advisory Hub and the InvestEU Portal.

(5b) The Commission estimates the amount of provisioning required to cover future life-time losses from the operations supported under the InvestEU Fund with a 95 % confidence level of the value at risk. Taking into account the positive experience with the InvestEU Programme to date and in order to maximise budgetary efficiency while preserving a suitable level of risk management, it would be appropriate for the Commission to assess whether to reduce that level to 90 %, which would be in line with risk-related methodologies in Union external policies and would enable a high volume of financing and investment operations in support of the Union’s strategic priorities.

(6) In order to enhance the attractiveness of the Member State compartment under the InvestEU Fund, it should be made possible for Member States to contribute also in a fully funded manner through an InvestEU financial instrument in addition to the existing option of contributing to the EU guarantee. The support from InvestEU financial instrument should, to the extent possible, be implemented following the same principles as those of the EU guarantee. Through the InvestEU financial instrument, non-euro Member States could benefit from the InvestEU programme financially more efficiently in their own currency. The InvestEU financial instrument should also provide a further incentive for responsibly increasing the risk appetite of the implementing partners thereby contributing to the crowding-in of private capital.

(6a) It is possible to combine amounts allocated to the Member State compartment with resources under the EU compartment in a layered structure to achieve a better risk coverage, in particular with a first loss tranche covered by national resources. Member States should further explore that possibility to mobilise more investments in strategic areas. To ensure coherence with the objectives of the InvestEU Programme, such combinations should respect the principles of EU value-added, fair competition, and the integrity of the internal market, and should support cross-border cooperation where relevant.

(7) In line with an overall objective of simplification so as to alleviate the administrative burden for final recipients, financial intermediaries and implementing partners, reporting requirements, including those relating to key performance and monitoring indicators, should be reduced, where appropriate, in particular those that affect small businesses and small-size operations. Without prejudice to the definition of an SME for the purposes of other Union acts and any future programmes and funds, the application of the definition of an SME for the purposes of the InvestEU Programme should be adjusted to remove complexities to the extent possible, taking account of the possibility for implementing partners to request information on the ownership structure of SMEs for the purpose of calculating the headcount. In that regard, and as noted in Recital 14 of Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC [3], enterprises should be permitted to use solemn declarations to certify specific characteristics relevant to their SME status, such as the autonomy of their ownership structures. Specific attention should be paid to social economy enterprises and micro finance institutions.

(7a) It is appropriate for the Commission to take further non-legislative simplification measures in order to complement this amending Regulation, such as reducing the frequency of progress reports to be submitted by implementing partners. However, it is important that such measures do not compromise the effectiveness of auditing and monitoring mechanisms necessary to ensure alignment with the Union’s policy objectives.

(7b) It is important that State aid procedures applicable to operations supported under the InvestEU Fund be proportionate, predictable, and streamlined. In that context, it is also important that the Commission explore all available means to simplify and accelerate State aid assessments. This could include making greater use of the principle of market conformity. Furthermore, it is necessary that, where appropriate, the Commission provide timely guidance and further clarify and simplify the application of State aid rules to national financial instruments.

(8) The frequency and scope of reports should also be reduced for the InvestEU programme and its predecessor, the EFSI programme.

(9) For the Commission’s accounting, implementing partners should provide for combinations audited financial statements in line with Article 212(4) of the Financial Regulation, clearly delineating the amounts related to the different legal basis.

(10) Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 should be amended to allow for combinations of support under those Regulations and the EU guarantee under this Regulation.

(10a) On 18 April 2019, the Commission declared that ‘without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Council in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), one-off contributions by Member States, either by a Member State or by national promotional banks classified in the general government sector or acting on behalf of a Member State, into thematic or multi-country investment platforms should in principle qualify as one-off measures within the meaning of Articles 5(1) and 9(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (13) and Article 3(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (14). In addition, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Council in the implementation of the SGP, the Commission will consider to what extent the same treatment as for the EFSI in the context of the Commission communication on flexibility can be applied to the InvestEU Programme as the successor instrument to the EFSI with regard to one-off contributions provided by Member States in cash to finance an additional amount of the EU guarantee for the purposes of the Member State compartment’. Since then, the economic governance framework has changed. In light of this, Member State contributions should still be considered as one-off measures.

(11) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to address Union-wide and Member State specific market failures and the investment gap within the Union, to accelerate the Union’s green and digital transition, enhance its competitiveness and strengthen its industrial base cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.

(11a) In order to support the European Parliament in exercising its institutional role in overseeing Union funds and ensuring alignment with agreed policy objectives, the independent final evaluation report on the InvestEU Programme referred to in Article 29(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/523 should assess the effectiveness and impact of the derogations introduced by this amending Regulation, in particular their role in facilitating access to finance for target groups such as SMEs. It should also consider the overall functioning of the InvestEU Programme in the light of the principles of transparency, accountability and performance monitoring, including an examination of the relevance of financial thresholds applicable to SMEs in the light of economic developments.

(11b) With a view to reducing administrative complexity and legal uncertainty, the independent final evaluation report on the InvestEU Programme referred to in Article 29(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/523 should also take into account any regulatory adjustments arising from the projected legislative proposal on a small mid-cap enterprise category. Due attention should be given to the effectiveness of measures aimed at facilitating enterprise development,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 [InvestEU Regulation]

Regulation (EU) 2021/523 is amended as follows:

(1) In Article 1, the first paragraph is replaced by the following:

‘This Regulation establishes the InvestEU Fund, which shall provide for an EU guarantee and an InvestEU financial instrument to support financing and investment operations carried out by the implementing partners that contribute to objectives of the Union’s internal policies.’;

(2) Article 2 is amended as follows:

(a) points (3), (4) and (5) are replaced by the following:

‘(3) ‘policy window’ means a targeted area for support by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument as laid down in Article 8(1);’

(4) ‘compartment’ means a part of the support provided under the InvestEU Fund defined in terms of the origin of the resources backing it;’

(5) ‘blending operation’ means, under the EU compartment, an operation supported by the Union budget that combines non-repayable forms of support, repayable forms of support, or both, from the Union budget with repayable forms of support from development or other public finance institutions, or from commercial finance institutions and investors; for the purposes of this definition, Union programmes financed from sources other than the Union budget, such as the EU ETS Innovation Fund, may be assimilated to Union programmes financed by the Union budget;’;

(b) point (8) is replaced by the following:

‘(8) ‘contribution agreement’ means a legal instrument whereby the Commission and one or more Member States specify the conditions for the implementation of the contribution under the Member State compartment, as laid down in Articles 10 and 10a, respectively;’;

(c) points (10) and (11) are replaced by the following:

‘(10) ‘financing and investment operations’ or ‘financing or investment operations’ means operations to provide finance directly or indirectly to final recipients through financial products:

(a) in the context of the EU guarantee, carried out by an implementing partner in its own name, provided by the implementing partner in accordance with its internal rules, policies and procedures and accounted for in the implementing partner’s financial statements or, where applicable, disclosed in the notes to those financial statements;

(b) in the context of the InvestEU financial instrument, carried out by the implementing partner in its own name or in its own name but on behalf of the Commission, as applicable;

(11) ‘funds under shared management’ means funds that provide for the possibility of allocating a portion of those funds to the provisioning for a budgetary guarantee or to a financial instrument under the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund, namely the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council [4], the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council [5] (the ‘ESF+ Regulation for 2021-2027’), the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council [6] and the European Agriculture Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council [7] (the ‘CAP Strategic Plans Regulation’);’;

(d) point 12 is replaced by the following:

‘(12) ‘guarantee agreement’ means a legal instrument whereby the Commission and an implementing partner specify the conditions for proposing financing and investment operations in order for them to be granted the benefit of the EU guarantee and/or of the InvestEU financial instrument, for providing the EU guarantee or support through the InvestEU financial instrument for those operations and for implementing them in accordance with this Regulation;’;

(e) point 21 is replaced by the following:

‘(21) ‘small and medium-sized enterprise’ (‘SME’) means (a) in case of financial products not conferring advantage in State aid terms, an enterprise which, according to its last annual or consolidated accounts, employs an average number of employees during the financial year of less than 250 and which has an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million and where information relating to the autonomy of its ownership structure for the purpose of calculating those thresholds may be made by way of a solemn declaration by the enterprise, or (b) in case of other types of financial products, a micro, small or medium-sized enterprise within the meaning of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC [8] or as otherwise defined in the guarantee agreement;’;

(f) the following point 24 is added:

‘(24) ‘InvestEU financial instrument’ means a measure defined in Article 2, point (30), of the Financial Regulation to be implemented under the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund.’;

(3) Article 4 is amended as follows:

(a) paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

(i) in the first subparagraph, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘The EU guarantee for the purposes of the EU compartment referred to in point (a) of Article 9(1) shall be EUR 30 652 310 073 in current prices.’;

(ii) the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘An additional amount of the EU guarantee may be provided for the purposes of the Member State compartment referred to in point (b) of Article 9(1) of this Regulation, subject to the allocation by Member States, pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council [9] (the ‘Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027’) and Article 81 of the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, of the corresponding amounts.’;

(b) in paragraph 2, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘An amount of EUR 15 827 310 073 in current prices of the amount referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be allocated for the objectives referred to in Article 3(2).’;

(ba) paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:

‘3. The financial envelope for the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII shall be EUR 630 000 000 in current prices.’

(4) in Article 6(1), the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘The EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument shall be implemented in indirect management with the bodies referred to in points (c)(ii), (c)(iii), (c)(v) and (c)(vi) of Article 62(1) of the Financial Regulation.’;

(5) Article 7 is amended as follows:

(a) The title is replaced by the following:

‘Combinations’

(b) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘Support from the EU guarantee under this Regulation, Union support provided through the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 and Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 may be combined to support financial products or portfolios implemented or to be implemented by the EIB or the EIF under this Regulation.’;

(c) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

‘Support from the EU guarantee under this Regulation, Union support provided through the guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 and released from the operations approved under these instruments and Union support provided through the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 and released from operations approved under that EU guarantee may be combined to support financial products or portfolios containing exclusively financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation, implemented or to be implemented by the EIB or the EIF under this Regulation.’;

(d) the following paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are added:

‘5. By derogation from Article 212(3), second subparagraph of the Financial Regulation, the released guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 may be used for covering financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation for the purpose of the combination referred to in paragraph 4.

6. By derogation from Article 216(4), point (a) of the Financial Regulation, the provisioning corresponding to the released guarantee under the Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 may not be taken into account for the purpose of operations referred to in Article 216(4) of the Financial Regulation and may be used for covering financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation for the purpose of the combination referred to in paragraph 4.

7. The release of the guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020, the transfer of corresponding assets from fiduciary accounts to Common Provisioning Fund and the release of the guarantee under the Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 referred to in paragraph 4 shall take place by an amendment of the relevant agreements signed between the Commission and the EIB or the EIF.

The conditions of the use of the released guarantees referred to in the first subparagraph, to cover financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation, and where relevant, the transfer of corresponding assets from fiduciary accounts to the Common Provisioning Fund, shall be set out in the guarantee agreement referred to in Article 17.

The terms and conditions of the financial products referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 of this Article and of the portfolios concerned, including the respective pro rata shares of losses, revenues, repayments and recoveries or the respective non pro rata shares in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 3, shall be set out in the guarantee agreement referred to in Article 17.’;

(6) In Article 8(8), the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Commission, together with implementing partners, shall seek to ensure that the part of the EU guarantee under the EU compartment used for the sustainable infrastructure policy window is distributed with the aim of achieving a balance between the different areas referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1.’;

(7) In Article 9(1), point (b) is replaced by the following:

‘(b) the Member State compartment shall address specific market failures or suboptimal investment situations in one or several regions or Member States to deliver the policy objectives of the contributing funds under shared management or of the additional amount provided by a Member State under Article 4(1), third subparagraph, or under Article 10a(1), second subparagraph, in particular to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion in the Union by addressing imbalances between its regions.’;

(8) Article 10 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Specific provisions applicable to the EU Guarantee implemented under the Member State compartment’;

(b) in paragraph 2, the fourth subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Member State and the Commission shall conclude a contribution agreement or an amendment to it following the Commission Decision approving the Partnership Agreement pursuant to the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or the CAP Strategic Plan under the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation or simultaneously to the Commission Decision amending a programme in accordance with the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or a CAP Strategic Plan in accordance with the provisions on the amendment to the CAP Strategic Plan laid down in the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation.’;

(c) in paragraph 3, point (b) is replaced by the following:

‘(b) the Member State strategy, consisting of the type of financing, the target leverage, the geographical coverage, including regional coverage if necessary, types of projects, the investment period and, where applicable, the categories of final recipients and of eligible intermediaries;’;

(9) The following Article 10a is inserted:

‘Article 10a

Specific provisions applicable to the InvestEU financial instrument implemented under the Member State compartment

1. A Member State may contribute amounts from the funds under shared management to the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund in view of deploying them through the InvestEU financial instrument.

Member States may also provide additional amounts for the purposes of the InvestEU financial instrument. Such amounts shall constitute an external assigned revenue in accordance with Article 21(5), second sentence of the Financial Regulation.

Amounts allocated by a Member State on a voluntary basis pursuant to the first and second subparagraph shall be used for supporting financing and investment operations in the Member State concerned. Those amounts shall be used to contribute to the achievement of the policy objectives specified in the Partnership Agreement referred to in Article 11(1)(a) of the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027, in the programmes or in the CAP Strategic Plan which contribute to the InvestEU Programme, in order to implement relevant measures set out in the recovery and resilience plans in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241 or, in other cases, for the purposes laid down in the contribution agreement, depending on the origin of the amount contributed.

2. Contribution to the InvestEU financial instrument shall be subject to the conclusion of a contribution agreement between a Member State and the Commission, which for the contributions from funds under shared management shall be done in accordance with Article 10(2), fourth subparagraph.

Two or more Member States may conclude a joint contribution agreement with the Commission.

3. The contribution agreement shall at least contain the amount of the contribution by the Member State and the currency of the financing and investment operations, provisions on the Union remuneration for the InvestEU financial instrument, the elements set out in points (b) to (e) and (g) of Article 10(3) and the treatment of resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument.

4. The contribution agreements shall be implemented through guarantee agreements concluded in accordance with Article 10(4), first subparagraph.

Where no guarantee agreement has been concluded within 12 months from the conclusion of the contribution agreement, the contribution agreement shall be terminated or prolonged by mutual agreement. Where the amount of a contribution agreement has not been fully committed under one or more guarantee agreements within 12 months from the conclusion of the contribution agreement, that amount shall be amended accordingly. The unused amount of a contribution from funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The unused amount of a contribution by a Member State under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

Where a guarantee agreement has not been duly implemented within the period specified in Article 14(6) of the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or Article 81(6) of the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, or, in the case of a guarantee agreement related to amounts provided in accordance with paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article, in the relevant contribution agreement, the contribution agreement shall be amended. The unused amounts allocated by Member States pursuant to the provisions on the use of the funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The unused amount of an InvestEU financial instrument attributable to the contribution by a Member State under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

Resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument pursuant to the provisions on the use of the funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

5. Contracts implementing the InvestEU financial instrument between the implementing partner and the final recipient or the financial intermediary or other entity referred to in Article 16(1), point (a), shall be signed by 31 December 2028.’;

(9a) In Article 11(1), point (d)(i) is replaced by the following:

‘(i) be allocated an amount of up to EUR 450 000 000 from the financial envelope referred to in Article 4(3) for the advisory initiatives referred to in Article 25 and the operational tasks referred to in point (ii) of this point;’;

(10) the title of Chapter IV is replaced by the following:

‘EU guarantee and InvestEU financial instrument’;

(11) in Article 13(4), the first two sentences are replaced by the following:

‘75 % of the EU guarantee under the EU compartment as referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(1), amounting to EUR 22 989 232 555, shall be granted to the EIB Group. The EIB Group shall provide an aggregate financial contribution amounting to EUR 5 747 308 139.’;

(12) Article 16 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 1, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The InvestEU financial instrument may be used to provide funding to the implementing partners for the types of financing referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph provided by the implementing partners.

In order to be covered by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument, the financing referred to in the first and second subparagraph shall be granted, acquired or issued for the benefit of financing and investment operations referred to in Article 14(1), where the financing by the implementing partner was granted in accordance with a financing agreement or transaction signed or entered into by the implementing partner after the signature of the guarantee agreement and that has not expired or been cancelled.’;

(b) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘Financing and investment operations through funds or other intermediate structures shall be supported by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument in accordance with the provisions laid down in the investment guidelines, as applicable, even if such structures invest a minority of their invested amounts outside the Union and in third countries referred to Article 14(2) or invest a minority of their invested amounts into assets other than those eligible under this Regulation.’;

(13) Article 17 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 1, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The Commission shall conclude a guarantee agreement with each implementing partner on the granting of the EU guarantee up to an amount to be determined by the Commission or on providing support under the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

(b) paragraph 2 is amended as follows:

(i) point (c) is replaced by the following:

‘(c) detailed rules on the provision of the EU guarantee or support under the InvestEU financial instrument in accordance with Article 19, including on the coverage of financing and investment operations or portfolios of specific types of instruments and the respective events that trigger possible calls on the EU guarantee or the use of the InvestEU financial instrument;’;

(ii) point (f) is replaced by the following:

‘(f) the commitment of the implementing partner to accept the decisions by the Commission and the Investment Committee as regards the use of the EU guarantee or of the InvestEU financial instrument for the benefit of a proposed financing or investment operation, without prejudice to the decision-making of the implementing partner in respect of the proposed financing or investment operation without the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument;’;

(iii) points (h) and (i) are replaced by the following:

‘(h) financial and operational reporting and monitoring of the financing and investment operations under the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument;

(i) key performance indicators, in particular as regards the use of the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument, the fulfilment of the objectives and criteria laid down in Articles 3, 8 and 14, and the mobilisation of private capital;’;

(ba) the following paragraph is added:

‘5a. The Commission shall, upon request, provide to the European Parliament and the Council the names of the implementing partners party to the guarantee agreements and the main content of those agreements, having due regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.’;

(14) Article 18 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Requirements for the use of the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument’;

(b) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1. The granting of the EU guarantee and the support from the InvestEU financial instrument shall be subject to the entry into force of the guarantee agreement with the relevant implementing partner.’;

(c) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘Financing and investment operations shall be covered by the EU guarantee or be supported through the InvestEU financial instrument only where they fulfil the criteria laid down in this Regulation and, if applicable, in the relevant investment guidelines, and where the Investment Committee has concluded that those operations fulfil the requirements for benefiting from the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument. The implementing partners shall remain responsible for ensuring that the financing and investment operations comply with this Regulation and the relevant investment guidelines.’;

(d) paragraph 3 is amended as follows:

(i) the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘No administrative costs or fees related to the implementation of financing and investment operations under the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument shall be due to the implementing partner by the Commission unless the nature of the policy objectives targeted by the financial product to be implemented and the affordability for the targeted final recipients or the type of financing provided allow the implementing partner to duly justify to the Commission the need for an exception.’

(ii) the following second subparagraph is added:

‘Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, implementing partners are entitled to appropriate fees in relation to the management of fiduciary accounts relating to the InvestEU financial instrument.’

(e) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

‘In addition, the implementing partner may use the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument to meet the relevant share of any recovery costs in accordance with Article 17(4), unless those costs have been deducted from recovery proceeds.’;

(15) Article 19 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Coverage and terms of the EU guarantee and of the InvestEU financial instrument’;

(b) paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

(i) the second sentence of the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The remuneration for the EU guarantee or for the InvestEU financial instrument may be reduced in the duly justified cases referred to in Article 13(2).’;

(ii) the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

‘The implementing partner shall have appropriate exposure at its own risk to financing and investment operations supported by the EU guarantee or by the InvestEU financial instrument, unless exceptionally the policy objectives targeted by the financial product to be implemented are of such nature that the implementing partner could not reasonably contribute its own risk-bearing capacity to it.’;

(c) in paragraph 2, first subparagraph, point (a), the introductory sentence is replaced by the following:

‘for debt products referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1):’;

(d) the following paragraph 2a is inserted:

‘2a. The InvestEU financial instrument shall cover:

(a) for debt products consisting of guarantees and counter-guarantees referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1):

(i) the principal and all interest and amounts due to the implementing partner but not received by it in accordance with the terms of the financing operations prior to the event of default;

(ii) restructuring losses;

(iii) losses arising from fluctuations of currencies other than the euro in markets where possibilities for long-term hedging are limited;

(b) for other eligible types of financing referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1): the amounts invested or lent by the implementing partner;

For the purposes of point (a)(i) of the first subparagraph, for subordinated debt a deferral, reduction or required exit shall be considered to be an event of default.

The Invest EU financial instrument shall cover the entire exposure of the Union with respect to the relevant financing and investment operations.’;

(16) in Article 22, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘A scoreboard of indicators (the ‘Scoreboard’) shall be established to ensure that the Investment Committee is able to carry out an independent, transparent and harmonised assessment of requests for the use of the EU guarantee or, as applicable, the InvestEU financial instrument for financing and investment operations proposed by implementing partners.’;

(17) in Article 23, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

‘EIB financing and investment operations that fall within the scope of this Regulation shall not be covered by the EU guarantee or benefit from the InvestEU financial instrument where the Commission delivers an unfavourable opinion within the framework of the procedure provided for in Article 19 of the EIB Statute.’;

(18) Article 24 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 1, first subparagraph is amended as follows:

(i) point (a) is replaced by the following:

‘(a) examine the proposals for financing and investment operations submitted by implementing partners for coverage under the EU guarantee or for support from the InvestEU financial instrument that have passed the policy check referred to in Article 23(1) of this Regulation or that have received a favourable opinion within the framework of the procedure provided for in Article 19 of the EIB Statute;’;

(ii) point (c) is replaced by the following:

‘(c) check whether the financing and investment operations that would benefit from the support under the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument comply with all relevant requirements.’;

(b) in paragraph 4, second subparagraph, the last sentence is replaced by the following:

‘Any project assessment conducted by an implementing partner shall not be binding on the Investment Committee for the purposes of granting a financing or investment operation coverage by the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

(c) paragraph 5 is amended as follows:

(i) in the second subparagraph, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘Conclusions of the Investment Committee approving the coverage of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument for a financing or investment operation shall be publicly accessible and shall include the rationale for the approval and information on the operation, in particular its description, the identity of the promoters or financial intermediaries, and the objectives of the operation.’;

(ii) in the fifth subparagraph, the second sentence is replaced by the following:

‘That submission shall include any decisions rejecting the use of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

(d) in paragraph 6, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

‘Where the Investment Committee is requested to approve the use of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument for a financing or investment operation that is a facility, programme or structure which has underlying sub-projects, that approval shall comprise those underlying sub-projects unless the Investment Committee decides to retain the right to approve them separately.’;

(19) in Article 25(2), point (c) is replaced by the following:

‘(c) where appropriate, assist project promoters in developing their projects so that they fulfil the objectives set out in Articles 3 and 8 and the eligibility criteria set out in Article 14, and facilitate the development of among others important projects of common European interest and aggregators for small-sized projects, including through investment platforms as referred to in point (f) of this paragraph, provided that such assistance does not prejudge the conclusions of the Investment Committee with respect to the coverage of the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument with respect to such projects;’;

(20) Article 28 is amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 2, the following second subparagraph is added:

‘Implementing partners shall be exempt from reporting on key performance and monitoring indicators laid down in Annex III, except those in points 1, 2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 5.2, 6.3 and 7.2, as far as financing or investments operations benefiting final recipients receiving financing or investment supported by the EU guarantee or by the InvestEU financial instrument from an implementing partner or a financial intermediary not exceeding EUR 300 000 are concerned.’;

(b) paragraphs 3 and 4 are replaced by the following:

‘3. The Commission shall report on the implementation of the InvestEU Programme in accordance with Articles 241 and 250 of the Financial Regulation. In accordance with Article 41(5) of the Financial Regulation, the annual report shall provide information on the level of implementation of the Programme with respect to its objectives and performance indicators. For that purpose, each implementing partner shall provide on an annual basis the information necessary to allow the Commission to comply with its reporting obligations, including information on the operation of the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument.’

4. Once a year, each implementing partner shall submit a report to the Commission on the financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation, broken down by EU compartment and Member State compartment, as appropriate. Each implementing partner shall also submit information on the Member State compartment to the Member State whose compartment it implements. The report shall include an assessment of compliance with the requirements on the use of the EU guarantee and the Invest EU financial instrument and with the key performance indicators laid down in Annex III to this Regulation. The report shall also include operational, statistical, financial and accounting data on each financing or investment operation and an estimation of expected cash flows, at the level of compartment, policy window and the InvestEU Fund. The report may also include information on barriers to investment encountered when carrying out financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation. The reports shall contain the information the implementing partners have to provide under point (a) of Article 158(1) of the Financial Regulation.’;

(21) Article 35 is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Transitional and other provisions’;

(b) paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:

‘1. By way of derogation from Article 212(3), first and fourth subparagraph, of the Financial Regulation, any revenues, repayments and recoveries from financial instruments established by programmes referred to in Annex IV to this Regulation may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation, taking into account the relevant provisions concerning the budget laid down in the Public Sector Loan Facility Regulation for 2021-2027.

2. By way of derogation from Article 216(4), point (a), of the Financial Regulation, any surplus of provisions for the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation, taking into account the relevant provisions concerning the budget laid down in the Public Sector Loan Facility Regulation for 2021-2027.

▌ By way of derogation from Article 214(4)(d) of the Financial Regulation, any revenues from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 received in 2027 may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation.’;

(22) Annex I is replaced by the following:

‘ANNEX I

AMOUNTS OF EU GUARANTEE PER SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE

The indicative distribution referred to in the fourth subparagraph of Article 4(2) towards financial and investment operations shall be as follows:

(a) up to EUR 11 589 045 902 for objectives referred to in point (a) of Article 3(2);

(b) up to EUR 7 707 119 112 for objectives referred to in point (b) of Article 3(2);

(c) up to EUR 8 095 166 498 for objectives referred to in point (c) of Article 3(2);

(d) up to EUR 3 260 978 561 for objectives referred to in point (d) of Article 3(2).’;

(23) In Annex III, the following two paragraphs are added in point 1 below point 1.4:

‘By way of derogation from Article 2(40) of the Financial Regulation, when determining the leverage and multiplier effect for financing and investment operations providing performance guarantees, the amount of risk coverage shall be assimilated to the amount of reimbursable financing.

By way of derogation from Article 222(3) of the Financial Regulation, the financing and investment operations providing performance guarantees shall not be required to achieve multiplier effect.’;

(24) In Annex V, the following paragraph is added:

‘This Annex also applies to the InvestEU financial instrument.’

Article 2

Amendments to Regulation 2015/1017 [EFSI Regulation]

Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 is amended as follows:

(1) Article 11a is amended as follows:

(a) the title is replaced by the following:

‘Combinations’.

(b) the following second subparagraph is inserted:

‘The EU guarantee may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council for the purposes of combinations referred to in Article 7(4) of that Regulation and it may cover losses in relation to financing and investment operations covered by the combined support.’;

(2) Article 16 is amended as follows:

(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

‘1. The EIB, in cooperation with the EIF where appropriate, shall submit once a year a report to the Commission on EIB financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation. The report shall include an assessment of compliance with the requirements on the use of the EU guarantee and with the key performance indicators referred to in Article 4(2), point (f)(iv). The report shall also include statistical, financial and accounting data on each EIB financing and investment operation and on an aggregated basis.’;

(b) paragraph 2 is deleted;

(c) in paragraph 3, the following subparagraph is added:

‘In relation to the combinations referred to in Article 11a, the EIB and the EIF, respectively, shall provide the Commission annually with the financial statements in accordance with Article 212(4) of the Financial Regulation. Such financial statements shall include accounting data about the support provided by the EU guarantee under this Regulation clearly delineated from the support provided by the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council.’;

(3) in Article 22(1), the fifth subparagraph is deleted.

Article 3

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 [CEF]

In Article 29 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1153, the following paragraph is added:

‘5. The guarantee supported by the Union budget and provided by the EIB through the CEF Debt Instrument established under Regulation (EU) 1316/2013 may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council(*) for the purpose of combination referred to in Article 7 of that Regulation and may cover losses in relation to the financing and investment operations covered by the combined support.’;

(*) Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 (OJ L 107, 26.3.2021, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/523/oj)’.

Article 4

Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 [Horizon Europe]

In Article 57 of Regulation (EU) 2021/695, the following paragraph is added:

‘3. The guarantee supported by the Union budget and provided by the EIB through the InnovFin Debt Facility established under Regulations (EU) 1290/2013 and 1291/2013 may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council(*) for the purpose of combination referred to in Article 7 and may cover losses of the financial product containing the financing and investment operations and covered by the combined support.’:

(*) Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 (OJ L 107, 26.3.2021, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/523/oj)’.

Article 5

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels,

For the European Parliament For the Council

The President The President

MIL OSI Europe News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Congresswoman Norma Torres Leads Letter from Former Mayors in Urging Speaker Johnson to Halt Harmful Big Ugly Reconciliation Bill
Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Norma Torres (35th District of California)
July 02, 2025

Washington, D.C. – Today, Congresswoman Norma J. Torres (CA-35), along with other former Mayors serving in Congress, sent a letter to House Speaker Mike Johnson, sounding the alarm on the devastating impacts of the House Republican-led Big Ugly reconciliation package. In the letter, the signers—all of whom have firsthand experience managing city budgets and responding to local community needs—warn that the bill’s drastic cuts to Medicaid, food assistance, and job-creating tax credits would be catastrophic for local governments and working families alike.

“As a former mayor, I know the real consequences of decisions made in Washington,” said Rep. Norma Torres, who previously served as Mayor of Pomona, California. “This bill is not beautiful—it is brutal. It guts healthcare, slashes food assistance, and pulls the rug out from under job-creating programs, all to finance massive tax giveaways to the ultra-wealthy. Our cities and constituents will pay the price.”

The letter outlines the projected consequences of the proposed legislation:
- The largest Medicaid cut in U.S. history—a $1 trillion reduction in coverage, stripping healthcare from 17 million Americans and putting rural hospitals and city health systems under immense strain. Medicaid is known as Medi-Cal in California.
- Drastic cuts to SNAP and child nutrition programs, which feed 42 million Americans—including 1 in 5 children—while shifting costs to already-overburdened states and cities. SNAP is known as CalFresh in California
- Threats to infrastructure, energy, and clean manufacturing jobs, risking nearly 2 million American jobs, and weakening energy independence in favor of foreign competitors.
“This bill is a job-killer, a healthcare wrecker, and a hunger-inducer,” Torres continued. “It is nothing more than a cynical effort to rob working families in our cities and towns in order to further enrich those at the very top. There’s still time to stop this and get it right. Our cities deserve better. Our people deserve better.”

The letter, grounded in the shared experiences of former mayors, urges Speaker Johnson to reconsider the partisan path of the current reconciliation process and instead work across the aisle on a proposal that supports—not sacrifices—American families.

The letter from former Mayors was signed by the following Members of Congress:
- Rep. Norma Torres (CA-35), former Mayor of Pomona, CA.
- Rep. Nanette Barragán (CA-44), former Mayor of Hermosa Beach, CA.
- Rep. Judy Chu (CA-28), former Mayor of Monterey Park, CA.
- Rep. Emanuel Cleaver (MO-05), former Mayor of Kansas City, MO.
- Rep. Laura Friedman (CA-30), former Mayor of Glendale, CA.
- Rep. Robert Garcia (CA-42), former Mayor of Long Beach, CA.
- Rep. Sam Liccardo (CA-16), former Mayor of San Jose, CA.
- Rep. Kevin Mullin (CA-15), former Mayor of South San Francisco, CA.
- Rep. Greg Stanton (AZ-04), former Mayor of Phoenix, AZ.
- Rep. Marilyn Strickland (WA-10), former Mayor of Tacoma, WA.
- Rep. Thomas Suozzi (NY-03), former Mayor of Glen Cove, NY.
Full letter

###
MIL OSI USA News –
July 3, 2025
Centre considering ₹100-crore Aqua Park for J&K: Union Minister Rajiv Ranjan

Source: Government of India

Source: Government of India (4)

Union Minister for Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying, Rajiv Ranjan Singh, on Wednesday said that flagship schemes such as the Blue Revolution, Fisheries and Aquaculture Infrastructure Development Fund (FIDF) and Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana (PMMSY) have significantly strengthened the fisheries ecosystem in Jammu and Kashmir.

Speaking at a function at the Shalimar Convention Centre, Sher-e-Kashmir University of Agricultural Sciences and Technology, Singh said the Centre remains committed to supporting the livestock and fisheries sectors as engines of rural income and nutritional security.

Jammu and Kashmir Minister for Agriculture Production and Panchayati Raj Javid Ahmad Dar, Secretary of the Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying Alka Upadhyaya, senior officials and progressive farmers from across the Valley attended the event.

Singh pointed out that over 10 crore farmers in India depend on livestock for their livelihoods, with small and marginal farmers owning more than 90% of dairy animals. Women account for over 70% of participation in the dairy sector and hold nearly a third of cooperative memberships.

In Jammu and Kashmir, milk production has increased by 47% over the past decade, rising from 19.5 lakh tonnes in 2014–15 to 28.74 lakh tonnes in 2023–24. Per capita milk availability in the Union Territory stands at 413 grams per day, he said.

Highlighting efforts to promote trout farming, Singh said the government facilitated the import of 13.4 lakh genetically improved eyed ova of Rainbow and Brown Trout from Denmark, boosting trout production from 650 metric tonnes (MT) in 2020–21 to 2,380 MT in 2023–24 — an increase of 266%.

Earlier in the day, Singh and Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah co-chaired a review meeting of the Animal Husbandry and Fisheries sectors at the Civil Secretariat in Srinagar. They also virtually inaugurated a 50,000-litre-per-day Ultra High Temperature (UHT) Milk Processing Plant at Satwari, Jammu.

Singh said the Centre sees immense untapped potential in J&K’s livestock and fisheries sectors and assured full support for their development. He called for closer collaboration between the Union and UT governments to translate this potential into sustainable rural livelihoods.

Encouraging youth to take up micro and small-scale ventures in fisheries and livestock, the Union Minister said that key national bodies like the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) and National Fisheries Development Board (NFDB) would help build strong infrastructure and market linkages.

He informed that under PMMSY, the Centre has committed ₹852 crore for Himalayan and North Eastern states, including ₹300 crore specifically for J&K, to enhance production, infrastructure, and employment.

According to Singh, annual fish production in J&K has grown from 20,000 MT in 2013–14 to 29,000 MT in 2024–25, while trout production has surged by over 800% — from 262 MT to 2,380 MT during the same period. Trout seed production has risen from 9 million to 15.2 million, and carp seed production has increased from 40 million to 63.5 million.

The Minister said that recognising J&K’s potential for cold-water fisheries, the Ministry has designated Anantnag as a Cold-Water Fisheries Cluster, with Kulgam and Shopian as partner districts to develop an integrated value chain for sustainable livelihoods.

He added that a proposal worth ₹100 crore is under consideration to set up an Integrated Aqua Park in J&K under PMMSY Phase-II to serve as a model for cold-water aquaculture.

Singh reiterated the Centre’s commitment to holistic rural development, farmer empowerment and the vision of a self-reliant India.

July 3, 2025
Centre considering ₹100-crore Aqua Park for J&K: Union Minister Rajiv Ranjan

Source: Government of India

Source: Government of India (4)

Union Minister for Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying, Rajiv Ranjan Singh, on Wednesday said that flagship schemes such as the Blue Revolution, Fisheries and Aquaculture Infrastructure Development Fund (FIDF) and Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana (PMMSY) have significantly strengthened the fisheries ecosystem in Jammu and Kashmir.

Speaking at a function at the Shalimar Convention Centre, Sher-e-Kashmir University of Agricultural Sciences and Technology, Singh said the Centre remains committed to supporting the livestock and fisheries sectors as engines of rural income and nutritional security.

Jammu and Kashmir Minister for Agriculture Production and Panchayati Raj Javid Ahmad Dar, Secretary of the Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying Alka Upadhyaya, senior officials and progressive farmers from across the Valley attended the event.

Singh pointed out that over 10 crore farmers in India depend on livestock for their livelihoods, with small and marginal farmers owning more than 90% of dairy animals. Women account for over 70% of participation in the dairy sector and hold nearly a third of cooperative memberships.

In Jammu and Kashmir, milk production has increased by 47% over the past decade, rising from 19.5 lakh tonnes in 2014–15 to 28.74 lakh tonnes in 2023–24. Per capita milk availability in the Union Territory stands at 413 grams per day, he said.

Highlighting efforts to promote trout farming, Singh said the government facilitated the import of 13.4 lakh genetically improved eyed ova of Rainbow and Brown Trout from Denmark, boosting trout production from 650 metric tonnes (MT) in 2020–21 to 2,380 MT in 2023–24 — an increase of 266%.

Earlier in the day, Singh and Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah co-chaired a review meeting of the Animal Husbandry and Fisheries sectors at the Civil Secretariat in Srinagar. They also virtually inaugurated a 50,000-litre-per-day Ultra High Temperature (UHT) Milk Processing Plant at Satwari, Jammu.

Singh said the Centre sees immense untapped potential in J&K’s livestock and fisheries sectors and assured full support for their development. He called for closer collaboration between the Union and UT governments to translate this potential into sustainable rural livelihoods.

Encouraging youth to take up micro and small-scale ventures in fisheries and livestock, the Union Minister said that key national bodies like the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) and National Fisheries Development Board (NFDB) would help build strong infrastructure and market linkages.

He informed that under PMMSY, the Centre has committed ₹852 crore for Himalayan and North Eastern states, including ₹300 crore specifically for J&K, to enhance production, infrastructure, and employment.

According to Singh, annual fish production in J&K has grown from 20,000 MT in 2013–14 to 29,000 MT in 2024–25, while trout production has surged by over 800% — from 262 MT to 2,380 MT during the same period. Trout seed production has risen from 9 million to 15.2 million, and carp seed production has increased from 40 million to 63.5 million.

The Minister said that recognising J&K’s potential for cold-water fisheries, the Ministry has designated Anantnag as a Cold-Water Fisheries Cluster, with Kulgam and Shopian as partner districts to develop an integrated value chain for sustainable livelihoods.

He added that a proposal worth ₹100 crore is under consideration to set up an Integrated Aqua Park in J&K under PMMSY Phase-II to serve as a model for cold-water aquaculture.

Singh reiterated the Centre’s commitment to holistic rural development, farmer empowerment and the vision of a self-reliant India.

July 3, 2025
Centre considering ₹100-crore Aqua Park for J&K: Union Minister Rajiv Ranjan

Source: Government of India

Source: Government of India (4)

Union Minister for Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying, Rajiv Ranjan Singh, on Wednesday said that flagship schemes such as the Blue Revolution, Fisheries and Aquaculture Infrastructure Development Fund (FIDF) and Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana (PMMSY) have significantly strengthened the fisheries ecosystem in Jammu and Kashmir.

Speaking at a function at the Shalimar Convention Centre, Sher-e-Kashmir University of Agricultural Sciences and Technology, Singh said the Centre remains committed to supporting the livestock and fisheries sectors as engines of rural income and nutritional security.

Jammu and Kashmir Minister for Agriculture Production and Panchayati Raj Javid Ahmad Dar, Secretary of the Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying Alka Upadhyaya, senior officials and progressive farmers from across the Valley attended the event.

Singh pointed out that over 10 crore farmers in India depend on livestock for their livelihoods, with small and marginal farmers owning more than 90% of dairy animals. Women account for over 70% of participation in the dairy sector and hold nearly a third of cooperative memberships.

In Jammu and Kashmir, milk production has increased by 47% over the past decade, rising from 19.5 lakh tonnes in 2014–15 to 28.74 lakh tonnes in 2023–24. Per capita milk availability in the Union Territory stands at 413 grams per day, he said.

Highlighting efforts to promote trout farming, Singh said the government facilitated the import of 13.4 lakh genetically improved eyed ova of Rainbow and Brown Trout from Denmark, boosting trout production from 650 metric tonnes (MT) in 2020–21 to 2,380 MT in 2023–24 — an increase of 266%.

Earlier in the day, Singh and Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah co-chaired a review meeting of the Animal Husbandry and Fisheries sectors at the Civil Secretariat in Srinagar. They also virtually inaugurated a 50,000-litre-per-day Ultra High Temperature (UHT) Milk Processing Plant at Satwari, Jammu.

Singh said the Centre sees immense untapped potential in J&K’s livestock and fisheries sectors and assured full support for their development. He called for closer collaboration between the Union and UT governments to translate this potential into sustainable rural livelihoods.

Encouraging youth to take up micro and small-scale ventures in fisheries and livestock, the Union Minister said that key national bodies like the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) and National Fisheries Development Board (NFDB) would help build strong infrastructure and market linkages.

He informed that under PMMSY, the Centre has committed ₹852 crore for Himalayan and North Eastern states, including ₹300 crore specifically for J&K, to enhance production, infrastructure, and employment.

According to Singh, annual fish production in J&K has grown from 20,000 MT in 2013–14 to 29,000 MT in 2024–25, while trout production has surged by over 800% — from 262 MT to 2,380 MT during the same period. Trout seed production has risen from 9 million to 15.2 million, and carp seed production has increased from 40 million to 63.5 million.

The Minister said that recognising J&K’s potential for cold-water fisheries, the Ministry has designated Anantnag as a Cold-Water Fisheries Cluster, with Kulgam and Shopian as partner districts to develop an integrated value chain for sustainable livelihoods.

He added that a proposal worth ₹100 crore is under consideration to set up an Integrated Aqua Park in J&K under PMMSY Phase-II to serve as a model for cold-water aquaculture.

Singh reiterated the Centre’s commitment to holistic rural development, farmer empowerment and the vision of a self-reliant India.

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Latvia, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Welcome Law Granting Latvian Citizenship to Stateless Children, Raise Questions on Hate Crimes and Access to Elections for Minorities and Non-Citizens

Source: United Nations – Geneva

The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the fourth periodic report of Latvia on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Committee Experts welcomed the adoption of the 2020 Latvian citizenship law, which granted Latvian citizenship to children who would otherwise be stateless, while raising questions on hate crimes against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons and access to elections for minorities and non-citizens.

One Committee Expert welcomed the adoption of a 2020 law which automatically granted Latvian citizenship to children of non-citizens who were not nationals of another State, and the recent reduction in the number of non-citizens.

Another Expert commended the State party for the establishment of a special unit to investigate hate crimes, and on changes in the criminal law addressing motivations for such crimes, including sexual orientation and gender identity. How were these changes publicised? Incidents of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons remained underreported, the Expert noted; how was law enforcement trained to facilitate reporting and to recognise and support victims?

A Committee Expert said the Pre-Election Campaign Law prohibited pre-election campaign materials in any language other than Latvian, except for European Parliament elections. How did the State party ensure that this prohibition did not unduly restrict accessibility and the participation of minorities in elections? Could the State party explain why non-citizen residents, including long-term residents, were excluded from elections?

Osams Abu Meri, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, introducing the report, said the fact that Latvia was a neighbouring country of Russia, which had invaded parts of Georgia and launched a full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, must not be overlooked. According to article 89 of the Constitution, the international human rights obligations binding upon Latvia formed an integral part of the domestic legal system. Domestic courts in Latvia had referred to the general comments and opinions issued by the Committee in numerous cases.

The delegation said work had been done to raise the awareness of those individuals in charge of prosecuting hate crimes, addressing victims’ rights from a broader, human rights-focused framework. The Ministry of Justice had also disseminated a circular on the interpretation of existing legal frameworks on hate crime and targeting the members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. As this was a very hot topic for Latvian society, the public broadcaster had also addressed the issue.

The delegation also said that if someone wanted to be elected or vote in Latvia, they needed to obtain citizenship. A Constitutional Court decision issued at the beginning of the year stated that the contested legal provisions did not impose a complete ban on the use of foreign languages, and only applied to individual campaigning with voters, hence they were in conformity with the Constitution. The Court decided that restrictions on fundamental rights were proportional.

In concluding remarks, Mr. Abu Meri expressed gratitude for the open and constructive dialogue. Latvia’s experience during these challenging times, as its neighbours Russia and Belarus deployed the full arsenal of hybrid warfare, had a broader relevance. Latvia would not only withstand these threats but remain steadfast in the rule of law, the principles of human rights and a rule-based law and order.

Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, expressed gratitude to all who had contributed to the dialogue. The Committee commended the State party for progress in several areas, including access to justice and gender equality, however remained concerned about the treatment of asylum seekers and non-residents, among other issues.

The delegation of Latvia was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Welfare; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Education and Science; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Culture; the Ministry of the Interior; the Ministry for Culture on Cooperation with Non-governmental Organisations; the Ministry of Defence; the Prosecutor General’s Office; the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs; the Internal Security Bureau; the State Police; the State Border Guard; the Cadet Force Centre; and the Permanent Mission of Latvia to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025. All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage. Meeting summary releases can be found here. The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m., Wednesday 2 July to begin its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Spain (CCPR/C/ESP/7).

Report

The Committee has before it the fourth periodic report of Latvia (CCPR/C/LVA/4).

Presentation of the Report

HOSAMS ABU MERI, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, presenting the report, said the situation in Europe had changed significantly since Latvia had last reported to the Committee. The fact that Latvia was a neighbouring country of Russia which, starting from 2008, had invaded parts of Georgia and acquired military and political control over parts of Ukraine, and on 24 February 2022 launched a full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, must not be overlooked. Because of these events, Latvia increasingly had legitimate reasons to fear for its security, territorial integrity, and democratic order. These events, along with information and hybrid warfare operations directed against Latvia, had strengthened efforts to defend democracy, national security, and effectively implement the rights and freedoms protected by the Covenant.



According to Article 89 of the Constitution of Latvia, the international human rights obligations binding upon Latvia formed an integral part of the domestic legal system. To illustrate, domestic courts in Latvia had referred to the General Comments and opinions issued by the Committee in numerous cases.



The financial resources allocated to domestic courts had steadily and consistently increased. Moreover, in 2024, the Academy of Justice, a new institution for the professional development of judges, prosecutors, prosecutor assistants, and investigators, was established. The Ombudsperson’s Office of Latvia had consistently received the highest “A” status of accreditation, and continued to operate in accordance with the highest international standards concerning respect for human rights and good governance. In 2022, Latvia ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Ombudsperson had been entrusted with the function of the national preventive mechanism, and, as of October 2024, had a new Department on the Prevention of Discrimination.



Latvia had continued to support the naturalisation of non-citizens; these were not stateless persons, as they enjoyed the right to reside in Latvia, along with a set of rights and obligations that extended beyond those prescribed by the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. In recent years, Latvia had seen a gradual and steady decline in the number of non-citizens residing in the country. A significant achievement in reducing the number of non-citizens in Latvia was the enactment of the law on the discontinuation of the non-citizen status for children, which had contributed to a substantial decrease in the number of non-citizens among younger age groups. Since 2020, all children born in non-citizen families had been granted citizenship at birth.



Between 2024 and 2027, Latvia had identified three priority areas for gender equality: increasing equal rights and opportunities in the labour market and education; reducing negative gender stereotypes; and integrating the principle of gender equality into policy planning.

In respect to combating gender-based violence, Latvia had significantly strengthened legal protections, expanded victim support services, and increased awareness-raising campaigns to challenge societal norms that perpetuate violence. Between 2022 and 2024, the authorities, together with non-governmental organisations, held workshops and discussions for young people on how to build non-violent relationships, based on the principle of gender equality.



In 2024, Latvia took a significant step forward in recognising diverse family forms by introducing civil partnership legislation. This legal framework allowed both same-sex and opposite-sex couples to register their partnership, granting them a range of rights and protections previously reserved for married couples. In 2021, the Latvian Parliament enacted amendments to the Criminal Law adding to the list of aggravating circumstances motivation based on “social hatred”, which covered hatred based on sexual orientation. Additionally, awareness-raising measures were continuously implemented, and investigators, prosecutors, and judges regularly attended trainings on the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert noted the various positive developments linked to civil and political rights, asking for additional information on the legal status of the Committee’s views in the national legal framework. What steps had Latvia taken to inform the public, including persons who did not read Latvian or English, about their rights under the Covenant and the possibility of submitting cases to the Committee under the Optional Protocol?

The Committee appreciated the rating of the Ombudsman and the increasing material and financial resources allocated to it, and the Expert asked for information on proposals to amend the Ombudsman’s enabling law. Regarding the implementation of the Corruption Prevention and Combating Action Plan, what mechanisms were in place to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures? Regarding judicial integrity, were there plans to adopt additional safeguards to prevent undue political influence in the judiciary?

Another Expert commended the State party for the establishment of a special unit to investigate hate crimes and on changes in the criminal law, adding “social enmity” and “any other characteristic” to cover sexual orientation and gender identity, and asked how these changes were publicised. Incidents of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons remained underreported, the Expert noted; how was law enforcement trained to facilitate reporting and to recognize and support victims?

Could the State party be more specific about the risks to national security posed by individuals with ties to the Russian Federation? How could fluency in the Latvian language prevent such risks? The Expert also asked for the number of persons deported so far, their background and to which countries they were deported. Had there been a state of emergency in parts of the country, in particular the Belarussian border from August 2021 to August 2023, and could the delegation confirm that Latvia did not derogate from its obligations under the Covenant during that period?

Regarding the equality of women, and efforts towards narrowing the gender pay gap, another Committee Expert asked what measures had been helpful so far, and what additional measures the government intended to introduce to narrow it further? Could the State party provide statistical data on gender-based violence and femicide from the last three years? What measures was the government preparing to improve prevention of the concerning occurrence of online violence against women, including against women journalists and women in politics and other leadership positions?

Regarding the right to life, a Committee Expert asked for disaggregated data on the high numbers of deaths in all places of detention, including psychiatric facilities. Was the definition of torture in line with that of international treaties, and what measures were in place to protect persons complaining of torture in places of detention?

Responses by the Delegation

Responding to the issues raised, the delegation said concerning the status of the Covenant and awareness-raising on submitting complaints, the Constitutional Court of Latvia had explained that the views of the Committee did not have the status of a legally binding instrument. While the Committee’s decisions did carry the weight of authoritative interpretation, they were not formally binding. The Committee’s views and opinions were soft-ball instruments, but had been taken into account by the courts over the years. Regarding awareness-raising on the United Nations human rights treaties, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had published informative material on its website in various languages, including guidance on submitting complaints to various treaty bodies, and ensuring accessible and transparent information for applicants. This was how Latvia ensured that society was informed about the Committee and the possibility of submitting complaints.

On training in the armed forces, the delegation said there were education programs which included human rights. The Ombudsman was appointed after approval by the Parliament. This aimed to strengthen human rights protection and ensure public awareness of the position. This approach aligned with the spirit of the Constitution and existing practice, whilst supporting the principles of democratic governance. On the Department of Discrimination, there was an Anti-Discrimination Unit, consisting of five people. There was a separation of the powers in Latvia, the delegation said, and there was currently a discussion on the procedure of nomination of the Ombudsman. There was no influence by political parties on the Ombudsman, and the election was entirely transparent.

Regarding anti-corruption measures, the Anti-Corruption Action Plan was in place since 2023, and the main reason for lack of fulfilment of its tasks was the lack of funding. The effectiveness of the Plan itself was usually measured by assessing the percentage of accomplished tasks, as well as feedback from institutions involved in its implementation. In 2025, six persons were fined in cases relating to corruption, and 2024 data showed that corruption was effectively investigated and sent to prosecution. On the independence of investigations conducted by the Internal Security Bureau, pre-trial detentions were supervised by a prosecutor. In accordance with the law, the Minister of the Interior could only supervise the legality and justification of the Bureau’s decisions, and could revoke them if necessary. On transparency of lobbying, work continued on effective implementation of legislation in this regard, and there was no Transparency Register yet.

The delegation said work had been done to raise the awareness of those individuals in charge of prosecuting hate crimes, addressing victim’s rights from a broader, human rights-focused framework. A specific hate speech conference event had been held in October 2024, with twenty-two participants who worked on such violations. A training session was also held for judges, prosecutors and investigators, focusing on a victim-centred approach to the justice system. For the general public, there were two specific web platforms with information about hate speech, hate crime, and related issues, and these were supported by the Ministries of Culture and Education, and the Ombudsman’s Bureau. The Ministry of Justice had also disseminated a circular on the interpretation of existing legal frameworks on hate crime and targeting the members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community. As this was a very hot topic for Latvian society, the public broadcaster had also addressed the issue. The legal framework, which prescribed criminal liability for social, national and ethnic hatred as an aggravating circumstance was sufficient and proportionate to existing needs.

Numbers of hate speech and hate crimes were not so large, usually fewer than 10 criminal cases per year, the delegation said, but this did not reflect the priority of the topic, as the Government was working on the issue. With regard to ethnic tensions, it was important to look at the information space, and how people used and consumed information inside the country. According to research and statistics, minorities, as well as the general population, found news and entertainment important, and consumed it at the same rates, showing that society was living in the same space. There were differences of opinion in society, as should be the case in any healthy society. Latvian society had gone through traumas, and was dealing with them, including by taking care of minorities, legally, but also practically, including through an annual festival celebrating cultural minorities.

Latvia saw its society as one which facilitated civic participation, and was working to strengthen this. Even Roma representatives and organisations were finally putting their projects forward, and they were being supported. Work was also being done on media literacy, as the current greatest threat to human rights was the great mass of information that was available, meaning critical thinking was a critical tool for building a cohesive society. Latvia had acquired a large number of refugees, including those fleeing from Ukraine, and was providing measures and support for their language acquisition and cultural and societal integration.

Latvia was working with the Roma strategy at the European Union level and had its own strategic plan for Roma integration. Unfortunately, the community was one of the most stigmatised, as it was across Europe. It was important for this stigmatisation to be approached and that communities were approached, with Roma mediators involved in the efforts to end the stigma. Hate speech had increased in the digital environment, and a plan was being put together to address it.

The delegation said the issue of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was not an ethnic issue: it was an issue of international law, colonialism, and history. This was how society and the government had treated it. The government had been very clear that this was an issue that had to unite everybody within the country, no matter the language and ethnicity of the individual. Research showed that there was an increase of differences of opinion on the issue within the country, but these were not aligned with ethnicity. The Russian minority was very vocal in its lack of support for the actions of Russia. On the declaration of a State emergency at the border, there had been a deliberate attempt by Belarus to destabilise European countries, including Latvia, in response to the imposition of sanctions on the Belarus regime. Actions to protect the external borders must be interpreted in the light of the broader geo-political context and the will to protect the system against abuse, including the instrumentalisation of migrants and refugees.

The gender pay gap had reduced further in Latvia, the delegation said, and female employment rates were relatively high, but the government needed to look into employment equality further, including encouraging women’s participation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics. Latvia was one of the rare countries that admitted to having problems in its prisons, and the government had approved an action plan to implement the Committee’s recommendations in this regard, showing its determination to tackle the issue. Prison staff were instructed and trained on sensitive periods in the life of a prisoner, aiming to limit incidents of self-harm and suicide.

Questions by Committee Experts

In follow-up questions, Experts asked for figures on deaths in prisons, and the reconciliation between self-administration prisons and the official system, and whether the former was to the detriment of detainees. Did psychiatric facilities offer education and therapeutic facilities, and was there sufficient staff? Another Expert asked for clarification on training in hate crimes and hate speech, asking whether it was mandatory and country-wide, or whether people could opt out. How was disaggregated data and statistics gathered on hate speech and hate crimes? There appeared to be a tension between language groups, and the Expert wondered how promoting a culture of human rights education and speech could be of help in resolving these matters.

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the Ministry of Justice had prepared a general policy planning document to combat and reduce the effects of informal prison hierarchies in Latvian prisons. This included building a new prison, and the education of prison guards and administration, including a new education centre, among others. One of the biggest problems in Latvian prisons was the outdated prison infrastructures, and the construction of the new prison to remedy this would be concluded in September 2025, with prisoners to be relocated in 2026.

There were 26,132 persons with mental disabilities in the country in 2019, and the situation was roughly the same now. It was very important today for persons with mental disabilities to have access to independent living, and Latvia had 12 social service homes, with between 50 and 150 places to which persons could be admitted voluntarily and could leave freely. There was only one long-term facility, with approximately 200 beds, meant for persons with severe mental disorders, and this hospital was also only for voluntary treatment. Regarding treatment and rehabilitation, nowadays in all treatment centres there were muti-professional teams, and staff workers ensuring integrated healthcare. Great efforts were made to ensure there were recreational facilities at all hospitals.

There was no mandatory training for judges, except on children’s rights, and training on hate speech and hate crimes were mostly linked to the specialisation of judges. In Latvia, the media enjoyed independence, and investigative journalism thrived, holding the government and the judiciary to account. The most common form of corruption involved the use of administrative resources, the delegation said.

The delegation said amendments had been made to the Criminal Code in 2024, establishing accountability for acts of violence against immediate family or in partner relationships. The amendments introduced the punishment of imprisonment for up to three years if the perpetrator committed a violent act against a family member, spouse or former spouse. Cases of spousal rape were considered rape under the Criminal Code, and sanctions were higher if there were aggravating circumstances. It was ensured that these crimes were reviewed by the courts in a timely manner. More than 13 trainings had been conducted for judges, investigators, prosecutors and those who worked on family violence cases. Every year, at least 20 women were killed by their partner in Latvia. The State believed that, in many instances, these deaths were preventable. From 1 July, electronic monitoring of offenders could be applied in criminal proceedings, providing an opportunity to prevent both femicides and homicides.

The ratification of the Istanbul Convention was a significant step in Latvia and was a cornerstone policy for the country. Changing societal attitudes towards women and violence and shifting deeply ingrained cultural norms and stereotypes required public awareness campaigns, which took time to yield results. Real-life stories of survivors had been made accessible to the public to raise awareness of the issue and encourage others to come forward. Services were accessible and no proof was required to receive help.

In December 2023, preventive visits had been carried out to two prisons, to assess potential risks of violent behaviour. Conferences had been held in cooperation with the Ombudsman’s office and non-governmental organizations dedicated to the prevention of violent conduct, attended by representatives of the prison administration. There had been an increase in crimes committed by prison administration officials in 2025, but this was due to the mandate to increasingly investigate these kinds of crimes.

Questions by Committee Experts

A Committee Expert asked why Latvia did not systematically collect and publish data on the length and frequency of pretrial detention. What steps would be taken to address this gap? Could data be provided on the use of non-custodial alternatives to detention? How was it ensued that all detainees were fully informed of their rights and access to a lawyer from the outset of detention? Would the State implement mandatory audiovisual recording of all police interviews with detained persons? How was it ensured that detainees received timely and effective assistance from qualified lawyers, including during the initial critical hours of detention?

What specific safeguards existed to prevent undue political influence in the appointment of Supreme Court judges? How did the State party address reports of politicisation and corruption in the judicial system? What measures were taken to improve trust in the justice system? What was the current operational status of the academy of justice? What specific training programmes had been implemented for judges and prosecutors since it opened? What steps had been taken to ensure timely issuance of judgements? Could information be provided on the types and lengths of sentences provided to minors? How was it ensured the detention of minors was used only as a last resort and for the shortest possible time?

Another Committee Expert said the overall national referral mechanism had not yet been established; why was this? How would the State implement the relevant European Parliament directive in time? How did the conflict in Ukraine impact trafficking in Latvia and different categories of victims, including victims of sexual exploitation and child trafficking? Were training activities organised for law enforcement in this regard? How did Latvia’s transition from a country of origin to country of transit and destination impact Government prevention efforts? What measures were being taken to promptly investigate, prosecute and punish all cases of trafficking? What remedies were provided to victims? How many cases had been raised against persons involved in human trafficking?

In mid-2024, the Ministry of Culture launched a study to ensure the safety of journalists in Latvia. What was its progress thus far? How were its recommendations being implemented? The Government informed the Committee that the criminal proceedings concerning serious bodily injuries inflicted to the journalist and publisher Leonids Jākobsons were terminated on 19 February 2025, as the authorities were unable to find the perpetrators. How often were similar cases involving infliction of serious bodily injuries terminated because of lack of success in finding perpetrators? How would the State ensure that similar incidents did not repeat, and that there was no impunity for perpetrators?

Could the delegation elaborate on the legal basis for the drastic revocation of TV Rain’s broadcasting licence on 6 December 2022, that was challenged before the Administrative Regional Court? The National Security Concept of 28 September 2023 served to prohibit the production of public television and radio content in Russian. What was the legal basis for this policy, and had there been any legal and administrative actions taken to implement it thus far?

Another Committee Expert said that in June 2023, Latvia established an enhanced border regime with restrictive measures, which had been extended to the end of 2025. Could the delegation confirm this? How did the State party justify prolonging these restrictions long after the formal state of emergency had ended? Credible reports indicated that from 2021 to 2025, the State border guard had engaged in 28,000 pushbacks to Belarus and other countries, without assessing the risks individuals would face. How did these pushbacks comply with the principle of non-refoulment? Refugees at the border were reportedly subjected to violence and abuse and left without water and food. What concrete actions had the State party taken to monitor the State border guard? How were the border guards trained to prevent ill-treatment of migrants?

How many official border crossing points were operating today? What steps were being taken to facilitate applications for persons seeking protection? What percentage of asylum seekers were detained and for how long? The Committee was concerned about the detention of children who sought asylum; would Latvia consider a policy of never detaining children for immigration reasons? The State had a good practice of providing free legal aid to refugees challenging asylum decisions, however reports stated it was not respected in practice. How did the State party uphold this commitment in practice?

The Committee welcomed the adoption of a 2020 law which automatically granted Latvian citizenship to children of non-citizens who were not nationals of another State. The Committee also welcomed the reduction in the number of non-citizens. Would the State party consider amending its citizenship law to grant nationality to all children born in Latvia who would otherwise be stateless? Was the State party considering extending political rights to non-citizens?

The Committee appreciated the measures adopted to safeguard the rights of conscientious objectors following the re-introduction of compulsory military service for men under Law 75 on the State Defence Service. The Committee also noted that the term of Alternative Civil Service was equal in length to military service, which was an improvement. Would the State consider allowing the Conscription Control Commission to operate independently of the miliary? Were conscientious objectors assigned responsibilities in alternative civil services, as opposed to non-combat roles within the military? How would the State party respect the rights of conscientious objectors during emergencies and armed conflicts?

A Committee Expert said the Committee understood that the Pre-Election Campaign Law prohibited pre-election campaign materials in any language other than Latvian, except for European Parliament elections. How did the State party ensure that this prohibition did not unduly restrict accessibility and the participation of minorities in elections?

Could the State party explain why non-citizen residents, including long-term residents, were excluded from elections? Would the State party be willing to permit their participation in elections? Where did the State party see the most need for further improvement regarding accessibility for persons with disabilities in elections? What measures had the State party taken to follow up on treaty body recommendations, including those calling on political parties to introduce quotas to promote women’s representation in political life?

The Committee had questions regarding the transition to Latvian as the exclusive language of instruction, eliminating Russian as a second language in schools and preschools. While this transition was envisaged a long time ago, its implementation had been rushed. How does the State party ensure that schools were ready within the limited timeframe, especially schools where many teachers lacked sufficient proficiency in Latvian? There were serious concerns about the lack of meaningful minority community consultation and participation during the law’s adoption. How many stakeholders were involved and how was active participation and meaningful dialogue ensured? The Committee was informed that national minority pupils at pre-school and primary education levels had a right to request education programmes on their language and cultural history. Did communities have to fund these programmes themselves? How were people made aware of these programmes and how easy was it to apply for them?

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said that while not all police interviews were recorded, this did not affect police investigations. All interviews with children were recorded. All interviews were documented in written form.

Legal aid was provided by the court administration. There had been just one case where a higher court judge had not been appointed by the parliament. Reports of corruption in the court system were legally investigated. The parliament adopted a law establishing a new judicial academy in 2024. In January this year, the newly established institution officially commenced its operations. The academy had been admitted as a member of the European Judicial Network. During this year, 106 events and trainings had already been held at the academy.

Latvia remained susceptible to labour exploitation, sham marriages, forced begging, as well as sexual exploitation. This year, just one criminal investigation had been launched so far in this regard. At the beginning of the Ukrainian refugee crisis, a programme was established that strengthened the capacity of State border guards to identify possible victims of human trafficking. All unaccompanied minors had been given legal assistance. Since 2022, there had been one case of sexual exploitation of a Ukrainian woman.

Regarding the case of the grievous bodily harm reflected on the journalist Leonids Jākobsons, despite its best efforts, the State had been unable to identify the perpetrator, and the proceedings had been closed. However, should new information emerge, the criminal proceedings could be reopened, and investigations could resume. In a 2019 case involving a journalist who had been persecuted and harassed for over a year, the perpetrator was identified and sentenced to prison for two years. This emphasised that the State recognised the importance of journalists and were committed to ensuring their safety and security.

A study had been launched which looked at updating the legal definition of “the media”. Seminars were provided for journalists that helped them to protect themselves. Meetings were held with the police once a year, to help them support journalists. Materials were envisaged for judges to help them on cases involving journalists.

Latvia was a democratic State that promoted the right to a fair trial and access to justice. A case was ongoing regarding Russian propaganda channels spreading hate speech in Latvia. The Government could not assess the outcome of the case at this point.

No languages had been prohibited in Latvia. Statistics showed that only 54 per cent of Latvian youth knew Russian language. The official State language was the Latvian language.

Around 47 to 50 per cent of television programmes and 35 percent of radio programmes were available in Russian language, and 13 per cent of the printed press was in Russian language. A law was in place which obligated the public broadcaster to broadcast in minority languages. The public broadcaster independently decided on media content and in which languages it should be broadcast. Work was being done to promote the inclusion of more minorities.

The state of emergency situation at the border with Belarus had been ended, but a new “enhanced border protection regime” had been introduced and would be in force until the end of the year. During legislative amendments, the State had assessed a proportional and law-based solution, considering European Union court rulings in this field. A lot of work had been done to comply with international obligations and the principle of non-refoulment. A document had been developed to instruct personnel at the border on how to deal with these cases.

Significant training had been provided to border staff, with more than 1,000 border guards trained in 2024 on asylum rights. The State did not have information on 20 deaths registered at the border with Belarus. There had been a case in 2024 in which a dead body was found on the Latvian border. This year, there had been 63 applications for asylum so far. As a rule, asylum seekers were not detained in Latvia and were accommodated in open space centres. However, due to several circumstances, the law on asylum permitted the detention of asylum seekers, such as in the case of security threats. Each case was individually and thoroughly assessed. Minors under 14 years old were not detained; they were placed in different facilities. Efforts were taken to accommodate minors with their families when possible. State-provided legal assistance could be accessed once an asylum decision had been appealed.

Regarding conscientious objection, no one from the Ministry of Defence had interfered with the Conscription Control Commission, and changes were not considered. The State defence service law set basic criteria for alternative service. So far, just three applications had been received, including for religious and health reasons. Military service was for a fixed period and a solider could choose whether to extend their contract or not. International regulations set a two-month resignation notice for military service, which the State believed was a reasonable amount of time. A reserve solider who could not perform military service due to their beliefs could be enrolled in the national armed force reserves. The State was not considering amending paragraph five of the military law.

Latvia did not consider “non-citizens” to be stateless persons. All non-citizens had the right to naturalise. The number of Latvian non-citizens had decreased by around 77 per cent in recent years. After a change in regulations in 2020, more than 500 children had been automatically registered after birth. Several campaigns had been carried out on the possibility of acquiring Latvian citizenship.

If someone wanted to be elected or vote in Latvia, they needed to obtain citizenship. A Constitutional Court decision issued at the beginning of the year stated that the contested legal provisions did not impose a complete ban on the use of foreign languages, and only applied to individual campaigning with voters, hence they were in conformity with the Constitution. The Court decided that restrictions on fundamental rights were proportional. Russian language was still widespread in Latvia, justifying the need to strengthen the use of Latvian as the official State language. The Constitutional Court had taken article 27 of the Covenant into account, which recognised the obligation to ensure minority groups could use their mother tongue. It found amendments in the law complied with article 27.

The naturalisation procedure was fairly easy. The path for non-citizens was wide, short and easy to walk.

Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

The Committee asked follow-up questions regarding actions taken to implement the national security policy before the Constitutional Court; the permanence of the enhanced border regime; ill-treatment of migrants crossing the Belarus/Latvia border between 2021 and 2022; granting citizenship to children born in Latvia who would otherwise be stateless; providing for honourable discharges from military service; the exclusion of non-citizens from all elections; alternative programmes for minority languages in schools; and measures in place to ensure detention of minors was only implemented as a measure of last resort.

Responses by the Delegation

The delegation said the public broadcaster was bound by media laws. Currently Belarussian authorities at the border were refusing to cooperate with Latvian authorities. These non-cooperation issues had brought about an increase in criminal activities across the border, including organised crime. This year, there had been 186 irregular migration cases across the border. An investigation had been launched in 2021 and 2022 regarding individuals who had attempted to cross the Belarussian border, which had analysed a significant amount of information. During the investigation, it was determined that injuries to migrants were not caused by the actions of border officials, but were likely obtained during the journey to cross the border.

Reasons for terminating a military contract prior to its conclusion were not specified in national laws. An agreement simply needed to be reached.

Only persons with Latvian citizenship had the right to vote. Using languages other than Latvian during political campaigning in the election period was not prohibited. The provision about using just the official language applied only to the pre-election period. Non-citizens who chose to keep their status still had the right to receive healthcare and work in the country.

Teachers were instructed on teaching methodologies in a linguistically diverse environment, and on how to teach students whose native language was not Latvian. There were targeted grants supporting minority languages and cultures.

As of 25 June this year, there were 27 inmates who were children. Four of these children were detained, with the rest serving their sentences on probation. This illustrated that incarceration of children in Latvia was a last resort.

Closing Statements

HOSAMS ABU MERI, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, expressed gratitude for the open and constructive dialogue. A wide range of topics had been addressed, including efforts to combat hate crimes, gender equality, and matters of national security. Latvia’s experience during these challenging times, as its neighbours Russia and Belarus deployed the full arsenal of hybrid warfare, had a broader relevance. Latvia would not only withstand these threats but remain steadfast in the rule of law, the principles of human rights and a rule-based law and order. These circumstances reaffirmed Latvia’s commitment to uphold the rights enshrined in the Covenant. Latvia appreciated the engagement and interest of the Committee.

CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed gratitude to all who had contributed to the dialogue. The Committee commended the State party for progress in several areas, including access to justice and gender equality, however remained concerned about the treatment of asylum seekers and non-residents, among other issues. Mr. Soh thanked all involved in the dialogue for their engagement and commitment.

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Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media;
not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

CCPR25.013E

MIL OSI United Nations News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: Province launches program to fund IVF, support families
Source: Government of Canada regional news

People on the path to parenthood now have more supports as the Province launches its first-ever, publicly funded in-vitro fertilization (IVF) program, making IVF care more affordable and accessible for hopeful parents throughout British Columbia.

“For people needing to access IVF care to start a family, the costs can make it simply out of reach,” said Josie Osborne, Minister of Health. “Being able to have a child shouldn’t depend on how much money you make. That’s why today we are launching B.C.’s first-ever, publicly funded IVF program that will ensure more people can access this life-changing treatment and bring hope to thousands of British Columbians on their path to parenthood.”

Starting Wednesday, July 2, 2025, eligible B.C. residents have access to one-time funding of up to $19,000 toward the cost of a single standard IVF cycle, including treatment and medications. Participating fertility clinics may now submit applications on behalf of their patients to the Ministry of Health. Applications will be reviewed in the order they are received, with provincial funding provided directly to a patient’s fertility clinics to limit up-front costs.

“For those wanting to start a family, barriers to conceiving a child can have a profound effect on people,” said Jennifer Blatherwick, parliamentary secretary for gender equity. “Empowering people in becoming parents sometimes means specialized supports are needed and B.C.’s new publicly funded IVF program will help more people on the path to parenthood.”

Funding amounts will be based on household income to ensure that more individuals and families can benefit from the program, with greater support for those who need it the most and are otherwise unable to afford the cost. Households with a pre-tax income of $100,000 or less will be eligible for the full $19,000, with benefits phasing out for households earning more than $250,000. The Province estimates that the program will fund between 1,100 and 4,500 IVF cycles, with the funding available this fiscal year.

To be eligible, individuals must be at least 18 years of age, 41 years of age or younger at the time of application and enrolled in the Medical Services Plan. Applicants who turned 42 between April 1, 2025, and July 2, 2025, are also eligible to apply. These criteria are in line with other Canadian jurisdictions.

B.C. will deliver the program through Olive Fertility Centre, Pacific Centre for Reproductive Medicine, and Grace Fertility and Reproductive Medicine. For those who need to travel, the Travel Assistance Program will help alleviate some of the transportation costs for those eligible B.C. residents receiving IVF treatment as part of this program.

This initiative is part of B.C.’s broader work to improve gender equity and reproductive autonomy. The Province is investing in improved access to maternal and women’s health services, including access to free prescription birth control, expanded perinatal care, mental health support and initiatives to address health equity throughout the province.

Quotes:

Dr. K. Seethram, managing partner, Pacific Centre for Reproductive Medicine –

“The novel funding program in British Columbia has drawn from the pan-Canadian experience, stakeholder input and expert opinion to craft a very thorough and progressive model, which has the ability to change, scale and expand as shifts occur in the needs of our population. The program of provincial IVF funding will open doors for patients who could not otherwise access IVF care and creates an environment where infertility treatments can start quickly, restoring hope and promise to those in need.”

Niamh Tallon, clinical medical director, Olive Fertility Clinic –

“This is a monumental moment for individuals and couples struggling with infertility, who dream of starting or growing their families but rely on advanced fertility services. The B.C. government’s new funding initiative acknowledges the significant financial barriers many face. By addressing these challenges, this program is a critical step toward ensuring more equitable access to fertility care, aligning B.C. with other provinces that have already embraced similar measures.”

Anthony Cheung, clinical medical director, Grace Fertility Clinic –

“Grace Fertility Centre is so happy that provincial IVF funding is finally available for B.C. residents. IVF treatment is a highly emotional journey for anyone. To have some government support will certainly help to alleviate some of the financial stress.”

Rachelle Pastilha, IVF patient –

“Knowing that the government is stepping in to help with funding makes a world of difference. It brings real hope — not just for us, but for so many others out there who are going through the same thing. So, thank you, from the bottom of my heart. This means more than words can say — for my family, and for countless others.”

Quick Facts:
- Infertility is a disease of the male or female reproductive system defined by the failure to achieve a pregnancy after 12 months or more of regular unprotected sexual intercourse.
- According to a recent report from the World Health Organization, one in six people globally are affected by infertility over the duration of their reproductive lives.
- In-vitro fertilization (IVF) is a fertility treatment that includes a complex set of procedures that can lead to a pregnancy.
- New clinics that become fully accredited and licensed to provide IVF services in B.C. are encouraged to contact the Ministry of Health about participating in the program.
Learn More:

To learn more about the IVF program, visit: https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/health/accessing-health-care/publicly-funded-ivf-program

MIL OSI Canada News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: ATF Warns Public of Scam Involving Fraudulent Calls
Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

Washington, D.C. – The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is alerting the public to a scam involving fraudulent phone calls from individuals claiming to be “ATF Officers” or “Agents.” These scammers, using phone numbers appearing to originate from Martinsburg, West Virginia, are instructing victims to purchase Apple gift cards in amounts of $500 or $1,000 to “clear a red flag” from their accounts. Victims are then asked to provide gift card numbers to the callers.

The ATF emphasizes that these calls are not legitimate and is working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which is actively investigating this scam. The public is urged to exercise caution and avoid sharing personal or financial information with unsolicited callers.

ATF Will Never:
- Call or email private citizens to demand payment or threaten arrest. You will not be asked to wire a “settlement” to avoid arrest.
- Ask you to use large sums of your own money to help catch a criminal.
- Request you send money via wire transfer to foreign accounts, cryptocurrency, or gift/prepaid cards.
- Call you about “frozen” Social Security numbers or to coordinate inheritances.
How to Protect Yourself:
- Do not share personal or financial information with unsolicited callers or emails.
- Verify the legitimacy of any contact claiming to be from a government agency by calling official numbers listed on agency websites, such as www.atf.gov.
- Report suspicious calls to the ATF at 1-888-ATF-TIPS (1-888-283-8477) or the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center at www.ic3.gov.
- If you have been a victim of this scam, contact your local law enforcement immediately.
Disclaimer on ATF.gov

ATF enhanced its websites by adding a prominent disclaimer to outline what ATF will never do, reinforcing public awareness and protection against scams. For more information or to report suspicious activity, contact your local ATF field office or visit www.atf.gov/contact/submit-a-tip.

ATF is the lead federal law enforcement agency with jurisdiction involving firearms and violent crimes, and enforces criminal and regulatory laws involving bombs, explosives, and arson. More information about ATF and its programs is available at www.atf.gov. For more information, contact ATF Public Affairs Division at liaison2@atf.gov.

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MIL Security OSI –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: The EIB reinforces global partnerships to boost food security and promote rural development, fight hunger and poverty
Source: European Investment Bank
- As part of its strategic cooperation with UN agencies, the EIB formalises its partnership with the World Food Programme, paving the way for the implementation of the first EIB-backed climate risk insurance scheme and enhancing EIB’s impact in fragile contexts.
- The EIB extends its partnership with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to strengthen sustainable agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa.
- Under the Seville Platform for Action, EIB joins the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty in two initiatives to fast-track finance for ending hunger, poverty and climate risk.
The European Investment Bank (EIB) announced new partnerships and commitments to promote food security and sustainable agriculture around the world and to combat hunger and poverty and. These steps were taken during the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) in Seville, Spain.

The EIB Group is supporting food security and sustainable agriculture across the globe. These partnerships and initiatives with UN institutions and the Global Alliance against hunger and poverty will improve and expand our support to those who need it most,” said EIB Vice-President Ambroise Fayolle. “By leveraging synergies and sharing best practices, we aim to enhance food security and nutrition, empower farmers around the world—particularly women—, support adaptation to climate change, and transform agriculture into a more resilient and sustainable sector.”

Partnership with World Food Programme

The EIB formalised a partnership with the World Food Programme (WFP) through a MoU that outlines key areas of cooperation, including climate resilience, food security and nutrition, critical agricultural infrastructure, innovative financing instruments, and inclusive access to finance for agricultural SMEs and smallholder farmers. This partnership has a global scope, with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa and fragile countries.

In addition, the EIB and WFP have signed a Letter of Understanding, enabling the EIB to directly finance WFP operations and benefit from its advisory and implementation expertise.

The first joint initiative will be a climate-risk insurance project in Ethiopia. This complements an existing €110 million EIB credit line to the Development Bank of Ethiopia aimed at improving rural access to finance – especially for small-scale farmers and women – and strengthening rural financial institutions.

“This partnership between the European Investment Bank and the World Food Programme reflects our shared commitment to investing in sustainable solutions that tackle the root causes of hunger, build resilience, and support communities most vulnerable to the impacts of conflict, climate and economic shocks,” said Rania Dagash-Kamara, Assistant Executive Director for Partnerships and Innovation at WFP.

Extension of memorandum of understanding with FAO

The EIB and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) renewed their joint commitment to promoting sustainable agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa by extending their Memorandum of Understanding – originally signed in 2015 and renewed in 2020 – until 2030. As part of this strengthened collaboration, the EIB has provided €1.4 million to the FAO for technical assistance in identifying and preparing projects that support sustainable and climate-resilient agriculture.

This collaboration has already facilitated the preparation of complex operations in Ethiopia and Liberia, including sector studies, feasibility assessments, and evaluations of project promoters’ implementation capacities.

By leveraging the FAO’s expertise, the EIB aims to expand its agrifood and bioeconomy lending pipeline, contributing to improved food security, increased farmer incomes, women’s empowerment and job creation.

A particular focus will be on supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in agriculture re and smallholder farmers through financial intermediaries while engaging the public and private sectors in developing agrifood value chains.

“FAO, through its Investment Centre, is enthusiastic about growing its collaboration with the European Investment Bank (EIB) by signing this MoU, first established in 2015 and regularly renewed as a cornerstone of our shared commitment, said Mohamed Manssouri, Director of the FAO Investment Centre. “Within this framework, the latest agreement signed in 2023 is achieving great results for beneficiary countries, with two approved operations unlocking a EUR 130 million credit line to support local banks lending to smallholders and agri-SMEs across Sub-Saharan Africa, and more investments are under preparation. This partnership directly supports FAO’s vision for Better Production, Better Nutrition, a Better Environment and a Better Life, leaving no one behind,” he added.

Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty

In 2024, the EIB joined other financial institutions in the Group of 20 global alliance against hunger and poverty led by Brazil. In line with its mission to eradicate hunger and extreme poverty, the EIB committed to supporting the alliance’s integrated, multi-level approach combining social protection with access to essential services in education, health, finance and agriculture.

At FfD4, the EIB joined two initiatives led by the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty through the Seville Action Platform to fast-track finance for ending hunger, poverty and climate risk. These initiatives focus on building better-integrated finance for sustainable development goals (SDGs) 1 and 2 and on scaling up finance for climate-resilient social protection and smallholder agriculture. They aim to accelerate the implementation of large-scale national programs by streamlining financial flows from multiple donors and connecting them directly to on-the-ground needs.

Background information

EIB

The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It finances investments contributing to EU policy goals. EIB Global carries out the EIB’s operations outside the EU. As a key partner in the EU’s Global Gateway, the EIB aims to support at least €100 billion of investments by 2028, one third of the strategy’s target. Over the 2014–2023 period, EIB lending outside the EU totalled more than €70 billion, with a significant share supporting infrastructure, climate, and food security. With offices across the world, EIB Global is close to local people, firms and institutions, and fosters strong Team Europe partnerships with development finance institutions.

FAO

The FAO Investment Centre works to deliver investment and finance solutions that promote inclusive economic growth, better diets and nutrition, greater equity and climate resilience. The Centre provides a full suite of investment support services to FAO Member states, working in over 120 countries. It partners with governments, national and international financing institutions, the private sector, research institutions, academia and producer organizations to help countries achieve lasting impact at scale.

WFP

The World Food Programme is the world’s largest humanitarian organization saving lives in emergencies and using food assistance to build a pathway to peace, stability and prosperity, for people recovering from conflict, disasters and the impact of climate change.

The Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty

The Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty was established in 2024 as a proposal from the Brazilian presidency of the G20 to support and accelerate efforts to eradicate hunger and poverty (Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 1 and 2), while reducing inequalities (SDG 10). The core of the Alliance is the Policy Basket, a menu of rigorously evaluated policy instruments, ensuring that donor investments are directed toward cost effective, high-impact initiatives. Acting as a neutral facilitator, the Alliance builds partnerships and mobilizes financial and knowledge resources to implement these policy instruments.

In an innovative approach, the Alliance reduces transaction costs and avoids duplication of efforts by leveraging a unified database, streamlining the identification of knowledge and funding needs and opportunities. The Alliance also differentiates itself by favoring the pooling of resources and expertise, enabling greater impact and efficiency compared to fragmented individual efforts. This allows the implementation of comprehensive, multisectoral strategies.
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Is the European defence industry represented by an American lobbyist? – E-001156/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament

Member States remain in the driving seat for defence whilst benefitting from the added value offered by the EU programmes and instruments supporting cooperation between European defence industrial players and between Member States, and incentivising investment in defence capacities.

In that respect, the Commission is particularly vigilant in ensuring the respect of the allocation of competences, as enshrined in the Treaties.

The Commission is fully aware of the responsibilities of the individual mentioned in the parliamentary question within RTX Corporation, as both the organisation and the individual are registered in the Transparency Register[1].

However, the Commission respects the freedom of every professional organisation to be represented by whomever it considers fit for this purpose.

As regards their relation with external stakeholders, Commission Members and staff members are bound by stringent rules and internal control standards, included in particular in the treaties, the Staff Regulations[2] and the Conditions of employment of other servants of the EU, as well as the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour[3].

These rules aim, in particular, at ensuring the independence, impartiality, objectivity and loyalty of Commission Members and staff members in the exercise of their duties. This includes the protection of any sensitive or classified information.

Finally, the issue of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) is very high on the agenda of the Commission, especially in the context of recent Russian attempts to undermine the EU and its Member States’ democratic processes.

FIMI is one of the key aspects of the recently adopted European Preparedness Union Strategy[4] and will be addressed in the upcoming European Democracy Shield.
- [1] https://transparency-register.europa.eu/searchregister-or-update/organisation-detail_en?id=87564644126-75.
- [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1962/31(1)/2014-05-01/eng.
- [3] https://commission.europa.eu/about/service-standards-and-principles/ethics-and-good-administration/good-administration/code-good-administrative-behaviour-and-complaints_en.
- [4] JOIN/2025/130 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0130.
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – US-Ukraine agreement – E-001842/2025(ASW)

Source: European Parliament

The United States (US)-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund will be operated solely by Ukraine and the US. Nonetheless, in the preambles of the agreement between the governments of Ukraine and US on the establishment of the fund, the two parties would welcome further investments by EU investors in mining, energy, and related technology in Ukraine.

Based on the provisions put forward in the agreement between the governments of Ukraine and US on the establishment of the fund, the Commission is conducting a preliminary assessment of any implications on the operations of the Ukraine Facility.

Specifically, it is noted that the agreement acknowledges Ukraine’s current legal obligations towards the EU, including those taken under the Ukraine Facility.

Once more details are provided by Ukraine on the development of the fund, the Commission will undertake a more in-depth legal analysis on the subject.

Last updated: 2 July 2025

MIL OSI Europe News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Canada: New chief, next step for municipal policing option
[. The IAPS will empower municipalities to adopt strategies that effectively respond to their specific safety concerns, enhancing public safety across the province.

Chief Parhar brings more than 25 years of policing experience, including senior roles with the Calgary Police Service, most recently as deputy chief. His frontline policing experience and deep understanding of Alberta’s complex and diverse public safety landscape positions him to lead the agency as it takes shape and begins its work as a new municipal policing option, keeping communities safe.

Once operational, the agency will strengthen Alberta’s existing policing model and complement the province’s current police services, which includes the RCMP, Indigenous policing services and municipal police. It will help fill gaps and ensure law enforcement resources are deployed efficiently to meet Alberta’s evolving public safety needs and improve law enforcement response times, particularly in rural communities.

“Appointing Chief Sat Parhar is a key milestone in Alberta’s plan to give municipalities a real choice in how their communities are kept safe. This is about building a modern police service that reflects the priorities of Albertans, strengthens local decision-making, and ensures every corner of our province, especially rural areas, can count on responsive, effective law enforcement. With his decades of experience and deep understanding of Alberta’s policing landscape, he is the right leader to bring this vision to life.”

Danielle Smith, Premier

“This appointment signifies a significant step forward in our efforts to establish a more robust, community-focused policing model that is better equipped to meet the unique needs of our local residents. Under Chief Parhar’s visionary leadership, we are confident that we will develop a modern, efficient police service that not only enhances public safety but also aligns closely with the priorities and values of Albertans. His experience and commitment are vital in shaping an IAPS that is responsive, transparent, and dedicated to fostering trust and collaboration within the community, ultimately ensuring a safer and more connected society for all.”

Mike Ellis, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency ServicesMike Ellis, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Services

Chief Parhar’s immediate priorities will be to hire an executive team and commence organizational planning such as developing key recruitment, training and other operational policies. Chief Parhar’s appointment is the first step of many to establishing the IAPS.

“It’s an honour to take on this role and help shape a modern police service built for Alberta. My focus from day one will be on setting high standards for professionalism, building strong relationships with our partners and ensuring this service reflects the needs and priorities of the communities we serve.”

Sat Parhar, chief, Independent Agency Police Service

The Independent Agency Police Service was formally created through regulation following the passing of Public Safety Statutes Amendment Act, 2024. The agency will operate as an independent Crown corporation, and will be renamed the Alberta Sheriffs Police Service, with its head office located in Calgary. The IAPS will be operationally independent from the provincial government with civilian oversight, consistent with all police services in Alberta.

“When it comes to policing, municipalities like ours deserve a choice – especially when the current system leaves us disadvantaged simply because of our size. We look forward to learning more about what that alternative will look like once an Alberta police agency is fully established and the options are clear. For us, this is about fairness, sustainability, and ensuring municipalities have access to policing solutions that reflect both their needs and their realities.”

Jack Van Rijn, Mayor of the Town of Coaldale

Quick facts
- The regulation establishes the IAPS Provincial Corporation and its governance structure including board of directors, board of director powers, financial responsibilities and accountabilities.
Related news
- Expanding municipal police service options (April 7, 2024)
Multimedia
- Watch the news conference
MIL OSI Canada News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: El estado de Washington demanda a la administración de Trump por compartir ilegalmente información personal de salud con ICE

Source: Washington State News

SEATTLE – El procurador general de Washington, Nick Brown, se unió ayer a una coalición multiestatal para presentar una demanda que impugna la decisión del U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS, Departamento de Salud y Servicios Humanos de EE. UU.) de otorgar acceso sin restricciones a la información personal de salud al Department of Homeland Security (DHS, Departamento de Seguridad Nacional), que incluye al Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE, Servicio de Inmigración y Control de Aduanas).

En las siete décadas transcurridas desde que el Congreso promulgó la ley de Medicaid para brindar asistencia médica a poblaciones vulnerables, la legislación, las políticas y las prácticas federales han sido claras: la información personal de salud recopilada sobre los beneficiarios del programa es confidencial y solo se compartirá en ciertas circunstancias específicas que beneficien la salud pública y la integridad del propio programa de Medicaid.

En la demanda presentada ayer ante el U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (Tribunal de Distrito de los Estados Unidos para el Distrito Norte de California), los procuradores generales argumentan que la transferencia masiva de estos datos viola la ley y solicitan al tribunal que bloquee cualquier nueva transferencia o uso de estos datos con fines de control migratorio.

“Los residentes de Washington esperan que la información confidencial que brindan al gobierno para acceder a tratamiento médico solo se utilice con fines de salud”, dijo Brown. “Su información no debería utilizarse para crear una gigantesca base de datos de información personal de estadounidenses ni para que ICE pueda deportar a inmigrantes indocumentados por tener que ir al médico”.

“El uso que la administración de Trump hace de la información de salud privada de los residentes de Washington para su propia agenda política es indignante. Esto constituye una violación de la confianza de todos aquellos cuya información se compartió de manera indebida, pero especialmente de nuestras comunidades inmigrantes y familias con condición migratoria mixta, quienes ya están en la mira de la administración de Trump. Defenderemos la dignidad y el derecho a la privacidad de todos los residentes de Washington”, dijo el gobernador Bob Ferguson.

Creado en 1965, Medicaid es una fuente esencial de seguro médico para personas de bajos ingresos y grupos de población desatendidos, como niños, mujeres embarazadas, personas con discapacidad y adultos mayores. El programa de Medicaid permite a cada estado participante desarrollar y administrar sus propios planes de salud. Los estados deben cumplir con los criterios mínimos establecidos por la ley federal, pero pueden adaptar los estándares de elegibilidad y las opciones de cobertura de sus planes a las necesidades de los residentes. Para enero de 2025, 78,4 millones de personas estaban inscritas en Medicaid y el Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP, Programa de Seguro Médico Para Niños) en todo el país.

El programa Medicaid de Washington funciona como parte del conjunto más amplio de programas de beneficios de salud de Apple Health. Apple Health incluye Apple Health Expansion, que brinda servicios médicos integrales a los residentes de Washington, independientemente de su condición migratoria. Hay más de 1,9 millones de clientes de Apple Health en Washington, que incluye a unos 49.000 cuya condición migratoria los excluye de algunos programas financiados con fondos federales. Apple Health cubre una gama de servicios de salud, que incluye atención hospitalaria para pacientes hospitalizados y ambulatorios, atención primaria y preventiva, servicios y apoyos a largo plazo y salud conductual. Los residentes de Washington se inscribieron en Apple Health con el conocimiento de que su información sería confidencial y no se compartiría por razones ajenas a la prestación de servicios de salud.

Se intercambia rutinariamente una cierta cantidad de información personal entre los estados y el gobierno federal para la administración de Medicaid. Antes de la actual administración de Trump, el DHS reconoció que la ley de Medicaid y otras autoridades federales de salud prohibían el uso de información personal de Medicaid para fines de control migratorio. Sin embargo, el gobierno federal parece haber creado, sin reconocimiento formal, una nueva política que permite la divulgación y el uso generalizados de la información personal de Medicaid de los residentes estatales para fines ajenos a la administración del programa de Medicaid.

El 13 de junio de 2025, los estados tomaron conocimiento a través de informes de prensa que el HHS había transferido masivamente los archivos de datos de Medicaid de su estado, que contienen registros médicos personales de millones de personas, al DHS. Los informes indican que el gobierno federal planea crear una amplia base de datos para “deportaciones masivas” y otros fines de control migratorio a gran escala.

El gobierno federal afirma haber proporcionado estos datos al DHS “para garantizar que los beneficios de Medicaid se reserven para las personas que legalmente tienen derecho a recibirlos”. Sin embargo, desde 1986, el Congreso ha extendido la cobertura y los fondos federales para Medicaid de emergencia a todas las personas que residen en los Estados Unidos, independientemente de su condición migratoria. Los estados han cooperado, y seguirán cooperando, con las actividades de supervisión federal para garantizar que el gobierno federal pague únicamente los servicios de Medicaid legalmente autorizados.

En la demanda de ayer, la coalición destaca que las acciones ilegales de la administración de Trump están generando temor y confusión que llevarán a las personas no ciudadanas y a sus familiares a cancelar su inscripción o negarse a inscribirse en Medicaid de emergencia, para el cual de otra manera serían elegibles, y dejarán a los estados y a sus hospitales de la red de seguridad con la responsabilidad de pagar los servicios de atención médica de emergencia exigidos por el gobierno federal. Estas personas podrían no recibir los servicios de salud de emergencia que necesitan y, como resultado, sufrirán consecuencias negativas para su salud, o incluso la muerte.

La coalición solicita al tribunal que declare que las acciones de la administración de Trump son arbitrarias y caprichosas, y que la elaboración de normas no cuenta con el debido procedimiento, lo cual viola la Administrative Procedure Act (Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo), la Social Security Act (Ley del Seguro Social), la Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA, Ley de Portabilidad y Responsabilidad del Seguro Médico), la Federal Information Security Modernization Act (Ley Federal de Modernización de la Seguridad de la Información) y Privacy Act (Ley de Privacidad), y que viola la Spending Clause (Cláusula de Gastos). La coalición también solicita al tribunal que prohíba al HHS transferir información personal identificable de Medicaid al DHS o a cualquier otra agencia federal y que prohíba al DHS utilizar estos datos para aplicar las leyes de inmigración.

Al presentar la demanda, el procurador general Brown se une a los procuradores generales de California, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nueva Jersey, Nueva York, Oregón y Rhode Island.

La demanda se presentó ayer y está disponible aquí.

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El Procurador General de Washington sirve al pueblo y al estado de Washington. Como la oficina judicial más grande de Washington, la Oficina del Procurador General brinda representación legal a todas las agencias, juntas y comisiones estatales de Washington. Además, la oficina sirve directamente a la gente al hacer cumplir las leyes de protección de los consumidores, de derechos civiles y de protección al medioambiente. La oficina también persigue el abuso de personas mayores, el fraude de Medicaid, y atiende los casos de depredadores sexuales violentos en 38 de los 39 condados de Washington. Para obtener más información, visite www.atg.wa.gov.

Contacto para la prensa:
press@atg.wa.gov
Contactos generales: Haga clic aquí

MIL OSI USA News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list – B10-0311/2025

Source: European Parliament

B10‑0311/2025

European Parliament resolution on the Commission delegated regulation of 10 June 2025 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela to the list of high-risk third countries which have provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies and have developed an action plan with the FATF, and to remove Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates from that list

(C(2025)3815) – 2025/2740(DEA))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Commission delegated regulation (C(2025)3815),

– having regard to Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC [1], and in particular Article 9(2) and Article 64(5) thereof,

– having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 of 14 July 2016 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council by identifying high-risk third countries with strategic deficiencies [2], in particular the Annex thereto,

– having regard to Rule 114(3) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Commission presents the delegated regulation as an omnibus package to secure its passage, thereby including several countries and territories that deserve separate parliamentary scrutiny;

B. whereas the addition to the list of several jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering / countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regimes, including Algeria and the criminal Venezuelan narco-regime, should not be used as a strategy to put pressure on Parliament to accept deals with the colony of Gibraltar;

C. whereas Gibraltar is widely recognised as an offshore financial centre with a favourable tax regime and financial regulation that has raised concerns for its use for illicit financial activities that result in a severe distortion of the European Economic Area (EEA);

D. whereas transparency and international cooperation are critical to the integrity of the global financial system and to combating money laundering, tax evasion and terrorist financing;

E. whereas concerns persist about financial opacity and the facilitation of illicit financial activities in Gibraltar that are affecting the whole EEA, in particular surrounding municipalities;

F. whereas Articles 61 and 62 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 highlight the need to identify and assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing in different financial sectors and activities;

G. whereas Gibraltar is listed as a non-cooperative jurisdiction in some Member States;

1. Objects to the Commission delegated regulation;

2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and to notify it that the delegated regulation cannot enter into force;

3. Considers that the Commission delegated regulation:

(a) positively addresses the risks in the cases of Algeria, Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela;

(b) does not properly take into account the threats to the international financial system in the case of Gibraltar, in accordance with the criteria set out in Directive (EU) 2015/849 and other relevant regulations;

(c) does not take into account the colony’s effective compliance with international standards against money laundering, tax evasion and terrorist financing, in accordance with the relevant provisions of Directive (EU) 2015/849;

(d) does not encourage Gibraltar’s current government to take the necessary measures to protect the integrity of the global financial system and to prevent illicit financial activities, in accordance with the principles and objectives set out in the current legislation;

(e) does not take into account the Spanish negotiating position for the long-term on the decolonisation procedure;

4. Calls on the Commission to submit a new delegated act as soon as possible which does not delete Gibraltar from the table in point I of the Annex to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675;

5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

MIL OSI Europe News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Eligible spending under ReArm Europe – E-001294/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament

The classification of the functions of government (COFOG) is a classification of transactions designed to apply to general government and its subsectors.

In the current version of the COFOG classification, which is used both globally and in Europe, there are 10 divisions, including division 02 Defence.

The classification is centred on primary purpose of government expenditure. Thus, division 02 Defence captures all government expenditure with primary purpose of supporting and developing defence capabilities, but it excludes expenditure and investment that has other primary purposes, like climate change.

The activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence[1] was justified by the exceptional circumstances created by Russia’s aggression of Ukraine and its major impact on Member States’ public finances.

The activation is framed in scope, size, and time to cater for a quick transition to a higher defence spending regime while preserving fiscal sustainability.

Member States should use the financial assistance provided under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation[2] to carry out common procurements. Eligible defence common procurement should relate to the list of priority areas identified by Article 1 of SAFE Regulation.

In addition, Article 16 sets out eligibility conditions applying to contractors, subcontractors and products participating in common procurement supported by SAFE.

Therefore, to be supported under the SAFE instrument, investments also contributing to tackling climate change need to fall into one of the areas identified in Article 1 of SAFE Regulation and be channelled through common procurement, which complies with the eligibility conditions set out in the regulation.
- [1] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a57304ce-1a98-4a2c-aed5-36485884f1a0_en?filename=Communication-on-the-national-escape-clause.pdf.
- [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Threat to the EU from the mafia of Türkiye and the Occupied Territories – E-001699/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Commission takes a comprehensive approach to protect the EU from financial crime. The anti-money laundering (AML/CFT) Directive[1] includes the obligation to identify third countries posing significant money laundering risks.

The AML package adopted in 2024[2] further strengthen these efforts inter alia by establishing mechanisms to better identify and manage risks from third countries.

The Commission engages in depth with candidate countries on topics related to organised crime, corruption and drug trafficking in the context of the negotiations on accession, which offers a direct and operational framework to engage with Türkiye.

Risks stemming from Türkiye and in the non-government controlled areas of the Republic of Cyprus are part of these ongoing discussions with Türkiye.

As a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Commission is fully aware of Türkiye’s compliance levels on AML/CFT, including its efforts to address any concerns through tangible actions, and of the risks associated with the non-government controlled areas as highlighted in the evaluation reports concerning Cyprus.

While FATF removed Türkiye from its ‘grey list’ of countries in June 2024, the Commission agrees that close monitoring of the effectiveness of Türkiye’s AML/CFT framework is essential.

In line with the EU methodology for identifying high risk third countries[3], as regards any candidate country, the Commission may consider mitigating measures included in the accession negotiations that address the identified strategic deficiencies.

[1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/849/oj/eng.

[2] https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/latest-update-anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism-legislative-package-2024-04-24_en.

[3] SWD(2020) 99: https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f745b6e8-735b-4855-b050-f52276356fe6_en?filename=200507-anti-money-laundering-terrorism-financing-action-plan-methodology_en.pdf.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Implementation of the Migration Pact in the context of the Polish Government’s position – E-000547/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation[1] foresees a mandatory but flexible solidarity mechanism, whereby each Member State has full discretion to choose between the available forms of solidarity, namely relocation, financial contributions and alternative measures (in-kind support).

A reference key, based on the size of the population (50% weighting ) and of the gross domestic product of the Member States (50% weighting ), should be applied in accordance with the mandatory fair share principle for the operation of the solidarity mechanism enabling the determination of the overall contribution of each Member State.

The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation also foresees possible deduction of solidarity contributions for Member States facing migratory pressure or a significant migratory situation.

The Asylum and Migration Management Regulation also requires that e ach year, by 15 October, the Commission adopts an implementing decision determining whether a particular Member State is under migratory pressure, at risk of migratory pressure during the upcoming year, or facing a significant migratory situation.

In doing so, the Commission will take into account qualitative and quantitative indicators, in accordance with Articles 9 and 10 of the regulation, including the number of beneficiaries of temporary protection in a given Member State. M ilitary assistance provided to Ukraine is not among the indicators set by the regulation.

[1] Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013; OJ L, 2024/1351, 22.5.2024.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Impact of the Trump administration’s decision to impose tariffs on European goods: impact on the Galician automotive sector – E-001311/2025(ASW)
Source: European Parliament
The Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector recognises the challenges of an increasingly volatile geopolitical context and their potential impact on the EU automotive sector.

Therefore, the Commission has committed on decisive actions to help secure global competitiveness of the EU automotive value chain and maintain a strong European production base.

In line with the Automotive Action Plan, the Commission has proposed already an amendment to the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers Regulation[1], which will extend the support to workers in companies in restructuring processes.

In addition, the mid-term review of the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)[2] will be used to incentivise Member States to reprogramme more money for the automotive sector.

Trade with the United States represents a source of prosperity and well-paying and quality jobs for the EU automotive value chain. The Commission is assessing the impact of the United States tariffs on EU automotive exports and will also monitor the indirect effects.

The Commission will continue to seek a negotiated and constructive solution with the United States, while being ready to protect European interests.

[1] COM(2025) 140.

[2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02021R1057-20241224.
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ21: Controlling expenditure on public works projects

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

Following is a question by the Hon Chan Siu-hung and a written reply by the Secretary for Development, Ms Bernadette Linn, in the Legislative Council today (July 2):

Question:

It is learnt that public works expenditures involving infrastructure, healthcare, education, housing, and so on account for a substantial proportion of government spending. However, there are views pointing out that the model of division of labour in which policy bureaux or government departments, as “users”, only need to specify the requirements and functions during the planning stage of a project, leaving the subsequent processes such as design and construction to be spearheaded by technical departments like the Civil Engineering and Development Department or the Architectural Services Department, is prone to result in user departments lacking awareness of project budget control and losing sight of cost-effectiveness, whereas the technical departments may need to adopt more costly building designs, methods, or materials, among others, in a bid to meet the individual requirements of user departments, hence driving up the cost of works even at the inception stage (i.e. the “upstream stage”) of the project. Therefore, various government departments should shift their mindset towards upholding an “awareness of being property owners” to take the lead in formulating a reasonable budget right at the early stage of project planning and strictly monitor its implementation. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) whether it will consider strengthening various government departments’ awareness of being property owners, with a view to exercising stringent control over the estimates of expenditure at the upstream stage of public works projects; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

(2) of the strategies and specific measures implemented by the Project Strategy and Governance Office under the Development Bureau at various stages (including upstream, midstream and downstream) of public works to reduce project cost; whether an assessment has been conducted on the respective effectiveness of these strategies and measures; and

(3) whether it has drawn on the cost control measures adopted by the Mainland and various places in the world at the upstream stage of public works; if not, of the reasons for that; if so, the details, including whether such measures encompass a concept similar to the awareness of being property owners?

Reply:

President,

The Development Bureau (DEVB) established the Project Cost Management Office in 2016 and upgraded it to become the Project Strategy and Governance Office (PSGO) in April 2019 for formulating and implementing strategic initiatives and enhancing capabilities in cost surveillance and project governance to public works projects. On monitoring project estimates of public works, there is a set of stringent vetting mechanisms in place. While not compromising the functionality, quality and safety of works, the PSGO, as an independent third party, participates in project cost vetting from project inception stage in accordance with the “fitness-for-purpose and no frills” principle, and will follow up on project development and design optimisation and continuously monitor the performance of the projects during construction stage, and implement suitable measures for cost saving.

Our responses to the three parts of the question are as follows:

(1) At different project implementation stages, the works departments have been maintaining communication with the project proponent policy bureaux, providing advice to the project proponent policy bureaux on project planning and design, cost estimation, progress, etc. In addition, senior management of project proponent policy bureaux participated in the project management and leadership development programme under the Centre of Excellence for Major Project Leaders under the DEVB to reinforce and strengthen their understanding of project cost management and ensure that public funds are used properly. To further enhance capabilities in cost surveillance and project governance, the DEVB is working with the Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau to study on optimising the preparatory and conceptual work before project inception, with emphasis on strengthening the review of site selection, usage mix, scale, design, implementation programme, etc, by the project proponent policy bureaux and user departments. This will help the project proponent policy bureaux and user departments to comprehensively evaluate the cost-effectiveness of different implementation proposals with the “ownership” mindset, so as to formulate practical and cost-effective proposals. By planning ahead the overall estimates before project inception, the project cost-effectiveness can be further enhanced. We are currently formulating relevant details and guidelines, with the relevant measures planned to be implemented within this year.

(2) The PSGO vigorously scrutinises cost estimates of public works projects. During the project inception stage, we also examine the technical feasibility statement submitted by the works departments to establish the technical feasibility of the project and review the preliminary cost estimate and cash flow requirements.

During the design stage, we liaise with project proponent policy bureaux and user departments to enhance project cost-effectiveness, reduce cost and minimise risk of cost overrun through design optimisation by means of exploring different design options, construction methods and procurement models. We also carry out benchmarking with costs of other similar projects and make reference to the prevailing market situation, to ensure that the project estimates are reasonable. Furthermore, the Government adopts parallel tendering before submitting funding application of the projects to the Legislative Council so as to accurately reflect the tender prices in the approved project estimate for better financial management of the projects to reduce the risk of cost overrun.

During the construction stage, the DEVB regularly conducts high-level meetings with works departments, complemented with the established Integrated Capital Works Platform, enabling management of different departments to grasp the real-time performance of each project, closely monitor the implementation programme of projects and provide timely intervention so as to mitigate the risks of project cost overrun and delays. At the same time, the PSGO also examines major variations in projects during the construction period and provides independent advice to works departments to ensure the cost-effectiveness of the major variations.

Since its establishment, the PSGO has scrutinised more than 540 capital works projects, and successfully saved about $190 billion (about 16 per cent) in construction cost out of the original estimate of about $1,200 billion proposed by the project proponent policy bureaux.

In addition, the overall cost management performance of the Capital Works Programme has all along been well performed. In the past ten years, there were 575 Category A projects approved by the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council, and so far only 15 projects required budget increase. Besides, in the past ten years, the total expenditure of the 510 Category A projects with their final accounts settled (including expenditure of the additional funding) was about 90 per cent of the total original approved project estimates.

The DEVB has completed the strategic study on relatively high construction costs in Hong Kong. We will progressively launch the relevant cost control measures along the following four directions, which includes (i) optimising the project procurement model, (ii) reviewing the design standards and requirements, (iii) applying advanced technologies and construction methods, and (iv) streamlining the approval process, once they are ready so as to reduce the construction costs.

(3) The Government has been liaising and actively exchanging project management experience with other authorities, including the Mainland, Singapore and the United Kingdom, to enhance the project delivery capabilities and performance. For example, the DEVB signed the Letter of Intent on Strengthening Guangdong-Hong Kong Cooperation in Construction and Related Engineering Sectors with the Department of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of Guangdong Province to deepen the co-operation in construction and engineering sectors between Guangdong and Hong Kong. We also signed a Memorandum of Understanding each with the Centre for Public Project Management of the Ministry of Finance of Singapore and the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, part of the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury of the United Kingdom, in December 2022 and February 2023 respectively. The DEVB also organised the Project Cost Management Forum to allow local and overseas industry leaders to exchange views and share experiences regarding project cost control. Among them, we make reference to the process and experience of implementing projects in the Mainland, as well as their practices for optimising construction programme. In addition, we understand that the Singapore government is involved in the upstream process of project planning to review the scope, design and cost reasonableness of the projects, and enhance the cost-effectiveness of the projects by revising the scope of the projects or optimising the design. We will continue to make reference to the experience of project cost control in different places and formulate comprehensive and systematic measures to manage project costs.

Ends/Wednesday, July 2, 2025
Issued at HKT 19:26

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians – B10-0304/2025

Source: European Parliament

Sergey Lagodinsky, Markéta Gregorová, Ville Niinistö, Jutta Paulus, Mārtiņš Staķis
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

B10‑0304/2025

European Parliament resolution on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war and the continued bombing of civilians

(2025/2710(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia,

– having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas three years ago, on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, in gross violation of the UN Charter and its own international commitments, including the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation; whereas the Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas region and the occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea;

B. whereas since then, Russian forces have continued to carry out and escalate indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure; whereas heavy and intense bombardments, combined with ground fighting, have continued throughout 2025; whereas the UN has confirmed that more than 12 500 civilians, including hundreds of children, have been murdered since February 2022; whereas the actual civilian death toll is estimated to be in the tens of thousands; whereas many more civilians have been injured, tortured, forcibly ‘re-educated’, harassed, raped, kidnapped or forcibly displaced;

C. whereas while their exact numbers are unknown, thousands of Ukrainians, both military personnel and civilians, are likely to be held in captivity currently, in Russia and occupied Ukraine;

D. whereas the vast majority of Ukrainian prisoners, both civilian and military personnel, held by the Russian Federation are deprived of any recognised legal status or procedural safeguards, leaving them without rights, legal representation or the ability to contact their families; whereas in 90 % of cases, relatives do not know whether their loved ones are alive;

E. whereas there is documented evidence of repeated extrajudicial executions of prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians by members of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, as well as other grave violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions and other international humanitarian law instruments;

F. whereas the Russian authorities have launched thousands of politically motivated criminal prosecutions against Ukrainian POWs and civilian detainees, often based on confessions extracted under torture and without credible evidence; whereas these fabricated charges commonly include terrorism, espionage and treason, with the charges of treason frequently following the forced imposition of Russian citizenship in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine;

G. whereas families of Ukrainian detainees face institutional barriers to accessing legal recourse or filing official inquiries, as the Russian state requires the use of domestic digital identification platforms that are not accessible to non-citizens; whereas in some cases, relatives advocating publicly for detainees have seen their loved ones punished with extended sentences or re-arrested on additional charges;

H. whereas the death of Ukrainian journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna in Russian captivity highlights the grave and growing dangers faced by Ukrainian journalists held by Russian forces; whereas others, including Iryna Danylovych, Dmytro Khyliuk and Iryna and Heorhiy Levchenko, remain in detention under life-threatening conditions;

I. whereas the Russian authorities consistently deny POWs access to international organisations in an effort to hide the atrocities taking place, leaving POWs even more vulnerable to violations of international law; whereas the Geneva Conventions guarantee POWs the right to regular correspondence, access to medical care, and visits from international organisations; whereas Russia’s treatment of Ukrainian POWs amounts to war crimes and crimes against humanity;

J. whereas the Russian authorities have detained large numbers of civilians in all temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine; whereas they target, among others, local authorities, civil servants and journalists; whereas the scale at which Russia is conducting these enforced disappearances against civilians is clearly in compliance with a coordinated state policy;

K. whereas in all temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine, Russian-installed proxy paramilitary structures and de facto authorities have played a key role in implementing Russia’s policy of repression and terror against the Ukrainian population by systematically engaging in intimidation, arbitrary detentions, torture and enforced disappearances of civilians under the guise of administrative or security procedures;

L. whereas many victims of enforced disappearances are transferred either to local detention facilities or deported to Russia; whereas various forms of torture are reportedly commonplace in these detention facilities; whereas civilians regularly go missing for months if not years, with some dying in detention; whereas these acts also amount to crimes against humanity;

M. whereas since the occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Russian Federation has systematically targeted Crimean Tatars with politically motivated prosecutions, enforced disappearances, intimidation and harassment; whereas Crimean Tatar leaders, journalists, civil society activists and religious figures have faced disproportionate repression, including under the guise of anti-extremism and antiterrorism charges; whereas these actions amount to violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and aim to erase the identity and presence of the indigenous Crimean Tatar people;

N. whereas cases of punitive psychiatry, including forced institutionalisation, drugging and involuntary treatment of both children and adults, have been documented in at least 42 psychiatric institutions and psycho-neurological boarding schools located in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine; whereas Russian occupying authorities have revived Soviet-style psychiatric abuse as a tool of repression, targeting individuals for their perceived pro-Ukrainian views or their refusal to accept Russian citizenship; whereas such acts represent a serious breach of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;

O. whereas the families are left traumatised as their loved ones are held incommunicado and the Russian authorities, in full violation of international law, refuse to provide information about people’s whereabouts;

P. whereas the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine confirmed, in its latest report of March 2025, that the enforced disappearances committed by the Russian authorities in a widespread and systematic manner against the civilian population, in the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, amount to crimes against humanity; whereas the same body documented countless cases proving that Russia’s use of sexual violence, including rape, as a form of torture is systemic in detention facilities and that this practice is clearly a deliberate policy, thus stressing that the Russian authorities committed the war crimes of rape and sexual violence as a form of torture;

Q. whereas the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, whose Ukraine Conflict Observatory has been documenting Russia’s abduction of Ukrainian children using biometric and satellite data and supported six International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments, has had its funding cut by the Trump administration; whereas the observatory has ceased all its work collecting data crucial for achieving accountability as of 1 July 2025; whereas the observatory’s database contains records on more than 30 000 Ukrainian children allegedly abducted by Russia from over 100 locations;

1. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure;

2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law;

3. Decries Russia’s policy of widespread and systematic use of enforced disappearance, incommunicado detention, torture and other forms of ill treatment against Ukrainian civilian detainees and POWs; demands that Russia notify the Ukrainian Government of the status of all POWs and allow international humanitarian organisations unhindered access; stresses that, under international law, Russia must provide adequate medical care to all Ukrainians in captivity and directly repatriate seriously sick and wounded POWs; urges Russia to release all unlawfully detained civilians without delay;

4. Demands the immediate release of all Ukrainian civilians held in Russian captivity who do not fall under any category for lawful detention under international humanitarian law, with particular attention to women, children and elderly individuals; underlines that their continued detention places them at imminent risk and constitutes a grave violation of the Geneva Conventions;

5. Condemns the ongoing persecution of Crimean Tatars in illegally occupied Crimea, including politically motivated detentions, torture, enforced disappearances and restrictions on freedom of religion, expression and association; calls for the immediate release of all Crimean Tatars imprisoned on political grounds and urges the EU and international organisations to enhance monitoring and advocacy on behalf of the indigenous people of Crimea;

6. Calls for the EU, its Member States and international partners to launch an urgent international campaign aimed at documenting and publicising evidence concerning the imprisonment of Ukrainian minors and elderly civilians in Russian detention, including the use of documented case studies compiled by civil society organisations; stresses the importance of visibility for accountability and rescue operations;

7. Demands immediate and unhindered access for international humanitarian organisations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, to all known and suspected sites where Ukrainian civilians are held, with particular attention to women, children and elderly people;

8. Insists on the immediate release of all Ukrainian journalists held in Russian captivity; calls for the international community to take urgent diplomatic and legal steps to secure their safety and freedom, and to ensure accountability for crimes committed against media professionals in the context of the war;

9. Strongly condemns the use of punitive psychiatry by the Russian occupying authorities in Ukraine, including the forced institutionalisation of civilians, especially children and individuals with pro-Ukrainian views, in psychiatric hospitals under inhumane and degrading conditions; calls for urgent international monitoring of psychiatric institutions in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and the immediate release of all individuals detained on politically motivated psychiatric grounds;

10. Insists that all perpetrators, in particular commanders and others within the Russian occupying forces ordering, soliciting or inducing the commission of crimes under international law, are held accountable in accordance with international standards;

11. Calls for the EU and the broader international community to use all possible judicial and non-judicial accountability mechanisms, including universal jurisdiction, to pressure Russia to immediately cease its campaign of enforced disappearances and torture;

12. Calls for the EU and the Member States to step up support for Ukraine to enable it to address the widespread mental health and psychosocial needs resulting from the armed conflict, by ensuring access to the relevant services for those returning from captivity, allocating resources to those services and enhancing their institutional coordination, legal regulation, monitoring and evaluation;

13. Regrets the decision by the Trump administration to cut the funding of the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab and is concerned about the consequent major gap in accountability efforts; welcomes the transfer of the lab’s data to Europol and calls for the EU and the Member States, in cooperation with like-minded partners, to ensure the continuation of the observatory’s work;

14. Commends the work of the ICC on its ongoing investigation into the situation in Ukraine from 21 November 2013 onwards, encompassing any past and present allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed on any part of the territory of Ukraine by any person; expresses concern about the worsening attacks on the ICC by the United States, and the impact this will have on the ICC’s ability to continue conducting its investigations; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the blocking statute and on the EU Member States to increase their diplomatic efforts in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system;

15. Stresses Europe’s responsibility to curb Russia’s aggression, both in support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and also for the sake of Europe’s own security; calls therefore for the EU and its like-minded partners to increase their efforts to shift the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine and set the conditions for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace; urges the Member States and like-minded partners, therefore, to provide Ukraine with more arms and ammunition to enable Ukraine to liberate its territory and deter further Russian attacks; notes, in this context, that a number of Member States are militarily neutral and urges them to increase their non-military support for Ukraine in line with their constitutions;

16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.

MIL OSI Europe News –

July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Continued and substantial violations of the Prespa Agreement – E-002612/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002612/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Nikolaos Anadiotis (NI)

The recent report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), of 24 June 2025,[1] supports the European path of the country with its capital in Skopje, without any reference to the continued and serious violations of the Prespa Agreement.

The state and political leadership of this country continues ostentatiously and relentlessly – more than 700 instances recorded[2] – to flout the Prespa Agreement in three ways: (a) by systematically using the name ‘Macedonia’ without the intended geographical designation, (b) by maintaining the prominence of the Vergina Sun and (c) by using the term “Macedonian’ in public bodies and organisations, when this is expressly prohibited. These practices constitute not only irregularities but also fundamental violations of the Prespa Agreement, based on Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

In light of the above:

1.Does the Commission acknowledge that these fundamental violations undermine the purpose and object of the Prespa Agreement?

2.Does the Commission intend to ask the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) to include, in its report, its explicit reservations, as well as the above-mentioned violations by the country in question?

3.Does the Commission intend to reconsider its position on the progress of the accession process?

Submitted: 27.6.2025

[1] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20250602IPR28709/european-parliament-backs-north-macedonia-s-eu-path-calls-for-bold-reforms

[2] https://epitropiellinismou.gr/post/3629
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Systemic political repression – Russian hybrid influence undermining democracy in the EU’s Eastern Partnership – E-002502/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-002502/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Krzysztof Brejza (PPE)

On 23 June 2025, a Georgian court sentenced opposition leader Zurab Japaridze to seven months’ imprisonment and imposed a two-year ban on political activity. This follows a concerning trajectory of judicial repression orchestrated by the ruling Georgian Dream party, under the influence of oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. Numerous high-profile opposition leaders – including Mikheil Saakashvili, Nika Melia, Nika Gvaramia and Irakli Okruashvili – are currently imprisoned or facing imminent imprisonment under politically motivated charges.

These developments constitute a systematic dismantling of democratic institutions, in direct violation of Georgia’s obligations under the EU-Georgia Association Agreement, and align with Russian hybrid warfare objectives in the Eastern Partnership region – seeking to erode democratic governance, provoke instability and obstruct Euro-Atlantic integration.

In this context:

1.What immediate and tangible measures will the Commission adopt to secure the release of Mr Japaridze and other political detainees?

2.What specific political, legal or financial instruments will the Commission activate to impose individualised sanctions on Mr Ivanishvili and affiliated enablers of repression?

3.In view of Georgia’s democratic backsliding, when will the Commission initiate a formal review of the Association Agreement, and under what criteria?

Submitted: 23.6.2025
Last updated: 2 July 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
July 3, 2025